Governing Metropolitan Indianapolis: The Politics of Unigov [Reprint 2019 ed.] 9780520317024

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GOVERNING METROPOLITAN

INDIANAPOLIS

The Politics of Unigov

A publication of the Franklin K. Lane Memorial Fund, Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, Berkeley T h e Franklin K. Lane Memorial Fund takes its name from Franklin Knight Lane ( 1 8 6 4 - 1 9 2 1 ) , a distinguished Californian who was successively New York correspondent for the San Francisco Chronicle, City and County Attorney of San Francisco, member and later chairman of the United States Interstate Commerce Commission, and Secretary of the Interior in the cabinet of President Woodrow Wilson. The general purposes of the endowment are to promote "better understanding of the nature and working of the American system of democratic government, particularly in its political, economic and social aspects," and the "study and development of the most suitable methods for its improvement in the light of experience."

Lane Studies in Regional Government: Metropolitan Winnipeg: Politics and Reform Meyer Brownstone and T. J. Plunkett

of Locai Government,

New York: The Politics of Urban Regional Development, Danielson and Jameson W. Doig Governing the London Region: 1960s, by Donald L. Foley

Reorganization

Governing Metropolitan bert Rose

A Social

Toronto:

Governing Greater Stockholm: Policy in Stockholm, by Thomas ). Anton

and

and Policy

by

by Michael N.

Planning in

the

Analysis,

by Al-

Development and Urban

Change

GOVERNING METROPOLITAN

INDIANAPOLIS The Politics of Unigov C. James Owen York Willbern

Published for the Institute of Governmental Studies and the Institute of International Studies University of California, Berkeley U N I V E R S I T Y O F CALIFORNIA P R E S S B E R K E L E Y LOS A N G E L E S LONDON

University of California Press Berkeley a n d Los Angeles, California University of California Press, Ltd. London, England © 1985 by The Regents of the University of California Printed in the United States of America 1

2

3

4

5

6

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8

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Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Owen, C. James (Carroll James) Governing metropolitan Indianapolis. (Lane studies in regional government) "Published for the Institute of Governmental Studies and the Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley." Includes index. 1. Indianapolis Metropolitan Area (Ind.)—Politics a n d government. I. Willbern, York Y. II. University of California, Berkeley. Institute of Governmental Studies. III. University of California, Berkeley. Institute of International Studies. IV. Title. V. Series. JS943.A8094 1985 320.8'09772'52 85-2776 ISBN 0-520-05147-5

To our wives, Susan Poplett Owen and Johnne Bryant Willbern

Contents

List of Illustrations Lisi of Tables Foreword

xiii xv xvii

1.

G o v e r n m e n t a l R e f o r m in I n d i a n a p o l i s I n d i a n a p o l i s Unigov: A S u b j e c t of S t u d y C i r c u m s t a n c e s and S c o p e of Reform Special Circumstances S c o p e of Reform A National P e r s p e c t i v e T h e Reform P r o c e s s S t r u c t u r e and F u n c t i o n

2.

C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of M e t r o p o l i t a n Indianapolis G r o w t h of the City An Emerging M e t r o p o l i s R e c e n t P o p u l a t i o n Changes Changing Patterns of W e a l t h and Growth Population Characteristics B l a c k s in I n d i a n a p o l i s Early Arrivals A Growing Population Political and Civil Rights E d u c a t i o n , E m p l o y m e n t , and Politics P o p u l a t i o n G r o w t h in the T w e n t i e t h Century K l a n - R e l a t e d S e t b a c k s , and New Gains

25 26

G o v e r n m e n t Before Unigov T h e B a s i c Units of G o v e r n m e n t A M u l t i p l i c i t y of G o v e r n m e n t s Functional Duplication Overlapping Jurisdictions Summary No " H o m e R u l e "

28 28 30 32 32 33 34

3.

1 1 3 3 3 5 6 7 14 14 15 17 19 21 23 23 23 24 24

viii

Contents

Adapting Government to Metropolitan Problems Special Service Districts Unsuccessful Reorganization Attempts

4.

34 35 37

The Reorganization Proposal: Background and Drafting The Mounting Complexity of Change Annexation General Reform Discussions T h e League of Women Voters and the Chamber of Commerce Government Study Committees Politics 1964 and the Period of Democratic Ascendancy A "Power Grab" Metropol The Republicans Return to Power T h e Republican Action Committee Lugar's First Campaign for Mayor The Planning Stage: Developing a Draft Proposal Policy Committee Early Business Ties Lawyers' Work Group Securing Political Support A Restructured Committee and a New Place of Work

41 41 42 43 44 44 46 46 46 48 49 50 51 53 54

5.

Public Discussion Stage Some Early Disclosures The Mayor's Task Force Role of the Progress Committee Task Force Meetings Judge Niblack's County Task Force Task Force Accomplishments T h e Detailed Drafting T h e Media: Placating the News and the Star A Speakers' Bureau T h e Legislative Delegation Drafting Decisions

56 56 58 60 60 62 63 64 66 68 69 71

6.

The Legislative Stage Leadership, Organization, and Strategy Senate Committee Consideration Major Compromises Senate Floor Debate

75 75 76 77 79

38 38 39 40

Contents

Second Reading Third Reading and Final Vote House Action Trouble with the Speaker Action at the Third Reading Legislative Tactics Party Caucuses Keeping Legislators Informed Lincoln Day Dinners Demonstrating Public Support Unigov Mail Two Petitions A Telephone Survey Public Hearings Black Spokesmen Conservative Opposition The Democrats Divided The Voice of Labor Dissident Republicans A Coordinated Effort Two Government Agencies Appeased Too Much Organization? Conclusion: The Elements of Success Consolidation as a Topical Issue A Measure of Political Partisanship The Role of State Government Outstanding Leadership Astute Draftmanship Willingness to Compromise Organizing Public Support 7.

Reorganization: Promise and Performance

Service Areas Center Township Indianapolis School District Fire Service District Police Service District Sanitation Division/Board of Works Housing Authority Consolidated City-County Library District Marion County Unigov Taxes, Revenue, and Expenditures Property-Tax Rates Other Revenues

ix

80 82 84 84 86 86 87 88 89 90 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 97 97 98 99 100 100 101 102 102 104 104 105 107

108 108 108 111 111 112 112 112 113 113 113 114 115

x

8.

Contents

Fiscal Policy and Management Federal Programs Increased Funding Under Unigov Federal Program Directions Significant Changes in Services and Finance Police Services Streets and Roads Planning and Development Sewage Treatment Facilities Public Transportation A Related Move to Redistribute Resources The Small Municipalities Municipal Annexation Procedures

222 124 125 125 127 128 129 129 130 131 132 133 134

Administrative Organization and Control Executive Departments Department of Administration Department of Public Safety Department of Transportation Parks and Public Works Department of Metropolitan Development Executive Control Merged City and County Executive Offices The Mayor's Office Increased Budgetary Powers Legislative Integration Improvements in Leadership and Management Improved Efficiency Legal Services Streamlining Personnel Practices Political Patronage Progress in Services, Planning, and Development Transportation Planning and Community Development Planning and Zoning Community Development Regionalization and Decentralization Regional Developments The Indiana Heartland Coordinating Commission Early Years of Operation Community Councils: Minigov Amendments and Modifications Clarifications and Amplifications Public Transportation

137 137 137 139 139 140 140 142 142 143 143 144 146 147 147 147 148 149 149 150 151 152 157 157 160 161 162 163 164 165

Contents

9.

xi

Judicial Review Agreement on the At-Large Council Seats Seating on the Service District Councils Unigov Tied to School Desegregation Summary

166 166 167 168 169

The Political Community: Unigov and Beyond Voter Reaction T h e 1971 Mayoral Election Partisan Political Gains Mayoral Campaigns: 1971 and 1975 T h e 1979 H u d n u t Landslide City-County Council Elections Other Elections Minority Representation A More P r o s p e r o u s C o m m u n i t y ? Direct Representation of Black Districts More Blacks in G o v e r n m e n t Offices Summary A C o m m u n i t y w i d e Council Unigov Impact Statewide Evansville: Vandigov Less C o m p r e h e n s i v e Reform: St. Joseph C o u n t y South Bend H o m e Rule

170 171 171 173 173 175 J 77 178 180 180 181 183 184 185 186 187

10. Conclusion T h e Restructured G o v e r n m e n t Characteristics of Unigov Reform Development Business a n d Economic Growth Black Involvement U n d e r Unigov Summary T h e Reform Process Unigov: A M o d e l for Reform? Political Strategy Political Leaders' Role The State's Role Appendix 1: The Mayor's Task Force on Improved Governmental Structure for Indianapolis and Marion County Appendix 2: Form Letter from Mayor Lugar Directing Formation of Task Force on Indianapolis-Marion County Reorganization, November 1968

189 192 194 194 195 195 196 198 199 200 200 201 202 204

209 211

xii

Contents

Appendix 3: List of Members of County Task Force as Reported in Memorandum by Judge John L. Niblack, Chair, County Task Force, December 19, 1968 Appendix 4: Editorials on Unigov, 1 9 6 8 - 1 9 6 9 Appendix 5: 1969 Marion County Legislative Delegation Appendix 6: Roll Call on Senate Bill 543 Appendix 7: Closing Remarks of E. Henry "Ned" Lamkin, Jr., on Passage of SB 543 Appendix 8: Roll Call on House Bill 543 Appendix 9: News Release from the Files of the Greater Indianapolis Progress Committee Index

213 214 220 222 224 228 230 233

Illustrations

Maps 1.

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Percent Change in Population in Indianapolis, EightCounty Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area, 1970— 1980 Marion County Townships with Assessed Valuations Trends in Local Government, Indianapolis-Marion County Prior to Implementation of Unigov in 1971 Units of Government After Unigov, Indianapolis-Marion County School Districts in Marion County Marion County and Included Towns Council Districts Under Unigov (1970), IndianapolisMarion County 1971 City-County Council Election Results

20 22 29 109 110 134 145 178

Charts 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Indianapolis City Government Before Consolidation Overlapping Layers of Local Government: Three Typical Examples Before Unigov Marion County Government Organization Before Consolidation City of Indianapolis, General Revenue by Source, 1979 Unigov Organization Chart, Consolidated Government for Indianapolis-Marion County

31 33 36 119 138

Photographs Indianapolis-Marion County Combined Government Building Indianapolis's Monument Circle Unigov Bumper Sticker Mayor Richard G. Lugar

4 12 70 103

xiv

Illustrations

Hyatt Regency Hotel C o m p l e x Downtown Indianapolis Skyline D o w n t o w n Skyline, M e r c h a n t s Plaza D o w n t o w n Skyline, D o m e d Sports A r e n a Lockerbie S q u a r e

141 151 154 155 158

Tables

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Characteristics of Selected Metropolitan Governments 9-10 Arrangement of Functions in Selected Metropolitan Reorganizations 11 Comparison of Total Population by Township/Marion County: 1960, 1970, 1980 18 Chamber Poll on Legislative Issues 59 City of Indianapolis, General Governmental Expenditures by Function, 1 9 7 1 - 1 9 8 0 116-17 City of Indianapolis, Assessed and Estimated Actual Value of Taxable Property, Countywide, 1 9 7 1 - 1 9 8 0 118 City of Indianapolis, Property-Tax Rates and Tax Levies, All Overlapping Governments, 1 9 7 1 - 1 9 8 0 120 Votes for Mayoral Candidates in Heaviest Black Wards 184

Foreword

Five years after the City of Indianapolis and Marion County had been consolidated by an act of the Indiana legislature, Mayor Richard Lugar said: "Modernizers and reformers of the municipal government must approach each opportunity with seemingly boundless enthusiasm, moral fervor, and careful definition of the grounds on which they expect to win." 1 After reading this book, one can understand the complex process whose outcome at times seemed doubtful and why Mayor Lugar considered it important to capitalize on every opportunity with at least the appearance of "boundless enthusiasm."

The Indianapolis Story James Owen and York Willbern, in the seventh volume of the Franklin K. Lane series on the governance of major metropolitan areas, have reconstructed the history of the only consolidation of a large city and county to occur in the United States without a popular referendum since the creation of Greater New York in 1897. 2 It is the story of how Mayor Lugar convinced the Republican Party leaders and other influential citizens of Marion County that unifying the city and county would be "good politics" and that a consolidated government with a mayor and council could provide the public leadership that Indianapolis had lacked for years. He persuaded the Republicans that 1. R i c h a r d G. Lugar, " A F e w C o m m e n t s on L o c a l G o v e r n m e n t M o d e r n i z a t i o n , " proceedings

of the A d v i s o r y C o m m i s s i o n on Intergovernmental Relation's

National

C o n f e r e n c e o n F e d e r a l i s m in A c t i o n , W a s h i n g t o n , DC, February 21, 1 9 7 5 . 2. A n a d v i s o r y r e f e r e n d u m not binding o n the N e w Y o r k legislature w a s held in 1 8 9 4 in N e w Y o r k City, Brooklyn, and the rest of Kings County, Queens and R i c h m o n d c o u n t i e s , a n d the s o u t h e a s t e r n portion of W e s t c h e s t e r County. T h e result w a s favorable to c o n s o l i d a t i o n , with a c l o s e vote only in Brooklyn and one of the W e s t c h e s t e r towns. Four years e l a p s e d before final action w a s taken by the legislature; see David C. H a m mack, P o w e r a n d S o c i e t y : Greater New

York at the Turn of the Century (New York:

Basic Books, 1 9 8 2 ) ; B a r r y J e r o m e Kaplan, " A S t u d y in the Politics of Metropolitanization: T h e Greater N e w Y o r k City Charter of 1 8 9 7 , " Ph.D. dissertation, State University of New York, Buffalo, 1 9 7 5 , pp. 1 5 1 - 1 5 5 . T h e city and c o u n t y of H o n o l u l u w e r e c o n solidated w i t h o u t r e f e r e n d u m in 1 9 0 4 , but at that t i m e the population of e a c h w a s very small.

xviii

Foreword

they would benefit from the move. Consolidation was facilitated by a rather u n u s u a l c o i n c i d e n c e : simultaneous Republican control of the mayor's office, the governorship, and the state legislature. T h i s is also the story of h o w Mayor Lugar led his team of advisers in putting together a legislative package that could attract the wide support—or at least the a c q u i e s c e n c e — o f most city and county officials, the press, and legislative leaders. He c o m p r o m i s e d w h e n c o m p r o m i s e was politically essential, but he also managed to protect his main objectives: consolidating the p o l i c y m a k i n g structures of the city and the county. Even after responsibility for the consolidation effort shifted from the mayor to the legislative leaders, Lugar still exercised influence. For e x a m p l e , he spoke at various county and congressional district meetings gathered to celebrate the memory of Abraham Lincoln, rem i n d i n g R e p u b l i c a n s of their unique opportunity to " u n s t i c k the gears of an archaic, e x p e n s i v e and overlapping Model-T form of government."' Mayor Lugar was talking from his own e x p e r i e n c e when he res p o n d e d in 1 9 7 3 to a question about the d y n a m i c s of a consolidation m o v e m e n t . His reply e m p h a s i z e d the importance of a few active dedicated leaders: "It s e e m s to me that probably s o m e o n e or a very small group of people active in the political life of Montgomery County, Dayton, Ohio, will need to determine their own plan of action. It may be assisted by a citizens' study group. But I think a number of people, or maybe a single person will need to put his political life on the line.'" 1 It is difficult to overstate the importance of Mayor Lugar's leadership. He was that " s i n g l e p e r s o n " who played for high stakes and won. In fact, he managed to ride the issue into the US Senate, in the face of c o n c l u s i o n s in the prevailing literature that such efforts are no-win or even losing propositions for the leaders involved. ' Mayor Lugar's e x p e r i e n c e demonstrates that there can be political gain from s u c h efforts, d e p e n d i n g on state-local c i r c u m s t a n c e s that predispose for or against s u c c e s s , as well as on the quality of leadership displayed. Moreover, political parties as well as strategically positioned political leaders e l s e w h e r e may gain or lose from metropolitan reorganization, or b e l i e v e that they will. In another volume of this series, 3. "Lugar Intends to Lobby for Unigov," Indianapolis Star, January 5, 19(59, p. 12. 4. National Association of Counties, Consolidation: Partial or Total, transcript of the National Conference (Washington, DC, 1973), p. 15. 5. Marilyn Gittell, "Metropolitan Mayor: Dead End," Public Administration Review 23 (March 1963). Although leadership in metropolitan reform does not often result in election to higher offices, as it did for Senator Lugar, local officials nevertheless frequently perceive the proposed reforms as supporting their amibitions; see John C. Bollens and Henry J . Schmandt, The Metropolis: Its People, Politics, and Economic Life, 4th ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1982). p. 384.

Foreword

xix

Metropolitan Winnipeg, Meyer Brownstone and T. J. Plunkett discuss the combination of "public interest" and "partisan advantage" in developing and enacting the proposal to consolidate all the local governments in the Winnipeg region.Contrary to what happened in Indianapolis, the sponsor of Winnipeg's reform, the Manitoba New Democratic Party, has not benefited from the consolidated city's electoral politics the way it had hoped to. Of course, Mayor Lugar did not work alone. Owen and Willbern show how a succession of informal organizations came into play. Each had a core of largely the same people, plus additional persons with such technical or symbolic qualifications as the occasion required. But Mayor Lugar and his key associates never allowed an independent organization to determine strategies or tactics. Procedure in Indianapolis thus differed significantly from the usual reform effort in the United States where moves to consolidate a city and county are typically sponsored by citizens' groups without the leadership of influential and ambitious public officials. 7 Only after the basic elements of a plan for Unigov—the popular term for the proposed reorganization—had been put into draft bill form by Lugar and his close associates did the mayor appoint the Task Force on Improved Government Structure for Indianapolis and Marion County. The task force consisted of 23 business leaders, a Presbyterian minister (later mayor), a member of a carpenters' apprenticeship program, a member of the League of Women Voters, and ex officio the 23 members of the all-Republican Marion County delegation to the state legislature. As Owen and Willbern observe: "Perhaps the task force members were most effective in promoting Unigov simply because of who they were. . . . Mayor Lugar's original task force instructions omitted any suggestion that it had the option of turning 6. Meyer Brownstone and T. ). Plunkett, Metropolitan Winnipeg: Politics and He/orm of Local Government (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). See also Frank Smallwood, Greater London: The Politics of Metropolitan He/orm (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), pp. 1 0 2 - 1 0 3 : The London Labour Party was flatly opposed to any reform that wou Id lead to the abolition of its local political prize, the London County Council, and dilute its central area strength in a sea of Conservative suburban votes. The Conservative position, on the other hand, was not quite this precise. While many Conservatives cast covetous eyes on precisely the political prospect Labour feared (i.e., the swamping of central London's Labourites within a sea of Conservative suburbia), some of the powerful Conservative county council leaders, especially in Surrey and Kent, were adamant against any reform that would result in the metropolitan fringes of their own home counties being wrested away from their local control and turned over to a new Greater London authority. 7. See, e.g., Henry Schmandt, The Milwaukee Metropolitan Study Commission (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965); and Government Affairs Foundation, Metropolitan Surveys (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1958).

xx

Foreword

down the whole plan. . . . The overriding effect was that the Unigov's principals successfully got the approval of an important segment of the c o m m u n i t y while retaining effective control over the Unigov effort." In short, the mayor used the task force to legitimize consolidation rather than to make major changes in the proposal. A well-informed student of metropolitan governance has remarked that nowhere else have citizen task forces been used with such political skill. 8

Indianapolis and Winnipeg: No Referendums The prevailing practice in the United States requires that any major (and often minor) metropolitan governmental reorganizations of the kind discussed in this book must be approved in a referendum. In Indiana, however, lacking a strong tradition of local home rule, astute Indianapolis leaders were able to capitalize on their party's control of the governorship and both houses of the legislature, pushing through legislation that consolidated the city and Marion County without a referendum. The near-simultaneous creation of Greater Winnipeg's Unicity—as the consolidated government was popularly known—in Canada's prairie province of Manitoba meant that two of North America's three largest consolidations of this century were achieved without a referendum vote. 9 8. Letter from V i n c e n t L. M a r a n d o , University of Maryland, to S t a n l e y S c o t t , D e c e m b e r 8, 1 9 8 2 . T h e u n i q u e features of the political process by w h i c h the Unigov reorganization was put together s h o u l d not blind us to the c o m p l e x political nature of almost any reorganization as well as the skillful m a n e u v e r i n g required to put it into effect and m a k e it work. Note, e.g., B e a t r i c e W e b b ' s a s t o n i s h m e n t at the " i n t r i g u e " s h e and S i d n e y W e b b found n e c e s s a r y to a c h i e v e Fabian S o c i a l i s t goals through the L o n d o n County C o u n c i l a n d other i n s t i t u t i o n s at the turn of the century. S h e wrote in 1 9 0 3 : It is a t i r e s o m e fact that, to get things done in what o n e considers the best way, entails so m u c h — t o s p e a k p l a i n l y — o f intrigue. T h e r e is no such thing as spontan e o u s p u b l i c o p i n i o n ; it all has to be m a n u f a c t u r e d from a Centre of C o n v i c t i o n and Energy radiating through persons, s o m e t i m e s losing itself in an u n s y m p a t h e t i c m e d i u m , at other t i m e s gaining additional force in such an agent as the B i s h o p of S t e p n e y or t h e D a i l y M a i l . Of c o u r s e there is always the e l e m e n t of " s p o r t " in this life of agitation, w a t c h i n g the ideas o n e starts, like, for instance, " t h e d o m i n a n c e of the N . U . T . [National U n i o n of T e a c h e r s ] over borough c o u n c i l s , " w e n d i n g their w a y s through all sorts of s o u r c e s to all sorts of places and turning up quite u n e x p e c t e d l y as allies in overthrowing counter interests and arguments. (Quoted in R o n a l d Clark's review of T h e Diary of Beatrice Webb, vol. 2: 1892-1905: All Good T h i n g s of Life, ed. Norman M a c K e n z i e and J e a n n e M a c K e n z i e [Cambridge, Mass.: B e l k n a p Press/Harvard University Press, 1 9 8 3 ] , in New York T i m e s B o o k Review, January 2 9 , 1 9 8 4 ) . 9. I n d i a n a p o l i s - M a r i o n County had a 1 9 7 0 p o p u l a t i o n of 8 0 0 , 0 0 0 , and Greater W i n n i p e g , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 . T h e third large c o n s o l i d a t i o n , w h i c h did involve a r e f e r e n d u m , brought together J a c k s o n v i l l e and Duval C o u n t y , Florida. T h i s area had a 1 9 7 0 popula-

Foreword

xxi

The two nonreferendum consolidations, however, took place in distinctly different political and constitutional circumstances: Indiana operates under a constitutional separation of powers dividing the executive and legislative branches, whereas Manitoba operates under a parliamentary system. Readers can compare this Indianapolis volume with the Brownstone and Plunkett account of Winnipeg's consolidation, given in another of the Franklin K. Lane volumes. 10 The two books help highlight the differing limitations and opportunities under the two systems as well as the corresponding strategies and tactics of consolidation's opponents and proponents in the two metropolises. Parliamentary

Versus Nonparliamentary

Systems

To most observers from the United States, it looks much easier to reorganize local governments in parliamentary systems (e.g., as in the province of Manitoba) than in the United States with its nonparliamentary system, written national and state constitutions, and separation of powers between legislative and executive branches. Canada's provinces have neither written constitutions nor separation of powers, and Canadian political parties are comparatively strong and well disciplined. In those circumstances the cabinet of a provincial government, particularly a government with a respectable majority in parliament, is in a strong position to effect reorganizations. In the United States, by contrast, consolidation statutes—either generally permissive or individual special acts (as in the case of Indianapolis)—must get the assent of two legislative houses and the governor. In addition, one or more referendum majorities from the local citizenry living within the areas to be reorganized are usually required. One of our Canadian reader-critics urged that we emphasize the importance of these effects of the parliamentary system, as a system, in facilitating successful reorganization. He acknowledged that absence of a referendum requirement is perhaps a necessary condition of effective local reorganization, but he also observed that lack of a referendum is not in itself a sufficient explanation. Several features of the

tion of 529,000. Another proposal, to consolidate Louisville and )efferson County, Kentucky (population 685,000), w e n t to a r e f e r e n d u m in November 1982, losing by a hairline margin of 0.08 percent; see D. A. Gilbert, "Louisville Merger Goes to Voters," National Civic Review 71(9):468-469 (October 1982); and 7 2 ( l ) : 5 2 - 5 3 (January 1983); Joseph F. Z i m m e r m a n , "City-County Mergers: Voters Say Yes and No," Public Administration Times 5(22) (November 15, 1982). In November 1983 voters rejected a consolidation proposal for the second time in the same year by an even larger margin than in November 1982; see D. A. Gilbert, "Louisville Voters Reject Merger Proposal—Again," Public A d m i n i s t r a t i o n Times 6(23) (December 1, 1983). 10. Brownstone and Plunkett, Metropolitan Winnipeg.

xxii

Foreword

parliamentary system also contribute. His s u c c i n c t description of the workings of the parliamentary system follows: T h e n o r m s of cabinet secrecy, collective responsibility and party d i s c i p l i n e make it m u c h easier for political parties of any stripe to m a k e dramatic changes in the status quo. Internal opposition to proposals for local government reorganization are discussed privately in the cabinet and in the caucus of the governing party. After the cabinet has acquired the support of the c a u c u s , or at least its a c q u i e s c e n c e , the cabinet can proceed to ask the legislature to pass the required legislation, with the assurance that it will pass (assuming the governing party has a majority in the legislature). T o be sure, the opposition can attempt to mobilize public o p i n i o n against the proposal, but if the governing party is willing to face the political c o n s e q u e n c e s , passage of the legislation is almost assured. Moreover, there is no executive veto to fear, as there is in the United States. 1 1

Referendums

and Multiple

Majorities

In addition to lacking the political-organizational " c l o u t " of the parliamentary system, m a n y U S states are further limited by their written constitutions, w h i c h often protect local governments from abolition by statute or s o m e t i m e s even from actions by the electorate, short of an actual state constitutional a m e n d m e n t . T h e most c o m m o n protection is the requirement that local consolidations be approved by referendums, often by m u l t i p l e majorities. T h u s , at the very least, separate majorities are required in both the central city and the rem a i n d e r of the county. 1 2 But the protection in s o m e state constitutions is even more formidable. For instance, Article IX of New York's constitution requires double or triple concurrent majorities to transfer a function to the county from a s u b c o u n t y unit. If a city or town func11. This comment was made to the editors by a knowledgeable reviewer with the Canadian government who requested anonymity. 12. From 1933 to 1957 the constitution of Ohio required that the transfer of municipal functions to the county be approved by three separate majorities—in the entire county, in the largest municipality, and in the county outside the largest municipality. For counties of more than 500,000, an additional set of majorities was required— a majority vote in enough individual municipalities and townships to comprise a majority of the units; see Ohio Constitution, Art. X, sec. 3. An extreme case of multiple and preponderant majorities stymied the 1929 attempt to adopt a metropolitan charter in the Pittsburgh area. Pittsburgh demonstrated that it is possible to lose while securing approval by a majority vote in a majority of municipalities and townships (82 of the 129 subdivisions approved the proposed charter). The relevant constitutional provision required a two-thirds majority vote in each of a majority of municipalities and townships; see Paul Studenski, The Government of Metropolitan Areas in the United States (New York: National Municipal League, 1930), pp. 3 7 6 - 3 8 3 . For Cleveland, see Victor (ones, Metropolitan Government (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942), pp. 2 3 6 - 2 4 7 .

Foreword

xxiii

tion is involved, city voters cast ballots as one unit, and town voters cast ballots as a second unit. If a village function is involved, separate affirmative majorities of city, town, and village voters are required before the function can be shifted. Village voters, of course, vote twice since they also are town voters. 1 3 Since 1 9 6 1 , at least four attempted city-county consolidations in the United States would have succeeded if similar special majorities had not been constitutionally required. Thus, despite a 54 percent favorable vote in 1 9 6 1 , the consolidation plan for the city of Richmond and Henrico County, Virginia, was rejected when it did not meet a multiple-majority test. Such requirements also defeated Virginia's Roanoke—Roanoke County consolidation proposal in 1 9 6 9 (66.4 percent yes), Georgia's S a v a n n a h - C h a t h a m County proposal in 1 9 7 3 (58.3 percent yes), and another Georgia proposal in A u g u s t a Richmond County in 1 9 7 4 (51.8 percent yes).

The Referendum:

Sources and

Consequences

In the United States, popular-vote approval of reorganizations that change local boundaries and/or eliminate general purpose local units has c o m e to be considered a virtually obligatory convention, even when not constitutionally required. By contrast, the local referendum is rarely used elsewhere. The recent history of substantial 13. In 1 9 7 7 t h e U S S u p r e m e Court h e l d that t h e state r e q u i r e m e n t of s u c h m u l t i p l e m a j o r i t i e s d o e s not v i o l a t e t h e e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n c l a u s e of t h e U S C o n s t i t u t i o n ; s e e Toivn of Lockport, NY. et al. v. C i t i z e n s for Community A c t i o n al the Local Level et al., 4 3 0 U S - 2 5 9 ( 1 9 7 7 ) . T h e l o w e r court had h e l d s u c h r e q u i r e m e n t s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l b e c a u s e t h e y v i o l a t e t h e o n e - m a n , o n e - v o t e p r i n c i p l e . T h e S u p r e m e Court, h o w e v e r , r e v e r s e d t h e j u d g m e n t , h o l d i n g that w h e r e a s all voters h a v e " a n e q u a l interest in repres e n t a t i v e d e m o c r a c y , " not all v o t e r s in a " s i n g l e - s h o t " r e f e r e n d u m on c o u n t y g o v e r n m e n t r e o r g a n i z a t i o n h a v e t h e s a m e i n t e r e s t s in or w i l l be affected in t h e s a m e m a n n e r by t h e r e o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e c o u n t y g o v e r n m e n t . T h e c h a l l e n g e d p r o v i s i o n s of t h e N e w Y o r k law rest on t h e state's i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of t h e d i s t i n c t i v e i n t e r e s t s of t h e r e s i d e n t s of t h e c i t i e s and t o w n s w i t h i n a c o u n t y r a t h e r t h a n t h e i r i n t e r e s t s as r e s i d e n t s of t h e c o u n t y as a h o m o g e n e o u s unit. T h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n is b a s e d in t h e r e a l i t i e s of t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of g o v e r n m e n t a l p o w e r s in N e w Y o r k , a n d is c o n s i s t e n t w i t h o u r c a s e s that r e c o g n i z e both the w i d e d i s c r e t i o n t h e S t a t e s h a v e in f o r m i n g a n d a l l o c a t i n g g o v e r n m e n t a l tasks to local s u b d i v i s i o n s , a n d t h e d i s c r e t e i n t e r e s t s t h a t s u c h local g o v e r n m e n t a l units m a y h a v e q u a units [ e m p h a s i s a d d e d j . ( T o w n of Lockport

v. C i t i z e n s , pp. 2 6 8 - 2 6 9 )

In t e r m s of r e c o g n i z i n g c o n s t i t u e n c i e s w i t h s e p a r a t e and p o t e n t i a l l y o p p o s i n g i n t e r e s t s . . . s e p a r a t e v o t e r a p p r o v a l r e q u i r e m e n t s are b a s e d on t h e p e r c e p t i o n that t h e real a n d l o n g - t e r m i m p a c t of a r e s t r u c t u r i n g of local g o v e r n m e n t is felt q u i t e d i f f e r e n t l y b y t h e different c o u n t y c o n s t i t u e n t units that in a s e n s e c o m p e t e to p r o v i d e s i m i l a r g o v e r n m e n t a l s e r v i c e s . V o t e r s in t h e s e c o n s t i t u e n t units are d i r e c t l y a n d d i f f e r e n t i a l l y a f f e c t e d by t h e r e s t r u c t u r i n g of c o u n t y g o v e r n m e n t s , w h i c h m a y m a k e t h e p r o v i d e r s of p u b l i c s e r v i c e s m o r e r e m o t e and less s u b j e c t to t h e v o t e r s ' i n d i v i d u a l i n f l u e n c e . ( T o w n of L o c k p o r t v. C i t i z e n s , pp. 2 7 1 - 2 7 2 )

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local government reorganizations in Canada, Great Britain, West Germany, Austria, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden shows how major restructuring is carried out by national (or state) legislative act, usually without provision for approval by either local voters or the governing bodies of the local authorities affected. 14 Arthur Gunlicks notes: "In no other country [except the United States] did we encounter the concept of volunteerism, the idea that it is somehow illegitimate to change local government boundaries or create regional substate special-purpose authorities without the consent of the local governments or local inhabitants concerned." 15 Why has the United States adopted the seemingly eccentric course of placing such heavy reliance on referendums to approve governmental reorganizations? The roots of the referendum in the United States are traceable as far back as the late 1700s when constitutional conventions and legislatures drafted state constitutioils and hinged their adoption on the results of plebiscites, reasoning that voter validation was appropriate for such basic laws. Later, toward the end of the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth century, as the concept of municipal or local home rule developed in some states, the resulting city and county charters were typically voted on by the electorates—probably because they seemed similar to state con14. In C a n a d a t h e 1 9 5 5 - 1 9 6 5 s t u d y by Harlan H a h n f o u n d local r e f e r e n d u m s u s e d m u c h m o r e f r e q u e n t l y t h a n u s u a l l y s u p p o s e d a n d for a variety of issues. Generally, s u c h votes are h e l d on t h e initiative of local c o u n c i l s that w a n t to "get off t h e h o o k " o n d i v i s i v e issues, not b e c a u s e of a m a n d a t o r y c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e q u i r e m e n t . T h e r e f e r e n d u m t o p i c s i n c l u d e d s u c h m a t t e r s as " b l u e l a w s , " s p o r t s or recreational facilities, h o s p i t a l s , utility a n d o t h e r p u b l i c i m p r o v e m e n t s , liquor control, suffrage e x p a n sion, t r a n s p o r t a t i o n s y s t e m s , d a y l i g h t s a v i n g time, a n d utility regulation. City governm e n t r e f o r m s w e r e t h e s u b j e c t of 20 of t h e 4 5 0 r e f e r e n d u m s i n c l u d e d , a n d m u n i c i p a l a n n e x a t i o n or a m a l g a m a t i o n figured in 18. In short, r e f e r e n d u m s w e r e h e l d on a f e w local r e f o r m s a n d b o u n d a r y c h a n g e s , but t h e n u m b e r s a n d p r o p o r t i o n s w e r e relatively s m a l l — o n l y 8.4 p e r c e n t of t h e total; see H a r l a n H a h n , "Voting in C a n a d i a n C o m m u n i ties: A T a x o n o m y of R e f e r e n d u m I s s u e s , " C a n a d i a n J o u r n a l of Political S c i e n c e 1 : 4 6 2 469 (December 1968). Significant for o u r d i s c u s s i o n here, voters w e r e not asked to p a s s on t h e creation of t h e s e v e n m e t r o p o l i t a n a n d regional g o v e r n m e n t s in O n t a r i o , t h e t h r e e u r b a n c o m m u nities in Q u e b e c , Unicity in W i n n i p e g , or t h e regional districts c r e a t e d in British Col u m b i a . All w e r e e s t a b l i s h e d by p r o v i n c i a l statutes a n d w i t h o u t local r e f e r e n d u m votes. For a detailed d i s c u s s i o n of p r o v i n c i a l laws a u t h o r i z i n g or r e q u i r i n g r e f e r e n d u m s in C a n a d i a n m u n i c i p a l i t i e s , see J. Patrick Boyer, Lawmaking by the People: fie/erendums a n d Plebiscites in C a n a d a (Toronto: B u t t e r w o r t h , 1982). W h e r e a s t h e vast m a j o r i t y of state a n d local r e f e r e n d u m s in t h e U n i t e d States are final a n d self-executing, almost all of t h e C a n a d i a n r e f e r e n d u m s are a d v i s o r y o n l y . 15. A r t h u r B. G u n l i c k s , " T h e U n i t e d States in Cross-National C o m p a r i s o n , " in Local G o v e r n m e n t Re/orm a n d R e o r g a n i z a t i o n , ed. A r t h u r B. G u n l i c k s (Port Washington, N.Y.: K e n n i k a t Press, 1981), p p . 2 0 5 - 2 1 5 . A u s t i n R a n n e y p o i n t s out that Switzerland m a k e s s u b s t a n t i a l u s e of t h e r e f e r e n d u m , i n c l u d i n g , in at least s o m e circumstances, to a p p r o v e b o u n d a r y c h a n g e s (letter to Stanley Scott, May 24, 1983).

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stitutions. Austin Ranney suggests the analogy among local, state, and national levels: The big plus for r e f e r e n d u m s is that on most issues they acquire a degree of legitimacy that no other form of democratic decisionmaking can achieve. . . . Presumably that is w h y most states and m a n y nations require popular approval of constitutional amendments before they become effective. Perhaps it is also w h y most changes in the political status of national units—the formation of n e w states, the dissolution of old states, and so on—are usually done after that special version of referendums now generally called "plebiscites." . . . Indeed . . . in some respects referendums on local-unit consolidations . . . have some resemblances to changes in the international status of former colonies, established states, and the like. 16 From shortly before the turn of the century until World War I, the Progressive movement pushed hard on behalf of the initiative, referendum, and recall, w h i c h were employed to reduce the influence in local and state legislatures of the political machines or special interests that often dominated them—for example, in California, the Southern Pacific Railroad—and to take decisions on certain issues out of the h a n d s of legislative bodies. In any event, many influences prevailing at the time—for example, accepted styles of constitution validation, Progressivism, populism, moves for local home rule, and strong distrust of legislatures and political machines—produced long ballots in many states. These ballots included referendums to approve local charter a m e n d m e n t s , governmental boundary alterations, and other structural changes. Such use of the referendum has now become an integral part of the written and unwritten constitutional system in the United States. The relative success of the Canadian and European structural reform efforts is largely explained by the lack of such vote requirements. Robert Morían considers their absence "of central importance" because referendum requirements would presumably have defeated most of the Canadian and European proposals. "Experience with referenda in Europe and North America has clearly indicated that, short of the most extreme financial exigency, the public is strongly resistant to amalgamations." 1 7 In short, restructuring by provincial, state, or national legislative action without a popular referendum is a key feature of most reform 16. 17. Success," e d . , Local

L e t t e r f r o m A u s t i n R a n n e y to S t a n l e y S c o t t , M a y 24, 1 9 8 3 . R o b e r t L. M o r í a n , " L o c a l G o v e r n m e n t R e o r g a n i z a t i o n : T h e C o m p o n e n t s of National C i v i c R e v i e w 7 0 ( 8 ) : 4 0 4 - 4 0 9 ( S e p t e m b e r 1981); s e e a l s o G u n l i c k s , G o v e r n m e n t Reform, c h s . 2, 3.

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adoptions outside the United States. Conversely, the nearly universal referendum requirement is the principal reason for the failure of most reorganization proposals in the United States. Marando noted in 1979 that of 68 efforts in the last three decades, three-fourths were turned down in referendum elections. 1 8 Furthermore, as we have noted, the referendum often extended well beyond requiring a simple areawide majority, calling for separate majorities in the central city and the remainder of the county or even for multiple majorities in several local units. Noting the high failure rate of reorganization efforts under a referendum formula, Marando reminds us that the states have both the authority and potential for reorganizing local government and suggests that the "political constraints upon consolidation may well create circumstances in w h i c h states may be drawn more directly into metropolitan area governing processes." He comments further: "States continue to consider changes in the 'rules of the game' in order to facilitate metropolitan reorganization. One of the areas where the 'rules of the game' will be changed is ending the referenda requirement for approval of local government reorganization." 1 9 Certainly the stresses and pressures on state and local governments attributable to our contemporary economic and fiscal environment are likely to accelerate d e m a n d s for more effective governmental processes. Will this also promote or even force a basic reconsideration of conventional wisdom and of requirements for referendum votes on at least some forms of structural change? In any event, many kinds of responses—short of comprehensive governmental reorganization—are possible in the quest for more effective government. Moreover, state and local officials see few constitutional impediments to such alternative courses. For example, a recent Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations survey of governors, attorneys general, departments of community affairs, legislative research bureaus, state municipal leagues, and state associations 18. Vincent L. M a r a n d o , " C i t y - C o u n t y C o n s o l i d a t i o n : Reform, Regionalism, Refe r e n d a , a n d R e q u i e m , " Western Political Quarterly 3 2 ( 4 ) : 4 0 9 - 4 2 1 (December 1979). 19. Ibid., p. 421. In a d d i t i o n to I n d i a n a , N e v a d a , a n d M o n t a n a , m e n t i o n e d by M a r a n d o , M i n n e s o t a acted w i t h o u t a r e f e r e n d u m w h e n in 1967 t h e legislature created o n e of t h e most s u c c e s s f u l r e c e n t e x a m p l e s of a regional g o v e r n m e n t in a m a j o r metropolitan area, t h e M e t r o p o l i t a n C o u n c i l of t h e T w i n Cities ( M i n n e a p o l i s - S t . Paul). T h e T w i n Cities C o u n c i l is basically an u m b r e l l a agency, all t h e p r e e x i s t i n g g o v e r n m e n t s h a v i n g been left intact. W h i l e t h e c o u n c i l has less far-reaching a u t h o r i t y than most o t h e r r e o r g a n i z a t i o n s , it has m o r e p o w e r t h a n t h e typical regional c o u n c i l of governm e n t s (COG) in t h e U n i t e d States. For t h i s reason the T w i n Cities f o r m u l a has been called " m e t r o p o l i t a n p o l i c y m a k i n g w i t h teeth"; see John J. Harrigan, Political C h a n g e in t h e Metropolis, 2 n d e d . (Boston: Little, B r o w n , 1981), p p . 3 3 4 - 3 3 8 . See also John J. Harrigan a n d W i l l i a m C. J o h n s o n , G o v e r n i n g the Twin Cities Region ( M i n n e a p o l i s : University of M i n n e s o t a Press, 1978).

