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Human Freedom, Christian Righteousness
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OXFORD STUDIES IN HISTORICAL THEOLOGY SERIES EDITOR David C. Steinmetz, Duke University EDITORIAL BOARD Irena Backus, Université de Genève Robert C. Gregg, Stanford University George M. Marsden, University of Notre Dame Wayne A. Meeks, Yale University Heiko A. Oberman, University of Arizona Gerhard Sauter, Rheinische FriedrichWilhelmsUniversität Bonn Susan E. Schreiner, University of Chicago John Van Engen, University of Notre Dame Geoffrey Wainwright, Duke University Robert L. Wilken, University of Virginia PRIMITIVISM, RADICALISM, AND THE LAMB'S WAR The BaptistQuaker Conflict in SeventeenthCentury England T. L. Underwood THE GOSPEL OF JOHN IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY The Johannine Exegesis of Wolfgang Musculus Craig S. Farmer CASSIAN THE MONK Columba Stewart HUMAN FREEDOM, CHRISTIAN RIGHTEOUSNESS Philip Melanchthon's Exegetical Dispute with Erasmus of Rotterdam Timothy J. Wengert
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Human Freedom, Christian Righteousness Philip Melanchthon's Exegetical Dispute with Erasmus of Rotterdam Timothy J. Wengert
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Oxford University Press Oxford New York Athens Auckland Bangkok Bogota Bombay Buenos Aires Calcutta Cape Town Dar es Salaam Delhi Florence Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madras Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi Paris Singapore Taipei Tokyo Toronto Warsaw and associated companies in Berlin Ibadan Copyright © 1998 by Timothy J. Wengert Published by Oxford University Press, Inc. 198 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016 Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic. mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Library of Congress CataloginginPublication Data Wengert, Timothy J. Human freedom, Christian righteousness : Philip Melanchthon's exegetical dispute with Erasmus of Rotterdam / Timothy J. Wengert. p. cm.—(Oxford studies in historical theology) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN O195115295 1. Bible. N. T. Colossians—Criticism, interpretation, etc. History—16th century. 2. Freedom (Theology)—History of doctrines—16th century. 3. Free will and determinism—Religious aspects—Christianity— History of doctrines—16th century. 4. Justification History of doctrines—16th century. 5. Righteousness History of doctrines—16th century. 6. Melanchthon, Philipp, 14971560. 7. Erasmus, Desiderius, d. 1536. 1. Title. II. Series. BS2715.2.W46 1997 233'.7'0922—dc21 9710340 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America on acidfree paper
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CONTENTS vii
Preface
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Abbreviations I Background to the Dispute 1 Philip Melanchthon: Alien to or Ally of Erasmus?
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The Current Debate The Printing History of Philip Melanchthon's Lectures and
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First Commentary on Colossians
14
2 Melanchthon's Relation to Erasmus, 15191524
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II Ground Rules for an Exegetical Debate 3 Text and Tradition
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The Biblical Text
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The Sources
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4 Ratio seu Methodus Melanchthonis
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The Pauline Grammar
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Paulus Rhetor
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Argumentum Magistri Pauli
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Contextus Pauli: The Locus communis
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III The Controversy Over Human Freedom and Christian Righteousness 5 Melanchthon's Controversy with Erasmus as Reflected in Their Correspondence, 15241528
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6 Colossians against Erasmus on the Freedom of the Will
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The Dissertatio on Col. 2:8: Origins of an Argument
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The Scholia of 1527: Undercutting Erasmus's Position
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The Scholia of 1528: Broadening the Attack
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The Translated Scholia of 1529: Revealing the Opponent
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Melanchthon contra Erasmum
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Luther neben Melanchthon
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7 Colossians 2:23 as Melanchthon's "Politics"
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The Text: Colossians 2:23
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The Scholia of 1527: An Exegetical Debate over Romans 13
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The Scholia of 1528: Melanchthon's Christian "Politics"
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IV The Aftermath 8 Melanchthon at Erasmus's Funeral: 15281560
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The Doctrines of the Will's Freedom and Civil Authority
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The Changing Assessment of Erasmus
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After 1536: Not to Speak Ill of the Dead
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The Origins of Melanchthon's "Erasmianism"
156 159
Appendix: The Printing History of the Scholia
Notes
163
Select Bibliography
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Index
227
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PREFACE On 7 April 1537 Philip Melanchthon sent a copy of an epigram he had written to his friend and correspondent in Nuremberg, the preacher Veit Dietrich. 1 He had originally composed it as an inscription for a copy of the third edition of his Scholia on Colossians, which he had given to Matthew Devay. He thought Dietrich would enjoy it, too. Not only did these fourteen simple lines of Latin poetry summarize Melanchthon's approach to Paul's epistle; they also encapsulate his unique place in the intellectual world of the early sixteenth century. Paul sent some austere writings of celebrated things To the little Colossae that the region of the Phrygians contains. I have expounded rather the pleasing things, so that The meaning may be plainer to the ignorant and the reading may be made easier. I do not cover up fallacies with obscure sleights of hand, For it is not proper that the godly play around in this way. For the Church has experienced no other greater plague, Nor have there been any more destructive things, Than insidious contrivances with words and confused sayings— Dogma branded foully and with new pretense. Wherefore I explain the Teaching of Christ without any deceptions, And — so that I may be useful — it is my greatest concern. Here also I have collected things fitting for life and morals. Therefore, I beseech you, do not despise my gift.2
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Wrapping it in humanist poetry, Melanchthon expressed what to him was the central goal of his work in the Reformation: simple exposition of Christ's teaching in "life and morals" for the sake of the ignorant in the church. He contrasted this sharply to the linguistic legerdemain and posturing he found around him. Whether he was thinking of the commentaries of medieval scholastics or of the obscure but pleasant paraphrases of humanist contemporaries makes no difference. His central criteria for judging his own work and others' from any age were its usefulness and clarity. This book examines the interaction of Melanchthon's training in and love of the humanities, so clearly expressed in the form and language of this poem, with his commitment to the central tenets of Wittenberg's evangelical theology, found tucked away in the epigram's veiled references but stated explicitly in the commentary itself. Human Freedom, Christian Righteousness concentrates on a single contribution to the interpretation of Pauline literature, Melanchthon's Scholia on Colossians, and the way he used his commentary to criticize and correct the most famous humanist of the day, Erasmus of Rotterdam. Using a disarmingly simple approach to Scripture, Melanchthon attacked Erasmus's interpretation, method, style, and behavior without so much as mentioning the latter's name. Yet the young university professor accomplished this—without betraying either his commitment to the humanists' arts or his defense of evangelical principles—by maintaining a careful distinction between human freedom and Christian righteousness. Whether we are examining Melanchthon's correspondence with Erasmus and other documents written by them (especially chapters 2, 5, and 8), or their exegetical methods and relation to the church fathers (chapters 3 and 4), or the content of Melanchthon's interpretation of Paul's "austere writings" to the Colossians (chapters 6 and 7), the outcome remains the same. Though his approach was compatible with Luther's more aggressive attack on Erasmus, Melanchthon marked out a unique position among sixteenthcentury thinkers as fully heir to both Renaissance and Reformation. He could stress both the necessity and the benefits of human endeavor and accomplishment in the realm of reason, while at the same time maintaining the centrality of faith and divine activity in the Christian's righteousness before God. Here reasonable, rational argumentsespecially the kind Melanchthon thought he encountered in Erasmus—were silenced by the assertion of God's gracious, undeserved work. Melanchthon was ever humanist and Reformer, even and especially in his most pointed attacks against the reformminded prince of humanists, Erasmus. This work would never have seen the light of day had it not been for the support of a variety of institutions and the encouragement of numerous friends and fellow scholars, whom I wish to acknowledge here. Study of the sources could not have occurred without the support of the Herzog August Bibliothek in Wolfenbüttel and its fine staff, especially Sabine Solf and Gillian Bepler, for four months of study at the library in 1991 and two more months in 1994 and without a grant from the German Academic Exchange Service for study at the MelanchthonForschungsstelle in Heidelberg in 1995. The team of scholars assembled there, especially Richard Wetzel and Walter Thüringer, managed to bear up with amazing grace under my most trivial questions concerning Melanchthon research. Special thanks must be given to my friend and fellow Melanchthon scholar Heinz Scheible, whose assistance and encouragement over the years has been a source of great joy and constant enlightenment.
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Help with various aspects of the research was also given by Stefan Rhein at the Melanchthonhaus, Bretten, and by David Wartluft at the Krauth Memorial Library of the Lutheran Theological Seminary at Philadelphia. That seminary; its dean, James Echols; and its president, Robert Hughes, have with their generous sabbatical policy and genuine advocacy of the spirit of inquiry contributed enormously to this work. Thanks is also owed to Dr. John Reumann of the faculty for help in identifying and translating particularly difficult passages from the Greek classics and to the entire faculty for making it such a pleasure to go to work each day. I also am pleased to acknowledge the assistance of Darren Poley, the seminary's public services librarian, in assembling the index. Several people have read and commented on this manuscript at various stages of its development. To David Steinmetz, who showed me how to divide the "baby" into a far more viable document; to Robert Kolb, whose collaborative spirit I especially prize; and to James Estes, whose reading of the text forced me to make it more readable, I am especially grateful. (Despite their best efforts, however, I have managed to smuggle in and hide all kinds of infelicities and errors, for which I gladly take the blame.) I am also grateful for Erika Rummel and Dale Schrag for their help with the sources. I also wish to acknowledge the support of Cynthia Read and her coworkers at Oxford University Press. Finally, I am pleased to recognize publicly the support of my wife, Barbara Farlow Wengert, and our children, Emily Jane and David Hayworth, who have patiently borne with a husband and father whose head and (sometimes) heart were more firmly fixed in the sixteenth century than in the present and who forced them to spend three summer vacations in Germany, waiting for him to come home from the library. I dedicate this work to my parents: to my father, Norman Irving Wengert, whose own stories of the past first instilled in me the love of history, and to my mother, Janet Mueller Wengert, who first taught me to find comfort in the writings of St. Paul. With Melanchthon I would ask them and other readers: "Hic quoque collegi res vitae et moribus aptas, non igitur munus spernito, quaeso, meum." T.J.W. PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA THE CONVERSION OF ST. PAUL, 1997
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ABBREVIATIONS Erasmus of Rotterdam. Opus Epistolarum Des. Erasmi Roterodami. Edited by P. S. Allen. 12 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 190658.
Ap
Apology of the Augsburg Confession
ARG
Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte
AS
Erasmus of Rotterdam. Ausgewählte Schriften. 8 vols. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 196880.
ASD
Opera omnia Desiderii Erasmi Roterodami. Amsterdam: North Holland, 1969.
Bds.
Bindseil, Heinrich, ed. Philippi Melanchthonis epistolae, iudicia, consilia, testimonia aliorumque ad eum epistolae quae in corpore reformatorum desiderantur. Halle: Gustav Schwetschke, 1874.
Bezzel
Bezzel, Irmgard. ErasmusDrucke des 16. Jahrhunderts in bayerischen Bibliotheken. Stuttgart: Hiersemann, 1979.
BKS
Die Bekenntnisschriften der evangelischlutherischen Kirche. 10h ed. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986.
CA
The Augsburg Confession
CR
Melanchthon, Philip. Corpus Reformatorum. Philippi Melanthonis opera quae supersunt omnia. Edited by Karl Bretschneider and Heinrich Bindseil. 28 vols. Halle: A. Schwetschke & Sons, 183460.
CWE
Erasmus, Desiderius. Collected Works of Erasmus. 11 vols. to date. Toronto: University of Toronto, 1974.
De rhet.
Melanchthon, Philip. De rhetorica libri tres. Leipzig: V. Schumann, 1521.
Erasmus NT
Erasmus'Annotations on the New Testament. Edited by Anne Reeves. 3 vols. Vol. 1: The Gospels. London: Duckworth, 1986. Vol. 2: ActsRomansI and II Corinthians. Vol. 3: Galatians to the Apocalypse. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990, 1993.
HAB
Herzog August Bibliothek
Allen, Ep.
Page xii Hartfelder, Karl. Philipp Melanchthon als Praeceptor Germaniae. Berlin: A. Hofmann, 1889.
Hugh
Hugh of St. Cher. Septima pars huius operis continens postillam domini Hugonis Cardinalis super Epistolas pauli Ad . . . Colossenses. Basel: A. Coburger and J. Amerbach, 1502.
Inst. rhet.
Melanchthon, Philip. Institutiones rhetoricae. Strasbourg: J. Herwagen, 1523.
Jonas BW
Jonas, Justus. Der Briefwechsel des Justus Jonas. Edited by Gustav Kawerau. 2 vols. Halle: O. Hendel, 1884.
Koehn
Koehn, Horst. ''Philip Melanchthons Reden: Verzeichnis der im 16. Jahrhundert erschienenen Drucke." Archiv für Geschichte des Buchwesens 25 (1984): 12771495.
LB
Erasmus of Rotterdam. Opera omnia. 10 vols. Leiden: Peter Vander, 17036.
Lyra
Nicholas of Lyra. Sexta pars biblie cum glosa ordinaria et expositione lyre litterali et morali necnon additionibus ac repliciis. Super Epistolas ad . . . Colossenses. . .. Basel: J. Amerbach, J. Petri and J. Froben, 1502.
MBW
Melanchthon, Philip. Melanchthons Briefwechsel: Kritische und kommentierte Gesamtausgabe. Regesten. Edited by Heinz Scheible. 8 vols. to date. StuttgartBad Cannstatt: FrommannHolzboog, 1977. The numbers refer to the number of the letters. See also T1 and T2.
MLStA
Luther, Martin. Martin Luther: Studienausgabe. 5 vols. to date. Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1979.
MSA
Melanchthon, Philip. Melanchthons Werke in Auswahl. [Studienausgabe] Edited by Robert Stupperich. 7 vols. Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn, 195175.
PG
Patrologiae cursus completus. Series Graece. 161 vols. Paris & Turnhout, 185766.
PL
Patrologiae cursus completus. Series Latina. 221 vols. Paris & Turnhout, 18591963.
Ratio seu methodus
Erasmus of Rotterdam, Ratio seu methodus compendio perveniendi ad veram theologiam (=AS 3:117495).
Roth
George Buchwald, "Stadtschreiber M. Stephan Roth in Zwickau in seiner literarischbuchhändlerischen Bedeutung für die Reformationszeit."Archiv für Geschichte des deutschen Buchhandels 16 (1893): 6246.
Scholia 1528
Melanchthon, Philip. Scholia in Epistolam Pauli ad Colossenses, recognita ab autore. Wittenberg: J. Klug, 1528.
Scholia 1529
Melanchthon, Philip. Die Epistel S. Pauli zun Colossern durch Philip Melanchton ym latein zum andern mal ausgelegt. Translated by Justus Jonas. Wittenberg: Michael Lotter, 1529.
Scholia 1534
Melanchthon, Philip. Scholia in Epistolam Pauli ad Colossenses iterum ab authore recognita. Wittenberg: J. Klug, 1534.
SM
Supplementum Melanchthoniana. 4 vols. Leipzig: Rudolf Haupt, 19101926.
Hartfelder
Page xiii Melanchthons Briefwechsel: Kritische und kommentierte Gesamtausgabe. Texte. Edited by Richard Wetzel. 2 vols. to date. StuttgartBad Cannstatt: FrommannHolzboog, 1991. See also MBW.
Thomas
Thomas Aquinas. Super Epistolas S. Pauli Lectura. 8th ed., rev. 2 vols. (Vol. 21, pts. 1 and 2 of his Opera.) Rome: Marietti, 1986.
VD 16
Verzeichnis der im deutschen Sprachbereich erschienenen Drucke des XVI. Jahrhunderts. 19 vols. to date. Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 1983.
WA
Luther, Martin. Luthers Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe. [Schriften] 65 vols. Weimar: H. Böhlau, 18831993.
WABi
Luther, Martin. Luthers Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe. Bibel. 12 vols. Weimar: H. Böhlau, 190661.
WABr
Luther, Martin. Luthers Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe. Briefwechsel. 18 vols. Weimar: H. Böhlau, 193085.
WATR
Luther, Martin. Luthers Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe. Tischreden. 6 vols. Weimar: H. Böhlau, 191221.
Wengert
Wengert, Timothy J. Philip Melanchthon's "Annotationes in Johannem" in Relation to Its Predecessors and Contemporaries. Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1987.
T1 or T2
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PART I— BACKGROUND TO THE DISPUTE
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1— Philip Melanchthon: Alien to or Ally of Erasmus? A century ago, a debate raged between two preeminent analysts of the sixteenth century over the relation between the Renaissance and Reformation. On the one side, Ernst Troeltsch argued that the two intellectual movements had been incompatible, so much so that the Reformation with its medieval concern for God's control of the world, a Christian secular culture, and a mystical inwardness—stood fundamentally opposed to the hope and promise of the Renaissance's celebration of a rejuvenated antiquity. On the other, Wilhelm Dilthey insisted that the Reformation and Renaissance were essentially compatible expressions of the dissolution of a medieval theological metaphysics into an individualistic subjectivism. 1 One hundred years later, shorn of the German intellectual milieu that spawned the debate, discussion about the relation between Reformation and Renaissance continues on an only somewhat more modest scale. For one thing, scholars such as Paul Oskar Kristeller have helped to refine the definition of "humanist," that important bearer of the Renaissance north of the Alps. From a slightly different perspective, Lewis Spitz traced the positive response of Germany's "third generation" of humanists to the Reformation.2 His student James Kittelson investigated the "transformation" of one such humanist, Wolfgang Capito, into a Reformer.3 He concluded that the Strasbourg Reformer's career "underscores the gulf between northern humanism and the Reformation." The abiding contribution of his humanism resided ''in the arena of action rather than the realm of formal thought."4 From Germany Bernd Moeller entered the lists with an essay entitled "German Humanists and the Beginnings of the Reformation" and investigated the support humanists gave to Luther early in his career. He argued that it was based on a creative misunderstanding of his rejection of scholasticism and his univocal appeal to the authority of Scripture.5 Luther's alienation from humanism, a stock assumption in all these studies, has been contradicted by studies on both sides of the Atlantic.6 The present study approaches this complicated problem from the narrow perspective of a single thinker, Philip Melanchthon, and his most important contribution to biblical studies during the 1520s, his Scholia on Colossians, and how that work
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defined his relation to humanist studies and to that most celebrated humanist of sixteenthcentury northern Europe, Erasmus of Rotterdam. Philip Melanchthon, born Philip Schwartzerdt in the trading town of Bretten in 1497, was at the same time born into the Renaissance, with its preoccupation for humanist studies. His father George, an armorer who had learned his trade in the bustling imperial city of Nuremberg, quickly introduced him to the Renaissance Palatine court in Heidelberg, where George served the elector. After his father's untimely death, he was sent with his brother (also named George) to the Latin school of George Simler, where Philip showed early on his phenomenal capacity for languages, learning Greek and earning praise from no less a Renaissance man than Johannes Reuchlin, a relative by marriage with whose sister Philip and George lived. Reuchlin consummated young Philip's humanist baptism by providing Philip with a hellenized name, melanchthon, "black earth," inscribed into a gift to him of a Greek grammar. After studying in both Heidelberg and Tübingen, where he earned his master of arts degree and where through his early publications he gained the attention of the prince of humanists, Erasmus of Rotterdam, Melanchthon received a call to teach Greek at the upandcoming University of Wittenberg, an institution committed to the humanities and to religious training purged of the dross of scholasticism. His inaugural address there in 1518 fairly dripped with the humanist's ideals for renaissance. His subsequent encounter with Luther and the Reformation's theology, however, makes him an ideal candidate for seeking new insight into the broader question of the relation between Renaissance and Reformation by concentrating on the narrower one of his relation to Erasmus. Thus, this book analyzes the exegetical and theological attack of Philip Melanchthon against Erasmus of Rotterdam as reflected in the younger man's interpretation of Colossians. However, an assessment of how scholars have understood the relation between Philip Melanchthon and Erasmus of Rotterdam must begin with 1 Thess. 2:7 ("But we were gentle among you"). In the process of transmission, this Pauline text was corrupted. Either a nu was added, turning the word "gentle ones" into "infants," or it was dropped, reversing the process. In any event, with the first printed edition of the Greek New Testament in 1516 the discrepancy between the Vulgate and the Greek texts used by Erasmus demanded annotation. 7 In fact, Erasmus himself hesitated for a moment over how to interpret the text (especially since not only Jerome's translation but also Ambrose read "infants'' and not "gentle ones") before finally casting his lot with Theophylact and others for "gentle ones" on the grounds that this reading more clearly fit Paul's meaning and best described the virtues of a bishop and leader of the church.8 To bolster this latter argument, Erasmus produced a lengthy excursus on the virtues of modesty and generosity, using as his chief example the Archbishop of Canterbury, William Warham (c. 14561532), one of Erasmus's benefactors.9 In the Dutch humanist's eyes the prelate's chief virtue was the love of learning and the support of humanists like himself. Erasmus ended this encomium by turning his gaze to other lands. He contrasted the generous support of the arts and letters given in Italy by Leo X and the Medicis and in France by William Briconnet, bishop of Meaux, who supported Faber Stapulensis and Guillaume Cop, to the sorry state of affairs in Germany, where the princes were more prone to things bellicose than
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things bookish ("ad rem bellicam. . . . quam ad rem literariam"). They behaved this way although the land was full of promising scholars. Alongside Jacob Sturm of Strasbourg, Ulrich von Hutten, and certain Swiss scholars (the Amerbach brothers, Vitus and Boniface, and Henry Glareanus), Erasmus named a young man of nineteen, Philip Melanchthon. Moreover, what hope does not that mere youth, scarcely a boy, also hold out—that Philip Melanchthon, who must be respected in both [Greek and Latin] literature as almost equal to the immortal God? What sharpness of [rhetorical] invention? What purity of speech? What capacity to remember profound things? How wellread? How modest and, for the public arena, an absolutely natural cheerfulness? 10
What do these words reveal about the earliest relation between Philip Melanchthon and Erasmus of Rotterdam? If taken out of their context, where they served as part of an attack on Germany's lack of support for good letters within an excursus praising an English archbishop, they could be distorted. If then combined with other excesses of humanist praise from early comments penned by these two men about one another, they could help construct a myth of friendship between these two figures and of the younger man's dependence on his older eulogist. The fact that in 1515 Melanchthon composed a Greek distichon and in 1516 a eulogy in Erasmus's honor would seem to clinch the matter.11 With the backdrop of such a myth, one would be hardpressed to explain Melanchthon's criticism of Erasmus's paraphrase of Romans in 1518 or the fact that formal correspondence between the two did not begin until January 1519 and included some rather testy comments on both sides. Instead, placed in their proper context, it becomes clear that these earliest comments about Melanchthon by Erasmus had more to do with the former's relation to Johannes Reuchlin (conspicuously absent from Erasmus's list in 1 Thessalonians) than anything else, and that the high praise the two heaped upon one another was humanist prose and nothing else. When in a letter to Ambrose Blaurer written in August or September 1514 Melanchthon gushed, "What is Latin is Erasmian," he meant just what he said, no more, no less.12 The Current Debate Misinterpreting this mutual admiration, however, has not singlehandedly distorted modern assessments of the relation between these two men. Other factors, some quite unrelated to the sixteenth century, have combined to skew the discussion. One problem, directly related to these citations, that has plagued the secondary literature for decades is the misconstrual of sixteenthcentury Latin prose and its excesses. Praise never defined agreement in thought; blame was couched in flowery language and can sometimes only be detected by veiled references and by what was left unsaid. For Erasmus, supporters of arts and letters could do no wrong and deserved special attention. Warham supported Erasmus in England; to Leo X Erasmus dedicated his earliest work on the Greek New Testament. The creation of fine Latin prose, what
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ever its content, was itself the goal of writing and worthy of recognition, something both Erasmus and Melanchthon did for each other. In all of this writing, the goal orscopus of a particular piece of writing overshadowed everything else. For example, to interpret properly a declamation praising Erasmus written by Melanchthon, one must inquire after the specific, explicit goal of the document and not confuse mention of Erasmus with any agreement in theology or philosophy or even with a desire to rehabilitate his work. 13 Similarly, Erasmus's paean to Melanchthon in his annotations on 1 Thessalonians was simply an exemplum for other, overarching arguments: that Germany showed little concern for letters (an exception was Archbishop Albrecht of Brandenburg) and that Erasmus's patrons were all the more worthy of praise. An even more difficult obstacle to obtaining a balanced assessment of the relation between Erasmus and Melanchthon arises from an inability among researchers to define humanism apart from Erasmus's own peculiar theological and philosophical platform. This bugbear has haunted recent scholarship. On one side, some simply equate humanism with Erasmus's own position, contrasting it to Martin Luther's reformational theology. Ernst Wolf spoke for many of his generation when he wrote that Luther's statements in De servo arbitrio proclaimed "his unequivocal 'No!' to the humanistic understanding of God, the human race and the Holy Scriptures."14 Contrariwise, Melanchthon tried to blend the two sides into an "evangelical humanism" that Wolf claims formed the beachhead for a later rationalischidealistische infiltration into the genuine reformatorisch.15The use of such charged terms, reminiscent of neoorthodox polemic against a perceived rationalistic liberalism, obscures the events Wolf is trying to analyze. At the same time Ekkehard Mühlenberg had pressed home a similar point, arguing that while the young Melanchthon had broken away from a humanistic anthropology to Reformation principles, the old Melanchthon attempted a synthesis of these two positions.16 Five years later Hans Martin Müller also insisted that the alliance between humanism and reformation collapsed over the issue of the bound will.17 These scholars owe a great debt to Wilhelm Maurer, one of the most important contributors to Melanchthon studies, whose twovolume work neatly divided Melanchthon into "humanist" and "theologian."18 In a section entitled ''Melanchthon's Position between Erasmus and Luther," Maurer argues that Melanchthon could not have foreseen the great differences between "a humanistic theology of reform" and "Luther's reformational theology."19 As they slowly became clear to him, Melanchthon stood before "the first religious decision of his life," which he made during his first years in Wittenberg. Although Maurer claims that Melanchthon did not play the role of mediator between Erasmus and Luther in this early period, he insists—in language worthy of von Ranke—that Melanchthon "was swept up by the powerful movement of the time that put the two heroes inexorably on a collision course."20 In the first instance Melanchthon lurched fully to Luther's side. Later, from 1522 (when, according to Maurer, he was Luther's representative in Wittenberg during the latter's stay in the Wartburg) until 1525, he underwent a crisis of vocation and, under the scorching polemic of Luther's De servo arbitrio, came back to a mediating position between his two "heroes."21 In the end Maurer talks of"Melanchthon's renewed turn toward Christian humanism" and even construes Luther's appeal to establish schools as part of Luther's grudging acceptance of "Christian humanism of the Melanchthonian type."22
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On the other side, scholars who also assume a basic contrast between humanism and reformation begin with a much more positive evaluation of humanism and have argued that Melanchthon simply blended it into the Reformation throughout his career. Bernd Moeller describes what he calls Melanchthon's "educational optimism," which rested on an understanding of truth borrowed from humanism. His actual life's work was the synthesis of such humanism and reformation. 23 In a work more specifically on the relation between Melanchthon and Erasmus, Robert Stupperich describes how Melanchthon could in later years praise Erasmus not just as peacemaker and humanist but as theologian.24 He proceeds to demonstrate that precisely those incidents Maurer construed as Melanchthon's rejection of Erasmus (the earliest letter of 1519, Melanchthon's criticism of the paraphrase of Romans, the Loci communes of 1521) evince no such thing and that even Erasmus's comments in De libero arbitrio and elsewhere represent no clear break with Melanchthon, at worst reflecting Erasmus's "injured pride."25 Like Maurer, however, Stupperich also insists that Melanchthon's encounter with the enthusiasts in the Wittenberg Unrest of 1522 and in the Peasants' War of 1525, as well as the fights with the Swiss and his own work as a visitor in 1527, brought him even closer to Erasmus's position. Throughout his article Stupperich describes Erasmus as the master or teacher and Melanchthon as the ''student of Erasmus."26 The most sophisticated proponent of this group is Siegfried Wiedenhofer, whose twovolume work matches in length Maurer's earlier tomes.27 Wiedenhofer realizes the problem of using Erasmus alone to define Christian humanism, so he includes the work of Willibald Pirckheimer and the young Melanchthon himself to define humanism's basic approach to revelation and tradition and, hence, to the formal structures of their theology. He correctly notes that "what can be said from a biographical perspective is this: a break between a humanistic and a reformational phase in Melanchthon's selfunderstanding is not ascertainable."28 Nevertheless, he detects in Melanchthon's thought a certain transition from Erasmus to Luther. This study will construe the texts Wiedenhofer has assembled to prove that Melanchthon viewed Erasmus as a leader in the renewal of theology in a quite different light, in part because Wiedenhofer overlooks the fact that almost without exception praise for Erasmus arose from the older man's abilities as a grammarian and linguist, not from his theological prowess. Wiedenhofer rejects past attempts to construct a break between Erasmus's humanistic theology and Melanchthon's Reformation principles, which in his opinion earlier scholars had based on the latter's distinction between theology and philosophy, ethics and grace, or tradition and Scripture. He blames the division between evangelicals and reformminded Roman Catholics on Wittenberg's sharp confrontation with late scholastic theology over anthropology and soteriology and a concomitant "polarization effect," which turned humanism into a "transitional stage" between two scholastic epochs. The Reformers abandoned late medieval scholasticism for a theological method in which they combined an orientation toward language and history with Aristotelianism.29 While both approaches to Melanchthon's relation with humanism have contributed to an understanding of Melanchthon's theology, they have also labored under a false assumption about the nature of humanism. The pioneering work of Paul Oskar Kristeller on humanism has largely gone unheeded.30 Kristeller defines the humanist (the word "humanism" first appeared in the nineteenth century) as one interested
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in languages, rhetoric, history, poetics, and moral philosophy who often taught on the fringes of the European university arts faculties and in the newly emerging Latin schools of the empire. Such scholars were concerned for good letters (bonae litterae) and rallied to the cry ad fontes, "to the sources." Under such a definition not only Melanchthon and Erasmus but even Martin Luther qualify as humanists or, at least in the case of Luther, friends of humanists. 31 North of the Alps humanists spread quickly into the universities and courts in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Johannes Reuchlin, Philip Melanchthon's distant relative by marriage, was humanist and counselor at the Wiirttemberg court. Melanchthon himself learned Greek at the Latin school in Pforzheim, found easy acceptance in a humanist sodality at the University of Heidelberg, and was most at home among his humanistminded comrades at the University of Tiibingen, especially the future reformer John Oecolampadius. Scholars as different as the Roman court theologian John Cochlaeus and the Anabaptist Conrad Grebel had drunk deeply from humanists' sources. None of the firstgeneration Reformers—one thinks especially of Martin Bucer in Strasbourg, John Brenz in Schwäbisch Hall, Oecolampadius, or Martin Luther himself—were immune from the influences of this movement, so they may all be considered both humanists and Reformers. This also means that Erasmus, as the prince of humanists, played a critical role in the intellectual development of all these figures—only rarely as theologian and philosopher, but always as linguist and rhetorician: that is, as humanist.32 Thus, many of these scholars could praise Erasmus's philology and blame his philosophy in almost the same breath. The notion that holding such common interests meant ipso facto that humanists held a common theology has consistently distorted the view of Melanchthon's relation to Erasmus. Throughout their lives these two men recognized one another as humanists and alternately praised or criticized each other on these grounds Melanchthon's earliest utterance about Erasmus, cited earlier, reflected his admiration of the older man's style, and Erasmus's encomium in the annotations to his Novum Instrumentum of 1516 focused on precisely the same issue.33 Even when Melanchthon praised Erasmus on theological grounds, as in De rhetorica libri tres, the postscript to Luther's 1519 Galatians commentary, or the preface to Luther's Operationes in Psalmos, he most often underscored Erasmus's contribution as grammarian and linguist.34 In fact, this estimate of Erasmus echoed throughout Melanchthon's later comments as well. Even if humanism is separated from the question of Melanchthon's relation to Erasmus, another, more difficult issue persists: how to investigate the relation of Erasmus to Melanchthon. Here the methods often employed by scholars have actually restricted their answers. Wiedenhofer, for example, carefully constructs "humanist theology" on the basis of the work of Erasmus, Pirckheimer, and the young Melanchthon. But what does this mean? Is this a historical phenomenon or merely the projection of twentiethcentury ecumenical interests into the sixteenth? Is their convergence real or imagined? How should a scholar assess contributions of other voices in Melanchthon's theological development, especially what he may have learned from theologians at Heidelberg and Tiibingen or directly from Rudolf Agricola or even Martin Luther? How does one reconstruct Erasmus's theology, given
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the wide variety of sources one could use? Wiedenhofer's approach represents an important exercise in comparative theology, an exercise that assumes one can argue for convergence and influence if two thinkers share the same general beliefs. 35 This work will focus instead on the interaction between these two thinkers, and how they perceived one another's theology, from Melanchthon's perspective. In this it follows a trail blazed by Heinz Scheible, whose brief article on the subject analyzes many of Melanchthon's most important utterances concerning Erasmus.36 He points out the connection between Erasmus's earliest praise of Melanchthon and the latter's edition of Terence.37 He takes seriously the tension in the earliest correspondence between the two. Unlike Stupperich, who simply dismisses the "Elogion de Luthero et Erasmo" as inauthentic because its sharp criticisms of Erasmus contradict his view of Erasmus and Melanchthon's compatibility, Scheible recognizes that the distinction made there between Erasmus the philosopher and Luther the theologian was basic to Melanchthon's developing theology.38 Contrary to Wiedenhofer's claims, Scheible understands the fundamentally moralistic nature of Erasmus's use of loci communes and the profound shift in their function for Melanchthon's thought. Scheible also refrains from reading Erasmus's moral philosophy into Melanchthon's comments that theology ought to support an emendatio vitae, since for the Reformer that phrase corresponded to the consolation of consciences offered in the gospel.39 Even Scheible's account of the free will controversy, grounded as it is in an analysis of the texts, rejects the notion that Melanchthon accepted Erasmus's theology. This book, building upon Scheible's suggestive introduction to the problem, seeks to reframe the relationship between these two humanists using Philip Melanchthon's chief exegetical work of the 1520s, the Scholia on Colossians, in order to pinpoint the nature of their exegetical and theological similarities and differences. What will emerge is Philip Melanchthon's systematic but largely unnoticed opposition to Erasmus of Rotterdam: opposition that may even have helped push the older man to excise any reference to the younger in the final edition of his annotations on the New Testament from 1535. The praise of Archbishop Warham remained, but mention of humanists in Italy, France, or Germany was expunged—the single largest omission from the last edition's comments on the Pauline corpus. Theirs was a struggle fought not over Melanchthon's supposed rejection of humanism but over the actual philological, philosophical, and theological decisions Erasmus made concerning the meaning of the New Testament texts and evangelical doctrine. Melanchthon drew the line not against humanism but in favor of humanism against any abuses. Thus the battle lines were drawn over the meaning of the biblical text, the use of the church fathers, and the function of philosophical questions in theological debates. In this confrontation Melanchthon martialed evidence from a variety of positions to oppose the older scholar. Melanchthon's opposition has largely gone unnoticed because he never mentioned Erasmus by name in the Scholia, even at the points where he attacked Erasmus's exegesis and theology most directly. In this, as in other aspects of the encounter with Erasmus, Melanchthon was following the rules of humanists' debate—so much so that he even criticized Erasmus for breaking these very rules in the dispute with Luther over the free will. The central document for this analysis will be Melanchthon's Scholia on Colossians, first published in 1527 and revised in 1528 and 1534. Just as the history of
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a single medieval university furnished another researcher with an intriguing new "observation tower" from which to view late medieval theology and the Reformation, so the present work employs biblical commentaries to provide a Schauinsland upon this important historical relationship. 40 For the most part intellectual historians have yet to exploit fully commentaries as a source of information on the Reformation and its theology.41 Even those who have used biblical commentaries have tended either to treat them like theological sourcebooks to be gleaned for the sake of a particular doctrinal debate or to focus on the exegetical debates so exclusively as to ignore the broader historical context out of which they arose.42 To be sure, commentaries reflect broader theological and historical issues; they also possess an internal integrity as exegesis. Few scholars have succeeded in bringing these two poles into a single focus.43 This work surveys the debate over free will from the tower of a single exegete's works on a single book of the Bible: Philip Melanchthon's commentaries on Paul's letter to the Colossians. While the importance of this particular exegete for the Reformation goes without saying, the book of the Bible may come as a surprise. Melanchthon lectured on this book at least three times and produced two separate commentaries on it, the first of which appeared in three separate and very different editions. In Melanchthon's exegesis Colossians played a role different from Romans, upon which he also commented on numerous occasions.44 Whereas Romans represented for him Paul's clearest comments on the theological topic of justification and the related areas of sin, grace, law, and gospel, Colossians dealt in more general terms with the gospel, its opponents, and Christian mores. Colossians allowed Melanchthon to investigate in greater detail topics not otherwise touched upon in Romans, especially the issue of Christian freedom. While Luther had staked out Galatians for his lectures, Melanchthon took responsibility for Romans and Colossians in Wittenberg's classrooms. As interesting a topic as it may be, this is no more a book on Melanchthon's interpretation of Colossians than Oberman's was simply another volume under the genre of histories of universities. To concentrate solely on this book of the Bible and its interpretation by Melanchthon, his predecessors, and his contemporaries would be, continuing the metaphor, to study the tower rather than to use it in observing the surrounding territory. As important as the patristic, medieval, and renaissance interpretations of the Pauline corpus were to Melanchthon per se, their exegesis did not in and of itself provide the centerpoint of his own work. Instead, it set the interpretive boundaries and provided both useful background information and illuminating insights for Melanchthon's own chief concerns, namely, employing the text within his own religious and social environment, answering the burning theological issues of his own day, and waging war on what appeared to him as perversions of the gospel. If anything, their exegesis provided ammunition in his struggle with Erasmus. But how well can commentaries function as observation platforms to the religious disputes of the day? For some exegetes, the answer must be: not always very well. One may catch glimmers of exegetical debates that figured in theological conflicts, but they are sometimes obscured or even suppressed in the interest of interpretation itself. Opponents, living or dead, are reduced to anonymous quidam. Arguments are often so truncated that it can be difficult to determine whether the debate
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is with Paul, some church father, or the friar down the street. Even the mind of the exegete can seem ambiguous, since it is hardly ever clear to what degree convention, tradition, or the text itself has determined the interpreter's agenda. In the sixteenth century the taciturnity of a Calvin contrasted sharply with the ebullient, homiletical style of Luther, who was only too eager to engage his opponents in the lecture hall. Melanchthon, too, provided the careful reader with remarkable insights into the context of his exegesis, but for different reasons. On the one hand, he edited his own work. Hence, a comparison of his commentaries with each other shows precisely where he made corrections and alterations in his interpretation. When such changes took place inside a single year, from 1527 to 1528 in the case of Colossians, and involved adding 50 percent to the volume of the original commentary, opportunities for analysis of the commentator and his reactions to the surroundings abound. On the other hand, Melanchthon's method itself invited engagement with the theological controversies of his day. Because he conceived biblical texts as specific instances of more general loci communes (common places), the individual verse of Scripture encouraged him to make lengthy digressions on a variety of topics— digressions bound to include rejections of other interpretations current in Melanchthon's day. 45 Thus, his exegesis does not simply offer a window onto the exegetical controversies connected to theological disputes. Instead, Melanchthon included the theological disputes themselves and ranged broadly to discuss scriptural and traditional sources. To Melanchthon these were hardly digressions but, rather, encounters with the appropriate commonplace in which the text itself was embedded and to which it pointed. Changes in Melanchthon's interpretation, then, occurred not merely in his understanding of a text but in his understanding of a text's locus communis. Melanchthon's method was especially tailored to engage both the text of Scripture and the exegete's own context. Although in his earlier exegetical writing he may not have fully appreciated the possibilities this newly developed method gave him, by the time he lectured on Colossians in 1526 he had started to tap them. Thus, his method centered on both text and context. He was confident that his grammatical and rhetorical skills, honed by over a decade of work with bonae litterae, could determine the simple meaning of the text. At the same time, the loci method (that is, the process of placing an individual text within its proper theological topic) gave him leave to address his own theological context. Each text suggested to him a web of interconnected theological arguments that would counter the mistaken use of reason by his opponents and bring the reader to the clarity of Scripture so important to him as humanist and reformer. This work uses the Scholia on Colossians to uncover the contours of Melanchthon's opposition to Erasmus of Rotterdam.46 The exegetical and theological battles with Erasmus took place on several levels. The first part of this monograph furnishes necessary background information. The remaining portion of this first chapter provides a brief review of the printing history of Melanchthon's lectures and first commentary on Colossians. A second chapter in part I will examine the early relation between Melanchthon and Erasmus, particularly as reflected in their correspondence. Part II will consider Melanchthon's exegetical engagement with Erasmus. This took place on three fronts. Chapter 3 both depicts how Melanchthon charted an oppos
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ing course for the meaning of the text of Scripture and describes how Melanchthon attacked Erasmus's use and understanding of the church fathers, all the while defining his own evangelical 47 approach to them. The fourth chapter discusses certain unique characteristics of Melanchthon's exegetical method, which he employed to develop an entirely different approach to the book of Colossians from that of Erasmus. Part III examines Melanchthon's participation in the controversy over the freedom of the will and his understanding of the righteousness of God. Chapter 5 investigates the controversy in the light of Melanchthon and Erasmus's personal correspondence from this time, contrasting this information to interpretations current in the secondary literature. Chapter 6 looks at the refutation of Erasmus's arguments in the Scholia and the construction of Melanchthon's own highly nuanced and astoundingly influential position on the will's bondage and freedom. Chapter 7 examines a topic close to the fundamental difference between Erasmus and Melanchthon: their concepts of a Christian "Politics." A concluding chapter in part IV will cast a glance at some of Melanchthon's later comments about Erasmus to see whether and how the wound of these earlier skirmishes healed. The Printing History of Philip Melanchthon's Lectures and First Commentary on Colossians From 1526 through 1527 Philip Melanchthon's duties in the theological faculty of the University of Wittenberg included lecturing on Paul's letter to the Colossians.48 These lectures led to the production of one of Melanchthon's most important theological works during the period between the publication of the first and second editions of his Loci communes (152135), namely the Scholia in Epistolam Pauli ad Colossenses.49 As such, the Scholia in its various editions provides an important window on the development of the theology and exegesis of this important theologian. Although the first edition of the Scholia and a socalled excerpt were published in this century,50 little attention has been paid to this book, despite the fact that it was the first of Melanchthon's biblical commentaries that he himself published.51 Of those who have paid any attention to it, most have used it as a means to other dogmatichistorical ends. Thus, for example, HansGeorg Geyer compares an edition of 1527 to one of 1545 as a way of describing the shifts in Melanchthon's theology as he distanced himself from Luther and developed his own approach to the law and poenitentia.52 Since the appearance of the Scholia from 1527 in the study edition of Melanchthon's works, most other researchers have come to rely on that edition exclusively.53 Such an approach only tends to turn complicated exegetical events of the sixteenth century into a disembodied "source" of the twentieth. As I have argued elsewhere, when historians examine commentaries within the living context of lecture hall and print shop, they open a rich window onto the ideas and events of the past.54 Thus, an overview of the history of the Scholia is provided as a necessary preliminary to analyzing the exegetical and theological battles that raged within its covers. Only after unlocking the complicated history of its printings can the historian gain access to the formative theological debates swirling around Melanchthon's exegesis in the late 1520s. These sources reveal a combative, inde
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pendent Melanchthon whose contributions to the defense of Wittenberg's theology rivaled that of any of his colleagues. Here Melanchthon provided refined arguments on the burning issues of the day: free will, law, the two kinds of righteousness (human and divine), education, penance. Here Melanchthon disputed positions held by such important contemporaries as Thomas Müntzer, Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam, and John Agricola of Eisleben. Melanchthon's Dissertatio The first printing of Melanchthon's lectures on Colossians was not, as most scholars have assumed, the commentary of 1527. 55 In fact, the first printing was a small excerpt, most likely published without Melanchthon's permission, that contained the first salvo in Melanchthon's skirmish with Erasmus over the freedom of the will, in which Melanchthon's weapons included Col. 2:8. Modern scholars, who are well aware of this printing, have generally assumed that this booklet consisted of an excerpt from the 1527 Scholia. A comparison of the two texts demonstrates instead that the Dissertatio, as it was called, preceded the Scholia and probably came directly from the lecture halls of Wittenberg. The Dissertatio exists in two forms: a Latin original and a German translation. The Latin original ("A") was produced, as the unadorned title page itself stated, by Adam Petri in August 1527. The printer placed the same date in the colophon of this short work of sixteen pages. The German translation, published in this century by Robert Stupperich, also came out in 1527, printed by George Rhau in Wittenberg.56 The date of the Latin original alone ought to give pause, since the Scholia of 1527 ("B,"), while bearing the month August on the cover, contains the month September in the colophon. If the Dissertatio was an excerpt, what possible reason would there have been for a printer to leave out nearly onethird of the comments printed in the Scholia, especially since two of the eight leaves used for the printing were, for all intents and purposes, blank? This disparity can only mean that the Dissertatio represented an earlier stage of the text, perhaps taken from Melanchthon's lectures themselves. The Scholia's prefatory letter to Alexander Drachstadt of Eisleben revealed that others were again threatening to publish his lectures without his approval.57 Perhaps this is one example of such unauthorized publication. The variations between the Dissertatio and the Scholia point univocally to the independence of the two sources and to the priority of the former.58 Of these, the most important was the addition of three words not found in the Scholia of 1527: "Philosophy is the teaching of the corporal life, as you see that medicine serves health, the distinction of storms navigation, civic virtue the common tranquility of human beings."59 The absence of these words in the Scholia was noticed by no one, not even by Melanchthon in his subsequent revisions of 1528 and 1534. Originally they provided an accurate balance to the threefold parallel which Melanchthon developed in the very next paragraph. The Dissertatio read, So, to observe a diet from the prescription of a doctor, likewise to observe distinctions in storms, do not justify. Similarly, civic virtues—such as not bearing arms
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where laws prohibit it or wearing clothes in accord with the laws—God demands. Nevertheless, that does not justify in God's sight.
It is highly unlikely that a printer would have provided a balanced parallelism in an unimportant section while at the same time omitting references to the usefulness of geometry and arithmetic. Rather, it is Melanchthon who, intent on adding other, more important arts, omitted the first reference to sailing as he edited his lectures for the first edition of the Scholia. Perhaps one could argue that Setzer himself omitted the words in question. After all, in a letter to John Agricola, Melanchthon complains about the poor job Setzer did in printing the Scholia.61 But that does not explain how Petri could have omitted references to geometry and arithmetic and inserted a reference to sailing. Instead, the most probable explanation is that the Dissertatio provides an earlier version of Melanchthon's comments on Col. 2:8. That this particular excerpt was printed on Erasmus's own home turf underscores the importance of its topic for these two thinkers. Its appearance may even have come at the initiative of someone like Luther, Jonas, or perhaps even Melanchthon himself. The title of this text, Dissertatio, may also point to its origins within the lecture halls of Wittenberg. When they are construed as "original" comments of Melanchthon in the classroom, a comparison of the Dissertatio with the Scholia provides additional insight into the development of Melanchthon's thought on this topic and his position in the debate over the freedom of the will. The Scholia of 1527 The Latin Edition of John Setzer The most widely known version of the Scholia in the last half of this century has been that of 1527, although it saw few printings in the sixteenth century and was not well received by its author, who must have set about almost at once making corrections and additions for a second edition. The circumstances surrounding this printing may be found in Melanchthon's correspondence from this time. Johannes Setzer, the printer of Haguenau and onetime student at Wittenberg, had once again shown up in Wittenberg to collect manuscripts from the Reformers to bolster work at his presses.62 According to the editor ofMBW,63 Setzer set out from Wittenberg on or about 12 May, which means that Melanchthon must have finished the Scholia's prefatory letter to Alexander Drachstadt by that time. This also implied that the lectures and their revisions went with Setzer at about the same time. As I mentioned earlier, the printing itself was completed around 1 September 1527. Melanchthon had seen a copy but had not received any of his own by around 2 October, when he wrote to Agricola expressing his dissatisfaction with Setzer's work.64 Without Melanchthon's authorization, a wooden, wordforword translation of the Latin into German was made for the Marburg printer John Loersfeldt and was published in the same year (our "b"). This unsuccessful attempt at rendering Melanchthon's polished Latin into the language of the people resulted in a much different translation a little more than one year later.
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The content of this commentary will be examined in more detail later. However, the importance of this publication in 1527 should not be underestimated. For one thing, despite echoes of the lecture hall in the prose, it represents Melanchthon's first attempt to produce a commentary himself. For another, the text of Colossians provided him with an opportunity to expound on important theological topics not covered in the Loci of 1522. Thus, in addition to a now expanded dissertation on the role and limits of philosophy, reason, and free will based on Col. 2:8, there were lengthy comments on human and divine righteousness (Melanchthon's version of Luther's socalled doctrine of the two kingdoms) in connection with the Peasants' War and the limits of civil obedience, as well as a brief analysis of the catalog of Christian virtues. 65 Before the twentieth century, this text was reprinted only once, in a rather peculiar collection of Melanchthon's works published by John Herwagen in 1541. There it rests alongside much of Melanchthon's early exegetica. Melanchthon did not even see fit to mention it in his preface to that collection. The German Translation of John Loersfelt In a letter of George Rörer sent from Wittenberg to Stephan Roth in Zwickau and dated 6 October 1527, Rörer noted that "Joseph [Klug] desires Philip's commentary on Colossians be translated from Latin into German, and he asks that I do it."66 Klug's wish was never fulfilled, partly because he soon received permission to print a new edition of the commentary in Latin and partly because John Loersfelt in Marburg beat him to the punch. The result was a wooden, wordfor word translation of Setzer's edition, down to the marginal notations. Copies of the octavo edition that have survived indicate that the book was poorly printed and hard to handle. As a result, it is not hard to understand Justus Jonas's comments in the second German translation of the work, when he wrote, "Had I translated this interpretation of the Epistle to the Colossians word for word, it would have become obscure and unintelligible, although it had been written in Latin most purely and well, with complete lucidity."67 Jonas's own work was intended to surpass any earlier attempts. The facts that the title made clear that this was a translation of the second Latin edition and that it contained a "lovely preface" by Martin Luther also indicate the lengths to which Jonas and Michael Lotter, the printer, were willing to go to differentiate their work from Loersfelt's translation. The Scholia of 1528 The Latin Edition of Joseph Klug Melanchthon's dissatisfaction with Setzer's work expressed itself in more than letters. He soon set about the business of producing a corrected and expanded edition ("C"). George Rörer wrote to Roth on 6 September 1528, "The Epistle to the Colossians interpreted by our own Philip has been recalled to the presses and will go out into the light for future markets in an expanded form."68 A little more than one month later he
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wrote, "Here is a list of the books I am now sending to you. . . one copy of the explanations of P[hilip] Melan[chthon] in the epistle to the Colossians, fourteen sheets." 69
But Rörer offered even an earlier indication of the printing of this edition. Buchwald mistakenly dates letter 240 "19 August 1529," when in fact it should be dated 1528.70 Here Rörer mentioned not only that the book was to be reprinted but also how Melanchthon had changed it. "Philip has recalled to the presses the [commentary on the] epistle of Paul to the Colossians; he has reexamined the annotations on the Epistle earlier published by him, expanded some things and condensed others."71 At nearly the same time, Melanchthon himself began to refer to the new edition. In a letter to John Koch in Wittenberg, dated 2 November 1528, he asked that Koch send the two copies of the Colossians commentary that he had just ordered to the bindery. He also complained about Setzer's work on both his Colossians commentary and his book on dialectic from the previous year. "For it [the Dialectics] has not been printed any more carefully by Setzer than was Colossians the previous year. Setzer foolishly abused my patience, and he will have seen that up until now I have been able to tolerate so much negligence."72 This new edition was an immediate success. Klug printed it twice in 1528, slightly improving the pagination and including the date in the second run. Setzer changed the title and nothing else in his own publication of the following year. Setzer's follower in Haguenau, Valentin Kobian, published it again in August 1534 (to compete with the new edition from Wittenberg?), and Peter Frentz and Peter Brubach collaborated to produce another printing in 1545. Melanchthon was clearly pleased with this edition, so much so that he saw it as a handy summary of his theology. Thus, a year after its printing he wrote to Theobald Billicanus, "What I think concerning other topics (loci) of Christian teaching I have revealed in the latest edition of the commentary on Colossians, from which judgment concerning me can completely be made. I do not flee the judgment of the church."73 This was clearly a much more positive assessment than Melanchthon was prepared to make about the first edition a little more than two years before. The German Translation of Justus Jonas, 1529 George Rörer's wish for a German translation of the Scholia came true in 1529, but not with his name on the title page. Instead, Justus Jonas devoted his skill to the task and produced, given his approach, as much a new edition as a new translation. Unfortunately, next to nothing is known about the production of this commentary ("c") from external sources. The afterword of Jonas, referred to earlier, gives some sense of his approach to translation. Although he was not nearly as free in his work as John Agricola was in his 1527 translation of Melanchthon's annotations on Romans and 1 and 2 Corinthians, Jonas nevertheless made it clear that the succinct Latin style for which Melanchthon was so famous needed expansion in the German language. Jonas wrote, "For it often happens that the correct meaning of one Latin word can scarcely be translated with four or five German words. Even then, more is contained in the Latin than is rendered with the German."74
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Jonas stressed two other things to alert the reader that his translation of the Scholia avoided two dangers that Agricola's translation of Melanchthon's other exegetica did not. On the one hand, Jonas emphasized that Melanchthon had approved this translation, especially on the very text where, as will become clear, the changes sharpened the attack against Erasmus. Therefore [given that wordforword translations are not very clear], because I showed this to Mr. Philip Melanchthon, my dear master and friend, especially at the place that discusses Philosophy, he ordered me and gave me free hand to add some words to it, so that in some places it could be all the clearer and would have so much better German style. 75
On the other hand, Jonas also delineated clearly the limits of translation. Thus, he wrote that he followed Melanchthon's orders, ''but sparingly and with nothing other than the meaning and intent of the Latin words."76 Years later, Melanchthon had reason to complain about a translation of another of his works by Jonas, but in the case of the Scholia the sources are silent as to whether in Melanchthon's eyes Jonas had succeeded in translating this text well, as the afterword boasted.77 Of course, the other important addition to this German translation of the Scholia was a preface by Martin Luther. Because this material will be examined more fully later, here only Luther's comments about the book's purpose need explanation. For one thing, unlike in his prefaces to past exegetical books by Melanchthon, Luther called this book "guidelines and instruction," not just a scaffold or outline to the Scripture. He insisted that in it was comprehended "in a very fine, brief fashion, and yet clearly and amply, what the Christian life and teaching is." Thus, a commentary in Wittenberg was by 1527 no longer simply a way of getting into the Scriptures; it now offered the reader a broader sampling of Christian teaching. Luther went on to call it a "Christian treasure," suggesting that Christians carry it close to their hearts and use it daily. Nevertheless, this commentary was at the same time not divorced from the Scriptures, so that at the end of his preface Luther concluded, Still, God willing, this little book will fare well, since it will find honor and praise, admiration and thanks, for "a good word finds a good home," and God's Word does not go forth in vain; it also does not return void [Isa. 55:11]. . . . This little book is to be recommended to the still, upright hearts. They shall have in here their paradise and shall find here announced and presented their dear Lord Christ as the true tree of life [Gen. 23].78
This translation closed a most important part of the history of Melanchthon's lectures on Colossians. Its appearance in 1529 marked the eighth separate printing of the commentary or portions thereof within less than three years. What started as lectures in the classroom of Wittenberg had in short order been transformed into an important statement of Melanchthon's theology. How important it was will become clear in the following chapters. The Scholia of 1534 In one sense, the Scholia of 1534 represented more an afterthought than an entirely new form for Melanchthon's work on Colossians. For the most part, the commen
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tary of 1528 remained intact; many sections, especially those on justification, free will, and politics, simply reprinted Melanchthon's earlier arguments. Yet at crucial points Melanchthon again took up his editor's pen and changed some entries to match his developing theology and the radically different situation of the 1530s. If nothing else, these changes show the importance Melanchthon accorded his published works and warn modern researchers to take as many different editions of his works as possible into account when investigating his thought. A tragic example of what happens when this simple rule is not followed occurs in the work of HansGeorg Geyer cited earlier. Readers are given the impression that they are witnessing the development and change in Melanchthon's thought over nearly twenty years. However, most of the changes in Melanchthon's understanding of poenitentia, for example, appeared in final form in 1528, right after his dispute with John Agricola over that subject. This was no gradual development, but clear shifts in emphasis hammered out in the context of conflict. The comments on justification also stem not from 1545 but, rather, from the highly interesting period after the publication of the Apology and the Commentary on Romans from 1532 but before the publication of the second edition of the Loci communes. Had Geyer set Melanchthon's comments within their historical context, he could have developed a much sharper and less idealized view of movement and change in Melanchthon's thought. The printing history of this edition ("D") is relatively simple. In 1534 Melanchthon reviewed Klug's edition of 1528 and made some changes, especially in the way he explained the relation of justification to the law. This publication appeared at the same time that Valentin Kobian reprinted the second edition. In 1545, for reasons that remain obscure, King once again published this final edition, and once again a South German publisher, this time from Schwäbisch Hall, brought another printing of the second edition to market. Thus, in 1545 it would have been possible for an exegete to have had access to Melanchthon on Colossians in three different forms: the first edition, reprinted in Herwagen's rendering of Melanchthon's Opera; the second edition, from Peter Brubach; and the third edition, from Joseph Klug. This continual tinkering with the text that characterized Melanchthon's commentaries may also have affected the later history of interpretation. When Calvin or others comment on Colossians, one may assume that Melanchthon's Scholia was near at hand. But which printing? Used at what time? Understood in what context? Only in 1559 does this question resolve itself, with the publication of Melanchthon's completely new Enarratio on Colossians, based on lectures delivered in Wittenberg in 1556. It was this work that made its way into the Wittenberg edition of Melanchthon's works, published in the 1560s, and from there into the Corpus Reformatorum. Nevertheless, during Melanchthon's lifetime, the Scholia, far more than the Enarratio, communicated his exegesis and theology to his contemporaries. Some of what this commentary communicated will be the focus of the following chapters.
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2— Melanchthon's Relation to Erasmus, 15191524 "What is Latin is Erasmian!" 1 With this enthusiastic praise the seventeenyearold Melanchthon expressed one enduring aspect of his estimate of Erasmus's worth. The Dutch humanist offered to his contemporaries a stunning, if not always Ciceronian, grasp of Latin. Melanchthon expressed the same admiration in his edition ofTerence, where he called Erasmus the "greatest and best protector of letters" (optimus maximus literarum praeses) In response to such laudatory remarks and to the erudite introduction to Terence in which they are found, Erasmus penned his lengthy note to 1 Thess. 2:7. Melanchthon, himself a budding humanist and worker at Thomas Anshelm's print shop in Tübingen, judged the older man as a humanist—nothing more or less. This motif appeared again and again in Melanchthon's earliest views of Erasmus. Take, for example, the epistle dedicatory to De rhetorica libri tres, his first handbook on rhetoric.2 Written in January 1519, about four months after his arrival in Wittenberg, and addressed to his former student from Tübingen, Bernhard Maurus, this preface extolled a trinity of living theologians: Erasmus, Johannes Reuchlin, and Luther.3 But on what grounds? Reuchlin, Melanchthon's relative by marriage who first hellenized the young Philip Schwartzerdt's name and whose recommendation landed Melanchthon the position in Wittenberg, kept from the flames "the most beautiful collections of books."4 Erasmus received praise as the quintessential humanist, the first of the teachers "who called theology back to the sources (ad fontes) The specifically nontheological compliments for the theology of these two men stood in sharp contrast to Luther's accomplishment: "because he states right things with authority." Already the content of Luther's theology (recta) and his prophetic behavior (moneat) counted as much as humanist contributions in saving and providing texts.5 Melanchthon's preface to Luther's Operationes in Psalmos must be understood along similar lines. The young professor of Greek and, by now, one of Luther's most enthusiastic students gave thanks to God for recalling to the light "sound and genuine theology. "6 To Erasmus "we owe the study of the Greek and Latin languages . . . the distinguished text [lectio] of the New Testament . . . and Jerome." As will be seen
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in chapter 3, even these contributions did not protect Erasmus from Melanchthon's criticism. Two years later, in a letter to Michael Hummelberg in Ravensburg, Melanchthon construed Erasmus's move to Basel in terms of his work on texts (the New Testament and Augustine) and prayed that the gods might favor his undertaking. 7 This oldest portrayal of Erasmus's humanist skills was also the most enduring. In his preface to the second volume of Luther's works, penned twenty five years later on 1 June 1546, shortly after the Reformer's death, Melanchthon again remembered Erasmus for his championing the study of Latin and Greek and for his concomitant rejection of the "barbarous and sophistic doctrine of the monks."8 Between 1519 and 1521 Melanchthon also praised Erasmus as a theologian per se. However, it would distort Melanchthon's praise of Erasmus's theology during this period to transform it into an attempt by a young scholar to harmonize the disparate theologies of his two "teachers," something Erasmus never was in any case. The defining moment for Wittenberg's theology in 1519 comprised the events leading up to and following the Leipzig debates that summer. Melanchthon's very first letter addressed directly to Erasmus arose out of the preparations for the debate in January 1519.9 Melanchthon wrote from Leipzig, where he and Luther had traveled to expedite negotiations for the debates.10 He used this letter as an opportunity to smooth over some tensions in his relationship with the older man, while at the same time recommending Luther to him, something Peter Mosellanus, lecturer of Greek at Leipzig, also did in a separate letter.11 Other letters from this period demonstrate the politically savvy attempts by the Wittenbergers, particularly Melanchthon, to bring Erasmus into their camp. When Erasmus sent a seemingly positive letter to Elector Frederick (so positive that he avoided publishing it in the same year with other letters; instead, it was appended to a printing of the theses for the Leipzig debates that included Luther's notorious Proposition Thirteen, his attack on papal and conciliar authority added by him to the original theses for debate), Melanchthon could boast in a letter to Wolfgang Capito, a later Reformer in Strasbourg, "Erasmus has 'cast the die' for us."12 Melanchthon was sadly mistaken; Erasmus was no Caesar, and the Leipzig debates hardly represented his Rubicon. Nevertheless, Melanchthon also wrote to Spalatin at nearly the same time, and with equal ardor, extolling Erasmus's supposed support of their cause.13 Within this highly charged environment, where even the protocols of the Leipzig debates were sent to Erasmus for his opinion,14 Melanchthon's afterword to Luther's Galatians commentary (along with the prefaces to De rhetorica and Luther's Operationes, discussed earlier) finds its proper place. Written at the same time as the letter to Spalatin, Melanchthon thinly disguised this pseudonymous note to the reader by signing it "the complete Paul from Bretten," his hometown, in order to reflect his own serious study of the Pauline corpus that was taking place at the time. It flattered Erasmus and gave the reader the impression that—despite Luther's broad attacks on Jerome's (and hence Erasmus's) interpretation of Galatians—the two men stood together. "Furthermore, Martin always considered this one thing: that, after the ravings of some have been rejected, you [the reader] may treat the Sacred Letters purely, and toward that end this one man above all others (after Erasmus) strove greatly."15 Even here the point was not to praise the content of Erasmus's theology but to show the convergence of the two scholars' humanist interests: rejecting the nonsense of
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some (like John Eck) and studying the Scriptures purely. Erasmus was not oblivious to the comments in this afterword, citing it and Luther's commentary itself as examples of Wittenberg's twofaced attitude toward him. 16 Erasmus's response to the changing conditions in 1519 came in the form of a letter to Archbishop Albrecht of Mainz and brought to clear expression another characteristic of his relation to Wittenberg and Luther in particular.17 Erasmus objected to Luther's assertiveness. This concern, already mentioned in Erasmus's response to Luther's letter of 28 March, became a leitmotif in his reaction to the Wittenberg Reformer. 18 Still claiming to have read nothing of Luther's works, he objected to their tone and informed the archbishop that he had admonished Luther (in May) to stick to the gospel. More than that, however, this letter demonstrated that Erasmus's neutrality could also be a liability for Wittenberg, and especially for Melanchthon who had only six months earlier interpreted the older man's statements in Caesarean terms. "Some extremely foolish people interpret these things [Erasmus's neutrality] as if I favored Luther: . . . I am neither Luther's accuser, nor his patron, nor his defender."19 Erasmus's distaste for Luther's assertions was wellknown to Melanchthon, even before the debate over the free will, and made its way into the same 1546 preface to Luther's works. There Melanchthon referred to a meeting between the Elector Frederick and Erasmus in Cologne at the coronation of Charles V and described Erasmus's agreement with Luther in theology (creative historiography by Melanchthon) and his desire for "mildness" (lenitas) on Luther's part.20 However, a common desire that Luther moderate his polemic cannot be construed as capitulation to Erasmus's theology. In fact, even this passage indicates how Melanchthon attempted to bring Erasmus's theology in line with Luther's, not the other way around. Erasmus was never above playing both ends against the middle. In this case, less than one year later he sent another letter to Melanchthon in which he again appeared more favorably disposed to Luther's cause.21 His clever wording convinced Melanchthon, who wrote to Spalatin that Luther was receiving the acclaim of the whole world (from Erasmus) and of the nobility (from Ulrich von Hutten).22 What had Erasmus said? "I favor the man, insofar as is permitted, although everywhere [people] conjoin my cause to his."23 Here he expressed two standard characteristics of his judgment of Luther: first, that he had nothing against the man Luther, and second, that people continually confused his interests with Luther's problems. He went on to add a third thing, already stressed in the letter to Albrecht: that those who favored Luther wished he had written "more civilly and moderately" (civilius et moderacius) A crucial last sentence introduced a final aspect of Erasmus's judgment: "I see that the matter tends toward sedition." Erasmus's fear of rebellion will be the subject of chapter 5. Melanchthon nevertheless remained optimistic about Erasmus's relationship to Wittenberg. A letter to Philip from Michael Hummelberg, a cleric and humanist teacher in Ravensburg, dated 5 September 1521 reflected growing concerns both about Erasmus and about Melanchthon's obliviousness to the true state of affairs. Hummelberg reported how he had surmised from an earlier letter (MBW 159) that Melanchthon did not trust rumors that because of Luther's pugnacious stance in the Babylonian Captivity of the Church Erasmus had abandoned Luther's cause.24 However, at nearly the same time in a note to Spalatin, Melanchthon himself admitted
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having received a copy of a letter written by Erasmus that reflected a changed situation. 25 Indeed, at the end of August, Erasmus had published his letter to Louis Ber through the offices of John Froben in Basel. There he expressly complained about Luther's acerbity in Why the Books of the Pope Were Burnt, The Babylonian Captivity, and The Assertion of All Articles26 and concluded glumly, "Thus it seems to me that Luther is acting as if he did not wish to be saved."27 Reacting to this same letter near the end of October and using words echoing Matt. 18:7 and 26:31, in which Christ predicted the falling away of his disciples, Melanchthon confessed in a note to Spalatin (in which he also included a copy of Erasmus's letter to Ber), "Now it is necessary for these souls to fall away."28 Even so, at year's end he still could interpret a report from Basel about the newly arrived Erasmus in a positive light to Spalatin. It was a specious rumor spread by "some fools" concerning the feelings of Erasmus against Martin.29 In 1522 Melanchthon also developed a more profound definition of justification that included a sharper distinction between worldly and divine righteousness, or law and gospel. The Zwickau prophets, the Wittenberg Unrest, and the suspicion with which some viewed the humanities caused Melanchthon to redouble his efforts to define the limits and usefulness of human reason.30 To explain the differences between the work of Luther and Erasmus, Melanchthon offered his brief De Luthero et Erasmo Elogion, which, despite Stupperich's objections to its authenticity, and given its publication in 1522, fit precisely into this time. Here Melanchthon employed his newly sharpened distinction between worldly and divine righteousness to explain the very different roles that Luther and Erasmus played on the stage of central Europe in the early 1520s. The full impact of these distinctions will become clear later in this work. Given the starkness of the division, it is little wonder that there are no extant letters between Erasmus and Melanchthon until late 1524. Then, when Erasmus did renew his correspondence with Philip, he included a complaint about this very text.31 Whatever his hopes for Erasmus's change of heart might have been, Melanchthon's first clear theological judgment concerning the content of Erasmus's work suffered under no such illusions. Erasmus had wanted to separate his cause from Luther's, and Melanchthon, using Wittenberg's theological categories, did just that. In theological matters we require two principal things. The one deals with the way by which we are consoled against death and the judgment of God and also by which we encourage the soul against all the plots of Satan, against the powers of the gates of hell. In short, this is true, evangelical and Christian preaching, about which the world and all human reason remains ignorant. Luther confesses this, and this is the righteousness of the heart that afterwards produces good works. Anyone who pursues these things in the reading of the Scriptures will easily understand its many mysteries. The other deals with good behavior and civics [or: civility]. As a rule, Erasmus teaches these things, but then, so do the Gentile philosophers. And what, I ask, does Christ have to do with philosophers? Or the Spirit of God with the blind reason of human beings? All who pursue this kind of thing teach love [charitas] to be sure, but they do not teach faith. Furthermore, unless love [charitas] flows from faith, it is in every case Phariseeism [written in Greek], a pretense, not love [charitas] Nevertheless, for my part I have no doubt that Erasmus is to be preferred to all the ancients.32
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The Elogion demonstrated Melanchthon's capacity to distinguish between his relationships to Luther and Erasmus. Luther championed the gospel; Erasmus contributed to civic virtue and philosophy (i.e., the law). In the Dissertatio of 1527 and the Scholia of 1527 and 1528, Melanchthon drew the line between philosophy and gospel even more sharply. Even in 1522, Melanchthon had already limited the influence of Erasmus to the humanities but in so doing had secured his influence there. In this way he provided modern researchers with an appropriate beginning point from which to investigate the relation of humanism in general and Erasmus in particular to the Reformation. Erasmus's contribution did not fall under the Reformation's peculiar gospel, with its drive toward confession and its opposition to the powers of hell. Instead, the Dutch humanist produced tools for pursuing ethics and civility that, whenever used to replace faith and the gospel, would be viewed by the Reformers as contradicting both. Seen in this way, the connection between the Reformation and Erasmian humanism loses its ambiguity and will always echo the Reformation's own dialectic of law and gospel. Two developments will help round out the contours of Melanchthon's early views of Erasmus. The one, although it also arose within the context of the Leipzig debates, stands apart from all the other evidence in that here alone Melanchthon praised the substance of Erasmus's theology. John Froben had just sent Melanchthon a copy of Erasmus's Ratio seu methodus compendio perveniendi ad veram theologiam, an expanded preface to the Dutch humanist's second edition of the Annotationes in Novum Testamentum. In a letter to Spalatin, Philip provided a pithy review. 33 With delight he proclaimed it a book "in which that excellent man seems to have handled many things in agreement with Martin [Luther] for the following reason: because they [actually] do agree, and on that account he is more open because he has a companion in holy and sacred instruction [disciplina] It is noteworthy that Luther's theology set the standards by which Erasmus was measured. Moreover, Melanchthon gave no details of the agreement he had found. Nevertheless, as the letters between Erasmus and Melanchthon at the beginning of January 1519 will provide an entree into the question of the use of the Fathers in chapter 3, so this brief book review will provide in chapter 4 the basis for a more intense look at the similarities and differences in exegetical method the two men were developing at this time. Melanchthon's own genius took certain methodological suggestions of Erasmus in much different and, at times, opposing directions. If Melanchthon's book review reflected the common search for an appropriate interpretive key to the Scripture, a second development will help elucidate another, often misunderstood facet of Melanchthon's participation in the Reformation: his distaste for open conflict among potential friends. Several years before he expressed any public disappointment for the vitriol Luther leveled at Erasmus in the free will debate, Melanchthon faced a somewhat similar problem in what might be termed the "Ulrich von Hutten affair." Melanchthon's response to von Hutten demonstrates the unlikelihood that any later reaction to Luther was somehow motivated by a sudden bout of theological insecurity. In the spring of 1523 a syphilitic Ulrich von Hutten, imperial knight, selfproclaimed protector of Luther, and selfstyled humanist, published an open and harsh letter, entitled Ulrichi ab Hvtten cum Erasmo Roterodamo presbytero theologo expostulatio, in which he savagely attacked Erasmus for failing to support the evan
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gelical cause. 34 When it became known in Wittenberg, around the beginning of July, Melanchthon's response was swift and consistent. Already on 3 July he complained to Spalatin about von Hutten's bitter invective against Erasmus. "For what did he gain by raging blindly against the best, most deserving elder statesman of [good] letters?"35 This one sentence contained the heart of Melanchthon's complaint: von Hutten's approach served no purpose and did no one, least of all the evangelical cause, any good. It also shows that at this time Melanchthon always framed his admiration for Erasmus in terms of his contribution to the humanities and not to evangelical theology. In August and September alone at least four letters from Melanchthon touched upon this affair. To Joachim Camerarius, Melanchthon's later biographer and perhaps his closest friend, he worried (not altogether without cause) that von Hutten's fiery darts would provoke Erasmus to write against the evangelicals.36 To Oswald Ulin in Ravensburg he proclaimed von Hutten to have done as much damage as Wittenberg's opponents.37 Writing to Spalatin on the subject almost two months after his first letter to him, he compared Erasmus to his firebreathing attacker in these terms. Although Erasmus hurts this [our] cause somewhat, nevertheless it would have been advantageous to ignore [him]. Certainly nothing of Hutten's made a difference—to inveigh against a man of such great birth and well deserving in studies with such bitter polemic! But what can I say? "An evil mind, an evil spirit."38
This letter shows Melanchthon's sober analysis of the situation. Doubtless Erasmus posed a problem for the evangelicals, but one best dealt with by neglect (something Wittenberg for the most part did quite well until Erasmus's attack in De libero arbitrio) However, despite his faults Erasmus was to be esteemed for his learning. Thus, harsh polemic served no practical purpose. Beneficial use of a thing, a concept that played a central role for Melanchthon in Christian doctrine ("To know Christ is to know his benefits!"), served an equally important function for him in theological argumentation. By September the situation had become so serious that the Wittenbergers dispatched Jerome Schurffto Basel to try to smooth Erasmus's ruffled feathers.39 Seven months later Melanchthon begged Jerome Baumgartner to accompany Joachim Camerarius to Basel, where a visit with Erasmus would demonstrate to Erasmus Wittenberg's distaste for von Hutten's attack.40 This brief conflagration in the evangelical camp made clear that Melanchthon's distaste for harsh polemics against a good humanist like Erasmus stemmed not from a psychological predisposition to avoid conflict, which both Melanchthon and his detractors then and now often alleged, but from political shrewdness. Neither he nor Luther, for that matter, wanted to separate the evangelical movement from good letters or from those who taught them. Moreover, Melanchthon calculated everything according to its usefulness for the cause of the gospel. He remained unconvinced that von Hutten's (or later Luther's) hot polemic could benefit anyone. Melanchthon did not agree with Erasmus and saw the older man's position as detrimental to the evangelical cause, but instigating a shouting match was not his idea of an appropriate response.
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In 1524 Johannes Memminger taught choirboys in Elector Frederick's church at the Torgau castle, a school Luther's eldest son, Hans, later attended. In the only piece of correspondence to him from Melanchthon that has been preserved, written around 8 July 1524, the university professor, apparently responding to an earlier, now lost query by Memminger, sought to explain to the schoolmaster the heart of the gospel as taught in Wittenberg. 41 At some point in the original request Memminger must have praised Erasmus. Melanchthon's response disclosed the scope and the limits of his respect for the Dutch humanist right on the eve of the dispute over the bondage of the will. "I regard Erasmus with respect and great confidence, but 'up to the altar."' This last phrase, written in Greek and explained in Erasmus's Adagia (3,2,1),42 precisely expressed Melanchthon's reservation. Used by Pericles and Plutarch, it was explained by Erasmus as the one proviso a person could attach to a friendship, "lest because of a human friendship we violate reverence of the deity."43 Not content with this classical but somewhat vague reference, Melanchthon then defined precisely what he meant. "Can you explain why you now praise [him] so highly to me, when up to this point he still has not clearly shown in any writing what he really thinks piety and 'the righteousness of God' [Greek: Rom. 1:17] consist in?"44 At the end of the conflict over the free will, in 1529, Melanchthon judged Erasmus even more harshly, as shall be seen. For now, he viewed the Dutch humanist's neutrality as running contrary to the gospel itself. "It is fitting for such a teacher to declare his opinion to the world, chiefly because Christ [Greek] commands [Mark 16:15] that 'the gospel be preached to all creatures."' Throughout his life Melanchthon insisted upon the public nature of the gospel and its proclamation. While he often distinguished polemics and debates from the Christian duty to proclaim the gospel, he never avoided the public teaching he believed so necessary for the church and its Lord. In fact, in the letter to Memminger he offered this very distinction. "I am not demanding from him," he wrote, "what they commonly want, that he write against the pope or the monks—I myself hate these contentions—but rather that he may teach what Christian righteousness really [Greek] is.'' When Erasmus finally did this in De libero arbitrio Melanchthon accepted the work in a fairminded way (aequo animo) not because he agreed with it but because Erasmus had finally spoken. And when Luther's heated polemic failed in Philip's eyes to bring the desired results (he had known since 1519 that Erasmus would never respond favorably to Luther's assertiveness), he immediately began crafting his own thorough refutation in his lectures and later commentaries on Colossians.
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PART II GROUND RULES FOR AN EXEGETICAL DEBATE
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3— Text and Tradition This chapter investigates the way Melanchthon used Erasmus's Latin translation of Colossians and the intricate web of commentators on the text to establish his own approach to this book of the Bible. The cry of the Reformation, sola scriptura, has sometimes been misunderstood to imply biblical exegesis shorn of patristic and medieval interpretations. This was never the case, least of all with Philip Melanchthon. Understanding the Bible always involved a complex interaction between text, interpreter, and tradition, as the following example indicates. The holdings of the Herzog August Bibliothek in Wolfenbüttel include a copy of the 1535 edition of Erasmus's Novum Testamentum and Annotationes, owned originally by the Reformer of Göttingen, John Sutel. 1 Sutel (150475) was a preacher in Göttingen from 1530 until 1542, when he resigned his position as superintendent there to become superintendent at Schweinfurt in Hesse. In the aftermath of the Smalcald War he found his way back to Göttingen, where he remained until sometime after 1555, when, to escape theological controversy there, he became superintendent in Northeim until his death.2 In marginal notations, written in an extremely legible sixteenthcentury hand, almost without a doubt Sutel's own, one can see quite clearly how evangelical Reformers read the Bible during this period of the church's life. The owner filled the margins of especially Matthew and Romans, but other biblical books as well, with the comments of other exegetes. In short order Sutel recorded the exegetical remarks of Bucer, Wolfgang Musculus, Luther, Melanchthon, and a host of patristic sources, above all Augustine and Jerome. Interestingly enough, the quotations come not, as one might assume, from other commentaries on the same book of the Bible but, rather, from a variety of sources. Thus, for example, in the margins of Romans there are eight references to Musculus's interpretation of the Psalms and eleven to Augustine's antiPelagian writings. Next to 2 Cor. 5:1621 Sutel wrote in the comments of Augustine, Bucer, and Musculus. In one particularly intriguing note over 1 John 3, Sutel recorded a conversation between Prince George von Anhalt and Justus Jonas over the nature of sin, referred to by Melanchthon in the preface to the fifth volume of Luther's works.
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Sutel's New Testament demonstrates that one must search far and wide to discover the sources an author might have read, noted, and used or reacted against. Beyond the actual sources for Sutel's own exegesis, this New Testament affords confirmation of the fact that sixteenthcentury exegetes, even—or perhaps especially—those who espoused the principle of sola scriptura, rarely if ever operated outside the constraints of the exegetical tradition. Texts were always read within the context of the exegetical conversation swirling around each passage, from both ancient and contemporary voices. The annotations in Sutel's New Testament also make clear that the context for the conversation around a text had changed. Whereas earlier in the sixteenth century the medieval exegetical tradition still played a direct role in defining the debate, there is in this work a new set of exegetical authorities: Musculus, Bucer, Luther, and Melanchthon, that is, evangelical Reformers, whose ideas and suggestions stand alongside those of the church fathers. Viewed in this light, even Erasmus's own annotations seem to come from a different era. Of course, Erasmus was hardly ignorant of modern exegesis and referred to the works of Lorenzo Valla and Faber Stapulensis in his comments on the biblical text. (One need only recall Erasmus's famous debate over John 1:1 to see his sensitivity to his contemporaries.) 3 But the systematic use of Reformers as authorities would hardly have occurred to him. My previous study concerning Melanchthon's interpretation of the Gospel of John indicates the degree to which Melanchthon was also indebted to the exegetical tradition.4 That work, limited to an investigation of other commentaries, demonstrates some ways in which the patristic, medieval, and humanist exegetical traditions impinged on Melanchthon's interpretation of the text. At the same time, the new authority of Luther also played a central role in shaping Melanchthon's exegesis, as did his own work in rhetoric and dialectics. By contrast, this present study centers on controversies current when Melanchthon gave his lectures on Colossians, revised them for publication, and reworked his commentary for a second and then a third edition. However, the Scholia, too, demonstrates the ways in which Melanchthon read the text in the light of the exegetical tradition, especially Erasmus. In this chapter Melanchthon's conversation with Erasmus will be examined as it touched first the biblical text and then other commentators on Colossians. The Biblical Text When lecturing on the Gospel of John in 152223 Melanchthon used the Vulgate as his text.5 Such was not the case for his lectures on Colossians. Although the number of lemmata is relatively small, a comparison of these texts to the Vulgate and Erasmus's translation of the New Testament yields the following results.6 Of the 73 separate texts, in only 12 were the three in total agreement. Of the remaining 61, Melanchthon's text agreed with Erasmus 30 times and with the Vulgate only 17 times. In 14 cases Melanchthon presented a text different from both Erasmus and the Vulgate. Especially where he quoted longer portions of the text, as in Col. 2:11 12, 20, and 23, one can see Erasmus's translation of the Greek behind Melanchthon's text.
