German Agrarian Politics After Bismarck’S Fall the Formation of the Farmers’ League 9780231883009

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STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAW Edited b j the FACULTY O F P O L I T I C A L SCIENCE O F COLUMBIA U N I V E R S I T Y

NUMBER

566

GERMAN AGRARIAN POLITICS AFTER BISMARCK'S FALL The Formation of the Farmers' League

SARAH REBECCA TIRRELL

German Agrarian Politics After Bismarck's Fall The Formation of the Farmers' League

BY

SARAH REBECCA TIRRELL, Assistant

Professor

of History,

University

PH.D. of

Omaha

NEW YOBK. COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

1951

PRESS

COPYRIGHT,

1961

BT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

P R I N T E ) I N T H E UNITED STATES OF AMEBICA

Published in Great Britain, Canada, and India by GEOFFBEY CUMBEBLEOB

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS London, Toronto, and Bombay

8»

MABEL RUTH TIRRELL WITH

APPRECIATION

PREFACE THIS study of German agrarian politics during the brief period while Caprivi was chancellor of the German Empire was undertaken in the hope that some light might be shed upon German domestic politics after Bismarck's dismissal. Though the subject is narrowed to one phase of internal affairs and is restricted in time, it has a broader and a more far-reaching significance because the problems which confronted German agriculturists were similar to those then faced by farmers in many other parts of the world, and because these problems are still largely unsolved. The attempt has been made here not only to describe the domestic crisis in agriculture and the parliamentary struggle over the commercial treaties which reduced agricultural protection, but also to point out the wider implications of the agrarian problem and its relation to the world-wide competition for markets. Though the old German Empire no longer stands as it did in the days of Bismarck and Caprivi, yet the Mittel-Europa area affected by the change in Germany's tariff policy is the region which still disturbs Europe. Twice in the twentieth century it has witnessed vast political and economic readjustments, the first of which came as a sequel to World W a r I, and the second as a preliminary to World W a r II. Owing chiefly to the recent war and the aftermath, I have had to rely in making this study upon the printed sources in this country. The materials for my research were found for the most part in the Columbia University Library and the Harvard College Library. For permission to use their collections and for the unfailing courtesy shown me by the staffs of these two great libraries I wish to express my thanks. A full bibliography appears at the end of this book. In order to reduce printing costs, I have followed the rule of the Journal of Modern History in regard to footnotes: namely, after the first citation of a book, only the author's name is used and the usual " op. cit." is omitted. Where reference has been made to 7

8

PREFACE

more than one book by the same author I have, in each citation after the first, added to the author's name the title in an abbreviated form. My sincere appreciation is here expressed to all persons who have aided me in this undertaking. I wish to give my special thanks to the following: to Professor Shepard B. Clough and Professor Frederick C. Mills of Columbia University, Dr. Alfred Vagts, Dr. J. S. Davis, Director of the Food Research Institute, Stanford University, and Dr. O. C. Stine of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, United States Department of Agriculture, for their helpful suggestions when I was beginning my research; to Professor John Wuorinen, Professor Austin P. Evans, and Professor Robert L. Schuyler, all of Columbia University, and Dr. Charles W. Cole, now President of Amherst College, for their painstaking reading of the finished manuscript and their comments. I appreciate particularly Dr. Cole's criticism of the sections dealing with economic matters. But I owe my greatest debt of gratitude to Professor Carlton J. H. Hayes and to Professor Jacques Barzun, both of Columbia University. It was through Professor Hayes that I first became interested in the agrarian movement and the formation of the Bund der Landwirte. During the stages of research, organization of material, and preliminary writing his kindly advice and encouragement were of invaluable assistance. I am likewise under great obligation to Professor Barzun, who gave unstintingly of his time while I was writing the final draft of the manuscript. For his careful reading of the text and his valuable counsel, especially in matters of style and presentation, I am deeply grateful.

TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE PKEFACE

7

CHAPTER I The State of Agriculture in 1890

11

C H A P T E R II " T h e New E r a " in Politics

34 C H A P T E R III

Party Politics and Agriculture

50

C H A P T E R IV Tariff Policy

69 CHAPTER V

The Austrian Treaty

100 CHAPTER VI

The Farmers' League

144 C H A P T E R VII

The Farmers' League in Politics

168

C H A P T E R VIII The Rumanian Treaty, 1893

207 C H A P T E R IX

The Russian Treaty, 1894

248 CHAPTER X

The Fall of Caprivi

299

APPENDIX

335

BIBLIOGRAPHY

337

INDEX

345

CHAPTER I T H E S T A T E O F A G R I C U L T U R E I N 1890 IN the 1890's agriculture was carried on in every state of the German Empire and in every province of Prussia. O v e r one-half the population lived in rural communities. T h e occupational census for 1895 showed that 36.19 per cent of those earning a livelihood were engaged in agriculture, forestry, or related occupations. 1 Agriculture could still claim to be the " largest producer and the largest consumer " in the G e r m a n state, but the time was not far off when it was to be superseded by industry. In the early 1890's it was in this respect at a turning-point. T h e relative importance of agriculture to industry in the economy of the state had changed markedly during the course of the century. In 1800 industry and commerce were b a c k w a r d ; about 80 per cent of the inhabitants of the area which became the German Empire were engaged in agriculture. A f t e r 1835 industry began to show new life, but even as late as 1850, the German states maintained their distinctly agricultural

char-

acter. Thereafter, and especially following the establishment of the Empire in 1871, " the share of industry in the whole production grew more strongly than that of agriculture." tween

2

Be-

1871 and 1890 Germany's total population increased

from 41,059,000 to 49,428,000. T h i s huge increase w a s absorbed almost entirely by industry and commerce. T h e rural 1 Statistisches Jahrbuch für das deutsche Reich, 1892, p. 1 3 ; Vicrteljahrshejte zur Statistik des deutschen Reiches, 1897, Ergänzung zum ziveiten Heft, p. 23. See also, W i l l i a m H . D a w s o n , The Evolution of Modern Germany ( i s t e d . ; L o n d o n a n d N e w Y o r k , 1908), pp. 43-44. O n t h e b a s i s of a

classification of population in communities of fewer than 2,000 as rural, the rural population in 1890 was 57.5 per cent of the total for the Empire ( J . H . C l a p h a m , The Economic Development IQ14 [4th e d . ; C a m b r i d g e , 1936], p. 278).

of France and Germany,

1815-

2 August Skalweit, Agrarpolitik (2d ed.; Berlin and Leipzig, 1924), p. 22; C l a p h a m , pp. 82, 96-97; A . S a r t o r i u s v o n W a l t e r s h a u s e n , Deutsche schaftsgeschichte, 1813-1914 ( i s t e d . ; J e n a , 1920), pp. 6-7.

11

Wirt-

12

GERMAN

AGRARIAN

POLITICS

population remained nearly stationary. By 1895 percentage of employed persons engaged in agriculture was only a fraction of one per cent greater than that of persons engaged in industry. Between 1890 and 1910 the industrialization of Germany continued at an accelerated rate; a population increase of 15,458,000 was again taken up by industry and commerce. 3 For German agriculture the nineteenth century was a period of remarkable progress in science and technique. By 1890 German farmers of all classes had benefited from the researches and writings of Thaer, Liebig, and others in the first half of the century. The rational agriculture advocated by the former early in the century could not be applied under the open-field system which prevailed generally throughout Germany at that time. T o enable peasants and landlords to put in practice the new teachings he advocated that the question of commons and common rights should be dealt with in conjunction with that of peasant emancipation, which was then going forward. A n d he was largely responsible for the joint treatment of these two matters in the Prussian law of 1821. T h e great landowners of the East were the real leaders in change. Even before 1800 they owned sizable consolidated holdings and they had begun to carry on capitalistic agriculture. T h e Prussian emancipation edicts of 1807-08 and later years made it possible for them to increase and consolidate their holdings still more, but the process was slow and the work was far from complete in 1850. By that time, however, " the bulk of the large landowners at any rate were in a position to carry out agriculture improvement on the grand scale." 4 The rearrangement of peasant holdings in some sections of the Northwest was undertaken early. Schleswig and Holstein had made great progress in this direction even before 1800. In some regions no change was necessary. Individual holdings had been a characteristic of the marsh colonies of the North 3 Vierteljahrshejte zur Statistik des deutschen Reiches, 1897, Ergänzung zum zweiten Heft, p. 48; Clapham, pp. 278-79. 4 Ibid., pp. 44-49. Liebig's first work was published in 1840.

THE

S T A T E OF A G R I C U L T U R E

IN

1890

13

and the forest colonies of the East since their foundation in the late Middle A g e s . But these areas were not typical of Germany as a whole. A s a rule the peasants gave up the open-field system and communal routine later and more reluctantly than the East Elbian Junkers. Almost everywhere in the western half of Germany, where peasant holdings predominated,

rearrangement

of the fields was not undertaken to any extent before the 'forties. Between

1850 and 1875, rearrangement of peasant

holdings was taking place all over Germany and with it the decline of the open-field system. B y 1871 when the Empire w a s founded most German peasants were the free owners of their land. A l l vestiges of feudalism were not eradicated, h o w e v e r ; some continued on into the twentieth century. 8 T h e decline of the open-field system came opportunely. T h e great development of railways between 1850 and 1870 and the economic and political unification of Germany in 1871 gave the peasant a wider market for his products and more incentive to improve his crop and his animals. T h e demands of the new industrial centers and of the rapidly g r o w i n g population stimulated efforts to increase output. Information regarding the latest agricultural methods w a s spread through agricultural societies, which had a great development after 1850. Agricultural schools, institutes, and colleges provided courses for the farmer and the peasant of greater means; for the small peasants there were other agricultural schools and winter courses, as well as extension courses given by travelling teachers. A f t e r 1870 experiment stations played an important part in scientific and technical improvement.® Gradually

the peasants as well as the large

landowners

began to practice rational agriculture. Peasants w h o were not reached by other means learned from the great landowners or from the more progressive members of their o w n class. B y 5 Ibid., pp. 29-52, 195-204; Werner Sombart, Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft im neunsehnten

Jahrhundert

und im Anfang

des 20. Jahrhunderts.

Einführung in die Nationalökonomie (7th ed.; Berlin, 1927), p. 348.

6 Ibid., p. 349; Sartorius von Waltershausen, p. 436.

Eine

14

GERMAN

AGRARIAN

POLITICS

1890 a greater acreage w a s under cultivation than in 1870 and production had increased in almost all branches of agriculture. Larger quantities of food stuffs were grown per hectare; better and heavier animals were bred. 7 Industrialization and the growth of urban areas did not keep an equal pace in all parts of the Empire. Industry was concentrated largely in certain sections of western and central Germany. Westphalia, the Rhineland, and Saxony became highly industrialized. Mining was important in the Saar, in the Ruhr, and in parts of Saxony. Immense urban areas had grown up around the old Hanse t o w n s — H a m b u r g , Bremen, and L ü b e c k — a s well as at the trading centers along the Rhine and elsewhere. But even in the eastern provinces commerce and industry had made inroads. Berlin and its environs formed a great industrial center. Mining as well as agriculture provided a means of livelihood for a large part of the inhabitants of Silesia. Commercial interests overshadowed all else in the vicinity of the Baltic ports—Danzig, Königsberg, Memel, and Stettin. Of the three largest cities in the Empire at this t i m e — Berlin, Munich, and B r e s l a u — t w o were in the eastern provinces. But extensive districts in the Prussian provinces to the east of the Elbe still preserved their predominantly agricultural character in 1895. In Gumbinnen in East Prussia, for instance, 76 per cent of the inhabitants were engaged in agricultural pusuits. 8 There were vast areas in the Northeast where grain raising and the cultivation of a few other crops were the chief concern of the population. W h e a t was g r o w n there, but the principal cereals cultivated, especially in the less fertile districts of East and W e s t Prussia, were rye, oats, and barley. In certain sections of Silesia, Brandenburg, and Pomerania centering in Frankfort on the Oder, the sugar beet was raised. 7 Helen C. Farnsworth, " Decline and Recovery of W h e a t Prices in the 'Nineties," Wheat Studies of the Food Research Institute, X (June and July, 1934), 347; Dawson, The Evolution ..., pp. 231-33. 8 Ibid., p. 24.

T H E S T A T E OF A G R I C U L T U R E

IN

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IS

Potatoes were grown in the lighter soils. A part of this crop was manufactured into potato spirits, largely by the farmers themselves in their own distilleries. Some tobacco was raised, especially in East Prussia and Silesia. 9 In the rest of the Empire there was greater diversity of crops than in the East Elbian provinces. Cereals were raised everywhere. Rye was usually the chief grain crop in all districts. By far the largest part of Germany's wheat was produced in the South and the West. 10 In western and central Germany farmers had to supply the more immediate food requirements of the urban and industrial population. In the West along the Rhine from Basel to Coblenz, in Hesse, and in the province of Nassau, the grape was cultivated. A wide area around Magdeburg in central Germany was the principal seat of the sugar beet industry. South Germany ranked next to the eastern provinces in agricultural production. In addition to rye, wheat, spelt, and other cereals, tobacco, hops, and grapes were cultivated. Wineculture was important in the Bavarian Palatinate, Baden, and Alsace. Tobacco was grown in Baden, Bavaria, and AlsaceLorraine. Hops were raised in all three of the southern states and in Alsace-Lorraine. Sheep raising, which had been profitable in the first half of the century, had fallen off greatly by 1890, and was confined chiefly to the large estates of the North and the Northeast. Bavaria, Saxony, Württemberg, Hesse, and Thuringia produced cattle; hogs were raised in Saxony, Westphalia, on the lower Rhine, and in Lorraine and Hesse. Both cattle and hog raising were undertaken more generally by peasants and small farmers than by large landowners. The agricultural population included persons of widely different social and economic outlook. There were even greater 9 Ibid., pp. 23-24; Statistisches p. is; 1894, p. 18.

Jahrbuch für das deutsche Reich, 1892,

1 0 H e i n r i c h Dade, "Die Agrarzölle," Schriften des Vereins für Sociolpolitik, X C I (1901), 44-45; Statistisches Jahrbuch für das deutsche Reich, 1892, p. 13.

IÓ

GERMAN

AGRARIAN

POLITICS

class distinctions in this occupation than in industry or commerce. Until the period of Stein's reforms at the beginning of the century the Prussian nobles were not permitted to engage in industry or commerce. Long after the prohibition was removed it left its impress upon German society. A t the top of the agricultural hierarchy were members of the higher nobility, of the ruling princely houses in the federated states, and of the Imperial family itself. The princes and the high nobility owned large estates which were scattered over Germany. Owners in this social stratum were seldom concerned with the management of their own estates; they leased their property to tenants. Prussia and some of the other states owned extensive domain lands. These were supervised by state officials, who leased the land to tenants for cultivation. The state and the royal and aristocratic owners were more interested in the returns to be derived from rent than in the problems of agriculture as an occupation. The Landwirt class 1 1 in the agricultural population was made up of independent owners who stood socially between the Bauer class and the higher nobility. Usually a Landwirt was a member of the lesser nobility. But the Landwirt class could be subdivided, according to the social position of the owner and the size of his estate. The most important members of this class were the lesser nobility in the East Elbian provinces of Prussia, called the " Junkers." They generally owned large estates. 11 The word "Landwirt" may be translated "agriculturist," "husbandman," or " fanner " ; in its broader sense it can be applied to anyone engaged in agriculture. However, it is usually restricted to the landowner belonging to the class above the Bauer and below the higher nobility. Usually a Landwirt was a member of the lesser nobility. " Bauer," likewise in the general sense, may be applied to all who cultivate the land, or even to all persons living in rural districts from the nobility to the rural day laborers; in this sense it is opposed to the term "townsman." But in its narrower sense, Bauer means " peasant," or the owner of a Bauerngut, or " farm." "Among the country people themselves generally only the owner of a whole, a half, or a quarter farm, not however of a smaller estate, is called a peasant" (Daniel Sanders, Wórterbuch der deutsche Sprache [Leipzig, 1876]).

THE

STATE

OF A G R I C U L T U R E

IN

189O

17

In this part of Prussia there were more good-sized estates than in any other part of the German Empire. Some, indeed, were of colossal size. In the same region there were peasants with small- and medium-sized holdings, but scarcely any small landowners of the Landwirt class. In general, agricultural society in the Northeast was made up of Junkers, peasants, and agricultural workers without property. Unlike the princes and the high nobility, the Junkers lived on their estates and kept up an active interest in all the problems connected with the cultivation and marketing of crops and the care of livestock. This was the case even on the largest estates. But on the latter a paid manager was frequently employed to look after the more exacting details of production. Since Junkers and others of the Landwirt class carried on capitalistic agriculture, they were seriously affected by a decline in agricultural prices. There were some large estates in Westphalia and even in South Germany,12 but they were much rarer. As a rule both in the West and the South the independent cultivator (Landwirt) had a much smaller estate than the agriculturist of the East Elbian provinces, and was therefore lower in the agricultural hierarchy, even though he might belong to the same lesser nobility. The owner of a very small-sized estate differed from the Bauer, the next lower in the scale of property owners, rather in his social position and his somewhat more ostentatious manner of living, than in the amount of his possessions. There is some evidence to show that in southern Germany at least, the process of change from peasant to Grundbesit2er, or " landowner," was constantly going on, as peasants became 12 Peasants were classified as follows, according to the size of their holdings : " big peasants " were those who owned between 50 and 250 acres of land; "middle peasants," those who owned between i2 l / 2 and 50 acres; and " little peasants," those who had from 5 to 12^2 acres. Peasants who owned less than 5 acres could not live on the income from their land (Clapham, pp. 198-99). According to Sartorius von Waltershausen, large estates predominated in Prussia east of the Elbe and in Mecklenburg, while in Hanover, Schleswig and Holstein, and in Westphalia the large-sized peasant holding was typical; in the West and the Southwest, on the Rhine, the Main, and the Neckar the small holding was usual {op. cit., p. 13).

l8

GERMAN

AGRARIAN

POLITICS

ambitious for the recognition and social position which attended the classification of Landwirt or Grundbesitzer.13 The peasant, as already indicated, was also an independent owner. In Prussia this class of the agricultural population had been freed from serfdom by the Edict of October 9, 1807; the Grundbesitzer, on the other hand, represented the class which had been independent owners before 1807. A peasant's holding was small enough usually so that it could be cultivated by the owner with the aid of his family, or perhaps one agricultural laborer in addition. T h e peasant lived simply, close to the land, and was satisfied with a very modest return for his labor. It is somewhat difficult to determine where in the social scale the tenant belonged. M a n y were close to the small independent farmers, for some of the most intelligent and best educated members of the agricultural population belonged to the tenant-farmer class. Other tenant cultivators were closer to the peasants. Some owned a little property of their own and rented the rest. Others rented all the land they cultivated. Land was leased to tenants for a term of years. T h e period varied, but the favorite length of lease was 18 years. 14 Under normal circumstances, or during a period when agricultural prices were rising, a tenant under a long-term contract was at an advantage. If he leased land in the neighborhood of a city or industrial area he might maintain a comfortable existence even when agriculture was not flourishing. But in other localities in time 13 Stenographische Berichte fiber die Verhandlungen des Reichstags (hereafter cited as "Reichstag"), 1890-92, V, 3427 ( D e c . 15, 1891, Baron Schenck von Stauffenberg). For statistical purposes, estates were sometimes classified according to their size, and sometimes according to their net yield. Some Landwirte estates had less than 250 acres. T h e estates of these individuals compared in size to those of some of the more prosperous peasants. There were relatively f e w estates of over 250 acres in the South and W e s t of Germany. T h e estates in the East usually had 2,000 or more acres. Entailed estates were for the most part of great size. In 1905 over 29 per cent of the latter exceeded 25,000 acres (Clapham, pp. 198-200; Dawson, The Evolution . . . , pp. 28, 259). 14 Handbuch der gesamten (Tübingen, 1890), 448.

Landivirtschoft,

ed.

T.

von

der

Goltz,

I

THE

S T A T E OF A G R I C U L T U R E

IN

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19

of depression his lot was probably worse than that of any other class except the agricultural laborer. A t the time of emancipation in Prussia a part of the land which the peasant cultivated went to the landlord and a part he retained. In many cases the amount which the peasant received was insufficient for the maintenance of his family. These peasants gradually lost what little they had. By 1850 a new class of landless agricultural workers had emerged from this group of the peasantry. 16 In the latter part of the nineteenth century the agricultural laborer's outlook was anything but rosy. After 1875 many of them began to emigrate overseas or to go to cities and industrial centers in the hope of bettering their economic condition. Though all former serfs were legally free, agricultural workers were usually brought under the classification of servants by the eastern landlords, and thus came under the jurisdiction of the Servants' Ordinance of 1810, the terms of which placed the agricultural worker in a status of semi-bondage of his master. T h e great benefits of the social legislation did not reach him. He was dependent upon local charity when he had misfortune. Because of the changes in agriculture which came with the introduction of machinery, he could count upon only seasonal employment. His only hope of relief was emigration or migration. 1 6 German agriculture had to meet totally different economic conditions in the latter part of the nineteenth century from those in the period from 1830 to 1870. A f t e r the Napoleonic Wars, it had suffered severely for a time from the effects of deflation; but by 1830 a greater demand in England for German grain and wool brought better times, and by 1840 the home market for agricultural products began to expand as industry developed and the population grew. 1 7 From 1850 to 15 T . von der Goltz, Geschichte der deutschen Landwirtschaft (hereafter cited by the author's n a m e ) , I I ( S t u t t g a r t and Berlin, 1903), 361-63. 16 Clapham, p. 205; Goltz, II, 361-70; Dawson, The Evolution..., 269-91. 17 Ibid., p. 233; H . Heaton, Economic and London, 1936), pp. 460-65.

History

pp.

of Europe (New York

20

GERMAN

AGRARIAN

POLITICS

about 1870 agriculturists enjoyed a period of prosperity. Prussia and the other German states could supply the increasing needs of the domestic market and also export their products to foreign countries. High prices brought a demand for agricultural property. Land prices rose. Just before 1870 there was a change. America began to export grain and meat. A s a result Germany lost the French and English grain markets, and its cattle exports to western European countries were reduced. F o r several years this loss of foreign markets was offset by the growing needs of Germany's own population. After 1873 production of both wheat and rye was increased, but Germany no longer satisfied its own requirements. R y e imports exceeded exports even in 1 8 7 2 ; in 1872 and 1875 Germany was still exporting more wheat than it imported, but in 1873 and 1874 it had to supplement domestic with foreign wheat. From 1875 to 1900 there was never a year when wheat or rye exports exceeded imports. 18 Germany's change from a grain-exporting to a grain-importing state coincided with the beginnings of agricultural expansion not only in America, but also in eastern and southeastern Europe. The grain which Germany used after the middle 'seventies to supplement its own supplies came from Russia, the United States, Hungary, Argentina, and the Balkan states. But the share of the several competing countries in wheat exports to Germany changed markedly in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. B y 1880 Austria-Hungary was providing 37 per cent, Russia 24 per cent, and the United States 39 per cent of Germany's wheat imports. In the same year Russia furnished 62 per cent of Germany's rye imports. 19 While wheat and flour exports from the United States fell off 18 Reichstag, 1887-88, Anlageband, I, 162; Farnsworth, loc. cit., pp. 34748 (Tables I I I and I V ) ; Dawson, The Evolution . . . , pp. 230-33, 237; Sartorius von Waltershausen, p. 304. 19 Ibid., pp. 304, 138; Dade, loc. cit., pp. 67-89; V . P . Timoshenko, " T h e Danube Basin as a Producer and E x p o r t e r of W h e a t , " Wheat Studies of the Food Research Institute, V I ( M a r c h , 1930), 190, 2 1 2 ; Farnsworth, loc. cit., pp. 295, 348 (Table I V ) .

T H E S T A T E OF A G R I C U L T U R E I N

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21

conspicuously during the 'eighties, Russia and Austria, continued to send large quantities of wheat to the German market. In the first and even more in the second half of the decade, however, A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y lost to Russia, and in the 'nineties to Argentina, Rumania, and the United States. 2 0 During both decades, despite the export prohibitions and the tariff w a r of the early 1 8 9 0 ' s , R u s s i a w a s the most important single source of G e r m a n y ' s wheat and rye imports. 2 1 20 T H E

P E R C E N T A G E OF G E R M A N Y ' S T O T A L W H E A T N I S H E D BY E A C H OF T H E C H I E F E X P O R T I N G

IMPORTS

FUR-

COUNTRIES

1880-84

1885-89

1890-94

1895-99

%

%

%

%

Russia 34.80 52.28 30.55 48.31 United States 8.81 4.65 30.94 27.16 Argentina 1253 11.01 Rumania 2.13 230 1020 9.92 Austria-Hungary 26.93 20.00 5.80 1.02 This table is adapted from one given by Dade (loc. cit., p. 67). His table shows that Belgium, the Netherlands, and the free port of Hamburg furnished 20.94 per cent of Germany's wheat imports in the first half and 16.65 per cent in the second half of the 'eighties; but it is probable that much of the wheat which Belgium and the Netherlands supplied was, like that from Hamburg, of foreign origin. Hamburg became a part of the German Customs Union in the late 'eighties; hence there are no separate statistics for Hamburg in the 'nineties. 21 T H E

P E R C E N T A G E OF G E R M A N Y ' S T O T A L R Y E IMPORTS BY E A C H OF T H E C H I E F E X P O R T I N G

FURNISHED

COUNTRIES

1880-84

1885-89

1890-94

1895-99

%

%

%

%

Russia 55.93 6952 67 59 76.53 United States 156 0.69 7.80 12.25 Rumania 0.16 1.42 6.82 8.06 Bulgaria 0.06 0.48 2.10 1.11 Turkey 0.23 0.71 4.99 0.71 France 9.07 1.78 2.43 059 Austria-Hungary 7.12 1.25 2.62 0.07 Dade, loc. cit., p. 66. Dade's table shows that Belgium, the Netherlands, and the free port of Hamburg furnished 24.56 per cent of Germany's rye imports in the first half and 24.28 per cent in the second half of the 'eighties. As in the case of Germany's wheat imports, it is likely that much of this rye was of foreign origin.

22

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POLITICS

Agricultural prices and income in Germany would not necessarily have been affected by foreign competition, had conditions of production been the same everywhere. Several factors enabled overseas countries and Germany's neighbors in eastern and southeastern Europe to produce more cheaply. A t a time when prices for agricultural land were becoming high in Germany, farmers in overseas countries could get it for very little. Legislation was passed in the United States, Canada, Australia, and Argentina in the 'sixties and early 'seventies which enabled settlers to obtain property at low prices or almost free of cost, provided they would put it under cultivation. 22 Farmers, especially those in the United States, were often willing in the first years of the " homestead " movement to produce grain for sale at less than the cost of production in order to obtain land. Grain grown in the rich, virgin soil of these new agricultural areas could easily compete in price with that grown in the long-used, somewhat depleted soil of Western Europe. In the German Northeast, where the principal grain crop was grown, a heavy crop yield could not be expected without the use of expensive fertilizers, because the soil was thin. American agriculturists, however, could still grow bountiful harvests under the system of extensive cultivation. The rapid improvement in transportation facilities after the middle of the nineteenth century encouraged agricultural expansion overseas. A s railroad mileage was extended, the interior of overseas countries was opened up. Grain could reach the ports easily. A t the same time a tremendous reduction in freight rates on steamship lines and to some extent on railroads was taking place. Between the early 1870's and the beginning of the twentieth century ocean freight rates from New Y o r k to London declined almost 80 per cent, and from Odessa about 70 per cent. Furthermore, perishable articles, such as meat, could be transported cheaply to Europe after 22 Farnsworth, loc. cit., pp. 295-96.

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refrigerating plants came to be installed upon railroads, sailing vessels, and ocean-going liners. 23 Improved agricultural machinery was not employed extensively in Western Europe until some time after it was in general use in the United States. There the McCormick reaper was widely used in the early 'fifties and in the 'sixties and 'seventies other mechanical devices were introduced to aid the farmer in harvesting grain. Between 1882 and 1895 there w a s a tremendous increase in the number of agricultural machines in operation in Germany. In the latter year 45.8 per cent of the small peasant holdings, and 78.79 per cent of the large peasant holdings employed machinery. F o r the smaller holdings this mechanical aid was made possible through co-operative associations. 24 Agricultural expansion in Russia and Hungary was aided by many of the same factors—fertile soil, rapid railroad development, and lowered transport costs. In Russia a lower standard of living helped to keep production costs down. Russia's agricultural expansion was facilitated also by governmental policy. T h a t country had fallen heavily into debt to foreign powers on account of its expenditures for the army, railroads, expansion in Siberia, and new industries. T o prevent the flow of gold from the country, Russia had undertaken to reduce its debt by fostering agricultural exports and curtailing imports of raw materials and manufactured goods as much as possible. B y 1890 Russia was able under normal conditions to export large quantities of wheat and rye, as already indicated. It was the competition of Russian rye which most threatened the German farmer. For Russia produced more 23 Ibid., pp. 293-4, 2 9 8 ; V . D . Wickizer, " Shipping and Freight Rates in the Overseas Grain Trade," Wheat Studies of the Food Research Institute, X V (Oct., 1938), 69, 118. 24 Sombart, pp. 152, 353; Sartorius von Waltershausen, pp. 427-28; Farnsworth, loc. cit., pp. 296, 299-301; W . Treue, Die deutsche Landwirtschaft zur Zeit Caprivis und ihr Kampf gegen die Handelsverträge (Berlin, 1933), PP- 35-38.

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rye than any other country in the world. T h o u g h wheat consumption had increased relatively and absolutely in Germany, rye w a s still the most important bread grain. 2 5 A debased currency w a s an asset in forcing exports and curtailing imports against a gold-standard country like Germany. In the early 1890's Russia, Italy, and A r g e n t i n a had this advantage over Germany. A l l these factors which fostered agricultural expansion led to an enormous increase in the world supply of grain.2® W h e a t became an important commodity in international trade and London the world market for wheat. M o r e and more there came to be a " world " wheat price which w a s much influenced by the countries which could produce most cheaply. T h e price in the producing country varied from the " world " price b y the amount of the shipping and other costs which were necessary to get the grain to its market. Other things being equal, wheat produced in a neighboring country could compete favorably with wheat produced farther away. But other factors were not always equal, for higher freight charges were often offset by lower production costs. Because the exporting countries were competing with one another for control of the W e s t e r n European market for grain, 2 7 Germany was no longer dependent upon any one country for the wheat needed to supplement its own production. T h i s w a s even more the case in 1890 than in 1875. R y e was not a world commodity in 1890 to the same extent as wheat. Fewer countries produced rye in large quantities, and the demand for rye w a s not as great as for wheat. But r y e production was greatly increased in Russia, Germany, A u s tria-Hungary, and elsewhere in Europe from the late 'seventies to the end of the century. T h i s expansion as well as the in25 Dawson, The Evolution ..., p. 241; Farnsworth, loc. cit., p. 303; E. Zweig, Die russische Handelspolitik seit 1877 (Leipzig, 1906), pp. 18-26. 26The population of Western Europe grew rapidly in this period; its increased food requirements stimulated production also. 27 Sombart, p. 359; Farnsworth, loc. cit., p. 292.

THE

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creased per capita consumption of wheat had a depressing effect upon rye prices. These factors were not the only ones 2 8 which caused a downward movement of wheat and rye prices in Europe from 1873 t o i&96> but they were probably of greater importance than any others. T h e movement was not steady. In the autumn of 1881 the price of British import wheat rose, then fell gradually until in the autumn of 1887 it reached its lowest level before the 'nineties. T h e sharpest drop was in the period from January, 1892, to October, 1894. F r o m December, 1879, to October, 1894, the price of British import wheat had dropped from 160 United States cents per bushel to 64 cents. 29 Though grain was protected in Germany after 1879, the decline in grain prices there took a somewhat similar course. Prices began to fall after 1873. T h e y reached low levels in the period from 1884 to 1887. T h e price of wheat rose in May and June of 1887, then dropped sharply in September to about 147 marks per metric ton. There followed a gradual, though far from even, rise until wheat stood just above 240 marks per metric ton in May, 1 8 9 1 ; it then fell precipitously until it reached the lowest point in the decade in October, 1 8 9 4 — 1 2 4 marks per metric ton. The rye price reached great heights in November and December, 1891, then fell and remained at a low level to the end of the century with only a slight recovery in May, 1898. The wheat price in 1898 exceeded the high point of 1891, then fell again. 30 2 8 D u r i n g this same period (1873-96) " B r i t i s h and American wholesale commodity prices declined almost continuously, except for interruptions in 1879-82 and 1886-90 of which the former w a s more pronounced in the United States index and the latter in the B r i t i s h " (ibid., p. 290). T h e decline in agricultural prices, however, w a s greater than that of wholesale commodity prices in general (ibid., pp. 290-93). 29Ibid., pp. 291, 346 ( T a b l e I ) . 30 Statistisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Berlin, 1890, 1891, 1892, 1893, 1894; J. Conrad, " D i e Stellung der landwirtschaftlichen Zölle in den 1903 zu schliessenden Handelsverträgen Deutschlands," Schriften des Vereins für Socialpolitik, X C (1900), 185-86 ( T a b l e s I and I I ) .

26

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T h e prices for almost all important agricultural including spirits and sugar, had a like downward from the late 'seventies to the end of the century in In marked contrast the prices for cattle and other and for eggs, hops and tobacco rose. 31

products, tendency Germany. livestock,

In 1890 German wheat and rye were protected by a tariff of five marks per 100 kilograms. T h i s amounted to 32.4 United States cents per bushel. A comparison of the annual average wheat prices in Germany and the neighboring states in the period from 1890 to 1895 shows how vital a matter the tariff on grain had become for the German farmer. 32 In 1890 Russian wheat from Odessa with the tariff but without the freight and other charges would cost the German importer 115.4 United States cents per bushel, or 8.6 cents less than German wheat. T h e ocean freight rate from Odessa was 9.4 United States cents a bushel on the average in the period 1890-95, and 8 cents a bushel in that of 1895-1900. Without doubt grain could be imported over the Russian border into the eastern provinces even more cheaply than by sea from Odessa. 33 T h e sharp decline of agricultural prices in the 1890*5 was a major cause for discontent in the agricultural population. Farmers claimed that prices did not cover the cost of production. For several reasons it is difficult to ascertain just what the cost of production for wheat and rye was in this period. In 31 Dade, ¡oc. cit., pp. 6-12; Sombart, pp. 358-59. 32 Prices of wheat in Germany and the neighboring states, estimated in U n i t e d States cents per bushel were as f o l l o w s :

1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895

Germany

Austria

Hungary

Russia

124 144 122 98 88 91

94 113 102 90 81 79

87 106 96 84 74 72

83 94 72 60 51 57

( T h e s e figures are taken from Farnsworth, ioc. cit., pp. 346-47 [Tables I and I I ] . ) 33 Ibid.,

pp. 294, 350 ( T a b l e V I I ) .

T H E STATE OF A G R I C U L T U R E IN

1890

27

the first place, costs varied from year to year, and were not the same in every locality. Furthermore there is no comprehensive study of agriculture in the last decade of the nineteenth century. M u c h that w a s written concerning prices and costs w a s colored by the particular views of the authors and reflected their approval or disapproval of tariff protection. 34 In a careful analysis which he made in 1 9 0 1 on the basis of several harvest years, Dade

35

estimated that in the German

E m p i r e the cost of production for a metric ton of wheat

fluc-

tuated between 1 7 0 and 2 0 0 marks and for rye between

140

and 1 7 0 marks, " a c c o r d i n g to the soil, climate, method of management, and market conditions." T h e average production cost of wheat w a s therefore 1 8 5 marks and of rye 1 5 5 marks per metric ton. 3 9 If w e accept his conclusions, grain producers 34 For instance, Conrad disregards the question of production costs when he says: " However, we lay stress on the fact that the protective tariff is to be justified only as a temporary institution and take therewith a definite position of principle" (loc. cit., p. 106). Professor Wahl says: " T h e Farmers' League and the Conservatives were plainly right in their assertion that the tariff reductions were not 4 endurable.' A fearful crisis now followed for our agriculture, of which remarkably little has stuck in the memory of men other than farmers." This statement and the brief remarks which he adds in regard to agricultural distress were based chiefly on " oral reports, and indeed for the most part, of farmers who belonged neither to the Farmers' League nor to the Conservative p a r t y " (A. Wahl, Deutsche Geschichte von der Reichsgriindung bis sum Ausbruch des IVeltkriegs, I I I [Stuttgart, 1932], 563, 697 [note 20]). 35 Dade, loc. cit., pp. 33-34. 36 During the debates on the Austrian treaty Reichensperger of the Center party quoted estimates made by Arendt in 1888. The latter, whom Reichensperger considered a good representative of agriculture, had written that the " normal selling price " of wheat was 180 marks per ton and for rye 140 marks (Reichstag, 1890-92, V, 3310 [Dec. 10, 1891]). According to Dade, Baron Lucius von Ballhausen, the Prussian minister of agriculture, estimated on Dec. 2, 1887, that the production costs for wheat and rye were 190 marks per ton (loc. ext., pp. 33-34). Count Kanitz contended that the costs for rye per ton were 30 marks higher in 1891 than in 1887, when it took 150 marks in eastern Prussia and 160 marks in Bavaria and the West to produce one ton (Reichstag, 1890-92, V, 3315 [Dec. 10, 1891]). But on April 13, 1894, Kanitz said that the cost of production for rye was 150 marks (ibid., 1893-94, III, 2099).

28

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had a wide margin of profit in December, 1891, when wheat was selling at 225 marks and rye at 239 marks per metric ton. But when in January, 1893, the best wheat was bringing only 156 marks and the best rye only 135 marks per ton, both cereals were selling for less than cost. A s agriculture became more and more profitable in the period from 1850 to 1870 there was a great demand for land. The rents for domain lands rose in this period about 300 per cent. Prices for agricultural property increased to two or three times their former level. But as agricultural prices dropped after 1873, the yield on the farmer's investment was reduced. The disastrous effects of the price movement were greatly aggravated by the fact that much agricultural property was heavily indebted. Some farmers had mortgaged their property at the time of purchase in order to speculate in land values while the market was rising. Others had assumed mortgages when estates were settled. Some had been compelled to mortgage their property in order to pay their taxes and other expenses. By 1890, whatever the process by which it had been brought about, the indebtedness of agriculture was a problem of major importance.37 A s a result many a German farmer was in a precarious economic situation in 1890. The yield on his investment was reduced. If his estate was mortgaged, he had to pay interest at the original rate upon the property valuation at the time the mortgage was assumed.38 In Prussia the eastern provinces 37 D a w s o n , The Evolution ..., pp. 245-47; Sombart, p. 360. Kardorff gives an account of distress in agricultural districts of Silesia ( S . von Kardorff, Wilhelm von Kardorff. Ein nationaler Parlamentarier im Zeitalter Bismarcks und Wilhelms II [Berlin, 1936], pp. 275-76). 38 U p t o the late 'eighties or early 'nineties land prices and rents continued to be high even though agricultural prices were falling. T h i s was partly because agriculturists were usually eager t o acquire more land, for a larger estate generally brought greater social distinction to the owner. T h e government's colonization schemes helped to keep land prices high in the P o l i s h provinces. It was not until 1893 that the rentals of Prussian domain lands began to show a decline in returns to the state, as old leases ran

T H E S T A T E OF A G R I C U L T U R E

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were more heavily indebted than those in the West; and largescale farmers were much more heavily mortgaged than small proprietors and peasants. But the indebtedness of peasants with large-sized holdings increased 37 per cent, and of small peasants 55 per cent in the period from 1883 to 1896. Not nearly as many of the peasants, however, were carrying mortgages which amounted to 60 per cent or more of the estimated value of their property. For many years prior to 1890, it had been generally agreed that the Prussian tax system, which was still essentially the system of the agricultural state of 1820, was in need of reform. Direct taxes were the chief source of income. These fell heavily upon landed property and took little account of the great growth of other forms of wealth in the latter half of the century. Nothing was done to remedy this condition while Bismarck was chancellor.89 The old age and sickness laws, which were put into effect in the 'eighties and the early 'nineties, placed an added burden upon the farmer. One agrarian spokesman claimed that the production cost of a metric ton of rye had risen 30 marks between 1887 and December, 1891, because of the social legislation and the increase in agricultural wages. 40 The movement of the population in the second half of the century away from the rural districts to the urban and industrial centers and overseas to North and South America took place at such a rapid rate—even beyond the rate which might have been expected of a country which was becoming highly industrialized—that it was known as the " land flight " ( L a n d flucht) of the laborer. Though this movement of agricultural out and new leases were taken up. From 1892 to 1902 the rental returns for new leases declined in amount between 20 and 30 per cent from the old rents; there was a decline also in the provinces of Hanover and HesseNassau, though a much smaller one (Goltz, II, 398). 39 W . Geiger, Miquel und die preussische Steuerreform, pingen, 1934 [Doctoral dissertation]), pp. 13-15, 19, 53, 63.

1890-93

(Göp-

40 This was Count Kanitz, already cited (Reichstag, 1890-92, V, 3315 [Dec. 10, 1891]).

30

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workers w a s in large measure caused by their poverty-stricken condition, by 1890 it was bringing about an acute shortage of labor in rural districts. T h i s led to an increase in agricultural wages, which added to the production costs of all agriculturists w h o had to hire labor. 4 1 ' T h e Bund der Landwirte, " Farmers' L e a g u e , " which played such an important part in the politics of the early 1890's, w a s not the first agricultural organization. T h e foundation earlier of agricultural societies to further agricultural science and technique has already been described. T h i s movement began in 1808 during the Napoleonic W a r s . T h e number of local societies grew steadily thereafter; by the latter part of the century they were widely extended throughout the Empire. In 1842 the State Agricultural B o a r d (Landesökonomie-Kollegium) was established as a central body for all the local societies of Prussia. In 1872 the German Agricultural Council (Deutsche Landivirtschajtsrat) was set up to bring to the attention of the government the economic needs of agriculture for the entire area of the German Empire, as the Landesökonomie-Kollegium did for Prussia. Meanwhile the local societies had been organized into provincial societies, and the latter into central associations for each state. 42 T h e German Agricultural Society ( D e u t s c h e Landwirtsckajtsgesellschaft) was founded in 1885. It w a s an aristocratic organization, patterned after the R o y a l A g r i c u l t u r a l Society of England. It became the leader of other agricultural associations. T h r o u g h its travelling exhibitions, its scientific literature, and its meetings it spread the new scientific and technical knowledge. 4 3 41 The government's colonization undertakings in the eastern provinces were in part an effort to counteract this movement away from the land there. 42 Sartorius von Waltershausen, p. 437; Sombart, p. 349; Goltz, II, 21215. 370. 372; J. Croner, Die Geschichte der agrarischen Bewegung in Deutschland (Berlin, 1909), pp. 23-24, 27-29. Some writers call the Bund der Landwirte the "Agrarian League." 43 Croner, pp. 31-33; Sombart, p. 350; Sartorius von Waltershausen, P- 438.

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Agriculturists had found it advantageous also to join together in co-operative societies. Agricultural loan banks were established to provide members with cheap long- and shortterm credit. They also served as savings banks. These co-operatives were first instituted in 1864 to free peasants and other residents of rural communities from their dependence upon retail merchants who charged exhorbitant interest rates. The co-operatives were located principally in the West and the Southwest of Germany. In 1876 a central loan bank for agriculture was established to facilitate loans between societies. Once started the co-operative movement was extended in many different directions. Separate organizations were set up for buying, selling, warehousing, animal husbandry, slaughtering, purchasing agricultural machinery, and for a great variety of other agricultural purposes. By 1890 there were 3,000 agricultural co-operatives in the German Empire.44 Agriculturists had made efforts from time to time prior to 1890 to work together for common economic ends. The Congress of North German Farmers was founded in 1868 for the purpose of bringing together all cultivators of the Landwirt class in the area of the North German Confederation. The South German Landwirt was invited to join also. It proposed to treat economic as well as technical questions. At its first meeting there were loud complaints against the Landesdkonomie-Kollegium, which was said to represent agricultural interests unsatisfactorily. Unsuccessful attempts were made in 1868 and 1869 t o have the Congress work for the election of legislative representatives who would champion the economic interests of agriculture. In view of the developments in the 1890's, it is interesting to note that violent opposition to the motion came from the great landowners of Old Prussia, who thought members of parliament should be representatives of the whole people and not of a single occupational class. But at its third general meeting in 1870 the Congress accepted by a 44 Goltz, II, 378; Sartorius von Waltershausen, pp. 433-36; Sombart, PP- 335-41-

32

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great majority a resolution to " work with greater energy for a stronger representation of agricultural interests in the legislative bodies." In contrast to its position in the 'nineties, the Congress of German Farmers stood then for free trade. A s time went on it concerned itself chiefly with purely technical rather than with economic questions, despite the statements made at the time of organization and in 1870. 45 In 1876 the need for another organization to represent the interests of the large landowners was felt and the Association of T a x and Economic Reformers (Vereinigung der und Wirtschajtsrejormer)

Steuer-

was founded. T h i s association felt

that the Conservative party had lost prestige and power by putting questions of church and state first in its program of 1876. According to the new association, a strong Conservative party must be " monarchical, national, and social." T h e association opposed liberalism in political and in most economic matters; but it was at first in favor of free trade. In its statutes, drawn up in February, 1876, it was stated that the association members were " opponents of protective tariffs." Foreshadowing their future position, was the rather contradictory sentence at the end: " However, we treat import duties and consumption taxes as open questions." T h i s association interested itself in the cause of bimetallism and later took an active part in the protective tariff movement. 46 In the districts of Germany where the population was predominantly Catholic numerous peasant associations had been organized under Catholic leadership. There was no general peasants' association, however, until Knauer-Grobers founded the German Peasants' League in 1885. A s long as peasant class interests were assured this league worked " hand in hand with the great landowners and the other conservative classes." W h e n Knauer-Grobers died, von Ploetz-Dollingen took over 45 C r o n e r , pp. 25-28. 46 Ibid., p. 30.

T H E S T A T E OF A G R I C U L T U R E

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33

the leadership of the Peasants' L e a g u e ; under his guidance it was to play an important part in the agrarian movement. 47 B y 1890 despite the remarkable progress made by German agriculture in the nineteenth century, conditions over which the German farmer had little control were threatening his economic security. H e was being driven to new exertions in order to escape ruin. Undoubtedly many cultivators even in 1890 had not changed their methods radically. But through the agricultural schools, societies, and other organizations the new teachings were spreading wider and deeper in the agricultural population. Unfortunately at just this time there was a demand for a reduction of agricultural protection. Bismarck, who fell from office in 1890, was succeeded by Caprivi. During the chancellorship of the latter a series of commercial treaties was negotiated, in which Germany granted important tariff concessions on agricultural products. These reductions were extended to all the chief agricultural-exporting countries. T h e Farmers' League, which was formed in 1893, aimed to improve conditions for agriculture in general and more especially to defeat Caprivi's tariff treaties. In the political contest which ensued the issue would have been more clear-cut if only economic questions had been involved; it was obscured by an accumulation of unsolved or only partially solved social problems. These problems, which had to do with the condition of the agricultural workers and the commanding position of the " feudal agrarians " in the state, will be discussed in a later chapter. 47 Ibid., pp. 129, 137; O. von Kiesenwetter, Fiinjundswonzig schajtspolitischen Kampfes (Berlin, 1918), pp. 15, 30.

Jahre wirt-

CHAPTER II " T H E NEW ERA " IN POLITICS WHEN William I I dismissed Bismarck on March 20, 1890, it not only caused alarm in the capitals of Europe, where it was feared that the domestic crisis would mean momentous rearrangements in international affairs; it also left the German people sadly bewildered. In more ways than one his departure marked a turning-point in German politics, which was to have important consequences for agriculture. His going necessitated some immediate changes in the foreign office as well as the appointment of a successor. Though the Kaiser announced shortly after the dismissal that the course would remain the same, 1 it was not long before the policies of the new government were being referred to as the " new course," even by William himself. 2 Georg Leo von Caprivi de Caprera de Montecuccoli, 3 the man who was chosen to take Bismarck's place, was not very well known when he became chancellor, though he had given distinguished service both in the admiralty and in the army. He belonged to the Conservative party. He was a bachelor, without family, and without landed estate. Soon after he assumed office, he remarked, without intending to cast any reflection upon the agricultural calling, that he owned " no acre and blade of straw." The picturesque expression, " kein Ar 1 Schulthess, Europäischer

Geschichtskalcnder,

1890, pp. 47, 53, 320.

2 Ibid., 1891, p. 182; Kardorff, p. 244 (Dec. 18, 1891). 3 Caprivi, 1831-1899, was born at Charlottenburg. The family came originally from Carniola, and the name was spelled " Kopriva." In the 18th century one branch of the family settled in Wernigerode and several members of it entered the Prussian service. His father held an important judicial position in Prussia. His mother's family, of the burgher class, produced many teachers, as well as some theologians and historians. Caprivi was educated in Berlin. He entered the army in 1849 and took part in the wars of unification. From 1883 to 1888 he was chief of the admiralty; from 1888 to 1890 he was commander of the 10th army corps (G. L. Caprivi, Die Reden des Grafen von Caprivi [Berlin, 1894], pp. 1-19). 34

"THE

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ERA"

IN POLITICS

35

und Halm," * immediately became a catch-phrase and during the next five years it was repeated again and again by agrarians who wished to emphasize this essential difference between the old and the new chancellor. With the agricultural population meanwhile Bismarck came to symbolize their particular interests: for he himself was a Junker and he knew the needs of agriculture. The agriculturists forgot the times in the past when they had criticized him; they thought only of his dynamic personality and of his successes. Caprivi became minister president of Prussia as well as chancellor, joining in one person, as Bismarck had done, the highest office of the largest state in the German Empire with that of the chief Imperial office. He took as well the Prussian as distinct from the Imperial office of foreign affairs. Though Caprivi by no means lacked initiative and independent judgment, he brought to his positions a strong sense of duty. His military training had taught him to obey.8 He accepted the appointment because his superior, the Emperor, requested him to do so, and he let it be known that he would remain in office and fulfill its obligations to the best of his ability as long as his sovereign desired his services. In this interpretation of his responsibilities Caprivi differed markedly from Bismarck, who had been the real ruler in Germany during the latter part of William I's reign. Caprivi proved to be a good administrator. He had intellectual ability and a great capacity for hard work. But his handicaps were great. He had had little previous experience in politics or government. He had had no training in foreign affairs. Caprivi assumed his responsibilities modestly.6 He real4 " Kein Ar und Halm," translated literally, means " no are and halm." An " a r e " is .025 acre. " H a l m " means " stems or stalks, as of cereals." 5 " Caprivi seems to me always to have the feelings of a soldier who carries out the commands of his war lord—not that of a chancellor responsible to the German princes and the German nation" (Kardorff, p. 242). 6 In his first speech as chancellor on April 15, 1890, before the Prussian lower house, Caprivi spoke modestly of his own qualifications (Schulthess, 1890, p. 55; A. von Brauer, Im Dienste Bismarcks [Berlin, 1936], p. 328).