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of counties found that 70 percent did not consider the ability of state legislatures to solve " m e t r o p o l i t a n and other areawide p r o b l e m s " to be " i n h i b i t e d " by constitutional grants of local discretionary authority or by constitutional prohibitions against special legislation. 2 0 Of course, the respondents may have differed widely on the definition of a " m e t r o p o l i t a n p r o b l e m " or on legislative actions adequate to solve them. Nevertheless, the e v i d e n c e of state inaction suggests a wide difference b e t w e e n constitutional authority to act and the apparently m u c h more limited political will to act. 2 1

Critiques of the Referendum W h e n Unigov was successfully established without a referendum, opponents of reform in other parts of Indiana were in effect forewarned by the Indianapolis experience. O w e n and Willbern note how other subsequent Indiana urban reform efforts were guided by Unigov's e x a m p l e but also " i n h e r i t e d a share of its 'negative' legacy." " C o n s o l i d a t i o n o p p o n e n t s across the state—feeling they had been caught unaware in 1 9 6 9 w h e n Unigov passed without requiring a r e f e r e n d u m — w e r e n o w vigilai;t and insisted on a referendum. T h e y would undoubtedly try to add a referendum requirement to any future consolidation bills. Local officials in Indiana are aware of the typical fate of referendums. Accordingly, subsequent local reform proposals have been m u c h less c o m p r e h e n s i v e . " Unless the United States' reliance on the referendum can be reduced, past e x p e r i e n c e suggests that few structural reorganizations will s u c c e e d . Moreover, most of them will be limited to small or middlesized urban areas or to single-county situations where there are relatively few other governmental units to act as a focus for opposition. In contrast to the United States' e x p e r i e n c e , a major c o m p o n e n t of the European reform efforts' s u c c e s s is a "general public commitment to the representative government c o n c e p t " (emphasis added). T h i s rests on the belief that legislative bodies made up of elected representatives should make judgments on c o m p l e x policy matters 20. See Joseph F. Zimmerman. Measuring Local Discretionary Authority (Washington, DC: Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1981), pp. 31, 77. 21. In a letter dated November 19, 1982, Henry Schmandt emphasized this last point: "State legislatures have historically demonstrated an unwillingness to intervene in metropolitan reorganization matters, in the absence of some consensus among local políticos, and seldom has such consensus existed. I also wonder whether special interests would be less effective in influencing legislative bodies in reorganization issues than they are in influencing popular referenda. These doubts lead me to be somewhat more tentative with respect to the greater likelihood of metropolitan reorganization success in the United States under the representative as against the referendum approach."

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but without a referendum. Public participation is often sought through public hearings. Furthermore, the deliberations of special investigative bodies are often accompanied by widespread public discussion and debate. In this way the leadership can try out proposals, reviewing and evaluating the response from interested sectors of the public, as well as from key officials whose interests might be affected. Policymakers thus retain their leadership while getting feedback from the public. Reasoning from such grounds, Scott and Nathan concluded: "Holding referenda . . . is not central to representative democracy, and indeed has not worked well. A referendum vote does not reflect the depth of information, perception, or issue awareness that may be essential to an appropriate decision on a policy issue. These added qualitative values, however, need not be lost when voting operates in its primary function: electing legislators to a representative government" (emphasis added). 22 But the United States has a widespread distrust of political parties and of interest groups that operate through legislatures to make or influence public policy. As David Butler and Austin Ranney observed: The Progressives . . . believed that truly democratic government consists of all the John and Jane Q. Publics observing, discussing, pondering, deciding, and, finally voting . . . any organization that seeks to interpose itself between the people and their government—that is, any intermediate organization—is bound to subvert democracy and the public interest to some degree. . . . Even popularly elected legislatures and municipal councils are bad because they are so easily purchased by special interests and dominated by party bosses. 2 '' On the other hand, there are various ways of organizing democratic processes. The best procedure is not necessarily to insist on elections where voters are expected to decide large numbers of ballot propositions. Regardless of how well or poorly the referendum may have fulfilled its Progressive proponents' fond hopes in the early days, many subsequent changes affect its performance today. Among the many developments the Progressives could hardly have foreseen is the great and growing influence of special interests with demonstrated abilities to collect large sums of money for direct mailings and to buy time from the pervasive electronic media. This gives such wellfinanced groups direct access to voters, facilitating the use of public 2 2 . S t a n l e y S c o t t a n d Harriet N a t h a n , " P u b l i c R e f e r e n d a : A Critical R e a p p r a i s a l , " U r b a n Affairs

Quarterly 5 ( 3 ) : 3 1 4 - 3 2 8 (March 1970).

2 3 . David B u t l e r a n d A u s t i n R a n n e y , " T h e o r y , " in Re/erendums: A C o m p a r a t i v e S t u d y of P r a c t i c e and

T h e o r y , ed. David B u t l e r and A u s t i n R a n n e y ( W a s h i n g t o n , DC:

A m e r i c a n E n t e r p r i s e I n s t i t u t e , 1 9 7 8 ) , pp. 2 8 - 2 9 .

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relations methods to plead causes and frequently cloud issues as well as deliberately misinform. The influence on US elections of the media and of highly committed, if not fanatical, single-interest groups now justifies serious concern for its effects on the electoral process. While money spent in such campaigns does not necessarily always determine election results, it nevertheless has great influence. 2 4 Over twenty years ago Frank Smallwood argued eloquently that Anglo-Canadian policymaking is in important respects more democratic than our own: " B y subordinating the prerogatives of widespread public participation to those of forceful political leadership, the English and Canadians have added a number of democratic elements to their decisionmaking process that are usually conspicuously missing from our own." 2 5 While acknowledging that direct public participation in policymaking is far more restricted in England and Canada than in the United States, Smallwood points to several "democratic elements" that we lack. First, he maintains that the Anglo-Canadian processes reduce the stalemate that clogs the processes here where our system has "a built-in bias sharply favoring those interests which support the status quo." He points out that stalemate or the inability to take any action "does not mean that no party has won the contest but, rather, that those who did not want such action in the first place are the victors." Because it minimizes this bias, Smallwood considers the Anglo-Canadian system more responsive to the democratic ideal than our own. 2 6 Second, Smallwood believes that our system—especially the referendum—risks "overloading the decisionmaking process to accommodate the feelings of basically disinterested and often unknowledgeable individuals, while assigning less weight to the views of those who are intensely interested." Again, he prefers the Anglo-Canadian 24. Edwin M. Epstein, "PACs and the Modern Political Process," paper delivered at the Conference on the Impact of the Modern Corporation, November 1 2 - 1 3 , 1982, Columbia University School of Law; Epstein is a professor at the School of Business, University of California, Berkeley. 25. Frank Smallwood, "Guiding Urban Change," National Civic Review 54(4): 1 9 1 - 1 9 7 (April 1965), p. 197. 26. Ibid., p. 195. A carefully reasoned article by L. J. Sharpe strongly supports Smallwood's conclusion. Moreover, Sharpe points to difficulty in changing the status quo as a deficiency in American government: Two kinds of responsiveness must be distinguished. The first is responsiveness to those who wish government to maintain the status quo. The second is responsiveness to those who wish government to change the status quo. The deficiency of the American tradition is its strong tendency to equate the responsiveness of government solely with the first kind of responsiveness, with the result that government may be incapable of being responsive in the second sense. Yet it is the second kind of responsiveness that is more vital to democracy. (Sharpe, "American Democracy Reconsidered," British /ournal of Political Science 3 : 1 2 9 167 [1973), p. 140)

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a p p r o a c h , w h i c h gives a hearing to interested individuals and groups but reserves the final d e c i s i o n on matters of local institutional c h a n g e to referees or " b r o k e r s " d r a w n from the Canadian provincial or British central g o v e r n m e n t . 2 7 Third, S m a l l w o o d argues that m a n y policymakers in the United States have u s e d the referendum as a loophole, a w a y " t o avoid or dodge r e s p o n s i b l e c o m m i t m e n t on issues of vital public c o n c e r n . " He writes: " O t h e r leaders have tended to fuzz referenda issues so c o m p l e t e l y through the use of emotional symbols that the issues h a v e b e c o m e m e a n i n g l e s s . . . in actual practice the referendum has often c o n f u s e d alternatives and allowed officials to e s c a p e the c o m m i t m e n t s of responsible leadership a c c e p t e d by the English and Can a d i a n s . " 2 8 S m a l l w o o d also notes that public interest and voter participation in local r e f e r e n d u m issues have often been very low, and he questions the role of the referendum in "dealing with c o m p l e x issues of institutional reform in highly developed urban s o c i e t i e s . " He c o n c l u d e s that " t h e r e f e r e n d u m p r o c e d u r e is so highly unstructured, diffuse and susceptible to distortion, it is very questionable w h e t h e r w e h a v e actually been able to e x e r c i s e as meaningful a degree of d e m o c r a t i c control over local policy-making as the English and C a n a d i a n s . " 2 9 27. S m a l l w o o d , " G u i d i n g Urban C h a n g e , " p. 195. Harold Kaplan also e m p h a sizes C a n a d i a n d e f e r e n c e to authority and leadership . . . |which] appears to stem from a more general C a n a d i a n political culture, w h i c h in turn is an adaptation to North A m e r i c a n e x p e r i e n c e s of the British political culture. . . . T h e s e aspects of culture may p r o d u c e in C a n a d a , as they do in Great Britain, a willingness to let public policy matters be d e t e r m i n e d by the officials' greater understanding of the issues and to rely on the officials' self-restraint for the protection of one's rights. (Kaplan, Urban Political Systems: A F u n c t i o n a l A n a l y s i s of Metro Toronto |New Y o r k : C o l u m b i a University Press, 1 9 6 7 ] , pp. 2 0 9 - 2 1 0 ) However, see also S h a r p e ' s q u e s t i o n i n g of the allegation that A m e r i c a n s are less deferential and therefore m o r e egalitarian than the British, in " A m e r i c a n D e m o c r a c y Recons i d e r e d , " pp. 9 - 1 7 . For a n o t h e r e x a m p l e of metropolitan g o v e r n a n c e under a political culture different from the A m e r i c a n , see T h o m a s J. A n t o n , Governing Greater S t o c k h o l m (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1 9 7 5 ) , pp. 1 5 - 3 6 , 1 8 5 - 1 8 8 . Anton e m p h a s i z e d that the S w e d i s h system is " o n e of elite interaction. W h i l e the n u m b e r of elite participants for any given d e c i s i o n is likely to be large, neither participants nor c o m m o n citizens expect any i n t e r f e r e n c e from outside c i t i z e n g r o u p s " (p. 30). 28. S m a l l w o o d , " G u i d i n g Urban C h a n g e , " p. 196. 29. Ibid., p. 1 9 7 . T h e t h e m e s featured in S m a l l w o o d ' s critique can also be found in more recent writings on the r e f e r e n d u m , e.g., Butler and Ranney, eds., He/erendums; Austin R a n n e y , ed., T h e Heferendum D e v i c e (Washington, DC: A m e r i c a n Enterprise Institute, 1 9 8 1 ) ; a n d David B. Magleby, Direct Legislation: Voting on Ballot Propositions in the United S t a t e s ( B a l t i m o r e : Johns H o p k i n s University Press, 1984).

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Effect on Reform Processes The story of Unigov's creation, as told by Owen and Willbern, highlights other contrasts between reform processes using referendum votes and those not using them. For example, the referendum not only greatly reduces the chances of success but also intimidates the sponsors of reform and influences the character of the proposals they put forth, which are more modest than they might otherwise have been. In fact, inclusion of a referendum alters the very process of reform in highly significant ways, shifting the arenas and sequence of debate, as well as foreclosing prematurely (in our view) the possibility of negotiations and of mutually acceptable compromises whereby policymakers can exercise effective political leadership in practising "the art of the possible." Instead, as soon as the text of the ballot proposition has been determined, the referendum requirement largely sets the character of the discussion, "freezing" the debate into a litany of arguments for or against the single, fixed reform proposal, which has passed beyond the point of flexibility and compromise. Finally, it is natural that opponents of reorganization use the referendum as a deliberate strategy to defeat reform. The referendum-influenced process clearly contrasts with Unigov's process, which featured virtuoso performances by Mayor Lugar and other city, county, and legislative leaders, who negotiated and compromised in working toward ultimate legislative approval. At various stages, the sponsors were willing to accept many changes, including some that significantly reduced the executive power they had hoped to assemble under the mayor's umbrella. Yet they still were able to go "down to the wire," negotiating their way to a reorganization plan that was acceptable to the county's legislative delegation and to the statewide legislative leadership. The result was successful implementation of a new governmental structure that has since accomplished a good deal of what the sponsors had hoped for and that the citizenry has apparently found satisfactory. The process would necessarily be substantially different under a referendum since the electorate would be the final judge of the outcome. Anticipating the referendum, the proponents (and the legislature) presumably would further modify the proposal in ways considered likely to improve its acceptability to the electorate. The end result would probably be an appreciably different reorganization from the one that could be put in effect by legislative act alone. Moreover, as noted above, after a reorganization proposal is finally agreed on and accepted for a referendum, there is then no longer any opportunity for change despite the continuation of the debate. Weeks or even months before the campaign, the negotiators would

xxxii

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have been forced to try " p s y c h i n g o u t " the probable response of an electorate that might at the time be largely uninformed and indifferent. T h e greatest effort w o u l d be devoted to the campaign, trying to reach and c o n v i n c e voters who have little or no knowledge about the proposal, w h o do not have the skills and sophistication to judge it, and w h o are predisposed to react negatively to change. During the c a m p a i g n m a n y of the issues might be debated vigorously, but this could no longer influence the proposal's content. Instead, the electorate could only respond by accepting or rejecting a " f r o z e n " and perhaps already superseded reorganization s c h e m e . By contrast, O w e n and W i l l b e r n demonstrate how the Indiana legislature debated and modified the Unigov bill until its final passage. W e can never be sure what w o u l d have happened if the referendum requirement had applied to the 1 9 7 1 reform of Indianapolis and Marion County. T h e local Jaycees did conduct a t e l e p h o n e survey in trying to determine support and opposition. T h e y found four-fifths of the respondents to be unfamiliar with the Unigov proposal and eliminated t h e m from their survey. T h e remaining one-fifth, a small minority of presumably well-informed voters, indicated strong support. In an actual referendum, of course, a good proportion of the eliminated res p o n d e n t s would in fact have voted, with a high probability that many would be ignorant of the details even after a referendum campaign. Potential voters confronted by strange issues are likely to vote against t h e m and are susceptible to well-publicized opposition regardless of its merits. In short, if a referendum had been held on Unigov, a substantial portion of the 8 0 percent who were unfamiliar would probably have voted against Unigov. T h e remainder who were polled—the knowledgeable one-fifth—were 69 percent for it. But in an actual refe r e n d u m , their strong favorable showing would very likely have been o v e r w h e l m e d by the four-fifths w h o were not aware."' In short, we can s p e c u l a t e that Unigov w o u l d have had very tough sledding under a referendum and probably w o u l d have failed.

Leadership in a Pluralistic Structure Calling Unigov " a c i t y - c o u n t y c o n s o l i d a t i o n " implies a m u c h more unitary structure than Unigov actually is. In fact, few such c o n s o l i d a t i o n proposals call for m o n o l i t h i c structures. In Indianapolis, preexisting suburban m u n i c i p a l i t i e s were not consolidated, and 3 0 . In C a l i f o r n i a , at least, t h e p r e v a i l i n g pattern is for voters to m a k e up their m i n d s o n ballot p r o p o s a l s at t h e last m i n u t e . T h u s , E u g e n e C. Lee r e p o r t s that " n i n e out of ten v o t e r s w h o cast a ballot o n i n i t i a t i v e m e a s u r e s often m a k e u p t h e i r m i n d s h o w to v o t e on the e v e of t h e e l e c t i o n , p a r t i c u l a r l y in t h e c a s e of c o m p l e x , t e c h n i c a l i s s u e s " ; s e e Lee, " C a l i f o r n i a , " in H e / e r e n d u m s , ed. B u t l e r and R a n n e y , p. 1 1 0 .

Foreword

xxxiii

neither were the schools. Under Unigov, individual services continue to be provided in different areas with wide variations in geography and continue to be financed by special taxes applying only to the areas served. Some important functions are still in the hands of special purpose boards, and most traditional elective offices have been retained. Owen and Willbern acknowledge that "the name Unigov may be an almost absurdly inexact description of the new legal entity." But the authors also emphasize that the term, with all its unitary connotations, "is a meaningful and useful characterization of political realities." They note: "Political leadership and responsibility are now clearly and unquestionably held by the elected mayor, and the CityCounty Council is, at least potentially, a deliberating, appropriating, and policy-determining body of preeminent significance." The prestige and influence of the mayor and the city-county government have been enhanced. Unigov mayors Richard G. Lugar and William H. Hudnut have both led the list of the community's most powerful and influential people, whereas in pre-Unigov times the topmost community power positions were occupied by private sector leaders to the exclusion of city or county officials. In short, while the Unigov reform is pluralistic, not monolithic, it nevertheless seems to have done what the sponsors wanted, that is, provide the countywide region with greater coherence in policy formulation. This appears to have been their main goal rather than a simple unitary integration of all local governments. In light of the Indianapolis experience, readers may find it curious that some critics—especially those identified with the publicchoice school—seem to argue that metropolitan reforms typically propose unitary consolidation of entire metropolitan areas under single units of local government. 3 1 Their evaluation rests on two unjustified assumptions: (1) that monolithic consolidations are usually involved, and (2) that the principal purpose of metropolitan reform is improved provision of local services. In fact, however, few if any reorganizations are unitary, and most reforms do not principally seek better or cheaper local services. Obviously, neither of these assumptions is justified in Unigov's case. First, it was not unitary. Second, instead of worrying about individual services, the Unigov reformers wanted to strengthen the mayor's role and create a policymaking structure for the county that could move ahead with major programs. While some old inefficiencies were reduced after the reorganization, this was a welcome side benefit, not the principal objective of the reform. 3 1 . R o b e r t L. B i s h a n d V i n c e n t O s t r o m , U n d e r s t a n d i n g Urban G o v e r n m e n t : Metr o p o l i t a n He/orm R e c o n s i d e r e d ( W a s h i n g t o n , DC: A m e r i c a n E n t e r p r i s e Institute, 1 9 7 3 ) , pp. 4 8 - 4 9 . S e e a l s o E l i n o r O s t r o m , " M e t r o p o l i t a n R e f o r m : P r o p o s i t i o n s Derived f r o m T w o Traditions," Social Science Quarterly 5 3 : 4 7 4 - 4 9 3 (December 1972).

xxxiv

Foreword

Getting Things Done Under Unigov: The Federal Connection Although the structural change that Unigov represented was undoubtedly crucial to the creation of an effective power center that could get things moving, the influence of federal programs and money was also essential. Four months after the inauguration of Unigov, at Mayor Lugar's request, a federal technical assistance team from the US Office of Management and Budget and the Department of Housing and Urban Development reviewed the budgetary and planning activities of the new government and recommended many changes in organization and procedures. 32 Owen and Willbern note how "the formation of Unigov and the vigorous search for federal funds complemented and reinforced each other," pointing out that "the federal funds and the accompanying conditions—especially the requirement of review and comment—further enhanced the mayor's position." Not only was the mayor's position strengthened, but also the very nature of the programs undertaken was powerfully influenced by federal policies and money. In fact, without Mayor Lugar's ingenious use of the federal aid programs, Unigov would have been known primarily for its "hardware" projects, that is, the building of highways and downtown structures principally benefiting the business community. Instead, by emphasizing community services, the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA), and community development and by focusing on social services rather than only on physical development, Unigov helped counterbalance such local influences as the property-tax freeze, the tax earmarking and other inflexibilities retained under Unigov, and the reluctance of the suburbs to support the central city. Otherwise, the concerns expressed by some blacks and Democrats about Unigov's potential disadvantages to them would have been realized to a much greater extent. Ironically, under Unigov a rather conservative Republican mayor made extensive and extremely effective use of programs inherited from Roosevelt's New Deal, Kennedy's Fair Deal, and Johnson's Great Society. Apparently, middle-of-the-road to conservative Republicanism—as expressed at the city-county level—does not necessarily mean rejection of either metropolitan reform or federally funded social programs. One wonders what will happen now that federal efforts have been drastically reduced. Will the cutbacks weaken the abilities of mayors and other urban leaders to influence events in their communities? 3 2 . U S O f f i c e of M a n a g e m e n t and Budget, F e d e r a l T e c h n i c a l A s s i s t a n c e T e a m , " I m p r o v i n g P r o g r a m , P l a n n i n g , E v a l u a t i o n B u d g e t a r y F u n c t i o n s in the C o n s o l i d a t e d G o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a n a p o l i s , " W a s h i n g t o n , DC, M a y 1, 1 9 7 0 .

Foreword

xxxv

The Future W e seem unlikely to h a v e other I n d i a n a p o l i s - t y p e reorganizations a d o p t e d w i t h o u t r e f e r e n d u m votes. A c c e p t e d c o n v e n t i o n w o u l d very likely force a r e f e r e n d u m o n the prevalent a s s u m p t i o n that "it's the p r o p e r t h i n g to d o " w h e n local b o u n d a r i e s are changed. Moreover, t h e I n d i a n a p o l i s e x p e r i e n c e has h e l p e d establish this c o m p o n e n t of political c u l t u r e in I n d i a n a a n d , p e r h a p s , i n t e n s i f y it elsewhere. In a n y event, the w i d e l y recognized difficulty of effecting local b o u n d a r y c h a n g e is a significant reason w h y other k i n d s of a d a p t a t i o n in m e t r o p o l i t a n g o v e r n a n c e are being explored. Even these " n o n s t r u c t u r a l " alternatives, h o w e v e r , can r u n afoul of the r e f e r e n d u m ethos. A California e x a m p l e is t h e s u c c e s s i o n of bills s p o n s o r e d by Assemblym a n John Knox in the early 1970s. T h e s e w o u l d have c h a n g e d no local b o u n d a r i e s but w o u l d h a v e created a limited m u l t i p u r p o s e regional agency in t h e n i n e - c o u n t y San Francisco Bay Area. Any of the Knox bills c o u l d have b e e n enacted if the a u t h o r had accepted the i n c l u s i o n of a r e f e r e n d u m r e q u i r e m e n t , w h i c h h e refused to do. U n d e r the r e f e r e n d u m , the f u t u r e of city-county consolidation looks d i m . Bollens a n d S c h m a n d t realistically predict that "isolated i n s t a n c e s of s u c h c o n s o l i d a t i o n will c o n t i n u e , particularly in the S o u t h and West," but they expect little m o r e . " The process that created Unigov may prove virtually u n i q u e . Regardless of limitations on t h e f u t u r e role of city-county consolidation, however, or of the particular character of the c i r c u m s t a n c e s that contributed to Unigov's creation, the t h e m e s a n d major findings of O w e n and Willbern add significantly to our u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the way different a p p r o a c h e s to t h e legitimation of g o v e r n m e n t a l changes affect the o u t c o m e of reform efforts. T h e y also p r o v i d e a valuable perspective for judging developm e n t s in m e t r o p o l i t a n g o v e r n a n c e and for evaluating a t t e m p t s to deal w i t h m e t r o p o l i t a n p r o b l e m s by structural or n o n s t r u c t u r a l means. We believe the a u t h o r s h a v e m a d e a substantial contribution to the literat u r e of m e t r o p o l i t a n studies.

Stanley Scott Editor, Lane F u n d Publications 33. B o l l e n s a n d S c h m a n d t , M e t r o p o l i s , p. 344.

Victor / o n e s Coeditor, Lane Studies in Regional G o v e r n m e n t

1 Governmental Reform in Indianapolis

Major reorganizations to adapt governmental structure to changing social and e c o n o m i c c i r c u m s t a n c e s have been considered seriously in most of the nation's 2 5 0 metropolitan areas, but in only a handful has substantial and c o m p r e h e n s i v e structural change actually been achieved during this century. Indianapolis is the largest of these and the only successful effort in the nation's northern portion, including most of the country's old urban centers. Moreover, the Indianapolis reorganization was a c c o m p l i s h e d quickly and with substantially less apparent controversy than elsewhere. Essentially u n k n o w n in Indianapolis were the better-known elements of c o n v e n t i o n a l m u n i c i p a l reform, for example, a home-rule charter, merit systems, nonpartisanship, and a city manager. Indianapolis was considered a " t r a d i t i o n a l l y " governed city, without a strong reform heritage, and having no record of developing progressive governmental institutions. In Inside USA John Gunther characterized the city's appearance and proclivities: "Indianapolis is an unkempt city, unswept, raw, a terrific place for basketball and auto racing, a former pivot of the Ku-Kluxers, and in it you may see the second ugliest m o n u m e n t in the w o r l d . ' "

Indianapolis Unigov: A Subject of Study In early 1 9 6 9 , a sweeping legislative act consolidated elements of the city government of Indianapolis with those of Marion County, a much larger geographical area that included Indianapolis, nearly two dozen other m u n i c i p a l i t i e s , plus a large unincorporated suburban population. With this action Indianapolis soared in the national ranking of cities, from twenty-sixth place in 1 9 6 0 to ninth place in 1 9 7 0 , and from 4 7 6 , 2 1 5 persons in 82 square miles to 7 9 3 , 5 9 0 people in an area of more than 4 0 0 square miles. 2 W h i l e the new consolidated gov1. John Gunther, Inside USA (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), p. 387. 2. It dropped to eleventh place in 1981, with 7 0 4 , 0 4 5 people, when four small communities, which were included for some purposes but not for others, were not counted; see World A l m a n a c (New York: Newspaper Enterprise Association, 1981),

2

Governmental

Reform in

Indianapolis

ernment is far from being a completely integrated and unitary arrangement, it provides a single executive and a central policymaking council with dominant power over what had previously been many largely independent and a u t o n o m o u s governmental units and agencies. With the passage of the Unigov Act, Indianapolis became the focus of a great deal of interest in the way the bill was passed and in its essential elements. A m o n t h after the law went into effect on January 1, 1970, with the formation of an interim government, Don Campbell, a reporter for the Times (Hartford), returned to Connecticut from a visit to Indianapolis and wrote: "It seems a little strange that a city like Hartford, with its reputation for progress in so many areas, could be so far behind in its approach to local government. You have to go to some corn pone town like Indianapolis to find innovation in government, and then you realize that Indianapolis is anything but corn pone, and that Hartford is anything but progressive." ! A year later, after Richard Lugar, mayor of the former city, had been elected as first mayor of the consolidated City of Indianapolis, an article appeared with the same theme: "Some time ago an urban magazine story on innovation in Indianapolis asked the question, 'Why Indianapolis of all places?' The implication was clear: why should urbanologists and others concerned with the plight of cities turn to Indianapolis, allegedly surrounded by a cornstalk curtain and commonly believed to offer little beyond the 'Indianapolis 500'?" 4 How did Indianapolis become a proving ground for local government innovation? Except for its conservative "corn pone" image, in 1968 Indianapolis resembled many large northeastern cities in the United States. Its population was still growing, although much more slowly than its suburban fringe areas. Its economy was stable, and new industries were being attracted, although most were locating outside the city limits. Its property-tax income was increasing, but not rapidly enough to keep pace with increasing demands. What Indianapolis shared most with other large cities was its problems. Indianapolis had its share of crime, pollution, racial strife, central-city decay, suburban sprawl, and other urban maladies. Like most large old American cities, it had neither the financial wherewithal nor the governmental capacity to cope with these problems. Annexation programs to extend the city's boundaries nearly always met interminable delays or were defeated in the courts. Al-

p. 1 1 0 . T h e c o m m u n i t i e s w h o s e p o p u l a t i o n s h a d b e e n c o u n t e d in t h e p r e v i o u s n a t i o n a l ranking w e r e L a w r e n c e , 25,591; S p e e d w a y . 12,641; Beech Grove, 13.196; and

South-

port, 2,266. 3. " ' U n i g o v ' in I n d i a n a p o l i s . " T i m e s ( H a r t f o r d , C o n n . ) . F e b r u a r y 9, 1 9 7 0 . 4. U S D e p a r t m e n t lenge 2(5):4 ( M a y 1971).

of H o u s i n g a n d U r b a n D e v e l o p m e n t . " U n i g o v . " I l l ' l ) C h a l -

Governmental

Reform in Indianapolis

3

though there was some success in enlarging jurisdiction over certain programs through the creation of single-purpose special districts, this also often c o m p o u n d e d matters by adding new layers of government to an already complex governmental system. Furthermore, having already extended its most-demanded services to areas beyond its boundaries, Indianapolis denied itself important bargaining leverage in annexation proceedings. Circumstances

and Scope of

Reform

In any event, Indianapolis had its share of the problems that prompted many other areas to consider metropolitan reorganization. Attempts usually failed because the forces resisting change were too strong. In Indianapolis, special circumstances facilitated a successful reorganization effort. Moreover, the reorganization itself, while enhancing the political leadership and community cohesiveness, also preserved a substantial degree of organizational complexity and structural pluralism. What did h a p p e n in Indianapolis? An orthodox, reasonable answer is that the area's people or leaders became so frustrated with divided and fragmented government that they decided to streamline and unify it, Unigov being the result. While there is much truth to this answer, there were also special circumstances that are crucial to understanding what h a p p e n e d . A combination of forces at a particular Special Circumstances. time led to the Indianapolis metropolitan reorganization. Some of these forces, but not all, are found in other cities. Moreover, they do not all "come together" in quite the same way. For example, although Indianapolis was the state's largest city by far, it did not have its own legal "charter," and its governmental structure was regularly modified by special state legislative acts applying only to Indianapolis. Over the years such special laws had already made a large number of adjustments in individual governmental functions and services. A basic thrust of the Unigov Act was to subject the existing institutional structures to a greater degree of central political control. The strong entrenchment of partisan politics in Indiana government provided the discipline and cohesiveness that made Unigov's enactment possible, and the prospect of partisan advantage provided m u c h of the motivation. The emergence of a political leadership with a sophisticated interest in governmental structure and with the will to use available political power to effect structural change was what got the law passed. Scope of Reform. While Unigov clearly represented a centralizing move, it was nevertheless probably even more complicated legally

4

Governmental

Reform

in

Indianapolis

The Indianapolis-Marion County combined government building was constructed by a countywide building authority in 1963. This was one of a number of ad hoc intergovernmental cooperative ventures that led to the more comprehensive Unigov reform of 1969. F r o m : D i v i s i o n of P l a n n i n g a n d Z o n i n g , I n d i a n a p o l i s - M a r i o n C o u n t y .

Governmental

Reform in Indianapolis

5

and s t r u c t u r a l l y t h a n t h e s e t u p it r e p l a c e d . F o r e x a m p l e , the city and c o u n t y w e r e c o n t i n u e d as legal e n t i t i e s , a l o n g with the t o w n s h i p s a n d all of t h e p r e v i o u s l y e x i s t i n g m u n i c i p a l i t i e s . U n d e r Unigov the geog r a p h i c a l areas of i n d i v i d u a l g o v e r n m e n t a l f u n c t i o n s and s e r v i c e s vary w i d e l y , c a n be c h a n g e d in a variety of ways, and are financed by e a r m a r k e d t a x e s a p p l y i n g o n l y to t h e p a r t i c u l a r areas i n v o l v e d . T h e s c h o o l districts r e m a i n i n d e p e n d e n t and u n c o n s o l i d a t e d . S o m e other f u n c t i o n s are a l s o still run by b o a r d s u n d e r c o m p l e x f o r m u l a s governing a p p o i n t m e n t s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . M o s t of t h e traditional e l e c t i v e offices h a v e c o n t i n u e d . S o m e regional units h a v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for several c o u n t i e s . F i n a l l y , t h e r e w a s an abortive attempt to establish an u n d e r l y i n g set of s m a l l c o m m u n i t y g o v e r n m e n t s in m u c h of the metr o p o l i t a n area. In short, U n i g o v ' s r e f o r m e d , " c o n s o l i d a t e d " g o v e r n m e n t a l system is still q u i t e c o m p l e x . O n the o t h e r h a n d , U n i g o v was created and is an o p e r a t i n g reality. T h u s , to a s u b s t a n t i a l degree, a single reasonably c o h e r e n t p o l i t i c a l c o m m u n i t y e x i s t s n o w and did not before. T h i s kind of c o h e r e n c e c h a r a c t e r i z e s f e w of the n a t i o n ' s other s p r a w l i n g m e t r o p o l i t a n areas.

A National Perspective U n i g o v ' s passage in 1 9 6 9 c a m e at a pivotal t i m e in the r u n n i n g debate t h r o u g h o u t the c o u n t r y o v e r t h e merits of c i t y - c o u n t y c o n s o l i dation as a reform m e a s u r e . F o r p r o p o n e n t s of c o n s o l i d a t i o n the dec a d e of the 1 9 6 0 s was a t i m e of c o n s i d e r a b l e activity and p r o m i s e but also a t i m e of defeat a n d r e j e c t i o n . W i t h m a r k e d s u c c e s s e s at Nashville and J a c k s o n v i l l e and p h i l o s o p h i c a l support from the C o m m i t t e e for E c o n o m i c D e v e l o p m e n t (CED) a n d t h e National C o m m i s s i o n on Urban P r o b l e m s , c i t y - c o u n t y c o n s o l i d a t i o n r e c e i v e d a great deal of a t t e n t i o n in m e t r o p o l i t a n areas t h r o u g h o u t the U n i t e d States, especially in the S o u t h . D e s p i t e this growing interest, h o w e v e r , there was m o u n t i n g frustration as voters in 10 c i t i e s t u r n e d d o w n c o n s o l i d a t i o n p r o p o s a l s b e t w e e n 1 9 5 9 and 1 9 6 9 . T h e fact that so m a n y c i t i e s att e m p t e d c o n s o l i d a t i o n had b o l s t e r e d e x p e c t a t i o n s a m o n g c o n s o l i d a tionists, but a n t i c i p a t i o n o u t w e i g h e d a c c o m p l i s h m e n t . B o l l e n s and S c h m a n d t s u m m a r i z e d t h e f e e l i n g s of m a n y at the t i m e w i t h t h e i r c o m m e n t : " I n general the o n e - g o v e r n m e n t a p p r o a c h to a r e a w i d e problems has p a s s e d its h e y d a y . " 5 In t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s the c r e a t i o n of U n i g o v aroused w i d e s p r e a d interest both as a rare e v e n t (creation of a m e t r o p o l i t a n g o v e r n m e n t ) and for the u n i q u e reform p o l i t i c s that lay b e h i n d its e s t a b l i s h m e n t . F u r t h e r m o r e , v a r i o u s a s p e c t s of t h e r e o r g a n i z a t i o n effort in I n d i a n a p o 5. John C. Bollens and Henry J. Schmandt, The Metropolis: Its People, and Economic Life, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 311.

Politics,

6

Governmental

Reform in

Indianapolis

lis were related to other themes in the national literature and debates about metropolitan governance, such as regional planning, neighborhood government, and polycentricity. Countywide planning and landuse control arrangements had been among the antecedents of Unigov, and although political forces limited Unigov itself to the central county of the metropolitan region, the Unigov administration had a major role in the creation of a multicounty regional planning agency. Some of the proponents of Unigov wanted to accompany it with a "minigov" arrangement so that regional and neighborhood governments could be simultaneously strengthened, a combination of centralization and decentralization. And while the reorganization clearly vested increased power in an enlarged political entity, remaining units in their variety and complexity comprised a political system that could certainly be characterized as "polycentric." While the Indianapolis reorganization may not have provided clear and simple answers in the debates about metropolitan government, it had many strands that were receiving national attention. The Reform Process. Unigov is one of the few city-county consolidations to become effective without a referendum, and it is perhaps unique in the dominant role the elected political leadership played in its inception and creation. These key features are central concerns in this study. Unigov was important for the innovation it brought to the consolidation debate, but, in addition, we are interested in the features it shares with reform efforts elsewhere. Despite acknowledged differences, the similarities may in fact make Unigov a more important case study than do its unique features. Like other North American metropolitan consolidations, Unigov was a compromise solution that departed from the more comprehensive plan originally proposed by reform proponents. The Indianapolis decisionmaking process dealt with the same merger issues that were encountered elsewhere, and the resulting document incorporates structural and functional arrangements reflecting the political currents that determined the outcome. Although powerful political forces pressed successfully for a nonreferendum decision on Unigov—and a pattern of lawmaking that favored the nonreferendum alternative—the end result is no more "comprehensive" than consolidations achieved elsewhere under different circumstances. Traditional antimerger arguments were raised during the Unigov debate: merger would mean higher taxes, citizens would be denied a voice in the bigger government, the black vote would be diluted, and existing community and neighborhood lifestyles would be disrupted. Certain government officials opposed Unigov because the mayor would be too powerful or the City-County Council unrepresentative. After the Unigov law's passage, opponents argued that it was less a

Governmental

Reform in Indianapolis

7

reform measure than a Republican Party takeover. Some called it unconstitutional while others maintained that it lacked voter support. One of our purposes is to review the debate and suggest its impact on the Unigov Act. We are also interested in effects of the legal environment on the reform process and on the resulting law. As noted, Indiana's constitutional and statutory provisions were generally advantageous to passage of the reform bill, while at the same time other legal provisions posed formidable barriers to a comprehensive merger. Welfare and education services, for example, are state functions in Indiana, administered locally by independent governmental agencies. The independent status of these functions was responsible for their omission from the new government. Similarly, several elected county officers and other governmental entities retained their independent legal status. Unigov's principal proponents—especially the attorneys who drafted the bill—knew that to tackle these independent entities would have involved a lengthy approval process, seriously jeopardizing the entire reform. By skirting such legally sensitive matters, Indianapolis also avoided the lengthy court battles that followed similar reforms in Baton Rouge and Miami. While Unigov itself has not faced any substantial court challenges, Indianapolis officials were involved in a 10-year lawsuit in federal court, questioning the omission of the schools from Unigov. This case will be considered below in detail. Structure and Function. Once they determined to seek a comprehensive metropolitan areawide form of government, the Unigov principals could choose among three basic models. (1) A two-tier federated form of government can be based on a reallocation of powers and functions between the city and county levels of government, essentially shifting some municipal authority from the city level to the county. The Miami—Dade County plan is a good example. (2) A threetier government, for example, the one adopted in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area, retains the existing city and county arrangement and creates a regional multiservice district as the third tier. (3) City-county consolidation combines local units into one government. Indianapolis chose city-county consolidation, as did Nashville, Tennessee, and Jacksonville, Florida. In Indianapolis, no extensive consideration was given to the federated two-tier or three-tier forms. The Twin Cities' pattern was quickly dismissed as politically unattainable in Indiana where antiregional government feelings run high. The two-tier form (e.g., Miami—Dade County) would conflict with the Unigov planners' goal of extending the mayor's administrative jurisdiction countywide. Moreover, making a Republican mayor a countywide figure appealed to some Unigov proponents who saw advantages in a countywide electoral constituency. Nor was the existing county government seen

8

Governmental

Reform

in

Indianapolis

as adequate to the task of administering a comprehensive municipal government, such as the two-tier plan would call for. Perhaps another important consideration was Nashville's proximity to Indianapolis. While Mayor Lugar knew about other mergers, he was most familiar with the Nashville—Davidson County experience. He had studied Nashville Metro and invited Nashville officials to Indianapolis as consultants during the early Unigov discussions. Accordingly, similarities between Nashville and Indianapolis are to be expected. For example, the idea of creating a special urban service district for certain service and taxing functions was based on the Nashville model. Both metropolitan governments were restructured at the county level, essentially merging the former city and county policymaking and administrative units. Both were strong mayor-council governments, giving the mayor substantial administrative powers. Despite these similarities, Unigov has many structural and functional features that are not based on the Nashville model. (See tables 1 and 2 for similarities and differences between Unigov and five other metropolitan governments.) Just as Unigov is not an exact replica of Nashville Metro, it cannot be closely likened to any of the other metropolitan governments. Despite its uniqueness, however, Unigov does conform to the general definition of a city-county consolidation in the 1980 Municipal Yearbook: "The National Association of Counties . . . defines city-county consolidation as the unification of the governments of one or more cities with the surrounding county. Boundary lines of the jurisdictions become coterminous. Some incorporated jurisdictions may be excluded from the consolidation. Political considerations often dictate exempting smaller suburban governments from the initial consolidation.'" 5 Indianapolis, Nashville, Jacksonville, and Lexington (Kentucky) all unified city and county governments into one basic unit. On the other hand, Miami and Toronto retained the existing units while shifting certain limited functions to the areawide government. Even their functional mergers, however, were less comprehensive than those of the four city-county consolidations. Toronto with three functional mergers and Miami with seven are less comprehensive than the consolidations that range from ten to thirteen in the number of functional agencies merged (see Table 2). Political considerations dictated the exemption of several smaller suburban governments from Unigov, which was true elsewhere, with the notable exception of Lexington. Such considerations also caused some important functions to be excluded from Unigov. 6. P a r r i s N. G l e n d e n i n g a n d P a t r i c i a S. A t k i n s , " C i t y - C o u n t y C o n s o l i d a t i o n s : N e w V i e w s for t h e E i g h t i e s , " The M u n i c i p a l Yearbook 1980, vol. 47 (Chicago: I n t e r n a tional City M a n a g e r s A s s o c i a t i o n , 1980), p. 68.