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Alongside the great debt owed to Erasmus's translation, Melanchthon changed and corrected Erasmus's text in a variety of ways. For one thing, he tended to avoid Erasmus's more flowery renderings. Thus, in Col. 3:16 he exchanged Erasmus's "sumptuously" (opulente) for a word closer to the Vulgate's "abundantly" (abundanter) and wrote, ''May the Word of God dwell among you fully" (Verbum Dei habitet inter vos abunde) Or again in 4:5 he replaced the word "outsiders" (extraneos) with the Vulgate's "who are in public" (qui foris sunt) Twice Erasmus employed figures of speech with the word "palm" (palma) in 2:18 ("through humility he robs the given works of the palm [honor]" [palmam intervertat data opera per humilitatem]) and in 3:15 ("may [the peace of Christ] win the palm [victory]" [palmam feret]) Melanchthon chose more direct language ("simulating humility he deceives" [decipiat simulans humilitatem] and "may [the peace of Christ] rule" [regnet]). 7 For another thing, Melanchthon's rendering of the Greek text stressed certain aspects of Pauline theology that Erasmus had not so clearly stated in his translation. Thus, Melanchthon rendered Col. 2:4 "so that no one deceives you with probable reason" (ne quis imponat vobis probabili ratione) where Erasmus read "with probability of speech" (probabilitate sermonis) and the Vulgate "with sublime speech" (in sublimitate sermone) Already in 1527 Melanchthon contrasted his peculiar rendering to those of certain inept interpreters. "[Paul], however, says credible reason and not, as some inept people interpret it, ornament of oratory."8 When he returned to the text a year later in the 1528 edition, Melanchthon added an entire page of ents supporting his contention. Furthermore, here [Paul] enjoins Christians to beware lest they are deceived by credible reason. Some inept people have understood this as ornament of oratory, but Paul holds a completely different opinion. For when Christian teaching disagrees with reason, he enjoins us to beware, lest we are deceived by arguments derived from reason. . .. And the word that the apostle uses here does not mean ornament of oratory or elocution, but cleverly thought out arguments that appear true. For Greek orators often used this word in this way.9
Melanchthon focused the Vulgate and Erasmus's translation by recasting the Greek without any reference to speech (sermo) at all! His comments amplified Erasmus's annotation on the same verse to some degree. Erasmus glossed the phrase "with persuasive oratory, or with persuadability or with probability" (in persuasibili oratione, sive persuasibilitate, sive probabilitate) and criticized Ambrosiaster's reading "with sublimity of speech" (in sublimitate sermonis) as twisting the text against the Sophists.10 Melanchthon, however, cast suspicion on reason itself and not just "persuasive speech, 'persuadability' or probability." Thus, he agreed with Luther's translation of the New Testament into German, which read "with reasonable words" (mit vernunfftigen wortten).11 Both exegetes wanted to avoid the appearance that Paul was attacking rhetoric per se. Only Melanchthon made it clear that the real culprit was reason, something he suspected Erasmus was loath to admit. Even when Melanchthon did not express theological grounds for his particular translation, his reasons are not hard to discern. For example, by following the Vulgate
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in his translation of Col. 1:15 ("[Christ], who is the image of the invisible God" [Qui est imago Dei invisibilis]) he avoided the peculiar "hidden" (inconspicui) of Erasmus in favor of the more orthodox invisibilis. On the single occasion when Melanchthon actually discussed various translations, he provided no explicit reason for his rejection of Erasmus. On the complicated problem of Col. 2:23, the Vulgate offered a wooden, literal rendering of the Greek: "which [human decrees] are indeed things possessing the reasonableness of wisdom in superstition and in humility, not for sparing the body and not in some mark of respect for satisfying the flesh." 12 By reading the Greek more negatively as expletio (appeasing) rather than the Vulgate's more neutral saturitas (satiety) Erasmus changed the translation to "which [human decrees] indeed have nominally the show of wisdom through superstition and humility of the soul and an attack on the body (not through some mark of respect) for appeasing of the flesh."13 He thereby made the entire verse an attack on people who practiced superstitious or exaggerated piety to their body's own harm—as in Italy (among the flagellants) at the present time, he added. 14 Melanchthon knew the alternatives but preferred the Vulgate. "I know that others have explained the last phrase differently, 'for the appeasing of the flesh.' But Jerome's opinion pleases me. He translates it this way: 'as much as is enough.' And Paul says, 'I have granted to prescribe for the body as much as is enough."'15 Melanchthon also discussed textual problems in the Scholia not directly reflected in his rendering of individual verses.16 Sometimes his comments matched those of Erasmus. On Col. 2:21 both agreed that Paul was speaking (using mimicry), in order to give examples of pseudoapostolic teaching.17 On the rest of the translation of Col. 2:23 both also agreed that the text referred to false religion (what Melanchthon calls works done without divine command) and simulated humility.18 At other times, Melanchthon seemed to disagree with or even correct the Dutch humanist. In place of Erasmus's modestia Melanchthon retained the word humilitas for his translation of Col. 3:12, and he went out of his way to describe biblical examples of such humility. In 1522 Erasmus defended his translation simply by remarking, "For modestia is preferably what the Greeks call ." Erasmus greatly expanded this comment in his annotations of 1527, where it reads, Humilitas means a sense rather of unwillingness, as one cast down in the soul. Even though the Greek word signifies something more than modestia. For people who are modest are those who are not arrogant, but are those who attribute less to themselves than they deserve.19
Here the two Greek scholars differed as to the proper way to express a word in Latin On Col. 2:22 the two scholars disagreed about the meaning of the Greek . This word, Melanchthon wrote in 1527, must not be understood concerning evil use, so that no one get even the faint notion that Paul wanted to say up to this point food does not justify, if we abuse it, but it justifies if we use it properly. Moreover he wants food not to justify even when we use it properly and rightly and he calls to be consumed in daily use.20
Here Melanchthon was reacting against Erasmus's comment that "therefore it must not be understood as if Paul prohibited anything be touched or tasted, but he re
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buked the censoriousness of those who prohibited these things with great arrogance." 21 This small shift demarcates the dividing line between the two scholars' understanding of justification. Melanchthon objected not just to the incorrect use of fasting and the like but to any use connected to justification whatsoever. Erasmus worried over moral excesses and arrogance. Finally, there was an exchange over the meaning of chirographum in Col. 2:14.22 On one thing both interpreters agreed: affixum cruci (nailed to the cross) referred to the custom of affixing the names of the enemies to a trophy. But what exactly was affixed there? Melanchthon took this to be either a sign of Christ's victory or a continuation of the metaphor Paul had alluded to with the word chirographum. In a kind of personification (prosopopoeia) the chirographum was nailed to the cross, just as Paul elsewhere spoke of the death of death. This chirographum was itself nothing other than our conscience, which testified against and condemned us and received its powerper decreta, that is, through the law. Thus the wrath of God, which oppressed our consciences, was nailed to the cross. A marginal notation in the September Testament agreed with this interpretation completely.23 Erasmus had a different approach. In 1522 he wrote, The Greek codices punctuate this in such a way that you understand the chirographum deleted what was against us through the decrees of the Law of Moses or through the decrees of the divine law. . . . Theophylactus interprets the chirographum of the Mosaic profession, which was abolished and rejected by the decree of the gospel.24
Whatever had been binding upon us through the Mosaic law or the divine law was now erased. This left open whether what the cross erased was merely the ceremonial law or the entire law. Similar to his interpretation of Col. 2:22, Melanchthon chose between these two possibilities and clearly rejected any interpretation that lessened the power of the law by reducing it to Mosaic ceremonies. In 1527, Erasmus expanded his discussion of this text by summarizing a homily of Chrysostom, who had argued that Paul exaggerated his description of our offense in order to heighten the mercy of God in forgiveness. But Erasmus viewed Chrysostom's comments, good in themselves, as having gone beyond the text. "It is not an easy thing to philosophize in the emphasis of words particularly in the writings of the blessed Paul, whose speech teems with rhetorical figures and tropes everywhere."25 If, in some small way, Erasmus seemed to open the door to an interpretation similar to Melanchthon's in 1527, he drew back from the same in the additional comments of 1535, almost as if, having read Melanchthon's Scholia, he wanted to distance himself from its results. First, he described the interpretation of certain "scholiasts in all Paul's letters," who argued that the chirographum was nothing less than the "memory of a God who keeps our sins." Erasmus was willing to admit that "all these things are correct" but then added the following caveat. Nonetheless, to me it seems more forced that "dogmas" are interpreted "faith," although nowhere is dogma used by the Apostles to be read in that sense. Rather, later on in this same chapter, following what he touches on regarding avoiding the commandments of the Jews, he says that those who either command external things or who by commands of this kind ("do not touch; do not taste; do not handle") are
Page 36 driven to superstition " ." Whence it seems more probably to the one who observes the tone of this word that here "dogmata" is being used for Judaic comments, the chief of which was circumcision. 26
Erasmus was willing to allow an interpretation like that of the Scholiastes, whose understanding matched well Melanchthon's own. However, he thought this forced, because it referred the dogmata to faith. At first glance, this may seem to have had little to do with Melanchthon, who called the dogmata law. However, as the rest of Erasmus's comment revealed, he meant that the dogmata were not to be connected with "[justification by] faith." That is, Erasmus was arguing that this text, far from being about faith or conscience ("memory of a God who keeps our sins"), concerned morals, specifically the way Paul insisted that we had been freed from Mosaic ceremonies, beginning with circumcision. On this text Melanchthon and Erasmus stood on opposite sides of the fence. Whereas Melanchthon rejected the notion that the chirographum and dogmata referred to ceremonial regulations, Erasmus finally insisted in 1535 that precisely this interpretation best described the Apostle's meaning. Anything else was interesting philosophizing that distorted the text's meaning. Throughout his career Melanchthon publicly praised Erasmus's work on the New Testament as one of his most significant theological contributions to the cause of the gospel. Melanchthon's Scholia tempered this clear vote of confidence by not simply accepting blindly all of Erasmus's textual suggestions. It substituted for Erasmus's more ornate Latin the simple and direct style for which Melanchthon was famous. More important, it did not hesitate to champion translations and definitions of Greek terms favorable to Wittenberg's construal of Pauline theology over the more clearly ethical orientation of Erasmus. Reason itself could not be trusted; the law was never reduced to Mosaic ceremonies but included the condemnation of the conscience; Paul forbade the use, not just the misuse, of any human rites as a way of salvation. Precisely where Erasmian and evangelical theology parted ways, Melanchthon defended Wittenberg's gospel and attacked the alternatives, all the while using humanist philological tools to prosecute his case. The Sources Differences between Erasmus and Melanchthon's use of the Fathers first came to light eight years before the publication of the Scholia. In October 1519 the presses of John Froben in Basel, the favorite printer of Erasmus, produced a collection of letters to and from the famous Dutch humanist, entitled Farrago nova epistolarum.27 Side by side, this folio volume contained an exchange between the prince of humanists and the twentytwoyearold Praeceptor Germaniae, Philip Melanchthon, over the former's paraphrase of Romans. In January 1519 Melanchthon had written to Erasmus, then residing in Louvain, to squelch a rumor that he had criticized the older man's work.28 In his very first letter to the Dutch humanist, Melanchthon fell over himself apologizing for the false accusations of some "goodfor nothing" (nebulo) who claimed that Melanchthon wanted to redpencil Erasmus's commentaries. With true humanist humility Melanchthon insisted that it would be ridiculous for a Joe Blow to make trouble for the top dog. As the letter unfolded, Melanchthon revealed that he had in
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fact thought some things in the paraphrase (of Romans) were more discursive than they needed to be, although further consideration made it seem otherwise. 29 From this burst the tragedy fanned by the calumnies of that crafty exaggerator, whom Melanchthon may have thought was John Eck. How could Melanchthon have said such things about Erasmus, the man Melanchthon regarded as the author and parent of all his own work? He appealed to those who had commended Melanchthon to Erasmus and begged that a scholar be allowed not only to hold right opinions but to express them freely as well. Melanchthon exposed the real reason for his sudden approach to Erasmus only at the end of the letter. It seemed that while he and Luther were in Leipzig making plans for the debate with Eck, they had heard (from Peter Mosellanus?) of Erasmus's ire. The last thing the Wittenbergers wanted at this juncture was to have to prosecute a Zweifrontenkrieg against both scholastic professors and humanist scholars. Thus, Melanchthon added that he had written offthecuff and at an evil time. "Martin Luther, most devoted to your good name, desires your approval at every turn."30 Erasmus's response dripped with the sharp sarcasm and subtle irony that marked his humanist letterwriting.31 His informant, he huffed, was neither a "goodfor nothing" nor an "exaggerator," as Melanchthon thought, but a good friend who had according to Melanchthon's own testimony told the truth. Worse yet, this man32 had only mentioned it in passing and had reported that Melanchthon's criticism was directed toward Erasmus's New Testament. Melanchthon himself had unwittingly made matters worse by revealing that he had objected to portions of the paraphrase [on Romans]. Erasmus would more quickly have submitted to Melanchthon's judgment on the New Testament than on the paraphrase, "concerning which no one will easily pronounce [judgment], except the one who has investigated with very keen eyes the commentaries of all the ancients."33 One cannot miss what Erasmus was implying by his words. Melanchthon, a grammarian (Eck did not invent this charge) able to criticize the Novum Instrumentum, did not have the requisite knowledge of the Fathers to judge Erasmus's paraphrase.34 This disdain for Melanchthon's familiarity with the church fathers and his ability to use their exegetical commentaries, coming already in 1519, stood at the beginning of a debate over this issue that continues to this day. Erasmus, who according to Peter Fraenkel stood between John Trithemius's Liber de Ecclesiasticis Scriptoribus of 1494 35 and Bellarmine's 1613 patrology of the same name, found the key to the Fathers not in theological but in literary judgment and used them most uncritically in his own literary creations.36 Thus, Erasmus could deflect Melanchthon's complaint, such as it was, by hinting at the sheer weight of patristic evidence in his work— without ever having to defend its theology.37 Melanchthon's ignorance of the Fathers, taken with his developing critical attitude toward them—even some of his friends complained about his 1539 De ecclesia et de autoritate verbi Dei on these grounds38placed his patristic skills in question. E. P. Meijering, despite his final praise for Melanchthon's lucidity, in some ways echoes Erasmus's view among modern scholars.39 After a wideranging review of Melanchthon's patristic sources, he concludes that with few exceptions Melanchthon did not in his earliest years use the Fathers widely. He subtly criticizes Melanchthon for having rejected (patristic) speculation on God's will in his Loci of 1521, while
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turning to that speculation in later works when it suited him. Following a lengthy review of Melanchthon's patristic and medieval sources, Meijering concludes only that Melanchthon does not work with any Patristic consensus, but . . . he picks out as an eclectic those statements from the writings of the Fathers which suit him, because they seem to say the same as what he wants to say, and he ignores those which do not suit him (and sometimes explicitly criticizes them). 40
Not only does Meijering judge Melanchthon's patristic skills on the basis of twentiethcentury criteria; he also fails to mention the intraLutheran christological controversies that occasioned many of Melanchthon's later comments.41 If one is searching for a general acceptance of "the commentaries of all the ancients," Melanchthon will invariably disappoint. As Peter Fraenkel has demonstrated conclusively in his Testimonia Patrum, Melanchthon replaced literary criticism and static harmonization of patristic evidence with a much more theologically critical, dynamic approach that accepted the Fathers and simultaneously criticized them on the basis of the biblical primum et verum (a term Fraenkel derives from Chrysostom, who said that what is first is true). Thus, to grasp fully Melanchthon's use of the Fathers in his exegesis, one must proceed beyond mere collation of patristic references or comparison of exegetical results—an important first step—to investigate the critical ways in which Melanchthon appropriated patristic exegetical debates and insights into his own interpretation of the Bible. This section expands on Fraenkel's own work, which did not investigate the peculiar problems posed by exegetical materials, by asking not only whether Melanchthon employed patristic exegesis and what sources he used but also how and why he used them. Like his contemporaries, Melanchthon both read patristic writings themselves and received them through a complex web of medieval and Renaissance traditions. If one simply tallies up explicit references to the Fathers in Melanchthon's exegesis, the results will disappoint. The Annotationes in Johannem of 1523 contained eleven; the Scholia in Epistulam Pauli ad Colossenses of 1527 held seven, only one of which came from commentaries on the text of Colossians. However, already in his analysis of Melanchthon's Old Testament exegesis Hansjörg Sick warned against such a narrow approach.42 Unlike Sutel's New Testament, Melanchthon's Scholia gives few clues to his reading list. Only a linebyline analysis of his work could begin to uncover all the possible influences on his own exegesis. He did, however, refer to three exegetes by name: Origen, Chrysostom, and Theophylact, archbishop of Bulgaria. whom in the style of the time he called Vulgarius. The references to Origen related more to his theology than to any particular text, although those comments will be examined in more detail later. The reference to Chrysostom had to do with an interpretation of 1 Cor. 7:21 and came at the end of a long excursus on the two governments and the validity of the Mosaic law.43 It dropped out of the 1528 edition. Theophylact, on the contrary, may well represent the commentator most often read by Melanchthon in the course of his study of the text. He was particularly interested in the work of this Orthodox archbishop, although he often disagreed with his conclusions.44 In the Scholia of 1528 there are two direct references to the Bulgarian prelate. The one, also within Melanchthon's discussion of the role of the Mosaic
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law, referred to Theophylact's commentary on the gospels. Melanchthon showed respect for Theophylact's opinion by citing him (on Matt. 23:3), but then he immediately distanced himself from what the archbishop said by countering it with his own interpretation of the text and by arguing that regardless of the interpretation of this text, no precept was able to fight with God's word. Merely comparing patristic exegesis to Melanchthon's would severely restrict any investigation by leaving the impression that Melanchthon simply read patristic exegesis and used it in his own work. In fact, from his earliest lectures on the New Testament until those produced in the last year of his life Melanchthon owed a heavy debt to the exegetical tradition for their own insights and for giving him access to the Fathers. Examining this complex web of sources reveals much about Melanchthon's exegetical method and his relation to patristic sources. 45 Thus these three were by no means Melanchthon's only sources. To trace the anonymous use of the tradition throughout the Scholia goes beyond the scope of this work. A single instance in Col. 2:9 (the other example of how Theophylact mediated the patristic exegetical tradition to Melanchthon) illustrates well the difficulty in tracking exegetical sources. In the 1527 edition of the Scholia on Colossians, Melanchthon discussed two options for interpreting the word corporaliter in Col. 2:9.46 The first contrasted the shadows of legal ceremonies, which signified God or Christ or justification, with the reality of Christ who was truly God and truly justified rather than simply promising justification. As in verse 17, Paul contrasted the body of Christ to the shadow of ceremonial law. The second argued that Paul wanted to stress not only that God was with Christ but that the divine nature put on the human body and became flesh. God was in the saints spiritually but in Christ personally. This made Christ properly (proprie) Redemption, Sanctification, and Father of the age to come. Melanchthon could have found descriptions of these alternatives throughout the medieval exegetical tradition in, to name only a few interpreters, Hugh of St. Cher, Thomas Aquinas, and Nicolaus of Lyra.47 These authors represented for Melanchthon the medieval tradition. In a fascinating addition to the Scholia of 1528 on Col. 2:8, in the course of discussing the benefits of knowing languages, rhetoric, and dialectic for the study of Scripture, Melanchthon observed, "Often because of their ignorance of languages, Thomas [Aquinas], Hugh [of St. Cher], [Nicholas of] Lyra, and others were dreaming in their interpretations of Scripture."48 Although he could hardly have named three betterknown exegetes, at least he showed some acquaintance with their exegetical work. In comments on Col. 2:9 and the word corporaliter Thomas discussed three modes in which God dwelt in something: "according to the shadow," as in the old law (to which he opposed God's dwelling in Christrealiter) "according to the soul," as in the saints (to which he opposed God's assumption of human nature in the personal union of Christ); and "according to the senses." At this point Thomas was borrowing directly from Hugh of St. Cher, his fellow Dominican, who wrote that God's indwelling in Christ was not in shadow, as in the Temple, but corporeally in three modes (height, breadth, and depth); as God was in all things through his power, in the saints through grace, and only in Christ through personal union. Lyra also referred both to the shadow and prefigured signs of the Temple and to the incarnation and the assumption of the body by the Word.49 Thus, all three exegetes provided
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in general terms the same interpretations for the text as Melanchthon himself gave. Moreover, Melanchthon's distinction between the corporeal indwelling of God in Christ and the spiritual indwelling in the saints had direct echoes in both Hugh and Thomas. The comments of Melanchthon on this text, set in the context of exegetical tradition of the church, demonstrated how he stood within a rich, orthodox christological discussion of the Middle Ages. 50 However, what was Melanchthon's point in referring to these interpretations? An investigation of the expanded version of the Scholia from 1528 sheds some light on this question. There Melanchthon totally changed the import of his arguments on this verse and thereby revealed his sources and the actual target for his comments First, he disclosed his own preference for the second interpretation, beginning his comments simply, "I understand Paul in this way."51 After describing his own interpretation using word for word the section from the 1527 edition, he then turned to what in 1527 had been the first alternative. He mentioned immediately that this was Theophylact's position. By contrasting shadow and body and connecting this verse to verse 17, the Bulgarian archbishop focused not on the nature of Christ but on the effect of his incarnation. Melanchthon then added that this interpretation "does not displease me, nor does it oppose mine. However, we have said that not only the effect of Christ but also his nature is described."52 The changes from 1527 to 1528 show how difficult tracking sources can be. It is not clear that one would immediately move from a passing reference in 1527 about the exegetical tradition ("Thus they contrast the word 'corporaliter' to the word 'shadow"') to Theophylact. Only in 1528 did Melanchthon's own comments connect this interpretation to Theophylact, except for one small detail. This was not Theophylact's interpretation of this verse at all! In fact, it most closely paralleled the Glossa ordinaria. It reads: Corporaliter: Not because God is corporeal, but he has used the word metaphorically. For God dwelt in a "temple made with hands" not in a bodily but in a shadowed sense, that is, by prefigured signs. Corporaliter, that is, completely so that he is the body and fulfillment of the shadows of the law.53
This in turn matched the comments of Augustine in Epistle 149, where he had written: "Therefore he said 'corporaliter' because they [were] seduced with shadows, and he uses the word metaphorically, as also the term shadow is not in these things certainly as a literal word, but transferred by some reason of similitude."54 Melanchthon's preferred position actually matched the exegesis of Theophylact and Thomas Aquinas Theophylact went so far as to say, "Corporaliter: that is, not just an operation by God, but the substance of God, and as embodied and one hypostasis existing with what was assumed."55 Even assuming this switch represented an innocent mistake, an important question remains. Why did Melanchthon bother to include this other interpretation which he clearly viewed as inferior? The answer to that question lies not within the medieval or patristic exegetical traditions but with Erasmus. In his paraphrase of Colossians, Erasmus had written, In Christ the whole fulness of the Deity persists and dwells, so that those who follow after this one have not what is the shadow of the Mosaic Law or the decep
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tions of human philosophy. The Truth has been plainly exhibited to all the senses; it is not that you see only a type or ambiguous promises.
In a similar vein, Erasmus mentioned in his annotations to the New Testament of 1519, "And he added , corporaliter, so that he may exclude the shadows of Mosaic Law." By 1527, however, he pointed out that Theophylact took corporaliter to mean "according to nature and substance not only effect as in the prophets, but rather because the Deity has never been separated from the body of Christ."57 hile leaving the interpretation to the reader's judgment, he cited the Ordinary Gloss in support of his interpretation. By 1535—perhaps aware of Melanchthon's arguments—Erasmus claimed he did not know where Theophylact got this idea and linked the Bulgarian's interpretation with Thomas Aquinas, arguing that, while Thomas's point about Christ's divinity was orthodox enough, it could not be argued from this text. Instead, Erasmus cited Augustine's letter and Chrysostom in support of his own position, as well as other texts in Colossians where Paul connected the Head (Christ) with his body (the church). Not only are there again hints in the final edition of Erasmus's Annotationes of a possible dialog between the Dutch humanist and his younger Swabian colleague; there are also grounds for Melanchthon's interest in this exegesis in the first place: Erasmus had clearly made it the only correct interpretation both in his paraphrase and in the annotations to the New Testament. However, the theological stakes were much higher than they might appear at first blush, and the comments on Col. 2:9 simply constituted the opening salvo in a subtle attack on Erasmus's Origenism.58 The debate between Melanchthon on the one side and Origin and his defenders on the other arose, among other places, over the meaning of Col. 2:3 ("In whom all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge [scientia] have been hidden"). In 1527 Melanchthon restricted the meaning of scientia to the will of God. Only in Christ did one discern God's will to justify by forgiving the sins of those who believe. This knowledge was unknown to the world and could only be encountered in the cross.59 Once again in 1528, Melanchthon expanded upon and sharpened his argument by referring to the exegetical tradition. They do not explain this text aptly who imagine that Paul says that all treasures of wisdom are in Christ because Christ hands down better commands than Moses or the philosophers. For all who interpret these words in this way do not see the distinction between law and gospel, nor do they understand why Christ was sent . . . Origen in Contra Celsum diligently gathers the commands of Christ in order to show that Christian teaching is more distinguished than Gentile philosophy. But it is the most pernicious error to imagine that Christ came to hand down new laws. For he came to forgive sins.60
On top of the question of the relation of Christ to law and gospel, Melanchthon also expressed his dissatisfaction with those who understood scientia as "speculative" and claimed that Christ knew "many hidden and sublime things" concerning God's nature. Such an interpretation missed Paul's point: that human reason was ignorant of a God who cares for us, listens to us, and forgives us, and that only when we are terrified by knowledge of sin do we discover in Christ God's mercy and help. Outside this truly arcane knowledge of God, both philosophers (like Cicero, who could
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not imagine a God who cares for people, or Epicureus, who denied God's existence) and Pharisees (who held that we are justified by works) fell into terrible error. By contrast, believers found consolation in the cross. "For this wisdom is concealed under the form of the cross." 61 Who held the views Melanchthon was attacking here? On the same text Thomas Aquinas had defined the scientia as knowledge of God and creation. Whatever was known about God, God in Christ "knew fully in himself." Likewise, whatever could be known about creatures, "he knew in himself supereminently."62 The second part of Melanchthon's remarks opposed Thomas's exposition. However, Erasmus provided in his paraphrase of Colossians an even more likely candidate for Melanchthon's opening remarks. Erasmus rendered this verse, Namely, outside this One nothing of human wisdom must be desired for us: either what philosophers of this world promise or what the teachers of the Mosaic law offer, or what others claim that they have learned from speaking with angels, when in this One have been hidden and concealed all treasures of wisdom and fruitful knowledge. From this source may be drawn profitably whatever pertains to true wellbeing.63
While Erasmus imagined Christ to have bested the knowledge of philosophers, Mosaic lawyers, and mystics, Melanchthon was convinced that Christ's knowledge was of a different, altogether incomparable sort from that of philosophers or Moses. To make the comparison, as Erasmus did, was to miss difference between law and gospel and to misunderstand why Christ came. Such criticisms of Erasmus did not mean that Melanchthon rejected his work out of hand. In fact, Melanchthon depended on Erasmus the most precisely where Erasmus's strengths lay: in the Greek text and history. This has already been demonstrated in his critical use—but use nevertheless—of Erasmus's translation. In introductory comments on the book of Colossians lurks another connection. In a brief paragraph, found in all versions, Melanchthon identified Colossae by referring to the work of Strabo.64 A further reference to the "tables of Ptolemy" set up his criticism of those who equate Colossae with the Colossus of Rhodes. While it is possible that Melanchthon read these sources and came up with this criticism on his own, it is far more likely that he was offering his students and readers a synopsis of Erasmus's introduction to Colossians in his Annotationes, where the Dutch humanist referred to additional ancient sources and was even more biting in his criticism of those who confused Colossae with a colossus.65 Comments on Col. 2:4 pose yet another important question for Melanchthon's relation to the tradition. As was already indicated, Melanchthon insisted that the Greek text must not be taken to mean "an embellishment of speech" and that those who had done so were "inept." The stakes for this rhetorician/theologian ran high. If Paul was attacking the very speech—making that Melanchthon taught in the arts faculty at the University of Wittenberg, then his life's work and his exegetical method would have been in jeopardy. But who, besides perhaps Erasmus (who had other reasons for construing this text differently), might such inepti have been? For one thing, in the mid1520s Melanchthon feared that learning itself was under attack by ineruditi of all kinds. For another, the exegetical tradition perhaps sparked Melanchthon's fears.
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Here the voices were divided. Hugh of St. Cher recognized an attack by St. Paul against ''knowledge that is only in elegance of words," which expressed itself in three ways: in "first (prima) philosophy" (Col. 2:4), 66 in "moral philosophy" (Col. 2:18), and in "knowledge of natural things" (Col. 2:8). Lyra, on the contrary, only spoke of philosophical words or arguments of philosophers. Thomas strengthened Hugh's argument by taking on rhetoricians directly. In worldly knowledge two things are contained, that is, some knowledge of speaking and some knowledge of things. And therefore they can deceive in two ways. Thus, he first defends them against those philosophers who deceive them through the knowledge of speaking . . .. Therefore he says: "I say that in Christ is all knowledge, and I say this so that you may not be deceived by seeking knowledge elsewhere." And he says, "Let no one," that is, neither Demosthenes nor Cicero, "deceive you with sublimity of speech." . . . But is it not then a sin to use sublime speech? I respond: No, because the holy men, such as Ambrose, Jerome and Pope Leo, also speak more eloquently than even a worldly rhetorician. For if he says that [someone] may use ornate elocution to persuade in an evil cause, much more may it be used in a good cause.67
Melanchthon clearly disagreed with such comments. In these verses Paul was not talking about rhetoric at all but about reason and the contrast between Christian righteousness and carnal righteousness. Thus, Paul commanded us to beware "lest we be deceived by arguments taken from reason." Warming up to his defense of good speech, Melanchthon then waxed eloquent. What deceived the Arians? Not someone adorned with oratorical powers, but the clever arguments of human reason. . . . What deceives those who think that we are justified before God by works and not by faith alone? Reason deceives, for it does not see another righteousness except the righteousness of good works. . . . Therefore all heresies in the church are born of rational arguments.68
Rather than see this verse as opposing rhetoric only to bring good speaking in through the back door, as Thomas does, Melanchthon changed the point of the text altogether and thereby exempted rhetoric completely from Paul's criticism. Patristic exegetes contributed much to Melanchthon's own interpretation of the biblical text. They provided proper definitions of the words and phrases in the text of Scripture. Over and over again, whether explicitly or implicitly, Melanchthon relied on patristic definitions of texts in his exegesis. This dependence had two aspects. On the one side, especially in connection with the meaning of individual Greek words, Melanchthon also allowed nonbiblical, classical sources an equal weight in determining the meaning of words. To use an example that was discussed earlier, in all editions of the Scholia on Colossians Melanchthon argued that in Col. 2:22a ("all of which perish by abuse [1528: use] itself") the word was not to be understood concerning evil use, lest someone got the mistaken impression that while the abuse of food did not justify, its proper use would. Instead, the word simply meant "daily use."69 The modern reader cannot see that Melanchthon here was rejecting a patristic interpretation, that of Ambrose (actually Ambrosiaster),70 who rendered this text "through a false use [abusio]."71 The sixteenthcentury readers would have recognized
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this immediately, since this rendering ("which all perish by abuse [abusus]") had found its way into Erasmus's translation of the text. 72 Even in his earliest annotations Erasmus had appealed to Ambrose. By 1528 Melanchthon, on the contrary, followed the Vulgate even more closely ("all of which are destroyed by use [usu] itself"). In this case Melanchthon thought he knew the Greek language well enough to correct Erasmus (even modern dictionaries side with the Wittenberg scholar) and refused to reiterate slavishly patristic interpretations of the text when they contradicted the primum et verum of Pauline theology and the common usage of the language. This then adumbrated the other side of Melanchthon's grammatical dependence on the Fathers: it rarely occurred outside of important sixteenthcentury theological debates. Melanchthon cared about the meaning of this word because of the way Erasmus construed this text.73 Melanchthon also used the Fathers because their exegetical works provided appropriate theological interpretations of the text and because their dogmatic comments, taken from a wide variety of sources, provided the reader with important aids for understanding the text within its theological context. This use of the Fathers deserves further attention. Melanchthon's exegetical method revolved around his use of commonplaces.74 Melanchthon viewed each text as a specific example of a more general theological category. By identifying such categories and discussing them, sometimes at length, the exegete was more faithful to the text itself than a simple grammatical explanation allowed. By focusing on a biblical author's argumentum either in an entire book or an individual chapter, exegetes obtained a usefull lens through which the main topics of theology could be illumined. This allowed exegetes like Melanchthon to skip verses or to subsume them under a more general discussion. Occasionally, the biblical writer inserted an excursus on another topic, to which exegetes could also turn their attention. In this context the patristic heritage provided for Melanchthon not only interpretations of specific texts—already an important contribution—but also insights into theological topics. Moreover, the theological issues and battles fought by Paul as revealed by the text became simply special cases of the same issues and battles being fought at other times and places. Thus it was perfectly natural, exegetically speaking, for Melanchthon to move from patristic debates to modern ones. Granted the power of patristic argument in Melanchthon's exegesis, one must also take seriously his critical approach. As Fraenkel has shown, criticism and acceptance of the Fathers (simultaneously!) marked all Melanchthon's use of them and were closely associated with Melanchthon's view of church history. For him there remained throughout history a single, harmonious body of believers drawn around the gospel, first proclaimed in the protoevangelium of Gen. 3 and repeated throughout the Old and New Testaments and in the history of the church. This gospel constituted the primum et verum to which the church of all ages gave witness. However, immediately after the pronouncement of the first promise, the devil began to undermine it with false belief and idol worship. Thus in the midst of this church, as the story of Cain and Abel demonstrated, there was always opposition. Against this opposition to the gospel arose moments of reformation in which God restored the gospel and preserved the church. For Melanchthon certain times posed
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particular crises for the church, embodied especially by Origen, Pelagius (whose father, Melanchthon liked to say, was Origen), and the scholastics/monastics of his own day. The aetas Origenica represented the first in a long line of perversions of the doctrine of justification. Against such Origenism, tied directly to the bad theology of the present, Melanchthon joined in the fray with and against the Fathers. How did this view play itself out in exegesis? Here Melanchthon's comments on Col. 2:1719 in the Scholia of 1527 and 1528 are instructive. Melanchthon led off his exegesis of Col. 2:17 ("which are the shadows of future things") with this cryptic reference: They explain "umbra" as a , as if he was saying this: "The law does not justify, therefore ceremonies are not necessary, as is also taught in Acts 15[:529]. What were the ceremonies? Types of Christ, as the Passover signifies Christ's death; the ark signifies the church; and propitiatory sacrifices Christ, who was to placate the Father for us." I do not disapprove this exposition, but it does not explicate enough the nature of the law. 75
Melanchthon then interpreted this section by defining the two (in the 1534 Scholia, three) uses of the law. Not just the ceremonial law, but all law (lex tota) was shadow because it did not justify but could only signify justification promised through Christ. Erasmus rejected just this distinction in his Hyperaspistes I of 1526, where he insisted instead upon a more traditional division of the law into natural, ceremonial, and moral, citing Augustine's De spiritu et littera as proof.76 This resulted in a moral construal of the gospel, which Erasmus equated with Moses' commandments, when he referred in this section to "evangelical commands." Only in Melanchthon's comments on the next phrase, "but the body is Christ's," does one discover what stake he had in the distinction between law and gospel. In 1527 he simply interpreted this phrase to mean that justification was given through Christ. In extensive additions in 1528 Melanchthon revealed the true enemy: Origen and "the great majority of our theologians."77 Their error? Believing that Christ was merely a legislator like Moses, who came to establish a new political entity on earth. This mistaken understanding, evident at the time of Julian the Apostate, continued to this day. In fact, Christ came to proclaim forgiveness of sins, to make satisfaction for our sins, to give the Holy Spirit and eternal life. By believing this gospel we were standing in line with all the "fathers," beginning with Abel, whose sacrifice was accepted because he believed in the words of Gen. 3:16. In the same way David was justified by faith, the Jewish rites and laws merely keeping a people separate for the sake of the coming Christ, to which they testified. At this point Melanchthon returned to his interpretation of this verse and warned the readers of another interpretation: observation of the ceremonial law did not justify, but the Decalogue with its opera moralia did. He then leveled this charge: "And this is the opinion of Origen and those who follow him. However, the readers know that this interpretation must be in no way tolerated. For it fights diametrically both with Paul's meaning and with other scriptures."78 Melanchthon then referred readers to the entire argument in Romans and to Ephesians. He answered the objection that the faith described here was only a historical faith, such as demons and the ungodly possess, and returned to Origen.
Page 46 Origen does not understand fully what Paul calls faith. Therefore he errs since he attributed justification to moral works and not to faith. I have said these things with godly intentions that the readers may be admonished, so that they may read his commentaries with care. Whoever imagines by some other judgment that a bigname author is being censured by me, he is completely mistaken. For I have recounted everything in this little commentary for no other reason and I have repeated Paul's meaning concerning the righteousness of faith only because I see that this doctrine is obscured in these ecclesiastical contentions. And I am anxious that it may reach posterity uncorrupted. 79
Origen and those who read him carelessly made the horrendous mistake of confusing faith and works in the matter of justification. Of course, here Melanchthon refused to attack certain enemies directly. Nevertheless, there was another "bigname author" in Melanchthon's sights besides Origen: Erasmus. What was at stake here were sixteenthcentury debates over the meaning of Colossians and the limits of human freedom. Not only in his argumentum for Colossians, used as a preface for both the Paraphrasis and the Annotationes, but also in the paraphrase and annotations of this passage (and others discussed earlier), Erasmus insisted that Paul excluded ceremonial, not moral, works from salvation. He followed an entire host of medieval and patristic commentators, including Augustine. But Melanchthon argued that the source of this approach, Origen, was misled and that, once followed to its logical conclusion, this approach resulted in a distortion of Paul's point of view (sententia) By making the origin of this defect Origen, he could warn readers away from an entire exegetical tradition and its presentday defender, the moral philosopher Erasmus.80 This final connection, so clearly shown in Melanchthon's comments on this passage, alone is missing from Fraenkel's work. With respect to New Testament exegesis, Melanchthon did not merely trace the beginnings of the perversion of the gospel back to Origen; he also traced it forward to the foremost Origenist of the sixteenth century, Erasmus. In Melanchthon's eyes, Erasmus's dependence on Origen flawed his interpretation of Colossians and, one can assume, other books of the Bible as well. Why, then, did Melanchthon fail to name names, especially given that he realized the reader would have understood him to mean Erasmus? To answer that question Melanchthon's final statement must be taken seriously. For him the stakes were too high to allow the petty jealousies of scholarship to obscure "Paul's understanding (sententia) of the righteousness of faith." He finally had to fulfill the last obligation of the theologian and witness for posterity to this very sententia incorrupta. This same concern marked his opposition to Erasmus on the freedom of the will. The bulk of Erasmus's argument in Hyperaspistes I, published in 1526, attacked Luther's principle of sola scriptura. Erasmus had deflected Luther's charge of atheistic skepticism by arguing that the uncertainty he had described in De libero arbitrio arose not from the Scripture itself but from its various interpreters. To overcome such uncertainty, Erasmus appealed to the consensus patristicus and the authority of the church.81 More specifically, Erasmus even offered Augustine's refusal in his Retractiones (I,9) to give up the concept of the free will as proof that the church's insistence on some human freedom in matters of salvation derived not from philosophy
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but from the Scripture, specifically as interpreted by Origen. 82 From Melanchthon's point of view, however, Origen was precisely the problem. From the outside Melanchthon's approach to the Fathers will always seem opportunistic or eclectic. But placed within his understanding of church history and the struggle between God's promise and the devil's lies, both his use and censure of the patristic exegesis take on new consistency. However, one dare not construe this dialectic as merely a static, scholarly endeavor, an attempt to revive classical Christianity in a barbarous age. Enemies and distorters of the patristic witness to the promise of the gospel confronted Melanchthon in the present, not only in the polemical battles of the Reformation but also in the exegetical offerings of one of the most respected biblical scholars in northern Europe. In that struggle what was at stake for Melanchthon was fidelity not merely to an idealized patristic consensus but to the sententia Pauli and hence to the biblical primum et verum and the testimonies of the Fathers thereunto. Melanchthon, like John Sutel, never read the biblical text alone. Hovering around his writing stand and echoing in his lecture room were the work of others on the same text of Scripture. Melanchthon's use of such sources was subtle, often obscure and never uncritical. He demonstrated a wide range of sources and a variety of interests in them. Read outside this wider range of voices, the richness and intricacy of Melanchthon's own exegesis can often go unnoticed. Within the range found in the Scholia one may clearly hear a conversation developing with Erasmus over the text and tradition of Colossians. Thanks in large measure to their common endorsement of the humanists' battle cry, ad fontes, these theologians considered both text and tradition central to their interpretation of the Bible. However, Melanchthon departed from Erasmus precisely in his consistent use of Wittenberg's confession of the gospel to understand Paul's text and to judge the patristic witness. Thus, Melanchthon's polemic against Erasmus's position on free will and human and divine righteousness rested in large measure on the younger man's ability to turn the text and tradition, especially the views of Origen, against the older humanist. To understand how Melanchthon could design a commentary that also functioned as a form of polemical theology, however, we must also investigate his exegetical method.
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4— Ratio seu Methodus Melanchthonis ! The deaf speaking to the deaf! 1 That was Melanchthon's judgment of the exegetical and theological books of his time. Filled with controversies, confused and obscure, written to fill huge tomes, these books bristled with , disputes over words. They worried over whether God could do evil or where the souls of the dead went. Such questions promoted curiosity, not piety. At base, these books and their authors demonstrated that they lacked the tools for properly interpreting the Scriptures. Paul, on the contrary, demanded that bishops be , that is, that they were to have a knowledge of "dialectics and rhetoric." What then, since sacred letters can neither be correctly understood nor learned without these arts? For what may that person understand who cannot judge concerning the words, who has learned no basis from grammar for construing a speech or figures, who has not learned from dialectics or rhetoric what are the longer parts of a speech, what are the order of propositions, of arguments: which agree among themselves, which disagree, where the parts of the arguments cohere, and where not? All who do not see these things in the Sacred Books and who are full of the most subtle disputations, they simply reveal that they know nothing.2
In this context Melanchthon carried out the attack on Thomas, Hugh of St. Cher, and Nicholas of Lyra referred to in the last chapter.3 Their grammatical errors could perhaps have been excused "if in a detailed exposition they had still retained the sum of the meaning of the Scriptures they were interpreting."4 Instead, they deviated from the author's intent and taught things foreign to true piety, in large part "on account of ignorance of these arts." How infelicitously they interpreted Paul's letter to the Romans, "because they did not pay attention to the proper division [oeconomia] of the speech." True, the Holy Spirit alone explained the Scriptures, but since the Spirit taught "through the Word, the nature of speech must be known. Indeed, because without the knowledge of these arts no one can make a judgment about a speech, we
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apply this instrument to the interpretation of Scripture." 5 What did the gift of tongues, described in 1 Cor. 1214, mean if not eloquentia? This excerpt from a much longer discussion of Col. 2:8, which will be examined more closely in chapter 6, provides a thumbnail sketch of Melanchthon's own exegetical method. Where others had failed, Melanchthon confidently rushed in, armed with grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic, to face the complexities of biblical exegesis. Grammar, the least important—or, rather, the source of the most excusable errors—provided a decent understanding of a text's words and phrases. Even more important, rhetoric and dialectic posed precisely those questions of the text that could break open the author's meaning. From rhetoric one learned the parts of an oration, and from dialectic one discovered the progression of propositions and argumenta: where texts agreed and disagreed; how the parts rightly cohered, and where they did not. Concern for rhetorical form and dialectical content allowed the exegete access to the "central idea" (summa sententiae) of an author, to the "proper division" (oeconomia) of the biblical work.6 This chapter will examine Melanchthon's exegetical method in order both to set in context his use and subtle critique of Erasmus and to clarify the unique form and structure of the Scholia.7 One thing is clear. Erasmus had leveled a similar critique against scholastic theology, complaining about controversies over words and exhorting bishops to follow Christ's way of concord.8 The Pauline Grammar Melanchthon first concerned himself for the text of Colossians. As was demonstrated in the previous chapter, he employed the Greek text in conjunction with Erasmus's translation and the Vulgate. In this connection he occasionally attempted to find the correct word or phrase to render the Greek, for example translating , interpreting it asprobabilis ratio in light of its use by Greek rhetoricians.9 But Melanchthon also encountered other grammatical conventions in his reading of Paul. He often pointed out the Hebraisms in the text. Here Erasmus led the way, having pointed out Hebraisms in Col. 1:13, 1:15 (where he attacked Thomas for reading into the text Platonic notions of divine ideas), 2:23, and 3:6.10 Melanchthon indicated that the words of Col. 3:12 ' ' signify according to Hebraic custom the viscera, what we call 'from the soul."'11 The younger exegete had discovered at least one instance of a Pauline Hebraism that Erasmus had missed. More generally, Melanchthon discovered how Paul used figures of speech in the text, such as in Col. 3:1 ("those things that are above"). The figure of speech is in Holy Writ. For "those things that are above" signify heavenly or spiritual goods, such as faith, peace of mind, patience, charity, chastity and similar things. "Those things that are below" signify carnal goods, such as pleasures, riches and the glory of the world.12
He then cited several instances of this same figure in other parts of the Bible. In his paraphrase of Colossians, Erasmus had given Paul's meaning a speculative twist,
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writing, "You have arisen to the study of sublime and eternal things" and "seek sublime things worthy of heaven." 13 Here again Melanchthon quietly corrected Erasmus by applying the phrase to the basic (evangelical) distinction between works of the flesh and fruits of the Spirit. Melanchthon also mentioned particular types of figures employed by Paul. Thus, the phrase "Chirographum affixed to the cross" (Col. 2:14) was a form of prosopopoeia, or personification, similar to the figures used in Rom. 8:3 ("He condemned sin through sin"), Hos. 13:14 ("O death, I will be your death"), or Eph. 2:16 ("Through the cross killing our enmity").14 Melanchthon called Col. 1:15 (''who is the image of the invisible God") a , that is, a description of the person of Christ.15 Col. 1:9 ("so that you may be filled with the knowledge of his will, in all wisdom and prudence") was a tautology, "because knowledge of God's will is itself spiritual wisdom."16 Here again Melanchthon clearly had Erasmus to thank in defining these specific figures, because when discussing prosopopeia and prosopographia in De rhetorica, he explicitly mentioned Erasmus's De copia.17 Paulus Rhetor Melanchthon was convinced that Paul himself wittingly employed these figures, personifications, prosographies, tautologies and the like. Not merely ignorance of grammar but ignorance of the rhetorical moves Paul himself attempted led to errors and disputes. Paul in his letters, like Cicero in his orations, consciously followed the rules of good speech. Here was Melanchthon's unique contribution to Pauline interpretation. While the church fathers seemed embarrassed by Paul's plain style, 18 Melanchthon was much more confident in the Apostle's rhetorical abilities. Erasmus, too, for all of the places he encouraged the use of rhetoric in biblical interpretation, never consistently analyzed Paul's letters using the parts of Ciceronean rhetoric. 19 In Melanchthon's view the letter of Colossians had a certain unmistakeable structure. It began, as all good letters should, with an epigrapha or inscription. In this case Paul used it to describe his office or function as a preacher like Moses or the other Old Testament prophets.20 Col. 1:311, while clearly an exordium, gave Melanchthon some problems, since it seemed to contradict the form of good letter writing. Nevertheless, lie stoutly defended his method of analyzing Paul. I may perhaps seem inept, if I compare Paul's speech to rhetorical precepts. I nonetheless think that a Pauline oration can be better understood if the order (series) and disposition of all the parts are considered. For in no case did Paul write without some order or reason, which the letter itself demonstrates.21
Here Melanchthon gave his students and his detractors insight into his approach to the Pauline text. While it might have seemed inept to compare Paul's letter with rhetorical rules, the text was better understood by regarding Paul's series et dispositio, which he defined as "an apt comparison of the parts and arguments of an oration."22 Paul wrote nothing without a reason or order. This single assumption completely dominated the way in which Melanchthon understood the text. He insisted that the
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Pauline text be viewed in the context of Paul's own intention and goal, which could best be ascertained by using rhetoric. At the same time, Melanchthon realized that especially regarding his rhetorical principles, Paul hid his intentions. In his continuation of comments on Col. 1:3 he wrote that "Paul has his loci, by which he prepares souls; he has some basis (ratio) of teaching and narrating, what is not revealed in the exposition. What is this but what the Greeks call a leap in the dark or, as Chrysostom says, to fight at night." 23 Melanchthon described two rhetorical goals: to prepare souls and to teach and narrate some ratio. Indeed, Melanchthon found both in Colossians. But Paul gave the reader no notice of what he was up to. This meant that the reader had to take the plunge and be prepared to analyze the text with the tools of rhetoric in order to discover Paul's intent. In the case of Col. 1:311, Melanchthon prefaced his remarks by reminding his readers that there were two kinds of exordia: gratulatio et imprecatio, by which Melanchthon meant "thanksgiving and prayer."24 First, Paul employed a form of gratulatio. Melanchthon was confident that this insight, coupled with another rhetorical device, cleared up a crucial obscurity in the text: Paul seemed to be arguing that the Colossians had merited eternal life through their works of love!25 The first locus of the exordium, namely the gratulatio, has nothing obscure. Only it must be observed that Paul used a distributio. For although he could have said, "I hear your godliness is proclaimed," he divided the name of the whole thing according to the parts: "I hear your faith, love, and hope is proclaimed."26
In this case, one had to be careful that, , Paul distributed the meaning of the phrase audio praedicari to all three nouns. On the basis of this rhetorical insight Melanchthon was able to read the text in an evangelical light by giving precedence to faith. In comments on Col. 1:9, Melanchthon again took up the rhetorical division of Paul's work and argued that from this verse onward Paul employed the other kind of exordium, namely a precatio, which he divided into three parts. This is a precatio [prayer], in which he prays for the Colossians: first that the supreme and most firm knowledge of God's will may reach them, and second that they may bear good fruit, and third that they may prefer the cross and in the cross may learn in addition the presence and good will of God toward them.27
He then followed this division in the following verses. In verse 9 Paul established "a firm and certain knowledge." Verses 1011a proved that God desired to help us, "to know and to increase in the knowledge of God." Finally, verse 11b concerned afflictions. Melanchthon's use of rhetoric to interpret the biblical text was not without its forerunners, among them Erasmus. Again, De copia, a book Melanchthon himself cited in De rhetorica, and other works of Erasmus (for example, De conscrihendis epistolis, published in 1522) passed on the antique tradition of the form of letters and speeches.28 However, as was mentioned earlier, Erasmus never applied rhetorical terminology consistently to the Pauline corpus and never broke down the various parts of Paul's letters for his readers as Melanchthon did. On the contrary, as shall
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be shown in the final chapter of this book, the Dutch humanist even criticized Melanchthon's 1532 commentary on Romans for its organizational unclarity. Argumentum Magistri Pauli If Col. 1:311 had prepared the hearts of Paul's listeners to receive the message, what did the rest of Paul's letter contain? To answer this question requires consideration of the heart of Melanchthon's exegetical method. It was, after all, Melanchthon who invented a new type of speech, the genus didaktikon, which used dialectical categories for its rules of invention. Chief among them was what Melanchthon called at various times in Colossians the oeconomia, summa, sententia scriptorum, argumentum, status, scopus, or . 29 These rhetorical terms corresponded to the dialectical question quid sit (what a thing is).30 In the Scholia Melanchthon prefaced his exegesis with a discussion of the argumentum. His approach helped to focus Paul's comments in that book on Wittenberg's gospel and thereby to exclude any other interpretation, especially that of Erasmus. As is customary in other writings to set up at the beginning what the argumentum of a work is, so in the Pauline epistles the reader must first be told what is being talked about, what is the status of this letter, in what (as the Greeks say) the , so that the reader may know what ought to be asked and expected of the entire writing.31
Melanchthon acknowledged his debt to rhetoric. He insisted that in the same way one used rhetoric to analyze other writings, the reader was to search for the main point of Paul's letter, otherwise one would not know what to expect ex toto scripto. Without the argumentum, an exegete could easily mutilate a text. With it, one could know the "organization (series) of the entire speech" and could thereby attain the "certain and sure understanding" (certa sententia) of the author, "which can defend and teach the conscience.''32 With this last comment Melanchthon made his intent clear. This didactic approach to Paul served the conscience itself, providing it with the certainty it needed. When, instead of using the actual argumentum Pauli, the exegete imagined that this letter concerned simply the abolition of Mosaic laws and ceremonies, then the Scriptures were not interpreted but dismembered (discerpere) In fact, such an exegete mistook a sententiola (minor opinion) in Col. 2:16 for the meaning of the entire text.33 Melanchthon's methodical search for the overall meaning of Colossians, for the argumentum Pauli, set him at odds with none other than Erasmus and belittled the older man's work for mistaking a minor argument for Paul's main point. Thus, Melanchthon's method itself provided a venue for his most biting condemnations of Erasmus. Against this mistaken view of Paul's argument in Colossians,34 Melanchthon took a different tack. In one paragraph he summarized his particular approach to this text, an approach that remained constant through all editions of the Scholia. Therefore the argumentum or status of this epistle is: What is the gospel. The apostles declared some new teaching in the whole world. Here he defines it—and
Page 53 he does not define it briefly but copiously differentiates Christian righteousness from the human righteousness derived from our industry, our powers, either on the basis of human commandments, the Mosaic law, or the Decalog. 35
Here Melanchthon merged rhetorical questions with dialectical answers. Here the entire point of the letter received its sharpest definition, precisely a finitio (the answer to the dialectical question Quid sit?: the chief interest of Melanchthon's exegesis). This letter dealt with the one thing nearest and dearest to a Wittenberg exegete's heart: the gospel and its distinction (another dialectical category) from human righteousness, which included not only Mosaic ceremonies (Erasmus had said as much!) but also the Decalog. Melanchthon, of course, realized that this definition did not hold true for the entire letter. So he added, "Afterwards he teaches some precepts concerning morals."36 However, even this secondary section revealed Paul's gospel. The apostle customarily began with the gospel and only afterward handed down "moral precepts." The world, on the contrary, only taught ''moral precepts" and attempted to constitute its righteousness before God from that.37 Paul taught a righteousness "through faith, if we believe our sins have been forgiven freely on account of Christ," in line with one of Melanchthon's favorite texts from Isaiah (53:11), "Knowledge of him will justify many." Here Melanchthon moved immediately from one dialectical question, quid sit, which provided the conscience a certa sententia, to another, quid effectus (what is the effect), by adding that this Pauline gospel was "the greatest consolation" for those same consciences.38 Melanchthon applied this argumentum rigorously to the text of Colossians, beginning with Col. 1:12. The introduction to this verse shows Melanchthon's exegetical artistry. Here he begins the narratio [the second part of an oration after the exordium], in which he defines the gospel. And because before he had prayed that the superior knowledge of the gospel may teach them, he now adds what that gospel is. But the gospel is a speech in which the benefits given through Christ are recited. Paul recounts these benefits in this place with a rhetorical congeries [accumulation], and the narratio was begun from the affectus [disposition]: "Give thanks to God, who made you acceptable for a portion of the inheritance of the saints," that is, for the consequent benefits of the gospel.39
After having aroused his audience with an exordium, Paul now turned to the task of defining the gospel. Melanchthon then faced the problem that Col. 1:12 did not sound at all like a definition. His solution? Paul used the rhetorical congeries40 and began from the effect and benefits of the gospel (the gospel is, after all, a recitation of Christ's benefits) rather than from a logical definition. All well and good. However, Melanchthon also had to face another problem. Col. 1:1519 did not seem to talk about this gospel or its benefits at all. The reason? "However, a description of the person of Christ is inserted in passing."41 This provided the proper context for his labeling Col. 1:1519 a prosopographia. He thus transformed what Erasmus thought was one of Paul's main points into a digression. The rest of the Scholia shows a similarly strict use of the argumentum to organize the text. Comments on Col. 1:23 began,
Page 54 Up to here [i.e., Col. 1:1222], he has defined the gospel. Now he adds the circurnstantia: how the benefits shown in the gospel reach us, as if he were saying, "You promise enormous things . . . but how may we obtain such a treasure?" Here he responds, but as in a brief epistle, briefly. Therefore no particle, however brief, must be passed over with neglect. Thus he says, "You have been redeemed if you remain firm in faith," that is, you have received forgiveness of sins if you have believed that sins are forgiven on account of Christ. 42
Melanchthon's rules of rhetoric suggested the use of circumstantiae to adumbrate a definition.43 He excused Paul's brevity (Col. 1:23a) on the basis of the shortness of the epistle. In 1528, however, this verselet allowed Melanchthon the freedom to discuss receiving God's promise by faith. After an excursus on Paul's own ministry (Col. 1:23b), Melanchthon then addressed the circumstantiae of affliction and God's aid (Col. 1:242:3).44 Col. 2:4 began a new section of the letter, a point Melanchthon emphasized more clearly in the 1528 edition of the Scholia by putting above the text, in capital letters, "Second Part of the Epistle" and by introducing the section as follows: Above, after having concluded the definition ofthe gospel, where he explains what Christian righteousness is, here he adds an admonition in which he prescribes avoidance of those things that contaminate Christian doctrine, like a physician when he explains the remedy also warns about what may injure good recovery. But Paul will do this a good bit after a notable comparison of Christian and carnal righteousness. For whoever does not hold this distinction is completely ignorant of Christ.45
By admonition (admonitio) Melanchthon seemed to be thinking of that section of a speech called a contentio, consisting of a confirmatio and confutatio. In this case, Melanchthon's division allowed him to bring the argumentum to bear upon the various warnings in Col. 2 by invoking the rhetorical device of the collatio.46 This chapter was not, as Erasmus had imagined, simply about ceremonial laws of the Mosaic code. What was at stake was the entire gospel, and here the good doctor, Paul, had prescribed the correct medicine for maintaining a healthy faith by constructing a collatio between human and divine righteousness, a distinction at the heart of Melanchthon's own theology. The consequences for Melanchthon's interpretation of this letter were enormous. If Paul was defending the gospel against objections by making a collatio, then Col. 2:4 had to do not with fancy rhetoric but with the distortions of reason; then Col. 2:8a delimited the realm of reason from that of the righteousness of Christ; then in Col. 2:8b Paul taught that faith limited the use of human traditions and political ordinances to the civil realm.47 Col. 2:910 moved the collatio further along by proposing a positive definition of Christian righteousness. Then, having defined Christian righteousness, Col. 2:11 completed the definition by adding "what Christ may do in believers."48 This definition had two parts: "putting to death (mortificatio) [Col. 2:1112] and making alive (vivificatio) [Col. 2:1315]." Again the version of 1528 emphasized the division of the epistle by placing above Col. 2:16 the word "Epilogue."49 This division constituted the fourth and final major section in a good speech, the peroration. Melanchthon introduced this section by reminding the reader,
Page 55 Here he begins the epilogue, because before he taught what Christian righteousness is and compared it with carnal and civil righteousness. He adds an epilogue concerning ceremonies, and Mosaic "politics" and concerning human traditions, as if he were saying this: Because righteousness is putting to death and bringing to life, therefore the observance of the ceremonies of the Mosaic law or human traditions is not demanded. 50
With this rhetorical tool Melanchthon circumvented the most damaging objection to his claim that Paul was speaking not of Mosaic ceremonies but of justification by faith. The sententiola, which Erasmus had tried to use to interpret the entire epistle, had become merely part of an epilogue. Even this epilogue had a structure for Melanchthon. It began with Col. 2:1617. Verses 1819 added a caveat and verses 2023 a ratio, that is, reasons brought forth to support an argument. This ratio touched upon both mortificatio (verse 20) and vivificatio (verse 21). True to form, when Melanchthon reached Col. 3 he summarized the previous, now concluded argument as a way of introducing the next section of the letter. Most striking in this summary is Melanchthon's move from definition to effect, that is, to consolation. Paul had taught in the preceding two chapters how we are justified. "And it is this anchor, this harbor for the afflicted and terrified conscience to see and to feel."51 When we see our righteousness is like filthy rags, Melanchthon asked, how can our merits console our terrified minds? However, "when we cast our eyes back on Christ and discern that he has made satisfaction for our sins and that on account of him we are forgiven, then we receive consolation and obtain life, righteousness, peace and all good things."52 To stress the break between the comfort of the argumentum of Colossians and this new section, Melanchthon added, This is the first part of Christian doctrine, which Paul has taught in his epistle up to this point. In the following chapters he teaches moral precepts because when that faith, about which has been spoken, effects new and spiritual life and participation in the divine nature, it is necessary that actions and moral behavior, of the kind that God demands, follow. Where works of this kind do not exist, there is not true faith but some simulation of faith.53
This section typified Melanchthon's theology and exegesis in the late 1520s. One had to begin with justification by faith, which defined the gospel and had the effect of consoling the conscience. But because this same faith also effected a new and spiritual life and participation in the divine nature, actions and practice necessarily followed. Without them, faith itself was a fraud. This also locates the true simul in Melanchthon's thought: not in Luther's radical description of the believer as simul iustus et peccator (at the same time righteous and sinner) but in the gospel's effect on the believer, simul mortificatio et vivificatio (at the same time being put to death and made alive). Just as the law terrified and put to death, the gospel consoled and made alive. How did Paul show this train of thought here? Melanchthon explained that in this chapter one discovered "a rhetorical circumduction: 'Since you have been raised again, seek the things that are above."'54 The Christian was to live life and exercise faith between the cause and
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"must" of the gospel ("since you have been raised") and the possibility inherent in the admonition ("go ahead and seek''). 55 With few exceptions, rhetorical terminology disappears altogether from these last chapters. Melanchthon treated the material as a list, moving from one kind of Christian behavior to another in a disconnected manner. The heart of the matter had been dealt with in Col. 12; the rest needed only occasional adumbration. As a result, 75 percent of the 1528 Scholia covered the first two chapters of Colossians.56 A final note: Melanchthon adhered to the argumentum Pauli so rigidly that he skipped entire verses or sections of Paul's letter. Thus, he completely ignored the concluding greeting, as well as the ethical section dealing with the relations between husband and wife, children and parents, and slaves and masters. He also ignored other problems in the text simply because he regarded them as secondary to the main point.57 This singlemindedness separated him from almost every other exegete of his time. This singlemindedness also represented a criticism of Erasmus. Several times in defining the argumentum of Colossians, Melanchthon criticized those who applied the Apostle's arguments only to ceremonial laws. As already demonstrated in chapter 3, Melanchthon had Origen and Erasmus in his sights. Erasmus's own argumentum, used for both the annotations to the New Testament and the paraphrase of Colossians, had argued that very point. He thought Paul disputed first against those who imagined that angels were the only mediators between God and the human race. However, there was more: "Then they mixed Jewish and philosophical superstition with the doctrine of Christ, observing some rules (instituta) of law and superstitiously observing the sun, moon, stars and elements of this world, to which they taught we were liable."58 This brief reference to the observation of law had considerable consequences for other annotations. In a note on Col. 2:8 Erasmus argued that Paul warned the Colossians "lest someone lead them from the right way of faith into error, ruin, and servitude to the Mosaic law." Erasmus penned similar comments for Col. 2:914, and 17.59 In this way a completely contrary image of Paul arose, one that undermined the bases of Wittenberg's theology and therefore could not go unchallenged. Contextus Pauli: The Locus communis Given this detailed discussion of Paul's argumentum, the reader might be surprised to learn that rhetorical and dialectical analysis, as described thus far, did not account for the bulk of the Scholia. Nor has this discussion fully captured Melanchthon's method. One crucial piece of the puzzle remains unexamined: namely, the new or, better, more thorough way Melanchthon employed loci communes in this particular commentary, an approach that defined his peculiar method for the rest of his life. For those using a different method, such as John Calvin, this device, coupled with his tendency to skip verses, caused frustration.60 But for Melanchthon it was a natural result of his study of dialectic. To be sure, Melanchthon was capable of writing a commentary without employing loci communes in the way the term will be used here. Only a few years after the Scholia first appeared on the market, he wrote a short work (64 leaves, compared to
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the Scholia's 106) on Romans entitled Dispositio orationis in Epistola Pauli ad Romanos. There he analyzed Romans using only the rhetorical method described earlier. Only in connection with Romans 13 did he interrupt his description of Paul's dispositio—in order to discuss the necessity of obeying the magistrates. Otherwise, he began with Paul's argumentum and throughout the book related its different parts to each other and to Paul's basic point. 61 Melanchthon did not simply look for loci communes in the works of those whom he studied; he used them himself as part of his own work as classroom orator. The genus didaktikon, which he had invented in the Institutiones rhetoricae, had its place in the classroom and used the tools of dialectic. However, even before this new invention, in the De rhetorica of 1519, Melanchthon had defined "commentary" in this way. The basis of exegesis is something different—and that more generally—when we explain authors with complete comments. The Greeks call this type , because, though varied, still a few more things must be said. Every speech is composed either for teaching or for history or for persuasion or allegory. Those that are composed for teaching, for example, are written exactly with a philosophical method. But before everything else, in a speech composed for teaching may there always be in your hands demonstrative questions, about which I taught above: whether something exists, what it is, what characteristics (species) does it have, what purposes, how are these characteristics compared among themselves.62
The basis of dialectical classroom teaching and commentary for Melanchthon derived from the basic questions: whether a thing exists, what a thing is, what its causes and effects are, what it is in whole and in part, what its genus and its species are, how it agrees with or contradicts other things. As Melanchthon also wrote in his Dialectices libri quatuor, first published in 1528, these questions defined the dialectical loci communes and thus the work of a teacher.63 Before examining how Melanchthon applied these loci in the Scholia, consideration must be given to Erasmus's explication of his own exegetical method, which Melanchthon himself praised: the Ratio seu methodus compendio perveniendi ad veram theologiam of 1519. Intended both as a preface to the second edition of Erasmus's New Testament and as an independent writing, this work provided a blueprint for Erasmus's approach to the Scripture. It revealed at several levels both the convergence and the disparity between Wittenberg and the Dutch New Testament critic.64 Rather than commence a broad comparison, this treatment will focus on two much narrower historical questions. First, what would Melanchthon have seen in this work that would have caused him to write such a glowing review to Spalatin and to find that "many things agree with Martin"?65 By reading the Ratio seu methodus not simply according to Erasmus's intent but through the eyes of an ever more convinced student of Martin Luther (cum Martino!) one discovers many things that indeed converged with Luther's theology as Melanchthon would have encountered and understood it in 1519. At the beginning of the work, Erasmus emphasized the necessity of languages and the liberal arts.66 He appealed to an affective, not simply an argumentative form of theology.67 He insisted that the central task of the theologian was to discuss faith, not frivolous questions, a crucial point that occasioned hefty polemic against scho
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lastic exegesis and theology and a certain reserve, for example, toward christological disputes. 68 He attacked the state of monasticism and monastic vows.69 His list of favored biblical books not only matched Melanchthon's lectures (Matthew, Romans, 1 and 2 Corinthians) but also contained one crucial book (Romans) in common with Luther's own list from the 1522 preface to the German New Testament.70 Despite the differences in method detailed in the following paragraphs, Erasmus, like his Wittenberg counterparts, attacked the use of the Quadriga (the fourfold method of biblical interpretation) and viewed the identification of Hebraic forms of speech as crucial to good exegesis.71 Even more important, Erasmus joined with Luther to a significant degree in attacking Luther's theological opponents for some of the same reasons. He seemed to agree with the NinetyFive Theses by categorizing indulgences as dubia.72 He attacked the pope for neglecting his proper duties (defined according to Erasmus s philosophia Christi) In this regard he even applied Matthew 16:1819 to all Christians and contrasted the intent of John 21:1618 (feed my sheep) to the behavior of some who ruled over and subjugated Christ's sheep.73 Keeping in mind how fluid the language and expressions of the newly emerging evangelical theology were at the time, many of Erasmus's comments about the gospel message itself could also have been construed as supporting Wittenberg's evangelicals. He defined faith as fiducia.74 He divided the Christian life into faith and love and gave a certain priority to faith.75 He contrasted trust in oneself to true faith.76 Using John 15:13, he insisted that all good fruit the believer bore had to be ascribed to the Vine, "without which we are nothing except fuel for the fire."77 Surely Melanchthon and Luther both could have appealed to such statements as "Do you see that everywhere [Paul] calls our righteousness grace and gift? What does he add? Through the one Jesus Christ."78 Erasmus spoke of the imputation of Abraham's faith as the only thing that pleased God.79 He even argued that in Ephesians Paul wrote, "He wanted the accepted salvation to be borne by faith alone."80 No wonder Melanchthon could review Erasmus's work in such glowing terms, and no wonder he held out such hope, as did Luther, for their joining forces in 1519. In the face of such a broad range of agreements, a second question must be posed. Could Melanchthon on the basis of this document be seen as a student of Erasmus in matters of theology or method? Here the answer must be categorically no. Every place the multa cum Martino convenientia emerged, certain critical though subtle differences also materialized. Erasmus's desire for "a bringing together [collatio] not a conflict" in theology was attacked by Luther in De servo arbitrio for its lack of faith; Melanchthon used the same expressed desire for peace to condemn the Dutch humanist's own warlike Hyperaspistes.81 Where Erasmus viewed the Scripture in terms of salvation history and placed Jesus' sayings and the Gospels at the center (ad fontes!) Melanchthon found the scopus of the Scripture in Romans and justification by faith alone.82 Where Luther and Melanchthon both distinguished between law and gospel in the Scripture, Erasmus consistently constructed a grand unity between the two, culminating in the philosophia Christi, an overarching moral construal of the gospel in which Christ provided the Christian with an ideal example. Thus Erasmus centered his description of the gospel in the creation of a Christian people, not in the forgive
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ness of sins. 83 His appeal for harmony and concord reflected the very center of Christ's gospel for him.84 In this regard he also clearly divided the Old Testament from the New and John the Baptist from the ministry of Jesus, using a variety of epochs to distinguish the times before and after the gospel, something neither Luther nor Melanchthon saw fit to do.85 Erasmus also did not conceive the world, as Luther and Melanchthon did, in terms of God's twofold righteousness. Thus, he portrayed the Christian community, in a way reminiscent of Plato's Republic, as a series of concentric circles, with Christ in the middle, the priests and bishops in the first circle, worldly princes in the second, and the common people in the third.86 Thus, even after strongly criticizing papal decrees he could still write that even the crudest among them was nearer the "simplicity of Christ" than the best of the emperor's laws.87 The Ratio seu methodus revealed that Erasmus and Melanchthon differed most strikingly of all in their exegetical methods. Not only did Erasmus not apply rhetorical categories in the same way that Melanchthon did, and not only did the two differ considerably in their construal of Paul's argumentum in Colossians; they also developed completely different approaches to biblical interpretation. First, as was already touched upon in the previous chapter, they constructed totally different approaches to the exegetical tradition. Throughout the Ratio seu methodus Erasmus lavished high praise on Origen, especially for his use of allegory.88 At the same time, in the Loci communis of 1521 Melanchthon rejected not all allegory (pace Stupperich and many others) but Origenistic allegory and exegesis.89 Later in the Scholia, as shown in the previous chapter, Melanchthon again rejected Origen in the strongest possible terms. Given this difference, one must reckon that Melanchthon's consistent criticism of Origen always implied a contemporary opponent: the Alexandrian's most avid sixteenthcentury supporter, Erasmus. To be sure, like Melanchthon, Erasmus also criticized patristic exegesis. However, the grounds of their criticism were miles apart. Erasmus excused mistakes in patristic exegesis because the Fathers were human and because some of the worst biblical interpretation came from documents falsely ascribed to them.90 Melanchthon, in search of testes veritatis, blithely ignored problems of authorship—perhaps to spite Erasmus—and judged patristic exegesis on the basis of its convergence with the gospel itself. It was not because they made human mistakes, but because the church's history always evinced a struggle between the gospel and the forces of evil, that earlier exegetes, even Augustine, sometime went astray. Second, Melanchthon and Erasmus also conceived loci communes from very different points of view. The question of the relation between Melanchthon and Erasmus on the use of loci communes has divided recent scholarship.91 In his classic article on the subject from 1926, Paul Joachimsen insisted that Melanchthon was dependent on Rudolf Agricola and Erasmus for the concept.92 In his response nearly thirtyfive years later, Wilhelm Maurer argued for Melanchthon's direct access to the ancient sources for the concept of loci communes; emphasized that unlike Agricola, Melanchthon linked them directly to dialectics; and distinguished Erasmus's "humantypological" use of loci from Melanchthon's "historicalconcrete" use.93 More recently, Siegfried Wiedenhofer has pointed out that the word locus or topos already had two distinct meanings among the ancients, namely "storehouse
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for arguments" and "general captions for universal considerations." 94 To this widely used method of the sixteenth century Melanchthon contributed the ability to move from the specific case—for example, David's sorrow over the murder of Uriah the Hittite—to the general topic, poenitentia. In this way loci communes became organizing principles of a particular subject. They no longer simply defined a topic or heading but also hinted at its content, that is, the basic concepts of a particular subject. Wiedenhofer concludes that whereas the humanist's use of loci always led to an "ecclesial hermeneutic," Melanchthon's approach opened the way to a "theological hermeneutic,'' that is, to a hermeneutic where soteriological and anthropological questions dominated criticism of the late medieval church's theology and practice. Indeed, the difference between Erasmus and Melanchthon on this point, which Maurer had already defined on a moralistic plane, gains new clarity with the addition of the ecclesial element and the distinction between the two traditional uses of loci and Melanchthon's new definition. Erasmus first introduced the notion of loci communes in his De copia of 1512. He noted that commonplaces could be gleaned by theologians from the Scripture. He defined loci in terms of argumenta and other dialectical categories, yet he suggested wandering through various authors to collect a variety of such loci, thus hinting at a definition of the term more along the lines of general headings. In general, however, he also expressed such topics chiefly in moral terms.95 In his Ratio seu methodus Erasmus referred readers to his discussion in De copia and again emphasized the practical usefulness of subsuming Scripture passages under various headings or "nestlets," as he called them. The copia of loci he then adduced were without exception moral categories.96 In anticipation of the objection that the method could be used outside of the ecclesial consensus, Erasmus followed his discussion of loci communes with arguments for the necessity of utilizing the church fathers.97 Melanchthon, as is well documented, used loci communes in theological and soteriological terms, especially in the first edition of his Loci communes theologici.98 He replaced the overwhelmingly moral and persuasive use by Erasmus with a theological and didactic application. At one point he even expressly criticized Erasmus's moralistic use, writing, "Many only require loci of virtues and vices in Scriptures, but such a point of view is more philosophical than Christian. You will understand why I say so a little later on."99 But how did he apply them in the Scholia? First, it must be remembered that the argumentum answered the question of "what a thing is" and that the way Melanchthon applied the argumentum to Colossians in the dispositio was really an application of the question of"what it is in whole and in part." But Melanchthon set the argumentum and dispositio in a larger context. They were but specific cases (species) for the general topics (genera) ofdoctrina Christiana. Thus, any point that Paul made in Colossians could immediately be referred to the same arguments in other letters of his and to the other arguments from the entire Bible. At the same time, opposing interpretations of the same text, objections to Melanchthon's interpretation, and similar or seemingly dissimilar texts could also be discussed under the heading of agreement and contradiction, the focus of medieval exegetical quaestiones. Practically speaking, this special focus of Melanchthon on the dialectical loci in exegesis meant that at virtually any verse within the sweep of Paul's letter, he could
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simply stop his examination of the argumentum or dispositio and launch into a discussion of the particular theme, the locus communis theologicus, found in that text. Just as Melanchthon's concern for the argumentum Pauli allowed him to skip verses and thus to condense the commentary, his own dialectical method permitted him to abandon discussion of the text itself in order to deal at length with a wide range of theological issues of the day. In this way the text functioned for Melanchthon as an entryway into the entire Scripture and as a point of contact with contemporary theological discussion and debate. Thus, loci communes, especially when combined with the argumentum, shaped not just the form but also the content of Melanchthon's biblical commentary. However, there was also a tension between the argumentum Pauli and the loci communes theologici in Melanchthon's exegesis, almost from the beginning. At the end of the decade Melanchthon wrote a dispositio of the book of Romans; but at the beginning he had attempted to extract commonplaces from the same book, resulting in what many have called the first Protestant book of doctrine, the Loci communes theologici. Within actual commentaries produced at this time, the same tension appeared only occasionally, and in very limited measure. 100 For the most part Melanchthon contented himself with interpreting the text at hand, although he used the quaestio, for example, as one way of handling contradictions from other parts of the Bible.101 Perhaps the strain of classroom preparation and Melanchthon's attempts to interpret entire books for his students cut short lengthier discussions. Since all his exegetica before 1527 were published without his permission, Melanchthon had no opportunity to change their shape. In 1527 that all changed. In the Scholia a wide range of what might be construed as interruptions in the text appear. Over and over again Melanchthon broadened the focus of a text and the locus it contained to discuss the theological context and contemporary debate around it. In fact, he transformed the genre of commentary into a form of or, better, an appendix to his own Loci communes of 1522. He did this in two ways. On the one hand, he assembled supporting biblical texts and explained contradictory ones, much as one finds in the Loci communes itself. These comments did not interrupt the flow of the text at any length and in fact paralleled Melanchthon's usage in other earlier commentaries. On the other hand, Melanchthon turned the text into a pretext for thorough discussion of theological issues and objections. Even within the Scholia itself, he occasionally alluded to another part of the commentary for broader discussions of a particular topic. For example, in 1527 Melanchthon closed his remarks on Col. 1:23a102 by referring the reader both to Paul's comments in Rom. 3 and to his own comments in another part of the commentary.103 In 1528 Melanchthon struck that sentence and added a page of polemic against those who imagined that St. Anthony's exercises or St. Martin's philanthropy rather than faith in Christ justified a person before God.104 What were the most important of these theological excursus in 1527? The first occurred in comments over Col. 1:15. As already noted, Melanchthon viewed this text as a prosopographia, inserted into the text by Paul. After discussing this text and its relation to other christological texts (especially Heb. 1:3, John 1:18, and Acts 17:28), he suddenly posed this question: "But it is customary to ask: If God sets nature in motion, is he not the author of evil and sins?"105 Over this quaestio Melanchthon
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instructed the reader for five pages in the original edition, introducing his comments with "It is not good to handle this question at present any more thoroughly." 106 In 1528 he expanded his comments to an eightpage attack on the free will and reason.107 As will become clear in chapter 6, the true opponent was Erasmus. The next long excursus occurred in comments on Col. 2:8, which, as we saw in chapter 1, had a literary life of their own. Because Melanchthon had them printed separately, his contemporaries realized the nature of these comments. In this case, Paul's warning not to be deceived by philosophy set Melanchthon off and resulted first in a classroom dissertatio of approximately ten pages, in a firstedition commentary of nineteen pages, and in a twentyfivepage outburst in 1528.108 Again, the target of this polemic was Erasmus. Melanchthon saved his longest excursus for an attack against Thomas Müntzer and others who either disobeyed civil authority or imagined that the evangelical message implied approval of such disobedience. Already twentyfive pages in 1527, this small book had expanded in 1528 to fortyfour pages of arguments on the place of civil obedience and human traditions, all arising from a single reference in Col. 2:23 regarding care for the body! This again provides insight into Melanchthon's method. After collating other important verses from Scripture on this theme and supporting the Vulgate translation of the text over Erasmus's, Melanchthon then introduced his remarks with these words, similar to the comment on 2 Cor. 2:5: "And because at this place (locus) many things have been said about human traditions, we also want to investigate this locus more fully."109 Of the other possible examples of such theological excursus, none showed Melanchthon's purpose and method better than his comments on Col. 3:11 ("Where there is neither Greek nor Jew"). Again, Melanchthon's comments on the subject grew over the years. In 1527 he wrote seven pages, in 1528 eleven, and in 1534 thirty three. He introduced his topic in 1527 with a slight hedge: "This locus contains some part of Christian freedom."110 By 1534 he simply wrote, "This locus contains the position [sententia] concerning Christian freedom."111 Here the opponent ranged from those who placed too much trust in ceremonies, to those who wanted to reinstitute the laws of Moses as the laws of the state, to those who disputed whether the Decalog pertained to Christians at all. In 1534, Melanchthon also proposed here, for the first time, a third reason to retain the law: "so that obedience may be required."112 The excursus in locos communes theologicos formed the bulk of Melanchthon's exegetical work on Colossians. The four loci discussed in the preceding paragraphs represented, in 1527, approximately fiftysix pages or 41 percent of the entire work and, in 1528, eightyeight pages or 42 percent. Here, between the Loci communes of 1521 and the Dispositio of 1529, Melanchthon produced his ideal Pauline commentary: a relentless search for the author's argumentum combined with a collation of the text with the commonplaces of the Scripture, as they were being debated in the Empire. As unwieldy as this method may seem to modern eyes, Melanchthon viewed it as essential to his work as theologian and exegete. In 1528 Melanchthon took another swipe at the scholastic exegetes and theologians, whom he was trying to replace, using Col. 2:10a ("And in him you are brought to perfection") as a foil. He must have realized that he had returned to the question of the relation between human and Chris
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tian righteousness one too many times in the Scholia, so he defended his approach by writing: Although we have often dealt with these things, nonetheless the entire text of Paul tries to teach us the same thing. I would have to deviate from his meaning [sententia] if I did not want to repeat these things. However, I do this one thing with great zeal, so that I may explain Paul's genuine meaning most simply. And because a good percentage of theologians and scholastics do not teach the righteousness of faith, nor do they show the distinction between philosophic and Christian righteousness, I am accustomed to relate these things with pleasure, so that I may protect godly readers against their pernicious errors to the utmost. For it is no secret that the sum of Christian doctrine hangs from knowledge of the righteousness of faith. 113
This text laid bare Melanchthon's concerns and method. First, Melanchthon saw himself forced by the text itself to repeat himself. Second, he viewed his work as the simplest exposition of Paul's meaning. Third, because the exegetical and theological traditions had missed Paul's point, he felt constrained to defend himself to the best of his ability against their pernicious errors. Why? Because, and this was his fourth point, the whole of Christian doctrine depended on "knowledge of the righteousness of faith." In sum, the text posed the questions, and Melanchthon's faith demanded simple answers and solid refutation. Christian teaching itself was at stake. Did Melanchthon understand his work on Colossians in this way outside the Scholia itself? Without a doubt. His letters left plenty of indication that he was pleased with the outcome (at least with the second edition) and that he saw this as a replacement for or an update of his own Loci communes of 1522. He advised Luther not to reply to Erasmus, since he had already done so in his recently published Scholia of 1527.114 Two years later, on 1 December 1529, he wrote from Wittenberg to Theobald Billicanus in Nördlingen giving him counsel on theological studies. "What I think about the other loci of Christian teaching, I have made clear in the last edition of the commentary on Colossians, from which things a judgment about me can be fully made. I do not flee the church's judgment."115 In later advice to students, probably dated around 1540, he advised students to read the letter to Calatians with the com mentary of Luther, "or my Colossians."116 Did others see Melanchthon's commentary in the same light? At least one man did. Sometime before midNovember 1529, Lazarus Spengler published a book on the then burning question of armed resistance to the emperor. As support for his position he called on the work of Luther on secular authority and of Melanchthon against the peasants. He added, "Likewise, it is completely clear in his commentary on St. Paul's letter to the Colossians, leaf 77."117 In the edition of 1528 there was a discussion of the locus classicus, Acts 5:29. Here Spengler had access to the latest theological opinion of Melanchthon on the issue. The commentary had indeed become a Protestant form of theological textbook. In this form, as will be discovered in part III of this study, it best served to refute Erasmus's positions on justification, the freedom of the will, and the distinction between the two realms. The contours of the relation between Melanchthon and Erasmus now appear in sharper relief. On the one hand, Erasmus served for Melanchthon as one important partner in the conversation around the meaning of Colossians. Where their
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humanist interests in grammar and patristic sources most clearly converged, Melanchthon borrowed freely from Erasmus, while maintaining a certain independence. In matters of rhetoric, too, their common concerns and Erasmus's pioneering work in De copia produced plenty of similarities. However, here, too, important differences emerged. Melanchthon's unique reading of Paul's rhetorical skills and his blending of rhetorical forms with dialectical questions took his interpretation in a quite different direction. Melanchthon realized that he fundamentally disagreed with Erasmus's overall construal of the gospel and its relation to Paul's argument in Colossians. Paul's point was not about angelic mediators or Judaic superstitions but about the gospel itself—understood as justification by faith alone, that is, Christian righteousness. The Wittenberger systematically overturned the Dutch humanist's view, especially under the guise of an attack on Origen. Here Melanchthon's arguments took on added urgency, since debate over the argumentum of Colossians put Wittenberg's very witness to the gospel in question. Finally, Melanchthon's use of loci communes in his exegesis produced a platform from which he could not only attack Erasmus on the narrow field of the interpretation of Colossians but also explore the more serious and immediate problem of the Dutch humanist's theology. Not only that, but the repetition of themes in Paul's letter allowed Melanchthon to return to the issue of the gospel over and over again, precisely as a corrective to the moralistic, philosophical theology of"a good percentage of theologians and scholastics"— Erasmus included. Returning to the question of the relation between Melanchthon, the second Reformer in Wittenberg, and the humanists, it is clear that Melanchthon's method is unthinkable without the humanists' concern for original texts, for the Fathers and the history of the church, for rhetoric and dialectics. In several instances Erasmus clearly provided the material and the method for the younger man. But precisely when the questions of content and theology or of the relation between method and content are posed, the picture changes and Melanchthon's work becomes unthinkable without Luther's theology and Melanchthon's own commitment to and reworking of Wittenberg's evangelical message. To glean from the text Paul's argumentum was the harvest of the humanists; to discover its focus in the gospel of forgiveness of sin freely on account of Christ by faith alone could only have sprung from the rich soil of Wittenberg's proclamation. It is precisely in this balance that Melanchthon could remain both humanist and Reformer and could at the same time use and harshly criticize the work of Erasmus. Otherwise, in his own mind at least, he, too, would have become one of the deaf speaking to the deaf.