36

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ized that whoever followed Bismarck would have no easy road. Herbert Bismarck, w h o had aided his father in the Imperial office of foreign affairs, was commissioned with the temporary direction of it under Caprivi; but he refused to remain after his father left. 7 T h i s post was then given to Adolph Hermann Baron Marschall von Bieberstein. A t the time of his appointment Marschall was serving in the federal council as envoy from Baden. In 1882 he had become public prosecutor at Mannheim, which was the principal grain trading center of western Germany, as well as the chief seat in Baden of the Imperial bank. H e had also held the position of Imperial commissioner of the bank, in which capacity he had gained an unusual knowledge of economic life, especially of banking and finance. Because of his experience in Mannheim he was a valuable aid to the government in its defense of the new commercial policy. 8 T h e fact that Caprivi and Marschall were novices in diplomacy called forth many facetious remarks regarding their appointment, such as Bismarck's description of Marschall as " ministre étranger aux affaires." 9 Their inexperience made 7 Herbert Bismarck handed in his resignation on March 21, 1890; it w a s accepted M a r c h 25, and he left office the n e x t day (Schulthess, 1890, pp. 44, 46, 49; Münchener Allgemeine Zeitung [hereafter cited as "Allg. Ztg."], March 26 and 28, 1890, N o s . 85 and 87). Baron v o n Marschall was appointed on March 29 ( E . Schütte, Freiherr Marschall von Bieberstein, ein Beitrag zur Charakterisierung seiner Politik [Berlin, 1936], p. 1 1 ) . 8 Baron Marschall, 1842-1912, w a s born in Karlsruhe, Baden. F r o m 1883 to 1890 he w a s envoy from Baden to-the federal council. T h o u g h a member of the Conservative party and an outspoken opponent of the National Liberals of Baden, he w a s really a South German democrat. In 1878 h e w a s elected to the R e i c h s t a g with the support of the Centrists. There he w a s especially interested in economic matters, in social legislation, and the situation of industrial workers. Like some of the Conservatives he was, however, a bimetallist ( S c h ü t t e , pp. 10-19; H . Lerchenfeld-Koefering, Erinnerungen und Denkwürdigkeiten [Berlin, 1935], pp. 206-07; Memoirs of Prince von Bülow, trans, by F. A . V o i g t [Boston, 1931-32] [hereafter cited as " B ü l o w " ] I, 9; I V , 629). 9 Bülow, I V , 638. See also, Brauer, p. 330; Bülow, I, 8, 10; I V , 641, 645; Bogdan von Hutten-Czapski, Sechzig Jahre Politik und Gesellschaft (Berlin, 1936), I, 243; H . L. Schweinitz, Briefwechsel des Botschafters General von Schweinitz (Berlin, 1928), p. 302; idem, Denkwürdigkeiten (Berlin, 1927), II, 443-

"THE

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ERA"

IN

POLITICS

37

Holstein indispensable. He had been in the political department of the foreign office under Bismarck, but he had never held a title higher than Vortragender Rat (speaking councillor). Under the new men this recluse, or "grey eminence," as he was called, was often allowed to guide the traditional diplomatic as distinct from the economic negotiations. No one else understood as he did the intricacies of the department. He took no direct responsibility, but German ambassadors and foreign ministers knew that they had to reckon with him. 10 Matters were complicated by the fact that William II apparently wished to be his own foreign minister. At times he seems to have acted independently and even to have made important commitments without first consulting his ministers. The divided responsibility brought about confusion; the firm hand of Bismarck was missed. The Kaiser's part in foreign affairs only increased the lack of unity in the foreign office which prevailed throughout Caprivi's chancellorship.11 Even before Bismarck fell from power he gave up his portfolio of commerce and industry to Baron von Berlepsch, who had been successful in settling the coal miners' strike in 1889." In June, 1890, Johannes von Miquel, a native of Hanover, became Prussian minister of finance. He was a leader of the National Liberal party and had been chief burgomaster of 10 Brauer, p. 330; Biilow, I, 15, 382; IV, 638; Hutten-Czapski, I, 175; Schweinitz, Briefwechsel, p. 301. See also, G. P. Gooch, " Baron von Holstein" in G. P. Gooch, Studies in Modern History (London, 1931) ; Encyclopaedia Britannica, n t h edition. 11 Brauer, p. 329; Bülow, I, 526; Lerchenfeld, pp. 193-4. 12 Hans Hermann Baron von Berlepsch, 1843-1926, was government president of the Rhine province with headquarters in Düsseldorf from 1884 to the time of his appointment as minister of commerce and industry in 1890. He belonged to an old Saxon noble family. Both parents were of the rural Gutsbesitzer class. His position in Düsseldorf brought him into close touch with big business and labor and gave him a deep interest in the labor movement. Throughout his life he was active in the cause of social reform (Schulthess, 1890, p. 18; Allg. Ztg., Feb. 1, 1890 [No. 32], p. 514; H. Berlepsch, Sozialpolitischen Erfahrungen und Erinnerungen [M. Gladbach, Volksvereins-Verlag, 1925], pp. 13-25; W . Trappe, Dr. Hans Freiherr von Berlepsch als Sozialpolitiker [Bochum-Langendreer, 1934], pp. 7-12).

38

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Frankfort on the Main for ten years prior to his appointment.18 With the exception of Miquel all the new officials belonged to the Conservative party. Not one of them, however, was of the Prussian Junker class. Marschall came from Baden, Miquel from Hanover and Frankfort, and Berlepsch from Saxony. Both Marschall and Berlepsch belonged to the Grundbesitzer class, but their outlook did not coincide with that of most Conservatives. Of them all Miquel, the National Liberal, best suited the Conservatives. For the time being the others who had served under Bismarck remained at their old posts; but in the next few years more changes were made, so that all in all a number of new men were brought into the government besides Caprivi. The Kaiser at this period of his life had decidedly liberal views. His mother and his tutor Hinzpeter may have been responsible in part.14 He wanted to be considered a " modern m a n " ; and he wished Germany to be powerful, economically as well as politically. He took great pride in Germany's two great commercial ports—Hamburg and Bremen— and in the progress made in Frankfort on the Main under Miquel.16 These new men from the Kaiser down, though few in number, held the most important positions in the state and controlled its policy. In part the changes which gave the " new era " its name were due to their conviction. But in another sense the " new course " represented their conscious effort to 13 Dr. Johannes Franz Miquel, 1828-1901. In his youth he was interested in the writings of Karl Marx and the Social Democratic movement; but in 1890 he was leader of the right wing of the National Liberal party. It was through him that the great reforms in the Prussian tax and financial system were worked out and carried through. While he was Prussian minister he worked with the Conservatives (Schulthess, 1890, p. 109; Geiger, pp. 5-8). 14 Bülow, I, 121-2, 615, 619; IV, 628; C. Hohenlohe-Schillingsfiirst, Denkwürdigkeiten des Fürsten Chlodwig zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst (Stuttgart and Leipzig, 1907), II, 464; A. Waldersee, Denkwürdigkeiten des General-Feldmarschalls Alfred Grafen von Waldersee (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1923), II, 99. 15 C. Hohenlohe, II, 459; Bülow, I, 595.

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disavow the work of the former chancellor. It also reflected their need to take into consideration the changed complexion of the Reichstag which showed itself during the struggle over the " socialist" law, and even more in the new Reichstag elected immediately afterwards. These two political events, as the future was to prove, were fateful for German agriculture. The contest over the " socialist " law was responsible for a reversal of one of Bismarck's policies even before he left office. During the 'eighties Bismarck had tried in two ways to prevent the growth of the Social Democratic party, which he considered dangerous to the state: by means of this law, which drastically curtailed their political activity; and by ameliorative social legislation, which he hoped would win the workers to the side of the government. The " socialist" law had been renewed from time to time and was due to run out in September, 1890. 1 9 Instead of another renewal of the same law, Bismarck had proposed in 1889 a permanent measure against the Social Democrats. Though softened in some of its repressive features, it was to be strengthened by an expatriation clause. This meant that individuals in certain districts might be banished from the district for as long as one year, if it was felt by the authorities that public order and security were imperiled by their presence. The law might, in fact, be interpreted to mean banishment from the German E m pire. In any case it was a serious handicap to the Social Democrats. The new bill was laid before the Reichstag in the autumn of 1889. It was violently opposed by the parties of the Left and by most of the Centrists. Windthorst, the leader of the Center, succeeded in bringing about its defeat on January 25, 1890. 1 7 In doing so, he broke the strength of the " cartel," as 16 This law was first passed in 1878. It was to remain in force for only a limited time; but it was renewed in 1880, 1884, 1886 and 1888. The National Liberals refused to vote for it in 1878 without the time limitation, and without their support Bismarck would have lacked a majority. The Center was against the measure in 1878, but in 1884 and 1886 a strong minority of the party voted to have it extended (Kardorff, p. 209). 17 Ibid., pp. 209-10. The bill was rejected by a vote of 169 to 98 (Reichstag, 1889-90, II, 1253-55).

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the parliamentary majority formed by the National Liberals and the two Conservative parties was called. T h e voting on January 25, while not a clear-cut decision against Bismarck, showed the weakness of the " c a r t e l " on which he depended. It also signified a loss of agrarian influence in the Reichstag, for it was in the t w o Conservative parties of the " cartel " that the agrarians were most strongly represented. Unfortunately for them as well as for Bismarck, in view of the critical political situation, the three-year term of the Reichstag ran out at just this time. The new elections on February 20 resulted in a revolutionary change: the " c a r t e l " parties suffered a severe defeat; the Radicals and the Social Democrats made spectacular gains; and the Center became the largest party in the Reichstag. Unless dissolved this Reichstag would last until 1898. 18 Even before this election William adopted a more conciliatory policy towards the workers, from whom the Social Democrats were drawing their recruits. O n February 4, despite the strenuous opposition of Bismarck, the Kaiser issued t w o decrees favoring labor. The young ruler hoped in this w a y to rally the workers to the side of the government; actually the leaders of the Social Democratic party used the decrees so skillfully in the campaign that they seemingly aided the party instead of the government. After the election the Centrists, the Radicals, and the Social Democrats, conscious of their strength in the Reichstag and believing in the liberal inclinations of the Emperor, contemplated pushing through legislation which they had long desired. That the government intended to adopt a different attitude towards those parties which had suffered most under Bismarck was evident soon after Bismarck's dismissal, when Caprivi announced that many wishes which had 18 The " cartel," which had numbered 221 in 1887, was now reduced to 140; the Centrists and their political associates were increased from 130 to 143, the Radicals from 32 to 66, and the Social Democrats from 11 to 35. Beginning in 1890 the Reichstags were to last for five instead of three years.

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not been fulfilled previously would now be subjected to a new study.19 The immediate result of the electoral victory of those parties was William's decision to allow the " socialist " law to lapse. The policy of conciliation which the government now adopted towards these parties seemed to signify a withdrawal of its support of agrarian interests. Though the Kaiser and Caprivi protested against this inference and professed their continuing concern for agriculture, the agrarians found in the policies of the " new era " a number of causes for complaint. The change which affected agriculture most seriously was Germany's reduction of its agricultural tariffs in its new commercial treaty with Austria. These concessions led to like grants to other nations, until finally all important grain-exporting countries were the recipients of these benefits—even Russia, Germany's most serious agricultural competitor. The commercial agreement with Russia which accorded these terms was not consummated, however, until after Germany and Russia had been engaged for many months in a tariff war. Another departure from the previous course was Germany's decision against the renewal of the Reinsurance treaty with Russia. This was the most radical change of the " new era," affecting as it did the whole system of European alliances. It was also a contributing factor in determining the new economic policy, and it led finally to a real estrangement between Germany and Russia. Neither the connection between the commercial and the diplomatic policy nor the existence of the Reinsurance treaty was generally known. Yet it was obvious to all as time went on that relations between the two countries had changed for the worse after Bismarck's fall. Bismarck was among the first to criticize the policy which produced this rift. Yet during the latter part of his own administration evidences of friction were apparent between the two powers, whose rulers had maintained more or less friendly relations ever since the days of Frederick the Great. In the 19 Schulthess, 1890, p. 5 5 ; Brauer, p. 328.

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latter part of the eighteenth century the Hohenzollerns and the Romanoffs had joined hands to dismember Poland, and in later years they had adopted a similar repressive policy towards their Polish subjects. Russia had stood behind Prussia while the wars of unification were being fought and the German Empire was being established. In 1878, nevertheless, there w a s a decided cooling in the traditional amity owing to Russia's dissatisfaction over the terms granted at the Congress of Berlin. T h e next year the T s a r withdrew from the League of the Three Emperors. In 1881 it was reconstituted and in 1884 renewed; but again in 1887 it was allowed to lapse. During the year 1887 several other matters caused increased tension between the two powers. Russia began a vast new armament program which seemed all too threatening to Germany. Bismarck consequently forbade the flotation of a new Russian loan in Germany. 2 0 France was willing to grant what Germany denied, and within a short time the loan was oversubscribed there. Earlier in the same year the T s a r issued a ukase 2 1 prohibiting foreign subjects from inheriting property in the western provinces of Russia. Foreigners who inherited estates there were required to dispose of them within three years. F o r the owners disposal within such a short time usually meant heavy financial loss. T h e ukase affected among others the wife of the future chancellor of the German Empire, Prince Chlodwig Hohenlohe. A t the death of her brother in August, 1887, Princess Holenlohe inherited one of the most extensive estates in Russia. 22 It comprised about three and half million morgen, it extended " over several provinces of the Russia Empire," and it was described as being " larger than the Grand Duchy of 20 Die grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914, ed. J. Lepsius, A. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, F. Thimme (Berlin, 1922-27) (hereafter cited as "Grosse Politik"), V, 335 ( N o . 1142, Nov. 10, 1887). 21 Ibid., V, 330 ( N o . 1137). This Russian law of May 24, 1887, made an exception in the case of property in commercial places and in cities. 22C. Hohenlohe, II, 425. See also, A. von Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst, Aus meinem Leben (Frankfurt am Main, 1925), pp. 74, 151, 160-62.

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Baden." 23 This ukase reflected the influence of Pan-Slavism, which flared up again in 1887. Whatever the T s a r might desire personally this movement was making difficulties between the two countries. In addition Russia had adopted a series of economic measures during the 'eighties which were thought to be directed mainly against Germany. A n d Germany for its part had increased its agricultural tariffs in 1885 and again in 1887, thereby hampering Russian agricultural exports to Germany. All these factors brought about a strain in the diplomatic relations between Germany and Russia in 1887. 24 W h e n in the same year it became evident that the T s a r did not intend to renew the League of the Three Emperors, Bismarck sought to forestall a possible loss of Russia's friendship by means of a new agreement—the so-called Reinsurance treaty. T h i s treaty was essentially a defensive pact; yet in a very secret supplementary protocol Germany made rather extensive pledges to Russia. Germany agreed in general to leave Bulgaria to Russia as a field of influence, and to remain neutral if Russia should be obliged to take the Straits and Constantinople. T h e existence of this treaty was known to only a handful of the chief ministers of each country, and its actual terms, at the urgent stipulation of the Tsar, 2 5 to still fewer. It was to run out on June 18, 1890. The renewal of the treaty was under consideration during the crisis preceding Bismarck's dismissal. T h e fact that the Tsar was reluctant to negotiate " such a secret affair " with a new Imperial chancellor 26 complicated the question of renewal 2 3 H u t t e n - C z a p s k i , I, 229-31, 334. See, 24 S c h w e i n i t z , Denkwürdigkeiten,

Appendix.

I I , 376-77.

25 H u t t e n - C z a p s k i , I, 306. T h e P a n - S l a v i s t m o v e m e n t u n d o u b t e d l y explains t h e f e a r of t h e T s a r t h a t t h e t e r m s of t h e R e i n s u r a n c e t r e a t y m i g h t b e c o m e k n o w n and his insistence t h a t only a v e r y f e w p e r s o n s in G e r m a n y be a l l o w e d t o k n o w of t h e t r e a t y ' s existence. 26 Grosse Politik, V I I , 3 ( N o . 1366). H e r b e r t B i s m a r c k i n f o r m e d the K a i s e r in a confidential r e p o r t o n M a r c h 20 t h a t S h u v a l o v h a d w i t h d r a w n t h e R u s s i a n o f f e r t o p r o l o n g t h e t r e a t y f o r this r e a s o n .

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after Bismarck left office. Bismarck had evidently hoped to use the treaty as a means of maintaining himself in power. In a conversation with Shuvalov on March 17 he implied that the harmonious relations between the two countries would be jeopardized if he were dismissed. But his ruse did not w o r k : for William had already sounded out the T s a r and had received word that in case it became necessary to let Bismarck go, it would cause no misunderstanding between the t w o countries. A n d in a private interview with Shuvalov the morning after the dismissal William signified his readiness to renew the treaty. 27 This decision, however, was not final. Inasmuch as Shuvalov was empowered by the Tsar to negotiate only with Bismarck, he had to obtain new instructions. Holstein meanwhile had begun to raise objections to the treaty. H e had rather officiously taken possession of the secret document and had shown the text to Caprivi, Marschall, and Schweinitz, while Herbert Bismarck was still in office. Holstein had long been unfriendly to Russia. Under his influence the new men decided that the treaty contradicted the spirit if not the letter of the Triple Alliance, and that Bismarck had purchased Russia's friendship at too high a price. Caprivi and Schweinitz, the German ambassador to Russia, conferred on March 27 with William, and the latter acquiesced in the vote against renewal. 28 F o r Holstein at least another consideration was important: he feared that Russia might insist upon negotiating only with Bismarck. 2 0 Schweinitz said later that the action taken at the conference with William on March 27, which was contrary to the assurance which the 27 Schweinitz, Denkwürdigkeiten, II, 396-401; Grosse Politik, VII, 11'5 (No. 1370), 20-21 ( N o . 1373, Anlage) ; S. von Kardorff, Bismarck— Vier Vorträge (2nd ed.; Berlin, 1930), pp. 189-90. 28 Schweinitz, Denkwürdigkeiten, II, 399-400, 404-05; S. Kardorff, Vier Vorträge, pp. 189-90, 191-92; Hutten-Czapski, I, 306; Grosse Politik, V I I , 10 ( N o t e ) , 10-11 (No. 1369) ; Brauer, p. 331; Bülow, I, 382. 29 Holstein to Count Philipp Eulenburg, S. Kardorff, Vier Vorträge, pp. 190-91.

March 28, 1890, quoted in

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latter had given Shuvalov on March 2 1 , enabled Capri vi to keep the chancellorship.80 For a time after Germany's decision against renewal of the Reinsurance treaty, relations between William and Alexander remained cordial. But when Caprivi also adopted a conciliatory policy towards the German Poles, another bond between the two dynasties was loosened, and the suspicion grew in Russia that Germany might be trying to extend its influence in Russian Poland. Gradually Germany's unwillingness to conclude any sort of written agreement with Russia brought about a coolness, 31 which gave France the opportunity it desired. Even before the Russian loan had been negotiated in France in 1888, French diplomats had been trying to bring about closer relations between the two countries. Russia preferred the German alliance and was slow to accept the French proposals. But in 1890 and 1891 a series of incidents seemed to indicate that new alignments were taking shape. Russia resented the spectacular manner in which the renewal of the Triple Alliance was celebrated, and felt that the visit of the British squadron to Fiume and Venice meant that Great Britain had joined the Alliance. A month after this event a French squadron went to Kronstadt. And on several public occasions the Russians took special pains to honor the French. In some quarters in Germany it began to be felt that the " new course," by neglecting to keep the line to St. Petersburg open, was running the risk of having a potential enemy on the east as well as the west. Finally in August, 1 8 9 1 , an entente was consummated between Russia and France, and the balance of powers of Bismarck's time was disrupted. 32 30 Schweinitz, Denkwürdigkeiten, 31 Grosse Politik, pp. 268-70.

II, 406 ( N o t e ) , 429.

VII, 411-12, 416-18, 420-21; Schweinitz,

Briefwechsel,

32 W . L. Langer, The Franco-Russian Alliance, 1890-1894 (Cambridge, Mass., 1929) ; idem, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902 ( N e w York, 1935), I, 3-65. In August, 1891, there was an exchange of notes only. On August 17, 1892, a Franco-Russian military convention was signed.

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The full significance for agriculture of these developments was not immediately apparent. But ultimately the failure to preserve the tie with Russia weakened Germany's diplomatic position and enabled Germany's partners in the Triple Alliance to press for commercial concessions which injured agriculture. The new commercial policy will be discussed in a later chapter. The agriculturists in the great grain-growing regions near the Russian border, moreover, were vitally interested in the preservation of peace with Russia. There the threat of Russia's power was most strongly felt. For in this vast plain which stretched on into the heart of Russia, there were no real barriers, except for a few rivers, to stop the onward march of the " Cossack hordes." In a part of this area of Germany the population was predominantly Polish. And just as Russian fears were awakened by Germany's Polish policy, those of the Germans living in this section were aroused by the Pan-Slavist agitation and by Polish nationalism. Any change in Germany's policy toward Russia or the Poles was therefore a matter of concern for the rural population in this part of Germany. While new adjustments in foreign relations were being made, the domestic scene was being disturbed by the actions of the fallen hero. There is no evidence to show that Bismarck had any hand in organizing the agrarian movement which played so important a part in the opposition to the commercial treaties of Caprivi's government. But Bismarck did not hesitate at any time during the next few years to criticize the government's policy. He did this partly through his connections with the Hamburger Nachrichten and other newspapers whose columns were put at his disposal,33 partly through public addresses and private conversations with friends, and partly through his talks to deputation after deputation of men and women who came from all parts of Germany to pay him homage. Wilhelmstrasse could never be certain whether its measures would be allowed to pass unnoticed or would be subjected to sharp at33 For a list of other newspapers which were willing to express Bismarck's point of view, see G. Egelhaaf, Bismarck (Stuttgart, 1918), pp. 427-28.

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tack. On the subject of the new army reforms, the Heligoland treaty with England, the government's relations with Russia, and the new economic policy Bismarck's pronouncements were antagonistic to the " new course." Although he did not divulge the existence of the Reinsurance treaty until 1896, 34 Bismarck tried to make it appear to Germany and the world at large that his dismissal meant a weakening of Germany's ties with Russia. Bismarck had returned to his estate bitter at the injustice of his dismissal. He did not criticize the Kaiser publicly; but he brooded over the treatment he had received. His family, especially his wife and his son Herbert, resented the humiliation he had suffered and kept aglow the smoldering embers of his injured pride. It is possible that Bismarck expected the Kaiser to recall him to Berlin soon, but as the weeks went by and no sign was given by the Kaiser, it began to be noised about that Bismarck would enter public life in another role—as a member of the Reichstag. There he would be able to bear down on the government at closer range. 35 The National Liberals wanted Bismarck to try for Johannes Miquel's constituency when the latter was appointed Prussian minister of finance in June, 1 8 9 0 ; but Kardorff advised against it, because Miquel had had a majority of only eighteen votes. It would never do for the former chancellor to suffer a defeat. I11 March of the following year the party again offered Bismarck a constituency. This time he accepted and was chosen on April 30, 1 8 9 1 , on the second ballot for the Geestemiinde-Kehdingen district of Han34 Then Bismarck disclosed also the more general features of the agreement, but not the most secret clauses (Grosse Politik, VII, 41-42 [No. 1384 and Note] ; Hutten-Czapski, I, 301-04). 35 The Hamburger Nachrichten discussed this possibility on April 19, and at the beginning of June an article appeared in the Parisian newspaper Figaro, and was reprinted in some German newspapers. It stated that Count Saldern-Ahlimb, a Conservative, was ready to give up his seat for Bismarck. This was denied by Count Saldern in a personal letter to Caprivi (Kardorff, pp. 231-32; Allg. Ztg., Apr. 22, 1890 [No. n ] , p. 2 ) .

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over. During the next two years Bismarck never once took his seat in the Reichstag; but the possibility that he might appear was a constant worry to the government. 87 Feeling a threat to its power in Bismarck's activity, the government did some unfortunate retaliating. On May 6, 1890, at the opening of the new Reichstag, the Kaiser in his speech from the throne did not mention the upheaval of the previous March or Bismarck's retirement. Bismarck had already announced that he would make known his views in the press, and the interviews with foreign newspaper correspondents had begun. 38 By early June Caprivi began to feel that Bismarck's activities were dangerous to the government, especially his reception of press reporters from countries which were not friendly to Germany. Accordingly German ambassadors and envoys were cautioned against giving any weight to Bismarck's utterances in the press and were instructed to pass on this warning to the governments to which they were accredited. Some Germans felt that the government ought to take legal action against Bismarck and charge him as an officer of the army with high treason and hostility to the policy of the Kaiser. But the latter apparently did not wish to restrict Bismarck's actions as a private citizen.39 In April, 1891, about the time Bismarck was elected to the Reichstag, a group of influential men discussed the possibility of re-establishing friendly relations between the Kaiser and Bismarck. Apparently Holstein was responsible for dissuading this effort. About a year later Baron von Stumm took the 36 The Social Democrats, the People's party, and the Ultramontanes were strong in Kaiserslautern, Miquel's electoral district (Kardorff, p. 230). Inasmuch as the Geestemünde-Kehdingen district of Hanover was not sure, Kardorff offered to give up his own seat for Bismarck in 1891, but the latter would not hear of it (ibid., p. 232; K. Wippermann, Deutscher Geschichtskalender, 1891, i, 246). 37 Kardorff, p. 247. 38 Schulthess, 1890, pp. 57, 62, 68, 93. 39 Ibid., pp. 93-94; Kardorff, Vier Vorträge, pp. 186-88; Hutten-Czapski, I, 158.

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matter up with the Kaiser and was commissioned by him to try to effect a reconciliation.40 The initial steps had been taken when Caprivi's " Urias Letter " frustrated for the time being all further attempts. The letter was written just before Bismarck's journey to Vienna for Herbert's wedding. Prince Reuss, the German ambassador in Vienna, was requested not to attend the ceremony. And at Caprivi's suggestion William wrote to Emperor Francis Joseph that if he granted an audience to Bismarck the Berlin government would consider it an unfriendly act. The former chancellor therefore had no official reception in Austria. Both Holstein and Caprivi doubtless feared that a reconciliation would mean Bismarck's return to office, and this they were determined to prevent if possible.41 Generally speaking the influential men in Germany did not dare to visit or keep in touch with Bismarck for fear of the Emperor's displeasure. Bismarck complained that he was " avoided like one infected with the plague." 42 A few political leaders, known as the " Bismarck Fronde," maintained their connection with him during his Coventry period. Wilhelm von Kardorff, the agrarian leader of the Imperialist party, was one of this group. As it became clear to the agrarians that the young Emperor and his advisers were turning from the course charted by Bismarck, and were taking one which might cause agriculture to founder, they became alarmed. In the next chapter the party relationships which accentuated this fear will be discussed. 40 Kardorff, pp. 260-61; F. Hellwig, Carl Ferdinand Freiherr von Halberg (Heidelberg-Saarbrücken, 1936), pp. 428-32.

Stumm-

41 The wedding was in June, 1892. Prince Reuss was ill at the time of Bismarck's visit; an audience which had been arranged with Emperor Francis Joseph was cancelled ( A . Wahl, III, 564-67). 42 Egelhaaf, p. 430; Lerchenfeld, p. 269; Hutten-Czapski, I, 260.

CHAPTER III PARTY POLITICS AND AGRICULTURE THE issue at stake in the Reichstag election of 1890 was not merely the " socialist" law, but the maintenance of existing protection for food products. The Radicals and the Social Democrats succeeded in increasing their representation by campaigning against agricultural tariffs. For the agrarians the election therefore had three important consequences: it focused attention upon this question at the very time when the government was beginning to work out its commercial policy; it reduced agricultural representation in the Reichstag; and it weakened the " cartel," thus forcing the government to look elsewhere for support. 1 Where the government would find its majority was not at first clear. The Centrists had won 106 seats and a command1 A comparison of the party strength in 1887 and 1890 follows: 1887

1890

German Conservatives German Imperialists Anti-Semites National Liberals

80 41 1» 99

73 20 5 42

Centrists Poles Alsatians Guelphs

98 13 15 4

Dane German Radicals German People's party Social Democrats

1 32

Nonpartisan

221

140

130

106 16 10 11

143

44

174

1 66 10 35

112

2

2

11 2»

397 These figures are taken from Reichstag, 1890-91 (Anlageband I ) , 230-33.

1887, I I I

255 2 397

(Anlageband I ) , 679;

* In 1887 there was no separate Anti-Semitic party, and the one representative was reported with the nonpartisan delegates. SO

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ing position in the Reichstag. Their forces exceeded the combined strength of either the Conservatives (98) or the Radicals and Social Democrats ( 1 0 1 ) . W i t h the Poles, the Guelphs, and the Alsatians, upon whose aid the Center could usually count, that party had about 143 votes at its disposal. T h e " cartel " parties, which now controlled but 140 seats, could not hope to maintain an effective alliance even in matters upon which they could agree. Neither could the Centrists pass the government's measures without the aid of other parties. T h e two middle parties combined—the National Liberals and the Centrists—likewise lacked a majority. T h e government must therefore find support in parties to the right or the left as well as in the middle in order to carry out its program. It had a number of choices. Instead of working constantly with one party grouping, it depended during the next few years upon shifting combinations. T o put through its new commercial policy, which will be described in the next chapter, the government placed chief reliance upon the three parties which had been successful in the 1890 elections—the Centrists, the Radicals, and the Social Democrats. It also hoped to gain the aid of a number of small parties. This new combination was less sympathetic to the demands of agriculture than the old " cartel " ; yet, as will be seen, there was no clear-cut division between the two groups on agrarian matters. T h i s enabled the government to gain some supporters from the old " cartel " ; but, on the other hand, it lost adherents from the Center after the passage of the Austrian treaty. T o understand the issues underlying the struggle over the commercial treaties it is necessary to know the attitude of the several political parties towards agriculture and those engaged in that occupation. T h e Social Democrats, who sat at the extreme left of the Reichstag, increased their representation from 11 to 35 in the election of 1890 with the slogan: " Against those w h o make food dear." 2 T h e y demanded the complete removal of agri2 " Gegen die Lebensmittelverteurer."

See, Schulthess, 1890, pp. 318-19.

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cultural tariffs. These indirect taxes on food, they held, furthered the interests of the bourgeoisie and the ruling classes, but bore heavily upon the workers. 8 The Social Democrats did not oppose agriculture as such. But they distinguished between large and small cultivators. According to them, the " feudal agrarians " were the only ones who had any real advantage from the grain tariffs; and the Prussian Junkers had " the lion's share " of the benefits, since the eastern provinces of Prussia comprised the chief grain lands of Germany. 4 The party maintained, on the other hand, that the great majority of agricultural producers did not raise enough food on their small estates to supply their own needs. Since they had to buy some of their own food, they had no benefit from the tariffs. 5 With these arguments the Social Democrats sought to convince rural workers and peasants that there was no common bond of interest between the large landowners and the great mass of the agricultural population. Many agricultural workers and peasants had already joined the ranks of urban laborers as a result of the industrial development of the 'eighties. Not all of these by any means had become Social Democrats. Yet the appeal of the party was strong, for it was the only one devoted solely to workers' interests. Though the Social Democratic party was still relatively small in 1890, its prospects for growth were highly favorable. There was every indication that German industry would experience even greater expansion in the next few decades, and that more agriculturists would be drawn into industry. The party, moreover, was constantly conducting its campaign for new members. It did this militantly by means of the best organized and the most widely extended party system in Germany. It did not permit deviations by individual members from the 3 A. Bebel, Die Sozialdemokratie im deutschen Reichstage, IV (" Die Tätigkeit des deutschen Reichstages von 1887-1889" [Berlin, 1909]), 310n , 317-18, 323, 3344 Ibid., p. 321. 5 Ibid.

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decisions of the annual party congresses or from the executive orders of party leaders. It was powerful because of this unified effort. It had grown in the 'eighties despite Bismarck's repressive measures. W i t h the lapse of the " socialist" law it could hope for even greater success in the future. A t its Halle party congress, held in October, 1890, immediately after this law ran out, the Social Democratic party adopted new tactics to win recruits. It voted to extend its propaganda campaign into the rural districts and to found a socialist newspaper for rural workers.® These attempts to work upon the susceptibilities of the peasants and small farmers were not at first successful. It is to be remembered that the Social Democratic party based its doctrines upon the Communist Manifesto of Karl M a r x and Friedrich Engels, and that its main purpose was to promote the interests of industrial workers. A t the Erfurt party congress a year later, Ehrhardt-Ludwigshafen reported that the party had published a series of articles which reviewed the situation of the peasantry. Y e t he confessed that those articles applied for the most part to the large landowners of the North and not to the conditions of the peasants of southwestern Germany who had only small parcels of land. " The peasant," he said, " reproaches u s : ' you take good care of the industrial workers in your program, but for the small peasant you have very little regard.' " Ehrhardt-Ludwigshafen added that the small peasant continued to believe that the tariffs helped him and it was exceedingly difficult to disabuse him of that opinion. 7 While not at first effective these teachings of the Social Democrats soon made both the Centrists and the Conservatives apprehensive lest their own agricultural constituents would be enticed into the Social Democratic fold. T h e German Freisinnige, or " Radical," party sat immediately to the right of the Social Democrats in the Reichstag. T h e party had been founded in 1884 by combining the old 6 Schulthess, 1890, p. 156.

7 Protokoll iiber die Verhondlungen des Parteitags der sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands (Berlin, 1890-93), p. 313.

54

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Fortschrittspartei ( " Progressive party " ) with those left-wing members of the National Liberal party who seceded in 1880 because of their unwillingness to support the government's protective tariff policy. T h e men who formed the new party were doctrinaire followers of the Manchester School of economic thought and admirers of the English system of government. N o love was lost between them and the Social Democrats, yet both parties held similar views on some economic questions. Like the Social Democrats, the Radicals believed that taxes and tariffs, which were " laid to a great extent upon articles of everyday use," burdened " the poorer classes disproportionately and increased their cost of living materially . . . to the advantage of the industrialists and the great landowners." The Radicals were also against any taxes or other regulations which would " afford certain classes special advantages." T h e y considered that the government had showered the " feudal agrarians " with favors. 8 And like the Social Democrats they directed their main attack against the Prussian Junkers. Y e t the Radicals did not demand in 1890 as great a change as the Social Democrats, even though they had always been the principal advocates of free trade: they asked merely for a lowering and a gradual removal of the agricultural tariffs. The theoretical views of the Radicals coincided with the economic interests of many of their adherents. T h e party drew its constituents from the middle classes, chiefly from those with mercantile and moneyed interests. It also included some professional men. T h e bankers, commercial agents, merchants, and shipowners who supported it naturally wished to foster trade and commerce. T h e best w a y to do this, they thought, was to lower or to remove the trade barriers between countries. Besides a reduction of food tariffs, they therefore demanded in their electoral summons of 1890 a return to a tariff policy which would " assure to commerce and industry by means of firm commercial treaties a paying trade with all civilized 8 This was a part of the electoral summons of the German Radical party in 1890 (Schulthess, 1890, pp. 12-13). Throughout this book " R a d i c a l " rather than " L i b e r a l " has been used to translate the German " Freisinnige."

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countries " and would " afford protection as much as possible against one-sided sudden tariff increases of other states." 9 T h e Center, a confessional Catholic party, was not necessarily opposed to the interests of agriculture. M a n y of its adherents in southern and in parts of western Germany were peasants who made their livelihood in agricultural pursuits. T h e party included also some agricultural proprietors of greater means, some typical " feudal agrarians," and even some members of the high nobility with extensive landed estates. T h e past history of the Center also showed the party's concern for agriculture. It had aided Bismarck in placing low protective duties on agricultural products in 1879 and in increasing them in 1885. But the election of 1887, which gave the " cartel " a majority of about 221 votes, threw the Centrists again into opposition. In that year they refused to accept Bismarck's proposal to raise the tariffs on wheat and rye to six marks per 100 kilograms. They compromised on five marks, and the measure was passed. Even so, they showed greater compliance to agrarian demands than the National Liberals in the " cartel." If in 1890 the Center and the Conservatives could have combined their forces in the Reichstag, they would have commanded 241 votes. But by 1890 the great industrial development of the 'eighties had brought about a marked change in the political situation. Since the Center was a cross section of all groups and interests in the state, a growth in the number of industrial workers in Germany as a whole meant a proportionate increase of workers amongst Catholics. If the party was to have political influence, its leaders must hold all the diversified elements of their faith in allegiance to the party; they wished above all to keep the Catholic workers from joining the Social Democrats. T h e leaders were aware too that many Centrists had liberal views which drew them to the Left rather than to the Right. One of the small parties upon which Caprivi counted for support was the South German People's party. It was composed 9 Ibid.

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almost entirely of representatives from Württemberg. In the Württemberg lower chamber it usually voted in opposition to the state government. 10 It won ten seats in the Reichstag from the " cartel " in 1890. 11 The party had no sympathy with the teachings of the Manchester School; yet the democratic leanings of its members led them to vote for the most part in favor of the commercial treaties. 12 T h e government also hoped to win the aid of the Centrist allies—the Alsatians, the Poles, and the Guelphs. All three of these small parties represented groups that had their own special nationalist grievances against Bismarck. The first two parties were drawn to the Center by a religious bond; all had suffered equally during the Kulturkampf,13 Though many Poles had migrated to the industrial areas of the West and others were to be found in the mining districts of Upper Silesia, most of the party's Reichstag delegates came from the two Polish provinces of Posen and West Prussia, which Prussia had seized in the latter part of the eighteenth century; and most of them belonged to the Rittergut-owner class. 14 Possession of a Rittergut, " knight's manor," was one 10 Allg. Ztg., June 27, 1893 (No. 176), p. 1; K. Bachem, Vorgeschichte, Geschichte und Politik der deutschen Zentrumspartei (Cologne, 1929), V I I I , 61-62. 11 In 1887 the National Liberals had 8, the Imperialists 5, and the Centrists 4 representatives in the Reichstag from Württemberg. In 1890 besides the ten delegates of the German People's party, 2 National Liberals, 1 Imperialist, and 4 Centrists were elected. 12 L. Bergsträsser, Geschichte der politischen Parteien in Deutschland (6th ed.; Mannheim, Berlin, Leipzig, 1932), pp. 107-08. In 1891 4 members were absent; 3 members voted against the grape and wine duties. 13 Since the population of Alsace-Lorraine was predominantly Catholic, the majority of the delegates chosen from the province were Catholics, though a few districts were won by one or another of the major parties, and occasionally there was a Protestant among the Alsatians. The majority of the Catholic delegates were priests. 14 Both in 1890 and in 1893, 3 of the Polish delegates were Princes, and one of these was also the owner of a knight's manor; the Rittergutowners had 9 other representatives in 1890 and 10 others in 1893, in a total of 16 and 19 delegates respectively.

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of the distinguishing marks of the so-called " feudal agrarians." These men and the German Rittergut-ov/ners of the eastern provinces had the same economic interests. Their constituents were engaged chiefly in agriculture. In 1890 agriculture was more depressed in this East Elbian area (of which the Polish provinces were a part) than in any other section of Germany. That the Poles were conscious of this common economic bond was demonstrated in 1887 when they joined with the Conservatives to vote for a tariff of six marks per 100 kilograms on wheat and rye, and after that measure was defeated for the five-mark tariff. Agriculture was important in Alsace-Lorraine and Hanover ; yet it did not play as large a part in the economy of those sections of Germany as in the granary of the East. The population of Hanover was overwhelmingly Protestant. Still the Guelphs had usually sided with the Centrists, because they felt it was the most effective way to keep alive their protest against Prussia's treatment of Hanover in 1866-67, and also because Windthorst, the Centrist leader, was a Hanoverian. 1 8 T h e antipathy of the Alsatians to the Prussian government dated from 1871 when Alsace-Lorraine was taken from France. F r o m the foregoing account it is evident that there was no unanimity of opinion regarding the need for food tariffs amongst these parties in which Caprivi was hoping to find a majority for the commercial treaties. The Radicals wanted the tariffs reduced, the Social Democrats demanded their complete removal. T h e South German People's party was compliant to reductions. But the Centrists and the Poles had agricultural constituents as did the Guelphs and the Alsatians. The election of 1890 and other events had doubtless caused certain Centrist leaders to question the advisability of maintaining the agricultural tariffs at the level adopted in 1887, but this feeling was 15 Only one of the 19 districts of Hanover—District 3, which was Windthorst's constituency—had a Catholic majority; all the remaining districts had Protestant majorities, and except in one or two districts these majorities were very high. Windthorst had been minister of justice in the Kingdom of Hanover before it was seized by Prussia.

58

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not shared by all members of the party, nor by the Poles. If there was no common basis for co-operation on the question of agricultural protection, there were very real reasons why these parties were willing to work with Caprivi and his advisers. Their victory at the polls had weakened Bismarck's parliamentary backing. They rejoiced at his dismissal. T o prevent his return they were willing to meet the new government halfway. 16 Rumors that relations with Russia were no longer as friendly as they had been did not disturb them, for they had no sympathy for the autocratic Tsarist regime. The various conciliatory measures which the new government adopted provided a further basis for understanding. As already indicated, the " socialist" law was allowed to lapse. The question of the Guelph fund, a long-standing bone of contention between the Hanoverians and Bismarck, was finally settled. The severe regulations regarding passes between France and Alsace-Lorraine were greatly modified.17 T o please the Poles, Florian von Stablewski, one of their own nationality, was appointed Archbishop of Posen and Gnesen. Poles also were again received at court. Caprivi attempted to put through in Prussia a new education law which would permit the churches to give religious instruction in the schools. Though he failed to secure the passage of the bill the Catholics appreciated the sincerity of his efforts. The willingness of these parties to stand behind the government when it introduced the first series of commercial treaties was, as will be seen, of great importance to the success of the new policy. In turning to these parties for aid the government was making another revolutionary change from the previous course: for the parties of the Left and the dissident small groups had been Bismarck's severest critics. Agriculture was more strongly represented in the old " cartel " than in the parties just described. Yet even in this com16 Brauer, p. 328; Biilow, I, 261; IV, 641. 17 The earlier passport regulations in Alsace-Lorraine were modified in Sept., 1891. The Guelph fund was settled in April, 1892. (W. H. Dawson, The German Empire [New York, 1919], II, 277, 279, 285).

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bination, which had supported B i s m a r c k f r o m 1 8 8 7 to 1 8 9 0 , there w a s now a weakening of agrarian influence. T h i s change w a s most conspicuous in the National Liberal and Imperalist parties.

The

National

Liberals

occupied

a position

in

the

Reichstag between the Radicals and the Centrists. L i k e the Center, this other middle party represented a variety of economic interests. F o r the most part its constituents in northern Germany were city-dwellers and belonged to the industrial middle

class.

Small

manufacturers

everywhere

supported

it.

O w n e r s of big business, however, determined its policies. T h e latter usually worked behind the scenes; but a few, for e x ample, Friedrich H a m m a c h e r

18

and Wilhelm Oechelhauser, 1 9

were to be found in the Reichstag. 2 0 S o m e of these large-scale 18 Friedrich Hammacher, 1824-1904, had in his early years strong democratic leanings. Later he was associated with the iron, steel, and coal industry of the Ruhr, and he became president of the Mining Union. H e opposed the anti-socialist laws. H e wanted to settle the coal miners' strike of 1889 by conciliation. H e worked with the Conservatives in the elections of 1884 and 1887, but he opposed the increase in the grain tariffs in 1887. He had no sympathy for " old Prussian reaction." In the i89o's he began to feel that universal suffrage was a mistake. H e was against trade unions. Through his efforts the coal syndicate was organized in 1893 (Pauline R. Anderson, The Background of Anti-English Feeling in Germany, 1890-1903 [Washington, D. C., 1939], PP- 73-78). 19 Wilhelm Oechelhauser helped Hammacher and others form the Nationalzeitung Companie, Inc., in 1890 in order to keep up this party journal, and he was a member of the board of directors of the National Zeitung. He was also a director of the Continental Gas Company of Dessau, and a member of the Handelstag, the central body for the chambers of commerce of the Empire (ibid., p. 82). Oechelhauser was not a member of the Reichstag elected in 1893. 70 Amtliches Reichstags-Handbuch, 1890-95 (Berlin, Verlag von Trowitzsch und S o h n ) ; Amtliches Reichstags-Handbuch, 1893-98 (Berlin, Verlag von Trowitzsch und Sohn) ; A. Bebel, IV, 412. After the election of 1893 at least 13 Reichstag representatives of the party were engaged in big business. Seven of these had received the title of Kommerzienrath, " Economic Councillor," for their industrial achievements; the title was the highest honor ever bestowed for industrial accomplishment (Amtliches Reichstags-Handbuch, 1893-98; W . H. Dawson, Germany and the Germans [New York, 1894], I, 90).

ÖO

GERUAN

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industrialists were also owners of great landed estates. Amongst the party's representatives from North Germany there were also lawyers, professors, and government officials. In striking contrast to the urban character of its constituency in the northern part of the Empire, its supporters in South Germany were agriculturists who still clung to the liberal traditions of 1848. In the 1890 election the National Liberal party was the heaviest loser. It had gained 99 seats in 1887, but it won only 42 in 1890. The party's agricultural representation was likewise reduced. The National Liberals had split on the tariff question in 1880. In 1884, as already noted, those who seceded joined with the Progressives to form the Freisinnige party. After 1880 the leaders of the National Liberals ceased to make the tariff policy a party matter; yet many members of the party were willing to accept some protectionist legislation. During the 'eighties the National Liberals continued to advocate protection for certain industries and to pay lip service to the solidarity of industry and agriculture; but their voting record showed a reluctance to increase agricultural protection. In 1885 the party gave 23 votes for and 20 votes against tariff increases for food products; in 1887 their vote was 20 for and 67 against the food tariff increases.21 During Caprivi's administration there was a left-wing group in the party whose views on food tariffs differed little from those of the Radicals. In 1890 there was also strong feeling within this party that Germany should extend its markets outside the Empire. And it was Bennigsen, the leader of the party, who advocated two years prior to the debates on the Austrian treaty that the government return to a system of tariff pacts when the old commercial treaties should run out in February, 1892.22 The Radicals, as has been shown, were making the same demand. The real opposition to the government's new commercial policy developed as time went on amongst the parties sitting to 21 Allg. Ztg., Jan. 19, 1891 (No. 19 AB), p. 2. 22Reichstag, 1890-92, V, 3326 (Dec. 11, 1891, Böttcher).

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the right of the Center party—amongst the Imperialists, the German Conservatives, and the Anti-Semites. T h e Imperialist, or Free Conservative party, which sat between the Centrists and the German Conservatives, suffered almost as severe a defeat as the National Liberals in 1890. 23 It secured only 20 seats as against 41 in 1887; and agrarian representation w a s greatly weakened. The party had been so solidly behind Bismarck's policies since its foundation in 1866, that it was often referred to as the Bismarck party. T h e verdict of the polls against the National Liberals and the Imperialists reflected the lack of confidence in Bismarck's program, and was felt by many to indicate public censure of the agrarian measures passed in 1887. T h e Imperialist party, though not large, was influential because it was composed of so many prominent men. It included agrarians such as K a r d o r f f , members of the high bureaucracy, and representatives of large-scale industry. 24 T h e leader of the industrial faction was the iron magnate of the Saar, Baron Carl Ferdinand von Stumm. W h e n first founded it was a Silesian party, and in the early 1890's it still had considerable strength in that province. But by that time it also had scattered constituencies throughout the Empire. Originally Catholics as well as Protestants belonged to the party. B y 1890 only two of its Reichstag representatives were Catholics; in 1893 all 28 were Protestants. T h e Imperialists stood for " protection of national work " and consequently they demanded tariffs for both industry and agriculture. In the latter part of the 'eighties the party had frequently held the balance of power and been instrumental in ironing out party differences. F r o m 1879 to 1891 it stood more than any other party for co-operation between agriculture and industry. The

Anti-Semites

were

first

formally

organized

as

a

Reichstag party in 1890 with five members, though one Anti23 In the Prussian diet the Imperialists were called " Free Conservatives." 24 Bebel, p. 412; Kardorff, pp. 30-37.