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3

Characteristics

of Metropolitan Indianapolis

19

Indianapolis is the largest of Indiana's 11 SMSAs (see Map 1), with a population of 1,156,200, ranking thirty-third among US SMSAs in 1980, a drop from twenty-ninth place in 1970. 6 The decline in national ranking is the combined result of the spectacular growth of four sunbelt cities and a declining rate of growth within the Indianapolis SMSA. The eight-county Indianapolis area experienced a net migration loss of 15,000 persons from 1970 to 1975. This, subtracted from the excess of births over deaths, gave a total population increase of 36,100 persons in those five years because gains of nearly 48,000 in the outlying counties outweighed Marion County's loss of nearly 12,000.

Despite its recent slight drop in national standing, the Indianapolis SMSA remains Indiana's fastest growing area; in the 1970s 30 percent of the state's total growth occurred there. Hamilton, Hancock, Hendricks, and Johnson, four of the state's fastest growing counties, are in the Indianapolis SMSA. Each grew more than 25 percent during this period, compared with a statewide growth of 5.9 percent (see Map 1). Of the outlying counties, only Shelby, with a growth rate of 5.5 percent, was below the state figure. Marion County ( - 3 . 6 percent), as noted above, lost population in the 1970s. The trend toward increased suburban growth and a declining central-city population became even more pronounced in the 1970s. Marion County was the only county in the SMSA to lose population between 1970 and 1980. Growth is most intense in and around the Hamilton County community of Carmel, located directly north of Indianapolis on US Highway 31, just three miles above the outer belt of the interstate highway system. Carmel nearly tripled its 6,691 population in 1970 to 18,272 in 1980. 7 Changing Patterns

of Wealth and

Growth

Along with its population growth, Hamilton County has also experienced the SMSA's most rapid rise in per capita income, with a 1969-to-1974 increase of 50.7 percent. Marion County showed the smallest proportionate increase (41.2 percent). Johnson County, second to Hamilton County in population growth rate, is also second in per capita income growth, with a 48.2 percent increase." Slightly more than half of the workers in the seven outlying counties earn their living in Marion County so that much of the increased income in the suburban counties is actually earned in Marion County. Commuter 6. U S D e p a r t m e n t of C o m m e r c e . B u r e a u of t h e C e n s u s , World A l m a n a c ; 1981 ( W a s h i n g t o n . DC, 1 9 8 1 ) . p. 1 1 3 . 7. U S D e p a r t m e n t of C o m m e r c e , B u r e a u of t h e C e n s u s , C u r r e n t P o p u l a t i o n Hep o r l s : Population E s t i m a t e s a n d P r o j e c t i o n s . S e r i e s P - 2 5 , 16 I n d . ( W a s h i n g t o n . DC, 1975), p. 16; a n d 1 9 8 0 Census of Population and H o u s i n g , p p . 4 - 2 0 . 8. Current

Population

R e p o r t s , p p . 16, 19, 22.

Map 1. Percent Change in Population Metropolitan Statistical Area,

in Indianapolis, 1970-1980

Eight-County

Standard

Source: Based on 1 9 8 0 census data. Prepared by Department of Metropolitan Development, Indianapolis.

Characteristics of Metropolitan Indianapolis

21

traffic to t h e s u b u r b s o u t s i d e M a r i o n C o u n t y is still m i n i m a l ; thus, of the 2 9 0 , 2 5 0 w o r k e r s w h o r e s i d e in t h e c o u n t y , 2 8 3 , 9 9 4 work there. 9 C e n t e r T o w n s h i p is c o n t a i n e d a l m o s t entirely w i t h i n the preU n i g o v b o u n d a r i e s of t h e City of I n d i a n a p o l i s (see M a p 2); it covers t h e e n t i r e c e n t r a l b u s i n e s s district, p l u s t h e i m m e d i a t e l y a d j a c e n t area of old r e s i d e n t i a l h o u s i n g and s o m e c o m m e r c i a l and m a n u f a c t u r i n g b u i l d i n g s , m a n y of t h e m a b a n d o n e d . It is the c o u n t y ' s o n l y t o w n s h i p to s h o w a net p o p u l a t i o n loss in r e c e n t years, a trend that c o n t i n u e s . N e a r l y 7 9 p e r c e n t of M a r i o n C o u n t y ' s 1 3 4 , 4 8 6 b l a c k s resided in C e n t e r T o w n s h i p in 1 9 7 0 . H o u s i n g v a l u e s in C e n t e r T o w n s h i p are c o n s i s t e n t l y l o w e r than t h o s e e l s e w h e r e in the c o u n t y , and the u n e m p l o y m e n t rate is g e n e r a l l y higher. T h e 1 9 7 5 per c a p i t a i n c o m e of $ 3 , 5 8 1 w a s the lowest in the c o u n t y and t h e S M S A . B y c o n t r a s t , W a s h i n g t o n T o w n s h i p , i m m e d i a t e l y north of C e n t e r T o w n s h i p , had the h i g h e s t per c a p i t a i n c o m e of the c o u n t y and the S M S A , with $7,027, nearly twice Center Township's. Hamilton C o u n t y ' s Clay T o w n s h i p is a distant s e c o n d , w i t h $ 6 , 0 9 1 per capita i n c o m e . U n e m p l o y m e n t in W a s h i n g t o n T o w n s h i p w a s less than 2 perc e n t , w h e r e a s Center T o w n s h i p ' s w a s m o r e than 4 p e r c e n t . N e e d l e s s to say, n e i t h e r C e n t e r T o w n s h i p n o r W a s h i n g t o n T o w n s h i p is t h e n o r m for M a r i o n C o u n t y , the m e d i a n b e i n g in b e t w e e n . B e c a u s e of its d e c l i n i n g p o p u l a t i o n and deteriorating r e s i d e n t i a l and c o m m e r c i a l areas, C e n t e r T o w n s h i p has b e e n the focus of a c o n s i d e r a b l e a m o u n t of d e v e l o p m e n t a n d r e h a b i l i t a t i o n activity u n d e r the Unigov a d m i n i s t r a t i o n in t h e 1 9 7 0 s (see C h a p t e r 8).

Population Characteristics W h i l e n o t i c e a b l e , e t h n i c g r o u p i n g s a m o n g the w h i t e p o p u l a t i o n of I n d i a n a p o l i s are p r o b a b l y m u c h less significant than in most c i t i e s of the East a n d M i d w e s t . L e s s than 2 p e r c e n t of the p o p u l a t i o n is foreignborn. Of t h e 4 2 , 7 5 7 p e r s o n s of foreign s t o c k (persons foreign-born plus first-generation A m e r i c a n s w i t h o n e or m o r e foreign-born parent) in 1 9 7 0 , G e r m a n s r e p r e s e n t e d t h e largest n a t i o n a l group with a p o p u l a tion of 9 , 2 7 1 , f o l l o w e d by p e r s o n s from the U n i t e d K i n g d o m ( 4 , 8 0 2 ) , Canada ( 3 , 3 5 5 ) , and I r e l a n d ( 2 , 7 5 2 ) . P e r s o n s w i t h S p a n i s h s u r n a m e s n u m b e r e d 6 , 2 1 1 . M a n y of t h e p e o p l e w h o c a m e to I n d i a n a p o l i s in both the n i n e t e e n t h and early t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r i e s c a m e from south of the O h i o R i v e r . A s o n e w r i t e r put it: " I n d i a n a p o l i s was a northern t o w n , but it w a s s o u t h e r n in its style and t h e i n f l e c t i o n of its v o i c e . " 1 0 9. T h e

source

of this

material

is t h e I n d i a n a

Information

Retrieval

System

(INDIRS), a c o m p u t e r i z e d data b a n k s p o n s o r e d by I n d i a n a U n i v e r s i t y and the I n d i a n a State Library. 10. Leary, Indianapolis,

p. 3 9 .

22

Characteristics

of Metropolitan

Marion County Townships with Assessed

Indianapolis

Valuations

Source; City of I n d i a n a p o l i s , A n n u a ! Report, D e c e m b e r 31, 1980.

Emigration f r o m the city to the suburbs by m a n y persons w h o usually voted Republican, c o u p l e d w i t h an immigration to the city of a growing labor force, m a n y f r o m Democratic areas of the South, has m a d e I n d i a n a p o l i s (like m a n y other eastern a n d m i d w e s t e r n areas) a normally Democratic city ringed by a Republican county. During the 40 years prior to the 1968 election, the Republicans captured the mayor's office only twice, for a total of eight years. W h i c h e v e r party has been in control, Indianapolis, the national h o m e of the A m e r i c a n Legion a n d f o u n d i n g place of the John Birch Society, traditionally has been a conservative city. 11 W h e n m a n y other cities w e r e clamoring for more federal aid, Indianapolis often chose to go ahead w i t h o u t o u t s i d e assistance. Perhaps Paul Friggens said it 11. John F e n t o n , Midwest pp. 1 7 7 - 1 7 8 .

Politics

(New York: Holt, Rinehart & W i n s t o n , 1966),

Characteristics

of Metropolitan

Indianapolis

23

best: "Indianapolis is a solid conservative community of half a million people in a historically conservative state." 12 Blacks in

Indianapolis

Historically, the status of blacks in the Indianapolis community has taken a dual course. While certain legal and political rights were attained early, holding promise of greater freedoms, a begrudging social acceptance by the majority white community usually relegated blacks to second-class citizenship, at best, forcing them to rely almost wholly on the resources of their own communities for personal advancement. Early Arrivals. There is some debate as to who was the city's first permanent black resident, but blacks clearly have been a part of the city from the outset. One of the earliest to arrive was Chiney Lively, who came as a housekeeper to Alexander Ralston, the surveyor w h o laid out the city's original mile-square plan in 1820. 13 Although records indicate that several blacks assisted in clearing the wilderness for the new capital, the first count was not taken until 1827. A Sunday school census in that year showed 529 white and 34 "colored" males and 479 white and 24 "colored" females, for a total 1827 population of 1,069 inhabitants, 1 4 suggesting a black population of between 5 and 6 percent of the total. A Growing Population. Black population growth generally kept pace with white population increases, that is, approximately 5 percent of the total, until the decade before the Civil War. From 1850 to 1860 the black population increased from only 405 to 498, bringing the black share of the overall population d o w n to 2.7 percent by the war's outbreak. This relative decline can be attributed to changes in the legal status of blacks in Indiana. Passage of the fugitive slave law alarmed many of Indiana's blacks, and fearing that they might be returned to slavery, they emigrated to Canada. A provision in the 1851 Indiana constitution, Article XIII, forbidding the immigration of blacks into the state, also deterred blacks from coming. The Civil War, however, soon rendered Article XIII ineffective. Indianapolis needed to bolster its work force, and black immigrants began filling the jobs of whites who had gone to war or taken better jobs. 12. Paul Friggens, " W i t h o u t Federal A i d , " National Civic Review 52(5):247 (May 1963). 13. Ralston, w h o as an assistant to Major Pierre Charles L'Enfant had h e l p e d lay the p l a n s for W a s h i n g t o n , DC, i n c o r p o r a t e d that city's radial street design into the original plan for I n d i a n a p o l i s . 14. Ignatius B r o w n , Logan's History of I n d i a n a p o l i s / r o m 1818 (Indianapolis: Logan & C o m p a n y , 1868), p. 19.

24

Characteristics

of Metropolitan

Indianapolis

By 1870 the black population had reached 2,931, nearly six times the 1860 count. It grew to 6,504 in 1880, 9,133 in 1890, and 15,931 in 1900. During the century's last three decades, the black share of the city's population rose gradually to approximately 10 percent. Political and Civil Rights. Carved out of the Northwest Territory, Indiana came under the Ordinance of 1787, which outlawed slavery and involuntary servitude. Frequent noncompliance with the law prompted the first state constitutional convention to include an antislavery provision in the 1816 constitution's Bill of Rights. In any event, while slavery had thus been legally barred from the territory and the state before Indianapolis's founding in 1820, other rights of blacks were not similarly protected. There was no black suffrage; blacks could not serve in the militia; they were barred from testifying in court; marriage between races was forbidden by law; and blacks were prohibited by law from attending public schools. The economic and population growth that established Indianapolis as a major city after the Civil War also made the black community an important distinct subgroup within the city. In addition to their rapidly increasing numbers and impact on the city, the blacks' presence was dramatized by their part in the war effort. These changes brought them a number of legal and political advancements before the turn of the century. Education, Employment, and Politics. The education and employment of blacks in the nineteenth century followed a line of loosely defined segregation. The statutes were revised in 1869 to permit blacks to obtain public education in segregated schools—the nineteenth century form of segregation, then prevalent was caused more by residential patterns than by established school policies. The standard practice was to draw school boundaries so that children could attend the school nearest their home. Thus, black children living in all-black neighborhoods attended all-black elementary schools, whereas some other blacks attended predominantly white elementary schools. Those few blacks who went beyond the elementary grades attended Indianapolis High School, the only one available. Black employment in Indianapolis resembled the situation in other large northern cities. Thus, most blacks filled the ranks of unskilled workers. Some farmed small patches of ground on the city's fringe, and a few purchased small businesses, but most worked as hod carriers, waiters, teamsters, porters, and janitors, and many black women worked as domestics. Business opportunities for blacks were limited, and those who were successful nearly always became so with limited capital and black clientele. Passage of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments to the US

Characteristics

of Metropolitan

Indianapolis

25

Constitution added significantly to the blacks' political presence in Indianapolis. This was particularly true of the suffrage amendment, nullifying the state constitutional provision limiting suffrage to whites. The ballot was of immediate importance to the black community, many of whose members quickly assumed the responsibilities of active citizenship. While politics provided a ladder to success for a few individuals, many of the political rewards available to other ethnic groups still eluded blacks. Only a few blacks were elected to office, generally to the state General Assembly or the City Council. Nomination of blacks for executive office was unheard of, and patronage positions were few and restricted to the least desirable jobs. Perhaps the most direct beneficiary of black suffrage in Indianapolis was the Republican Party, which used large black electoral majorities to help control Indianapolis politics and government until the 1930s. Population Growth in the Twentieth Century. Census figures for the present century show the city's black community to have grown steadily and more rapidly than the white community. A very noticeable increase occurred between the 1910 and 1920 census years when the black population grew from 21,816 to 34,678, a 59 percent increase. Just as in the Civil War period, blacks were attracted to fill war production labor needs during World War I. The black population growth rate declined somewhat during the 1920s when the Ku Klux Klan was most active in Indianapolis and during the Depression in the 1930s. Nevertheless, their increases still slightly outpaced white population growth. This was true in part because of the white migration to the suburbs beginning in the 1920s. Black population increases were even more dramatic after the beginning of World War II. From 1940 to 1950 the black population increased from 51,142 to 63,867 (12,725), and the black proportion rose from 13 percent to 15 percent. A 54 percent growth rate in the 1950s raised the city's black population to nearly 100,000 persons, bringing their share to 21 percent. The heaviest concentration of the black population continues to be found in the old city's west to northwest side, although many of the new arrivals have located on the near east side of downtown. This initiated a certain rivalry between the west side's old timers and the east side's newcomers, which diminished during the 1960s, however, as both communities expanded to meet on the near north side at Meridian Street. In order to go from the city's center to the upper-class white areas on the north side, it is now necessary to traverse areas of heavy black population. Almost no blacks were found in the suburban areas in 1960; Beech Grove with a population of almost 10,000 counted only one

26

Characteristics

of Metropolitan

Indianapolis

black resident, and Speedway, also with about 10,000 residents, had three blacks. Only Lawrence, the largest incorporated suburban city, had a sizable minority population of 1,196 (1.81 percent) by 1970. In 1980 the nonwhite population was slightly more than 13 percent of the eight-county metropolitan area total, slightly over 20 percent in Marion County, approximately 30 percent in the area previously included in the City of Indianapolis, and about 41 percent in Center Township, the geographical center of the city and the county. These percentages had increased from 1970 figures of 17 for Marion County, 21 for the old city of Indianapolis, and 39 for Center Township. As the figures indicate, the black population of the metropolitan area resides almost entirely in Marion County; only about 2,000 of more than 400,000 people in the other seven SMSA counties were black. In Marion County blacks are concentrated overwhelmingly in the old city area of Indianapolis, largely in Center Township. Klan-Related Setbacks, and New Gains. Pressured by Ku Klux Klan members and several civic groups, including the Chamber of Commerce, the Board of School Commissioners authorized construction in 1927 of Crispus Attucks High School for blacks and redrew elementary school districts to correspond to the all-black neighborhoods. The school segregation was essentially total and remained so until after World War II when returning veterans, the NAACP, and church, labor, and civic groups pressed for change. Following passage of a state statute outlawing school segregation in 1949, the Indianapolis Board of School Commissioners undertook a deliberate program to desegregate Indianapolis schools. Within a decade black students were attending all of the city's high schools; junior high and elementary schools accepted students regardless of race; and the all-black teaching staffs that had taught in the black schools were broken up and assigned to teach white students. Even so, sharply segregated residential patterns have made it extremely difficult to desegregate schools. In fact, as many white residents have moved to the suburbs and send their children to predominantly white suburban schools, the concentration of blacks in the city school districts has grown. Because for decades the city's schools were clearly and deliberately segregated as official policy, the federal courts have found a positive obligation to desegregate, and the litigation concerning this obligation has been protracted and complex. The Klan was also influential in other political circles. During the 1924 election, when Republican candidates included a number of Klan members, many blacks voted Democratic for the first time in their lives. Although most of these returned to the Republican ranks at the following election, others remained Democrats, providing a nucleus for the massive switch of blacks to the Democratic Party 10 years later. Klan

Characteristics

of Metropolitan

Indianapolis

27

influence also effectively increased segregation in real estate, job opportunities, public recreation, entertainment, and elsewhere. The formidable influence of the Ku Klux Klan in Indianapolis was not broken until the end of World War II. Extensive civil rights progress has been made since 1945. Relying on federal programs and local initiative, Indianapolis's leadership, both black and white, has made notable advances in providing equal opportunities in housing, public programs, jobs, business, education, and politics. Despite the long period of strong Klan influence, in the postwar years there has been less overt tension between the races than has existed in many other cities. For example, in 1978 Ebony magazine rated Indianapolis among the nation's 10 top cities in terms of desirability for blacks to live in. Admittedly, Ebony added some qualifications, cautioning prospective black residents about the continued presence of the Ku Klux Klan, the John Birch Society, and the American Nazi Party. It also noted that black political power had been diluted by the new regional government. 15 Nevertheless, Indianapolis's overall high rating as a place for blacks to live is the underlying reason why blacks have not seriously opposed the unified government. While opportunities for blacks clearly lag behind those of whites, the Klan no longer dominates the public sector in Indianapolis, and the white leadership seems committed to bettering race relationships. There is increasing strength among the black leadership that builds on a long tradition of Indianapolis blacks using their personal status to improve the situation of the black community. Unquestionably, Indianapolis still has problems of discrimination, but it has not experienced the racial upheavals that have characterized many other major US cities in recent years. 15. "Cities for Blacks," Ebony. February 1978, pp. 9 5 - 1 0 1 .

3 Government Before Unigov

T h e 1 9 6 7 census of governments identified 6 0 governmental units in Marion County: (1) n i n e townships (all of Indiana's territory is included within a t o w n s h i p just as it is within a county), (2) 23 cities and towns (in Indiana the distinction between a city and a town depends largely on size), and (3) the county itself. None of the suburban municipalities was large compared with Indianapolis; only three (Beech Grove, Lawrence, and Speedway) had 1 9 7 0 populations over 1 0 , 0 0 0 , and n o n e had reached 2 0 , 0 0 0 (see Map 3). T h e county was divided into 11 school districts. One essentially served the area of the City of Indianapolis but was considered to be a distinct governmental unit. T w o others corresponded to two of the other m u n i c i p a l i t i e s (Beech Grove and Speedway). T h e other eight school districts served areas outside the three municipal school systems. In addition to schools, the 1 9 6 7 census also noted 16 other special districts, some c o i n c i d i n g with general purpose units. 1

The Basic Units of Government As with most states, Indiana's counties are considered primarily subdivisions of the state government, their structure being heavily influenced by the ideas and practices prevalent in the Jacksonian frontier era. Strictly prescribed and rather limited powers are vested in a board of county c o m m i s s i o n e r s , comprising three members elected from districts by both city and noncity voters. In addition, there are eight other directly elected county officials: clerk, auditor, recorder, treasurer, sheriff, coroner, surveyor, and assessor. All of these save one are provided for by the state constitution, only the office of assessor being created by statute. A County Council of five members (reduced from seven in 1 9 6 7 ) c o n c e r n s itself almost entirely with matters of budget and finance. A civil t o w n s h i p government has even fewer functions than a 1. It is s o m e t i m e s d i f f i c u l t to d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n s e p a r a t e g o v e r n m e n t a l

units

a n i l a u t o n o m o u s a g e n c i e s i v i t h i n a g e n e r a l p u r p o s e u n i t , a l t h o u g h t h e B u r e a u of t h e C e n s u s t r i e s to m a k e its c r i t e r i a f o r s u c h d i s t i n c t i o n s e x p l i c i t .

Government

Before Unigov

WASHINGTON TOWNSHIP PIKE TOWNSHIP

£

Williams Creek

Meridian Hills

29

Castleton LAWRENCE TOWNSHIP

1/ Ravenswood hore Acres

\ortn Crows Ncsl ( rows Nest I High Woods

Lawrence

Sprin

Speedwa Warren Park

WAYNE TOWNSHIP

Cumberland

Lynhi

WARREN TOWNSHIP

Beech Grove Be

DECATUR TOWNSHIP

PERRY TOWNSHIP Homecroft

FRANKLIN TOWNSHIP

1

Southpor

SB!

Pre-Uriigov City of Indianapolis Other city or t o w n

Map 3.

Unincorporated area

Trends in Local Government, Indianapolis—Marion plementation of Unigov in 1971

County Prior to Im-

Source: Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce, Governmental Affairs Department.

county. A township trustee, township assessor, and a three-member township advisory board are elected in each township. Townships continued to have some role in administering "poor relief," although most of the real responsibility for this function was transferred to county departments of public welfare in the 1930s. Property-tax assessment is done by the township assessor under the county assessor's supervision. By the time of the Unigov reorganization, Marion County's suburban townships were beginning to provide a few rudimentary urban-type services, for example, volunteer fire and ambulance departments.

30

Government

Before

Unigov

Before Unigov, Indianapolis had a mayor-council government (see Chart 1). The mayor, elected for four-year terms, was the city's chief executive officer, performing administrative, ceremonial, and political duties commonly associated with a strong-mayor system. The city clerk (also secretary to the City Council), elected for a four-year term, maintained the municipal records, documents, and ordinances. A nine-member elected City Council, officially named the Common Council, was the local legislative body for Indianapolis. The council's jurisdiction, prescribed by state law, included a wide range of powers over municipal regulations and finance. The system of electing councilmembers was unique. Each of the two parties could nominate a candidate from each of the six council districts. In the general election, the nine candidates with the most votes were elected. This formula ensured seating at least three members of the minority party. The facilitation of borrowing was an important reason for the formation of special purpose units of government in Indiana, sometimes with boundaries identical to those of an existing general purpose unit. The state constitution does not permit a municipal corporation to incur debts exceeding 2 percent of its assessed property valuation, whereas a newly created unit, even if in the same area, could borrow up to its own limit. Special purpose units are also established to provide some particular governmental service in a territory different from and ordinarily larger than existing units. These are the two principal reasons why 16 semiautonomous units of government were added to the basic governmental pattern in the 20 years prior to 1968. Some of these units will be discussed later in reviewing steps taken to accommodate preexisting governmental structure to metropolitan growth. A Multiplicity

of

Governments

The quest for Unigov did not originate with a detailed inquiry into the need for consolidated government in Marion County. No comprehensive study/charter commission preceded the reform. No outside consultant was retained, and no local university was brought in to study metropolitan problems. The issue was decided by a politically powerful group of experienced local government operatives. These men were keenly aware that the conventional wisdom of merger proposals emphasized economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in local government. While economic issues and increased productivity were important to Unigov proponents, the deciding issue for them lay in the need to devise a governmental structure in which they could get things done. They were aided by growing community concern over the ineffectiveness of government in Indianapolis-Marion County. The governmental arrangement in Indianapolis and Marion County was seen by most of the community opinion leaders as an

Government

Before

Unigov

31

Chart 1 Indianapolis

City Government

Before

Consolidation

Source: Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce, Governmental Research Department, A Primer of Local Government in Marion County (Indianapolis, 1964), p. 43.

32

Government

Before

Unigov

array of overlapping jurisdictions with functional duplication of certain services (see Chart 2). Each of the 60 units duplicated in some measure the executive and legislative offices of the others and presented the citizens and voters an often bewildering list of elected and appointed officials. The Indianapolis News editorialized: "The compartmental and conflicting governmental units of city, county and township are suitable no more. They were set up for a simpler era." 2 The League of Women Voters made a similar point by giving their local government study the title Who's in Charge Here?1 Functional Duplication. Many functions—purchasing, welfare, fire protection, and garbage collection—were handled by several different jurisdictions, but law enforcement was the most noticeable example of a function provided by a large number of separate units. Thus, police protection was provided by 24 different units in Marion County, including the sheriff's office, constables in six townships, full-time police forces in three cities, a park department, and marshals in 13 incorporated towns. Moreover, the FBI and the state police were always on call. In a plea for metropoi—a term the local press coined for a proposed countywide police force—a local newspaper commented: "Included in this checkerboard of police authority are six radio broadcasting stations, five major police headquarters, with the two best equipped one block from each other, four police chiefs, a sheriff and two police garages." 4 Ironically, despite the apparent duplication, some built-up areas were left unpatrolled. For example, new shopping centers sometimes hired private police to patrol their premises, thus in effect creating still more units of law enforcement, albeit private. Overlapping Jurisdictions. Overlapping jurisdictions were most evident in transportation. Five separate governmental entities built and maintained highways, streets, and bridges in Indianapolis. Meridian Street, the main thoroughfare through the center of the city, also US Highway 31, was under the aegis of the State Highway Commission, like all the other federal and state highways traversing the city. Certain boulevards, for example, Kessler and Fall Creek, were under the Metropolitan Park Department. The County Highway Department also had jurisdiction in Indianapolis, although its activities were generally limited to noncity areas, except for bridge building. The newly created regional Metropolitan Transportation Authority had jurisdiction over all streets defined as thoroughfares by the Metropolitan 2. Editorial: "Census and S e n s e , " Indianapolis News, June 9, 1960, p. 8. 3. League of Women Voters of Indianapolis, Who's in Charge Here? (Indianapolis, 1960). 4. " A Plan for Metropoi," Indianapolis Times, March 1, 1964, sec. 2, p. 1.

Government Before

Unigov

33

Chart 2 Overlapping Layers of Local Government: Three Typical Examples Before Unigov

In W a s h i n g t o n T o w n s h i p ( o u t s i d e c i t i e s or t o w n s ]

In t h e City of I n d i a n a p o l i s (in C e n t e r T o w n s h i p )

In t h e City of L a w r e n c e

Housing Authority Utility District Off-Street Parking Authority R e d e v e l o p m e n t District S a n i t a r y District

Utility B o a r d of L a w r e n c e

Center T o w n s h i p

Civil City of L a w r e n c e

Washington Township

Civil C i t y of I n d i a n a p o l i s

Lawrence Township

Metro. S c h o o l District

S c h o o l City of I n d i a n a p o l i s

M e t r o . S c h o o l District

I n d i a n a p o l i s Park District I n d i a n a p o l i s - M a r i o n County Building Authority Metro. Thoroughfare Authority Airport A u t h o r i t y District Marion County Fair Board Marion County Flood Control Board Health a n d H o s p i t a l C o r p o r a t i o n of M a r i o n C o u n t y G o v e r n m e n t of M a r i o n C o u n t y

Source: Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce, Governmental Research Department, A Primer of Local Government in Marion County (Indianapolis, 1964), p. 60.

Plan Commission. But the most important agency—in miles of streets built and maintained—was the city's own Board of Works. Outside the city, the State Highway Department, the county, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, and the smaller municipalities all had transportation responsibilities. Summary. The idea for Unigov resulted from the convergence of two conflicting forces—one a political movement of recent vintage, the other a governmental malaise of long standing. When the new Republican mayoral team took control of the city government after a long Democratic dominance, they were inspired by optimism and an ambition to do something dynamic and visible for their community— to make their political mark. But each of their preliminary plans was frustrated by the counsel of the more experienced members of the group, who pointed out that the governmental arrangement did not provide the mayor with enough authority to take the decisive and coordinated action needed to get things done.

34

Government

Before

Unigov

Although no one had undertaken an in-depth study of local government in Marion County specifically in preparation for Unigov, a number of legislative committee hearings, civic group papers, and media inquiries in recent years had expressed a growing community sentiment of frustration and apathy over local government. The League of Women Voters publication Who's in Charge Here? was one of many that pointed out the inadequacy of local government structure and authority. Implicit in the report's title was the idea that the confusing array of overlapping and duplicating governmental units resulted in a situation where no one actually was "in charge." Most of the groups that had pointed out the problems of multiple governments had also proposed city-county consolidation as an appropriate method of reform. Most of the Unigov principals had participated in the community discussions and, as active government officials, were acutely aware of the problems. Thus, when they obtained enough political leverage to change things, the move for consolidation followed almost predictably. No "Home Rule." All local government structures, powers, and processes are prescribed by state law in Indiana, the concept of city or county charter being absent from the state constitution and "home rule" a subject only for wistful discussion by local officials. 5 The constitution requires state laws applying to local government to be general in character but permits classification of local units according to size. Indianapolis has long been the only city in the first class, permitting legislation that is general in form to be passed applying only to Indianapolis or to Marion County (the latter often through the device of a general law applying to "any county containing a city of the first class"). A growing body of this legislation has been passed.

Adapting Government to Metropolitan Problems The city's failure to grow by annexation left fringe-area residents without urban services unless they sought them from other sources. The county lacked authority to provide the needed services, prompting suburban builders and dwellers to incorporate towns for the task. A commission appointed to study the matter reported: "Adding to this problem [of increased service demands] is the fact that as certain localities in the unincorporated areas become more densely populated and the need for providing these localities with municipal services becomes urgent, additional towns are incorporated in an effort to sat5. A h o m e - r u l e l a w p a s s e d after U n i g o v ' s i m p l e m e n t a t i o n is largely ineffectual in p r o v i d i n g n e w or s t r e n g t h e n e d p o w e r s to l o c a l units of g o v e r n m e n t (see c h . 6).

Government

Before Unigov

35

isfy these requirements." 6 Before 1963 when Marion County's small towns were formed, it was relatively easy to set up new municipal corporations, but a 1963 law prohibited the incorporation of towns within four miles of a first-class city (Indianapolis). Various ad hoc efforts to provide urban services in the fringe areas were also undertaken. Over a considerable period of years, significant efforts were made to enlarge the governmental areas within which particular services and functions were conducted. Most of these efforts focused on Marion County, since Indianapolis was entirely within the county, which was considered to be a single-county metropolitan area until the middle of the 1960s (see Chart 3). Growing interest in governmental arrangements for the Indianapolis metropolitan area prompted no small number of studies and reports on the subject, but without any major effort at comprehensive reorganization before 1965. On the other hand, there were a number of attempts—some successful—to extend the jurisdiction for several individual municipal functions (discussed below). Special Service

Districts

After World War II, nearly every state legislative session passed acts to adjust the allocation of local government functions in relation to the Indianapolis metropolitan area. Usually each piece of legislation (proposed or enacted) dealt with only one particular function. 7 As early as 1929, the city's public utility board was authorized to operate "within and outside" the city and to hold property up to five miles from the corporate limits if necessary to provide service to the city and the "community contiguous thereto." 8 Indianapolis operates a gas utility that is not subsidized by taxation. Water and electric power are provided by private corporations. Ten additional special service districts were established during the ensuing 40 years, 9 all with extraterritorial jurisdiction beyond the 6. Metropolitan Area Study Commission of Marion County, Report and Recommendations for the Eighty-Eighth Session of the Generai Assembly, State of Indiana (Indianapolis, 1952), p. 4. 7. The history of these efforts to adapt function to area was clearly and succinctly summarized by Carl Dortch in a paper presented to the Governmental Research Association in January 1971. Dortch, retired executive vice-president of the chamber, has worked from time to time for local governments and has been associated with these efforts for years. 8. Indiana Legislative Council, Indiana Code 1 9 - 4 - 2 3 (Indianapolis: West Publishing Co., 1973). 9. The 10 additional special service districts established between 1929 and 1969 were the Board of Aviation, Capital Improvement Board, County Planning Board, CityCounty Library Board, Indianapolis Flood Control District, Indianapolis Housing Authority, Marion County Health and Hospital Corporation, Metropolitan Park Board, Metropolitan Thoroughfare Authority, and the Sewer and Sanitation Department.

36

Government Before

Unigov

Chart 3 Marion

County

Government

Organization

Before Consolidation

Source: Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce, Governmental Research Department, A Primer of Local Government in Marion County (Indianapolis, 1964), p. 25.

Government

Before Unigov

37

city limits and operating under independent boards or commissions with various degrees of fiscal autonomy. Four of these units had particularly significant effects on Unigov: 1.

2.

3.

4.

The Health and Hospital Corporation was supported by a powerful political block and was partially excluded from the Unigov structure. The Sewer and Sanitation Department provided services beyond the city limits long before Unigov. Its service area and tax base were extended after Unigov. In 1978, the tax base for its capital program was extended to nearly the entire county. The County Planning Board, formed in 1955, was the base unit in the formation of a formidable Department of Metropolitan Development. The Metropolitan Thoroughfare Authority was authorized in 1963 but in 1969 was still struggling to get off the ground. It became one of Unigov's most powerful departments.

Unsuccessful Reorganization Attempts Some major unsuccessful efforts were made to establish larger territorial bases for particular functions. In 1959, an official study commission was created to make proposals concerning Marion County school districts. (This was part of a general statewide effort for the reorganization of school districts.) The commission unanimously recommended a county unit school system, consolidating the 12 independent school districts into one. But the public response was so vehemently negative that the commission withdrew its recommendation. In 1967, a recommendation of the Greater Indianapolis Progress Committee (to be discussed later) resulted in legislative proposals for a countywide consolidated police force. But when sheriffs and other sources voiced stronger opposition than had been anticipated, the mayor did not support the proposal, and the effort collapsed.

4 The Reorganization Proposal: Background and Drafting

Governmental reform had been debated in Indianapolis for 50 years, and 16 special purpose units had been established in the preceding 20 years. T h e push for major reorganization intensified in the five years i m m e d i a t e l y preceding Unigov. T h e Democrats and Republicans consecutively gained political ascendancy statewide, w h i c h gave t h e m c o n f i d e n c e to pursue major reform proposals.

The Mounting Complexity of Change By 1 9 6 8 , responding to urban and metropolitan growth, the Indianapolis metropolitan c o m m u n i t y had taken major steps, one function at a time, to adjust the territorial base of most of the important functions of local government. T h e base most often used was the county, w h i c h had about five times the city's geographic area and about 6 0 percent more people. S o m e t i m e s a smaller base was used, but one still substantially larger than the city. In any event, the areas and the m e c h a n i s m s employed were those that s e e m e d appropriate for the service needs or that recognized the political realities of the particular function. W h i l e other metropolitan areas were making similar adjustments, the shifts in Indianapolis even before 1 9 6 8 were probably more numerous and significant than most of those elsewhere, although they had not attracted m u c h attention, either national or local. Of the major local functions, only police and fire services were administered by the Indianapolis government entirely within the m u n i c i p a l boundaries, and even with these there were o c c a s i o n a l extraterritorial activities. T h e b a s e - w i d e n i n g actions had been ad h o c and function by function, with little or no attention to coordination or integration and only limited c o n c e r n with political responsibility. T h e motives behind the various shifts were usually mixed. In part, the moves were made in the interest of the fiscal autonomy that c a m e with increased borrowing power and earmarked revenues for functions. But often

The Reorganization

Proposal

39

equally important was the proponents' desire to separate a particular function from the partisan politics and the spoils system that prevailed in the general purpose governments. Where these problems seemed somewhat less pressing, for example, with schools, the reorganization effort was unsuccessful. The base-widening move usually gave the function to a board, appointed partly by the mayor or City Council and partly by county officials. Sometimes there was ex officio membership. Most of the board members had overlapping terms, and powers of removal were often vague or nonexistent. The creation of these single-purpose special districts alleviated some problems but often compounded others by adding governments to an already complex pattern. Political and governmental power were widely dispersed among these functional agencies.

Annexation Meanwhile, by effectively extending its most-demanded services beyond the city boundaries via the special purpose agencies, Indianapolis lost a bargaining position that would have otherwise been useful in annexation proceedings. The upshot, as Deputy Mayor John W. Walls saw it, was the economic and political isolation of the city from the rest of the county. Thus, the city had no place to grow. "The old City of Indianapolis had literally put its back to the wall through all the metropolitan reorganizations. It had really nothing to offer through annexation. It was stymied." 1 Moreover the growing social differences between the central city and the suburbs also made central-city annexation increasingly difficult. The Municipal Yearbook, which lists annexations of "one-fourth square mile or more" each year, included Indianapolis only twice from 1960 to 1968, for a total annexed area of 5.16 square miles. 2 In any event, the city government did not pursue annexation aggressively. Its approach was succinctly stated in the words of Mayor Al G. Feeney: "We feel we ought to go slow on annexation. . . . It's difficult, sometimes impossible, to give people in annexed areas the services they have a right to expect for their taxes. We don't want to be like other cities that have to overextend themselves just to make population figures look good." 3 Expansion efforts were also limited by several other factors. Thus, a state statute called for municipal annexa1. John W. Walls, interview with James Owen, Indianapolis, April 20, 1972. 2. "Metropolitan Area Developments," The Municipal Yearbook, vols. 2 3 - 2 9 (Chicago: International City Managers Association, 1 9 6 2 - 1 9 6 6 ) . 3. "Annex Cautiously Feeney Urges," Indianapolis Times, September 15, 1950, p. 1.

40

The Reorganization

Proposal

tions to be accompanied by extension of the school boundaries so that the two would be coterminous. But suburban residents, proud of their own institutions and dubious about the city schools with large black enrollments, fought bitterly against inclusion in the city school district from which they may have only recently moved away. Contested annexations were heard in court, and the city was reluctant to risk drawn-out, expensive litigation with angry citizens on both sides. Furthermore, the Democratic mayors of Indianapolis may not have been enthusiastic about bringing the largely Republican suburban voters into city elections.

General Reform Discussions One irony in Unigov's success is its occurrence in a city without a recognized record of reform. Admittedly, Indianapolis did have a long record of reform discussions, which now in retrospect appear to have been far more important than they seemed at the time. Thus, when the Unigov debate was initiated, consolidation had already been debated and commented on for over 50 years. For example, 52 years before the Unigov statute was passed, a study by the New York Bureau of Municipal Research recommended the "consolidation of city, township and county governments in Indianapolis and Marion County." 4 More than a decade later, in 1930, Paul Studenski also wrote of Indianapolis as a city that had already seen decades of consolidation efforts/' But these moves lost much of their impetus after several unsuccessful attempts to reform city government. For example, a highly spirited campaign for a council-manager form of government was particularly responsible for drowning out the voices for consolidation in the late 1920s. This issue, along with home rule, superseded consolidation as a reform issue in Indianapolis. (Indianapolis actually got legislative approval for a city-manager government, only to have it declared unconstitutional by the Indiana Supreme Court.) Attention was understandably diverted to other matters during the Depression years and World War II. After the war, provoked in part by John Gunther's taunt, in 1947 Mayor Robert H. Tyndall appointed a citizens' committee to study the problems of Indianapolis. This committee was the forerunner of others formed in the subsequent two decades, with varying kinds of sponsorship, to consider the problems of government in Marion County. Many of these recommended some form of consolidated govern4. " C o n s o l i d a t e d

Local

Governments,"

Indianapolis

Star, D e c e m b e r

1,

1917,

5. Paul S t u d e n s k i , T h e G o v e r n m e n t of M e t r o p o l i t a n A r e a s in the United

States

p. 2 1 . (New Y o r k : N a t i o n a l M u n i c i p a l League, 1 9 3 0 ) , p. 1 7 1 .