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PART III THE CONTROVERSY OVER HUMAN FREEDOM AND CHRISTIAN RIGHTEOUSNESS
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5— Melanchthon's Controversy with Erasmus as Reflected in Their Correspondence, 15241528 By 1527 Melanchthon had perfected and refined his exegetical method to allow direct and expanded attacks against his opponents. The biblical text and the heart of Christian teaching demanded that he defend and prove his interpretation of Paul against all comers, so that the conscience could fix its faith upon something certain. Three such disputes stand out: on free will against Erasmus, on obedience to governmental authorities against the revolutionaries (and against others, like Erasmus, who did not understand the difference in the twofold righteousness of God), and on law and poenitentia against John Agricola. This does not mean that Melanchthon did not have other interests in his commentary as well. He began comments on Col. 4 with a thorough examination of prayer. At various points he had reason to attack the religious practices of the monks. He was always eager to emphasize justification by faith alone against those who imagined that salvation is earned. Throughout he sought to tie the argumentum Pauli to the lives and faith of his readers. About at least one burning issue of the day Melanchthon had very little to say in this commentary: the Lord's Supper controversy. In part his reticence stemmed from the fact that Colossians itself did not mention the Lord's Supper at all. In part his reticence may be construed as a sign either that he viewed this as a matter best handled by Luther or that he wanted to avoid offending the likes of Oecolampadius, Zwingli, and Bucer. 1 In fact, his collection of citations in favor of real presence from the church fathers represented his own serious attempt to affect the outcome of the dispute.2 Moreover, in 1527 Melanchthon used one text, Col. 2:10b, to defend a portion of Luther's position by equating Christ's ascension into heaven with reigning by divine power.3 In 1528 he returned to the same issue in a fully rewritten exposition of Col. 1:18. The reign of Christ meant that he was truly present (vere adsit) distributed gifts, and heard and defended us, Melanchthon wrote. He then attacked the "reasonable" explanation. But reason dreams up something far different. For it is not able to understand that presence of Christ or the power of mercy. But, as Homer imagines Jove was feast
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Outside of this passage and a warning against those who tried to abolish all rites and ceremonies, Melanchthon had little to say to the preachers from the South.5 He did, however, have much to say to another person residing in the southern reaches of the Empire: Erasmus of Rotterdam.6 Up until 1524 Erasmus had managed, outside of some comments in his letters and his attack on von Hutten, to avoid starting a pamphlet war with Luther and Wittenberg. However, pressured by such friends as the vicar general for the diocese of Constance John Fabri, by his fellow countryman Pope Adrian VI, and by political leaders, Erasmus took up his pen against Luther. His topic, whether the human will participated to some degree freely in salvation, was raised by Luther himself in his Assertion of All Articles, where he wrote that the "free will" was free in name only.7 Erasmus, promising to argue on the basis of Scripture alone, rejected Luther's "assertion" and took instead the role of a skeptic, examining various biblical references that seemed to him, as a neutral observer, unclear on this issue. After a look at the evidence pro and con, Erasmus decided in favor of some freedom of the will for, among other things, three reasons. First, it protected God from the charge of injustice. Second, it allowed for human merit in the process of justification. Third, and most important for a moral philosopher like Erasmus, it helped undergird the human quest for virtue. According to his own testimony, Luther delayed responding in part because he did not think Erasmus's arguments were sophisticated enough to merit a response. However, urged by his colleagues, including Melanchthon, Luther went to work. The result, De servo arbitrio, published in 1525, was a harsh, deeply sarcastic attack against the Dutch humanist. Luther found Erasmus's claim to neutrality to be the heart of the problem. He also expressly praised Melanchthon's Loci communes as a book worthy of taking a place alongside the Bible itself. Erasmus in turn replied in 1526 and 1527 with a twovolume work entitled Hyperaspistes.8 In it he criticized not only Luther but also Melanchthon. Melanchthon's position on the freedom of the will was wellknown. Already in 1521 he treated it as the first topic in his Loci communes theologici.9 He began by emphasizing that his exposition would not follow human opinions but, rather, would explain everything "most simply and plainly."10 He pitted the Scripture against human reason and against philosophy, which he claimed obscured Christ's benefits by its insistence on human freedom. As the early church had been misled by Plato and his insistence on the power of the ratio (reason), the medieval, scholastic theologians had mistakenly followed Aristotle and his notion of the liberum arbitrium (free choice). After presenting a simplified anthropology, in which he differentiated the intellect ("the power of knowing") from the will or affectus ("the power by which what is known is either pursued or fled from"), Melanchthon attacked attempts to limit the affections to bodily appetites, to divide the soul further, or to define a liberum arbitrium or ratio between these two powers. His point was to distinguish law from grace.
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To the question of the will's freedom, Melanchthon answered with a resounding no on two counts. First, divine predestination eliminated the possibility of freedom. 11 Second, human experience with the higher affections proved our lack of freedom. Although human beings possessed some liberty in external works, God observed the internal motions of the heart (Scripture's word for the voluntas, the seat of affections). Although human beings, especially the ungodly, could simulate such freedom, they were not able, as the scholastics had imagined, to elicit an act of love of God. Far from being a mere infirmity of nature, the lack of control human beings exercised over the highest affections lay at the heart of the human predicament. Freedom in external works gained nothing in the face of God's demands for the purity of the heart and resulted only in Pharisaism. In 1522 Melanchthon reworked his arguments in this section of the Loci. First, he reversed the order, discussing the lack of freedom in human affections before predestination. Second, he went into more detail on the competing anthropologies of Aristotle and Plato, claiming that the former placed the will over the intellect by using the term liberum arbitrium, while the latter placed the intellect over the will and used the term ratio. Either way, Melanchthon rejected the notion of the will's freedom. Third, he made a much more forceful distinction between flesh and spirit on two levels. On the one hand, he insisted that both human will and human intellect operated only on the level of the flesh, judged everything in terms of selfinterest, and therefore were incapable of knowing God or choosing spiritual good.12 On the other, he defined flesh to include the very highest parts of the human being. Thus, the will could experience freedom in externals but never in the internal affections. Fourth, although in both 1521 and 1522 Melanchthon insisted that the will's basic lack of freedom was a matter of human experience, in 1522 he added the following testimony of common sense. The light of nature wanted only its own good. It therefore would always flee evil. Since the flesh would inevitably view God's will to kill the flesh as evil, it would always flee God. Finally, he made few changes in the section on predestination, except to eliminate an expressed attack on Eck in favor of Lorenzo Valla. Given the statements in both versions, there can be little doubt that an attack on Luther over the freedom of the will would inevitably touch Melanchthon's theology as well. The question of Melanchthon's participation in the controversy between Luther and Erasmus is not a new one. In 1958 the wellknown Melanchthon scholar Wilhelm Maurer wrote an article in theArchiv für Reformationsgeschichte that has set the standard for the discussion.13 According to Maurer, Melanchthon began his dispute with Erasmus in his Loci communes (especially in the preface) by subtly attacking Erasmus's theology without ever mentioning him by name. In the De libero arbitrio, as well as in a letter to Melanchthon, Erasmus in turn expressed his opposition: Melanchthon's understanding ofcaro (flesh) as comprising the entire human being left no room for civic virtues; his principle ofsola scriptura meant a rejection of the early Fathers; the way he related Word and Spirit left him no way to distinguish the spirits. Although Luther answered these objections by praising the Loci in De servo arbitrio, Melanchthon was, in Maurer's own words, "cut to the quick." Although he seemed oblivious to Erasmus's attack on him in a letter to Spalatin dated 25 September 1524, he went out of his way not to condemn Erasmus but, rather, to close the
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gap that had broken open between humanism and Reformation. In this situation Melanchthon wrote a letter to Erasmus expressing the opinion that he did not think Luther would strenuously respond to De libero arbitrio. At the same time, Melanchthon could not share his concerns with his "friend," Luther, who was already burdened with so many problems. Melanchthon's efforts at reconciliation, Maurer claimed, collapsed with the publication of Luther's bristling attack in De servo arbitrio and with Erasmus's equally harsh reply in Hyperaspistes I. In the former Melanchthon's Loci were praised. In the latter the younger Reformer came under direct and indirect attack by Erasmus. First, Erasmus quoted from Melanchthon's letter and claimed that its offer of peace was hypocritical. Second, Erasmus made the wild claim that some Logodaedalus (builder of verbal labyrinths, i.e., Melanchthon) actually wrote or at least edited portions of Luther's treatise, giving it its biting style. Erasmus accused Luther of smearing him with poison honey (melle toxico) a clear play on Melanchthon's name. Despite this strong attack, Melanchthon was still searching for a middle way. In this context he published his commentary on Colossians as a corrective to the Loci communes. The result, according to Maurer, was catastrophic. Thus, the middle position that Melanchthon had taken in the controversy between Luther and Erasmus resulted in a change in the bases of his doctrine of the will, which were given in the 1521 Loci and from which everyone who had actively participated in this debate had taken their departure. 14
Melanchthon's cleverness in attacking Erasmus's Ratio seu methodus in the preface to the Loci backfired when, in 1524, he was confronted by the differences between humanism and Reformation. When these differences became public in 1526, he was shocked and tried to close the gap, finally leaping at the opportunity for renewed friendship offered in Erasmus's letter of 1527. Maurer concludes, "For Melanchthon's development, his position in the controversy between Luther and Erasmus possessed decisive importance. And in the history of his Loci, these changing relationships are reflected."15 This assessment of the activity and theology of Melanchthon has influenced scholarship for the past thirtyfive years. Maurer's contribution to the issue consists of his correct assessment that in some ways, especially in its preface, the Loci of 1521 attacked Erasmus's way of doing theology and especially his reliance on Origen.16 Maurer also accurately describes the special role that that book and its author played in the debate between Erasmus and Luther. But he labors under several misconceptions regarding the Reformation. To explain Melanchthon's behavior he constructs a psychological picture that paints the Wittenberg professor as (almost pathologically) searching for a middle position. On the basis of very little evidence, Maurer calls Melanchthon "deeply moved," "shocked by his own cleverness," and using an argument from silence—protecting his "friend" Luther by not sharing his "deepest concerns." And Maurer makes two other mistakes. He imagines that Melanchthon's problems may be traced back to his participation in the Wittenberg unrest—now seen to have been of minor importance for him17—and he defines Melanchthon's life as if it were lived between the irreconcilable differences of humanism and Reformation, represented by the looming figures of Erasmus and Luther.18
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An examination of Melanchthon's attack on Erasmus that uses his work on Colossians must begin with a reassessment of some of the letters referred to in Maurer's article. At the time of the publication of De libero arbitrio, Erasmus sent two letters to Melanchthon. 19 In the first, dated 6 September 1524, Erasmus sent a copy of the book in an attempt to avoid a confrontation with Melanchthon and, especially, Luther. He filled this letter with humanist niceties (e.g., I would have answered sooner if Conrad Pellikan had shown me your letter). He referred to Melanchthon's comments concerning Erasmus in the Elogion and Luther's comments in two letters published ''in hatred of me" at the same time, along with Erasmus's own letter to John Fabri concerning Luther.20 The comments on the Loci were as vague in their objections as faint in their praise. They proved two things: that Erasmus had read the Loci thoroughly and that he was offended (offendebar) by some of what he saw. I have read your Loci all through, and saw in it very clearly how fair as well as fertile your mind is. Your gifts have always inspired me with respect and affection, and this is the more true on both counts now that I have read this, so far am I from regretting your work; though as I read I took exception to several passages which I would gladly have discussed with you, had we been able to meet.21
He went on to praise attacks on the "Pharisees" but warned that there were other things which, whether they were defensible or pointless, he and his friends either did not understand or as a matter of conscience could not proclaim publicly. This vagueness dissipated in the Hyperaspistes I of 1526, where Erasmus criticized Luther's praise of the Loci communes and took exception to the Reformers' distinctions between flesh and spirit and between law and gospel and, of course, to arguments about the free will.22 Anticipating Melanchthon's question—why he, Erasmus, had not attacked the things that displeased him—Erasmus claimed that he did not want to hurt "the business of renewing evangelical freedom" and that he hoped at the same time that Luther, admonished by more moderating counsel (i.e., Melanchthon's), would do the same. As he had in previous letters, Erasmus spoke of separating his case from Luther's. After describing how he had played Gamaliel to Pope Adrian VI, Clement VII, and Cardinal Campegio, he again tried to anticipate Melanchthon's charge that these were pseudoapostles by pointing out that only people like Capito, Caspar Hedio, Zwingli and, to a lesser extent, Oecolampadius fit this category; their positions contrasted sharply with Melanchthon's own on questions of images, vestments, and episcopal authority.23 Following a rendition of the deteriorating situation in South Germany (using Zwingli, Capito, and Farel as examples), he worried that the extinction of bonae litterae would result. How could he follow the teachings of those whose warlike behavior contradicted Christ's teaching?24 He returned to this theme when explaining his reasons for sending Melanchthon a copy of the book. Why had he written it, especially given Luther's offer of peace? First, because enemies of languages and good letters were leaving no stone unturned to hurt him. Second, because some rulers and friends had urged him to write it. Third, because of Luther's very peace offer, which served to compromise Erasmus's neutrality by encouraging attacks on good letters from the right. Last, to provide by his own moderation a contrast to the "evangelical madmen" from the South. Was he
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trying to support the "tyrants"? Not in the least. No one had tried to avoid such savagery more than he. 25 Melanchthon responded with a letter that Erasmus would later cite in Hyperaspistes I.26 He answered several of Erasmus's charges. Those socalled evangelicals who had subverted public order had nothing to do with Luther. Melanchthon even went so far as to assume Erasmus would agree that "Luther's cause embraces the teaching of the gospel"—something Erasmus himself had denied. Despite differences on the free will, Luther and Erasmus did agree on the matter of ceremonies. Outside of the case with the pope, Luther abhorred sedition and opposed those who supported it (including, most recently, Thomas Müntzer). Melanchthon totally rejected Erasmus's characterization of Oecolampadius or his own interest in condemning Luther's teaching. He then uttered the fateful words that would later so upset Erasmus and mystify modern scholars. "What pertains to the Diatribe on Free Choice, it has been accepted here with most impartial minds [aequissimis animis]"27 But Melanchthon contrasted this directly to Tyranni who had forbidden the teaching of certain ideas in the church. In other words, no one in Wittenberg was stopping Erasmus from holding his opinions or publishing them. Everything was to be most free, he went on to say, provided that—and this was the catch—private feelings were not mixed in.28 Melanchthon praised Erasmus's moderation, "although in some places you sprinkled in black salt," that is, you said some things with too much bite and with questionable motives.29 Then followed the most important section of the letter. But Luther is not so irascible that he can swallow nothing. And so he promises to use equal moderation in his reply. It may perhaps be a good thing for everyone to have this problem of the freedom of the will thoroughly discussed; and if one wishes to be of use to men's consciences, what is the point of bringing private feelings into a question of public importance? Once indignation has begun to carry the mind off its course, I do not see how it can do justice to such an important subject. I personally am quite clear about Luther's good will towards you, and this gives me hope that he will make a straightforward reply.30
What did it mean to use equal moderation? To sprinkle with just as much black salt? (Perhaps this attitude was reflected in Luther's opening remarks in De servo arbitrio, when he admitted that he was at first going to ignore De libero arbitrio altogether.) In Melanchthon's eyes, the only redeeming value in Erasmus's attack would arise if Luther responded for the sake of consciences who needed to be taught on the subject. Otherwise, Erasmus's book—which was after all premised on the idea that he was just sharing his opinion—became a matter of private feelings (privati adfectus) and was worthy to be banned. One should expect anger from someone who has been crossed, but Luther had shown himself, at least to Melanchthon at this time, to be remarkably benevolent. There followed this parting shot: "In return it is your duty, my dear Erasmus, to take care, to make sure that this discussion is not embittered by any greater ill will on your side."31 Thus, Melanchthon closed his letter by urging Erasmus to show more restraint.32 Far from supporting Erasmus, this letter showed just how far Melanchthon was from him. It also indicated that there was some truth to Luther's claim in De servo arbitrio
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not to have wanted to answer Erasmus at all. Of course, Luther's initial reaction changed, and the result was that Melanchthon's letter sounded to Erasmus like a lie, carefully constructed to catch Erasmus off his guard. What were Melanchthon's true feelings on the matter? At the same time, he directed a letter to John Oecolampadius in which he wrote, "And Erasmus, whom I had expected to be more an author of peace than of new commotions, is renewing the Papistic war." 33 Erasmus renewing the papistic war? This surely was "salt in the wounds" and hardly sounded like the words of a man ''caught in the middle" or "cut to the quick." In this letter the phrase aequissimis animis was again used to describe the book's reception in Wittenberg. Luther had plainly promised a most moderate response, Melanchthon added, and he will do it unless I am mistaken. Of course, Melanchthon was mistaken. But at the time, the words that followed were aimed as much at Erasmus as at Luther: "For what is more unjust, than what now occurs commonly: to desire to butcher someone who dissents, rather than to teach?"34 Melanchthon again indirectly questioned Erasmus's salty manner of attack. At nearly the same time, Melanchthon wrote to Spalatin, sending him both Erasmus's book and his letter. "It does not seem to have treated us in a completely insulting manner."35 This backhanded compliment was matched by Melanchthon's hope for a response from Luther. I sincerely hope that this issue, which is certainly chief in the Christian religion, may be diligently examined, and because of that issue I almost am glad that Erasmus took up the fight. For a long time I have wished for some prudent antagonist to befall Luther in this case. If Erasmus does not seem to be that kind of opponent, I am really mistaken.36
Melanchthon wanted two things from Luther: a clear defense of the bound will in answer to Erasmus's challenge and a moderate answer. He received the first, but, as shall be seen, he himself had to supply the second. Erasmus's response to Melanchthon, dated 10 December 1524, showed a man clearly put on the defensive.37 He began with a strenuous complaint against iconoclasm in Basel. "If you were only here to see it, my Philip!" He was sure that Luther would be angry about it, too. The reputations of both the pope and Luther were being damaged by overzealous proponents. After defending himself against the charge of strongly (vehementer) urging Melanchthon to recant ("I am not the judge of another's conscience nor lord of another's faith"), he rejected out of hand that he "bore a grudge against evangelical doctrine," as Melanchthon had alleged.38 Whatever Luther wanted, Erasmus preferred the gospel and the peace it brought. Erasmus ticked off his oftrepeated objections. Luther always preferred hyperbole. He was too vehement. Erasmus wanted a renewed Christianity but not at the expense of public peace. He recounted all of the wild charges Luther had made— including that the pope was antiChrist, confession was a plague, free will was nothing—and he worried about how certain people would use only the worst parts of Luther's statements. Plato had been smart enough to see that the masses could not govern themselves. However, by attacking the leaders instead of converting them, Luther himself, not Erasmus, was about to destroy evangelical piety. He contrasted the aequissimi animi in Wittenberg to the attitude of hiscandidissimus amicus (most honest friend),
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Oecolampadius, who wanted to attack De libero arbitrio even before it came off the press. Erasmus also defended himself against other phrases in Melanchthon's letter. Melanchthon had to ask Luther to respond moderately, which proved that such behavior was contrary to his style. Erasmus's moderation came naturally. If there seemed to be any "black salt" in De libero arbitrio, it was actually directed against Farel and his kind, although, given Luther's comments in hisAssertio, Erasmus could have gotten even more worked up. "In other arguments we have given in somewhat to human feelings [humanis affectibus] in this case no insult will deflect me from the right course." 39 Melanchthon seemed worried that if Erasmus continued, the case could put the gospel at risk. While wondering what Luther would do, Erasmus nevertheless promised never to take up arms against the gospel truth, thereby implying that Luther's teaching was anything but. Having responded to Melanchthon's letter, Erasmus returned to the problem of the "seditious" and complained that he could not dissent from Luther without being attacked. Look at what Oecolampadius, von Sickingen, and Zwingli had been writing! He then included the following rumor, which became a crucial part of Melanchthon's formal response to Erasmus. "In Strasbourg, and not only there, they publicly teach no subjects for study at all nor any languages outside of one: Hebrew!"40 If this were to continue, even Luther would prefer the tyranny of bishops and pontiffs. Erasmus closed his letter by expressing his trust in Melanchthon's sincerity and painting a picture of himself as a boat tossed about in a storm.41 With this the die was cast. Beneath the flowery rhetoric, both sides had outlined their case. On the one hand, Melanchthon perceived Erasmus's sharpness and welcomed the opportunity Luther would have to address the question of free will. He also expressed the hope that this response would be simple and equally moderate On the other side, Erasmus connected Luther's teaching with sedition, iconoclasm, mob rule, and gross overstatement, including overstatement regarding the free will.42 Erasmus held to the hope of reform from within the hierarchy and feared that both the gospel, as he understood it, and good letters were going to suffer if his moderate program were not followed. At this juncture Melanchthon was not in the middle on this issue, and both men knew it. The publication of De servo arbitrio surely shocked Erasmus, especially given Melanchthon's promises. Its sharpness doubtless disappointed Melanchthon, who had good reason to believe that more "black salt" was the last thing Erasmus's wounds needed. Luther took Erasmus's very claim of moderation toward Luther's assertion and turned it into the heart of the debate. He also, as was mentioned earlier, brought Melanchthon's Loci communes into the fray. At this point it would be nice to know Melanchthon's opinion ofDe servo arbitrio at the time it was first published. Yet from the time he announced to Camerarius on 4 April 1525 that Luther was writing a reply (in which Camerarius's struggles with the subject would be answered) until 28 February 1526, when he told the same friend that he had heard that Erasmus was going to respond to De servo arbitrio, Melanchthon's correspondence was almost completely silent.43 He wrote about Luther's marriage, his writings against the peasants, the Lord's Supper controversy, and many other things in the intervening sixtytwo letters, but nothing about this tract. Maurer's
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claim to know the mind of Melanchthon is undermined by the fact that the latter did not share it with anyone at that time. Once Erasmus's response to De servo arbitrio arrived in Wittenberg, Melanchthon's letters were again filled with opinions. To Jerome Baumgartner in Nuremburg he promised to give him his opinion orally, but managed a sarcastic "What? Do we not seem to have been beaten soundly enough by him?" 44 To John Agricola in Eisleben he expressed the fear that Luther would answer even more strongly than in De servo arbitrio.45 To Spalatin he merely mentioned having received the book.46 In a letter to Joachim Camerarius, dated 11 April, Melanchthon gave an even more devastating review of the book. "Have you ever read a more biting book, Joachim, than Erasmus' . It is plainly an asp."47 Hardly the opinion of a man caught in the middle! It is important to remember that in Melanchthon's eyes Erasmus had in his response violated every rule of humanist courtesy: attacking Luther, Melanchthon, Jonas, and even the deceased Wilhelm Nesen. Without naming names, he had even accused Melanchthon of having coauthored Luther's work.48 Naming names, he had quoted Melanchthon's aequissimis animis letter, accused him of insincerity (something of which almost every refined letterwriter of the age was guilty), and attacked the Loci.49 He also pointed out that even Melanchthon claimed to be uncertain in his little commentaries on the Bible.50 Melanchthon worried first about Luther's response. He did not yet know Luther's mind (animus) on the matter, but he had already again implored him "by everything sacred" that if he, Luther, insisted upon responding, he should do it "briefly, simply, and without insults." Then Melanchthon reflected back on De servo arbitrio. When it first appeared, he said immediately that it would result in the cruelest recriminations. Now that had happened, and Melanchthon feared even worse things from Erasmus in the sequel.51 Clearly, the worst Melanchthon had to say about Luther here was that his book egged Erasmus on. But Erasmus was in his eves the chief culprit. (In the next volume he would be disabused of the notion that Erasmus would avoid bad taste.) Melanchthon then defended himself against the false charges of having written for Luther, using the same words he had employed with Jerome Baumgartner. "Plainly, he burdens me undeservedly with a great illwill, when he attributes to me a part of the work—indeed the most hateful part." In the face of this insult, Melanchthon's reaction was interesting: "But I shrink to whisper about this injury."52 At the same time, he hoped Luther would follow suit. He had thought Luther would mellow with age, but in fact he had become more vehement. "This thing really tortures my mind greatly.'' Which thing? Luther's behavior or theology? No, the entire affair. For Melanchthon went on to add that unless "God has regard for this confusion and spares us," he feared where it would all lead. "But perhaps these things are unique and [divine deeds]."53 Not a word is spoken here against Luther's theology, only against his bombast. Even in the midst of his fears about where such a confrontation might lead, Melanchthon confessed that God could well be working through it all. By the summer of 1526 the dust had settled to some degree, Melanchthon was in the midst of lectures on Colossians, and he took the time to address Erasmus indirectly, through a letter to Sigismund Gelenius, the Pragueborn editor at Froben's
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press in Basel. 54 For the most part the letter represented Melanchthon's last attempt to induce Gelenius to accept a professorship in Nuremberg. At the close of the letter, however, he appealed to him to make it clear to Erasmus that the Dutchman had erred in assuming Luther had used "my works." He concluded: "For I do not enjoy these bitter disputes—for you know my nature—and I especially do not want these two to be fighting with each other."55 Here Melanchthon's comments echoed his public position against von Hutten. There was no trace of any criticism of Luther, only a heartfelt wish that Erasmus and Luther would stay out of each other's hair. Luther must finally have listened to his young colleague. The Wittenberg Reformer, who had his hands full with other thinkers from the South, made no response to Hyperaspistes. Meanwhile, Erasmus completed his second book. When this appeared in October 1527, Melanchthon offered a withering opinion. To Caspar Aquila, preacher in Saalfeld, Melanchthon wrote, "Erasmus has written most slyly on the free will, and indeed I am on account of that writing greatly saddened. But still he will not drag me away from the true meaning [of the doctrine]."56 To Justus Jonas, around 2 October, he wrote even more clearly. "For Erasmus has most cunningly overturned everything to which Luther objected." He added a scathing indictment to the ears of anyone committed to bonae litterae: "but none of the ordinary people will understand it, because it is confused and prolix. Nor is it easy to comprehend in the ambiguities of such a long disputation the author's clear meaning."57 In both letters Melanchthon heaped up his scorn. He criticized Erasmus's subtlety. Hyperaspistes II, little more than a linebyline refutation of the arguments in De servo arbitrio, could not drag a theologian of Melanchthon's caliber from the truth, but it could trick simpler souls—had it not been so poorly written. Melanchthon also communicated his opinion of Erasmus to Luther. From Jena, where he was teaching because of the plague in Wittenberg, he penned this book review for Luther, who had not yet read the work, on 2 October. The disputation is long and confused, which not many of the crowd will understand, as I see it. It takes this one approach, to interpret cleverly opinions [from the Scriptures and Fathers] cited by you, so that they may be thought not to contradict the judgment of human reason. Although you may want to respond, I still do not wish you to react hastily. However, whenever it seems right, I would want you not to write a confutation of this work (for, outside of the most skilled in this type of thing, they do not easily understand those struggles over words) but to undertake a simple exposition of your opinion. That would not be difficult for you to do, and except for [contributing to] fighting, harsh speech would result in less.58
The criticisms corresponded to those in other letters from the same time. The work itself was confusing and hard for the common reader to comprehend. Erasmus had done his work cleverly. Melanchthon counseled patience in very respectful and direct words, asking Luther to produce something which in its clarity and simplicity would do more good than simply heaping up more polemics. One thing, however, was completely new. One learns here how Melanchthon understood Erasmus's cleverness. The Dutch humanist had twisted every one of Luther's objections to conform to human reason. That phrase, humana ratio, cut to the heart of Melanchthon's criticism, a criticism of Erasmus he had already expressed in his Elogion. At the same time, Melanchthon made another key addition to the
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end of his remarks. "I have touched on this issue in Colossians," he wrote, "and, the first chance that comes along, I plan to explain it in some other writing more fully." Here is the proper context for the quotation used in chapter 4. The next chance for Melanchthon to deal with the issue arose when he rewrote his commentary on Colossians in 1528. That text, translated by Justus Jonas in 1529, paid particular attention to the free will and earned for Melanchthon Luther's highest praise. The latter surely knew what the former was up to when he contrasted his own rough, woodsman style to the gentler, agricultural approach of his colleague. At Melanchthon's request, Luther maintained a discreet silence in the dispute with Erasmus. He did not even have to follow up with another simple statement because Melanchthon beat him to the punch in the Scholia. This is not to say that their understandings of the issue completely matched. They did not. Nevertheless, from 1527 to 1529 Luther and Melanchthon saw themselves building two fronts against a common enemy: the one matching in subtlety of argument what the other offered in sharpness of attack. If anyone was caught in the middle in all of this, it was Erasmus. On 5 February 1528 Erasmus sent something of an olive branch to Melanchthon. 59 He mentioned having read a version of the Visitation Articles that did not contain everything listed in the table of contents.60 "O that Luther would shun occasions for sedition and appeal to good morals with zeal equal to his vehemence in defense of dogma."61 Immediately Erasmus confronted Melanchthon with the old challenge: Luther was linked to sedition and to the destruction of Erasmus's own program of reform in morals and good letters. Erasmus seemed to admit defeat. Since he saw no remedy to the tumult, he was returning as much as possible tobonae litterae, which he feared might come to an end.62 He placed hope in Melanchthon's ability in this area, since he was more learned, and closed the letter with an introduction for its bearer, Francis Dilfus. Melanchthon responded immediately and in such a way that makes clear that this was the first direct contact between the two men since the publication of Hyperaspistes I.63 He proclaimed himself particularly happy to receive this letter, because in Hyperaspistes there were some signs of an animus subiratus (slightly angered mind). Dilfus himself had cleared up any doubts Melanchthon might still have harbored regarding Erasmus's demeanor. Nevertheless, Melanchthon went on to rub salt into their wounded relationship. "It would take too long to recount all the reasons for my silence," he began.64 Both privately and publicly his feelings toward Erasmus had not changed and would not change, so that Melanchthon could never be induced to attack him (publicly). Having refused to attack—the higher moral ground for anyone observing humanist etiquette—Melanchthon immediately returned to the real grounds for his silence: the unfounded suspicions which are scattered (like black salt?) throughout Hyperaspistes. At least, Melanchthon wrote ironically, Erasmus behaved clementius toward him in the second volume. Then, for the first time directly to Erasmus, Melanchthon revealed his position in the dispute. For although I am not accustomed to keep secret what I feel concerning that controversy, nevertheless I have never loved Luther to such an extent that I approve of his acerbity in dispute. The last thing I would want to do to help him would be, if I may say so, to add fuel to the fire. And of this decision of mine Luther himself is my best witness.65
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At the very time he was editing the Scholia for a second time, Melanchthon clearly placed himself on Luther's side, while complaining, as he would increasingly from this time on, about the vehemence of the older man's style. But even Luther (perhaps in the letter Melanchthon wrote to him from Jena) could attest to Melanchthon's decision to stay out of the polemical fray. "But O that such a horrible struggle had not been taken up between you! For Luther has not taken into account your worth, and you in turn have deformed him exceedingly." 66 Melanchthon went on to argue that Luther was a better man than his violent writings indicate. He counseled—for the sake of the church—that both should avoid more attacks, adding in Greek, "Those who preside at the games must be filled not with dissensions but with the fairest habits." Erasmus, Greek scholar and collector of adages, had been told in his own language how to behave! But Melanchthon's criticism was not complete. He now turned to the matter of Wilhelm Nesen. Erasmus had charged that Luther had exercised too great an influence over both Nesen and Justus Jonas.67 Melanchthon countered that Nesen had nothing but the highest opinion of Erasmus, and he thereby implied that Erasmus had broken a cardinal rule of good behavior: speaking ill of a dead friend. Melanchthon then admonished Erasmus to stick to philology. "Because you continue to help the studies of letters, I pray Christ that he may favor your labors." Melanchthon was after all only a simple soldier, following Erasmus's standard. The praise of Erasmus's contribution to bonae litterae remained unbroken in Melanchthon's comments on the subject. He closed with a reference to the Visitation Articles: "I hope that they did not displease you." With those words, he reminded Erasmus that he had noticed how the great humanist had neglected to make any comment about their content. He could also have been referring to the section on the free will, where Melanchthon wrote against Erasmus's distortion of evangelical teaching, that included this statement: "The human will is not free with respect to spiritual works."68 He mentioned the "great censure" that the articles had caused by being more moderate than some had hoped. The whole point of the articles had been to preserve the public peace. How can Melanchthon's relation to Erasmus on the issue of free will be characterized? He was hardly caught in the middle. He rejected the substance of Erasmus's arguments, decried his characterization of Luther, and took him to task for his immoderate behavior. When Melanchthon's guard was down and lie was writing to his best friend, Joachim Camerarius, how did this Wittenberg theologian sound then? There was such a letter, dated 24 July 1529, in which Melanchthon showed his contempt for Erasmus's person and theology.69 Melanchthon revealed that he would follow Camerarius's advice and stop writing to Erasmus, since he was not out to win Erasmus's friendship. He pointed out how "our enemies" (Zwingli and Oecolampadius) loved Erasmus, who had sown the seeds in their books for all kinds of dogmas which would have caused even worse problems in the church had Luther not arisen and handled the "human studies" in another way. "That whole tragedy concerning the Lord's Supper could be seen as having arisen from him [Erasmus]." That this was not an unfair judgment could be seen all over among "Arius and his faction," which "we here have constantly disap
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proved." No letter was of greater worth to a Christian than one that dealt with justification and the magistrates. "From great men I require perfect handling of these loci. But those who know nothing, elevate him [Erasmus]." 70 This opinion, that Erasmus had not handled the chief topics of the Christian faith, and not some anxious searching for the middle ground fueled Melanchthon's attack on Erasmus's opinion as found in his comments on Colossians.
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6— Colossians against Erasmus on the Freedom of the Will Melanchthon's attack on Erasmus's defense of the will's freedom developed from a simple classroom declamation in 1526, criticizing the misuse of philosophy and based on Col. 2:8. Melanchthon broadened his attack the following year with the publication of the first edition of the Scholia, in which he outlined his own position on the freedom of the will and expanded the comments on philosophy. Throughout the commentary he defined certain theological terms in stark contrast to Erasmus's own position. In 1528, in the second edition of the Scholia, Melanchthon sharpened his arguments and attacked both Erasmus's style of argumentation and his (to Melanchthon) immoral equivocation. In the 1529 translation of this edition Justus Jonas took the opportunity to state explicitly what Melanchthon had in part only implied, especially with respect to the comments on philosophy. Although Melanchthon's arguments differed from Luther's own, both men and their contemporaries understood that they were fighting the same opponent, using different means. Were these attacks aimed chiefly at Erasmus? Since Melanchthon did not name names, it is impossible to say with absolute certainty based on the texts of the Scholia themselves. However, the comments in Melanchthon's letters from this period, which were examined in the previous chapter, indicated as much. Nevertheless, it is important to note that there was also another opponent of Melanchthon who had bitterly attacked him on the issue of the free will at this time: Johannes Cochlaeus. A fierce enemy of Luther and the Lutheran cause from 1521 onward, Cochlaeus had by 1525 already published at least thirteen tracts against Luther. 1 In 1524 he wrote, and in 1525 Ulrich Morhardt of Tübingen published, an attack on Melanchthon's Loci communes.2 Already in the preface Cochlaeus bemoaned the fact that Melanchthon would have been the glory of good letters (decus litterarum) had he not been infected by Lutheranism. Cochlaeus wanted to use his treatise to demonstrate how Philip's arguments opposed not only the faith and religion of the Holy Fathers but also human reason, nature, and the common opinion of the philosophers. In an introductory section, which also attacked Luther as a seditious heretic, Cochlaeus reminded
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Melanchthon that as in the case of Augustine's Manichaean opponent Faustus, it was not enough to be erudite. The Loci communes, which Cochlaeus called a hydra, erred when it eliminated human free will on the basis of divine necessity. It thereby made God the author of sin, undercut divine commands, subverted the justice of divine punishment for sin, and eliminated the need for rhetorical persuasion or exhortations. Cochlaeus even argued that it attacked not only the Fathers of the church but the Virgin Mary herself! In the first book of his actual defense of the free will Cochlaeus marshaled seven scriptural witnesses from the Law, History, Writings (Psalms), prophets, gospels, Pauline epistles, and general epistles. 3 He began his discussion of each witness with a refutation of passages used by Melanchthon in the Loci and then offered one or two texts that stated, in his view, the opposite opinion. He noted, for example, that Melanchthon never quoted the Psalms in this section of the Loci because they all stood against him. He then offered an interpretation ofPs. 4 based on "our Erasmus," Cassiodorus, and the Interlinear Gloss. Convinced that Melanchthon's Loci, by equating the will (which directed reason) with the affections and by insisting that the highest affections were in bondage, made human beings no better than beasts, Cochlaeus often mockingly called Melanchthon's arguments bestialitates. In the second book Cochlaeus laboriously cited Melanchthon's entire locus on free will, dividing it into eleven sections and refuting it line by line.4 He employed a catena of references from the Fathers, Plato, Aristotle and other philosophers, and the Bible to show Melanchthon's errors. The division of the human being into reason and will, for example, was incorrect because even the Bible divided us into body, soul, and spirit. Even Pliny recognized that the higher affections were found in animals. Cochlaeus argued against Pelagius, who insisted that salvation depended on human effort alone, and Melanchthon, who insisted that it depended alone on God. Contrariwise, Cochlaeus, the Fathers, and the Scriptures insisted that our powers and God's help combined to save us. In discussing the sections on divine predestination, Cochlaeus challenged Melanchthon to explain what happened to the arts, oratory, and government if all things happened according to divine predestination.5 Where Melanchthon argued that our internal affections were not in our power but that external works to some extent were, Cochlaeus replied that the actual situation was reversed. Playing on Melanchthon's favorable comments about Gerson elsewhere in the Loci, Cochlaeus responded to his opponent's mockery of the "sophists" by citing Gerson against him—along with Seneca and Cicero. Most striking here and elsewhere was Cochlaeus's univocal understanding of truth. Scripture and the Fathers stood united with pagan philosophers and scholastic theologians. All of them condemned Melanchthon's view. Many of these arguments were answered by Melanchthon in the Scholia. Yet Melanchthon aimed his comments not against Cochlaeus but against Erasmus. It is not even clear how aware he was of Cochlaeus's publication. Melanchthon's correspondence of 152426 made no mention of Cochlaeus at all—all the more striking when compared to the frequent discussions of Erasmus. Even his commentary on Romans of 1532, according to Rolf Schäfer's edition, contained only one possible allusion to this work.6 Moreover, Cochlaeus's work was outdated, since he used the first edition of the Loci of 1521, rather than the second edition of 1522, where
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Melanchthon substantially altered his argumentation, as was mentioned in the previous chapter. In addition, Cochlaeus's method of argumentation did not present nearly the challenge that Erasmus's works did. Rather than arguing only from the Scripture as Erasmus had, Cochlaeus mixed sources. Thus, he cited the Fathers or the Gloss on a particular text as if their interpretations could not be challenged. He ponderously refuted Melanchthon's text point for point, resulting in an unwieldly commentary that did not sustain its arguments. He also mixed arguments on particular texts with polemic barbs and charges of heresy. In short, Cochlaeus's work represented a peculiar amalgamation of humanist methods and Thomistic theology that very likely allowed Melanchthon simply to ignore him. Without a doubt, however, many arguments crafted for Erasmus also struck Cochlaeus, as will be made clear. The Dissertatio on Col. 2:8: Origins of an Argument "See that no one deceive you through inane philosophy!" With these words of Paul in Col. 2:8, Melanchthon began his 1526 attack on defenders of the will's freedom from a Wittenberg classroom. If the reconstruction of the printing history in chapter 1 is correct, these comments first appeared in Basel in August 1527 as an opening salvo in Melanchthon's opposition to Erasmus and others on the freedom of the will. The Dissertatio dealt with some of those elements of Erasmus's challenge to Luther that Melanchthon found most damaging: the limits of reason and the place of human wisdom in the Christian life. And it dealt with these issues outside of the hefty polemic that constituted the exchange between Luther and Erasmus. In many ways the Dissertatio had all the markings of a formal speech. 7 It began with an exordium in which Melanchthon introduced the problem at hand. It continued with an argumentum, where he defined philosophy. In an expansion of the argument, Melanchthon went on to show three areas where philosophy erred. After an extensive epilogue summarizing his conclusions, he appended an admonitio to warn his listeners of another problem with philosophy. Given its balance and well planned construction, this speech could easily have been a declamatio, a formal speech given at the University of Wittenberg as partial replacement in the curriculum for medieval disputations. Melanchthon began his speech by informing his listeners that Col. 2:8 represented the start of a collatio between human and Christian righteousness.8 Thus, it was necessary to see how the two related to each other and to what extent God demanded human righteousness and to what extent he rejected it. To answer this quaestio, Melanchthon began his argumentum with a definition of philosophy as the science of speaking, of natural things, and of civic virtues—all comprehended using reliable reason. He added an important second part to the definition by speaking of its cause. Philosophy was a creature of God. God had given to human nature clear and certain judgment in natural and civil matters. For proof he cited Rom. 2:15, that the law of God was written in the hearts of all, where law meant "judgment," and included such things as not injuring another, being thankful for blessings, or obeying the magistrates.
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It is important to note that Melanchthon defined philosophy completely within the limits of its usage in his day. Philosophy did not mean metaphysics but, rather, what might now be called the sciences and the liberal arts. 9 Moreover, Melanchthon juxtaposed Rom. 2:15 over against Col. 2:8 to give him some room to maneuver. Not philosophy in general—a gift from God into human hearts—but "inane philosophy" (citing Paul's text as it was misquoted in the title of the Dissertatio) caused problems. What conclusions did Melanchthon draw from his double definition? First, he listed some of the areas in which human beings possessed sure and certain judgment from God: natural sciences, numbers, measures, architecture, and medicine (where he quoted Sirach 38:12 as a proof text and stressed that knowledge of the nature of bodies and their healing were "true and certain things shown to us by God"). Second, he considered the overall application of his argument to Col. 2:8. This text must not be understood as if discussing medicine (remediorum naturae aut corporum ) were vain. Positively speaking, human beings could also use their judgment in matters of clothing or food. This text did not forbid numbering or measuring bodies, building, painting, medical treatment, or judging. Third, when human beings heard that philosophy was God's gift, they would—here Melanchthon turned to the effects of his definition—venerate philosophy as God's gift to preserve life. God wanted us to work, and knowing remedies for sickness and how to rule permitted us to live more comfortably than the barbari. He repeated himself with great rhetorical flourish: "Therefore all of us who know these arts, which must be used in this life to preserve the body—such as the art of numbering, of measuring, of building, of discerning times from the motions of heavenly bodies—all these things, since they are gifts of God, we ought rather to hug and kiss."10 As proof for this behavior Melanchthon quoted Ecclesiastes 2:13.11 Thus the first part of Melanchthon's Dissertatio ended. Erasmus seemed less his opponent than people in Wittenberg and elsewhere who had written off every other form of knowledge outside theology. Against these very people Luther wrote his admonition to city councils to establish schools, and Melanchthon held a series of declamations lauding the place of the arts and sciences in the life of the university.12 As rector of the University of Wittenberg at the same time, he had also encouraged reform of the curriculum and asked Spalatin to relieve him of the burdens of theological lectures so that he could devote more time to teaching in the Arts.13 Whatever the source, the argument was the same: when Paul spoke against philosophy, he was not trying to attack the arts, medicine, or law. On the contrary, if we human beings knew what was best for us and understood the origin of these fields, we would embrace them. While this argument did not directly take aim at Erasmus, it certainly underscored Wittenberg's commitment to the humanities, contradicting both those rumors cited by Erasmus that nothing outside of Hebrew was being studied in Strasbourg and the persistent charges of the Dutch humanist and Cochlaeus that Wittenberg's theology itself was harmful to bonae litterae. However else one understood Christian righteousness and its relation to human righteousness, it did not condemn human beings to ignorance. Melanchthon picked examples that strengthened his case most: medicine, mathematics, and architecture. Surely Paul was not forbidding such things in this verse.
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The largest section of the Dissertatio contained Melanchthon's examination of the limits of philosophy. "Concerning God philosophy errs in three ways," he began, and then, using trinitarian categories, he considered governance (Father), justification (Son), and the virtuous life (Holy Spirit). Each of these arguments consisted first of the misunderstanding of philosophy, then of the Christian counterclaim, and finally of a list of Bible verses supporting the Christian position. In all three cases there are hints of the countervailing position in the attacks of Erasmus and Cochlaeus. The First Error: De rerum gubernatione Philosophy could see how God made things, but because of injustice in the world it denied that God now governed the world. Philosophy argued that like the builder of a ship, God pushed the world out to sea and then went on vacation. Christian doctrine, on the contrary, warned us not to be deceived by philosophy, which always failed to understand God's counsels. As proof for this position, Melanchthon cited 1 Cor. 2:14 ("natural [animalis] man does not perceive the things that are of God") and glossed the word animalis to mean the whole of human nature not renewed by the Holy Spirit. 14 Only through God's Word could God's will be known, as was clear from Isa. 8:20, and hence only there could we discover that God had not only made the world but governed and protected it, punished some and preserved others. God had not only built the ship; God also captained it by some motion in the present. Melanchthon concluded this section with a string of proof texts, reminiscent of the conclusion in many sections of his Loci communes.15 The Second Error: De iustificatione Philosophy said that before God our civil righteousness sufficed. Christian doctrine taught that our righteousness before God was faith in Christ. For proof Melanchthon took the example of bees. He described their various virtues, including prudence, justice, obedience, helpfulness, courage, and temperance, but concluded that just as these virtues did not make them Christian, neither did the moral acts of human beings.16 What mattered was that we believed that on account of Christ, God overlooked our sin and received us into grace. To this statement Melanchthon attached two proof texts, Rom. 3:28 and 1 Cor. 1:2930. Because this line of argument actually touched on the Dissertatio's overall division comparing human and Christian righteousness, Melanchthon had to take up the broader issue again. He reminded his listeners that on the basis of Rom. 13, Christian doctrine did not do away with civic virtues and in fact, according to 1 Tim. 1:9 and Gal. 3:24, demanded justice.17 He concluded: "But reason and the gospel are opposed in that the gospel denies that civil righteousness suffices before God."18 This was aimed directly at Erasmus's position in Hyperaspistes I, where the Dutch humanist had insisted that the church had not condemned the position, held by Gabriel Biel and William of Occam, that "through morally good works [a person] can merit grace congruously [de congruo]"19 Erasmus also deflected Luther's charge (that because philosophy generally supported the notion of free will the doctrine had no place in Christian dogma) by demonstrating where philosophy and Christianity agreed.20
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The Third Error: De sanctificatione Philosophy also thought ''reason possessed enough of powers from its own nature to combat vices and does not see the need for the Holy Spirit." 21 On the contrary, the Gospel taught that the heart was impure and inflamed with concupiscence and that the devil enticed us into shameful crimes.22 Here Melanchthon cited John 15:5 and Rom. 8:14 and recalled the terrible example of Saul's abandonment by God. This contrasted markedly to Erasmus's statement in Hyperaspistes I that those freed by grace were in the same condition as Adam and Eve, except for some weakness to sin and some darkness in the ratio.23 In part, then, all three arguments really were intended for the likes of Erasmus and Cochlaeus. That Melanchthon had Erasmus in mind as he formulated these philosophical errors can be gleaned from Erasmus's comments in De libero arbitrio. Most telling was Erasmus's statement near the end of the treatise, where, summarizing his opposition to Luther, he wrote, Why, you ask, is something attributed to free choice? So that it may be that [punishment] is justly imputed to the ungodly who willingly flee from God's grace; so that calumnies of God's injustice and cruelty may be excluded; that desperation may be excluded from us, so that security may be excluded, so that we may be motivated to try.24
Erasmus argued that attributing free will to human beings exonerated God from charges of cruelty and unjustice. Melanchthon retorted that only the Word of God could rid God of that charge. For Erasmus free will excluded despair and security in regard to our relation to God.25 Melanchthon argued, on the contrary, that only faith and not virtue sufficed before God. Finally, where Erasmus insisted that the free will stimulated us to try, Melanchthon argued that our nature could not escape its own concupiscence nor the work of the devil, unless the Holy Spirit transformed, ruled over, and governed us. As proof he quoted John 15:5, a text that Erasmus—in contrast to Luther—took to mean we could make progress, even if we could not reach the goal.26 Melanchthon also cited 1 Cor. 2:1415, making sure to point out that this has to do with "the entire human nature not renewed by the Holy Spirit." Precisely this verse and others like it Erasmus had taken up against Luther and argued that such words did not denote the entire human being but only the infirmity of our nature and its proclivity toward sin.27 In the epilogue to the Dissertatio Melanchthon summarized both sides of his argument, running back and forth between those who judged Christian doctrine by reason and those who spurned philosophy in natural matters. On the one hand, those who brought philosophy to bear in matters of doctrine were as insane as someone who tried to use the rules for making shoes to judge Christian teaching. On the other, those who rejected human philosophy altogether were rejecting a gift of God. When Paul said, "See that philosophy does not deceive," it was no different than saying, "See that you are not deceived by wine."28 Clearly, Melanchthon would be no philosophical teetotaler! In this context he also touched on the second halfof Col. 2:8, concerning "inane deception." This he took to signify arguments collected from philosophy regarding
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the will of God. For the first time in the speech he dealt with speculative philosophy, "inane dreams," such as the Epicurean idea that God did not care about us, the Platonic disputation on the origin of divine ideas, 29 or the Aristotelian contention that the world was eternal and had no beginning. He also attacked those who mixed philosophy with Christian doctrine, "who taught that we are justified by our merits."30 He also took a shot at Pico della Mirandola when he spoke of"someone who wrote that the foundations of Christian doctrine are Platonic philosophy." With this last comment Melanchthon might again have been thinking of Erasmus.31 Melanchthon now treated the listener to a second set of conclusions, this time positively expressed. He used the levitical command not to mix seeds (Lev. 19:19) to argue that philosophy and the gospel also were not to be mixed. The gospel was the teaching of the spiritual life, philosophy the teaching of the bodily life. Although medicine, ship navigation, and civil government were necessary and approved by God, taking medicine, studying storms, not bearing arms, or not wearing forbidden clothing did not justify us—no more than God's command to eat justified us when we ate! When Paul commanded in 2 Tim. 2:15 that we were rightly to divide the word of God, he meant not mixing gospel and philosophy! Here Melanchthon very gently touched upon that central point of disagreement between the Reformers in Wittenberg and the defenders of the free will: the meaning of the commandments. Whereas Luther attacked Erasmus with the socalled second use of the law (that commands were given not to be fulfilled but to show our sin), Melanchthon suggested that even viewed from the perspective of the first use of the law (that commands were given to maintain order and restrain wickedness), commands had less to do with salvation than Erasmus or Cochlaeus imagined. Just because we were commanded to do certain things, including not to bear arms, our doing them did not justify us before God. Melanchthon concluded his oration with a short addendum, warning his listeners that even when used in the appropriate realm, philosophy could still be dangerous. Reason could easily be deceived and could make distinctions even in this world that were contrary to nature. As proof he cited Rom. 1:21 and 1:28, 2 Thess. 2:11, and Prov. 29:18, as well as the patently absurd arguments in praise of the gods, in favor of suicide (proposed by Seneca), and contrary to nature (proposed by Diogenes). God showed us such horrible examples so that we might fear, cease trusting our own powers of reason, and allow ourselves to be taught and ruled over by God's Word.32 An attack against Erasmus? Melanchthon's range of vision was at this point much broader, yet in the concluding words and throughout this speech he made it clear that what drove Christian theology was not reason and philosophy but the Word of God. And was not that precisely what the dispute between Luther and Erasmus boiled down to, a dispute over where one stood in relation to the Word? If the Word—the meaning of which Erasmus equated with its interpreters—was obscure regarding human freedom of choice (as Erasmus had argued), then one had to stand outside the Word and play the part of the skeptic, laying the biblical texts next to one another and choosing among them, using reason, the tradition, and ecclesiastical authorities as guides. But such an approach—dangerous even from within the area where reason had its proper place, as Melanchthon demonstrated at the end of his oration—was impossible regarding the things of God. The whole human being had
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no access to such matters as God's governance, justification, or sanctification but instead imagined that God was unjust, that God was pleased with our civic virtues, or that our natural powers could set aside human vices. Only the Word of God, which Melanchthon richly quoted, allowed access to God's will. Melanchthon thus succeeded in exposing for all to see what he regarded as the chief weakness of the free will defense without ever having even mentioned any opponents by name. Less than a year later, he attempted the same thing on an even grander scale. The Scholia of 1527: Undercutting Erasmus's Position "I have touched upon this issue in Colossians," Melanchthon wrote to Luther. He was far too modest. In fact, the commentary of 1527 represented a thoroughgoing refutation of Erasmus's position on Melanchthon's own terms. 33 The previous chapters have demonstrated the critical attitude Melanchthon took toward some of Erasmus's translations, his use of the Fathers, and his exegetical method. This one will examine other sections of the commentary before returning to Melanchthon's reworking of his exposition of Col. 2:8. What Is Law? Melanchthon's interpretation of the argumentum Pauli rested on a rejection of the notion that Paul was chiefly concerned about the end of the ceremonial law. He attacked this notion most clearly in texts composing the epilogue to Col. 12.34 First, how was one to interpret umbra in Col. 2:17? Some explained that the shadow was actually a type, as if to say: the law did not justify, therefore ceremonies were not necessary, as in Acts 15:529. What, then, were ceremonies? Types of Christ. The Passover signified Christ's death, the ark was the church, and sacrifices were the propitiation of Christ to the Father for us. Melanchthon concluded, "I do not disapprove of this exposition, but it does not explain satisfactorily the nature of the law."35 With that comment, Melanchthon led the reader in quite a different direction. The notion that the law was a shadow of future things meant, "The whole law was given, not to justify, but to signify the justification promised through Christ." Ceremonies were given not to justify but to bring to mind the promises concerning justification.36 Because faith justified and because the end of the law was Christ (Rom. 10:4), the whole law was fulfilled here. After warning against allegories, he posed the quaestio: why did there need to be so many laws? The answer lay in God's desire to create a people who would bear God's word in the world and from whom would come the Christ (Rom. 3 and 9). In order to constitute such a politeia, God needed many laws. However, as if still not satisfied with his response, Melanchthon added a discussion of the two offices of the law.37 First, the law restrained Israel in the same way that God restrained other nations through magistrates and laws (1 Tim. 1:9 and Gal. 3:24). Second, the law incited terror, condemned us, humbled us, and showed that we were sinners so that we might seek grace and justification from Christ (Rom. 3:20 and 11:32). This was the chief function of the law and provided Melanchthon with yet another reason for the abundance of laws: that sin might abound and we
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might be killed by many laws (Rom. 5:20 and Acts 15:10). Thus, the law condemned and reminded us of the promises concerning Christ. Melanchthon concluded: "So in a general sense I understand the law to be a shadow of future things, that is, the entire law signifies the righteousness promised through Christ." 38 God gave the law for two reasons: to coerce the flesh and to terrify and humble.39 This approach countered Erasmus, who followed Jerome and Origen. In his preface, or argumentum, to the book of Colossians, Erasmus had written that the congregation in Colossae mixed Judaism and the superstition of philosophy with Christian doctrine, "observing some precepts of the law."40 Paul then warned them not to judaize or to slide into philosophical superstitions. For Melanchthon it was not some part of the law, but the whole law. Likewise, Christ fulfilled not simply the ceremonial law but the whole law. Without this distinction the exegete ran the risk of distorting the entire argumentum of Paul's letter, at least as Melanchthon understood it. What Is God's Image? In the midst of a comparison between the new and the old creature (Col. 3:9), Melanchthon asked what "according to the image of God" meant in verse 10.41 Again, he admitted that some exegetes placed the image of God in the reason and old creature as "some likeness of the Trinity in our mind." After describing this Augustinian train of thought, he concluded, "I do not reprove this idea," adding that God's image could be found in many other creatures as well. However, here Paul was speaking of some other image, found only in the new creature. In sum, this image meant rightly and truly understanding God and what God was doing to us by purifying the heart and mortifying the flesh. The flesh, on the contrary, did not understand this at all but imagined that God was cruel and punished sinners. While Adam was created in God's image, that is, as capable of accepting the Word, that image was not retained and could therefore be bestowed on us only through Christ, the substantial Word. Only because of Christ, who was God's substantial image, did God call others "his image." For it was on account of Christ that these others followed righteousness, truth, and sanctity. Paul's statement, that we were to grow in the knowledge of God, meant in poenitentia and fear as well as in faith, so that we could call on God in every trouble. Using Rom. 5:35, Melanchthon concluded that the actual imago Dei consisted of Christian hope under trial. Melanchthon had simply reduced a crucial part of Erasmus's argument concerning human freedom to an opinion. There might be an image of God in human beings, as in other creatures, but Paul had something else in mind. The discussion of Sir. 15:1418 in De libero arbitrio42 and Melanchthon's exegesis had nothing in common. While Erasmus insisted that the Fall had darkened but had not extinguished human capacities (through which the human being could begin to move toward God), Melanchthon spoke of the Fall as a loss of the Word, regained only in Jesus Christ. Hope, not reason, defined the image of God in the Christian. The disparity between Melanchthon and Erasmus appears even greater when comparing Hyperaspistes I to the Scholia. In speaking of the light of nature, a phrase used in a much different way by Luther, Erasmus asked pointedly,
Page 89 If the light of nature was completely extinguished in us, how did the philosophers know God without the grace of God? How did they produce so much about honesty and living rightly, about the immortality of souls, about the beginning and end of the world, about the diverse rewards for the godly and ungodly? 43
Melanchthon responded that there might have been such a light, but it did neither the philosophers nor us any good when used for the wrong purposes. On the Freedom of the Will The passage to which Melanchthon referred in his letter to Luther was probably Col. 1:1516.44 After dealing with the christological question of God's image in Christ, Melanchthon emphasized how the reference to creation included God's gubernatio, as also found in Acts 17:28. Living, breathing, eating, speaking, and other natural things were "works of God." Using an image also encountered in the Dissertatio, Melanchthon remarked that unlike a shipbuilder, God did not create things and then refuse to govern them. This premise set the stage for two related questions.45 First, did not this make God the author of sin? Melanchthon answered by protesting that he did not wish to treat this question at length. We needed instead to hold fast to the premise that God conserved nature and effected things so that (in connection with Col. 2:16b) whatever power or effect anything had, it had that effect or power from God. At the same time, because Christ in John 8:44 said that when Satan lied, he lied "from his own nature" (ex propriis) God was not the author of sin. God conserved nature, life, and the like, even though the devil and the ungodly did not use them rightly. Of course Melanchthon had not so much answered the question as placed two sets of biblical texts in opposition to one another. He did not simply assume some free sphere of human activity and then fit God into what remained. Instead, he began with the activity of God, described in broad terms, and then wedged diabolic activity into it. Was there room for free will here? That was Melanchthon's second question. If God moved in all creatures, was there no freedom of the will? Melanchthon first admitted that it was not generally his purpose to explain such deep and intricate questions, but "because many have disputed about this controversy," he, too, wanted to explain it briefly, "so that, as much as I am able, I may heal some weak souls who have doubts about these things."46 Far from avoiding the issue, Melanchthon faced it because many had disputed about this issue. His reason for doing so? To heal the weak, doubting souls. This characteristic excuse for Wittenberg's approach to the issue, to care for the weak, carried itself from here into certain sections of the 1580 Formula of Concord itself. It also marked one of the important differences in starting points between Luther and Melanchthon, as shall be seen. However, it also delineated the vast chasm separating Melanchthon from Erasmus, who by his own admission chose to debate the question of the free will for a quite different set of reasons. The first distinction Melanchthon made in his answer would arise again in the Latin version of the Visitation Articles of 1527 and in the Augsburg Confession itself. He was not asking whether it was in a human being's power to eat, drink, come, go, hear, and other natural matters ( ). The question was "whether without the Holy Spirit we can fear God and believe in God and love the cross, etc." He rephrased
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the point: we were not asking de creatione (concerning creation) how God moved all creatures, but de iustificatione et sanctificatione (concerning justification and sanctification). That is, this question concerned the second and third errors of philosophy outlined in the Dissertatio. In Hyperaspistes I Erasmus had noted this distinction in Luther and claimed that it marked an internal inconsistency in Luther's position. 47 Melanchthon stated his answer quite plainly. "Therefore this must be held: that human nature is not able by its natural powers to bring about true fear of God or true trust in God and the remaining spiritual affections and motions."48 Fear and trust of God were outside natural human powers. How did one prove that? First Melanchthon cited 1 Cor. 2:14 and stressed that the word meant "all (omnes) natural powers: reason, mind, will."49 As earlier, here Melanchthon stressed the word omnes against Erasmus's construal of the text. He added as further proof texts Rom. 8:67 and John 6:44 and 15:5, texts representative of those over which Luther and Erasmus had fought.50 He then added this: "From clear propositions" (claris sententiis) it followed that the human will was not free to effect Christian or spiritual righteousness. With these two words the entire argument of Erasmus regarding the unclarity of Scripture in this matter came under a blistering critique. The notion that the Scripture could be unclear in such an important matter was as unthinkable for Melanchthon, the dialectician and exegete, as it was for Luther, the assertive preacher. From this basis Melanchthon drew two corollaries. First, Christian righteousness did not arise from civic virtue created by our ratio, since the ungodly were ignorant of the new life, and second, this righteousness was worked in us by the Holy Spirit. He then concluded that it was not hard to understand where the will did not have freedom, as long as one distinguished between what was born from Adam (to go here or there; to like this kind of clothing or that) and recreation, or the new birth, which was effected by the Holy Spirit. Erasmus's favorite definition of free will, used in De libero arbitrio and defended in Hyperaspistes I, had no place in Melanchthon's theology at this time.51 Melanchthon built on this conclusion by asking, not why Christ came if we merited forgiveness by our works—a standard topic in Reformation polemics—but why the Holy Spirit was necessary, if the human will by its powers could fear God, trust God, overcome concupiscence, and love the cross (in one's own life). It was a sign of arrogance that we looked to our own powers for help instead of to the Spirit promised by Christ. "Here I expect to be overlooked as disputing most dimwittedly."52 With these words of humanistic humility, Melanchthon returned to the question of human freedom in matters of . Again he gave a list of areas of freedom including refraining from killing or remaining faithful to one's spouse. Here "human reason" governed, producing what the Scripture calls prudence, righteousness of the flesh, or works of the law. Since the ratio could do such things, God wanted it to be taught and restrained by laws and magistrates. Here Melanchthon cited Gal. 3:19 and 24. Over against Melanchthon's dimwittedness, some ridiculed the "deepest and holiest notion" that all nature was sustained and moved by God.53 It seemed almost
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absurd to them that God incited people to sin. Melanchthon answered in two ways. First, he rejected the notion that human liberty and God's coercion were at odds. If God had not restrained the flesh, he asked, what righteousness would it have effected on its own? Second, he pointed out that the particular kind of motion oractio generalis Dei ("general action of God," a term Melanchthon admitted having borrowed from the theologians) matched the particular kind of creature, so that it differed for trees, beasts, and humans. God provided life and motion to us, as a result of which we could choose and act as described in Acts 17:28. 54 However, because this action of God was hidden, Melanchthon insisted that we were not to dispute curiosius but simply to use the liberty and to perform civil righteousness diligently. Completely in the style of his comments on philosophy, Melanchthon then took time to discuss the impediments to such righteousness: the weakness of the flesh and the devil—difficulties Erasmus's Hyperaspistes I seemed to minimize. Given our weakness, we needed to learn that reason alone could not even produce a pure civil righteousness. Even some of the better philosophers were amazed at the weakness and the "rage of affections" in human beings. Melanchthon encouraged his readers to hold to that "most serious voice" of the prophet Hosea (13:9) and to Ps. 127:1, which reminded us that God was our only help. Melanchthon ended with a prayer that God would control all parts and actions of our lives. "At this place I wanted to remember these things, so that I would help some weak souls stuck in the controversy on the free will, things which perhaps will be explained more completely at another time."55 As in the letter to Luther, Melanchthon announced that he would deal with this issue at length in another setting. His chance came a year later in the Scholia of 1528. Standing alone, the arguments in the Dissertatio could have referred to any number of people, including Erasmus. With the addition of these comments on free will in the Scholia, clearly representing Melanchthon's participation in the controversy, one can see more clearly the broad case that Melanchthon built against the Dutch humanist from 1526 on. Several aspects of his case stand out. First, he was concerned for "weak souls." This meant that his approach would contrast both in style and content from the disputations going on around him. He dealt with the issue from two sides: God's governance of creation (clearly suggested by the text of Colossians) and the Holy Spirit's recreation. Whatever differences some might want to find between Luther and Melanchthon,56 the clear opponent in the Scholia was Erasmus, whose concern for free choice in matters of salvation Melanchthon viewed as sheer arrogance. This relatively short discussion of the Holy Spirit contrasted to Melanchthon's lengthy debate over God's governance. He brought it up in the first part of the discussion only to put the reader off. Then, perhaps as a later addition to the original lecture notes, he returned to the question, using scholastic categories to speak of God's motion and our relative freedom. Although this discussion has seemed to some more open in comparison to the Loci of 1521, where human freedom was more severely restricted, even in this passage human freedom—restrained by God through magistrate and law and hemmed in by the flesh and the devil—had more weaknesses than strengths. Melanchthon was trying less to find space for human freedom than to defend the governance of God against the attacks of reason.
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On Philosophy In the Scholia of 1527 Melanchthon added seven pages not found in the Dissertatio to his discussion of philosophy. Before we examine these additions in detail, a few comments about other changes are in order. First, Melanchthon had fashioned a new introduction that linked this text to Col. 2:4 and its mention of probabilis ratio. 57 Some references were changed so that Melanchthon left his readers with the impression that philosophy taught "the nature of bodies or civil behavior" instead of "the nature of medicinal cures or of bodies,"58 and that we ought to "embrace and cultivate" rather than "hug and kiss" these gifts of God.59 Only a few additions were made to the section on the errors of philosophy. Melanchthon now admitted that there were many other areas where reason caused trouble for the faith but that he would only discuss some articles under three headings. The Trinitarian balance was not acknowledged. The texts proving God's governance now included a reference to Deut. 8:3, which had less to do with God's governance than with the overall polemic against the use of reason: "one lives not by bread alone but also by every word that proceeds from God's mouth.''60 The balance near the end of the Dissertatio between medicine, navigation, and governing was broken both with additional comments on geometry and arithmetic (in line with comments in the major addition to the piece and with the omission of a reference to navigation.61 The other addition that merits attention involves Melanchthon's attack against those who mixed philosophy with Christian doctrine.62 While the Dissertatio complained about those "who taught that we are justified by our merits," the Scholia of 1527 attacked those "who attribute to reason the power of effecting in us faith toward God without the Holy Spirit." Melanchthon's imprecision in the Dissertatio concerning his true opponent disappeared with this small change. Not simply the article of justification and the role of merits—which Erasmus also defended—but much more specifically the doctrine of free choice came under attack. The reference to the Holy Spirit echoed the earlier discussion of Col. 1:1516. By far the largest addition to the text came not in the attack on philosophy but in its defense. Melanchthon's opponent was not Erasmus directly but, rather, those who disgraced the evangelical cause (in Erasmus and Melanchthon's eyes) by attacking any and all uses of philosophy (that is, of the arts and sciences). Melanchthon began by labeling such an opinion ignorant, pernicious, and impious. These were gifts of God, as long as they were applied to bodily matters and not to religious dogmas.63 Just as eating, which preserved the body, entailed no sin for the Christian, so medicine, human arts, eloquence, letters, and laws, which also preserved the body, could also be freely studied. People who spoke against such things were to be punished like thieves and rioters! Melanchthon had now expanded the discussion to include the teaching of eloquence. In defense of his position, Melanchthon cited Augustine's De doctrina Christiana and its references to the need of the arts and languages for the study of the Scriptures, something Erasmus had done in his introduction to the New Testament. But, Melanchthon hastened to add, these arts were also needed in subjects completely outside religion as well, in agriculture, medicine, and the study of nature. He also cited Paul in Rom. 1:25, where the apostle called such things veritas Dei.64 Ifknowl
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edge of nature revealed the Divinity, then surely it was to be studied, defended, and passed on as a kind of patrimony. God gave us eyes and ears (Prov. 20:12) to use for just this kind of investigation. What the poet Ovid said of the poet's skill applies to all disciplines: "This impulse possesses the seeds of the sacred mind." Melanchthon chose several areas of human studies to prove the point he and Paul (Rom. 1:25 and 1 Tim. 4:34) wanted to make. He began with medicine, something much on his mind if the declamations on the topic from this time are any indication. 65 He quoted Sir. 38:1 and referred to the use of medicine by Isaiah to help Hezekiah. Under medicine he included physiology and astronomy, citing Hippocrates to back up his claim. This "observation of the times" was not superstition but "divine ordering." This led to a broader discussion of the role of astronomy in other fields as well.66 Melanchthon took his second major example of the positive use of philosophy from ethics.67 He discussed the poets Hesiod and Homer and the philosophers Cicero and Aristotle. Melanchthon judged that such works were especially helpful when they had the practical goal of assisting in statecraft, law writing, and human duties. Like an untended field, the human mind was easily corrupted when not fixed on some doctrina. When focused on nature and its laws, the mind was actually dealing with the law of God written on our hearts—no less sacred than what God carved for Moses.68 At this point Melanchthon broke off his argument to examine the question of philosophical speculation, something he dealt with in another context in the Dissertatio. He attacked Aristotle's understanding of the world's eternity, Epicureus' theory about atoms, and the of the Stoics. Was this reason to reject all natural and moral philosophy? Not at all. Melanchthon insisted that such wild theories disagreed not only with Christian doctrine but even with "natural reason"! Where God did not rule minds with the Word, any number of hallucinations resulted. With this warning, Melanchthon now redefined what he meant by philosophy. "Therefore I call philosophy only that which affirms nothing except what is revealed by certain reason or experience." Logic (Melanchthon surely had in mind dialectic as taught in Wittenberg) and experience had become the two extrabiblical checks against bad philosophy. Finally, Melanchthon had arrived at his third example: eloquentia. Erasmus might have seen the end ofbonae litterae in the theology of Luther, but not Melanchthon. Instead, he treated the reader to a detailed discussion of the importance oforatio, by which he meant not the deceit that passed for speech but, rather, explanation of a thing clearly (dialectic), with dignity (rhetoric), and for the benefit of the nation (politics). Melanchthon dispensed with a discussion of the kind of eloquence used by legislators and the like in favor of a discussion of its role in schools. Without languages, rhetoric, and dialectic no one could understand or explain laws and letters. Since eloquence was nothing other than the biblical gift of tongues, it was also, as Paul indicated, necessary for the office of bishop.69 One could not understand the Scriptures without a good grounding in the trivium (grammar, rhetoric, dialectic). Many of the debates in the church today, he went on to say, arose from an ignorance of rhetoric and dialectic where the deaf were simply speaking to the deaf. The only way to figure out which arguments agreed with the Scripture and edified and which did not was through a generous use of basic dialectical tools.