62

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Semite, Bockel, had been elected in 1887. 2 5 They were more or less connected with the German Conservatives, but they were at once more radical and at the same time more reactionary than many of the latter. The agitation against the Jews had begun even before 1880, largely through the influence of the Imperial court chaplain, Dr. Christian Adolf Stöcker, a member of the German Conservative party. In the hope of strengthening conservatism, he sought to found in Berlin a workers' party based upon the ideals of Christian social reform. 29 Of low birth himself, he had a magnetic appeal. Kardorff described him as " a speaker gifted by the Gods," who had " no equal in popular assemblies, in the chancel, or in parliament—except for rebuttal." 27 After its initial success in the early 'eighties the anti-Semitic movement died down in the capital. But it spread into other parts of Germany, where it became identified with different leaders. It flared up again in the early 1890's, gaining considerable headway in Hesse, Hesse-Nassau, Saxony, the Rhineland, and Westphalia. Oswald Zimmermann was the leader of anti-Semitism in Saxony. In Kassel, Liebermann von Sonnenberg won a great following in 1893. 28 There were two main directions in the agitation of the 1890's: the milder stood for Christian social reform; the more violent form went to extremes, denouncing the Jews as members of "an alien race." T o the latter group belonged Ahlwardt, an elementary school teacher, who made a tour of northern and central Germany in 1892. His following became so large that a separate political party was founded—the German Reform 25 Bergstrasser, p. 122; H. Gabler, Die Entwicklung der deutschen Parteien auf landschaftlicher Grundlage von 1871-1912 (Tübingen, 1934), p. 30. Dr. Otto Bockel was chosen in 1887 from a district of Hesse. Bockel established cattle markets and organized rural loan banks and consumers' associations to aid the people of Hesse, who were suffering from adverse economic conditions. 26 Anderson, p. 38. 27 Kardorff, p. 259. 28 Ibid., p. 281; Gabler, p. 30.

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party. 29 In 1892 and 1893 Stocker also resumed his campaign against the Jews. Even the German Conservative party was influenced by this activity of the Anti-Semites. Their agitation w a s particularly rewarding amongst peasants and small farmers. Throughout the struggle over the commercial treaties, the Anti-Semites stood staunchly on the side of agricultural protection. A t the extreme Right in the Reichstag were to be found the German Conservatives. They were not exclusively representatives of agriculture. Caprivi could call himself an " old Conservative man " even though he possessed no " acre and blade of straw." Younger sons of well-to-do Conservative families customarily found employment in the army, the civil service, or one of the professions. Some of them lost touch with agriculture, but many who were not actively engaged in producing wheat and rye themselves were so intimately connected with agriculture through family ties that they looked at its problems with sympathetic understanding. The party was supported also by craftsmen and other members of the lower middle class. T h e mainstay of the party, nevertheless, was the agricultural population. The Prussian Junkers furnished the party leadership. Behind them stood the peasants and small farmers. Though the party was strongly entrenched in Prussia, its constituents were to be found also in other parts of the Empire. It should be noted, however, that in Bavaria, Upper Silesia, and the Rhineland, the majority of the agriculturists were Catholics and belonged to the Center party. F o r Conservatives opposition to the government involved a change as revolutionary as the decision of the Radicals and the Social Democrats to work with the government. The German Conservative party was par excellence a party of law and order. Its program emphasized respect for monarchy and the preservation of state and society. There had been occasional minor differences during the previous twenty-five years, but usually 29 Dawson, The German Empire, II, 292-93. In 1893 there were 4 AntiSemites who were not members of the Reform party.

64

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through thick and thin the government could count upon the loyalty of this party. That the Imperialists should join the opposition after Bismarck's dismissal was perhaps not so strange, since they had backed Bismarck's policies from the beginning. Y e t even this party held to many of the principles of the German Conservatives and had had little past experience of opposition. T h e German Conservatives lost very few seats in the 1890 election, and they were still firmly established in the Prussian lower house. In fact, the two conservative parties—the German Conservatives with 1 1 9 and the Free Conservatives with 68 seats—were but 27 votes short of a majority in the latter chamber. 30 Their numerical strength there, however, did not indicate their real following in Prussia, for they were favored by the three-class system of voting, by the open ballot, and by a continuance of the seat distribution of i860 despite population changes. 31 They were, besides, ordinarily assisted at election time by influential government officials. The Radicals and the Social Democrats naturally objected to these advantages enjoyed by the Conservatives, and were constantly pressing for fundamental changes in the electoral law of Prussia. There were also inequalities in the Reichstag electoral system. N o alteration had been made in the distribution of Reichstag seats since 1871, when Germany was predominantly agri30 Allg.

Ztg., Jan. 7, 1890 ( N o . 7), p. 91. S i x seats were vacant.

31 T h e representation in the Prussian lower house had been established in i860 on the basis of the population census of 1858. It provided for one representative for every 50,000 inhabitants. Since that time there had been no alteration of representation in the old provinces, and none in the n e w provinces since 1867. A s a result the rural districts, and especially those in the eastern provinces of Prussia, where there were comparatively f e w large towns, had a great advantage over the cities. T h e three-class system of voting gave the " w e l l - t o - d o classes a representation altogether disproportionate to their n u m b e r " and left the " w o r k i n g classes almost entirely unrepresented" ( D a w s o n , The Evolution..., pp. 433-37)- See also, idem, Germany and the Germans, II, 61; F. C. H o w e , Socialized Germany ( N e w York, 1915). PP- 36-51.

PARTY

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32

cultural. This aided both the Conservatives and the Centrists. The Radicals and the Social Democrats wanted a frequent redistribution of Reichstag seats on the basis of population changes. Had the government listened to their demands for electoral reform in Prussia and the Empire, the Conservatives might have lost a great part of their political influence in the state. The " feudal agrarians," to whom reference has already been made, were not confined to one political party. They were to be found in the Imperialist, the Centrist, the Polish, and the National Liberal parties; but in the extreme right wing of the Conservative party they had their chief stronghold. The epithet by which the Prussian Junkers and the other " feudal agrarians " were known was in part derived from the titles they bore: Fideikommissbesitzer, Majoratsbesitzer, Rittergutsbesttzer, and the more lowly Gutsbesitzer. These titles, which had been used in feudal times to denote the type of holding, had lingered on after feudalism disappeared, and with the title a remnant of feudal practice was preserved. Both the Gutsbesitzer ("manor owner") and the Rittergutsbesitzer ("knight's manor owner") had the right of independent administrative jurisdiction in the Gutsbezirk ( " manorial district " ) . In large sections of Prussia—especially in the East Elbian provinces, where manorial jurisdiction was general—local self-government did not exist. Attempts at reform having been unsuccessful, the Conservatives remained in control of local government in this part of Prussia. Other parties criticized the 32 The Imperial Constitution of 1871 provided for the election of Reichstag members on the basis of universal manhood suffrage. Despite the unequal distribution of seats in 1890, thte Social Democrats were able to poll that year 354,067 votes in Prussia, about half the number they polled for the entire Empire (708,800), and to win 14 seats; in 1893 they polled 963,306 votes in Prussia alone and secured 22 seats in Prussian districts (Reichstag, 1890-91 [Anhgeband I], 165-233; 1893-94, I, 271). The votes polled by the Social Democrats have to be discounted to some extent, because they put up candidates everywhere, even in districts where there was no possibility of election. Germany did not have proportional representation until 1919.

66

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Conservatives not merely because they wished to preserve this type of jurisdiction, but also because they seemed to be extending it. Werner Sombart protested that there were 3,204 more knights' manors in 1891 than in 1858, and he asserted that the new manors had been established without legal right.83 Besides possessing the right of independent manorial jurisdiction the Fideikommissbesitzer and the Majoratsbesitzer could hand down their estates undivided from generation to generation. In Prussia these entailed estates had to have a rental value of at least 7500 marks per year. This meant that most of the entailed estates were of great size.34 Rickert, a leader of the Radicals, complained that they took up six or seven per cent of the whole area of Prussia. 35 There was also a relic of feudalism in the local government law, which permitted the council of the rural commune to require " hand and span " service of the inhabitants. Usually it might be performed by deputy or be commuted to money payments.88 33 Stenographische Berichte iiber die Verhandlungen. Hous der Abgeordneten ( P r u s s i a ) (hereafter cited as " H. der Abg."), I V , 1624 ( A p r . 9, 1891, S o m b a r t ) . 34 " A return published a f e w years ago [i.e., prior to 1908] showed that 88.8 per cent of the entailed land consisted of estates exceeding 2,500 acres in extent, and over 29 per cent fell to estates exceeding 25,000 acres. T h e 937 proprietors of these entailed estates owned some live and a half million acres of land and forest, and a million acres m o r e than all the three and a quarter million small proprietors with holdings of five acres or l e s s "

(Dawson, The Evolution..., 35Reichstag, 1890-92, V,

p. 259).

3371 (Dec. 12, 1891, R i c k e r t ) . According to Dawson there were in 1905 1,165 entailed estates in Prussia " with an aggregate area of 5,581,250 acres, equal to 6.37 per cent of the entire surface, against 6.09 per cent in 1895." T h e province of Silesia had the greatest per cent of entailed land, 14 per c e n t ; in East and W e s t P r u s s i a " the p r o p o r t i o n " was " under 4 per cent." " In isolated districts of the monarchy the proportion is as high as 30 and 40 per cent, and in one administrative circle of Westphalia it reaches 52 per cent." T h e Prussian Constitution of 1850 prohibited the creation of entailed estates; a law passed two years later, however, permitted it (Dawson, The Evolution..., pp. 258-59).

36 Ibid., p. 31.

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The social and political position of the great landowners in the local communities of the East gave them such control over the lives of the poverty-stricken agricultural workers and peasants that these classes, though legally free, were actually in a state of semi-bondage as long as they remained on the remote, isolated estates. The " feudal agrarians " sought to preserve this relationship, and at the same time to attach the workers and peasants permanently to the soil, when the Prussian Rentengiiter bill was being considered in 1890. The real purpose of this law was to counteract the influence of great estates by multiplying small holdings. State credit was to be granted for rent-fee farms which could be redeemed in 56^2 years. The landed proprietors attempted, though without success, to make the farms 100 per cent irredeemable. They hoped thereby to secure for themselves a permanent supply of laborers. As finally passed the law provided that all but 10 per cent of the land could be redeemed.87 The Polish " feudal agrarians," as already indicated, had the same economic interests as the Prussian Junkers. National differences separated them, however, after Bismarck began his Germanizing policy. Among the measures adopted was the Colonization Act of 1886. With the aid of state funds the estates of Polish landowners in Posen and West Prussia were to be purchased, subdivided, and then distributed among German peasants and agricultural workers. In part this legislation represented an effort to break up large estates; but its main purpose was to Germanize these predominantly Polish provinces. It failed to achieve the desired results; rather it had the effect of stimulating Polish nationalism. The Poles, remembering that the votes of the German Conservatives had supported Bismarck's policy, decided to work with Caprivi. M 37 H. der Abg., 1890, III, Evolution . . . , pp. 30, 259-60.

1426-51,

1973-95.

2033-5°;

Dawson,

The

38 R. W . Tims, Germanising Prussian Poland. The H-K-T Society and the Struggle for the Eastern Marches in the German Empire, 1894-1919 (New York, 1941), pp. 15-16, 20, 52-53.

68

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T h e Prussian Junkers represented the extreme reactionary forces in the German state. T h e y were opposed to the extension of parliamentary government at the expense of the prerogatives of the Crown, to a reform of the three-class system of voting in Prussia, and to a redistribution of the seats in the Prussian lower house and in the Reichstag on the basis of the latest census returns. Many sections of the eastern provinces were extremely isolated; yet the agrarians kept opposing the plans to open them up by means of canals and highways. 8 * This was partly because they feared the competition of foreign agriculture. One of the Polish delegates w h o had been protesting against the Polish land settlement policy declared in the Reichstag in 1 8 9 1 : " If those 100 millions which were laid out for that politically hated purpose had been put to productive use in the provinces of Posen and W e s t Prussia for highways, bridges, and so forth, it would have been a hundred times better." 40 The advocacy of an antiquated system of local government by the great landed proprietors and their failure to provide in the rural districts of the East adequate schools 4 1 indicated a social outlook which could scarcely be defended in the last decade of the nineteenth century. It is obvious from the foregoing account that the aristocrats of the agricultural population were vulnerable to attack by other groups on a number of scores. Their chief opponents were the Radicals and the Social Democrats, w h o utilized the opportunity, when the commercial treaties were under consideration, to launch a savage assault upon both agricultural tariffs and aristocratic privilege. Undoubtedly with the object of increasing their own following, both parties of the Left tried to separate small farmers and peasants from their traditional allegiance to the landed aristocracy; but the latter were fully alive to the situation and were prepared to resist to the last ditch this attempt to break the united front of agriculture. 39 Dawson, The Evolution 40 Reichstag,

. . . , pp. 34-35.

1890-92, V, 3337-38 (Dec. 11, 1891, von Komierowski).

41 Dawson, The Evolution....

pp. 29-31, 35.

CHAPTER IV TARIFF POLICY THE new commercial policy of Caprivi's government was the chief cause of agrarian discontent. T h e agriculturists objected especially to the government's decision to grant reductions in agricultural tariffs in order to obtain concessions for German industry. Y e t the agriculturists themselves had been ardent free traders prior to 1875. T h e factors which made them protectionists and the steps which were significant in the formulation of Germany's commercial policy provide a background for understanding agrarian opposition while Caprivi was chancellor. B y 1871 the Zollverein, which had been formed in 1834, had been extended gradually until it w a s almost coterminous with the newly founded German Empire. Only Bremen and Hamburg remained outside; by 1890 these great ports had also become a part of the Customs Union. Prussian statesmen were the chief architects of this large free-trade area in Germany. Like the political union, it did not include Austria. Prussian officials had resisted the efforts of the Austrian statesman Bruck to establish an Austro-German customs union, because they feared that this would lead to the political and economic supremacy of Austria in central Europe. Since Bruck's scheme for a Mitteleuropa was favored by a number of states in southern and central Germany, Prussia succeeded in excluding A u s tria in the t w o critical periods, 1848-53 and 1860-65—when negotiations for the renewal of the Zollverein treaties were going on—only by setting up for the Zollverein tariffs which were lower than Austria was willing to accept. 1 The establishment of this extensive free-trade area within Germany did not signify the adoption of free trade with countries outside the Zollverein. Most other European great powers 1 For the material in this summary of the development of the Zollverein, the writer is indebted chiefly to W . O. Henderson, The Zollverein (Cambridge, 1939).

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had maintained high tariffs after the Napoleonic W a r s ; but Prussia, having decided upon a policy of only moderate protection, reduced its import duties in 1818. There were some slight increases in its tariffs in the 'twenties and 'thirties. W i t h modifications its tariff of 1818 became the basis of the Zollverein tariff of 1834. Though there were minor revisions in the Zollverein tariff from time to time, the controversies between protectionists and free traders in Germany prevented any radical change for many years. Something was accomplished, however, in 1853: the import duty on corn was abolished; and in the treaty between the Zollverein and Austria mutual tariff reductions were granted, which gave Austria advantages not enjoyed by other states. 2 A great change came about in the 'sixties. In the FrancoPrussian treaty of 1862 the Zollverein tariff was completely revised. In 1865 the new tariff was accepted by the other states of the Customs Union, and the same rates were extended to all other countries. 3 F r o m 1865 until the end of the 'seventies only a few very low industrial duties—chiefly upon iron and steel manufactures—remained in Germany. 4 B y 1870 the principles of free trade had been accepted so widely in Germany that it was practically impossible to get serious consideration for any other viewpoint. Agriculturists had become ardent free traders in the 'sixties. They did not need protection. T h e y opposed industrial tariffs because they increased the cost of tools and machinery. If Germany's iron tariffs should be maintained, the agriculturists feared reprisals 2 Ibid., p. 226. 3 Treaties which Prussia concluded with Great Britain, Belgium, and Italy in the same year introduced further free trade modifications in the Zollverein tariff. 4 Dawson, The German Empire, I, 157-59. With the Franco-Prussian War the commercial treaty with France came to an end and was not renewed. Article X I of the Treaty of Frankfurt provided that France and Germany should " grant to each other permanently any tariff concessions either state might make to Great Britain, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Austria-Hungary or Russia" (Henderson, p. 328 [Note 2 ] ) .

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in England against German grain. T h e y also foresaw that agriculture would be forced to pay higher wages. In their desire for free trade commerce and agriculture had a common bond. 5 Despite the widespread acceptance of the doctrines of free trade in Germany, the members of the Reichstag compromised when Bismarck laid before them on June 16, 1873, a bill providing for the removal of the tariffs on pig iron and on iron and steel manufactures, and for a reduction of duties on tin plate and coarse iron and steel wares, to take effect on October 1, 1873. T h e y voted to do away with the tariffs on pig iron and raw steel on that date, but to retain the other tariffs on iron wares until January 1, 1877. 8 In December, 1876, the iron manufacturers attempted to have the time for the repeal of the remaining iron tariffs extended to January 1, 1879. A motion to this effect was made by Windthorst, the Centrist leader, but it was rejected by 201 to 1 1 6 votes. T h e industrialists realized at once that without the support of agriculture industrial protection would be impossible. 7 Meanwhile Baron Wilhelm von Kardorff of the Imperialist party had become convinced as a result of his extensive study of the tariff question and his practical experience in farming that protection was needed for both agriculture and industry. Stumm, the co-leader, and one or two other members of K a r dorff's party supported him. Inasmuch as he was at that time connected with the iron industry and Stumm was one of the chief iron manufacturers, both were accused of working for their own interests. This did not deter Kardorff. He maintained that protection was necessary for the welfare of the state, and he published his views in 1875 in a pamphlet entitled Against the Current! (Gegen den Strom!).' In the belief that industry must organize against the united stand of agriculture and wholesale trade if it was to make its 5 Croner, p. 90. 6 Kardorff, pp. 119-20, 126-28. 7 Ibid., pp. 130-31, 133-35 ; Croner, p. 58. 8 Kardorff, pp. 121-25.

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views felt in government circles and in the Reichstag, Kardorff took the initiative and invited a small group of leading industrialists to a meeting in Berlin on December 14, 1875. This gathering prepared the w a y for a second, larger meeting on February 15, 1876, at which the Central Association of German Industrialists was founded. 9 T h e first task of this Association was to convince agriculture of the need for protection. This was not easy. T h e German Conservatives and, with the exceptions noted above, the Imperialists were against tariffs. The Congress of German Farmers and the German Agricultural Council also stood for free trade. During the very year that the industrialists organized, the farmers of East Prussia drew up a petition demanding the repeal of the iron tariffs. 1 0 A few agriculturists, however, were beginning to take a different view now that Germany was changing from a grain-exporting to a grain-importing state. For the most part they were members of the Association of T a x and Economic Reformers. Y e t they hardly dared to admit protectionist ideas and they had little influence upon their fellow members in the Association. Founded also in 1876, this organization, it will be recalled, was composed principally of large landowners. Not until 1878, however, when a representative of the Central Association of German Industrialists spoke before the Association of T a x and Economic Reformers, were the latter convinced. Even then they were reluctant to change. M a n y members feared that agriculture would be deserted once industry had obtained what it wanted. But Baron von Thüngen-Rossbach, who became one of the most violent opponents of Caprivi's tariff policy in the 'nineties, persuaded his fellow members to accept the hand extended to them by the industrialists. From 1878 on these two organizations provided the nucleus of the protective tariff movement. 11 9 Ibid., pp. 126-29. 10 Croner, pp. 58-59. 11 Ibid., pp. 63-65, 67-68. T h e following members of the Association of T a x and Economic Reformers were among the first to feel the need of

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The next step for the industrialists and their allies was to secure Bismarck's backing. In March, about a month after the meeting just described, 60 Reichstag delegates with protectionist views formed a Union which cut across party lines. The new elections in 1878 brought the protectionists into the Reichstag in such numbers that the Free Economic Union (Freie Wirtschajtliche Vereinigung), as it was now called, had 204 members and was stronger than any other party alignment.12 It was with this political support that a group of influential men suggested to Bismarck that he solve the question of Imperial finances, which he was then studying, by re-establishing protection for agricultural products, iron manufactures, and certain other manufactured goods. Bismarck was looking for additional sources of revenue, and hoped to effect reforms which would make the central government independent of the federal states. The obvious course was to increase the indirect taxes: for in the Constitution of 1871 this source of revenue was granted to the central government, while all direct taxes were reserved to the states. Whatever money the Imperial government needed in addition to that secured from indirect taxes had to be determined each year in the budget, and presented to the Reichstag for approval; the several states were then assessed in proportion to their population. In 1878 even before the Economic Union was formed Bismarck had been exploring the possibility of raising the necessary funds by placing excise taxes on tobacco, stamps, and playing cards; but he had encountered the opposition of the National Liberals, who feared that the Reichstag's control of finances would be lost if these tax measures were enacted. When Bismarck found it difficult to come to an agreement with Bennigsen, the leader of the

protection for agriculture: Dr. Frege, M. Anton Niendorf, Baron von Thiingen-Rossbach, von Diest-Daber, and Baron von Mirbach-Sorquitten (ibid., pp. 60-61, 63, 67, 72, 75-76). The same men were active in the agrarian movement of the early 1890's. 12 Ibid., pp. 91-92; Kardorff, p. 144. According to Kardorff, there were 66 in this Union before the election.

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National Liberal party, he decided to work with the majority provided for him by the Free Economic Union, even though it meant a break with the party which had been his main support during the 'seventies. H i s decision brought about a change also in his relations with the Center: the anticlerical laws were to be removed gradually, and that party agreed to support the new tariff legislation. 13 While Bismarck was thus able to secure the passage of the tariff bills and a tobacco tax, and so to increase the revenue of the central government, he was forced to accept the " Franckenstein clause," which stipulated that all amounts raised from the customs and the tobacco excise in excess of 130 million marks were to be returned to the several states. T h e Reichstag could therefore still maintain its control of the purse strings, inasmuch as the Imperial government would be obliged to supplement its revenue from other sources by contributions from the states. 14 T h e bill in aid of agriculture was passed by the Reichstag on July 12, 1879, by a vote of 2 1 7 to 117. It placed an import duty of 1 mark per 100 kilograms on wheat, rye, and oats, and a one-half mark tariff on the same quantity of barley and maize. 1 5 T h e agricultural tariffs were again overhauled in 1885. A new law, which the Reichstag passed on M a y 13 by a vote of 199 to 105, raised the duties on wheat and rye to 3 marks per 100 kilograms, and increased the tariff on wood. A s in 1879 a Free Economic Union was formed to secure its passage. In 1885 it was made up of Conservatives, Centrists, and some National Liberals. 16 1 3 W a h l , I, 460-79, 541-64; Kardorflf, pp. 129-56; C r o n e r , pp. 89-108. 1 4 D a w s o n , The German Empire, I I , 15-16, 25-27. T h e " F r a n c k e n s t e i n c l a u s e " w a s article 7 of t h e tariff bill. I t w a s accepted by t h e R e i c h s t a g o n J u l y 9, 1879, by a vote of 211 t o 122. T h e bill included i n d u s t r i a l as well a s a g r i c u l t u r a l t a r i f f s (ibid., p. 25; W a h l , I, 548-49). 15 Ibid., pp. 560-61; K a r d o r f f , p. 155. 16 C r o n e r , pp. 120-21; D a w s o n , The German Empire, I I , 31. T h i s tariff r a i s e d duties on o t h e r a g r i c u l t u r a l a n d on a f e w i n d u s t r i a l p r o d u c t s also. T h e g o v e r n m e n t proposed in t h e o r i g i n a l bill a tariff of 2 m a r k s p e r 100 k i l o g r a m s f o r rye, but t h e F r e e E c o n o m i c U n i o n w a n t e d t h i s r a i s e d t o 3 m a r k s . T h e w o o d tariff w a s n o t included in t h e o r i g i n a l bill.

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T h e free traders had predicted a great increase in food prices as a result of the tariffs placed upon agricultural products in 1879. T h e r e were ups and downs in the prices, but, as already shown, the price tendency was d o w n w a r d after 1879. Prices continued to fall in 1886, despite the increased protection of 1885 ; and in 1887 grain prices in Germany reached their lowest level during the decade. T h e average price for wheat that year was 164 marks per metric ton as against 2 1 4 marks in the crop year of 1881-82. T h e price of rye had fallen from 180 to 125 marks per metric ton in the same period. 17 Confronted by these facts some farmers had already begun to doubt the efficacy of the tariffs in maintaining prices. Some claimed that the real source of trouble was the depreciation of silver,

and

demanded

the adoption

of

bimetallism.

Count

Kanitz expressed the opinion in 1887 that the reduction in ship freight rates had " completely paralyzed the effects of the tariffs." Others felt that another increase in agricultural duties too soon would only call forth the criticism of their adversaries. But agriculturists as a whole in 1887 were asking for further protection for grain and livestock. 1 8 B y this time Bismarck w a s a firm believer in food tariffs not only as a source of revenue, but also as a means of keeping agriculture solvent. H e therefore proposed in 1887 to raise the duties on wheat and rye to 6 marks per 100 kilograms. A s this rate was unacceptable to the Centrists, the National Liberals, and about half the Imperialists, a compromise was worked out. A motion—supported by the German Conservatives, the Imperialists, and the Poles, as well as by all but four of the Centrists, most of the Alsatians, and 22 National L i b e r a l s — t o increase the tariff on wheat to five marks per 100 kilograms w a s then accepted by 227 to 125 votes. A like tariff for rye w a s 17 Croner, pp. 110-12, 113-14, 117, 119; Kardorff, p. 196; Conrad, ¡oc. cit., pp. 103-85, and Tabellen I and II at the end.

18 Croner, pp. 121-25.

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passed by 213 to 126 votes with about the same party division. 19 These were large majorities. T h e same Reichstag passed two other measures which Bismarck introduced in 1887 to aid the agrarians. One bill sharply increased the brandy tax and provided that it should apply to the South German states as well as to the former North German taxing area. 20 T h e distillers were to pay the tax on all brandy manufactured for drinking purposes, but were allowed a rebate of 20 marks per hektoliter for the amount of brandy which, according to official estimate, w a s consumed in Germany. T h e opponents of the bill raised a loud protest against this Liebesgabe ( " l o v i n g g i f t " ) , as it was called. Bebel, the Social Democratic leader, insisted that the consumer's price for brandy was increased by the full amount of the tax and that consequently the producers secured a double benefit. Most of the brandy made from potatoes was produced in distilleries located on farms rather than in industrial plants. T h e rebates increased the profitableness of farming in the eastern provinces of Prussia, where the farmers in many areas were forced because of soil conditions to cultivate potatoes. Bebel claimed that the Liebesgabe amounted to about forty million marks yearly and that the chief beneficiaries were the large landowners and stock companies. 21 lQAIlg. Ztg., Dec. 15, 1887 (No. 347, Beilage), p. 5125. The government bill had increased the tariff on oats to 3 marks, on buckwheat and legumes to 2 marks, and on barley to 2.25 marks per 100 kilograms. The bill as finally passed increased the tariff on oats to 4 instead of 3 marks, and maintained the rate for barley at 2.25 marks. The entire bill was accepted on December 17 by a majority of 203 to 116. The German Conservatives, the Imperialists, the Centrists, the Poles, and 20 National Liberals voted in favor of it. The latter party gave 67 votes against it (Croner, pp. 126-28;

Dawson, The German Empire, II, 31-32; Kardorff, p. 196; Allg. Ztg., Jan. 19, 1891 [No. 19 A B ] , p. 2 ) . 20 It provided for a tax of 7 0 marks per hektoliter of 1 0 0 grade brandy in addition to the former tax, which amounted to about 15 marks (Bebel, IV, 4 6 s ) . 21 Ibid., pp. 463-69; Kardorff, p. 195.

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Bismarck's other measure was a new sugar tax. For years sugar beet growers and manufacturers had been receiving rebates on all sugar exported. Theoretically the rebate was a refund of the sugar tax to enable them to compete with foreign producers. But the excise tax was paid on the sugar beet, not on the finished sugar. In reckoning the rebate it had been estimated originally that 1200 kilograms of sugar beets would produce 100 kilograms of sugar. Gradually as manufacturing processes were perfected and the quality of beets was improved, more sugar was produced from a given quantity of beets. T h e basis of taxation nevertheless remained the same until 1887. Actually sugar manufacturers were making a profit from the sugar tax while the government's revenue from this source was steadily diminishing. T h e new bill of 1887 reduced the premiums paid for sugar exports, but, according to Bebel, the exporters were still allowed more than they paid in taxes. 22 While these three laws, which were put through by the Reichstag elected in 1887, aided the central government as well as the agrarians, it was felt by many that the agrarians had used their large majority in the Reichstag unfairly, and that reprisals would follow in the next election. Three other matters of interest to agriculture need explanation. In 1880 and 1883 the importation of American pork in any form was prohibited because of the danger of trichina. A little later, to prevent the spread of pestilence, the border was closed to imports of beef from Russia and Austria. In 1886 the hoof and mouth disease spread to 375 farms. Between 1888 and 1889 the number of farms newly hit by this epidemic rose from 3,185 to 23,219. 2 3 In the summer of the latter year, the restriction against the importation of pork was extended to Denmark, Austria, and Russia. T h e disease nevertheless con22 Ibid., pp. 327-30. The final votes on the sugar and brandy taxes were taken on the same day. 23Ibid., pp. 331-32; Dade, loc. cit., p. 13; W . Lötz, " D i e Handelspolitik des deutschen Reiches unter Graf Caprivi und Fürst Hohenlohe," Schriften des Vereins für Socialpolitik, X C I I (1901), 57, 72.

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tinued to spread until it reached a peak in 1892 with over four million animals newly infected. The sanitary regulations against the importation of foreign cattle and meat naturally raised the price of domestic meat. The Social Democrats claimed that this was the sole purpose of the prohibitions.24 While Bismarck was chancellor no thoroughgoing reform of the tax system was undertaken to relieve the heavy burden on real property. Owners of real estate in Prussia had to pay a class tax, which was a kind of income tax, as well as land and building taxes. In defense of his tariff bill of 1879 Bismarck pointed out that by increasing the Imperial revenue from indirect taxes the burden on landed property would be reduced somewhat. In Prussia some relief was gained from the " Lex-Huene " of 1885, which provided that all revenue which the Empire turned over to Prussia on the basis of the " Franckenstein clause" in excess of 15 million marks should be divided among the communal associations for local use.28 The tariff increases of 1887 were thus a potential means of tax relief to owners of landed estates. But since there was always the possibility that the central government might require a contribution from Prussia which would offset the amounts distributed to the local communities, the tariffs did not get at the root of the difficulty. The real need was an equalization of the tax burden. The third matter which affected agriculture was a measure which had been put through during Bismarck's chancellorship; and it became one of the chief causes of agrarian complaint. After 1871 efforts were made to establish a unified coinage system for the entire Empire. The reform as finally worked out in 1873 included the introduction of the gold standard. The single gold standard soon brought forth the protests of the agriculturists. By 1890 Kardorff and others who became active in the cause of bimetallism thought that they had convinced 24 Dade, loc. cit., p. 13; Bebel, IV, 332. 25Geiger, pp. 18-19, 48, 94 (note 255) ; Kardorff, p. 150.

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Bismarck of the reasonableness of their demands; they believed that he would have taken steps to bring about the rehabilitation of silver or an international settlement of the currency question along bimetallist lines, had he remained in office. 26 In setting up its protective tariffs for manufactures and agricultural products in 1879 Germany for the most part established specific rates of duty for each article to be protected and treated all foreign countries alike. T h i s " autonomous " system lasted as long as Bismarck was in office. During the entire period from 1879 to 1890 Germany was in a peculiarly advantageous position in its commercial relations. W i t h most foreign countries Bismarck was able to secure favorable trade agreements, while Germany as a rule granted merely mostfavored-nation treatment, and was at liberty to increase its own tariffs whenever it seemed desirable. Germany concluded treaties with a number of states which obligated them to reduce some of their tariffs, or not to increase them. 27 In the trade treaties which Germany negotiated between 1883 and 1888—that is, after adopting a protective tariff policy—it had to grant reductions in its own tariffs in order to obtain the desired concessions from the other contracting powers. But except in the case of Switzerland, German concessions were slight. T h e y involved raw materials principally, which Germany wished to import as cheaply as possible. 28 W i t h a third group of states Germany did not succeed in bringing about tariff treaties. The most that could be obtained was the continuation of most-favored-nation treatment. 29 26 Ibid., pp. 169-72, 321; Wahl, I, 62. The Association of T a x and Economic Reformers was active in the cause of bimetallism. 27 The states in this group were: China, Japan, Korea, Siam, Serbia, Rumania, Turkey and its vassal states, and Zanzibar (Lotz, loc. cit., p. 60; P. Ashley, Modern Tariff History [3rd ed.; London, 1920], p. 62). 28 The states in this group were Italy, Spain, Greece, and Switzerland (Lotz, loc. cit., pp. 60-62; Ashley, p. 62). 29 With Austria-Hungary, Belgium, the Netherlands, France, and SwedenNorway, Germany continued the most-favored-nation agreements (ibid.; Lotz, loc. cit., pp. 62-63).

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Germany's favorable commercial position during this period depended in large measure upon the peace terms drawn up after the Franco-Prussian W a r . In Article X I of the Treaty of Frankfurt each country agreed to accord the other as favorable treatment as it granted Great Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, and Russia. In the early 'sixties France had greatly reduced its tariffs. Modifications in its low tariff policy were introduced in the 'eighties. A g r i culture was protected, and tariffs were erected against those states with which France had no commercial agreements. But with all important neighboring states France continued the policy begun in i860, negotiating treaties which provided for free trade or for very low duties. B y virtue of Article X I of the Frankfurt Treaty Germany gained the French concessions and through its own most-favored-nation agreements it enjoyed the tariff reductions which the neighboring states granted to France. Even in the case of states which had fixed only a part of their tariffs for Germany, the most-favorednation clause in its treaties gave Germany the benefit of every reduction granted to France or any other country. Furthermore Great Britain continued its policy of free trade. T h i s enabled Germany to export to Great Britain unhampered by trade restrictions. 30 But the ideal situation which had existed for eleven years could not last indefinitely. B y 1890, even before Bismarck left office, it was beginning to be felt that Germany must take precautions to prevent the threatened loss of its foreign markets. F o r the French treaties would expire on February 1, 1 8 9 2 ; 3 1 and it was believed that instead of renewing them on the same basis, France would establish high protective duties. In that case Germany's trade advantages, which depended largely upon 30 Ibid. 31 Of the French treaties which expired on February 1, 1892, those with the following countries were important for Germany: Belgium, Portugal, Sweden-Norway, Spain, the Netherlands, and Switzerland (Lotz, loc. cit., p. 62 [note]).

TARIFF

POLICY

8l

the French network of treaties, would be lost overnight It happened that 1892 was the " comet " year as well for the commercial treaties of many other European countries.82 Some of Germany's trade agreements would expire on February 1, 1892, or a little later. Others could be denounced at any time.88 If these countries believed that they had been injured by Germany's commercial policy they could now retaliate by refusing to negotiate or by demanding important concessions. A s already shown Russia and Austria-Hungary were the chief sources of Germany's supplementary grain supplies in the 'eighties. For each country it was important that the grain exports to Germany be maintained. Yet the competition of overseas grain and Germany's protective tariffs had already made difficulties, though they were more noticeable in the case of Austria-Hungary than of Russia. Prior to 1890 Germany and Austria had a most-favorednation agreement, which could be denounced at any time. Like Germany Austria had raised its tariffs in the 'eighties. They were designed to protect its infant industries—principally its textile manufactures—against the competition of England and Germany. The newly developing manufacturing industry was confined to the western half of the Austrian Empire, while in Hungary agriculture was the chief occupation. Because of the expansion of its grain acreage in the late 'sixties and the 'seventies, Hungary had come to depend more and more upon the export of large quantities of grain. Owing to its geographical 3 2 Spain's treaties with Belgium, Switzerland, S w e d e n - N o r w a y , Italy, and Switzerland's treaty w i t h Austria-Hungary ran out on February I, 1892; the Italian treaty with Portugal expired on January 24, 1892, and the Swiss-Italian treaty on February 14, 1892 (ibid.). 3 3 T h e Allgemrine Zeitung ( M u n i c h ) reported that on February 1, 1892, the commercial treaties w i t h Switzerland, Italy, and Spain would run o u t ; before that the treaties with T u r k e y and Rumania would expire ; on January 1, 1893, the treaty with Serbia and on February 20, 1895, the treaty with Greece would expire (Jan. 6, 1890 [ N o . 6], p. 78). Belgium, Great Britain, Ireland, the Netherlands, Austria-Hungary, and Portugal could recall their treaties at any time upon a year's notice (ibid.).

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location, however, it was forced to use German railroads to send its products to France, Switzerland, and England. After 1879 the German agricultural tariffs and Germany's hostile railroad policy were a serious handicap to the export of Hungarian grain, cattle, and wood. In the 'eighties Hungarian grain exports were hampered also by higher agricultural tariffs in France and by England's increased use of overseas wheat. A s a result of the Ausgleich of 1867 each half of the Austrian Empire had an equal voice in determining the economic policy. It was said that Hungary had agreed to the industrial tariffs of the 'eighties, which were against its own economic interests, solely as a means of bringing Germany to terms. It was likely, therefore, that whenever Germany and Austria drew up a new tariff agreement, Hungary would make a strong demand for an easing of the grain trade.34 Though Russia had maintained and even increased its grain exports to Germany during the previous decade, by 1890 commercial relations between the two countries were anything but friendly. 35 Unlike most countries, Russia had for years taken an independent stand in tariff matters and had refused to treat with any foreign country. Having set up somewhat more moderate tariffs after 1850, Russia returned to a strictly protective policy in 1876. The ukase of that year, requiring that all tariffs be paid in gold, raised them 33 per cent. Between 1881 and 1890 Russian duties were increased seven times; and in consequence Germany's export trade to Russia was kept up only with difficulty. The value of German exports to Russia and Finland, exclusive of bullion, dropped from 215 million 34 F o r the material on the commercial relations between Germany and Austria-Hungary, see A. von Matlekovits, " D i e handelspolitischen Interessen Ungarns," Schrijten des Vereins fur Socialpolitik, X C I I I (1901), 3-17. 35 For the discussion of Russo-German commercial relations the following studies were used: Sartorius von Waltershausen, pp. 308-09; Ashley, pp. 63, 69-74! Lotz, loc. cit., p. 64; P . Arndt, " Zum Abschluss eines neuen deutsch-russischen Handelsvertrages," Schrijten des Cereins fur Socialpolitik, X C I I (1901), 5-6; Zweig, pp. 8-45; Henderson, pp. 32, 35, 56, 137, 175-76,

231-32.

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83

marks in 1880 to 124 million marks in 1887. 36 Some Germans asserted that the main object of the two increases in Germany's food tariffs was to punish Russia for its unfriendly economic policy. T h o u g h Russian tariffs applied to all countries alike, Russian policy placed Germany at a disadvantage in the Finnish trade; and Germany found it difficult to compete with England in the coal and iron trade to Russia because of the preference given by Russia to sea-borne over land-borne commerce. 87 German imports of grain and flour from the United States, as already noted, were drastically reduced in the 'eighties, and Germany had prohibited the importation of American pork. Commercial relations between Germany and the United States were regulated by a most-favored-nation agreement, but it w a s not clearly defined and did not always function. The United States like Germany had refrained from fixing its tariffs by treaty, and was at liberty at any time to raise them. It is obvious from the foregoing discussion that the negotiation of new commercial treaties to take the place of the series of treaties which would run out in 1892 was one of the most serious problems facing Caprivi's government in 1890, and that economic considerations would play an important part in determining the new policy. It was likely that Germany would have to take into account more than it had in the past the economic requirements of its commercial allies, and that new developments in domestic economy would have to be considered. T h e fact that some of Germany's own citizens and some of the countries with which Germany wished to secure commercial agreements were making the same demands was doubtless a powerful factor in determining the commercial policy. Y e t economic questions were not the only ones that weighed in the decisions. Political as well as commercial treaties were to expire soon after Caprivi took office. It is probable that the turn 36 Lotz, loc. ctt., p. 64 (note 2). 37 Grosse Politik,

VII, No. 1666 (Feb. 18, 1894).

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POLITICS

which the political treaty negotiations took played an important part in the government's decision to reduce the grain and wine duties. In September, 1890, Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria and Kálnoky, the Austrian foreign minister, attended the Kaiser's maneuvers in Silesia. 38 The real purpose of this meeting at Castle Rohnstock was to discuss the renewal of the Triple A l liance. At the time of the meeting the Austrian government knew nothing about the secret Reinsurance treaty with Russia or the Germany decision against its renewal. But Bismarck's dismissal had been interpreted in Austria as a sign that AustroGerman relations were to be closer in the future. Kálnoky hoped that the change in chancellors would give Austria a chance to assume the leadership in the Triple Alliance. Between March and September, 1890, when this meeting took place, Russia had made another effort to secure a renewal of the Reinsurance treaty. But again in June as in March Germany was against renewal. 39 A month before the meeting at Castle Rohnstock, William and Caprivi visited Russia. William and Alexander were friendly. But both William and Caprivi studiously avoided a discussion of political relations. When pressed by Giers, the Russian foreign minister, Caprivi made noncommittal statements regarding Bulgaria and the Straits, which showed that Germany was not altogether unsympathetic to Russian interests in southeastern Europe. After his return 38 The meeting at Castle Rohnstock near Jauer in Silesia lasted from September 17 to 19 (Die Handelspolitik des deutschen Reichs vom Frankfurter Frieden bis sur Gegenwart [Berlin, 1899], p. 155 [When the second edition of this work was published in Berlin in 1901 the name of the author, Alfred Zimmertnann, was given]). See also, Allg. Ztg., Sept. 17, 1890 (No. 258), p. 1; Langer, The Franco-Russian Alliance, pp. 107-08 (and note 77, p. 108) ; idem, The Diplomacy 0} Imperialism, I, 9; Waldersee, Denkwürdigkeiten, II, 146. 39 On June 18, 1890, the very day when the Reinsurance treaty expired, Germany concluded a treaty with England; though this treaty dealt chiefly with colonial matters, it seemed to bring England into closer relations with the Triple Alliance. The possibility of complete isolation loomed before the Russians (Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, I, 6-7).

TARIFF

POLICY

85

to Germany, however, Caprivi w a s unwilling to put into writing the gist of his conversation at Narva. 4 0 It is highly significant in view of the unsatisfactory commercial relations between Germany and Russia that the Russian T s a r should have issued a ukase on A u g u s t

16, 1890, one day before W i l l i a m and

Caprivi arrived in Russia, announcing that a new general tariff would be drawn up to offset the improvement in the credit ruble, and that a flat increase of 20 kopecks on the ruble would be in force during the interim while Russia's tariff needs were being determined. 4 1 A t the time of the Rohnstock meeting the M c K i n l e y tariff bill had all but passed in the United States Congress. B o t h Germany and A u s t r i a were thus threatened with the loss of the French, Russian, and United States markets. M a n y

smaller

European states had already raised their tariffs, anticipating the time when new treaties would have to be negotiated. In an effort to reassure the A u s t r i a n s regarding Germany's relations with Russia, W i l l i a m told E m p e r o r Francis Joseph for the first time at Rohnstock about the Russian Reinsurance treaty, and Caprivi promised K a l n o k y that in the future Germany would make no concessions to Russia in the N e a r East without A u s t r i a ' s consent. 42 T h e decision against the renewal of the Reinsurance treaty had enhanced the value of the Triple Alliance for G e r m a n y : without it G e r m a n y would be confronted with the possibility of complete diplomatic isolation. William's revelation and Caprivi's assurances therefore placed A u s t r i a in a strong position as a negotiator. Shortly after this meeting A u s t r i a even began to discuss Balkan questions with Russia. T h o u g h A u s t r i a n statesmen probably had no intention of g i v i n g up the T r i p l e Alliance, A u s t r i a ' s angling in Russian waters did cause some uneasiness in Germany, and made the 40 Ibid., I, 8-9.

41 Zweig, pp. 32-33. The new tariff was worked out and put in force in 1891. 42 Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, I, 9; idem, The Franco-Russian Alliance, p. 107; Grosse Politik, XXX, Nos. 10987, 10989, 10998.

86

GERMAN

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Germans all the more willing to ingratiate themselves with the Austrians. 4 3 A t Rohnstock also Caprivi proposed for the first time that the Triple Alliance be reinforced by commercial treaties between all the members. A t first he evidently had in mind a central European tariff union, and later, after Germany had succeeded in bringing about commercial agreements between the members of the Triple Alliance, a league of the states of central and western Europe against the United States and Russia. 44 It is probable that the Austrians were also promised at Rohnstock a reduction of the grain tariffs, or else some hint was dropped that Germany would be willing to make this concession in return for equivalent concessions to German industry. In any case about a month later a series of news reports from Vienna indicated that because of decisions reached at Rohnstock the prospects for the negotiation of a commercial treaty between the two countries were very favorable. Delegates from both states met the next week for a preliminary discussion of commercial matters. 45 O n November 7 some German newspapers reported that Baron Lucius von Ballhausen, the Prussian minister of agriculture, might be replaced, because he did not favor the innovations then pending—repeal of the certificates of identity, reduction of the grain tariffs for Austria, and easing of the ban on Austrian cattle imports. Shortly after his resignation was accepted. 46 43 Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, I, 9. 44 Idem, The Franco-Russian Alliance, pp. 108 (and note 78), 109; Waldersee, Denkwürdigkeiten, II, 230 (Jan. 19, 1892). 45 Allg. Ztg., Oct. 14, 1890 ( N o . 285), pp. 1 - 2 ; Oct. 16, 1890 ( N o . 287), p. 1 ; Langer, The Franco-Russian Alliance, p. 109. T h e meeting was on October 20. 4 6 A l l g . Ztg., Nov. 8, 1890 ( N o . 310 A B ) , p. 3 ; Nov. 15, 1890 ( N o . 317 M B ) , p. 2. Baron Lucius von Ballhausen, D r . Med., Rittergutsbesitzer, had been Prussian minister of agriculture since July 13, 1879. H e was a member of the Imperialist party. It was reported that he would not go as f a r as seemed desirable " t o gain a tolerably secure foundation for the commercial treaty n e g o t i a t i o n s " {ibid.).

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87

On December 2, 1890, the commercial negotiations began in Vienna; they lasted with some interruptions until the end of March, 1891. Austria wanted the repeal of all German agricultural tariffs, the freeing of its cattle exports to Germany, and most-favored-nation treatment in railroad rates. Germany asked for tariff reductions on textiles and iron, free transit for German salt to the Balkan countries, and removal of the special favors which Austro-Hungarian ports enjoyed in the direct import of overseas wares. Germany was willing to reduce its agricultural tariffs and to grant a cattle plague convention; but Austria offered in return only insignificant reductions in its high tariffs. T h e chief concession which Austria made in the commercial treaty as finally worked out was a reduction of its pig iron tariff from .80 to .65 gulden (gold) per 100 kilograms. 47 The meagerness of the Austrian concessions is difficult to explain if only economic factors in the relations between the two countries are considered. F o r Austria the working out of satisfactory commercial agreements w a s more essential than for Germany. Over one-half of Austria's total exports went to Germany, while Austria-Hungary absorbed only about 10 per cent of Germany's exports. 48 Germany needed a favorable railroad agreement with Austria to promote its trade in the Balkans. But it was equally important for Austria to have its railroad rates regulated by treaty. F r o m the economic standpoint Germany's position as a negotiator was much stronger than Austria's. Y e t the reductions in Austria's tariffs were so slight that a great expansion of the Austrian market, which Germany had hoped for, was impossible. 47 Die Handelspolitik des deutschen Reichs vom Frankfurter Frieden bis sur Gegenivart, pp. 155-56; R. W u t t k e , " D e r deutsch-osterreich-ungarische Handelsvertrag vom 6 D e z e m b e r 1891," Schriften des Vereins fiir Socialpolitik, X C V I I I (1902), 432; Reichstag, 1890-92, Anlageband V , 3238 ( N o . 570). 48 Ashley, pp. 66-67. Germany's imports f r o m A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y amounted to only about 14 per cent of its total imports.

88

GERMAN

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POLITICS

Though the purpose of the Rohnstock meeting was to consider the renewal of the Triple Alliance, the powers did not get together in Berlin to take the matter up in earnest until April, 1891. B y that time Germany and Austria had already finished their negotiations for a commercial treaty, and Italy also had succeeded in gaining important commercial concessions. It is clear that Germany's need for a political alliance was forcing it to grant trade concessions to both Italy and Austria-Hungary. When Caprivi visited Milan in October, 1890, Crispi, the Italian minister president and foreign minister, urged as a matter of vital importance to the Triple Alliance the establishment of a " commercial league " between Italy, Austria, and Germany, " a sort of inner m a r k e t " which would make them " independent of the foreign world." Caprivi agreed, said that Kalnoky also thought such a commercial union very desirable, and added that Germany " would first seek an understanding with Austria and then with Italy." 49 Italy was in need of an economic alliance, because its commerce with France had been disrupted by a tariff war, which began in 1880. While the worst phase of this war had ended by 1890, commercial relations between the two countries were unsatisfactory until 1899. One of the chief industries to suffer was the Italian wine trade. 80 Italy therefore wished to gain the German market for its wine. B y January 1, 1891, the Italian ambassador thought that Germany was ready to reduce its tariff on Italian wine. 81 Since Italy was not one of the states enumerated in article X I of the Frankfurt Treaty, France would not automatically receive a reduction made for Italy; 49 Grosse Politik, VII, 53-55 (No. 1394), 56-57 (No. 1396). 50 Ashley, pp. 323-27. 51 Allg. Ztg., Jan. 8, 1891 (No. 8 AB), p. 2; Jan. 12, 1891 (No. 12 AB), p. 1.

TARIFF

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POLICY

and the proposed concession would give the preference

to

Italian over French wine in the German market. 62 In its efforts to secure the renewal of the Triple Alliance with Italy, Germany had to combat the French attempts to shatter it. France had begun its intrigues in 1887, and w a s using the tariff w a r and refusal of loans to the Italian government as weapons to bring Italy to terms. W i t h the departure of Bismarck, France redoubled its attack. Even while negotiations were going

forward

between

Germany

and

Italy,

France w a s doing its best through the employment of paid agents to learn the terms of the secret treaties and prevent their renewal. 53 Italy wanted to d r a w up a new treaty instead of renewing the old one and w a s trying to get the support of the Alliance for its interests in N o r t h Africa. But as long a s Crispi w a s foreign minister, G e r m a n y felt fairly secure and did not speed the conversations. H i s sudden fall from power o n January 31, 1891, changed the situation, for it w a s well k n o w n that his successor, M a r q u i s di Rudini, w a s friendly to France. B y April 21, 1891, therefore, Caprivi was eager to bring the treaty negotiations with Italy to a conclusion as soon as possible. 54 Rudini meanwhile had dropped Crispi's demands f o r support in North A f r i c a , but like his predecessor he wanted a commercial treaty. A n d according to Biilow, Rudini nearly broke up the Triple Alliance by demanding that Austria grant a " linen duty."