The Reorganization

Proposal

41

ment,r> but before 1969 such reorganization proposals elicited mostly discussion, with very little action. While the results were slow to materialize, however, the postwar period's renewed interest in reform contributed greatly to Unigov's successful creation. The discussions projected the idea of consolidation to prominence among public issues debated in the years preceding Unigov, and the numerous incremental reforms, which accompanied the larger debate, fully tested the public decisionmaking process with respect to government reform. The League of Women Voters and the of Commerce

Chamber

Leading the discussions as proponents of government consolidation were the League of Women Voters and the Chamber of Commerce. Both groups had many mutual interests in governmental reform and supported each other in public forums on a variety of local reform issues, but also each had its own primary interest that was central to its efforts. Thus, the league was most concerned about the effects of governmental structure on voter representation. It believed that citizens were confused by governmental complexities in Indianapolis and Marion County and consequently were discouraged from participating. The league's publication Who's in Charge Here?7 reflected this concern. The chamber's chief concern was the inefficiency they saw inherent in the overlapping, multiple government pattern. According to a 1964 chamber study," an individual citizen-taxpayer in Marion County could be taxed by 10 to 16 taxing units (see Chart 2). The study argued that this not only meant added costs to the taxpayer but also contributed to budget complexities that confounded taxpayers and administrators alike. Government

Study

Committees

Complementing the efforts of the League of Women Voters and the Chamber of Commerce were several government-sponsored study committees, formed locally as well as by the state General Assembly. Many of these were formed at the request of the chamber or the league, but the decisive impetus came from government officials frus6. E.g., s e e M e t r o p o l i t a n A r e a S t u d y C o m m i s s i o n of M a r i o n C o u n t y , Report a n d R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s for the E i g h t y - E i g h t h S e s s i o n of t h e G e n e r a l Assembly, S t a t e of I n d i a n a ( I n d i a n a p o l i s , 1952); L e a g u e of W o m e n Voters of I n d i a n a p o l i s , W h o ' s in C h a r g e Here? ( I n d i a n a p o l i s , 1960); a n d I n d i a n a p o l i s C h a m b e r of C o m m e r c e , G o v e r n m e n t a l Res e a r c h D e p a r t m e n t , A Primer of Local G o v e r n m e n t in M a r i o n C o u n t y ( I n d i a n a p o l i s , 1964). 7. W h o ' s in C h a r g e Here? 8. P r i m e r of Local G o v e r n m e n t .

42

The Reorganization

Proposal

trated at being unable to get things done. This frustration produced a third reform element that became promiment in the pre-Unigov discussions: the objective of these study commissions was to make government organizationally more efficient and to equate authority with responsibility. If this reform was accomplished, it would result in the identifiable leadership that the league wanted and produce the tax savings and budget controls sought by the chamber. Perhaps the most important of numerous government-sponsored study groups appearing in the 1950s and 1960s was the Greater Indianapolis Progress Committee (GIPC), formed in 1965. GIPC was a bipartisan citizens' group representing a wide spectrum of the greater Indianapolis community, including a large number of civic leaders. One of its most active subcommittees was a task force on government that issued several papers favoring reform in the years immediately preceding Unigov. The progress committee was then and still is a widely respected citizens' group, being credited with numerous public accomplishments. Its support greatly enhanced the Unigov concept's prospects. The media were also very responsive, providing substantial coverage throughout the period. This was especially true of the print media. In addition to their regular reporting, all three daily newspapers 9 published special features on the governmental problems and editorialized in favor of some form of consolidated countywide government. In fact, the Indianapolis Star concluded a 13-part series with just such an argument on the eve of the Unigov debate. 10 These long-continued discussions, focusing public attention on reform issues, may have been especially influential in paving the way for passage of the Unigov legislation. This kind of public attention also represented a usually subtle but nearly constant reminder that many people saw Indianapolis as not having much to offer as a city. Community leaders were sensitive to the city's "corn pone" image, and when the newly elected government had the opportunity to do something dynamic in 1968, it had the added motivation of wanting to prove the critics wrong.

Politics The spoils system governs the appointment and tenure of many, perhaps most, employees of the general governmental units, although the schools and many of the other special purpose units are at least 9. There are now two major Indianapolis newspapers; the Indianapolis Times ceased publication in 1965. 10. "Area Moves Slowly to Metropolitan Government," Indianapolis Star, March 1 0 - 2 2 , 1968.

The Reorganization

Proposal

43

partly exempted from partisanship and the spoils system. Moreover, elements of professionalism and tenure are also found in some areas of general governmental employment. In Indianapolis and Marion County, both major parties have strong and active organizations and present candidates for most elective positions. In recent decades, Democrats have been much more successful than Republicans in elections in the City of Indianapolis. In contrast, Marion County (including Indianapolis) has returned Republican majorities substantially more often than Democratic. Thus, in the 10 Indianapolis mayoral elections preceding the reorganization, the Democrats won seven times and the Republicans only three. Moreover, when they were successful, the Republicans tended to win by narrower margins than the Democrats. There is no such single measuring rod of party success at the county level because the counties have so many elected officials. Nevertheless, in Marion County the Republicans clearly have controlled a majority of the county offices and the state legislative delegation most of the time since the New Deal days of the 1930s, although there were Democratic victories in 1948, 1958, and 1964. Republicans also generally win in most, though not all, of the suburban municipalities. Margins of victory are seldom very large in either city or county, however, the winners usually getting 50 to 60 percent and the losers 40 to 50 percent. Party organization is important in both the city and the county, and there is strong, active staffing at the county, ward, and precinct levels. The county has probably been a more significant political party unit than the city, and the county chair usually directs city campaigns, as well as those in Marion County. 1964 and the Period of Democratic

Ascendancy

The Democrats swept the Indiana elections in 1964 at the time of Lyndon Johnson's victory over Barry Goldwater. After that election the governor was a Democrat, both houses of the General Assembly were controlled by Democrats, and the Marion County state legislative delegation, which dominates legislative consideration of matters affecting Indianapolis, was also Democratic. The Indianapolis city government was also controlled by the Democrats, who had won the mayor's office and council elections in 1963. 11 Moreover, the Democratic county chair, James W. Beatty, a young attorney, was also corporation counsel for the City of Indianapolis. Both Beatty and Indianapolis's democratic mayor, John J. Barton, felt frustrated by the inability of the city's chief executive to control 11. In Indiana, municipal elections are held every four years, one year preceding US presidential elections.

44

The Reorganization

Proposal

the activities of many semiautonomous agencies and boards that were in charge of a large number of local functions. Beatty prepared a series of 14 related bills whose purpose was to increase the elected officials' control—particularly that of the mayor—over the boards governing health, sanitation, parks, airports, welfare, and other functions. These bills generally did not propose changes in the agencies' basic structure or territorial jurisdictions. Instead, the primary aim was to alter the way board members were appointed and to make it clear that members could be removed by the appointing official. A "Power Grab." The Indianapolis Star and the Indianapolis News gave the proposals considerable attention and opposed them vigorously. (These are now the only two daily papers in the city. Both are owned by the same organization and are generally conservative politically.) The News called the proposals a "power grab," a phrase that gained immediate currency in the community and the General Assembly. Perhaps the measures' strongest opposition came from the public officials who would be affected. Particularly affected were officials of the Citizens Gas and Coke Company and the County Health and Hospital Corporation. As might be expected, the Republican Party leadership also spoke out strongly against the bills. At one point the GOP county chair, H. Dale Brown, claimed that "nothing like this has been attempted in Indianapolis since the days of the Ku Klux Klan." 12 Elements of the Democratic Party also had strong reservations. Some were reported to have urged Mayor Barton to force Beatty out and to take the Democratic county chair's job himself. The mayor, who was more conservative than his county chair, disassociated himself from the proposals to some degree, saying that "most of the bills . . . were being promoted by the Democratic organization, not the city administration." 1 3 Because of the heavy opposition, Beatty's proposals were only moderately successful in the General Assembly. Some of the bills failed, and some were vetoed by Governor Roger D. Branigin. While the governor was a Democrat, he was also much more conservative than the Marion County Democratic leadership and had been favored for the office by the Star, which seldom supported Democrats. Five of the 14 bills did become law, substantially increasing the mayor's power over one city board and four countywide agencies. Metropol. Undaunted by the difficulties attending the 1965 "power grab" proposals and the prospect of facing a Republican12. " A l a r m , P r e s s u r e M o d i f y S o m e 'Grab' B i l l s , " I n d i a n a p o l i s S t a r , F e b r u a r y 2 1 , 1 9 6 5 , p. 1. 13. " M a y o r P o w e r P l a y L a s h e d , " I n d i a n a p o l i s Star,

F e b r u a r y 6, 1 9 6 5 , p. 1.

The Reorganization

Proposal

45

controlled lower house, the city administration returned to the following session of the General Assembly, in 1967, with another major reorganizational proposal, calling for a metropolitan police department. This time, the authorship was attributed to the Greater Indianapolis Progress Committee (GIPC), the bipartisan civic group noted earlier, and chaired by Frank E. McKinney, Sr., chair of the board of one of the state's largest banks and former national chair of the Democratic Party. The GIPC focused m u c h of its attention on capital improvement projects, but it also had committees that considered governmental reform. The proposal for a metropolitan police department in 1967 was stimulated by one of these committees. Following the recommendations of the GIPC committee report, Representative John Mutz (Rep., Indianapolis) introduced a bill to give the city police department countywide jurisdiction. Metropol (the name commonly given the bill) would also have occasioned a major reorganization of the operation, powers, and duties of the police force. One section, for example, required that the police chief be appointed from outside the department. The county sheriff was to be retained, but with duties essentially limited to that of jailkeeper. Other provisions were similarly far-reaching, provoking strong opposition. At this point Mayor Barton then appeared at a General Assembly hearing against the recommendations, effectively ending further consideration of the bill. The 1 9 6 5 - 1 9 6 7 reform efforts had effects that went beyond the governmental changes themselves and had a decided though indirect impact on the subsequent Unigov debate. One immediate effect was to establish the merger idea as a topical issue for discussion. This development was fairly well publicized by a local government study committee authorized by the 1965 General Assembly. Also important was the political impact generated w h e n the Democrats pushed a reorganization plan. This did a number of things. It put Democrats on record as favoring reform; it alerted Republicans and thereby precipitated a response; it identified sources of opposition. Not least in importance was the lesson learned from the split in the Democratic Party. This tended to weaken their bills' chances considerably and made the party vulnerable to defeat. Mayor Barton had increasingly noticeable differences with his party chair. A group of "young Turks" led by Beatty had recently wrested control of the party machine from an "old guard" centered around former mayors Phillip Bayt and Charles Boswell. With the support of this old guard, Barton attempted to oust Beatty from the party chairship in 1966 but failed. Beatty in turn challenged Barton in the 1967 mayoral primary. Barton, with the advantage of incumbency, prevailed over the party organization in a heated campaign that left many w o u n d s .

46

The Reorganization

Proposal

The Republicans Return to Power W h i l e efforts to extend the mayor's influence were being c o n sidered, important changes were occurring within the R e p u b l i c a n Party in Marion County, changes that were crucially significant for the subsequent reorganization efforts.

The Republican

Action

Committee

Disappointed with the sweeping defeats in 1 9 6 4 , a group of Republican partisans calling themselves the Republican Action Committee began an intraparty struggle to unseat the regular Republican leadership. T h e R e p u b l i c a n Action Committee presented a c o m p l e t e slate of candidates in the May primary of 1 9 6 6 , including candidates for the precinct c o m m i t t e e m e n , who in turn choose the county leadership. T h e y w o n a decisive victory in the primary, every one of their candidates for public office being nominated, and they gained an overwhelming majority of the precinct c o m m i t t e e m e n . At the GOP county c o n v e n t i o n four days after the primary, the longtime county chair was replaced, and a m e m b e r of the Republican Action Committee, L. Keith Bulen, a young attorney and former m e m b e r of the General Assembly, was elected by acclamation in a brief 35-minute meeting. 1 4 Many of the people w h o worked with the Republican Action Committee in the 1 9 6 6 elections continued to be active in the city campaign of 1 9 6 7 , the general elections of 1 9 6 8 , and the Unigov effort in 1 9 6 9 . T h i s new R e p u b l i c a n leadership was generally young (although including s o m e older persons), relatively prosperous, and well educated. B u l e n rapidly b e c a m e one of the state's most powerful Republican politicians. His Marion County forces were successful in the legislative races of 1 9 6 6 and the mayoralty campaign of 1 9 6 7 and provided the decisive margin in nominating the successful Republican candidate for governor in 1 9 6 8 . Bulen then b e c a m e Republican national c o m m i t t e e m a n , and in a state that had no Republican US senator, he b e c a m e the chief c h a n n e l for national Republican patronage in Indiana.

Lugar's First Campaign for Mayor In the 1 9 6 7 mayoralty campaign, the Republican Party primary resembled the Democratic race between Barton and Beatty: both contests were in large measure b e t w e e n old and new leadership. In the R e p u b l i c a n Party, however, youth prevailed. Bulen and 14. "County Republicans Elect Bulen 'Party Chief,' " Indianapolis 1966, p. 14.

Star, May 8,

The Reorganization

Proposal

47

most of the others w h o had been active in the 1966 Republican Action Committee campaign supported one of their own group, Richard G. Lugar. Six weeks before the primary, Lugar was designated as the candidate of the leadership by a special 20-member screening committee. In choosing Lugar, the screening committee turned d o w n strong bids by two GOP stalwarts, Judge William T. Sharp and former mayor Alex M. Clark (1952—1956). Disenchanted with the committee's choice, Clark announced his own candidacy a week later (with Judge Sharp's endorsement). In spite of the decided edge the choice by the screening committee gave Lugar, Clark managed to revive antiorganization factions and mounted a formidable opposition. Lugar's advantage, based in considerable measure on party organization support, became evident as the campaign progressed. He defeated Clark for the nomination by a decisive but not overwhelming margin—21,551 to 17,000. Thus, the recently captured regular party organization responded to the challenge with a victory and established Lugar as a vote getter. Richard Lugar was then only 35 years old. A descendant of German immigrants w h o settled in central Indiana in the early part of the nineteenth century, Lugar achieved a distinguished record as an Indianapolis schoolboy; he made Eagle Scout at age 13 and graduated from Shortridge High School first in his class of 600 in 1950. He won Phi Beta Kappa honors at Denison University in Ohio, where he also graduated first in his class and went to Oxford as Denison's first Rhodes Scholar. He studied politics, philosophy, and economics at Pembroke College, Oxford, and served as president of the student body at Pembroke College and as president of the American Students' Association at Oxford University. After college, Lugar served in the navy three years, then returned to Indianapolis to reestablish two family businesses. He also became active with civic, social, and educational groups. He was elected to the Indianapolis school board in 1964 and served as its vice-president from 1965 to 1967. During the s u m m e r months preceding the 1967 general election for mayor, Lugar and Bulen successfully healed their differences with Clark and his supporters and conducted an active campaign. Much younger and more active than Barton, Lugar made nearly 400 speeches and drew strong support from a highly motivated and wellmanaged party organization under Bulen's direction. The result was a Republican victory by a margin of nearly 9,000 votes. In addition to Lugar's victory in the mayoralty campaign, the Republicans also won a majority of the City Council seats. The last previous Republican victory in a mayor's race had been 16 years earlier, and this was only the third such victory in 40 years. Lugar's winning campaign received substantial contributions in influ-

48

The Reorganization

Proposal

ence, money, and m a n p o w e r from suburban as well as city Republicans. In soliciting contributions in the suburbs, one Republican f u n d raiser emphasized the metropolitan interrelationships, saying that "the mayor controls by his appointment boards and agencies w h i c h operate countywide and affect residents outside city limits even though they don't vote for the mayor." 1 5

The Planning Stage: Developing a Draft Proposal On January 1, 1968, Richard G. Lugar took office as the Republican mayor of Indianapolis. In his 1967 campaign Lugar had said nothing specific about governmental reorganization, although he had set up a task force on government reorganization. He was certainly aware of past changes in authority and responsibility and of the proposals emanating from the Greater Indianapolis Progress Committee and the general community debate over reorganization. Committed to dynamic, active leadership, he was even more frustrated than his Democratic predecessor by the dispersion of responsibility and power among the various local government agencies. In describing these frustrations, he frequently used as an example the Eagle Creek reservoir in northwestern Marion County, a major stream i m p o u n d m e n t whose development required changes in roads, land use, health and sanitation facilities, and governmental services of many kinds. As chief executive of the central city, Mayor Lugar was necessarily interested in the Eagle Creek project but found responsibility for action on it divided among agencies over which he had limited influence. In some cases, they were actually extraterritorial activities of the city government; in other instances, the agencies were run by boards over w h i c h he had only partial appointing authority; some were county agencies over which he had no control; in still other instances, state and federal offices were involved and could be persuaded to do certain things only if the local community spoke to them through clear and direct channels. Lugar summed up the reasons for his exasperation: "Why are eight different authorities responsible for drainage, five for transportation, and so many for the development of 4,000 acre Eagle Creek Park that the whole lake is becoming a quagmire of frustration and not a park?""' Lugar was not the only official interested in the possibility of reorganization. The president of the Marion County Council, Beurt 15. " M o n e y S h o r t a g e W o r r i e s Lugar H . Q . , " Indianapolis

Star, O c t o b e r 8, 1967,

p. 8. 16. R i c h a r d G. Lugar, " T h e N e e d for C o u n t y L e a d e r s h i p in C o u n t y M o d e r n i z a t i o n , " s p e e c h to t h e T h i r t y - F o u r t h A n n u a l C o n f e r e n c e of t h e N a t i o n a l A s s o c i a t i o n of C o u n t i e s , P o r t l a n d , O r e g o n , July 28, 1969, p. 2.

The Reorganization

Proposal

49

SerVaas, a prominent businessman and civic leader, and Indianapolis City Council president Thomas C. Hasbrook, an executive in the Eli Lilly company, had both been active in the new Republican leadership, and soon after the 1967 Republican victories in the city elections they had begun conversations on possible increased city-county cooperation. John Walls, chief staff officer of the Greater Indianapolis Progress Committee, had been co-opted into Lugar's new administration as deputy mayor and was also very interested. Walls was less an active partisan than a professional public administrator, which he was by virtue of training and experience. Policy

Committee

Within a month or two of Lugar's becoming mayor, SerVaas called the first in a series of unofficial meetings of city and county government and party leaders to discuss ways to promote intergovernmental cooperation and to establish government priorities on a countywide basis. Senior among those attending was John Burkhart, president of the College Life Insurance Company, president of the Capital Improvement Board (one of the ad hoc agencies created to build new capital facilities for the area), a longtime active member and leader of the Chamber of Commerce and other civic groups, and one of the chief financial backers of the Republican Action Committee. Also in regular attendance at the early meetings were Mayor Lugar, county chair Keith Bulen, Hasbrook, Walls, Lawrence M. Borst, a veterinarian and chair of the Marion County legislative delegation, and Charles L. Whistler, an attorney and president of the Metropolitan Planning Commission. This group, later known as the policy committee, worked out the overall concept for Unigov.17 As discussions progressed, others were invited to meetings of the policy committee. One such was Carl R. Dortch, chief executive of the Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce, longtime government researcher, and member of the Governmental Research Association. Dortch had been chair of the school reorganization study several years earlier and was a veteran of most of the struggles to get various kinds of reform legislation through the General Assembly. Physician E. Henry "Ned" Lamkin, Jr., and John Mutz, active members of the Marion County legislative delegation, were also frequent participants. From the first gathering, a series of informal Sunday cocktaildinner meetings began, held monthly from February to October 1968 at John Burkhart's house. The flexible attendance and the cocktail17. The group was not officially attached to the Greater Indianapolis Progress Committee. The latter was a much larger body, including numerous Democrats as well as Republicans, and discussions in such a forum could not have been as frank or confidential as those in the policy committee.

50

The Reorganization

Proposal

dinner format suggest the informal atmosphere prevailing at these meetings, for w h i c h no chair was selected or secretary appointed. No agendas were prepared, nor were minutes kept. T h e group was confident that with their n e w leadership team in office they could do something d y n a m i c for Indianapolis. T h e completion of Eagle Creek reservoir, an areawide road system, and the revitalization of the downtown mile-square were considered, among other priorities. Each time the group felt stymied by the governmental arrangement, discussion turned to how the organization of government could be improved to help them gain their priorities. Eventually they agreed to develop a whole new structure of government. Hasbrook described the evolution of the Unigov concept: " W e considered several projects large and small. But each time we were frustrated by the limitations of authority that were placed on us by the legislature and the cumbersome structure we had to work with. Unigov was a kind of distillation of these frustrations.'"" Mayor Lugar's participation and leadership were always recognized as central and indispensable. He was knowledgeable about efforts at local government reorganization elsewhere, having been impressed by the reorganizations in Nashville and Jacksonville, and was confident that Indianapolis could do as m u c h or more. T h e s e 1 9 6 8 discussions, as well as the political campaigns of that year, were characterized by a considerable degree of enthusiasm, optimism, and camaraderie. Undoubtedly the discussions were conducted in an atmosphere of partisan as well as civic interest, but it would be a great oversimplification to view the activities as a clandestine political plot. T h e participants were actively interested in governmental reform to further what they considered to be the general public interest. Nevertheless, as members of one political party they also undoubtedly felt that one good way to further the public interest was to promote the goals and effectiveness of their own party. T w o things helped keep the Unigov discussions out of public view during this period. First, public attention was focused on the new mayor's i m m e d i a t e tasks of assembling an administrative staff and responding to the e c o n o m i c and racial problems of 1 9 6 8 . Second, it was a part of the overall strategy to keep Unigov under wraps until the concept was well developed. T h i s strategy would prevent the opposition from marshaling its forces early and perhaps, more important, keep some of its proponents from killing it with interminable debate and delay.

Early Business

Ties

Mayor Lugar tried to solidify his support in the business community by involving b u s i n e s s m e n in his programs and activities. Con18. T h o m a s C. H a s b r o o k , i n t e r v i e w w i t h J a m e s O w e n , I n d i a n a p o l i s , M a y 23, 1972.

The Reorganization

Proposal

51

fronted by both unemployment and the threat of racial strife, the mayor sought to combat both with a single program. If he could find jobs for inner-city blacks, he reasoned, the employment picture would brighten and thereby reduce the likelihood of rioting. To implement this plan, Lugar turned to the Chamber of Commerce's Voluntary Adviser Corps (VAC) and the Greater Indianapolis Progress Committee. The VAC committee, staffed largely by personnel directors from local businesses, was intended to provide direct assistance to the unemployed in helping them find jobs. The volunteers were each given the name of a person seeking a job. They would then work with that person on a one-to-one basis until the individual found a job and was secure in it. Mayor Lugar gave his personal endorsement to this committee and worked with the business executives to plan its activities. He also went on television to describe the committee's program and to urge 2,000 volunteers to join it. VAC's success obviously depended on the volunteers' effectiveness in helping the unemployed find jobs. To augment the volunteers' efforts, the mayor organized a GIPC task force on employment to try to secure more job openings in business and industry. This group of volunteer business executives was directed by Juan C. Solomon, an Eli Lilly company employee on full-time executive loan to the task force. In another move to tap the business community, Mayor Lugar appointed Donald L. Robinson—director of governmental affairs of the Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce—to the city post of deputy controller. Robinson received a salary of one dollar a year from the city while retaining his regular income from the chamber. As will be seen later, these close working relationships between the business community and Mayor Lugar's administration were to continue throughout his term, providing him with a major source of support for his Unigov proposal. Lawyers'

Work

Group

The discussion and planning respecting organizational reform were not limited to general policy and strategy. The participants, particularly the mayor, realized that a great deal of detailed technical work would be essential to the reorganization effort. In the late spring of 1968, when the discussions of the policy committee had got off to a good start, Mayor Lugar asked Lewis C. Bose, an Indianapolis attorney with considerable legislative drafting expedience, to prepare a memorandum on the possibilities and problems of metropolitan government reform in Indianapolis. After the policy committee had considered Bose's memorandum, Lugar again met with Bose, asking him to serve as the coordinator of a legal research team to prepare legislative drafts to implement the ideas that might emerge from the deliberations then taking place.

52

The Reorganization

Proposal

This was still in the late spring and early summer of 1968, long before the Republican victories of November 1968 made it clear that there would be Republican majorities in the county and state governments and before any discussion in the press or other public forums of specific governmental reform proposals. Bose, after a long discussion convinced him of the mayor's commitment and the enterprise's potential, agreed to undertake the drafting task with such assistants as he could recruit. Being the state capital, Indianapolis has many lawyers experienced in legislative drafting. The larger business firms often facilitate and encourage such work by some of their staff members. Moreover, some of the local government units—most of them dominated by persons who had been participating in these discussions—had good attorneys. In any event Bose was able to secure talent that he considered of high quality, and some eight to ten lawyers spent a great many hours considering and refining alternative drafts. Bose also received some assurance of remuneration, which, while undoubtedly inadequate compensation for lawyers of the quality he secured, nevertheless kept their work from being entirely a "labor of love." During the months in the planning stage, Bose and his lawyers' work group met each week, primarily to determine the present structure of the various governments, what their functions were, and their statutory or constitutional origins. With this groundwork laid by late summer 1968, a rough draft proposal was prepared and presented to the policy committee for consideration. Mayor Lugar, recognizing the technical aspects of their work, left the lawyers' work group pretty much on their own, while continuing to direct the campaign to marshal support for the idea. Communication between the policy committee and the lawyers' work group was maintained throughout by Charles Whistler, w h o was a member of both, and by John Walls, who sat in with the lawyers from time to time. Through this network compromises were negotiated and incorporated in the draft bill, attempting to strike a balance between what was needed for local government reform and the political practicalities of what would be likely to pass the legislature. The emerging consensus had four major components: (1) Indianapolis would be converted into a countywide metropolitan government. (2) The Unigov principals decided on a single countywide executive of the strongmayor type. (3) Considerations of political expediency convinced them to omit the school districts from the plan and (4) to exclude the municipalities of Beech Grove, Lawrence, and Speedway from the jurisdiction of the extended metropolitan government. With these four principles established, the remainder of the Unigov debate became a process of negotiation and compromise over specifics.

The Reorganization

Proposal

53

Securing Political Support With the policy committee for Unigov as their primary goal for the 1969 legislative session and the lawyers' work group effort in progress, the next order of business for the mayor and the policy committee centered on marshaling political and legislative support for Unigov. To ensure legislative passage, one primary objective was Republican control of the General Assembly and the state executive offices. Many reasons are given for the successful passage of Unigov in 1969, but the most frequently cited is the fact that the Republican Party was then in control of both the executive and legislative branches of government on the city, county, and state levels. 19 Mayor Lugar concurred with this assessment: "I cannot conceive of Unigov coming under other circumstances than very powerful political unity within the Marion County legislative delegation, within the structure of Ward Chairman and Precinct Committeemen in Indianapolis and Marion County, without overt support from Indiana GOP District Chairmen and GOP legislators from these districts, without the camaraderie of the 1968 campaign and especial interest manifested in our situation by President Nixon and Vice President Agnew." 2 0 The partisan strategy that took Unigov from an idea to an accomplished fact was succinctly outlined by John Walls in a speech a year after Unigov's passage: Now I am not pushing the Republicans in this sense, but I am suggesting another reality in terms of the politics of reorganization. If you are going to get it done, you will have to recognize that it is the political process that does it. We can scurry around with citizen committees and with all kinds of studies and research, but w h e n it comes to the final analysis you must have 26 votes in the Indiana Senate, and 51 votes in the House of Representatives or you're dead. And you have to have a governor who will sign the bill w h e n it's passed. We were fortunate . . . , in terms of strategy, in having Dick Lugar at the helm in Indianapolis. An indication of his leadership is the solidarity with which we were able to go to the General Assembly in 1969 and achieve this result. 21 19. S e e D. M . L a w r e n c e a n d H. R. T u r n b u l l , 111, " U n i g o v : C i t y - C o u n t y C o n s o l i d a t i o n in I n d i a n a p o l i s , " P o p u l a r G o v e r n m e n t 3 6 ( 2 5 ) ( N o v e m b e r 1969); R o b e r t V. K i r c h , " U n i g o v : M e t r o p o l i t a n R e f o r m o r P a r t i s a n P o l i t i c s ? " P r o c e e d i n g s of ( h e Indiana Academy of Social Sciences, n . s . 4 ( 4 ) : 1 5 3 (1969); a n d " S e l f - H e l p a n d t h e C i t i e s , " N a t i o n ' s B u s i n e s s 59(7):24 (June 1971). 20. R i c h a r d G. Lugar,- s p e e c h to R o b e r t A . T a f t I n s t i t u t e of G o v e r n m e n t , N e w York, M a y 21, 1970. 2 1 . J o h n W . W a l l s , " L o c a l G o v e r n m e n t in I n d i a n a , " in M o d e r n i z i n g O u r S t a t e G o v e r n m e n t ( N o t r e D a m e , I n d . : C e n t e r f o r C o n t i n u i n g E d u c a t i o n , U n i v e r s i t y of N o t r e D a m e , 1 9 7 0 ) , p . 52.

54

The Reorganization

Proposal

The first official opportunity to work for legislative support occurred in the May primaries of 1968 when the Republican Party electors chose Marion County's legislative candidates for the November election. Though there had still been little or no public discussion of reorganization, Mayor Lugar, Keith Bulen, Beurt SerVaas, and John Burkhart (chair of the Republican slating committee) played a decisive role on behalf of legislative candidates known to favor the idea of governmental reorganization and who were in harmony with many of the mayor's programs. Most of them had also been active in the Republican Action Committee's successes the previous two years. The efforts of the slating committee culminated in primary victories for Marion County's entire organization-backed Republican slate. A major opportunity for Marion County Republicans to expand their power base statewide came when the state GOP convention opened with Mayor Lugar as the keynote speaker. Under Bulen's direction, the Marion County forces combined to secure the gubernatorial nomination for Secretary of State Edgar D. Whitcomb, and their choices for the entire slate of state candidates were selected. The convention closed with Bulen named as Republican national committeeman from Indiana. The Star's comment on these maneuverings was that "such a display of power with finesse may never be seen again at a state GOP convention." 2 2 Shortly thereafter, Mayor Lugar attended the national GOP convention as a delegate and platform committee member. His efforts on behalf of Richard Nixon not only established Lugar's credentials as a supporter of the national GOP ticket but also increased the back-home demand for him as a speaker. From this base, Lugar mounted an exhaustive statewide campaign continuing through the November election, speaking in support of GOP candidates while also stockpiling political debts for later collection. Afterward, Lugar commented that much of his 1968 Unigov strategy involved campaigning throughout Indiana not only on behalf of state candidates but also more particularly for state senators and representatives. 23

A Restructured Committee and a New Place of Work In October, as events multiplied and the prospects for electoral success appeared bright, the policy committee decided they could not keep abreast of developments using their previous mode of operation. Accordingly, the committee was restructured and a new work plan established. Hasbrook explained the transition as follows: "After the 22. Editorial, IndianapoJis Star, June 23, 1968, p. 8. 23. Patrick Healy and Raymond L. Bancroft, "Three Mayors Review Their Governments," Nation's Cities 7(11):28 (November 1969).

The Reorganization

Proposal

55

bare bones plans were laid at John Burkhart's, several of us met every Sunday for a couple of months in the Mayor's conference room with the assignment to pull the specifics together." 24 While nearly the same people were involved as before, the mayor's conference room had advantages of location and access to needed materials, making it a more effective place "to pull the specifics together." William A. Brennan, Jr., a Democratic realtor, and William H. Hardy, a black member of a public relations firm, were added to the group to give some balance to the previously all-white Republican committee, and they proceeded to work with the attorneys to complete the first draft of the bill and then to form a task force for a public airing of the proposal. 24. Hasbrook interview.

s Public Discussion Stage

The overwhelming Republican victory in the general election of November 5, 1968, caused a dramatic change in the Unigov discussions. Mayor Lugar underscored the election's importance on the debate's outcome w h e n asked whether the Unigov effort would have been dropped had the Democrats won in 1968. His immediate response was yes, but then he added: "I shouldn't say that so quickly. I don't know . . . but I suspect we would have had to move in a different way entirely. As it was, we did use, very forcefully . . . the fact that the Republicans had w o n these offices." 1 While the question was academic, the answer strongly suggests the partisan nature of the proposal, which in turn made everything hinge on the election's outcome. A Democratic win would have entailed a major change of strategy, probably meaning the end of any plans for a countywide form of government. With the Republicans now in control at every step of the legal decisionmaking process—from mayor and council to governor—Unigov's proponents were assured at least favorable hearings by the legal decisionmakers. To take advantage of their position, however, it was imperative that they seek broader public support. Accordingly, the earlier tactic of quietly marshaling the support of key influentials changed to an all-out appeal for public support, giving the debate an entirely new dimension. Timing and quick action were also essential because the newly elected state officeholders would assume their duties in January 1969, a short two months away. The General Assembly would then have only a fast 61-day regular session before another election, and the plans for Unigov legislation had to be completed in a very short t i m e /

Some Early Disclosures As noted earlier, part of the policy committee's previous strategy had been to keep its Unigov plans under wraps until a propitious time 1. R i c h a r d G. Lugar, i n t e r v i e w w i t h James O w e n , I n d i a n a p o l i s , F e b r u a r y 2, 1972. 2. T h e G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y d i d not h a v e regular a n n u a l s e s s i o n s until p a s s a g e of a state c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a m e n d m e n t in 1970.

Public Discussion Stage

57

for an a n n o u n c e m e n t . In order to limit the length of the public debate and to keep it out of the November election campaign, the release was planned for after November 5, 1 9 6 8 . But this major release was preceded by three earlier kinds of public disclosure in October. W h i l e these disclosures did not open the public debate prematurely, they had other important effects on the Unigov debate that needed to be considered. At least one important state Senate candidate included the Unigov c o n c e p t in his speeches, although Unigov was not an issue in the fall campaign. "In the fall, at all the meetings, I talked about this. I didn't call it Unigov. I called it c o m b i n e d government or something like that. I was probably the only one that really did it." 3 T h i s kind of low-key statement was important in that it refuted the contention that none of the a s s e m b l y m e n had run on the merger idea. It was also significant that Senator Borst had assumed this responsibility. As head of the Marion County delegation to the General Assembly and sponsor of the Unigov bill in the Senate, Borst was a most visible e x p o n e n t of Unigov, and people could recall his early statements on it. T h e metropolitan government plan also got fleeting preelection attention in the press w h e n a reporter for the Indianapolis News uncovered the story. On October 15, Hugh Rutledge wrote an article that outlined Mayor Lugar's plans to present a metro bill to the 1 9 6 9 General Assembly. 4 T h i s was the first news story on Unigov, but it failed to arouse enough public interest to stimulate follow-up articles, and Unigov was allowed to remain a virtually unnoticed issue for three more weeks. Instead of hurting Unigov's chances by upsetting its timetable, Rutledge's early disclosure actually helped its proponents. Unigov's most important boost c a m e from the News publisher, who included a boxed-in statement with the October 15 article, affirming the newspaper's support for the concept of metropolitan government. THE N E W S PROPOSES M E T R O P O L I T A N GOVERNMENT FOR A L L OF MARION C O U N T Y , HEADED B Y AN ELECTED C O U N T Y W I D E LEGISLATIVE BODY. ABOLISH THE BOARD O F C O U N T Y COMMISSIONERS AND HIRE A C O U N T Y MANAGER/'

T h i s supporting statement b e c a m e an important point of discussion later w h e n the News began to editorialize against Unigov and the mayor sought its support. 3. L a w r e n c e M . B o r s t , i n t e r v i e w w i t h J a m e s O w e n , I n d i a n a p o l i s , M a y 3 0 , 1 9 7 2 . 4. " C i t y , C o u n t y M e t r o t o b e r 1 5 , 1 9 6 8 , p. 1. 5.

Ibid.

Plan Prepared

for A s s e m b l y , "

Indianapolis

News,

Oc-

58

Public Discussion

Stage

The Rutledge article also referred to a statement by Mayor Lugar to the effect that "if such a measure fails in the next General Assembly . . . his administration will p u s h an 'aggressive annexation campaign.' " 6 This lightly veiled threat, w h i c h may be related to Nashville's successful consolidation referendum after an aggressive annexation campaign in 1 9 6 2 / was repeated throughout the Unigov debate and may have prompted some people to support Unigov. Because Unigov passed and the annexation threat was never tested, it is hard to tell if it had a strong influence. The third early disclosure of the metro plan was even more restricted in scope than the first two and also failed to stimulate a public debate, but it played an important part in later developments. In October the Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce conducted a letter poll of its 4,800 members to determine what issues the membership would be most concerned about in the 1969 legislature. Seventy-six percent of the approximately 500 returns expressed strong support for the metro concept, and another 13 percent indicated casual support for the idea, totaling an overwhelming 89 percent (see Table 4)." This was a major point in the chamber's activities in supporting Unigov. Up to this point, Carl Dortch's support for Unigov had to be guarded, as it was based on his personal views and on earlier chamber statements on similar proposals. With evidence of strong membership support, however, the chamber's support could be stated more emphatically as expressing the wishes of the chamber membership. It thus could have a greater bearing on the outcome.

The Mayor's Task Force The first move to a public debate of Unigov began on schedule, three days after the Republican Party's victory in the general election of 1968, w h e n Mayor Lugar a n n o u n c e d that Thomas Hasbrook and Beurt SerVaas would cochair a yet-to-be-named task force to study governmental organization. The Mayor's Task Force on Improved Governmental Structure for Indianapolis and Marion County first met on November 27, its composition emphasizing Mayor Lugar's heavy reliance on the business c o m m u n i t y for support of his proposal. The task force consisted of 42 members, appointed in two groups. 6. Ibid. 7. D a v i d A. B o o t h , M e t r o p o l i s e s : T h e Nashviiie Consolidation (Lansing: Instit u t e for C o m m u n i t y D e v e l o p m e n t a n d S e r v i c e s , M i c h i g a n State U n i v e r s i t y , 1963), pp. 8 5 - 8 7 . 8. I n d i a n a p o l i s C h a m b e r of C o m m e r c e Issue S u r v e y , 1969 I n d i a n a G e n e r a l Ass e m b l y , f r o m t h e files of D o n a l d L. R o b i n s o n , f o r m e r director, G o v e r n m e n t a l A f f a i r s D i v i s i o n , I n d i a n a p o l i s C h a m b e r of C o m m e r c e .

Public Discussion Stage

Table 4 - Chamber Poll on Legislative Issues Governmental Reorganization Metropolitan government for Indianapolis-Marion County (excluding schools) Convention for new state constitution Removal of issuance of auto license plates and drivers' licenses from political control and patronage system

59

(percentages)

Strong Support

Casual Support

76

13

9

2

36

31

20

13

89

7

3

1

Opposed to Issue

No Interest

Source: Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce issue Survey. 1969 indiana Generai Assembly, from the fites of Donald L. Robinson, former director, Governmental Affairs Division. Indianapolis Chamber of Commerce.

T h e first group of 2 9 a p p o i n t e e s w a s a b l u e - r i b b o n a s s e m b l a g e of influential b u s i n e s s a n d c i v i c l e a d e r s , c o m p r i s i n g the m a i n body of the task force (see A p p e n d i x 1). T h e s e c o n d g r o u p — i n a c t i v e at this s t a g e — c o n s i s t e d of t h e 2 3 m e m b e r s of t h e a l l - R e p u b l i c a n M a r i o n C o u n t y delegation to the G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y , w h o served as ex officio m e m b e r s . T h e first group of 2 9 a p p o i n t e e s reflected M a y o r Lugar's c o n c e r n with b u s i n e s s - c o m m u n i t y s u p p o r t , largely to the e x c l u s i o n of other groups. T w e n t y - t h r e e of the a p p o i n t e e s c a m e d i r e c t l y from the business sector, r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e area's largest m a n u f a c t u r e r s , banks, n e w s m e d i a , law firms, u t i l i t i e s , and real estate a g e n c i e s . T h e s e have cust o m a r i l y b e e n s o u r c e s of s u p p o r t for m e t r o p o l i t a n g o v e r n m e n t reform efforts in o t h e r cities.' 1 T h r e e of t h e r e m a i n i n g seven a p p o i n t e e s also had b u s i n e s s ties. T h e t h r e e g o v e r n m e n t officeholders on t h e task f o r c e — H a s b r o o k , S e r V a a s , and W i l l i a m G. S c h n e i d e r (county c o m m i s s i o n e r ) — w e r e part-time g o v e r n m e n t e m p l o y e e s with full-time b u s i n e s s interests. T h e n e w s p a p e r and broadcast m e d i a , n u m b e r i n g eight of the 2 9 original a p p o i n t e e s , c o m p r i s e d the largest single group represented. A l t h o u g h b u s i n e s s - c o m m u n i t y i n v o l v e m e n t was the primary objective of t h e task force a p p o i n t m e n t s , the s c o p e of the m e m b e r s h i p was b r o a d e n e d a little by t h e a d d i t i o n of the three n o n b u s i n e s s a p p o i n t e e s . T h e s e i n c l u d e d a P r e s b y t e r i a n m i n i s t e r — w h o later was Lugar's s u c c e s sor as m a y o r — a labor r e p r e s e n t a t i v e from a c a r p e n t e r s ' a p p r e n t i c e s h i p program, and t h e o n l y f e m a l e a p p o i n t e e , from t h e League of W o m e n Voters. T h e s c o p e of t h e m e m b e r s h i p had also b e e n b r o a d e n e d by inc l u d i n g three b l a c k b u s i n e s s m e n a m o n g the b u s i n e s s a p p o i n t e e s . Geo9 . T h o m a s R . D y e , Politics Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. 2 5 2 - 2 5 4 .

in States

a n d C o m m u n i t i e s ( E n g l e w o o d C l i f f s , N.J.:

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graphical representation was evenly balanced between the city and the suburbs. While nearly all of the appointees had Indianapolis business addresses, half of them resided outside the city limits. Mayor Lugar's reliance on business-community support for Unigov went beyond the obvious consideration that the Indianapolis business community generally supported metropolitan government plans. It was with the business community that he had his greatest influence. He was a businessman himself and had involved the business community in many of his projects. Moreover, as a Republican, the mayor could expect a large measure of political support from this group—an essential factor in view of the partisan nature of the proposal. In fact, few known Democrats were appointed to the task force. Those who were, for example, realtor William Brennan, had other known interests that prompted them to favor Unigov. With this alignment of potential supporters Mayor Lugar could be assured of a friendly reception for Unigov and expeditious task force consideration and action on the proposal. Role of the Progress

Committee

Although largely absent from task force membership, some Democrats did have a further voice in the Unigov debate through their membership on the Greater Indianapolis Progress Committee. The preceding chapter noted that the progress committee had been largely bypassed in the initial planning for Unigov. Once those plans had been formulated, however, and the public debate opened, the progress committee was involved in significant ways—though it did not predominate. Its volunteer members represented the community's highest level of business and civic leadership. Moreover, the progress committee had sponsored a series of successful community projects, capped by a multimillion dollar convention center, making it an accepted and respected vehicle for community improvement. It was also significant that the progress committee had been founded by Mayor Barton, Mayor Lugar's Democratic predecessor, and the successor to Frank McKinney as its chair was Jack E. Reich, a Democrat and prominent businessman. This helped balance the Republican management of Unigov's early development. Thus, when Mayor Lugar took office, he was able to convince the progress committee of Unigov's merits, and he brought a certain additional level of prestige and legitimacy to his proposal, which in the absence of a referendum proved of great importance. Task Force

Meetings

The mayor's task force held its initial November 27 meeting in Mayor Lugar's conference room. Hasbrook and SerVaas, chairs of the City Council and the County Council, respectively, served as cochairs.