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At this point Melanchthon turned to the errors of philosophy, after having increased this introductory section from 38 lines in the Dissertatio to 291 lines in the Scholia. But to whom was Melanchthon addressing this defense? For one thing, he was expressing yet again the humanist's educational ideal for the University of Wittenberg, first proposed by Spalatin and Luther in 1517 and defended consistently by Melanchthon from his opening address as teacher of Greek in 1518 until the end of his life. 70 For another, he must have had some fairly specific opponents in mind, such as Karlstadt, who turned his back on the University altogether, or the likes of the Strasbourg preacher to whom Erasmus refers. Closer to the home front, a letter to Spalatin written on 13 or 14 September 1524, explaining the reasons for stopping his lectures in theology, included this statement: "I have done this for a public cause, although it would also have been easier for me (if you consider the things carnally), to dictate theological matters from pulpits than to recall listless youth to these necessary letters."71 Melanchthon clearly viewed teaching and learning the liberal arts more difficult and more important than reciting theologica from the pulpit. At nearly the same time, between 30 April 1523 and March 1524, just such a radical critique of the humanities was being expressed by Francois Lambert in his lectures at the University of Wittenberg.72 In his commentary on the Song of Songs, which perhaps had its origin in lectures at the University of Wittenberg, he wrote like a professor denied tenure: "Neither power, nor dignity, nor promotion of the universities, nor any other human knowledge contributes anything to the authority of rightly and truly judging the Word."73 In May of 1524, even closer to the time he left Wittenberg according to Bodenmann's dating, Lambert also published a series of poems, appended to his commentary on marriage. The fourth song was entitled "Against the Wisdom of This Age and Ungodly Universities" and praised the exegetical ability of farmers, children, and women. Children and workers, whom you [O God] make with your words more learned than [university teachers], will conquer the same. They will be conquered by women and farmers in whom you have poured your mouth and wisdom, because all human studies are nursery rhymes apart from the most sacred study of your law.74
That this populist attack included Wittenberg and its arts faculty became clear in later writings. In his Farrago of January or February 1525 he again called on farmers and artisans to judge "concerning the ungodly universities and their promotions."75 The most direct and sustained attack against the humanities came in his Commentarii de Prophetia, eruditione Linguis, published in March 1526.76 It included such statements as the following: Now it is clear from the commandments that that doctrine or erudition alone is true and alone is secure which is possessed by faith. Truly all other is from a created sense, which in itself is vain, speculative, lying, pernicious, unless it is made perfect by an uncreated sense.77 From this it follows that every teaching of unbelievers is vain, false, pernicious, and blasphemy against God, because it possesses nothing in common with the sense of the eternal truth. From this it also follows that only the faithful can teach correctly—even human, natural things.78
Page 95 Certainly, the end of all erudition is the good and the useful. Therefore, because the unbelievers lack the wit of all erudition, namely the sense of God, their erudition is nothing other than sophistic erudition: evil, ungodly, abominable to God, most wicked, deadly, and sometimes ruinous. 79
He attacked grammar, rhetoric, dialectic, Aristotle, Plato, Vergil, Cicero, and others. Dialectic, for example, which ought to have been about proofs, made the unbeliever who used it "a sophistic person: speculative, babbling, loquatious, rash and puffed up."80 "It is a most pernicious thing to be taught or to teach human things without faith."81 The only place for eruditio humana was when it was restrained by the Word of God and faith. The wisdom of God could be had without human erudition, and "the writings of God could be explained without the knowledge of the liberal arts.''82 With such a book rolling off Herwagen's Strasbourg presses in early 1526 (the prefatory letter is dated October 1525), it is little wonder that Nicholas Gerbel wrote from that city to Melanchthon in January 1526 concerning the establishment of its schools, "I hold onto the hope that studies will once again arise, studies that the ungodly piety of some tries to condemn, among whom now that Franciscan Lambert rashly rages."83 Lambert did not exclude studies altogether, but he saw them restrained only by the life of faith. The very connections that Melanchthon and others wanted to make between the humanities and theology were being attacked by Lambert's radical, biblicistic fideism. Lambert replaced Melanchthon's distinction between civil and Christian righteousness, where both categories have their place in the Christian's life, with a radical division between the carnal and the divine. This attack on the humanities instigated by people associated with the evangelical camp was a real one; it probably occurred in Wittenberg within two years of the time Melanchthon delivered the Dissertatio. No wonder that on 2 July 1526 Melanchthon wrote to Camerarius about the need to defend the study of liberal arts, agreeing with him that God would help those who did.84 Attacks by people like Lambert also indirectly made Erasmus a prime target for the comments in Col. 2, in part because of Erasmus's negative comments about Lambert in Hyperaspistes I.85 Like Erasmus, Melanchthon perceived that the study of the humanities was under attack, but unlike Erasmus, he refused to link such attacks to the evangelical cause.86 On the contrary, precisely evangelicals who understood the distinction between civil and Christian righteousness would have found reason to embrace and cultivate (if not hug and kiss) these studies as well. Erasmus's inability to make this distinction meant that in De libero arbitrio he was fighting the wrong opponent with the wrong weapons. The best defense ofbonae litterae was not in defending the free will in theology but in carefully putting free will in its proper place. The Scholia of 1527 represented a manysided attack on Erasmus's position. On textual questions, discussed in chapter 3; on exegetical problems, such as the meaning of the law; and on theological questions, such as the meaning of God's image or the freedom of the will, Melanchthon carefully presented positions opposed to those of Erasmus. Moreover, on the question of the role of philosophy and reason,
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Melanchthon carefully extolled the arts, medicine, and law without at the same time having to capitulate to Erasmus's demands for a free will with powers in matters of salvation. The Scholia of 1528: Broadening the Attack More than likely, the Scholia of 1527 was on Melanchthon's writing desk undergoing corrections at the very time Erasmus's poor excuse for an apology arrived in February 1528. Melanchthon's response makes it safe to assume that the letter had little impact on his work. In fact, the second edition of the Scholia represented an attack against the Dutch philologist that was even better conceived than the first The Law On the question of the law, it was first in 1528 that Melanchthon expressly distanced himself from Origen and others who made Christ into a better lawgiver or philosopher. 87 In the same connection Melanchthon greatly expanded his discussion of Col. 2:4, referring the text to philosophy (ratio) and not oratory (senno) He sought to demonstrate how, controlled by reason, philosophers like Cicero could not imagine a god who cared for human beings and how "Pharisees" imagined that they could attain heaven through their works. Melanchthon also expanded his comments on Col. 2:17. He excused taking time with this issue in this way. "The great majority of our theologians have been in error, in that they imagined there are two lawgivers sent from God: Moses and Christ."88 Against these theologians Melanchthon argued that Christ came not to set up a new government but to preach remission of sins, to make satisfaction for them, and to give the Holy Spirit. Jewish rites no more justified the Jews than Saxon laws justified the Germans. Those who imagined that fulfilling the Ten Commandments or other opera moralia justified were simply following Origen's opinion. After proving to his satisfaction from other portions of the Pauline corpus that such had never been the case, Melanchthon concluded with a warning to students about reading Origen's works.89 The Free Will By far the most telling arguments against Erasmus, however, came in connection with comments on free will. In one case, commenting on Col. 2:2, Melanchthon discussed Paul's use of the term (full assurance of understanding), which he linked to faith, "which assuredly perceives that God forgives on account of Christ, which assuredly perceives that God hears us, which assuredly establishes that God will defend us, as assuredly as we perceive a hand will get burned when held over fire."90 Melanchthon contrasted this certainty to the fallacies of the hypocrites, "who teach that faith is effected in us by the powers of the free will (liberum arbitrium) For reason is not able to assent to God's promises."91 When surrounded by Sennacherib's army, ratio did not help Hezekiah. Instead, faith did, because it constantly expected help from God based on God's promises
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and Word. In fact, in all afflictions our only certainty was in God's promised grace and aid. 92 This text approaches the theological grounds for Melanchthon's rejection of Erasmus: the certainty of faith. Erasmus wanted to encourage anyone who tried. Melanchthon tried to comfort everyone in the midst of distress and failure. In such anxiety only the certainty of God's Word, not the vagaries of reason or free choice, provided help. Melanchthon believed that teaching like Erasmus's undermined the entire doctrine of justification. This was clear in his comments on John 16:811. Already in 1525 Luther had claimed that this text excluded the possibility of the will's freedom.93 In response Erasmus wrote in Hyperaspistes II that Jesus' comments about the Holy Spirit in that text had nothing to do with free will and everything to do with the fact that the Jews, with inexcusable pertinacity, refused to believe in Christ's divinity. Moreover, the stark contrast Luther made between the kingdoms of Satan and Christ ("wherever Christ was not known, there was Satan, impiety and death") was false. Granted, there were two kingdoms, but between them stood the "children and weak in Christ."94 Already in the 1527 Scholia Melanchthon had employed John 16 in connection with Col. 1:13. To be in darkness, he wrote, was not to know God. The ratio's ignorance had four parts: not to know that God condemned sin, not to know what sin was (here he quoted the first part of John 16:8), not to know what righteousness availed in God's presence (here he quoted the second part of the verse and what followed in verse 10), and not to understand oneself as under the devil's power. In 1528 these points were emphasized to an even greater degree. To the second part he added, "For the Gospel [John 16] shows some other righteousness by which we are justified before God than the righteousness of works. For it teaches the righteousness of faith, namely, to believe that sins are forgiven us on account of Christ."95 In the fourth part he stressed the powers of darkness "to impel to sin and to detain those captive and subject to eternal death."96 Precisely what Erasmus objected to in Luther's interpretation of John 16 from 1525—namely, the centrality of justification and the power of the devil—turned up with a somewhat less polemical edge in Melanchthon's exegesis of 1527 and 1528.97 As was the case in 1527, Melanchthon returned to the question of free will in comments on Col. 1:1516. Changes in both style and content abounded. The end result was only slightly (one page) longer, but the effect of the changes is quite striking. At the beginning of his comments Melanchthon followed the 1527 text outlined earlier, asking the questions whether because of God's governance of the world God were the author of sin and whether God's movement of all creatures excluded free will.98 However, he greatly expanded his discussion of the work of the Holy Spirit in the life of believers. The Spirit renewed hearts; brought forth in believers new movement, life, light, and knowledge; and through the Word worked fear and faith in their hearts. This recitation of the Spirit's work set up his criticisms. "They are completely in error who think the power of the free will (liberum arbitrium) suffices for changing concupiscence. Much more do they err who dream they can be defended against the devil by the powers of free will (liberum arbitrium)"99 After describing the devil's work (if he tempted Christ, think what he would do to us!), Melanchthon added that
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the ratio, a word he used interchangeably with liberum arbitrium, also was unable to help console those afflicted by death, hell, or God's judgment. The Scripture insisted that all flesh is grass! This meant, contrary to what some had said, that we could not produce or even prepare for righteousness before God by our own powers. 100 Instead, only the Holy Spirit worked faith, chastity, and humility in our hearts through the Word. Much of this material Melanchthon had already introduced in 1527. However, the tone of commentary had changed. Now a much more resolute, even pugnacious Melanchthon was speaking, as if, having read Erasmus's attack in Hyperaspistes II, he felt compelled to respond.101 He excluded preparation for grace in any form; he extolled the work of the Holy Spirit. Luther's warning about the relation between this debate and the work of the devil was taken seriously here. Melanchthon was also more wary in the discussion concerning the general action of God. Only after having discussed what was required in this debate did he feel he could turn to this second question, now non curiose (avoiding speculation).102 After describing all kinds of actions in the civil realm, he argued that what had to be understood was that all nature was governed and moved by God. Where in 1527 he merely mentioned that God moved different parts of creation differently, here he described the difference. The Scripture ascribed to human beings some prudentia that the ratio effected by its own powers. In this civil righteousness, Melanchthon included such things as refraining from stealing, adultery, murder, and the like. Given this understanding of God's governance, Melanchthon described two kinds of misunderstanding. Some figured that the law was given in vain and could not restrain human desires. Here again the opponents included Erasmus, who had argued that without free will human beings would feel secure and never do good.103 To these Melanchthon answered, more clearly than in 1527, that the punishments and rewards of the law were precisely for carnal human beings. As Paul said, the law was for the unjust.104 The human being could produce some form of civil righteousness. Immediately, however, Melanchthon thought of a second kind of misunderstanding and pointed out that although this civil righteousness was as natural as the production of leaves on a tree, the tree was in fact diseased by original sin and the power of the devil and therefore produced withered leaves. From this Melanchthon inferred that we could not even prepare civil righteousness without God's help. Here again, although this material was present in some form in 1527, the arguments were much clearer and more forcefully presented. At one point, however, he significantly changed one of his earlier arguments. In 1527 he had spoken of philosophers who were amazed by human weakness. Now he spoke of philosophers who tried hard to fulfill civil righteousness but could not even attain that. God had left us such examples so that we would know the weakness of human beings and the power of the devil. Who among the philosophers had not searched in vain for the cause of this weakness? Only the Scriptures moved us to find the answer in original sin and the devil. Consequently, those who greatly praise the powers of the free will (liberum arbitrium) follow philosophers, who support the power of human reason with immoderate praises. But the philosophers and all who follow those authors go astray and do not consider what Holy Scripture teaches.105
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The tie to Col. 2:8 had now been made even stronger. The attack against Erasmus was at its sharpest: those who follow these authors "do not consider what Holy Scripture teaches." With that phrase Melanchthon swept aside as philosophical speculation De libero arbitrio and all of Hyperaspistes II (which was simply bursting with arguments from the Scriptures). Luther charged that Erasmus had misused the Scripture; Melanchthon, in language reminiscent of his review of Hyperaspistes penned for Camerarius, did not think Erasmus used it at all. After a prayer, which used some of the same phrases employed in 1527, 106 Melanchthon closed with a summary of what he considered the most important arguments. Human reason was not able to produce Christian righteousness. It could produce some civil righteousness, but that neither justified nor prepared us for justification. It had some choice and freedom in regard to such civil righteousness, although that freedom was impeded by the weakness of our nature and the power of the devil. The arguments differed from Luther's, but they clearly had only one opponent in mind: Erasmus and those who defended the freedom of the will. On Philosophy As if these arguments against Erasmus were not enough, Melanchthon also produced some interesting changes in his interpretation of Col. 2:8, nearly doubling its length. The additions came neither in the first half of the text of 1527 nor in the attack on the errors of philosophy already present in the Dissertatio but specifically in connection with Melanchthon's discussion of rhetoric and dialectic.107 In this section he not only rewrote individual sentences but also made major additions. He introduced the section on rhetoric in a slightly different manner, by referring more specifically to the use of rhetoric and dialectic in lawmaking. This discipline was not to be taken out of Christian schools, lest Christians ended up standing around in public looking like the silent character of Greek comedies.108 With this introduction he now focused on the use of such tools in the interpretation of Scripture. Here he lodged complaints against Thomas, Hugh, and Lyra, discussed in chapter 3. They were ignorant not only of grammar but of the Bible's summa sententiae as well. They had not interpreted one page of the Prophets or Psalms correctly, to say nothing of missing the oeconomia in Paul's letter to the Romans.109 Then, almost as if responding directly to Lambert, he added that this did not exclude the Holy Spirit from interpretation. In fact, spiritual things could not be understood except when the Spirit moved our hearts. "And nevertheless, since the Holy Spirit teaches us through the Word, the nature of speech (sermo) must be known."110 The only way to interpret such speeches was by using these tools. Of course, this syllogism required proof, which Melanchthon derived from Paul's discussion of tongues in 1 Cor. 1214. It was the gift of tongues which helped the original apostles and which had led to a recleansing of ecclesiastical doctrine in this age.111 In this context he rearranged the order of his arguments from 1527 so as to discuss the role of bishops as teachers. Those who knew neither the way to organize a speech nor the basis for argumentation said whatever came into their heads and left out more certain things. Instead they dealt with "doubtful matters."112 This led to much dissension in the church, he added, which could have been avoided.113 Ques
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tions arose which were not edifying for the church, including "whether God causes evil things." Taken out of context, this point might be misconstrued as an attack on Luther. Instead, as we have seen again and again, Erasmus's challenge to Luther was the real culprit. To pose the question of the pagans, whether God was the cause of evil, showed an improper understanding of rhetoric and dialectic. Yet this was in fact what worried Erasmus! What questions were to be discussed in the church? Melanchthon provided a list: whether faith alone justified; whether works made satisfaction for our sins; what faith was and how it came into our hearts; what the power of the sacraments was; to what extent human traditions were to be preserved. Good minds that allowed themselves to be taught would not, if given the proper foundation, have a hard time understanding these things. Then came the final, most direct attack against Erasmus: I ask you, what can that shapeless mass of commentaries by [John] Fabri or by [John Fisher, bishop of] Rochester, or by similar people confer on a reader, where so many things beside the point and from another subject are thrown together? Who teaches in this way instead disturbs doubting consciences as well. 114
This was as close as Melanchthon came to attacking Erasmus by name (similii). He mentioned the lengthy attacks on Luther by two of Erasmus's patrons. John Fabri, at this time general vicar for the bishop of Constance, was in constant contact with Erasmus. His Malleus haereticorum, published in 1523, included an allout attack on Luther's theology.115 Erasmus cited him both in his letter to Melanchthon of 1524 116 and in both volumes of the Hyperaspistes, where he specifically criticized Justus Jonas for attacking Fabri.117 John Fisher, who earlier had encouraged Erasmus to come to Cambridge, in 1523 wrote A Confutation of Martin Luther's Assertiones,118 which became one of the sources for De libero arbitrio.119 Between them, they represented Erasmus's hope for a proper reform of the church in head and members by bishops who cared for bonae litterae,120 and they were the only living theologians Erasmus referred to positively and by name in De libero arbitrio or Hyperaspistes! Melanchthon would have none of it. Their works and those of "similar people" showed no understanding of how to use good letters and firmly ground arguments in defense of the gospel. In Melanchthon's eyes, not only had Erasmus gone wrong by importing the errors of philosophy into the discussion of Christian righteousnesssomething pointed out already in the Dissertatio—but he had also made the further mistake of misusing the very tools of civil righteousness (in this case rhetoric and dialectic) that people must employ to interpret Scripture. Melanchthon's defense of the civil realm and good letters, originally shaped to meet Erasmus's objections, now had been turned against the prince of humanists, who in De libero arbitrio and Hyperaspistes had not only created the very moles commentariorum supporters of good letters were to avoid but also made weak people doubt, a cardinal sin in evangelical circles. Against the backdrop of this pointed polemic, one other text that might otherwise be overlooked can now be included in the discussion. In both his letters to Melanchthon and in De libero arbitrio and Hyperaspistes, Erasmus had objected
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strenuously to Luther's argumentative style. Melanchthon answered this charge in comments on Col. 2:18 ("lest someone, faking humility, deceive you"). Excising the bulk of the comments made in 1527, 121 he discussed the word , which might be translated "equanimity." Those who feigned humility often exhibited no equanimity in judging others, making false charges and distorting the reputations of good men. In the words and deeds of their opponents they overlooked the good and pulled out only the poorer things. "On the contrary, [when] their words and deeds are most fittingly interpreted, here they possess some new sincerity, here they require equanimity from others. Whoever wants to get to know a Sycophant can devote himself to these teachers."122 He went on to call such people Pharisees—a code word for Roman opponents—and added that one did not need look for examples of this kind of behavior from ancient history. There followed Melanchthon's public complaint (against Erasmus) for having attacked both Luther and himself. For this our own age can supply a "copia" of examples. For I imagine no people to have been more greatly hated than have at this time some good men, who teach properly. Nor are they hated by only one kind of people, but they have been hated greatly by some Hypocrites, who with reluctance censure their teaching, and who fear lest they let slip some praise of wisdom. Although there is incredible pride in these Hypocrites, nevertheless they wonderfully know how "to put in an appearance," and to confine the pride of soul under the singular appearance of humility. Formerly the monks publicly made a pretence with dress and their manner of walking. Now another, much more clever craft has been thought up for simulating humility, which is of such a quality, that it does not please me to describe it.123
This was the crowning touch in a commentary full of attacks against the Dutch humanist. Melanchthon managed in 1528 to attack not only the theological grounds for Erasmus's arguments in De libero arbitrio and Hyperaspistes but also its rhetorical and dialectical flaws and, in something that hit at the heart of Erasmus's program for moral reform, Erasmus's own behavior. Far from showing the kind of equanimity that was esteemed in both Wittenberg and Basel, Erasmus was finally a hypocrite, giving out the appearance of humility in a much more seditious way than the monks he delighted in attacking. In Melanchthon's eyes he was perhaps just another pagan philosopher, who could describe what was right but could not do it. The very virtue he most esteemed was the one that, at least in the debate over the free will, he was least able to model. The Translated Scholia of 1529: Revealing the Opponent As already discussed in chapter 1, Justus Jonas viewed the work of translator somewhat broadly, insisting that the brevity of Latin and the loquaciousness of German required him to use more words to do the commentary justice. He added in the afterword to the reader that he had shown his work to his "friend and dear sir, Philip Mel(anchthon)," who commended him and gave him free rein, "especially at the place where philosophy is considered." This meant that precisely where Melanchthon's criticism of Erasmus was the broadest, there Jonas had asked for
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permission to expand the text. He did this in part, no doubt, because he, too, had been attacked in Hyperaspistes. 124 Erasmus, who had loudly objected to the translation (by Jonas!) of De servo arbitrio into German as being unfit for lay consumption. in 1529 had to endure Melanchthon's more moderate attacks put before the same Germanspeaking public by the same translator. In fact, Jonas made small expansions and explanations of the text throughout the commentary, although in comparison to what John Agricola did to Melanchthon's commentaries on Romans and 1 and 2 Corinthians the changes were relatively minor. To take one example from comments on Col. 1:1516, what Melanchthon had described rather coolly regarding the objection that no one was able to follow God's law if the will was not free,125 Jonas made it much more lively: "Some people, when they hear us talk about the free will and its inability, cry continuously, 'If I hear correctly, then all commands and laws are for naught and we can do whatever we want."'126 The notion of hearing such people crying arose from the mind of Jonas, not the pen of Melanchthon. The basic point, however, had not changed. In the same section Jonas was also capable of making Melanchthon's arguments against the free will even stronger than the original. On two separate occasions, once where Melanchthon simply stated that by nature a person could not believe and once where he contrasted the works of the Holy Spirit to the free will, Jonas added the word allein (alone).127 In another instance he threw down the gauntlet to Wittenberg's opponents by pointedly stating: "This then is the most necessary article, which those who want to preserve the free will ought to prove first."128 In the same vein Jonas added precision to Melanchthon's concluding statements. Not only had Melanchthon written this section so that the weak would know where chiefly to look in this matter,129 but Jonas now added that they were also to know "what the main question is, namely, whether the free will or reason is able from itself to make an uprightness or righteousness that avails before God. There we conclude and say simply: No!"130 Regarding comments on Col. 2:8, changes were more expansive. Jonas began the discussion of philosophy by more carefully dividing knowledge into the three areas that Melanchthon would then discuss: physics (that is, natural science and medicine), moral philosophy (including political science and law), and rhetoric. He contrasted philosophy to the Scriptures allein, not just to Christian teaching,131 and human reason to the "rage and depravity" of the wild bears and wolves. This last comment he tied to God's command in Gen. 2 to work. Where Melanchthon made a passing reference to Hungary (where law was not being followed), Jonas followed up by cataloging Turkish atrocities.132 Jonas also made Melanchthon's attack on people like Lambert sharper. People who denied the importance of philosophy for Christians argued "as if the best Christian were the crudest, most ignorant jackass."133 (Melanchthon had mentioned no beasts of burden.) Jonas argued that many of the arts had been passed on to the pagans from the patriarchs, Adam and Noah.134 He also added that the highest form of rhetoric, about which Melanchthon had decided not to talk, was the kind "about which Cicero writes."135 He even described the contributions made by moral philosophers in more detail.136 The single most important change, however, that Jonas brought to Melanchthon's discussion of this text came in precisely those places in comments on Col. 2:8 where,
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without using the term "free will," Melanchthon had had that particular debate in mind. Melanchthon had written, "And because obscure controversies often exist in the church concerning the greatest matters, a person who has not been instructed enough in dialectics and rhetoric will not know how to explain these things or defend the truth." 137 Jonas boldly translated, or rather, paraphrased, Moreover, because often controversy and discord arise in the church concerning high, mighty, powerful articles—as for example, on the free will and the like—no one who has not learned something about dialectics or rhetoric can understand, explain or judge regarding these things.138
Again, in the same paragraph, Melanchthon had simply stated, "And when there is a dissension concerning some issue, since they mix in the dispute many things foreign to the main argument, they do not explain the controversies but rather obscure them by teaching, so that they cannot be understood or sorted out."139 Jonas now made clear exactly which dispute Melanchthon had in mind, or at least which one occurred to the translator in 1529. It also often occurs when someone is dealing with an article—as for example, with the free will—these same unlearned people bring in many things that do not belong to the issue nor serve it. Instead it only makes the matter more longwinded and obscure, so that a person can get out of it just that much less.140
What Melanchthon had pointed out in the third error of philosophy, Jonas applied to the entire speech. This meant that not only the careful reader of the twentieth century but also the simplest reader in the sixteenth would have understood that Melanchthon's commentary on Colossians and especially the analysis of Col. 2:8 represented his contribution to the debate with Erasmus. Set within this context, Luther's prefatory epistle to the translation made perfect sense. It was hardly praise from a man who no longer read his younger colleague's work. It did not show the goodnatured Luther putting up with the betrayal of his longtime "friend." Here was Martin Luther, beset by all kinds of false brethren in other places and attacked by all manner of people in the Roman church, praising a book that presented "what Christian teaching and life is," in a "clear and rich" manner.141 Given the differences in the way the two men approached the problem of the free will—that is, given Melanchthon's subtler approach—it is no wonder that Luther could say that the book was such that "all people can carry it with them in their bosom as their Christian treasure for daily exercise." This mirrored the very advice Melanchthon himself gave in the same year and later to students of theology.142 The preface also contained Luther's famous endorsement: ''I myself really prefer the books of Master Philip to my own, and I prefer to see them rather than mine in the bookstalls both in Latin and German." The hyperbole for which Luther was famous notwithstanding—it was after all Erasmus who nicknamed him Doctor Hyperbolicus in Hyperaspistes II 143—it is possible within this context to understand why Luther would have said such a thing in reference to this commentary, especially if Jonas happened to have pointed out to him the expansions of the section on Col. 2:8! The context and changes in Melanchthon's arguments against Erasmus and their importance in this commentary also help explain another important, and often mis
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understood, passage, where Luther attempted to compare the styles of the two men This was not the stuff of which psychograms are made. It was not the pious wishes of a now aging and sick Reformer under attack from the devil. It was Luther's shrewd assessment for public consumption of the way in which Melanchthon had followed up his own attack on Erasmus. I was born for this purpose: to fight with the rebels and the devils and to lead the charge. Therefore my books are very stormy and warlike. I have to uproot trunks and stumps, hack at thorns and hedges, and fill in the potholes. So I am the crude woodsman, who has to clear and make the path. But Master Philip comes after me meticulously and quietly, builds and plants, sows and waters happily, according to the talents God has richly given him. 144
Better than many a learned dissertation, Luther hit on the clear difference between his and Melanchthon's approach to Erasmus. The assertive style of the older man gave way to the much cleverer and more indirect tactics of the younger. In this particular situation, these "gifts" served Melanchthon well. To be sure, later, when the older colleague was no longer there and people demanded answers and confession, Melanchthon's style as well as his theology came under heavier attack.145 Melanchthon contra Erasmum The attack by Melanchthon on Erasmus took place on three different but related levels. In the first place, Melanchthon wanted nothing to do with the theology represented by De libero arbitrio and its successors. Erasmus failed to make what for Melanchthon had become a more and more important distinction in his theology, a clear division between Christian righteousness and human freedom.146 As a result, Erasmus could not see the philosophical questions that undergirded his objections to the will's bondage. He insisted on bringing in irrelevant and even irreligious questions, such as whether God caused evil. He did not understand the connection between justification by faith alone and the exclusion of human freedom before God. He made the Holy Spirit unnecessary in his rush to leave room for human freedom. He caused people to doubt. Melanchthon, on the contrary, under very carefully defined circumstances allowed for human freedom in the things of this world. Even there he insisted on the "general action of God" and on the weakness of this freedom, given original sin and attacks of the devil. Philosophers, for all their efforts, were incapable of following their own best moral principles and were at a loss to explain why that was. Nevertheless, Melanchthon was convinced that for all its weaknesses, philosophy had a place in this world. In his theology medicine, law and, especially, the humanities would not fall prey to a triumphalistic gospel that insisted on emptying the schools and filling the pulpits with, to use Jonas's term for them, jackasses. Using this same distinction between the two righteousnesses, Melanchthon further developed the difference between the Word of God and human reason, already expressed in his Loci of 1522. Human reason had its place in things below, but it was
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completely incapable of figuring out what was wrong with this world. Only the Word of God, used by the Holy Spirit in the human heart, could overcome this blindness. Only the Word of God, properly interpreted, provided the very comfort demanded by the uncertain soul. Erasmus's claim that the Scripture was at some level uncertain did not play well in Melanchthon's theology. If the Scripture was uncertain about a subject as crucial to faith as this one, all was lost for Melanchthon. Erasmus's approach to such a theological question left Melanchthon to conclude that Erasmus did not use the Scripture at all because he robbed the conscience of the very consolation it so desperately needed and depended instead on unreliable interpreters, notably Origen. On this point Melanchthon even found a way in the Scholia to cite Erasmus against himself. In his annotations to the New Testament, Erasmus had criticized the Vulgate's rendering of the word in Col. 2:2. Instead of "fullness" (plenitudino) Erasmus insisted upon "firm persuasion" (certa persuasio) tying it to the certainty of faith. As an example of this connection Erasmus offered Luke 1:1, where the Evangelist desired for his readers "a certain knowledge of the mystery, lest they altogether hesitate about something." 147 As discussed earlier, Melanchthon added to his 1528 Scholia a discussion of the phrase in Col. 2:2. He, too, insisted that it meant ''full and perfect understanding or knowledge that doubts nothing." He also linked the phrase to a faith that "perceives assuredly" that God forgives us for Christ's sake and hears our prayers in our weakness and that "assuredly establishes" that God will defend us. Melanchthon then expressly applied Erasmus's insight to Erasmus. "Hypocrites, who teach faith is effected in us by the powers of the free will (liberum arbitrium) are completely mistaken."148 Why? The very certainty about which Paul spoke here these "Hypocrites" undermined by building upon reason and not God's promises. In this context Melanchthon discussed the faith of Hezekiah, who trusted God's Word rather than his reason that Sennacherib's army would be routed. He closed with a parting warning for the reader, a warning aimed squarely at the skeptical position taken by Erasmus in De libero arbitrio. Thus we have said these things so that the readers may diligently measure the power of the word . For in this way they will learn that faith ought to be some certain perception (sententia) in the mind and not an ambiguous opinion. And the sum of this sentence is "I indicate to you my afflictions, so that when you see that [the crosses] are not taken away, you may grasp faith that will be present also for you. For in afflictions you experience his presence, if you firmly believe he promises grace and help many times."149
For Melanchthon, Erasmus's uncertainty showed a second kind of weakness that involved the method Erasmus used in his defense of the free will. By not employing proper distinctions of dialectic, by posing questions that Melanchthon viewed as beside the point, and by having no clear plan of attack, Erasmus demonstrated that he did not really serve the cause of bonae litterae, which included both rhetoric and dialectic. This line of attack arose after the appearance of Erasmus's third volume on the freedom of the will. In many ways it marked one of the harshest criticisms Melanchthon had to offer and one which, given the standards of the
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day, would have been seen as most devastating. Criticism of his theology Erasmus could have deflected under the guise of being a simple man talking the laity's language, but criticism of his style and method? This would have meant that his arguments could not be taken seriously at all and did not deserve pointforpoint refutationprecisely Melanchthon's counsel to Luther after the publication of both volumes of Hyperaspistes. Finally, the Scholia of 1528 also included an attack on Erasmus's behavior. The prince of humanists lacked the equanimity he so prized, as proved by his unjustified attack against and failure to defend those good men who taught rightly. Here was a hypocrite, who imagined that by writing a meager letter filled with disingenuous praise he could turn the affections of one of the most politically savvy theologians in Germany. Perhaps Erasmus showed up at Luther's funeral, 150 but in 1527 and 1528 it was Melanchthon who was digging the Dutch humanist's grave. Of course, Erasmus's failure only pointed out what Melanchthon had said so clearly in his discussion of the free will: philosophers never seemed capable of following even the best ethical advice. Perhaps Melanchthon meant Erasmus to stand as God's example for what happens when the human being is left without divine assistance. By attacking Erasmus's style and behavior as well as his theology, Melanchthon had turned the tables on the Dutch humanist. Whereas Erasmus confessed his willingness in De libero arbitrio to argue on Luther's terms by using the Scripture alone, Melanchthon attacked Erasmus not only on theological grounds but on the humanist's own favorite terms: writing style and life style. Seen in this light, the more passive approach of the Scholia's exegesis may actually have been more devastating to the humanist's free will defense than the aggressive manner of Luther, for all its citation of humanist texts. Luther neben Melanchthon151 The snapshot that offers some insight into the relation between the two Reformers is the picture of a young grammarian handing his beleaguered professor notes at the Leipzig debate with John Eck. A turn in the argument immediately brought to the eager student's mind a citation out of the Fathers or a biblical reference. The use of the loci method, as even Erasmus would have recognized it, was hard at work. It may be impossible to grasp fully the personal relation of theology professor to master of Greek in 1519, but Melanchthon's singleminded attention to method and his preeminent use of loci communes give entree into the heart of the theological relation between the two. Melanchthon developed a process for taking Luther's particular expression of an exegetical insight or theological idea and generalizing that statement into a defensible thesis usable in a vast array of situations. In the case of the gospel of John, Melanchthon transformed Luther's insight concerning the soteriological structure of John's prologue into the argumentum for the entire gospel.152 In Colossians the topic was the bondage of the will. Melanchthon took a few minor paragraphs from De servo arbitrio, coupled them with the longer discussion of the two governments in Luther's 1523 tract on secular authority, and turned them into the central plank of
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his attack against Erasmus. Luther admitted that of course the human being had certain freedom in human affairs, but his argument against Erasmus hardly centered on this insight. Luther wanted much more to convert and confront Erasmus with texts that demonstrated how God controlled the humandivine relationship. But Melanchthon lifted precisely that insight out of Luther's work and turned it into the heart of his argument. Where Luther attacked Erasmus's plea that none would follow God's commands if the will were said to be bound by crying, "None can," Melanchthon slyly allowed the Dutch humanist's point. Human beings could indeed follow the law in this world to some extent, so that rewards and punishment had some meaning. However, one was not to derive from this the freedom of the individual before God. Moreover, even this civil freedom was under constant attack from sin and the devil. In this world you were free to sprout leaves, but they would suffer from blight. Or again, where Luther gladly sparred with Erasmus over the meaning of necessity and employed the scholastic distinctions of the necessity of consequence and the necessity of the thing consequent, all in order to underscore the omnipotence of the divine will, Melanchthon invoked another scholastic distinction, the actio Dei generalis, in order to allow human beings freedom in things below but within the constant governance of God. Yet precisely here, where he seemed to approach Erasmus's own arguments most closely, Melanchthon gave things an evangelical slant by emphasizing God's governance and providence and rejecting any attempts to smuggle human freedom of choice into the doctrine of justification. The vastly different approaches of these two theologians to Erasmus, however, also revealed other important differences in method and theology. If one may be allowed this crude generalization of Luther's De servo arbitrio: Luther, the fiery preacher, was out to preach the law to Erasmus so that he might die and rise again. That is, Luther used a polemical, sermonic approach. The talk of the devil, the attempts to smoke Erasmus out of his neutral corner, the irony and sarcasm, far from being superfluous, stood at the heart of Luther's understanding of the gospel—one that Erasmus saw but misunderstood. For Luther, the gospel stood or fell on assertion, on "thus says the Lord." De servo arbitrio was above all else a sermon, the actual doing of law and gospel to the defenseless Erasmus. The allein, which Jonas had to add to Melanchthon's arguments, came quite naturally for Luther. Melanchthon based his method and his arguments quite clearly on what he himself called in other contexts the first use of the law, not the second. He used dialectic and rhetoric even on the Scripture, precisely because human beings confronted with human words—even words used by the Holy Spirit—had permission from God to use the gifts at hand. The limit, or borderline, between these gifts of nature and the Word revealed through the Holy Spirit was precisely what Erasmus had overlooked. This meant that instead of a Lutheran sermon, what Erasmus needed most in Melanchthon's eyes was a lesson in making proper dialectical distinctions. And Melanchthon was precisely the one most suited to doing such teaching. Thus, his approach was not so much to argue the case for bondage as to show where the arguments of Erasmus missed the point or misunderstood it. The question of certitude, which Luther solved with an assertion of God's sovereign promise, Melanchthon
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answered with an appeal to a certain Word understood and explained by certain methods through the power of the Holy Spirit. He even used Erasmus's own biblical interpretation against the master exegete. But it was precisely at this point of certainty, where method (dialectic) and theology (two governments; first use of the law) coalesced, that an important, unavoidable tension appeared in Melanchthon's thought. Reason could not understand the work of the Trinity or the weakness of the human race. For that only the Holy Spirit working through the Word sufficed to bring true comfort to the uncertain conscience. But that Word consisted at the same time of speech and therefore demanded the use of all available human tools to interpret it clearly and with certainty. Here Melanchthon and Luther differed most markedly. Luther's critique of reason rested finally in a theology of the cross that discovered the scandal of the God who speaks in words, or the scandal of the Word in the manger, playing on Mary's lap, or hanging on the cross. That scandal, asserted to the hilt, became the very thing that drove a person from reason and its claims of freedom to faith. Did the words of the sacred text demand interpretation for Luther? Of course. He was no enthusiast. But the process of understanding those words scandalized the reader and the reader's method in order to drive to faith. Melanchthon also rejected reason in favor of the Word of God, accommodated to human weakness and therefore accessible to human beings through the use of reasonable tools. However, he subsumed the scandal of the cross under the Holy Spirit's work of sanctification. The cross was for him the sign of the Christian experiencing the death of the old creature and the birth of faith. But that scandal never became the means to criticize methods of scriptural interpretation themselves. Melanchthon finally had to protect this method itself under the rubric of God's gubernatio, so that it continued to bear some weight for the believer's certainty. Law and gospel became answers to the question quid effectus, after one had already ascertained the answer to quid sit. Theology of the cross for him described the life of the believer moving through the various parts of the Christian existence, from repentance to faith in the midst of affliction. Holding such a commitment to the clarity of speech and thought in tension with the gospel was the hallmark of Melanchthon's theology. It represented his particular contribution to the Reformation in Wittenberg and later in the Lutheran church. It also gave rise to the peculiar set of disputes that raged after the Augsburg Interim of 1548, where both opponents and friends of Melanchthon, using in large measure the method outlined in the preceding sections, sought to confess or to clarify the gospel both to the world and to each other. Melanchthon's criticisms of Erasmus may even have influenced Luther's own approach to the Dutch humanist. When Luther renewed his attack on Erasmus in the early 1530s at the urging of Nicholas von Amsdorf, he, too, criticized Erasmus's behavior and misuse of rhetoric. Moreover, he claimed that Erasmus was also guilty of judging God by human standards. As has now been shown, Melanchthon had already made many of the same charges in the Scholia. 153 Transferring the picture of the Leipzig debates to this later context, it becomes clear, as Greschat has pointed out, that Melanchthon was neben Luther, and in
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this case neben Luther gegen Erasmus. The tension in thought between the two Wittenberg Reformers described here may be obvious 470 years later. However, these two colleagues in Wittenberg during the 1520s consistently portrayed themselves as working together against common enemies: those who would destroy education or obedience to worldly authorities, those who would undermine the teaching of justification, and those who could not imagine God working in the lives of believers through common means.
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7— Colossians 2:23 as Melanchthon's "Politics" On what basis did Melanchthon attack Erasmus? He was clearly not simply mimicking Luther's own views. What, then, constituted the heart of Melanchthon's theology as he set his own course within the Reformation? A wide range of scholars have realized that from the mid1520s, perhaps as early as 1522, Melanchthon's thought was dominated by a distinction between two spheres of human existence: activity in this world and encounter with God in matters of salvation—alternatively called a distinction between the two governments or kingdoms, between two kinds of righteousness or between law and gospel. 1 This marked the great divide between Melanchthon and Erasmus: not a different level of interest in the ancient sources, in good Latin and Greek style, but a profound disjunction at the center of their thought. Whereas Erasmus was ever the moral philosopher who, with his philosophia Christi and his love for good Latin, sought ethical and philological standards and held to a fundamental continuity in God's work, Melanchthon demanded a theological core that put language and morals in one distinct, Godgiven sphere and the gospel in another. This question of the relation between Christian faith and governmental authority was among the most important issues debated in the Reformation. Already in the late Middle Ages changes were occurring in the Holy Roman Empire that accentuated the strains between Kirchenregiment and the authority of the princes. Thus, as Manfred Schulze has argued, it is impossible to place on Luther's shoulders the blame for either the subsequent control of churches by the territorial princes or a supposed disenchantment of the common folk with his theology.2 Indeed, Luther's theology provided those interested in bringing the church under the control of territorial or urban rule with less useful arguments than others more directly influenced by Erasmus.3 As shall be shown, Melanchthon's theology formalized Luther's arguments and took on the Erasmian attempts to merge the functions of government with the proclamation of the gospel by distinguishing law and gospel and dividing the two realms. While many researchers have noticed this division in Melanchthon's thought, its origins and relation to Luther remain in dispute. In 1950 Wilhelm Neuser, trying
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to formulate the beginning point of Melanchthon's theology, argued forcefully that a shift took place from the earliest Loci of 1521, where Melanchthon made an absolute division between flesh and spirit and linked the activity of God with divine predestination, to Melanchthon's later works, where an encounter with the Zwickau prophets and the simultaneous Wittenberg Unrest of 152122 led him to distinguish between God's two governments. 4 This shift resulted from Melanchthon's return to humanism after a brief flirtation with the paradoxes of Luther's own insights. Wilhelm Maurer, in his twovolume work on Melanchthon and in subsequent essays, codified Neuser's view. He spoke of a crisis of vocation occurring in the mid1520s that led to Melanchthon's abandoning theology for the arts faculty and concomitantly turning from Luther's theology to humanism and especially Erasmus.5 This view had so permeated the literature by the 1960s that Hermann Pfister could write about Melanchthon's reaction to the Wittenberg Unrest, This collapse of an order in civil and ecclesial realms must have deeply shaken Melanchthon. On the basis of his peculiar theological position, he had nothing with which to object to some theological opinions—or he in fact found them worthy of consideration. However, the continual undermining of the external order of life gave him no rest, until by the thoughtful attainment of clarity on such basic questions of life he possessed criteria for effective behavior.6
In 1956 Paul Schwarzenau presented an alternative to Neuser's thesis.7 In his dissertation under Robert Stupperich he admitted that a shift similar to that described by Neuser took place, but he insisted that it did not signal Melanchthon's return to humanism—a constant in Melanchthon's thought throughout his life—but rested instead upon Luther's own insights. He could demonstrate similarities in theology between the two thinkers, but despite his commanding view of the sweep of Melanchthon's theology from 1521 to 1535, he could only compare their ideas and assert the connection. Because his work lacked an important document, Schwarzenau did not know that Melanchthon's own words substantiated his thesis. Although he was one of the first scholars to use the Scholia of 1527 to outline important aspects of this new theology, Schwarzenau either was not aware of or did not have access to the revised commentary from 1528. There, in comments on Col. 2:23, Melanchthon provided his readers with an unusually clear admission of his dependence upon Luther on this very point and with the earliest thorough exposition of his own "politics," to use Melanchthon's term for it. Melanchthon's comments on this text provide a key for understanding the development of Melanchthon's theology under the tutelage of Luther. Melanchthon's early encounter with Luther, by his own admission, provided him with the soteriological center to his theology: justification by faith alone. But it was Luther's triumphant return to Wittenberg's pulpit in 1522 and the tracts stimulated by his reaction to the Wittenberg Unrest and, later, to the Peasants' War of 1525 that provided Melanchthon with the crucial limit and lasting dialectic of his thought. If Schwarzenau is correct, the 1522 reworking of the Loci already bore the first fruits of this second encounter with Luther. Here one no longer finds justification by faith alone mixed with a radical predestinarianism but a careful delineation of the two
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fold righteousness or two governments of God: divine righteousness bestowed without merit for the sake of Christ (gospel) and civil righteousness employed in this world by human reason (law). 8 As hinted at in previous chapters, this distinction provided Melanchthon with a framework for sharply criticizing Erasmus while at the same time retaining a place for human reason, government, and intellectual pursuits. This chapter will examine a single text, Col. 2:23, and show how Melanchthon sharpened his interpretation between 1527 and 1528 in order to elucidate his own reasons for making the distinction between God's two realms. Here Melanchthon had to steer a course between traditionalists, who rejected any changes in church practice as violating authorities ordained by God, and radical reformers and revolutionaries, who opposed the legitimacy of God's rule through civil government. He was thereby answering Erasmus's derision of the distinction between law and gospel and his insistence that the Peasants' War was in part a result of Luther's theology.9 The text itself, Col. 2:23 ("by virtue of. . . injury to the body, not by virtue of some honor, for the satisfying of the flesh" [Per laesionem corporis, non per honorem aliquem, ad expletionem carnis]) may seem an odd one to have evoked the longest single commentary in the Scholia, let alone a discussion of the two realms of God and the importance of civil obedience. However, when understood from the perspective of conflicting views of tradition and authority, the reason for Melanchthon's comments becomes clearer. Other factors played a role as well. The evangelicals, given their rejection of some church traditions, came under relentless attack from several quarters regarding their obedience to civil authority. At the Diet of Speyer in 1526 they were accused of breaking the peace of the empire. The visitation of churches in Saxony, begun in earnest during the summer of 1527, also posed the question of the relation between church traditions and the authority of pope and emperor. The iconoclasm of some cities in southern Germany and Switzerland, the Peasants' Revolt of 1525, and the rejection of a Christian magistracy by certain Anabaptists during this same period put additional pressure on Melanchthon to delineate his own views. And speak out he did, not only in the Scholia of 1527 and 1528 but also in other documents prepared at nearly the same time. The structure of his pamphlet A Writing of Philip Melanchthon against the Articles of the Peasants ("Eyn schrifft Philippi Melanchthon widder die artickel der Bauwrschafft")10 revolved entirely around the distinction between faith, poenitentia, and love on the one side and secular authority, called weltlich regiment or weltliche ordinatio, on the other.11 It included a lengthy exposition of Rom. 13:17.12 A year earlier, in his Epitome of the Renewed Ecclesiastical Teaching for the Illustrious Prince of Hesse (Epitome renovatae ecclesiasticae doctrinae ad illustrissimum principem Hessorum) written, as the title implies, for Philip of Hesse,13 Melanchthon used a distinction between human righteousness (iustitia humana) and Christian righteousness (iustitia Christiana) to shape the entire document. He worried about a "new ungodliness" brought about by preachers who imagined that Christian freedom eliminated the need to coerce the ungodly.14
Not only the new edition of the Loci in 1522 but also other documents written in that crucial year demonstrated Melanchthon's new concern. Theses for a disputation on 25 July 1522 written by Melanchthon began, "Government is twofold: spiri
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tual and bodily." 15 Finally, a fragment from 1522 entitled "The Difference between Secular and Christian Righteousness"16 and later published in Melanchthon's catechism, Etliche Spriiche, again defined the Christian's life in terms of these two kinds of righteousness. "Secular righteousness" was called by Paul in Col. 2:8 , ''the order of the world." Melanchthon connected this order to reason (Vernunfft) embedded in human beings at creation. This external righteousness was found first of all in the temporal sword. Contrasting this to "divine righteousness," Melanchthon commented that where only external righteousness existed there was only hypocrisy, as Paul had pointed out in Col. 2:23. The Text: Colossians 2:23 For Melanchthon Col. 2:1623 formed the epilogue for the entire first part of Paul's letter.17 Thus he commented on verse 16, "Here Paul begins the epilogue, because before he taught what Christian righteousness is and he compared it to carnal and civil righteousness. He adds an epilogue concerning ceremonies and Mosaic political laws and concerning human traditions."18 According to Melanchthon,19 with verse 18 Paul returned to the main point of the epilogue and amplified it with certain details by warning against being deceived by hypocrites. Finally, in verses 2023 Paul added what Melanchthon called the ratio, or basic argument, for the epilogue. Thus, Melanchthon's lengthy comments attached to verse 23 actually arose out of his interpretation of this whole section, but especially verses 2023, translated here into English from the Erasmian Latin version used by Melanchthon. 20 Therefore if you have died with Christ to the elements of the world, why do you hold to [its] decrees as20 if living in the world?21 [Decrees such as] "Do not touch; do not taste; and do not handle,"22 which all perish by their abuse according to the precepts and teachings of human beings;23 which [things], for example, have indeed the form of wisdom by virtue of superstition and humility of the soul and injury to the body, not by virtue of some honor, for the satisfying of the flesh. Uncharacteristically, Melanchthon commented on each verse. Verse 18 indicated that Christian righteousness required mortification of the flesh but excluded human traditions as agents of such mortification. In verse 21 Melanchthon, like Erasmus, recognized Paul's mimicry of the pseudoapostles. On verse 22 he disagreed with Erasmus's translation of , so that it was a matter not of abuse, as if correct use could justify before God, but of any use.21 The phrase "according to the human mandates [Erasmus: precepts] and teachings" in verse 22 proved to Melanchthon that Paul was talking not only about the law of Moses but also about other human traditions. This justified Melanchthon's attacks in this section against the monks and other Roman practices. Melanchthon then divided verse 23 itself into three parts. In the first part he argued that the phrase "appearance of wisdom" (species sapientiae) did not imply outright rejection of such traditions, but only their restriction to human, not divine, wisdom. Some rites, such as fasting, had been instituted for the sake of the body; others, such as the Lord's Supper, for the sake of justification; and still others for the
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sake of peace and good order. Left to itself, reason always sought justification through its works. In the second part he corrected Erasmus's translation at two points. First he translated (superstitio) as "a work without a divine command, chosen or instituted by our own choice" (an interpretation reflected in later editions of the German Bible). Second, he insisted that humility here had to be understood as "concerning hypocritical humility" (de simulatione humilitatis).22 The third part contained Melanchthon's lengthy excursus, which will be analyzed in the remainder of this chapter. The first paragraph of Melanchthon's comments, however, remained unchanged from 1527 to 1528 and contained the basic grammatical interpretation of the text.23 Melanchthon began by admonishing the reader that this text had to be examined diligently because Paul commanded that the body be spared, given its proper honor, and offered enough to meet its needs. He then briefly investigated other texts that said the same thing, showing again how the loci method functioned in his exegesis. (These texts included Prov. 12:10, 1 Tim. 4:3, Luke 21:34, 1 Cor. 6:10, and Ecclus. 33:25.) He concluded by returning to the last part of the text "for the satisfying of the flesh." Melanchthon was well aware that some interpreted this text negatively, namely, that all this superstition and hypocrisy only satisfied the flesh. 24 Nevertheless, he insisted that he was following Jerome, who had argued that Paul was commanding that we give to the body "as much as it needs."25 (In effect, Melanchthon eliminated the comma after aliquem in order to allow ad expletionem carnis to modify non per honorem aliquem.) It was as if Paul were saying that these human traditions had become distorted through selfchosen piety and false humility but found their proper use through some honorable satisfying of human, physical needs. It was this distinction that gave rise to his fuller explication of civil powers and the role of traditions. The Scholia of 1527: An Exegetical Debate over Romans 13 Melanchthon did not change his introduction to the discussion of this text from 1527 to 1528. He began with a quaestio, much discussed in the sixteenth century, that arose from the text itself: "Whether it is a sin to violate human traditions?"26 However, the way he posed this question sparked a second one: what was meant by "human traditions"? For some Roman opponents, violating ecclesiastical traditions was no different from, and was indeed worse than, violating civil law. The demand for obedience in Rom. 13 applied equally to churchly and civil authorities.27 Melanchthon excluded this mixture of the two realms by stressing that he was speaking "about ecclesiastical traditions instituted for seeking justification or remission of sins or, as they call it, in general for the worship of God (ad cultum Dei) However, even though Col. 2:23 raised only this narrow question, Melanchthon's exegesis, driven as it was by his loci method, could also pose the wider problem for his readers, namely, the nature of obedience to civil authority. In his mind and in the world of 1527 the question of civil obedience and ecclesial disobedience were inextricably linked and had to be dealt with together. After this common beginning, the two editions of the Scholia diverged significantly. Melanchthon thoroughly reworked his comments in 1528. In some cases the
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changes were cosmetic: he tightened certain arguments, rearranging them and deleting extraneous comments. In other cases, however, the changes reveal more clearly the grounds for his deep concern over this issue and, as already mentioned, his debt to Luther. Nevertheless, because he built his subsequent remarks on the Scholia of 1527, those comments provide an important starting point. Though it was not a sin to violate human traditions, it was very much a sin to violate any (ulla) precept or order of the civil magistrate, Melanchthon began. Because in his mind this point was most decisively proved in Rom. 13, he treated his readers to a thorough interpretation of this text, running over ten pages in MSA 4. 28 This singleminded attention to Rom. 13 was obscured in the rewriting of 1528, but in 1527 it provided the organizational framework for his remarks. He began with an offhand remark that the reference to "higher" powers (Rom. 13:1) proved that not just Old Testament laws but laws of all nations could be followed, a point to which he returned later in the discussion.29 He concentrated his remarks on the notion that these governmental authorities were ordained by God. In the first place, this statement taught the magistrates themselves that their office came from God. Criminal acts were not ordained by God, governmental authorities were.30 More than that, this text taught the magistrates that their office was not only an honest occupation but also a divine ordinance. This reasoning had two consequences. First, the magistrate was taught faith.31 When things seemed to be falling apart and the devil seemed to be in charge, what better consolation than to know for certain that what one was doing came from God? This consolation, while offered to all nations, was particularly clear in the history of Israel and in leaders like David, Hezekiah, Gideon, or Samson. Second, the magistrates were taught to fear God's judgment when they abused authority.32 Here, as elsewhere, Melanchthon was keen on showing the limits of governmental authority. Returning to the word ordinatio, Melanchthon listed several specific duties of the office (make laws, pass judgment, punish evildoers, and protect the innocent), stressing again that such laws included those of all nations and not simply the laws of Moses, as long as they conformed to Paul's rule in verse 3.33 This final comment occasioned a lengthy discussion of the origins of government. Here Melanchthon squarely confronted those opposed to his understanding of civil authority. Human reason foolishly imagines that the beginnings of the magistrate commenced because some, burning with ambition, took over the imperia and that laws were made not by some certain reason but according to the whim of the rulers. But here we hear that the magistrate is from God and that laws are divinely ordained. And it is a singular benefit of God to have revealed this, and we owe to God no small thanks for such a benefit.34
Against whom was Melanchthon writing here? In Plato's Republic there was talk of the origins of civil strife in avarice and the inevitable decay of the state.35 In the City of God Augustine complains, "Remove justice, and what are kingdoms but gangs of criminals on a large scale?"36 This cynicism was tempered somewhat in the Middle Ages by, among others, Pope Innocent IV, who, like Aristotle, claimed that government arose naturally among human beings. But he also insisted that imperial
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authority had merely been permitted to exist up until its Christianization, after which it received new legitimacy from the vicar of Christ. 37 The argument that civil government needed legitimization by the spiritual, papal authority came under fierce attack from William of Ockham, who insisted instead on the divine granting of temporal power extra ecclesiam and backed up his claims with the example of Paul and Rom.13.38 In On Royal and Papal Power, John of Paris clearly delimited two parties: the Waldensians, who denied the pope any dominion over temporal things, and certain moderni (Henry of Cremona among them), who claimed for the pope all temporal power.39 Here Melanchthon seemed to stand on a conciliarist side against papalists and perhaps even against Augustine, all of whom questioned, denigrated. or rejected the independent, Godgiven ordination of governmental authority. Melanchthon's position, however, most certainly struck at other enemies much closer to home. Not only papalists but also revolutionaries and Anabaptists also called into question the divinely ordained authority of princes. Thus, Thomas Müntzer argued that government had come into existence after the Fall and arose from human fear of creatures.40 While Müntzer himself was attacking both papalist and conciliarist notions of the unity of temporal and ecclesiastical authority, he at the same time insisted that only the Spiritfilled could sanction and identify the true government. Thus, his apocalyptic stance actually mirrored the papal position. It was divinely given revelation and the power of Christ's spiritual kingdom, not God's independent work in the world, that gave Christians leave to act in this world. The final results of Müntzer's position in Frankenhausen were of course wellknown in Melanchthon's day. In his last sermon to the faithful, Müntzer insisted that "God the Almighty wants to purify the world now. He has taken power from the government and has given it to the subjects."41 Even more to the point, by 1527 Wittenberg was reacting to the claims of certain Anabaptists who also rejected secular authority. At the very time that Melanchthon was editing the Scholia for the second edition, he was also busy writing Judgment against the Rebaptizers.42 Already on 23 October 1527 he could report to Jerome Baumgartner in Nuremberg that he had long ago (iam dudum) begun work on the piece.43 By 23 January 1528 he could report to Baumgartner that the tract was completed and awaiting publication pending Luther's examination of it.44 Shortly before 12 May 1528 he completed the epistle dedicatory to the abbot of St. Aegidian's in Nuremberg, Frederick Pistorius.45 By October he expressed the hope in another letter that the same abbot had received a copy of the book.46 In it Melanchthon defended infant baptism and the right to own property. In a short transitional paragraph between these two sections, lie mentioned, It is simply impious that they teach that it is not perissible for Christians to exercise the office of magistrate or to obey the offices of magistrates, to pass judgment, to use the sword against the guilty and similar things, concerning which topic [locus] this has often been discussed elsewhere [e.g., in the Scholia].47
To both the monistic claims that ecclesial authority legitimized civil authority and to the rejection of the holding of civil authority at all, Melanchthon replied that Rom. 13 with its divine ordinatio eliminated any such confusion of the two realms. Governmental authority had not simply been tolerated until the Christian church
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in the person of the pope bestowed upon the empire the temporal sword, nor could the prophecy of the Spiritfilled suddenly strip it of its legitimacy and return it to the Christian people. Instead, Rom. 13:1 insisted that magistrates and laws were divinely ordained, a revelation that itself was a "singular blessing of God." 48 Just to prove his point, Melanchthon cited and glossed a host of other scriptural texts (including 2 Chron. 19:6, Prov. 8:15 and 16:1011, Rom. 13:4, and John the Baptist's sermon to soldiers in Luke 3:14). Civil ordinances were made by God, and the magistrate was not a thief, which would make him an enemy of God like the devil, but a minister of God. Melanchthon capped his argument with a reference to Gen. 9:6, a favorite proof text for legitimate government, and to the command (in 1 Tim. 2:1 2) to pray for the government. After citing examples of believing magistrates in both the Old Testament and the New, he then turned to Paul's comment in Rom. 14:23 ("Whatever is not from faith is sin"). This text laid bare Melanchthon's ultimate worry. If one could not demonstrate that government, far from being merely tolerated, was ordained by God, then the radicals like Müntzer or the Anabaptists were right, and no Christian should be involved with government at all. On the other hand, if government was a divine work, then Christians who were involved with government received "the greatest consolation" in the midst of every danger. From this argument an objection arose with which Melanchthon had to deal: namely, that because Christ had prohibited vengeance, magistrates sinned when they punished evil.49 Here, following Luther, Melanchthon distinguished between Christ's institution of his own kingdom and his simultaneous approval for the kingdom of the world, citing 1 Tim. 1:9 ("The law was established not for the just but for the unjust") as a way of underscoring the magistrate's duty to use the law in coercing non Christians. The vengeance Christ rejected was private, not public. Melanchthon also responded to a second objection, derived from Matt. 20:2526, concerning Christ's prohibition of domination among Christians.50 Again, although Luther did not deal directly with this verse, Melanchthon relied heavily on Luther's basic arguments. He insisted that Christ had not come to institute an earthly kingdom, since that had already been instituted not only among the Israelites but also, in Gen. 9, among all nations. In defense of his position Melanchthon cited John 18:36, Zeph. 3:12, and Zech. 9:9 before giving his own interpretation of Matt. 20:2526 in the form of an extended paraphrase, turning the text into a proof for the two kingdoms. He concluded, "Therefore [Christ] made here two peoples, gentiles and saints, and he calls them 'kings of the gentiles,' because their rule had been constituted so that they may coerce the unjust."51 Christ's own behavior in paying the temple tax (Matt. 17:2427) was further proof for Melanchthon's arguments and for his insistence that Christians had to obey secular authority, as Paul also stated in Rom. 13:5. Having answered the objections of his opponents, Melanchthon proceeded with his exegesis of Rom. 13. He first divided Paul's text into two parts.52 For one thing, Paul included a rule (Rom. 13:34) by which to determine whether or not God approved of individual civil laws. For another, Paul commanded obedience to the governing authorities (Rom. 13:57). He touched on the first part in passing later during his exegesis. It was clearly of little importance to him. Instead, he launched into a prolonged discussion of the nature and, much more briefly, the limits of Chris
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tian obedience to secular authority. 53 This section provided a crucial introduction to the overall discussion of ecclesiastical ordinances, the actual theme of Col. 2:23. Melanchthon had to prove to his Roman opponents, including the likes of Erasmus, that Wittenberg's evangelicals were neither seditious nor bent on disturbing the public peace. He began by noting that Rom. 13:5, with the phrase "not only on account of wrath, but also on account of conscience," demanded obedience even when a Christian could get away with disobedience without injuring anyone. Then he divided obedience into three parts, working backward through Rom. 13:7. Chiefly, Christians obeyed the authorities to return honor to God, for these authorities spoke with the voice of God unless they commanded something contrary to God. For Melanchthon it followed that even if in their wisdom Christians could make better laws than the magistrates, Christians still were dutybound to follow them: "For God has subjected our wisdom to the wisdom of magistrates."54 A second honor given to magistrates occurred whenever Christians gave thanks to God for preserving the state and prayed that God would govern and rule their leaders. Here Melanchthon listed the various benefits of good government, briefly describing its functions. His list included peace and all its benefits, such as the feeding, educating, and training of offspring; civil discipline; and public order. In fact, because of its duties government stood in contrast to the original murderer, the devil. Because peace came from God, the Christian was to thank God for it but at the same time also thank God for the magistrates, who were God's instruments for attaining peace. Even when princes erred, Melanchthon counseled Christians to follow the examples of Noah's sons, who showed respect for their drunken father, and of David, who respected Saul.55 Despite the common practice of complaining about rulers, God demanded that they be honored. As Paul commanded in 1 Tim. 2:1 2, Christians were to pray to God for the magistrates, that through them God might give peace.56 Such prayer and obedience were the highest forms of honor, from which other external honors flowed.57 Turning to the second part of obedience, fear, Melanchthon reiterated portions of his previous argument. Again, even if disobedience hurt no one, one should obey out of fear for God's judgment. This also excluded contempt for rulers. Because Christians realized that the command to fear secular authorities implied that God supported their magistrates, they could take comfort in the fact that although some evil magistrates could evade earthly justice, none, not even unjust rulers, could escape divine punishment. Melanchthon supplied a long list of proof texts to buttress his contention.58 He concluded by warning against taking vengeance and by insisting that magistrates deserved our honor and fear. The third part of obedience consisted of works and taxes. Here, too, Melanchthon assaulted the reader with biblical examples and texts.59 He included Samuel's prophecy concerning the king's demands (1 Sam. 8:1118), Jesus' payment of the temple tax and command to pay taxes to Caesar (Matt. 17:2427 and 22:21), Joseph's taxation of Egypt (Gen. 47:1326), and Paul's own comment in Rom. 13:6. He concluded, "Therefore we also must bear our public responsibilities and burdens [onera et graviora] nor may we abandon them of our own free will."60 Without having named
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names, Melanchthon seemed to criticize the peasants' stance during the 1525 revolt and to distance his theology and practice from theirs. 61 Melanchthon disputed another position championed by the radicals, posed here as a quaestio: whether Christians ought to be subject to nonbiblical law.62 Again without naming names, Melanchthon rejected the peasants' arguments on the basis of the distinction between the two realms. "I respond: The kingdom of Christ is a spiritual kingdom that consists of fear, faith, chastity, and love. But besides that kingdom there is a civil kingdom that distributes inheritances, punishes crimes, passes judgment for the sake of public peace."63 This latter realm had a great variety of laws: Mosaic, Roman, Saxon. Christian liberty, which did not insist upon Mosaic ceremonies in worship, also did not demand that only Mosaic law be used for justice but rather that, just as food, dress, and language varied from one people to another, so did laws regarding life in the body. After listing a host of biblical examples—including Paul, Jesus, Cornelius, the Proconsul Sergius (Acts 13:712), John the Baptist's sermon to soldiers,64 and Daniel—Melanchthon used Acts 15:910 to argue that Christian righteousness (iustitia) was faith that purified hearts, not the observation of ceremonies nor bodily ordinances concerning civil matters. This lead him to conclude that those who demanded that Moses be followed in civil matters and that gentile laws be abolished sinned gravely. The Gentiles needed God, not the law of Moses. Therefore, in civil matters they could continue to use their own laws. To this argument Melanchthon added examples familiar to anyone acquainted with the Twelve Articles of the Swabian Peasantry: division of inheritance, the hanging of thieves, the freeing of slaves every seven years, and the restitution of property in the year of Jubilee. In this context he referred to Romans 13:34 in passing, arguing that Paul also called Gentile laws divine ordinances as long as they punished evildoers. The varying severity of laws from one nation to another simply reflected the different needs of different peoples, some of whom needed harsher laws the way some sick patients needed stronger medicine.65 Gentiles and Jews alike had the law of nature, what Melanchthon defined as the law written in human hearts (Rom. 2:15), by which laws could be made and judged. This "wisdom of the world" (1 Cor. 1:20), a natural judgment over corporeal things, was bestowed already in Gen. 1:28, where human beings were given dominion, a word Melanchthon glossed to mean "administration." Melanchthon's confidence in government and law seemed supported at every turn by his detailed exegesis of Rom. 13. In fact, as David Steinmetz has pointed out, the Pauline text itself contained no caveats or warnings against governmental powers at all and thus legitimized such a onesided interpretation.66 This makes it all the more notable that Melanchthon felt constrained to add two warnings that were not in the text itself but were very much a part of the exegetical and theological tradition. First, he had to deal with a commonplace recorded, among other places, in Erasmus's Adages concerning the immorality of Sybaritic and Milesian laws.67 Because their laws did not punish immoral behavior, they were not laws at all, Melanchthon argued, but diabolical confusion. They stood as stark examples of God's wrath, that is, of what occurred when God deserted a people and of the weakness of human nature when left to its own devices. To support his claims, Melanchthon cited Prov. 20:12.
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But Melanchthon saved his most important adjustment of Paul's argument for last, invoking at the end of the entire discussion the socalled clausula Petri of Acts 5:29, where Peter responded to the temple officials, "We ought to obey God rather than mortals." "Up to now," Melanchthon began, "we have taught that magistrates must be obeyed and that all things they command, which can be done without our sin, must be done." 68 By this one sentence he had completely changed the outlook of his argument. Now Melanchthon was ready to defend evangelical disobedience. Anything commanded by the magistrates that contradicted divine command, such as the command to the apostles in Acts 4:18 not to preach, could not be followed. This invocation of Acts 5:29 brought Melanchthon to speak to the reader in the most personal terms, outlining the entire scope of his arguments for civil disobedience. You may understand this in the following way. If they command you to sin, for example, if they command you to perjure yourself, then [they] are not to be obeyed. For if you can perform [your duty] without sin, even though unjust rulers command you, we still ought to perform [it], as when they justly demand onerous works. Then, too, when they command you to sin, for example, if they command you to abandon the gospel, then you may refuse to obey, as long as you do not use any force against them. But if they want to kill you unjustly, you may suffer as Christ and the apostles suffered. For to use force against the magistrates, even when they act unjustly, is seditious and criminal, because it is written [Rom. 13:2], "Whoever resists the powers, receives judgment on himself."69
Melanchthon, caught between his deep respect for Paul and the evangelical necessity to preach the gospel, had to find a way out of this dilemma without undermining governmental authority and thereby encouraging revolt. Refusal to obey was allowed on the narrowest of grounds: contradiction to God's natural law or the gospel. Even the unjust nature of the ruler was of no account. Moreover, disobedience implied no use of force. In 1527 the only model Melanchthon knew for handling the tension between Peter's defiance of and Paul's obedience to the "powers that be" was the suffering of Christ and the apostles.70 Any other response implied sedition and deserved God's harshest judgment. With these words Melanchthon concluded his discussion of political authority. He had combined Luther's distinction between the two realms with a narrow interpretation of Paul in Rom. 13 to indicate both the degree to which evangelicals supported civic peace and the limits of that very support. Not unlike Luther, but within the constraints of his exegesis of Paul, Melanchthon championed the Godgiven character of civil government, convinced that Rom. 13 provided consolation for beleaguered Christian rulers and direction for believing subjects. Yet he painted this obedience against the backdrop of the clausula Petri and the actual disobedience of suffering evangelicals. This discussion served as the proper background for the more immediate issue of ecclesiastical traditions, which formed the second main section of Melanchthon's comments.71 Here he distinguished several kinds oftraditions. In the first place, there were some that neither contradicted God's commands nor were set up to earn salvation but, rather, were set up to maintain order in the church, as delimited in 1 Cor. 14:40.72 After indicating how songs, fasts, and feast days once served good order and
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the need for teaching, Melanchthon summed up their purpose and the purpose of all old orders and conciliar decrees: they maintained peace and eliminated confusion in the church. These Christians could preserve according to the Pauline dictum in 1 Cor. 7:18. Melanchthon then attacked those who by overturning these ordinances damaged charity and created scandal for the weak. 73 He associated such behavior with Christ's prohibition in Matt. 9:17, arguing that the "little ones" referred to there included those who took the changing of old ordinances as license to sin. New wine in new wineskins! This command required that people listen to the gospel first before making changes in their customs. Melanchthon realized how often people were more attached to human traditions than to divine commands, how easily they could come to hate the gospel, and how scandalous changes in church practice could appear. Paul's advice to those who ate meat sacrificed to idols appeared in Melanchthon's eyes to fit his own situation, as did the canon of the Council of Nicea that prohibited changes in church ordinances and Augustine's statement urging that indifferent practices were not to be changed.74 In the second place, Melanchthon also discussed ecclesiastical ordinances that could be obeyed only when the conscience was not constrained.75 Thus Jews could follow Mosaic ceremonies, as long as these were not required for salvation and no one was offended. Melanchthon cited, among other texts, Col. 2:16 and concluded that Augustine also taught the same thing. Third, some traditions conflicted with divine precepts.76 Among them Melanchthon mentioned traffic in the mass and the burden of celibacy. He immediately invoked, for the second time, the clausula Petri of Acts 5:29. This brought him to his fourth and final point, an exegetical quaestio based on Matt. 23:34, where Christ commanded his followers to do as the Pharisees commanded.77 Melanchthon countered with Jesus' warning in Matt. 7:15 to beware of false prophets, Jeremiah's warning against the same in Jer. 23:16, and Paul's caveat in Gal. 1:9.78 These texts indicated to him that the Matt. 23 passage had to be understood only of those commands that did not conflict with God's commands. He even went so far as to apply this argument to adiaphora (here called "middle things"), which were not to be followed when said to be necessary for salvation.79 In this context he referred back to Col. 2:16, which introduced Paul's entire epilogue. One's conscience could not be condemned for violating such traditions, provided that no one was offended and the gospel was not blasphemed ( Tim. 6:1)by which Melanchthon meant, provided that people did not confuse liberty and license or become frightened away and never receive the teaching they needed. This latter problem clearly worried Melanchthon so much that he very quickly moved away from the reasons to violate human traditions, back to the grounds for keeping them in order to avoid scandal. Paul's example again loomed large for Melanchthon, and he described a Paul who kept the law among the Jews and, although teaching justification by faith alone, insisted that love was greater than faith or hope. The strong in faith had to yield to the weak. Melanchthon had learned his lesson from Luther's Invocavit sermons of 1522 and was in the process of applying what he had learned to the Saxon Visitation Articles.80
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Against this Pauline example Melanchthon contrasted the behavior of some in his own time who, because of arrogance or a love for novelty, "deviate from all common observations without necessity." 81 After calling such behavior sin, Melanchthon asked plaintively, "Why do we not preserve this rule of Paul?" (from 1 Cor. 7:18) that everyone (circumcised or uncircumcised) ought to remain in their own place in order that peace and love be served. He buttressed his plea with references to Chrysostom (PG 61:156) and Christ's command to go the extra mile. Finally, Melanchthon drew the following analogy. People who, upon discovering Christian freedom, simply rejected all ecclesiastical traditions they had previously kept out of ignorance were like the person who in ignorance had preserved perfume in a jar and, upon being told what its purpose was, then threw it away. "For first now we know how to keep them [the traditions] in a useful manner."82 Having concluded his basic arguments, Melanchthon now added the reason for his closing remarks. He wanted to admonish the reader to what extent the old ordinances could be preserved without sin, in keeping both with Peter's admonition in Acts 15:711 that all was to be done in the church through God's power and with Paul's warning that no new circumcision was to be instituted and that no one was to become the author of the greatest of scandals, namely, causing dissension in the church and fostering license among the common people. Melanchthon pronounced upon such scandalmongers Paul's judgment (Gal. 5:10) and associated such uprisings with the devil. He warned that both Peter (2 Pet. 2:19) and Paul (Gal. 5:13) predicted such corruption of Christian freedom. He closed with his own version of Luther's paradox of Christian freedom: "And although [Paul] taught that we have been called in freedom, nevertheless he leads us back into servitude and commands that all serve one another through love and support public concord."83 This attitude was more important than eating meat or similar things. In this one sentence Melanchthon distanced himself from the Wittenberg Unrest, the peasants' uprising, and certain aspects of the Swiss reform. Melanchthon concluded the section this way: "We have said these things about ecclesiastical rites. Concerning civil burdens there is no doubt but that all things, however heavy, must be endured as divinely imposed on us."84 This division, growing out of the distinction between the two realms, again assured the reader that Melanchthon wanted to drive no wedge between the evangelicals' message and obedience to secular government. Ecclesiastical rites presented a special case where, under certain circumstances, Christian freedom could be exercised. The same could not be said about civil laws, which Melanchthon permitted no Christian to break even if no one was thereby hurt. This detailed look at Melanchthon's exegesis of Col. 2:23 from 1527 discloses how central the distinction between the two kinds of righteousness was and how he could apply it to a variety of issues: rebellion, ecclesiastical regulations, iconoclasm. There was no equivalent division in Erasmus's thought or in his interpretation of Colossians. In fact, by making this "epilogue" to the first two chapters of Colossians into one of the epistle's main points, Erasmus had in Melanchthon's eyes distorted Paul's central argument.85 Despite these differences, Melanchthon had not yet formulated an expressed rejection of Erasmus's theology. That came in 1528.