56

52 In article XI of the Frankfurt Treaty, as already noted, France and Germany agreed to grant each other permanently any tariff concessions which either might make to Great Britain, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Austria-Hungary, or Russia. SSGrosse

Politik,

V I I , 64 ( N o t e ) a n d N o s . 1402, 1407, 1408, 1418.

64 Ibid., Nos. 1401, 1411; Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, I, 10-17.

55 The following is a quotation from a letter which Anton Monts wrote to Biilow from Budapest on November 16, 1891: " Besides, do you know that in the negotiations for a commercial treaty Rudini threw us overboard? If Austria didn't let Luzzati concede that ' linen duty' so desired by his electors, then he, Rudini, would go and it would be all up with the Triple

90

GERMAN

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W h e n the three powers met in Berlin in April, 1891, negotiations for the renewal of the Triple Alliance went along smoothly, and the treaty was ready for signature on M a y 6. Be Attached to the joint treaty, which replaced the three separate treaties of 1887, 67 was a protocol, in which Germany, AustriaHungary, and Italy promised to grant each other most-favorednation treatment and " all the facilities and all the particular a d v a n t a g e s " in economic matters (finances, customs, railroads) which would be " compatible with the exigencies of each of the three states and with their respective engagements with third powers," each state reserving only the right of parliamentary approval of the actual stipulations which would follow from this declaration of principle. 58 In this w a y the principle of joining political and commercial matters in foreign relations was firmly established by treaty. Rumania had become a part of this defensive alliance on October 30, 1883, when it signed a secret treaty with AustriaHungary, which Germany joined by accession declaration on the same date. A t the expiration of this treaty in 1888, it was Biilow's task to convert " the very indeterminate 'understanding'. . . into a formal agreement." 59 This time Italy as well as Germany subscribed to the treaty. A t the urgent request of Rumania the fact that it had joined the Triple Alliance w a s kept a secret. 60 T h e treaty was to expire in October, 1891. Rumania was dilatory about renewing it a second time, partly Alliance. You can't imagine what a panic it caused in the Foreign Ministry in Berlin. J u s t at the critical time I was in Vienna. Dispatches simply flowed and the comedy ended, of course, with the acceptance by us of the Italian d e m a n d s " (Biilow, I, 34). 56 Langer, The Diplomacy

of Imperialism,

I, 18.

57 T h e three separate treaties were d r a w n up in 1882 and were renewed in 1887. 58 Crosse Politik, V I I , Nos. 1426 (the text of the Triple Alliance) and 1427 (the text of the protocol). 59 Biilow, I V , 624. 60Ibid., pp. 619, 623-24; Crosse Politik,

V I I , 151 ( N o t e ) .

TARIFF

POLICY

91

because K i n g K a r l hesitated to reveal the earlier secret document to new political leaders, and partly because Rumania resented Hungary's treatment of Rumanians living in Transylvania. F o r a time in March, 1891, it looked as though the K i n g of Rumania were contemplating an understanding or political alliance with Russia. 6 1 Finally in June, 1892, Rumania indicated its willingness to renew the treaty with Austria-Hungary. In the course of the conversation which preceded this declaration, Alexander Lahovary, the Rumanian foreign minister, tried " several times to mix the secret treaty with the grain tariff business " and to insist " that the former must not be regulated before the settlement of the latter." Lahovary was told that " there was no real connection between the two, as in the grain tariff matter it was a question solely of an economic petition of the Rumanians to Germany, and in the secret treaty matter it was a question of a purely political act of state between Rumania and Austria-Hungary." 82 T h e treaty between Austria-Hungary and Rumania was finally signed, subject to ratification, on July 25, 1892; Germany subscribed to it on November 23, 1892, and Italy five days later. 83 Rumania had given notice of the cancellation of its numerous tariff treaties in 1890 and the last ones ran out on July io, 1891.'84 O n the next day Rumania applied to all countries alike its tariff of 1891. Because of a movement in favor of protection for industry, which had developed in Rumania while it was engaged in a tariff war with Austria, the new tariff was higher than the former treaty tariffs. 8 5 Germany wanted a reduction of this tariff and Rumania desired the grain tariff concessions contemplated for Austria. 61 Ibid., Nos. 146s, 1467, 1469. 62 Ibid., No. 1484 (June 8, 1892). 63Ibid., p. 181 ( N o t e ) , and Nos. 1486-87.

64 Lötz, loc. cil., p. no. 65 K. Grünberg, " Die handelspolitischen Beziehungen Österreich-Ungarns zu Rumänien, Serbien und Bulgarien," Schriften des Vereins für Socialpolitik, XCIII (1901), 113-21.

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This tariff war between Austria-Hungary and Rumania began in June, 1886, and lasted until Rumania's new general tariff became effective. A s a result Germany had been able to win from Austria first place in the export trade to Rumania. In this trade England had been a close second to Germany, while Austria had dropped to third place.68 After Bülow secured Rumania's adherence to the Triple Alliance in 1888 he had to negotiate a commercial treaty between Germany and Rumania. In this he " had the intrigues of the Austrians to contend with." They did not like to see Germany " penetrate the Rumanian market, hitherto controlled by themselves." m One of the causes of friction between Austria and Rumania in 1886 was Austria's unwillingness to continue tariff freedom for Rumanian grain. 68 Germany's desire to strengthen its political allies was given as a reason for granting Austria and Italy concessions in 1891. Rumania could claim a concession on this basis also. Whatever may have been said to the Austrians regarding Germany's commercial relations with Rumania, one gathers from the scanty references in the printed documents that Germany wished to maintain the commercial advantage which it had won in Rumania during the tariff war between that country and Austria. 69 Though German negotiations for a commercial treaty with Rumania were kept in the background while Germany and Austria were trying to induce Rumania to renew its agreement with the Triple Alliance, Germany granted the grain reductions to Rumania provisiones/«rf. 67 Bülow, IV, 624. 68 Grünberg, loe. cit., p. 118. 69 Caprivi wrote to Prince Reuss, the German ambassador to Austria, on March 26, 1891: "A reference to the almost irresistibly attractive power which an Austro-German commercial treaty must exert upon Rumania for economic reasons might be premature in the present stage of the commercial treaty negotiations and perhaps might be apt to awaken mistrust as to the objectivity of our view" (Grosse Politik, VII, No. 1467). See also, Bülow's letter to Caprivi, reporting his conversations with Alexander Lahovary (ibid., No. 1484).

TARIFF

POLICY

93

ally on July i, 1892, some little time before the political treaty was signed. 70 Both countries extended to each other mostfavored-nation treatment, and Rumania promised not to increase its industrial tariffs. 7 1 This meant that Rumania granted merely its general tariff of 1891 in return for the grain concessions. This satisfied Rumania and her statesmen were in no hurry to work out a more permanent commercial agreement. It was not until October 2 1 , 1893, after the provisional agreements had been twice extended, that Rumania and Germany finally signed a commercial treaty. 72 While its economic and political relations with its allies in the Triple Alliance were thus making it expedient for Germany to change its tariff policy, there were also domestic forces which were working in the same direction. For years almost all the chambers of commerce had been advocating a tariff treaty with Austria in place of the most-favored-nation agreement. 78 A t a very secret meeting of the German Trade Congress in Berlin late in December, 1889, the future commercial policy was discussed and the question was raised whether Germany should hold to the " autonomous " tariff or adopt a system of tariff pacts after February 1, 1892. 74 About the same time Bennigsen, the leader of the National Liberals, advocated a return to such a system in order to avoid the anarchy which threatened when almost all the commercial treaties would run out at the same time in February, 1892. 78 It will be recalled also that the 70 Allg. Ztg., Nov. 1, 1893 ( N o . 303 M B ) , pp. 1-2. A s already noted, the Triple Alliance was signed by Austria-Hungary and Rumania on July 25, 1892. 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid. ; Schulthess, 1893, p. 295. 73 Die Handelspolitik zur Gegenwart, p. 154.

des deutschen

Reichs

vom Frankfurter

Frieden

bis

74 This meeting took place on December 29, 1889. Very little concerning it was published, as no members of the press were present (Allg. Ztg., Jan. 6, 1890 [No. 6], p. 78). 75 Reichstag, 1890-92, V, 3326 (Dec. 11, 1891). Böttcher said that Bennigsen had taken this stand about two years before.

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Radicals demanded in the electoral campaign of 1890 " firm commercial treaties " which would protect Germany " as much as possible against one-sided sudden tariff increases of other states." 76 One important change in Germany's tariff policy was thus clearly foreshadowed before Bismarck left office. The most important departure from the earlier commercial policy from the point of view of the agrarians was the reduction of the agricultural tariffs. This also had been advocated before Bismarck's retirement. Within Germany there were many who felt that the agrarians had overshot the mark in 1887. It was prophesied then that as soon as grain and bread prices rose to great heights again, popular indignation would be so great that the grain tariffs would be swept away entirely. Bismarck had publicly refuted the contention of the parties of the Left that tariffs had increased the cost of food, 77 but when grain prices rose in 1890 and continued to increase in 1 8 9 1 , their prophecies seemed to have come true, and an ideal situation was provided for those who wished to have all food tariffs repealed. In view of what has already been said regarding the general decline of grain prices as a result of the increased supplies of grain coming to Western Europe from overseas and from eastern and southeastern Europe, the higher prices in 1890 and 1891 need some explanation. In January, 1890, German stocks of wheat and rye were low. 78 There was only a moderate harvest of these two cereals in 1890. The world wheat crop of the same year was a little below normal owing to deficiencies in the United States, India, and Russia. Estimated shortages in world 76 Schulthess, 1890, p. 13. 77" It is rather," he wrote, " the very articles which have high tariffs (wheat, rye, barley, maize, and slaughter beef, etc.) that have become considerably cheaper. For the price increase of the year 1889 the tariff policy cannot be made responsible." H i s statement was based on a published report of the Statistical Bureau, which gave the average prices of important articles in the wholesale trade during the preceding decade (Allg. Ztg., Feb. 12, 1890 [No. 43], 710). 78 Allg. Ztg., Jan. 6, 1890 ( N o . 6 ) , p. 77.

TARIFF

POLICY

95

supplies of wheat kept up the price.™ Because of extremely cold weather in the winter of 1891, followed by bad harvesting conditions, France, Belgium, Holland, Germany, and Russia had poor harvests. Russia was threatened with famine. 80 A shortage of wheat and rye in Europe, amounting to about 10 million tons, was offset by a bumper crop in the United States and excellent harvests in Canada, Argentina, and India. H a d these overseas supplies come to Europe immediately wheat and rye prices would not have reached such heights. 81 But grain was held back by traders and farmers in the hope of better prices, until by the beginning of 1892 it was found that the early predictions had overrated the shortages in Europe, except in Russia. Despite its own poor crop Russia exported as much wheat as usual from August to November 21, 1891, when further exports were prohibited. T h e expectation that the Russian government would place an embargo on wheat exports much sooner than it did stimulated prices. Even after grain supplies began to come to Germany and other European countries in greater quantities in 1892, the crop estimates were still bearish. It was not until March, 1892, that it began to be recognized that the United States wheat crop of 1891 had been grossly underestimated, and that the world wheat crop of that year was not unusually deficient, but of moderate size. Curtailed use of wheat in Russia and some other European countries left 79 F a m s w o r t h , loc. cit., p. 304. Miss Farnsworth quotes the Corn Trade News of A u g u s t 12, 1890: " S t o c k s e v e r y w h e r e are l o w . . . . There has not been a single bumper crop raised anywhere in the world this season, if perhaps we except R u m a n i a . . . . " 80 T h e Russian government forbade the export of rye in August, of potatoes, flour, and all cereals but wheat in October, and of wheat on November 21 (ibid., p. 305). 81 It was estimated that these countries had a wheat surplus of 8 million tons (Dade, loc. cit., p. 8 9 ) . Miss F a r n s w o r t h would probably place this surplus much higher. A c c o r d i n g t o her estimate, " the United States crop of 1891 was a record for its time, and around 270 million bushels larger than the crop of 1890." In 1890 the crop w a s 516 million bushels, and 787 million bushels in 1891 ( F a r n s w o r t h , loc. cit., p. 3 1 1 ) .

96

GERMAN

AGRARIAN

POLITICS

fairly large amounts of wheat for the remaining countries." A s these facts began to be realized and great quantities of wheat came to Europe in 1892, prices started to fall. 83 The grain and other food tariffs had furnished the Radicals and Social Democrats with a solgan in the electoral campaign of 1890. While grain prices were mounting in 1890 and 1891 the parties of the Left kept up their agitation against indirect taxes on food. Eugen Richter, the Radical leader, lost no time in presenting the subject in the Reichstag. He moved on M a y 6, 1890, the first day of the new session, that the grain tariffs be reduced to the rates of 1 8 8 7 ; that provision be made for the gradual removal of tariffs on grain, cattle, and wood; and that the export premiums for sugar and the consumption tax on brandy be repealed.84 The next day Auer, of the Social Democratic party, moved for the immediate repeal of all food tariffs. 8 5 In July, when these motions might have been considered, both parties agreed to postpone them for the government's military bill. They were not taken up until January 1 3 , 1 8 9 1 ; by that time the government had already begun the negotiations with Austria-Hungary for a commercial treaty. The high prices and the attitude of the Radicals and the Social Democrats towards food tariffs may have affected the decisions reached in the commercial treaties. The needs of commerce and industry undoubtedly played an important part in bringing about a system of tariff pacts. But the government hoped also, by concluding treaties which would aid industry and commerce, to provide employment for workers and to pro82 Ibid., p. 312. 83 The material for this discussion was found chiefly in Farnsworth, loc. cit., pp. 303-12 and Dade, loc. cit., p. 89. The latter states that in July, 1892, 326,743 tons of wheat were imported into Germany, the highest monthly import of wheat that the German customs territory had ever received, and that it constituted a quarter of the total wheat import of that year (ibid., pp. 89-90). 84 Reichstag, 1890-91, Anlageband in the form of a resolution.

I ( N o . 21), 123. Richter's motion was

85 Auer's motion was in the form of a law (ibid.

[No. 19], p. 122).

TARIFF

POLICY

97

mote their well-being. The agitation of the parties of the Left against the food tariffs, however, made it difficult for the government to secure the desired concessions from Austria and other countries. Both the Austrian and later the Russian statesmen used this agitation skillfully to minimize or even to discount entirely the grain tariff concessions. The clamor against the tariffs was so great, it was said, that the German government would be compelled to reduce them anyway. 89 Whatever considerations may have weighed in the decisions reached, Germany's tariff policy was changed, as we have seen, in three important respects after Bismarck's retirement: the "autonomous" system gave way to one of tariff pacts; agricultural duties were reduced; and Germany joined political and commercial matters in its treaty agreements with foreign countries. The published records do not show when it was decided to make these changes or who was responsible for them. Two well-informed contemporaries had different views regarding these matters. Count Lerchenfeld-Koefering said that Caprivi had studied the matter carefully and determined that the grain tariff reductions were necessary for the good of the state.87 Caprivi's defense of the new policy and the wide recognition and blame which he received because of it would seem to substantiate that view. Kardorff, on the other hand, was of the opinion that the Austrian commercial treaty was " the inspiration of the All Highest," and that William had "let himself be caught" by the Austrians in that treaty. 88 The interest which William showed in the passage of the treaties, the favors he bestowed upon those who helped to bring them about, his declaration later that he wished to be considered a Prince of 86 Allg. Ztg., Nov. 26, 1890 ( N o . 328 A B ) , p. 2. 87 Lerchenfeld, pp. 267-70. According to Lerchenfeld, Miquel warned Caprivi against the grain tariff reductions, because the Conservatives held the balance in Prussia. 88 On July 19, 1893, Kardorff "urgently exhorted" Miquel "to take precautions so that His Majesty does not let himself be caught again in his visit to Austria as he did with the commercial treaty" (Kardorff, p. 284). See also, ibid., p. 235 (Jan. 13, 1891).

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GERMAN

AGRARIAN

POLITICS

Peace, and his personal efforts in connection with the Russian treaty seem to indicate the correctness of Kardorff's viewpoint. Caprivi himself left no memoirs and never tried to defend himself or his policy after he left office. It is possible that William and Caprivi were of one mind regarding the commercial policy; or Caprivi and William may have agreed upon most of the essentials of the new policy without having decided about the reductions in agricultural tariffs. For it is easy to believe that William himself decided to reduce the agricultural duties, and that Caprivi was merely carrying out the commands of his superior. The grain tariffs were the subject of a conversation between the Kaiser and Biilow immediately after the latter was appointed chancellor in 1900. According to Biilow, William at that time was inclined to reduce agricultural duties still more, but Biilow refused to take over his new office until he had been assured by the Kaiser that agricultural protection would be increased. 89 What Bismarck intended to do, had he remained in office, is not clear. A commission to prepare for the future commercial treaties had been appointed early in January, 1890, before he left office. Concerning the instructions given to this commission we have no information. 90 Herbert Bismarck said very much later that his father had planned to denounce the mostfavored-nation agreements and to introduce maximum

and

minimum tariffs before negotiating new treaties, in order to be 89 Lucanus told Biilow before he saw the Kaiser that " H i s Majesty had been told by his Hamburg friends that an increase or even the fixing of grain duties would make the conclusion of trade treaties impossible" and that " the Kaiser was determined to conclude trade agreements at any price." When Biilow saw William, the latter brought up the question and said that the agrarians must get " ' what they deserved right a w a y . ' " W h e n Biilow insisted on the agricultural tariff increases, the Kaiser pointed out that " in England industrialization was more highly developed" than in Germany. William finally told Biilow to see what he could do ( B i i l o w , I, 441-43). 9 0 A l l g . Ztg., Jan. 4, 1890 ( N o . 4), p. 43.

TARIFF POLICY

99 81

in an advantageous position to win concessions. It is hardly likely that Bismarck had contemplated reducing the grain tariffs. In retrospect it would appear that Germany had weakened its position in the Triple Alliance by giving up the tie to Russia. Though actually stronger both politically and economically than either Austria or Italy, Germany nevertheless found it necessary to grant rather important commercial concessions to those countries in order to maintain its political alliance with them. T o a certain extent, however, Germany's failure to secure more advantageous terms was due to the ineptness and inexperience of its negotiators and to Germany's apparent desire, at least in the first group of treaties, to conclude tariff agreements at whatever cost. 91 Sartorius von Waltershausen, p. 385; Lotz, loc. cit., pp. 66 (and note), 74 (and note 1) ; Reichstag, 1897-98, II, 919; 1893-94, I, 478; 1895-97, VI, 4536 (Dr. Hahn, Feb. 8, 1897) ; V I I I , 5722 (Kardorff, May 3, 1897).

CHAPTER THE AUSTRIAN

V TREATY

DURING the first two years of Caprivi's administration, he was under almost constant pressure from the parties of the Left. The suffering caused by the business depression which set in about 1890 was aggravated by high food prices. The efforts which Social Democrats and Radicals made to influence the government's policy regarding food tariffs had to be combated while negotiations for the commercial treaties with Austria-Hungary and Italy were going forward. The main terms of the Austrian commercial treaty were settled in the spring, and the treaty was put into final shape in May, but it was not signed until December 6, 1891. In the interval Germany and Austria were negotiating jointly with the other states which were to be included in the commercial treaty network radiating from the states of the Triple Alliance. These other states on their part were working out commercial agreements with one another.1 Meanwhile Social Democrats and Radicals redoubled their attacks upon the government. The Conservatives were not idle, but the economic constellation gave their opponents the advantage. The government was thrown into the defensive by the domestic crisis; this aided Germany's commercial allies and weakened Germany's position as a negotiator. In January when Germany and Austria were in the midst of the negotiations for the commercial treaty, the price of good wheat was 193.1 marks per metric ton; by May, when the Triple Alliance was signed, it had risen to 240.9 marks. Between May and December there was a slight decline in the 1 After an understanding in commercial matters had been worked out between Germany and Austria, representatives from the two countries began joint negotiations in Vienna with the Swiss and in Berlin with the Belgians. Before a Swiss agreement had been settled representatives from Germany and Austria met those from Italy in Munich in August, 1891. Switzerland and Italy likewise negotiated a treaty which was signed at the same time as the Swiss treaties with the two Empires (Lotz, loc. cit., p. 80). 100

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price; but even in December it stood at 234.4 marks per metric ton, which was very much higher than the average price for 1890. Rye of good quality rose in price from 176.4 marks per metric ton in January to 204 marks in May. Unlike wheat, it continued to rise after May. In November it reached 240.8 marks—about the price which wheat had touched in May. Ordinarily rye sold for about thirty marks per metric ton under wheat. But in December, when the treaties were being considered in the Reichstag, rye at 239.6 marks per metric ton cost 5.2 marks more than the same quantity of wheat. 2 The Russian ban on rye exports effective August 27 was an important factor in this unusually high price.3 The motions concerning food tariffs introduced in the Reichstag by Richter of the Radical party and by Auer of the Social Democratic party have already been mentioned. They were finally considered by the Reichstag on January 13, 1891. The debate lasted four days. Radicals and Social Democrats made a violent attack upon the protective tariff system. Y e t it was evident almost at once that their demands would not be accepted. Vigorous objections to the motions were presented by Conservatives representing the eastern provinces, Bavaria, and Alsace-Lorraine, and by Centrists from Silesia, Bavaria, and Baden. Komierowski, a Polish delegate, entreated the government to do nothing which would add to the burdens of agriculture. Most agriculturists by this time were protectionists, but a small group led by Wisser, a nonpartisan from SaxeWeimar, 4 believed in free trade. The Imperialist party supported Kardorff and disavowed the Post editorial of January 2 The average price of good wheat for 1890 was 196.9 marks per metric ton and for 1889, 189.9 marks. T h e average price of the same quantity of good rye for the same years was 172.7 and 157.2 marks respectively (Statistisches

lahrbuch

der Stadt Berlin,

1 8 8 9 a n d 1890, p. 3 2 6 ) .

3 Wippermann, 1891, ii, 49. 4Reichstag, 1890-91, II, 966-69 (Jan. 15, 1891). See also, ibid., pp. 951 (Helldorff, Jan. 14), 929 (Lutz, Jan. 13), 969 (Zorn von Bulach, Jan. 15), 931 (Schalscha, Jan. 13), 958 (Burlein, Jan. 14), 972 (Komierowski, Jan. IS). 985-88 (Schuler, Jan. 16), 999 (Baron von Pfetten-Arnbach, Jan. 16).

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8, which had endorsed the proposed commercial treaty with A u s t r i a . 6 Apparently Dr.

Reichensperger of the Center had

aJready published a pamphlet which advocated low grain tariffs.® Windthorst, the Centrist leader, did not speak on Richter's motion but voted against it.T Richter said he thought about one-third of the Reichstag agreed with the Radical demands, while only about one-eighth of the old Reichstag had been in f a v o r of them. 8 T h e y were rejected by a vote of 2 1 0 to 106.* It will be recalled, however, that Richter's motion included several items, among them the gradual removal of all duties on grain, cattle, and wood. Richter would not agree to a separation of these items. Oechelháuser of the National

Liberal

party made the statement toward the close of the debate that m a n y of the North German members of his party would be agreeable to a reduction of the grain tariffs to the rates of 1 8 8 7 . 1 0 F r o m this debate the government gained some idea of the party strength for and against a reduction of the grain 5 The Post was the party newspaper. The article was published by Dr. Kayssler, the editor-in-chief, without the authorization of party leaders. Kardorff published an article in the same paper two days later, stating that the party would presumably not alter the position it had taken in economic questions since 1879. He said the party was sympathetic to the commercial alliance with Austria, but not at the price of reducing the grain tariffs, unless there were compensations in other fields, such as in the currency question. Fixing the tariffs for twelve years on a lower basis was unacceptable to him. A commercial alliance with Austria required the most cautious weighing to prevent it from weakening rather than strengthening the political alliance with that country (Kardorff, pp. 233-35). 6 Reichstag, 1890-91, II, 923 (Schumacher, Jan. 13). 7 Ibid., pp. 1013-14. Windthorst died on March 14, 1891. 8 Ibid., p. 925 (Jan. 13). 9Ibid., pp. 1011-13 (Jan. 16, 1891). Since Auer's motion was in the form of a bill instead of a resolution, it came up for a second reading in February, 1892, when it was defeated (ibid., 1890-92, VI, 4356). There was no roll call on his motion. 10 Schulthess, 1891, p. 4; Allg. Ztg., Jan. 19, 1891, (No. 19 A B ) , p. 2; Reichstag, 1890-91, II, 1011. For the attitude of other members of the National Liberal party, see Allg. Ztg., Jan. 14, 1891 (No. 14 AB), p. 1; Jan. 17, 1891 (No. 17 2d M B), p. 6.

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tariffs while negotiations for the Austrian commercial treaty were still in progress. The question of the industrial tariffs was raised, and Radicals and Social Democrats were charged with working for the removal of the agricultural but not of the industrial tariffs, though both had been introduced at the same time. In reply Richter merely said that there had been two increases in the agricultural tariffs since 1879 and none in the industrial tariffs. 1 1 Three Centrists criticized the policy of maintaining industrial tariffs if agricultural protection were reduced. One of these, Count Hoensbroech, declared that the Social Democrats did not want to touch the industrial tariffs because workers' wages would then be lowered and workers would fall away from the party. 12 Wisser, a nonpartisan delegate, outdid both the Radicals and the Social Democrats by demanding that if the legislators removed the agricultural tariffs, those of big business must be taken away also. He and a small group of his friends wanted Richter's motion referred to a committee for revision. 18 Shortly after this debate the government was given an opportunity to estimate party feeling regarding the meat import prohibitions. Dr. Barth of the Radical party moved the repeal of the ban on the importation of American hogs, pork, and sausages. It was debated on January 23, but was lost by 1 3 3 to 106 votes. Though the Centrists decided the issue by voting against the repeal, Windthorst protested emphatically against the protectionist arguments of the agrarians. He advocated repeal of the prohibitions as soon as it was certain that the sanitary dangers were removed. 14 11 Reichstag,

1890-91, II, 925 (Jan. 13).

12Ibid., pp. 976 (Imperial Count von und zu Hoensbroech, Jan. 15), 98588 (Schuler, Jan. 16), 999 (Baron von Pfetten-Arnbach, Jan. 16). Y&Ibid., p. 969 (Wisser, Jan. 15). 14Lotz, loc. cit., p. 72; Reichstag, 1890-91, II, 1117-37 (Jan. 23, 1891). The import prohibitions against hogs, pork, and sausage from Denmark, Sweden, and Norway had been removed by the government on December 5, 1890 (Lotz, loc. cit., p. 72).

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Outside the Reichstag, the Social Democrats were stirring up sentiment against the food tariffs. In January before these debates, Singer harangued a popular meeting in Berlin on the subject. 15 A scathing editorial in Vorwärts, the party organ, 16 repeated in the usual inflamatory style the Social Democratic charges against " the great landowners with and without von," taunting them for turning to " brother peasant" in an agony of fear that they would be reduced to beggary. 17 In June the party held a series of meetings, where party speakers denounced the tariffs. Eight thousand persons attended one of the larger meetings. 18 During May and June the Radicals used the Reichstag and the Prussian house of deputies as sounding boards for their declamations. Richter was responsible for introducing the subject of the food tariffs in the Reichstag on May 4, two days before the signing of the Triple Alliance. He was obviously trying to instigate another tariff discussion like the one in January. He was restrainted on a point of order and was permitted merely to interpellate the government. He asked how it intended to meet the situation created by the increase in grain prices during the previous six weeks. 19 What Richter was unable to do on May 4 in the Reichstag, he accomplished on the twenty-seventh of the month in the Prussian lower house. During the budget debate he asked the government again what it was going to do. " Twenty-two days 15 Allg. Ztg., Jan. 12, 1891 ( N o . 12 A B ) , p. 2. 16 In January, 1891, the Berliner Volksblatt changed its title to Vorwärts. Henceforth it was to be the official organ of the Social Democratic party. Liebknecht was the manager of the newsheet (Allg. Ztg., Jan 3, 1891 [No. 3 A B], p. 2 ) . 17 Vorwärts, March 1, 1891 (No. 51), p. 1. 18Ibid., June 12, 1891 ( N o . 134) ; June 13, 1891 ( N o . 135, 1. Beilage), pp. 1-2. These two issues of Vorwärts reported at least 16 gatherings in as many different cities between June 6 and 11; at a meeting in Bremen, where Liebknecht spoke, it was estimated that between 7,000 and 8,000 persons were present. 19 Reichstag, 1890-91, IV, 2713-14.

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have passed," he said, " and the grain scarcity has increased." 20 Rickert of the same party deplored the stagnation of trade in Danzig, where the chief business was the export of grain. H e reminded the government that France, which formerly had been in the front rank of the protective tariff movement, had reduced its grain tariff to 2.40 marks per 100 kilograms. H e insisted that the grain stocks were much smaller than the government had supposeed at first. B y hesitating to convene the Reichstag to repeal the tariffs, the government was assuming a heavy responsibility. 21 Though the grain tariff reductions had been discussed in the press, the government had made no statement concerning them. During the debates on May 27 the Conservatives expressed great concern over one item of the commercial treaty negotiations with Austria-Hungary which had trickled through, namely, that the grain tariffs might be reduced to 3.50 marks per 100 kilograms. It was even reported that the reductions might be extended to Russia. 2 2 Kanitz deplored the secrecy about the treaties. H e questioned whether it was right to reduce the tariffs and demanded a statement from the government. 23 T h e Conservatives as well as the government felt that the high price of grain was due in part to the uncertainty concerning the terms of the Austrian treaty. N o merchant would import grain until he was sure there would be no tariff reductions. It was insinuated also that the high prices were caused by speculation on the grain market. H a v i n g been urged by the Radical party press, grain traders had sold grain below cost in the West, it was said, in the hope of bringing about a simultaneous fall in the price; instead the price in Berlin and the 20 H. der Abg., 1891, V, 2353. The Triple Alliance was ratified May 17, 1891.

21 Ibid., p. 2354 (Rickert, May 27). France reduced its grain tariffs from August 1, 1891, to June 1, 1892. 2 2 Ibid.,

p. 2355 ( K a n i t z , M a y 27, 1891).

23 Ibid.,

pp. 2355-56.

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E a s t had been raised. 24 Government officials attempted to quiet the excitement by making brief statements, without committing themselves on their policy. B u t even these brief

statements

seemed to be contradictory. E v e r y o n e agreed that the discussion had settled nothing. It w a s claimed that the sole object of the Radical party in starting the discussion had been to raise the grain price still higher by producing greater uncertainty. 2 8 B y June i Caprivi felt that he must make a statement regarding grain duties. T h e government, he said, did not " intend to propose to the federal council that the grain tariffs be reduced or repealed."

26

Investigations had been started at the

end of April to ascertain the grain stocks on hand and the domestic and foreign crop prospects for 1 8 9 1 . These researches to determine the seriousness of the crisis had been carried on peacefully until M a y 2 7 . T h e n because of the excitement the government realized that it would have to make a statement much sooner than it had planned. F r o m the abundant data 24Ibid., pp. 2355-56 (Kanitz), 2354, 2356 (Heyden). Kardorff pointed out that while the grain prices were usually very much higher in the West than in Berlin and the East, the quotations then for a metric ton of May wheat were: 238 marks in Mannheim, 234 marks in Cologne, and 248 marks in Berlin. H e said the purpose of the gentlemen in this grain speculation was not at the moment to gain money for themselves, but if possible to shatter the grain prices simultaneously. H e hoped that the agricultural people in Prussia would be able to live. Richtcr replied to this charge by saying that two Berlin houses which were speculating on a rise in wheat had sold parcels of wheat, not in foreign countries, but in Mannheim, in order to ease the situation in the critical days (ibid., pp. 2357-58 [Kardorff]; p. 2364 [Richter]). 25Ibid., pp. 2361 (Boetticher), 2366 (Kanitz), 2368, 2370 (Huene). Schalscha of the Center party said that he could not understand the sudden clamor at the increase in prices because of a tariff of five marks per 100 kilograms when in 1880 with a tariff of only 1 mark prices for bread grain went even higher (ibid., p. 2362). 26 Ibid., p. 2447 (Caprivi, June 1, 1891). Caprivi said he was replying to the question raised on May 27, " whether the present conditions necessitate a reduction or repeal of grain tariffs soon." He made no statement regarding the proposed grain tariff reductions in the commercial treaties.

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gathered, the government had become firmly convinced that the country had a sufficient supply of food. 27 Kardorff had said on May 27 that his party would not object to a reduction of the grain tariffs for three months.28 Caprivi reported that the government had decided after mature consideration that a moderate reduction of the t a r i f f s — " what might be called leaving the matter open until the completion of the German-Austrian commercial treaty "—would not help; if the grain tariffs were reduced for a few months, it would be difficult to return to them. T o those who wanted the grain tariffs abolished, he said that a government must be able to " swim against the stream " for the good of the state, and that the government did not have in mind then, and never had had in mind, the adoption of " a free-trade system for grain." 29 Since the grain tariffs were being used to win commercial concessions from the countries with which Germany was negotiating, Caprivi would have been seriously handicapped had he been forced to suspend or reduce the tariffs prior to the conclusion of the treaty negotiations. On June 1 1 Rickert of the Radical party moved in the Prussian house of delegates that the government be requested to produce the material collected in reference to the grain supplies and harvest prospects. Caprivi asked the house to reject the motion: its only object was to bring about an extended discussion. The government had not changed its position. He was unwilling to disclose the sources of his information, since it had been given in confidence. He acknowledged that much of the government's material was really based on estimations; but 27 Ibid., pp. 2447-49 (Caprivi, June 1, 1891). See also, ibid., pp. 26992700 (Caprivi, June 11). 28 Ibid., p. 2357. 29Ibid., pp. 2447-49 (Caprivi, June I, 1891). By using the words "against the stream" Caprivi was reminding Kardorff of the policy he had advocated in the 'seventies when he was working almost alone to bring about protection. Kardorff wrote a pamphlet in 1875 entitled Gegen den Strom t Eine Kritik dcr HandeUpolitik des deutschen Reichs an der Hand der Careyschen Forschungen (Kardorff, p. 121).

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he asked if stock exchange quotations were not also mere estimations, and if they indicated actual conditions any more accurately than the government's estimations.30 As a matter of fact Caprivi's advices were correct: despite the general pessimism which prevailed regarding the grain situation, Caprivi had managed to obtain reliable information. On June 19 an editorial in Vorwärts, which began with the English words, " The rain it raineth every day," expatiated on the unfavorable crop situation. Reports indicated, according to the writer, that there would be poor harvests in Russia and India; in Germany the crop was threatened by wet weather; the price of rye on the Berlin exchange had increased. The government was urged again to do away with the grain tariffs. 81 On August 14, three days after the Russian government announced the export prohibition of rye,82 the German government issued a reassuring statement in the Reichsanzeiger. The grain supplies would be sufficient, but because of Russia's export prohibition more extensive use of wheat and the importation of rye from other countries might be necessary. The agitation was not confined to the parties of the Left. From Caprivi's speeches we know that expressions of dissatisfaction were coming from other quarters also. During the course of the year 1891 two pamphlets appeared under the pseudonym " Borussen." The first, which was written in March, was entitled What Sort of Course Have We? Reviewing the events of the year following Bismarck's dismissal, it sought to demonstrate that in almost every field of practical politics the course had changed for the worse and that " those who were responsible for the policy had lost control of the rudder." 83 In an effort to discredit Bismarck's policy, the new 30 Ibid., pp. 2699-2700 (Caprivi, June 11, 1891). The motion was rejected on June 12 by a vote of 223 to 20 (Schulthess, 1891, p. 98). 31 Vorwärts, June 19, 1891 (No. 166). The average price per ton of good wheat in June was 235.2 marks and for rye of the same quality 212.7 marks. 32 It was announced on August 11 that the prohibition would be effective August 27 (Wippermann, 1891, ii, 49). 33 Borussen, Was für einen Kurs haben wirf Eine politische ung (2d ed.; Gotha, 1891), p. 59.

Zeitbetracht-

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IO9

government had tried to create the impression that state life had stagnated under his administration. The changes which had been introduced in such haste were designed to give the appearance of progress. Since it was recognized that the protective tariff policy could not be discarded, recourse had been taken to " political considerations " in the commercial negotiations with Austria-Hungary; reminiscences of the Zollverein had been revived in order to promote the idea of a tariff cartel with its ally—an idea which Bismarck had long since found unworkable.34 This was one error in the new commercial policy; the other was the assumption that agriculture could bear a tariff reduction.35 It will be noted that this pamphlet appeared before the Austrian commercial treaty or the Triple Alliance had been signed. It was said that the Kaiser was greatly offended by the pamphlet.38 There were no expressions of disloyalty in it; the brutally frank discussion of the new policy might well have been taken as a criticism of the new ministers only, except for a reference to the Kaiser at the beginning in connection with Bismarck's dismissal. The latter was spoken of as a " national possession," which the Kaiser, acting in accordance with his constitutional right, had given away. It was to be expected that " that which was brought in in Bismarck's place would be closely watched." This duty of observation had fallen chiefly upon the Kaiser himself " who wished to be looked upon as his own minister." 37 Thus indirectly he was made responsible for the new course. The other pamphlet, composed in October, concerned the German-Austrian commercial treaty. Like the first pamphlet, Reject or Accept emphasized the great changes which had been 34 Ibid., pp. 29-30, 54. 35 Ibid., pp. 54-5536WaIdersee, Denkwürdigkeiten,

II, 209.

37Borussen, Was für einen Kurs haben wirf,

p. 31.

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introduced in German policy, despite the assurances given that the course would remain the same. T h e new German policy had brought Russia and France together in a political alliance. 38 Since Bismarck was the only one w h o could restore the traditional friendly relations between Germany and Russia, the authors advocated Bismarck's recall as chancellor. 39 The new commercial policy was then subjected to severe criticism. The politically stronger state of two contracting powers was under no compulsion to make an economic treaty which was injurious to its own national existence in order to obtain a political treaty. In the recent negotiations with Austria-Hungary it was not a question of bringing about treaties between two states whose commercial relations had never before been regulated by treaty, but rather of changing over from one treaty to another. The former treaty was not disadvantageous. In the new treaty the only important concession which Austria had made was the reduction of its pig iron tariff from 80 to 65 kreutzer, but this would not benefit German industry. 40 A s soon as the immediate crisis had passed, German agriculture would require a tariff of five marks, or possibly of 6 or 6.50 marks. There was not the slightest doubt that it was to the interest of Germany to conclude a commercial treaty with Austria-Hungary. It was just as emphatically asserted that the treaty which had been drawn up should be rejected by the 3 8 Borussen, Ablehnen oder Annehmenf Vorbemerkungen über den deutsch-österreichischen Handelsvertrag nebst einer einleitenden Beurteilung der politischen Lage (3d ed.; Gotha, 1891), p. 20. T h e Franco-Russian entente w a s effected at the end of August, 1891, in the form of an e x c h a n g e pp. 354-55; Wahl, III, of notes (Langer, The Franco-Russian Alliance, 178-82). 39 Borussen, Ablehnen

oder Annehmenpp.

18-22.

40 German industrialists consulted said that only English blast-furnaces and Austrian and Hungarian rail works would be benefited. England and Belgium would receive the same reduction. E n g l i s h exports to Austria, which went by water, could g o cheaper than the German exports, w h i c h had to g o by rail (ibid., pp. 51-54). These figures, as given in the pamphlet, are approximate. T h e actual tax w a s .65 gulden per 100 kilograms.

THE

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Reichstag. 41

T h i s pamphlet likewise caused great excitement. 42 Before the summer was over the German government worked out an agreement in commercial matters with the United States. T h e United States Congress passed meat inspection laws in 1890 and 1891 which provided for a strict sanitary control of meat destined for export. In the Saratoga Convention of A u g u s t 22, 1891, Germany recognized that these new laws removed the grounds for the ban on the importation of American meat and agreed to remove the import prohibitions; it also provided that United States should receive whatever reductions were made in Germany's tariff system. In return Germany was to be allowed most-favorednation treatment for its sugar exports. 43 Pursuant to this agreement a German decree, dated September 3, 1891, repealed these import prohibitions of March 6, 1883. 44 The commercial treaties with Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Belgium were signed on December 6, 1891. The next day members of the Reichstag received copies of the treaties and the government's Memorandum. Unlike the former most45 favored-nation agreements, the new treaties set up elaborate tariff schedules with specific rates for numerous articles. In41 Ibid., pp. 73-74, 106-07. 42 Waldersee, II, 219. It w a s the opinion of Herrfurth, minister of the interior, that the author or editor of both pamphlets was Lothar Bucher, that Count Mirbach-Sorquitten and Count Kanitz-Podangen were coauthors, and that Herbert Bismarck wrote the introduction of the second

(ibid., p. 219 [Note]). 43 Lotz, loc. cit., pp. 71-73. Paragraph 3 of the American tariff bill of 1890 empowered the President of the United States to withhold tariff freedom for sugar and molasses from any state whose agricultural tariffs or other tariff regulations were unfavorable from the point of v i e w of reciprocity to American export (ibid., p. 71).

44 Ibid., p. 73. 45 P r i o r to 1879 the German Zollverein had concluded tariff treaties with other countries. T h e last of the treaties of that kind with Austria w a s the one of March 9, 1868, w h i c h ran out at the end of 1878. T h e treaty w h i c h took its place on December 16, 1878, w a s essentially a most-favored-nation agreement (Reichstag, 1890-92, Anlageband V, 3342 [ N o . 570]).

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stead of a few brief paragraphs, a voluminous document confronted the legislators. 46 T h e reduction of the German agricultural duties and of the Austrian pig iron tariff were known, but other details of the treaties had been kept secret until the treaties were published officially on December 6. Three days after Reichstag delegates received copies of the treaties, the first reading began. It was generally known before the debates started that the government wanted the bills dispatched before Christmas. O n December 12 Caprivi made a statement to this effect. T h i s meant that the Reichstag would have only eight days to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of the treaties and the new tariff policy.' 17 Since the time was short and the treaties would have to be accepted or rejected as a whole, the government did not want to have the treaties referred to a committee. T h e Centrists, Radicals, and Social Democrats agreed with the government. A motion for a committee of 28, which was made by von Massow, a Conservative, did not have enough supporters to bring it to vote. Most of the National Liberals wanted to have just the first reading before Christmas. In this way the party hoped to avoid the appearance of haste in a matter of such great importance. 48 T h e feeling against the commercial treaty w a s " very strong " among the Imperialists at a party meeting on 46 In the Stenographische Berichte the treaties and the accompanying tables and Memorandum take up 210 pages (ibid., pp. 3215-3425). 47 Reichstag, 1890-92, V , 3374 (Caprivi, Dec. 12, 1891). T h e first reading took place on December 10, n , and 1 2 ; the second reading on December 14, 15, 16, 17; the third reading was on December 18. 48 At first it was said that the National Liberals wanted a committee; then on December 9 the party voted to try to have just the first reading before Christmas. D r . Biirklin, a delegate from the Bavarian Palatinate, representing a small minority of the party, moved to have parts of the treaties referred to a committee of 14. This motion he later withdrew in favor of von Massow's motion (ibid., pp. 3386-87 [Dec. 12, 1891]; Allg. Ztg., Dec. 4, 1891 [No. 336 A B ] , p. 1 ; Dec. 5, 1891 [No. 337 A B ] , p. 1 ; Dec. 10, 1891 [ N o . 342 A B ] , p. 2). V o n Massow's motion was supported by all five members of the Anti-Semitic group, by some Imperialists, and by 36 members only of the Conservative party.

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December 10. T h e y decided to " speak in full session against time " in order to bring the third reading of the bill after Christmas, if they failed to secure a committee discussion. When it was evident that there was a majority behind the government, a free commission was formed to decide on the tactics to be used to prevent the government from squeezing the bills through before Christmas. 49 The government's reasons for a speedy dispatch of this legislation are fairly obvious. It w a s then sure of a majority in favor of the treaties. If members of the Reichstag had an opportunity to consult their constituents during the Christmas holidays, and to study the effects of the new tariff rates, that majority might be lost. There w a s hardly time for a lengthy discussion of the treaties if they were to be accepted before the old ones ran out on February 1, 1892. T h e government seemed to fear both the economic and the political consequences of a treatyless status. In view of the intimate connection between the commercial treaties and the Triple Alliance, Caprivi probably felt that the Triple Alliance would be strengthened if the commercial treaties could be accepted without too much discussion. T o the world at large the solidarity of the Alliance would be demonstrated, and Germany's prestige abroad would be enhanced. It was also desirable that the German Reichstag should set an example to the legislatures of the countries with which Germany was concluding treaties, so that they in their turn would not set up obstacles which would wreck the groundwork of the commercial treaty structure which Germany w a s trying to erect. F o r these first treaties were to be the basis of an extensive treaty network. W h i l e the first three treaties were being considered, a fourth was being concluded with Switzerland, and secret conversations had already begun with other countries. T h e government no doubt wanted also to put an end to the agitation and unrest which had prevailed for months on account of the industrial depression and the high grain prices. It was probably felt that the settlement of the grain tariff 49Kardorff, pp. 242, 247, 248.

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question for a period of twelve years would restore domestic peace. Another reason for the government's haste, which was perhaps less obvious, was its fear that Bismarck would take his seat in the Reichstag when the treaties were debated. " Every minute some minister " asked von Kardorff if he had " any surer news " about Bismarck's coming and they were " all scared to death." Their concern was not unfounded. Von Mirbach and von Kardorff were of the opinion that the former chancellor should " come for the third reading, give a very short declaration, and then leave the chamber again and return to Friedrichsruh." 60 One can only conjecture what the fate of these treaties would have been, had Bismarck, resourceful and unpredictable as he was, decided to take his place on the benches of the opposition. Both the government and the party leaders who were willing to support the treaties without a thorough study of their terms were subjected later to severe criticism. Even at the time party leaders were not spared by the Allgetneine Zeitung of Munich. It spoke of the strange impression made " when great parliamentary parties approve bills which concern vital interests of the greatest importance to the people, without even knowing the contents." It was suggested that " after mature examination of the treaties a majority " would be found in the Reichstag which would " perceive the rejection and the consequences connected therewith as the lesser evil." 5 1 The three treaties, and also the one with Switzerland, 52 were to be effective from February i, 1892, to December 31, 1903; 50 Kardorff, pp. 247-48. Count Henckel offered his residence in Berlin to Bismarck. In conversation with Waldersee on December 10 Bismarck was still uncertain about going to the Reichstag (Waldersee, I I , 224-26). 51 Allg.

Ztg., Dec. 5, 1891 ( N o . 337 A B ) , p. 1.

52 F o r the discussion of the terms of the treaties, the following sources were used: Reichstag, 1890-92, Anlageband V , 3215-3425 ( N o . 570); Die Handelspolitik des deutschen Reichs vom Frankfurter Frieden bis zur Gegenwart; Lotz, loc. cit., pp. 80-84, 94"95 I Sartorius von Waltershausen, p. 387; Ashley, pp. 66-68.

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thereafter, if not denounced, they were to remain in force, but could be terminated by either side upon a year's notice. Actually they lasted until 1906. They were based upon the principle of reciprocity: each state granted the other most-favored-nation treatment, a reduction of some duties, and a stabilizing of others. In the Austrian treaty Germany lowered its tariffs f o r wheat and rye from 5 to 3 . 5 0 marks per 1 0 0 kilograms, and granted reductions in the rates for other agricultural products and for wood.® 3 Germany made moderate reductions also in some of its tariffs on manufactures, but in this and the other treaties there was scarcely any modification of the existing high protection for iron and iron manufactures. T h e border trade between the two countries was eased. A railroad agreement which had been in force f r o m 1 8 5 3 to 1 8 8 1 w a s revived: in railroad matters each country w a s to treat the subjects of the other like its own. T o the Austrian commercial treaty w a s attached a veterinary convention to regulate the importation of Austrian livestock—a concession not granted to any other treaty power. Freedom from transit dues was granted mutually. Austria reduced its textile tariffs generally about 20 per cent, and made some concessions for glass manufactures, musical instruments, iron wares, machines, instruments, and other articles. F o r Italy Germany lowered its duty on cask wine from 24 to 2 0 marks per 1 0 0 kilograms, and on mashed fresh grapes from 1 0 to 4 marks. The rate for blended wine and for wine used in the preparation of cognac was set at 1 0 marks per 1 0 0 kilograms. T a r i f f s on poultry, eggs, and southern fruits were also reduced. Italy had lowered or fixed only 8 items in its former commercial treaty with Germany; in the new treaties with Ger53 The following are some of the agricultural reductions granted, the rates being per 100 kilograms: Oats from 4 to 2.80 marks Barley from 2.25 to 2 marks Maize from 2 to 1.60 marks Hops from 20 to 14 marks Flour from 10.50 to 7.30 marks

Il6

GERMAN

AGRARIAN

POLITICS

many and A u s t r i a it fixed 254 items. T h e principal branches of German industry to be benefited by the Italian concessions were the woolen, silk, iron, and large-scale chemical industries. It w a s estimated that Germany exported to Italy yearly goods valued at from 80 to 100 million m a r k s ; of this amount goods to the value of about 23 million marks had lowered tariffs, and goods to the value of about 60 million marks had stabilized duties under the new tariff treaty. 64 In Germany's treaties with Belgium and Switzerland the concessions on both sides were made in industrial tariffs. T h e r e w a s a great stir of excitement in the Reichstag on December 10 when the debates on the treaties began. Benches and stands had been only sparsely filled while the budget w a s being considered; " n o w everyone was in place w h o w a s not detained by a force majeure." T h e journalists' box w a s overcrowded and outside the Reichstag all was in readiness to take the shorthand reports and telegrams to the editorial offices and postal establishments. " T h e federal council table w a s filled to the last seat, ministers and commissioners were present, in the court and diplomatic boxes there were numerous guests." 68 Caprivi himself opened the debate with a speech which lasted an hour and a quarter. 58 H i s defense of the policy and the speeches of other ministers showed the government's concern for Germany industry. In the Memorandum attached to the treaties, Germany was referred to as an industrial state of the first rank. 5 7 Caprivi said that Germany's exports had been running behind its imports during the 'eighties by about 800 million marks yearly. T h e imports were in great part indispensable, since they were foodstuffs, raw materials and half-manufactured g o o d s needed for industry. Unless steps were taken to increase exports in proportion to the g r o w i n g German popu54 Allg. Ztg., Dec. 8, 1891 (No. 340 M B), p. 1. 55 Allg. Ztg., Dec. 14, 1891 (No. 346 A B), p. 2. See also, Kardorff, p. 247.