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61

The mayor and the two cochairs made opening statements, followed by a wide-ranging discussion of governmental problems and possible actions. 1(1 Most of those present—perhaps all—knew that the mayor and others had been discussing the possible reorganization for some time and that several attorneys had been working on its technical aspects. The spirit of the discussion indicated that the time seemed ripe for a substantial governmental reorganization, although the possibility of reservations and objections from some quarters was recognized. A few spokesmen from the suburbs suggested that some of their areas might be reluctant. A black journalist, Marcus Stewart, Jr., of the Recorder indicated the need to carefully consider adequate representation for the black minority, and Mayor Lugar and his associates agreed that this was an important consideration. Some argued that school district consolidation should be included in the program, while others, w h o had witnessed the school consolidation movement in the 1960s and participated in earlier Unigov discussions, counseled strongly forcaution and restraint in dealing with the schools. Some sentiment was expressed favoring a city manager. The mayor indicated his willingness to consider this but also noted that he personally preferred a strong political executive with a professional administrator—he mentioned Walls as an example—serving as a managerial subordinate. In short, while several reservations were expressed and debated, clearly there was substantial sentiment for drastic change. The first meeting closed with general agreement on the desirability for quick action in view of the pending legislative session and the need for good technical work, which the mayor and the cochairs indicated was already underway. After this first meeting the task force met again (on December 13 and December 19) for more substantive discussion, and its report was issued after the meeting of December 19. In his letter inviting prospective members to join his task force, Mayor Lugar charged them with three specific assignments (see Appendix 2): 1.

2. 3.

To direct the preparation of legislation for presentation to the 1969 Indiana General Assembly by a committee of lawyers who will prepare the actual bill. To work with the members of the General Assembly and the public in promoting this legislative program. To give guidance to the Mayor and other public officials in establishing the governmental structure following a successful legislative effort. 11

10. T h i s m e e t i n g ' s d i s c u s s i o n w a s r e c o r d e d a n d t r a n s c r i b e d a n d is on file in t h e m a y o r ' s office. 11. R i c h a r d G. Lugar, m a y o r , letter to task f o r c e m e m b e r s , N o v e m b e r 6, 1968, f r o m t h e files of t h e G r e a t e r I n d i a n a p o l i s Progress C o m m i t t e e .

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Despite this broad charge, several f a c t o r s — i n c l u d i n g the short t i m e available for a c t i o n — n a r r o w e d t h e range of task force activities a n d limited it largely to a s s i g n m e n t s 1 a n d 2. A s s i g n m e n t 3 — g u i d a n c e in setting u p U n i g o v — w a s not carried out b e c a u s e t h e task force s t o p p e d m e e t i n g long b e f o r e t h e U n i g o v bill w a s p a s s e d . T h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of the n e w l y f o r m e d g o v e r n m e n t w a s t h u s left to M a y o r Lugar and other p u b l i c officials. T h e task force's role in a s s i g n m e n t 1 — p r e p a r i n g t h e legislation— w a s its most i m p o r t a n t f u n c t i o n . A l t h o u g h the m a j o r w o r k of directing the p r e p a r a t i o n of a legislative bill w a s a s s u m e d by others, the task force m a d e i m p o r t a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n s . Its r e v i e w a n d a p p r o v a l of the Unigov c o n c e p t p r o v i d e d t h e d r a f t e r s w i t h i m p o r t a n t g u i d e l i n e s w i t h i n w h i c h to w o r k , t h u s a c h i e v i n g a m o r e or less p u b l i c r e s o l u t i o n of s o m e vital issues that w o u l d o t h e r w i s e h a v e b e e n left to the select d r a f t i n g g r o u p . For e x a m p l e , the task force a p p r o v e d a single c o u n t y w i d e e x e c u t i v e a n d c o u n c i l a n d the e x c l u s i o n of courts, schools, a n d three m u n i c i p a l i t i e s f r o m the merger. In a d d i t i o n , the task force m a d e several specific s u g g e s t i o n s that w e r e i n c o r p o r a t e d in the bill. After its longest debate, the task force voted to enlarge t h e m e m b e r s h i p of the p r o p o s e d c o u n c i l f r o m 15 to 25. It also rejected a r e f e r e n d u m proposal w i t h only o n e d i s s e n t i n g vote.

fudge Niblack's

County Tusk Force

T w o o t h e r s u g g e s t i o n s t h e task force p r e s e n t e d to the attorneys did not originate w i t h it but c a m e f r o m a task force of u n e a s y c o u n t y o f f i c e h o l d e r s led by M a r i o n C o u n t y circuit court judge John L. Niblack. Judge N i b l a c k ' s c o u n t y task force w a s not entirely against Unigov, h a v i n g b e e n f o r m e d to obtain a voice in Unigov's p r e p a r a t i o n rather t h a n to defeat it. N e v e r t h e l e s s , Niblack's g r o u p d i s t u r b e d the m a y o r ' s task force's p r o c e e d i n g s a n d t e m p o r a r i l y stymied Lugar's effort to m a r s h a l p u b l i c s u p p o r t for Unigov. T h i s c o u n t y task force c o m p r i s e d a g r o u p of 13 R e p u b l i c a n c o u n t y officeholders, most of w h o m h a d not b e e n c o n s u l t e d in t h e d r a f t i n g of Unigov a n d w h o were t h u s afraid that t h e i r i n t e r e s t s w o u l d not be c o n s i d e r e d in the n e w plan (see A p p e n d i x 3). As Judge Niblack said at t h e time: " T h e c o u n t y group w a s f o r m e d b e c a u s e w e felt like o r p h a n s . " 1 2 In a d d i t i o n to the o f f i c e h o l d e r s ' fears, t h e r e w a s also s o m e t h i n g of an intraparty struggle b e t w e e n the G O P ' s old g u a r d , led by Judge Niblack, w h o h a d been c o u n t y j u d g e for n e a r l y 20 years, a n d the g r o u p of R e p u b l i c a n newcomers, e s p e c i a l l y M a y o r Lugar a n d party chair Bulen, w h o were m a k i n g all t h e p l a n s . After p r i v a t e c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h Mayor Lugar and Beurt Ser12. ")udgo Niblack Heads County Task Forces." Indianapolis Slar, December 5, 1968, p. 41.

Public Discussion

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63

V a a s , " t h e c o u n t y g r o u p ' s m a i n fears w e r e allayed, w h e r e u p o n their suggested c h a n g e s f o c u s e d on t w o points. T h e s e w e r e noted in a sixpage m e m o r a n d u m that largely favored Unigov, p r e p a r e d by Judge Niblack a n d p r e s e n t e d to t h e m a y o r ' s task force at its final meeting. O n e r e q u e s t w a s that t h e e l e c t i o n of the n e w m a y o r a n d c o u n c i l not be h e l d in 1970 b u t be d e l a y e d u n t i l a later date. T h i s w o u l d p e r m i t a longer t r a n s i t i o n p e r i o d a n d did not d i s t u r b the term of i n c u m b e n t o f f i c e h o l d e r s u n t i l n e w e l e c t i o n s c o u l d be held. T h i s request w a s a p p r o v e d by t h e task force, a n d the election w a s slated for 1971. 14 T h e other r e q u e s t related to Unigov's a d m i n i s t r a t i v e organization. O r i g i n a l l y it w a s c o n t e m p l a t e d that the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w o u l d be a h i e r a r c h i c a l a r r a n g e m e n t w i t h straight lines of a u t h o r i t y f r o m the m a y o r to the d e p a r t m e n t h e a d s . But Judge Niblack held out for c o u n c i l - a p p o i n t e d " w a t c h d o g " r e v i e w b o a r d s to oversee each d e p a r t m e n t . T h i s r e q u e s t w a s also a p p r o v e d a n d i n c o r p o r a t e d in the draft proposal, but the r e v i e w b o a r d s w e r e not given s u b s t a n t i a l p o w e r s . To s u m u p , both c h a n g e s w e r e significant but not basic. In any event the results w e r e a n n o u n c e d on D e c e m b e r 19, the s a m e day the m a y o r ' s task force a n n o u n c e d its final a p p r o v a l of the Unigov c o n c e p t a n d d i s b a n d e d , leaving the actual bill d r a f t i n g to others.

Task Force

Accomplishments

T h e m a y o r ' s task force m a d e i m p o r t a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n s w h e n it a p p r o v e d the Unigov c o n c e p t a n d allayed the fears of Judge Niblack a n d c o u n t y officials. M o r e o v e r , the sense of c o m m i t m e n t task force m e m b e r s g a i n e d by their h a v i n g been involved gave t h e m credibility and e f f e c t i v e n e s s in p e r f o r m i n g a s s i g n m e n t 2, to p r o m o t e Unigov legislation a m o n g t h e General A s s e m b l y a n d the p u b l i c . U n d o u b t e d l y , d e v e l o p i n g p u b l i c s u p p o r t w a s the task force's m a j o r a c h i e v e m e n t , as well as t h e p r i m a r y reason it w a s f o r m e d . T h e idea that d e v e l o p i n g p u b l i c s u p p o r t s h o u l d be the p r i m a r y f u n c t i o n of the m a y o r ' s task force originated w i t h the policy c o m m i t tee several m o n t h s earlier. At that t i m e the c o m m i t t e e delegated areas of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y a m o n g its m e m b e r s , Senator Borst being asked to s p o n s o r t h e project in the General A s s e m b l y . O n e of his c o n d i t i o n s for a c c e p t i n g the a s s i g n m e n t w a s that the m e t r o p o l i t a n g o v e r n m e n t proposal c o m e f r o m a c i t i z e n s ' g r o u p . Borst, an e x p e r i e n c e d legislator, was d o u b t l e s s m i n d f u l of the u n f a v o r a b l e r e c e p t i o n the p u b l i c a n d the General A s s e m b l y gave t h e privately p r e p a r e d " p o w e r grab" bills in 1965. To avoid this fate, the p u b l i c initiative for Unigov s h o u l d not 13. A s a m e m b e r of t h e M a r i o n C o u n t y C o u n c i l , S e r V a a s w a s a l s o a m e m b e r of the c o u n t y task force. 1 4 . " P l a n T i e s ' W a t c h d o g s ' t o M e t r o G o v e r n m e n t , " i n d i a n a p o l i s Star, 2 0 . 1 9 6 8 , p . 1.

December

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c o m e f r o m t h e p o l i c y c o m m i t t e e , w h o s e restricted, partisan m e m b e r s h i p m a d e it v u l n e r a b l e to the " p o w e r grab" label. T h e initiative must at least a p p e a r to c o m e f r o m a m o r e b r o a d l y based group, that is, the task force a n d the c o m m u n i t y l e a d e r s h i p it r e p r e s e n t e d . O n e task force m e m b e r , E l d o n C a m p b e l l , general manager of television station WFBM, e x p r e s s e d this responsibility quite accurately: "I t h i n k t h e single solitary p u r p o s e w a s to get the visible l e a d e r s h i p of this c o m m u n i t y a b s o l u t e l y accurately i n f o r m e d , so that no o n e in a l e a d e r s h i p p o s i t i o n w a s w a n d e r i n g a r o u n d the streets m a k i n g statem e n t s w h i c h w e r e inaccurate." 1 5 A l t h o u g h the task force did not explicitly a n d officially organize a p u b l i c c a m p a i g n to p r o m o t e Unigov, the fact of their s u p p o r t was given broad c u r r e n c y t h r o u g h o u t the c a m p a i g n a n d w a s e s p e c i a l l y effective in the General Assembly. Furt h e r m o r e , several task force m e m b e r s a d d e d prestige to the debate w h e n they s p o k e to p u b l i c g r o u p s as m e m b e r s of the speakers' bureau, f o r m e d later. P e r h a p s the task force m e m b e r s w e r e most effective in p r o m o t i n g Unigov s i m p l y b e c a u s e of w h o they were. T h e i r blue-ribbon status m e a n t that all w e r e active w i t h other civic committees, as well as p r o f e s s i o n a l a n d social g r o u p s in w h i c h m a n y of t h e m held offices. T h i s no d o u b t a f f o r d e d t h e m m a n y o p p o r t u n i t i e s to a n s w e r questions or d e f e n d Unigov in a variety of p u b l i c f o r u m s , a n d they were very influential in the p u b l i c d i s c u s s i o n that p r e c e d e d legislative action. M a y o r Lugar's original task force i n s t r u c t i o n s omitted any suggestion that it h a d t h e o p t i o n of t u r n i n g d o w n the w h o l e plan. Instead, its p r i n c i p a l c o n t r i b u t i o n w a s to p r o m o t e the program with the public a n d the General A s s e m b l y . T h i s w a s Lugar's a n d the policy committee's p r i m a r y objective, reflected in the w a y the task force's m e m b e r s h i p a n d o r g a n i z a t i o n w e r e geared. T h e o v e r r i d i n g effect was that the Unigov p r i n c i p a l s s u c c e s s f u l l y got the a p p r o v a l of an important segm e n t of the c o m m u n i t y w h i l e r e t a i n i n g effective control over the Unigov effort.

The Detailed Drafting Most of the b a c k g r o u n d research a n d the general outlines a n d format of t h e Unigov p r o p o s a l h a d b e e n d o n e by the Unigov principals in the s u m m e r a n d fall of 1968, but the actual drafting of the c o m p l e x a n d l e n g t h y bill took place in a 33-day period between Dec e m b e r 19, w h e n t h e m a y o r ' s task force c o m p l e t e d its work, and January 21, 1969, w h e n t h e bill w a s i n t r o d u c e d to the General Assembly. During this p e r i o d t h e lawyers' w o r k w a s most intense. 15. Eldon C a m p b e l l , i n t e r v i e w w i t h James O w e n , Indianapolis, June 8, 1972.

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W h e n given t h e go-ahead to draft the Unigov bill, attorney Lewis Bose faced a very d e m a n d i n g s c h e d u l e . Senator Borst h a d originally asked that d r a f t i n g b e c o m p l e t e d on J a n u a r y 10 so that the bill c o u l d be i n t r o d u c e d very early in t h e session. A l t h o u g h this target date w a s m i s s e d , the d r a f t e r s w o r k e d very h a r d . At least o n e of the lawyers w o r k e d every day e x c e p t t h r e e of the 33 days, w h i c h i n c l u d e d t h e C h r i s t m a s - N e w Year h o l i d a y s . T h e l a w y e r s w e r e able to c o m p l e t e the long bill in a m o n t h , in part b e c a u s e M a y o r Lugar h a d i n c l u d e d t h e m in the early stages of the p l a n n i n g , a n d they h a d a l r e a d y d o n e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a n d statutory research o n t h e subject as far back as t h e p r e v i o u s spring. After this p r e l i m i n a r y legal w o r k w a s c o m p l e t e d in late s u m m e r 1968, Bose a n d Charles W h i s t l e r c o n t i n u e d to meet w i t h the Unigov p l a n n e r s , especially d u r i n g t h e task force stage. T h u s , w h e n t h e y a n d the other lawyers met again in m i d - D e c e m b e r , they c o u l d p r o c e e d quickly w i t h the n e c e s s a r y bill writing. T h e l a w y e r s ' w o r k g r o u p e s s e n t i a l l y h a d the t e c h n i c a l d r a f t i n g job of p r e p a r i n g S e n a t e Bill 199 (SB 199), the Unigov bill, w h o s e m a j o r policy features, i n c l u d i n g m a n y practical c o m p r o m i s e s , h a d been d e c i d e d d u r i n g t h e p r e c e d i n g 12 m o n t h s . Accordingly, the lawyers' p r i m a r y c o n c e r n w a s to e x p r e s s t h e s e features in an organized f a s h i o n a n d e m b o d y t h e m in a legal format. T h i s task was n e i t h e r easy n o r u n i m p o r t a n t : p r o p o s a l s for g o v e r n m e n t a l c h a n g e can f l o u n d e r for lack of a d e q u a t e d r a f t s m a n s h i p . As chair of the l a w y e r s ' w o r k g r o u p , Bose took the m a j o r responsibility for d r a f t i n g the bill. " T h e l a w y e r s all suggested that, in as far as m y s t r e n g t h w o u l d h o l d out, I s h o u l d w r i t e it, a n d assign parts to them." 1 1 ' T h i s p r o c e d u r e w a s f o l l o w e d , w i t h Bose p r e p a r i n g an o u t l i n e of the bill a n d t h e n c o n c e n t r a t i n g his efforts on the first five sections, w h i c h dealt w i t h d e f i n i t i o n s , p o w e r s , organization, a n d p r o c e d u r e s of the projected n e w a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . Bose a n d W h i s t l e r kept the g r o u p task-oriented, allocating ass i g n m e n t s to t h o s e s p e c i a l i s t s w h o h a d the most k n o w l e d g e a n d interest in e a c h subject area, t h u s c a p i t a l i z i n g on the m e m b e r s ' special expertise. T h i s p r o c e d u r e w a s p a r t i c u l a r l y effective w h e n sections on the i n d i v i d u a l d e p a r t m e n t s w e r e written. For e x a m p l e , the section on the D e p a r t m e n t of T r a n s p o r t a t i o n w a s w r i t t e n by Robert Davies, w h o had w o r k e d o n t h e c o u n t y w i d e t h o r o u g h f a r e bill in p r e v i o u s s e s s i o n s of t h e General A s s e m b l y . W a y n e P o n a d e r , w h o in the p r e v i o u s session had w o r k e d o n a m e t r o p o l i t a n police bill, wrote the section on the D e p a r t m e n t of P u b l i c Safety. A n o t h e r lawyer, Mark M u r p h y , a m e m ber of the Board of Park C o m m i s s i o n e r s , w r o t e the section on parks and recreation. A t t o r n e y Robert Elrod, recently chair of a local govern16. L e w i s C. B a s e , i n t e r v i e w w i t h J a m e s O w e n , I n d i a n a p o l i s , J u n e 14, 1 9 7 2 .

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ment study commission in Marion County, helped in a variety of areas. Although Bose was in direct charge of the research and drafting, Whistler, who had also been a member of the policy committee, was a chief participant in crucial portions of the drafting process. He was particularly effective in negotiating prelegislative compromises that were included in SB 199, making the lawyers' task something more than a purely technical exercise. Most of these compromises were made necessary by a small but influential conservative element in the community and were also influenced by the Unigov proposal's reception by the press.

The Media: Placating the News and the Star The media generally supported Unigov, giving it good news coverage and in many cases editorializing for it. The television stations came out most strongly in support of Unigov, giving it broad news coverage and offering special telecasts of debates and panel discussions. One station, WTTV (Channel 4), prepared a half-hour videotape for statewide distribution. The other three television stations, WISH, WFBM, and WLWI, supported Unigov with editorials (see Appendix 4). All the radio stations also gave favorable coverage, with the exception of one, WTLE-AM, whose broadcasts are directed to the black community. No major opposition to Unigov came from the suburban newspapers, which were divided on the matter, or from the Recorder and the Herald, two black community newspapers. Instead, the principal press opposition came from the Indianapolis News and the Indianapolis Star. Both of these dailies were owned by Eugene C. Pulliam, shared the same conservative editorial policy, were Marion County's only daily papers, had a large state circulation, and were generally known to influence many elected officials, including members of the General Assembly. During the first month of the public debate on Unigov, when the task force was deliberating, these papers did not give extensive coverage and took no editorial position. One reason for the light coverage was the fact that previous task forces had not produced substantial results, and there was no assurance that the current one would be any more newsworthy. In fact, the Star did not even report the second meeting of the task force, on December 13. Both papers had traditionally supported the metropolitan government concept, and their opposition to Unigov focused on specific issues—especially the proposed increase in the mayor's executive powers. The criticism appeared largely in the editorial pages of the

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News, the afternoon paper. 1 7 The News attack was directed by its editor, M. Stanton Evans, w h o opened the fray on December 23 by likening Unigov to the 1965 "power grab": "When the Democrats came up with their o w n variant of the 'strong mayor' approach in 1965, the News opposed it as a 'power grab.' We see no reason to favor this approach now that a different version of it is being advanced by Republicans. Rationalizing City-County relations and extending proper services to make government more fully responsible is one thing. Eliminating checks and balances and putting all power in a supermayor is quite the opposite." 1 8 On December 31, specific charges against Unigov appeared in another News editorial attack entitled "It's a Grab." This article made it clear that the mayor's proposed control of various appointments raised the ire of the News: "To take a specific example, consider the changes w h i c h would occur in one of the most vital agencies of local government—the Metropolitan Plan Commission. This powerful agency at present has nine voting members, four chosen by the mayor, two by the county council, two by the county commissioners, and one by the city council. Under the Lugar plan this agency would be superseded by a Metropolitan Development Commission—all nine members of which would be appointed by the mayor." 19 Soon after the "It's a Grab" editorial appeared, Mayor Lugar arranged a meeting with representatives of the News and Star to discuss their antagonism toward Unigov. Representing both papers were the publisher's son, Eugene S. Pulliam, assistant publisher of the Star, and M. Stanton Evans. Accompanying the mayor were Carl Dortch, Beurt SerVaas, John Walls, and Charles Whistler. The mayor pointed out that Unigov was something that over a period of time the News and Star had supported in concept, and thus he was concerned over the present opposition. The n e w s p a p e r m e n responded that the proposed appointive powers of the mayor would make him too powerful, which was what Mayor Lugar had expected. The outcome of the meeting was an agreement that the powers of the new mayor would be limited in crucial areas and that the newspapers would support Unigov during the coming legislative session. The results of this meeting were immediately reported to the lawyers' work group, w h e r e u p o n two important sections were added to SB 199, greatly curtailing the mayor's powers. Section 304 was added, restricting the mayor's appointment of directors, deputy mayors, and administrators to one-year terms and requiring approval by a 17. D u r i n g t h e prelegislative d e b a t e t h e Star n e i t h e r attacked Unigov editorially nor s u p p o r t e d it. But it d i d p u b l i s h several readers' letters to the editor o p p o s i n g Unigov. 18. " T o o M u c h P o w e r , " I n d i a n a p o l i s News, D e c e m b e r 23, 1968, p. 6. 19. "It's a Grab," I n d i a n a p o l i s News, D e c e m b e r 31, 1968, p. 6.

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m a j o r i t y v o t e of the City-County C o u n c i l . Section 808 n a r r o w e d the m a y o r ' s control over the p r o p o s e d Metropolitan D e v e l o p m e n t Comm i s s i o n by d i v i d i n g t h e a p p o i n t m e n t s to its n i n e - m e m b e r board three ways: four to be m a d e by t h e mayor, three by the City Council, a n d t w o by the c o u n t y c o m m i s s i o n e r s . T h e n e w s p a p e r s r e s p o n d e d to t h e s e changes w i t h s u p p o r t for Unigov a n d favorable editorials. T h e News p u b l i s h e d an editorial h e a d e d "In t h e B a l a n c e " a l m o s t i m m e d i a t e l y after the changes: " T h e recent m o v e by M a y o r Lugar's task force on m e t r o p o l i t a n g o v e r n m e n t to get m o r e b a l a n c e into the p l a n for c o u n t y w i d e voting here is an e n c o u r a g i n g one. T h e task force has t a k e n a step in the right direction a n d w e trust that other s u c h intiatives will be forthcoming." 2 U T h e Star w a i t e d u n t i l t h e bill h a d b e e n i n t r o d u c e d to print its editorial, " C o n s o l i d a t i o n Will C o m e " : " T h e r e is little doubt c o n s o l i d a t i o n will take place. In t i m e e v e n its n o w most zealous e n e m i e s are likely to d e m a n d it to r a t i o n a l i z e the g o v e r n m e n t of what in m a n y w a y s is n o w a single c o m m u n i t y split only by o u t d a t e d b o u n d a r y lines w h o s e irr e l e v a n c e is p l a i n to a n y o n e w h o travels along them." 2 1

A Speakers' Bureau In a d d i t i o n to U n i g o v ' s p u b l i c airing through the task force a n d the m e d i a , t h e r e w a s a f u r t h e r a t t e m p t to reach the citizenry t h r o u g h a s p e a k e r s ' b u r e a u . T h i s w a s not a h i g h l y mobilized a n d intense public relations effort but r a t h e r a loosely organized, low-key attempt to exp l a i n Unigov to t h e p e o p l e . Robert B e c k m a n n , Mayor Lugar's p u b l i c i n f o r m a t i o n d i r e c t o r at the time, described its f o r m a t i o n : " T h e s p e a k e r s ' b u r e a u w a s not a highly i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d thing. We d i d n ' t sit d o w n a n d d e t e r m i n e that w e n e e d e d a speakers' bureau and t h e n d r u m u p b u s i n e s s for it. We d i d n ' t need to, because the speakers' bureau was the result of a large n u m b e r of p h o n e calls into the m a y o r ' s office."" 2 T h e s p e a k e r s ' b u r e a u began f u n c t i o n i n g shortly after Thanksgiving w h e n a p p r o x i m a t e l y 25 v o l u n t e e r s w e r e briefed on Unigov's progress to date. T h e s e s p e a k e r s w e r e c h o s e n from various groups, s u c h as a t o a s t m a s t e r ' s c l u b , t h e League of W o m e n Voters, a n d the Jaycees, w h e r e t h e r e w a s a l r e a d y a level of civic m i n d e d n e s s and a willingness a n d ability to a d d r e s s p u b l i c gatherings. It was also i m p o r t a n t that v o l u n t e e r s a l r e a d y h a v e a f u n d a m e n t a l k n o w l e d g e of the processes of state a n d local g o v e r n m e n t b e c a u s e w i t h the bill's being a m e n d e d 20. "In t h e B a l a n c e , " I n d i a n a p o l i s News, J a n u a r y 14, 1969, p. 4. 21. " C o n s o l i d a t i o n Will C o m e , " / n d i a n a p o f i s Star, January 23, 1969, p. 6. 22. Robert D. B e c k m a n n , Jr., i n t e r v i e w w i t h James O w e n , I n d i a n a p o l i s , June 8, 1972.

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frequently, it would have been an exhaustive job to keep them informed of the changes. In any event, the 25 volunteers were usually given assignments expected to be the least controversial, the more difficult ones being handled by selected city officials w h o were in a position to know of bill changes immediately as they occurred. The more important speaking engagements were reserved for some of Unigov's principals, such as Lawrence Borst, Lewis Bose, John Walls, Charles Whistler, and Mayor Lugar. It was advantageous to have these men out on the hustings, as they were in the best position to dispel misinformation and allay fears that could otherwise prove damaging. The reverse flow of information received was also valuable in helping them understand the political pressures on the legislators, and it gave them useful guidance for negotiating further compromises as necessary. Arranging the speaking engagements was the responsibility of John Walls and Robert Beckmann. Calls coming into the mayor's office requesting speakers were channeled to Walls, w h o decided who could best fill each assignment, and then he asked Beckmann to follow up with the necessary arrangements. This was no mean feat, as the mayor's office was regularly receiving about 200 requests for speakers each month, and the Unigov debate raised the figure substantially. It was estimated that the speakers reached approximately 75,000 people in many kinds of meetings, including church groups, professional organizations, civic clubs, PTAs, and social clubs. Several thousand pamphlets and a smaller number of "I Love Unigov" bumper stickers were also available for public distribution. In spite of the effort to publicize Unigov through the task force, the media, and the speakers' bureau, there was still some feeling that more needed to be done. Certainly, a greater effort to reach the public could have been made. Advertising space could have been purchased in the media, instead of relying on public service time and editorials. A series of neighborhood meetings could have been held, and door-to-door campaigns waged. Much more money could have been spent on printing and mailings. These things were not done largely because of time and budgetary limitations. Avoiding public debate until after the November election was a political decision, but after the election, time and money were the chief constraints on the campaign for Unigov.

The Legislative Delegation During November and December 1968, between the election and the opening of the General Assembly, the Marion County delegation (see A p p e n d i x 5J met several times to discuss important issues in

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used to promote

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p r o s p e c t for t h e c o m i n g s e s s i o n . At least t w o of t h e s e m e e t i n g s w e r e h e l d in M a y o r L u g a r ' s c o n f e r e n c e r o o m , U n i g o v b e i n g t h e c e n t r a l topic. T h e meetings were unstructured, had no agenda, and no one p r e s i d e d , e v e n t h o u g h S e n a t o r L a w r e n c e Borst a n d R e p r e s e n t a t i v e " N e d " L a m k i n , d e l e g a t i o n l e a d e r s in t h e S e n a t e a n d H o u s e , w e r e present. 2 " 1 T h e d i s c u s s i o n s w e r e o p e n . S e n a t o r Borst o p e n e d the first m e e t ing by o u t l i n i n g t h e n e e d for g o v e r n m e n t a l r e o r g a n i z a t i o n in M a r i o n C o u n t y , e m p h a s i z i n g t h e i m p o r t a n c e of a u n i f i e d f r o n t a m o n g M a r i o n C o u n t y l e g i s l a t o r s w h e n U n i g o v w a s p r e s e n t e d to t h e G e n e r a l A s s e m bly. T h i s w a s t h e t h e m e t h r o u g h o u t t h e m e e t i n g s . P o r t i o n s of t h e d r a f t bill w e r e d i s c u s s e d at l e n g t h , b u t o n l y a f e w m i n o r a m e n d m e n t s m a d e . T h e d i s c u s s i o n s a l s o gave t h e d e l e g a t i o n u s e f u l briefings o n t h e m o s t r e c e n t d e v e l o p m e n t s in t h e d r a f t i n g a n d p r e p a r e d t h e m to answer queries from their legislative colleagues. T h e o n l y s t r o n g o b j e c t i o n to t h e U n i g o v p l a n e x p r e s s e d in t h e m e e t i n g s c a m e f r o m S e n a t o r Joan G u b b i n s , w h o w a n t e d t h e bill s u b m i t t e d to a v o t e r s ' r e f e r e n d u m for a p p r o v a l . S e n a t o r G u b b i n s ' s a p p e a l w a s c o u n t e r e d by s e v e r a l o t h e r s , w h o s e m a i n a r g u m e n t w a s that t h e c h a n g e in local g o v e r n m e n t p r o p o s e d in t h e U n i g o v bill w a s not revol u t i o n a r y a n d c l e a r l y fell w i t h i n t h e G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y ' s j u r i s d i c t i o n . M o r e o v e r , it w a s n o t e d t h a t a r e f e r e n d u m w o u l d be e x p e n s i v e a n d t i m e - c o n s u m i n g . S e n a t o r D a n i e l B u r t o n , an early o p p o n e n t of U n i g o v w h o h a d s w u n g a r o u n d in f a v o r , s e e m e d to e x p r e s s t h e o p i n i o n of m a n y b y c o m m e n t i n g t h a t t h e p e o p l e elect t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s to d o t h e l e g i s l a t i v e w o r k , a n d if t h e y are d i s s a t i s f i e d , t h e y can vote t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e out. 2 4 S e v e r a l of t h e l e g i s l a t o r s p r e s e n t s p o k e in f a v o r of U n i g o v , as d i d n o n l e g i s l a t o r s T h o m a s H a s b r o o k , R i c h a r d Lugar, Beurt SerVaas, a n d C h a r l e s W h i s t l e r . K e i t h B u l e n , R e p u b l i c a n Party c o u n t y c h a i r , d i d n o t a t t e n d , b u t t h e p r e s e n c e a n d p o s i t i o n of t h e o t h e r R e p u b l i c a n Party m a i n s t a y s left n o d o u b t t h a t U n i g o v h a d t h e party o r g a n i z a tion's support. 23. M i n u t e s of m e e t i n g s w i t h t h e M a r i o n C o u n t y legislators, D e c e m b e r 27, 1968, a n d J a n u a r y 2, 1 9 6 9 , f r o m t h e files of t h e Greater I n d i a n a p o l i s Progress C o m m i t t e e . 24. Ibid.

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In s p i t e of a low a t t e n d a n c e — o n l y 12 of t h e M a r i o n C o u n t y delegation's 23 m e m b e r s t u r n e d out for the first m e e t i n g — t h e session, along w i t h t h e o t h e r political p r e p a r a t i o n , p r o v e d s u c c e s s f u l in h e l p ing get a solid m a j o r i t y of the delegation to favor Unigov. W h e n t h e General A s s e m b l y c o n v e n e d , o n l y 3 m e m b e r s of the c o u n t y ' s entire delegation were considered doubtful supporters.

Drafting Decisions T h e m a i n e l e m e n t s of t h e Unigov p r o p o s e d reorganization were: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

C o n s o l i d a t i o n of the e x e c u t i v e a n d legislative f u n c t i o n s of the city a n d c o u n t y . Election of a single, strong chief e x e c u t i v e (though not q u i t e as s t r o n g as w a s originally p l a n n e d ) . Election of a single strong c o u n c i l . A s u b s t a n t i a l degree of a d m i n i s t r a t i v e integration, w i t h related f u n c t i o n s g r o u p e d into m a j o r d e p a r t m e n t s . P r o v i s i o n of d i f f e r e n t taxing a n d service districts for particular f u n c t i o n s or g r o u p s of f u n c t i o n s . E x e m p t i o n of t h e s c h o o l districts. P r e s e r v a t i o n of the s u b u r b a n m u n i c i p a l i t i e s .

Despite t h e imagery of the t e r m Unigov, the proposal fell far short of c o m p l e t e u n i t a r y c o n s o l i d a t i o n . In part, this w a s d u e to d o u b t s a b o u t t h e d e s i r a b i l i t y of t h o r o u g h c o n s o l i d a t i o n , but also m a n y of t h e e x c e p t i o n s r e p r e s e n t e d c o n c e s s i o n s m a d e pragmatically, and s o m e w h a t r e l u c t a n t l y , to real or a n t i c i p a t e d o p p o n e n t s of m o r e s w e e p i n g c h a n g e . O t h e r e x c e p t i o n s w e r e m a d e to avoid c h a n g e s that would have required a constitutional amendment.25 T h e m e a s u r e ' s m o s t i m p o r t a n t d e p a r t u r e s f r o m full city-county consolidation deserve further comment: 1.

2.

W h i l e s o m e key organs of the c o u n t y a n d city w e r e consolid a t e d , M a r i o n C o u n t y a n d the City of I n d i a n a p o l i s cont i n u e d as s e p a r a t e legal entites. T h i s w a s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y n e c e s s a r y , as the state c o n s t i t u t i o n has m a n y p r o v i s i o n s d e a l i n g w i t h c o u n t i e s — a n d a f e w w i t h c i t i e s — m a k i n g it difficult to avoid c o n s t i t u t i o n a l difficulties if a c o m p l e t e c o n s o l i d a t i o n h a d b e e n a t t e m p t e d u s i n g only statute law. A l t h o u g h m a n y U n i g o v p r o p o n e n t s p r o b a b l y favored school

25. A m e n d i n g t h e I n d i a n a c o n s t i t u t i o n is difficult a n d t i m e - c o n s u m i n g : an a m e n d m e n t m u s t be a p p r o v e d by t w o s u c c e s s i v e legislatures, in exactly the s a m e form, and t h e n a p p r o v e d by t h e voters in a s t a t e w i d e r e f e r e n d u m . T h e p r o p o n e n t s of this measure d i d not w a n t to e m b a r k u p o n s u c h an effort.

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district consolidation in principle, the policy committee decided very early that any attempt to change the school system would endanger the proposal. Consequently, the 11 ind e p e n d e n t school systems were untouched. While the reorganization measure was being considered (and subsequently), the central-city school system was involved in heated controversy and litigation over racial segregation practices. This had a major impact on Unigov's implementation, a point that will be considered more thoroughly in Chapter 8. The elective county offices were hardly touched. Under Unigov, eight elective offices were continued: the sheriff, prosecutor, auditor, treasurer, recorder, coroner, surveyor (all prescribed in the constitution), and the assessor (provided by statute law). Their duties remained essentially the same, and they were affected only to the extent that budgetary control and general legislative control (subject, of course, to the general state statute) are now vested in the City-County Council. By retaining these county offices, the bill avoided constitutional entanglements and in considerable degree escaped the opposition that the elected officials and their adherents would probably have mounted. The posts of the three county commissioners—who constituted the closest approach to a general county executive and legislative organ—were handled in an ingenious fashion. While the positions were not abolished, they are no longer separately elective. Instead, the county auditor, treasurer, and assessor serve as county commissioners, exercising certain minor residual functions not transferred to the mayor or City-County Council. Two of the three incumbent county commissioners at the time opposed the bill, but they lacked sufficient influence to block it. The nine townships were untouched, thus avoiding or at least muting opposition from the elective township trustees. The chief functions of Indiana townships are what the law calls "poor relief," that is, general assistance (as distinguished from the categorical assistance administered by the County Department of Public Welfare), and tax assessment u n d e r the supervision of the county tax assessor but operating on appropriations by the City-County Council. As originally drafted, the Unigov bill provided for a department of local government coordination, under the mayor, presumably to have substantial supervisory authority over all of the county officials and agencies. Since the officials w h o would have been affected were greatly disturbed at

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this—including Circuit Judge Niblack—the provision was dropped. 6. The largest suburban municipalities were excluded from the territorial jurisdiction and tax base of the consolidated city-county, although as part of the county they are subject to the controls and taxes enacted by the City-County Council w h e n acting in its capacity as governing body for the entire county. Since the mayor and City-County Council act as the executive and legislature for the whole county, citizens of the excluded municipalities are permitted to vote for them, as well as for their own mayors and city councilors or town board members. The bill excluded all cities except Indianapolis, as well as towns of over 5,000 population. When Unigov was being drafted, it was believed the exclusions would affect only the cities of Beech Grove and Lawrence and the town of Speedway, each with about 15,000 population and each having a good deal of civic pride in its autonomy and municipal service levels. Between Unigov's enactment and the effective date of its statute, the town of Southport (previously with only about 1,000 people) annexed some additional territory and population, changing its status to that of a city and making it one of the excluded municipalities. In any event, officials in most of the small cities and towns opposed Unigov, regardless of whether or not they were to be excluded. But it was believed that excluding the larger ones would help mollify the potentially most effective suburban opposition. 7. Most of the functional agencies that already had a degree of i n d e p e n d e n c e and autonomy were allowed to retain some of their independence. The Airport Authority, the Health and Hospital Corporation, the County Board of Public Welfare, the County Home, the City-County Building Authority, and the Capital Improvement Board were preserved. Although one of Beatty's 1965 proposals would have given the mayor some power over the County Welfare Board, this was not seriously considered in the Unigov effort. The health program was originally to have become one of the consolidated city's major departments, but the authors of Unigov backed off from this proposal w h e n they detected substantial opposition. The Unigov statute provided that the budget of the Health and Hospital Corporation is to be approved by the City-County Council. The same is true of the Airport Authority, over which the mayor had substantial appointing power u n d e r existing law. To s u m up, all of the agencies are some-

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8.

9. 10.