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The Scholia of 1528: Melanchthon's Christian ''Politics" When Melanchthon edited the Scholia in preparation for a new printing in 1528, he completely reworked the section under Col. 2:23, leaving intact only the opening exegetical section, the introductory paragraph to the theological locus, and some smaller portions of his arguments dealing with ecclesiastical traditions. The text, set in approximately the same size type in both editions, expanded from twentyeight pages in 1527 to fortyfour in 1528. In some cases the changes and additions simply contained stylistic improvements and clarifications of existing arguments. However, for the most part the new material revealed much more clearly why Melanchthon included this discussion in his commentary and how it differed from other points of view, including Erasmus's. The single most important addition occurred after he divided the locus into two parts: civil and ecclesiastical traditions. 86 Rather than launch into an exegesis of Rom. 13, as he had in 1527, Melanchthon presented what amounted to an exordium for his discussion of civil authority. "I know there are many who think wrongly about the civil magistrates over against what Christian literature teaches."87 He characterized this as "a very sharp contention" and outlined two related objections: that one could not be both a Christian and a magistrate and that the prohibition of vengeance undermined public order and allowed the guilty to escape punishment. The result was an alienation of human aspirations (hominum uoluntates) from Christ's teaching. Melanchthon asked rhetorically, "Who is not repulsed by such absurd paradoxes?"88 And he proceeded to list them: that it was a sin to coerce criminals by the fear of judgments and penalties, that everyone was to hold property in common, that it was wrong to have magistrates in the state (ciuitas) Melanchthon exuded here a new confidence and clarity. He had replaced the wooden exegetical style of 1527, more suited to the classroom, with a highly charged rhetoric. The opponent was much more clearly outlined, although in more general categories that demonstrated the extremes. Melanchthon would reveal the identity of the opposition a bit later. First, however, he placed himself much more squarely than before within the broader tradition of the church. He began with the witness of the Fathers who had worked hard to refute these calumnies, including Origen's Contra Celsum, Gregory of Nazianzus's tract against Julian, and Augustine's letter to Marcellinus.89 However, he abruptly broke this discussion off by inserting a rhetorical question. But why should I mention the ancients when in these past few years many pamphlets have been published in Germany, indeed by some who want to be called theologians, in which have been disputed whether any Christian is permitted to be a magistrate, whether property ought to be held in common, and the like. One man, Luther, has most steadfastly defended the rights and authority of the magistrates. Whoever would compare his writings on this matter with those disputations of the ancients will see that the authority of magistrates was never as well clarified and embellished by them. And for this favor he scarcely receives fitting thanks from certain Sycophants, who are wont to call him seditious, because they cannot invent a more plausible insult.90
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Here Melanchthon revealed the true cause for his excursus on this text. His readers no longer needed to speculate about his reasons. On the one side, as was made clear in the analysis of the Scholia of 1527, Melanchthon rejected the claims of Karlstadt, Müntzer, the leaders of the Peasants' Revolt, and certain Anabaptists who in his eyes had denigrated government and private property. Yet these were not his only opponents. Thus, on the other side, he accused certain sycophants of attacking Luther as seditious. In the middle stood the "hero" Luther, whose writings on the subject, by their support for civil government, had surpassed the church fathers and who had received meager thanks for all his work. The sycophants—and here Melanchthon must have been thinking not simply of Luther's papalist opponents in general but specifically of Erasmus—could think of no better charge than sedition. 91 This denomination of Luther's and, hence, Melanchthon's opponents provides the key for understanding Melanchthon's position on this subject. Previous scholarship insisted that it was the Wittenberg Unrest, the Peasants' Revolt, and their attacks on government and bonae litterae among other things that brought about and sustained Melanchthon's shift in theology.92 This is wrong on two counts. First, Melanchthon clearly indicated here his debt to Luther, not to the Zwickau prophets or Karlstadt, for "clarifying and embellishing" the function of magistrates. It was not some deep confusion brought on by the socalled radicals but the steadfast defense of secular authority by Luther that profoundly shaped Melanchthon's theology.93 Second, and perhaps even more telling, Melanchthon launched into this defense of civil authority not simply to answer Karlstadt, Müntzer, the Anabaptists, or certain Strasbourg preachers but to exonerate Luther from false charges made by some "sycophants" that he and his followers undermined legitimate civil authority. Thus, Melanchthon refuted the radicals' position with an eye toward Erasmus and other supporters of the papal party who had attacked Luther's rejection of ecclesiastical tradition as seditious. This was Melanchthon's peculiar contribution to the debate: to defend Luther against his sycophantic detractors. However, the way he prosecuted this defense formed, as he himself stated in the rest of the introduction, another significant contribution. Here, for the first time, he brought his theological method to bear on the question of civil authority: "Therefore, although it is customary to dispute about the authority of magistrates in various ways, I myself have considered at this place that the thoughts of the Scripture, which show clearly what we ought to think concerning the magistracy, must be collected."94 "The thoughts of Scripture must be collected" could surely stand as the motto for Melanchthon's use of commonplaces in theology. He had in one stroke praised Luther and, at the same time, cleared room for his own theological method, which, if Luther's judgment was correct, planted and watered where Luther had hacked and cleared a way. What did Melanchthon hope such work would accomplish? He immediately let the reader know. "Perhaps this work of mine will benefit the consciences of some people."95 What he had said in 1527 regarding the comfort Paul's sayings gave to Christian magistrates, Melanchthon now applied to the entire discussion. This was always the effect toward which his exegesis tended.96 In this case, Melanchthon argued that knowing the Holy Spirit's word on the subject would lead many to godli
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ness and that knowing God was pleased with such work and defended such officeholders would console the Christian magistrate. A further benefit also accrued. The ethnici, who had attacked "our teaching," could be refuted. "For nothing is more fitting for the Christian, than to defend the dignity of religion against such calumnies." 97 Although it may be safe to say that Melanchthon was more concerned about the calumnies of certain contemporary radicals, this statement and what followed also demonstrated that Melanchthon saw himself in conversation with another group of detractors, namely, the same pagans whom Origen, Gregory, and Augustine had felt constrained to answer. This opposition matched Melanchthon's consistent concern to defend good letters and philosophy, a concern that was blossoming at this time. In 1527 he lectured on Aristotle's politics and ethics. As his later publications demonstrated, his main interest in these works was to provide Christians with usable guides that pointed out where Aristotle diverged from Christian thought.98 In the Scholia he distinguished philosophical "Politics" from his own Christian contribution: ''Therefore we will treat this locus more freely, which contains something like a 'Politics' for Christians. For it teaches that there is an office of magistrates that pleases God and that this office is defended and preserved by God, that subjects ought to obey them religiously."99 Did using texts in this way to construct a Christian version of Aristotle's Politics point to a biblicistic streak in Melanchthon? Not at all. He professed his love for the political books of philosophers and his eagerness to read them (to allay the suspicions of certain sycophants?), but he also insisted that the examination of the Scripture was much more useful. Because philosophers could not connect the authority of the magistracy to the will of God, they did not show the "firmest protection" of magistrates, and they could not even imagine that subjects themselves possessed an office. Instead, they thought states were constituted by human counsel alone. Melanchthon, his eye still firmly fixed on the sycophants, concluded that anyone who studied the biblical texts listed here would know that there was no doctrine on earth which was defended in the same way as the authority of the magistrates. Melanchthon's use of the term "Christian Politics" signaled a reply not only to Erasmus's letters of 152428 and the Hyperaspistes but also to the position outlined, among other places, in Erasmus's Institutio Principis Christiani.100 The Institutio, first published in 1515 but reprinted often during Erasmus's lifetime, gave advice on how to educate a (Christian) prince.101 It did not go into any detail on the question of the origins of the prince's authority. Instead, Erasmus, having cited Aristotle favorably on the election of rulers, noted that since most current rulers inherited their titles and lands, the need for education was even greater. This line of argument implied the derivation of a prince's rights not from God or from God given office but from the will of the people or, among the barbari according to Aristotle, the success of the prince's education. The prince was, according to Plato's proposal, to be a philosopher. In Erasmus's mind this meant a combination of bonae litterae—that is, moral philosophy (he expressly rejected defining it as speculative philosophy)—and the philosophia Christi. Whatever advice the ancients could give, Christian ethics, derived from the prince's baptism, required a higher level of commitment. It was more complete, drawn from the purest sources. Far from excluding the writers of Greek and Latin antiquity, this approach simply placed Christian phi
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losophy at the pinnacle of the prince's strivings. To neglect this web of Christian and pagan moral advice was to forsake being a prince and to become, instead, a tyrant. 102 At the same time Erasmus insisted that the good prince was, following Plutarch among others, "a sort of living image of God."103 The bad prince, or tyrant, could claim only the opposite. Most of the introductory section offered comparisons of princes and tyrants from classical and biblical sources, on several occasions naming tyrants latrones. Erasmus crowned his locus communis by citing Matt. 20:2526, a text Melanchthon also discussed. Given the example of Christ, the Christian prince could be "godlike" only when not claiming dominion over others. At this point Erasmus rolled out the biblical texts so central to Melanchthon's thought, including Matt. 22:21, Rom. 13:1, and 1 Tim. 2:2. These proof texts for princely authority, he argued, applied "to pagan princes," not to Christian princes, and these texts taught Christians to tolerate pagan rulers. In one stroke—Melanchthon would have said by not properly distinguishing the twofold righteousness of God—Erasmus had eliminated what for Melanchthon was the heart of a Christian "Politics." He had to do this in order to make room for his own version of the same, namely a philosophia Christi based not on fear but on love. This heightening of the responsibility of Christian princes culminated in the eleventh chapter of the book, in which he pitted even the patristic tradition of just war (held by Augustine and Bernard) against the pacifism of Christ, Paul, and Peter: "For the entire philosophia Christi teaches against war."104 Melanchthon's twosided approach to the philosophers, consisting of both praise and criticism, mirrored his fuller arguments on Col. 2:8, detailed in the preceding chapter. In both cases it was his distinction of the two righteousnesses that allowed him this freedom. Just as the ethics of philosophers could not imagine a God who justified the ungodly, the political science of philosophers could not reveal God's role in civil affairs and instead reduced it to human agreements or, in the hands of Christian philosophers, tried to subsume it under Christ's commands. The new fourpage introduction offered insights into the reasons for this excursus, and so did the new structure into which Melanchthon's exegesis was placed. The exegesis of Rom. 13, which had provided the basic organization for the Scholia in 1527, no longer dominated his comments. Instead, Melanchthon arranged his comments around the two categories he found lacking in the "Politics" of philosophers: the divine institution of the magistracy (60v°71r°) and the office of subjects (71v°77r°). Under the first, and longer, rubric Melanchthon discussed the question raised in 1527: whether it was a sin to be a magistrate. "First, therefore, it must be understood that to be a magistrate is not an illicit thing or a sin."105 To support his assertion Melanchthon now cited Rom. 13:1, but this text no longer structured his overall response. Again he contrasted God's ordinatio to latrocinium, where the former implied that God not only constituted but also conserved the magistracy, in much the same way that God ordered sunrise, seasons, and harvest. When magistrates were villainous, it could only be called a confusion or perturbation of divine order. Melanchthon repeated the same argument using Paul's other designation of the magistrate as a "servant of God" (Rom. 13:4). A criminal could use power indiscriminately for good or evil; the magistrate was meant to wreak vengeance while discern
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ing good from evil. In this context Melanchthon claimed that Jesus' reference to kings as benefactors (Luke 22:25, the parallel text to Matt. 20:2526) supported his contention. He interpreted this termcited only in Greek—to mean that kings watched over life, fortune, and common tranquility so that their citizens could instruct the young and be freed to engage in honest work and to practice religion. 106 Melanchthon claimed that these two texts showed clearly enough God's approval of the magistracy. Nevertheless, he insisted on adding others. However, before investigating these other texts, Melanchthon again gave the reader insight into his method and underlying theological concern by discussing why the Scripture praised government to such an extent. For Melanchthon, the abundance of scriptural references on this topic ran parallel to a similar profusion on other articles of faith. Why? "For as in other articles of faith, the outward appearance that confronts the senses is completely opposed to the actual thing."107 God provided this abundance to instruct us against such false perceptions. As examples Melanchthon mentioned the lowliness of Christ (abiectus homo) whom the Word declared to be God, and the afflictions of the godly, which seemed to indicate God's abandonment when in fact they were, according to the Word, signs of grace. Melanchthon concluded that "Whoever would consider all the articles of faith would thus know that the Word has been given because reason either did not comprehend what is true or also decided for the opposite."108 Again Melanchthon was playing on the distinctions found in Col. 2:8: reason's limitations in the face of God's action. The paradoxes of humble incarnation and suffering faith provided the key for understanding the purpose of the Scripture. As Luther delighted in the paradox of God revealed "under the opposite form" (sub contrario specie) Melanchthon here distinguished what was true from its species and used this difference to explain the Scripture itself and its divergence from philosophical observation. Measured in light of Melanchthon's argument, few had missed the mark more widely than Erasmus. In this case, human beings could not see the hand of God in this world and thus would never be able to decipher the origins of civil authority without the Word. Reason, Melanchthon argued, saw only the various crimes, cruelty, and negligence of rulers and nations, a standpoint held in common by both ancient histories and present experience. No wonder reason took offense, denied that government was a work of God, and, by calling magistrates robbers and tyrants, led the people to rise up against them, "as against brigands" (latrocinia) as in the case of Brutus.109 Against false opinions of this kind "the Holy Spirit teaches us." But who held such false opinions? Unlike the 1527 edition, Melanchthon did not keep his readers in the dark. Instead, he quoted a portion of Plato's "De legibus," where, according to Melanchthon, Plato confessed that although human beings could not establish civil rule, the state was established by chance rather than by divine counsel.110 As with his comments on Col. 2:8, Melanchthon was also opposing Erasmus. As already mentioned, in the Institutio Principis Christiani Erasmus urged Christian princes to follow Jesus' advice in Matt. 20:2526 and not lord it over others. He cited Seneca's opinion with approval: "Seneca has written profoundly that in the same place we put villains and pirates, kings who have the soul of villains and pirates must be put. This alone distinguishes a king from a tyrant, not the title."111 For Melanch
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thon, on the contrary, it was not a moral issue (Who had the good soul?) but an article of faith (Was this a divine ordinance?). Having introduced the classics and argued that the Bible offered something they lacked, Melanchthon had created a new problem for himself. Some pagan authors actually did confess that God was in charge. Melanchthon knew this and hence cited Homer, who wrote that God cared for kings and accepted their laws as divine. 112 How did Homer come to share this divine revelation? Melanchthon admitted that many coniecturae (divinations) moved this very wise (sapientissimus) poet, but then, anticipating a similar addition by Justus Jonas to the discussion of Col. 2:8, he added this explanation: "Perhaps he also received an opinion of this kind from his ancestors, to whom doubtless the first parents, who knew the Word of God, passed down, as if by hand, many honest precepts."113 Most likely following the example of some church fathers, who had claimed that Moses was read by the Greek philosophers, Melanchthon posited a direct tradition of the law of God from Adam and Eve to Homer. Yet in some ways Homer provided merely the poetic exception to prove the philosophical rule, since the philosophers denied God's maintainance of the civil state. Reason without God's word (written or oral) was deceived in this matter. Therefore, despite Homer, Melanchthon could confidently assert that God provided his Word in this matter so that we could recognize his benefits. There may also have been something else behind this citation of Homer. In his Institutio Principis Christiani, Erasmus, in the same section where he cited Seneca, quoted a line from Homer immediately preceding our text, where Achilles called the prince a (literally, a king who sucks dry [the people]) and contrasted that to Homer's other name for kings, namely, shepherds of the people.114 Melanchthon's Homer had an even more positive view of kings, which, in contrast to Erasmus's ethical approach that divided good princes from bad tyrants, focused on God's ordinance. Having cleared the way for his use of Scripture, Melanchthon now investigated individual texts, almost all of which he had discussed in 1527. Yet he handled them with a new clarity and thoroughness lacking in 1527. They were no longer simply proof texts for an exegetical argument but ammunition in a theological struggle over the legitimacy of civil government. Take, for example, the first text Melanchthon dealt with in this section, Gen. 9:6. In 1527 Melanchthon had referred to this text twice: once, in passing, he mentioned it as the place where civil government was established, and a second time he cited it to refute the objection raised by Matt. 20:2526. In 1528 it became a centerpiece in his argument. Here was the origin of all ordinances for maintaining public peace and punishing criminals. By making this law, God had sanctioned government and legitimated its use of force in punishment. Then, anticipating the objection often supported by Matthew 20:2526, but not citing that text, he immediately added that the gospel did not abrogate this law. To support this contention he cited 1 Tim. 1:9 ("The law has been laid down for the unjust"), a text also used in 1527 as part of his discussion of Matt. 20:2526. More complete exegesis within more clearly ordered theological arguments occurred again and again throughout this excursus.115 The close to this section also showcased Melanchthon's method. In both 1527 and 1528 he concluded that the legitimation of the magistracy functioned to give "the
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greatest consolation in all dangers." 116 But in the 1528 introduction to the entire excursus, as already mentioned, Melanchthon stressed the singular importance of this consolation. Not surprisingly, he expanded this point greatly, as if sensing that his readers, especially "godly princes," needed comfort in the face of an increasingly hostile world. Knowing that government was ordained by God, "they can hope for help from God in all doubts, because they are carrying a burden and command from him."117 To support this point he quoted Ps. 7:6 and transferred to this place in the text a second list of pious princes who were comforted by knowing that God had ordained their work.118 Why did God give all these examples? Because no occupation was exposed to more dangers. In the higher rhetorical style that marked this edition, he quoted a portion of Horace's famous poem about the "golden mean"119 and described all the dangers (including the devil) that surrounded the prince. In all of these dangers, knowledge of God's ordinance, depicted in the various symbols of princely authority, afforded the prince "a firm consolation'' in the face of any and all tempests. Whereas Erasmus had given the Christian prince new tasks outlined in Christ's precepts, Melanchthon provided him with comfort from the gospel. Having strengthened his discussion of the consolation offered by this doctrine, Melanchthon did not neglect its other side, namely, fear.120 However, in 1528 he added a new twist. For him the very act of punishing criminals constantly reminded those magistrates who believed God had given them authority about God's wrath and vengeance. A passing reference to 2 Chron. 19:6 in 1527 became a fullblown discussion of Jehosaphat's advice. Even tyrants like Ahab had to fear God's judgment. As God punished the crimes of the people through the magistrate, so he punished the misdeeds of tyrants with other calamities. History taught, Melanchthon wrote, that no one would escape because the Word of the Lord remains forever.121 At this point Melanchthon was ready to deal with the objection arising from Christ's prohibition of vengeance.122 Although his basic argument remained unchanged, it was clear that between 1527 and 1528 Melanchthon had done his homework. He noted that the question had been handled in a variety of ways and quoted Gregory of Nazianzus, whom Melanchthon acknowledged as the source for the notion that this statement of Jesus was a counsel, not a command (a position strongly attacked by Luther and, following him, by Melanchthon in his Loci).123 But here he immediately linked this position to a much more serious problem, namely, that on the basis of this text some doubted the legality of magistrates completely. And vestiges of this opinion may be discerned in the books of some who often fall into this opinion concerning magistrates, speak outrageously concerning their office, assemble opinions by which tyrants are censured, exaggerate the vices of magistrates. From this follows that readers assume a false persuasion concerning this type of life, because they are not admonished that this office or type of life is approved by God.124
In Melanchthon's view Erasmus's Institutio principis Christiani had this effect because it was quite simply a collection of statements against tyrants.125 But even Gregory's position, shared of course by an entire medieval Latin tradition, did not in Melanchthon's eyes finally help against such charges. Dividing Christians into two groups according to those who merely followed commands and those
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who kept commands and counsels was only a small step from rejecting the magistracy altogether. Gregory's distinction did not finally answer the charges of the pagans, who imagined that Christianity undermined the state. As in the Scholia of 1527, Melanchthon preferred to distinguish between private and public vengeance in his interpretation of this text. Here again, however, he greatly expanded his argument. "I do not make up this interpretation from myself, but Scripture forces us to discern private vengeance from the office of magistrates." 126 This stark contrast in verbs between human fabrication and scriptural compulsion reflected the very method Melanchthon himself outlined. Here reason had to be taken captive to the Word. Melanchthon was so confident of his position that he could even taunt the opposition, wondering why they took exception to Christ's comment about vengeance, when the fifth commandment, "You shall not kill," created similar difficulties. Matt. 5:44 was little more than commentary on that commandment by Christ. who understood that vindictiveness was a great problem "in souls of noble birth."127 Melanchthon also cited Rom. 13:4 and contrasted the vengeance taken under divine command to the grave sin of wreaking vengeance privately. The renewed reference to God's commandment and the honor the magistracy derived from it led Melanchthon to describe its functions, all of which he called the ''sum and most holy works of love."128 In the midst of his discussion of vengeance Melanchthon invoked the distinction of the twofold righteousness of God, or two kingdoms. "Those who think that Christ burdened civil administration with extensive new laws do not understand why Christ came."129 Here again, Erasmus and his philosophia Christi matched Melanchthon's complaint. As 1 Tim. 1:9 stated, Christ came to forgive sins and to give the Holy Spirit to believers, not to upset the government ordained for the ungodly majority. Christ did not set up a new government (noua magistratus) but advised his apostles, despite their misconceptions, to obey the Romans. It was in this light that all of Matt. 6 (he meant chapter 5 as well) was to be understood. There are similar expansions to arguments discussed earlier in the remainder of Melanchthon's excursus. When he moved to the second objection, found in Matt. 20:2526, he specifically rejected the opinion of Theophylact, who viewed Christ's comments about Gentile kings in a completely negative way. However, Melanchthon tempered his judgment by adding, "Theophylact can be excused, because he is speaking not about the office of magistrate but about the vices of those who bear that office."130 As in the last section, Melanchthon warned readers to beware of such opinions, "in innumerable writings." Among those who in fact espoused this position was Erasmus, both in his Querela pacis and in his Institutio Principis Christiani.131 To counter this view Melanchthon again invoked the two kingdoms of God, claiming that Christ was merely using a "comparison" (collatio) and he again discussed the Greek word , which was used by Luke (22:25).132 He again listed the functions of the magistrate, but this time in order to distinguish fully between political authority, designed to coerce those not sanctified by the Holy Spirit, and the reign of Christ. He again quoted Gen. 9:6, this time capitalizing per hominem to stress that vengeance was exercised through human government. "Christ did not come to abolish this kingdom but to establish his own spiritual kingdom in which the gospel would be preached, the Holy Spirit given, and the hearts of believers renewed."133 Thus, Matt. 20:25 actually defined the difference between the two kingdoms.134
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As in other sections of the 1528 Scholia, Melanchthon also warned against writers who contrasted Christ's crown of thorns to princely pomp and circumstance. This mistaken corollation implied that "Christ had come only for this: to set up a more moderate government, so that he might hand down in a civil manner some precepts for living." Erasmus's moderate approach did not work for Melanchthon. Ignoring the two kingdoms led to priests who thought their preeminence was divinely established—a reference to the papal monarchy?—or "in our day" to the seditious who armed themselves against the magistrates under the pretext of the gospel. 135 It had taken him half of the excursus to do it, but Melanchthon had finally succeeded in turning Erasmus's charges against Luther back on Erasmus's own head. It was not Luther's gospel but Erasmus's moderation and its failure to distinguish the two realms of God that stood in direct line with papal monarchism and peasant revolution. It was those who thought along these lines who mocked Christ with purple and crowned him with thorns. To emphasize this crucial distinction Melanchthon concluded his addition to the material from 1527 with the following description of the two kingdoms: Therefore let us carefully discern these two kingdoms: the kingdom of the world and the kingdom of Christ, as we have urged many times up to this point. The kingdom of Christ is found in the hearts of the saints who according to the gospel believe that they have been received into grace on account of Christ, who are renewed and sanctified by the Holy Spirit and taste eternal life, who show forth their faith in good works and on account of God's glory do good to all, so that they invite many to knowledge of the gospel. They tolerate all things, nor do they allow themselves to take up arms in a desire for vengeance against those who have injured them. They obey the magistrates with great care, they hold public offices (if such are entrusted to them) with vigilance and courage. If duty demands, they punish the guilty and fight in battle. However, they do not rush in to seize public offices of their own accord, but if forced by their calling they take them up. Furthermore, the kingdom of the world, as I have often said, is a legitimate order that defends public peace with the authority of magistrates, with laws, judgments, punishments and war.136
To this description he then added material from the Scholia of 1527 which emphasized that Christians also followed the magistrate to set a good example.137 Apart from the distinction of the two kingdoms, some of the detailed comments on Christian behavior (toleration, repudiation of vengeance) echoed Erasmus's views. However, it was precisely the initial distinction, with its emphasis on faith alone, that separated the two thinkers. In 1528 Melanchthon transformed this section of his remarks. What had been an exposition of Rom. 13 became an essay on Christian political theory. Two exegetical quaestiones became detailed refutations of opponents' positions. As if these changes were not enough, however, Melanchthon added still another twist. Having concluded his discussion of the problem of vengeance and of Christ's command in Matt. 20, he dismissed other passages that could have been used against his position, claiming that they "can be easily explained."138 Instead he turned his attention to another, much more serious problem: the testimony of history. Here the human soul was offended by the tyrannical way power had been seized and thereby concluded that Christians were not permitted to be magistrates. He mentioned Julius Caesar from pagan his
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tory and Nimrod (Gen. 10:89) from the Scripture. But Melanchthon went beyond examples from the past 139 and described the French invasion of the duchy of Milan, the subsequent capture of the French king (on 6 March 1525 at the battle of Pavia), and his return ("through the humanity of Emperor Charles") to France. Recent events, too, seemed to indicate that such a kingdom was not ordained by God.140 "For reason, when it considers the beginnings of kingdoms or their ends, or the vices of princes, thinks far differently."141 In contrast, the "godly mind" considered not what the eye saw, but the Word of God. Divine ordinance had to be distinguished from the person who held the office. He compared magistrates to another divine institution, marriage, which could be abused by an avaricious man who married a wife with a large dowry. In the same way God instituted government for the sake of laws, justice, and peace. Nevertheless, this institution should be numbered not among evil things God allowed to happen— as some claimed—but among the "proper works of God." Just as God created the sun and instituted marriage, so, Melanchthon maintained, the political institution was made by God, and only if God preserved it would it remain intact against the attacks of human improbity and diabolical wickedness.142Precisely because God held the magistracy in such high regard did it suffer such abuse.143 But that abuse did not constitute sufficient grounds for rejecting a magistrate or for rebellion. Again, by contrast, Erasmus in the Querela pacis and elsewhere used the horrors of war to argue that only through its eradication could Europe hope to return to its Christian roots.144 For Melanchthon this advice represented a further confusion of the two kingdoms. With this argument Melanchthon concluded the first section of his Christian "Politics" and turned to the second: the office of subject. As the preceding analysis has shown, he spent time on this topic in order to clear up the confusion in commoners' minds that changes in ecclesiastical traditions meant a dissolution of all laws and a condemnation of the magistrac. Melanchthon asserted on the contrary that based upon Rom. 13 (a text that was to be diligently taught to the people), it was a sin to disobey the magistrates. Instead, subjects were to be taught both to honor and to fear the magistrates. Here Melanchthon followed the arguments of 1527 more closely. The changes often sharpened and clarified his arguments. Thus, in speaking of honor Melanchthon noted explicitly what he had taken for granted in 1527, namely, that common folk tended to mistake the outward signs of honor for the real thing. He then defined "honor" as "to attribute to another wisdom, righteousness, goodness, and similar things."145 He also emphasized even more strongly than in 1527 the duty to pray for princes rather than to complain about them. Melanchthon claimed that when public tranquillity was threatened, we were to blame ourselves, not the princes. Furthermore, God did not correct princes by encouraging sedition or other crimes.146 Likewise, Melanchthon's discussion of fear followed the 1527 text closely, although he shortened it in places.147 He then turned to works and tribute, following portions of the 1527 text word for word.148 He inserted a dire warning, in the form of an interpretation of the statue in Dan. 9, that the greater "our sins," the more bitter the rule would be. He even turned this warning around and insisted that when people were crushed by servitude from their rulers, they needed to recognize God's judgment Immediately after posing the question whether Christian magistrates could use Gentile law, Melanchthon again, as has already been noted several other times,
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identified his immediate opponent in 1528. 149 "And concerning this thing I am reminded that Karlstadt excited great tragedies by calling us back to the Mosaic law and contended thatRoman law having been rejected—the law of Moses must be used in public."150 He also mentioned "some other person" who also taught a "new ," namely a return to the law of Jubilee.151 From this arose great tumults—in particular, the Peasants' Revolt. Melanchthon even told his readers why he was warning them, lest they fall into the same errors. He then heightened his rhetoric by using repetition (error est and sedicioi sunt) to reject Karlstadt's contentions, as well as the notion of communal property, coercion of Christians into using Mosaic law, the use of physical violence against princes, and the usurpation of legislative rights from them. After defining the enemy, Melanchthon then returned to the arguments used in 1527 and more strongly emphasized that Gentile laws had to correspond to the law of nature or reason.152 The Sybaritic and Milesian laws clearly bothered Melanchthon enough that, unlike in 1527, he now felt the need to reiterate Paul's and, according to Melanchthon, Solomon's contention that the laws of the Gentiles were in fact God's work as long as they corresponded to the natural knowledge (notitia) of honesty and right that God had written in human hearts: "Those things that diverge from that natural judgment, as the Milesian laws, are not laws but disorder and confusion caused by the devil, who drives people so that they may fight with their nature with some kind of fury."153 These additions underscored that Melanchthon's growing use of natural law was not merely a direct consequence of his distinction between the two righteousnesses (although it could not have arisen without it) nor a conscious distancing of himself from Luther, who in fact also used such terminology on occasion. Instead, it came to light precisely where Melanchthon saw a weakness in his own positive assessment of nonbiblical, pagan law. Was absolutely any and all law ordained by God? No, Melanchthon had to say, there was lawless law where Satan had completely overwhelmed the natural knowledge of God's law out of which all good law arose.154 Natural law, then, served as a check against pagan lawlessness on the one side and Mosaic legalism on the other. That government was ordained by God was revealed in the Scripture; that anyone actually governed justly was a function of natural law. The concluding portions of Melanchthon's arguments followed the Scholia of 1527 fairly closely, although one again can sense the heightened rhetoric in the second edition. Thus, a comparison of the law of Moses and "our laws" contained several new examples and a more careful working out in rhetorical terms of the differences.155To censure existing laws was as seditious as cursing a magistrate. We were, rather, to love the laws, because there was nothing more poisonous in a nation than the change of laws.156 He ended with a warning to teachers in the church, "so that, as if possessing laws worthy of the tribunes to lay before the people, they do not rage against public laws."157 It was not their office to govern. This introduced a brief discussion of the clausula Petri, following exactly the argument in 1527.158 The final portion of Melanchthon's excursus on Col. 2:23 centered on ecclesiastical traditions. In 1528 his remarks were two pages shorter than in 1527. They also followed a different order. His third point in 1527, that some traditions conflicted with divine ordinances, had become the first and flowed quite directly from his dis
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cussion of Acts 5:29 in the preceding section. 159 In second place now were the "traditions concerning 'middle things,' as they are called."160 This Stoic term for adiaphora was clearly still regarded by Melanchthon as a borrowed one, but it now played a much more central role. To this discussion Melanchthon then included what in 1527 was his first point: that as long as such practices were understood not to be necessary for salvation, then they ought to be preserved, just as one observed certain civil ceremonies. However, if someone thought such practices produced works that placated God's wrath, then they were not to be retained. This discussion introduced Melanchthon's remarks concerning "the old canons."161 In 1528 he underscored that only later did these canons become combined with notions that not following such ordinances was a mortal sin or that their performance made satisfaction for sin. This led naturally to a discussion of the objection posed by Matthew 23:34.162 Small changes demonstrate yet again the heightened polemic. "Some object" in 1527 was changed in 1528 to "adversaries object." Melanchthon then inserted a new reference to Theophylact's solution to the dilemma. (He had argued that the scribes sat in Moses' seat only when they spoke about Moses, not when they required their own traditions.) Melanchthon dismissed this solution and reiterated the one brought up in 1527: Christ was not talking here about precepts in conflict with God's Word. In a second addition to the 1527 Scholia, Melanchthon discussed a reference to canon law: that the gospel was preserved in vain by those who did not observe the canons. To this Melanchthon responded not only with the examples of Peter's vision of unclean food and the disciples' own behavior in Matt. 15:3 (also used in 1527) but also with the example of John Gerson, the scholastic theologian. When he argued against the same reference, Melanchthon bristled, no one had attacked him; now everyone was attacking the evangelicals. At the same time that Melanchthon added these comments he also omitted what amounted to a threepage conclusion from 1527, in which he had defended the use of traditions,163 and replaced it with a much briefer, onepage attack on certain torturers of consciences (carnificia conscienciarum) who insisted on following certain traditions, even though no one preserved them properly. "How often," Melanchthon wondered, "did the sacrificing priests omit their prayers" while at the same time destroying the consciences of those who violated traditions?164 All because they never knew the difference between divine and human commands, not to mention the fact that they were imbued with a false faith (in traditions) and obscured the benefit of Christ and the gracious remission of sin. Melanchthon's concluding remarks showed once again the dual nature of his opponents. I have said these things, not because I approve of those who abolish all rites and observe no old ordinances, but so that I may teach that the false opinion about traditions must be gotten rid of. Nevertheless this still must be emphasized, so that traditions that can be observed without sin are not violated in the presence of those who do not correctly understand the doctrine of liberty, lest we might be a scandal to them.165
Torturers of consciences on the one side, scandalizers of the weak on the other. Sycophants and revolutionaries. Among these formidable forces Melanchthon
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threaded his way in 1528. The fight over ecclesiastical traditions involved the nature of civil government, the distinction between God's two realms, and the problem of adiaphora and Christian liberty. For the first time since the Peasants' Revolt, Wittenberg's evangelical party had produced a thorough exposition of its political position. Was anybody listening? At least one person: Lazarus Spengler, secretary for Nuremberg's city council. 166 In the tumultuous year leading up to the 1530 Diet of Augsburg, Spengler, like so many other evangelical politicians and theologians of his time, wrestled with the problem of resistance to the emperor. His opinion, written for the city council in Nuremberg sometime during the first half of November 1529 but copied many times thereafter, stood squarely with Luther and Melanchthon, both of whom in 1529 still rejected any armed resistance to the emperor.167 Spengler concluded with a reference to the sources of his opinion. What Luther's judgment and opinion is in this case everyone can find very clearly and purely stated in his booklet On Secular Authority, Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved, and then in his Admonition to Peace to the rebellious peasants in the Swabian Articles. Concerning the same subject, Philip Melanchthon [writes] in his booklet On the Twelve Published Articles of the Peasants, likewise in his commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to Colossians, leaf 77, just as these things may all be found in the special signed judgment of Melanchthon that follows.168
Thus, at least a portion of Melanchthon's "Politics" came to the attention of the Nuremberg city council through its secretary. It also formed an important backdrop to Melanchthon's own opinions on the subject written at nearly the same time.169 Spengler was not the only important figure from the sixteenth century to read and comment on Melanchthon's excursus. Sometime after 1534 Martin Luther himself read at least portions of Melanchthon's Scholia of 1534.170 The only comment from that volume mentioned by Bubenheimer touched on Melanchthon's statement, already in the 1528 edition and underlined here by Luther, "And to me the old canons seemed to have been executed with a far different mind, having made and preserved traditions far differently than what began to be demanded later."171 Luther's marginal comment delineated a variance in the two Reformers' approaches to ecclesiastical traditions, one that would haunt Melanchthon in the years immediately after Luther's death, during the socalled adiaphoristic controversy. Melanchthon's high regard for ancient church traditions contrasted starkly to Luther's fundamental assertion of Christian freedom. He wrote: "Canons are good, just, holy, beautiful, made by the holiest and wisest, but they are not for slavery: instead, liberty born by Christ's blood reigns."172 Luther may well have suspected that Melanchthon's high praise for the old traditions would in the long run simply destroy the "freedom born of the blood of Christ." A romantic clinging to the past could no more restrict Christian freedom than the insistence in canon law itself that its ordinances were to be followed. It is important to note, however, that Luther was not so much disagreeing with Melanchthon as modifying his statements. After all, the underlined statement in the Scholia itself could have evoked Luther's concurrence. The longe alia mente was precisely the Christian freedom they thought their opponents, including Erasmus, had lost.
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Yet this modification itself revealed a crucial difference in theological method. Melanchthon had crafted his comments in light of his opponents. He derived from central theological premises what he viewed as clear, logical conclusions and refutations. This highly nuanced approach could, for all its clarity, lose sight of the central experience of the believer, born to freedom by the blood of Christ. It was Luther's peculiar gift to keep theology centered in that gift. Even the suspicion of another starting point for theology caused him to underline texts and scribble comments in the margins of books—a behavior that demonstrates an important difference between the gruff woodsman and the quiet planter. Nevertheless, the point of convergence between the theologies of Luther and Melanchthon and of divergence between Erasmus and Melanchthon came down to the distinction between the twofold righteousness of God. Melanchthon depicted the centrality of this distinction in no uncertain terms when in 1528 he added to his comments on Col. 2:10. We have already often dealt with these things. Nevertheless Paul's text forces us to say the same thing so many times. I would have had to deviate from his thought, had I wanted not to repeat these things. However, I treat this one thing with such great zeal so that I may explain Paul's genuine thought in the simplest way possible. And because a good part of scholastic theologians neither teach the righteousness of faith nor show the difference between philosophical and Christian righteousness, I have dwelt on this more thoroughly here as a matter of course, in order that I may to the utmost of my ability defend godly readers from their pernicious errors. For it is quite clear that the sum of Christian teaching depends upon a knowledge of the righteousness of faith. 173
Whether it was the question of the freedom of the will or the scope of civil authority, this conviction dominated Melanchthon's thought in the 1520s and set him at odds with both Erasmus's pacifism and his defense of the free will. Already in the Elogion of 1522 this conviction gave birth to Melanchthon's divided assessment of the work of Erasmus and Luther. In 1528, especially in comments on Col. 2:23, Melanchthon used this conviction systematically to reject Erasmus's political views (and those of most of his Roman contemporaries). At the same time, he established the framework for evangelical acceptance of the humanities, of tradition, and of the government. Thus, Melanchthon's stark rejection of Erasmus's view strengthened rather than weakened his commitment to good letters, especially in service of the Godgiven offices of magistrate and subject.
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PART IV THE AFTERMATH
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8— Melanchthon at Erasmus's Funeral: 15281560 Twentyone years and one week after Erasmus of Rotterdam's death, a student at the University of Wittenberg, Bartholomew Kalkreuter, recited a declamation, De Erasmo Roterodamo, recently penned for him by Philip Melanchthon. 1 In the course of rehearsing Erasmus's life, he depicted the Dutch humanist's relation to the Reformation this way: "Afterwards, the whole body of church doctrine was again purified by the voice of that reverend man, Doctor Luther. He [Erasmus] was a preparation for this thing, because the apostolic books and the ancient histories were now in people's hands."2 Kalkreuter added that despite their differences, Erasmus agreed with Luther's attack on church practices, praised Luther's exegesis, and, in a conversation with Frederick the Wise, insisted that Luther's greatest errors were attacking "the pope's crown and the monks' bellies."3 Erasmus as preparation for the Reformation? Erasmus as Luther's supporter? At first glance, given the controversy outlined in the previous chapters, it would seem impossible to get here from there. Yet get there Melanchthon did, although not, as is sometimes alleged, in the form of a capitulation to Erasmus's theology or an abandonment of the evangelical cause. Although a detailed examination of the route Melanchthon took in the years after 1528 goes beyond the scope of this work, this chapter will provide at least a road map, pointing out some important sites along the way. It will first examine the continuing influence of the teachings outlined in the Scholia for Melanchthon's later work and the important changes he wrought in them after 1530. Then, chiefly on the basis of Melanchthon's correspondence, it will outline both his later relations with Erasmus and his assessment of the Dutch humanist's life and work. Finally, it will suggest a couple of places to look for the origins of some of the most enduring theories regarding Melanchthon's Erasmianism. The Doctrines of the Will's Freedom and Civil Authority At the time Melanchthon was working on the Scholia, its influence was already evident in his other works. On the basis of the previous two chapters, it can now be ar
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gued that the statements regarding the freedom of the will and governmental authority that figured prominently in the Latin version of the Visitation Articles and even more so in the German version of 1528 were simply abridgments of positions Melanchthon had worked out in detail in the Scholia. 4 In the Latin version, as in the Scholia of 1527, Melanchthon derived the magistrates' authority from Rom. 13 and fought against (Karlstadt's) notion that civil laws were to be derived from the Old Testament.5 The expanded version of 1528 described the three aspects of obedience to authorities according to Rom. 13 (taxes, fear, and honor), where honor included recognizing that civil authority came from God and praying for its preservation. Along with the issue of Old Testament laws, the articles also answered the objection of those who argued on the basis of Nimrod and Julius Caesar that government could not have come from God.6 Regarding free will, the Latin version set its sights on those whose teaching on the will's bondage was interpreted by the masses as permitting license. Against them Melanchthon invoked the distinction between civil and spiritual righteousness and insisted that despite sin and the devil, it was within human powers (by God's grace and aid) to do good according to civil righteousness. Spiritual works could not be done by our reason or through the law. Instead, such "Christian righteousness" could only be received from God.7 The version of 1528 is little more than a translation of this section.8 In 152930 Melanchthon published his second commentary on Romans, the Dispositio orationis. There, too, one can recognize formulations from the Scholia, as Melanchthon sought to refine and sharpen them.9 The argumentum began, "Certainly it can be observed in the reading of all Scripture that righteousness is twofold."10 In his introduction Melanchthon emphasized the centrality of God's twofold righteousness. He still interpreted chapters 911 in terms of divine predestination. And he saved his largest excursus for Rom. 13, where he immediately distinguished Paul's approach to "politics" from the philosophers'. In what may have been an indirect reference to Erasmus's Institutio, he asked, "What similar thing [to what is found in Paul] do we read in Plato's Republic?"11 At the same time he fretted about "some books written in recent years'' which had insisted that the gospel and magistracy were incompatible. He again attacked Milesian and Sybaritic laws and defended the use of Roman or Saxon laws (rather than Mosaic ones) among Gentiles.12 At the same time, he continued to attack Erasmus's position on the free will. For example, in comments on Rom. 8 he strongly objected to those who did not properly define flesh and spirit: "And those who imagine the Spirit signifies reason and make from the gospel some human philosophy that requires nothing except the works of reason are completely opposed by Paul."13 Then followed perhaps the most direct attack on Erasmus from this entire period. For this entire chapter of Paul has been wickedly contaminated by Origen and others, who, as people bound by oath to his words, hyperaspistize [defend] his philosophy. However, from their immoderate philosophy, since they attribute justification to the powers of reason, arises that they suppose nothing else is required from a human being except civil works. 14
Erasmus's Origenism caused him to miss Paul's meaning and to reduce justification to "civil works." Origen was not a help but a contaminant. His followers were charged
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with wickedness and immoderate philosophy. By 1529 a yawning gulf had opened between Erasmus and Melanchthon on the question of free will. 15 In 1530, as Melanchthon struggled to formulate the evangelicals' teaching for the Augsburg Confession, he again expressed positions worked out in the Scholia and reflected in the Visitation Articles.16 Here CA 16 and 18 were most important.17 The Schwabach Articles, which served as a basis for much of the first half of the CA, had in article 14 simply required, until Christ came, honor and obedience toward worldly authority, as an estate ordered by God to protect the pious and punish the evil, and had stated that Christians could exercise such an office without injury to their faith. The German version of CA 16 and an early German translation of the Latin (Na) emphasized much more clearly that the estate was created by God. It listed a variety of permitted activities, many of them aimed at objections made by the Anabaptists. Moreover, in order to divide this teaching according to God's twofold righteousness, the article not only condemned Anabaptists for separating Christians from such activity but also condemned others (monks) for reducing the evangelical perfection of faith to an external rejection of house and home. "For the gospel teaches not an external and temporal but an internal, eternal existence and righteousness of the heart."18The conclusion to the article included an invocation of Acts 5:29, as had the Scholia itself. CA 18 had no parallel in the Schwabach Articles. Here the German translation of an early Latin version (Na) and the Latin editio princeps contrasted a iustitia civilis (äub erliche Gerechtikeit) to a iustitia Dei seu . . . spiritualis (innerliche geistliche Gerechtikeit) In the German version of the CA, the two kinds of righteousness were more implied than stated, although all three documents referred specifically to the limits of reason.19 The citation of (pseudo)Augustine's Hypomnesticon must be placed against the backdrop of Erasmus's reference to the same document in Hyperaspistes II.20 Melanchthon's Apology of the Augsburg Confession from 1531 showed an even greater debt to the formulations of the Scholia. Regarding Ap 16, not only did he proclaim "Here the whole locus concerning the distinction between the kingdom of Christ and the civil kingdom is usefully illustrated by our writings" (among which books he could have included the Scholia) he also referred to Karlstadt and to the defense of Christianity by Origen and Gregory against the calumnies of the pagans.21 He dealt with the prohibition of vengeance in Matt. 5:39 and Rom. 13. New from the standpoint of the Scholia, but already present in CA 16, was the attack on any notion of Christian perfection that undermined civil order. The tone and argumentation of Ap 18 was set by the Confutation. Again the basic distinction between the two righteousnesses echoed the Scholia's central point. After granting reason's capacity to effect civil righteousness, Melanchthon pointed out the power of concupiscence and the devil to limit even these works and the inability of philosophers to lead a just life.22 As Paul argued in 1 Cor. 2:14, spiritual things (that is, faith and fear of God) came through the Holy Spirit, not the free will.23 In Melanchthon's 1532 Romans commentary, small, subtle shifts had taken place in Melanchthon's position on justification and the free will.24 To be sure, even in the very beginning of the commentary he launched an attack against Origen and his inability to distinguish civil righteousness from the righteousness required by God.25 However, Melanchthon's actual adversaries here were more Eck and the authors of
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the Confutation than "moderate" voices such as Erasmus. 26 True, he criticized scholastic theologians for imagining that human beings could satisfy the law by their own powers, an error that arose from the blindness of human reason.27 However, at the same time he made more room in his theology for the notion of reward.28 He still strongly rejected the arguments of some "Epicureans" who imagined that the word ''flesh" did not imply the entire human being.29 Yet for the first time he put Rom. 911 under the commonplace de ecclesia.30Here the issue for Melanchthon had become one of comfort, not curiosity, and he now placed some cause for that election in the recipients of God's mercy, insofar as they did not repudiate the offered promise.31 Moreover, while again having introduced the concept of the "general action of God" into the discussion, he explicitly rejected any disputations about contingency.32 He also more carefully distinguished the new birth and the Christian keeping of the law from the righteousness imputed by faith on account of Christ.33 Although Melanchthon had changed the way he spoke about justification, the lengthy section on governmental authority attached to Rom. 13 covered much of the same ground that the Scholia had, with many of the same examples, objections, and proof texts.34 Melanchthon simply added several sections, one on contracts and usury35 and one on the legitimacy of law suits.36 The movement discernible in the 1532 commentary becomes more obvious when the 1534 Scholia is compared to its predecessor from 1528. In comments on Col. 1:15 and the free will Melanchthon changed only one section. Where in both 1527 and 1528 he had written, "Thus with clear statements it is taught that the human will does not have freedom such that it can effect Christian or spiritual righteousness," he now stated, "such that it can effect a spiritual movement without the aid of the Holy Spirit."37 He then excised completely some of the strongest language in the entire locus for the Holy Spirit's work (first added in 1528)38and replaced it with a section that emphasized human cooperation. But when human minds hear the Word of God and do not repudiate it, at the same time the Holy Spirit moves them so that they are both terrified and again raised up and believe the promises and truly hold that God forgives, is present for, hears, helps, defends, and governs us, and that he helps human minds in bringing about true virtues: chastity, love of neighbor, patience, etc.39
Here one must be careful not to read too much into these changes. Because he refused to indulge in what he considered speculation, Melanchthon's comments about not repudiating the Word did not for him simply connote a kind ofsynergism. Instead, he seemed finally to have found a place in his theology for paradox simul: not in the tension between iustus and peccator, as with Luther, but in the simultaneous nonrejection of human minds and the work of the Holy Spirit, who moved the hearts of true hearers of the Word and helped them effect true virtues. Thus, the paradox appeared within the life of the justified, not between righteousness and sin. Whether or not this "not to repudiate" constituted a work became the basis for later disputes. However, in other additions to the Scholia Melanchthon also went to great lengths to stress the necessity of good works in the redeemed and even invented a third use for the law in the process.40
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Turning from these few, important changes in the Scholia to the Loci communes of 1535, it is clear that a major shift had taken place in the way Melanchthon expressed the doctrine of justification. Based on Wittenberg lectures that began 15 May 1533, 41 the first copies of the second edition of the Loci were rolling off Joseph Klug's presses in Wittenberg sometime in March 1535.42 Looking only at the locus, "On Human Powers or on the Free Will," in comparison to the 1528 Scholia, changes are obvious.43 Melanchthon began by rejecting the disputes of Valla and many others regarding contingency. The church needed to know about human nature and whether it could perfectly fulfill the law, not about "the arcane counsel of the God who governs all things," predestination, or contingency. Melanchthon wanted to put aside such contentious matters and focus on the nature of human weakness and Christ's benefits.44 He then partitioned human powers according to the philosophical categories of ratio, which judged, and voluntas, which accepted or rejected the judgment of the ratio.45 He stated that "they" (presumably philosophers) call liberum arbitrium the voluntas and ratio combined. The Scripture, when it used words like "heart" or "mind," meant judgment and true appetites, not external works. He quickly moved from questions of nomenclature to the question of the freedom of the will (voluntas) stated in terms of how it could obey the law of God. Three things had to be considered: the magnitude of sin, the weakness of human nature, and the requirements of the law (that is, that it demanded not only external, civil deeds but perfect and total obedience). Furthermore, Melanchthon admitted that before the Fall human beings had the ability to fulfill the law through true trust and obedience, but he narrowed the question to what they could do given their present weakness. Using different language from the 1528 Scholia but to the same end, Melanchthon argued first that in this state the human will was able to perform external works of the law. This was what the philosophers meant by the term "free will." 1 Tim. 1:9 and Gal. 3:24 proved that the Scripture also allowed this freedom to the will. However, this freedom, too, was undermined by human weakness and the devil, something even Ovid had noticed.46 Second, he insisted that the gospel taught that there was such a horrible corruption in nature that it could not integrally obey the law. This inability did not reside in the nature of the human voluntas itself but was an effect of its corruption.47 At this level Melanchthon's testimony and his subsequent interpretation of key passages of the Bible matched his earlier statements: "The human will does not obey God without the Holy Spirit."48 The very next paragraph, however, demonstrated that Melanchthon's perspective had undergone an important change. He worried about "throwing consciences into a trap" and deterring people from even trying to obey or believe. He insisted that the promise of the gospel was universal and insisted that these things could be judged more clearly "in real struggles" than in leisurely disputations.49 Although the will struggled against its weakness, it sustained itself in the Word, through which the Spirit worked. In its distress the soul must be encouraged to retain the Word with all its effort and not become discouraged, lest it not try. And it must be taught that the promise is
Page 144 universal and that it ought to believe. In this fashion we see that three causes are conjoined: the Word, the Holy Spirit and the will, not really as a passive thing [otiosam] but fighting its weakness. 50
He cited several patristic sources to the same effect and pointed out that other writings, synods, and especially Augustine held the same opinion, the latter against the "delusions" of the Manichaeans, who thought there was no difference between a statue and the human will. Turning then to the abilities of the justified will, Melanchthon argued that with the help of the Holy Spirit the will could effect something against external lapses. Even those outside of grace were called to external discipline, because that very call. being the law, also drove them to the Word through which the Spirit worked. Thus, "many are called to true godliness through this exercise."51 However, he interpreted Ecclus. 15:24, a crucial bone of contention between Luther and Erasmus, not as proof for the free will outside of grace but as implying that when the Holy Spirit helped the justified, they experienced true freedom. He closed the section by explaining that Jerome's anathema of those who said that God commanded the impossible must be interpreted by another saying of Jerome that anathematized those who claimed we could fulfill the law without grace. His gloss of the word "grace" in this connection linked the entire explanation to a forensic interpretation of justification. Here "grace" is understood not only that we are helped by the Holy Spirit, but also as that gracious imputation or reception of righteousness, that is, that we are declared righteous on account of Christ and that then an inchoate obedience is pleasing [to God] although it does not satisfy the law.52
Turning briefly to Melanchthon's comments on governmental authority, there is evidence for the continuing importance of the Scholia in providing the language for Melanchthon's later comments.53 Underneath them all ran the red thread of his distinction between civil and spiritual righteousness. A consistent addition in the Loci of 1535 to that framework, already encountered in the Apology, comprised references to the monks and their implicit disparaging of civil life. He also attacked the likes of Müntzer and Karlstadt under the name of"fanatic spirits." He organized his comments under five rules, some of which introduced new subject matter. Even when he investigated (for the first time) signs that God's presence was revealed in the government, citing Isocrates and Plato along the way, his point was still to refute those who identified kings with crooks. A comparison between the office of preacher and prince, while implicit in the Scholia, had its origins in CA 28. The final rule argued that it was a mortal sin to disobey the magistrates and reflected arguments heard for the first time in the Romans commentary on the "on account of the conscience" of Rom. 13:5 Yet this heightened call to obedience actually introduced a clearer exposition of the limits of that obedience. Melanchthon discussed not only instances where the authorities commanded something against the gospel (Acts 5:29) but also instances when the prince broke natural law or even his own law. This last case played a particularly important role from 1531 onward, when the Saxon court's lawyers convinced Wittenberg's theologians that the emperor was an equal to the elector and had broken imperial law. Melanchthon concluded by arguing that the prince was custodian not only of the second table of the law but also of the first, at least as far as external
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discipline was concerned. Only by adding the final phrase did he maintain some semblance of the central distinction of the two righteousnesses. Clearly, the continuing problems of the punishment of heretics, first posed in encounters with the Anabaptists, and of the church visitation received a much more thorough investigation here. The year after Melanchthon published the second edition of the Loci, Erasmus died. Melanchthon's relation to the Dutch humanist after that time took on a very different character, as will be seen in the following sections. Thus, this brief overview of Melanchthon's later theology can be summarized as follows: Two things are clear. First, in the years immediately following the publication of the 1528 Scholia, the formulations found there exercised an enormous influence on Melanchthon's later statements, up to and including the Apology of 1531. Second, from 1532 some important changes appeared, especially in connection with Melanchthon's understanding of justification by faith and the freedom of the will, which culminated in the second edition of the Loci communes. A thorough examination of this shift in Melanchthon's understanding of justification and free will would require a separate study. This limited review can only point to several external and internal causes, arising from Melanchthon's immediate environment and the inner connections of his theology, respectively. Turning first to external factors, despite later intraLutheran disputes over the free will in which Melanchthon also participated, Melanchthon's reasons in 1534 for emphasizing human activity had less to do with some internal predilection for synergism than with his increasing desire to answer the objections of and build bridges to the socalled reform Catholic party, on the one hand, and with his fear of theological statements that could be used to support antinomianism, on the other. Melanchthon's dispute with John Agricola in 1527 over the nature of penance and the law convinced him that evangelicals abandoned the preaching of the law only at their own peril. Thus, at every turn in later formulations of his understanding of the law, Melanchthon excluded a kind of gross antinomianism that turned the gospel into an excuse to sin. At the same time, and this may have been developed as a further response to Erasmus's critique in the Hyperaspistes, he took care to demonstrate that the evangelicals were also not Manichaeans. 54 In 1530 Melanchthon also returned from the Diet of Augsburg anxious to draw the line between the bad theology of the Confutation and Wittenberg's evangelical theology. In so doing he also hoped to convince some in the Roman camp that their worst fears about the confessors at Augsburg were unfounded. This became all the more important in 1534, when Albrecht of Mainz attempted to restart talks between the evangelical and Roman parties. Gregory Briick and Melanchthon were sent by the elector of Saxony to Leipzig, where they met in April 1534 with Julius Pflug (who was also representing Duke George of Saxony), Michael Vehe, and Christopher Türck.55 Much of the protocol produced by those theologians matched the new language used by Melanchthon in the 1534 Scholia to describe justification and good works. The same year another exchange took place involving Melanchthon and Guillaume du Bellay, the brother of the bishop of Paris.56 His conversation with Melanchthon in the summer of 1534 resulted in Melanchthon's composing a theological opinion covering many of the areas of dispute between Wittenberg and
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Rome that was sent to du Bellay at the beginning of August 1534. 57 That opinion included the statement that the liberum arbitrium, aided by the Holy Spirit, helped the justified guard against sin.58 These encounters with reformminded members of the Roman party provided the external pressure on Melanchthon's theological expressions. Turning from these external developments to the internal logic of Melanchthon's theology, three forces—Melanchthon's insistence on forensic justification, his quest for clear, nonspeculative definition in theology, and his conviction that all theology served to comfort the individual conscience—converged to create something new in his thought. By 1531 Melanchthon was already insisting on expressing the doctrine of justification in exclusively forensic terms. For him this insistence implied a greater field of play for the law and human activity in all other areas of his theology, as long as one excluded them from justification. Thus, when commenting on human freedom in the Loci of 1535, he finally returned to a statement about justification, repeated with dulling regularity throughout this work. The more justification was understood as God's gracious imputation, the more questions of human participation demanded answers. One could perhaps speak of a narrowing of the distinction between the two righteousnesses, in that "Christian righteousness" was reduced to the moment when the individual was declared righteous before God. What Luther solved through paradox, Melanchthon explained with definitions. He was also convinced that the unity of the church could be found in clear statements of true doctrine (quid sit!) Thus, wherever agreements were reached he reworked his own exegesis and theology to match the new language.59 Here it was not Melanchthon's "humanism" (as if reading Homer or Ovid could effect such shifts!) but his untrammeled trust in dialectics and his concomitant fear of speculation that powered these movements in his theology. He also used definitions of the ancient church as a guide for his own theological terminology. Underlying this shift in terminology was Melanchthon's fear that Wittenberg's evangelical theology could be misunderstood as antinomianism or Manichaeanism. Either way the human will would become lazy and would use its own bondage as an excuse to sin. The conscience under attack would lose its only comfort: that the promises of Scripture applied to it. He viewed both extremes as undermining the power of the Word and the integrity of the human being. In the socalled first antinomian controversy with John Agricola, Luther stressed the Word's power and argued that antinomianism could only pretend to eliminate the law, because a theological fiat could not change the human condition or the threat of the law. Thus, for him antinomianism merely covered up the old creature's deeper legalism, which deflected the work of the killing law from its fulfillment.60 On the contrary, without denying the power of the Word, Melanchthon emphasized the way human beings used antinomianism (or, alternatively, Manichaeanism) to protect themselves from reacting to the Word. The iustitia Dei passiva, which Melanchthon defended in his forensic understanding of the justification, was not to be twisted into an excuse for the carefree passivity of the naturally active human being. Freedom from the law's threats was no excuse for lawlessness, nor was the will's weakness an excuse for willfulness. Thus, the Holy Spirit "helped," justification included three causes, and good works were necessary and Godpleasing, even though
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all reward stemmed from Christ's merit. The human being as recipient of God's Word and the Holy Spirit's work thus acquired an independent value in Melanchthon's theology, but only arising from a defense against antinomian or dualistic conjectures, not from theological speculation. 61 Melanchthon feared speculation. He regarded questions of contingency and predestination in a somewhat different way than Luther. Struggles with such questions drove Luther to God's promise and revelation in Christ. Melanchthon believed that such questions drove only to despair or vain curiosity, not to Christ. He insisted on cutting such speculation short for the sake of theological clarity and certainty. Nowhere did he describe his hermeneutic of moderation more clearly than in a letter to John Brenz from this time.62 In the context of giving Brenz permission to edit the publication of another set of lectures on Romans for the Haguenau printer Peter Brubach, Melanchthon described his approach to theology. "I do not want to produce new dogmas, but instead I am looking for simple and harmonious doctrine and method, which I follow in the Loci communes and which I followed in my previous [work] on Romans." Melanchthon's fear of novelty must be played not off Luther's teaching on justification but off Origen's. In Melanchthon's mind the new occurred when someone incorrectly mixed Origenistic speculation into Christian theology. Note, too, that he was searching for simple and harmonious doctrine and method. Both together defined Melanchthon's overall goals in theology. He continued, Although I know that others love more vulgar things in these same matters—in the commonplace on predestination or contingency and I don't know what else—nevertheless the things I write I judge to be correct and useful, which I nevertheless moderate so that I hope not to offend those who are more anxious.63
Here Melanchthon expressed the other side of his concern, that things said more coarsely simply offended the anxious. Melanchthon did not believe that his moderation undercut his theology's chief goals (recta et utilia) Instead, it served in a way that in his eyes the shocking paradoxes of a Luther could not: to comfort the anxious. As the preceding chapters make clear, however, these changes had nothing directly to do either with the original conflict with Erasmus during the 1520s or with Erasmus's theology. Although some of these changes meant that Melanchthon had created a much wider space for the human will and showed a greater openness to positions echoing Erasmus's criticisms from the Hyperaspistes, the causes for these changes rested in the inner logic of Melanchthon's own theology and in the theological environment of the early 1530s. Only insofar as Erasmus was a part of that later environment did his theology play any role at all. The invocation of Erasmus's spirit or the corrosive effects of humanism to explain this shift simply distorts the evidence. Even the search in Melanchthon's earlier writings for the origins of such changes overlooks the fact that he viewed his writings from the 1520S as attacks on Erasmus and his ilk. The facts are that in 1534, when reading his own work written six years earlier, Melanchthon himself felt constrained to write in a very different way about human activity. Thus, this change was the conscious act of a living theologian, not the inevitable conclusion of a flawed mind, fruitlessly trying to bridge the gap between his two favorite teachers. How small a role Erasmus played in
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these matters will become clear in the following examination of Melanchthon's correspondence. The Changing Assessment of Erasmus An examination of Melanchthon's correspondence, broken off in chapter 5, uncovers the extremely complex and variable nature of Melanchthon's relationship to Erasmus. In 1528 a controversy independent of the debate over free will had already further damaged Melanchthon's opinion of Erasmus. In March 1528 Erasmus published a broadside against the Ciceronians, people who made the imitation of Cicero's style the goal of their Latin, aimed especially at the recently deceased Christopher Longolius. 64 Written in the form of a dialog, it depicted a Christian scholar's quest for a true Ciceronian and included barbed comments about a host of humanists, including Joachim Camerarius and Melanchthon.65 Melanchthon's correspondence reflected that Camerarius, who much more than Melanchthon imagined himself a true Ciceronian, appeared to have been deeply upset, so that his Wittenberg friend had to smile at his zeal.66 Melanchthon's own review of the book was brief and to the point: "That book is plainly ridiculous."67 It seemed to have been written simply to punish the dead Longolius. A month later, Melanchthon responded to Camerarius's own critique with this insight: "To me that old, rigid moralist [censor] seems powerfully silly, and I hardly know whether the whole book may not have been written so that some witty saying of Longolius might be avenged."68 This violated the Attic law, cited by Demosthenes, not to speak ill of the dead. (In 1538, when Camerarius finally published his own refutation, Melanchthon expressed himself more cautiously on the subject of imitation, reserving it especially for schoolchildren.)69 This second, humanistic controversy serves as the correct background for Melanchthon's comments to Camerarius a year later that, following Camerarius's advice, he would no longer concern himself with Erasmus, whose theology was the real cause for the controversy over the Lord's Supper and who understood neither justification nor the authority of the magistrates.70 A new phase of the relation between Melanchthon and Erasmus began in 1530 at the Diet of Augsburg.71 Here several letters between Erasmus and Melanchthon reflect Melanchthon's attempts to get Erasmus to say something in favor of peace with the evangelicals, something the latter steadfastly refused to do. Only God could solve this disturbance, Erasmus wrote in the first of these letters, even if ten councils tried. A balanced approach to the issue only earned the label "Lutheranism."72 In a note to Francis Burckhard in Wittenberg written at the very time he received Erasmus's letter, Melanchthon turned Erasmus's final comment to his own advantage: "In the letter are included these most humane words, 'Whoever would publish something more balanced hears immediately "Lutheran." He receives no other reward.' I delight more in this judgment than in the conversation with some great Satrap [the emperor]."73 On 1 August 1530 Melanchthon wrote to Erasmus thanking him for a letter to the emperor, a letter that Erasmus in fact had never written.74 He pointedly admonished Erasmus that writing such a letter was the best way to put his wisdom and au
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thority to use, all the more ironic given the older man's actual silence. 75 He described the peaceloving Augsburg Confession in terms aimed at endearing the evangelicals to Erasmus.76 In this letter Melanchthon had no thought of endorsing Erasmus's theology nor even of Erasmus's endorsing the evangelicals' position. Instead, using a politically shrewd approach, Melanchthon thought he had discovered a way to tap into Erasmus's own desire for tranquillity by describing the evangelicals and the Augsburg Confession in terms matching Erasmus's desire for peace. In the three letters from Erasmus that followed, one written before the arrival of MBW 1004 and two written after, Erasmus denied having written to the emperor, insisted that he would maintain his neutrality despite the meager thanks he received, and lamented the fact that this controversy would lead to war.77 In the final letter he complained about the Zwinglians and Bucer as well.78 There is no trace of Melanchthon's response. In fact, it seems almost as if the first response from Melanchthon's pen came two years later in a letter written on 25 October 1532, when, as if to excuse a prolonged silence, he described his contentions and troubles over the past two years. He wrote that they were totally foreign to his nature (one of Melanchthon's favorite psychograms for himself, as has been demonstrated), and he spoke of the comfort Erasmus's letters gave him.79 His request to Erasmus, however, remained the same: to weigh in on the side of peace. Furthermore, he pointed to his recently edited commentary on Romans as an example of his opinion and attitude. As would be understood and approved by "the prudent" (doubtless he wanted Erasmus to include himself among such people), Melanchthon desired only to cut short many controversies and to illustrate in good faith those things necessary for godliness (pietas).80 Here Melanchthon provided his readers with a description of what might be called his hermeneutic of moderation, which was first mentioned earlier in the investigation of the Romans commentary. These comments demonstrate that the external circumstances of the 1530s themselves contributed greatly to Melanchthon's shift in how he expressed his theology. However, the very words he used to describe this moderate approach made clear that he himself did not conceive of it as a compromise with Erasmus's theology as much as an avoidance of controversy (hence his use in the 1534 Scholia of compromise language) in the service of true pietas. His was a pragmatic approach to theology: what served true righteousness; what comforted the afflicted; what benefited the church. Traces of this shift also appeared in the changing assessment of Erasmus's doctrine of justification. In 1522 Melanchthon had complained that Erasmus refused to express clearly his views on justification.81 In 1529 he intimated that Erasmus's views on justification and the magistrates were wrong.82 By 1533, however, he could write that at least Erasmus's position was better than that of George Witzel, an opponent of the evangelicals then preaching in Eisleben, because although Erasmus taught that a combination of faith and works justified, at least he understood faith in terms of trust in God's mercy.83 Two years later a crisis arose in Melanchthon's Friedenspolitik. Luther, egged on by Nicholas von Amsdorf's heated letter linking Erasmus's teaching to George Witzel (a connection Melanchthon had expressly denied the year before), and in part reacting to Erasmus's comments in his 1533 catechism and elsewhere, published
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an open letter bitterly attacking both Witzel and Erasmus. 84 Melanchthon reacted immediately. To Martin Bucer he expressed his sadness but concluded, "I see these things plainly to be necessary evils."85 In the same spirit he wrote to Camerarius, attributing to both Luther and Erasmus the condition of old age.86 Melanchthon may also have written a letter to Erasmus, urging him not to respond. In any case, Erasmus answered Melanchthon in a letter dated 6 October 1534, in which he hinted that he would not rise to Luther's bait.87 In the same letter he mentioned that he had purchased three copies of Melanchthon's commentary on Romans with the intention of giving copies to the bishop of Augsburg and to Jacopo Sadoleto, bishop of Carpentras. However, he delayed stating his own opinion of the work. In a separate letter to Sadoleto from around the same time, though, he stated his opinion in no uncertain terms. I have sent the Commentary of Melanchthon, not that you would imitate it (for he does not twist the Scripture anywhere more than where he professed a remarkable simplicity), but, since there are recorded there the varied opinions of many [exegetes], I knew your prudence would excerpt from there whatever would assist in understanding the Pauline mind.88
Erasmus proposed that Sadoleto use Melanchthon according to the rules of Erasmus's own consensus patristicus, as a kind of flawed Catena aurea of sources. No wonder he refused to share his opinion with Melanchthon! Erasmus attacked the commentary using as his criterion the very simplicity Melanchthon so cherished. Nowhere did the younger man more twist the Scripture than where he professed its clarity and simplicity! This struck at the heart of Melanchthon's own hermeneutic: the quest for simplicity and the avoidance of controversy through the use of dialectical and rhetorical techniques. The final exchange between these two men revealed the continuing suspicion with which Erasmus viewed his Wittenberg correspondent and the true nature of their reconciliation. On 12 May 1536 Melanchthon responded to a now lost letter from Erasmus.89 Apparently Erasmus had read the new edition of the Loci communes and suspected Melanchthon of attacking him without naming names. Erasmus felt censured (reprehendere) in an introductory section, where Melanchthon had detailed the difference between philosophy and Christian doctrine and had attacked skepticism.90 No wonder! In the Loci's preface to Henry VIII, Melanchthon had criticized Origen's On First Principles.91 In the introduction he condemned "some people who, in putting together theological loci, assemble only some things from moral philosophy."92On the basis of an overview of the entire Bible he argued that in order to understand the Scripture and arrive at a "certain and firm opinion," one had to distinguish between law and gospel. This meant that the "customs of the Academic Philosophers and Sceptics," who insisted on doubting all things or at least suspending assertions, had to be repudiated.93 Erasmus took exception to what he considered Melanchthon's indirect attacks and accused him of dissembling in the matter of the most recent controversy involving Luther.94 Melanchthon responded with the skill of a modern labor negotiator. He began by complimenting Erasmus for having brought his concerns directly to him.95 Although he wanted to allay Erasmus's suspicions, Melanchthon went on, he would
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not write a longa purgatio. 96 He appealed to Erasmus's better judgment, through which the latter would easily discover against whom he, Melanchthon, was writing in the Loci. He added a description (written in Greek) of his approach to theology in contrast to others in Wittenberg. "For I do not take pleasure in nor do I love the incorrect phraseology and vulgar paradoxes of the people from our side, and I am eager to speak mild words in most doctrines—not without risk!"97 This summarized Melanchthon's hermeneutic of moderation: an aversion to incorrect phrases (hence, a fondness for good dialectical distinctions), a distaste for paradox (because it contradicted his own method and left the reader confused), a love for mild words, and a conviction that this approach was risky. It certainly stood in marked contrast to Luther's own love of paradox and assertion. Melanchthon also insisted that it would have been unforgiveable for him to have taken less care with this edition than the last. Moreover, whatever he had toned down (mitigare) he did so not so as to censure anyone (as Erasmus had suspected), which was foreign to his nature, but for the sake of the unskilled.98 "I did not want to attack you at all . . . and you see that I have borrowed some things from you regarding the very distinction ofdogmas."99 With the final point Melanchthon could have had in mind changes in his locus on the free will, where he excised all discussion of predestination and contingency, but he could also have meant the loci method itself. He was not such a silly blusterer (a word from Erasmus's letter?) that he wanted more struggles, since such struggles brought about public discord and neither matched his personality nor benefited the church. Melanchthon had made both points before in his writings, and here he was using both for political ends. On the one hand, it does Melanchthon an injustice to read his professed hatred of conflict as a psychological weakness. He was involved in and had even caused enough conflict in his day. He framed comments about his psychological predisposition to place himself above the fray and, thus, in the higher world of the sure and certain statements of Scripture. On the other hand, for Melanchthon the study of such biblical statements best served the church. Here again the question of benefit was very much on Melanchthon's mind.100 Melanchthon himself indicated the link between these benefits and his quest for certainty in the very next sentence of his purgatio, where he answered directly the question of his statement about assertion. Here it becomes clear that despite any diiudicationes Melanchthon may have borrowed from Erasmus, the (Lutheran) insistence on assertion drove his entire theological method. In fact, Melanchthon even went so far as to put into Erasmus's mouth and before his eyes the heart of Wittenberg's evangelical doctrine. "Concerning the word 'sceptics,' you yourself see what I mean. In articles of faith, in promises and threats, I require firm assent [certam assensionem]—in which things you also require it."101 What Luther attempted to show by confrontation, Melanchthon tried to overcome by what is sometimes called cooptation. Threats and promises required certa assensio. Only if the dispute was extra scripturam could it be handled according to skeptical academic practices. Melanchthon again hastened to add that he could not see how this could possibly oppose Erasmus's own view. He summarized his approach this way: "I did this in order to indicate that uncertain and absurd opinions must not be applauded but that firm and useful teaching in morals and piety must be sought."102
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At the same time Melanchthon insisted that he did not want to become the author of new doctrine. Instead of defending the paradoxes of ''our people" (Luther), he wanted to bring together (colligere) the common teaching of religion (again a Ciceronian term) in the simplest way possible (simplicissime) In the face of such confusion of opinions, Melanchthon did not think his Loci to be an unuseful (non inutile) methodos seu summa for the outline of church doctrine. 103 Again his words reflected a defense of his approach to theology (colligere, methodos, summa) and its goals (simplicissime, non inutile) so that in fact he had not retreated in the least from the position outlined in the Loci communes. Melanchthon ended his purgatio with what he called (according to rhetorical practice) a deprecatio.104 He called on the testimony of others regarding his opinion of Erasmus. He stated his admiration for Erasmus's powerful mind, excellent teaching, and virtues. He claimed that his opinion coincided with Erasmus's in many controversies.105 Finally, he refused publicly to judge certain recent writings attacking Erasmus, because it was not his office and because such attacks were unuseful for the res publica. As if responding again to Erasmus's charges, Melanchthon concluded, "Nor have I lied about my judgment at all."106 Erasmus's response, one of the last letters he wrote, was swift.107 However, rather like certain kinds of modern book reviewers, who are unable to give unqualified approval to any book not written by themselves, Erasmus still managed to scatter some "black salt." To be sure, he reported that Melanchthon's letter had dissipated the "cloudlet" of suspicion, although his reading of the Loci had left him more surprised than indignant. He admitted that Luther's latest attack had fanned his mistrust108 but that Melanchthon's letter had diffused the situation. Reacting directly to Melanchthon's statements, Erasmus insisted that he did not disapprove of Melanchthon's method or of his moderation—a clear indication that Erasmus had read and understood Melanchthon's defense. Yet the now sickly man could not resist adding, "But since you have published the entire Loci, it was overly modest to keep it [this method] secret in the preface, but instead [it would have been better] to give the reader an explanation for why you thought some things had to be dealt with in a different way."109 Erasmus concluded by upbraiding Melanchthon in the form of a general admonition to anyone "who hands down the rules of the catholic faith." A great burden was placed on such a writer, for any inconsistency called into question his authority in all things, albeit chiefly in the opinion of perverse and less than candid judges.110 Thus, Erasmus managed to cast a shadow over Melanchthon's whole enterprise, especially over his quest for simplicity and clarity, by virtue of the inconsistent use of his own method of moderation. As he had done earlier with Luther, Erasmus attempted to refute Melanchthon's central point, that in threats and promises there was no room for uncertainty, by pointing out the uncertainty and inconsistency of the interpreter himself. Not content to leave it at that, Erasmus concluded with this devastating review of Melanchthon's work: "In your writings, in which many things please me exceedingly, now and then I desire a little more circumspection. For frequently you touch upon the headings of certain matters [capita rerum] so lightly that you would seem to neglect what might clearly occur to the reader."111 Erasmus's parting shot completely rejected Melanchthon's approach to theology. Erasmus dismissed Melanchthon's writings for their superficiality and lack of circumspection,
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that is, for a kind of Leisetreterei, a treading lightly—a charge later gnesioLutherans would also make. 112 Erasmus had placed his finger on a crucial weakness in what has here been called Melanchthon's developing hermeneutic of moderation: his readers were capable of asking the very questions Melanchthon wanted to avoid. Despite his best efforts Melanchthon could not end theological dispute and speculation by theological fiat. The limits of Scripture, the threat of reason's vain curiosity, and the benefits to the church were not enough either to satisfy every reader's craving for doctrinal explanations or, in the end, to provide adequate resources to refute reason's best arguments. For that a different kind of moderation and concord would be needed, such as that constructed by the Praeceptor Germaniae's very own students in the Formula of Concord a generation later. Melanchthon's correspondence up to Erasmus's death demonstrates the variety of the younger man's assessment of and relation to the older. In 1529 that relation had reached its lowest point, and Melanchthon no longer respected Erasmus's contribution to theology or good letters. With changes in the relations between evangelicals and their opponents in the 1530s, Melanchthon began a gradual reassessment of Erasmus's contributions with an eye toward convincing the older humanist to use his authority to weigh in on the side of peace. At the same time that Melanchthon was continuing to sharpen his understanding of justification, he was also broadening his assessment of Erasmus and others, as an example of moderation and keen judgment in the service of godliness and the church. After 1536: Not to Speak Ill of the Dead With Erasmus's death in 1536 Melanchthon began the process of reinserting the Dutch humanist into the history of the Reformation by creating a series of topoi to explain his life and work in service of the Reformation. To take these later statements as reflections of changes in Melanchthon's theology would completely misconstrue the role they played in Melanchthon's thought. They were exempla within Melanchthon's developing history of the church's return to the gospel and human beings' return to the sources. Erasmus's death transformed him into a cipher that Melanchthon could then decipher for his own historical and theological purposes. Erasmus, the Banned In 1538 a secret proposal for reformation of the church, written by a group of reform cardinals including Sadoleto and Contarini, came to light and was published first in Milan but then in translation in Wittenberg with Luther's preface and glosses.113 Among other things, the cardinals suggested that Erasmus's (in part) godless Colloquia should no longer be used in the schools.114 In a letter to Camerarius, Melanchthon, too, labeled the cardinals' book a joke, mentioned the attack on Erasmus, and mockingly called two of the bishops involved (Aleander and Sadoleto) "heroes." What could be hoped for? he asked. The whole thing was in God's lap.115 Two years later Melanchthon wrote to Luther during the colloquy at Worms about a Belgian edict banning the poet Eobanus Hessus's writings. Only the inter
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vention of Granvella had prevented Erasmus's writings from sharing the same fate. "Meanwhile 'our heroes' think that the authors of such edicts will be lavishing many [such] things on us. I commend us and our public cause to God and to your prayers." 116 In both instances the banning of Erasmus's books had direct consequences in Melanchthon's mind to the evangelicals' own position: the enemy of my enemy is my friend. In Praise of Luther If the attacks on Erasmus by the evangelicals' enemies moved him closer to Wittenberg's camp, so did Melanchthon's memory of his praise for Luther. This topos had several facets. During Luther's lifetime, Melanchthon had already recalled (or put into Erasmus's mouth) the Dutch humanist's compliment for Luther's biblical exegesis. The epistle dedicatory to Luther's commentary on Micah, addressed to Nicholas von Amsdorfand ghostwritten for Veit Dietrich by Melanchthon, mentioned that Erasmus, despite his distance from Luther's theology, had warned some wouldbe detractors of Luther not to censure the man, since "one page of his interpretation contained more solid scholarship and shed more light on the prophetic and apostolic teaching than the expositions of any other age."117 After Luther's death this praise became even more effusive, as demonstrated by Melanchthon's preface to the third volume of Luther's Latin works, published in 1549. "I know that Erasmus of Rotterdam was used to saying that not one of those whose writings are extant since the time of the Apostles was a more correct interpretation of all [the Scriptures]."118 In this same spirit Melanchthon was also capable of remembering Erasmus's moderating voice in support of the Lutheran cause, a position the native of Holland seemed loath to take during his lifetime. In lectures on Colossians delivered in 1556, he quoted Erasmus, now dead for twenty years, as having said that the mind is Christian and the stomach Lutheran.119 This cryptic reference, nowhere to be found in Erasmus's writings, was expanded by John Manlius, a student at Wittenberg in the 1550s, who described the saying this way. Erasmus was accustomed to saying, "I do not freely eat fish. For the stomach is Lutheran, and the mind is Christian." This is stated most beautifully, and there is a lovely ambiguity in the stomach, which word here is taken either for anger or indigation. He wanted to say, "I am no less angered by the wicked deeds of the Pope than Luther himself."120
Whether the explanation came from Melanchthon or Manlius is hard to say. Whatever the case, it clarifies not only the use Melanchthon made of the phrase but also the way Erasmus's statements (whether fact or fiction) served the Lutheran cause. In Melanchthon's eyes Erasmus was also capable of praising Luther's anger in another way. When late in his life Luther suddenly attacked the law faculty at Wittenberg, his anger reminded Melanchthon of his colleague's earlier outbursts against Erasmus and the Swiss.121Melanchthon went on to say how in these days he often called to mind that Erasmus had told good people (who approved of Luther's cause but demanded moderation), "In these times the church has not merited a gentler doctor." Erasmus had more or less said as much in, of all places, Hyperaspistes
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I. In the very first pages he defended his neutrality, comparing it to Gamaliel's. He wondered whether because of the corrupt morals of the time God might not have had to send such a severe doctor, who had to heal with amputation and cauterization what could no longer be fixed with medicines and plasters. 122 (Of course he went on to accuse Luther of abusing his goodwill, but that did not serve Melanchthon's point here.) This same saying of Erasmus also made an appearance in Melanchthon's funeral oration for Luther.123 Erasmus: Forerunner of the Reformation A third topos centered on Erasmus's contribution to the Reformation itself. The idea that Erasmus had helped the evangelical party was not new with Melanchthon. In 1529 he could already report to Jonas that Erasmus was fighting with some Spanish theologians and with Albert Pio, who had made him responsible for the "whole Lutheran tumult."124 Moreover, Melanchthon already had a similar topos into which he could now fit Erasmus, namely, the importance of good letters for the Reformation. This was a topos that, as we have already seen, Melanchthon had even used in his conflict with Erasmus. On 27 April 1536, shortly before Erasmus's death, Melanchthon held a declamation De philosophia, in which he again argued for the importance of philosophy (a term that included Melanchthon's own dialectics, physics, and psychology) in providing a proper method for theologians.125 As expected, Melanchthon also insisted on distinguishing theology from philosophy. Philosophy was not to be used to import into theology a lot of confusing sophistry and ambiguous theology. Without faith one was to be considered an unlearned theologian, under which rubric Melanchthon placed both the unlettered Anabaptists and those "who speechify magnificently but say nothing certain both because they are not accustomed to a proper method and because they do not hold enough to the sources of things." They either were completely blind to theology's contribution or limited it to theology's agreement with philosophy.126 It almost seemed as if Melanchthon were, among other things, further prosecuting a case against Erasmus laid out in the introduction to the 1535 Loci and already defended in the 1527 Dissertatio. After Erasmus's death Melanchthon could, without fear of contradiction, now describe the Dutch humanist's contribution in terms of this division. As was pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, Erasmus was the one who provided the text of the New Testament and the Fathers. Moreover, in line with Erasmus's alleged comment about his Lutheran stomach, Melanchthon's Erasmus could also agree with Luther on the matter of ceremonies. This inclusion of Erasmus in the service of the Reformation was nowhere more clearly stated than in Melanchthon's preface to the second volume of Luther's works, a volume that included texts from Luther's early controversies, including De servo arbitrio.127 Erasmus's writings helped Luther to study Greek and Latin and to abhor the barbarisms and sophistry of the monks. 128 Here, too, Melanchthon mentioned Erasmus's conversation with Frederick the Wise and especially his plea for moderation. Melanchthon used this comment to depict Luther's willingness, expressed to Cardinal Cajetan in Augsburg, to stop the dispute.129 He also emphasized that the
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guilt for these and later disputes lay with those who sowed errors in the church, not with Luther. 130 Among Luther's contributions? His teaching on repentance, forgiveness, and the consolation of the cross and his distinctions between law and gospel, between philosophy and the gospel, and between spiritual righteousness and political matters.131 Melanchthon concluded the preface by describing the church's history and its continual struggle with the "delusions of Origen," the theologian who had fatefully mixed philosophy with the gospel.132 As was the case when Luther and Erasmus were alive, Melanchthon allowed the Dutch humanist to play only a small, albeit significant, role in the Reformation drama. Despite the overwhelmingly positive things Melanchthon could still say about the deceased Erasmus, there was one instance where Melanchthon criticized the dead man. On 12 March 1543 he responded to an inquiry of Veit Dietrich, preacher in Nuremberg, regarding John the Baptist and the difference between his baptism and the baptism of Jesus.133 He rejected the (medieval) notion, Melanchthon wrote, that John's baptism was only ceremony without the substance, that is, without forgiveness of sin. And then, as if he had just recalled it, he added, "You remember the silliness of Erasmus, who wrote that John had conceded to war [in Luke 3], because he preached to the imperfect. Afterward, Christ gave to the more perfect the law of refraining from war. It is most absurd to think of John's vocation and ministry in this way."134 Indeed, Erasmus had said as much in every edition of his annotations to the New Testament, adding by 1527 an extended reference to Theophylact. 135 He insisted that John was preaching to the Gentiles and the most profane Jews, not to Christians. The very thing that divided Melanchthon and Erasmus in 1527 continued to divide them sixteen years later: a proper distinction between the two righteousnesses of God. The Origins of Melanchthon's "Erasmianism" This book has argued that Melanchthon, evangelical theologian and humanist, was no Erasmian and that especially in the late 1520s he staked out positions in biblical interpretation and theology that expressly contradicted Erasmus's own. The belief that Melanchthon was theologically dependent on Erasmus and eventually abandoned Luther for Erasmus (or, simply, for "humanism") has arisen out of a complex web of theological and historical presuppositions, many of which have been touched upon throughout this work. IntraLutheran debates that began during Melanchthon's lifetime, suspicions of forensic justification among the liberal theologians in Germany before World War I, suspicions of liberalism, and the identification of humanism with the Enlightenment among those influenced by Barth and the dialectical theology of the 1920s: all these things have played their part. This final section, however, will briefly examine two letters, written by Melanchthon's contemporaries to him, that stood at the beginning of this process. On 9 November 1556, Nicholas Gallus, a gnesioLutheran preacher locked in a battle with Melanchthon over the freedom of the will, attacked Melanchthon's position as having been gathered from Erasmus and Lombard, both of whom had argued that the free will could apply itself to grace.136 Gallus denied that he himself
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taught a Stoic necessity or mixed predestination into the discussion (arguing in such a way as to prove the influence of Melanchthon's method). However, he objected to Melanchthon's discussion in his third edition of the Loci, where he defined the free will as a faculty in human beings that applied itself to grace. "This definition, having been gathered from the works of Lombard and Erasmus, is worse than both." 137 He concluded that Melanchthon asserted, with Erasmus, the power of the free will apart from grace or, with Lombard, its power to apply itself to grace (the Word) with the help of grace. In any case, both positions were "against Scripture and the teaching of Luther in our churches."138 So Gallus's letter provided one of the earliest examples where Melanchthon was linked with Erasmus against Luther. Erasmus could attack the Loci in 1536 for being too Lutheran; Gallus could attack it in 1557 for being too Erasmian. A second letter furnishes a second kind of identification. Heinrich Bullinger, Ulrich Zwingli's successor in Zurich, wrote to Melanchthon to complain about his failure to take a stand in the controversy over the Lord's Supper.139 Here Bullinger warned Melanchthon that just as Erasmus's neutrality in the cause of the Reformation cost him everyone's respect, so Melanchthon's fencesitting would have the same result. This, of course, is the other famous charge against Melanchthon: Leisetreterei (treading lightly), something about which Erasmus himself had complained. There was, of course, some truth in both charges. This chapter has examined the shift in Melanchthon's theological position and its expression in the 1530s. He did develop what has been termed a hermeneutics of moderation in the years after the 1530 Diet of Augsburg in order to avoid speculation and to comfort the weak. However, the identification of these shifts with Erasmus misses the mark. At the core of Melanchthon's theology remained what he considered Luther's own most important contribution to the gospel: the distinctions between the two righteousnesses of God and between law and gospel. Melanchthon's willingness to defend that position against all comers led to the strange silence Bullinger complained about, and it led to the even stranger mixture of grace and free will—for the sake of comforting the conscience, that is, for sake of the gospel—to which Gallus objected. Whatever others may have seen of Erasmus in Melanchthon's later position, Melanchthon saw himself as remaining true to Wittenberg's gospel. What, then, can be said about Melanchthon's place in the Reformation and the Renaissance? For him there was never a conflict between his evangelical faith and his love for "good letters" and for the ancient sources, precisely because, like Luther, he built his theology around God's twofold righteousness. Champions of the Renaissance and its celebration of the human spirit then and now, whose theology rejects this very distinction, will always find Melanchthon's evangelical theology wanting and perhaps destructive to their insertion of human freedom into the realm of Christian righteousness. On the contrary, Melanchthon's commitment to evangelical theology forced him, especially in the Scholia, to take sides in the debate between Luther and Erasmus. Thus, his praise of Erasmus focused on the Dutch humanist's language skills, and his criticism centered on the older man's failure to distinguish human moral righteousness and freedom from God's gift of righteousness in Christ: a failure that not only undermined Erasmus's understanding of the gospel but also hampered his abil
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ity to articulate a Christian "politics." Later in Melanchthon's career, a different set of demands shifted the contours of his theology, but never to the point that he abandoned this fundamental distinction and the way—in his mind, at least—it clarified the separate fuctions of human endeavor and God's gracious work in Christ. The research here has affirmed that for Melanchthon's earlier positions, especially as reflected in the Scholia, Erasmus's theology provided not so much a measuring stick of their validity as an opposing pole, one against which Melanchthon developed his own unique theological voice—a voice that continues, especially through the Augsburg Confession, to speak to Christian theologians in the present.
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APPENDIX THE PRINTING HISTORY OF THE SCHOLIA
The Dissertatio. A1. PHILIPPI || MELANCHTHONIS IN || locum ad Colossenses: Videte ne quis uos || decipiat per philosophiam ina= || nem, dissertatio. || RECENS EDITA. || BASILEAE EXCVDE || bat Adamus Petrus, Mense Au || gusto, Anno || M.D. XXVII. || No woodcut, 8°. Colophon: BASILEAE APVD ADA || MVM PETRVM MEN || SE AVGVSTO. || ANNO || M. D. XXVII.|| [ [6] leaves + [2 blank] leaves, A iviii. a1,. Erklerung deB || spruchs Pauli zuo Co= || lossern. Seht das euch nie || mandt betrieg/durch die || vnnutze Phylosophey || durch Phylipp Me= || lancht zuo Latin || V darnach zuoll Teütscht ge= || bracht. || M. D. XXVII. || Woodcut, 4°, no colophon. [4] leaves. [According to VD 16: Wittenberg, Georg Rhau.] A2. CR 12:69196. a2. Robert Stupperich. Der unbekannte Melanchthon: Wirken und Denken des Praeceptor Germaniae in neuer Sicht. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1961. Pages 14652.
The Scholia of 1527. B1. SCHO || LIA IN EPISTO= || LAM PAVLI AD || COLOSSENSES || PHIL. MELANCH. || Haganoae per Ioan. Secerium || Anno M.D.XXVII. || Mense Augusto. || Woodcut, 8°. Colophon: Haganoae per Ioannem Secerium, II Anno M.D.XXVII. || Mense Septembri. || 69 + [3] leaves. Note: The preface has been reprinted in CR 1:87374 and MSA 4:21011 (MBW 547). b2. Außle= || gunge der || Epist. S. Pauli zu || den Colossern/ durch || Philips Melanch. || Marpurg. || M.D.XXVII. || Woodcut, 8°. Colophon: Ende der
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außlegungen Phlippi [sic] Me= || lanchthonis/vber die Epistel S. Pau || li/zun Colossern/ ynns deutsch bracht/ || Vnd gedrückt zu Marpurg || bey Johan Loersfelt/|| Anno. 1527 || 78 + [2] leaves. B2. OPERVM PHILIP= || PI MELANCTHONIS [sic] TOMI QVINQVE, || quorum Catalogos sequentes paginae || indicabunt. || [Herwagen's seal.] || BASILEAE || APVD IOAN. HERVAGIVM, || Anno M. D. XLI. || Five volumes, printed at the same time. Volume 2: SECVNDVS || TOMVS OPE= || RVM PHILIPPI ME || lanchtonis [sic] || [design] || 2°. Colophon [Vol. 5, p. 363]: BASILEAE, || ANNO M.D.XLI. MENSE || Augusto. || Note: The commentary is found on pp. 390340 [sic =440], that is, ll l v° pp 2 v°. B3. MSA 4:209303. be. Paul's Letter to the Colossians, trans. D. C. Parker. Sheffield: Almond Press, 1989.
The Scholia of 1528. C1. SCHO= || LIA IN EPISTO= || LAM PAVLI || ad Colossenses, re= || cognita ab || autore. || PHIL. MELANCH. || Woodcut, 8°. Colophon: IMPRESSVM VVITTEN= || BERGAE PER IO= || SEPHVM KLVGK. || 106 + [1+ 1 blank] leaves, numbered 116, 16, 1730, 3240, 4[1], 4248, 48, 4956, 55, 58, 57, 60, 59, 62, 61, 64100, 001, 1025. C2. SCHO= || LIA IN EPISTO= || LAM PAVLI || ad Colossenses, re= || cognita ab || autore. || PHIL. MELANCH. || 1528 || Woodcut, 8°. Colophon: IMPRESSVM VVITTEN= || BERGAE PER IO= || SEPHVM KLVGK || 106 + [1 + 1 blank] leaves, numbered 116, 16, 1730, 3240, 4[1], 4248, 48, 49100, 001, 1025. Note: The improvement in the numbering from 5664 and the addition of the date indicates that this printing followed C1 and did not precede it. C3. S PAV= || LI, AD COLOSSEN= || ses, Epistola, cum || commentarijs Philip || pi Melanchthonis, || iam ultimo ab ipso || multis in locis reco || gnitis atque locu|| pletatis. || Haganoae, An. M.D.XXIX. || Woodcut, 8°. Colophon: HAGANOAE, PER || Iohannem Secerium, Anno || M.D.XXIX. || [96] leaves. c. Die Epi= || stel S. Pauli zun || Colossern durch Philip || pum Melanchton [sic] ym la= || tein zum andern mal || ausgelegt. || Verdeudscht durch Justum || Jonam mit einer schönen vor || rhede Martini Luther || an die deudschen || leser. Gedruckt. || 1529 || Woodcut, 4°. Colophon: Hat gedruckt Michael Lotter. 1529. || [101 + 1 blank] leaves. Note: This translation also includes an afterword by Justus Jonas on translation, Bb iii r°. This letter is reprinted in Jonas BW 1:13940 (No. 158). For a history of the printings of Luther's preface, see WA 30,2:6469. C4 . EPISTO || LA PAVLI AD CO= || lossenses cum Comen [sic] || tarijs PHILIP. MEL. || quae iam nouissime ab || authore ipso recogni || ta sunt ac locuple= || tata, idque quam || plurimis in || locis. || Haganoae. Anno. M.D. || XXXIIII. Mense
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|| Augusto. || Woodcut, 8°. Colophon: HAGANOAE, PER VA= || LENTINVM KOBIA || NVM. ANNO. M.D. || XXXIIII. || [96] leaves. Note: Judging from the title and place of origin, this version is dependent on C3. C5. COM= || MENTARIA PHILIP. || MEL. in Epistolam Pau || li ad COL. iam nouissi || me recognita & lo || cupletata. || Cum indice copioso. || HALAE Sueuorum ex officina || Petri Frentz, impensis Petri || Brub[ach]. An. 1545.|| Woodcut, 8°. No colophon. 178 + [16] leaves. Note: Judging from the title, this version is dependent on C4. The substantially greater number of pages stems from the use of a much larger typeface.
The "Scholia" of 1534. D1. SCHO= || LIA IN EPISTO= || lam Pauli ad Colossenses || iterum ab authore re= || cognita. || PHIL. MEL. || M.D.XXXIIII. || Woodcut, 8°. Colophon: IMPRESSVM VITEBERGAE || PER IOSEPHVM CLVG. || 112 leaves. D2,. SCHO= || LIA IN EPISTO= || lam Pauli ad Colos= || senses iterum ab || autore reco= || gnita. || PHIL. MEL. || M.D.XLV. || Woodcut, 8°. Colophon: IMPRESSVM VITEBERGAE. || PER IOSEPHVM KLVG. || 112 leaves. Note: Differences between this printing and that from 1534 are slight. A comparison of several photocopied pages from this version, kindly supplied to the author by Stefan Rhein of the Melanchthonhaus in Bretten (M 160), and the 1534 version reveals that the woodcut is the same and that occasionally page headings differ, e.g., XI v° in 1534: "SCHOLIA PHILIP," and in 1545: "SCHOLIA PHILIP.". Leaf numbers have periods after the Roman numeral in 1534, not in 1545. Only on the break from CXI v° to CXII r° is there any change in the type, with the result that the words ''hi qui praesunt Ecclesijs" from CXI v° in the 1534 version is printed on CXII r° in 1545.