56 Allg. Ztg., Dec. 11, 1891 (No. 343 M B), p. 2. 57 Reichstag,

1890-92, Anlageband V, 3341.

THE

AUSTRIAN

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II7

lation the adverse balance would grow. T h e only solution was to try to export more manufactured goods. He considered " commerce and industry . . . the most essential sources of wellbeing and therefore of political power and cultural significance. . . ." 68 Either Germany would have to export goods or export men.8® The emphasis upon commerce and industry w a s disquieting to the agriculturists, who looked upon agriculture as the chief occupation in the state. Caprivi made it plain that the government had no intention of giving up protection for agriculture. A t the same time he contested the idea that a reduction of 1.50 marks per 100 kilograms in the tariffs on wheat and rye would injure agriculture. Agriculture was not making a sacrifice, as the agrarians asserted. The state was making a heavy sacrifice for agriculture. T h e new rates were above those of 1885. Raising the tariff to 5 marks per 100 kilograms in 1887 had been a test of strength, which had not been beneficial to the state. The bow had been overstrained. 60 Later Marschall warned the agrarians that Germany would have a moderate tariff or none at all.®1 In its commercial agreements, said Caprivi, Germany had formerly been in an ideal situation: it could set up tariffs without reference to foreign countries and yet enjoy most favored treatment for its exports. The tariff policy of 1879 was successful for a time; but as other countries began to adopt protection and as German industry was confined more and more to the home market, there was danger of overproduction. If Germany were now to follow the isolation policy of Russia, A m e r ica, and France there would soon be a war of all against all. In time Germany would have to give up one market after another. B y forming a union of all neighboring states, it was hoped that Germany would enlarge its existing markets and win new ones. 58 Ibid., V,

3306.

59 Ibid.,

p. 3307.

60

Ibid.,

p. 3306.

61

Ibid.,

p. 3320 (Marschall, Dec. 1 1 ) .

Il8

GERMAN

AGRARIAN

POLITICS

In order to provide German industry with the stability which it needed more than anything else, the tariff treaties were to be in force for twelve years. Such a union would be impossible unless Germany made concessions. T h e delegates were urged to keep in mind the good of the whole. It was not a question of the doctrinaire concepts of " free trade " and " protection," but of finding the means most fitting to keep agriculture solvent, to see that industry was busy, and to provide work for laborers. " W e must balance our interests with love of the fatherland." 62 It was impossible, said Caprivi, to live in a state of economic warfare with those to whom they were united to preserve the peace. H e hoped that the treaties concluded with members of the Triple Alliance would bring mutual benefit. Germany's soil was to be the " battlefield for Italian wine against the French." 63 Caprivi made it clear that the concessions in the tariff treaty would be extended to the United States and to other countries with which Germany had most-favored agreements. 64 Concerning a treaty with Russia the government was vague. It was known that many delegates w h o might be willing to vote for the treaties with Austria and Italy would hesitate to accept a treaty with Russia. In December, 1891, the Russian ban upon wheat and rye exports was still in force; because of this Caprivi said that there was as yet no actual question of a treaty with Russia. Towards the agrarians Caprivi used a somewhat sharper tone. He acknowledged that German agriculture was in a difficult situation. H o w it got there w a s comprehensible, though it was far from his idea " to attribute the blame to individual farmers or to generations of farmers." 60 There had been a de6 2 Ibid., p . 3302. 6 3 Ibid., p p . 3306-07. 6 4 Ibid., p p . 3303, 3307. 6 5 Ibid., p . 3304.

THE AUSTRIAN

TREATY

II9

mand in the agrarian press, he continued, for a minimum price for wheat and rye. The government was asked to give assurance that in the twelve years the tariff would not be reduced still further. N o government, said Caprivi, was in a position to say in advance what it would do in the course of twelve years. He reminded the agrarians of the discussions in the spring in the Prussian diet. Then if the Prussian government " had given way by only a finger " the tariffs would have been reduced for a time. This movement the government had withstood quite alone. It had borne " scorn and mockery for months," but it had remained firm. The grain tariffs would have been lost forever if a second moderate harvest had followed their temporary suspension. Caprivi wanted to know what agrarian had done more for the maintenance of the tariffs.6« Caprivi then appealed to the loyalty of the farmer, whose support the state needed in time of stress. The chief motive, he held, for the maintenance of agriculture was exclusively political. Without a grain acreage which would suffice, if necessary, to nourish even a growing population in time of war, the existence of the state would be at stake. Somewhat prophetically he expressed his conviction that " in a future war feeding the army and the country would play a decisive role." 67 The Centrists and the Radicals had announced their willingness to support the government before the terms of the treaties were published.68 It was soon evident that the Social Democrats and the Poles would accept them also. Had the Center refused to support the government, it is probable that enough opposition to reject them would have been manifested amongst Conservatives. The Centrists had voted for the 5-mark tariff in 1887, but had joined with the 66 Ibid., pp. 3303-04. 67 Ibid., p. 3305. Ibid., pp. 3147-48 (Huene, Nov. 30, 1891); Allg. Ztg., Dec. 4, 1891 (No. 336 A B ) , p. 1 ; Dec. 5, 1891 (No. 337 A B ) , p. 1.

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Social Democrats and Radicals in 1890 to break the " cartel." Undoubtedly Centrist leaders were influenced in 1891 by the fact that the Radical and Social Democratic campaign against food tariffs had given them an overwhelming victory at the polls in 1890. But Baron von Schlorlemer Alst, a Centrist leader, was one of the first in 1890 to protest against the grain tariff reductions then rumored. It was said at the time that his was the widely prevailing view in Centrist districts. 69 It is perhaps worthy of note that Caprivi made no effort to work with Windthorst until a few days after von Schlorlemer Alst's views had received wide publicity. 70 What Windthorst would have done had he lived we do not know. He was present and voted against Richter's motion in January, 1891. At that time party opposition to the proposed grain tariff reductions was very pronounced. The high food prices and the general political situation between January and November probably had great influence with the Center. Dr. Reichensperger expressed the point of view of the consumers in the party when he said that conditions were unfavorable for a high tariff when bread was dear. 71 It was a coincidence that the first three treaties to be negotiated were with countries which were predominantly Catholic. Even the agrarians in the party would find this a compelling reason for acceptance. Many of the agriculturists in the party came from South Germany, where the tradition of friendship for Austria was strong. With Centrists also the political significance of the Austrian and Italian treaties was an im&9Allg.

Ztg., N o v . 12, i89o ( N o . 314 A B ) , p. 2.

7 0 W a l d e r s e e , I I , 161 ( N o v . 18, 1890). "Unbelievable though it could seem half a year ago, the government (Caprivi) is negotiating with W i n d thorst and will bring him and the Kaiser together on M o n d a y ! Bismarck's conversation with W i n d t h o r s t was one of the causes of the chancellor's fall, and then the Kaiser said, so that many heard i t : ' I f Windthorst comes into the Castle, I will have him arrested by a petty officer and three men and thrown out.' N o w they will eat together peaceably I " 71 Reichstag,

1890-92, V, 3310-11 (Dec. 10, 1891).

THE AUSTRIAN

TREATY

121

portant factor. On the more practical side, they had no desire to have Caprivi lose prestige at home or abroad. They did not want new elections. They hoped with their majority in the Reichstag to be able to put through legislation which would increase the influence of the Catholic Church in Germany. The fact that the Center made known its position prior to the signing of the treaties, would suggest a deal between Caprivi and the party. 72 We do not know what took place when the party decided to support the government, but casual references to the decision by Centrists and other delegates seem to indicate great disagreement amongst party members. Following Windthorst's death several leaders in the party had been struggling for dominance. Despite the announced party position a good deal of criticism was voiced by Centrists against the principal concessions in the treaties. Delegates from Upper Silesia said the iron industry there, which suffered from high coal prices, would have no advantage from the treaty. " Only the Austrians would be benefited." 73 Unlike Dr. Reichensperger, some members of the party believed that the grain tariff reductions would injure agriculture. A Bavarian delegate, Dr. Orterer, 74 said there was " great alarm over the commercial treaties" among South German 72 Waldersee was astonished " that with most parties, and above all with the Center, the judgment was settled, namely, ' to accept,' before the content was known. The whole thing gave the impression of a deal with Caprivi, in which the Evangelicals and the Prussians would pay the reckoning {op. cit., II, 225 [Dec. 9, 1891]). 73 Reichstag, 1890-92, V, 3533 (Letocha, Dec. 18, 1891). It was reported that von Schalscha and his associates, who felt that their interests were injured by the Austrian treaty, would vote against it ( A l l g . Ztg., Dec. 11, 1891 [No. 343 A B ] , p. 2 ) . Actually he was on leave when the voting took place. 74 Dr. Georg Orterer, Royal Gymnasium Professor at Freising in Upper Bavaria, had been a representative in the Reichstag from the same Lower Bavarian district since 1884.

122

G E R M A N AGRARIAN

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farmers, even though there w a s no fear that the new course of the government w a s leading " in the w r o n g w a y to the L e f t . " T h e tariffs had brought them good prices for agricultural products during the last few y e a r s ; without this protection agriculture would long since have " fallen victim to a crisis." 7 5 H e claimed that agricultural tariffs were not a sacrifice f o r the state, as Caprivi had said, because those w h o carried on a g r i culture made up more than half the inhabitants. H e asked if " these lowered tariffs would now also be for the benefit of A m e r i c a , " already a formidable competitor. If the Russian " boundary should be opened as well, a further h e a v y burden would fall upon agriculture." W h a t Germany needed w a s a " middle European alliance against the assault upon " its production. 7 8 Baron von Huene, 7 7 w h o had announced the party's willingness to accept the treaties, insisted that the party had the power to resist further changes in the tariff in the direction of the bill. 78 Dr. Orterer agreed w i t h him that there could be no more " crumbling a w a y of the agricultural tariffs," and that if " the hope of the gentlemen of the L e f t " materialized " that would be the beginning of the e n d ! "

79

In Baden and all other wine-growing districts of the Southwest it w a s greatly feared that the lowered grape and wine duties in the Italian treaty would injure German wine-growers. Seven Centrist delegates f r o m Baden were invited to attend a party meeting in Berlin on December 9 for the purpose of determining

their

action

in connection

with

the

commercial

75Reichstag, 1890-92, V, 3375 (Dec. 12, 1891). 76 Ibid., pp. 3375-7977 Baron Carl von Hoiningen-Huene, Major on half-pay, owner of a Rittergut, leader of the agrarian wing of the party, was one of a group of Silesian aristocrats who were trying to secure control of the party. 78Reichstag, 1890-92, V, 3411 (Dec. 14), 3355 (Dec. 12); Allg. Ztg., Dec. 1, 1891 (No. 333 A B), p. 1. 79 Reichstag, 1890-92, V, 3375-79-

THE

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123

treaties. W h a t took place there we do not know, but five Centrists from Baden voted against the Italian treaty. 80 These were the only votes which the Center cast against either bill. In view of the " eminent political importance " of the treaties Orterer and Letocha let their objections fall away. Huene was willing to accept them for the same reason and because he did not wish the government to lose prestige at home or abroad. 81 This did not mean that party leadership was secure. M a n y members failed to appear for the voting. Twentyeight of the 110 Centrists were absent from the roll-call vote on the Austrian treaty, and 34 from the vote on the Italian treaty. It will be recalled that the Polish party voted with the Conservatives in 1887 in favor of the grain tariff increases and that Komierowski protested in January, 1891, against Richter's motion to reduce them. Since then Caprivi had begun his policy of conciliation; Stablewski had already been appointed A r c h bishop of Posen and Gnesen. 82 Koscielski, 8 3 w h o headed the " court " faction of the party, took occasion during the budget debates to acknowledge the friendly attitude of the government. While the Poles were not ready to support every demand of the government, they were glad to be able to contribute toward the success of the state according to their strength. 84 Caprivi's appeasement policy kept the Poles from voting against the treaties, even though some members objected to the agricultural concessions. Komierowski regretted that they must decide upon the acceptance or rejection of the treaties as a whole. 8 O A l l g . Ztg., Dec. 7, 1891 ( N o . 339 A B ) , p. 2. E i g h t of the 14 electoral districts of Baden were held by Centrists. T h e y voted as f o l l o w s : on the Austrian treaty, six in favor, t w o absent; o n the grape and wine duties, three in favor and 5 against. 81 Reichstag, 1890-92, V , 3379 (Orterer, Dec. 12), 3533 (Letocha, 18). 3359 ( H u e n e , Dec. 12).

Dec.

82 T h e appointment w a s made in October, 1891. 83 Both Koscielski and K o m i e r o w s k i were o w n e r s of

Rittergiiter.

84 Reichstag, 1890-92, V , 3149 (Koscielski, N o v . 30) ; Allg. 1891 ( N o . 333 A B ) , p. 1.

Ztg.,

Dec. 1,

124

GERMAN

AGRARIAN

POLITICS

W e r e it possible for the Reichstag to decide upon the agricultural duties, his party would vote in favor of higher rates. 86 Only six other members of the party joined Koscielski and Komierowski in voting for the treaties. One-half of the party members were absent. T h e Guelphs voted with the Centrists in favor of the treaties. Only one member of the Alsatian party voted for the Italian treaty, and none voted for the Austrian treaty. 88 T h e free trade press had been attacking the treaties. If the Radicals and Social Democrats had followed their usual tactics while Bismarck was chancellor, they would have given an emphatic " no " to the treaty bills of 1891, because they failed to satisfy all demands completely. Bebel denied that the Social Democratic party was committing a " sort of spiritual suicide " by accepting them. 87 But the party made it plain that it thought of the treaties as only a quite weak and insufficient attempt to " break with the unhealthy war and protective tariff system." It would continue to fight against the grain tariffs until they fell.88 The Radicals, like the Social Democrats, said the treaties did not go far enough, that they were only half-way measures. 8 * Though the Radicals had asked for tariff treaties, the orthodox free trade doctrine demanded the elimination of all tariffs rather than treaties to fix duties. 90 In fighting the protective tariff system both parties of the Left had directed their attack against the food tariffs. Regarding the industrial tariffs they said very little. Y e t in the new treaties the iron tariffs were $5 Reichstag,

1890-92, V, 3337 (Komierowski, Dec. 11).

86 Three of the ten Alsatian delegates abstained from voting on the Austrian treaty, and seven were absent. One delegate withheld his vote on the Italian treaty, one voted for it, three voted against it, and five were absent. 87Reichstag, 1890-92, V , 3544 (Bebel, Dec. 1 8 ) ; Allg. 1891 (No. 351 A B ) , p. 1. 88Reichstag, 1890-92, V, 3349 (Singer, Dec. 12). 89Ibid., p. 3321 (Broemel, Dec. 11). 90 Lotz, loc. cit., p. 85 (Note 1).

Ztg.,

Dec. 19,

THE

AUSTRIAN

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125

scarcely touched and the reductions in the industrial tariffs as a whole were much smaller than in the agricultural tariffs. Both parties, it is true, were interested in securing an international rather than just a national lowering of duties. Treaties which granted reciprocal privileges and created a "common rather large economic sphere " were greeted with approval. 81 With the general aim of Caprivi's legislation—to increase exports—the Social Democrats were in agreement. Singer said that Germany needed " a wider market for its industry, for the utilization of its mass production." 92 The Radical party wanted " a paying trade with all civilized countries." 93 But the Radicals were just as eager to strengthen Germany's import trade as to increase its exports. With them Caprivi's mercantilist arguments could have no weight. Hence the Radicals gave the government only lame support. While Caprivi and Marschall denied that a new tariff policy—a liberal, free trade policy— had been adopted, Broemel of the Radical party insisted that both in their speeches had declared war against the former tariff policy. Broemel also held that the economic pre-eminence of the United States was due to the free trade within its extensive territory. 94 But though both parties of the Left inveighed against high protection, practical politics kept them from trying to remove both the agricultural and the industrial tariffs at the same time. By failing to oppose the treaties they helped to establish the industrial tariffs for another twelve years. Both parties made it clear that they were supporting Caprivi's legislation because the treaties would lower the cost of food and forestall future tariff increases.95 But the German concessions in the treaties would go to the countries with which 91 Allg. Ztg., Dec. 13, 1891 ( N o . 345 M B ) , p. 3. 92Reichstag, 1890-92, V, 3349 (Singer, Dec. 1 2 ) . 93 Schulthess, 1890, p. 13. 94Reichstag, 1890-92, V, 3322, 3325 Dec. 12, 1891 (No. 344 M B ) , p. 1.

(Broemel, Dec. n ) ;

95 Ibid., pp. 3538 (Bebel, Dec. 18), 3544 (Dr. Barth).

Allg.

Ztg.,

126

GERMAN AGRARIAN

POLITICS

Germany had most-favored-nation agreements—even though they granted nothing in return and were free to increase their own tariff barriers at any time. In this w a y the grain tariff reductions would g o to most grain-exporting countries except Russia. A c c o r d i n g to Mirbach of the Conservative party the Radicals were under obligation to reject the treaty with A u s tria because they had stated emphatically in their press that they would vote against it if it established a differential duty. H e called upon them to fulfill their promises. 94 B y g i v i n g their support to the treaties both parties of the L e f t hoped also to break up the alliance of the protectionists. 97 A t the time of the election in 1890 the Post had hinted that the effect of the meat and bread prices upon the election m i g h t bring about a coalition of all other parties against the great landowners. 9 8 L o n g before the debates on the A u s t r i a n treaty it w a s evident that the isolation of the agrarians w a s one of the chief aims of the Leftist parties. T o w i n the government and the middle parties to their side, they emphasized the benefits which the great landowners derived from the food tariffs, the brandy and sugar taxes, and the ban upon cattle and meat imports. T h e agrarians, it w a s asserted, had been guilty of taking an unfair advantage of the political situation in 1887 to push through legislation which increased the cost of living f o r consumers. It bore most heavily upon the poorer families.9® T h e Poles, w h o had been complaining about the lack of agricultural workers, were reminded that the Conservatives had supported Bismarck when he expelled the Polish workers f r o m the east96 Ibid., pp. 3433 (Mirbach, Dec. 14), 3315 (Kanitz, Dec. 12) ; Kardorff, p. 244. Like Mirbach, Kanitz and Kardorff considered these two aspects of the new policy as serious defects, (ibid.) A memorial of the directorate of Danzig merchants, dated November, 1890, stated that a differential treatment of Russia would ruin the German ports (Ablehnen oder Annehmen, PP. 96-97). 97Ibid., pp. 3538 (Bebel, Dec. 18), 3544 (Dr. Barth). 98 Schulthess, p. 30, quoting the Post (Feb. 26, 1890). 99Reichstag, 1890-92, V, 3371 (Rickert, Dec. 12), 3321 (Broemel, Dec. 11).

THE AUSTRIAN

TREATY

12"J

era provinces. In order to isolate the great landowners from other agricultural producers both the Radicals and the Social Democrats reiterated their claim that the great majority of agriculturists would have an advantage from a reduction of the food tariffs, since they had to purchase a part of their food supplies. Only the great landowners, who had large amounts of grain or other produce to sell, had any advantage from protection. In southern and western Germany where small and middle-sized farms predominated agriculturists would be aided by the new treaties. The Radicals sought also to overcome the doubts of South German farmers by stressing the importance of the political union with Austria.101 It was principally against the Junkers of the six eastern provinces that the Left directed its attack. 100

In reply to agrarian protests Rickert said that no one need raise any " lamento " if agriculture had a setback after a succession of good years. Agricultural difficulties had arisen because farmers had purchased too dearly and managed too badly.102 Broemel reiterated the Radical doctrine that the profitableness of agriculture depended upon the value of the soil and the rent which the owner derived from it. The grain tariff had not so much the tendency to protect agricultural labor as to raise the rent of the landed owner and keep it high. 103 The Social Democrats declared that if agricultural tariffs were necessary, the existing system of agriculture should no longer be maintained. The land (Grund und Boden) should be nationalized.104 Seven members of the South German People's party of Württemberg voted for the Austrian treaty. Three of the party, 100 Allg. Ztg., Dec. 13, 1890 (No. 345), pp. 2-3 (Rickert, Dec. 12). 101 Reichstag,

1890-92, V, 3431 (Schenck von Stauifen berg, Dec. 14).

102 Allg. Ztg., Dec. 13, 1891 (No. 345 M B ) , p. 3. 103Reichstag, 1890-92, V, 3324 (Broemel, Dec. 11). 104 Allg. Ztg., Dec. 13, 1891 (No. 345 M B ) , p. 1.

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GERMAN

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however, voted against the grape and wine duties in the Italian treaty. 1 0 5 T h e agitation of the Radicals and Social Democrats and the results of the 1 8 9 0 election undoubtedly influenced the National Liberals and Imperialists in 1 8 9 1 . T h e two latter parties were the principal losers in that election. T h e y secured 7 8 fewer seats than in 1 8 8 7 . Forty-five were lost to the Radicals and Social Democrats, and another ten to the South German party.

108

People's

This striking protest of the electorate could hardly

fail to effect party action. A s already shown the National Liberals gave a divided vote on agricultural protection in 1 8 8 5 and 1 8 8 7 . After 1 8 8 5 party support of the food tariffs weakened and in 1 8 9 1 it was at its lowest ebb. 107 Only five votes were cast against the Austrian treaty and twelve against the Italian treaty. The opposition came almost entirely from representatives of the three South German

states and

Hesse, 1 0 8

where

agricultural

producers

105 Haerle, who spoke for the party, said that he himself did not object so much to the reduction of the wine duty, which was only 17 per cent, as to the lowered grape duty, which amounted to 60 per cent. He thought the latter even more important than the very doubtful insertion of blended wines into a new more favorable position (Reichstag, 1890-92, V, 3465 [Dec. 16]). 106 Eighteen of the 57 seats which the National Liberals lost went to the Radicals, 14 to the Social Democrats, 6 to the South German People's party, and 14 to the Centrists and Guelphs. Of the 21 losses of the Imperialists, 9 went to the Radicals, 4 to the Social Democrats, 4 to the People's party of Württemberg, and 2 to the Centrists and Guelphs. 107 In 1885 over one-half the party voted to raise the tariff on wheat and rye to 3 marks per 100 kilograms. In 1887 it refused to accept the tariff of 6 marks and less than a quarter of its members voted to increase the rate to 5 marks. The vote of the party was as follows: For Against 1885 (3 marks) 23 20 1887(5 marks) 20 67 108 Four representatives from the Bavarian Palatinate and one from Hesse voted against the Austrian treaty. One delegate from Koblenz, 2 delegates from Hesse, 2 from Württemberg, and 7 from Bavaria—all six of the delegates from the Bavarian Palatinate and one from the government district of Middle Franconia—cast votes against the grape and wine duties in the Italian treaty.

THE AUSTRIAN

TREATY

I2g

consumers. 109

greatly outnumbered The vote was a protest against the reductions in the grain and wine duties. 110 T h e North German members, who represented consumer interests almost entirely, were in favor of the grain tariff reductions, but they felt some hesitation about accepting the new grape and wine duties. 1 1 1 Party leaders were desirous of holding the allegiance of the South German group. Y e t they were bound to recognize the interests of the larger North German section of the party. 1 1 8 Böttcher 1 1 3 said that he had always been against agricultural tariffs because the very name contained "within it so great an agitating element." 114 For the latter statement and his assertion that the National Liberals had never made a party matter of the tariff, he was chided by Rickert. The latter said that formerly the National Liberals had generally turned against high tariffs for food and that high grain tariffs were incompatible with the program of a liberal party. 1 1 5 Bennigsen, the National Liberal leader, had recommended two years before that the government try to avoid a treatyless condition after February i , 1892. Both Oechelhäuser and Böttcher of the same party commended the chancellor for accomplishing this end. They hoped, as did the Radicals, that the 109 Allg.

Ztg.,

Dec. 14, 1891 ( N o . 346 A B ) , p. 1.

110 Ibid. 111 Ten members of the party were absent from the voting on the Italian treaty and only 4 from the voting on the Austrian treaty. 112 The party had ten Reichstag delegates from the three southern states, 2 from Alsace-Lorraine, and twenty-eight from the rest of Germany. 113 Friedrich Böttcher, Dr. of Philosophy, an author and editor of party newspapers since 1868, had been publisher of the National Liberal Correspondens in Berlin since 1874. In the Reichstag he represented his "native Rhineland." H e is not to be confused with von Bötticher, vice-president of the Prussian ministry and secretary of state for the interior. The latter was in office tinder both Bismarck and Caprivi. 114 Reichstag,

1890-92, V, 3326 (Böttcher, Dec. 11).

116 Allg.

Dec. 13, 1891 ( N o . 345 M B ) , p. 3.

Ztg.,

130

GERMAN

AGRARIAN

POLITICS

treaty system would be extended to other countries as well. 1 1 8 It was evident late in 1891 that the National Liberals—who must have seen that the " cartel " was broken—were flirting with the idea of a closer alliance with the Radicals. According to the Allgemeine Zeitung, the National Zeitung, a National Liberal newspaper with which Oechelhäuser was connected, expressed views on the new commercial policy which were farther to the left than those of Rickert of the Radical party and almost identical to those of Richter, the Radical party leader. 1 " Shortly after this, during the debates on the Swiss commercial treaty, Bennigsen pointed out that the system of commercial treaties, by minimizing the conflict between the free traders and the protectionists, might be the means of bringing about the cooperation of all liberal parties. This, he said, was desirable in the struggle for ideals. 118 While some of the North German members of the party were critical of Bismarck's policy, it will be recalled that it was the National Liberal party which had offered Bismarck a Reichstag candidacy earlier in the year. Even amongst the North German members there was a difference of opinion regarding the treaties. Oechelhäuser greeted them with " complete, unconditional, and joyful approval." T h e majority of the party members were in doubt about particulars. 119 Böttcher considered the Italian treaty favorable for German industry, but he was uncertain how far industry would be able to win the Austrian market as a result of the Austrian concessions. 120 116Ibid., p. 2; Dec. 12, 1891 ( N o . 344 M B ) , p. 1; Reichstag, V , 3326 (Böttcher, Dec. 11). 117 Allg.

1890-92,

Ztg., Dec. 14, 1891 ( N o . 345 A B ) , p. 1.

118 Kardorff, p. 250. Bennigsen had a double motive in suggesting the co-operation of all liberals, for he called upon them also to join together against the new education bill which had been laid before the Prussian house of deputies shortly before. 119 Reichstag,

1890-92, V , 3365 (Oechelhäuser, Dec. 12).

120 Ibid., p. 3326 (Böttcher, D e c . 1 1 ) ; Allg. 346 A B ) , p. 1.

Ztg.,

Dec. 14, 1891

(No.

THE AUSTRIAN

TREATY

I3I

In 1891 when food prices were high the agrarian members of the Imperialist party had little influence. Only one member of the party voted with Kardorff against the Austrian treaty. Four members disapproved of the grape and wine duties. A number of the Imperialists saw in the reciprocal concessions a great opportunity for German industry without sacrificing the principle of " protection of national work." Prince von Hatzfeldt-Trachenberg, one of the few remaining Catholics in the party, estimated that Germany would not only keep the domestic market for domestic production, but would also add to the 47 million domestic consumers 75 million new ones. 121 The industrialists in both the Imperialist and National Liberal parties were in a delicate position. The Radicals and Social Democrats were ready to maintain the industrial tariffs in the new treaties, but in the future it would be difficult if not impossible to keep industrial protection without the aid of agriculture. While negotiations with Austria-Hungary were going forward, a number of industrial associations stated that they did not wish to purchase industrial concessions if agriculture had to pay the cost. A t that time Baron Stumm, the leader of the industrialists in the Imperialist party, protested both to the government and to the Central Association of Industrialists against reducing the grain tariffs. Even while the debates on the treaties were in progress, the chairman of one of the most influential industrial associations of Westphalia and the Rhineland took a similar attitude. 122 Nevertheless the Reichstag delegates who were closely affiliated with the Central Association of German Industrialists voted for the Austrian treaty. 123 T h e 121 Reichstag, 1890-92, V, 3379 (Dec. 12). Leuschner said that he and his political friends would vote for the treaties because they believed that this tariff union with about 130 million men would serve as a good basis for future commercial relations (ibid., p. 3393 [Dec. 14]). 122 Schulthess, 1891, pp. 12-13, quoting Berliner Politische Nachrichten (beginning February, 1891) ; Lotz, loc. cit., pp. 93 (and note 3 ) , 96 (and note 2) ; Reichstag, 1893-94, I, 56 (Stumm, Nov. 24, 1893). 123 Lotz, loc. cit., p. 93. Stumm was absent on account of illness in Dec., 1891.

I32

GERMAN

AGRARIAN

POLITICS

organization founded by Kardorff w a s no longer on the side of the agrarians. It is probable that very few Conservatives really approved of the agricultural concessions in the commercial treaties. Y e t it w a s a striking fact that the party w a s not united in its opposition to the government bills. T h e Kreu2zeitung appealed to the Conservatives in vain to take the united stand against them " which the past and the future of the party imperiously demanded." 124 A little over one-half the party voted against both treaties. Eighteen Conservatives voted for the A u s t r i a n treaty, and 14 for the Italian treaty. Some Conservatives may have felt that it would be a mistake to demand too much and that if agriculture should overreach itself the tariffs would be swept a w a y entirely. E v e n such ardent defenders of agricultural protection as K a n i t z and K a r dorff were ready for a temporary compromise in view of the high prices. T h e former proposed a reduction of the grain tariff to three marks per 100 kilograms until June i , 1892, and then an automatic return to the former rate. H e w a s also willing to vote for the total removal of the rye tariff for a half year or a year. In M a y K a r d o r f f had recommended a temporary suspension of the grain tariffs. During the debates on the A u s t r i a n treaty K a r d o r f f made it clear that he would oppose the grain tariff reductions until bimetallism had been introduced either with or without the participation of England. 1 2 6 H e intimated that his party might be willing to accept the lower rates for five years, but Caprivi at once rejected this proposal. 1 2 6 These sug\2AAllg. Ztg., Dec. 12, 1891 (No. 344), p. 3. The Kreuzzeitung was a very conservative newspaper, yet it maintained an attitude independent of the party. It was published by Baron v o n Hammerstein, w h o s e mother was a sister of Count zu Eulenburg-Prassen, one of the wealthiest landowners of East Prussia. Hammerstein and A d o l p h Stocker, the Christian-Socialist leader, headed the " Kreuzzeilung-mng" of the Conservative party. T h i s faction made difficulties for Bismarck and also for Caprivi. 125Reichstag, 1890-92, V, 3332 ( K a r d o r f f , Dec. Dec. 18), 3314 (Kanitz, Dec. 10).

n),

3536 (Kardorff,

1261btd., 3335 (Kardorff, Dec. 11) (Caprivi, Dec. 11) ; Kardorff, p. 246.

THE

AUSTRIAN

TREATY

I33

gestions were made by Kanitz and Kardorff because they believed the crisis would be short-lived. Neither thought agricultural protection was too high for normal times. It is doubtful whether very many Conservatives felt that the situation warranted a reduction of the tariffs on wheat and rye by 1.5 marks per 100 kilograms for a period of twelve years. W h a t led a minority of the German Conservatives as well as some agrarians in the Imperialist party to vote for the commercial treaties was their unwillingness to break with the government. Old conservative principles were not easily forgotten. 127 Other members of these parties who did not wish to fall out with the government either withheld their votes or absented themselves. 128 Helldorff, the leader of the Conservative party, was taking the side of the government rather than giving expression to feeling in his party when he stated his belief that the grain tariff reductions would not injure agriculture. 128 Baron von Manteuffel presented the views of some of the 18 Conservatives who voted for the Austrian treaty. H e urgently begged the chancellor to see that agriculture had compensation in other fields for the protection it would lose. H e and a number of his political friends were of the opinion that the commercial treaties would have an unfavorable effect and would be a misfortune for the German Empire. They saw that the costs of the 127 Waldersee, II, 224. Kardorff reported to Bismarck on December 10 that many of the agrarians would not have the heart to voice their conviction in order not to fall out with the government (Kardorff, p. 2 4 3 ) . 128 T w o Conservatives withheld their votes on the Austrian treaty. Count Donhoff-Friedrichstein withheld his because he feared the effects of the tariff in his home province [East Prussia] (Allg. Ztg., Dec. 19, 1891 [ N o . 351 A B ] , p. 1 ) . 129Reichstag, 1890-92, V , 3531 ( H e l l d o r f f , Dec. 18). Helldorff had c o m mented earlier upon the alliance between the Radicals and the Social Democrats—though each party was the opponent of the other on principle. H e urged the delegates not to do a w a y with the protective tariff system. T h e s e remarks were made during the debates in January {ibid., 1890-91, H , 947-951 IJan- 14, 1 8 9 1 ] ) -

134

GERMAN

AGRARIAN

POLITICS

agriculture. 180

treaties would be borne by O n the other hand he was convinced that agriculture would suffer more from a rejection of the treaties than from the reduction of the grain tariffs to 3.5 marks and their stabilization for a rather long time. 131 Manteuffel's position was similar to Huene's. Like the latter Manteuffel insisted that this was the limit—the reductions in the food tariffs must go no further. 132 Both treaties were accepted by overwhelming m a j o r i t i e s — the Italian treaty by a vote of 200 to 66 and the Austrian treaty by 243 to 48 votes. There was wider and more vigorous resistence to the lower grape and wine duties than to the new grain tariffs. A s might be expected the chief opposition to the Italian treaty outside the Conservative party came from delegates representing South German constituencies and localities along the Rhine. 133 Twenty-eight delegates from southern Germany voted against the Italian treaty but only 11 voted against the one with Austria. Northeastern Germany—the stronghold of the Conservative p a r t y — w a s the other principal section of 130 Reichstag, 1890-92, V, 3359 (Dec. 12) ; Allg. Ztg., Dec. 22, 1891, (No. 354 A B ) . The party numbered 68. It voted on December 9 by 24 to 13 " under no circumstances to be able to say ' yes ' to the commercial treaties " (Kardorff, p. 243 [Dec. io, 1891] ; Allg. Ztg., Dec. 12, 1891 [No. 344 M B], p. 3 ) . Kardorff gives the figures 24 to 13, the Allgemeine Zeitung, 24 to 12. 131 Reichstag,

1890-92, V, 3364 (Dec. 12).

132 Allg. Ztg., Dec. 14, I89I (No. 346 A B ) , p. 1. 133 The geographic distribution of the vote against the Italian treaty by parties from these constituencies was as follows: Baden Conservative Imperialist Anti-Semitic National Liberal . . Centrist S. German People's Alsatian Totals

2

Ba " Würt. Hesse Cassel Cob- Alsace- Totals vana lenz Lor.

1

1

3

4 1 4 12 5 3 3

4

32

1 1

7

8

6

3

3

1

T H E AUSTRIAN TREATY

I35

opposition. F r o m this area there were 2 7 votes against the A u s trian and 2 5 votes against the Italian treaty. 1 3 4 W i t h the e x ception of the 5 Centrists w h o voted against the Italian treaty, all Social Democrats, Radicals, Centrists, Poles, and Guelphs in attendance voted solidly for both treaties. T h e only faction which w a s united in its disapproval of the treaties w a s the A n t i - S e m i t i c group. V O T I N G ON T H E GBAPE AND W I N E D U T I E S I N T H E ITALIAN TREATY

Parties

For

Conservatives Imperialists Centrists Poles National Liberals . . German Radicals . . People's Party Social Democrats . . Nonpartisan

Nonpartisan: Alsatians Anti-Semites Guelphs Dane Others

AbAgainst stained

Absent

14 11 71 8 18 39 4 25 10

35 4 5

7

1

19 4 34 8 10 27 4 10 11

200

66

1

127

1

3 4

1

5 1

..

12 3

Vacant Seats

Totals 68 19 110 16 40 66 11 35 29 394

3

1 4

10 5 4 1 9

11

29

4 5 10

7

1

397

134 The sectional vote against the two treaties was distributed as follows: Northeastern Germany: 6 eastern provinces and 2 Mecklenburgs Italian treaty . Austrian treaty

25 27

Central Germany

Western Germany

Southern Germany, including AlsaceLorraine and Hesse 28 11

Totals

66 48

136

GERMAN

AGRARIAN

POLITICS

VOTING ON T H I ATJBTEIAN TREATY

AbAbsent Vacant Against stained Seats Totals

Parties

For

Conservatives Imperialists Centrists Poles National Liberals .. German Radicals .. People's Party Social Democrats .. Nonpartisan

18 14 82 8 31 50 7 24 9

36 2

5

3

16 4 11 12

243

48

5

96

3

7

Nonpartisan: Alsatians Anti-Semites .. Guelphs Dane Others

3

2

5

5

5

68 19 110 16 40 66 11 35 29

4

6 9

12 3 28 8

3

3

394 397

1 1 3

10 5 4 1 9

12

29

In view of the clamor against the later treaties it is perhaps surprising that the first two were accepted by such large majorities. T h e high food prices in 1891 influenced the decision. But considerations which had nothing to do with the economic factors involved in the commercial treaties weighed heavily with the Centrists and Poles and even with the Imperialists and Conservatives. Probably very few of the delegates suspected that as far as agriculture w a s concerned a crucial decision w a s made when the Austrian treaty was accepted. T h e government did not anticipate a great drop in agricultural prices following the acceptance of the treaty. N o r did a majority of the delegates. In a sense the large majorities for these treaties were deceptive. A l m o s t a third of the Reichstag w a s absent when the roll-call vote on the Italian treaty was taken, and the a y e s numbered but t w o over a majority of the total membership at

THE AUSTRIAN

TREATY

137

time. 188

that The passage of the Austrian treaty was decided by three-quarters of the house. T h e absences were distributed amongst all parties. M a n y even of the Radicals failed to appear—40 per cent on December 16 and 25 per cent on December 18. Some absences, of course, were unavoidable, but it is safe to say—especially in view of the activity in the Reichstag six days before when the debates on the treaties began—that many of the empty seats indicated disapproval of the tariff legislation.18® The treaties did not really please any party. Nor did they satisfy the German economic interests. The Radical party, which more than any other represented commercial interests, thought the treaties did not go far enough. 137 The agriculturists in the Conservative, the National Liberal, and the Centrists parties believed their interests had been " sacrificed " for the benefit of other occupations. Kardorff reported that " in the industrial circles the disappointment " was very great. 188 T h e Italian treaty was considered advantageous by some representatives of industry; there was general dissatisfaction with the concessions obtained by the government in the Austrian 135 Allg. Ztg., Dec. 17, 1891 ( N o . 349 A B ) , p. 1. Since three seats were vacant, the majority was 198. 136 The sectional distribution of absences was as follows: ^

m

cfermany Italian treaty Austrian treaty

39 28

Central

Westera

Germany

Germany

32 23

23 16

Southern

Germany 33 31

T

,

lotala

127 98

137 According to the Allgemeine Zeitung, Eugen Richter was already agitating for a further drastic reduction of the tariffs and for new treaty negotiations, and insisting that the government's principal motive for the conclusion of the treaties—the twelve-year stability for industry—was weak (Allg.

Ztg., D e c . 17, 1891 [ N o . 3 4 9 A B ] , p. 1 ) .

138 Kardorff, p. 243 (Dec. 10, 1891). T w o days later Kardorff wrote that he had little peace, because all the industries which were hit by the treaties came and wished to hold consultations at the moments when he was free from the Reichstag, party meetings, and conferences (ibid., p. 247).

138 treaty.

GERMAN AGRARIAN 139

POLITICS

Since industry as well as commerce w a s to derive

great advantage from the new commercial policy, this attitude w a s surprising. It is to be explained in part by the government's failure to consult business to any extent when the terms of the treaties were being drawn up. It w a s not until after the later treaties had been adopted that industry began to perceive the beneficent effects of the new policy. 1 4 0 W o r k e r s and other consumers might be expected to praise the new policy, but the spokesmen of the Social Democratic party insisted that nothing short of the total removal of all food tariffs would appease labor. T h e Conservatives as well as agriculturists in other parties feared that German agriculture w a s headed for disaster. T h e y presented their demand that agricultural protection be maintained from a number of different angles. B y and large industry had had greater advantage than agriculture f r o m the tariffs since 1 8 7 9 ; not until very recently had agriculture begun to de139 The majority of the National Liberal party [in which business interests were strongly represented] attended the debates on the Austrian treaty, said Oechelhauser, " as it were with the feelings at the marriage of Claudius with Hamlet's mother, with a clear, dry eye " (Reichstag, 1890-92, V, 3365 [Dec. 12, 1891]). 140 The government had consulted the Imperial department of the interior and the commercial policy department of the foreign office, also the Prussian ministry of commerce. In difficult, doubtful matters concerning the commerce of the German states experts had been called in. Caprivi said that secrecy had been necessary; otherwise a treaty would not have been brought about in twelve years (Reichstag, 1890-92, V, 3303 [Caprivi, Dec. 10, 1891]). Lotz suggested a number of reasons why the most influential German industrialists failed to appreciate the new tariff policy. Some industrialists continued to feel an attachment for Bismarck; others wanted a Socialist Law and disliked the energetic social policy of the " new course." Still others feared that the alliance with the agrarians would be shattered by the tariff policy. They also considered that the concessions granted to Germany were insufficient. They complained that only individual industrialists had been questioned privately and not the great associations as such. And finally, according to Lotz, they failed to appreciate the difficulty in obtaining concessions from other countries while Germany maintained a really high tariff (loc. cit., p. 96).

THE AUSTRIAN

rive any benefit from

them. 1 4 1

TREATY

I39

T h e government should have re-

duced the industrial duties instead of expecting the real sacrifice from that part of the productive life which had had relatively the least advantage from protection. 142

Agriculturists

said they would not agree much longer to support high industrial tariffs against the attacks of the free traders. 1 4 3 It was not true that industry, commerce, and labor were making a sacrifice for agriculture, because agriculture had to pay for industrial protection. 144 T h e y asked w h o would assure them that the price of rye would not fall to 100 marks per metric ton and thus bring the price below the production cost. 148 Agriculture had to compete with countries having lowered money v a l u e s — R u s sia, Austria, and R u m a n i a — a n d with silver countries, such as E a s t India; but industry competed with gold standard countries. 1 4 6 T h e stability of the tariff would be of no significance for agriculture; on the contrary

fixing

the tariff rate for

twelve years at a level with which they had had sad experience in 1 8 8 7 — w i t h o u t the possibility of getting any relief as in the p a s t — w a s the greatest calamity of all. 147 Referring to the Chancellor's j o y because the workers would be cared for, they asked

if there were not agricultural as well as

industrial

workers. T h e y contended that if agriculture was not in a position to produce and was no longer

flourishing,

agricultural

workers would suffer distress and would press much more into 141 Reichstag, 1890-92, V, 3338-39 (Kropatschek, Dec. 11). 142 Ibid.

143 Ibid., p. 3312 (Kanitz, Dec. 10). 144 Ibid.

145 Ibid., p. 3315. Kanitz said that the cost of production was 30 marks per metric ton higher in 1891 than in 1887 because of the rising cost of labor and the burdens of the old age and sickness laws; furthermore, because receipts from the agricultural tariffs would be less, there would be little help for the agricultural districts on the basis of the " Huene " law. 146 Ibid., p. 3330 (Kardorff, Dec. 11). 147 Ibid., p. 3403 (Kleist-Jletzow, Dec. 14).

140

GERMAN

AGRARIAN

POLITICS

cities.148

large Agriculture in Germany would soon be faced with the conditions which had developed in England and Ireland, where all landed property was in the hands of a few families and agriculture was ruined.14® The agrarians claimed that the Radicals wanted cheap land in order to support the tendency of mobile capital to expropriate real estate. If land were cheap quite different people from the peasants would buy the land. The peasant would be ruined first of all. 160 In reply to those who thought the commercial treaties would strengthen the political union, it was pointed out that the Zollverein of 1866 had not prevented a war of all against all. 181 Caprivi had said that a Middle European tariff league would serve as a counterpoise against the " autonomous " tariffs of France and America. 182 Mirbach regretted that because of political considerations a closer union could not be brought about between France and Germany, especially with reference to overseas production. For him the essential of a Middle European tariff league was a strong protective tariff system against overseas imports.183 Mirbach, Kanitz, and Kardorff prophesied that the tariff policy of the government would engender a tariff war with Russia. 164 Kardorff raised a point which should have appealed to the Radicals and the Social Democrats. He argued that since the 148 Ibid., pp. 3338-39 (Kropatschek, Dec. 11). 149 Ibid., p. 3332 (Kardorff, Dec. 11). The Radicals greeted KardorfTs further remarks on this point with derisive shouts of laughter. The latter spoke of the sad conditions in England: the great landowners could no longer get farmers and had to manage the area themselves and received only about a fifth or a sixth part of the income to which they had been accustomed. 150 Ibid., p. 3431 (Mirbach, Dec. 14). 151 Ibid., p. 3403 (Kleist-Retzow, Dec. 14). 152 Ibid. ISSIbid., p. 3433 (Mirbach, Dec. 14). 154Ibid., pp. 3315 Kardorff, p. 244.

(Kanitz,

Dec.

12), 3433 (Mirbach,

Dec.

14);

THE

AUSTRIAN

TREATY

I4I

Reichstag was forced to accept or reject the treaties as they stood, there was a new tariff policy which henceforth could " be carried on only by the federal government without the cooperation of the parliaments." Members of the Reichstag had renounced the right to exercise influence in the formation of tariffs." 156 The veterinary convention with Austria-Hungary, for which the government was later so severely criticized, was accepted without discussion by the Reichstag.156 While the Radicals and the Social Democrats insisted that the treaties with Austria-Hungary and Italy did not go far enough, both parties were jubilant over the discomfiture of the agrarians.1"7 The other parties showed little concern for agriculture. Nevertheless one or two proposals for the relief of agricultural difficulties were suggested. Rickert said that he would agree to the legislation regarding relief residence demanded by Manteuffel, but not to a law which would hinder the freedom of movement of workers.188 Oechelhäuser of the National Liberal party proposed that the certificates of identity (which were used to earmark grain imports destined for foreign use) be abolished: this would be of especial value to cultivators in the eastern provinces.189 The Conservatives were in a rage with the government. 180 It was not alone the " liberal, free trade, Privy Councillor's 155 Ibid. 156 Lötz, loc. cit., p. 95. 157 Kardorff, p. 247. 158Allg. Ztg., Dec. 13, 1891 (No. 345 M B), pp. 2-3. 159 Ibid., p. 2. The certificates of identity were not abolished until 1894 when the Russian treaty was being considered. The certificates of identity were established in 1879 when a tariff was placed on grain imports. In order that Germans might engage profitably in the grain trade with foreign countries, provision was made to permit grain which was destined for foreign consumption to enter Germany duty free. Certificates of identity were used to distinguish this grain from that imported for domestic consumption. See Chapter IX for a fuller discussion of the certificates of identity. 160 Kardorff, p. 247.

142 style "

GERMAN AGRARIAN 161

POLITICS

of the treaties themselves or " the break with the

principle of

an efficacious protection

of national w o r k "

162

which angered them, but their belief that Caprivi, despite " h i s w a r m w o r d s for the importance of agriculture," prized industry higher. 1 8 3 F o r m e r l y agriculture had been accustomed

to

find in the government its best friend. 1 6 4 A number of the n e w chancellor's arguments in his exposition of motives seemed to bind him to the parties of the L e f t . One of his points—the contention that the tariff increases in 1 8 8 7 had been a test of strength which had not proved beneficial to the

state—was

especially repugnant to the Conservatives. T o add to their g e n eral feeling of frustration t w o peasant spokesmen,

Thomsen

and W i s s e r , sided with the L e f t in the belief that only large landowners had any advantage f r o m protection. 1 6 5 T h e gulf 161 Reichstag,

1890-92, V, 3318 (Kanitz, Dec. 10).

162 Ibid. 163 Ibid., p. 3338 (Kropatschek, Dec. 11, 1891). 161 Ibid., p. 3318 (Kanitz, Dec. 10, 1891). 165 Thomsen was a Dane from Schleswig-Holstein. In 1887 he was a member of the Radical party, in 1890 nonpartisan, and in 1893 he joined Rickert's party. He was speaking for the peasants of Oldenburg, SchleswigHolstein, Hanover, Thuringia, Bavaria, Brunswick, etc., who were in a better economic position than the peasants on the latifundian estates of the East. H e complained also about high land prices (ibid., pp. 3435, 3437-38 [Dec. 15, 1891]). Wisser was nonpartisan. H e represented the "intelligent German peasantry." The tone of Wisser's speech foreshadowed the violence of some of the remarks which came from the lips of farmers and peasants after the agrarian movement had started. H e said the peasants would fight on until both the agricultural and the industrial tariffs had been removed (ibid., p. 3411 [Dec. 14, 1891]). Friedrich Lutz, a brewer and a farmer of the government district of Franconia, Bavaria, who was later to be prominent in the Farmers' League, undertook the task of replying to Wisser. H e himself cultivated only 30 hectares of field and meadowland, and the average acreage of the peasants who had elected him was 5 hectares. H e claimed that they all had a great interest in sufficient protection. A petition with 12,000 signatures, asking that the tariffs be kept as they were, had been given to him to hand over to the Reichstag. Some had signed with the entry that they did not share his political views in other matters. Lutz asked if these 12,000 peasants were to be considered unintelligent because they did not share the free trade point of view (ibid., p. 3414 [Dec. 14, 1891]).