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what more i n d e p e n d e n t than the regular executive departments of the city-county government, although only public welfare retains its c o m p l e t e separation and autonomy. Existing territorial arrangements respecting individual local governmental services were changed very little by Unigov. As noted earlier, many functions had already been extended on a c o u n t y w i d e basis. Others—for example, sanitation, trash c o l l e c t i o n , libraries, and public housing—were available to an area larger than the city but smaller than the entire county. T h e bill provided for special taxing and service districts to support individual functions but made no significant changes in preexisting boundaries. Fire and police services, the only major services still confined within the limits of the city, were to be administered and supported in special service districts. Under the n e w act, enlargement of the police service district was m a d e s o m e w h a t easier than had been annexation to the old city. Extension of the fire service district boundaries, on the other hand, was made significantly more difficult under the new act than annexation had been in the past. Thus, annexation to the fire service district now requires the request of the majority of the owners of real property or the owners of real property amounting to 75 percent of the assessed valuation in the area affected. Politically, this meant that the bill's sponsors feared the potential opposition of volunteer fire d e p a r t m e n t s — w h i c h serve the suburban a r e a s — more than they did the potential opposition of the sheriff, w h o provided police service to the unincorporated area. No changes were attempted in the judicial system. Apparently no real thought was given to extending any local government functions beyond Marion County even though the official standard metropolitan statistical area includes seven other counties, and arrangements for mutual consultation on s o m e matters already existed. In fact, the Unigov framers, knowing that Indiana law permits cities to a n n e x adjacent land in another county, expressly protected adjacent counties against annexation by the newly consolidated city-county by making annexation impossible. T h i s was done to allay the fears of the adjacent counties.

T h e s e general provisions were incorporated in the original draft bill, but the process of negotiation and c o m p r o m i s e continued throughout the legislative session, with a decided effect on certain articles. T h e s e changes are c o n s i d e r e d in the following chapter, along with discussion of the legislative process.

6 The Legislative Stage

Legislative c o n s i d e r a t i o n of Unigov began w h e n the ninety-sixth session of the Indiana General A s s e m b l y opened on January 9, 1 9 6 9 , although the Unigov bill was not actually introduced until January 21. T h e legislative phase e n d e d on March 13, 1 9 6 9 , w h e n Governor Edgar D. W h i t c o m b signed the Unigov bill into law. O n c e the General Assembly c o n v e n e d , all the reorganization effort focused on the legislative process. For e x a m p l e , Mayor Lugar continued his exhaustive s c h e d u l e as the chief s p o k e s m a n for Unigov, but with important changes. M o v i n g the Unigov debate into the legislature shifted m u c h of the leadership initiative away from the mayor and to the bill's legislative sponsors. T h e mayor's efforts to organize support in Marion County were now e x t e n d e d to a statewide campaign to persuade General A s s e m b l y m e m b e r s to support Unigov. W h i l e the mayor and his associates c o n t i n u e d to play an important part in the Unigov debate, they recognized the a u t o n o m o u s nature of the General Assembly and left day-to-day m a n a g e m e n t of the bill to the legislators.

Leadership, Organization, and Strategy S e n a t o r L a w r e n c e Borst and Representative " N e d " Lamkin, delegation leaders in the S e n a t e and House, respectively, provided the legislative leadership for the proposal. T h e y had been a part of the Unigov d i s c u s s i o n from the beginning and were personally c o m m i t t e d to the idea. T h e practice of keeping the entire Marion County legislative delegation informed as d e v e l o p m e n t s occurred also facilitated passage of the leadership reins to the legislators. T h e Unigov bill was introduced 12 days after the General Assembly c o n v e n e d . In the interim, the Marion County delegation assisted by organizing the legislative leadership and informing legislators from other parts of the state about their plans for a metropolitan form of government. In the 1 9 6 9 General A s s e m b l y the R e p u b l i c a n Party had a 73 to 27 edge in the House and a 35 to 15 advantage in the Senate, giving it a large working majority. T h e 15 house m e m b e r s and 8 senators from M a r i o n County were all R e p u b l i c a n s . Physician Otis R.

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B o w e n ( B r e m e n ) , w h o had b e e n a c a n d i d a t e for the R e p u b l i c a n Party's n o m i n a t i o n for g o v e r n o r in 1 9 6 8 and w a s to be the n o m i n e e in 1 9 7 2 , was r e e l e c t e d s p e a k e r of t h e House. A l l e n E. B l o o m (Fort W a y n e ) w a s e l e c t e d p r e s i d e n t pro t e m of the S e n a t e , s h a r i n g that b o d y ' s l e a d e r s h i p w i t h L i e u t e n a n t G o v e r n o r R i c h a r d E. F o l z (Evansville), w h o s e r v e d as p r e s i d e n t of t h e S e n a t e . In t h e H o u s e , S p e a k e r B o w e n n a m e d R e p r e s e n t a t i v e L a m k i n as c h a i r of a 1 5 - m e m b e r Affairs of M a r i o n C o u n t y C o m m i t t e e , c o m p r i s i n g 11 R e p u b l i c a n s and 4 D e m o c r a t s , with s e v e n m e m b e r s f r o m M a r i o n C o u n t y . In the S e n a t e , L i e u t e n a n t G o v e r n o r F o l z a p p o i n t e d S e n a t o r B o r s t c h a i r of its C o m m i t t e e on Affairs of M a r i o n C o u n t y , a l o n g w i t h t h e 7 other m e m b e r s of the M a r i o n C o u n t y d e l e g a t i o n . S e n a t o r A l b e r t J. L a M e r e (Munster) was the lone D e m o cratic m e m b e r . D u r i n g t h e e a r l y stages, the M a r i o n C o u n t y delegation m a d e a c o n c e r t e d effort to e s t a b l i s h c o n t a c t s w i t h their f e l l o w legislators to a p p r i s e t h e m of t h e U n i g o v proposal a n d what they thought about it. T h i s w a s d o n e p r i m a r i l y through the i n f o r m a l e x c h a n g e s of getting a c q u a i n t e d a n d r e a c q u a i n t e d that a c c o m p a n y e a c h n e w s e s s i o n . But d e l e g a t i o n m e m b e r s w e r e a l s o asked to m a i n t a i n ties with s p e c i f i e d legislators to e n s u r e that n o one was m i s s e d . T h e plan was not to s o l i c i t votes in t h e early stages but m e r e l y to keep c h a n n e l s of c o m m u n i c a t i o n o p e n . T h e y a s k e d for votes later. A c c o r d i n g to S e n a t o r Borst, the d e c i s i o n as to w h i c h c h a m b e r s h o u l d be t h e h o u s e of origin was important in U n i g o v ' s case: " P o l i t i c a l l y s p e a k i n g , w e felt t h e S e n a t e w o u l d be far-and-away the hardest c h a m b e r to get it [Unigov] through b e c a u s e t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e m e m b e r s h i p is stronger t h e r e . A n d w e k n e w if w e c o u l d get it through the S e n a t e w e c o u l d get it t h r o u g h the H o u s e . " 1 T h u s , the p r i n c i p a l s and s p o n s o r s of U n i g o v , h o p i n g that the S e n a t e ' s strong l e a d e r s h i p and favorable c o m m i t t e e w o u l d c o m p e n s a t e for t h e h e a v i e r o p p o s i t i o n exp e c t e d in t h e u p p e r h o u s e , c h o s e to i n t r o d u c e their bill in the S e n a t e .

Senate Committee Consideration After a w e e k e n d drafting s e s s i o n , the attorneys c o m p l e t e d t h e final v e r s i o n of S e n a t e B i l l 1 9 9 ( S B 1 9 9 ) , and S e n a t o r Borst i n t r o d u c e d it on J a n u a r y 2 1 , 1 9 6 9 . S B 1 9 9 was r e c e i v e d and read that day and s u b m i t t e d to t h e C o m m i t t e e o n Affairs of M a r i o n C o u n t y . B e c a u s e of o p p o s i t i o n in the S e n a t e , t h e major Unigov c o m p r o m i s e s w e r e m a d e in that b o d y . After the bill was a p p r o v e d by the S e n a t e , it p a s s e d t h e H o u s e w i t h a large majority w i t h n o m a j o r a m e n d m e n t s of t h e S e n a t e - a p p r o v e d version. A c c o r d i n g l y , this dis1. L a w r e n c e M . B o r s t , i n t e r v i e w w i t h J a m e s O w e n , I n d i a n a p o l i s , M a y 30, 1 9 7 2 .

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cussion of the legislative procedure concentrates on the Senate and on the committee and second-reading stages. By the end of its first week's deliberations the Senate committee had identified a number of technical errors in SB 199, as well as several controversial sections that, unless amended, would probably impede the bill's progress or prevent its passage altogether. Accordingly, Senator Borst met with attorneys Bose and Whistler to make the necessary revisions. The attorneys' actions at this stage illustrate their insight into the workings of the General Assembly and reflect the professionalism that went into the bill's preparation. Instead of making the necessary changes and resubmitting a modified SB 199 to the committee, the attorneys chose to draft and submit a completely new bill. The new draft was completed early in February and was introduced on February 4 as Senate Bill 543 (SB 543). The original bill was left to die in committee and thus never reached the floor. By this procedure, a "clean" bill was presented to the General Assembly, devoid of all the deletions and additions that otherwise would have s h o w n up in an amended version of SB 199.2 Furthermore, the process of SB 543 was expedited when Bose got his law partner, William H. Evans, attorney for the Republican majority in the Senate, personally to present the bill for printing, thus enabling the bill to be submitted directly to the committee without the usual printing delay, the time thus saved being important in a short session. Major

Compromises

Except for the modifications noted, SB 543 was an article-by-article duplication of SB 199. On the other hand, the changes were extensive and substantial. There were five major changes in all, three of them amendments and two outright deletions. These changes make it clear that the Unigov legislation did not move uneventfully through the General Assembly on a straight partisan vote despite the large Republican majority. On the contrary, the most effective arguments against Unigov came from within Republican Party ranks. The first two amendments were in Article III, which provided for the officers of the consolidated city and county. Under the original provisions, the first mayor and council of the merged governments were to be elected in 1970. This was amended to postpone elections until 1971. The preferences of elected officers (mostly Republican) whose terms would be shortened by the earlier election prompted this change, which had been agreed to in discussions between Mayor Lugar and county officials. A possible legal entanglement was the dominant reason for the 2. A m e n d e d s e c t i o n s of a bill m u s t a p p e a r in c a n c e l e d ( " s t r i k e - o u t " ] t y p e , foll o w e d by t h e s u b s t i t u t e d n e w m a t e r i a l , w h i c h a p p e a r s in italics.

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s e c o n d a m e n d m e n t to A r t i c l e III, dropping the proposed 5 at-large c o u n c i l m e m b e r s f r o m s e c t i o n 3 0 6 and instead having all 25 c o u n c i l m e m b e r s e l e c t e d f r o m s i n g l e - m e m b e r districts. B u t the c h a n g e also had significant p o l i t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . T h u s , the R e p u b l i c a n s exp e c t e d to gain an e l e c t o r a l a d v a n t a g e w i t h the e x t e n s i o n of c o u n c i l e l e c t i o n s on a c o u n t y w i d e basis, so i n c l u d i n g 5 at-large seats had o b v i o u s p a r t i s a n o v e r t o n e s a n d advantages for t h e R e p u b l i c a n s . But it w a s b e l i e v e d that t h e o n e m a n , o n e vote p r o v i s i o n s of recent U S S u p r e m e Court d e c i s i o n s w o u l d probably a p p l y to Unigov e l e c t i o n s , and this t e m p o r a r i l y o v e r c a m e partisan c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , resulting in d r o p p i n g t h e at-large seats. Later in t h e s e s s i o n , h o w e v e r , t h i n k i n g on t h e o n e m a n , o n e vote m a t t e r shifted o n c e m o r e , and 4 at-large seats w e r e a d d e d to t h e 2 5 - m e m b e r c o u n c i l . A m e n d m e n t s a n d d e l e t i o n s affecting articles VI, XI, and X I V c o m p r i s e d t h e m o s t f a r - r e a c h i n g c h a n g e s affecting the Unigov bill. U n d e r t h e o r i g i n a l p r o v i s i o n s of A r t i c l e VI, setting up the departm e n t s , t h e m a y o r w o u l d h a v e gotten e x t e n s i v e p o w e r s to revise or create d e p a r t m e n t s u n d e r h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . T h u s , u n d e r s e c t i o n 6 0 4 of t h e original bill t h e m a y o r n e e d e d o n l y to s u b m i t his reorganization plan to t h e c o u n c i l , w h e r e u p o n the p l a n w o u l d a u t o m a t i c a l l y b e c o m e effective u n l e s s the c o u n c i l m u s t e r e d a majority against it w i t h i n 6 0 days. R e q u i r i n g a c o u n c i l m a j o r i t y to vote against a mayor's plan in order to stop it, i n s t e a d of r e q u i r i n g a majority vote for its approval, w o u l d give t h e m a y o r a d e c i d e d edge. B u t t h e n e w p r o v i s i o n , s e c t i o n 6 0 4 of S B 5 4 3 , reversed this p r o c e d u r e , r e q u i r i n g a m a y o r ' s plan to r e c e i v e an affirmative vote of t w o - t h i r d s of the c o u n c i l ' s m e m b e r s to pass. A p p r e h e n s i o n s of a strong e x e c u t i v e on t h e part of the I n d i a n a legislators prompted the change.3 S B 1 9 9 ' s A r t i c l e X I w o u l d create a D e p a r t m e n t of P u b l i c Health, i n c l u d i n g t h e H e a l t h a n d Hospital Corporation (a s p e c i a l district gove r n m e n t e s t a b l i s h e d in 1 9 5 1 ) . Officials of the Health and Hospital C o r p o r a t i o n p r o t e s t e d , fearing loss of t h e c o r p o r a t i o n ' s b o n d i n g power along w i t h its a u t o n o m y . M i n d f u l of the s u c c e s s f u l c a m p a i g n of s o m e of the s a m e officials against a s i m i l a r p r o v i s i o n in the 1 9 6 5 " p o w e r g r a b " b i l l s , t h e a t t o r n e y s d e l e t e d the entire article from S B 5 4 3 . T h u s , the original e i g h t - d e p a r t m e n t a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w a s r e d u c e d to seven. T h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n w a s further r e d u c e d to s i x d e p a r t m e n t s w h e n S B 1 9 9 ' s A r t i c l e X I V w a s left out of the n e w b i l l , dropping the prop o s e d D e p a r t m e n t of L o c a l G o v e r n m e n t C o o r d i n a t i o n , w h i c h w o u l d have given t h e m a y o r vast i n f l u e n c e over the a g e n c i e s and governm e n t s i n c l u d e d u n d e r U n i g o v : " T h e D e p a r t m e n t of Local G o v e r n m e n t 3. Phillip S. Wilder, Jr., "State Government Reorganization in Indiana: Pressures and Resistance," Indiana Academy of Social Sciences, Proceedings, n.s. 10:13 (1965).

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Coordination shall provide for liaison, coordination, and cooperation among county agencies, local government, independent agencies and the unified city to the end that duplication of services is avoided, conflicts among officials are resolved, cooperation promoted, and more efficient governmental operation achieved." 4 Although the jurisdiction of the Department of Local Government Coordination would not have included townships, cities and towns, or independent agencies, the department might have had extensive authority over elected county officials, judges of the county and municipal courts, and all other countywide agencies that were not separate municipal corporations. Unfortunately for those who favored the arrangement, the officials potentially most affected were the same ones who had formed the county task force of Republican officeholders in December 1968. Out of respect for the political power of this group, especially Judge Niblack, the entire article was dropped. Senate Floor

Debate

A week after being submitted as SB 543, the new Unigov bill had been amended and reported from committee with a "do pass" recommendation. With two significant exceptions, the committee's amendments were technical in nature. The first significant change was the amendment of Article III to put back in a number of at-large councilmembers, reversing the earlier change (noted above) and increasing the council from 25 to 29 members, the 4 additional members to be elected countywide. Some of the political motives for this were noted earlier, but also it was considered a structurally sound idea to establish at-large seats to help give the mayor (regardless of party) a working majority in the council. Thus, it was presumed that the party winning a countywide vote for mayor in a given election would also take the at-large seats. It was further assumed that the at-large seats would help assure a ruling majority on a council whose posts were expected to be both highly contested in most elections and rather evenly split between the parties. Another significant change was addition of a new section to Article XV, providing for transfer of territory between the consolidated city and the excluded cities. This was a reciprocal process, that is, the consolidated city and the excluded cities were each given the power to annex real estate within the other municipalities' territorial limits. But the implementation formula—requiring approval of both annexing and disannexing cities and leaving final arbitration to the circuit court— was so complex as to signify an annexation stalemate for the foreseeable future. This was, nevertheless, acceptable to the Unigov principals, as it appeased its suburbanite proponents and would also limit 4. I n d i a n a S e n a t e Bill 199, 1969, Art. XIV, sec. 1402, p. 153.

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infringements on the consolidated city's territory. Presidents of the excluded cities also saw the amendment as safeguarding their territorial integrity against depredations by the consolidated city-county. Second

Reading

With SB 543 thus amended and reported favorably out of committee, after the required two-day waiting period Senator Borst "called d o w n " the bill for a second reading on February 14. Action at the second reading centered on amendments from the Senate floor. This was critical as successful amendments at this stage could have drastically changed the bill, delayed it, or defeated it entirely. Five amendments were proposed and defeated in nearly straight party-line votes. Three of these motions are discussed here to illustrate the difficulty of Unigov's passage, highlighting the opposition and some of its motivation. In many respects, the bill's greatest hazard was posed by the proposal of Senator Joan Gubbins—the only Marion County senator to vote against Unigov later w h e n it came up for final passage. She moved to strike everything after the bill's enacting clause, substituting a study commission charged with preparing an entirely new plan for metropolitan government. The Marion County delegation thus confronted a maverick in its midst. An unwritten rule made this most awkward. The Indiana General Assembly is like other state legislatures in having adopted certain informal "rules of the game" by custom and tradition. One such rule has been stated in general terms by Thomas Dye: "Another informal rule is the practice in many states of passing bills that would affect only one area of the state without debate or opposition when the delegation in that area unanimously supports that bill." 3 This rule was closely adhered to by the Indiana General Assembly and had special significance for the Unigov effort of the Indianapolis—Marion County delegation. As the only first-class city in the state and the largest delegation in the legislature, Indianapolis-Marion County was traditionally (though sometimes grudgingly) accorded a considerable amount of autonomy by the other delegations. Marion County also sends the largest and most highly organized delegation to the state Republican convention, giving it added power when Republicans control the legislature, as they did in 1969. Because of these considerations, SB 543 had been written to apply only to counties with cities of the first class, that is, only to Marion County, and an extensive effort was made to have a united delegation behind it. Thus, when one of their own members broke ranks to speak against Unigov, this threat5. T h o m a s R. Dye, P o l i t i c s in States P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1968), p. 129.

and C o m m u n i t i e s ( E n g l e w o o d Cliffs, N.J.:

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ened the credibility of Unigov's sponsors among their fellow legislators. Moreover, Senator Gubbins's possible use of her conservative image to persuade other conservative senators to go against Unigov on a close vote was an obvious threat. Senator Gubbins's motion was voted down 14 to 34 on a nearly straight party-line vote. Opposing the motion were one Democrat, Senator Robert E. Mahowald (South Bend), and 33 Republicans. In favoring the amendment, Senator Gubbins was joined by one other Republican, Senator Leo Sullivan (Peru), and 12 Democrats. One senator from each party abstained. Though the opposition from within their delegation was irritating and potentially dangerous to Unigov, a still more serious threat came in the Democratic motion to submit SB 543 to a referendum. The referendum question had been an important issue throughout the debate and had been raised at all the earlier public meetings. The bill's proponents defended their opposition to a referendum in several ways. They argued that referendums were not required by general law, and since the legislature clearly had the power to enact or not to enact the bill, a referendum could only be advisory. In support, they cited a recent Indiana Supreme Court decision: 6 "Subordinate divisions of the government are but parts of the state government as a whole. The state, by its legislature, may abolish, consolidate, combine, eliminate, or create new governmental corporations, or authorize such alterations to govern those who live in a given area. There is no constitutional guarantee for the continued existence of a governmental subdivision of the state. They are all creatures of the legislature." 7 While the referendum is considered to be an important part of the democratic process in dealing with major legislative measures in many other states, this was not the case in Indiana, which was not regarded as a reform state. The initiative, the nonpartisan ballot, and the recall vote, popular at the turn of the century, had not been adopted as part of the Indiana political process, and the referendum was seldom employed. Although Hoosiers observed their neighboring states voting regularly on school tax levies and other issues, they had not employed the referendum themselves. Thus, the Unigov proponents were not bound legally or by custom to seek a referendum vote. Unigov advocates also opposed the delay and expense a referendum would require. Obviously, they also wanted to avoid the difficulties, controversy, cost, and effort of a referendum campaign. Later, Mayor Lugar said: " T o have gone the route of referendum risked polarization of the worst sort along racial or sociological lines. Secondly, 6 . R i c h a r d G. L u g a r (mayor), T h o m a s C. H a s b r o o k (City C o u n c i l p r e s i d e n t ) , and B e u r t S e r V a a s ( C o u n t y C o u n c i l p r e s i d e n t ) , letter to m e m b e r s of M a r i o n C o u n t y legislative d e l e g a t i o n , J a n u a r y 2 3 , 1 9 6 9 . 7 . W o e r n e r v. C i t y of I n d i a n a p o l i s , 1 7 1 NE 2 n d , 3 4 ( 1 9 6 0 ) .

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to t h r o w an issue w h i c h has tested the w i s d o m of the best c o n s t i t u tional l a w y e r s in t h e state to p e r s o n s w h o have not the slightest idea of w h a t g o v e r n m e n t w a s b e f o r e or after is not wise." B Probably most i m p o r t a n t w a s their belief that t h e y h a d the political m u s c l e n e e d e d to pass the bill w i t h o u t a r e f e r e n d u m p r o v i s i o n a n d their w i l l i n g n e s s to use it. In a n y event, the closest vote d u r i n g the s e c o n d reading w a s on t h e m o t i o n for a r e f e r e n d u m , d e f e a t e d by 18 in favor and 28 against. O n c e again party a l l e g i a n c e s p r e v a i l e d in a highly partisan vote, des p i t e s u b s t a n t i a l R e p u b l i c a n d e f e c t i o n s . All 28 votes against t h e motion w e r e cast by R e p u b l i c a n s . T h r e e of the seven defecting Republic a n s voted w i t h t h e D e m o c r a t s , a n d f o u r a b s t a i n e d . A n e a r l y c o m p l e t e p a r t y - l i n e vote also d e f e a t e d a third a m e n d m e n t s u b m i t t e d by Democrat S e n a t o r Robert J. Fair (Princeton): "No p e r s o n elected Mayor u n d e r this act shall be eligible for election for a n y other p u b l i c office, local, c o u n t y , state or federal d u r i n g t h e fouryear term for w h i c h the M a y o r has been elected, w h e t h e r or not he c o n t i n u e s in his office as Mayor."' 1 T h i s o b v i o u s attempt to curtail M a y o r Lugar's political a m b i t i o n s for the near f u t u r e u n d e r s c o r e d the p a r t i s a n n a t u r e of t h e bill's s u p p o r t a n d o p p o s i t i o n . Every Democrat voted yes o n S e n a t o r Fair's m o t i o n , along w i t h R e p u b l i c a n S e n a t o r s G u b b i n s a n d F r a n k J. B i d d i n g e r (Marion), but o t h e r w i s e the Republican m a j o r i t y h e l d firm to beat d o w n the m o t i o n 17 to 13.

Third Reading and Final Vote M o t i o n s for a m e n d m e n t on the third r e a d i n g require the a p p r o v a l of t w o - t h i r d s of the Senate, so n o r m a l l y at that stage a bill is p r e s e n t e d directly for passage w i t h o u t a m e n d m e n t . T h i s w a s also SB 543's c o u r s e w h e n , after b e i n g "called d o w n " by Senator Borst the next day, it c a m e before the S e n a t e for a vote. T h e d e b a t e w a s restricted to the q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r the bill s h o u l d pass a n d w a s e n d e d by S e n a t o r Borst after o n e h o u r , w h e r e u p o n t h e vote w a s taken. T h e p r i n c i p a l d e b a t o r s on a t h i r d reading, Senators Borst a n d G u b b i n s , had a l r e a d y p r e s e n t e d their views at the second reading, so the d e b a t e d i d not attract m u c h a t t e n t i o n o n the floor, w h e r e at t i m e s f e w e r t h a n half of t h e m e m b e r s w e r e present. But the vote itself attracted a great deal of a t t e n t i o n b e c a u s e of its closencss. In I n d i a n a , passage of a bill r e q u i r e s a m a j o r i t y of the full S e n a t e m e m b e r s h i p , so 26 yes votes w e r e necessary. T h e bill passed by a vote of 28 to 16, w i t h 6 a b s t e n t i o n s (see A p p e n d i x 6). B. " C i t y - C o u n t y C o n s o l i d a t i o n s , S e p a r a t i o n s , a n d F e d e r a t i o n s . " A m e r i c a n C o u n t y 35(11):17 ( N o v e m b e r 1970). 9. j o u r n a l of the I n d i a n a State Senate, Ninety-Sixth Session of the G e n e r a l Ass e m b l y ( I n d i a n a p o l i s : C. E. P a u l e y & Co., 1969). p. 1234.

The Legislative

Stage

83

Republicans cast 25 of the 28 votes for passage, one short of the required constitutional majority. Two senators from Saint Joseph County cast 2 of the 3 Democratic votes, a part of the sponsors' strategy. Senators Robert Mahowald and John J. Frick (South Bend) supported the Unigov plans primarily because they were currently involved in the formulative stage of reorganizing the governments in Saint Joseph County. Although no outright vote trading was involved, it was no coincidence that w h e n their plan was ready for the next legislative session, Senator Borst introduced it in the Senate. The third Democratic vote, cast by Senator Wilfred J. Ullrich (Aurora), was unanticipated and went unexplained. The Republican vote shows several interesting anomalies. As expected, of course, Senator Gubbins voted against the bill. The Marion County delegation's solidarity was also broken by the abstention of Senator Charles E. Bosma (Beech Grove). Senator Bosma's abstention had been anticipated and was more easily tolerated than Senator Gubbins's action, as Bosma did not speak against the bill or try to persuade others to vote against it. His decision was essentially political: although his Senate constituency was Marion County where he ran at-large, his h o m e and base of political support was in Beech Grove, one of the suburban cities where sentiment was strongly against Unigov. Accordingly, he kept the principals apprised of his situation, and in turn his abstention received their begrudging approval. Political and geographic considerations also prompted 3 of the 6 senators from counties immediately adjacent to Marion to cast negative votes. They were concerned that Unigov might eventually be extended to their counties. The bill's sponsors attempted to allay such opposition by including a clause forbidding annexation of territory outside Marion County, a limitation not normally imposed on Indiana cities. Nevertheless, Senators Paul W. Swisher (Mooresville) and James B. Young (Franklin) were not convinced and voted against the bill, whereas Senator Keith C. McCormick (Lebanon) abstained. In all, 6 of the Senate's 35 Republicans voted against the bill, and 4 abstained (under Indiana's legislative procedure abstention is equivalent to a negative vote). In summary, the Republican majority was obviously essential to SB 543's passage, but clearly it did not sweep through the Senate entirely on the basis of Republican dominance. In fact, its most effective opposition came from Republicans, both inside and outside the Senate, w h o forced several committee a m e n d m e n t s greatly reducing the scope of the original Unigov bill. Moreover, the fact that some Republicans, mostly conservatives, withheld support made Unigov's passage d e p e n d on a few essential crossover votes by Democrats. In any event, with the bill through the Senate, Mayor Lugar and several of his colleagues, w h o had spent the Saturday afternoon of the

84

The Legislative

Stage

final S e n a t e d e b a t e a n d vote in c o n s i d e r a b l e anxiety, c o u l d b r e a t h e a bit easier. A m a j o r h u r d l e h a d been s u r m o u n t e d .

now

House Action Four d a y s e l a p s e d b e t w e e n February 15, w h e n SB 543 passed t h e Senate, a n d F e b r u a r y 19, w h e n S p e a k e r Otis Bowen h a n d e d it clown for the first r e a d i n g in the H o u s e of R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s a n d assigned it to the Affairs of M a r i o n C o u n t y C o m m i t t e e for c o n s i d e r a t i o n . T h e leaders h i p of the Unigov d e b a t e t h e n p a s s e d from Senator Borst to Repres e n t a t i v e L a m k i n . L a m k i n h a d b e e n a m e m b e r of the policy g r o u p that h a d w o r k e d t h r o u g h the p r e v i o u s year, h a d joined in the decision to p r o p o s e a m e t r o p o l i t a n f o r m of g o v e r n m e n t , and had p a r t i c i p a t e d at each level of the p u b l i c Unigov debates. As the bill m o v e d t h r o u g h t h e Senate, he h a d kept abreast of its progress, m a i n t a i n i n g a step-by-step liaison w i t h S e n a t o r Borst a n d the other m e m b e r s of the M a r i o n C o u n t y delegation. S e n a t e action had a m e n d e d or d e l e t e d m a n y of the bill's m o r e controversial p r o v i s i o n s , leaving few if a n y items on w h i c h c o m p r o m i s e w a s n e c e s s a r y in the H o u s e . A c c o r d i n g l y , SB 543 w e n t t h r o u g h c o m m i t t e e a n d a s e c o n d r e a d i n g in good t i m e and with little o p p o s i tion. T h u s , five d a y s after being referred to c o m m i t t e e it was r e p o r t e d out w i t h a r e c o m m e n d a t i o n of " d o p a s s " as a m e n d e d . T h e c o m m i t t e e a m e n d m e n t s , w h i l e n u m e r o u s , w e r e all technical, a n d the H o u s e q u i c k l y c o n c u r r e d in the c o m m i t t e e report w h e n the bill was h a n d e d d o w n for a s e c o n d r e a d i n g on F e b r u a r y 27, three days later. At the s e c o n d reading, the Democrats repeated several of the m o t i o n s that had b e e n m a d e at the s a m e stage in the Senate, s u b m i t ting five a m e n d m e n t s d e s i g n e d to w e a k e n or defeat the IJnigov bill. If p a s s e d , the D e m o c r a t i c a m e n d m e n t s w o u l d have required a referend u m , barred the e x c l u d e d cities f r o m voting in the c o u n t y w i d e mayoral election, r e m o v e d the f o u r at-large c o u n c i l seats, p r e v e n t e d t h e n e w m a y o r f r o m r u n n i n g for a n o t h e r political office for the d u r a t i o n of his term, a n d p r o v i d e d for a merit e m p l o y m e n t system for Unigov. Each p r o p o s e d a m e n d m e n t w a s , h o w e v e r , q u i c k l y defeated by a solid m a j o r i t y in a h i g h l y p a r t i s a n vote. T h e entire bill passed 57 to 34, w i t h every Democrat v o t i n g no. In a d d i t i o n to the 57 R e p u b l i c a n s voting yes, 9 R e p u b l i c a n s a b s t a i n e d , a n d 7 voted no.

Trouble with the

Speaker

At this p o i n t , party lines a p p e a r e d to be h o l d i n g well, a n d prospects w e r e e n c o u r a g i n g for final passage w h e n the bill was h a n d e d d o w n for its t h i r d r e a d i n g . But S p e a k e r B o w e n delayed h a n d i n g d o w n

The Legislative the bill, and events took an unexpected

Stage

85

turn that almost dealt

the

p r o p o s a l a fatal setback. T h e s p e a k e r w a s in a p o s i t i o n to c o n t r o l t h e a g e n d a d u r i n g t h e f i n a l d a y s of t h e s h o r t s e s s i o n . U n l e s s h e " h a n d e d d o w n " t h e b i l l , it c o u l d n o t c o m e u p f o r final p a s s a g e . A c c o r d i n g to H o u s e r u l e s , t h e earliest S B 5 4 3 c o u l d be h a n d e d d o w n for the third reading w a s Friday, February 28. W h e n t h e c a l e n d a r w a s r e l e a s e d that m o r n i n g a n d S B 5 4 3 w a s not listed a m o n g the s c h e d u l e d events, M a y o r Lugar was disturbed and apprehensive.

At a p r e s s c o n f e r e n c e

held that e v e n i n g , the

mayor

c h a r g e d that the s p e a k e r w a s h o l d i n g up the final vote on Unigov. He g a v e o u t t h e s p e a k e r ' s u n l i s t e d p h o n e n u m b e r , u r g i n g c i t i z e n s to flood his office with p h o n e calls supporting the bill. T h e speaker took i m m e d i a t e u m b r a g e at t h e m a y o r ' s a c t i o n . " B o w e n , v i s i b l y a n g e r e d at L u g a r ' s c h a r g e s , s a i d h e w o u l d not h a n d d o w n t h e b i l l u n t i l h e w a s c o n v i n c e d it h a s t h e s u p p o r t of t h e m a j o r i t y of M a r i o n C o u n t y r e s i d e n t s . ' " " T h e m a y o r ' s a p p a r e n t b l u n d e r in a l i e n a t i n g t h e m o s t p o w e r f u l i n d i v i d u a l in t h e G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y w a s c o m p o u n d e d b y t h e t e l e p h o n e r e s p o n s e to h i s a p p e a l . T h e s p e a k e r ' s s e c r e t a r y a n n o u n c e d t h e r e s u l t s as o n l y 1 0 2 c a l l s f a v o r i n g U n i g o v of t h e 1 , 1 8 8 c a l l s s h e r e c e i v e d . M a y o r Lugar realized that a d i s p u t e w i t h S p e a k e r B o w e n so near t h e e n d of t h e s e s s i o n w o u l d s u r e l y kill t h e b i l l a n d h a d h i s c h a u f f e u r deliver a personal

l e t t e r to B o w e n o n S a t u r d a y , a p o l o g i z i n g for h i s

a c t i o n a n d s t a t i n g that h e w a s " m i s i n f o r m e d " a b o u t t h e m e c h a n i c s of handing down a House bill."

Lugar's l a c k of legislative

experience

w a s c e r t a i n l y a c o n t r i b u t i n g f a c t o r , but h i s r a s h d e c i s i o n to i n t e r c e d e w a s m o r e likely the result of a long, e x h a u s t i n g , and nearly c o n c l u s i v e campaign

for U n i g o v . A s a D e m o c r a t i c

l e g i s l a t o r put

it: " T h e

boy

w o n d e r r e a l l y lost h i s c o o l . ' " * S p e a k e r B o w e n h a d b e e n a c a n d i d a t e for t h e R e p u b l i c a n g u b e r n a t o r i a l n o m i n a t i o n at t h e c o n v e n t i o n t h e p r e v i o u s s u m m e r a n d h a d b e e n d e f e a t e d in l a r g e m e a s u r e t h r o u g h t h e e f f o r t s of M a r i o n C o u n t y chair B u l e n and his associates. Nevertheless, the speaker's action was probably

not

a

vindictive

response

to t h e

actions

of t h e

Marion

C o u n t y d e l e g a t i o n , as B o w e n s t i l l h a d p o l i t i c a l a m b i t i o n s . H e ran for a n d w a s e l e c t e d g o v e r n o r in 1 9 7 2 a n d w o u l d not w a n t to a n t a g o n i z e a powerful

contingent

of his party.

But he was d e e p l y interested

significant statewide legislation concerning taxation—matters

in

which

w e r e m o r e i m p o r t a n t to h i m t h a n t h e g o v e r n m e n t o f M a r i o n C o u n t y , a n d h e p r o b a b l y w a n t e d as m u c h l e v e r a g e as p o s s i b l e w i t h t h e M a r i o n 10.

"Lugar

Charges

House

Speaker

with

Sitting

on

Hill."

hu/kmupolis

Slar.

M a r c h 1 . 19GU, p. 1. 11.

"Lugar

Apology

Sent

in

Uni-gov

Outbursts,"

/ndiunnpolix

Shir, March

2.

i y ( ) 9 , p. 1. 12.

" L u g a r Charges House S p e a k e r . . . ." Iiuliuiuipulis Slur. March

I . 1!H>!). p. 1.

86

The Legislative

Stage

County delegation in c o n n e c t i o n with the tax controversies. In any event, leaders of the delegation apparently did all they could to make peace with the speaker. He finally handed down the bill for its third reading on W e d n e s d a y afternoon, March 5, the last possible day a Senate bill could be c o n s i d e r e d for final passage in the House.

Action at the Third Reading Action at the third reading in the House went much as the bill's sponsors expected. T h e short debate centered on a moving speech, delivered by Representative Lamkin (see A p p e n d i x 7), later designated "best speech of the s e s s i o n " by the city staff of the Indianapolis Star (who also voted Mayor Lugar's run-in with Speaker Bowen as the "top g o o f " of the s e s s i o n ) . " After two Democratic motions to delay passage were voted down by the Republican majority, the final roll call vote went 66 to 29 in favor of passage (see A p p e n d i x 8). Unigov had b e c o m e more strongly a party issue in the House than it had been in the Senate, and Republican d o m i n a n c e assured its passage. T h e two Democrats who bolted and voted for the bill were representatives Joe Barber and Burnett C. Bauer, both representing St. Joseph County (including S o u t h Bend), which as noted earlier had its own plans for reorganization. Of the five Republicans who voted no on Unigov, only one, Representative Roger L. Jessup (Blackford, Grant), represented an area outside of the Indianapolis standard metropolitan statistical area ( S M S A ) . T h e remaining four were Otis M. Yarnell from Marion County and Robert H. Bales, H. Jack Mullendore, and Jack N. S m i t h e r m a n , the three representatives of Hendricks, Johnson, and Morgan and S h e l b y counties, four counties bordering Marion County on the east and the south. After the final vote in the House, S B 543 was returned to the Senate for c o n c u r r e n c e in the House amendments. As these amendments were minor, there was no need for the time-consuming process of a c o n f e r e n c e c o m m i t t e e , and the Senate concurred in the amendments that same evening. T h e bill was sent to the printer to be enrolled in its final legislative form and was subsequently signed by the speaker of the House and the president of the Senate on March 10, the final day of the session, and presented to Governor W h i t c o m b for his signature. He signed the bill into law on March 13.

Legislative Tactics T h e crucial role of the Marion County legislative delegation had been recognized long before by Unigov sponsors. Its leaders were i:i.

" B e h i n d C l o s e d D o o r s , " I n d i a n a p o l i s Star.

M a r c h 9 . l!)(ii), p. 3.

The Legislative

Stage

87

m e m b e r s of t h e m a y o r ' s p o l i c y g r o u p , a n d t h e d e l e g a t i o n h a d b e e n t h o r o u g h l y b r i e f e d . In a d d i t i o n , p a r t l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e b i l l ' s p a s s a g e w a s t h e v e r y e f f e c t i v e p r o g r a m to o r g a n i z e s u p p o r t b o t h i n s i d e a n d o u t s i d e t h e G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y . T h e v e r y h i g h l e v e l of from

the

Marion

Speaker Bowen

County

delegation

in b o t h

houses

was

support essential.

h a d s a i d t h a t " i t w o u l d b e h e l p f u l if m o s t but n o t

n e c e s s a r i l y all o f t h e M a r i o n C o u n t y d e l e g a t i o n s u p p o r t e d t h e b i l l . ' " 4 T h e p r o p o n e n t s l o s t t w o m e m b e r s of t h e e i g h t in M a r i o n

County's

S e n a t e d e l e g a t i o n a n d o n l y o n e of the f i f t e e n - m e m b e r H o u s e delegation. As noted, the Senate's dissenters were Joan Gubbins,

identified

w i t h a very c o n s e r v a t i v e portion of the R e p u b l i c a n c o n s t i t u e n c y , a n d Charles

Bosnia,

whose

personal

and

political

base

was

in

Beech

G r o v e , a s u b u r b a n c o m m u n i t y s t r o n g l y o p p o s e d to U n i g o v . T h e H o u s e d i s s e n t e r w a s O t i s Y a r n e l l , a m e m b e r of t h e B r o t h e r h o o d of R a i l r o a d Trainmen.

Party

Caucuses

In a f u r t h e r a t t e m p t to s o l i d i f y d e l e g a t e s u p p o r t for U n i g o v , K e i t h Bulen, Republican dinner meetings.

Party c o u n t y chair, arranged a series of w o r k i n g

Marion County assemblymen caucused each

Mon-

d a y n i g h t d u r i n g t h e n i n e t y - s i x t h s e s s i o n to set l e g i s l a t i v e p r i o r i t i e s and

strategy.

Despite

his

considerable

power

as

party chair

in

a

county w h e r e legislative candidates were slated by a special screening c o m m i t t e e and clected at-large, Bulen used the d i n n e r meetings

for

p o l i t i c a l a r m - t w i s t i n g to get v o t e s for U n i g o v . In t h e U n i g o v d i s c u s s i o n s h e a p p a r e n t l y d i d not d i s c o u r a g e c r i t i c i s m a n d d e b a t e , a n d h e r e c o g n i z e d t h a t a f e w d e l e g a t e s m i g h t h a v e s p e c i a l p r o b l e m s in c o n s t i t u e n c i e s s u c h as B e e c h G r o v e or in t h e l a b o r u n i o n s . F o r t h e m o s t part t h e s e m e e t i n g s a l l o w e d t h e d e l e g a t e s to a p p l y t h e i r o w n s e l f - d i s c i p l i n e w i t h respect to their Unigov votes. Of c o u r s e , they that

the

mayor

and

party

chair

solidly

favored

the

realized

proposal

and

s e n s e d t h e p o t e n t i a l r i s k s of n o t g o i n g a l o n g . Representative Yarnell, the only House m e m b e r who went counter to t h e p o s i t i o n o f t h e d e l e g a t i o n , a c k n o w l e d g e d t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s w h e n h o s a i d h e d i d not f e a r f a i l u r e b e c a u s e h e d i d not p l a n to s e e k r e e l e c t i o n . 1 ' N e v e r t h e l e s s , h e d i d not b u c k t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n v i g o r o u s l y , did not c a m p a i g n against the bill, and like S e n a t o r B o s m a , kept the p a r t y i n f o r m e d of h i s s t a n d . A l s o l i k e S e n a t o r B o s m a , Y a r n e l l a t t r i b u t e d h i s p o s i t i o n to t h e U n i g o v o p p o s i t i o n in h i s h o m e c o n s t i t u e n c y . E d u c a t i n g t h e m s e l v e s to k e e p t h e i r c o l l e a g u e s i n f o r m e d o f t h e 14. " I , » g a r R e m a i n s H o p e f u l of A p p r o v a l of l . J n i - g o v i ' l a n b y ( ¡ ( m o r a l A s s e m b l y , " I n d i a n a p o l i s S t a r . J a n u a r y 2 0 . 15)fiS), p. 2 1 . 15. p. 1.