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Notes Preface 1. MBW 1882 (CR 3:33637). 2. Paulus ad exiguas quae misit scripta Colossas aspera nobilium quas tenet ora Phrygum; Exposui, ut rudibus sententia planior esset, et facilis fieret lectio, grata magis. Non ego praestigiis involvo sophismata coecis, namque pios non hoc ludere more decet. Non aliam sensit graviorem Ecclesia pestem, nec res ulla magis perniciosa fuit, Quam structae insidiae verbis confusaque dicta, turpiter et fuco dogmata inusta novo. Quare Doctrinam Christi sine fraudibus ullis explico, et ut prosim, maxima cura mihi est. Hic quoque collegi res vitae et moribus aptas, non igitur munus spernito, quaeso, meum.
Chapter 1 1. See Wilhelm Dilthey, "The Interpretation and Analysis of Man in the 15th and 16th Centuries," and Ernst Troeltsch, "Renaissance and Reformation," in The Reformation: Basic Interpretations, 2d ed., ed. Lewis Spitz (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1972), 1143. 2. Paul Oskar Kristeller, Renaissance Thought and Its Sources, ed. Michael Mooney (New York: Columbia University, 1979). Lewis Spitz, ed., The Religious Renaissance of German Humanists (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963); "The Third Generation of German Renaissance Humanists," in Spitz, The Reformation, 4459; and "The Course of German Humanism," in Itinerarium Italicum: The Profile of the Italian Renaissance in the Mirror of Its European Transformations, ed. Heiko A. Oberman and Thomas A. Brady Jr. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975), 371436. See also the subtle critique by Oberman in his introduction to the same volume, "Quoscunque tulit foecunda vetustas," xxviixxviii.
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3. James M. Kittelson, Wolfgang Capito: From Humanist to Reformer (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975). 4. Ibid., 238, 243. 5. Bernd Moeller, "Die deutsche Humanisten und die Anfänge der Reformation," Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte 14 (1965): 24657; English translation: "German Humanists and the Beginnings of the Reformation," in his Imperial Cities and the Reformation: Three Essays, ed. and trans. H. C. Erik Midelfort and U. Mark Edwards (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972; reprint, Durham, N.C.: Labyrinth, 1982), 1938. Note especially his rejection of Troeltsch on p. 21, n. 2. 6. Helmar Junghans, Der junge Luther und die Humanisten (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1985), and Maria Grossmann, Humanism in Wittenberg, 14851517 (Nieuwkoop: De Graaf, 1975). 7. For the following reconstruction see Erasmus NT 3:64850 and the Appendix. 8. Luther's translation (WABi 7:242) agrees and translates the Greek as mutterlich. 9. Erasmus referred to him throughout as a Maecenas, in honor of the Augustan knight who was patron for Horace and Vergil. He also mentions Henry of Bergen, bishop ofCambrai. and Lord Mountjoy (William Blouiit), who introduced Erasmus to the English primate. For their roles in Erasmus's life, see LéonE. Halkin, Erasmus: A Critical Biography, trans. John Tonkin (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 1213 and 3045. 10. Erasmus NT 3:555. "At deum immortalem quam non spem de se praebet, admodum etiam adolescens, ac pene puer, Philippus ille Melanchthon utraque literatura pene ex aequo suspiciendus? Quod inuentionis acumen? quae sermonis puritas? quanta reconditarum rerum memoria? quam uaria lectio? quam uerecunda regiaeque prorsus indolis festiuitas?" 11. CR 10:470 and SM 6/1:2021. (dated 20 August 1516). 12. MBW4 (T1:40,6). "Latina est, Erasmica est." Other early comments by Melanchthon also stressed Erasmus's rhetorical accomplishments, a compliment even Martin Luther willingly made. 13. See, for example, James Michael Weiss, "Melanchthon and the Heritage of Erasmus: Oratio de Puritate Doctrinae (1536) and Oratio de Erasmo Roterodamo (1557)," in Actes du Colloque International Érasme (Tours, 1986), ed. Jacques Chomarat et al. (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1990), 293306, and Robert Stupperich, "Erasmus und Melanchthon in ihren gemeinsamen Bestrebungen," in L'Humanisme Allemand (14801540), ed. Joel Lefebvre and JeanClaude Margolin, XVIIIe Colloque International de Tours (Limoges: Fink Verlag & Librairie Vrin, 1979), 40526. In their interpretations of Melanchthon's declamations on Erasmus, both scholars underemphasize this context. See the concluding chapter for a different approach to these documents. 14. Ernst Wolf, "Reformatorische Botschaft und Humanismus," in Studien zur Geschichte und Theologie der Reformation, ed. Luis Abramowski and J.F. Gerhard Goeters (NeukirchenVluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1969), 97119, here 100. 15. Ibid., 114. 16. Ekkehard Mühlenberg, "Humanistisches Bildungsprogramm und reformatorische Lehre beim jungen Melanchthon," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 65 (1968): 43144. 17. Hans Martin Müller, "Humanismus und reformatorisches Christentum," Kerygma und Dogma 21 (1975): 25776. According to Müller, Melanchthon used Luther's gospel as the basis for his understanding of the emendatio vitae, a humanistic principle. 18. Wilhelm Maurer, Der junge Melanchthon zwischen Humanismus und Reformation. 2 vols. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 196769). 19. Ibid., 2:27. 20. Ibid., 2:39.
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21. Ibid., 2:22329. 22. Ibid., 2:43545. See also 2:48189. Carl S. Meyer, "Christian Humanism and the Reformation: Erasmus and Melanchthon," Concordia Theological Monthly 41 (1970): 63747, is less interested to show the tension than Maurer is and insists upon, quoting Jean Boisset (Mélanchthon: Éducateur de l'Allemagne [Paris: Editions Seghers, 1967], 105), Melanchthon's "double amitié avec Erasme et avec Luther." 23. Bernd Moeller, "Philipp Melanchthon," in Luther kontrovers, ed. Hans Jürgen Schultz (Stuttgart and Berlin: KreuzVerlag, 1983), 198211. 24. Stupperich, "Erasmus und Melanchthon," 405. 25. Ibid., 409. 26. Ibid., 421, 423. 27. Siegfried Wiedenhofer, Formalstrukturen humanistischer und reformatorischer Theologie bei Philipp Melanchthon, 2 vols. (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1976). See the contrast between Wiedenhofer and Maurer given in John R. Schneider, Philip Melanchthon's Rhetorical Construal of Biblical Authority: Oratio Sacra (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990), 3036. For an assessment of Schneider's work see my review in Sixteenth Century Journal 25 (1994): 2023. 28. Wiedenhofer, Formalstrukturen, 1:111. 29. Ibid., 1:49296. 30. Paul O. Kristeller, Renaissance Thought and Its Sources, ed. Michael Mooney (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979). See Wengert 25. For a more critical assessment of Kristeller's work that may not always take seriously enough the historical bases for his approach, see Günther Frank, Die theologische Philosophie Philipp Melanchthons (14971560) (Leipzig: Benno, 1995), 4047. 31. See Junghans, Der junge Luther. 32. For a fuller list of these humanists, see Lewis Spitz, The Religious Renaissance. 33. Note Erasmus's mention of literatura, inuentionis acumen, sermonis puritas, reconditarum rerum memoria, or uaria lectio. These formed important aspects of the humanist's rhetorical ideal. 34. See Wiedenhofer, Formalstrukturen, 1:11314, for the references. He consistently mistakes these comments for agreement in theology. See the further discussion in chapter 2. As Junghans points out (Der junge Luther, 298), Melanchthon had already become acquainted with Luther's theology before arriving in Wittenberg. 35. See Schneider, Oratio Sacra, 3435, for a useful critique. Unfortunately, Schneider's reading of Maurer is incorrect. While Maurer (Der junge Melanchthon, 1:171206) does attribute a certain independence to Melanchthon regarding some aspects of the humanities, he insists later on dependence in theology. 36. Heinz Scheible, "Melanchthon zwischen Luther und Erasmus," in Renaissance Reformation: Gegensätze und Gemeinsamkeiten, ed. August Buck (Wolfenbüttel: Herzog August Bibliothek, 1984), 15580. 37. See MBW 7 (T1:4551). The preface is a tour de force of humanistic textual analysis and rhetorical style. 38. Cf. CR 20:699700. As Luther did with Augustine's theological language, Melanchthon sometimes recast humanist nostrums for evangelical use. 39. MBW 371 (T2:23941). 40. See Heiko Augustinus Oberman, Werden und Wertung der Reformation, 2d ed. (Tiibingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1979), 416, where he discusses "der Elfenbeinals Aussichtsturm." 41. See, for example, William S. Maltby, ed., Reformation Europe: A Guide to Research II (St. Louis: Center for Reformation Research, 1992), which includes no section on the history
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of biblical interpretation. Perhaps in its next edition this commenetary on Reformation studies will include studies of Reformation commentaries. 42. For the former, see my later criticisms of HansGeorg Geyer, Von der Geburt des wahren Menschen (NeukirchenVluyn: Neukirchener Verlag des Erziehungsvereins, 1965). 31681. For the latter, the author's previous work on Melanchthon may qualify. However. see also Wengert, 1322 for a discussion of other ways commentaries may be misused. 43. Exceptions from the Second International Colloquy on SixteenthCentury Exegesis (1982) include Guy Bedouelle, "The Consultations of the Universities and Scholars Concerning the 'Great Matter' of King Henry VIII," and Irena Backus, "Polemic, Exegetical Tradition, and Ontology," in The Bible in the Sixteenth Century, ed. David C. Steinmetz (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1990), 2136 and 167180, respectively. From the third colloquy, see, for example, Elsie McKee, "Calvin, Discipline and Exegesis: The Interpretation of Mt 18,17 and 1 Cor 5,1ff. in the Sixteenth Century," Giinther Wartenberg, ''Zum Kommentar des Alexander Alesius zum Johannesevangelium," and Ernst Koch, "Evangelienauslegung und Krisenbewältigung: Zur Funktion der lutherischen Postillenliteratur zwischen 1550 und 1600," in Théorie et pratique de l'exégèse: Actes du troisième colloque international sur l'histoire de l'exégèse biblique au XVIe siècle (Genève, 31 août2 septembre 1988) ed. Irena Backus and Francis Higman (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1990), 31928, 32842, and 35561, respectively. 44. There are annotations from 1522, an outline from 1529, and commentaries from 1532 (later edition: 1540) and 1556. The Loci communes of 1521 also traces its origins to commonplaces on Romans. See Timothy J. Wengert, "Philip Melanchthon's 1522 Annotations on Romanas and the Lutheran Origins of Rhetorical Criticism," in Biblical Interpretations in the Era of the Reformation, ed. Richard A. Muller and John L. Thompson (Grand Rapids Eerdmans, 1996), 11840. 45. For an explanation of Melanchthon's "loci method" see Wengert 12224 and the literature cited there. 46. A second controversy, against John Agricola of Eisleben over the meaning of penitence and the law, was also being prosecuted in the same commentary. Agricola's sermons on Colossians were published the same year as the first edition of Melanchthon's Scholia This will be the subject of a separate study, Law and Gospel: Philip Melanchthon's Debate with John Agricola of Eisleben over "Poenitentia" (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1997). 47. Here and elsewhere this term is used to designate Wittenberg's approach to theology in the 1520s, where it would be anachronistic to employ the term "Lutheran." 48. The hiatus in biblical lectures from the middle of 1523 until 1525 has been described by Wilhelm Maurer (Der junge Melanchthon, 2:41928) as a crisis in vocation. Instead, the sources indicate that Melanchthon's duties as rector in 1524 and the reforms of the university undertaken at that time led to the curtailment of his lectures in theology. See Heinz Scheible, "Melanchthons Bildungsprogramm," in Lebenslehren und Weltentwürfe im Übergang vom Mittelalter zur Neuzeit, ed. Hartmut Boockmann et al. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989), 23348. From 1526 on Melanchthon lectured on some part of the Bible, the Creed, or his own Loci communes almost without interruption until his death in 1560. See Hartfelder 77102 and Peter F. Barton, "Die exegetische Arbeit des jungen Melanchthon 1518/19 bis 1528/29: Probleme und Ansätze," ARG 54 (1963): 5289, esp. 8284. Barton describes the biblical lectures given during this time. 49. Other important works include his scholia on the book of Proverbs of 1529, his commentary on Romans from 1532 and, of course, the CA and Ap. He also began lectures on Aristotle during this time. 50. MSA 4:209303 and Philip Melanchthon, Der unbekannte Melanchthon: Wirken und Denken des Praeceptor Germaniae in neuer Sicht, ed. Robert Stupperich (Stuttgart:
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Kohlhammer, 1961), 14652. See also the translation of the Scholia into English: Philip Melanchthon, Paul's Letter to the Colossians, trans. D. C. Parker (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1989). 51. For an overview of the printing history of earlier commentaries by Melanchthon, see Wengert 25563. 52. Geyer, Von der Geburt, 31681. This chapter, entitled "In Poenitentia et Iustificatione," is flawed because the sources are not accurately dated. The 1545 text is a reprint of the 1534 edition, and many of the comments Geyer analyzes were written in 1528. Thus, the shifts in theology Geyer argues took place in eighteen years actually occurred in one. 53. For example, Maurer, Der junge Melanchthon, 2:48389. 54. Wengert 2554. 55. For a list of the printings referred to in the following sections, see the Appendix. 56. This according to VD 16: M 4197. 57. MSA 4:210. "Sed cum viderem futurum, ut vel me invito ederent alicubi, ut nunc fere fit, typographi, recognovi ea, quae in scholis dictaveram, quaedam etiam illustravi." Luther had earlier published his lectures on Romans and 1 and 2 Corinthians and on John. 58. See CR 12:69196 and MSA 4:230,7243,2. 59. In the Scholia (MSA 4:241,31242,3) the text reads: "Philosophia vero est doctrina vitae corporalis: sicut vides medicinam valetudini servire, mores civiles communi hominum tranquillitati et iudiciis exercendis: deinde alias artes aliorum usuum causa repertas esse. Geometrica metitur corpora, in emendo, vendendo, in aedificando. Arithmetica contractus et magnam partem societatis humanae gubernat." The Dissertatio reads: "Philosophia vero est doctrina vitae corporalis: sicut vides medicinam valetudini servire, nauigantibus discrimina tempestatum, mores civiles communi hominum tranquillitati" (emphasis added). 60. Dissertatio A5 v° (=MSA 4:242,812). "Ita diaeta ex medici praescripto, item tempestatum discrimina observare non iustificant. Item civiles mores, ut non gerere arma, ubi leges prohibent, aut vestire secundum leges, exigit Deus, neque tamem [sic] id iustificat coram Deo." The Scholia adds the word uti before ex and omits item in the first line. 61. MBW 598 (Bds. 511), dated around 2 October 1527. After promising to send Agricola copies of his commentary as soon as he received his own (he had only seen a friend's copy), Melanchthon concluded, "Desidero diligentiam in Secerio in multis locis eius editionis." 62. See Wengert 4348 for details of one of Melanchthon's previous publications, the Annotationes in Johannem. Setzer had taken over the offices of his fatherin law, Thomas Anshelm, who had earlier moved his business from Tiibingen, where Melanchthon had worked for him. 63. MBW 547 (CR 1:87374), dated Wittenberg, before 20 May 1527, and MBW 550 (CR 1:86768), dated Wittenberg, 20 May 1527. In the latter Melanchthon mentioned that he was sending a letter to Camerarius via Setzer. 64. Melanchthon made other mention of his Colossians commentary at this time. In MBW 597 (CR 1:89394), sent from Jena to Luther (in Wittenberg) and dated 2 October, he mentioned that he had handled the question of the free will in his commentary on Colossians. MBW 606 (CR 1:896), dated 19 October 1527, shows that Melanchthon's own copies of the book arrived no earlier than 16 October. "Mitto et Colossenses. Sero, inquies! Verum ego citius non potui. Nam bibliopola intra triduum proximum primum huc rediit." 65. Absent from this and every other edition of this commentary are comments both on the Haustafel of Col. 34 and on the eucharistic controversy. However, the text does reveal that Melanchthon understood the sessio ad dextram (Christ's exaltation to God's right hand) in ways similar to Luther, who unlike Ulrich Zwingli did not view the Ascension as excluding Christ's presence in the bread and wine of the Lord's Supper.
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66. Roth 6364 (No. 133). "Josephus [Klug] cupit transferri sibi e latino in germanum commentarium Philippi in Collossenses oravitque ut hoc ego praestarem." Why WA 30,2:64, n.2, imagines that Roth was going to translate it is hard to understand, since the word ego refers to Rörer, not to Roth. It could be that Rörer provided the translation of the excerpt of Melanchthon's work ("a"), which was presumably printed in 1527 by George Rhau in Wittenberg. 67. Scholia 1529, Bb iii r (=Jonas BW, 1:149). "Wo ich ynn dieser auslegung der Episteln zu den Colossern auffs genawest nür ein wort aus dem andern verdolmetschet hette, were sie ynn deudscher sprach tunckel vnd vnuerstentlich worden, welche doch ym latein auffs reynst vnd best gantz klar geschrieben." The notion that John Agricola translated this is the fiction of CR 15:1221, where the editor probably confused Agricola's translation of Melanchthon's annotations on Romans and 1 and 2 Corinthians and Agricola's own sermons on Colossians. 68. Roth 77 (No. 176). "Collosensium [sic] epistula per Philip nostrum enarrata sub incudem reuocata est, ad futuras nundinas locupletior in lucem prodibit." 69. Roth 79 (No. 181). "Librorum quos iam tibi mitto hic est Catalogus . . . j Enarrationes P. Melan in epistolam ad Col. XIIII bogen." WA 30,2:65, n.1, correctly states that this edition was printed on only thirteen and a half sheets. 70. Roth 9798 (No. 240). The argument for dating is as follows. Rörer wrote (p. 97), "Vis vt credam tabellario pro fl. exemplaria noui testamenti nuper excusa et nouissime emendata . . . sed haec exemplaria nondum absoluta sunt quae tu poscis . . . . Nolui itaque dare tabellario exemplaria noui testamenti superioris anni aestate in lucem aedita." A little later he continued, "Psalterium breui in lucem aedetur recognitum diligentissime a patre nostro Martino." The Luft edition of the "previous year'' was from 1527 (cf. WABi 6:xxiii. and the new edition of the Psalms appeared in 1528 (cf. WABi 10,2:xi). See also Georg Buchwald, ed., Zur Wittenberger Stadt und UniversitätsGeschichte in der Reformationszeit: Briefe aus Wittenberg an M. Stephan Roth in Zwickau (Leipzig: G. Wigand, 1893), 42 (No. 43), where Rörer referred directly to the printing of the Psalter by Luft in a letter dated 5 August 1528. There is also a larger portion of letter 240 (here, p. 6263, no. 70), where he wrote, "Philippus iam est Jene, in nuptiis M. Vitij." A footnote refers to Veit Amerbach, but see MBW 706 and 707, where Heinz Scheible identifies the Veit being married in Jena as Veit Ortel. The letter is thus to be dated around 1 September 1528. 71. Roth 98. "Philippus sub incudem reuocauit Epistolam Pauli ad Colossenses, cuius Epistolae Annotationes ab ipso anaaeditas recognoscit, auget quandoque, quandoque artauit." 72. MBW 720 (CR 1:1007), Melanchthon in Weimar to John Koch in Wittenberg on 2 November (1528). "Non enim est [Dialectica] diligentius excussa a Secerio, quamante annum Coloss. Secerius mea patientia inepte abutitur, et viderit, ut diu tolerare hanc tantam negligentiam possim." The first section reads: "Mitte mihi duos libellos Colossensium, quos iussi ligari istinc abiens." Melanchthon left Wittenberg on 15 October. 73. MBW 843 (CR 1:111112), Melanchthon in Wittenberg to Billicanus in Nördlingen, 1 December 1529. "De aliis locis christianae doctrinae quid sentiam, aperui in postrema editione commentarii ad Colossenses, ex quibus iudicium de me prorsus fieri potest: nec ego defugio Ecclesiae iudicium." 74. Scholia 1529, Bb iii r° (=Jonas BW 1:149). "Denn es kömpt offte, das man eins lateinischen worts rechte meynung, kaum mit vier odder funff deudschen worten reclit verdolmetschen kan, vnd bleibt dennoch mehr ym latein, denn ym deudschen geben ist" 75. Scholia 1529, Bb iii r°. "Derhalb, do ich solchs [translation], sonderlich an dem ort do der Philosophey gedacht wird, D. Philippo. Mel. meinem lieben herrn vnd freund angezeygt, hat er mir befolhen vnd frey macht geben etliche wort darzu zu setzen, domit etlich orte ynn deudscher sprach deste klerer weren vnd deste besser deudscher art hetten"
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76. Scholia 1529, Bb iii r°: "doch sperlich, und nyrgent anders denn wie der lateinischen wort sententz vnd meynung ist." 77. See Melanchthon's comments about his Loci communes to the newly ordained dean, Stephan Reich, on 5 July 1542 (MBW2999 [CR 4:834]): "Praeterquam enim quod D. Iustus Ionas in priore versione multa negligenter reddiderit, quae a me ipso iam maiori cum diligentia recognita sunt." 78. WA 30,2:6869. "Doch wird dis biichlin, ob Gott wil, wol komen, da es ehre und lob, lieb und danck finden wird, den ein gut wort find eine gute stet und Gotts wort feret nicht umb sonst aus, kompt auch nicht leer widder [Isa. 55:11]. .. den selbigen stillen frumen hertzen sol dis biichlin befolhen sein, die sollen yhr paradis drynn haben und yhren lieben HERRN Christum drynnen angezeigt und furgestellet finden als den rechten bawm des lebens." Chapter 2 1. MBW 4 (T1:40,6). The letter was written in August or September 1514. 2. For an introduction to Melanchthon's three works on rhetoric, see most recently Joachim Knape, Philipp Melanchthons 'Rhetorik' (Tiibingen: Max Niemeyer, 1993), 160. 3. MBW 40 (T1:101,4347) 4. Not a surprising reference, given that Melanchthon had worked on the socalled Dunkelmännerbriefe for Thomas Anshelm, a book that made fun of Reuchlin's detractors in the dispute over the Kabbala. 5. This last sentence was carefully deleted from the Paris printings of 1527 and 1529. 6. MBW47 (T1:111,1721), dated around 27 March 1519. At nearly the same time Luther wrote his first letter to Erasmus (WABr 1:36163; =Allen Ep. 933, dated 28 March 1519). 7. MBW 159 (T1:33132, esp. 332,1416), dated 10 August 1521. 8. MBW 4277 (CR 6:161). As I mentioned in chapter 1, James Michael Weiss simply reads too much into comments such as these. 9. MBW 38 (T1:9597; Allen Ep. 910), dated 5 or 9 January 1519. 10. Cf. WABr 1:29597, a letter from Luther to John Eck written from Leipzig on 7 January. 11. Allen Ep. 911. Mosellanus (Peter Schade) was rector in the following year and delivered the opening address at the Leipzig debates. See Peter G. Bietenholz and Thomas B. Deutscher, eds., Contemporaries of Erasmus: A Biographical Register of the Renaissance and Reformation, 3 vols. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 198587), 2:46667. 12. MBW 57 (T1:129,1820), dated 17 May 1519. Melanchthon wrote to Capito, then preacher in Basel and worker at Froben's press, in an attempt to win him to Wittenberg's side. Erasmus's letter is printed in Allen Ep. 939, dated from Antwerp on 14 April. More detailed information concerning the contemporary printed versions of Ep. 939 comes from WA 2:157. Here Erasmus's neutrality (he claimed not to have read Luther's works but to view Luther as above moral reproach) worked to Wittenberg's advantage. 13. MBW 58 (T1:130,46), dated 21 May 1519. He gave glory to God that Erasmus commended Elector Frederick's virtues and that he gave "causae Martini non gergarium aut, ut iurisconsulti dicunt, suffragatorem 'pedarium."' (Compare Erasmus's Adagia 1,10,79 [=LB 2:390EF].) 14. Cf. MBW 63 (T1:14647), a letter to George Spalatin dated around 11 August 1519. 15. MBW 65 (Tl:149,1820), dated August 1519. "Porro id unum Martinus semper spectavit, ut, deliriis quorundam reiectis, sacras literas pure tractares, atque ad id post Erasmum unus omnium maxime condendit." The irony of praising Erasmus in Luther's commentary on Galatians would not have escaped the sixteenthcentury reader.
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16. LB 10:125455 (AS 4:230). He referred to the author as "Commodus Brittanus" and perhaps was not aware of Melanchthon's authorship. 17. Allen Ep. 1033, dated 19 October 1519. For a much more sophisticated analysis of Erasmus's changing position toward Wittenberg, see Heinz Holeczek, "Erasmus' Stellung zur Reformation: Studia humanitatis und Kirchenreform," in RenaissanceReformation: Gegensätze und Gemeinsamkeiten, ed. August Buch (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1984), 13153. Holeczek calls the period between 1519and 1521 Erasmus's "early phase," in which he tried to work to protect Luther from enemies similar to his own. 18. WABr 1:36163 (=Allen Ep. 933) and WABr 1:41014 (=Allen Ep. 980), dated 30 May 1519 19. Allen Ep. 1033,5558. "Haec quidam stultissimi sic interpretati sunt quasi Luthero fauerem: . . . Ego Lutheri nec accusator sum nec patronus nec reus." 20. MBW 4277 (CR 6:163). 21. MBW 97 (T1:21618; Allen Ep. 1113), dated shortly before 21 June 1520. 22. MBW 100 (T1:221,1617), dated 14 July 1520. 23. MBW 97 (T1:216,1416). 24. MBW 164 (T1:33839). The earlier letter, MBW 159, bore the date 10 August 1521 25. MBW 163 (T1:33738). The letter from Erasmus to Louis Ber in Basel was dated 14 May 1521 (Allen Ep. 1203). 26. WA 7:16182, WA 6:497573, and WA 7:94151, respectively. 27. Allen Ep. 1203,2627. The double meaning of seruari was doubtless intended. Cf. CWE 8:212, where it is translated "kept alive." 28. MBW 179 (T1:382,2224). 29. MBW 191 (T1:41415), dated 26/27 December 1521 and reacting to a letter of Conrad Pellikan from 30 November 1521. 30. For just one example, see the expanded comments in the revised edition of the Loci communes theologici, printed in 1522, on "De libero arbitrio," in Die Loci Communes in ihrer Urgestalt, 2d ed., ed. G. L. Plitt and T. Kolde (Erlangen and Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1890), 7883. Luther made similar distinctions in On Secular Authority (WA 11:24581) and To the City Councilmen in Germany (WA 15:2753). 31. MBW 341 (T2:169,2526; Allen Ep. 1496), dated 6 September 1524. See chapter 5. 32. CR 20:699700. For the 1522 publication of this piece along with some other writings of Luther and Melanchthon, see MBW 124 (T1:25256). 33. MBW 46 (T1:l09,710). The Ratio was first published in January 1519 by Froben (Bezzel, no. 1688) and is printed in LB 5:75138 (AS 3:117495). 34. For the text see Ulrich von Hutten, Schriften, ed. Eduard Böcking, 7 vols. (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 185969), 2:180248. For a description of the affair from von Hutten's point of view, see the still unsurpassed work of Hajo Holborn, Ulrich von Hutten, 2d ed., trans. C. Tecklenburg Johns (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1968), 16880. In short order von Hutten accused Erasmus of snubbing him in Basel (2:18082), of toadying to the pope (2:18687, 219 and passim), of lacking all faith (e.g., 2:205), of acting duplicitously in the Reuchlin affair and with Luther (throughout), and of falsely accusing Luther of arrogance (2:221). 35. MBW 279 (T2:71,1920). 36. MBW 287 (T2:83), dated 23 August 1523. Cf. MBW 286 (T2:8182), a letter to Jerome Baumgartner, dated between 15 and 20 August, where Melanchthon called von Hutten a sycophant. 37. MBW 288 (T2:8384), dated 24 August 1523. Ülin was a coworker of Michael Hummelberg. 38. MBW 289 (T2:85), dated the end of August 1523. The quote is from Terence, Andria 1,1,137 (164).
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39. See MBW 292 (T2:9091), dated 8 September 1523. In the same month Erasmus's Spongia adversus aspergines Hutteni (Bezzel no. 1804; ASD 9/1:91210) appeared. Cf. MBW 341 (T2:168,8). Here Erasmus replied point for point to von Hutten's arguments and reiterated his fear of rebellion and his reasons for rejecting Luther's pugnacity. A response by Erasmus Alber to the Spongia, entitled ludicium de Spongia Erasmi Roterodami, also received nothing but Melanchthon's contempt. See MBW 339 (T2:165,1114), dated August or later in 1524. 40. MBW 319 (T2:127,1114), dated around 16 April 1524 Erasmus's response to Melanchthon will form the basis of chapter 5. 41. MBW 332 (T2:14649). 42. ASD 2/5:112, no. 2110 (=LB 2:748BD). 43. ASD 2/5:112, 19091. 44. MBW 332 (T2:148,4749). Chapter 3 1. C 204b Helmst.2°: NOVVM TESTA|| MENTVM IAM QVINTVM ACCVRA || tissima cura recognitum a DES. ERASMO ROTER. || cum Annotationibus eiudem ita locupletatis ut propemodum opus nouum uideri possit. || FRO [Seal] BEN. || . . . . .|| BASILEAE ANNO M D XXXV || Cum priuilegio Caesareae maiestatis in annos quatuor. || with "Joan. Sutellius" at the very top of the title page, the words "Gottingen: Anno 1535" at the bottom right and a citation of Acts 4:29 in Erasmus's translation under the title. The author is particularly indebted to Dale Schrag and Erika Rummel for having discovered this book while working on a catalog of the Erasmiana found in Wolfenbüttel's Herzog August Bibliothek. 2. Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie 37:19697. See also Robert Stupperich, Reformatorenlexikon (Güttersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1984). The collection in Wolfenbüttel also contains other books from Sutel's library. C 83.4° Helmst.: In lesaiam Prophetam HYPOMNEMATWN (1525) and In Hieremiam Prophetam Commentariorum (1533), containing in the front inside cover the words "Anno 1534, Gottingen" and on the title page of the first work Sutel's name and a quotation of Acts 4:29 in Erasmus's translation. C 105.4° Helmst.: In Danielem Prephetam . . . libri duo (1530) and In postremos tres prophetas . . . Commentarius (1527), containing the words "Anno 1533, Gottingen" on the inside cover and Sutel's name and Acts 4:29 on the title page of the first book. A third volume, H 402.4° Helmst., contains a variety of pamphlets on Anabaptists, including Melanchthon's Verlegung etlicher unchristlicher Artikel welche die Widerteuffer furgeben (1536); Rhegius's Widderlegung der Munsterischen . . . bekentnus (1535); the anonymous Bericht aub der heyligen geschrift, defending Münsterite beliefs (1534); Bucer's Handlung inn dem . . . gesprech gegen Melchior Hoffman (1533); Oecolampadius's Underrichtung von dem Widertauff(1527) and Bucer's Von kirchen gütern (1540), with an index in Sutel's hand in the front cover and his name and Acts 4:29 on the first title page. D 130b.8° Helmst. and H 1134° Helmst. (1) may also be parts of the same library. I am indebted to Ulrich Kopp, librarian at the Herzog August Bibliothek, for many of these details. 3. Erasmus NT 1:21821 (LB 6:33537). See also C. A. L. Joirrot, "Erasmus' In Principio Erat Sermo: A Controversial Translation," Studies in Philosophy 61 (1964): 3540, and Erika Rummel, Erasmus and His Catholic Critics (Nieuwkoop: De Graaf, 1989). 4. See Wengert 55140. 5. Wengert 12434. This was something of an exception. For lectures on Romans and 1 and 2 Corinthians he employed Erasmus's text. 6. For Erasmus: LB 6:88398. For the Vulgate, Novum Testamentum Latine, ed. Eberhard Nestle, 11th ed. (Stuttgart: Württembergische Bibelanstalt, 1971).
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7. Cf Erasmus NT 3:639 (LB 6:890), where Erasmus in contrast complained about Augustine's rendering as "Graecam vocem fidelius quam elegantius exprimens." 8. MSA 4:229,3334. "Vocat autem probabilem rationem, non ut quidam inepti interpretantur ornatum orationis." 9. Scholia 1528, 22 r°. "Porro hic iubet [Paulus] Christianos cauere ne probabilem rationem decipiantur. Quidam inepti intellexerunt hic ornatum orationis, sed longe alia mens est Pauli, cum enim doctrina Christiana dissentiat a ratione, iubet nos cauere, ne decipiamur argumentis a ratione sumptis. Et vocabulum , quo hic usus Apostolus, significat non ornatum orationis seu elocutionem, sed callide & verisimiliter cogitata argumenta. Saepe enim ea uoce Graeci Rhetores in earn significationem utuntur." Erasmus's annotations to the New Testament talked of persuasive oration and his paraphrase to the New Testament read "sed in speciem probabili ac verisimili." Melanchthon's true opponent was not only medieval interpreters but also John Agricola. 10. Erasmus NT 3:637 (LB 6:888), where persuasibilitas is a neologism. Both Erasmus and Melanchthon assumed that they were reading a genuine Ambrose text. That text is PL 17:428: "[Q]uia sapientes mundi arte quadam et minutiis disputationum irretive gestiunt simplicium animos." Erasmus even suggested that Ambrose was reading a different word in the Greek. Despite this clear rejection in the annotations to the New Testament, Erasmus was more generous in the paraphrase to Colossians (LB 7:1009). He began, "[N]e quis humanis artibus instructus adversus Euangelicae doctrinae simplicitatem, fucum vobis faciat, & imponat falso sermone, sed in speciem probabili ac verisimili." (In the 1522 annotations he had remarked that Augustine had translated the phrase "in verisimili sermone.'') But he concluded more along the Scholia's lines, "Solent enim hujus mundi Sophistae captiunculis quibusdam, & argutiis rationum humanarum, animos simplicium illaqueare." Note here Erasmus's penchant for blending a variety of patristic interpretations into his paraphrase. 11. WABi 7:230. The 1530 text returned to "mit vernünfftigen Reden" but added the gloss "Die der vernunfft gemes vnd eben sind, als die lere von wercken etc." Comparing the fourteen places where Melanchthon's Latin translation agreed with neither Erasmus nor the Vulgate to the German reveals six texts that show direct agreement with the German, three that are indistinguishable in translation, and five where the German agreed with the Vulgate, Erasmus or both over against Melanchthon. 12. "Quae [doctrinae hominum] sunt rationem quidem habentia sapientiae in superstitione, et humilitate, et non ad parcendum corpori, non in honore aliquo ad saturitatem carnis. 13. LB 6:894. "Quae [doctrinae hominum] verbotenus quidem habent speciem sapientiae per superstitionem ac humilitatem animi & laesionem corporis, non per honorem aliquem, ad expletionem carnis." 14. Erasmus NT 3:643 (LB 6:893). This rejection of fasting got Erasmus into hot water with his conservative critics, including Josse Clichtove and Alberto Pio, who suspected him of harboring Lutheran ideas. See Erika Rummel's excellent monograph, Erasmus's 'Annotations' on the New Testament: From Philologist to Theologian (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), 14652. 15. MSA 4:260,2226. "Scio alios varie exposuisse postremam particulam 'ad expletionem carnis,' sed mihi placet Hieronymi sententia, qui sic interpretatur: quantum satis est, et Paulum ait iubere tribui corpori, quantum satis sit." This verse will be the focus of chapter 7, where it will become clear that Melanchthon's rejection of Erasmus's ethical reading had important consequences for their theological and exegetical debate. 16. For the most part these questions arose already in the Scholia of 1527. Little textual analysis was added in 1528 and none at all in 1534, but neither was this material excised from the later editions.
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17. MSA 4:257,1417 and Erasmus NT 3:642 (LB 6:892). This particular point was widespread in the exegetical tradition, with the exception of Ambrose. See Rummel, Erasmus's 'Annotations', 15152, for the way Erasmus answered his conservative critics. 18. MSA 4:259,2024 and Erasmus NT 3:642 (LB 6:893). 19. Erasmus NT 3:643 (LB 6:894). "Humilitas sensus magis in vitiam sonat: quemadmodum abjectus animo. Etiamsi Graeca vox plus quiddam significat, quam modestia. Modestus enim est qui non est arrogans: at , qui minus sibi tribuit quam promeretur." In MSA 4:291,31292,5 Melanchthon commented, "Superbi sunt, qui quasdam suas dotes se habere vident, . . . sed has dotes existimant maiores esse, quam re ipsa sint, deinde his dotibus confidunt et contemnunt ceteros prae se. Contra veram humilitatem verus timor Dei parit, is facit, ut agnoscamus quidem nos aliquas cotes, sed Dei beneficio habere." 20. MSA 4:257,31258,1: "non est accipiendum de malo usu, ne quis suspicetur Paulum velle dicere turn demum cibos non iustificare, si abutamur: iustificare vero, si utiliter utamur. Item hoc vult cibos non iustificare, cum utiliter et rite utimur, et vocat consumi cottidiano usu." 21. Erasmus NT 3:642 (LB 6:892). "[N]on igitur sic accipiendum est, quasi Paulus prohibeat tangi gustarive quippiam, sed reprehendit eorum supercilium, qui haec magno fastu prohibebant." Erasmus knew of an interpretation similar to Melanchthon's in Ambrosiaster, which he rejected. "Et tamen Ambrosius ita interpretatur, quasi Paulus his uerbis deterreat ab omni spe mundanorum, mea sententia non satis attente, quod quidem cum tanti uiri pace dictum sit." 22. MSA 4:249,11250,31. The text reads: "Blotting out the chirographum of the dogmata against us, which was against us . . . nailing it to the cross." 23. WABi 7:230. "(handschrifft) Nichts is ßo hartt widder vnns, als vnser evgen gewissen, damit wir als mit eygener handschrifft vbertzeuget werden, wenn das gesetz vns die sund offinbart, da mit wyr solche handschrifft geschrieben haben. Aber Christus erloBet vns von solchem allem durch seyn creutz, vnd mattet auch den teuffel mit der sunden etc." 24. Erasmus NT 3:638 (LB 6:889). "Graeci codices ita distinguunt, ut accipias chirographum deletum, quod erat nobis contrarium per decreta Legis Mosaicae, sive per decreta Legis divinae. . . . Theophylactus interpretatur, chirographum professionis Mosaicae, sublatum & antiquatum decreto Evangelicae." By 1535 he admitted that this was also the opinion of Chrysostom (PG 17:430) and that both exegetes also allowed that the word chirographum could also have meant "original sin." Ambrosiaster (PL 17:430) also connected this text to the sin of Adam. 25. Erasmus NT 3:63839 (LB 6:889). "Nec otiosum est in emphasi vocum philosophari praesertim in scriptis beati Pauli, cujus oratio schematibus ac tropis undique scatet." 26. Erasmus NT 3:639 (LB 6:890). "Mihi tamen coactius videtur, quod 'dogmata' interpretantur fidem, quum in eo sensu nusquam legatur dogma ab Apostolis usurpatum: quin in hoc ipso capite prosequutus quod agit de vitandis Judaeorum praescriptionibus, dicit eos, qui vel praescribunt externa, vel hujusmodi praescriptis urgentur ad superstitionem, 'Ne tetigaritis, neque gustaveritis, neque contrectaveritis.' Unde probabilius videtur observanti sermonis hujus tenorem, hic dogmata dici praescripta Judaica, quorum caput erat circumsio." It is not clear to what the term scholiastes referred, although one might be tempted to link it to the author of the Scholia itself. 27. See MBW 38 (T1:95) for the bibliographic information. This printing is Bezzel no. 1017. Portions of this part of chapter 3 were originally delivered at a colloquium of the Herzog August Bibliothek, Wolfenbüttel, Germany, in a different form, as "'Qui vigilantissimis oculis veterum omnium commentarios excusserit': Philip Melanchthon's Patristic Exegesis."
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28. MBW 38 (T1:9597; Allen Ep. 910). This letter, written from Leipzig, was accompanied by a longer letter by Peter Mosellanus who recommended Melanchthon in a closing postscript. See Allen Ep. 911. 29. CWE 6:221,19 translates
as "farfetched."
30. MBW 38 (T1:97,2223; Allen Ep. 910). "Martinus Luther, studiosissimus nominis tui, per omnia tibi probari cupit." CWE 6:221,2830 reads, "Martin Luther, who is a keen supporter of your reputation, desires your good opinion at all points." This attitude also permeates Peter Mosellanus's letter, written at the same time. 31. MBW 53 (T1:11921; =Allen Ep. 947). 32. According to CWE 10:308, n. 3, perhaps Eobannus Hessus. 33. MBW 53 (T1:120,810; Allen Ep. 947), dated 22 April 1519. The text reads, "[D]e qua nemo facile pronunciabit, nisi qui vigilantissimis oculis veterum omnium commentarios excusserit." CWE 6:308 translates: "for no one will easily pronounce on that who has not been through all the ancient commentators with his eyes well and truly open." In the remainder of his rejoinder Erasmus insisted that freedom of thought must be tempered by correctness not the other way around. He also chided Melanchthon for a lack of fairness and for breaking the solidarity of those who had to ward off attacks on the humanities. In the midst of a paeon of praise for Melanchthon's inaugural lecture, he criticized his younger correspondent for spending too much time attacking opponents of the humanities rather than exalting the humanities themselves. His closing remarks about Luther (even Erasmus understood what the real point of Melanchthon's letter was!) were typically moralistic. No one was complaining about Luther's life; his theology drew mixed reviews. Erasmus had not yet read Luther's writings (a probable prevarication to distance himself from Luther's case and from the necessity of taking sides). He only hoped that the Elector Frederick was pleased with his Lives of the Caesars, which Erasmus had dedicated to him. 34. Eck used Erasmus's letter in his attack against Melanchthon's report of the Leipzig debates, and the latter answered in turn. 35. See Richard Auernheimer and Frank Baron, eds., Johannes Trithemius: Humanismus und Magie im vorreformatorischen Deutschland (Munich and Vienna: Profil, 1991). 36. For this argument, see Peter Fraenkel, Testimonia Patrum: The Function of the Patristic Argument in the Theology of Philip Melanchthon (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1961), 25560. 37. Erasmus employed this same kind of argument against Luther in the Hyperaspistes I, one of the major targets of the Scholia. There the Dutch humanist wrote (LB 10:1283 [AS 4:390]), "[I]n quarum [Scripturarum] interpretatione malo sequi sententiam tot Orthodoxorum et Ecclesiae, quam tuam unius et paucorum tibi juratorum." See also LB 10:129102 and 12991304 (AS 4:43438 and 474504). 38. See Fraenkel 30710, reporting on the description by Joachim Camerarius in the first biography of Melanchthon, De vita Philippi Melanthonis Narratio. 39. E. P. Meijering, Melanchthon and Patristic Thought: The Doctrines of Christ and Grace, the Trinity and the Creation (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1983). 40. Ibid., 108 (emphasis added). His reference to Fraenkel, Testimonium Patrum, 1004, contradicts Fraenkel's argument about Melanchthon. One should be careful not to reduce Melanchthon's understanding of church history to a gradual corruption of the church over time until the Reformation. 41. For example, he gives no reasons why Melanchthon should criticize Peter Lombard for claiming that Christ is mediator only according to his human nature (viz., because of the Osiandrian controversy), or why a discussion of the communicatio idiomatum would figure so heavily in Melanchthon's later writings (viz., because of disputes over the Lord's Supper
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after Luther's death). See Meijering, Melanchthon and Patristic Thought, 100 and 11213, respectively. 42. Hansjörg Sick, Melanchthon als Ausleger des Alten Testaments (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1959), 13141, where he compares the Psalm interpretations of Melanchthon, Augustine, and Erasmus and their respective usage of Tychonius's rules. 43. MSA 4:276,1415 44. See Wengert 6566, for the discussion of Theophylact in Melanchthon's letters and his use in interpreting the Gospel of John. In the case of Colossians, as Erasmus also recognized in his 1535 annotations on Col. 2:1314. (Erasmus NT3:638 [LB 6:889]) and elsewhere, Theophylact followed Chrysostom. 45. For an example from the Annotationes in Johannem, see Wengert 7779 and 147. 46. MSA 4:245,19246,15. Col. 2:9 reads: "Quoniam in illo inhabitat omnis plenitudo deitatis corporaliter." 47. An examination of the commentary on Paul by Faber Stapulensis turned up no such parallels. 48. Scholia 1528, 28r°, added to Scholia 1527 (MSA 4:237,11). "Saepe propter inscitiam linguarum hallucinati sunt in enarranda scriptura Thomas, Hugo, & Lyranus & alii similes." See also chapter 6. Erasmus also criticized medieval exegesis, as will be discussed in chapter 4. 49. Thomas 21,2:14445 (ca. 2, lec. 2, par. 96) and Hugh VII:F 3r° and Lyra VI:1 06r°. 50. Chrysostom (PG 62:339) on this text argued that this indwelling should be connected not with the Father or the church but instead with believers themselves: "Quid ergo illud est? Quia nihil minus habetis quam ille: sicut in illo habitavit, ita etiam in vobis." Ambrosiaster (PL 17:429) interpreted the text more clearly in christological terms: "In quo perfectio divinitatis est. Omnia enim quae habet Pater, dedit Filio, cum illum in plenitudinis genuit divinitate corporaliter; ut quia ipse caput est, creatura autem ejus corpus est." 51. Scholia 1528, 38v°. "Ego sic intelligo Paulum." In 1527 the line read "Sed ego etiam sic intelligo." 52. Scholia 1528, 39r°. 53. Glossa ordinaria, to Col. 2:9. "Corporaliter: Non quia corporeus sit deus: sed verbo translato vsus est: quia in templo manufacto non corporaliter sed vmbratiliter habitauit, i[d est], praefigurantibus signis. . . . Corporaliter, i[d est], completiue vt sit corpus et impletio vmbrarum legis." The gloss also included other possible interpretations. 54. PL 33:64041 (Ep. CXLIX.26, ad Paulinum). "Ideo corporaliter dixit, quia illi umbratiliter seducebant; translato verbo usus, sicut etiam umbrae nomen in his rebus non est utique verbum proprium, sed quadam similitudinis ratione translatum." In sixteenthcentury collections, this is letter 59. 55. PG 124:1239. "Corporaliter: hoc est, non operatio quaedam, verum substantia, ac veluti incorporatus et una hypostasis exsistens cum assumpto." He also cited the position of Cyril of Alexandria to the effect that this text proved that Jesus' divinity did not forsake Jesus' body in the tomb the way his (human) soul did at death. 56. LB 7:1010: "in eo [Christo] perseverat atque inhabitat omnes plenitudo Deitatis corporaliter, ut hunc habentes, non sit quod umbras Mosaicae Legis, aut humanae philosophiae praestigias sectemini. Veritas palam exhibita est omnibus sensibus, non est quod jam typos, aut ambiguas pollicitationes spectetis." 57. Erasmus NT 3:63738 (LB 6:88889). 1519: "Etaddidit , corporaliter, ut excludat umbras Legis Mosaicae." 1527: "juxta naturam & substantiam, non modo juxta effectum, quemadmodum in Prophetis: aut quia Deitas nunquam sejuncta fuit a corpore Christe."
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58. For Erasmus's Origenism, see Max Schär, Das Nachleben des Origines im Zeitalter des Humanismus (Basel and Stuttgart: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1979). 59. MSA 4:229,125. 60. Scholia 1528, 20r°. "Non enarrant apte hunc locum isti qui arbitrantur ideo Paulum dicere in Christo omnes thesauros sapientiae esse, quia praecepta meliora tradiderit Christus, quam Moyses, aut Philosophi. Qui enim sic interpretantur haec uerba non uident discrimen legis & Euangelij, non intelligunt cur Christus missus sit. . . . Origenes aduersus Celsum diligenter colligit praecepta Christi, ut ostendat Christianam doctrinam praestantiorem esse gentili Philosophia. Sed est perniciosissimus error arbitrari Christum ideo uenisse, ut nouas leges traderet. Venit enim ut remitteret peccata." 61. For this paragraph, Scholia 1528, 20r°21v°. "Est enim formis crucis tecta haec sapientia." John Agricola, commenting on this verse in his sermons on Colossians, made some of the same points. 62. Thomas 21,2:141 (ca. 2, lec. 1, par. 81). Here Thomas reflected much of the exegetical tradition. See, for example, Chrysostom (PG 62:334) and Ambrosiaster (PL 17:427). 63. LB 7:1009. "Videlicet extra unum hunc, nihil nobis expetendum humanae sapientiae, sive quid promittunt huius mundi Philosophi, sive quid pollicentur Mosaicae Legis Doctores, sive quid alii jactant sese doctos ex Angelorum colloquiis, cum in hoc uno reconditi sint & abstrusi omne thesauri sapientiae, & cognitionis fructiferae. Ex hoc foiite compendio licet haurire quicquid ad veram salutem pertinet." Erasmus's idea expanded the interpretation of Ambrosiaster (PL 17:427): "Digne ergo omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae in eo dicuntur, ut per ipsum omnes subsistere videantur." 64. Geographica 12, 8, 13. See MSA 4:213,2230. 65. Erasmus NT 3:633 (LB 6:883). "In primis non possum non mirari, quid in mentem uenerit iis qui Colossenses ad quos scribit hanc epistolam Paulus, aiunt esse Rhodienses, oh nobiliem illum colossum, qui memoratur inter septem mundi miracula." Erasmus also referred to Ptolemaeus, Pliny, Strabo, Theophylact, and Faber Stapulensis. 66. Most probably Hugh meant the trivium and hence rhetoric and dialectic. In De Oratore 1.15.68, Cicero also divided philosophy up into three parts, but in a different order: "Philosophia in tres partes est tributa, in naturae obscuritatem [Hugh's third kind], in disserendi subtilitatem [dialectics, Hugh's "prima philosophia"], in vitam atque mores [Hugh's second kind]." 67. Thomas, 21,2:14243 (ca. 2, lee. 1, par. 8385). "In scientia vero mundana duo continentur, quia est quaedam scientia loquendi, et quaedam scientia rerum, et ideo dupliciter possunt decipere. Idea primo munit eos contra philosophos decipientes eos per scientiam loquendi. . . . Dicit ergo: Dico quod in Christo est omnia scientia. Et hoc dico, ne quaerentes alibi scientiam, decipiamini. Et dicit 'ut nemo,' id est nec Demosthenes, nec Tullius, 'vos decipiat in sublimitate sermonis.' . . . Sed numquid est peccatum uti sermonibus sublimibis? Respondeo. Non, quia etiam sancti viri elegantius loquuntur quam etiam rhetore mundi, sicut Ambrosius, Hieronymus, et Leo papa. Nam si dicit uti ad persuadendum in malo ornata locutione, multo magis in bono." Cf. Lyra VI:104r° and Hugh VII:F 2v°. 68. Scholia 1528, 22r°. "Quid decepit Arrianos? non orationis ornatus aliquis, sed callida argumenta rationalis humanae . . . . Quid decipiat eos qui sentiunt, quod operibus iustificemur coram Deo, non sola fide? Ratio decipit, nam haec non uidet aliam iustitiam, nisi iusticiam bonorum operum. . . . Denique omnes haereses in Ecclesia natae sunt ex rationis argumentis." 69. MSA 4:257,31258,3. In the Enarratio on Colossians of 1559 (CR 15:126364) Melanclithon still made the same point, arguing that only the word meant "repeated use or sufficiency in use." This could have been shown in innumerabilia exempla, but Melanchthon cited only one, from Plato's Politics.
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70. Angelo di Berardino, ed., Patrology, vol. 4: The Golden Age of Latin Patristic Literature, trans. Placid Solari (Westminster, Md.: Christian Classics, 1986), 18284. 71. PL 17:433. 72. LB 6:892. He also followed this interpretation in his paraphrase, LB 7:1011 (ipsoque abusu consummuntur) 73. There is no little irony here that Erasmus was also attacked for his position on this verse by conservative critics who thought him Lutheran. See Rummel, Erasmus and His Catholic Critics, 14652. 74. See Wengert 12223, 13234, 19498, and the literature cited there and, more recently, John R. Schneider, Philip Melanchthon's Rhetorical Construal of Biblical Authority: Oratio Sacra (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990), 7078. This will also be a main topic of discussion in chapter 4. 75. MSA 4:252,28. 76. LB 10:132425 (AS 4:61620). As will be shown in chapters 5 and 6, one important target of Melanchthon's Scholia was the Hyperaspistes. 77. Scholia 1528, 48r°49v°. 78. Scholia 1528 48a v°. (In this version there are two pages numbered 48. The second will be designated 48a.) 79. Scholia 1528, 49r°v°. 80. This concern was not only Melanchthon's. Luther, too, in his first commentary on Galatians made much the same charge against Jerome. He connected Erasmus's bad theology to his support for Jerome. See WABr 1:70,440 and 1:90,1526. For a discussion of Erasmus's support of Origen, see chapter 4. It is, however, important to note with Rummel (Erasmus' 'Annotations', 67) that in his annotations to the New Testament Erasmus especially prized Origen for his philological insights. 81. See, as one example among many, LB 10:1291 (AS 4:434), where Erasmus argued, "Nec video cur ista putaris dicenda, nisi forte hoc credis impium ac blasphemum aliquid tribuere Doctoribus, quibus tantum auctoritatis tot jam seculis detulit Ecclesia Catholica, quorum testimonia ne tu quidem gravaris citare quoties commodum est." In LB 10:1297 (AS 4:464) Erasmus used the consensus Ecclesiae to attack Luther's understanding of the church revealed sub contrario specie. Cf. also LB 10:128384 and 129495 (AS 4:392 and 452) 82. LB 10:1315 (AS 4:562). He stated that Augustine had derived this doctrine not from philosophy, "sed ex autoritate sacrarum Scripturarum, et alicubi ¬, quod Origenem, ni fallor, sequutus scripsit." Chapter 4 1. Scholia 1528, p. 29v°, paraphrasing Apostolius, Cent. VI, 36 cit. Nikarchos (MSA 4:237, n. 24). 2. Scholia 1528, p. 28r° (cf. MSA 4:237,111). "Quid quod sacrae litterae sine his artibus neque intelligi neque doceri recte possunt? Quid enim intelliget is, qui de sermone iudicare nequit, qui nullam orationis construendae aut figurarum rationem ex grammatica didicit, qui non ex dialectica et rhetorica didicit, quae sint orationis paulo longiores partes, quae series sit propositionum, argumentorum, quae inter se consentiant, quae pugnent, ubi recte cohaereant argumentorum partes, ubi non cohaereant? Haec qui non videt in sacris libris, qui pleni sunt subtilissimarum disputationum, is simpliciter fateatur se nihil intelligere." 3. See chapter 3. 4. Scholia 1528, p. 28v°: "si in longa enarratione summam tamen sentenciae scriptorum quae enarrabant, retinuissent."
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5. Scholia 1528, p. 28v°: "per uerbum, sermonis natura cognoscenda est. Atqui cum sine harum artium scientia nemo de sermone iudicare possit, adferre nos hoc instrumentum ad scripturae tractationem." 6. On the word oeconomia as a technical term in rhetoric meaning "arrangement" or "division," see Cicero, Academicae Questiones 6,1,1 and 6,1,11 and Quintillian, Institutiones Oratoricae 3,3,9 and 1,8,9. On the use of the word summa in Melanchthon, see Wengert 18389. 7. For a more thorough discussion of these categories and their implications for Melanchthon's exegesis see Wengert 167212; Rolf Schäfer, "Melanchthons Hermeneutik im Römerbriefkommentar von 1532," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 60 (1963): 21635, and John R. Schneider, Philip Melanchthon's Rhetorical Construal of Biblical Authority: Oratio Sacra (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990), 6596 and 14762. 8. See his Ratio seu methodus, LB 5:13337 and 8892 (AS 3:46888 and 194220). As will be seen in chapter 6, Melanchthon included Erasmus among the scholastics and used his own philosophia Christi against the Dutch humanist. For a more thorough comparison on this point see Manfred Hoffmann, "Rhetoric and Dialectic in Erasmus's and Melanchthon's Interpretation of John's Gospel," in Melanchthon and the Commentary, ed. Timothy J. Wengert and M. Patrick Graham (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997). 9. Scholia 1528, 94r° (cf. MSA 4:291,31) and 22v° (cf. MSA 4:229,33230,2). See the discussion of the latter in the preceding chapter. 10. LB 6:884, 885, and 893. See also his Ratio seu methodus, LB 5:120F (AS 3:37478), where he admitted that his list was not complete (121 [378]): "Verum huius generis formas aliquot sparsim indicavimus in Annotationibus, quas scripsimus in Novum Testamentum" 11. Scholia 1528, 93v°. "' Melanchthon calls it a Hebraismus.
' Hebraica consuetudine viscera significant, quod nos dicimus ex animo." Compare MSA 4:291,910, where
12. MSA 4:280,1721. "Figura sermonis est in sacris litteris, significant enim 'ea quae sursum sunt', bona caelestia seu spiritualia, ut sunt fides, pax cordis, patientia, caritas, castitas, et similia. 'Ea quae desursum sunt', significant bona carnalia, ut voluptates, divitias, gloriam mundi." 13. LB 7:1012. "Vos . . . surrexistis ad studium rerum sublimium & aeternarum . . . sublimia quaerite, coeloque digna." 14. MSA 4:250,2631. In his Inst. rhet., Fij r°, Melanchthon defined this as "fictio personae: imitatur tropos, cum res exanimes ueluti in animatas transformamus." 15. MSA 4:221,1114. The term itself is simply a descriptio, which Melanchthon explained in his De rhet., 45, as a kind of locus communis. On p. 67 he connected this to the demonstrative type of speech. "Sed in genus demonstratiuum seu laudatorium, primi ac ultimi generis cadunt prosopopeiae, item prosopographiae." 16. MSA 4:218,78: "quia cognitio voluntatis Dei est ipsa spiritualis sapientia." 17. See LB 1:79F81D, where Erasmus gave definitions and examples of both. Erasmus did not use the term "tautology" in a good sense in De copia. See LB 1:6. 18. See, for example, the arguments of Augustine in De doctrina Christiana, IV.xvixx (3344), on Paul's use of rhetoric. 19. See his Ratio seu methodus, LB 5:7980 (AS 3:14250). 20. In his description of the exordium in Inst. rhet., Aiij v°, Melanchthon wrote, "Exordium non modo in hoc genere, sed in alijs etiam tribus locis constat: Beneuolentiae, Attentionis, Docilitatis. . . . Facillimus & usitatissimus benuolentiae tractandae locus est officium personarum." 21. MSA 4:214,32215,3. "Videar fortassis ineptus, si Pauli sermonem ad rhetorica praecepta conferam. Ego tamen sic existimo intelligi melius posse orationem Paulinam, si
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series et dispositio omnium partium consideretur. Neque enim omnino nullo ordine aut nulla ratione scripsit Paulus, id quod res ipsa ostendit." 22. Inst. rhet., [C iv] r°. "Dispositio est partium orationis, & argumentorum apta collatio." He added ([C iv] v°), "Esto autem haec unica disponendi regula, ut naturae ordinem sequaris, quem ipsa dicendi ratio praescribit." For Melanchthon's work on Romans, see Timothy J. Wengert, ''Philip Melanchthon's 1522 Annotations on Romans and the Lutheran Origins of Rhetorical Criticism," in Biblical Interpretation in the Era of the Reformation, ed. Richard A. Muller and John L. Thompson (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 11840. 23. MSA 4:215,37, emphasis added. "Habet suos locos, quibus praeparat animos, habet suam quandam docendi et narrandi rationem, quam in enarrando non animadvertere. Quid aliud est, quam quod Craeci dicunt: in tenebris saltare, seu ut Chrysostomus ait: ." The citation is from Erasmus's Adagia II,1,9,40. 24. Melanchthon was alluding to the two kinds of speeches within the demonstrative type of speech: laudatio and vituperatio. Further, see John O'Malley, Praise and Blame in Renaissance Rome (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1979). The Inst. rhet. speaks of three kinds of exordia: beneuolentia, attentio, and docilitas. 25. See chapter 3. 26. MSA 4:215,1418. "Prior locus exordii, gratulatio videlicet, nihil habet obscuri, tantum observandum est Paulum esse distributione usum, nam cum posset dicere: audio praedicari vestram pietatem, ipse partitus est nomen totius : audio praedicari fidem vestram et caritatem et spem." 27. MSA 4:217,48. "Precatio est, qua imprecatur Colossensibus primum, ut contingat eis cognitio uberrima seu firmissima voluntatis Dei. Secundo, ut bonos fructus pariant. Tertio, ut perferant crucem et in cruce addiscant praesentiam et benevolentiam Dei erga se." 28. See ASD I/2:153579 and I/6 (LB 1:1059 and 269419), respectively, as well as the introduction to De conscribendis epistolis, written by Kurt Smolak in AS 8:ixlxxxvi. 29. See, respectively, Scholia 1528, 28v°, and MSA 4:211,1012 and 18. 30. For a fuller discussion of this issue, see Wengert 2038, Melanchthon associates this with the status of the judicial type of speech, which he also connects to dialectic in his Inst. rhet., B iv r°. See also Wengert, "Philip Melanchthon's 1522 Annotations on Romans." 31. MSA 4:211,913. "Sicut in aliis scriptis principio constitui solet, quod sit argumentum operis, ita in Paulinis epistulis primum monendus est lector, qua de re dicatur, qui sit cuiusque epistulae status, quo, ut Graeci dicunt: , ut, quid petere et exspectare ex toto scripto debeat, sciat." 32. MSA 4:211,146. 33. MSA 4:211,1625. 34. Held by Origen, Chrysostom, and Theophylact, as well as Erasmus. See chapter 3. 35. MSA 4:211,2631. "Est itaque argumentum huius epistulae et status, quid sit Evangelium. Novam quandam doctrinam orbi terrarum pollicentur apostoli, eam hic definit, nec definit breviter, sed copiose discernit a iustitia Christiana iustitiam humanam collectam nostra industria, nostris viribus vel ex praeceptis hominum vel ex lege Mosaica sive decalogo." 36. MSA 4:211,32. "Postremo tradit quaedam praecepta de moribus." Both John Bugenhagen and John Agricola noticed a similar division. Hugh of St. Cher (E 7v°) alone among medieval commentators made a similar division: chapters 12 have to do with faith and chapters 34 with morals. Thomas (21,2:127 [ca. 1, lec. 1, par. 3], 21,2:128 [ca. 1, lec. 2, par. 8], and 21,2:141 [ca. 2, lec. 1, par. 74]) first divided the salutation from the body of the epistle and then divided the argument between Col. 1:329, which concerned the truth of the gospel, and Col. 24, in which Paul rejected those things contrary to the gospel. He subdivided Col. 24 into Paul's statements against corrupt doctrine (chapter 2) and his statements against perverse morals (chapters 34). Lyra divided the letter into three parts (salutatio, prosecutio,
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and conclusio) and the prosecutio again into three (faith in chapter 1, preaching against pseudoapostles in chapter 2, and on how the sanctity of life was to be continued in chapters 34). Erasmus was not explicit in his divisions, remarking only that chapters 3 and 4 concerned moral exhortations. In the first two chapters Paul refuted a christological heresy (that angels were the only mediators) and rejected the notion that Mosaic regulations were necessary for the Christian life. 37. Cf. Melanchthon's criticisms of Erasmus in the Elogion de Luthero et Erasmo. 38. MSA 4:212,36. In 1528 Melanchthon changed the final section of the preface to match his arguments against another opponent, John Agricola. (Cf. MSA 4:212,913 and Scholia 1528, 2v°.) 39. MSA 4:220,917. "Hic orditur narrationem, in qua definit evangelium, et cum ante precatus sit, ut uberior cognitio evangelii illis contingat, subicit, quid sit evangelium. Est autem evangelium sermo, quo beneficia, quae per Christum donata sunt, recitantur; ea beneficia commemorat hoc loc Paulus rhetorica congerie, et incepta est narratio ab affectu: 'Agite gratias Deo, quo fecerit vos idoneos ad partem hereditatis sanctorum,' id est: ad consequenda evangelii beneficia." 40. Defined by Melanchthon in Inst. rhet., F ij v°. "Interpretatio, Graece : Fabius [Quintillianus] uocat uerborum congeriem. Est cum multa uerba eiusdem pene significationis eidem tribuuntur." In the Inst. rhet., Melanchthon gives examples from Romans and 1 Corinthians. Here he notes several examples from Col. 1:12, 13, 14, 20, and 22. 41. MSA 4:220,2223. "Est autem obiter inserta personae Christi descriptio." 42. MSA 4:227,28228,5. "Hactenus [i.e., Col. 1:1222] definivit evangelium, nunc adicit circumstantiam, quomodo nobis contingant beneficia ostensa in evangelio, quasi diceret: Ingentia promittis . . . . [S]ed quomodo consequemur tantum thesaurum? Hic respondet, sed ut in brevi epistula breviter, itaque non negligenter haec quamquam brevis particula praetereunda est, sic inquit: Estis redempti, si manetis in fide firmi, id est: consecuti estis remissionem peccatorum, si credideritis propter Christum remissa esse peccata." 43. In De rhet., 68, Melanchthon wrote: "Circunstantias Graeci atque id genus aliae."
dicunt. Eae partim sunt rerum, ut causa, locus, occasio, instrumentum, tempus, modus,
44. MSA 4:228,9229,25. He expanded his comments on affliction in Scholia 1528, 20r'21r°. 45. Scholia 1528, 21v°22r°. "Supra absoluta definitione Euangelij, cumque tradidit, quid sit iusticia Christiana, hic subicit admonitionem, in qua iubet uitare ea, quae Christianam doctrinam contaminant, sicut medicus, cum tradidit remedium, monet etiam, quae laedant valetudinein. Faciet autem Paulus aliquanto post insignem collationem iustitiae Christianae cum iustitia carnali. Nam qui hoc discrimen non tenet, is Christum prosus ignorat" (emphasis added to show insertions made in 1528; compare MSA 4:229,2833). 46. In the Inst. rhet., G[i] r°, Melanchthon described this under the term comparatio. "Comparatio, nec alia est qua crebrius aut commodius utimur in amplificando. Nam quid non crescit aut minuitur cum alio collatum? Fit comparatio uel similium dissimilium, ubi maiora minoribus & minora maioribus conferuntur." 47. MSA 4:22944. 48. MSA 4:24451, here 4:246,30. 49. Scholia 1528, 45v°. 50. MSA 4:251,1521. "Hic epilogum instituit, quia enim ante, quid sit Christiana iustitia, docuit eamque contulit cum carnali et civili iustitia; adicit epilogum de caeremoniis et politica Mosaica et de traditionibus humais, quasi sic dicat: Cum Christiana iustitia sit mortificatio et vivificatio, ergo non est exigenda observatio caeremoniarum legis Mosaicae, aut traditionum humanarum."
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51. MSA 4:277,2123. "Estque haec ancora hic portus afflictae et territae conscientiae videre ac sentire." 52. Scholia 1528, 80r° (cf. MSA 4:277,2730): "cum reicimus oculos in Christum et cernimus illum satisfecisse pro nostris peccatis et propter eum nobis ignosci, tum accipimus consolationem et consequimur vitam, iustitiam, pacem, et omnia bona." 53. Scholia 1528, 80v° (cf. MSA 4:278,5ll). "Haec estprima pars doctrinae Christianae, quam hactenus in Epistola tradidit Paulus. In his sequentibus capitibus tradit praecepta morum, quia, cum fides illa, de qua dictum est, efficiat novam vitam et spiritualem et participem naturae divinae, necesse est sequi actiones et mores, quales Dens exigit. Ubi non sunt eiusmodi opera, ibi non est vera fides sed quaedam fidei simulatio" (emphasis added to show the additions in 1528). 54. This complex train of thought became for John Agricola the cause for formal complaint. Scholia 1528, 80v° (cf. MSA 4:278,1213): "circumductio rhetorica: 'Cum resuscitati sitis, quaerite ea, quae sursum sunt."' The MSA mistakenly has circumdictio. Melanchthon defined circumductio in De rhet., 128, "Circunductio est cum particulis causalibus oratio contexitur, siquidem ita fato constitutum erat &c." (A circumduction occurs when an oration is shaped by particular causes, as if it was so constituted by destiny.) 55. See part III. 56. Scholia 1528, 2v79v°. In 1527 Melanchthon dealt with the first two chapters in 72 percent of the book. 57. Thus, Erasmus's long discussion in the annotations concerning Laodicea found no place in the Scholia. 58. LB 6:88182. "Deinde Judaismum & Philosophiae superstitionem cum Christi doctrina miscebant, observantes quaedam Legis instituta, & superstitiose observantes solem, lunam, ac stellas, & elementa hujus mundi, quibus docebant nos esse obnoxios." Erasmus made the same point in his 1519 preface to the New Testament, the Ratio seu methodus. There, quoting Col. 2:2122 among other passages, he contrasted "spirit," defined as sincera pietas animi puritate, and "flesh" or ''letter," defined as superstitio caerimoniis. 59. LB 6:88889, 890, 891, respectively. The quotation is from 6:888: "ne quis . . . abducat eos e recta fidei via in errorem, ac perniciam, ac servitutem Legis Mosaicae." 60. CR 38:404. 61. This work (CR 15:44392) is often overlooked because of its proximity to Melanchthon's commentary on Romans of 1532 (MSA 5). It demonstrates the twofold nature of Melanchthon's exegesis and also contains specific references to the way he puts his method to work. For example, to introduce Paul's argumentum, he wrote (CR 15:44546): "Propriae pertinet haec Epistola ad genus didacticum, quia finis eius est, ut doceat nos quid sit iusticia coram Deo. Potest tamen ad iudiciale genus referri, quia hoc quoque ad docendum accomodatum est. Status Epistolae finitivus est . . . . Et quia optimum interpretandi genus est, orationis ostendere, seriem omnium locorum, propositionum & argumentorum annotavimus, ut sentencia Pauli cerni possit, & intelligi quomodo consentiant inter se singula membra disputationis. Nam conscienciae ita muniendae sunt, ut certo sciant sententiam scripturae de tantis rebus, ut firma & certa praesidia habeant, ad quae in tentacionibus se recipianti." 62. De rhet., 3132. "Alia est exegeseos ratio, eaque uulgatior, cum integris commentarijs autores explicamus, Graece genus hoc dixerunt: quod, cum uarium sit, paulo plura de eo dicenda sunt. Omnis oratio est, ant ad docendum composita, aut historica, aut suasoria, aut allegorica: ea quae ad docendum composita est, puta cum est methodo philosophica exacte conscripta. . . Sed ante omnia in oratione ad docendum composita, sint tibi semper in manibus quaestiones demonstratiuae, quas supra tradidi, an sit, quid sit, quas habeat species, officia, quomodo inter se species comparentur."
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63. Dial. lib. quat., Gvv°H3vº. (He rarely asked whether a thing existed.) 64. For much more detailed looks at Erasmus's method in this work, see Manfred Hoffmann, Rhetoric and Theology: The Hermeneutic of Erasmus (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), esp. 3239; Marjorie O'Rourke Boyle, Erasmus on Language and Method in Theology (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), especially 59127; and Donald Conroy, "The Ecumenical Theology of Erasmus of Rotterdam: A Study of the Ratio verae theologiae" (Ph.D. diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1974). 65. MBW 46 (T1:109,710): "multa cum Martino convenientia." See chapter 2. 66. LB 5:7781 (AS 3:13052), something about which both Luther and Melanchthon were deeply concerned. Cf. Luther's letters to Spalatin and John Lang regarding the reform of the university, for example: WABr 1:174,4850 (to Spalatin, 18 May 1518) and 1:203,1115 (to John Lang, 16 September 1518, describing Melanchthon) and Melanchthon's opening address to the Wittenberg faculty in 1518, "De corrigendis adolescentiae studiis" (MSA 3:2942). 67. LB 5:80 (AS 3:150), in the context of a discussion of rhetoric (cf. LB 5:117 [3:358]). This was also an important aspect of Melanchthon's evangelical theology, as the detailed discussion in the Loci communes theologici of 1521 (MSA 2/1:810) demonstrates. 68. LB 5:8384 (AS 3:170) "At praecipuus theologorum scopus est sapienter enarrare divinas litteras de fide, non de frivolis quaestionibus rationem reddere, de pietate" (cf. LB 5:90, 110, 12730, 13338 [AS 3:206, 324, 43052, 46894]). He was to use this reserve against Luther in the free will debate, a position that revealed the distance between him and Wittenberg. In 1519, however, both Melanchthon and Luther also criticized scholasticism's approach to the Scripture. As shall be shown, however, Melanchthon viewed Erasmus's Hyperaspistes as scholastic in the worst sense of the term. 69. E.g., LB 5:8485, 112 (AS 3:174, 332) Cf. Luther's De votis monasticis iudicium of 1521 (WA 8:573669) and Melanchthon's comments in the Loci communes of 1521 (MSA 2/ 1:5254). 70. LB 5:92 (AS 3:222) and WABi 6:10. Erasmus, like Luther ( WABi 7:404), was also suspicious of Revelation. 71. LB 5:126 and 120 (AS 3:422 and 37478). See chapter 3 for Melanchthon's corrections of Erasmus's annotations. 72. LB 5:11011 (AS 3:32428): "Cur dubia [=indulgences] certis anteferimus." Of course he also insisted that they might be good for those in distress. (He also was rather skeptical of purgatory in LB 5:90 [AS 3:206].) Later he was to view the bondage of the will in the same way. See WA 1:23339 and 525628. 73. LB 5:86, 89, 9091 (where he attacks the papal and the conciliar parties), 101, and 107 (AS 3:18082, 198, 2068,27274, and 306). On the matter of John 21, see Luther's Resolutio Lutheriana super propositione XIII. de potestate papae, WA 2:183240, especially 196,57, where Luther might well have had Erasmus's statement in mind when he wrote, "Rectius ergo facies, si hoc verbum Christi [in John 21] accipias pro exhortatione, immo praecepto non quo oves ad subiectionem sed quo pastores ad diligendum Christum et pascendum populum astringantur." Erasmus had written (LB 5:86 [AS 3:182]): "Neque vero dictum est: rege, aut: subige oves sed: pasce. Neque dictum est: oves tuas, sed meas." 74. LB 5:105 (AS 3:296). 75. LB 5:10513 (AS 3:296338). 76. LB 5:1024 (AS 3:27886). 77. LB 5:103 (AS 3:280): "sine qua nihil sumus nisi ignis alimonia." 78. LB 5:104 (AS 3:286). 79. LB 5:108 (AS 3:308). 80. LB 5:108 (AS 3:31012): "soli fidei vult salutem acceptam ferri."
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81. LB 5:77 (AS 3:130). 82. LB 5:84 (AS 3:170; emphasis added): "Illud mea sententia magis ad rem pertinuerit, ut tirunculo nostro dogmata tradantur in summam ac compendium redacta, idque potissimum ex euangelicis fontibus, mox apostolorum literis, ut ubique certis habeat scopos, ad quos ea quae legit conferat." Note that, unlike Melanchthon, Erasmus thought there was more than one scopus to the Scripture. See also Luther's preface to Romans in WABi 7:226. 83. LB 5:84 (AS 3:170). "Christum caelestem doctorem novam quendam populum in terris instituisse." See also LB 5:86 and 92 (AS 3:182, 21820). 84. LB 5:92 (AS 3:220). "At circulum hunce et omnium rerum inter se congruentium harmoniam in solo Christo reperies." 85. LB 5:8687 (AS 3:18486). See chapter 8, where Melanchthon derided Erasmus's interpretation of John the Baptist's sermon to the soldiers. Later Melanchthon also divided the world's history into epochs. However, he always insisted that the gospel itself was clearly spoken in every age and, unlike Erasmus (LB 5:88 [AS 3:192]) and, later, the Anabaptists, never distinguished the time of Christ from the time after the emperors accepted Christianity. 86. LB 5:88 (AS 3:194 [cf. 209, n. 112]). 87. LB 5:89 (AS 3:198). This difference will form the topic of chapter 7. 88. LB 5:80, 127 ("Porro in tractandis allegoriis felicissimus artifes est Origenes"), 132 ("Inter quos [commentatores] praecipuus est Origenes") (AS 3:152, 430, 462, 466). He favored the patristic commentators over the scholastic ones (Thomas excepted), concluding a long discussion of the same (LB 5:13337 [AS 3:46888]) with the confession that he would rather be a pious theologian with Chrysostom than an undefeated one with Scotus. 89. MSA 2/1:4,3840. "Ex Origine si tollas inconcinnas allegorias et philosophicarum sententiarum silvam, quantulum erit reliquum?" 90. LB 5:13233 (AS 3:46266), where again Origen is proclaimed the best. 91. See Wengert 12223 and the literature cited there. 92. Paul Joachimsen, "Loci Communes: Eine Untersuchung zur Geistesgeschichte des Humanismus und der Reformation," LutherJahrbuch 8 (1926): 2797. 93. Wilhelm Maurer, "Melanchthons Loci Communes von 1521 als wissenschaftliche Programmschrift: Ein Beitrag zur Hermeneutik der Reformationszeit," Luther Jahrbuch 27 (1960): 150. 94. Siegfried Wiedenhofer, Formalstrukturen humanistischer und reformatorischer Theologie bei Philipp Melanchthon, 2 vols. (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1976), 1:37376 and 2:3057. 95. LB 1:89D, 88E, 100CD,F. To the last point: "Eos sumet partim a generibus ac partibus vitiorum virtutumque, partim ab his, quae sunt in rebus moralium praecipua, quaeque frequentissime solent in suadendo incidere." 96. LB 5:13031 (AS 3:452). He even believed that he could detect the use of such a loci method in Jerome. 97. LB 5:13237 (AS 3:46288), especially 133 (468) where he raised this very objection. 98. See Wengert 18291, for a discussion of their use in Melanchthon's Annotationes in Johannem. 99. MSA 2/1:8,47. "Plerique locos virtutum et vitiorum tantum in scripturis requirunt, sed ea observatio philosophica magis est quam christiana. Quod cur ita dicam, paulo post intelliges." The final sentences could be construed to mean that the entire Loci communes theologici was to be taken as a corrective to Erasmus's Ratio seu methodus. 100. For example, Melanchthon labeled his comments on 2 Corinthians 2:5 (MSA 4:9598) "De poenitentia." He began by excusing the interruption of his exegesis. "Quia hic locus inter argumenta refertur de lapsorum restitutione seu poenitentia, ideo visum est de poenitentia latius dicere."
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101. Wengert 2013. 102. See the preceding discussion regarding circumstantia. 103. MSA 4:228,78. "Et nos intra in collatione civilis iustitiae et Christianae latius tractabimus." 104. Scholia 1528, 15v°16r°. 105. MSA 4:222,78. "Sed quaeri solet: Si Deus agitat naturam [cf. Acts 17:28], est ne malorum seu peccatorum auctor?" It is striking how small a role the christological texts played in the Scholia, in contrast both to Erasmus's argumentum for Colossians and to Melanchthon's Enarratio of 1559. 106. MSA 4:222,89. "Hanc quaestionem in praesentia non libet tractare prolixius." 107. Scholia 1528, 10v°14r°. 108. See, respectively, the Dissertatio, MSA 4:23043 (=16b26a), and the Scholia 1528, 22v°34V°. 109. MSA 4:260,2728. "Et quia hoc loco de traditionibus humanis multa dicta sunt, volumus et nos eum locum copiosius excutere." Here Erasmus's theology also received corrective, as shall be discussed in chapter 7. 110. MSA 4:287,78. "Hic locus partem quandam libertatis Christianae continet." 111. Scholia 1534, XC r°. "Hic locus continet sententiam de libertate Christiana." 112. Scholia 1534, XCIIII v°. Here the opponent was actually John Agricola. See Timothy J. Wengert, Law and Gospel: Philip Melanchthon's Debate with John Agricola of Eislehen over "Poenitentia" (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1997). 113. Scholia 1528, 37v°. "Haec cum s[a]epe iam tractauerimus, tamen cogit nos Pauli textus toties idem dicere, a cuius sententia mihi discedendum esset, si nolim haec repetere. Ego autem hoc unum summo studio ago, ut germanam sententiam Pauli simplicissime exponam. Et quia bona pars theologorum scholasticorum nec iustitiam fidei docet, nec discrimen ostendit philosophicae & christianae iustitiae, libenter in hoc loco commemorari soleo, ut aduersus perniciosos istorum errores, pios lectores, pro uirili, muniam. Neque enim obscurum est, summam Christianae doctrinae pendere a cognitione iusticiae fidei." 114. MBW 597 (WABr 4:256), dated 2 October 1527. "Attigi in Colossensib[us] hanc ipsam causam, eamque, vbi primum occasio erit, in aliquo alio scripto cogito copiosius explicare." As will become clear in the next two chapters, the alium scriptum was the 1528 Scholia. 115. MBW 843 (CR 1:1111). "De aliis locis christianae doctrinae quid sentiam, aperui in postrema editione commentarii ad Colossenses, ex quibus iudicium de me prorsus fieri potest: nec ego defugio Ecclesiae iudicium." 116. CR 3:1112. 117. Lazarus Spengler, "Ob ainer christenlichen oberkait mit got und gutem gewissen zustee, sich gegen dem kaiser in gewaltiger handlung deß evangelions mit gewalt aufzuhalten und ime mit der that zu widerstreben," in Das Widerstandsrecht als Problem der deutschen Protestanten 15231546, 2d ed., ed. Heinz Scheible (Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1982), 39. "Item gantz klar in seinem Comentario uber S. Paulus epistel zu den Collosern am 77. plat." Chapter 5 1. See Wilhelm Maurer, Der junge Melanchthon zwischen Humanismus und Reformation, 2 vols. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 196769), 2:497511, for the second position. 2. CR 23:72952, first published in 1530 as "Sententiae verterum aliquot scriptorum de coena domini." See Peter Fraenkel, "Ten Questions concerning Melanchthon, the Fathers and the Eucharist," in Luther and Melanchthon, ed. Vilmos Vajta (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg, 1961), 14664.