THE

AUSTRIAN

TREATY

I43

which separated the R i g h t from the chancellor w a s apparent to all: for, though both conservative parties had given some votes for the commercial treaties, " the soul of these parties w a s w i t h the opposition." T h i s opposition had reference not merely to the economic questions involved in the new treaties, but to the general political situation. T h e events of the weeks immediately preceding the acceptance of the treaties had shown that the Conservatives would henceforth be able to take " only a secondary position beside the Center in relation to the government." 1 6 6 W h e n the K a i s e r received w o r d that the commercial treaties had been accepted, he commended Caprivi publicly in w o r d s of highest praise. T h e Chancellor's political vision had enabled him to safeguard the fatherland at the right moment against grave danger. F o r contemporaries and for posterity the conclusion of the treaties would be one of the most significant historical events. T h e delegates w h o had voted for them had set a landmark and a memorial in the history of the German E m pire. In recognition of Caprivi's services, W i l l i a m conferred upon him the title of Count. 1 8 7 T h e Allgemeine Zeitung took occasion to remind its readers that this honor w a s not bestowed upon Bismarck until 1866 and that Moltke did not receive it until Versailles. 1 6 8 166Allg. Ztg., Dec. 22, 1891 (No. 354 A B), p. 1, quoting Hann. Courier, a National Liberal newspaper. 167Lotz, loc. cit., pp. 96-97. 168 Allg. Ztg., Dec. 19, 1891 (No. 351 A B).

CHAPTER VI THE FARMERS' LEAGUE T H E year which followed the acceptance of the Austrian and Italian commercial treaties brought about a changed viewpoint in agricultural circles. T h e German Conservative party experienced an upheaval which affected the leadership and the program of the party. Friction developed between the agricultural and the industrial direction in the Imperialist party. AntiSemitic agitation gained ground. T h e economic outlook for agriculture changed for the worse. Agriculturists in all parties took a more pronounced position on the question of protection. T h e ground was being prepared for the agrarian movement. Late in 1892 the call came for the farmers to unite. T h e German Censervatives had been faced with the alternative of voting for the commercial treaties, which many believed would injure agriculture, or of falling out with the Kaiser. Whether or not William himself initiated the new commercial policy he identified himself with Caprivi in seeing it through. 1 A majority of the party withstood the temptation to stand well with the government, and voted against the treaties. During the debates it was evident that the government had broken completely with " high agrariandom." 2 Conservatives were angry because measures of m a j o r importance to the party had been hurried through the Reichstag with the aid of parties which had long been antagonistic to agriculture as well as the government. T h e party had been deserted by the Centrists and the Poles, who had formerly voted with the Conservatives for agricultural protection. Relatively few National Liberals and scarcely any Imperialists had stood by them. They were almost completely isolated. Even among those members of the party w h o had voted for the treaties there was a feeling of frustration and disillusion. 1 Waldersee, II, 224. 2Reichstag, 1890-92, V , 3365 (Dr. Oechelhauser, Dec. 12, 1891). 144

THE

FARUER'S

LEAGUE

I45

Relations between the party and the government were not improved by the treatment accorded to Count Limburg-Stirum, retired Prussian ambassador and leader of one wing of the Conservative party in the Prussian lower house.8 On December 14, while the debates were in progress, he had written a signed article for the Kreuszeitung, which criticized the government's policy. He asked whether there was really such an emergency imminent for the German export industry that agriculture must be asked to make heavy sacrifices, and also whether the general political situation demanded concessions in the commercial field in order to secure the political alliances. Answering both questions in the negative, he said that if the party could perceive that the sacrifice expected of agriculture were really necessary for the well-being of the state, it would be made without grumbling. But to see the surrender of that for which the Conservatives had been struggling for years, produced the bitter feeling which arose when unjust treatment was experienced after loyal and faithful support.4 For his conduct Count Limburg-Stirum was brought to trial in the Disciplinary Court. The verdict was given on February 6, 1892: namely, that he be removed from office, because his article had discredited in high degree the direction of the foreign policy within the country and more especially abroad, and because " he had intended through his article to exercise upon public opinion and upon the voting in the Reichstag an influence opposed to the express intention of the government." An official who engaged in that sort of " inadmissible oppositional demonstration " and " public agitation " did not merit a post of confidence.® Even though the Kaiser remitted the sentence against Limburg-Stirum on April 11, 8 this treatment of an 3 Kiesenwetter, p. 2 1 ; Wippermann, 1892, i, 267. 4 Ibid. 5 Wippermann, 1892, i, 267-68. 6 The minister of foreign affairs reported on the matter to the Kaiser on April 11; the latter confirmed the sentence and at the same time remitted it {ibid).

I46

GERMAN

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important and highly-respected member of their party was resented by Conservatives. During the early months of 1892 the Kreuzzeitung wing of the Conservative party gained greater influence as a result of the struggle over the Prussian education bill. This bill provided that religious instruction should be given in the elementary schools of the state by the Catholic and Protestant clergy. It is probable that the Center secured the promise of this bill before agreeing to support the commercial treaties. In any case the bill was earnestly desired by the Centrists, who hoped by means of religious instruction to fight the growing secularization in the life of the state and to win greater support for the Catholic Church. The bill found favor with many Conservatives. Seemingly it had sufficient support from these two parties to make it a law. The Kreuzzeitung hoped that in the future the Conservatives and the Center would work together. Helldorf, the leader of the Conservative party, wanted the reestablishment of the " cartel." When the Kaiser decided to withdraw the bill because it did not have the support of the National Liberals, a ministerial crisis arose. Caprivi gave up his office of Prussian minister president. At the same time von Zedlitz, the culture minister, resigned. The failure of the bill brought within the Conservative party as a whole an intensification of " Christian " ideals. It strengthened the position of von Hammerstein and Stocker and weakened that of Helldorff. Stocker had resigned late in 1890 as Court preacher. 7 H e could now give his undivided attention to politics. H e aimed to increase the religious influences in the state. Hammerstein supported him because he wished to gain recruits for the Conservative party. During and after the crisis over the education bill Helldorff was subjected to rather sharp questioning and criticism by his own party. It was felt that the education bill should have been allowed to stand or fall on its merits. It had been rumored that von Hell7 His resignation was approved on Nov. 7, 1890 (Allg. Ztg., Nov. 8, 1890 (No. 310 A B), p. 2.

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dorff had advised the Kaiser against pushing through the bill with just the votes of the Conservatives and the Center.8 Shortly after this episode, Stocker advocated, while speaking before a Conservative electoral society in Berlin, that the Conservatives make " a correct utilization of the hour " and become " a truly independent party " and accept " new points of view in the old conservative program." 9 Through the Conservative Weekly (¡Conservatives Wochenblatt),10 Helldorff warned the Conservatives against following the direction of the Krenzzeitung, and sharply attacked Stocker. The latter replied in Volk, in which he was influential: " A s long as a man like von Helldorff stands at the head of the Conservatives, even a Demosthenes will not get the Conservatives in the country to work together happily." 1 1 Helldorff evidently decided that matters had gone far enough, for he demanded on the same day, April 4, a complete separation of the radical and the conservative elements in the party. Contrary to his expectation the party turned against him rather than his opponents. He was excluded from the Conservative faction of both houses of the Prussian diet on April 6. 12 On May 27 Helldorff resigned from the chairmanship of the Conservative party, and soon his place was taken by Baron von Manteuffel. 13 Several factors probably enter into an explanation of the shift in party leadership. Helldorff was not liked personally by some members of the party. 14 A s one of the founders of the 8 W a h l , III, 544-56; Wippermann, 1892, i, 102. 9Ibid., p. 99 (March 29, 1892). 10 It was under the direction of Helldorff. It had been founded for the express purpose of " making a counterpoise against the danger of one-sided shaping of opinion in the p a r t y " by the powerful Krevzzeitung (ibid., p. 101). 11 Ibid., p. 102. 12 Ibid., pp. 102, 104, 167; Wahl, III, 545; Hellwig, pp. 426-28. Kardorff says that he was excluded from the Conservative faction of the house of lords on April 6 and of the house of delegates on April 27 (op. cit., p. 259). 13 Wippermann, 1892, i, 167. 14 Waldersee referred to Helldorff as a " clever speaker, soft as a plum," who had impressed even the Kaiser with his gossip (Waldersee, II, 163).

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new Conservative party in 1876—which was to work with the Imperialists and the National Liberals in support of Bismarck's policies—he had usually advocated acceptance of all government measures. The Kreuzzeitung wing of the party was more independent. Since the accession of William II it had tried to undermine Bismarck's influence with the Kaiser and to break the " cartel." 15 During the debates on the anti-Socialist bill Helldorff's leadership in the party was insecure. Both Helldorff and Manteuffel were among the eighteen Conservatives who voted for the Austrian treaty. Helldorff said he did not believe that the reduction of the grain tariff to 3.50 marks would injure agriculture. 16 Manteuffel made an urgent appeal to the government to do something for agriculture to compensate for the reduction in the agricultural tariffs and he voted against the grape and wine duties. Immediately after the acceptance of these treaties, it was reported that there was a great ferment in the Conservative party and that it was unlikely that Helldorff's influence would prevail. 17 T h e crisis over the education bill brought the antagonism of the two directions in the party into sharp relief. Shortly after Helldorff's exclusion from the Conservative faction of the diet, Manteuffel stated publicly that " he had never considered the withdrawal of the education bill absolutely necessary." He felt that the deliberations should have been allowed to go on. 18 N o doubt the government's decision to reduce agricultural protection and its withdrawal of the education bill strengthened the feeling in the party that in the future it should exercise greater independence. It is likely also that many of the Conservatives were against any a c t i o n — such as a break with the radical elements of the party—which would reduce their numbers at a time when their influence in the Reichstag was already waning. 15Kardorff, pp. 114, 203-04, 211-19.

16 Reichstag, 1890-92, V, 3351 (Dec. 18). YJ Allg. Ztg., Dec. 22, 1891 (No. 354 A B), p. 1, quoting Hann. Courier, a National Liberal newspaper. 18 Wippermann, 1892, i, 105.

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Though Manteuffel's assumption of party leadership did not indicate that Christian-social views had gained the upper hand, the protests of those who refused to be led in that direction showed the strength of the movement. Adolf Wagner declared before a Conservative party gathering on April 8 that it shocked his German soul " that the deplorable excuse is always made, that we are those whom the Jews have seduced." Most of the professors and scholars, he said, were of the opinion that anti-Semitism was wrong, an enormous exaggeration. 1 9 Before Helldorff retired from the leadership of the Conservative party, he made one more appeal to the Conservatives. T h e whole German-social, anti-Semitic, or Christian-social direction, the mastery of which the Kreuzzeitung and newssheets allied with it were aiming at, and which found its expression most abundantly in Volk was unclear in its aims, demagogic in its manner, and a grave danger to Germany's development. W h a t w a s good in the movement had long been a part of the Conservative program. He said he would like to see the Junker who had read the German-social program really with understanding and w h o then still considered the movement a conservative one. H e wanted a clean separation from things that were not conservative. 20 During the next few months the press discussed the recent preference of the Conservatives for the " Christian rather than the national viewpoint," which had been the chief item of their 1876 program. 2 1 A proposed new program for the Conservative party w a s published on December 1 by the Executive Committee ( V o r stand) of the Conservative Electoral Society, and it was considered at the Conservative party congress in Berlin on December 8. Held under the chairmanship of Manteuffel and attended by 1200 persons from all parts of Germany, the meeting claimed to represent the party as a whole. This claim Helldorff contested: " the so-called Conservative party congress " 19 Ibid., pp. 104-05. 2 0 Ibid., p. 108, quoting ¡Conservatives 21 Ibid., p. 77.

Wochcnblatt,

M a y 10, 1892.

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was " not a gathering of peaceful men," but a blueprint of a " Berlin anti-Semitic meeting." 2 2 This gathering decided to hold fast to the principles laid down in 1876, but also " to take a position on the essential tasks of the present." Among the fifteen points in the new program the following had a bearing on the agricultural movement : the maintenance and strengthening of the Christian view of life; resistance to Jewish influence in national life; opposition to any attempt at restricting the monarchy in favor of a parliamentary regime; maintenance and, if necessary, increase in the protection of industry to meet foreign competition; stricter governmental regulation of the commodity exchange, especially in connection with articles of food; legal provision to fight the adherents of Social Democracy as enemies of public order. " F o r agriculture, which suffers from the inclemency of the world market, international currency conditions, and the domestic economic development, the existing protection is to be maintained; but preparations are to be made in addition for sufficient protection in the future; and care is also to be taken to revise the laws regarding the residence requirements for local relief in the sense of equal justice." 23 From the foregoing account it is evident that this so-called " Tivoli " program of the Conservative party included the chief demands of the Anti-Semites. The anti-Semitic leaders outside 22 Ibid., p. 86. At the request of Helldorff and eighteen of his party associates a declaration signed by them was read aloud at the meeting. It indicated their support of the resolution adopted unanimously by the German Conservative faction of the Reichstag: to hold fast to the program of 1876 and to consider the proposal to be laid before the party congress merely as the draft of a declaration regarding questions then dominating public life (ibid., p. 84). 23 Ibid., pp. 79-81, 84. Relief residence legislation had to do with the poor laws. It was held by the residents of rural districts that agricultural laborers who went to the cities to become industrial workers often returned to the rural communities for charity and assistance when times were bad and they failed to get work. Sometimes a woman would return with a child which would mean an additional burden for the community.

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the Conservative party had been agitating to bring this about. 24 It was said at the Conservative party congress that the party must take a stand against the Jews if it did not wish to lose its popular support. 26 T h e Conservatives hoped at first to absorb the Anti-Semites. Failing in this, they then attempted to guide the movement. T h e Christian Socialists and the Anti-Semites were antagonistic to the Social Democrats and the Radicals as well as to the Jews. The Christian Socialists fought in particular the atheism of the Social Democratic party. A n d the Prussian education bill of 1892, which was supported by the Conservatives, the Christian Socialists, and the Centrists, was an effort to combat the anti-Christian, " alien " influences in the state. A s we shall see later, the Farmers' League likewise linked the Jews with the Social Democrats and the Radicals as their enemies. It is very difficult to determine whether a specifically Jewish influence was at work in these two parties. It should be remembered that at this time there were relatively few Jews in Germany. In 1891 they made up only 1.15 per cent of the total population. The proportion, to be sure, was very much higher in many large commercial towns, as it was in Berlin. T h e Center party would naturally have no Jewish members. T h o u g h it is quite possible that some Jews joined the German Conservative party, that party was strongly Lutheran in character. In the German Reichstag the National Liberal party had a few Catholic representatives, but the rest of the delegates were Lutherans or members of some other Protestant denomination. B y this process of elimination, one may conclude that the Radical and the Social Democratic parties may have had relatively more Jewish members in the i890's than the other German parties. But even though we may assume that the Jews were more likely to join or to work with the parties of the Left, and we know that there were a few prominent Jewish leaders in 24 Bergstrasser, p. 122. T h i s party congress was held in Tivoli H a l l in Berlin. 25 Wippermann, 1892, i, 82.

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each of these two parties, this does not mean that they were influential enough to determine party policies. 2 * Aside from the fact that some agrarian leaders felt that it was necessary to take advantage of any support they could get, it is equally difficult even to suggest an explanation of the attitude of some agrarians towards the Jews. A s already indicated, agriculturists of all classes were heavily in debt. Doubtless some of the mortgages on their property were held by Jews. Some of the small farmers and peasants who had food supplies to sell in only small quantities apparently came in contact with Jewish as well as other merchants at harvest time. The need of these small cultivators for money and their lack of storage facilities sometimes forced them to sell their products when market prices were low. It is probable also that many Jews were in favor of the commercial treaties, against which the agrarians took such a strong stand: for the treaties were likely to be beneficial to those engaged in commerce as well as consumers. The occupational census for 1895 showed that nearly 55 per cent of the Jewish inhabitants engaged in gainful occupation were employed in commerce and nearly 19 per cent in industry, while only about 1.50 per cent worked in agriculture. 27 T h e Jews, in fact, played a considerable part in the economic life of the country. Some were influential in Germany's mercantile and industrial enterprises and in banking. Their interest in commerce and industry rather than agriculture, which can undoubtedly be attributed to earlier restrictions placed upon their holding of land, is perhaps the chief reason w h y some agrarians grouped the Jews with the Radicals and Social Democrats as enemies. Anti-Semitism, however, was not general amongst farmers. A n d it should be kept in mind that many of the Conservatives and Imperialists w h o were greatly con26 Heinrich Rickert, w h o became the head of the Radical Union in 1893, when he and five other Radicals were forced t o withdraw f r o m the Radical party because of their support of Caprivi's military bill, w a s frequently referred to as the leader of the "Jewish defense troops" (Judenschutztruppe) (Wippermann, 1893, i, 25-26). 27 Vierteljakrshefte

zur Statistik

des deulschen

Retches,

1897, p. 48.

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cemed about the depression in agriculture thought as Helldorff and Kardorff did, that the anti-Semitic movement was to be deplored. While Conservative viewpoints were changing and the party w a s suffering from inner dissensions, differences of opinion were developing also within the Imperialist party. T h e disagreement between Kardorff and Dr. Kayssler, the editor of the Post, over the latter's article in favor of the Austrian commercial treaty has already been described. Further friction developed regarding the policy of the Post, and Kardorff withdrew from the board of directors of the newspaper on March 1, 1891. H e later became affiliated with the Berliner Neueste Nachrichten.2S When Caprivi first assumed office, he had Kardorff's support. A f t e r 1891 Kardorff became less friendly. T h e chancellor's new commercial policy, his lack of sympathy for agriculture, and his general " insufficiency" for his high office, made Kardorff look forward to the time when Caprivi would go. Kardorff resented the chancellor's ridicule and the w a y in which he made light of agricultural distress. W h e n Kardorff retaliated in kind, Caprivi assumed that Kardorff was working for Bismarck's return as chancellor. B y the end of 1892 the t w o men were at swords' points. Kardorff was opposing the government's new military bill. Another and more violent clash between them occurred in the Reichstag on December 12, 1892, over the currency question. 29 Kardorff and other prominent agrarians, as we have already seen, had been agitating for years to have the German government take the initiative in bringing about an international agreement to regulate currency on the basis of bimetallism. In November, 1892, the United States called together a conference of the powers for the purpose of fixing the value of silver in relation to gold by international agreement. Representatives of 28 Kardorff, pp. 233-35, 2 3 7 ; H e l l w i g , p. 454. 2 9 Allg.

Ztg., Dec. 14, 1892 ( N o . 347 A B ) .

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twenty-two nations met in Brussels. T h e prevailing sentiment at the conference was in favor of the gold standard. 30 Kardorff attacked the government on December 12 because of its failure to push forward the demands of the bimetallists. The latter were insisting upon the introduction of bimetallism as compensation for the heavy losses which agriculture was suffering on account of the tariff reductions. T h e matter was of great importance to them late in 1892, because the price of silver had fallen steadily since 1890; it was feared that it would drop still more. 31 T h e silver situation was so serious in the United States that it seemed likely that Congress would repeal the Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 1890.82 Stumm, the leader of the industrialists in the Imperialist party, was ill and not in attendance during the debates on the Austrian and the Italian treaties, but he had taken pains to state his views that no advantage should be asked for industry which would injure agriculture. H e had made his position clear both to the government and in the industrial organizations with which he was connected. 33 Whether his action was motivated more largely by a desire to protect agriculture against the agitation of the free traders, by a wish to preserve the bond which had united the agriculturists and the industrialists in his party since 1879, or by the hope of strengthening the government's hand in its dealings with Austria-Hungary at a time when negotiations were rendered difficult by free trade agitation is a moot question. Perhaps he was guided by all three motives. In any case he did not fall out with the government, and twice during the year 1891 he received special recognition 30 Kardorff, pp. 321-29; Croner, pp. 220-25. 31 In London the silver price in relation to an ounce of gold of standard fineness was: in 1888, 22.07; in 1889, 22.06; in 1890, 19.77; >n 1891. 20.93; in 1892, 23.68; in 1893, 26.43; in 1894, 32.49 (ibid., p. 199). 32 The act was passed on July 14, 1890, and was repealed on October 30, 1893. For some time India had ceased to use as much silver as formerly. On June 26, 1893, the government of India decided to close the mints (ibid., p. 225). 33Reichstag, 1893-94, I, 55-36 (Stumm, Nov. 24, 1893).

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from the Kaiser. 3 4 W h e n the later treaties were considered he supported Caprivi's commercial policy effectively with his speeches and his vote. T h e Imperialist party, which had symbolized more than any other the co-operation of agriculture and industry in the period from 1879 to 1891, showed the strain which was coming between these two branches of the economic life. There were other matters which divided Kardorff and Stumm in 1892. Both had made great efforts to bring about a reconciliation between the Kaiser and Bismarck in the spring of that year. W h e n their attempts failed in June, Kardorff continued to keep in close touch with Friedrichsruh. Stumm, on the other hand, remained loyal to Caprivi, partly in the belief that in doing so he was upholding the authority of the Kaiser. O n the currency question Stumm was in favor of the gold standard. T h o u g h Kardorff and Stumm had agreed in the 'eighties not to let their differences over this question come between them, a decided coolness developed in their relations after Kardorff entreated Stumm earnestly but in vain in December, 1892, to reconsider his stand on the commercial policy and the currency question. 35 T h e failure of the two leaders to see eye to eye in these matters and their different attitude toward the chancellor caused a tense situation in the party. Bismarck's popularity in the country at large was demonstrated after the failure of the reconciliation plans. His trip to and from Vienna proved to be a kind of progress during which he was accorded an enthusiastic reception by the German people wherever he stopped en route to change trains or to break the journey. He spoke at almost every stop, often merely to answer the words of greeting extended to him by the people, but sometimes to discuss some historic event or an important ques34 On May 4, 1891, the Kaiser personally appointed him Major and on November 10 Stumm received the authority to call himself Baron von Stumm-Halberg as long as he remained in possession of Halberg (Hellwig, P- 424).

35 Kardorff, pp. 273-76.

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tion of the moment. While in Austria he did not hesitate to criticize the policies of the German government. On the return trip he tarried at the health resort in Kissengen from June 26 to July 30. One delegation after another of the German people came there to pay him homage. The ovation he received was even greater after the texts of the government's official releases of May 23, 1890, and June 9, 1892, were published in the Reichsanzeiger. The first had instructed the German foreign officials to see that Bismarck's press pronouncements and other remarks were not taken too seriously in foreign capitals; the second was a more or less accurate version of the so-called " Urias letter." 86 The changes in the political situation only partially explain the events which were about to follow. Political and economic factors were so closely intertwined in the agrarian movement that it is often difficult to separate them. There was a slight decline in the price of wheat and rye as soon as the new treaties went into effect. Between December, 1891, and March, 1892, the wheat price dropped from 225 to 2 1 3 marks and the rye price from 239 to 206 marks per metric ton. On the basis of Dade's estimate—that the cost of production for a ton of wheat ranged from 170 to 200 marks and for rye from 140 to 170 marks—the rye price in March was exorbitant and the wheat price high.37 These prices caused bread riots in Berlin in February, 1892. 38 Even in July when wheat was selling at 197 and rye at 183 marks per metric ton prices were high. This was particularly the case with rye, the chief bread cereal of the German people. It was not until July and August that the Russian government lifted the export ban on wheat and rye.39 Under normal conditions Russia was the chief source of Germany's rye imports. In 1892 Russian grain had to pay the five-mark 36 Wippermann, 1892, i, 212-49; ii, 22-76. 37 Dade, loc. cit., pp. 33-34. See discussion in Chapter I. 38 They occurred on February 25-26, 1892 (Wippermann, 1892, i, 197). 39 Zweig, p. 38.

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tariff. T h i s may account in part for the rye price. O n the other hand, as already shown, the earlier pessimistic view regarding the world wheat situation was revised between March and July, 1892, and great quantities of wheat were imported into Germany in the latter month. In A u g u s t wheat fell 21 marks and rye 34 marks per metric ton below the respective July prices. In September wheat was selling for 163, in November for 158, and in December for 153 marks per metric ton. If Dade's estimates are accepted, the price of wheat from September on did not cover the cost of production. F o r the months of September, November, and December, the rye price was 147, 148, and 133 marks per metric ton respectively. 40 Though there was no serious depression in the rye price during 1892, for wheat growers the period of " bad times " had already set in. It was to last for the next five years. A g r i cultural distress was beginning to be noticeable. Kardorff wrote to Stumm toward the end of December that never in the 38 years he had lived in Silesia had he experienced such a despairing bitterness as then prevailed everywhere. H e warned Stumm that he would " experience the result of this in the next elections." 41 T h e price decline of wheat and rye could be attributed only in part to the tariff reductions. T h e greatly increased production of both cereals all over the world after 1891 as a result of improved weather conditions also had an important effect upon prices. But the fact that prices declined almost as soon as the tariff reductions became effective and continued to drop as the rates were extended to more and more countries seemed to the popular mind to be conclusive evidence that the tariff reductions had caused the depression. In 1892 also the spread of the hoof and mouth disease was far greater than in any previous year. 42 F o r these calamities the agricultural population 40 Reichstag, 1890-92, V, 3310 (Reichensperger, Dec. io, 1891); Conrad, loc. cit., Charts I and II, opposite p. 186. 41 K a r d o r f f , pp. 275-76; Hellwig, p. 464. 42 Dade, loc. cit., pp. 13-14.

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blamed the government and the parties which had supported its commercial policy. Toward the end of December an editorial in the Allgemeine Zeitung of Munich criticized Caprivi's policy of using shifting majorities to carry through the government's legislation. The writer held that the prodigious reception given to Bismarck in Dresden, Munich, Kissengen, and Jena during the previous summer amounted to a popular protest against the " new course." 48 The same editorial reported that movements " still in the embryonic stage " were on foot in South Germany, on the Rhine, and in Berlin to form " new parties." It spoke of a " National party." 44 Had the movement in favor of a " National party " been successful it would have split the Free Conservatives and the National Liberals. 45 The revised program of the Conservative party, the greatly increased activity of the Anti-Semites, and the rumors of new parties in the making were all part of the political unrest which preceded the formation of the Farmers' League. It has already been shown that the idea of organizing to secure better representation of their ideas was not new amongst Landwirte or peasants. In 1891 the need of better representation of agricultural interests in the Reichstag and the state diets was again expressed.49 One of the German learned societies published during the year 1892 an article about the Farmers' Alliance in the United States. In August at the Farmers' Club in Berlin the most important share requisitions of the " Farmers' League " were raised.47 On December 21, 1892, shortly before the Allgemeine Zeitung reported that movements were on foot to form new parties, the Landwirtschaftliche Tierzucht (Farm Stock Breed43 Allg. Ztg., Dec. 26, 1892 (No. 360 A B ) . Ulbid.,

Dec. 31, 1892 (No. 363 M B ) .

45 M. Wertheimer, The Pan-German League (New York, 1924), p. 39. 46 Treue, p. 62, quoting K. Mayer, Die ländlichen Genossenschaften als Mittel zur Organisation des Bauernstandes (Leipzig, 1891), p. 21. 47 Treue, p. 63.

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ing) published at Bunzlau in Silesia an article entitled " A Proposal for Improving our Situation " (Ein Vorschlag zur Besserung unserer Lage), written by a Silesian tenant-farmer named Ruprecht-Ransern. Its inflamatory style was quite different from the tone in which agricultural subjects were usually presented to the public, and its recommendations also were highly " radical," so that it seemed questionable to the author whether his " heretical ideas " would " see the light of day in the columns of an agricultural newspaper." 4 8 Ruprecht-Ransern proposed to the farmers " nothing more nor less " than that they " go among the Social Democrats and seriously oppose the government," show it that they were unwilling to allow themselves " to be treated any longer as badly as formerly," and let it feel their power. When farmers who looked beyond the boundaries of their own potato and turnip fields met together, he wrote, they gave voice to a legitimate dissatisfaction which was expressed in the agricultural journals only " cautiously and timidly." Then he asked: " Are we farmers really the quintessence of the German Michel? Is agriculture the milch cow for the whole people, giving not merely its milk, but letting its hide be torn away as well, so that other better situated occupational groups have an advantage from it ?" Complaining of the low prices, of the burdens of Old Age and Invalid Insurance as well as accident and professional cooperative societies, of the threatened change in the tax system which would affect sugar factories and distilleries disastrously, and of the proposed reduction of the tariffs towards Russia, he said: " W e must cease to complain, we must shout. W e must shout so that the whole country hears, we must shout so that it penetrates into the parliamentary halls and the ministries— we must shout so that it is heard at the very steps of the throne." 4 9 But it was not enough that agriculture should shout, it must act as well. The paragraphs which stipulated that no politics 48 Kiesenwetter, pp. 21, 335-37. 49 Ibid., pp. 335-36.

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might be carried on must be struck out of the statutes of the agricultural associations, for " reckless and unvarnished interest politics " would have to be carried on. " W e must cease to be and to elect Liberal, Ultramontane, or Conservative; rather we must join closely together in a single great agrarian party, thereby seeking to win more influence in the parliaments and in legislation." 80 T h a t his proposal to join the Social Democrats was not seriously made is obvious from these later proposals and also from his demand that they found a great newspaper " for the party " with the lowest possible subscription rates so that it would find its way into peasant circles. 51 Shortly thereafter Baron von Wangenheim, a Pomeranian Rittergut owner, met with a number of farmers and they released a second summons composed by him. It was published first on January 28, 1893, in the Landwirtschajtliche Tiersucht; later a great many special reprints were made and distributed widely among the agricultural associations. Wangenheim called his article A Question for the Government; a Warning to German Farmers! (Eine Frage an die Regierung; eine Mahnung an die deutschen Landwirte!). In it he called attention to the article written by Ruprecht-Ransern. The number of declarations of agreement which had been received since the appearance of that article, showed, he said, that it " had given the impulse to a serious movement," which was directed against the existing economic policy. 52 Wangenheim stated that his purpose in writing w a s to bring to the attention of the general public as well as government officials the real condition of agriculture. He considered it unnecessary to waste time outlining agricultural distress for agricultural readers. H i s catalogue of complaints was lengthy 50 Ibid., p. 336. 51 Ibid. 52 Kiesenwetter, p. 337. Concerning Ruprecht-Ransern's article, von Kiesenwetter wrote that " the effect and the echo of this summons were incomparable" (op. cit., p. 22).

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L i k e Ruprecht he said that agriculture needed in

the parliaments " a great economic party " with understanding for economic matters and resoluteness in their solution. On F e b r u a r y 4 a group of about 1 2 0 farmers f r o m all parts of Germany met together in the F a r m e r s ' Club in Berlin. T h e y discussed plans for the formation of a farmers' association. In order that every farmer might join it without sacrificing his political affiliations it w a s to be non-political in character. T h e leaders at this preliminary meeting were R u p r e c h t - R a n sern, Baron von W a n g e n h e i m , and the publisher of the wirtschajtliche

Tier2ucht,

Land-

F e l i x Telge. Because of his long e x -

perience as leader of the G e r m a n Peasants' L e a g u e (Deutscher Bauernbund),

the Reichstag delegate von Ploetz w a s asked to

preside at the meeting. B u t it w a s W a n g e n h e i m w h o made known the aims of the proposed organization. It w a s to be thoroughly non-political; it w a s to concern itself with economic 53 Ibid., pp. 337-43. According to Wangenheim, the growing of grain was no longer profitable, and " now Russia our most dangerous enemy is about to receive the tariff reduction." Sheep raising had declined. Hog and cattle raising were made uncertain because of the changed import regulations and of the foot and mouth disease, which had spread lately throughout the country owing to the " insufficiency of the border control." The recent tax legislation against the spirit industry and the government's proposal to remove the export premiums for the sugar industry threatened two other agricultural industries. The transportation facilities for agriculture were inadequate (railroads were built for towns and for military purposes). Wangenheim said he would not murmur against the social legislation, but " w h y must millions be wasted in the administration of i t ? " The government had been spending millions on public buildings, but when it came to rural needs, there was no money. " Where we, however, are obliged to contribute to school buildings, etc., then the bureaucracy knows no restraint ; then it is managed as if we had money like hay." The chief cause of the prevailing grievances was the lack of understanding of agricultural affairs in the administration from the highest to the lowest. Wangenheim said he was not complaining against the Prussian officials; no country had better ones. But why did they have to be ruled by jurists? " D o e s the study of Roman law alone give the ability for a correct judgment of practical conditions ? " The greatest blame, however, was to be placed upon the shoulders of the farmers themselves, who lacked the necessary willingness for sacrifice. " Our business" lacks unified representation in the country and the press as well as the parliaments.

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questions only, but in these economic matters it was to carry on energetic agitation by means of itinerant speakers and a newspaper of its o w n so as to gain the greatest possible influence in the parliaments. Dr. Roesicke Gorsdorf warned the farmers especially that they should act unitedly and purposefully and be ready for sacrifices for the cause in accordance with their means and ability. A s a result of his example a goodsized purse w a s collected. 64 It w a s decided to call the new association the F a r m e r s ' L e a g u e ( B u n d der Landwirte). T h e new League w a s to be launched officially at a larger meeting to be held on February 18. A committee of 25 under the chairmanship of Ploetz w a s chosen to prepare for the meeting. Evidently the invitations and organization plans were distributed widely amongst the district agricultural societies of Germany. T h e leaders proposed ultimately to set up the central office of the League in Berlin. D u r i n g the initial stages of the movement the editorial office of the Landwirtschajtliche Tiemucht at Bunzlau was the clearing house for the decisions which were made throughout Germany for and against the plan. 85 In their summonses Ruprecht and Wangenheim had referred to the possibility of a commercial treaty with Russia. T h e press had reported from time to time that negotiations for such an agreement were in progress, but there had been little hope that it could be effected. E a r l y in January before W a n g e n h e i m ' s call w a s issued, it w a s reported that relations with Russia had improved and that the commercial treaty negotiations between the t w o countries might be brought to a successful conclusion. 66 In February heated discussions arose in the Prussian lower house and in the Reichstag relative to these negotiations. Manteuffel, speaking in the Reichstag, questioned whether the g o v ernment really had that measure of good will for agriculture which had been stressed in former deliberations and by the 541 bid., p. 22. 55 Ibid., pp. 22-23.

56 Allg. Ztg., Jan. 14, 1893 (No. 14), p. 1; Jan. 20, 1893 (No. 20), p. 3-

THE

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chancellor especially during the debates on the Austrian commercial treaty. The government had failed to make any changes in the law regarding relief residence; it had taken a stand against the settlement of the currency question, and had done nothing to relieve the shortage of laborers. Agricultural distress was so great that it must be reckoned with. During these debates the Radicals reiterated their old contention that the interests of the large landowners and the peasants were not the same. The Radicals claimed that the Conservatives, because of the weakness of their position, wanted to make it appear that their party was the only one which had in mind the interests of agriculture. In reality the Conservatives had at heart only the concerns of the large landowners. They were now attempting to outdo Ruprecht. Manteuffel had already stated that the attempt to separate large and small landowners would not succeed; it had failed for all time.87 For the benefit of those delegates who were unaware of it, Rickert of the Radical party announced that the Farmers' League was about to be organized.58 On the last day of this discussion Caprivi spoke. He thought it a striking phenomenon that debates on agriculture had been called forth at the same time in both the Prussian house of delegates and the Reichstag just before the meeting of an association which was to be composed entirely of farmers. The tone of the discussion surprised him, he said. Government officials and the chancellor had been sharply attacked. For months the evidences of distrust had been so pronounced that he was forced to the conclusion that the chief object of the discussion was an attack upon the government—at least on the part of some of those who had spoken. He did not believe the Russian commercial treaty could be the object of the debates, for it would not pay to talk for days on end about a treaty which was still in embryo. In closing Caprivi made the urgent request that the agriculturists " repent 57 Reichstag, 1898-93, II, 1020 (Feb. 14, 1893, Manteuffel), 1021 (Rickert), 1029 (Barth). 58/Wrf., p. 1021 (Feb. 14, 1893).

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and ponder carefully " whether the paths they had chosen were for the best interests of the state. It w a s not a question of a single man. " W h a t is one man o v e r b o a r d ? " — h e a s k e d — " i f only the ship goes on! " It was a question of the ship upon which the German flag was waving. 5 9 If the agriculturists heard Caprivi's admonition, they were of a different mind concerning the needs of the state, for on the next day the Farmers' League was founded. On the morning of the great day, February 18, the " broadshouldered figures with their weather-beaten, vigorous features, so entirely different from the usual type of urban asphalt walker " 60 began to appear in great numbers. Inasmuch as the largest hall in Berlin would not hold them all and they had been unable to get permission from the police to hold an outdoor meeting, it was necessary to have t w o meetings one after the other in the great hall of the Tivoli brewery on the outskirts of Berlin. 61 The first meeting began at half past t w o and lasted for t w o hours; it was followed immediately by the second, which took a similar course. 62 Ploetz made the introductory remarks. T h e y had come together, he said, to secure protection for agriculture; without it agriculture would be ruined. Before he had finished he emphasized the love of the agricultural class for the fatherland and their devotion to the high princes of the federal government. A special telegram was then sent to the Kaiser ex59 Ibid., p. 1114 (Feb. 17, 1893, Caprivi). 60 These were the words with which the author of the first memorial on the founding of the League described them (Kiesenwetter, p. 23, quoting Ten Years of Economic Struggle, revised by O. von Kiesenwetter [Berlin, I903])61 Reports concerning the size of the gathering differ. Kiesenwetter says that more than 15,000 appeared {op. cit., p. 23). According to Wippermann (op. cit., 1893, i, 141) 7,000 attended: 4,000 at the first meeting, and 3,000 at the next. Another source gives about the same figures as Wippermann, but adds that the thousands who were unable to press in heard the speeches from the outside through the open windows ( A U g . Ztg., Feb. 19, 1893 ( N o . 50), p. 3 ; Feb. 20, 1893 ( N o . 51), p. I. 6 2 Allg.

Ztg.,

F e b . 19, 1893 ( N o . 50), p. 3-

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pressing the " humble greeting " of the many thousand farmers assembled at Tivoli and assurance of their " unchangeable faithfulness." 68 Ruprecht spoke to counteract the effect of his advice to the farmers that they " go among the Social Democrats." Radicals and others had claimed that these words were demagogic, he said. He professed to be a religious and royalist man and to belong to a family that had always been faithful to those ideas. Replying to those who were admonishing the leaders of the movement to take care lest it get beyond their control, he thought they need have no fear, for the German agriculturists from the small peasant to the greatest magnate stood behind the leaders. Their supporters were people of Germanic origin in contrast to others. If the leaders had had thoughts which were criminal and dangerous to the state, he was sure not one of those present would have answered the call. " But this loyalty to the state and the King does not prevent even us from eventually entering into opposition, not for fun or for mere pleasure in opposition, but solely because we must fight for our existence." 84 The meeting had been arranged for in great haste, said Wangenheim, so that they could oppose the proposed new commercial treaties.05 Speakers from many sections of Germany were heard. It was the unanimous decision of those present that a permanent organization be formed to represent agricultural interests. It was to be called the Farmers' League. Ploetz was named the chairman of a temporary committee of seven to perfect the organization.*6 Before the gathering broke up Dr. Roesicke-Gorsdorf asked the League to take a position on the two burning questions of 63 Kiesenwetter, p. 23; Wippermann, 1893, i, 141-42. 64 Kiesenwetter, p. 24. 65 Croner, p. 134. 66 Kiesenwetter, pp. 24-25; Wippermann, 1893, 1, 141-47. Ploetz was soon to be president of the organization.

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the moment : the military bill and the commercial treaties. His resolution was adopted unanimously. It stated that the League was ready to make any sacrifice necessary for " a strong military power " which could assure agriculture the peace which it needed, and it urgently requested the Reichstag to reject all further commercial treaties which reduced the existing tariffs. 67 The Farmers' League also adopted the following formal program : German agriculture is the leading industry, the surest support of the Empire and the separate states. To protect and strengthen it is our first and most serious task, because through its prosperity and success the well-being of all other branches of industry is assured. We therefore demand: 1. Adequate tariff protection for the products of agriculture and its supplementary industry ; 6 8 2. No lowering, therefore, of existing tariffs, no commercial treaties with Russia or other countries which will result in a reduction of German agricultural tariffs ; a regulation of our relations with America for a like purpose ; 6 9 3. Tax leniency for the supplementary industry of agriculture, especially that of the peasants; 4. Prohibition of cattle importation from countries suspected of having pestilence ; 5. Introduction of bimetallism as the most efficacious protection against the decline of agricultural prices ; 6. Legally regulated representation of agriculture through the formation of agricultural chambers; 7. Further legislation to regulate residence requirements for local relief, freedom of movement, and workers' breach of contract; 67 Kiesenwetter, pp. 25, 343-44. 68 The supplementary industry had reference to the alcohol distilleries and the sugar beet industry. 69 Without a regulation of commercial relations, United States would continue to receive the lowered tariff rates already granted to Austria, because of earlier most-favored-nation agreements.

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8. Revision of the laws protecting labor, removal of border controls, and reduction in the number of officials administering [the social legislation]; 9. More effective supervision by the state of the commodity exchange, to prevent arbitrary price-fixing, injurious alike to agriculture and to consumers;. 10. Revision according to the German conception of justice of public and private law, as well as the laws regulating the indebtedness of real estate and of homesteads, so that the interests of real estate and agriculture may be better served than formerly; 11. The greatest possible relief for the rural self-governing organizations.70 The most important item in this program was the second. It was the fear of the Russian commercial treaty more than anything else which brought so many diverse elements in the agricultural population together in one organization. Despite predictions to the contrary, the two meetings of the League took a peaceful course. The leaders emphasized the loyalty of the assembled farmers to the monarch and the state. When Bismarck's name was mentioned, the leaders hastily changed the subject. Unlike the agricultural societies, which were not permitted to have membership dues, the League at once decided that dues were necessary. Without them the organization could hardly hope to carry out its program. Having arranged for its financial support, and sketched roughly its plan of organization and its aims, the Bund der Landwirte was ready to begin its work. 70 J . Hohlfeld, Deutsche Reichsgeschichte in Dokumenten, (Berlin, 1927), I, 276-77; Wippermann, 1893, i, 146.

1849-1926

CHAPTER VII THE FARMERS' LEAGUE IN POLITICS THE immediate tasks before the Farmers' League were organization and a campaign for membership. They were undertaken together. The leaders of the agrarian movement had scheduled the constituent assembly of the League during the week in February when agricultural groups customarily met in Berlin to discuss common problems. This careful timing assured the leaders of a good-sized nucleus with which to start the new movement, and gave them an opportunity to work upon individual members of the older agricultural organizations. The speakers on February 18 repeatedly stressed the need to stand together " shoulder to shoulder, without distinction of rank or class, or of political outlook, and to allow no difference between large landowners and peasants to separate them from one another." 1 It was obvious also that efforts were being made to unite all existing agricultural associations of whatever type under the banner of the Farmers' League. But this hopeful plan was not to be realized. In the case of the two national bodies which were concerned with the technical and scientific problems of agriculture—the German Agricultural Council and the German Agricultural Society—this led to a heated discussion between SchultzLupitz, 2 who headed the latter, and Ploetz, who had been elected president of the Farmers' League. Schultz-Lupitz implored Ploetz not to let the League interfere in the work of the Agricultural Society or the central organ of the agricultural 1 Kiesenwetter, pp. 23-24. 2 Schultz-Lupitz was an agricultural expert and one of the founders of the German Agricultural Society. H i s special contribution to agriculture was the discovery of a means to make it possible for small farmers to cultivate profitably in the light soil of the eastern provinces. T h e s e studiei were important for the success of the internal colonization schemes.

168

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associations. 8 T h o u g h both organizations maintained their independence, the leaders of the League made use of the widespread agricultural societies in promoting their plans and patterned the League's organization after them. Reprints of Wangenheim's article and invitations to join the League were distributed among the local agricultural societies. Almost all the district agricultural bodies approved the plan to form a farmers' league, and after it was established many local societies joined it. 4 B y M a y i twenty Silesian societies—among them the large Breslau agricultural society—had announced their decision to adhere to the League. O n March 28 the agricultural society for the province of Westphalia declared itself in favor of the Bund der Landwirte ' T h e Union of Württemberg Farmers, whose members were largely farmers of middle-sized or small holdings, joined the movement of the North and named delegates to attend the meeting on February 18. 8 T h e agricultural society of L o w e r Franconia, Bavaria, took similar action. 7 Those agricultural bodies which were originally established to work for the economic interests of their members had also to determine their relationship to the League. T h e t w o aristocratic associations—the Congress of German Farmers and the Association of T a x and Economic Reformers—did this almost at once. Great hopes had been set upon the Association of T a x and Economic Reformers. Nevertheless this

organization—

which had long been under the leadership of Mirbach-Sorquitten—decided not to disband but to continue as before to 3 Reichstag, 1893-94, I, 45 (Ploetz, Nov. 24, 1893), 87 N o v . 25, 1893)-

(Schultz-Lupitz,

4 Kiesen wetter, pp. 22-23 J Treue, p. 71, quoting the Landwirt. 5 Treue, p. 71; Wippermann, 1893, i, 154. 6 Wippermann, 1893, i, 152. 7 Allg. Ztg., Feb. 21, 1893 ( N o . 52), p. 1. Middle and Lower Franconia were electoral districts of B a v a r i a ; the terms as used in this book refer to these governmental divisions.

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questions.8

study prominent economic Its aims, expressed in a number of resolutions passed on February 21, were similar to those of the Farmers' League, albeit the T a x and Economic Reformers gave first place to the currency question. The association adopted a final resolution anent the proposed commercial treaties with Russia and Rumania. Since they would be highly injurious to agriculture until the currency in those states was placed upon a firm basis, the federal council and the Reichstag were petitioned to refuse their consent to the treaties.9 T o this declaration the Congress of German Farmers acceded on the following day. A t this meeting—presided over by Manteuffel—it was also decided to unite with the Farmers' League. 10 Ploetz was undoubtedly influential in bringing about the amalgamation of the German Peasants' League with the newly founded Farmers' League. He had been president of the Peasants' League since 1889. Under his direction it had become strong. In February, 1893, it had a membership of 40,coo. A committee meeting attended by 100 members had requested him to announce at the general meeting on February 20 that the German Peasants' League was ready to dissolve and join with the Farmers' League, provided the members could be assured that they would enjoy the same advantages as before. There were indications, he said, that the Catholic peasant associations would follow suit. He added that the Farmers' League did not intend to represent merely one-sided agricultural interests; it wanted to strengthen and unite all the productive classes into a " strong dike " against " the disintegrating force of the Radicals, Jews, and Social Democrats." Lutz 8 Treue, p. 7. 9 Wippermann, 1893, i, 148-49. 10 Ibid., p. 151; Treue, p. 71. According to the Congress of German F a n n e r s four matters were of particular importance to the well-being of agriculture: opposition to the Russian commercial t r e a t y ; the currency question; revision of the legislation regarding relief residence; and the restriction of freedom of movement (Wippermann, 1893, i, 151).

THE

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I7I

of Bavaria declared that the peasant could go with no party which endangered religious education—therefore neither with the Social Democrats nor the Radicals. 11 During the course of this meeting it was resolved that any conclusion of a commercial treaty with Russia which would cause agriculture to bleed anew was to be regarded as a misfortune for German agriculture. The federal council and the Reichstag were earnestly petitioned to refuse their consent. 12 It was not until June 18, at a meeting which was not very well attended, that the Peasants' League decided to join the Farmers' League. The motion to dissolve on July i and transfer the funds to the Farmers' League brought forth a lively discussion, but it was passed with only 9 dissenting votes. Peasant Evers protested that the Peasants' League should " build up and not destroy." The nobility had shown that it had no interest in the peasants. The Farmers' League merely wanted to " swallow " the 35,000 marks belonging to the Peasants' League. Ploetz replied that the Farmers' League had 200,000 marks in its treasury and did not need the 35,000 marks. 13 Winning the adherence of the Peasants' League was an achievement of which Ploetz could well be proud. It gave great numerical strength to the Farmers' League, and it brought together small and large farmers for the first time in a common effort to gain politico-economic ends. A minority of the Peasants' League stood away from the new movement. The following February they brought forth a new program for the " German Peasants' League of North Germany." Those who had not joined the Farmers' League and those who were dissatisfied with it were asked to affiliate with the revived Peasants' League. It was pointed out that the 11 Wippermann,

1893, i,

147-48; Allg.

Ztg.,

p. 2.

12 Wippermann, 1893, i, 148. 13 Allg. Ztg., June 20, 1893 ( N o . 169), p. 3.

Feb. 22, 1893

(No.

53),

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" disruptive ideas of social democracy and the oppression of mobile capital" had made it necessary for the sound kernel of the " state-maintaining parties " (staatserhaltende Parteien) to draw together in common defense. Peasants, mechanics, and the producing middle class were counted among the state-maintaining parties. A f t e r organizing in 1885 the German Peasants' League had undertaken to unite these groups. It had at once approached the mechanics and merchants and had succeeded in winning many friends in cities. It had attempted also to erase the long-standing and to some extent unfounded distrust which separated the small and large farmers. This effort had been partially successful. Then the aggressive attitude of the Farmers' League had again distrubed the harmony of the relationship and had called forth a legitimate distrust in town and country of the great landowners represented by the Bund der Landwirte. T h e new like the old program of the Peasants' League aimed to maintain and foster peasant ownership as well as that of the producing middle class. It contained seven specific items, all of which had in view the development of selfhelp by means of co-operatives and other joint undertakings. 14 Meanwhile efforts were being made to win greater support for the Farmers' League in southern Germany. It will be recalled the the farmers of Württemberg and the governmental districts of Franconia in Bavaria sent representatives to attend the initial meeting of the League, and that those who came on that occasion were from all parts of Germany. It was recognized nevertheless that the great majority of those present were from districts to the east of the Elbe. The leaders consequently decided to hold a special meeting at the City Hall in Mainz on March 25 for southern farmers. A l l farmers and members of " agricultural and peasant societies, circles, casinos, and clubs " of Baden, Bavaria, Hesse, Hesse-Kassel, HesseNassau, Württemberg, and Alsace-Lorraine were summoned to attend the meeting in large numbers. T h e response was 14 Wippermann, 1894, i, 261-62.