" U n i - g o v B i l l S e n t o n W a y to G o v e r n o r . " I n d i a n a p o l i s S t a r . M a r c h (>, 1 9 6 9 ,

88

The Legislative

Stage

m a n y changes in the bill took a good deal of the delegates' time, but the effort u n d o u b t e d l y had the desired effect. Members of the House from other areas generally deferred to the Marion County delegation w i t h regard to Unigov. Keeping

Legislators

Informed

To c o m p l e m e n t Keith Bulen's c a u c u s d i n n e r meetings, Mayor Lugar hosted a series of l u n c h e o n s with small groups of legislators, d u r i n g w h i c h he e x p l a i n e d the Unigov bill: " T h e process c o n t i n u e d after the election in terms of 'courting,' in groups of five or six, legislators from o u t s i d e M a r i o n County. I explained the law to them personally. We s a w 91 of 127 of t h e m in this way, and m a d e a fairly accurate h e a d c o u n t . " " ' T h e s e carefully p l a n n e d l u n c h e o n s , attended by both Democrats a n d R e p u b l i c a n s , i n c l u d e d Deputy Mayor John Walls, Representative Lamkin a n d Senator Borst, plus other Unigov principals w h o could be present. T h e mayor was briefed on each legislator's previous and present stand on metropolitan government bills and w a s prepared to r e s p o n d to inquiries and doubts. T h e s e were low-key meetings e m p h a s i z i n g information on the bill and a n s w e r i n g of questions. A second p u r p o s e was to make it clear that Unigov w a s the Marion County delegation's primary goal for the ninety-sixth session a n d to d e m o n s t r a t e that the bill was s u p ported by the task force and the mayor's administration. This special effort w a s necessary in part because of legislative jealousies b e t w e e n Marion C o u n t y ' s delegation and the other legislators d u e to the favorable position Marion County sometimes seemed to enjoy in the Cencral Assembly. Because of this, it had become a legislative c u s t o m to allow only o n e major Marion County bill to pass at any given session. T h u s , it was imperative to let the General Assembly know that Unigov ought to be that bill in 1969. In keeping w i t h the mayor's intent of maintaining a low-key m o o d at the l u n c h e o n s , party leader Bulen was not present at any of t h e m . As the l u n c h e o n s were bipartisan, Bulen's open participation w o u l d work against getting s o m e hoped-for Democratic s u p port. Even if the l u n c h e o n s had been limited to Republicans, a n t i Marion C o u n t y jealousies in the General Assembly might have c o m e to the fore, stirred u p by parallel jealousies within the state party organization. M i n d f u l of the t e n u o u s r e l a t i o n s h i p s between Marion County and the rest of the state and respecting a legislative taboo against mayors or other nonlegislators soliciting votes, Mayor Lugar did not 16. R i c h a r d G. Lugar. " T h r e e M a y o r s R e v i e w T h e i r G o v e r n m e n t s , " Cities. N o v e m b e r 1969. p. 29.

Nation's

The Legislativo

Stage

89

a p p r o a c h legislators directly to solicit Unigov votes, except for t h o s e w h o m h e k n e w personally. 1 ' D e s p i t e the playing d o w n of overt a n d partisan political activity at this stage, the bill w a s clearly political. Moreover, Mayor Lugar w a s not a b o v e p u s h i n g for a p a r t i s a n vote w h e n the o c c a s i o n p r e s e n t e d itself. A s he said later: "I'll be c a n d i d . I k n o w this is good for Republicans. T h a t ' s h o w I sold it to the state legislature.'"" But the l u n c h e o n s w e r e n o t the p r o p e r occasion for p a r t i s a n p l e a d i n g , a n d the m a y o r h a d to go e l s e w h e r e to d o his politicking.

Lincoln Day

Dinners

A l t h o u g h c u s t o m p r e v e n t e d Mayor Lugar from seeking votes from m o s t legislators directly, he c o u l d a p p e a l for votes indirectly t h r o u g h t h e i r c o n s t i t u e n t s . He did this in a n u m b e r of s t a t e w i d e app e a r a n c e s d u r i n g t h e General A s s e m b l y session. T h i s t i m e c u s t o m was o n h i s side, most of his a p p e a r a n c e s being at traditional Lincoln Day d i n n e r s that I n d i a n a R e p u b l i c a n s hold to celebrate the February b i r t h d a y of the p a r t y ' s first p r e s i d e n t . T h e f o r t u i t o u s t i m i n g of the d i n n e r s in the m i d d l e of the General A s s e m b l y ' s c o n s i d e r a t i o n of SB 543 a f f o r d e d the m a y o r excellent o p p o r t u n i t i e s to state his case for Unigov. As Siur reporter Robert P. M o o n e y a n t i c i p a t e d , Mayor Lugar's sales pitch was a soft-sell a p p r o a c h , a i m e d at p e r s u a s i o n rather t h a n the extraction of political favors. H i z z o n e r w o n ' t be brash e n o u g h to m a k e his o w n legislative p r o g r a m the m a i n t h e m e of talks h o n o r i n g the 16th P r e s i d e n t of t h e U n i t e d States. But Lugar is clever e n o u g h to slip in a loud a n d clear message. T h e message probably will move his R e p u b l i c a n - d o m i n a t e d a u d i e n c e s to urge their o w n legislators to s u p p o r t his p r o p o s a l s . Lugar's battle cry will stress that it takes a R e p u b l i c a n adm i n i s t r a t i o n , f e w a n d far b e t w e e n in the state's largest city, to u n s t i c k the gears of an archaic, e x p e n s i v e a n d o v e r l a p p i n g M o d e l - T form of government. 1 ' 1 While h e d i d not overtly trade on t h e political capital he had a c c u m u lated in t h e p r e v i o u s year's s u c c e s s f u l R e p u b l i c a n c a m p a i g n , Mayor Lugar's m e s s a g e w a s i n d e e d l o u d a n d clear. His m e r e p r e s e n c e in 17. M a y o r s a n d o t h e r o f f i c i a l s art) g e n e r a l l y w e l c o m e t o a p p e a r b e f o r e t h e G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y in g i v i n g t e s t i m o n y a n d e x p l a i n i n g b i l l s , b u t r e g a r d l e s s of t h e i r p a r t y o r t h e n a t u r e of t h e l e g i s l a t i o n , t h e y a r e e x p e c t e d n o t to s o l i c i t v o l e s o u t r i g h t . 1H. P h y l l i s M v e r s , " j u r i s d i c t i o n s : W h y D i d I n d i a n a p o l i s , of A l l P l a c e s , T a k e a S t e p T o w a r d M e t r o p o l i t a n i s m ? " City

:i(:i]:39 ( J u n e 1 9 6 9 ) .

19. " L u g a r I n t e n d s t o L o b b y f o r I J n i - g o v , " I n d k i n n p o f i s S l u r , ( a n u a r v 5. 1 9 0 9 , p. 12.

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support of Unigov was enough to remind Republicans what it was he sought.

Demonstrating Public Support Although the General Assembly had been assured there was no legal precedent for a referendum, s o m e legislators continued to voice c o n c e r n about the extent of active public support for Unigov. T h e principals then sought to substantiate their claim of broad public support. Up to this point, support had been generated largely through the leadership of the business, civic, and Republican Party organizations. T h u s , w h i l e Keith B u l e n , the Marion County delegates, and the mayor were engaged in a program to educate the General A s s e m b l y on the merits of Unigov, another campaign attempted to show that the public was i n c l u d e d in the debate and generally supported the concept. T h i s campaign i n c l u d e d (1) solicitation of letters supporting Unigov, (2) a petition and a poll, and (3) a series of public hearings held by the legislative delegation.

Unigov Mail In spite of Mayor Lugar's appeal to out-of-state Republicans to express their support for Unigov by writing to their legislators, only a light response c a m e in for or against it. Only a few letters were sent by individuals, and the pros and cons were about evenly divided. As to quality, the opposition letters may have given a slight edge to the Unigov proponents because they merely repeated the expected conservative, suburban arguments that had been heard throughout the debate. Letters from individuals were thus not very important, but several letters from local organizations were useful to the proponents. Groups such as the Christian Inner-City Association, the Indianapolis Civic Progress Committee, the Jaycees, the Indianapolis Real Estate Board, and the Greater Indianapolis Progress Committee sent letters to their legislators, including board resolutions supporting the Unigov c o n c e p t . In each case, care was taken to note that the resolution supported the idea of Unigov but not necessarily all of the bill's specifics. A letter from the president of the Real Estate Board made this quite plain: " W e do not wish to be drawn into the debate over the intimate details of the make-up of the bill. We fully expect that there will be m a n y changes before the bill is ready for adoption in its final form. W e do wish to cast our support for the basic principle." 2 " 2 0 . Letter from W . A. B r e n n a n , Jr., p r e s i d e n t , I n d i a n a p o l i s Real Estate Hoard, to L a w r e n c e M. Borst, s e n a t o r , J a n u a r y 2 8 , 1 9 6 9 .

The Legislative Stage

91

S e e k i n g s u p p o r t for t h e concept of m e t r o p o l i t a n g o v e r n m e n t w h i l e a v o i d i n g a r g u m e n t s o n t h e f i n e p o i n t s of t h e bill w a s a p e r s i s t e n t t h e m e of t h i s c a m p a i g n a n d a p r a c t i c a l w a y of m a r s h a l i n g b a c k e r s for t h e U n i g o v i d e a . In a n y e v e n t , t h e p r i n c i p a l s m a d e good u s e of t h e s e letters, d u p l i c a t i n g t h e m a n d c o m p i l i n g t h e m i n t o a f o l d e r , a l o n g w i t h o t h e r s u p p o r t i v e m a t e r i a l s , for m e d i a u s e a n d for d i s t r i b u t i o n to t h e l e g i s l a t o r s . T h e r e w a s n o d i r e c t m a i l i n g to legislators b y o r g a n i z a t i o n s o p p o s e d to U n i g o v , b u t t h e A s s o c i a t i o n of I n d i a n a C o u n t i e s , Inc., d i d a t t e m p t to r e a c h legislators i n d i r e c t l y t h r o u g h s e v e r a l " L e g i s l a t i v e F l a s h " m a i l i n g s to t h e i r m e m b e r s h i p a n d a s t a t e w i d e m e d i a r e l e a s e . C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e o n l y o r g a n i z a t i o n a l m a i l legislators r e c e i v e d o n t h e i s s u e s u p p o r t e d SB 543. If t h i s m a i l h a d a n y effect at all, it w a s u n d o u b t e d l y f a v o r a b l e . U n o p p o s e d in t h i s w a y , M a y o r Lugar g a i n e d s o m e g r o u n d in h i s bid to d e m o n s t r a t e p u b l i c s u p p o r t for U n i g o v . N e v e r t h e l e s s , h i s g a i n s w e r e n o t e x t e n s i v e b e c a u s e his s u p p o r t w a s still s e e n as c o m i n g f r o m o r g a n i z a t i o n s a l r e a d y k n o w n to s u p p o r t t h e c o n c e p t . In s h o r t , t h e m a y o r h a d to t u r n e l s e w h e r e in t r y i n g to d e m o n strate s u p p o r t a m o n g the general p o p u l a t i o n .

Two

Petitions

M e a n w h i l e , r e c o g n i z i n g t h e a p p a r e n t v u l n e r a b i l i t y of t h e m a y o r ' s c l a i m of p u b l i c s u p p o r t for U n i g o v , s o m e m e m b e r s of t h e o p p o s i t i o n distributed an anti-Unigov petition. Soon afterward the mayor drafted a p e t i t i o n of h i s o w n a n d w e n t e v e n f u r t h e r by a r r a n g i n g for a t e l e p h o n e survey. T h e d r i v e to s e c u r e s i g n a t u r e s o n t h e a n t i - U n i g o v p e t i t i o n w a s h e a d e d by t w o R e p u b l i c a n o f f i c e h o l d e r s , c o u n t y r e c o r d e r M a r c i a B. H a w t h o r n e a n d c o u n t y c o m m i s s i o n e r W i l l i a m G. S c h n e i d e r . P e t i t i o n f o r m s w e r e m a d e a v a i l a b l e for d i s t r i b u t i o n f r o m t h e i r offices, as w e l l as t h o s e of c o u n t y p r o s e c u t o r N o b l e R. P e a r c y a n d c i r c u i t j u d g e J o h n Niblack. 2 1 T h i s p e t i t i o n effort d i d n o t r e p r e s e n t o u t r i g h t o p p o s i t i o n to U n i g o v as s u c h b u t a s k e d t h a t t h e bill not be p a s s e d i m m e d i a t e l y a n d c a l l e d for a t w o - y e a r d e l a y a n d s t u d y p e r i o d . R e a d e r s w i l l recall t h a t c o u n t y c o m m i s s i o n e r W i l l i a m S c h n e i d e r h a d b e e n a m e m b e r of t h e m a y o r ' s task f o r c e that h a d e n d o r s e d t h e U n i g o v c o n c e p t , a n d J u d g e N i b l a c k h a d p r e s e n t e d s p e c i f i c r e q u e s t s to t h e task f o r c e , w h i c h h a d b e e n a c c e p t e d . T h u s , to r e p e a t , t h e p e t i t i o n w a s not a h e a d - o n attack, b u t e s s e n t i a l l y a c o n s e r v a t i v e , d e l a y i n g strategy by i n c u m b e n t o f f i c e h o l d e r s a n d p o l i t i c i a n s w h o w e r e w o r r i e d a b o u t t h e p r o s p e c t of q u i c k a n d d r a s t i c c h a n g e . A p p a r e n t l y , it d i d not get a v e r y s t r o n g r e s p o n s e . S e n a t o r G u b b i n s a n n o u n c e d that s h e w o u l d 21. " G O P P e t i t i o n s Seek 1 9 6 9 , p . 10.

U n i - g o v P l a n D e l a y , " Indianapolis

Star.

January

21,

92

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Stage

d e l i v e r t h e s i g n e d p e t i t i o n s to t h e S e n a t e C o m m i t t e e o n A f f a i r s of M a r ion C o u n t y , b u t h e r p r o m i s e w a s n e v e r f u l f i l l e d . T h e day after this o p p o s i n g petition was a n n o u n c e d , Mayor Lugar a n n o u n c e d h i s a p p o i n t m e n t of c i t y m a r k e t m a s t e r F r a n k J. M u r r a y to h e a d a d r i v e f o r s i g n a t u r e s o n p e t i t i o n s s u p p o r t i n g Unigov. 2 2 W h e n t h e m a y o r p e r s u a d e d M u r r a y to join h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n in J a n u a r y 1968, h e r e m o v e d a p o t e n t i a l b l o c k to his U n i g o v p l a n s in t h e 1 9 6 9 G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y . A s f o r m e r h e a d of t h e I n d i a n a p o l i s T a x p a y e r s ' A s s o c i a t i o n , M u r r a y h a d e s t a b l i s h e d t h e r e p u t a t i o n as a legislative gadfly, w h o w a s a b l e to o b s t r u c t t h e p a s s a g e of m o s t bills not to h i s liking. T h e m a y o r ' s a n n o u n c e m e n t , f o l l o w i n g t h e o p p o n e n t s ' a n n o u n c e m e n t by o n e d a y , h a d t h e e v i d e n t p u r p o s e of c o u n t e r i n g t h e county officials' effort. W h e n the o p p o n e n t s ' drive faltered, the mayor a l s o a l l o w e d h i s o w n to die.

A Telephone

Survey

About the t i m e M u r r a y ' s pro-Unigov petition drive was losing m o m e n t u m , t h e I n d i a n a p o l i s Jaycees, w h o h a d p r e v i o u s l y gone o n r e c o r d s u p p o r t i n g U n i g o v , v o l u n t e e r e d to c o n d u c t a p h o n e s u r v e y of the public's attitude t o w a r d Unigov. T h e mayor accepted their offer, a n d 4 0 c a l l e r s f r o m t h e Jaycees a n d t h e i r c o u n t e r p a r t , Jayncees, c o n d u c t e d a d a y - l o n g s u r v e y o n F e b r u a r y 14, 1969, s u p e r v i s e d by p r o j e c t d i r e c t o r T h o m a s E. L y o n s , d i r e c t o r of q u a l i t a t i v e a n a l y s i s for H e r r o n A s s o c i a t e s , a n I n d i a n a p o l i s m a r k e t r e s e a r c h firm. 2 1 T h e c a l l e r s d i a l e d 2 , 8 0 0 n u m b e r s s e l e c t e d at r a n d o m f r o m t h e I n d i a n a p o l i s t e l e p h o n e b o o k a n d c o n t a c t e d 1,500 r e s p o n d e n t s . T h r e e c r i t e r i a w e r e u s e d in s c r e e n i n g r e s p o n d e n t s : " T o q u a l i f y to register t h e i r o p i n i o n , c i t i z e n s m u s t be 21 y e a r s of age, m u s t live in t h e h o u s e h o l d that w a s c a l l e d , a n d m u s t h a v e said that t h e y w e r e f a m i l i a r w i t h t h e U n i g o v p r o p o s a l n o w b e f o r e t h e G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y . " 2 4 T h e s e criteria e l i m i n a t e d a b o u t f o u r - f i f t h s of t h e r e s p o n d e n t s , l e a v i n g 281 res p o n d e n t s (19 p e r c e n t of t h o s e c a l l e d ) w h o s e v o t e s w e r e c o u n t e d . T h e big falloff w a s d u e p r i n c i p a l l y to t h e large p r o p o r t i o n of r e s p o n d e n t s w h o c o u l d not c l a i m f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h t h e U n i g o v p r o p o s a l , e v e n t h o u g h it w a s t h e n b e f o r e t h e s t a t e l e g i s l a t u r e . In a n y e v e n t , t h e s u r v e y f o u n d 69 p e r c e n t of t h e qualified r e s p o n d e n t s favoring Unigov. Although Unigov received favorable m a j o r i t i e s f r o m r e s p o n d e n t s b o t h i n s i d e a n d o u t s i d e t h e city, the p r o 22. " L u g a r P l a n s P e t i t i o n s o n U n i - g o v , " I n d i a n a p o l i s

S t a r . J a n u a r y 22, 1 9 0 9 ,

p. 1. 23. " U n i - g o v P a s s e s P o l l , " Indianapolis Star. F e b r u a r y 15, 19(>5). p. 4. 24. T h o m a s K. L y o n s a n d D o n a l d F o s t e r ( p r e s i d e n t . I n d i a n a p o l i s Jaycees, 15)09), u n d a t e d n e w s r e l e a s e f r o m t h e files of t h e G r e a t e r I n d i a n a p o l i s P r o g r e s s C o m m i t t e e (see A p p e n d i x 9).

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U n i g o v vote w a s m u c h larger in the city t h a n in s u b u r b a n areas. Ins i d e t h e city the f a v o r a b l e vote w a s 78 p e r c e n t (138 for a n d 33 against); 2 1 o u t s i d e I n d i a n a p o l i s only 52 p e r c e n t favored Unigov (57 for a n d 53 against). As i n d i c a t e d by t h e c a m p a i g n soliciting pro-Unigov letters, as w e l l as t h e m a y o r ' s p e t i t i o n a n d the Jaycee poll, the effort to b u i l d p u b l i c s u p p o r t w a s not of the highly organized variety u s u a l l y seen in r e f e r e n d u m - b a s e d mergers. As Mayor Lugar s u b s e q u e n t l y c o m m e n t e d : " T h e tactics e m p l o y e d h a v e o f t e n b e e n i m p r o v i s e d o n short notice." 2 1 ' N o w h e r e w a s this m o r e e v i d e n t t h a n in his efforts to d e m o n s t r a t e p u b l i c s u p p o r t for Unigov. N e v e r t h e l e s s , his a n d B u l e n ' s a t t e m p t s to u n i f y t h e i r d e l e g a t i o n a n d e d u c a t e the legislature w e r e highly effective. T h e fact that h e c o u l d s u c c e e d w h i l e failing to d e m o n s t r a t e u n q u a l i f i e d p u b l i c s u p p o r t for Unigov is largely attributable to his operating f r o m a p o w e r f u l a n d prestigious g o v e r n m e n t a l a n d political base that h e h e l p e d to create. A related c o n t r i b u t i n g factor w a s the disorg a n i z a t i o n of the o p p o s i t i o n a n d its c o m p a r a t i v e lack of access to the political f o r u m s . T h i s d o e s not m e a n the o p p o s i t i o n w a s w h o l l y ineffective in its bid for votes against Unigov. But the m a y o r did h a v e t h e u p p e r h a n d in trying to d e m o n s t r a t e p u b l i c s u p p o r t t h r o u g h the mailings, t h e p e t i t i o n s , t h e t e l e p h o n e survey, a n d the party i n f r a s t r u c t u r e . T h e o p p o s i t i o n , a l t h o u g h still poorly organized, b e c a m e m o r e visible d u r i n g t h e final a t t e m p t to o p e n the d e b a t e to the p u b l i c — t h e legislative p u b l i c hearings.

Public Hearings T h e legislative h e a r i n g s c o m p r i s e d a n o t h e r p h a s e in the p u b l i c d e b a t e o n Unigov. T h r e e legislative p u b l i c hearings w e r e held in Febr u a r y w h e n SB 543 w a s at a crucial stage. P u b l i c p a r t i c i p a t i o n w a s s o m e w h a t less t h a n e x p e c t e d , t h e small t u r n o u t n u m b e r i n g m a i n l y the s a m e p a r t i c i p a n t s w h o h a d b e e n active in the debate s i n c e the previo u s N o v e m b e r . T h u s , t h e h e a r i n g s p r o b a b l y did little m o r e t h a n reinforce t h e s t a n c e that t h e legislators h a d a l r e a d y taken. Nevertheless, w e can l e a r n s o m e t h i n g about t h e character of the o p p o s i t i o n a n d the p r o p o n e n t s f r o m t h e p u b l i c hearings, w h i c h brought the o p p o s i t i o n into s h a r p e r relief a n d forced t h e p r o p o n e n t s to try h a r d e r to m a i n t a i n their p r e d o m i n a n t p o s i t i o n . T w o p u b l i c h e a r i n g s w e r e s p o n s o r e d by the C o m m i t t e e on Affairs of M a r i o n C o u n t y in t h e S e n a t e a n d its sister c o m m i t t e e in the 25.

Ibid.

26. R i c h a r d G. L u g a r , s p e e c h t o R o b e r t A . T a f t I n s t i t u t e of G o v e r n m e n t , York, M a y 21, 1970.

New

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House, but all were actually joint hearings in that members from both committees participated. T h e hearings were also similar in format and so are considered together. The Christian S c i e n c e Monitor was quite accurate though perhaps simplistic in stating that the most active opponents were black militants, ultraconservatives, and the Democratic Party: "By arguing its merits he [Mayor Lugar] drew the dual wrath of black militants and the John Birch Society; both testified against it in public hearings. S o m e legislators, Democrats in particular, viewed the idea suspiciously as an attempted power grab by the Mayor."''

Black

Spokesmen

Leaders of black communities in Indianapolis generally opposed the measure. Before the Unigov consolidation, blacks accounted for only about one-fourth of Indianapolis's population, and there was no early likelihood of a black majority in the city. Nevertheless, some black leaders argued that their position in the Democratic Party was rapidly becoming dominant, and since the Democrats usually won the city elections, they were approaching the point where they could at least control the party that controlled the city government. In their view, consolidation with the overwhelmingly white population of the suburbs would clearly dilute that political power. Of the four people who testified against Unigov from the black community, only one, Charles " S n o o k e y " Hendricks, spoke directly from the streets as a black militant. The others, Democratic attorney John Preston Ward, NAACP representative Andrew Ramsey, and the Reverend Father Boniface Hardin, repeated the commonly held argument that "they had mixed reactions about the legislation but unanimously opposed it on the ground that it would dilute the black vote." J " But Hendricks, who later described himself as an "ex-convict, ex-dope fiend, ex-everything who became a radical or militant when I was released from the p e n i t e n t i a r y , w a s most violent in his attack, and in doing so, he exposed a major weakness in the Unigov opposition. This weakness was the sharp cleavage between the blacks and the suburbanites, neither being willing to join with the other against Unigov. When told of Mayor Lugar's comment that the greatest danger to the proposal was an unlikely coalition between inner-city blacks and suburban whites,'" Hendricks replied: " T h e r e never was a coali27. " Y o u n g I n d i a n a p o l i s M a y o r R e l i s h e s Urban C h a l l e n g e s , " C h n s h i i n .Science Monitor.

M a r c h 3 1 . 1 9 6 9 . p. 10. 2fi. " S u b u r b a n i t e s A m o n g O b j e c t o r s to I J n i - g o v , " I n d i a n a p o l i s iVeivs. February 8.

1 9 6 9 , p. :). 29. C h a r l e s

"Snookey"

Hendricks,

i n t e r v i e w with J a m e s O w e n .

July 19, 1 9 7 2 . :10. Lugar, " T h r e e M a y o r s R e v i e w T h e i r G o v e r n m e n t s , " p. IKi.

Indianapolis,

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tion. W e were fighting Unigov on different terms. T h e y were fighting it on terms of integration. . . . W e were fighting it more on a political basis. Like I told the whites . . . your only reason for fighting Unigov is that it o p e n s up housing to blacks in your area.'" 1 In addition to differences between inner-city blacks and suburban whites that polarized the opposition, differences within the black comm u n i t y prevented it from making a concerted effort against Unigov. W i l l i a m T. Ray, a black Republican realtor and Unigov supporter, gave two reasons w h y blacks had m i x e d reactions to the bill: " T h e r e was a large group of the black c o m m u n i t y — m u c h the same as w h i t e s — w h o just weren't informed. T h o s e w h o did know what was going on c o u l d n ' t d e c i d e w h e t h e r the plan would dilute their vote or extend their tax b a s e . " 1 2 Frank P. Lloyd, a prominent black physician and respected figure in the Democratic Party, as well as in both the black and white c o m m u n i t i e s , substantiated Ray's views with his own explanation of the black c o m m u n i t y ' s failure to unite against Unigov: " T h e r e was just no black leadership in this c o m m u n i t y . Blacks are just not organized at all. A n d , if you looked at blacks in the c o m m u n i t y , we were divided even on that. For e x a m p l e , I certainly am not against Unigov. But I would prefer that the s c h o o l s be under Unigov. I was part of the Democratic try to get the police and fire metropolitanized for the very s i m p l e reason that I wanted to extend the tax b a s e . ' " 1

Conservative

Opposition

Though n o n e of those who testified identified themselves as m e m b e r s of the John Birch Society, testimony from spokesmen of a conservative bent surely reflected the society's views. One, Claude Martin, who at a later meeting accused Mayor Lugar of attempting to set up a type of government that "is endorsed by a Communist front group,'" 4 c l a i m e d that Lugar was endeavoring to establish a "local d i c t a t o r s h i p . ' " ' A n o t h e r speaker, Chet Webb, who served as the Marion County c h a i r for the Ceorge Wallace presidential campaign in 1 9 6 8 , waved a c o p y of the C o m m u n i s t Manifesto in front of the crowd as he a c c u s e d Mayor Lugar of attempting to establish a Marxist dictatorship. T h e rancor displayed in these two statements did not attract m u c h following from the other opponents in the audience. In fact, 31. H e n d r i c k s interview. 32. W i l l i a m T . Rav, interview with lames O w e n . Indianapolis. |une 16, 1 9 7 2 . :;:). Frank P. Llovd. interview with lames O w e n , Indianapolis, June I S , 1 9 7 2 . 34. " 1 5 0 Hear Unigov Pros. C o n s , " I n d i a n a p o l i s Star. February 2 2 . 1 9 6 9 , p. 9. 35. " M a y o r Makes Plea at S t o r m y M e e t i n g , " I n d i a n a p o l i s Star. February 8, 1 9 6 9 , p. 14. 36. Ibid.

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Marion County Democratic chair James Beatty, who followed Martin and W e b b to speak against Unigov, rose and said: " S o m e of t h e attacks on this bill have been so outrageous my sense of justice almost forced me to c o m e up and speak for i t . ' " '

The Democrats Divided T h e opposition was also divided by the Democrats' move to disassociate themselves from the conservatives and their inability or unwillingness to join with Republican officeholders who opposed Unigov. Moreover, the Democrats were divided among themselves. Although they agreed that Unigov was a tool to bring Republican voters into the city, they disagreed on the bill's overall merits. T h i s was brought out early in the legislative session by a n e w s p a p e r article entitled " D e m o s Divided in Legislature on Unigov B i l l . " In it, S e n a t e minority leader David Rogers (Dem., Bloomington) was cited as c o m m e n t i n g , " D e m o c r a t s are divided on the issue," w h i l e adding that he personally approved of it. :i " Although Beatty did not speak in favor of the bill, neither did he oppose it with the vigor of a county chair who was about to give up " 8 5 , 0 0 0 v o t e s " to the other party. Beatly opposed the bill, but more for what it did not include: "I would be willing to take the political disadvantages that w o u l d c o m e from supporting this legislation if we were really going to get s o m e t h i n g , " he said, "but we are n o t . ' " " Past history almost forced Beatty to take this course. In his own push for governmental reform in 1 9 6 5 , he had gone firmly on record favoring the major precepts of the Unigov proposal. T h i s helped explain his approach of attempting to discredit the bill for what it did not i n c l u d e while by i n n u e n d o trying to c o n v i n c e conservatives that the more inclusive approach was what Unigov ultimately intended to take. While Beatty's attack was well designed, it failed to provide a c o m m o n ground from w h i c h the diverse elements of the opposition (including those within his o w n party) could jointly campaign against Unigov. Partially for this reason Beatty did not use his party's financial and organizational resources to wage a precinct-by-precinct campaign to generate a s h o w of public disapproval for Unigov. There was too great a risk that such a campaign would expose the opposition's differences and thus actually help the R e p u b l i c a n proponents. 37. "Suburbanites Among Objectors to Unigov," Indianapolis Nana. February 8, 1969, p. 3. 38. Robert P. Mooney, "Marion County Round-Up." Indianapolis Star. January 22, 1969, p. 5. 39. "Suburbanites Among Objectors to Unigov." Indianapolis /Yews. February 8, 1969, p. 3.

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The Voice of Labor T w o labor s p o k e s m e n also testified against Unigov. Max E. Bryd e n t h a l , p r e s i d e n t of t h e M a r i o n C o u n t y AFL-CIO, stated labor's case against U n i g o v w h e n he said that it "leaves out c o u n t y w i d e police, fire a n d s c h o o l s , p l u s Beech Grove, L a w r e n c e a n d Speedway." 4 1 1 But this f r e q u e n t a r g u m e n t w a s i n t e r p r e t e d as m u c h in favor of U n i g o v as against it. M o r e o v e r , w h e n t h e labor leaders failed to s u p p o r t their t e s t i m o n y w i t h a m o r e c o n c r e t e d e m o n s t r a t i o n of their m e m b e r s h i p ' s feelings, they also failed to p r e s e n t a viable o p p o s i t i o n to Unigov.

Dissident

Republicans

A l t h o u g h j u d g e Niblack d i d not a p p e a r at the hearings, several R e p u b l i c a n o f f i c e h o l d e r s f r o m o u t s i d e the city, w h o w e r e still unsatisfied, did a p p e a r , a l o n g w i t h S e n a t o r G u b b i n s , to give o p p o s i n g testim o n y . H o w e v e r , b e c a u s e their p o s i t i o n s as elected officials a n d the t o n e of their s t a t e m e n t s suggested a party-at-interest motive, they w e r e not p e r s u a s i v e . H a v i n g lost Judge Niblack's l e a d e r s h i p , they w e r e too w e a k to be e f f e c t i v e against t h e Marion C o u n t y R e p u b l i c a n organization. N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e y w e r e not entirely i m p o t e n t , for they h e l p e d p e r s u a d e the state o r g a n i z a t i o n of c o u n t y officials to o p p o s e t h e proposal, w h i c h m a y a c c o u n t for t h e loss of s o m e rural R e p u b l i c a n legislators' s u p p o r t .

A Coordinated Effort W h i l e the o p p o n e n t s w e r e beset w i t h i n t e r g r o u p a n d i n t r a g r o u p d i f f e r e n c e s a n d a p p e a r e d b e f o r e the legislators w i t h u n c o o r d i n a t e d a n d s o m e t i m e s c o n f l i c t i n g s t a t e m e n t s , the m o r e organized p r o p o n e n t s p r e s e n t e d c o n s i s t e n t a n d m u t u a l l y s u p p o r t i v e t e s t i m o n y . Most of the a r r a n g e m e n t s c o o r d i n a t i n g t h e p r o p o n e n t s ' p r e p a r a t i o n s w e r e directed t h r o u g h t h e m a y o r ' s office. As e x p e c t e d , m a n y l e a d i n g b u s i n e s s a n d civic organizations that had p r e v i o u s l y e n d o r s e d Unigov sent r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s to the hearings. Carl Dortch a p p e a r e d for t h e C h a m b e r of C o m m e r c e , Jack Reich for the Greater I n d i a n a p o l i s Progress C o m m i t t e e , a n d Mrs. E d w a r d Leary for the League of W o m e n Voters; all read s t a t e m e n t s e n d o r s i n g Unigov. T h e s e t h r e e a n d o t h e r s w e r e joined by Mayor Lugar, T h o m a s Hasbrook, a n d Beurt SerVaas to r e p r e s e n t t h e view of elected officials. S p e a k i n g on behalf of s o m e black citizens w e r e William Hardy, A r t h u r Pratt, a n d t h e R e v e r e n d William Dennis. Rev. D e n n i s said: 40. " 1 5 0 H e a r U n i g o v P r o s . C o n s ; H o u s e Unit to C o n s i d e r Bill," I n d i a n a p o l i s Neivs. F e b r u a r y 22, 1969, p. 9.

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"The single-member council districts will e n s u r e that the black community will have indigenous, authentic leadership."41 This argument w a s based on the expectation that a m o n g n e w council districts w o u l d be several central-city districts with black majorities and was the heart of U n i g o v ' s e f f o r t t o s e c u r e b l a c k s u p p o r t . Rev. D e n n i s ' s s t a t e m e n t , d i r e c t e d at a s i n g l e i s s u e of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , w a s i n t e n d e d to d i s p e l a n u n d e r l y i n g fear in the black c o m m u n i t y that Unigov w o u l d dilute their political power. T h e p r o p o n e n t s r e p e a t e d t h i s k i n d of a p p r o a c h t h r o u g h o u t t h e hearings, each s p o k e s m a n taking u p a different issue and attempting to o f f s e t a s p e c i f i c c l a i m a g a i n s t U n i g o v . S u c h a n a p p r o a c h is m o s t e f f e c t i v e w h e n c o o r d i n a t e d to a v o i d d u p l i c a t i o n , w h i l e e n s u r i n g t h a t e v e r y p o i n t of d e b a t e is c o v e r e d . T h i s s t r a t e g y w a s i m p l e m e n t e d by M a y o r Lugar's office.

Two Government

Agencies

Appeased

In a d d i t i o n to Rev. D e n n i s ' s r e m a r k s o n b l a c k r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , t h r e e o t h e r s s t o o d o u t as p a r t i c u l a r l y e f f e c t i v e in h e l p i n g to r e d u c e fears about Unigov. Bernard L a n d m a n ' s s t a t e m e n t that his board " u n a n i m o u s l y a p p r o v e d " t h e b i l l w a s c r u c i a l ; 4 2 as p r e s i d e n t of t h e b o a r d of the Health a n d Hospital Corporation, he t h u s allayed the fears a n d s u s p i c i o n s of t h e o t h e r s p e c i a l d i s t r i c t g o v e r n i n g b o a r d s w h o s e b u d gets w o u l d a l s o c o m e u n d e r t h e n e w g o v e r n m e n t ' s r e v i e w . T h i s a c h i e v e m e n t w a s p a r t i c u l a r l y satisfying for M a y o r Lugar, w h o recalled the strong, successful battle the Health and Hospital Corporation board h a d w a g e d in 1 9 6 5 a g a i n s t t h e " p o w e r g r a b " b i l l s . A l s o s a t i s f y i n g w a s t h e t e s t i m o n y of t w o f o r m e r s c h o o l b o a r d p r e s i d e n t s , Sol B l i c k m a n a n d M a r k G r a y . In s p i t e of t h e i r o b v i o u s s c h o o l c o n n e c t i o n s , n e i t h e r m a d e a d i r e c t c o m m e n t 011 t h e e x c l u s i o n or i n c l u s i o n of s c h o o l s u n d e r U n i g o v b u t s i m p l y m a d e s t a t e m e n t s t h a t g e n e r a l l y s u p p o r t e d t h e bill. T h e r e w a s g o o d r e a s o n for t h i s a p p r o a c h . A s t h e R e v e r e n d L a n d r u m S h i e l d s , b l a c k p r e s i d e n t of a n o t h e r I n d i a n a p o l i s s c h o o l b o a r d , p o i n t e d o u t l a t e r , t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p of t h e s c h o o l s to t h e U n i g o v p l a n w a s a v o l a t i l e i s s u e t h a t n e e d e d to be h a n d l e d cautiously: "To h a v e i n c l u d e d schools in Unigov w o u l d have raised the s p e c t r e of r a c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n — a d e s e g r e g a t i o n s u i t b r o u g h t b y t h e N a t i o n a l A s s o c i a t i o n f o r t h e A d v a n c e m e n t of C o l o r e d P e o p l e , j o i n e d b y t h e J u s t i c e D e p a r t m e n t , a l r e a d y is p e n d i n g in c o u r t h e r e — a n d w o u l d h a v e m e a n t i n s t a n t d e a t h for the p l a n . W e c o o p e r a t e d w i t h the M a y o r b y n o t k i l l i n g U n i g o v . . . . I d o n ' t t h i n k M a y o r L u g a r is p l a n n i n g to a t t e m p t to i n c l u d e t h e s c h o o l b o a r d in U n i g o v a n y t i m e s o o n . " 4 1 41.

Ibid.

42.

Ibid.

4 3 . " I n d i a n a p o l i s ' M a y o r , " W a l l Street

J o u r n a l . M a r c h 19. 1 9 7 1 . |). 8.

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A l t h o u g h the s c h o o l officials w e r e in fact d e l i b e r a t e l y c o o p e r a t ing w i t h the m a y o r in o r d e r to k e e p the s c h o o l s out of Unigov, a p u b l i c s t a t e m e n t w o u l d h a v e u n n e c e s s a r i l y raised the ire of t h o s e w h o preferred to h a v e t h e s c h o o l s i n c l u d e d . At the s a m e t i m e , t h o s e w h o w e r e o p p o s e d to t h e s c h o o l s ' i n c l u s i o n w e r e t a c i t l y r e m i n d e d that t h e s c h o o l s w o u l d not be a f f e c t e d by U n i g o v . T h e Unigov p r i n c i p a l s thus s u c c e e d e d in s e c u r i n g t h e s u p p o r t , or at least p a s s i v e a d h e r e n c e , of a c r u c i a l part of t h e c o m m u n i t y , w h i l e not giving the o p p o s i t i o n a rallying point for unified a c t i o n against U n i g o v .

Too Much

Organization?