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3. MSA 4:246,1725. See also MSA 4:278,25279,4. 4. Scholia 1528, 14v°. "Sed longe aliter somniat ratio. Neque enim potest intelligere illam praesentiam Christi aut vim misericordiae. Sed ut Homerus fingit Iouem apud Aethiopas conuiuari nec uacari ad audiendas preces hominum. Ita somniat caro, Christum tanquam Tyrannum aliquem alicubi beate uiuere, ac sibi regnum gerere, nos non respicere ac audire. Aduersus huiusmodi impias cogitationes corda uerbo Dei munienda sunt." 5. Scholia 1528, 79V°. 6. Among the voluminous literature on this issue, see Marjorie O'Rourke Boyle, Rhetoric and Reform: Erasmus's Civil Dispute with Luther (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983); Dietrich Kerlen,Assertio: Die Entwicklung von Luthers theologischem Anspruch und derStreit mit Erasmus von Rotterdam (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1976); ErnstWilhelm Kohls, Luther oder Erasmus: Luthers Theologie in derAuseinandersetzung mit Erasmus, 2 vols. (Basel: F. Reinhardt, 1972); Harry J. McSorley, Luther: Right or Wrong? An EcumenicalTheological Study of Luther's Major Work, The Bondage of the Will (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1969); Klaus Schwarzwäller, Sibboleth: Die Interpretation von Luthers Schrift De servo arbitrio seit Theodosius Harnack (Munich: Christian Kaiser, 1969), and Theologia crucis: Luthers Lehre von Prädestination nach De servo arbitrio (Munich: Christian Kaiser, 1970). The most recent article on the subject is John F. Tinkler, "Erasmus's Conversation with Luther," ARG 82 (1991): 5981. On Erasmus's subtle approach to Luther see James D. Tracy, "Two Erasmuses, Two Luthers: Erasmus' Strategy in Defense of De Libero arbitrio,"ARG 78 (1987): 3759. 7. "Assertio omnium articulorum M Lutheri per bullam Leonis X novissimam damnatorum" (1520), in WA 7:14249. 8. Erasmus of Rotterdam, LB 10:12491536. The word hyperaspistes was not a Greek neologism, as reported in AS 4:201, n. 6. It meant literally "the one who holds a shield over" and could be be rendered "defenses," as a contemporary translator did, calling it a "Schutzund Trutzbüchlein.'' Luther and others twisted it to mean "viper" (hyperaspis: "super snake" or "upon a snake"; in Greek aspis meant "shield" or "asp"), as if Erasmus were threatening to "sting" Luther with this attack. (See WABr 4:263.) Erasmus could have been thinking of its use in the Psalms, where the word (in the singular) was only employed as a description of God (of the sixteen occurences, see, e.g., Psalm 18:2, 30 and 115:911). 9. MSA 2/1:2131. 10. MSA 2/1:22,5. 11. MSA 2/1:25,526,8. His definition of predestination in this section has much in common with his description of God's providence in the Scholia. "Quandoquidem omnia quae eveniunt, necessario iuxta divinam praedestinationem eveniunt, nulla est voluntatis nostrae libertas." In 1522 he changed this to read: "Postremo libertatem, homini adimit diuina praedestinatio. Eveniunt enim omnia iuxta divinam praedestinationem cum externa opera, tum internae cogitationes, in omnibus creaturis." It is cited here from p. 9v° of the revised edition printed in Strasbourg by Johannes Herwagen in 1523. See MBW 132 (T1:268), the edition "S '23Jan" (VD 16: M 3593). 12. Loci communes . . . theologicae . . . recognitae (Strasbourg: Johannes Herwagen, January 1523), 6v°. "Sicut enim nihil cernit intellectus, nisi carnalia, spiritualium prorsus ignorans, ita nihil adfectat uoluntas, praeter carnalia bona, uitam, opes, gloriam, bonam ualetudinem etc. nihil fugit praeter mala carnalia, mortem, inopiam, ignominiam, aduersam ualetudinem etc. Deum nec amat nec metuit." 13. Wilhelm Maurer, "Melanchthons Anteil am Streit zwischen Luther und Erasmus," ARG 49 (1958): 89114, reprinted in MelanchthonStudien (Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1964), 13762. 14. Ibid., 149. 15. Ibid., 162.
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16. But see the preceding chapter for a much more complicated picture of the relation between Melanchthon and the Ratio seu methodus. 17. Heinz Scheible, "Luther and Melanchthon," Lutheran Quarterly, n.s., 4 (1990): 31739, where he also destroys the myth of Luther and Melanchthon's friendship. 18. Wengert 2528 and 5759 and Siegfried Wiedenhofer, Formalstrukturen humanistischer und refonnatorischer Theologie bei Philipp Melanchthon, 2 vols. (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1976), 1:199. 19. Heinz Scheible, "Melanchthon zwischen Luther und Erasmus," in RenaissanceReformation: Gegensätze und Gemeinsamkeiten, ed. August Buck (Wolfenbüttel: Herzog August Bibliothek, 1984), 15580. 20. MBW 341 (T2:16776; Allen Ep. 1496), here T2:169,23170,30. For John Fabri, see chapter 6. 21. MBW 341 (T2:170,3035; Allen Ep. 1496; English translation: CWE 10:379,3742) "Perlegi Locos omnes. In quibus perspexi tuum istud ingenium non minus candidum quam felix: quod ego semper turn suspexi tum amaui, sed magis etiam utrumque facere coepi posteaquam illa legi, tantum abest ut me eius operae poeniteat. Quanquam inter legendum scrupulis aliquot offendebar de quibus voluissem tecum communicare, si coram licuisset." 22. See LB 9:1236 and 10:1256, 1277, 1295, 129899, 1304 (AS 4:126, 238, 354, 454, 470, 474, 502). 23. This also meant that he anticipated Luther's use of the term against the same people. See Mark Edwards, Luther and the False Brethren (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975). 24. MBW 341 (T2:171,78151; Allen Ep. 1496). 25. MBW 341 (T2:15183; Allen Ep. 1496). Erasmus also mentioned an attempt by Campeggio to lure Melanchthon away from Wittenberg, about which Erasmus had praised Melanchthon's spirit and his hatred of contentions but despaired the younger humanist's desire to recant (palinodium) On the same day he wrote an equally defensive, but much shorter, note to Spalatin (Allen Ep. 1497) in which he again attacked the savagery of the evangelicals and decried the behavior of Capito, Hedio, Oecolampadius, and Zwingli. 26. MBW 344 (T2:17983; Allen Ep. 1500). See Erasmus, LB 10:1251 (AS 4:21012). 27. MBW 344 (T2:182,3839; Allen Ep. 1500). "Quod ad de libero arbitrio attinet, aequissimis animis hic accepta est." What follows begins, "Tyrannis enim . . ." (emphasis added). The English translation (CWE 10:392,4546) translates the phrase "aequissimis animis" as "a very mild reception.'' This was certainly how Erasmus construed the phrase, but it is not quite what Melanchthon wrote. 28. MBW 344 (T2:182,41; Allen Ep. 1500): "modo ne priuati adfectus admisceantur." 29. MBW 344 (T2:182,42; Allen Ep. 1500). "Tametsi alicubi 'nigrum salem' asperseris." Salt is taken here as biting and black, as with evil intent. Cf. Erasmus's Adagia II.v.1 (LB 2:559), where "white salt" describes sophisticated jokes without teeth, in contrast to the "black salt of Momus," biting ridicule. (I am indebted to Erika Rummel of the University of Toronto for this reference.) MBW 344 refers to Horace, Epist. 2,2,60, where Horace contrasted those who liked love songs or poems to the one who preferred Bionian [=biting, after Bion, the satirical philosopher] prose and "black salt." CWE 10:392,4950 translates: "though you do slip in a barbed remark now and again." 30. MBW 344 (T2:182,4249; Allen Ep. 1500). "Verum non est tam 'irritabilis' Lutherus, ut devorare nihil possit. Proinde pollicetur se in respondendo pari usurum esse moderatione Forsan autem multis profuerit diligenter excuti locum de libero arbitrio, quorum si conscientiis servitur, quid attinet ad publicam causam privatos affectus adferre? lam ubi iracundia aninum transversum rapere coeperit, non video qui tanto negocio satis facere possit Mihi Lutheri erga te benevolentia perspecta est; ea spem facit simpliciter responsurum esse." I am indebted to Erika Rummel for early on sharing proofs of the English translation now in
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CWE 10:392, 5058. The translators and annotator do not discuss the play on the phrase "black salt." 31. MBW 344 (T2:182,4950; Allen Ep. 1500; English translation: CWE 10:392, 5860). 32. He also mentioned the death of William Nesen. See chapter 6. 33. MBW 345 (T2:184,1112). "Et Papisticum bellum renovat Erasmus, quem optarim pacis potius, quam novorum motuum autorem esse." 34. MBW 345 (T2:184,1516). "Quid est enim iniustius quam quod nunc vulgo fit, dissentientem iugulare, quam docere malle." 35. MBW 343 (T2:17879). "Videtur non contumeliose admodum nos tractasse" (emphasis added). In his analysis Maurer overlooked the word, admodum. 36. MBW 343 (T2:179,48). "Ego misere cupio, ut haec causa, quae certe caput est religionis christianae, diligenter excutiatur, atque ob eam causam paene gaudeo, Erasmum capessere pugnam. Diu optavi, Luthero prudentem aliquem de hoc negotio antagonistam contingere, qualis si Erasmus non videtur, ego valde fallor." 37. MBW 360 (T2:20817; Allen Ep. 1523). 38. MBW 360 (T2:210,2122; Allen Ep. 1523), citing MBW 344 (T2:181,1315; Allen Ep. 1500). 39. MBW 360 (T2:214,11617; Allen Ep. 1523). "In aliis argumentis nonnihil dedimus humanis affectibus, in hoc negotio nulla conumelia me depellet a recto." 40. MBW 360 (T2:215,13638; Allen Ep. 1523). "Argentoratinec ibi tantumpublice docuerunt nec vllas disciplinas nec linguas esse discendas, praeter unam Hebraicam." Martin Bucer claimed this rumor referred to a sermon of his, where, to help a teacher of Greek, he extolled the virtues of Greek and Hebrew over Latin. As shall be seen, the writings of Lambert also gave substance to such fears. See the note to Ep. 1523 in CWE 10:447, n. 40. The author is indebted to Erika Rummel for this reference. 41. He also expressed sorrow at the death ofWilhelm Nesen. Melanchthon would not forget this. 42. He would return to these charges in Hyperaspistes I, where he claimed that Luther's teaching had sparked the Peasants' War (LB 10:1256 [AS 4:240]) and pointed out the inconsistencies among the reformers on the Lord's Supper and iconoclasm (LB 10:1263 [AS 4:278]), and in Hyperaspistes II (LB 10:148184). 43. MBW 387 (T2:27580) and MBW450 (T2:4078). For his 4 July 1526 comments to Sigismund Gelenius (MBW 474), see n. 54. 44. MBW 457 (T2:41516), dated 10 April 1526. T2:416,2021: "Quid? Satisne videmur depexi [a term used in comedies] ab illo? Me immerentem gravissima invidia onerat." 45. MBW 458 (T2:41617), dated around the same time. T2:417,89: "O quale scriptum! Noster [Lutherus] vero videtur subiratior [than in De libero arbitrio] et vereor multo responsurum vehementius quam antea scripsit." 46. MBW 460 (T2:41820). 47. MBW 459 (T2:41718). T2:417,23: "Ecquid unquam legisti scriptum acerbius, loachime, quam Erasmicum ¬. Est is plane aspis." 48. For Melanchthon as the Logodaedalus who had ghostwritten parts of De servo arbitrio, see LB 10:1252, 1256, 1271, 1299 (AS 4:21620, 238, 32224, 476); for more general attacks see LB 10:1256, 1277, 1295, 129899, 1304 (AS 4:238, 354, 454, 470, 474, 502). For Jonas, Luther's Patroclus, see LB 10:1252, 1317, 1321 (AS 4:218, 57273, 598). For the recently deceased Wilhelm Nesen, see LB 10:1250, 1268 (AS 4:206, 306). 49. See LB 10:1251, 1255, 1295 (AS 4:210, 230, 456). In the last passage Erasmus asked pointedly why, if according to Luther Melanchthon could write such divine things in the Loci, he had lied in his letters. 50. LB 10:1308 (AS 4:524).
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51. MBW 459 (T2:418,68): "Statim edito Lutheri libro dicebam exituram hanc contentionem in crudelissimam criminationem. Id accidit, et tamen puto [things done in bad taste] servari ab Erasmo in secundam operis partem."
52. MBW459 (T2:418,810). "Me plane immerentem magna invidia onerat, cum mihi partem operis et quidem odiosiorem imputat. . . . Sed decrevi mussitare hanc iniuriam." 53. MBW459 (T2:418,1316). "Ea res sane animum meum graviter cruciat. Sic est, nisi Deus consuluerit huic tumultui, et servarit nos, quam vereor ne quo non oportet evadant hae contentiones. Sed profecto hae res singulares sunt et ." 54. MBW474 (T2:43739), dated 4 July 1526. See Peter G. Bietenholz, ed., Contemporaries of Erasmus, 3 vols. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), 2:8485. 55. MBW 474 (T2:439,4143): "Ego enim neque illis acerbis conflictationibus delector. nosti enim meam naturam, et in primis hos duos nollem inter se commissos esse." 56. MBW 616 (CR 4:96364, here 964). "Erasmus scripsitargutissime de libero arbitrio, et quidem his diebus propter id scriptum graviter contristatus sum. Neque tamen eripiet mihi veram sententiam." The meaning of argutissime is somewhat obscure, since it can be taken positively (keen or sagacious) or negatively (shrill, prattling, sly). His letters to Camerarius and Luther, written at about the same time, as well as the last sentence, suggest the latter. 57. MBW 599 (CR 1:91213). "Vaferrime enim evertit [Erasmus] omnia, quae obiecit Lutherus. Sed id opus de vulgo nemo intelligit. Est enim confusum ac prolixum, nec facile est, certain auctoris sententiam in his ambagibus longae disputationis comprehendere." 58. MBW 597 (WABr 4:25657). "Longa et confusa disputatio est, quam non multi de uulgo intelligent, ut video. In eo uno est, ut sententias a te citatas callide interpretetur, ne dissentire credantur a iudicio rationis humanae. Ego etiamsi velis respondere, nollem tamen te properare. Velim autem te, si quando videretur, non confutationem huius operis (nam istos ; non facile intelligunt, nisi exercitatissimi in hoc ipso genere), sed tuae sententiae simplicem enarrationem instituere. Id non esset tibi difficile factu, et extra pugnam minus esset habitura acerbitatis oratio." 59. MBW 654 (Allen Ep. 1944). 60. Perhaps the edition published by John Froben. 61. MBW 654 (Allen Ep. 1944, 35). "Vtinam Luterius pari studio vitasset seditionum occasiones, et ad bonos mores prouocasset, vt fuit in defensione dogmatum vehemens!" 62. MBW 654 (Allen Ep. 1944,57). 63. MBW 664 (Allen Ep. 1981), dated 23 March 1528. 64. MBW 664 (Allen Ep. 1981,10). "Longum esset recensere causas omnes silentii mei." 65. MBW 664 (Allen Ep. 1981, 2226). "Quanquam enim non soleo dissimulare quid de controuersia illa sentiam, tamen nunquam ita amaui Lutherum vt probarem eius in disputando acerbitatem: tantum abest vt adiuuare velim et, vt ita dicam, oleum igni addere. Atque huius mei iuditii ipse mihi Lutherus optimus testis est." 66. MBW 664 (Allen Ep. 1981, 2629). "Vtinam vero non esset tam atrox certamen inter vos susceptum! Neque enim habuit tuae dignitatis rationem Lutherus, et tu vicissim illum mirifice deformasti." 67. In Hyperaspistes II (LB 10:148586). "Erat aliud quod illi [Lutheri] movit stomachum in Diatriba. Quid? Quod Philippi sententiam ipsius suppressio nomine taxarim. O non ferendam virulentiam! Nunc Libellis Germanice scriptis objicit [Lutherus] ingratitudinem quod taxarim Wilheylum [Nesen]. Estne quisquam hoc nomine? Si nullus est nec fuit, nullius est a me nomen proditum, & tamen illi quisquis fuit nihil debeo, multum ille mihi. Fuit amicus, sed illius unius amicitia plus attulit mihi malorum quam multorum inimicitia. Hoc satis est de mortuo. Puto Jonam non esse tam improbum, ut jactet sua in me officia. Visus est olim mihi vir sano placidoque ingenio, priusquam Lutheri spiritu esset afflatus, qualis nunc sit nescio. Nec aliud queri de me potest, nisi quod eum disserentem adversus
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[Johannem] Fabrum Lutheri exemplo nimium admiscuisse convitiorum, scripsi. Hoc etiamsi tacuissem, liber editus arguebat. Haec admonitio erat, non insectatio." 68. CR 26:27. "Voluntas humana non est libera, si respicias opera spiritualia." 69. MBW 807 (CR 1:108284 and MSA 7,2:9298). The dispute behind this letter will be examined in chapter 8. 70. MBW 807 (MSA 7,2:9495). The entire section reads: " ab ipso orta est. Quam aequus vbique est Ario et illius factioni, quam nos hic constantissime improbauimus. Quae litera in illis libris est digna viro christiano, de iustificatione, de iure magistratuum. Horum locorum perfectam tractationem a magnis viris requiro. Sed tollant eum, qui non norunt." Chapter 6 Parts of this chapter and the preceding one will also appear as "Philip Melanchthon's Contribution to the Debate with Erasmus over the Bondage of the Will," in By Faith Alone: Essays on Justification in Honor of Gerhard O. Forde (forthcoming). 1. See David V. N. Bagchi, Luther's Earliest Opponents: Catholic Controversialists, 15181525 (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991), 27173. Bagchi comments on Cochlaeus's role in this opposition throughout his monograph. See especially pp. 21820. For a biography of Cochlaeus, see Remigius Bäumer, Johannes Cochlaeus (14791552): Leben und Werk im Dienst der katholischen Reform (Münster: Aschendorff, 1980). 2. DE LIBE= II RO ARBITRIO HOMI= 1 NIS ADVERSVS LO 1 cos communes Philippi Me= II lanchthonis, libri duo 11 Ioannis Co= 1) chlaei. 11 [Decoration] 11 ANNO. M.D.XXV. II [Tübingen: Morhardt, 1525] 8°, [122] leaves. (It has been reproduced for the microfiche series Flugschriften des frühen 16. Jahrhunderts [Zug: IDC, 1985], no. 3860.) The publisher's name is not mentioned but can be determined on the basis of the titlepage woodcut. See Wengert 260 for another book from this time using the same woodcut and published by Morhardt. The preface to the Abbot of the Cistercian monastery in Maulbronn was dated 15 June 1524. 3. De libero arbitrio adversus locos communes, B 4r°H 4r°. 4. De libero arbitrio adversus locos communes, H 4r°P 10rº. 5. De libero arbitrio adversus locos communes, M 7v°. 6. MSA 5:205. The issue is identifying the "old creature" with "flesh." Erasmus raised the same objection. 7. This is also what Sachiko Kusukawa assumes in her book, The Transformation of Natural Philosophy: The Case of Philip Melanchthon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 6569. This fine study came into my hands too late to be collated in a meaningful way with the present study. Suffice it to say that Kusukawa, using for the most part a very different set of data, comes to many of the same conclusions about the centrality of law and gospel for Melanchthon's thought and his relation to Luther. 8. The text is found in CR 12:69196. The section discussed here covers MSA 4:230,711 (exordium) and 230,8231,14 (argumentum). 9. See Heinz Scheible, "Melanchthons Bildungsprogramm," in Lebenslehren und Weltentwürfe im Übergang vom Mittelalter zur Neuzeit, ed. Hartmut Boockmann et al. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989), 23348, for a closer definition and what this
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entails for understanding Melanchthon and Luther's role in the promotion of the liberal arts in the 1520s. 10. MSA 4:231,812 and CR 12:69196. 11. MSA 4:231,13. The text was misquoted in the Dissertatio, where the copyist or printer read iusticiae for inscitiae, making it sound as if wisdom were better than righteousness. 12. Important declamations from this time included: "Necessarias esse ad omne studiorum genus artes dicendi . . . Declamatio" (1523; Koehn No. 58 and CR 11:50 66), "De legibus" (1525; Koehn No. 40 and CR 11:6686), "De gradibus discentium" (1525; Koehn No. 40 and CR 11:98101), ''In laudem novae scholae" (1526, delivered at the opening of the Nuremberg Latin school; CR 11:10611), "De vestitu" (1527, delivered by Caspar Cruciger; Koehn No. 41 and CR 11:13949), "De dialectica" (1528, delivered by Jacob Milich; Koehn No. 42 and CR 11:15963), "De studiis adolescentium" (1529?; CR 11:18191), "Laus artis medicae" (1527; Koehn No. 272 and CR 11:19197), and "Encomium Medicinae" (1527?; Koehn No. 278 and CR 11:197202). Melanchthon was also responsible for having Luther's "An die Ratherren aller Städte deutsches Lands, daß sie christliche Schulen aufrichten und halten sollen" (WA 15:2753) translated. It appeared under the title: DE CON || STITVENDIS SCHO || LIS MAR. LVTHER || Liber donatus Latinitate || Haganoae, per lohannem || Secerium. || 8°, with woodcut. Colophon: Haganaoae ex Officina || lohan Secerij || 31 + [ blank] leaves. It included a preface by Melanchthon: [Leaf] PHIL MEL || ANCHTHON STVDIO II SIS OMNIBUS. S. ||, dated by MBW 330 (T2:14445) to the second half of June 1524. That it was first published in 1527 or 1528, according to WA, MBW and VD 16, is somewhat surprising. 13. MBW 26870 (T2:5760). Melanchthon was rector from 18 October 1523 to 1 May 1524. See Karl Eduard Förstemann, ed., Album Academiae Vitebergensis, 2 vols. (Leipzig. 1841), 1:119. From the accession of Elector John in 1525 the pace of university reform increased. as indicated by the correspondence of both Luther and Melanchthon. 14. This against Cochlaeus and Erasmus, who in his annotations to the New Testament on this text argued that Paul divided the human being into three parts (flesh, soul, and spirit and that Paul seemed to be misusing the word "soul" for "flesh." Moreover, in De libero arbitrio and Hyperaspistes I Erasmus attacked the Loci itself for holding the position that "flesh" meant the entire human being. See LB 9:1236 and 10:1277 (AS 4:126 [cf. 127, n. 262 and AS 4:354 [cf 355, n.302]). 15. MSA 4:238,7239,8. 16. Was Erasmus in some way responding to this in Hyperaspistes II (LB 10:1401), when he argued from the virtues of animals, including bees, that human virtues could not be excluded from justification? See also Cochlaeus's arguments from Pliny regarding the virtues of animals in De libero arbitrio adversus locos communes, K 1V°f. 17. This latter verse, which at this time Melanchthon consistently connected with the first use of the law, also figured in the dispute with John Agricola. Melanchthon may also have been defending against Erasmus's charge in Hyperaspistes I (LB 10:1270 [AS 4:31415]) that the Wittenbergers' theology fostered antinomianism. 18. MSA 4:239,9240,6; here 240,56. "Sed in eo dissentiunt ratio et Evangelium, quo evangelium negat civilem iustitiam satis esse coram Deo." 19. LB 10:1330 (AS 4:64647): "per opera moraliter bona possit de congruo promereri gratiam." Cf LB 10:1331 (AS 4:650), where he wrote about the human being "applicans naturae vires ad earn gratiam." Cochlaeus also insisted on the power of the human being to attain grace. 20. LB 10:1294 (AS 4:44849). 21. MSA 4:240,719; here 240,79: "rationem satis habere virium ex sua natura contra vitia, nec videt opus esse Spiritu sancto."
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22. MSA 4:240,14. The Dissertatio used the word pertrahat ("entices"), the Scholia 1527 protrahat ("drags"), and the Scholia 1528 impellat (''forces"). 23. LB 10:133031 (AS 4:648). 24. LB 9:1248 (AS 4:190). "Cur, inquies, datur aliquid libero arbitrio? Ut sit, quod merito imputetur impiis, qui gratiae dei volentes defuerint, ut excludatur a deo crudelitatis et iniustitiae calumnia, ut excludatur a nobis desperatio, ut excludatur securitas, ut exstimulemur ad conandum." Another summary statement is found in LB 9:1246 (AS 4:18284). "Primum enim pene crudelem faciunt deum. . . . Deinde cum aiunt illos, qui per fidem iustificati sunt, nihil aliud quam peccare adeo, ut amando deum et fidendo deo reddamur digni odio dei, nonne vehementer hic faciunt parcam dei gratiam, quae sic iustificat hominem per fidem, ut tamen adhuc nihil aliud sit quam ipsum peccatum? Praeterea dum deus tot praeceptis onerat hominem, quae ad nihil aliud valent, quam ut magis oderit deum graviusque damnetur." 25. See also LB 9:1246 (AS 4:18084). 26. LB 9:1237 (AS 4:134). In LB 9:1241 (AS 4:158) Erasmus also argued that the free will was the source of all our good works. 27. LB 9:1235 (AS 4:12022). Referring to Gen. 6:3, he wrote: "Hoc loco scriptura non accipit carnem simpliciter pro impio affectu, quemadmodum aliquoties usurpat Paulus, cum opera carnis iubet mortificari, sed pro infirmitate naturae proclivis ad peccandum." He cited 1 Corinthians 2:14b in a list of texts which he took to prove that the whole human being could not be flesh after rebirth. He claimed that he would stick with the "auctoritas veterum" who taught that something good remained in human beings through which they could see and attempt the good. See LB 9:1236 (AS 4:128). 28. For this section see MSA 4:240,19241,8. 29. MSA 4:241,1227; here 241,1718. Melanchthon expressed himself rather vaguely: "Deum gignere cogitationem quandam." 30. MSA 4:241,21 and CR 12:69196: "qui docuerunt, quod nostris meritis iustificemur." Changes to this text will be discussed later. 31. MSA 4:241,2324: "quidam scripsit fundamenta Christianae doctrinae philosophiam Platonicam esse." On this famous text and Melanchthon's participation in the debate, see Erika Rummel, "Epistola Hermolai nova ac subditicia: A Declamation Falsely Ascribed to Philip Melanchthon," ARG 83 (1992): 3025. 32. MSA 4:242,19243,2. 33. Here again, these arguments also refuted Cochlaeus's position. However, they were for the most part indistinguishable from those directed against Erasmus's. By Melanchthon's own admission, the opponent in the Scholia was Erasmus. 34. He had already dealt with the issue in part through comments on Col. 2:1112, where Paul spoke of circumcision, by proving that this comment was another name for mortificatio, not Mosaic ceremonies. This was even more strongly put in Scholia 1528, 40r°43v°. 35. MSA 4:25253; here: 252,78. "Hanc expositionem non improbo, sed non satis explicat legis naturam." 36. MSA 4:253. "Lex tota data est, non ut iustificet, sed ut significet iustificationem, quae per Christum promissa erat." He linked this to the Eucharist, where the manducatio corporis itself did not justify but taught that forgiveness of sins was promised to believers. 37. This was changed into three in 1534. 38. MSA 4:253,2426. "Sic in genere accipio legem esse umbran futurorum, id est: totam legem significare promissam per Christum iustitiam." 39. Melanchthon returned to the question of the law in comments on Col. 2:21, discussed in chapter 3. 40. LB 6:88182, emphasis added: "observantesquaedam Legis instituta." It also undercut arguments in Hyperaspistes I. See especially LB 10:12991304 (AS 4:474504), where
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Erasmus discussed the relation between the Testaments, or again LB 10:131819 (AS 4:58283), where he attacked the distinction between law and gospel this way. "Quantum enim hic est distinctionum, quae faciunt necubi possis comprehendi? Distinguitur Lex ab Euangelio, sed sic ut utrumque sit in utroque." 41. MSA 4:285,9287,5. In 285,9 the MSA mistakenly refers to Gen. 1:2627 rather than Col. 3:10. 42. LB 9:1222 (AS 4:4648). Cochlaeus also stressed the importance of God's image for the will's freedom. 43. LB 10:1324 (AS 4:614). "Si lux naturae prorsus erat extincta in nobis, quo modo Philosophi sine gratia Dei Deum cognoverunt? Quomodo tam multa prodiderunt de honesto deque recte vivendo? De immortalitate animarum, de initio et fine Mundi, de diversis pioruin et impiorum praemiis?" 44. MSA 4:22225. See also comments on Col. 2:10a (MSA 4:244) However, many of his comments on the first two chapters had Erasmus in mind. See, for example, comments on Col. 2:11 (MSA 4:220,24), where Ezek. 18:23 is applied to patience under the cross and not the free will. 45. Melanchthon also anticipated an argument developed by Erasmus in Hyperaspistes II regarding Acts 17:28 and 1 Cor. 12:6. In De libero arbitrio (LB 9:1234 [AS 4:11617]) Erasmus had argued that a host of texts alternatively supported free will or grace, citing among others 2 Tim. 2:21 and 1 Cor. 12:6, respectively. In De servo arbitrio (WA 18:732) Luther had argued that these two texts were not contradictory, because the former text was prescriptive and only the latter indicative, "omnia opera, omnem uirtutem affirmans." In Hyperaspistes II (LB 10:1402) Erasmus added a reference to Acts 17:28, which he insisted "nimirum de naturali motu loquentis," and suggested "Jam oportuit Lutherum distinguere generalem illam actionem primae causae in rebus conditis omnibus a peculiari actione . . . de qua loquitur Paulus primae Corinth, duo decimo. .. . Nec illic loquitur de quibuslibet hominum actionibus, sed de variis donis Sancti Spiritus." In contrast, Melanchthon did not reduce God's work as first cause to creation but included the notion of God's governance. 46. MSA 4:222,2326 (emphasis added): "quia multi de hac controversia litigant . . . ut alicubi infirmos animos de ea dubitantes, quantum possem, sanarem." Perhaps Joachim Camerarius was among those weak souls. See chapter 5. 47. LB 10:128990 (AS 4:424; cf. WA 18:638). LB 10:1289 (AS 4:426) reveals that Erasmus had no place in his theology for a distinction between the two righteousnesses of God, a distinction crucial to Melanchthon's entire theology. 48. MSA 4:223,14. "Hoc itaque tenendum est naturam hominis naturalibus viribus non posse efficere verum timorem Dei et veram fiduciam erga Deum et reliquos affectus et motus spirituales." 49. MSA 4:223, 56: "naturales vires omnes, rationem, mentem, voluntatem." 50. See LB 9:1238 (John 6:44) and 1237 (John 15:5) (AS 4:140, 134) and WA 18:774,1739 (Rom. 8:67); 781,29782,11 (John 6:44); 748,835 (John 15:5). 51. LB 9:122021 (AS 4:36): "Liberum arbitrium est vis humanae voluntatis, qua se possit homo applicare ad ea quae perducunt ad aeternam salutem, ant ab iisdem avertere." His synergism was even more clearly stated in Hyperaspistes I (LB 10:1319 [AS 4:588]), when he argued that the entire De libero arbitrio was written, "ut evincam esse verum quod definivit Ecclesia, esse in homine vim liberi arbitrii, quae operanti in nobis gratiae cooperatur, sed sic ut ipsum non assequatur salutem absque gratia." 52. MSA 4:223,3132 " [H]ic potulo mihi ignosci
disputanti."
53. Cochlaeus had ridiculed Melanchthon's misuse of God's providence to undermine human freedom.
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54. Erasmus made a similar distinction in Hyperaspistes II (LB 10:1402), but in an attempt to reduce God to a first cause and create room for human choice. Melanchthon stressed God's governance in an attempt to define more clearly God's role in human activity. 55. MSA 4:225,3033. "Haec volui hoc loco monere, ut uivarem nonnihil imbecille animos haerentes in controversia liberi arbitrii, quae fortassis alias latius explicabuntur." 56. For example, Wilhelm Maurer, Der junge Melanchthon zwischen Humanismus und Reformation, 2 vols. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 196769), 2:48389, esp. 486, where he claims that in the Scholia of 1527 Melanchthon achieved a Mittelstellung between humanism and the evangelical truth. 57. See chapter 3. 58. MSA 4:230,32 (cf. CR 12:69196): "naturas corporum ant civiles mores" instead of "remediorum naturas aut corporum." 59. MSA 4:231,12. 60. Cf. also MSA 4:241,811, where Melanchthon concluded his discussion of the three errors by again pointing out that others could be included. His point? " [D]e articulis fidei non ratio, sed scriptura consulenda sit." 61. MSA 4:241,29242,12. See chapter i. 62. MSA 4:241,2024. In Hyperaspistes I Erasmus stated, for example, that God's mercy fed our faith, "ut quibusdam argumentis, quae sensu ac ratione comprehendimus." At several points he went out of his way to emphasize the philosophical teachings that accorded with Christian doctrine, including especially the freedom of the will. See, for example, LB 10:1294 (AS 4:44849). 63. MSA 4:231,21. He included here the phrase ut dixi, which may indicate that he was now reflecting back on and repeating portions of the Dissertatio and fitting them into the Scholia. 64. MSA 4:232,13233,2. 65. See n. 12 in this chapter. For this paragraph see MSA 4:233,8234,10. 66. In this section he mixed astronomy with what is now called astrology. 67. MSA 4:234,11235,5. 68. For a discussion of Melanchthon's understanding of natural law, see Clemens Bauer, "Die Naturrechtsanschauungen des jüngeren Melanchthon," ARG 42 (1951): 64100; Hermann Pfister, Die Entwicklung der Theologie Melanchthons unter dem Einfluß der Auseinandersetzung mit Schwärmgeistern und Wiedertäufern (Freiburg: Pax Christi Bewegung, 1968); and Günther Frank, Die theologische Philosophie Philipp Melanchthons (14971560) (Leipzig: Benno, 1995). 69. Here Melanchthon may have been playing directly on a comment from Hyperaspistes I (LB 10: 1251 [AS 4:21213]). Erasmus complained, "Et Paulus vult Episcopum esse ." 70. See Scheible, "Melanchthons Bildungsprogramm," 23348; Helmar Junghans, Der junge Luther und die Humanisten (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1985); Karl Bauer, Die Wittenberger Universitätstheologie und die Anfänge der Deutschen Reformation (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1928); and Maria Grossmann, Humanism in Wittenberg, 14851517 (Nieuwkoop: De Graaf, 1975). To place the 1520 speech concerning St. Paul in opposition to all the others is to use history for theological ends. Melanchthon was attacking the abuse of philosophy in that speech. As an early example of Melanchthon's public defense of humanities, see the preface to Jerome's Ecloga de locis hebraicis, written in 1522 (MBW 252 [T1:516,1923]). "Nam qui sacras literas sine aliarum artium atque literarum adminiculo tentant, nae illi 'sine pennis volaturi' sibi videntur. Stultissime autem omnium
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sentiunt qui hodie nihil esse pietatem nisi contemptum omnium bonarum literarum omnisque priscae eruditionis arbitrantur." 71. MBW 342 (T2:178,2123). "Feci hoc publica causa, cum et mihi fortasse facilius esset. si carnaliter expendas rem, theologica a pulpitis dictare, quam reuocare languescentem iuventutem ad necessarias has literas." His reasons included health, the number of lectures being given by others (four or more daily), the fact that his "hour" had been taken by "Gallus" (Francois Lambert) earlier and now by others who lectured at the church, and his conviction, expressed here, of the necessity and difficulty of the preparatory work. Other letters discussed the problem of pay. It had nothing to do with a crisis in vocation, as Maurer (Der junge Melanchthon, 2:41928) claims. In fact, Melanchthon saw himself to have "assumed a province"' (T2:178,1920: ''sumpsi mihi 'provinciam"'), which Erasmus in hisAdages (2,4,41. =LB 2:535F536A) associated with taking the burdens of an office. 72. Förstemann, Album Academiae Vitebergensis, 1:117. 73. IN CAN || TICA CANTICORVM SA= || lomonis libellum quidem sensibus al= || tissimis, in quo sublimia sacri con= || iugij mysteria, quae in Christo et || ecclesia sunt. pertractantur, || Francisci Lamb. Aue= || nionensis Commen= || tarij || Norinbergae apud Io. Petreium. || Anno M.D.XXIIII. || 8°, no woodcut and no colophon. 127 + [1 blank], 47r°, comments on the text "Vox dilecti mei" of chapter 2. "Neque potentia, neque dignitas, neque promotio uniuersitatum, neque quaecunque humanae scientiae aliquid faciunt ad authoritatem recte & uere iudicandi de uerbo." On Lambert, see Peter Fraenkel, ed., Pour Retrouver François Lambert: Bio bibliographie et études (BadenBaden: V. Koerner, 1987). which includes Reinhard Bodenmann, "Bibliotheca Lambertiana," 9213. This is Bodenmann, No. 6a. 74. Bodenmann, No. 5b. DE SACRO || CONIVGO COMMENTARIVS || FRANCISCI LAMBERTI || in Positiones LXIX. partitus. || Eiusdem Antithesis uerbi dei & inuentorum ho= || minum, prima positione. || Eiusdem psalmi siue Cantica. VII. || [The Seal of Petrejus 8°. No Woodcut. Colophon: NOREMBERGAE apud Ioannem || Petreium. Anno Domini || M.D.XXV. || 114] leaves. Here 04 v°. "Vincent eos [university teachers] infantes & artifices, quos illis doctiores tuis sermonibus facis. Vincentur a foeminis & agricolis, quibus os & sapientiam tuam infudisti. Quia nenia sunt omnia studia hominum, praeter legis tuae studium sacratissimum." 75. Bodenmann, No. 8a. FARRAGO || OMNIVM FERE RERVM || Theologicarum, quarum catalogum sequenti || pagella reperies. Francisco Lamber= || to Auenionem. autore || [three leaves] || 8°, no woodcut or colophon. 51 [+ 1] leaves. Here 42v°, 43r°, 44r: "de impijs uniuersitatibus, & promotionibus earundem." 76. Bodenmann, No. 15a. FRANCI || SCI LAMBERTI AVENIO= || nensis, Commentarij de Prophetia, || Eruditione & Linguis, de= || que Litera et Spiritu. || EIVSDEM, || LIBELLVS DE DIFFE=|| rentia Stimuli carnis Satanae || nuncij, & Vstiones. ARGENTORATI, || ANNO M.D.X.VI. [sic: =1526] || 8°, with woodcut. Colophon. AREGENTORATI APVD || IOHANNEM HERVAGIVM II MENSE MARTIO, || ANNO, M.D.XXVI. || 139 + [5] leaves. For a detailed analysis see Gerhard Müller, Franz Lambert von Avignon und Die Reformation in Hessen (Marburg: N. G. Elwert, 1958), 2531, and, more recently, Gerald Hobbs, "Francois Lambert sur les langues et la prophetie," in Fraenkel. ed., Pour Retrouver François Lambert, 273301. 77. Commentarii de Prophetia, 5r°v°. "Iam liquet ex praescriptis, quod ea sola doctrina seu eruditio uera est, eaque sola tuta, quae fide habetur. Nimirum omnia alia, est a sensu creato, qui a se ipso est uanus, curiosus, mendax, et perniciosus, nisi a sensu increato perficiatur." 78. Commentarii de Prophetia, 5v°. "Ex hoc sequitur, quod omnis doctrina incredulorum est uana, fallax, perniciosa, deoque execrabilis, quod nihil habeat commune cum sensu
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aeternae ueritatis. Sequitur quoque ex hoc, quod soli fideles recte docere possunt, etiam humana naturalia." 79. Commentarii de Prophetia, 6v°. "Finis quippe omnis eruditionis est bonum et utilitas, ideo quia increduli sale omnis eruditionis, nempe sensu Dei carent, eorum eruditio non est aliud, quam sophistica eruditio, mala, impia, Deo abominiabilis, nocentissima, mortifera, & nonquam non perdens." 80. Commentarii de Prophetia, 8r°: "hominem Sophistam, curiosum, garrulum, loquacem, temerarium, elatumque." 81. Commentarii de Prophetia, 8v°. "Rem perniciosissimam esse, doceri, aut docere humana, sine fide." He added, "Mendacia, figmenta, somnia, fallaciae, sophismata, & perditiones, sermones eorum [=Ethnicorum] scripti sunt." 82. Commentarii de Prophetia, 11v°: "sine artium liberalium peritia, Dei scripta enarrari." 83. MBW 445 (T2:399,2123). "Spem concipio exoritura rursum studia, quae impia quorundam pietas conatur damnare, inter quos nunc temere insanit Lambertus ille quondam Franciscanus." 84. MBW 473 (T2:436,1319)∙ 85. See LB 10:1277 (AS 4:356), where Erasmus complained about Lambert's attacks on him. 86. Erasmus admitted in Hyperaspistes I (LB 10:1263, 126869 [AS 4:27879, 3089]) that Luther and Melanchthon supported bonae litterae, referring to Luther's tract "An die Radherrn," which Melanchthon had translated into Latin (cf. MBW 330), but he hastened to add that people accused Luther of abandoning the gospel thereby (cf. also MBW 360 [T2:215,13642]). In this connection Melanchthon may also have been reacting to Erasmus's Lingua (ASD 4/1a), first published in 1525, which disparaged the Reformers' use of language. 87. See chapter 3, on Col. 2:3. 88. Scholia 1528, 48r°. "Magna pars Theologorum nostrorum, in hoc error fuerunt, ut somniarint duos esse legumlatores a Deo missos, Moysen, & Christum." 89. See chapters 3 and 4, where Erasmus's praise for Origen's theology is described. Erasmus spent a major section of Hyperaspistes II (LB 10:134663; 1499) arguing against this very position. For example, he summarized Romans 3:20 this way (1348): "Mihi videtur loqui de crassiore parte [Legis], quae praescribit ceremonialia." In the Scholia 1528, 13r°, Melanchthon also briefly examined the problem of the abrogation of the law against John Agricola. Luther also attacked Origen and Jerome in De servo arbitrio (WA 18:703). 90. Scholia 1528, 19r°: "quae certo sentiat Deum ignoscere propter Christum, quae certo sentiat exaudiri nos, quae certo statuat Deum nos defensurum esse, quemadmodum certo sentimus uri manus admotus igni." 91. Scholia 1528, 19r°: "qui docent uiribus liberi arbitrij fidem effici in nobis. Ratio enim non potest assentiri promissionibus Dei." 92. Scholia 1528, 19v°. 93. WA 18:782. 94. LB 10:151112. 95. Scholia 1528, 9v°. There was no hint of a christological construal of this text. 96. Scholia 1528, 10r°: "impellere ad peccandum & detinere captivos & obnoxios aethernae morti." 97. Melanchthon also dealt with the issue of reward, widely discussed throughout Hyperaspistes I and Hyperaspistes II, in the Scholia 1528, 5r°, an addition to comments from 1527 on Col. 1:3 (MSA 4:215,29). Good works were done simply because of God's will, not for reward (merces) since the flesh was so mercenary (mercenaria) that even the saints could not free themselves from love of reward. Promises of reward and threats of punishment functioned in the Scripture pedagogically, as the law was supposed to, as signs of God's will that
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sustained the saints' patience in the midst of suffering. The saints sought reward because they discerned under such promises God's mercy and grace. On the contrary, already in De libero arbitrio Erasmus derived from promise of reward proof for the necessity of the will's freedom. 98. The proof text from Hos. 13 was moved to MSA 4:222,19. 99. Scholia 1528, 11v°12r°. The rewritten material begins after MSA 4:223,17. "Longe errant qui existimant ad concupiscentiam mutandam liberi arbitrij vires sufficere. Multo magis errant, qui somniant se uiribus liberi arbitrij aduersus diabolum defendi posse." 100. This text from Isaiah figured in the debate between Luther and Erasmus. See LB 9:1236 (AS 4:12426) and WA 18:73840. Erasmus returned to this text in Hyperaspistes II (LB 10:145766, cf. 145154) and insisted, using Jerome's interpretation, that flesh meant infirma hominis conditio. Moreover, he directly referred to Luther's accusation that the Diatribe was actually attacking Melanchthon's Loci. LB 10:1458 (cf. WA 18:740) reads, "Impium igitur affectum esse quicquid est in homine: nam hoc negat Diatribe, nec tamen suggillat Philippum, quem non noinat, & si suggillaret, quid erat periculi? Non est fas a Philippo dissentire?" Cochlaeus also objected to Melanchthon's definition of "flesh" in his De libero arbitrio adversus locos communes, E 2r°. 101. Among other things, Erasmus again allowed the scholastic understanding that the free will merited grace de congruo. See LB 10:1476, where he described it as someone else's argument, and 1525, where he admitted that, rightly understood, the terminology could be used. He summarized his approach this way (1476): "Erat quidam et illa proposita opinio, quae praedicat liberum arbitrium per opera moraliter bona, posse de congruo promereri gratiam justificantem. Verum hanc Diatriba nec admodum tuetur, nec improbat, verum in hoc magis confert omnem disputationem, ut ostendat voluntatem hominis posse praebere se gratiae pulsanti, posse avertere, Item cooperari gratiae operanti, & ab hac se posse subducere." Erasmus did not explain how "posse praebere se gratiae pulsanti" differed from "meritum de congruo" or "facere quod in se est.'' In fact, lie seems to have been recasting these late medieval, scholastic arguments using humanist rhetorical techniques. 102. Scholia 1528, 12r°. 103. For example in Hyperaspistes II (LB 10:134547). 104. Perhaps as a result of the settlement of the dispute with John Agricola, he left out a reference to Gal 3:24 (cf. MSA 4:224,14). 105. Scholia 1528, 14r°. "Proinde qui magnopere predicant vires liberi arbitrij, sequuntur Philosophos, qui vim rationis humanae vehunt immodicis laudibus. Sed falluntur una & Philosophi, & qui hos autores sequunt ur, nec considerant quid sacrae litterae doceant." See note 123 for a possible application to Erasmus. 106. MSA 4:225,2530. Cf. Scholia 1528, 14r°. 107. That is, MSA 4:230,3236,1 and MSA 4:238,3243,2 remained approximately the same. He did mention (Scholia 1528, 21r°) that Cicero was among those uncertain of God's immediate care for the world. The discussion of comments on Col. 1:15 showed how important God's gubernatio was for Melanchthon. 108. Scholia 1528, 27v°f. This phrase was also used by Melanchthon in MBW 175 (T1:373,62) and can be found in Erasmus's Adagia 1,10,78 (LB 2:390DE). I am indebted to Richard Wetzel of the MelanchthonForschungsstelle for pointing this out. 109. Scholia 1528, 28r°f. Here Melanchthon was setting up his attack on Erasmus's friends by attacking scholastic theologians much as Erasmus had in the Ratio seu methodus and in his annotations on Colossians. For the latter, see comments on Col. 1:15, already present in the annotations of 1516. 110. Scholia 1528, 28v°. "Et tamen, quoniam spiritus sanctus docet nos per uerbum, sermonis natura cognoscenda est."
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111. Cf. Luther's comments about the resurgence of languages, books, and learning in "An die Ratherren," WA 15:31,820; 36,7; 36,2133; 37,139,14; 52,2526. Both theologians rejected what they saw as Lambert's Schwärmerei, that is, the notion that the Holy Spirit taught apart people from the actual words of Scripture. 112. Scholia 1528, 29r°. 113. Scholia 1528, 29v°. "Atque hoc tempore in tot dissensionibus maxime oportuit eos qui praesunt in Ecclesiis, his artibus instructos esse, ad sanandas mentes quae in tanta uarietate opinionum, nihil certi constituere possunt. . . . Magnam partem contentionum tollent, si diligenter exposuerint , in quibus litigatur de uerbis, non de re." Melanchthon's use of this term is reminiscent of Erasmus's discussion of scholastic argumentation in Ratio seu methodus (LB 5:136 [AS 3:486]). 114. Scholia 1528, 30r°. "Obsecro, quid illa moles commentariorum Fabri, aut Roffensis & similium, lectori conferre queat, ubi tam multa praeter rem, & aliena a caussa congeruntur. Qui sic docent, conscientias dubitantes magis etiam perturbant." 115. [Leaf] MALLEVS [Leaf] || IOANNIS FABRI DOCTORIS CELEBER || rimi, Illustriss. principis Ferdnandi archiducis Austriae &c. || a secretis, in haeresim Lutheranam, iam denuo uehe= || mentiori studio & labore recognitus, in Tracta= || tus etiam & Paragraphos divisus. || Adiectus est triplex Index, multaquam alia, quae in caeteris || exemplaribus desiderantur. || [Coatofarms] II Ad Hebraeos tilt. || Doctrinis uariis & peregrinis nolite abduci. || ANNO MDXXIIII. || 2°, no woodcut. Colophon: Coloniae apud loannem Soterem, expensis ho= || nesti ciuis Petri Quentel. || 176 + [12] leaves. This treatise was not dealt with in David V. N. Bagchi, Luther's Earliest Opponents: Catholic Controversialists, 15181525 (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991). Cochlaeus would also count among the similii were it not for the clear connections of Fisher and Fabri to Erasmus. 116. See chapter 5. 117. LB 10:1317 (AS 4:57273) and 10:148586. 118. ASSERTI> || ONVM MARTINI LVTHERI || confutatio, per Reuerendum pa || trem D. Iohannem Roffesnem || ep[iscop]um, Cantabrigien[sis]. academiae || cancellarium edita: Suntque singu || lis confutationibus singulae Lu= || theri assertiones praefixae, quo fa || cilius, utrius sententiae subscriben || dum sit, cognoscatur. Accessit || praeterea totius operis Eucharium Ceruicornum, Impensa & ere M. Godefridi Hit= || torpij civis Colonien[sis]. Anno || M.cccccxxv. mense || Januario. || 364 + [12] leaves. See Bagchi, Luther's Earliest Opponents, 83, 16465, and 174, for brief comments on Fisher's arguments. 119. See the footnotes on the following pages of the German translation of De libero arbitrio, in AS 4:3, 121, 123, 125, 131, 133,135, and 137. In Hyperaspistes I (LB 10:1297 [AS 4:468]) Erasmus proposed Fisher as the model of a good bishop (cf. WA 18:65051). In Hyperaspistes II (LB 10:1395, 1479, 1484, 1519) Erasmus referred directly to the bishop's refutation of Luther. 120. Already in his Spongia against Ulrich von Hutten, Erasmus wrote (LB 10:1656D): "Quid mea civilis amicitia nocet Luthero? Fortassis alicubi prodest. Reverendus Pater Joannes Episcopus Roffensis scripsit ingens volumen in Lutherum. Jam olim usus sum illo viro, & singulari amico, & constantissimo patrono. An jubebit Huttenus ut illi denuntiam inimicitiam, quia stylum acuit in Lutherum?" 121. That is, MSA 4:254,10255,4. Cf. Scholia 1528, 51v°52r°. 122. Scholia 1528, 51v°. "In aduersariorum dictis aut factis, quidquid inest boni dissimulant, tantum excerpunt deteriora, haec miro artificio amplifiant, ut eorum commemoratione bona penitus obruant. Econtra sua dicta ac facta commodissime interpretantur, hic nouo quodam candore utuntur, hic aequitatem ab alijs requirunt. Ad hos magistros, siquis uolet Sycophanticam discere, conferre se poterit." This may have been in response to Hyper
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aspistes I (for example, LB 10:1314 [AS 4:560]), where Erasmus argued that his neutrality in the debate over the free will was a means "quo tibi [Luthero] quoque probetur aequitas nostra." 123. Scholia 1528, 51v°52r°. "Nam haec nostra aetas magnam copiam exemplorum suppeditae potest, nunquam enim maiore in odio fuisse ullos homines existimo, quam sunt hoc tempore boni quiddam viri [Luther and Melanchthon], qui recte docent, nec in odio sunt uni licui generi hominum [like Eck], verum maxime inuisi sunt Hypocritis quibusdam, qui suam doctrinam reprehendi aegre, quique metuunt, ne sapientiae laudem amittant. In his Hypocritis cum [52r°] sit incredibilis superbia, tamen mire norunt , & singulari specie humilitatis fastum animi cogere. Olim Monachi uulgo faciebant fucum genere uestitus ac incessus. Nunc aliud artificium multo callidius excogitatum est simulande humlitatis, quod quale sit, non libet mihi hic describere." 124. Hyperaspistes 1: LB 10:1252 (AS 4:218), where Jonas was surreptitiously (under the name Patroclus) named coauthor of De servo arbitrio; 1317 (AS 4:57273), where Erasmus criticized Jonas's attack on John Fabri; 1321 (AS 4:598), where Erasmus lamented his abandonment of the bonae litterae; and Hyperaspistes II: LB 10:148586, where Erasmus bemoaned Jonas's corruption through Luther's spirit, especially in his attack on Fabri. 125. See Scholia 1528, 13r°. 126. Scholia 1529, D[i] r°. "Etlich wenn sie hören vns vom freyen willen reden vnd seinem vnuermögen, schreien sie von stunden auff, so hör ich, so sind alle gebot vnd gesetz vmb sunst; so mögen wir thun was wir wollen." Scholia 1528, 13r°, read: "Quidam cum audiunt uoluntati libertatem adimi, frustra arbitrantur leges esse positas ad cohercendam carnem & desperatione quadam cupiditatibus, frenum laxant." 127. Scholia 1529, [C iv] r° (cf. MSA 4:223,4), "sondern solchs gibt allein der heilige geist," and [C iv] v° (cf. Scholia 1528, 12r°: "Spiritus sancti opera sunt"), "Sondern das werck gehört allein dem heiligen geist zu." 128. Scholia 1529, [C iv] v°. "Das ist nu der nötigest artickel, welchen die yenigen so den freyen willen wollen erhalten, am ersten beweysen solten." 129. Scholia 1528, 14r°: "qui sciant in hac disputatione hoc in primis tenendum esse" (=Scholia 1529, Dij v°: damit sie wissen mügen/ worauff man ynn dieser disputation furnemlich sehen miisse"). 130. Scholia 1529, D ij v°: "was die heubtfrage ist, nemlich, ob der frey wille odder vernunfft vermüge yhr selbst ein fromkeit odder gerechtickeit zu machen die fur Gott gilt. Da beschliessen wir vnd sage kurtz, Neyn." Despite his love of brevity, Melanchthon was never quite so abrupt. 131. Scholia 1529, F iij v° and [F iv] r° (to MSA 4:231,22 and 232,26). 132. Scholia 1529, F iij r° (to MSA 4:231,5 and Scholia 1528, 23v°). 133. Scholia 1529, F iij v°: "als sey der yhenig der beste Christ, welcher der gröbest vngelertest esel sey." 134. Scholia 1529, [F iv] v° (to MSA 4:232,30). 135. Scholia 1529, G iij r°. 136. Scholia 1529, G [i] v° (to MSA 4:234,17): "was dem menschen nach art angeborn / vnd haben vrsach gesucht solcher gebot / warumb dis erbar / yhenes vnerbar sey / vnd also befunden / vnd gefasset / wie das gantz erbar leben eins menschen stünde auff vier stücken odder vier heubt tugenden (die etliche angel tugent nennen) aber daruon wil ich hie weytter nicht reden." 137. Scholia 1528, 29r°. "Et cum saepe obscurae in ecclesia de maximis rebus controversiae exsistant, nec explicare illas, nec verum defendere sciet is, qui non satis instructus est a dialectica ac rhetorica."
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138. Scholia 1529, H [i] r°, emphasis added. "Dariiber/ nach dem offte ynn der kirchen von hohen mechtigen wichtigen artickeln zanck vnd hader furfallen, als von freyen willen vnd der gleichen, kan die selben niemands verstehen, ausörtern, odder richten, der nicht etwas von Dialectick odder Rethorick gelernt hat." 139. Scholia 1528, 29r°. "Et cum de re dissensio est, quoniam in disputando multa aliena a proposito admiscent, non explicant controversias, se magis obscurant tractando, ut cognosci & diiudicari nequeant." 140. Scholia 1529, H [i] r°, emphasis added. "Offt kömets auch wenn man von einem artickel handelt, als vom freyen willen, so bringen dieselben vngelerten viel dings mit ein, das nicht zur sache gehöret noch dienet, sondern nür weitleufftiger vnd tunckler den handel macht, das man dester weniger könne draus komen." 141. The preface is quoted according to the printing in in WA 30, 2:6869. 142. See chapter 4. 143. LB 10:1345 and passim. 144. WA 30, 2:68,1269,1. See Heinz Scheible, "Melanchthon zwischen Luther und Erasmus," in RenaissanceReformation: Gegensätze und Gemeinsamkeiten, ed. August Buck (Wolfenbüttel: Herzog August Bibliothek, 1984), 17275, for a similar assessment. 145. See Robert Kolb, Confessing the Faith: Reformers Define the Church, 15301580 (St. Louis: Concordia, 1991), 6398. 146. Paul Schwarzenau, Der Wandel im theologischen Ansatz hei Melanchthon von 15251535 (Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1956), traces this shift from its beginnings in the Loci communes of 1522 to the Loci communes of 1535. See chapter 7. 147. Erasmus NT 3:637 (LB 6:888): "certam cognitionem mysterii, ne quid omnino haesitent." These comments, including a reference to Theophylact, were already in the earliest editions. 148. Scholia 1528, 19r°. "Longe falluntur Hypocritae, qui docent uiribus liberi arbitrij fidem effici in nobis." Note the parallels in language to his attack on those with false humility. 149. Scholia 1528, 19r°f. (emphasis added). "Haec ideo diximus, ut diligenter expendant lectores uim uerbi . Ita enim discent, fidem oportere, quandam certam in mente sententiam non ambiguam opinionem esse. Estque haec summa sententiae, Significo uobis meas adflictiones, ut cum uidebitis ne ereptum esse, fidem concipiatis Christum & uobis adfuturum esse. Nam in adflictionibus experimini praesentiam eius, si constanter credideritis ei toties pollicenti gratiam & auxilium." 150. James Michael Weiss, "Erasmus at Luther's Funeral: Melanchthon's Commemorations of Luther in 1546," Sixteenth Century Journal 16 (1985): 91114. 151. On this point the title of Martin Greschat's dissertation is most apt. See Martin Greschat, Melanchthon neben Luther: Studien zur Gestalt der Rechtfertigungslehre zwischen 1528 und 1537 (Witten: Luther Verlag, 1965). Unfortunately, Greschat uses neither the 1528 Scholia nor the 1534 Scholia in his research. Earlier work by Bizer or Schäfer focused primarily on the young Melanchthon. See Ernst Bizer, Theologie der Verheissung: Studien zur Theologie des jungen Melanchthon (Neukirchen: Verlag des Erziehungsvereins, 1964), and Rolf Schäfer, Christologie und Sittlichkeit in Melanchthons friihen Loci (Tiibingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1961). See also Schäfer's refutation of Bizer's critique in his "Zur Prädestinationslehre des jungen Melanchthons," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 63 (1966): 35278, especially 36975. Schäfer argues that the lack of a true theology of the cross in Melanchthon's early theology made it impossible for him to perceive Prädestinationsanfechtung as gospel. 152. Wengert 14766. 153. See Martin Brecht, Martin Luther, 3 vols., trans. James Schaaf (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 19851993), 3:7884.
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Chapter 7 1. Wilhelm Neuser, Der Ansatz der Theologie Philipp Melanchthons (NeukirchenVluyn: Verlag der Buchhandlung des Erziehungsvereins, 1957); Paul Schwarzenau, Der Wandel im theologischen Ansatz bei Melanchthon von 15251535 (Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1956); Wilhelm Maurer, Der junge Melanchthon zwischen Humanismus und Reformation, 2 vols. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 196769), 2:230454. See chapter 6 for its use in the debate with Erasmus. Most recently, Günther Frank investigated the relation between philosophy and theology in his Die theologische Philosophie Philipp Melanchthons (14971560) (Leipzig: Benno, 1995), 5271. 2. See especially Manfred Schulze, Fürsten und Reformation: Geistliche Reformpolitik weltlicher Fürsten vor der Reformation (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1991). 3. See, for example, James Estes, Christian Magistrate and State Church: The Reforming Career of Johannes Brenz (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), 1834, and Robert C. Walton, Zwingli's Theocracy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), 1729. An even more thoroughly "humanistic" approach was carried out in England, according to James Kelsey McConica, English Humanists and Reformation Politics under Henry VIII and Edward VI (Oxford: Clarendon, 1965), 1343. 4. Neuser, DerAnsatz, 115. 5. Maurer, Der junge Melanchthon, 2:41554. For a refutation of this thesis see Heinz Scheible, "Luther and Melanchthon," Lutheran Quarterly, n.s., 4 (1990): 31739. 6. Hermann Pfister, Die Entwicklung der Theologie Melanchthons unter dem Einfluß der Auseinandersetzung mit Schwärmgeistern und Wiedertäufern (Freiburg: Pax Christi Bewegung, 1968), 63. The sections from the correspondence between Luther and Melanchthon that Pfister cites actually prove, first, that Melanchthon was not very upset by, among other things, the prophetic claims made by Nicholas Storch and others and, second, that his deep concern over infant baptism sent him back to Luther for advice. In any event, Luther himself provided the impetus for Melanchthon's theological change and not, as Pfister implies, some sort of psychological crisis (cf. zutiefst erschrecken) 7. Schwarzenau, Der Wandel, 5159. 8. See above, chapter 5 for a brief analysis of the Loci communes theologici. It remains an interesting though highly speculative debate to determine whether this second distinction was already present in Melanchthon's earlier thought. The burden of proof falls on those who insist that some sort of break occurred, because apart from the obvious changes in language, Melanchthon himself never characterized his life in the mid1520s in catastrophic terms. The critical edition of Melanchthon's letters helps make clear that he viewed teaching in the arts faculty as the burden of his office, not a crisis. See MBW 342 (T2:178,1728) and the important reference to the Adagia 2,4,41. 9. Cf. chapter 5 and Hyperaspistes II (LB 10:134547 and 148184). 10. MSA 1:190214, first published in 1525. 11. MSA 1:195. 12. The concern for this text was also reflected in Melanchthon's commentary on Col. 2:23 in 1527 and in a surprising digression from his Dispositio on Romans from 152930, where almost the only verses to receive lengthy commentary were Rom. 13:17. 13. MSA 1:17989. The publication date in the MSA is incorrect. Compare MBW 342 (T2:17778), which dates a letter to Spalatin referring to ongoing work on the Epitome to 13/ 14 September 1524. 14. Melanchthon linked this coercion to Gal. 3:24, which he interpreted in terms of the civil use of the law.
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15. MSA 1:16870. "Duplex est regimen, spirituale et corporale." The fifteenth thesis read, "Peccant, qui contra hanc ordinationem usurpant gladium, cuiusmodi sunt, qui aliena invadunt." 16. MSA 1:17175: "Unterschidt zwischen weltlicher und Christlicher Fromkeyt." 17. See chapter 4. 18. MSA 4:251,1518 (=Scholia 1528, 46r°). "Hic epilogum instituit [Paulus], quia enim ante, quid sit Christiana iustitia, docuit eamque contulit cum carnali et civili iustitia; adicit epilogum de caeremoniis et politica Mosaica et de traditionibus humanis." 19. LB 6:892, 894, which reads: "Itaque si mortui estis cum Christo ab elementis mundi, quid quasi viventes in mundo decretis tenemini? Ne tetigeris, ne gustaris, neque contrectaris, Quae omnia ipso pereunt ab usu, juxta praecepta & doctrinas hominum, Quae verbotenus [=verbi gratia] quidem habent speciem sapientiae per superstitionem ac humilitatem animi & laesionem corporis, non per honorem aliquem, ad expletionem carnis." From 1530 the German Bible ( WABi 7:232) reflected Melanchthon's interpretation. "So jr denn nu abgestorben seid mit Christo den Satzungen der welt/ was lasset jr euch denn fangen mit satzungen/ als lebetet jr noch in der welt? (die da sagen) Du solt das nicht angreiffen/ Du solt das nicht kosten/ Du solt das nicht anrüren/ Welches sich doch alles vnter handen verzehret/vnd ist Menschen gebot vnd lere/Welche haben einen schein der weisheit/durch selb erwelete Geistligkeit vnd Demut/ vnd dadurch/ das sie des Leibes nicht verschonen/ vnd dem Fleisch nicht seine Ehre thun/ zu seiner notdurfft." To the word Ehre the translators felt constrained to add a marginal note, not in the 1522 translation: "Gott wil den leib geehret haben. das ist/ er sol sein futter/ kleider etc. zur notdurfft haben/ vnd nicht mit vntreglichem fasten/ erbeit oder vmmüglicher keuscheit verderbt werden/ wie der Menschenlere thun." In this the Wittenberg translators followed Melanchthon and the Greek church fathers who, according to Walter Bauer, William Arndt, and F. Wilbur Gingrich, A GreekEnglish Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), s.v., understood the final phrase to mean ''for gratification of physical needs." 20. This may in part have been because Erasmus mistakenly saw in these verses part of Colossians' argumentum, a position Melanchthon strongly rejected (MSA 4:21112; cf. above, chapter 4). They were for Melanchthon a corollary to Paul's basic understanding of the gospel, presented in Col. 1 and 2. 21. In Scholia 1528, 56r°, Melanchthon changed the lemma to read: "quae omnia ipso pereunt usu." See chapter 3. 22. MSA 4:259,1930. 23. MSA 4:259,31260,26. 24. The Greek text for v. 23 remains a conundrum for modern translators. The New Revised Standard Version, its predecessor, and the Jerusalem Bible offer variations in their footnotes to the text. These, along with the New English Bible and the New International Version supply a word implying restraint to the final prepositional phrase. Thus, the NRSV reads: "These have indeed an appearance of wisdom in promoting selfimposed piety and humility and severe treatment of the body, but they are of no value in checking the indulgence of the flesh." The note reads: "Or: are of no value, serving only to indulge the flesh." 25. The reference in the footnote to MSA 4:260,24 is inaccurate. Melanchthon was perhaps referring to brief comments on Colossians ascribed to Jerome found in PL 30:858. As I noted earlier, Melanchthon's argument was followed in later translations of the German Bible. Ambrose (PL 17:433) clearly took it negatively. It is not clear whether Melanchthon was aware of the Greek tradition on this text.
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26. MSA 4:260,2829. "Sit ne peccatum violare traditiones humanas?" As an examplc of the discussion from the Roman side, see Johannes Eck, Enchiridion locorum communiun adversus Lutherum et alios hostes ecclesiae (15251543), ed. Peter Fraenkel (Münster Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1979), 146 72. Col. 2:16 is cited on pp. 157, 168, 172 27. See David C. Steinmetz, "Calvin and Melanchthon on Romans 13:17," Ex Auditu: An Annual of the Frederick Neumann Symposium on Theological Interpretation of Scripture 2 (1986): 7677, where he shows that both the young Luther and Sadoleto favored including ecclesiastical powers in Paul's admonition in Romans 13. 28. Steinmetz looked only at Melanchthon's commentaries on Romans from 1532 and 1556. A comparison of those comments with Melanchthon's earlier writings (1522, 1527, and 1529) goes beyond the scope of this work. The exegesis runs from MSA 4:261,4 to 271,28. 29. MSA 4:261,915. 30. MSA 4:261,1623. 31. MSA 4:261,24262,7. 32. MSA 4:262,812. 33. MSA 4:262,1320. 34. MSA 4:262,2027. 35. Plato, Republic viii.545. 36. Augustine, De civitate Dei iv.4. English translation: Augustine: City of God, trans Henry Bettenson (New York: Pelican Books, 1976), 139. 37. See also the "Unam sanctam" of Boniface VIII. Among the forest of books on medieval political theory, Brian Tierney, The Crisis of Church and State: 1050 1300 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: PrenticeHall, 1964), still gives a fine overview. 38. See Arthur Stephen McCrade, The Political Thought of William ofOckham (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 98. Ockham consistently reflected Aristotle's more positive view of political authority found in The Politics. 39. See the prologue of De Potestate Regia et Papali. English translation: John of Paris on Royal and Papal Power, trans. Arthur P. Monahan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 15. 40. See Eric W. Gritsch, Thomas Müntzer: A Tragedy of Errors (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1989), 80, and the references cited there. 41. Ibid., 13, citing from the confession of Hans Hut, 1527, in Akten zur Geschichte des Bauernkriegs in Mitteldeutschland, 2 vols. (Leipzig and Jena, 1923 1942; reprint, Aalen: Scientia, 1964), 2:897. 42. MSA 1:27295: Adversus anabaptistas iudicium. 43. MBW 609 (CR 1:900901). On the same day he announced to his friend Joachim Camerarius plans to publish the piece (MBW 610). He expressed the same wish in a letter to Spalatin on 12 November 1527 (MBW 624) and to Balthasar Düring on 17 November (MBW 626). MBW 640, a preliminary draft of part of this material, stemmed from this time. 44. MBW 648 (CR 1:93637). The same day, Camerarius received a letter to the same effect (MBW 650). 45. MBW 676. He sent the manuscript with John Setzer, the printer in Haguenau and soninlaw of Thomas Anshelm. In a letter written at the same time to Nicholas Gerbel ill Strasbourg (MBW 679 [CR 1:97374]), he indicated that the tract would also displease certain Strasbourg preachers. 46. MBW 716, dated 12 October 1528 (CR 1:1001). See also MBW 717. On 3 June 1528 (MBW 691) Gerbel was still waiting for the book to appear. 47. MSA 1:291,1923. "Simpliciter impium est, quod docent, non licere Christianis gerere magistratus, aut obire officia magistratuum, exerecere iudicia, gladio uti adversus sontes et similia, de quo loco alias [e.g. in the Scholia] saepe dictum est."
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48. MSA 4:262,25. 49. This familiar objection formed the backbone of Luther's first major treatise on the two realms from 1523, "On Secular Authority" (WA 11:24581). Melanchthon's argument ran from MSA 4:263,29 to 264,11. 50. MSA 4:264,12265,10. 51. MSA 4:264,34265,2. "Itaque et duos populos facit, gentes et sanctos, et vocat reges gentium, quia regna sunt constituta, ut coerceant iniustos." For a second time he cited 1 Tim. 1:9 and glossed the word gentium to mean "all people who are not righteous." 52. MSA 4:265,1117. 53. MSA 4:265,17272,12. 54. MSA 4:265,3435. 55. MSA 4:266,30267,3. He also cited Terence. 56. MSA 4:267,15. He also quoted Jer. 29:7. 57. For an example of such elaborate externals as practiced in Melanchthon's day, see the description of the 1519 meeting of Henry VIII and Francis I near Calais in Jasper Ridley, Statesman and Saint: Cardinal Wolsey, Sir Thomas More, and the Politics of Henry, VIII (New York: Viking Press, 1982), 8792. 58. MSA 4:268,26269,7. The list included Ps. 32:910, Prov. 26:3, 16:1415, 20:2, and 24:2122, Eccles. 8:2, 8:8. At nearly the same time as Melanchthon lectured on Colossians, he also was interpreting Proverbs, a book that provided a host of texts relating believers to government. 59. MSA 4:269,1729. 60. MSA 4:269,2729. 61. For more on this point see Clyde Manschreck, Melanchthon: The Quiet Reformer (New York and Nashville: Abingdon, 1958), 12128, and Robert Kolb, "The Theologians and the Peasants: Conservative Evangelical Reactions to the German Peasants Revolt," ARG 69 (1978): 10330. 62. MSA 4:269,29271,28. This section includes the brief exegesis of Romans 13:34 referred to earlier. Karlstadt also represented this kind of radical biblicism. 63. MSA 4:269,3034. "Respondeo: Regnum Christi est spirituale regnum, quod consistit in timore, fide, castitate, et caritate. Verum praeter illud regnum est regnum civile, quod distribuit hereditates, punit maleficia, constituit iudicia pacis publicae causa." 64. The importance of this story for evangelicals is indicated by Lucas Cranach Jr.'s painting of the same, now hanging in Braunschweig's Herzog Anton Ulrich Museum, entitled Die Predigt Johannes des Täufers vor Kriegs und Hofleuten (Inv. Nr. 29). How their interpretation of this story differed from Erasmus's will also be discussed in chapter 8. 65. MSA 4:271,412. 66. Steinmetz, "Calvin and Melanchthon," 80. 67. MSA 4:271,2128. The reference to the 1518 Strasbourg edition oftheAdages in MSA 4 is less than helpful. References to the Sybarites are found especially in LB 2:46971 (Nos. 2,2652,267) and to the Milesians in LB 2:35152 (No. 1,949). The inhabitants of both places were known in antiquity for their debauchery. 68. MSA 4:271,2931. "Hactenus docuimus magistratibus parendum esse et facienda omnia, quae imperant, quae sine peccato nostro facere potest." 69. MSA 4:272,212. "Hoc sic accipias: Tum non esse obtemperandum, si te peccare iubeant, ut si iubeant peierare. Nam quae sine tuo peccato praestare potes, etiamsi iniuste principes exigant, tamen praestare debemus, ut cum operas graviores iusto exigant. Deinde etiam cum iubent te peccare, ut si cogant deficere ab evangelio, ita recuses oboedire, ut tamen nullam vim adversus eos pares. Sed si velint te per iniuriam occidere, patiaris, sicut Christus et apostoli passi sunt. Nam adversus magistratus, etiam cum iniuriam faciunt, vim
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parare seditio est et scelus, quia scriptum est: 'Qui potestati resistunt, iudicium sibi acquirunt."' 70. This position matched Luther's own. See, for example, Luther's letter to Elector John of Saxony on 18 November 1529 (WABr 5:18183). 71. MSA 4:272,13277,1 6. 72. MSA 4:272,16273,26. 73. Here, and elsewhere in this discussion, Melanchthon may have had in mind Andreas Karlstadt, who had written "Von dem Sabbat vnd gebotten feyertagen" and "Ob man gemach faren vnd des ergernüssen der schwachen verschonen soll/ in sachen so gottis willen angehn," both printed in Erich Hertzsch, ed., Karlstadts Schriften aus den Jahren 152325, 2 vols. (Halle: Max Neimeyer, 195657), 1:2147, 7397. 74. MSA 4:273,1626, where the references to the canons of Nicea and Augustine are cited. 75. MSA 4:273,26274,10. 76. MSA 4:274,1116. 77. MSA 4:274,17275,18. This already posed an exegetical problem for Wessel Gansfort. 78. On the importance of this last text for Luther, see Timothy J. Wengert, "Martin Luther's Movement toward an Apostolic SelfAwareness as Reflected in His Early Letters," LutherJahrbuch 61 (1994): 7192. 79. MSA 4:274,33275,3. In support of this thesis he referred to Paul's standing up to Peter in Gal. 2, his refusal to circumcise Titus, and references in the pastoral epistles (1 Tim. 4:1 and Titus 1:14). 80. Melanchthon demonstrated his concern for the governing authorities and the contours of Christian freedom already in the 1527 Latin version of the Visitation Articles (CR 26:1617, 2326) and even more broadly in the 1528 German version, edited in conjunction with Luther and John Bugenhagen (CR 26:5763, 7477, 7983). 81. MSA 4:276,45. 82. MSA 4:276,2425. 83. MSA 4:277,912. "Et cum docuisset [Paulus] nos in libertatem vocatos esse, tamen redigit nos in servitutem et per caritatem alios aliis servire et concordiam publicam alere iussit." 84. MSA 4:277,1316. 85. See chapter 4. 86. Cf. MSA 4:260,27261,3. 87. Scholia 1528, 57a r°. "Scio enim multos esse, qui secus de ciuilibus magistratibus sentiunt, quam Christianae literae docent." The numbering of the leaves in this section is confused, running 58, 57 [=59], 60, 59 [=61], 62, 61 [=63], 6467, 65 [=68], 6979. To avoid confusion 57 [=59] and 65 [=68] will be referred to as 57a and 65a, respectively. 88. Scholia 1528, 57a r°. "Quis enim non abhorreat a talibus paradoxis, tam absurdis." 89. Neither Peter Fraenkel,Testimonia Patrum: The Function of the Patristic Argument in the Theology of Philip Melanchthon (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1961), nor E. P. Meijering, Melanchthon and Patristic Thought: The Doctrines of Christ and Grace, the Trinity and the Creation (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1983), used the Scholia of 1528. See also Wengert 5793. 90. Scholia 1528, 57V°. "Sed quid ego ueteres commemoro, cum his proximis annis tam multi libelli in germania editi sint, & quidem a nonnullis qui audire [Melanchthon uses a Hellenism here, treating audire like the Greek ¬] Theologi uoluerunt, in quibus disputabatur, nemini Christiano licere magistratus gerere, facultates omnium communes esse debere, & alia similia. Vnus Lutherus constantissime defendit ius atque authoritatem magistratuum, cuius siquis scripta hac de re conferet, cum ueterum disputationibus, uidebit nunquam perinde Magistratuum autoritatem, atque ab isto illustratam, atque ornatam esse,
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Et pro hoc tanto beneficio, minime dignam gratiam reportat a quibusdam Sycophantis, qui solent eum adpellare seditiosum, quia nullum inuenire conuicium plausibilius queunt." 91. See, for example, Erasmus's comments in Hyperaspistes II (LB 10:148184), as well as comments in his letters to Melanchthon discussed in chapter 5. Others who charged Luther with having brought about the Peasants' War included Jerome Emser and John Cochlaeus. See Martin Brecht, Martin Luther, vol. 2: Shaping and Defining the Reformation, 15211532, trans. James Schaaf (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990), 18889. 92. For these scholars, see chapter 7, n. 1. Discussion of Melanchthon's understanding of the civil realm has been wideranging, but no one has used his comments in the 1528 Scholia as the basis of their analysis. See especially Rolf Bernhard Huschke, Melanchthons Lehre von Ordo politicus: Ein Beitrag zum Verhältnis von Glauben und politischem Handeln bei Melanchthon (Giitersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1968), who looks especially at the later Melanchthon; Guido Kisch, Melanchthons Rechts und Soziallehre (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1967), whose work is based primarily on Melanchthon's legal commentaries and on his declamations; Luther D. Peterson, "Melanchthon on Resisting the Emperor: The Von der Notwehr Unterrichte of 1547," in Regnum, Religio et Ratio: Essays Presented to Robert M. Kingdon (Kirksville, Missouri: Sixteenth Century Journal Publishers, 1987), 13344, who, as the title indicates, deals with only one pamphlet by Melanchthon when his position was quite the reverse of that reflected in the Scholia. Huschke, perhaps because he deals with only the later Melanchthon, does not accurately assess the influence of Melanchthon's opponents in the development of his political theory. Kisch includes reprints of several first editions of the declamations; points out the influence of Jerome Schürff, a church visitor with Melanchthon in 1527, and stresses Melanchthon's high regard for Roman law. Without reference to the scriptural commentaries, however, he misses the polemical context for Melanchthon's thought. 93. Crucial to Luther's influence over Melanchthon in this matter was a letter to his younger colleague written from the Wartburg on 13 July 1521 (MBW 151 [T1:30411]). See especially lines 30102. But even later one can observe the sharpening of the arguments between the Latin and German versions of the Visitation Articles. 94. Scholia 1528, 57a v°f. "Cum igitur de magistratuum autoritate varie disputari soleat, ego hoc loco duxi colligendas esse scripturae sententias, quae, quid de magistratu sentire debeamus, dare ostendunt." Of course, he had already touched upon these issues in the 1521 edition of the Loci communes, but there only the distinction between ecclesiastical and civil authorities and the problem of scandal concerned him. See MSA 2/1:15863. 95. Scholia 1528, 60r°. "Fortassis hic labor meus aliquorum conscientiis proderit." He gave a similar reason for discussing the freedom of the will. 96. See the more extensive comments in Wengert, 20811 and Fraenkel, Testimonia Patrum, 23843. 97. Scholia 1528, 60r°. "Nihil autem magis decet hominem Christianum, quam dignitatem religionis aduersus tales calumnias defendere." 98. See CR 16:41752. His Commentarii in aliquot politicos libros Aristotelis was first published by Joseph Klug in 1530. (See VD 16: M 273739.) Cf. CR 16:417: "Sed initio magnopere opus est discernere politicam ab Evangelio et imperitorum opinionem convellere, qui somniant Evangelium nihil esse aliud nisi politicam doctrinam, iuxta quam civitates constituendae sint." 99. Scholia 1528, 60r°. "Quare libenter hunc locum tractabimus, qui quasi quandam Christianorum continet, Docet enim quod sit officium Magistratuum, quod Deo placeat, quodque a Deo defendatur, & conseruetur, quod subditi debeant illis religiose obedire." 100. ASD IV/1:95219 (AS 5:112356).
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101. For more on this document, see James M. Estes, "Officium principis christiani: Erasmus and the Origins of the Protestant State Church," ARG 83 (1992): 4972, and the literature cited there. Estes mentions Erasmus's distinction between pagan and Christian rulers but focuses his attention on Erasmus's stress of publica utilitas and the way in which certain reformers borrowed this focus from him. 102. ASD IV/1:144 (AS 5:134). "Ni Philosophus fueris, Princeps esse non potes, Tyrannus potes." 103. ASD IV/1:150 (AS 5:150). 104. ASD IV/1:215 (AS 5:34243). He reiterated these arguments in a long excursus to Luke 22:36 in the annotations to the New Testament, much of which he wrote in 1519. In his broader analysis of Erasmus's position, Estes ("Officium principis christiani," 61) concludes that in Erasmus thought "the distinction between priest and prince, church and state, sacred and profane all but disappears." It is this very blurring that Melanchthon attacked. 105. Scholia 1528, 60v°. "Primum itaque sentiendum est, quod magistratum gerere, non sit res illicita, seu peccatum." He clearly had some contemporaries in mind. Already on p. 59v° he stated, "[C]um . . . multi libelli in germania editi sint, & quidem a nonnullis qui audire Theologi uoluerunt, in quibus disputabatur, nemini Christiano licere magistratus gerere." On p.70r° he wrote, ''Ex ea opinione memini quendam raciocinari, qui non liceat homini Christiano gere magistratus, aut imperia." Jonas translated the latter, "Vnd icli gedencke noch wol eines hochgelerten der darauff wolt schliessen." 106. Scholia 1528, 59v° 107. Scholia 1528, 59v°. "Sicut enim in alijs articulis fidei, prorsus dissentit a uero, species ea quae in sensus incurrit." 108. Scholia 1528, 62r°. "Siquis articulos fidei omnes considerauerit, intelliget ideo uerbum esse traditum, quia ratio aut non comprehendebat uerum, aut etiam diuersum iudicabat." 109. Scholia 1528, 62v°. 110. Scholia 1528, 62v°. The citation reads "[ ." English translation: "Not anyone among the mortals legislates anything, but in human affairs chance is nearly everything." Plato did insist that God used fortune to rule and suggested that the skill of the ruler also played a part, but in any case the gods had at best an obscure role in Plato's political theory. 111. ASD IV/:159 (AS 5:176), citing Seneca, Benef. 2, 18, 6. "Graviter a Seneca scriptum est. eodem loco quo ponimus latrones ac piratas, ponendos esse Reges, latronum ac piratarum habentes animum. Hic enim solus Regem a Tyranno distinguit, non titulus." 112. Scholia 1528, 62v°f. He was quoting the Iliad 1,23839. " judges, who defend [divine] decrees at the bidding of Zeus, bear [the scepter] in [their] hands."