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gratifying. Five thousand farmers assembled and declared their allegiance to the Farmers' League. Ploetz, who was appointed honorary chairman of the meeting, announced that the Farmers' League had gladly complied with the demand of the South Germans and that three more gentlemen had been added to its board of directors. It was resolved at this meeting that the power and greatness of the fatherland depended upon the prosperity of agriculture and the peasant class. The federal government and the Reichstag were urgently petitioned to refuse their consent to any more commercial treaties containing a reduction of the existing agricultural tariffs, and especially to a commercial treaty with Russia. They were requested also to consider how agricultural export could be fostered. 15 It was hoped that the League would swell its numbers and increase its strength in Silesia and in southern and western Germany by gaining the support of the Catholic peasant associations. The associations of Westphalia, and Grand Duchy of Hesse, Silesia, the Rhineland, Nassau, and the Kingdom of Saxony recognized the " community of their efforts" but thought they could gain more by remaining separate and they declined to join the Farmers' League. Had the League secured their adherence it would have been a severe blow to the Centrist party. 16 In Bavaria the Catholic peasants felt that the Center had failed to look after agricultural interests sufficiently. Yet they were unwilling to unite with the Farmers' League, because its organizers, they said, were " almost exclusively princes, counts, and barons " with no understanding for peasant interests. A strong particularist tendency amonst Bavarian 15 Kiesen wetter, p. 26; Wippermann, 1893, i, 152-54. For the "Aufruf an die Landwirte von Baden, Hessen, Hessen-Cassel, Hessen-Nassau, Bayern, Württemberg und Elsass-Lothringen," see Kiesenwetter, pp. 344-46. Kiesenwetter gives the date of this meeting as March 25, 1893, while in Wippermann it is reported as March 24, 1893. 16Treue, pp. 7 1 - 7 2 ; "Wippermann, 1893, i, 154-55. Baron von Huene was the director of the Catholic peasant association of Silesia (Wippermann, 1893, i, 155).

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peasants kept them from joining any existing political party or organization. Instead they met on March 18 at Straubing and founded their own Lower Bavarian Peasants' League, with a program similar to that of the Farmers' League. 17 B y the end of June the agricultural organizations and societies in Germany had decided either for or against uniting with the League. Even those bodies which declined to join the new movement wanted the government to refuse its consent to any other commercial treaties containing a reduction of the existing agricultural duties. A similar request was presented to William by a delegation of the central agricultural association for the six eastern provinces of Prussia. Heading their list of ten grievances was the statement that further erosion of the protective tariffs as a result of new commercial treaties would be fateful for agriculture and the desire was expressed that agricultural export be fostered. A s a second item it was asserted that a commercial treaty with Russia on the basis of the concessions to Austria-Hungary would be especially injurious to the old Prussian provinces. 18 There was plenty of evidence in the winter and spring of 1893, if the government had cared to recognize it, that the proposed commercial treaties, especially the one with Russia, were unpopular with the agricultural population. During the course of the year the organization of the League was worked out, and the qualifications for membership were determined. Both were officially confirmed at the first general assembly of the League on February 17, 1894. 19 Every farmer (Landwirt) and every friend of agriculture could be a member of the Farmers' League, provided he was a citizen of the German Empire, of age, and in full possession of civil rights, belonged to one of the Christian confessions, recognized the League's statutes, and paid the League's dues. 1 7 T r e u e , pp. 72-73; Bacbem, V , 272; Wippermann, 1893, i, 155. 18 Wippermann, 1893, i, 149-151. T h e petition w a s presented on Feb. 22. 19 Croner, p. 142.

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Members of the League who resided in the same village were to form a local group (Ortsgruppe). The local groups in localities having common interests and the same trading center were to be drawn together into a larger unit (Hauptgruppe). This larger unit was to have a chairman and a vice-chairman. All larger units (Hauptgruppen) in a given administrative (Verwaltungsbezirk) or political district (Kreis) were then to be organized into a district branch (Bezirksabteilung). But the district branches of an electoral district ( Wahlkreis) were to be joined together into one division for the entire electoral district (Wahlkreisabteilung). The latter in turn were to be united together in provincial or state divisions. Over each of the separate branches or divisions of the League from the Hauptgruppe up there were to be officers—a chairman and a vice-chairman. During the first year while organization was going on the officers were appointed. After that they were elected. They were chosen in each case up to chairman of the electoral district by all members of the particular group, Hauptgruppe, or district branch, and each member had an equal vote. The men who won the confidence of the members by securing election to office in the district (Bezirk) and the electoral circle (Wahlkreis) then chose the chairman and vicechairman for the provincial or state division to which they belonged. To represent and direct the League in all its activities there was a central organization comprised of a general assembly, a board of directors, a central committee, and a directorate. The general assembly ordinarily met once a year in February or early March. It decided all League matters and its decisions were binding upon all members. The chairman of the provincial and state divisions of the League chose the members of the executive committee and the directorate. Together they made up the board of directors. In this board the chairman of the provincial and state divisions acted as representatives of the divisions which they headed. The executive committee had

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fourteen members—eleven besides the directorate. The latter, a select executive committee, was made up of the president, the vice-president, and the director of the League. A s already noted, Ploetz was made president of the League. Dr. Roesicke of Gorsdorf became its first vice-president, and Dr. Heinrich Suchsland, its first director.20 Besides establishing an effective organization to represent agricultural interests, the leaders of the agrarian movement wished to have newspapers in which the League's point of view could be presented to the public. The Landwirtschaftliche Tierzucht, the newssheet in which Ruprecht-Ransern's article was published, became an official organ of the League. Besides this the League had two other publications of its own. A weekly, entitled Bund der Landwirte, which went free to all League members, published its first issue on April 1, 1893. Very soon after that 21 the first number of the Korrespondenz des Bundes der Landwirte appeared. It was designed primarily tt> furnish the friendly provincial and local press with news items.22 The need for a great daily was soon felt. The project was pushed by Wangenheim, Roesicke, and Felix Telge. It was not undertaken by the League itself, but the necessary capital—500,000 marks—was raised through the generosity of a number of League members. The German Daily News (Deutsche Tageszeitung) was founded as a result of these efforts on September 1, 1894. Its chief editor was Dr. Oertel and its business manager was Felix Telge. 23 Though not an official organ of the Bund der Landwirte, the express purpose of this newspaper was to represent the ideas and aims of the League 20 F o r this sketch of the organization and the qualifications for membership in the League, see Kiesenwetter, p. 27 and Croner, p. 142. T h e names of the members of the board of directors, the executive committee, and the directorate are given in Kiesenwetter, pp. 28-31. 2 1 Croner g i v e s the date of the April 11, 1893 (op. cit., p. 141).

first

issue of the Korrespondenz

22 Kiesenwetter, p. 26. 23 Dr. Oertel belonged to the Conservative party.

as

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IN

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IJJ

and " in the spirit and name " of the latter to do battle against the hostile press. 24 T h e League organizers aimed to secure the adherence not only of those agriculturists who had been prominent in the older agricultural societies and associations and in the legislative bodies; they hoped also—by means of agitation in the League's press and in meetings with special speakers—to arouse and draw together " the indolent m a s s e s " who had hitherto stayed away from the polls. In this activity they were adopting the methods used by the Social Democrats and the Radicals. T h e League's campaign for membership was rewarding. In October, 1893, it could boast a membership of more than 160,000.26 B y the end of the first year it had 178,939 members. 26 T h i s number, to be sure, represented but a small fraction of the agricultural population. But like the Social Democratic party—which reported a membership of 227,023 in the trade unions for the year 1892 2 7 —the League had an influence far greater than its actual numbers. The strength and importance of the new movement is evident at once from a comparison of these figures, especially when it is remembered that the League had been in existence for only a year. Its members included owners of small, medium, holdings. T h e typical " feudal agrarians " were by numerically predominant. In fact there were in all only about 15,000 Rittergut owners. 28 Even if all of

and large no means Germany them had

24 Kiesen wetter, p. 41. 25 Der Landwirt, N o v . 14, 1893, cited by Treue, p. 73. 26 Kiesenwetter, p. 27. 27 In the middle of October, 1893, Vorwärts reported that the number of members in the trade unions had dropped from 237,897 in 1891 to 227,023 in 1892. T h e drop w a s the result of the decline in membership in miners' organizations (Allg. Ztg., Oct. 20, 1893 [ N o . 291 M B ] , p. 3 ) . 28 Reichstag, 1890-92, V , 3371 (Rickert, D e c . 12) ; H. der Abg., 1891, I V , 1624 (Sombart, April 9 ) . Sombart gives the figure as 15,612 in 1891. D a w s o n gives 12,218 as the number of independent manorial districts in all Prussia ( D a w s o n , The Evolution..., p. 29).

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joined the League, they would have amounted to very little over nine per cent of the total membership in October, 1893. Later as the League increased in size, this percentage was reduced. Without question the small and medium-sized cultivators had the numerical strength in the League from the beginning. The League also cut across party lines. According to the announcements at the time of organization the League was to be composed of all friends of agriculture without regard to political party. From the first it was made clear, however, that the Radicals and the Social Democrats were not welcome.29 It was also expressly stipulated at the general assembly in February, 1894, that only Christians were eligible for membership. Conservatives and Imperialists attended the meeting on February 18, 1893, in large numbers. Anti-Semites, Poles, Guelphs, and National Liberals were also present.80 The Bund der Landwirte was a threat to all the political parties—even the Conservatives. The Radicals, Social Democrats, and Centrists recognized the danger of the movement from the beginning. Even before the constituent assembly met the Radical Berliner Tageblatt recommended that the government take steps to prevent the holding of the meeting.31 The same paper fought the movement on the ground that it was unconstitutional: according to Article 29 of the Imperial Constitution a representation of special rights (Sonderrechten) 29 Allg. Ztg., Feb. 20, 1893 (No. 51), p. 1; Wippermann, 1893, i, 142-43. 30 Stocker spoke before the assembly, gaily introducing himself as a peasant proprietor (Wippermann, 1893, i, 147). See also, the speech by Noel (ibid., p. 145). Dr. Hahn referred to the presence of National Liberals of Hanover (Stenogrophische Berichte des Bundes der Landwirte, cited by K. H. Kroger, Die Konservativen und die Politik Caprivis (Rostock, 1937), p. 47. For the presence of other parties, see Kiesenwetter, pp. 25, 36; Treue, pp. 69-70; Wippermann, 1893, i, 145. 31 This great daily asked the government how long it would idly watch this demagogic incitement, which cast all agitation of Social Democrats into the shade (Berliner Tageblatt, January 27, 1893, cited by Treue, p. 66).

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I79

was not permitted.82 The Social Democrats at their party congress in 1893 considered the Farmers' League such an important adversary that it was given first place in the order of business for the next year.88 Though there had been indications that the Centrists might support the movement, the leaders of the party saw to it shortly after the League was organized that the Catholic peasant associations formally declined to join the League. Had these associations, which were a strong prop for the party during elections, decided differently, it would have been a severe blow to the Center. The Poles, through their representative von Saskarowski, declared their general agreement with the movement at the constituent assembly.84 But a month later the Polish faction of the Reichstag considered it necessary to publish an official statement of its position. The party, it was stated, would always support the interests of agriculture ; but since the agrarian movement undoubtedly had a political tendency, any participation in it by party members would have to be regarded as a purely private matter.85 The presence of National Liberals in the Bund der Landwirte caused a good deal of difficulty in that party as the year wore on.89 But the new organization was a threat also to the Conservatives, for it was by no means certain at first that the Conservatives were in the saddle. During the three years immediately preceding the formation of the Farmers' League, a number of pamphlets had appeared, which advocated the establishment of an effective organization, so that agricultural interests might be represented in the administration and the legislatures by practical farmers. The organization was to include all farmers 32 Berliner Tageblatt, Feb. 12, 1893, cited by Treue, p. 67. Set alto, ibid., Feb. 8, 1893, cited by Treue, p. 66. 33 Kiesenwetter, p. 36; Croner, pp. 140-41. 34 Wippermann, 1893, i, 145. 35Ibid., p. 154 (March 28, 1893). 36 A National Liberal party congress for Swabia, a governmental district of Bavaria, met in Augsburg and expressed itself in favor of the agricultural movement and against the commercial treaties (ibid., p. 154).

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from the largest to the smallest landowner. Some of these pamphlets saw in the peasant associations the model for such an organization, and farmers who had not already done so were urged to join one of the peasant associations. But the Middle German Peasants' Association, one of the chief of these, insisted that only peasants {Bauern), or those who would promise to represent peasant interests be chosen as representatives in the legislative assemblies of their association. This organization had its chief support in Hesse. It had no sympathy with the large landowners of eastern Germany. There were, in fact, very few peasant associations in the eastern provinces, the stronghold of the Conservative party.37 Because of this feeling within the peasant associations and the demagogic tone of Ruprecht's appeal, the Conservatives were immediately apprehensive that the movement would get beyond control. Wangenheim and Ploetz took over the organization and leadership. Though the former was a Rittergut owner, he had not previously been a member of the Conservative party.88 Even Ploetz, who was chosen the first president of the League, had no responsible position in the party.89 He was, however, a large landowner, and his experience as leader of the German Peasants' League was counted an asset in the effort to guide the " unchained stream in a more peaceful channel." 40 The Kreuzzeitung editors had long been opposed to the new commercial policy, and they had been trying to bring new viewpoints to prevail in the Conservative party; nevertheless they realized the danger for the Conservatives in the League and besought the agriculturists not to found any new associations.41 The Kreuzzeitung pointed out the difficulties which would arise if a non-political association made one of the items 37 Treue, pp. 62-63. 38 Reichstag,

1893-94, HI, 1416 (Mirbach, Feb. 26, 1894).

39 Ibid. 40 Kröger, p. 48. 41 Treue, p. 64.

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of its program the " influencing of political elections." 42 W h e n it became evident that they could not stop the movement, the editors of the Kreuzzeitung made strenuous efforts to bring it under the control of the Conservatives. During the period of organization, the columns of the newspaper were at the disposal of the League organizers. 43 The greatest response to Wangenheim's summons came at first from the agricultural societies of the eastern provinces, which were closely allied with the Conservative party. This led the Kreuzzeitung to hope that the Conservative electoral society would be strengthened. T h e Kreuzzeitung faction sought also to bring the control of the League into the hands of the Conservatives by securing the adherence to it of the two aristocratic organizations—the Congress of German Farmers and the Association of T a x and Economic Reformers. 44 W h e n the Economic Reformers declined to join, it caused great disappointment. T o counteract the demagogic tone of Ruprecht's article, the Kreuzzeitung spoke of the " painful impression " which his " incautious " remarks about the Social Democrats had made. 45 Both the Kreuzzeitung and the Conservative Reichsbote were enthusiastic in their praise of the achievements of the League's constituent assembly. T h e latter remarked that the Conservative party had always fought for those things which the Bund der Landwirte demanded in its program. 48 The Kölnische Zeitung, a newspaper with National Liberal connections, claimed that the Conservatives had already been shunted aside, and it made merry over their efforts to place themselves at the head of the League. 47 W h e n for a time the Conservatives despaired of success and began to 42 Kreuszeitung,

Feb. 14, 1893, cited by Treue, p. 67.

43 Treue, pp. 64-67. 44 Kreuszeitung,

Jan. 26, 1893, cited by Treue, p. 64.

45 Ibid. 46 Kreuzzeitung, Treue, p. 69. 47 Kölnische

Feb. 19, 1893, and Reichsbote,

Zeitung,

Feb. 19, 1893, cited by

Feb. 21, 1893, cited by Treue, p. 69.

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fear that instead of becoming a source of strength to the Conservatives the League would swallow the party, there was even talk of founding a Y o u n g Conservative party which would work solely in behalf of the rural districts (plattes Land) and the middle class. 48 In the end the League came under the guidance of the Conservatives. Its first board of directors was made up largely of members of the two conservative parties. Of the 43 chairmen and vice-chairmen at the head of the provincial and state divisions, 19 were Rittergut owners. There were in addition 7 Gut owners, 2 counts, 3 barons, a general, and 5 government officials. A t least 28 of the board belonged to the aristocracy. 4 * T h e League's constitution gave the chairmen of these divisions the right to choose the executive committee and the directorate. Count Mirbach-Sorquitten headed the committee. It included also Baron Manteuffel, the leader of the Conservative party, and the well-known agrarians—Lutz of Bavaria and Dr. von Frege of Saxony. Y e t the great landowners could not overlook the fact that if the League was to have wide-spread popular support it must cater to some extent to the wishes of peasants and small landowners. It is not surprising therefore to find t w o other tenant-farmers besides Ruprecht-Ransern on the central corrtmittee. It was also essential to have the League's publications written in a style which would appeal to the populace. This brought a new tone in the writings designed for conservative f o l k — a tone which resembled that which had been used effectively by the Radicals and the Social Democrats. Indeed tht identification of the League with the Conservative party w a s never complete, and when the articles in the League's pamphlets and newspapers became too violent, the Conservative party leaders could disavow their responsibility. 60 T h e agrarian movement revitalized the Conservative party and gave it 48 Kroger, pp. 47-48. 49 The list of officers is given in Kiesenwetter, pp. 28-29. 50 Lotz, loe. cit., p. 113.

THE

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greater force in the legislative bodies. Under the banner of the League the most diverse elements of the conservative population were brought together—landed aristocrats, small fanners, tenant-farmers, peasants, Anti-Semites, and friends of Bismarck and Bismarck's enemies. All this wrought a change in the Conservative party itself. Economic interests came to the fore and old conservative principles were to some extent forgotten. Before the Farmers' League had had an opportunity to perfect its organization or to complete its campaign for membership, it was forced to turn its attention to the electoral campaign for the Reichstag. Normally the elections would have fallen in 1895. But the Reichstag was dissolved on May 6, when it rejected the government's military bill. The new military bill had been placed before the Reichstag on November 23, 1892." It provided for an increase of 80,000 in the size of the army and for a two-year instead of a threeyear term of service in the infantry. It would be necessary to call up 235,000 instead of 175,000 recruits each year. Since the law would go into operation on October 1, 1893, and would expire on March 31, 1899, the seven-year provision for military needs (Septennat) was also given up. T o meet the additional costs for these changes, the governments proposed to increase the beer, alcohol, and stock exchange taxes. The three-year military service and the Septennat were important features of Bismarck's military program. The two-year military service was an old demand of the liberals dating from the " conflict time " ; but its proposed introduction worked like a red rag upon the Conservatives. 62 Caprivi hoped by means of it to gain the support of the Center and some of the Radicals. But the bill found complete favor with no political party, and for months its acceptance seemed doubtful. Finally by the end 51 Kardorff, pp. 52 Ibid., p. 271.

270-79.

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of March the Conservatives let it be known that as a last resort they would be willing to vote for the two-year service. Meanwhile the military bill was producing a major crisis in the Center. In preparing the bill Caprivi had kept in touch with Cardinal Kopp of Breslau. He and the Silesian Centrists—including Count Ballestrem, the chairman of the party—supported the bill. Like the Conservatives of the eastern provinces they felt the need of adequate protection against the Russians. The Bavarian Centrists, on the other hand, opposed it because of the proposed increase in the beer tax, and because they objected to a large army. Bavaria produced more beer per head of population than any other state in the Empire, and the contemplated change in the tax would hit them in a tender spot.63 The attitude of the Bavarian Centrists affected that of the entire party.54 Because the party leaders outside Silesia knew that the military bill was unpopular with their constituents and would cause difficulties at the next election, they refused to support it. Cardinal Kopp and Count Ballestrem meanwhile had had an audience with the Pope in Rome. The Pope had advised them—albeit cautiously—to accept the bill. When this fact became known after the Easter recess, it led to Count Ballestrem's resignation as chairman and to Baron von Huene's withdrawal from the executive committee of the party. Dr. Ernst Lieber succeeded Ballestrem as party leader. A democrat, a native of Nassau, by occupation a tea trader, 66 Lieber had little in common with the " feudal agrarians " in the party or with the East Prussian nobility. He was accustomed to refer to himself as " one who was compelled to be a Prussian (Mussprettssen)."M Huene was the spokesman of the Center party in the military committee, to which the bill had been referred. He brought to 53 Ibid., p. 277. hi Ibid. 55 Ibid., p. 279; Anderson, pp. 94-96; Wahl, III, 512; Bachem, V, 241-42. 56Kardorff, p. 279; Bachem, V, 241. This, of course, referred to the fact that he was forced to become a Prussian subject when Prussia annexed Nassau in 1866.

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the plenary session of the Reichstag on May 2 a compromise motion, which the " cartel" parties decided to support. This motion reduced the effective force of the army by about 13,000 from the government's figure, and eliminated some of the new demands for the artillery; otherwise it left the government's bill unchanged. But the Center—except for a small right-wing group—voted against Huene's motion on May 6. There were likewise difficulties in the Radical party over the military bill, which caused a split. Though concessions had been made to the Radical viewpoint in the bill, most members of the party were unwilling to accept it. Eugen Richter, the party leader, forced the six members of the party who did vote for the bill, to leave the party immediately after the dissolution of the Reichstag. Richter's party then took the name Freisinnige Volkspartei, " Radical People's party." A new Radical party, made up of those who had seceded, was straightway formed under the leadership of Heinrich Rickert—the Freisinnige Vereinigung, or " Radical Union." It will be remembered that Rickert represented Danzig, where commercial interests were strong. Rickert's party was inclined to co-operate with Caprivi, while Richter's group of Radicals adhered more strictly to their principles. The latter were nevertheless more friendly to Caprivi than they had been to Bismarck. The elections for the new Reichstag were scheduled for June 15. It was known that the government planned to bring a somewhat modified military bill before the new Reichstag. Consequently this was the chief issue in the campaign. But because the Farmers' League had been formed and the agricultural population was becoming thoroughly aroused on account of the government's commercial policy, this issue was almost as important. In its campaign the Farmers' League laid great stress upon the choice of independent men who would be willing to work for agricultural interests despite considerations of party politics. This point had been emphasized by Ruprecht-Ransern and

186

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Wangenheim in their appeals and by a number of the speakers at the meeting on February 18.57 In order to secure such representatives, the League adopted the plan of supporting only those candidates who would agree to pledge themselves to vote on future bills which affected agriculture as the League desired. That there might be no misunderstanding later regarding the obligation of the League's candidates, each one was asked to agree—either orally or in writing 6 8 —to vote and act on seven specific points in accordance with the League's wishes. The seven items were similar to the eleven contained in the platform adopted by the Leagufe on February 18. The most important of these were the agreements to vote for the rejection of all commercial treaties which reduced the agricultural tariffs, and to work actively to bring about a solution of the currency question by international agreement.69 A s a seventh item the candidates supported by the Farmers' League had to promise that they would join the Economic Union which was to be formed in the Reichstag for the purpose of carrying out the program of the League. The Economic Union, as already shown, was first established in 1878-79. A t its instigation and with its aid Bismarck put through his first protective tariff bill. The Union was called into activity from 57 Ruprecht had warned the agriculturists that they must not choose men like the Lower Silesian delegate who said to his rural constituents: " Gentlemen, I have a heart for agriculture, but considerations of a higher sort determine me to vote for the commercial treaties" (Kiesenwetter, pp. 335-37). From the circumstances and the description, the delegate referred to may have been Huene. Von Wangenheim likewise protested against the election of professional parliamentarians. " W e choose them merely upon the basis of a political party program, we even help them don the faction's straight jacket, and then we are surprised if in the great decisions it comes out so entirely different from our expectations, if we hear again and again the old refrain: from political party considerations, in view of the next elections we could not vote otherwise" (ibid., p. 341). 58 Reichstag, 1893-94, I. 45 (Ploetz, Nov. 24). 58 Kiesenwetter, pp. 347-48; Wippermann, 1893, i, 180-81.

T H E FARMERS*

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187

time to time thereafter to support thfc government's later protective tariff bills. No effort was made in 1891 to use it in opposition to the government's new commercial policy, because the Centrists were unwilling to back it.90 Originally it had been organized fully as much for the benefit of the industrialists as for the agriculturists. In 1893 the Bund der Landwirte was attempting to use it exclusively for agrarian interests. The League was hardly in a position, we may assume, to insist that every candidate which it supported subscribe to all seven points in the questionnaire. But all had to give assurance at least that they would vote against any commercial treaty which reduced the agricultural tariffs, and especially against a treaty with Russia which granted these concessions.61 A mere expression of friendliness for agriculture on the part of a candidate was not considered sufficient. The League's position on this point was made clear in a letter which Dr. Suchsland, the director, wrote to Baron Stumm. The latter was informed that even though he was sympathetic to the League's efforts but nevertheless voted in favor of the commercial treaty with Russia, the League would consider itself injured, because as far as the League was concerned it did not matter whether the vote for the acceptance of the treaty came from an extreme or a moderate free trader. Since the Bund der Landwirte intended to carry on practical politics it could not renounce a definite answer to a definite question.62 This meant that a candidate supported by the Farmers' League—of whatever political party he might be—would be unable to act in accordance with the dictates of his party in case it took a different stand from the League on the commercial treaties. It also obligated the candidates so sponsored 60 Kardorff, p. 280. 61 A. Dix, Der Bund der Landwirte. Entstehung, Wesen, und politische Tätigkeit (Berlin, 1909), p. 12. This was written by a National Liberal. It criticizes the Fanners' League. 62 Dr. Suchsland's letter to Stumm, dated June 7, 1893, is quoted in full in Hellwig, pp. 471-73-

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by the League to vote in the prescribed w a y regardless of compromises or concessions which might be introduced by the government. In the campaign this hiade little difference to the German Conservatives and the Anti-Semites, because most of the former and all of the latter were in agreement with the economic aims of the League. In the eastern provinces generally the Bund der Landwirte supported Conservatives who belonged to it, oftentimes against National Liberals. In Hesse the A n t i Semites accepted the League's program, and were supported with few exceptions by it. The result was a tremendous increase in Anti-Semitic delegates in the new Reichstag. 63 The division of interest in the Imperialist and National Liberal parties has already been discussed. T h e method used by the League to control voting was naturally resented by industrialist and consumer members. Baron Stumm was unwilling to accept the dictates of the League in regard to his own " future political activity." A n d he protested against the League's use of an " imperative mandate," which he claimed was contrary to article 29 of the Imperal constitution." According to the Allgemeine Zeitung " a very considerable part of the Centrist faction " was thoroughly in favor of the Free Economic Union and some members of the party had decided in M a y just before the Reichstag was dissolved to declare their adherence to it. But Centrist leaders immediately called a party meeting where it was decided that joining the Free Economic Union w a s a party matter. 65 A s time went on the Poles found it difficult to co-operate with the Conservatives in the eastern provinces even though their economic interests were the same. Conservatives resented Caprivi's conciliatory policy toward the Poles. During the debates on the Russian treaty Dziembowski-Pomian complained of the League's attitude toward them. T h e y 6 3 D i x , p. 12. 64 Hell wig, pp. 471-73-

t&Allg. Ztg., Aug. 4, 1893 (No. 214), p. 1.

THE

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had been informed during the previous electoral campaign, he said, that the League would support even an anti-agrarian rather than a P o l e . " By another year Conservative antipathy to the Poles had reached such proportions that an anti-Polish organization, popularly known as the H - K - T Society, was formed in this section of Prussia. 67 The Reichstag election was held on June 15, 1893, and the second ballot was completed before June 27.68 All parties which had opposed the government's military bill—with the sole exception of the Social Democrats—lost in the election. The latter gained 9 seats. The Centrists and those allied with them lost 13. The Radicals suffered the severest defeat. They held 70 constituencies when the Reichstag was dissolved.89 In the new Reichstag the Radical Union, which was ready to accept the government's military bill, returned thirteen members. Richter's faction won only twenty-three seats. The Social Democrats, Radicals, and Centrists secured 207 constituencies in 1890 but only 180 in 1893.70 The Right of the house made some gains. The German Conservatives were reduced only slightly, from 73 to 67. The Imperialist party gained eight more seats. The Anti-Semites increased their membership from 5 to 16, 12 of whom belonged to the newly organized German Reform party. The Farmers' League elected Ploetz, who was also a member of the Conservative party. No independent candidates of the League were returned. The Lower Bavarian Peasants' League sent four repre66 Reichstag, 1893-94, I, 85-86 (Dziembowski-Pomian, Dec. 12, 1893). Tiedemann, the government president in the Polish district of Gnesen, had informed the Poles that the executive committee of the League had taken this action, said Dziembowski-Pomian. Tiedemann was one of the three organizers of the H - K - T Society, which took shape in 1894. 67 Tims, pp. 24-31. 68 Allg. Ztg., J u n e 27, 1893 ( N o . 176), p. I. 69 Kardorff, p. 280. 70 Allg. Ztg., J u n e 27, 1893 ( N o . 176), p. 1.

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sentatives to the Reichstag. The Right—if the latter are included—had 115 seats, or 17 more than in 1890. But its strength was still far below that of the Centrists, Radicals, and Social Democrats combined. Of the other parties, the National Liberals were the chief gainers with 11 more seats. The Poles won three additional constituencies and the South German People's party one. The Alsatians lost two. The election brought about also a change in the composition of some of the Reichstag parties—a change which was unquestionably influenced by the campaign of the Farmers' League and the depressed condition of agriculture. Though the Imperialist party regained only 8 of the 21 seats lost in 1890, its members were now almost exclusively agrarians. 71 Only eleven of those who had sat in the Reichstag in December, 1891, were members of the new Reichstag. A similar change was evident in the choice of Conservative delegates. For the most part those who were friendly to the government were not returned and only unconditional agrarians were elected. Higher state officials and even Rittergut owners who held government positions were no longer members.72 The Center lost three constituencies in 1893 to members of the party who had seceded and joined the Bavarian Peasants' League. Two Centrist seats were won by Conservatives. The campaign slogan of the radical Lower Bavarian Peasants' L e a g u e — " no nobles, no clergy, no officials "—made a deep impression upon the agricultural population.7® In consequence non-aristocratic members of the Center were chosen in many electoral districts which for years 71 Besides Stumm and Krupp there were two other industrialists and one jurist; all the rest were agrarians. In recognition of Stumm's efforts to secure the passage of the military bill, the Kaiser conferred upon him the Commander Cross of the House of Hohenzollern. Because of this and the results of the election, Stumm's position in the party was weakened and KardorfFs strengthened (Hellwig, pp. 476, 478; Kardorff, pp. 382, 285). 72 Kroger, p. 51. 73 Bachem, VIII, 25, 36; V, 294-95.

T H E FARMERS' LEAGUE IN POLITICS

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had been represented by the Catholic nobility. The party elected no nobles in Silesia, and only two in southern Germany. Of the thirty-one Centrist aristocrats who had sat in the Reichstag in December, 1 8 9 1 , only 1 2 were re-elected; most of the latter represented electoral districts in western Germany. The Centrist leaders, nevertheless, prevented the formation of a separate Centrist party for Bavaria, which was threatened during the conflict over the military bill and during the electoral campaign. 74 A COMPARISON OF T H E REICHSTAG ELECTION RESULTS OF 1 8 9 0 AND 1 8 9 3

Parties

1890*

1893»

Conservatives Imperialists Reform Center Poles National Liberals Radical Union ) German Radical People's party t ' Social Democrats South German People's party Nonpartisan:

73 20 0 106 16 42

67 28 12 100 19 53 13 23 44 11 27

AlflatiiuiH Anti-Semites Guelphs Dane Bavarian Peasants' League Others

66 35 10 29 10 5 11 1 0 2

397

397

8 4 3 1 4 7

'Reichstag, 1890-91, Anlageband I, Aktenstück 35, pp. 165-233; Deutscher Reichstag, 1890. fc The figures given here show the party numbers in November, 1893, when the Reichstag met. Between July, when the elections were held, and November two delegates had died and their seats had been filled. There were other slight changes. The figures are taken from AUg. Ztg., Nov. 15, 1893 (No. 317 A B), p. 2. For the results of the July election, see: Reichstag, 1893-94, Anlageband I, Aktenstück 46, pp. 270-323; Deutscher Reichstag, 1893. 74 Brauer, p. 347; Bachem, VIII, 27.

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Bismarck was not a candidate for re-election, but his son Herbert was chosen on a nonpartisan ticket in the province of Saxony. Alexander Hohenlohe, son of the future chancellor, was recalled from Russia by his father to run for election in an electoral district in Alsace-Lorraine which had become vacant. 75 Stocker was defeated because the Anti-Semites supported the National Liberal candidate. 76 Eugen Richter was hard-pressed in the constituency of Hagen in the Ruhr which he had held since 1874, but was ultimately successful. 77 W h e n the new commercial policy was determined and the Austrian treaty was debated, Radical influence was strong in Berlin. A t that time the party held four of the six Berlin seats in the Reichstag. T h e other two seats belonged to the Social Democrats. N o w in 1893 the latter won all but one of the Berlin constituencies from the Radicals. 78 In 1891 the Radicals and the Social Democrats divided the two Breslau seats between them; in 1893 both went to the Social Democrats. In Posen the Imperialists and the Conservatives each lost a seat to the Poles; and the latter won a seat in East Prussia from the Center. In the light of agrarian agitation, it is significant that the constituency which Baron von Huene had held since 1884 was now taken by Count Limburg-Stirum; and that Count von Kanitz-Schlochau, a relative of Count Kanitz-Podangen, secured the seat which Helldorff, the former leader of the Conservative party, had had in 1891. 75 Alexander was son of Chlodwig Hohenlohe, governor of AlsaceLorraine and Caprivi's successor as chancellor. In 1887 because of the war scare, the government thought that Alsace would choose the government's candidates, who would vote for the army and navy bills. Instead 13 opposition delegates had been elected. In 1893 the effort was being made to secure the election of representatives who would vote for the military bill. Alexander was in Russia at the time of his recall in the interest of the immense estate which his mother had inherited there ( A . Hohenlohe, pp. 57, 151, 185; see Appendix). 76 Because Stocker opposed Ahlwardt, Bockel of the German Reform party recommended the National Liberal in Siegen, the constituency for which Stocker was running (Waldersee, II, 292). 7 7 A l l g . Ztg., Oct. 31. 1893 ( N o . 302 A B ) , p. 1. 78 This one constituency went to the Radical People's party.

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V e r y soon after the Reichstag met in the summer of 1893 the Free Economic U n i o n w a s organized by Ploetz. It had 142 members. 7 * N o t a single Centrist joined it. It w a s made up largely of German Conservatives, Imperialists, and A n t i Semites, with some National Liberals. Some Poles m a y have belonged to it. N o t all members of the Free Economic U n i o n had necessarily been sponsored by the Farmers' L e a g u e or were members of it. K a r d o r f f , w h o did belong to it, urged t w o industrialists of his p a r t y — S t u m m and L e u s c h n e r — t o take part in it to prevent " the new alliance, which represented a « a c ceptance of the earlier directions of this sort kept up for decades, from representing one-sided agrarian interests." 80 Ploetz w a s chairman of the Free Economic Union. K a r d o r f f and Dr. Hahn, an associate of the National Liberal party, were its reporters ( R e f e r e n t e n ) . 8 1 T h e new Reichstag met on July 4. Caprivi brought in on the next

day

the

new

military

bill, 82

which

incorporated

the

changes proposed by Huene. T h e chancellor made it clear that the decision regarding the two-year service would hold only until March 31, 1899. It was only after the government had stated that the beer and alcohol taxes were not to be increased to meet the financial costs of the bill, that it w a s passed on July 15, by 201 to 185 votes. 8 3 Both the Poles and the A n t i Semites voted for it. Either party could have caused its rejection. T h e political events of 1893

0311 n o t

be separated f r o m the

economic. In 1893 it w a s apparent that the agricultural depression had hit all parts of Germany, not just the eastern prov79 Allg. Ztg., Aug. 4, 1893 (No. 214), p. 1; Kiesenwetter, p. 36; Hellwig, pp. 477-78. 80 Ibid., p. 478; Kardorff, p. 284. 81 Allg. Ztg., Dec. 12, 1893 ( N o . 344 A B ) , p. 1.

82 Kardorff, pp. 281-84. 83 Caprivi stated that only " the most capable shoulders " would be asked to bear the taxes necessary (Kardorff, p. 283).

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inces. This fact more than any other explains the strength of the agrarian movement amongst small and middle-sized cultivators. For the unrest in the agricultural population, though undoubtedly stimulated by the activity of the Farmers' League, had a deeper cause. To understand the wide-spread appeal of the movement and the League's success, it is necessary to go behind the agitation to the real basis of discontent. This entails a review of the calamities which befell agriculture about 1893. The drop in the grain prices during 1892 has been described. A s a result of favorable harvests in 1892 the world wheat surplus grew. Though the world wheat crop of 1893 was larger than that of 1892, it was better distributed, so that the surplus did not increase substantially. 84 Germany's very satisfactory grain harvest in 1892 was followed by a bumper crop in 1893. 85 Wheat and rye prices there continued to fall gradually during 1893, except in the months from April through August inclusive, when they improved somewhat. In January wheat of good quality was selling for 156 marks, but in November and December for only 1 4 6 marks per metric ton. The rye price dropped from 1 3 5 marks per metric ton in January to 129 in November, and 127 in December. 88 In 1893 for the first time in almost fifty years Bavaria experienced a real depression in grain prices. The decline in agricultural prices, which set in during the 'eighties and led to the demand for higher tariffs in 1885 and 1887, had not been evi84 Farnsworth, loc. cit., p. 325. According to the latter, the " net decline of British import wheat prices during 1892-93 (only about 10 cents) appears surprisingly small in view of the abundance of world wheat supplies and the deepening of trade depression throughout the world. The fact that international wheat prices did not decline more is attributable mainly to the fact that merchants, speculators and farmers in the United States, and importers and millers in Europe, were willing and even eager to hold large stocks of wheat in anticipation of a rise in prices" (ibid., pp. 3 1 3 - 1 4 ) . In each of the three crop years 1891-92, 1892-93, and 1893-94, the early-season forecasts of students of the wheat market were for higher prices (ibid., p. 314). 85Lotz, loc. cit., pp. 103, 112. 86 Statistisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Berlin, 1893, p. 208.

T H E FARMERS' LEAGUE IN POLITICS

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dent to any marked degree in western and southwestern G e r many. There had been no dangerous depression in the wheat price in B a v a r i a since 1 8 5 1

and none in the rye price since

1 8 6 6 . Beginning in 1 8 9 3 , however, the average annual wheat price fell below 1 9 0 marks per metric ton for five consecutive y e a r s ; and for four successive years the rye price w a s below 1 5 0 marks. 8 7 T h e property of large landowners in the eastern provinces w a s already heavily mortgaged prior to 1 8 9 3 . T h e statistics on mortgage indebtedness of real estate in Prussia show a great increase in the period from 1 8 8 3 to 1 8 9 6 in the indebtedness of medium-sized and even more of small-sized peasant holdings. A n d by 1 8 9 6 this class of property w a s almost as heavily indebted in the western as in the eastern provinces. 88 In addition 87 According to Dade, " the economic effect of a price decline upon the producer will depend upon the depth, the duration, and the repetition of the depression." Taking the period from 1850 to 1899 for his study, he found that the annual average price of wheat in Prussia fell below 180 marks per mctric ton only twice in the period from i860 to 1879; but it fell five times in the decade 1880-89—despite the tariff of 1879 and the increases in 1885 and 1887—and six times in the decade 1890-99. In Bavaria in the period 186079 there were only two years when the annual average price of wheat fell below 190 marks per metric ton, and three such years in the decade 1880-89; but there were six in the decade 1890-99. Assuming that for a Prussian producer who sold, a dangerous depression existed when for three consecutive years the price of wheat fell below 180 marks per metric ton and the price of rye below 140 marks, Dade found that the only dangerous depression in the wheat price in Prussia between 1852 and 1890 occurred from 1884 to 1888, when even with the tariff the price was only 165 marks per metric ton; and that the only dangerous depression in the rye price between 1865 to 1890 was from 1886 to 1888, when the average price was 131 marks even with the tariff. For his study of prices in Bavaria, Dade took as a measure both for wheat and rye a price which was ten marks higher than the corresponding price for Prussia (loc. cit., pp. 21-26). 88 Dade used for his study the published reports of indebtedness in 42 distrtict-court divisions of Prussia for each of these years. He found that by 1896 peasant property was as heavily indebted as the estates of the large landowners had been in 1883; and that, because of the rate of increase in the indebtedness of peasant property, it was likely soon to become as heavily mortgaged as that of the great landowners (ibid., pp. 101-02).

196

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to their property indebtedness middle-sized and small-sized owners frequently had personal debts which were even more burdensome.89 These facts together with the abundant testimony of Reichstag representatives in 1893 concerning distress amongst peasants, make it seem probable that a tremendous increase in peasant indebtedness was taking place during this very time, and in all parts of Germany as well as in Prussia. 90 The position of tenant farmers was also becoming precarious, if we may judge from statistics concerning the leasing of the Prussian state domain. During the period from 1849 t o I&79 the lease prices of Prussian domain lands had increased markedly. Lease prices continued to rise until 1892, when the movement turned in just the opposite direction. During the next decade the lease price fell on the average about 15 or 16 per cent, but for the six eastern provinces between 20 and 30 per cent.81 For tenants who were still under contract for a term of years at the old rates, the next several years would necessarily bring hardship. One could conclude from these facts, according to Goltz, that the net income of the private estates, especially the larger ones in northeast Germany, had also declined.92 8 9 Ibid., p. 102. 9 0 Kardorff reported t o S t u m m in December, 1892, that never in the 38 years he had lived in Silesia had he experienced such despairing bitterness as he then found in all districts. A s one instance of the change, he described what w a s taking place in the village of P o n z w i t z , which he had known as a well-to-do community. In this village of 600 to 700 inhabitants every peasant farm ( B a u e r n h o f ) had been up for sale at public auction within the ten preceding years, " the number of school children (the best measure of an increase or decline in the population)" had fallen from 190 t o 160, and the indebtedness of small o w n e r s as well as of peasant owners had increased almost threefold. Kardorff added: "And that is not a somewhat abnormal, isolated case, but more than half of the rural communities of this place are in analogous fashion declining steadily in well-being and in population under wretched agricultural conditions, and it i s just exactly the same with large landowners. O n l y the parts of the district in which beet cultivation can be carried on offer an exception and hold their o w n in some measure " ( K a r d o r f f , pp. 275-76 [ D e c . 26, 1892]). 91 Goltz, II, 398-400. 92 Ibid., pp. 399-400.

THE

FARMERS'

LEAGUE

IN P O L I T I C S

I97

Like the price of wheat and rye, that of wine and of all other sorts of grain fell in the 'nineties. Fodder grain prices, however, did not drop to the amount of the tariff reductions. Prices for sugar, alcohol, potatoes, wool, and garden vegetables also suffered a sharp decline during the decade, though they were in no way affected by the tariffs. 93 The only articles not affected by the downward trend in agricultural prices were hops, tobacco, eggs, hogs, and cattle.94 Nevertheless livestock producers were hit by other calamities. A s already indicated the hoof and mouth disease had begun to spread in Germany in the 'eighties. It increased greatly after 1888 and reached tremendous proportions in 1892. The disease spread especially in northern Germany. 95 Farmers suffered not only from the loss of milk and butter, but also from their inability to sell their infected animals.96 Though the veterinary convention with Austria did not go into effect until February 1» i893, 97 there had been some loosening of border control before that time. For instance, in the autumn of 1890 the control on the Russian border was modified to some extent to permit importation of live hogs for two cities of Upper Silesia. Later a similar release of the prohibition was permitted in the case of three other cities of the East. The prohibition against swine imports from Denmark, Sweden, and Norway was repealed on December 5, 1890.98 The hoof and mouth disease abated markedly in 1893. But the year brought a drought which caused a serious shortage of fodder. The government took measures to relieve distress. Freight rates were lowered and export of straw and fodder was temporarily prohibited. Even so, 9 3 Dade, loc. cit., pp. 5-15. Alcohol, sugar, potatoes, and wool kept their earlier tariff rates or their former freedom f r o m tariffs (ibid., p. 14). 94 Ibid., p. 12. 95 Ibid., p. 13; Lotz, loc. cit., p. 103. 96 Reichstag, 1893-94, I, 77 ( K a r d o r f f , Nov. 25, 1893). 97 Lotz, loc. cit., p. 104. 98 Grosse Politik, V I I , 390-91, note.

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many peasants were compelled to sell their cattle at any price. Statistics showed that during the year ending December 1, 1893, Germany lost as a result of the drought 6.70 per cent of its horned cattle. Losses were particularly heavy in the Rhineland, Alsace-Lorraine, and the three southern states, that is, in the localities where small-sized peasant ownership was the rule." T h e commercial treaties of 1891 could not be blamed for all the difficulties which agriculture suffered after their conclusion. Nevertheless it was true, as Dade observed, that prior to 1891 German agriculture had not known such a price reduction of its most important products since 1850, and in the case of grain since the period 1820-40, as it was experiencing in 1893. 100 It was unjust, but perhaps natural, that many agriculturists should hold the government which had sponsored the new commerecial policy responsible for all the ills of agriculture. While the agricultural depression was deepening in Germany, its commercial relations with Russia were becoming strained to the breaking point. In July, 1893, Germany refused a provisional most-favored-nation agreement because it failed to satisfy German demands; and on August 1 Russia put in force against Germany its new maximum tariff. This led to a tariff war between the two countries, which brought hardship to German industry and commerce. Germany nevertheless took a firm stand, and refused to negotiate unless Russia would give an equivalent for the grain tariff reductions and other concessions which it desired. F o r a time it seemed unlikely that any basis of compromise would be reached. T h e agrarians commended Caprivi for his stand and hoped that all thought of a treaty would be given up. 101 99 Lötz, loc. cit., pp. 112-113; Dade, loc. cit., pp. 13-14. Bavaria's losses in horned cattle were greatest in number—348,025—but the percentage loss was higher in Alsace-Lorraine, W ü r t t e m b e r g , and Baden (ibid., p. 14). 100 Ibid. 101 Allg. Ztg., August 4, 1893 ( N o . 214 M B ) , p. 1.

THE

FARMERS'

LEAGUE

IN

POLITICS

I99

By October i, however, both countries felt the need of a better understanding, and negotiations began again in earnest. As it became clear that the German government, despite the opposition of the agricultural population, wished to conclude a treaty with Russia if possible, the agitation of the Farmers' League became more openly hostile to those in authority. Early in October the Korrespondens des Bundes der Landwirte published an article by Baron von Wangenheim, entitled Schafft Klarheit (Let Us be Clear).102 Referring to the fact that negotiations with Russia for a commercial treaty were just beginning, Wangenheim sought to refute the argument which he said was appearing daily in the press, namely, that it would make no difference to agriculture if the reduced grain tariffs should be extended to Russia. Even without any Russian imports the price of bread cereal did not cover the cost of production, because, as agriculture's opponents themselves asserted, the supply exceeded the demand. Was it to be supposed, Wangenheim asked, that the price would not sink considerably lower as soon as the supply increased as a result of Russian imports? Not until currency matters and freight rates between the contracting states were regulated, could there be talk of a commercial treaty. He reproached the government because in a year of distress it had not lowered the manure tariffs or allowed the dried-up West to send its cows free to winter in the East where fodder was plentiful. The government would rather let the highly developed cattle-husbandry of the West perish than sacrifice some hundred thousands for its preservation; but millions upon millions were given away to foreign countries in the commercial treaties. 102 Kiesenwetter, pp. 3 4 8 - 5 0 ; Wippermann, 1893, ii, 77-78. Kiesenwetter (op. cit., p. 3 7 ) gives October 12, 1893, as the date of Wangenheim's pamphlet. But the article had already been criticized in the press some time before October 12. T h e article w a s no doubt reprinted in pamphlet form after its original appearance in the Korrespondens.

200

GERMAN

AGRARIAN

POLITICS

The uphappy consequences of the tariff treaty with Austria were apparent, continued Wangenheim, yet the Chancellor was so taken with the idea of further treaties, that he could hardly be expected to change. The Chancellor was not blamed because he failed on account of his purely military training to understand agricultural conditions, but he was reproached for seeking the advice in these matters of men who for a generation had breathed the air of an office and knew agriculture only from the documents. The author was convinced that the Chancellor believed he was doing what was best, but that he was not " the right man in the right place." Accordingly they must wish for his retirement. For the person of the Chancellor, said Wangenheim, was dispensable, but not German agriculture. German agriculture had shown by voting for Caprivi's demands in the military bill that it was not opposed to all government measures as a matter of principle. But " if he perseveres obstinately in the course taken, that will and must result in our fighting every demand of his government." The one ray of light in the gloom, said Wangenheim, was the Kaiser, who had given his word that he would protect agriculture. Unfortunately there was no one near him to picture the true state of affairs. Hence it was more than ever the task of the Farmers' League to speak out without fear and to remain firm and true. This article, which appeared shortly before the elections to the Prussian diet, caused a sensation. From the first Caprivi had looked upon the formation of the Farmers' League as an attack upon himself. And Centrist leaders refused to support the Economic Union on the ground that it was directed against the Chancellor.103 Their suspicions now seemed to be confirmed. In protest against the article, Schultz-Lupitz, an Imperialist delegate to the Reichstag, withdrew from the League.104 The Post, which had been taken over by Stumm and lQBAUg. Ztg., Aug. 4, 1893 (No. 214 M B), p. 1. 104Reichstag, 1893-94, I, 87, 89 (Schultz-Lupitz, Nov. 25, 1893).