T h e p r i n c i p a l s ' a b i l i t y to plan and c o o r d i n a t e t h e i r m o v e s e n a b l e d t h e m to present t e s t i m o n y that e f f e c t i v e l y c o u n t e r e d the o p p o n e n t s . N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e i r p e n c h a n t for o r g a n i z a t i o n was not a l w a y s to their a d v a n t a g e , c a u s i n g s o m e e m b a r r a s s m e n t on at least two o c c a s i o n s . T h e first i n c i d e n t s t e m m e d from their d e c i s i o n to hold the p u b l i c h e a r i n g s in t h e a u d i t o r i u m of the C i t y - C o u n t y B u i l d i n g instead of a c h a m b e r of t h e G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y . R e p u b l i c a n c o u n t y r e c o r d e r M a r c i a H a w t h o r n e s p o k e for m a n y o p p o n e n t s w h e n s h e o b j e c t e d to this as a p l a n n e d stratagem to favor the b i l l ' s p r o p o n e n t s . S h e c o n t e n d e d that " o t h e r legislators w o u l d be i m p r e s s e d by t h e n u m b e r of protestors against t h e b i l l " if the h e a r i n g s w e r e h e l d in the s t a t e h o u s e . ^ S e n a t o r Borst e x p l a i n e d that a d e q u a t e s p a c e for s u c h a large gathering was not a v a i l a b l e in the s t a t e h o u s e at the t i m e w h e n the hearings w e r e s c h e d u l e d , but his e x p l a n a t i o n w a s not e n t i r e l y satisfactory. A n d w h e n H o u s e s p e a k e r B o w e n later requested a p u b l i c hearing by the H o u s e c o m m i t t e e " i n order to be fair to all c o n c e r n e d , " he further stipulated " t h a t t h e hearing s h o u l d be h e l d in t h e H o u s e c h a m b e r at a c o n v e n i e n t t i m e for all i n t e r e s t e d persons.'" ) > In c o m p l y i n g w i t h S p e a k e r B o w e n ' s request, the p r i n c i p a l s outdid t h e m s e l v e s by o v e r z e a l o u s m a n a g e m e n t . W h e n the third hearing was h e l d on the floor of t h e H o u s e , the U n i g o v p r i n c i p a l s p a c k e d the a u d i e n c e w i t h c r e w s f r o m t h e M e t r o p o l i t a n Park D e p a r t m e n t . M a n y of t h e s e t u r n e d out in t h e i r w o r k u n i f o r m s , a dead g i v e a w a y to reporters c o v e r i n g t h e hearing, w h o e x p o s e d t h e stratagem before the m e e t i n g started. M a n y of t h e w o r k e r s t h e r e u p o n w e n t h o m e early, and t h e h e a r i n g p r o c e e d e d w i t h o u t a n y m e a s u r a b l e input from this group. T h e park w o r k e r s ' a p p e a r a n c e did little m o r e than e m b a r r a s s the p r i n c i pals at t h e hearing, but t h e i n c i d e n t a l m o s t c a u s e d a bigger uproar w h e n a front-page story alleged that t h e workers had b e e n p r o m i s e d c o m p e n s a t o r y t i m e off for their efforts. F u r t h e r e m b a r r a s s m e n t was 4 4 . " 1 2 5 at U n i - g o v P a r l e y S e e O f f i c i a l s O u t b u r s t , " Indianapolis 5, 1 9 6 9 , p. 1 2 . 4 5 . N o r t h East ' t o p i c s ( I n d i a n a p o l i s ) , F e b r u a r y 2 0 , 1 9 6 9 . p. 1.

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averted w h e n the mayor said he "didn't know anything about it," and primary responsibility was assumed by the parks director, Kenneth Simpson. 4(1 In any event, at the hearings the Unigov principals had considerable success in unifying supporters and demonstrating support in the General Assembly. While the various opposing groups could have been collectively formidable, their attempts to block Unigov were stymied by several long-standing differences among them, for example, between the blacks and suburbanites. Unable to overcome their differences, they did not put up an effective opposition. But an even more important cause of opposition weakness was the indecision within each group over the merits of the Unigov bill.

Conclusion: The Elements of Success An obvious contributor to the success of the reorganization proposal was the experience accumulated through the gradual extension of municipal-type services to larger geographical areas, with special emphasis on the county. The "municipalization" of the county had been proceeding for more than two decades on a piecemeal, function-by-function basis, without any structural reform of the county government. The City-County Building is probably worth a special note because of its symbolic impact. From 1962, when it was first occupied, until the reorganization, it was the tallest and most imposing single building in Indianapolis, indeed in the whole state. It had been constructed in one of Indianapolis's typical ad hoc arrangements, via a City-County Building Authority. City and county offices were distinct, and there was relatively little interaction. Existence of this combined headquarters structure helped prepare officials and leading citizens psychologically for some form of consolidation. Consolidation

as a Topical

Issue

The Unigov proposals were also aided by the general popularity of the consolidation idea. This showed up in four ways. First, the recruitment of volunteers, especially the attorneys who did the research and drafting, was enhanced by their familiarity with the subject. Second, m u c h public support for the Unigov concept came from business and civic groups that were already in harmony with the reform idea. Third, Unigov did not strike the legislators as a completely new issue, as many of them had served or were serving on 46. "Park C r e w O r d e r e d to U n i g o v Hearing," Indianapolis 1 9 6 9 , p. 1.

Slur. February 22,

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legislative or c i t i z e n s c o m m i t t e e s to s t u d y local g o v e r n m e n t p r o b l e m s a n d w e r e s y m p a t h e t i c to r e f o r m p r o p o s a l s ; for e x a m p l e , t w o crucial S e n a t e votes c a m e f r o m D e m o c r a t s w h o w e r e p r e p a r i n g similar legislation for a n o t h e r c o u n t y . T h e f o u r t h w a y the r e o r g a n i z a t i o n effort w a s a i d e d c a m e about a bit p a r a d o x i c a l l y . T h e f r e q u e n t earlier floating of g o v e r n m e n t a l reorg a n i z a t i o n p l a n s a n d their f a i l u r e to m o v e in t h e legislature left m u c h of the p o t e n t i a l o p p o s i t i o n u n i m p r e s s e d w i t h the initial Unigov ann o u n c e m e n t in October 1968. F u r t h e r m o r e , w h e n Unigov did emerge as a realistic p r o p o s a l in D e c e m b e r 1968, s o m e of t h o s e w h o w e r e o p p o s e d w e r e h a n d i c a p p e d by their h a v i n g p r e v i o u s l y gone on record favoring t h e c o n s o l i d a t i o n idea. Also c o n t r i b u t i n g to p r o - c o n s o l i d a t i o n s e n t i m e n t w a s t h e political l e a d e r s h i p ' s g r o w i n g f r u s t r a t i o n w i t h the f u n c t i o n a l s p e c i a l i z a t i o n a n d a u t o n o m y of the territorial e x t e n s i o n s of i n d i v i d u a l f u n c t i o n a l services. T h i s w a s clearly e v i d e n t in the Barton a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s effort to e x t e n d the control of t h e city's elected chief executive.

A Measure of Political

Partisanship

T h e e x t e n t a n d intensity of I n d i a n a ' s political p a r t i s a n s h i p facilitated the U n i g o v reorganization. T h e R e p u b l i c a n s p r o m o t e d it, as is e v i d e n t in M a r i o n C o u n t y R e p u b l i c a n Chair B u l e n ' s s t a t e m e n t that Unigov w a s his "greatest c o u p of all time." 4 7 Mayor Lugar, a bit m o r e subtly, said: " T h e g e n i u s of A m e r i c a n political s y s t e m s is well illustrated in o u r s u c c e s s f u l battle for u n i t e d g o v e r n m e n t in I n d i a n a p o l i s or ' U n i g o v ' as t h e press p r o m p t l y d u b b e d o u r efforts." 4 " T h e political setting that u l t i m a t e l y m a d e Unigov's passage possible d e v e l o p e d in t w o stages. First, the p o w e r of the R e p u b l i c a n Party in M a r i o n C o u n t y w a s s u b s t a n t i a l l y e n h a n c e d by the R e p u b l i c a n Action C o m m i t t e e ' s 1966 party r e o r g a n i z a t i o n c a m p a i g n . T h i s brought a w h o l e c o m p a n y of a m b i t i o u s a n d far-sighted n e w c o m e r s into the party a n d got m a n y of t h e m elected to city, c o u n t y , a n d state offices in the s u c c e e d i n g t w o years. Mayor Lugar w a s a m o n g t h e m . T h e s e c o n d stage w a s set w h e n a single party got control of all the key i n s t r u m e n t s of g o v e r n m e n t at b o t h state a n d local levels in 1968. T h i s w a s d u e in large m e a s u r e to t h e efforts of t h e M a r i o n C o u n t y t e a m a n d p r o m o t e d a high degree of party g o v e r n m e n t a n d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . T h e party l e a d e r s h i p seized the o p p o r t u n i t y to e x t e n d a n d c o n s o l i d a t e its p r o s p e c t s for p o w e r . W h i l e t h e political setting h e l p e d Unigov at each stage of its d e v e l o p m e n t , p e r h a p s the most o b v i o u s illustration of t h e partisan 47. " I n d i a n a p o l i s ' M a y o r , " W a l l Street J o u r n a l , M a r c h 19, 1971, p. 8. 48. R i c h a r d G. Lugar, s p e e c h to Robert A. T a f t I n s t i t u t e of G o v e r n m e n t , N e w York, M a y 21, 1970.

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impact on the debate was in the General Assembly. The wholly Republican Marion County delegation was nearly unanimous in support, and the large statewide Republican majority assured passage of the Unigov bill. The importance of a partisan vote in the legislature is summed up in Mayor Lugar's assessment: "In terms of the votes cast in 1969, many of them I am certain were influenced by the fact that I had helped them with their election campaign in the fall of 1968. There was a strong Republican loyalty and tie which held up on the votes which were cast on amendments as well as the decisive votes which passed in both the House and the Senate. The party lines held with few exceptions statewide." 4 " And as a final note, a Republican governor signed the bill into law. The Role of State

Government

Indiana is not a home-rule state. In accordance with Dillon's rule, the state government controls local government affairs, and there is no legal precedent for establishing, dissolving, or restructuring local governmental entities by exclusively local action. The Indiana General Assembly must pass all reorganization proposals—a strongly established practice of direct legislative control that unquestionably was important to Unigov's passage. Legislative arrangements applying uniquely to Indianapolis and Marion County are common, and their frequency made special action on governmental problems easier. For some years the legislature had had standing committees in each house, chaired and dominated by members of the Marion County delegation, to which all bills concerning Indianapolis and Marion County were referred. In effect, the county's delegation also comprised a sort of recurring constitutional convention for the county. This represented a form of home rule—but not one based on voters' referendums—since the General Assembly generally deferred to the wishes of the delegation on items applying only to Marion County. Moreover, at that time all members of the Marion County delegation in each house were elected from the county at-large. The delegation thus tended to be a fairly cohesive group, accustomed to working together. Outstanding

Leadership

The emergence of dynamic leadership in the personalities of the Unigov principals was a contributing factor that is intangible and impossible to measure but difficult to overemphasize. Leadership was essential in view of the many diverse political elements and personalities that had to work together if the Unigov bill was to succeed. 49. R i c h a r d G. Lugar, i n t e r v i e w w i t h James O w e n . I n d i a n a p o l i s , F e b r u a r y 2, 1972.

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Mayor Richard G. Lugar. R e p r i n t e d b y p e r m i s s i o n of I n d i a n a p o l i s M a g a z i n e , c o p y r i g h t 1 9 7 2 .

T h e policy committee's organization was informal, nonstructured, and highly personal. T h e early meetings when the principals were deciding to go for Unigov were mostly dinner sessions with no agenda, no minutes, and no one presiding. The only organization agreed upon was that certain qualified people would concentrate on certain tasks. For example, attorneys Bose and Whistler were given primary responsibility for legal research and bill drafting.

104

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T h e p o l i c y c o m m i t t e e w a s not only n o n s t r u c t u r e d but also w h o l l y u n o f f i c i a l . It did not h a v e the status of f u n d i n g of a l o c a l l y or s t a t e - a p p r o v e d c h a r t e r c o n s o l i d a t i o n c o m m i t t e e , s u c h as t h o s e that m a k e most c o n s o l i d a t i o n s t u d i e s . Instead, its f u n d i n g was on a c a t c h a s - c a t c h - c a n basis, and m o s t of t h e labor was v o l u n t e e r . T h e o n e p e r s o n w h o c a n c o n c e i v a b l y be d e s c r i b e d as the e x e c u tive d i r e c t o r of t h e p o l i c y c o m m i t t e e was D e p u t y M a y o r John W a l l s , w h o on b e h a l f of M a y o r Lugar a n d t h e others did m u c h of the legw o r k , arranging, a n d c o o r d i n a t i n g . But this w a s an unofficial s e r v i c e , m o s t l y d o n e in a d d i t i o n to his regular duties. In p e r f o r m i n g t h e s e s e r v i c e s , W a l l s s h o w e d h i m s e l f an e x c e l l e n t a d m i n i s t r a t o r , as w e l l as totally c o m m i t t e d to the U n i g o v project. Most of the p r i n c i p a l s w e r e high-status i n d i v i d u a l s in the c o m m u n i t y , e a c h w i t h a p o l i t i c a l f o l l o w i n g w h o s e loss was risked by p u b l i c a d v o c a c y of U n i g o v . T h o m a s Hasbrook was an e x p o n e n t of Unigov in t h e c i t y ' s g o v e r n m e n t a l and political c i r c l e s . Keith B u l e n , J o h n B u r k h a r t , a n d B e u r t S e r V a a s w o r k e d at the c o u n t y and state levels. S e n a t o r Borst a n d R e p r e s e n t a t i v e L a m k i n steered the bill through the legislature. T h i s k i n d of i n d i v i d u a l l e a d e r s h i p by the p r i n c i p a l s w a s e s s e n t i a l to U n i g o v ' s s u c c e s s . W i t h so m a n y strong p e r s o n a l i t i e s m a k i n g key c o n t r i b u t i o n s , it might a p p e a r that the U n i g o v l e a d e r s h i p was w h o l l y c o l l e c t i v e — t h a t t h e r e w a s no l e a d e r . But in fact M a y o r Lugar was the u n q u e s t i o n e d leader.

Astute

Draftmanship

T h e p r i n c i p a l s also w e r e fortunate in s e c u r i n g e x c e l l e n t attorneys to draft the bill. T h e work on the original bill, S B 1 9 9 , as well as its s u b s t i t u t e , S B 5 4 3 , w a s b a s e d on s o m e t h i n g m o r e than just the a u t h o r s ' p r o f e s s i o n a l drafting skills. T h u s , the p r i n c i p a l s had sought the m o s t c o m p e t e n t I n d i a n a p o l i s attorneys a v a i l a b l e , w h o , through their c o n s i d e r a b l e s t a t e h o u s e e x p e r i e n c e , w e r e a b l e to r e c o g n i z e and deal w i t h t h e b i l l s ' p o l i t i c a l a n d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r a m i f i c a t i o n s , as w e l l as t h e legal a s p e c t s . T h u s , the a u t h o r s c o u l d draft bills that skirted m a n y p o l i t i c a l l y d a n g e r o u s pitfalls.

Willingness to

Compromise

A further l e a d e r s h i p attribute deserving s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n — w h i c h w a s probably c r u c i a l — w a s t h e p r o p o n e n t s ' w i l l i n g n e s s to a c c e p t realistic goals, settle for less t h a n t h e y might have w i s h e d , c o m p r o m i s e , and a n t i c i p a t e and n u l l i f y the m o s t i m p o r t a n t potential s o u r c e s of o p p o s i t i o n . M a n y o u t s i d e " r e f o r m e r s " and c r i t i c s of the reorganization point to t h e m a n y t h i n g s that w e r e not d o n e or e v e n tried. T h e p r o p o n e n t s c o n c l u d e d , p r o b a b l y a c c u r a t e l y , that to have a t t e m p t e d m o r e w o u l d h a v e m e a n t f a i l u r e for the w h o l e effort.

The Legislative

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105

The importance of compromise was clearly stated by one of the chief negotiators: "This sort of effort can never succeed if one is intransigent in saying what its framework must be or what its specifics must be. It is possible to effect compromise—even compromise on large issues—in order to get a structure and a framework established. I think the mayor had a lot of very good judgment in shunting aside, avoiding, compromising out what would have been some head-on conflicts." 30 This kind of maneuvering enabled the principals, on learning that certain sections of the Unigov bill were offensive to influential county officials or special-district board members, to make modifications in return for the erstwhile opponents' active support or inactive nonsupport. Such negotiation also enabled the principals to check the opposition of a politically powerful county judge and to reverse the anti-Unigov attitudes of the editors of the News and Star. Organizing

Public

Support

The weakness and disorganization of the potential opposition probably contributed almost as much to the bill's success as did the proponents' effective leadership. The county officials most significantly affected—the commissioners—were not very powerful politically; there were no large, strong suburban municipalities or any very vocal suburban leaders; the Democratic Party was ideologically divided, as well as rather ambivalent toward the proposal; the black population was neither militant nor politically well organized compared with black communities in most northern and eastern cities. Despite the opposition's apparent weaknesses, the principals still had to demonstrate public support for Unigov. Promoting a governmental reorganization of such magnitude without some evidence of public support would have been a serious mistake. Also, as there was to be no referendum on Unigov, a number of legislators, including the speaker of the House, were curious as to the extent of public support. To satisfy this concern, the Marion County delegates conducted a vigorous program to educate their fellows daily on the progress of the Unigov debate. In support of this program, the principals conducted an extensive extralegislative campaign before and during the session. This effort was so far superior to anything attempted by the opposition that it moved one out-of-county legislator to remark: "Unigov . . . was . . . the type of issue where . . . no one [was] presenting the other side. Actually, their education program was so good I volunteered to speak in favor of it on the floor of the House." 51 Two basic features of the campaign for public support made it effective. First, in each case where public support was sought, ap50. Charles Whistler, interview with James Owen, Indianapolis, June 14, 1972. 51. John R. Sinks, interview with James Owen, Fort Wayne, October 25, 1972.

106

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p r o v a l w a s a s k e d o n l y of t h e U n i g o v concept, w i t h s p e c i f i c r e o r g a n i z a t i o n i s s u e s s k i r t e d w h e r e v e r p o s s i b l e . T h i s w a s a p a r t i c u l a r l y effect i v e w a y of b r i n g i n g in s u p p o r t e r s , m a n y of w h o m in a r e f e r e n d u m m i g h t h a v e v o t e d a g a i n s t U n i g o v b e c a u s e t h e y d i s a p p r o v e d of s p e cific p r o v i s i o n s . S e c o n d , t i m i n g w a s a l s o a c r u c i a l factor. I n t r o d u c i n g U n i g o v w h e n the political setting was most propitious was the most obvious s t r o k e of t i m e l i n e s s . T h e p r i n c i p a l s ' i n t e n t i o n a l l y k e e p i n g U n i g o v u n d e r w r a p s u n t i l a f t e r t h e N o v e m b e r 5 e l e c t i o n not o n l y gave t h e m a c h a n c e to s i z e u p " t h e lay of t h e l a n d " b e f o r e c o n t i n u i n g ; it also gave t h e o p p o s i t i o n o n l y a s c a n t t w o m o n t h s to o r g a n i z e b e f o r e t h e o p e n i n g of t h e G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y . M o r e o v e r , as U n i g o v ' s s p e c i f i c s w e r e n o t a n n o u n c e d u n t i l a f t e r t h e t a s k f o r c e m e t t h e last t i m e o n D e c e m b e r 19, t h e o p p o s i t i o n h a d n o t h i n g of s u b s t a n c e to r e s p o n d to u n t i l t h e C h r i s t m a s - N e w Year h o l i d a y s . W h e n in s e s s i o n , t h e I n d i a n a G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y ' s b u s i n e s s is c o n d u c t e d at a h e c t i c , r a p i d p a c e that s o m e t i m e s o v e r w h e l m s e v e n experienced legislators. Accordingly, w h e n the General Assembly c o n v e n e d s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e h o l i d a y s , little c h a n c e r e m a i n e d for t h e s c a t t e r e d o p p o s i t i o n , u n i n f o r m e d a n d i n e x p e r i e n c e d , to o r g a n i z e eff e c t i v e l y a n d to " c a t c h u p " w i t h t h e U n i g o v p r o p o n e n t s . A s u b u r b a n n e w s p a p e r s u m m e d u p t h e s i t u a t i o n : " A s so o f t e n h a p p e n s , h o w e v e r , t h e u n g r e a s e d w h e e l s of p u b l i c o p i n i o n m a y h a v e m o v e d too s l o w l y to exert a n y i n f l u e n c e — o n e w a y or a n o t h e r — o n t h e w e l l oiled gears of the Unigov machine."'2 M a j o r s t r u c t u r a l r e o r g a n i z a t i o n d o e s not c o m e easily in US m e t r o p o l i t a n a r e a s . P e r h a p s it w o u l d not h a v e o c c u r r e d in I n d i a n a p o l i s if a n y of t h e p r e d i s p o s i n g f a c t o r s d i s c u s s e d h a d b e e n m i s s i n g . W h i l e e v e r y o n e of t h e m m i g h t not h a v e b e e n a b s o l u t e l y e s s e n t i a l , t h e s e f a c t o r s a p p e a r to a c c o u n t for t h e s u c c e s s of t h e I n d i a n a p o l i s reorganization effort. 52. North

East Topics,

F e b r u a r y 13. 1969.

7 Reorganization: Promise and Performance

T h e terms most frequently used in referring to the Indianapolis organization—Unigov and city-county consolidation—are both useful shorthand references but if taken at face value are substantially misleading. Governments in the Indianapolis region are far from unified. Despite the Unigov name, a complex variety of governmental units and agencies persists under a highly pluralistic arrangement. Moreover, the term city-county consolidation suggests much greater changes in the geographic base of services and taxation than actually occurred. In short, the Indianapolis reorganization is an interesting compromise between unity and plurality, between integration and continued autonomy of the components. T h e Indianapolis reorganization can probably best be viewed from three different perspectives: (1) by looking at the areas used for service and taxation, (2) by considering administrative organization and control, and (3) by examining the political community. The reorganization made only minor changes with regard to areas for service and taxation, the existing geographic bases being continued with relatively minor modification. The most obvious changes made by Unigov were in administrative organization and control, with many (but not all) of the previously separate and autonomous city and county agencies grouped into a limited number of strong executive departments, each subject to a much higher degree of control by the chief executive and the council. The establishment of Unigov, in fact, was much less an act of geographic centralization than of administrative integration. But perhaps the most important impact has been the effect on the political community, as the act made one majorshift in political constituency, and the county became the important political unit. Political leadership and responsibility are now clearly and unquestionably held by the elected mayor, and the City-County Council is, at least potentially, a deliberating, appropriating, and policy-determining body of preeminent significance. In short, while the name Unigov may be an almost absurdly inexact description of the new legal entity, it is a meaningful and useful characterization of political realities, even if somewhat overstated.

108

Reorganization

This chapter will be devoted to a discussion of service and taxation areas. Subsequent chapters will deal with administrative organization and control and then the political community.

Service Areas As noted earlier, a great many attempts had been made in the Indianapolis area to reconcile function with area. Many services had their bases extended beyond the existing city limits. While in some areas attempted adjustments had admittedly been unsuccessful, the limits of political acceptability had at least been tested. Recognizing those limits, the reorganized government retains a complex pattern of jurisdictional and functional relationships. The urban area's service districts can be thought of as a set of concentric circles, each associated with a function or a group of functions. These are now discussed, starting in the middle. Center

Township

Center Township comprises the innermost area (see Map 4), which is smaller than the old city limits, with about 270,000 people (40 percent black) and a 1977 assessed valuation of $683 million (about 30 percent of the county's entire valuation). Center Township remains as a separate unit of government, with an elected township trustee, a township assessor, and a three-member advisory board. (Although providing "poor relief" is Center Township's only significant function, this is not true of the eight surrounding suburban townships where fire protection is a significant budget item.) Indianapolis

School

District

The next larger "circle" is the Indianapolis school district, a separate governmental unit with more than half of the county's population, less than half of its assessed valuation, and the largest budget of any local governmental agency or unit in the metropolitan area. As shown in Map 5, the Indianapolis district is surrounded by the county's 10 other independent school districts (listed below). Marion County School Districts Indianapolis City Schools School City of Beech Grove School Town of Speedway Franklin Township Community School Corporation Metropolitan School District of Wayne Township Metropolitan School District of Perry Township

Reorganization

Metropolitan Metropolitan Metropolitan Metropolitan Metropolitan

^

School School School School School

District District District District District

of of of of of

109

Lawrence Township Pike Township Warren Township Washington Township Decatur Township

Consolidated City of Indianapolis Included towns Excluded cities and towns

fc^

Indianapolis police and fire service districts Indianapolis extended police service districts

Map 4. Units of Government After Unigov, Indianapolis-Marion

County

Source: Consolidated Cities and Counties Act, Indiana Acts of 1969, Chapter 173. Prepared by Department of Metropolitan Development, Division of Planning and Zoning, Indianapolis-Marion County, December 1972.

110

Reorganization

Map 5. School Districts in Marion Source:

County

Indianapolis C h a m b e r of C o m m e r c e , M a r c h 1 9 7 0 .

The names of the districts are legal titles that signify whether the school corporation is that of a city, town, or township and denote the clear legal and financial separation made in Indianapolis between a civil unit of government and a school unit. The term metropolitan, as applied to the township school corporations, is rather misleading since it only indicates that the school district's administration was restructured under the Indiana 1959 school reorganization law. The metropolitan township districts retain their pre-1959 jurisdictional boundaries but are now administered by five-member, nonpartisan, elected school boards. Only Franklin Township continues to operate under the old township trustee system. Like the townships, each school district establishes its own property tax levy, within strict state limits. The school's levy is not reviewed by the mayor or the City-County Council: after school board

Reorganization

111

a p p r o v a l , s c h o o l b u d g e t s go directly to the c o u n t y tax a d j u s t m e n t b o a r d for r e v i e w a n d a p p r o v a l .

Fire Service

District

T h e c o n s o l i d a t e d city's fire service district is slightly larger t h a n the I n d i a n a p o l i s s c h o o l district, a n d fire district services are a d m i n i s tered by U n i g o v ' s n e w D e p a r t m e n t of P u b l i c Safety. Jurisdictional limits are e q u i v a l e n t to t h o s e of t h e old City of I n d i a n a p o l i s a n d can be e n l a r g e d o n l y o n p e t i t i o n of a m a j o r i t y of real p r o p e r t y o w n e r s or o w n e r s of p r o p e r t y a m o u n t i n g to 75 p e r c e n t in assessed v a l u a t i o n of the area to be a d d e d , a p r o c e d u r e significantly m o r e difficult t h a n a n n e x a t i o n to t h e old city, w h i c h itself w a s h a r d e n o u g h . O u t s i d e t h e fire service district, fire p r o t e c t i o n is p r o v i d e d by 16 " v o l u n t e e r " d e p a r t m e n t s in t o w n s h i p s , t o w n s , a n d the e x c l u d e d cities. Since U n i g o v ' s f o r m a t i o n m a n y of t h e s e h a v e d e v e l o p e d a professional c h a r a c t e r , e s p e c i a l l y w i t h the a d v e n t of general r e v e n u e sharing. N e w b u i l d i n g s , e q u i p m e n t , a n d rolling stock h a v e been purc h a s e d , a n d m a n y d e p a r t m e n t s n o w h a v e at least o n e f u l l - t i m e driver o n d u t y for e a c h s h i f t . T h e s e v o l u n t e e r fire d e p a r t m e n t s are d e e m e d locally to be q u i t e effective a n d are politically influential as well.

Police Service

District

Next larger in size is t h e c o n s o l i d a t e d police service district—the s e c o n d m a j o r f u n c t i o n of U n i g o v ' s D e p a r t m e n t of Public Safety. T h e police service district w a s initially c o t e r m i n o u s w i t h the fire service district. But e x p a n s i o n of t h e police service is easier t h a n e x p a n s i o n of the fire service district, a n d Unigov's i n t e r i m City-County Council ( c o m p r i s i n g n i n e m e m b e r s f r o m t h e old City C o u n c i l a n d five m e m bers f r o m t h e old C o u n t y Council) p a s s e d a series of a n n e x a t i o n ordin a n c e s in 1970 e x t e n d i n g the p o l i c e service district. T h e areas i n c l u d e d w e r e n e i t h e r a f f l u e n t nor p o p u l o u s but do c o n t a i n s o m e of t h e c o u n t y ' s chief i n d u s t r i e s , so t h e a n n e x a t i o n w a s significant in t e r m s of a s s e s s e d p r o p e r t y v a l u a t i o n a n d tax base. T h e e x p a n s i o n w a s w o r k e d out in a n a c c o m m o d a t i o n w i t h the industries. T h e city n e e d e d the larger tax base to a v o i d a tax rate increase soon after t h e r e o r g a n i z a t i o n . Initially it p r o p o s e d a s u b s t a n t i a l l y larger e x p a n s i o n b u t settled for t h e o n e that w a s effected in 1970. O u t s i d e t h e p o l i c e service district, the s h e r i f f ' s d e p a r t m e n t provides p o l i c e services. W h i l e t h e w h o l e c o u n t y shares in the financial s u p p o r t of t h e s h e r i f f ' s d e p a r t m e n t , services are a c t u a l l y s u p p l i e d almost e x c l u s i v e l y o u t s i d e t h e I n d i a n a p o l i s police service district. T o w n m a r s h a l s a n d city p o l i c e forces in the small m u n i c i p a l i t i e s also p r o v i d e local p o l i c e services.

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Reorganization

Sanitation

Division/Board

of Works

Liquid- and solid-waste services (sewerage and trash collection and disposal) are provided to an area substantially larger than the police service district. Under legislation enacted before Unigov this service area had for some time been expanding beyond the corporate limits of the old City of Indianapolis. Once a separate and rather autonomous department of the city, headed by a three-member, bipartisan board of sanitary commissioners, the sanitary division (sometimes called sanitary district) is now administratively part of Unigov's Department of Public Works. The division has its own earmarked property tax sources for operations and bond retirement and also relies on sewer use charges and contract fees (e.g., it provides sewage treatment for Beech Grove). Annexation to the sanitary district is relatively easy: the Board of Works simply extends the appropriate taxing district to correspond to the extension of services. A recent legislative amendment divided the liquid- and solid-waste functions into separate taxing districts to permit one activity and its accompanying tax levy to be extended separately from the other. Both districts are still administered as sections of the Public Works Department's sanitary division. Housing

Authority

Under the Unigov law, the Housing Authority is authorized to operate five miles beyond the old city limits, as it did before Unigov. But in fact neither before or since Unigov has any public housing been built outside the old city boundaries. The Housing Authority's failure to extend its activities beyond the old city's boundaries is an issue in a school desegregation suit now in the federal courts. (This issue will be considered below at greater length.) The authority also does not participate in the rental subsidy program now favored by national policy. Although it is a division of the Department of Metropolitan Development, the Housing Authority retains a limited degree of autonomy under its five-member board of commissioners appointed directly by the mayor rather than by the head of the department. While the mayor's power of appointment and removal limits the commission's independence, on matters of personnel and policy the commissioners sometimes serve as a buffer between the authority's staff and the department director. Most of the authority's funds come from the federal government and from rental fees on its buildings. Consolidated

City-County

Unigov itself, the consolidated city-county, is the next-larger unit in size, including all of the territory in Marion County except for the

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113

four small excluded cities noted earlier. Although the attention of the city's general government is now presumably focused primarily on this area, in fact it is the geographic base for very few services, and although Unigov is authorized to levy property taxes for city purposes on this countywide base, none has yet been levied. (The urban renewal district, whose boundaries are coterminous with Unigov's, has levied a tax.) Library

District

The Indianapolis-Marion County library district is slightly larger than the consolidated city-county, including all but two of the smaller municipalities. Its governing board, appointed by a variety of governmental officials, retains its pre-Unigov status as a quasi-independent entity. Marion

County

The county is the territorial and financial base for a substantial number of services—health and hospitals, parks and recreation, sewage treatment, planning and zoning, and airports, among others, along with the traditional county functions. Some of these are administered by departments of Unigov and some by the old county offices. Some are administered by agencies having different degrees of autonomy— although the power of the mayor to appoint and remove agency board members and of the council to control appropriations is a significant influence on most of these otherwise rather autonomous functions. An important financial decision was made by the Unigov council in 1977 and 1978 to use the whole county's tax base to pay the local share of the capital costs of the huge new sewage treatment plant rather than only the area currently served.

Unigov Taxes, Revenue, and Expenditures The Unigov law made few budgetary and taxing changes in Indianapolis and Marion County. Various governments' fears of losing taxing and bonding powers was one of the chief concerns expressed about Unigov during the legislative debate. In accommodating these concerns, the governmental units were continued, including 11 school corporations, 9 townships, 5 independent municipal corporations, and the 4 excluded municipalities. Moreover, some agencies that were included in the consolidation retained all or part of their bonding or taxing powers. In short, under the Unigov umbrella is an array of 50 separate governmental units with 95 separate taxing units, subject to

114

Reorganization

varying degrees of budget coordination or review by the mayor and City-County Council. Property-Tax

Rates

While governmental agencies sought to maintain their fiscal autonomy, citizens' groups argued that Unigov would cause property taxes to go up. In fact, although the level of services seems to have increased, there has been a definite attempt on the part of the Unigov mayors to hold property taxes down. In 1970, the first year under Unigov, the property-tax rate for the consolidated City of Indianapolis's municipal services was $3.95 per $100 assessed valuation—according to the best estimate of such a rate, using data on all the taxing districts and earmarked receipts in the rather confusing financial situation that prevailed during that transition period. By 1979 the rate had risen gradually to $4.25, before dropping precipitously to $3.50 in 1980 following a 1979 property reassessment (see Table 5). Previously, the Indianapolis municipal corporation tax rate had been $4.15 in 1967, the last year of the Barton administration, and $3.95 in 1969, the last pre-Unigov year. 1 Total property-tax revenues raised increased from $43 million in the 1969 pre-Unigov district to $74 million in 1980 in the consolidated City of Indianapolis. Much of the increase under the consolidated government can be attributed to growth in the assessed value of real property (see Table 6j. New housing developments were largely responsible for the incremental growth of $50 million each year from 1971 to 1979. A general reassessment in 1979 accounted for a major increase in the tax base from $1.5 billion to $2.5 billion. Tax rates were held down in part because the Unigov mayors were committed to governmental economy. Perhaps more significant, however, was the 1973 state property-tax relief law holding propertytax rates of most public corporations to the 1973 level, except in very special circumstances. With rates thus effectively frozen, increased assessments and alternate revenue sources have provided f u n d s needed to meet inflationary cost increases or to add some new activities. Despite the 1973 rate freeze, total property-tax receipts have in-

1. Comparisons between the old Indianapolis corporate budget and the consolidated City of Indianapolis budget can be made with a fair degree of accuracy and reliability, but not with great precision. Since special taxing districts were created within the consolidated city to coincide with user benefit districts, households that receive the full range of municipal services under the consolidated city are in large measure the same households served under the former government. There have been very few extensions of the property tax base beyond the pre-Unigov corporate limits. Accordingly, the budget figures now given for the consolidated City of Indianapolis generally correspond to those of pre-Unigov Indianapolis.

Reorganization

115

creased substantially under the consolidated government as new assessments (plus the small rate increases) have permitted the addition of about $28 million to the total annual city levy from 1971-1980 (an increase of about 62 percent) (see Table 7). By comparison, the annual school-tax levy, a separate property-tax component over which Unigov authorities have no direct control, increased over $30 million in the same 10-year period. The taxpayers are thus paying higher total amounts in property taxes than before, partly because the assessed value of their property has risen but also because of the levies of units not under Unigov's jurisdiction. Other

Revenues

There are several alternate sources of revenues that are almost constantly changing. Federal funds, the largest outside revenue source, comprised 36 percent of the total consolidated city budget in 1979 (see Chart 4). Three federal block grant funds have provided a fairly constant revenue source in recent years: in 1979 general revenue sharing (GRS) provided approximately $13 million annually, the community development block grant (CDBG), about $14 million, and the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA), $11 million. Under the new federalism initiatives of the Reagan administration, however, these f u n d s have been reduced: by 1983 the GRS allocation had dropped to $12 million annually, the CDBG allocation to $9 million annually, and CETA to $4.5 million. (In 1983 CETA was reorganized and renamed the Jobs Training Partnership Act [JTPA].) As explained below, Indianapolis was able to anticipate these reductions and thereby lessened their effect somewhat. After the federal government, the state is the most important source of outside revenue. State-collected taxes on gasoline, cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, intangibles, and inheritances, allocated to the city by complicated formulas, approximated 16 percent of the total budget in 1979 (see Chart 4). An additional one-time allocation of nearly $1.5 million in state revenue sharing money raised the state's share to about 20 percent. Several miscellaneous local revenue sources have increased since Unigov. Some fines and fees have been increased, and methods of collecting them (as well as other delinquent taxes) have improved. For example, because of revisions in the sewer user tax, the sanitary district now bases its charges on the content as well as the volume of industrial and commercial waste. Indianapolis's continued reliance on nonlocal (particularly federal) f u n d s to offset increasing government costs may present serious problems in the near future. A very large portion of the consolidated city government's operating expenditures is now funded with federal

116

Reorganization

Table 5 - City of Indianapolis, General Governmental Expenditures by Function, 1971-1980 Departmental and Modified Accrual Basis 1978

1977*

1976

56,176,224

$ 52,707,326

$ 49,381,249

$ 47.375,257

11,075,128

13,226,978

13,261,962

12,559,381

10.937.759

39,002,629

24,893,126

39,877,920

22,822,520

19,620,904

22,112,721

27,237,327

32,552,587

22,242,998

21,635,872

25,230,458

26,435,700

25.291,946

24,545,885

18,242,571

1,112,337

932,011

899,695

859,901

678,531

4,723,345

6,283.080

5.444,017

3.489,740

2,853.897

22,623,305

22.505,676

18,823,564

18,913,029

16,902,808

103,698,581 $293,301,478

84,334,198 $262,024,320

27.704,877

26.637,314

$216,563,891

$181,452,017

35,332,740 $173,580,339

1979

1980 Protection of people and property Community cultural and recreation Community development and welfare Transportation and related services Environmental services Executive/ Legislative affairs of government Administrative services General debt services Capital outlay Total Note:

$

63,722,974

$

Expenditures include general, special revenue, debt service, capital projects, and ex-

pendable trust funds. Source: City of Indianapolis, A n n u a l Report, December 31, 1980.

dollars, s p e c i f i c a l l y g e n e r a l r e v e n u e sharing. W h i l e this program s e e m s r e a s o n a b l y w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d , the future availability of c o m m u nity d e v e l o p m e n t a n d J T P A f u n d s a p p e a r s to be less s e c u r e or predictable. A l t h o u g h I n d i a n a p o l i s r e s e m b l e s other large A m e r i c a n cities in its d e p e n d e n c e on federal dollars, a s t a t e - i m p o s e d tax rate freeze m a k e s its s i t u a t i o n s o m e w h a t u n u s u a l . T o m e e t e x p e c t e d inflationary costs w i t h o u t r e d u c i n g s e r v i c e levels, I n d i a n a p o l i s will n e e d n e w s o u r c e s of r e v e n u e in a d d i t i o n to future property-tax e x p a n s i o n s . A s already n o t e d , p r o p e r t y - t a x r e v e n u e i n c r e a s e s h a v e d e p e n d e d a l m o s t entirely on i n c r e a s e d a s s e s s m e n t s . T h e G e n e r a l A s s e m b l y h a s , for t h e last t w o s e s s i o n s , c o n s i d e r e d alternate local g o v e r n m e n t tax o p t i o n s to the property tax w i t h o u t s u c c e s s . T h i s w a s the priority issue o n c e again in the 1 9 8 3 legislature w h e r e I n d i a n a p o l i s , working w i t h other I n d i a n a c i t i e s t h r o u g h t h e I n d i a n a A s s o c i a t i o n of Cities and T o w n s , s p o n s o r e d m a j o r l e g i s l a t i o n to revise t h e local g o v e r n m e n t tax structure. T h i s l e g i s l a t i o n , w h i c h failed by a n a r r o w margin on t h e final

Reorganization

Table 5

117

(cont.) Cost C e n t e r a n d Cash

Basis

1975

1974

1973

1972

1971

$ 44,610,297

$ 39,635,407

$ 35,703,195

$ 33,713,746

$31,209,800

9,922,548

8,085,801

6,976,580

7,405,572

6,222,882

25,599,548

17,898,373

19,451,291

15,508,536

9,047,933

28,575,156

24,685,888

12,612,870

15,582,806

17,662,398

14.568,395

12,618,226

10,714,445

10,176,899

9,247,932

657,344

540,800

527,051

501,083

647,175

3,476,444

2,949,649

2,748,638

2.025,807

1,835,391

15,886,926

14,743,762

15,228,000

13,238,686

13,078,783

t

t

+

t

t

$143,296,658

$121,157,906

$103,962,070

$98,153,135

$88,952,294

M n c l u d e s r e d u c t i o n of $ 1 , 9 4 4 , 3 4 3 f r o m c h a n g e in a c c o u n t i n g m e t h o d for i n v e n t o r i e s . t C a p i t a l o u t l a y e x p e n d i t u r e s e g r e g a t i o n s i m i l a r to 1976 t h r o u g h 1980 not p r e s e n t e d o w i n g to d i f f e r e n t r e c o r d k e e p i n g p r o c e d u r e s as to t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of s u c h e x p e n d i t u r e s .

day of the session, was designed to allow for greater property-tax flexibility or a local income tax option. This kind of appeal to the state for home-rule determination on revenue matters is the thrust of Indianapolis's quest for an improved financial status. Although the full impact of the Reagan administration's economic and new federalism programs have not yet been fully assessed in American cities, early indications in the consolidated City of Indianapolis are that although the reductions will adversely affect some specific departmental programs, the overall operation of government will not be critically affected. That is not to say that Indianapolis does not have revenue problems. Mayor William Hudnut alerted the City-County Council to this possibility in the letter of transmittal accompanying his 1980 budget report: "Of concern to the City of Indianapolis, as well as all sectors of the economy, is the continued depressed status of the economy. While, to date, the economic slow-down has caused only minor concerns, a prolonged con-

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