." English translation: "[Now, however, O sons of the Achaians,]
113. Scholia 1528, 61r°. "Forsan etiam acceperat huiusmodi opinionem a maioribus, quibus haud dubie multa honesta praecepta quasi per manus primi parentes, qui norunt uerbum Dei, tradiderant." 114. ASD IV/1:16062 (AS 5:17880). Erasmus used pagan sources to indicate that princes were called gods and then employed God's attributes to paint the picture of the good prince, Melanchthon wanted instead to prove that the princes were God's. 115. In this section (Scholia 1528, 61v° f.) the texts included, in order, Prov. 16:11 [=MSA 4:262,3233], Prov. 8:15 [=MSA 4:262,3132], Luke 3:14 [=MSA 4:263,811], 1 Tim. 2:12 and Jer. 29:7 [MSA 4:267,1422]. Only the list of biblical magistrates [MSA 4:263,1822], which follows the citation of Gen. 9:6, remained the same in both editions.
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116. Scholia 1528, 64r°: "maxima in omnibus periculis consolatio." Except for a change in word order it was the same as MSA 4:263,27. There was also a reference to Rom. 14:23 in both editions. 117. Scholia 1528, 64r°: "hi sperare possunt in dubijs rebus auxilium Dei, quia onus ab ipso impositum ac mandatum sustineant." 118. The list was the same as that in MSA 4:262,4. 119. Horace, Cannina 2,10,912. Scholia 1528, 64v°. Saepius uentis agitatur ingens Pinus, & celsae grauiore casu Decidunt turres, feriuntque summos Fulmina [Loeb: fulgura] montes [Loeb: montis]. Translated in Horace: The Odes Epodes, trans. C. E. Bennett, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1914), 13031. "'Tis oftener the tall pine that is shaken by the wind; 'tis the lofty towers that fall with the heavier crash, and 'tis the tops of the mountains that the lightning strikes." 120. This followed the order of MSA 4:261,24263,13. Melanchthon moved this whole discussion to after his interpretation of Gen. 9:6 and expanded it greatly. 121. Scholia 1528, 65v°. The entire passage read: "Sicut enim ulciscitur Dens flagicia populi per magistratus, ita tyrannorum delicta alijs calamitatibus ulciscitur cuius rei multa exempla suppeditani omnium temporum historiae. Non euadunt legum poenas homicidae, quocunque fugiant, quia Dei ordinatio est, ut dent poenas. Ita propter Dei ordinationem & tyranni poenas soluunt. Manet enim ordinatio Dei, ac rumpi nullis opibus, nullis uiribus tyrannorum potest, sicut scriptum est, Verbum Domini manet in aethernum." It was hardly accidental that Melanchthon cited this important biblical text, used by Saxon princes and soldiers during the Reformation. See F. J. Stopp, "Verbum Domini Manet in Aeternum: The Dissemination of a Reformation Slogan, 15221904," Lutheran Quarterly, n.s., 1 (1987): 5471. 122. Matt. 5:44. This had followed the citation of Gen. 9:6 in MSA 4:263,2931. Cf. Erasmus's completely opposite use of the same verse inQuerela pacis, ASD IV/2:74 (AS 5:390). 123. Gregory of Nazianzus, Contra Julianum I, Oratio IV.xcviixcix (PG 35:63134). 124. Scholia 1528, 66r°. "Et uestigia huius opinionis est cernere in quorundam libris qui quoties de magistratibus mentio incidit, contumeliose de eorum munere loquuntur, colligunt sententias quibus exagitantur tyranni, exaggerant uicia magistratuum. Ex qua re fit, ut induant lectores falsam de ipso etiam uitae genere persuasionem, quia non admonentur, munus ipsum seu uitae genus Deo probari." 125. It could also be that Melanchthon had some as yet unidentified Anabaptist writer (perhaps from Strasbourg) in mind. See n. 139. 126. Scholia 1528, 66r°. "Neque ego ex me fingo hanc interpretationem, sed scriptura cogit nos discernere uindictam priuatam ab officio magistratuum." 127. Scholia 1528, 66v°. In keeping with the higher rhetorical style, he again referred to Juvenal (Satires 13,180), who wrote: "At uindicta bonum, uita iucundius ipsa." 128. Scholia 1528, 67r°: "summa & sanctissima caritatis opera." 129. Scholia 1528, 67r°. "Non intelligunt cur uenerit Christus in mundum, qui existimant eum ciuilem administrationem nouis legibus latis sustulisse." 130. Scholia 1528, 67v°. "Vulgarius excusari potest, quod non de munere magistratus, sed de uiciis eorum qui magistratus gerunt loquatur." 131. Querela pacis (ASD IV/2:74 [AS 5:390]) and Institutio Principis Christiani (ASD IV/1:159 [AS 5:17475]). The latter reads, "Neque vero sic ipse sibi palpetur Princeps, haec [Matt. 20:2526] ad Episcopos pertinent, non ad me. Imo ad te pertinent, si modo Christianus es: si Christianus non es, nihil ad te pertinent."
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132. Erasmus made no comment on this word in his annotations on Luke (LB 6:216). but in comments on the Matthean version (LB 6:105) he insisted, "[I]ndicans [Jesus] earn potestatem esse tyrannicam." His paraphrase of Luke (LB 7:451) made a distinction between worldly power and the kingdom of heaven and took the word negatively. 133. Scholia 1528, 65a r°. "Nec uenit Christus, ut hoc regnum aboleret, sed ut suum quoddam ac spirituale regnum inchoaret in quo praedicaretur Euangelium, daretur spiritus sanctus, renouarentur corda credentium." 134. Scholia 1528, 65a v°. Melanchthon paraphrased the text: "Non eripio Romanis inperium, suos illi magistratus, suas leges, sua instituta retineant. Ego quoddam regnum constituo, quod non impediet illorum administrationem, sed confirmabit potius. Per Euangelium liberabo meos ab aetherna morte, a peccato, a diaboli potentia, talis doctrina non perturbat ciuilem administrationem." Erasmus's paraphrase of Matthew (LB 7:10910 contained no such distinction, and his interpretation in the Institutio implied the opposite 135. Scholia 1528, 69r°. "Christum in hoc tantum uenisse, ut
moderatiores, constitueret, ut praecepta quaedam ciuiliter uiuendi traderet."
136. Scholia 1528 69r°f. "Quare prudenter discernamus haec duo regna, regnum mundi, & regnum Christi, quemadmodum hactenus non semel monuimus. Regnum Christi uersatur in cordibus sanctorum, qui credunt iuxta Euangelium se a Deo propter Christum in gratiam receptos esse, qui renouantur & sanctificantur a spiritu sancto, & uitam aethernam degustant. qui bonis operibus foris ostendunt suam fidem & propter gloriam Dei, omnibus benefaciunt. ut ad agnitionen [sic] Euangelii plurimos inuitent, tolerant omnia, nec paciuntur se cupiditate uindictae armari aduersus eos, a quibus iniuria adfecti sunt, obtemperant magistratibus summa cura, gerunt magistratus, si tamen mandentur eis, uigilanter ac fortiter, Si cogat officium puniunt sontes, pugnant in acie. Non autem irrumpunt ad gerendos magistratus ultro, sed si cogantur uocatione suscipiunt eos. Porro regnum mundi, ut saepe dixi, est legitima ordinatio, quae magistratuum autoritate, legibus, iudicijs, poenis, bello, publicam pacem defendit." Most of these themes were sounded in Luther's 1523 tract On Secular Authority. 137. Scholia 1528, 69v°. Cf. MSA 4:265,410 and, by contrast, Erasmus's comments in the Institutio (ASD IV/1:166 [AS 5:198]). 138. Scholia 1528, 69v°. 139. Scholia 1528, 70r°. "& quotidie uidemus reges ambicione aut ira percitos bella mouere, & in alienas possessiones inuadere." The reference to Caesar and Nimrod also came up in the German version of the Visitation Articles (WA 26:209,2123) as part of the argument ofetliche. Neither the WA, MSA, MLStA nor I could identify the source. An exchange between Gerbel and Melanchthon from this time indicated opposition of this kind in Strasbourg (MBW 679 and 691). In 1530 Wolfgang Capito translated a tract by Wessel Gansfort into German, which Capito entitled "DaB die Untertanen geistlichen und weltlichen Obrigkeiten nicht stets Gehorsam zu leisten, sondern ihnen zu widerstehen und sic abzusetzen schuldig sind," which contains a reference to Nero in the text and Nimrod in the margin. See Flugschriften vom Bauernkrieg zum Täuferreich (15261535), ed. Adolf Laube et al., 2 vols. (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1992), 1:51844, here 534, 537. See Melanchthon's condemnation of Capito in his commentary on Aristotle's ethics, CR 16:419. 140. Scholia 1528, 70r f. Melanchthon even admitted that "rideant homines prophani hoc paradoxum." 141. Scholia 1528, 70v°. "Nam ratio cum regnorum inicia, cum fines, cum principum uicia considerat, longe aliter sentit." As was the case in chapter 6, reason was the culprit. 142. Scholia 1528, 71r°. "[I]ta senciamus ab eo [Deo] ordinationem illam
conditam esse."
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143. Scholia 1528, 71r°. "Semper optimarum rerum maximus est abusus." 144. See JeanClaude Margolin, Guerre et Paix dans la Pensée D'Erasme (Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1973), and Philip C. Dust, Three Renaissance Pacifists: Essays in the Theories of Erasmus, More, and Vives (New York: Peter Lang, 1987). 145. Scholia 1528, 72r°: "tribuere alteri sapientiam, iusticiam, bonitatem, & similia." For parallel texts for 71v° through 73v°, see, in order, MSA 4:265,1124; 265,25266,5; 266,30267,4; 266,629 [where prayer for the magistrate is the second honor listed; in 1528 it is praecipuus honos] 267,1423; 267,811; 266,18 19. 146. Scholia 1528, 73v°. This was somewhat less evenhanded than Luther, who at least in the early stages of the Peasants' Revolt was willing to blame both princes and peasants and claimed that the revolt was God's wrath on the princes in the form of their subjects. In the summer of 1525 he repeated the same opinions in his preface to Karlstadt's Endschuldigung (WA 18:43145). Melanchthon also mentioned that princes should fear God's wrath, but he was less clear about whether or how this was discerned. 147. Scholia 1528, 73v°74r°, following MSA 4:267,28269,16. Most notably the discussion of vengeance, which in 1527 Melanchthon admitted having already discussed (MSA 4:267,33), was omitted here. 148. Scholia 1528, 74r°f. See MSA 4:269,1729. 149. Scholia 1528, 74v° (cf. MSA 4:269,2930). 150. Scholia 1528, 74v°. "Et hac de re memini Carolostadium miras tragoedias excitare, qui nos ad legem Mosaicam reuocabat, & contendebat Romanis legibus explosis, lege Moysi in foro utendum esse." 151. Scholia 1528, 74v°. The Greek means "a shaking off of burdens" and was used by Plutarch in reference to Solon's laws regarding debt. Melanchthon was probably referring to the Twelve Articles of the Swabian Peasantry. 152. Scholia 1528, 75r°76r°. This parallels MSA 4:269,32270,29; 271,828. The positions of Karlstadt and the peasants were touched on in MSA 4:270,30 271,8. As I show later, Melanchthon returned to and expanded this list in Scholia 1528, 76v°. 153. Scholia 1528, 76r°. "Quae dissentiunt ab illo naturali iudicio, ut leges Milesiae, non sunt leges sed homines, ut quodam furore perciti cum natura sua pugnent."
, & confusio quam diabolus efficit, impellens
154. Melanchthon's "Oratio de legibus," delivered in 1523 or 1524 and printed in 1525, covered some of the same ground. See Kisch, Melanchthons Rechts und Soziallehre, 8090 and 19094, for the text and its analysis. 155. Scholia 1528, 76v°, found also in MSA 4:270,30271,8. 156. Here Melanchthon added an unidentified Greek quote to the same effect. 157. Ibid.: "ne tanquam tribunicijs rogationibus debacchentur aduersus leges publicas." This warning could fit any number of preachers from the mid1520s. 158. Scholia 1528, 77r° (=MSA 4:271,29272,12). 159. Scholia 1528, 77r¬f. (=MSA 4:274,1116). 160. Scholia 1528, 77v° (=MSA 4:274,33275,3 and 274,37). 161. Scholia 1528, 78r°f. (=MSA 4:272,1833). 162. Scholia 1528, 78v°f. (=MSA 4:274,17275,7). This was a common objection from the papal party's side and was even dealt with by Wessel Gansfort. 163. See note 83 for a closer description. 164. Scholia 1528, 78r°. "Quoties preces suas omittebant sacrificuli?" Here Melanchthon may have had in mind attacks on the Visitation Articles by Cochlaeus, among others. 165. Scholia 1528, 78v°. "Haec ideo dixi, non quod probem eos, qui omnes ritus abolent, qui nullas ueteres ordinationes obseruant, sed ut doceam, falsam opinionem de traditionibus
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abiiciendam esse, interea tamen hoc praestandum est, ne traditiones quae sine peccato seruari possunt, uiolentur apud eos, qui non recte intelligunt doctrinam libertatis, ne cui scandalo simus. 166. See Harold J. Grimm, Lazarus Spengler: A Lay Leader of the Reformation (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1978). 167. For a complete discussion of his views see ibid., 14143. For the letter, see Heinz Scheible, ed., Das Widerstandsrecht als Problem der deutschen Protestanten: 15231546 (Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn, 1969), 2939. An opinion to the Margrave George of BrandenburgAnsbach, dated the beginning of January 1530, is found on pp. 5056. 168. Scheible, Das Widerstandsrecht, 39. "Was in disem fall Luthers iuditium und mainung sey, wurdet ain veder in seinem puchlein Von der weltlichen oberkait, item im puchlin Ob kreigsleut im seligen stand seien, und dann in seiner Ermanung zum frieden auf der aufrurigen pauern in Schwaben artickel nur gantz klar und lauter finden. Deßgleichen Philippus Melanchton in seinem puclilin aufder pauern 12 außgeschriben artickel. Item gantz klar in seinem Comentario uber S. Paulus epistel zu den Collosern am 77. plat, wie dann das alles sampt Melanchtonis sonderlichem verzeichenten iuditio hernach gefunden wurdet." 169. Ibid., 5760. 170. See Ulrich Bubenheimer, "Unbekannte Luthertexte," LutherJahrbuch 57 (1990 22041. Luther's copy is still in the library of Wittenberg's Predigerseminar. He also read Melanchthon's commentary on Romans from 1532. 171. Scholia 1534, 80r° (=Scholia 1528, 78r°). "Et mihi veteres Canones excutienti longe alia mente, et factae, et servatae traditiones videntur, quam, qua postea ceperunt exigi." 172. Bubenheimer, "Unbekannte Luthertexte," 237. "Sunt canones boni, iusti, sancti, a sanctiss[imis], a sapientiss[imis], pulcherrimi, sed non sunt servatu, sed libertas parta sanguine Christi regnet." 173. Scholia 1528, 37v°. "Haec cum s[a]epe iam tractauerimus, tamen cogit nos Pauli textus toties idem dicere, a cuius sententia mihi discedendum esset, si nolim haec repetere. Ego autem hoc unum summo studio ago, ut germanam sententiam Pauli simplicißime exponam. Et quia bona pars theologorum scholasticorum nec iustitiam fidei docet, nec discrimen ostendit philosophicae & christianae iustitiae, libenter in hoc loco commorari soleo, ut aduersus perniciosos istorum errores, pios lectores, pro uirili, muniam. Neque enim obscurum est summam Christianae doctrinae pendere a cognitione iusticiae fidei." Chapter 8 1. Koehn No. 209 (CR 12:26471), dated 5 August 1557. The student came from Krossen in Brandenburg. See MBW 3590b for an alternative date of 5 August 1549. 2. CR 12:269. 3. CR 12:270. 4. The other striking feature of the Visitation Articles, the description of repentence, had its origins in the other major dispute Melanchthon was embroiled in at the time with John Agricola. 5. CR 26:1617. 6. WA 26:42326. 7. CR 26:2628. 8. WA 26:226. 9. It is unfortunate that Wilhelm Maurer, in his Historical Commentary on the Augsburg Confession, trans. H. George Anderson (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986), 98108, compared the statements of CA 16 and 18 to this work but not to the Scholia of 1528.
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10. CR 15:443. "Valde potest in universae scripturae lectione observare, quod duplex sit iusticia." 11. CR 15:486. 12. CR 15:48889. 13. CR 15:467. "Et prorsus a Paulo dissentiunt, qui somniant Spiritum significare rationem, et ex Evangelio philosophiam quandam humanam faciunt, nihil praeter rationis opera requirentes." Throughout this outline of Romans, Melanchthon provided his readers with alternatives to Erasmus's interpretation from Hyperaspistes II. Such a comparison goes beyond the scope of this work. 14. CR 15:468. "Nam hoc totum caput Pauli sceleste contaminatum est ab Origene et aliis [=Erasmus], cui [sic: =qui] tanquam uirati in verba Origenis : sed horum intempestiva philosophia, dum tribuunt iustificationem viribus rationis, inde oritur, quod nihil requiri putant in homine, nisi civilia opera." By employing the Greek verb, Melanchthon made an obvious play on words with Erasmus's Hyperaspistes. 15. This was also reflected in Melanchthon's correspondence from the same time, as shall be seen later. 16. See Hans Engelland, Melanchthon, Glauben und Handeln (Munich: Kaiser Verlag, 1931), 8090. Engelland is one of the only scholars to have used and compared Melanchthon's position in the various editions of the Scholia. Wilhelm Maurer, Der junge Melanchthon zwischen Humanismus und Reformation 2 vols. (Göttingen: VandenHoeck & Ruprecht, 196769), 1:11417, describes some aspects of the unique origins of CA 16 and 18, without, however, connecting them to the Scholia. As important as Eck's "404 Articles" were, the language Melanchthon employed for the confession had in many respects already been fixed in the Scholia. 17. BKS 7071 and 7374. 18. CA 16,4. "Dann das Evangelium lehrt nicht ein äußerlich, zeitlich, sondern innerlich, ewig Wesen und Gerechtigkeit des Herzen." 19. Na (the German translation of an earlier Latin form of the CA): "so der Vernunft unterworfen sein;" CA 18: "so die Vernunft begreift" and "et deligendas res rationi subiectas." 20. LB 10:1523. John Cochlaeus also referred to this document in his De libero arbitrio adversus locos communes. 21. Ap 16,2,3,6. "Hic totus locus de discrimine regni Christi et regni civilis litteris nostrorum utiliter illustratus est." 22. Ap 18,5, points taken directly from the Scholia. 23. Ap 18,78. 24. For descriptions of this important work and of changes in Melanchthon's theology at this time, see Martin Greschat, Melanchthon neben Luther: Studien zur Gestalt der Rechtfertigungslehre zwischen 1528 und 1537 (Witten: Luther Verlag, 1965), especially pp. 13350, and Rolf Schafer, "Melanchthons Hermeneutik im Römerbriefkommentar von 1532," Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche 60 (1963): 21635. Both disagree with Engelland's assessment that Melanchthon's theology had not changed through this period. 25. MSA 5:31,1119. 26. See, for example, the very helpful notes to the commentary in MSA 5:37,16; 42,26; 45,29; etc. Nicholas Herborn, John Cochlaeus, and George Witzel were also among his opponents. 27. MSA 5:17478. 28. MSA 5:4446. 29. MSA 5:23234. 30. MSA 5:24958.
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31. MSA 5:254,815. Of course this acceptance could only take place when the Holy Spirit moved the heart through the Word. 32. MSA 5:255,5257,11, contrary to both Erasmus and Cochlaeus. 33. MSA 5:28184. 34. MSA 5:30225. 35. MSA 5:31317. 36. MSA 5:31718. 37. MSA 4:223,1012; Scholia 1528, 11v°; Scholia 1534, XIv°. 38. Scholia 1528, 11v°. "[Q]ui [=Spiritus sanctus] nouos motus, nouam uitam, nouam lucem ac noticiam gignat in mentibus nostris, qui per uerbum perterrefaciat corda m etu Dei, qui erigat corda & consoletur, ac efficiat, ut uere credant promißionibus Dei, et uere sentiant Deum adesse nobis, uiuare nos, & exaudire ac defendere, qui inserat castitatem, amorem proximi, qui superbiam, ambicionem, inuidiain, ex animis radicitus euellat." 39. Scholia 1534, Xlv°f. "Sed cum humanae mentes audiunt uerbum Dei & non repudiant, Spiritus sanctus simul mouet eas, ut et perterrefiant et rursus erigantur & credant promiBionibus & uere statuant Deum nobis ignoscere, adesse, nos exaudired, iuuare, defendere, gubernare, Et adiuuat humanas mentes in efficiendis ueris uiritutibus castitate, amore proximi, patientia etc." 40. It might well have been comments like the following that angered Conrad Cordatus in the socalled Cordatus controversy of 1536. Scholia 1534, XVIIr° (again replacing a much stronger statement about justification from the Scholia 1528, 16a v°): "In conuersione necessaria est contritio aliqua, hoc est, pauor & dolor conscientiae, necessaria est & morum mutatio in melius." He went on to state that we were pronounced righteous not because of our contrition or works but "per misericordiam propter Christum." However, he also insisted (XVII r°f.) that "necessaria iam est iusticia bonorum operum." Again, these good works done by the justified pleased God only because the justified had already been reconciled by trusting Christ. See Timothy J. Wengert, "Caspar Cruciger (15041548): The Case of the Disappearing Reformer,'' Sixteenth Century Journal 20 (1989): 41741, especially 435 (a reference to Melanchthon's lectures on Colossians) and Greschat, Melanchthon neben Luther, 2130. References to the third use of the law are found on pp. XLVIIIr° and XCIIIIrº. The origins of this shift will form the basis of my forthcoming study of Melanchthon and John Agricola. 41. CR 21:253332. 42. See MBW 1555, the prefatory epistle to Henry VIII, dated March 1535. 43. CR 21:37378. 44. CR 21:373. "Haec enim agnoscenda est, ut discamus, quare nobis opus sit beneficio Christi." 45. CR 21:373. He had made a similar distinction in the Loci of 1521. 46. Citing Metamorphoses, VII,2021. 47. Matthew Flacius and Melanchthon's student Victorin Strigel fought over this question using the Aristotelian language of substance and accidence. See the Formula of Concord, Solid Declaration, I. 48. CR 21:376. 49. CR 21:376. "In veris certaminibus," what Luther called Anfechtungen. 50. CR 21:376. "In hac lucta hortandus est animus, ut omni conatu retineat verbum. Non est dehortandus, ne conetur, sed docendus quod promissio sit universalis, et quod debeat credere. In hoc exemplo videmus coniungi has causas, Verbum, Spiritum sanctum, et voluntatem, non sane otiosam, sed repugnantem infirmitati suae." 51. CR 21:377.
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52. CR 21:37778. He concluded: "In this way it is understood that the Law is possible through grace." Thus Melanchthon held that saints' obedience diverged from the law but nevertheless was pleasing on account of Christ. 53. CR 21:54254 54. There were other causes, including the Confutation. See Heinz Scheible, "Melanchthons Auseinandersetzung mit dem Reformkatholizismus," in Venn ittlungsversuche auf dem Augsburger Reichstag 1530: MelanchthonBrenzVehus, ed. Rolf Decot (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1989), 6890. 55. MBW 1433 (CR 2:72226). 56. For this section see Martin Bucer, Martin Bucer: Etudes sur la Correspondance avec de nombreux textes inédits, ed. J. V. Pollet, 2 vols. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962), 2:488527. Melanchthon's work here is put in its larger context by Georg Elliger, Philipp Melanchthon: Ein Lebenshild (Berlin: R. Gaertner, 1902), 30330. Elliger makes the mistake of equating Melanchthon's interest in reform with humanistic impulses and his personality. 57. MBW 1467 (CR 2:74175). Cf MBW 1468 and 1469, cover letters to Bucer and du Bellay. 58. CR 2:749/50. "Item [illa conveniunt,] quod liberum arbitrium aliquid agat in cavendis talibus delictis. Item quod adiuvetur a Spiritu sancto, ut caveat talia delicta." 59. Another example occurred when he rewrote the CA in the Variata. 60. See Gustav Kawerau, Johann Agricola von Eisleben: Ein Beitrag zur Reformationsgeschichte (Berlin: Wilhelm Hertz, 1881); Joachim Rogge, Johann Agricolas Lutherverständnis: Unter besonderer Beriicksichtigung des Antinomismus (Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1960); and Timothy J. Wengert, Law and Gospel: Philip Melanchthon's Debate with John Agricola of Eisleben over "Poenitentia" (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1997). 61. The focus on the human being as such was a constant in Melanchthon's thought. However, it was always moderated by his distinction between the two righteousnesses and his conviction that the human being was weak and under constant attack. 62. MBW 2092 (CR 3:58587), dated 15 September 1538. 63. MBW 2092 (CR 3:586). "Nolo enim nova dogmata gignere, sed simplicem & consentientem doctrinam ac methodum tueor, quam in locis communibus sequor et quam in Romanis prius [=MSA 5] sequutus sum. Etsi autem scio alios amare , in quibusdam materiis, in loco praedestinationis, de contingentia, et nescio quibus aliis, tamen haec, quae scribo, et recta et utilia esse iudico, quae tamen ita tempero, ut sperem non offensura illos morosiores." 64. Christophe de Longueil (ca. 14881522), a peripatetic scholar who left France for Italy in order to become a better Ciceronian. (John Manlius, in his Locorum communium .. collectorum tomus II, 32425, reported, for example, that Longolius did not use the Greek loan word ecclesia but substituted Respublica Christiana and for fides the word persuasio.) For the tract, Ciceronianus, see ASD 1/2:581710 (LB 1:9691026 and AS 7:1355). 65. About Melanchthon Erasmus bemoaned the fact that he had not stuck with the Muses, although even then the Dutch humanist wondered whether Melanchthon would still have failed. He ended his short description with the damning phrase, "[N]unc aliis [=all the Evangelicals] intentus eloquentiae studium magna ex parte videtur abiecisse." 66. MBW 693 (CR 1:98283), dated 15 June 1528. Julius Pflug, too, did not think much of Erasmus's tract. See MBW 714 (CR 1:95253), dated ca. 9 October 1528. A list of responses is given in AS 7:xlviiilii. 67. Using corrections in SM 6/1:427 based on the original. Camerarius's own version of the letter toned down Melanchthon's judgment to "Plane, quod pace auctoris dixerim viri summi, mirificus libellus est." Melanchthon himself felt no need at that time to protect Erasmus's name or feelings.
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68. MBW 696 (CR 1:98489), dated 15 July 1528, here CR 1:989 (with SM 6/1:42829). See also MSA 7/2:62, n. 26. Melanchthon nicknamed the tract (in Greek), "Hatred of [Marcus] Tullius [Cicero]." Camerarius's commentarium meant his own opinion rather than necessarily an "Entwurffür dessen gegen Erasmus gerichtete, erst im Jahr 1538 in Basel gedruckte Schrift." 69. MBW 2051 (CR 3:53840), dated 10 June 1538. See also MBW 2018. The tract bore the title "Commentariorum in M. T. Ciceronis Tusculanam primam . . . libri duo . . . copiosa est inserta disputatio de imitatione" and was dedicated to Julius Pflug. (See MSA 7/2:62, n. 26.) See HannaBarbara Gerl, "'De imitatione' von Camerarius: Die Wichtigkeit der Nachahmung für humanistische Anthropologie und Sprachtheorie," in Joachim Camerarius (15001574): Beiträge zur Geschichte des Humanismus im Zeitalter der Reformation, ed. Frank Baron (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1978), 18798. This tract is no. 37 in the publication list of Frank Baron and Michael H. Shaw from the same volume. 70. MBW 807 (MSA 7/2:9495), dated 24 July 1529. Compare this letter with MBW 830 (MSA 7/2:11012), to Caspar Aquila, dated 12 October 1529, where Melanchthon reported that Zwingli admitted, presumably in their private conversation at Marburg, learning his doctrine of the Lord's Supper from Erasmus. 71. See Heinz Scheible, "Melanchthon und Luther während des Augsburger Reichstags 1530," in Martin Luther: 'Reformator und Vater im Glauben', ed. Peter Manns (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1985), 3860, and "Melanchthon zwischen Luther und Erasmus," in RenaissanceReformation: Gegensätze und Gemeinsamkeiten, ed. August Buck (Wolfenbüttel: Herzog August Bibliothek, 1984), 15580. 72. MBW 956 (Allen Ep. 2343). He also mentioned his displeasure with Luther's letter attacking Duke George (WA 30, 2:148). It is interesting to note that both Erasmus and Luther (for example, in the preface to the Smalcald Articles) agreed that councils would probably not do any good. 73. MBW 985 (MSA 7/2:22829), dated 21 July 1530. Freude upon receiving this letter, as the digest of MBW 985 describes it, is perhaps too strong a term. Melanchthon was defending himself against rumors about secret contacts with the emperor. Erasmus's backhanded compliment was simply the lesser of two "evils." 74. MBW 1004 (Allen Ep. 2357). Compare this to MBW 991 (WABr 5:5079), a letter to Luther dated 27 July 1530, where Melanchthon described the letter's contents as defending the evangelicals' positions on the marriage of priests, vows, and communion in both kinds. This rumor may have arisen as a result of Erasmus's letter to Cardinal Campegio (Allen Ep. 2328), in which he complained about having to move to Freiburg and about his fear of war. 75. MBW 1004 (Allen Ep. 2357,1113). "Nil hac tua sapientia atque autoritate dignius facere potes, nil ad omnem posteritatem gloriosius, quam si tua diligentia hos motus [of the evangelicals' enemies] sedaveris." 76. MBW 1004 (Allen Ep. 1004,1417). "Nos causam nostram [in the Augsburg Confession] simpliciter et sine conuiciis proposuimus. Quanquam cauillari aliquis possit serani esse moderationem [here Melanchthon could well have been thinking of Erasmus's charges against Luther and others], tamen volumus ostendere nos non abhorrere a consilio [MSA 7/ 2:245,20: conditionibus] pacis, si conditiones aequae proponantur." 77. MBW 1007 (Allen Ep. 2358), dated 2 August 1530, MBW 1019 (Allen Ep. 2363), dated 12 August, and MBW 1028 (Allen Ep. 2365), dated 17 August. 78. His accuser was one Gerhard Gelden. 79. MBW 1287 (Allen Ep. 2732). 80. MBW 1287 (Allen Ep 2732,2026). He also insisted that he wanted to show proper respect for ecclesiastical rulers, which may have been a reference to the preface, addressed to Albrecht of Brandenburg, the archbishop of Mainz. 81. MBW 332.
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82. MBW 807. (Cf. MBW 830.) 83. MBW 1370 (CR 2:67780), written to John Agricola and dated 22 October 1533. (Note that this position was similar to comments in CA 20,47.) In this same letter Melanchthon attacked Witzel's theology mercilessly because the latter did not understand justification or the role of government and held to a Zwinglian doctrine of the Lord's Supper. For Georg Witzel see Winfried Trusen, Um die Reform und Einheit der Kirche: Zum Leben und Werk Georg Witzels (Münster: Aschendorff, 1957). Like Conrad Cordatus Witzel was also preacher at Niemegk for a time. 84. WABr 7:2740 and (von Amsdorf's letter) WABr 7:1617. The date in the WA, ca. 11 March 1534, may still be correct, but MBW 1421 (CR 2:7089) is dated 17 March, not 11 March, and cannot be used to prove this dating. 85. MBW 1420 (CR 2:71013), dated 15 March 1534. "Doleo Lutherum renovare certamen cum Erasmo. Sed video haec esse plane
"
86. MBW 1421 (CR 2:7089), dated 17 March 1534. Camerarius again heavily edited this section, turning the descriptive comment " in utroque me solicitant." He called Luther by the nickname "Arcesilas," a Greek philosopher and founder of the Middle Academy known for his polemic. See Der Kleine Pauly: Lexikon derAntike, 5 vols. (Munich: Bruckenmüller, 1975), 1:59697. 87. MBW 1500 (Allen Ep. 2970). He did respond in "Purgatio adversus epistolam non sobriam Lutheri" (ASD IX/1:42783). 88. Allen Ep. 2971,2125, dated 31 October 1534. 89. MBW 1735 (Allen Ep. 3120). 90. MBW 1735 (Allen Ep. 3120,1011 and 2428). 91. MBW 1555 (CR 21:33340). 92. CR 21:347: "quidam in colligendis Theologicis locis, tantum quosdam ex Philosophia morali accersunt." He added that such loci belonged only to some part of God's law. 93. CR 21:349. Melanchthon quoted a portion of this section in MBW 1735 (Allen Ep. 3120,2428). 94. MBW 1735 (Allen Ep. 3120,20 & 5354). 95. This in contrast to the recent public exchange between Luther and Erasmus. 96. MBW 1735 (Allen Ep. 3120,56 and 4243). He employed the same word Erasmus had for the response to Luther's 1534 attack. Erasmus had entitled his tract "Purgatio adversus epistolam non sobriam Lutheri." 97. MBW 1735 (Allen Ep. 3120,1113). 98. MBW 1735 (Allen Ep. 3120,1518). "Et tamen si quid [parum] mitigo, id facio non studio reprehendendi, quod a mea natura alienissimum est, sed vt imperitis, si qui nostra legant, consulam." Allen's insertion of the word parum is unnecessary; Erasmus thought Melanchthon's mild language concealed a sneak attack on his theology. Note again Melanchthon's reference to his psychological disposition. 99. MBW 1735 (Allen Ep. 3120,1820). The word diiudicatio was a Ciceronian term synonymous to distinctio, meaning "to tell two things apart." In fact, the entire letter was written in the highest Ciceronian style, using surprisingly few Greek loan words found in ecclesiastical Latin. 100. MBW 1735 (Allen Ep. 3120,2124). 101. MBW 1735 (Allen Ep. 3120,2426). This was precisely what Luther attacked in his 1534 tract. See WABr 7:3236. His use of the phrase promissiones et comminationes for "gospel and law" and the word assensio for "assent" was again an indication of a more polished Latin style. 102. MBW 1735 (Allen Ep. 3120,2732). The word pietas could best be translated "righteousness." Here Melanchthon was playing the Ciceronian by using a nonbiblical term, which in the German of his day was translated Fromkeyt, a synonym for Gerechtigkeit.
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103. MBW 1735 (Allen Ep. 3120,3239). 104. MBW 1735 (Allen Ep. 3120,4454). In de Oratore 3,53 Cicero used the term in connection with a purgatio as a final plea to the gods or listeners for a hearing. 105. It is important not to read too much into this phrase but to put it in its proper context: a letter designed to prevent Erasmus from attacking Melanchthon publicly and to defend his statements in the Loci. Both times that Melanchthon confessed Erasmus's influence he did not specify what controversies. This vagueness was politically shrewd and ought not be taken as another sign of Melanchthon's capitulation to Erasmus's theology. Melanchthon may not have disguised his opinion of Luther's attack on Erasmus, but he did disguise the nature of his agreement with Erasmus. 106. MBW 1735 (Allen Ep. 3120,5354). "Neque hoc iudicium meum dissimulaui vnquam. " Melanchthon's neutrality here mimicked Erasmus's during the Diet of Augsburg. 107. MBW 1750 (Allen Ep. 3127), dated 6 June 1536. Only one letter from Erasmus in Allen bears a later date. 108. MBW 1750 (Allen Ep. 3127,68). 109. MBW 1750 (Allen Ep. 3127,1316). "Sed quoniam Locos toties edidisti, verecundius erat id in praefatione non dissimulare, at lectori rationem reddere, cur putaris quaedam aliter tractanda." 110. MBW 1750 (Allen Ep. 3127,1619). He followed this statement with an attack on Bucer. 111. MBW 1750 (Allen Ep. 3127,3235). 112. This term was in fact used by Luther in its verbal form to describe Melanchthon's work on the Augsburg Confession. 113. WA 50:284308, "Consilium . . . de emendanda ecclesia." 114. WA 50:304,711. Luther added this sarcastic gloss: "Ja, der mus gethan haben. Wolt Gott, er [Erasmus] solt leben und euch schendliche Buben bezalen und anzeigen, wie Gottselig jr mit worten und wercken jung und alt gebessert habt." 115. MBW 2014 (CR 3:5067), dated 31 March 1538. 116. MBW 2572 (WA Br 9:28185). 117. MBW 3070 (CR4:88792, here 892), dated 22 October 1542. The word dixisse made clear that this was part of an oral tradition. There is no trace of such a saying in Erasmus's writings. 118. MBW 5515 (CR 7:39099, here 398). This volume contained part of Luther's Old Testament exegesis. 119. CR 15:1280, commenting on Col. 4:6, where he also distinguished between the white salt of Mercury and the black salt of Momus. I am especially grateful to Erika Rummel for her assistance in deciphering this matter. 120. John Manlius, Locorum communium . . . collectorum, tomus II (n.p., n.d.), 306. "Erasmus dicere solebat: Ego non libenter uescor piscibus: nam stomachus est Lutheranus, & mens est Christiana. Venustißime dictum est, & bella ambiguitas in stomacho, quae uox hic pro iracundia seu indignatione sumitur. Vult dicere: Ego non minus irascor sceleribus Papae, quam ipse Lutherus." 121. In a letter to Joachim Camerarius, MBW 3450 (CR 5:30911), dated 9 February 1544. Luther's attack is found in WA 49:294343. 122. LB 10:1251 (AS 4:208). "Postremo sic aliquando mecum cogitabam, quid si Deo visum est corruptissimis horum temporum moribus, tam saevum dare Medicum, qui sectionibus et usturis sanet, quod potionibus et malagmatis non poterat." 123. Koehn Nos. 11834 (CR 11:72634), delivered 22 February 1546 Note that the charge was that Luther was harsher than he needed to be. Melanchthon agreed only with the first part (that Luther was too harsh); he used Erasmus to rebut the second (than he needed to
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be). The fact that Melanchthon should discuss criticisms of Luther was expected in this genre of speech. 124. MBW 762 (CR 1:104142). See LB 9:10151122 and Allen Ep. 2094, 1634, and 2080. 125. Koehn No. 78 (CR 11:27884; MSA 3:8895). In his interpretation of the Oratio de puritate doctrinae, J. Michael Weiss did not take this oration into account. It did not defend Erasmus but, rather, attacked his way of doing theology. See "Melanchthon and the Heritage of Erasmus: Oratio de Puritate Doctrinae (1536) and Oratio de Erasmo Roterodamo (1557)," in Actes du Colloque International Érasme (Tours, 1986) ed. Jacques Chomarat et al. (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1990), 293306. It is also not clear that the Oratio de puritate doctrinae was written by Melanchthon. See Timothy J. Wengert, "Caspar Cruciger (15041548): The Case of the Disappearing Reformer," Sixteenth Century Journal 20 (1989): 41741, for arguments to the contrary. In any case the point of the oration was not to praise Erasmus but to counter those in Wittenberg, such as Conrad Cordatus, who had attacked Cruciger and Melanchthon. 126. CR 11:282. 127. MBW 4277 (CR 6:15570), dated 1 June 1546. See Eike Wolgast, Die Wittenberger LutherAusgabe: Zur Überlieferungsgeschichte der Werke Luthers im 16. Jahrhundert (Nieuwkoop: De Graaf, 1971), 27984. 128. CR 6:161. 129. CR 6:163. It also allowed Erasmus to bear witness in Luther's favor. "Erasmus Roterodamum amanter orasse, ut libere diceret, num errare Lutherum in iis controversiis iudicaret, de quibus praecipue disseruisset." Melanchthon's point was not to make Wittenberg Erasmian but to put Erasmus (and Erasmians) in Luther's corner. 130. CR 6:164. Melanchthon may have had Erasmus's dispute with Luther in mind when he wrote immediately before this statement, "Quare pium et necessarium officium fuit Lutheri, praesertim cum Ecclesiam Dei doceret, taxare perniciosos errores, quos homines Epicurei etiam nova impudentia cumulabant, et auditores recte docenti assentiri necesse fuit." Luther had called Erasmus an Epicurean or skeptic throughout De servo arbitrio. See WA 18:620,3. 131. CR 6:161, the very things Melanchthon saw himself defending in the Scholia. 132. CR 6:16669. Not surprisingly, Erasmus was not included among the list of the faithful saints. 133. MBW 3192 (CR 5:6365). 134. CR 6:64. "Meministi ineptias Erasmi, qui scribit lohannem concessisse bellum, quia imperfectis praedicarit: Christum postea perfectiorem legem dedisse, de non bellando. Sic de Iohannis vocatione et ministerio sentire insulsissimum est." 135. See Erasmus NT 1:17172 (=LB 6:24142). 136. MBW 8017 (CR 8:895902). The topics of discussion, arising from the socalled Leipzig Interim, also included the use of the word sola in justification by faith, the necessity of works, and the nature of repentance and the sacraments. 137. CR 8:897. See CR 21:65265, esp. 659. 138. CR 6:898: "contra scripturam et doctrinam Lutheri in nostris Ecclesiis." 139. MBW 8909 (Bds. 44451), dated 30 March 1559.
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INDEX A Actio Dei generalis. See God, work of Acts 4:18, 120 5:29, 63, 12021, 134, 141 13:712, 119 15:529, 45, 87 15:711, 122 15:910, 119 15:10, 88 17:28, 61, 89, 91, 192n.45 Ad fontes, 10, 21, 47, 153 Adiaphora, 121, 13435 Adiaphoristic controversy, 135 Adrian VI, Pope, 68, 71 Affections, 69, 81, 9091 Affectus, 53, 68 Agricola, John, 1516, 1820, 67, 75, 102, 146, 166n.46, 176n.61, 179n.36, 180n.38, 184n.112, 190n.17, 196n.104, 210n.4, 215n.83 Agricola, Rudolf, 10, 59 Albrecht of Brandenburg, archbishop of Mainz, 8, 23, 145, 214n.8 Ambrose, 6, 4344, 173n.17, 201n.25 Ambrosiaster, 33, 43, 173n.21, 173n.24 Amsdorf, Nicholas von, 108, 149, 154 Anabaptists, 10, 112, 11617, 124, 141, 155, 183n.85, 207n.125 Annotationes (1535). See Erasmus, annotations of Anshelm, Thomas, 21, 167n.62, 169n.4, 202n.45 Anthropology, 89, 60, 6869 Antinomianism, 14547 Antiquity, 5, 135 Apology of the Augsburg Confession, 20, 141, 144, 166n.49 Apostles, 35, 99 Aquila, Caspar, 76, 214n.70 Argumenta(um), 44, 46, 49, 5156, 5962, 6465, 82, 88, 106, 122, 140, 201n.20 Pauli, 52, 56, 59, 6162, 122 Aristotelianism, 9, 86 Aristotle, 6869, 81, 93, 95, 115 lectures on, 166n.49 Politics, 125, 202n.38 Arius, Arianism, 43, 78 Arts, 67, 81, 83, 92, 102 Augsburg Confession, 89, 141, 149, 158, 166n.49, 211n.16 Augsburg Interim of 1548, 108 Augustine, 22, 31, 4041, 4546, 59, 81, 92, 125, 144, 175n.42, 177n.82 City of God, 115 De doctrina Christiana, 92 De spiritu et littera, 45 Hypomnesticon by pseudo, 141 just war and, 126 letter to Marcellinus, 123 Authority, civil, 62, 63, 67, 106, 110, 11415, 117, 120, 12325, 13031, 136, 142, 205n.94 obedience to, 114, 11718, 125 ordained by God, 112, 115, 120
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Authority, civil (continued) origins of, 127, 140 Imperial, 11516 reformers against, 112, 116, 119 B Baptism, infant, 116, 200n.6 Barth, Karl, 156 Basel, 22, 24, 26, 36, 73, 76, 82, 101, 169n.12, 170n.34 Baumgartner, Jerome, 26, 75, 116, 170n.36 Ber, Louis, 24, 170n.25 Bernard of Clairvaux, 126 Bible. See Scripture Biel, Gabriel, 84 Billicanus, Theobald, 63 Blaurer, Ambrose, 7 Bodenmann, Reinhard, 94, 194n.73 Bonae Litterae, 68, 10, 13, 21, 26, 71, 74, 7778, 80, 83, 93, 100, 105, 12425, 136, 155, 157, 195n.86 Bondage of the Will, 73, 81, 104, 10607, 140. See also Free will Brenz, John, 10, 147 Bretten, ix, 6 Briçonnet, William, Bishop, 6 Brubach, Peter, 18, 20, 147 Briick, Gregory, 145 Bubenheimer, Ulrich, 135, 210nn.170, 172 Bucer, Martin, 10, 31, 67, 150 Buchwald, Georg, 18, 168n.70 Bugenhagen, John, 179n.36, 204n.80 Bullinger, Heinrich, 157 C Calvin, John, 13, 20, 56 Cambridge, 100 Camerarius, Joachim, 26, 75, 78, 148, 150, 153, 167n.63, 174n.38, 188n.56, 202n.44, 213n.67, 215n.86 Campegio, Cardinal, 71, 214n.74 Capito, Wolfgang, 5, 22, 71, 169n.12 Ceremonies, 36, 52, 55, 62, 96, 113, 119, 155 Charles V, Emperor, 23, 132, 135 Chirographum, 3536, 50, 173n.22 Christology, 61, 89 disputes over, 38, 40, 58, 174n.41 Chronicles, Second, 19:6, 117, 129 Chrysosyom, John, 35, 38, 41, 51, 122, 173n.24, 176n.62, 179n.34, 183n.88 Church, 4446, 60, 78, 99100, 103, 120 122, 177n.81 Cicero, 41, 43, 50, 81, 93, 9596, 102, 176n.66, 178n.5, 214n.68 Ciceronians, 21, 148, 213n.64 Civics, 2425 54, 92, 98 Clausula Petri, 12021, 133 Clement VII, Pope, 71 Clichtove, Josse, 172n.14 Cochlaeus, Johannes, 8086, 190n.14, 192n.42, 192n.53, 205n.91, 211nn.20, 26 Collatio, 54, 58 Colossae, 42, 88 Colossians, 12, 47, 49, 53 chs. 12, 56, 87, 179n.36 1:3, 51 1:329, 179n.36 1:311, 5051 1:9, 5051 1:1011, 51 1:12, 53 1:1222, 54 1:13, 49, 97 1:15, 34, 49, 50, 61 1:1516, 89, 92, 97, 102 1:1519, 53 :18, 67 1:23, 5354, 61 1:242:3, 54 chs. 24, 179n.36 ch. 2, 95 2:2, 96, 105 2:3, 41 2:4, 33, 4243, 54, 92, 96 2:8, 1517, 39, 43, 49, 54, 56, 62, 80, 8283, 85, 87, 99, 1013, 12628 2:9, 39, 41, 56, 175n.53 2:10, 62, 67 2:11 54 2:1112, 32, 54 2:1314, 175n.44 2:1315, 54 2:14, 35, 50, 56 2:16, 52, 54, 89, 113, 121 2:1617, 55 2:1623, 113 2:17, 3940, 56, 87, 96 2:1719, 45 2:18, 33, 83, 101, 113 2:1819, 55 2:20, 32
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2:2023, 55, 113 2:21, 34 2:22, 3435, 43, 113 2:23, 32, 34, 49, 62, 11113, 118, 122, 133, 136, 200n.12 chs. 34, 179n.36 ch. 3, 55 3:1, 49 3:6, 49 3:9, 88 3:10, 88 3:11, 62 3:12, 34, 49 3:15, 33 3:16, 33 ch. 4, 67 4:5, 33 Commandment, 35, 45, 53, 62, 86, 94, 96, 130. See also Law Commands and counsels, 130 Commands of Christ. See Jesus Christ, teachings of Commentaries, biblical, 12, 14, 20, 3132, 57, 63, 167n.51 Common places. See Loci Confutation, 14142, 145 Conscience, 3536, 52, 72, 144 consolation of, 11, 108, 146 torturers of, 134 Consensus patristicus, 46, 150 Contingency, 142143 Cop, Guillaume, 6 Corinthians, First 1:20, 119 1:2930, 84 2:14, 84, 90, 141 2:1415, 85 6:10, 114 7:18, 12122 7:21, 38 chs. 1214, 49, 99 12:6, 192n..45 14:40, 120 Corinthians, First and Second, 18, 58, 102 Corinthians, Second 2:5, 62 5:1621, 31 Corporaliter, 3941 Cross, 35, 4142, 5051, 8990, 108, 156 Cyril of Alexandria, 175n.55 D Daniel, ch. 9, 132 Death, 35, 50, 9799, 108 Decrees, conciliar, 121 Demosthenes, 43, 148 Deuteronomy, 8:3, 92 Devay, Matthew, vii Devil, 44, 85, 89, 91, 9799, 104, 107, 115, 11718, 122, 129, 133, 140 Dialectic, 18, 32, 39, 57, 59, 64, 93, 95, 105, 146 rhetoric and, 4849, 56, 93, 99, 100101, 103, 105, 107, 150 Diet of Augsburg (1530), 145, 148, 157 Dietrich, Veit, 154, 156 Dilfus, Francis, 77 Dilthey, Wilhelm, 5 Doctrine, 11, 27, 57, 73, 78, 9394, 146, 15152 Christian, 1819, 26, 41, 55, 60, 63, 67, 8486, 88, 92, 102, 150 Drachstadt, Alexander, 1516 Duty, Christian, 27 E Ecclesiastes 8:2, 203n.58 8:8, 203n.58 2:13, 83 Ecclesiaticus 15:24, 144 33:25, 114 Eck, John, 23, 37, 69, 106, 174n.34, 202n.26, 211n.16 Education, 10, 15, 83, 9495, 99, 109 Eloquence, Eloquentia, 49, 9293 Enthusiasts, 9 Ephesians, 45 2:16, 50 Epicurus, Epicureans, Epicureanism, 42, 86, 93, 142, 217n.130 Epilogue, 54, 113 Erasmus, Desiderius, 6, 8586, 179n.34 adages and, 78, 119, 194n.71 annotations of, 25, 31, 4142, 46, 56, 105, 196n.109 classical sources and, 42 critical of German princes, 67 death of, 139 De copia (1512), 50, 60, 64, 101
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De libero arbitrio, 9, 2627, 46, 6971, 7476, 85, 88, 90, 95, 99101, 1046, 170n.30, 190n.14, 192n.45, 192n.51, 196n.97 evangelical theology and, 10, 23, 2526, 32, 36, 139, 155 exegete, 32, 57 Hyperaspistes, 58, 6870, 7677, 99102, 106, 125, 145, 147, 182n.68, 195n.97 Hyperaspistes I (1526), 4546, 7072, 77, 84, 88, 9091, 95, 15455, 174n.37, 190n.14, 192n.51, 195n.86, 197 198n.122, 198n.124 Hyperaspistes II (1527), 76, 9799, 103, 141, 187n.42, 192n.45, 193n.54, 196n.103, 200n.9, 211n.13 Institutio Principis Christiani, 12530 loci communes and, 11, 75, 126 Luther and, viii, 22, 2426, 58, 68, 82, 86, 99, 108, 150 Melanchthon admiration misinterpreted, 78, 23 moralist, 3536, 46, no, 128 neutrality of, 27, 131, 157, 169n.12, 216n.106 New Testament and, 6, 31, 36, 57, 92, 172n.10, 173nn.2426 pacifism of, 136, 149 paraphrases, 7, 37, 46, 49 Ratio seu methodus (1519), 25, 57, 5960, 70 theology of, 910, 22, 69, 106, 139, 158 twofold righteousness and, 122 Ethics, 9, 25, 93, 106, 12526 Exegesis, 31, 39, 47, 49, 5758, 60, 62, 95, 128 Exordia, exordium, 5051, 53, 123 F Faber Stapulensis, 6, 32, 175n.47, 176n.65 Fabri, John, 68, 71 Faith, 2425, 3536, 43, 4546, 49, 51, 5356, 58, 67, 79, 84, 92, 94, 105, 110, 149, 179n.36 alone, 6465, 100, 104, 121 articles of, 127, 151 certainty of, 97, 105, 108 justification by, 45, 55, 58, 64, 111, 217n.136 righteousness of, 46, 63, 97, 136 works and, 46, 50, 55 Fasting, 35, 113 Fathers of the Church, viii, 11, 1314, 25, 32, 3647, 50, 5960, 64, 67, 69, 76, 8082, 106, 12324, 12829 Fisher, John, bishop of Rochester, 100 Flagellants, 34 Flesh, 34, 39, 50, 69, 71, 88, 9091, 11214, 190n.14 spirit and, 111, 140 Forgiveness, 35, 90, 156 Formula of Concord (1580), 89, 153, 212n.47 Fraenkel, Peter, 3738, 44, 46, 174n.36, 174n.38, 174n.40 Frederick the Wise, elector of Saxony, 2223, 27, 139, 155, 169n.13, 174n.33 Free will, free choice, 17, 47, 63, 7374, 7678, 8082, 8486, 8991, 9598, 1023, 1056, 118, 140, 151, 205n.95 apart from grace, 97, 157 controversy concerning, 11, 1416, 23, 25, 27, 46, 6769, 71, 74, 99, 1012, 106, 141, 14546 defended, 99, 136 Freedom, 91, 122, 126 Christian, 12, 62, 71, 112, 122, 135 human, 46, 6869, 104, 107 Frentz, Peter, 18 Froben, John, 2425, 36, 7576, 188n.60 G Galatians, 10, 12 1:9, 121 3:19, 90 3:24, 84, 87, 90, 143, 196n.104, 200n.14 5:10, 122 5:13, 122 Gallus, Nicholas, 15657 Gelenius, Sigismund, 7576 Genesis 1:2627, 192n.41 1:28, 119 chs. 23, 19 ch. 2, 102 ch. 3, 44 3:16, 45 ch. 9, 117 9:6, 117, 128, 130 10:89, 132 47:1326, 118
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George, prince of Anhalt, 31 Gerbel, Nicholas, 95, 202n.45 German, 18, 101, 103 Bible, 114, 201nn.19, 25 Gerson, John, 134 Geyer, HansGeorg, 14, 20, 166n.42, 167n.52 Glossa ordinaria, 40 GnesioLutherans, 153, 156 God, 27, 39, 4041, 68, 89 action of. See work of evil and, 48, 100, 104 governance of, 87, 89, 91, 9798, 1078, 192n.45 grace of, viii, 85, 89, 140 image of, 34, 50, 8889, 95, 126 judgment of, 9899, 115, 132 knowledge of, 4142, 51, 88 law of. See Law, divine mercy of, 35, 41, 142, 196n.97 nature of, 41, 55 promise(s) of, 47, 54, 88, 9697, 105, 107 punishment by, 81, 85, 88, 107 righteousness of, 14, 27, 113 Spirit of. See Holy Spirit will of, 37, 41, 5051, 69, 8485, 107, 125, 195n.97 word of, 33, 68, 8486, 97, 104, 108, 128, 132, 142 work of, viii, 89, 91, 98, 104, 107, 109, 111, 127, 142, 192n.45 wrath of, 35, 119, 134, 209n.146 Gospel, 11, 12, 25, 27, 36, 4447, 5254, 56, 59, 64, 74, 8586, 97, 100, 121, 131, 43 Law and. See Law, Gospel and Luther and, 107 Melanchthon and, 12, 110 philosophy and, 156 preaching, 120, 130 Göttingen, 31 Government, governance, 81, 84, 96, 112, 115, 11719, 124, 12628, 140 God's role in, 128, 13233, 144 Grace, 9, 12, 58, 68, 8485, 9798, 105, 127, 144, 196n.101 Grammar, 4849, 64, 93, 95, 99 Greek, 67, 27, 3334, 36, 4244, 49, 94, 110, 125 codices, 35 comedies, 99 distichon, 7 Erasmus and, 6, 2122, 32 grammar book, 6 Melanchthon and, 6, 106 orators, 33 study of, 2122, 155 text, texts, 6, 42 Gregory of Nazianzus, 123, 125, 129, 141, 207n.123 Guillaume du Bellay, 14546 H Heaven, 50, 96 Hebraisms, 49, 58 Hebrew, 74, 83 Hebrews, 1:3, 61 Hedio, Caspar, 71 Heidelberg, viii, 6, 10 University of, 10 Hell, 25, 99 Henry of Cremona, 116 Herwagen, John, 17, 20, 95 Herzog August Bibliothek, viii, 31, 171nn.12, 199n.144 Hippocrates, 93 History, 910, 57 ancient, 101, 13132 church, 44, 47, 64, 15674n.40 Holy Spirit, the, 24, 45, 48, 8485, 8992, 9697, 99, 102, 10405, 1078, 124, 13031, 14142, 146 Homer, 67, 93, 128, 146 Horace, 129, 164n.9, 207n.119 Hosea 13:9, 91 13:14, 50 Hugh of St. Cher, 3940, 43, 48, 176nn.66 67 Humanism, viiviii, 511, 17, 2122, 26, 37, 70, 147 Humanists, 5, 9, 21, 47 Humility, 34, 90, 98, 101, 114 Hummelberg, Michael, 2223 Hutten, Ulrich von, 23, 2526, 68, 76, 170n.34, 36, 171n.39, 197n.120 I Iconoclasm, 74, 112, 122, 187n.42 Incarnation, 3940, 127 Indulgences, 58 Innocent IV, Pope, 115, 231
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Interpretation, interpretations Biblical, 47, 50, 99 medieval, 31 patristic, 31, 4344 Isaiah, 93 8:20, 84 55: 11, 19 J Jena, 76, 78, 167n.64 Jeremiah 23:16, 121 29:7, 203n.56 Jerome, 6, 2122, 31, 43, 88, 144, 177n.8, 201n.25 Jesus Christ, 27, 39, 4142, 45, 55, 5859, 89, 95, 112, 119 benefits of, 53, 68, 134 coming of, 90 divinity of, 41, 97 faith in, 61, 84, 119 incarnation of, 3941 justification through, 45, 54 person of, 50 spiritual kingdom of, 116, 119, 130 teachings of, viii, 71, 97, 12123, 126, 131 Jews, 9697, 121 Joachimsen, Paul, 59 John the Baptist, 59, 117, 119, 156 John, elector of Saxony, 204n.70 John, First, ch. 3, 31 John, Gospel of, 32, 106, 175n.44 1:1, 32 1:18, 61 6:44, 90 ch. 8, 97 8:44, 89 ch. 10, 97 15:13, 58 15:5, 85, 90 ch. 16, 97 16:811, 97 18:36, 117 21:1618, 58 John of Paris, 116 Jonas, Justus, 1619, 31, 7578, 80, 1004 107, 128, 155 Julian the Apostate, 45, 123 Julius Caesar, 131, 140 Justice, 81, 84, 119 Justification, 12, 15, 20, 24, 3436, 39, 4142, 46, 61, 6768, 84, 86, 92, 9697, 99100, 142 doctrine of, 97, 107, 143, 212n.40 forensic, 144, 146 perversions of, 45 K Kalkreuter, Bartholomew, 139 Karlstadt, Andreas, 94, 124, 133, 14041, 144, 203n.62 Kittelson, James, 5 Klug, Joseph, 1718, 20, 143, 168n.66, 205n.98 Kobian, Valentin, 18, 20 Koch, John, 18 Kolb, Robert, ix, 18, 20 Kristeller, Paul Oskar, 5 L Lambert, François, 9495, 99, 102 Commentarii de Prophetia, 94 Language, languages, 910, 39, 58, 74, 93, 197n.111 Aristotelian, 212n.47 enemies of, 71 ignorance of, 39 Latin, 7, 1718, 36, 101, 103, 110 antiquity, 125 Cicerionianism and, 21, 148, 215nn.99, 102 Erasmus and, 2122 prose, 7 schools, 6, 10 study of, 2122, 155 translation, 31 verse, vii Law, laws, 12, 1416, 25, 3536, 59, 67, 81, 88, 93, 9596, 98, 107, 143 canon, 135 ceremonial, 3536, 39, 45, 54, 56, 88 civil, 62, 114, 122, 140 divine, 35, 82, 93, 102, 128, 143 first use of the, 86, 1078 Gospel and, 2425, 4142, 45, 55, 58, 71, 1078, 110, 112, 156, 189n.7 Mosaic, 35, 38, 40, 42, 5256, 62, 113, 115, 119, 133 natural, 45, 120 nonbiblical, 118, 133 Roman, 119, 205n.92 Saxon, 96, 119 second use of the, 86
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study of, 83, 96, 102, 104 Sybaritic and Milesian, 119, 133 third use of the, 45, 142 Leipzig, 22, 145 Leipzig Debates, 22, 25, 37, 106, 108 Leipzig Interim, 217n.136 Lenitas, 23 Leo X, Pope, 67, 43 letters, good. See bonae litterae Leviticus, 19:19, 86 Liberalism, 8, 156 Liberty, 91, 119, 135 Liberum arbitrium. See Free will License, 12122, 140 Literature, Pauline, interpretations of, viii, 12, 50 Loci, 18, 51, 60, 79, 123 Loersfelt, John, 16, 17 Logic, 93 Lombard, Peter, 157, 174n.41 Lord's Supper, 67, 74, 78, 113, 148, 157, 167n.65, 187n.42, 214n.70, 215n.83 Lotter, Michael, 17 Love, 24, 51, 58, 112, 118, 122, 130 Luke, Gospel of 1:1, 105 ch. 3, 156 3:14, 117 21:34, 114 22:25, 127, 130 Luther, Hans, 27 Luther, Martin, 5, 910, 16, 21, 24, 37, 46, 58, 69, 94, 97, 103, 107 Admonition to Peace, 135 aggressiveness of, 27, 90, 106 Assertion of all articles, 24, 68, 100 authority of, 21, 32 Babylonian Captivity, 2324 De servo arbitrio (1525), 8, 58, 68, 72, 74, 102, 1067, 155, 192n.45, 217n.130 Dissertatio preface, 17, 19 ''Doctor Hyperbolicus," 103 exegete, 31, 139 Galatians and, 10, 12, 22, 63 gospel of, 131 homiletical style, 13 humanism and, 5, 89, 10 Invocavit sermons (1522), 121 Melanchthon and, 10, 21, 103, 115, 12324 New Testament translator, 33, 35 Ninetyfive Theses, 58 On Secular Authority, 135 Operationes in Psalmos, 10, 2122 paradoxes and, 111, 122, 127, 14647, 152 theology of, 11, 21, 25, 57, 64, 75, 93, 100, 110, 112 two kingdoms doctrine and, 17, 117, 120 Why the Books of the Pope Were Burnt, 24 Lutheranism, 80, 148 M Magistrates, 79, 82, 87, 9, 115. See also Government authority of, 12324, 131, 148 Christian, 112, 12325, 13132, 141 disobedience toward, 132 duty toward, 118 education of, 125 evil and, 12627 fear of, 132, 14041 function of, 124, 130 honoring, 132, 140 marriage and, 132 ordained by God, 117, 12527, 129, 206n.114 protection of, 125 punishment by, 115, 123, 129 unjust, 120 Manichaeans, Manichaeism, 81, 14446 Marburg, 1617, 214n.70 Mark, Gospel of, 16:15, 27 Marriage, 94, 132 Matthew, Gospel of, 31, 58 ch.5, 130 5:39, 141 5:44, 130, 207n.122 ch. 6, 130 7:15, 21 9:17, 121 15:3, 134 16:1819, 58 17:2427, 117, 118 18:7, 24 ch. 20, 131 20:25, 130 20:2526, 117, 12628, 130 22:21, 118, 126 ch. 23, 121 23:3, 39 23:34, 121, 134 26:31, 24
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Maurer, Wilhelm, 39, 5960, 6970, 7475, 111, 210n.9 Maurus, Bernard, 21 Medicine, 15, 83, 92, 96, 102, 104 Meijering, E. P., 3738 Melanchthon, Philip, 36 address to the Wittenberg faculty (1518), 182n.66 annotations, 34, 38, 167n.62, 175n.45, 179nn.22, 30 Aristotle and, 125 Biblical studies and, 5 collected works, 1617, 20 Colossians and, 14, 27, 63 Commentary on Romans (1532), 140, 144, 150, 166n.49, 181n.61 De rhetorica libri tres, 10, 2122, 5051, 57 Dialectices libri quator (1528), 57 Dispositio orationis (1529), 57, 6062, 140 Dissertatio (1526), 1517, 19, 25, 62, 8285, 8995, 99, 100, 159, 167n.59, 193n.63 Elogion de Luthero et Erasmo (1522), 11, 2425, 71, 76, 136, 180n.37 Enarratio on Colossians (1559), 20, 176n.69 Enthusiasts and, 9, 121 Epitome of the Renewed Ecclesiastical Teaching, 112 Erasmus's admiration misinterpreted, 78 Erasmus's work criticized by, 7, 9, 33, 37, 122 Erasmus's work praised by, 36, 57, 152 Etliche Sprüche, 113 exegete, 17, 3132, 38, 44, 53, 62, 88, 90, 114 Farrago nova epistolarum, 36 grammarian, 13, 37, 44, 106, 114 hatred of conflict, 2526, 70, 151 Humanism and, viii, 89, 11, 64, 111 humanist, vii, 6, 13, 25, 64, 156 Institutiones rhetoricae, 57 Judgment against the Rebaptizers, 116 lectures on Colossians, 1213, 16, 1920, 27, 32, 75, 203n.58 lectures on John, 32 lectures on the New Testament, 39 lectures on Romans, 12 linguist, 67 Loci communes (1521), 9, 14, 17, 20, 37, 59, 63, 6971, 8081, 91, 111, 166n.44, 182n.67, 205n.94 Loci communes (1522), 81, 104, 11112, 170n.30 Loci communes (1535), 14344, 146, 150, 155 Loci communes theologici, 5657, 5962, 64, 81, 84, 106, 129, 169n.77, 187n.49, 196n.100, 199n.146, 216n.105 Luther. See Luther, Melanchthon and Luther, Erasmus, and, 8, 9, 22, 25, 5758, 63, 69 Luther's works and, 22, 31, 15455 Luther and, 6, 8, 10, 2122, 106, 111, 114, 117, 124 method of, 13, 25, 39, 42, 49, 57, 61, 128, 130, 151 moderation and, 15155, 157 Paul's writings and, viii, 12, 135 political shrewdness of, 26, 111, 151, 216n.105 Psalm interpretations of, 175n.42 Scholia. See under separate headings Scripture and, viii, 13, 124 teacher, 6, 12, 14, 15, 21, 57, 6263, 76, 80, 8283, 91, 94, 96, 103, 106, 123, 125, 174n.33 theological development, 1011, 14, 20, 111, 141, 143, 145, 158, 199n.151, 205n.92, 211n.24 theology of, 54, 62, 105, 108, 11011, 118, 124, 147, 182n.67, 192n.47, 211n.24 Visitation Articles (1527), 7778, 89, 121, 140, 205n.93, 210n.4 writing . . . against the Articles of the Peasants, 112 MelanchthonForschungsstelle, viii Memminger, Johannes. 27 Metaphysics, 5, 83 Method, 9, 57, 82, 107, 124, 136 exegetical, viii, 12, 14, 25, 39, 42, 47, 59, 67 loci, 106, 114 Mirandola, Pico della, 86 Modesty, modestia, 6, 34, 49
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Monks, monastics, 22, 27, 45, 67, 101, 113, 139, 155 Morals, 12, 36, 53, 55, 60, 77, 84, 128, 151, 179n.36 Morhardt, Ulrich, 80 Mortificatio, 5455 Mosellanus, Peter, 22 Mühlenberg, Ekkehard, 8 Müller, Hans Martin, 8 Müntzer, Thomas, 15, 62, 72, 11617, 124, 144 Musculus, Wolfgang, 31 Mysticism, 5 N Narratio, 53 Neoorthodoxy, 8 Nesen, Wilhelm, 75 Neuser, Wilhelm, 110 Nicea, Council of, 121 Nicolaus of Lyra, 39, 43, 48, 176n.67, 179n.36 Nuremberg, vii, 6, 7576, 116, 135 O Obedience, civil, 17, 62, 67, 82, 84, 109, 112, 11718, 141, 144 Oberman, Heiko, 12, 163n.2 Oecolampadius, John, 10, 67, 7174, 78, 171n.2 Oeconomia, 4849, 52, 99, 178n.5 Office of, the magistrate, 12526, 130, 136, 144 preacher, 144 subject, 126, 132, 136 Opera moralia, 4546, 96 Oratory, 33, 81, 96 Ordinances. See Law, laws and Commandments, and Ceremonies Origen, Origenism, 38, 59, 64, 88, 96, 125, 14041, 177n.80, 179n.34 Contra Celsum, 41, 123 delusions of, 156 Erasmus and, 41, 140, 105, 176n.58 Melanchthon and, 4547, 56, 150 Ovid, 93, 143, 146 P Pacifism, 126. See also under personal headings Pagans, 1012, 125, 130 Papacy, 27, 58, 73, 112, 11617, 131, 139 Parallelism, 16 Paul, 54, 63, 119 argumentum of, 57 dispositio of, 57 exaggerations of, 35 pacifism of, 126 philosophical interpretations of, 35 respect for, 64, 120 rule of, 115, 122 Peace, 114, 11819, 122 Peasants' War (1525), 9, 17, 63, 11112, 119, 124, 13, 133, 135, 187n.42, 205n.91, 209n.146 Pelagius, Pelagianism, 31, 45, 81 Pellikan, Conrad, 71, 170n.29 Penance, 15 Peter, Second, 2:19, 122 Petri, Adam, 1516 Pfister, Hermann, 111, 200n.6 Pflug, Julius, 145 Pharisees, Pharisaism, 42, 69, 71, 96, 101, 121 Philip, landgrave of Hesse, 112 Philology, 10, 36, 78, 177n.80 Philosophia Christi, 58, 110, 12526, 130, 178n.8 Philosophy, 910, 15, 17, 25, 4142, 46, 62, 80, 8283, 85, 91, 9596, 101, 103 abuse attacked, 193n.70 Christian, 126 defined, 82 discussion of, 92, 102 errors of, 10, 94 gift of God, 83, 85 human, 4142, 85, 140 limits of, 84 moral, 43, 93, 102, 125, 150 Pio, Alberto, 155, 172n.4 Pirckheimer, Willibald, 910 Pistorius, Frederick, 116 Plato, 59, 6869, 73, 81, 95, 144 De legibus, 127 Politics, 176n.69 Republic, 115 Platonism, 49, 86 Plutarch, 27, 126 Poenitentia, 14, 20, 60, 67, 88, 112, 166n.46, 183n.98, 184n.112 Poetics, 10, 94, 128
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Polemics, 2627, 47, 5758, 6162, 76, 78, 82, 90, 92, 97, 100, 107 Politics, 20, 93 Christ and, 45 Christian, 14, 12526, 13132, 158 Melanchthon's, 135 Mosaic, 55 philosophical, 125 Praeceptor Germaniae, 36, 153 Prayer, 51, 6768, 105, 134, 140 Preaching, 24, 27, 94, 96, 107 Predestination, 69, 81, 111, 157 Princes. See Authority, civil; Government; Magistrates Property, ownership of, 116, 12324, 133 Prosopographia, 50, 53, 61 Prosopopoeia, 35, 50 Proverbs, 166n.49 8:15, 117 12:10, 114 16:1011, 117 16:1415, 203n.58 20:2, 203n.58 20:12, 93, 119 24:2122, 203n.58 26:3, 203n.58 29:18, 86 Psalms, 31, 81, 99 Psalm 4, 81 7:6, 129 32:910, 203n.58 127:1, 91 Pseudoapostles, 71, 113 Q Quadriga, 58 Question, 11, 53, 57, 64, 95, 123 R Radicals, Revolutionaries, 112, 12425, 134 Ratio, 51, 55, 68, 76, 85, 90, 9699, 113 probabilis, 49, 92 voluntas and, 143 Ravensburg, 2223, 26 Real Presence, the doctrine of, 67 Reason, 17, 24, 33, 36, 43, 50, 81, 8586, 88, 90, 96, 102, 104, 114 arguments from, 33 attacks on, 91 human, viii, 41, 68, 76, 80, 99, 102, 112, 115 limits of, 82, 108 use of, 13, 24, 92, 95 Rebellion, 23, 122 Redemption, 39, 54 Reformation, the, 89, 44, 47, 110, 153 Erasmus and, 10 humanism and, 5, 89, 25, 70 Melanchthon and, 25 theology of. See Theology, evangelical Reich, Stephen, 169n.77 Renaissance, viii, 56 Reuchlin, John, 67, 10, 21, 169n.4, 170n.34 Reumann, John H. P., ix Revolutionaries. See Radicals Rhau, George, 15, 168n.66 Rhetoric, 10, 21, 3233, 35, 39, 4243, 5051, 5354, 64, 74, 81, 93, 95, 102 dialectic. See Dialectic, rhetoric and Righteousness, 55, 58, 88, 91, 102 before God, viii, 47, 53, 98, 112 carnal, 43 Christian, 27, 43, 5355, 6264, 8384, 90, 95, 99100, 104, 11213, 119, 140 civil, 84, 91, 95, 98100, 11213, 140, 144 human, 47, 5355, 6263, 8384, 112 twofold, 15, 24, 59, 67, 82, 104, 110, 11213, 122, 126, 130, 136, 140, 15657, 192n.47, 213n.61 Romans, 12, 18, 31, 3637, 45, 48, 5758, 61. 99, 102 1:17, 27 1:21, 86 1:25, 9293 1:28, 86 2:15, 8283, 119 ch. 3, 61, 87 3:20, 87 3:28, 84 5:35, 88 5:20, 88 8:3, 50 8:67, 90 8:14, 85 chs. 911, 142 ch. 9, 87 10:4, 87 11:32, 87
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ch. 13, 57, 84, 11417, 11920, 126, 13132, 14042 13:1, 117, 126 13:17, 112 13:2, 120 13:3, 115 13:34, 117, 119 203n.62 13:4, 117, 126, 130 13:5, 11718 13:57, 117 13:6, 118 13:7, 118 Rörer, George, 1718, 168n.66, 168n.70 Roth, Stephen, 17, 168n.66 S Sadoleto, Jacopo, Bishop of Carpentras, 150, 153 Salvation, 46, 58, 6768, 81, 86, 91, 12021, 134 Samuel, First, 8:1118, 118 Sanctification, 39 Schäfer, Rolf, 81 Scheible, Heinz, viii, 11, 184n.117, 199n.44, 214n.71 Schneider, John R., 165n.27, 165n.35 Scholasticism, viii, 56, 11, 35, 45, 107, 182n.68 Scholia of 1527, 11, 1417, 25, 35, 3840, 45, 61, 63, 80, 8797, 99, 11112, 11424, 126, 13234, 15960, 172n.16 Scholia of 1528, 11, 14, 1718, 25, 33, 3840, 43, 45, 54, 56, 62, 7778, 80, 91, 96101, 1056, 11112, 114, 12336, 140, 16061, 168nn.7475, 169n.76, 172n.9, 172n.16, 195n.97, 198n.125, 204n.89 Jonas's translation, 19, 1014 Scholia of 1534, 11, 19, 35, 45, 161, 167n.52, 172n.16 compared with 1528 edition, 142 compromise language of, 149 Luther and, 135 personal inscription in, vii Scholia on Colossians, vii, 5, 1114, 20, 32, 34, 43, 47, 49, 52, 56, 77, 80, 88, 94, 105, 108, 112, 158, 167n.64, 193n.63 list of printings, 159161, 167n.55 Visitation articles and, 14041 Schulze, Manfried, 110 Schurff, Jerome, 26 Schwabach Articles, 141 Schwäbisch Hall, 10, 20 Schwartzerdt, George, 6 Schwartzerdt, Philip, 6, 21. See also Melanchthon, Philip Schwarzenau, Paul, 111 Scientia, 4142 Scopus, 8, 52, 183n.82 Scripture, 9, 13, 19, 2425, 31, 4749, 6061, 68, 76, 8182, 90, 93, 98, 105, 107, 125, 128, 146 arguments from, 99 evangelical reading of, 31 interpretation, 31, 4344, 47, 50, 99 Law and Gospel and, 150 loci of, 62 purpose of, 127 study of, 39, 125 text of the, 11, 13, 3132, 47, 61, 67 Secular authority. See Authority, civil Sedition, 23, 63, 72, 74, 77, 80, 101, 120, 13132 Luther and, 124 Seneca, 81, 86, 127, 206n.111 Sententia, sententiae, 4647, 49, 5253, 55, 6263, 90, 99, 105 Senno, 33, 96, 99 Setzer, John, 1618, 167n.62, 202n.45 Sick, Hansjörg, 38 Sin, 12, 50, 55, 81, 85, 89, 100, 107, 114, 122, 140, 143 forgiveness of, 41, 45, 59, 64, 84, 9697, 114 nature of, 31 original, 98, 104 satisfaction for, 134 Sirach 15:1418, 88 38:1, 93 38:12, 83 Smalcald War, 31 Sola Scriptura, 3132, 46, 6869, 102, 106 Song of songs, 94 Sophists, 33, 81 Soteriology, 9, 60, 106, 111 Soul, souls, 4849, 51, 81, 89, 91, 105, 131, 143, 190n.14
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Sources. See also Ad fontes biblical, 126 classical, 43, 59, 110, 126, 157 patristic, 31, 64, 144 Spalatin, George, 23, 2526, 57, 69, 73, 75, 83, 94, 169n.14, 182n.66, 200n.13 Speculation, 37, 41, 49, 86, 9394, 99, 125, 142, 14647, 157 Speech, 50, 58, 99, 108, 217n.123 Spengler, Lazarus, 63, 135, 184n.117, 210n.166 Speyer, Diet of (1526), 112 Spitz, Lewis, 5 Steinmetz, David, ix, 119 Stoics, 93 Strabo, 42, 176n.65 Strasbourg, 10, 22, 74, 83, 9495, 202n.45 Stupperich, Robert, 9, 11, 15, 24, 59, 111 Superstition, 34, 36, 56, 64, 88, 93, 114 Sutel, John, 3132, 38, 47 Swiss reformation, 9, 112, 122, 154 Synergism, 142, 145 T Teaching. See Doctrine Terence, 11, 21, 170n.38, 203n.55 Theology, 913, 15 chief goals of, 146 convergence of, 10, 136 evangelical, viii, 6, 36, 56, 58, 62, 64, 83, 107, 14546 humanism and, 8, 64 Melanchthon's shift in, 124, 199n.146 Pauline, 33, 36, 44 Scholastic, 9, 49, 82 Theophylact(us), 6, 35, 3841, 130, 134, 156, 175n.44, 176n.65, 179n.34, 199n.147 Thessalonians, First, 1, 68 2:7, 6, 21 Thessalonians, Second, 2:11, 86 Thomas Aquinas, 3943, 4849, 175n.49 Timothy, First 1:9, 84, 87, 117, 128, 130, 143 2:12, 11718 2:2, 126 4:3, 114 4:34, 93 6:1, 121 Timothy, Second 2:15, 86 2:21, 192n.45 Tongues, Biblical gift of, 93, 99 Tradition, exegetical, 9, 41, 59, 63, 113, 119, 173n.17 humanist, 32, 38 medieval, 32, 3839, 46, 176n.62 patristic, 32, 3940, 43, 46 Tradition, traditions, 9, 11314, 134 church, 112, 114, 120, 12223, 13235 false faith in, 134 human, 5455, 62, 100, 11315, 121 medieval, 39, 129 Melanchthon and, 32, 42 violated, 121, 134 Trinity, 84, 88, 108 Trithemius, John, 37 Liber de Ecclesiasticis Scriptoribus (1494), 37 Troeltsch, Ernst, 5, 163n.1 Truth, 41, 81, 88, 94, 127 Tübingen, 6, 10, 21, 167n.62 University of, 10 Tiirck, Christopher, 145 Twelve Articles, 112, 119, 135, 209n.151 Two kingdoms, doctrine of, 17, 38, 63, 97, 106, 108, 11012, 117, 130, 156 confusion in, 132 distinction in, 13132, 135 Tyrants, tyranny, 12627, 131 U Ülin, Oswald, 26 V Valla, Lorenzo, 32, 69, 143 Vehe, Michael, 145 Vengence, 130 Magistrates and, 126, 130 prohibition of, 117, 123, 129, 141 Vergil, 95, 164n.9 Virgin Mary, 81, 108 Virtue, virtues, 6, 17, 25, 60, 68, 69, 8485, 90, 142 Vivificatio, 5455 Vulgarius. See Theophylact Vulgate, 6, 3234, 44, 49, 62, 105 W Waldensians, 116 War, 126, 132 Warham, William, 67 Wartburg, 8
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Wiedenhofer, Siegfried, 911, 5960 William of Ockham, 84, 116, 202n.38 Wisdom, 42, 50, 82, 101, 113, 119 Wittenberg, 6, 8, 1718, 21, 26, 63, 73, 75, 76, 83, 95, 101 University of, 6, 14, 8283, 94, 139 Wittenberg Unrest (152122), 9, 24, 70, 111, 122, 124 Wolfenbüttel, viii, 31, 199n.144 Word, The, 39, 48, 69, 9394, 9799, 1078, 127, 130, 142, 144, 146 Works, 24, 43, 69, 84, 90, 96, 110 free will and, 191n.26 justification through, 114, 131 righteousness of, 43, 97 Wiirttemberg, 10 Z Zechariah, 9:9, 117 Zephaniah, 3:12, 117 Zwickau, 17 Zwickau prophets, 24, 111, 124 Zwingli, Ulrich, 67, 71, 74, 78, 157, 167n.65, 214n.70, 215n.83