T H E FARMERS'

LEAGUE IN POLITICS

20I

placed at the disposal of Caprivi, defended Schultz-Lupitz. 105 More separations would occur, said the Post, if the view gradually gained ground that the League was animated chiefly by its hatred of the Chancellor rather than by its desire for the preservation of agricultural interests. 106 The Radical Vossische Zeitung thought that powerful opposition should be set in motion against the agitation of the agrarians in case Caprivi turned a deaf ear to it: for it was feared that the Chancellor might be exposed to pressure from above. Shortly before a Centrist paper of the Rhineland had reported that the Farmers' League had energetic representatives in the immediate vicinity of the Kaiser.1®7 Soon after Wangenheim's article appeared, the National Zeitung, a left-wing National Liberal newspaper, asked the Farmers' League if it was sure that the Economic Union would be against the Russian treaty. 108 This led to an acrimonious dispute between the National Zeitung and the Kreuzzeitung. The former claimed that the National Liberal members of the Economic Union had merely agreed to give agriculture such support as they deemed best. The Kreuzzeitung, on the other hand, insisted that those who had asked for and received the support of the League in the Reichstag elections had first made certain definite promises, among which was the one in regard to the Russian commercial treaty. 109 The National Zeitung considered it unconstitutional and revolutionary to declare, as Wangenheim had done, that all demands of Caprivi's government must be fought if he persisted 105 After the June elections the Post published an article by Zedlitz, " which spoke very pessimistically about the Caprivi government." Stumm demanded a counter declaration. In the autumn of 1893 he took over the management of the Post (Hellwig, pp. 478-79).

106 Allg. Ztg., Nov. 4, 1893 (No. 306 M B), p. 2. 107 Ibid., Oct. 7, 1893 (No. 278), p. 2. 108Ibid., Oct. ii, 1893 (No. 282), p. 2.

109 Ibid., Oct. 13, 1893 (No. 284), p. 1.

202

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POLITICS

in his efforts to negotiate a treaty with Russia on the wellknown basis. It criticized government officials who, if they did not actually encourage, were yet indifferent to the revolutionizing of the peasantry by ruined great landowners or unscrupulous persons for their own benfit. 110 T h e Kreuzzeitung protested against the attempt of the National Zeitung to denounce Conservative officials who held the viewpoint of the Farmers' League, and it defended the behavior of the district presidents {Landräte), government presidents, and the lord lieutenants of the provinces (OberPräsidenten). It asked if the National Liberals thought that only the L o r d Lieutenant of Hanover had a right to fight government bills, and then referred to Bennigsen's efforts " to call into the a r e n a " liberals of all shades against the government's education bill of 1892. 1 1 1 Meanwhile early in October, 1893, the Farmers' League began to organize a series of meetings in the electoral districts, with the object of enlightening farmers regarding the severe economic injuries which threatened them, and for the purpose of drawing up identical resolutions against the reduction of the import duties on Russian grain. A t one of these meetings Herbert Bismarck was a guest of honor. 1 1 2 A n d the Kreuzzeitung published a list of eleven items to which candidates supported by the Farmers' League would have to agree. 1 1 3 The crisis in agriculture, the presence in Berlin of Russia's delegates to the tariff treaty conference, the League's attack upon Caprivi, the charges and countercharges in the press regarding the tariff policy and the League's activities, and the growing fear in southern Germany that the government would raise the tax on wine and tobacco to offset the expected deficit 110 Ibid., O c t . 12, 1893 ( N o . 283), p. I . in Ibid., O c t . 13, 1893 ( N o . 284), p. 1. 112 Ibid., O c t . 2, 1893 ( N o . 273), p. 2 ; O c t . 19, 1893 ( N o . 290 M

B),

p. 2. H e r b e r t B i s m a r c k w a s at H a l l e f o r t h e meeting o f t h e b r a n c h a s s o ciation o f the L e a g u e f o r S a x o n y and A n h a l t on O c t o b e r 11 (ibid., O c t . 13, 1893 [ N o . 284], p. 2). 113 W i p p e r m a n n , 1893, ii, 87-88.

THE

FARMERS'

LEAGUE

IN

POLITICS

203

114

in tariff receipts —all these factors intensified party feeling as the electoral campaigns for the Prussian Landtag and for some of the other state legislatures began in the latter part of October. 118 In the campaign for the Prussian house of delegates the National Liberals supported the Radicals for the most part in preference to Free Conservatives and " moderate " Conservatives, to prevent an increase of the Right. 116 The Center had to combat—besides the liberals, Social Democrats, and agrarians—the Poles in Upper Silesia and in Ermland, East Prussia, where for the first time they set up their own candidates in opposition to the Center.117 The position of the Conservatives was threatened in some constituencies of Posen and Pomerania by the Poles. In Posen the Polish People's party separated from the so-called " c o u r t " party, and set up its own candidates.118 In Berlin there was a sharp contest between the Radical Union and the Radical People's party. Against both, the Conservatives, Christian Socialists, and Anti-Semites banded together as the United Imperial Loyalist Parties of Berlin (Vereinigte reichstreue Parteien Berlins). But except in Upper Silesia and Berlin the voters took a much less active interest in the Prussian than in the Reichstag elections of the previous summer. 11 ' 114 During the week of October 16 the proposals to increase the taxes on tobacco and wine were to go to the federal council for consideration (Allg. Ztg., Oct. 18, 1893 [No. 289], p. 2 ) . 115 There were elections in Saxony, Hesse, and Baden (ibid., Oct. 21, 1893 [No. 292 A B], p. 1). The election in Bavaria was held in the summer shortly after the Reichstag election (Bachem, VIII, 23). 116 Allg.

Ztg., Oct. 18, 1893 ( N o . 289), p. 3.

117 Bachem, VIII, 25; Allg. Ztg., Oct. 13, 1893 ( N o . 284 A B ) , p. 1; Oct. 19, 1893 ( N o . 290 M B ) , p. 2 ; Oct. 21, 1893 ( N o . 292 M B ) , p. 3. 118Ibid., Oct. 21, 1893 ( N o . 292 M B ) , p. 3 ; Oct. 22, 1893 (No. 293), p. 2 ; Oct. 31, 1893 ( N o . 302 A B ) , p. 1. 119Ibid., Oct. 13, 1893 ( N o . 284 A B ) , p. 1; Oct. 18, 1893 ( N o . 289 M B ) , p. 2 ; Oct. 24, 1893 ( N o . 295 A B ) , p. 1; Oct. 25, 1893 ( N o . 296 M B ) , p. 2 ; Oct. 26, 1893 ( N o . 297 M B ) , p. 2 ; Oct. 31, 1893 No. 302 A B ) , p. 1; Nov. 3, 1893 ( N o . 305 A B ) , p. 1.

204

GERMAN AGRARIAN

POLITICS

The results of the election were known on November 7. 1 3 0 T h e Conservatives won 19 more seats than they had in 1888. T h e Free Conservatives lost 9 and the Center 8 seats. T h e Radicals were reduced from 31 in 1888 to only 20 in 1893. T w o independent candidates of the Farmers' League

were

elected. More than a third of the delegates chosen had not been members of the former diet. 121 The Poles made some gains, but not in proportion to their expectations. In Silesia most of the Centrist aristocrats, including Count Ballestrem and Baron Huene, were re-elected. 122 Stocker was also returned; but no Anti-Semites of Ahlwardt's type were chosen. 123 T h e Radical People's party was victorious in Berlin, and the Radicals again secured Breslau, the second largest city of Prussia. 1 2 4 Eugen Richter, defeated in Hagen, with which his name had been associated for many years, now became a representative of Berlin. 125 In the new house of delegates a Conservative-Clerical majority was still possible, though unlikely in view of the events of 1892. Nor would the government be obliged to depend upon the Center. The Right, including the two members of the Farmers' League, was but seven votes short of a majority. 128 Because the Right was in opposition to the government in the Reichstag, its strength in the legislature of the largest state of the Empire was likely to add to the government's difficulties. 120 Wippermann, 1893, ii, 88-89. 121 Of those chosen 276 were members of the former house; 157 were new (ibid.). 122 Allg. Ztg., Nov. 8, 1893 ( N o . 310 A B ) , p. 1. 123 Ibid., Nov. 8, 1893 ( N o . 310 A B ) , p. 1; Nov. 3, 1893 ( N o . 305 A B ) , p. 1. 124 Ibid. 125 Ibid., Nov. 8, 1893 ( N o . 310 A B ) , p. 1. 126Ibid., Oct. 31, 1893 ( N o . 302 A B ) , p. 1; Nov. 10, 1893 ( N o . 312), p. 2.

THE

FARMERS*

LEAGUE

IN

POLITICS

205

A COMPARISON o r ELECTION RESULTS FOB THE PRUSSIAN HOUSE or DELEGATES IN 1888 AND 1893

Parties Conservatives Free Conservatives Centrists Poles National Liberals Radical Union ) Radical People's party J Farmers' League Danes Guelphs Nonpartisan

1888

1893

130 68 99 15 86

0 2 2 0

149 59 91 18 90 6 14 2 2 1 1

433

433

31

These figures are taken from Wippermann, 1803, ii, 88-88. Schulthess gives slightly different figures, but he includes with the numbers belonging to the major parties those who usually voted with them (op. cit., 1893, p. 147). The AUgemeine Zeitung of November 10, 1893, reported that the newspapers disagreed over the election figures, as follows: Reichsameiger

Kreuzzeitung

Conservatives 148 145 144 Free Conservatives 62 65 66 It will be noted, however, that the Conservatives with the Farmers' League had 210 votes, as reported also by Wippermann (Allg. Ztg., Nov. 10, 1893 [No. 312], p. 2). According to Schulthess they had only 209 votes (op. cit., 1893, p. 147).

As these elections closed, it was apparent that the political situation had been altered by the events of the summer and autumn. Of the parties which had banded together to break the " cartel" both the Centrists and the Radicals had suffered losses. The Center was still the largest party in the Reichstag. Though party leadership was insecure for some time, it had passed definitely out of the hands of the Silesian aristocrats. As the new leader, Lieber, gradually strengthened his position in the party, the democratic influence became more pronounced. The gains made by the Poles and Social Democrats were looked upon with alarm by the Centrists and the parties

206

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POLITICS

of the Right. T h e spectacular gains which the Anti-Semites won in this election with the aid of the Farmers' League and the Conservatives were not entirely to the advantage of the latter. Gradually the support of the Conservatives was withdrawn. In fact, 1893 was the high point of the Anti-Semitic movement. A s an influence separate from the Conservative party it soon died down. The defeat of the Radicals was widely discussed in the press. " Not since the 1850's," said the Frankfurter Zeitung, " had the parliamentary representation of honest, solid liberalism reached such a low point." 127 For their failure Richter was blamed even by the Radicals themselves. T h e party never recovered from this defeat of 1893. The government's position was weakened by these elections. Of the parties which had co-opereated to defeat the " cartel," only Rickert's small group of Radicals was willing to vote for the military bill; and the government was forced to depend upon the Poles or the Anti-Semites to secure its passage. T h e government was in an even less favorable situation with respect to its financial measures. T h e very parties which opposed the military program—the Centrists, Richter's group of Radicals, and the Social Democrats—were the ones which the government was counting upon in its tariff legislation. Y e t t w o of these parties had suffered losses; and there was so much dissatisfaction with the tariff policy in the Centrist party that it could not be counted upon to give an undivided vote. It was soon evident that the government's majority in the commercial treaties was to be almost as close as in the military bill and that again small, insignificant parties or groups were to play a decisive role. 127 Wippermaiin, 1893).

1893, ii, 89 (quoting Frankfurter

Zeitung,

Nov. 8,

CHAPTER VIII T H E R U M A N I A N TREATY, 1893 ABOUT nine months after the formation of the Farmers' League, the commercial treaties with Rumania, Spain, and Serbia were ready for the Reichstag. All three treaties, like those with Austria and Italy, were to be in force until December 31, 1903. In the Spanish agreement Germany conceded the lowered rye and wine tariffs, reduced the duty on cork stoppers from 10 to 5 marks per 100 kilograms and granted 78 articles most-favored treatment. Spanish iron ore was kept on the free list. In return the Spanish government reduced some of its t a r i f f s — w h i c h it also placed on a most-favored basis—and granted most-favored treatment to 178 other items. The German government failed to secure the reduction of the Spanish duty on spirits desired by the agrarians. 1 T h e treaty was accepted by the German Reichstag after considerable objection had been voiced against it; it did not go into effect because it was rejected by the Spanish parliament. For a number of years thereafter Germany and Spain were engaged in a tariff war. Germany granted Serbia the agricultural tariff reductions which Austria had received and fixed its tariffs on plums and oilseeds (Ölfrüchte).2 Serbia stabilized its duties on numerous articles and lowered its general tariff of 1892. Included in this agreement were regulations which simplified and eased the trade between the t w o countries. Of the three treaties, the one with Rumania was considered the most important. A f t e r Rumania had put into effect its gen1 Reichstag, 1893-94, I. 58 (Stumm, Nov. 24, 1893). Spanish ore was considered an important article of import. 2 Lötz, loc. cit., p. 109. The former treaty with Serbia ran out on August 5. i893- Between June 25, 1893, and time when the new German-Serbian treaty was in force, Serbia gave Germany most-favored-nation treatment. The German government lacked the legal authority to accord Serbia like treatment during the same period. 2

207

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eral tariff of 1891, the German government found it difficult to negotiate a tariff agreement which would do more than stabilize those rather high rates. From July 11, 1891, until the new German-Rumanian commercial treaty was in force, German goods had to pay these rates even though on July i, 1892, Germany made a provisional grant to Rumania of the grain tariff reductions which Austria had received. All that Rumania conceded in return was most-favored-nation treatment for German goods and the promise that its industrial tariffs would not be increased. The German government consequently considered it something of a triumph when a commercial treaty which granted German industry some concessions was finally concluded with Rumania on October 21, 1893. Some of Germany's tariffs were kept at their former height, but Rumania received the agricultural duties which had been granted to Austria but only provisionally to Rumania. Rumania conceded to Germany tariff reductions on exports valued at 25 million francs and tariff freedom for exports valued at from 10 to 20 million francs. For the rest of Germany's exports Rumania fixed its tariffs. Railroad rails—an important item for Germany—were kept on the free list. Rumania's reduction of its tariff on woolen textiles from 150 to 135 lei per 100 kilograms was thought to be a considerable concession. But Rumania protected its felt, leather, and other textiles, which were just getting started, against " powerful foreign trade." 3 For months the German press had been so taken up with the discussion of a commercial treaty with Russia, that little attention had been paid to the one with Rumania, and its final conclusion went by almost unheralded.4 On January 30, 1892, 3 Reichstag, 1893-94, I, 58 ( S t u m m , Nov. 24, 1893). T h e chief German industries sharing in the export trade to Rumania were the Greizer woolen ware industry, the textile industry of Gera, Muhlhausen, Berlin, and Saxony (especially the Upper L a u s i t z ) , the Upper Silesian iron industry, and the Black Forest clock industry (Lotz, loc. cit., p. 109). 4 Allg. Ztg., October 26, 1893 ( N o . 297 A B ) , p. 1.

THE RUMANIAN

TREATY,

1893

20g

the Reichstag had empowered the federal council to extend to other countries in return for suitable advantages to Germany the tariff regulations and reductions—either in whole or in p a r t — w h i c h had been granted to Austria, Italy, and Belgium. O n the basis of this authority Rumania received the grain tariff reductions provisionally on July i, 1892. In November the federal council requested an extension of its authority in this matter to April 1, 1893, in view of the favorable turn which the treaty negotiations with Rumania were then taking. T h e government anticipated that a commercial treaty with Rumania would soon be laid before the Reichstag. Since the government put these two things together it was apparent that the grain tariff reductions would be included in the new Rumanian treaty. Y e t the representatives of agriculture made no protest. Instead they wanted the assurance of the government that this authority would be used for Spain and Rumania only—not for other states, and especially not for Russia. In March, 1893, the federal council requested the extension of its power to December 31, 1893; this time, however, its authority was specifically restricted to Spain and Rumania. T h e fact that the agrarians had failed to oppose these several grants of authority to the federal council led a Berlin correspondent of the Allgemeine Zeitung to think that the commercial treaty with Rumania could hardly be the subject of a great parliamentary battle. 6 But the Bund der Landwirte had left no doubt about its attitude toward the Rumanian treaty. 6 A n d by November 24 the pages of the Allgemeine Zeitung presented a very different estimate of the political situation. It w a s reported that the Conservatives would probably stand solidly against all three of the " small treaties " ; and that about three-quarters of the Imperialist party would do the same. In the National Liberal party there was a split in favor of the Spanish treaty and grave doubt about the acceptance of the Rumanian treaty. It was thought 5Ibid., Nov. 1, 1893 (No. 303 M B), pp. 1-2. 6 Ibid., October 26, 1893 (No. 297 A B), p. 1.

GERMAN AGRARIAN

2IO

POLITICS

that about 50 or 60 Centrists would vote against the Rumanian treaty and probably against all three. The Poles, it was said, would reject the treaties. Had these prognostications been correct, there would have been a majority against the Rumanian treaty. 7 A s the year 1893 wore on it became increasingly apparent that the opposition which developed against these treaties, particularly against the one with Rumania, was stimulated by the acute distress in agricultural districts. W h e n the federal council first received the authority to grant the tariff reductions which had been allowed to Austria, Italy, and Belgium wheat and rye prices were still high. Even when the council made use of its authority for Rumania, the price of both cereals was above normal. This was not the case in November, 1892, nor in March, 1893, when the federal council's powers were extended. 8 It will be noted that the average monthly price of wheat dropped 39 marks per metric ton and that of rye 45 marks between July and November, 1892. Probably not until late in 1893, when the import figures for Rumanian wheat and rye became available, did agriculturists begin to realize Rumania's importance as a competitor in cereals. During the debates on the Rumanian treaty the import figures for the first nine months of 1893 could be compared with the figures for the same period in 1892 and for 1890 and 1891. Germany imported from Russia 750,000 metric tons of rye in 1890 and 7Ibid., Nov. 24, 1893 (No. 326 A B ) , p. 2. 8 The average monthly prices in marks per metric ton for wheat and rye of good quality in the month when the federal council's powers were granted or used were as follows : 1892 Jan. July Nov.

Wheat 227 197 158

Rye

153

131

226 183 138

1893 Mar.

THE

RUMANIAN

TREATY,

1893

211

6 1 8 , 9 0 0 in 1 8 9 1 ; the rye imports from Rumania in those two years were 2 3 , 7 0 0 and 2 3 , 2 0 0 metric tons respectively.9 The year 1 8 9 2 was an abnormal one, when Germany did not have to import much cereal; even so, imports of wheat from R u mania were greatly increased. A comparison of the figures for 1 8 9 1 and 1 8 9 3 shows that Germany imported more than twice as much rye and over three times as much wheat from R u mania in the latter year. 1 0 The " small treaties" were laid before the Reichstag on November 16. After a week's recess the first reading began. 11 9 The government submitted no import statistics in its memorandum accompanying the treaties. These figures are from pages 38 and 39 of the committee report, cited by Bennigsen (Reichstag, 1893-94, I. 425 [Dec. 13, 1893]). 10 Dade gives the following figures for the wheat and rye imports from Russia and Rumania in the early 1890's: Russian grain in tons Wheat Rye 1890 370323 750,461 1891 515,212 618,985 1892 257,299 123,377 1893 21,636 95,920 1894 280,594 533,449 1895 678,203 841,974 (Dade, loc. cit., pp. 71, 77).

Rumanian grain in tons Wheat Rye 61,800 23,744 42,853 23,300 91,785 26,818 143,578 52,740 142,953 88,442 127,154 93,843

11 The first reading of the treaties began on November 23 and was continued on November 24 and 25; on the latter date they were referred to a committee of 21 members, over which Dr. Hammacher presided. On December 6 this committee reported 12 to 8 in favor of the Rumanian and 13 to 7 in favor of the Serbian treaty. The Polish member of the committee was absent when these votes were taken. When the second reading began on December 12, Manteuffel, the leader of the Conservative party, moved to have the Rumanian treaty considered first, since it called forth the most interest, and then the treaty with Spain. This motion was carried after the National Liberals and the Center had indicated their approval. A roll-call vote on the Rumanian treaty was taken at the end of the second reading on December 13. The second reading of the Spanish and the Serbian treaties was on December 14. The next day the third reading and the final voting on the three treaties took place (Reichstag, 1893-94, I, 90, 385 [Manteuffel, Dec. 12], 386, 441-42, 471'» Allg. Ztg., Dec. 8, 1893 [No. 340 M B], p. 3).

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GERMAN

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As in 1891 there was diversity of opinion regarding the need of a committee. Immediately before the session the Economic Union ( W i r t s c h a j t l i c h e Vereinigung) met under the chairmanship of Ploetz and decided to vote in favor of the Conservative motion to refer the treaties to a committee.12 The Social Democrats and the Radicals were ready to accept the treaties and were against a committee. For them the open discussion was an opportunity to bring their views to the attention of the people. Rickert and Richter of the Radical party asserted that the treaties were the logical consequence of the earlier ones and that even those who had voted against the latter must vote for the new ones.13 At least, said Richter, they were a consequence of the provisional concessions to Rumania." The Centrist and National Liberal spokesmen refused to accept this reasoning. Lieber denied that there was any compulsion to vote for the new treaties. It was rather the duty of the delegates to decide about them on their merits after weighing their advantages and disadvantages. For tactical reasons the leaders of both the middle parties wished to avoid the appearance of accepting the treaties without sufficient study. More votes would be gained than lost by delay. In any case LimburgStirum's motion had a majority in the house,15 for the Imperialists and the Poles were likewise in favor of a committee. Lieber thought besides that there would be a stormy meeting and that the tedious airing of the pros and cons in open ses12 Ibid., Nov. 24, 1893 ( N o . 326 A B ) , p. 2. 13 Reichstag, 1893-94, I, 24-25 (Rickert, Nov. 23), 60-61 (Richter, N o v . 24), 82 (Meyer, Nov. 25), 54 (Schoenlank, Nov. 24). 14 Ibid., pp. 60-61 (Richter, Nov. 24). 15Ibid., pp. 29 (Lieber, Nov. 23), 44 (Paasche, Nov. 24), 74-76 (Hammacher, Nov. 25) ; Allg. Ztg., Nov. 24, 1893 ( N o . 326 A B ) , p. 2. Stumm like Lieber denied that logic compelled the delegates to accept the treaties just because they had taken the others (Reichstag, 1893-94, I, 5 5 ) .

THE RUMANIAN

TREATY,

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sion would hardly facilitate the conclusion of other commercial treaties. 16 A t first the Centrist leader would declare himself neither for nor against the new treaties. He called those of 1891 " the great deed of the new era " ; he believed that they had strengthened the Triple Alliance and had preserved the 3.50-mark tariff against the risk of temporary or permanent repeal. Nevertheless he advocated a thorough discussion of the new treaties in committee in view of conditions in agricultural districts. The fact that the advantages anticipated for industry from the earlier treaties were not as great as had been expected made such a careful examination even more desirable. He questioned in particular the extension of the Italian grape and wine duties to Spain. He wanted to know what effect it would have upon German wine growers. 17 It was obvious that Lieber was trimming, for he was in a dilemma. A s leader of the largest party in the Reichstag he had an opportunity to bargain with the government; and he hoped to win important concessions for the Catholics. T o accomplish this end it was necessary to keep party members in line. In the summer Lieber had succeeded in preventing Centrists from joining the Bund der Landwirte. But his party had lost 13 seats in the June election, some to the Lower Bavarian Peasants' League. In Bavaria and in other sections of southern Germany the constituents of the party were known to be disaffected. In Silesia its position was insecure. Even while the debates on the new treaties were in progress convincing proof was received that in some parts of western Germany Catholic groups were in sympathy with the aims of the Farmers' League. It was known that the Westphalian Peasants' Union, which had a member16 Ibid., pp. 28-29 (Lieber, Nov. 23), 86 (Dziembowski-Pomian, Nov. 25). Stumm was for the treaties; Kardorff was against them, but had no objection to the committee. The party as a whole wanted to withhold its decision regarding them until after the committee discussion (ibid., pp. 55, 60 [Stumm, Nov. 24], 78 [Kardorff, Nov. 25]). 17Ibid., pp. 29-30 (Lieber, Nov. 23).

214

GERMAN AGRARIAN

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ship of 25,000, had voted shortly before to take an energetic stand against the commercial treaties. Telegrams endorsing the League's stand received from this and other organizations of western Germany were read aloud to members of the Reichstag by Ploetz. Because Lieber failed to take a definite position in respect to the " small treaties " he was twitted by both the Conservatives and the Social Democrats. Kanitz suggested as an explanation of Lieber's indecision that he could not quite ignore the vote of a great part of the Catholic population in the western provinces. Schoenlank, a Social Democrat, called attention to the do-ut-des policy of the Center and advised Lieber to refer the commercial treaties to a committee on the Jesuit law. " If Paris is worth a mass," he said, " the Jesuit law is certainly worth the commercial treaties." 18 The National Liberals were not agreed in their attitude toward the commercial treaties. Some had joined the Farmers' League, and had presumably committed themselves to a rejection of the treaties—the " small treaties " as well as the one with Russia. T h e large-scale industrialists in the party and their representatives in the Reichstag were pushing the government's tariff policy. T h e city dwellers of various professions and occupations who accounted for a goodly proportion of the party's adherents naturally had the consumer's point of view regarding tariffs on food. But in southern Germany the party's support came almost wholly from agricultural districts and they opposed the new tariff policy. The first speaker for the National Liberals, Dr. Paasche, was a professor of political science. H e had joined the Farmers' League. H e acknowledged that in many respects the earlier treaties did not satisfy his political friends and that perhaps too great an effort had been made to strengthen Germany's political allies. Y e t on the whole the treaties were a great step 18Ibid., Nov. 24). sought its pp. 72-73;

pp. 31 (Kanitz, Nov. 23), 418 (Ploetz, Deo. 13), 55 (Schoenlank, The law against the Jesuits dated from 1872. The Center now repeal. It was not repealed until 1903, under Bulow (Kardorff, Wippermann, 1894, i, 176-77).

T H E R U M A N I A N TREATY, 1 8 9 3

215

in advance. For himself and those like him who had at first greeted the so-called agrarian movement with enthusiasm, he expressed regret that the League had seen fit to adopt a policy of agitation and exaggeration. He agreed with Rickert that it was no great misfortune for the nation if here and there a large landowner who was too heavily indebted had to give up his lands (Scholle). But the danger at the moment was much greater and more wide-spread. Many peasants were threatened with loss of lands which had come down to them from their fathers and grandfathers. This solid peasantry and small ownership—the backbone of the German state—had a right to exist. He was convinced that the protection which German agriculture then had must be preserved. But he was equally sure and he hoped that his political friends would come to the same conviction, that the treaties did not demand " a new sacrifice of agriculture " for it had had since 1892 the tariffs which were being established in the new treaties. This statement by a member of the Farmers' League caused great excitement in the Reichstag. 19 During the autumn the non-agrarian members of the National Liberal party had carried on a spirited controversy in the columns of the National Zeitung with the Kreuzzeitung concerning the extent to which National Liberals had bound themselves to vote according to the wishes of the Farmers' League in the coming sessions of the Reichstag.20 It is possible that the government had exerted some pressure upon Paasche as an official in the employment of the state. In any case his speech was the cause of a great commotion outside the Reichstag the next day. Later in the same session Marschall took Paasche under protection. Ploetz regretted that this action had been necessary. He declared, however, that the agricultural electors and the members of the League had full confidence that all those who had voluntarily 19 Reichstag,

1893-94, I. 40-43 ( N o v . 24).

2 0 A l l g . Ztg., Oct. u 13 (No. 284), p. 1.

( N o . 282), p. 2; Oct. 12 ( N o . 283), p. 1 ;

Oct

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GERMAN AGRARIAN

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given their word before the elections, would fulfill their promises and that not a single one would " adopt such a sophistical interpretation " as Paasche. 21 Because of the excitement which the latter's speech aroused, Hammacher, the next spokesman for the National Liberals, explained that neither he nor Paasche, who were in favor of the treaties, represented the sentiment of the party as a whole. The others would postpone decision regarding the treaties until after the discussion in committee.22 In the Imperialist party almost the same attitude prevailed. The majority would wait until after the committee finished its work before passing judgment. Meanwhile two of its members—Schultz-Lupitz and Stumm—were supporting the government. Because the former had already expressed his disapproval of the League's methods, it was perhaps inevitable that friction should develop between him and Ploetz, It will be recalled that Schultz-Lupitz and Ploetz had come to words shortly after the foundation of the Farmers' League. At that time Schultz-Lupitz had entreated Ploetz not to carry on the type of agitation which appealed merely to the lower instincts. Rather he urged that Ploetz give the League spiritual and idealistic aims in the broad field that was open before it. And Schultz-Lupitz had suggested a whole series of practical technical and social problems to which the League might devote its energies. He now deplored the fact that the League had seen fit to follow a different course. A violent clash between the two men had come in the previous autumn after Schultz-Lupitz's withdrawal from the Farmers' League. He gave as his reason for this the attack which Wangenheim made upon the chancellor. Schultz-Lupitz's desertion and his justification of his action were denounced in no uncertain terms by the leaders of the Bund der Landwirte. But the Free Conservative Post, 21 Reichstag, 1893-94. I. 74 (Hammacher, Nov. 25), 71, 73 (Marschall, Nov. 25), 45 (Ploetz, Nov. 24), 419 (Ploetz, Dec. 13). 22 Ibid., p. 74 (Nov. 25).

T H E R U M A N I A N TREATY,

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217

which had come under the control of Stumm, defended SchultzLupitz. Many of the details of this controversy were explained to the delegates assembled to discuss the " small treaties." Schultz-Lupitz then said that he recognized the seriousness of the agricultural depression. But like Paasche he indicated that he would vote for the treaties because he did not foresee that they would bring increased injury to domestic agriculture. 28 H e evidently considered that his withdrawal from the League had freed him from the obligation to fulfill his pledges. No doubt the government and some of the National Liberal and Imperialist leaders hoped that the example set by Paasche and Schultz-Lupitz would be followed by other members of the Bund der Landwirte. The efforts of Stumm, the iron magnate, to conciliate the opposition and at the same time to strengthen the position of the government will be described later. Only a small fraction of his party stood behind him in the end; the great majority sided with Kardorff against the treaties. During the debates chief attention was focused upon the Rumanian treaty. Against it the opposition brought its full force to bear. This opposition included, as already indicated, some National Liberals and Centrists. But the most vigorous direction of the parlimentary battle against the treaties was in the hands of the Conservative parties. Some of the arguments used against the Austrian treaty were reiterated in more cogent form; some special objections were raised against the new treaties. And amongst Conservatives there was little evidence of a desire to stand well with the government. From the beginning, they said, the government had assumed that the agricultural tariffs were too high and " the opportunity to lower them was gladly used." Why, they asked, had the reciprocal concessions not come from industry? They contested the assertion of Marschall, the foreign secretary, that 23Ibid., pp. 45 (Ploetz, Nov. 24), 87, 89 (Schultz-Lupitz, Nov. 2 5 ) ;

Allg. Ztg., Nov. 4, 1893 (No. 306 M B), p. 2.

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agriculture would benefit if industry flourished. If the industrialists provided themselves only with articles of food and breadstuffs from other countries, then agriculture had merely a secondary advantage from industrial prosperity in western and southwestern Germany. The conditions about which industrialists complained—insufficient markets, decaying business, and strikes—had been caused, the agrarians claimed, by the deterioration of the domestic market. The reduction of the agricultural tariffs had increased agricultural distress and consequently had decreased the purchasing power of the agricultural population, which was still the largest consumer group in the German state. The Foreign Secretary's statement should be turned about, said a member of the Imperialist party: if agriculture was flourishing, industry would benefit also, and small industry and commerce as well.24 It had been an error, it was asserted, to join commercial policy with political treaties. A political alliance so purchased was nothing more than a modern form of subsidy treaty. It could scarcely be claimed that Germany's relations with Austria had improved since the conclusion of the Austrian commercial treaty. It had been wrong for the government to take the initiative in 1891; it should have held to the "autonomous " tariffs and let the other states get along by themselves. If war had come, Germany would have been successful, and any injury which industry might have received would have been healed.28 After deciding upon the new system, the government had been in too great haste to bring about commercial agreements " at any cost " ; if it had waited it could have obtained important concessions. The failure to do so was not the fault of Germany's negotiators: limited as they were by the government's instructions, they could have done no more " if they 24 Reichstag, 1893-94, I, 15 (Limburg-Stirum, Nov. 23), 31-32 (Kanitz, Nov. 24), 46 (Ploetz, Nov. 24), 430 (Kalmring, Dec. 1 3 ) . 25 Ibid., pp. 16 (Limburg-Stirum, Nov. 23), 68 (Hammerstein, Nov. 2 5 ) .

THE

RUMANIAN

TREATY,

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2ig

had been Talleyrands at every single place." Since that time G e r m a n y had been almost forced to conclude treaties with other countries. T h e latter had been able to profit by Germany's mistake, because they knew that G e r m a n y could not very well withhold the concessions granted to A u s t r i a in 1891. 2 6 If the agricultural concessions which had been granted to A u s t r i a so that it might be strengthened economically were now extended to R u m a n i a and other countries, A u s t r i a would have enjoyed the differential on grain for only t w o of the twelve years for which it had fixed its industrial tariffs. K a n i t z recalled that he had prohesied in 1891 a critical situation with R u s s i a as a result of the new policy. A c t u a l l y a tariff w a r had been the outcome. T h e agrarians generally agreed that if the Reichstag accepted the treaties with Rumania,

Serbia,

and

Spain, it would be difficult to deny the same agricultural concessions to the Russian negotiators—concessions, which had already been granted to most European states and also to the United

States.

Therefore

Kanitz

proposed

that

Germany

should come to an agreement with A u s t r i a " to annul the A u s trian treaty of

1891

by common consent." T h e n

Germany

would get " out of the period of provisions and conflicts and return to freedom, to autonomy,

in the commercial

field."

Other Conservatives were emphatically of the opinion that the new treaties should be rejected. If industry should suffer any hardship on that account, they would regret it, but they could not on that account accept treaties which would bring new injuries to agriculture. 2 7 T h e Conservatives criticized the treaties also from the financial angle. T h e cost of the treaties w a s more than the government had anticipated. Imperial income would be more and more reduced as the lowered agricultural duties were extended to other countries. T h e deficit would have to be met by successive t a x levies. T h i s w a s an especially telling argument, for 26Ibid., pp. 13-14 (Limburg-Stirum, Nov. 23), 32 (Kanitz, Nov. 23). 27 Ibid., pp. 32, 34, 35 (Kanitz, Nov. 23), 69 (Hammerstein, Nov. 25), 78 (Kardorff, Nov. 25), 388 (Limburg-Stirum, Dec. 12).

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in the early 'nineties greatly increased expenditures for the army and the new social legislation had swollen Imperial budgets. Even as the treaties were being considered, new budget bills were before the Reichstag. In July the new army bill had passed the Reichstag only after Caprivi had expressly stated that the government would not introduce a beer or an alcohol tax, and would not burden agriculture further. Only " the stronger shoulders " would be asked to bear the new taxes, he said.28 Instead of these earlier proposals to meet the increased government costs and to offset a temporary loss of income from tariffs, the government now had in mind four expedients—increases in the tobacco, wine, and exchange (or stamp) taxes, and a rearrangement of the intricate financial agreement between the Reich and the separate states. Additional taxes on tobacco and wine were opposed in southern and southwestern Germany where wine-growing and tobacco manufacturing were important. 29 Furthermore the South German states feared that the loss of income from the tariffs would jeopardize the " Franckenstein clause," and thereby their control over Imperial finances. This in turn would affect the federal character of the state. Protests of special groups, debates in the state Landtage, and newspaper articles kept the issue alive until the financial reform had been thoroughly worked out.30 Aside from these general criticisms of the new policy, the discussion of the Rumanian treaty revolved around two prin28 Kardorff, p. 283. 29 The proposed increase in the tobacco tax would be to the advantage of the tobacco growers, but there was strenuous opposition to it on the part of tobacco manufacturers. 30 This was part of a comprehensive financial reform which Miquel worked out chiefly for Prussia, and introduced in separate bills during the early 1890's. Through the increases in the wine, tobacco, and stamp taxes, the government hoped to raise 100 million marks, 60 million marks for the increased cost of the army, and the rest for a special fund so that the Empire would not have to make greatly increased demands on the individual states. Miquel anticipated that as the population grew, the temporary deficit in tariff receipts would be more than offset because of increased imports (Geiger, p. 94, note 258).

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cipal questions: whether the lowered grain tariffs in the treaties would injure agriculture, and conversely whether industry would be benefited by them. The pros and cons of the first topic were thrashed out at length. The government and those who wanted the treaties accepted rested their case chiefly upon the argument used by Dr. Paasche, the renegade from the Farmers' League: that agriculture would receive no added injury from the Rumanian treaty because those tariff reductions were already in force under the provisional agreement of 1892. But the government and party spokesmen found it difficult to convince the agrarians that the new treaties would not affect agricultural prices. Marschall claimed that the agrarians were demanding that the state guarantee a minimum price for agricultural products. This he considered ridiculous. He added that he had no more idea than anyone else what effect the grain tariff would have upon the domestic price. But he maintained that there was no relation between the Austrian treaty and the low prices then prevailing in Germany. He explained that when Germany was compelled in 1 8 9 1 to import 1 3 per cent of its rye and 30 per cent of its wheat it had been swamped with foreign grain; but the price had not been cheap, for " no foreigner was so malicious as to offer us cheap grain when he could sell it to us for a high price." On the other hand, he said, when in 1892 Germany had a rich harvest and could provide all but 2 per cent of its needs in rye and 18 per cent of its requirements in wheat the price of grain was falling day by day. In 1892 even the 3.50 mark tariff had done its duty in holding off the speculative importation of foreign grain; grain imports in 1892 had been the lowest since the introduction of the grain tariffs. 8 1 T o this reasoning Limburg-Stirum replied: " N o one of you will be able to assert that tariffs have a tendency to depress domestic prices; and that, gentlemen, is the only es31 Reichstag, 1893-94, I, 18-20 (Marschall, Nov. 23, 1893). While Bismarck was chancellor it was often argued by those who favored protection that the foreign countries paid the tariff. But during the debates on the Austrian treaty this view was expressed only once (Lotz, loc. cit., p. 77).

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sential which I set down here as indubitable: grain tariffs have a tendency to keep the domestic price at a certain level." 82 His standpoint was identical to that of the Freisinn and the Social Democrats. Both parties campaigned in 1890 against the food tariffs, because they increased the price of food. And Reichensperger of the Center party expressed a similar view in 1891 when he said that conditions were not favorable for a " high tariff " when the price of bread was high. 33 Repeated reference was made to the " free trade policy " of the government and to the fact that Caprivi's and Marschall's words won approval only from the Radicals and the Social Democrats. According to some Conservatives more than a weakening of the protective tariff system was taking place; the grain tariff was ceasing to give protection. This view was expressed in the meetings of the Economic Union on December 11 and 12. Von Staudy, a Conservative from East Prussia, considered that the industrial tariffs had always been much higher than the agricultural tariffs, and that the agricultural tariff of 1887 at 3 marks could hardly be considered a protective tariff, but at most only a financial tariff. " The commercial policy now inaugurated brings about free trade and therefore must be fought on principle." 34 A similar position was taken by Lutz of Bavaria: " W e had adequate protective tariffs against America; they have been taken away from us." 35 In connection with prices, the currency question was brought up from time to time. The bimetallists argued that there was a shortage of money in circulation, since gold provided an insufficient medium of exchange. The resulting increased purchasing power of gold had a depressing effect upon the price of agricultural produce; creditors gained but indebted landowners lost as gold rose in value. Motions were already before the 32 Reichstag, 3 3 Ibid.,

1893-94, I. 3&7 ( D e c . 12, 1893).

1890-92, V , 3310-11 ( D e c . i o , 1891).

34 Allg. Ztg., Dec. 14, 1893 (No. 346 2d M B ) , p. 5. 3 5 Reichstag,

1893-94, I . 4 3 5 ( D e c . 13, 1893).

T H E R U M A N I A N TREATY,

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223

Reichstag which provided not merely for greater use of silver in Germany, but also for the working out of an international agreement to rehabilitate silver. Every country was to have in circulation a fixed amount of silver per head of population. Until such an understanding was worked out, said the bimetallists, Germany would often be at a disadvantage in its foreign trade. For when the value of a foreign country's currency fell in relation to gold, imports into that country would be hampered, but exports from that country would be facilitated. The bimetallists pointed out that after the conclusion of the commercial treaty of 1891 Italy put into effect a law of 1881 requiring that the tariff be collected in gold. This measure, said Limburg-Stirum, had increased Italy's tariffs by 14 or 1 5 per cent. Marschall acknowledged that this was true. On the other hand, he said, the earlier depreciation of Italy's currency to 1 5 per cent below par had meant a lowering of the tariffs for Germany. He informed the Reichstag that Austria-Hungary had paper currency, but that it had just passed a law to introduce gold currency; the members could therefore assume that Austria's gold premium was only temporary. Marschall also corrected statements which had been made relative to R u mania's currency: it was not depreciated; Rumania had pure gold currency and was in a sound economic condition.36 On previous occasions when the currency question had arisen, Caprivi and Marschall had treated the subject with derision. Now Marschall went so far as to say that it was a matter of great importance. Both he and Stumm—who, as already shown, was an advocate of the gold standard—admitted that the repeal of the Sherman Act in the United States and the suspension of silver coinage in India had changed the situation. With the adoption of gold currency by the whole civilized world, said Stumm, there might be too short a gold coverage and debtors' obligations might mount disproportionately, 36 Ibid., pp. 78 (Kardorff, Nov. 25, 1893), 14-15 (Limburg-Stirum, Nov. 23. 1893)1 21 (Marschall, Nov. 23).

224

GERMAN AGRARIAN

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thereby causing serious calamities. Limburg-Stirum and K a r dorff insisted that something must be done at once. Kardorff wanted Germany to take the initiative in bringing about a regulation of the currency by international agreement. If the government would give assurance through the Chancellor that this would be done, Kardorff thought the treaties would g o through without opposition. Agriculture w a s convinced, he said, that this was the only way it could be helped. 87 The government and those who supported its policy used a second argument to show that agriculture would not be injured by the new treaties. Whether or not the new treaties were accepted, they said, all grain would henceforth be imported at the lower tariff rate of 3.50 marks. F o r the world market at London determined the price of grain, and London was " swamped with grain from all sides." Germany did not have to ask whether Rumania could supply the " few thousand t o n s " needed. T h e gates had once for all been opened w i d e — " not merely to Austria and Italy, but to North and South America, to Australia and East India." 38 F r o m the 30 million hundredweight of grain in the English Channel, said Stumm, it was " the simplest manipulation in the world " to separate and send to English ports the 1,200,000 needed for Germany. Since no certificates of origin were demanded of England, a corresponding quantity of American wheat marked for English ports could then be directed to Germany. If the agrarians were unwilling to admit this possibility, they must concede that a substitution could be effected by a simple unlading in London, Antwerp, or Rotterdam. A s soon as Rumania had a differential tariff, the same thing could be done in Bulgaria as in the English Channel, for Germany had most-favored-nation treaties with Bulgaria and Turkey. 8 9 37Ibid., pp. 15 (Limburg-Stirum, Nov. 23), 21 (Marschall, Nov. 23), 57 (Stumm, Nov. 24), 78 (Kardorff, Nov. 25), 388 (Limburg-Stirum, Dec. 12). 38 Ibid., pp. 43-44 (Dr. Paasche, Nov. 24). 39Ibid.,

pp. 59 (Nov. 24), 398-99 (Dec. 12).

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TREATY,

1893

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This argument, though impressive, was not likely to allay the fears of the agrarians. Well might they ask how prices could help being affected, if grain from every part of the world was swamping the London market as Paasche said. Bennigsen sought to comfort the grain producers by predicting the time when America would no longer be able to support overproduction in grain. L u t z thought that time would be 20, 50 or 100 years hence. 40 T o forestall further protest, Stumm pointed out that the argument did not apply to a commercial treaty with Russia, because rye was not a world commodity like wheat. Disquieted though they were, the Conservatives and others were not to be outdone by the logic of their opponents. They asked why Rumania set such store upon obtaining the agricultural concessions. Mirbach thought there was no reason to suppose the Rumanians were foolish. If they themselves placed great importance upon securing the grain concessions, which would make direct import possible for them, it was also true that the price would be affected by grain importations which could come to Germany without detour. 41 T o support their contention that agriculture would be injured by the Rumanian treaty, the agrarians offered three special arguments. T h e first had to do with navigation on the Danube. If the Rumanian treaty should be accepted, grain could be brought up that river in great quantities at a lower rate than it could g o via the Black Sea and the Mediterranean to ports in western Germany. The government, Stumm, and Lieber contested this claim, because the freight rate upstream was more than the sea rate via Amsterdam and Antwerp to Mannheim; furthermore, it took five or six weeks to make the trip up the Danube to Regensburg. Shipping on the river was not heavy, said Lieber, because it was dry in summer, and had ice in winter. But Dr. Schaedler, a Centrist from Bavaria, 40Ibid., pp. 427 (Bennigsen, Dec. 13), 435 (Lutz, Dec. 13). 41 Ibid., pp. 59 (Stumm, Nov. 24), 401 (Mirbach, Dec. 12). Gräfe of the Reform party presented the same view as Mirbach (ibid., p. 434 [Dec. 13]).

226

GERMAN AGRARIAN

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thought the freight rates on the Danube might be lowered; and the agrarians were sure that if the treaties should be accepted a way would be found to bring the grain upstream. Sigl of the Lower Bavarian Peasants' League claimed that there was already an agreement with the Danube Steamship Society, which provided that if navigation became impossible, a carload of foreign grain might be transported from Passau to Regensburg for 20 marks. Bavarian grain, on the other hand had to pay 65 marks. 42 Schaedler of Bavaria said that Rumania had already become a more important competitor of German agriculture than was generally supposed. The trade statistics showed a great increase in Rumanian imports. Imports from Austria stood far behind those from little Rumania. He questioned the correctness of the grain statistics relative to imports from Austria and Rumania in the years prior to 1892. Since the certificates of origin had been unnecessary under the " autonomous " system, and were not put into operation until the new treaties became effective, he regarded the reported decreases in grain imports from Austria and the increases from Rumania with suspicion. He believed that formerly much Austrian grain was not distinguished from that of the hinterland. Consequently the Bavarian peasant would be hit by these supplies of grain from Austria, Serbia, and Rumania. 43 The first two arguments indicated how much the farmers of southern Germany feared the competition of Rumanian grain. The third argument concerned farmers of the eastern provinces fully as much as those of the South. Since Rumania had no tariff against Russian grain, Germany would be flooded with Russian rye if the Rumanian commercial treaty should be accepted. Kardorff asked the delegates if they thought the certificates of origin would be handled correctly in Rumania. He 42Ibid., pp. 398 (Stumm, Dec. 12) (Schaedler), 415 (Lieber, Dec. 13), 422 (Marschall, Dec. 13), 437 (Lutz), 438 (Sigl). 43 Ibid., pp. 396-97 (Schaedler, Dec. 12).

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227

doubted whether they were administered properly at the Dutch border, because the rye imports reported from Holland were far greater than that country produced. Limburg-Stirum agreed with Kardorff that it would be easy to smuggle Russian grain into Germany through Rumania. Both Russia and Rumania used the same kind of grain ships—so-called Schlepps—on the Pruth, the common waterway between the two countries. Marschall denied stoutly that any Russian grain had entered Germany without paying the 7.50-mark tariff, but when the Russian treaty came up for consideration the government felt it would be difficult to maintain permanently a higher rate for Russian than for Austrian, Rumanian, and Dutch grain.44 This was because Russian grain was being sent more and more to Rumania, Austria, and the Netherlands to be made into flour. Article 7 of the supplementary protocol to the Rumanian treaty stated expressly that only flour manufactured from Rumanian grain would receive the reduced flour tariff. But this would be a difficult matter to control.45 Party leaders in general agreed that industry had very little advantage from the Austrian treaty. But this was not their opinion of the new treaties, for the government had sought the advice of industrialists while the treaties were being negotiated. The iron, cotton, and woolen industries appeared to be fully satisfied with the provisions of the Rumanian treaty. It was estimated that the Rumanian market was worth 100 million, the Spanish 40 to 50 million, and the Serbian several million marks. The delegates were warned that these markets which German merchants and industrialists had worked up against the heavy competition of France and England must not be lost " through immoderate tariff increases." Though agriculturists tried to prove that industry would have no advantage from the treaties, industrialists were exerting every effort to gain their acceptance, in order that Germany might secure 44 Ibid., pp. 72 (Marschall, Nov. 25), 76 (Kardorff, Nov. 25), 388 (Limburg-Stirum, Dec. 12), 391 (Marschall, Dec. 12). 45 Lotz, loc. cit., p. i n and note.

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these important outlets for its goods in Spain and southeastern Europe. 44 Rickert, who represented the Radicals of Danzig, where commercial interests were all-important, came to the aid of the manufacturers. A state with an export trade amounting to 3,000 million marks, 2,000 millions of which represented manufactured goods, had to proceed cautiously and reasonably, he said, even with small states and must not " nearly always threaten with the saber." N o other state had been able to dissuade Rumania from holding fast to its general tariff. Because the German government was successful in this, Germany could take first place ahead of England in the export trade to R u mania and could work with Austria under equal conditions. 47 W h e n the debates began the government and many party spokesmen refused to believe that agriculture would really suffer from the " small treaties." Some thought the agrarians were fighting for concessions; others believed they were preparing for the struggle against the Russian treaty; Marschall claimed that unless they could prove the truth of their assertion that the the treaties would injure agriculture, they were merely agitating. 48 But as speaker after speaker testified to the distress in rural districts, it became evident that the representatives of agriculture were really serious in their opposition to the treaties. 49 Their resistance produced, as the debates continued, a 46 Reichstag, 1893-94, I, 40, 44 ( P a a s c h e , N o v . 24), 58-59 ( S t u m m , N o v . 24), 74-75 (Hammacher, N o v . 25), 416 (Berlepsch, Dec. 13). Hammacher stressed Rumania's sound economic condition: it had 3,000 kilometers of railroad along the Danube to the harbors of Konstanza and Braila; it had 30,000 kilometers of h i g h w a y ; and its budget balanced with a surplus (ibid., pp. 74-75). A n industrialist of the National Liberal party w a s outside during the debates lobbying for the treaties (ibid., pp. 432-33 [Gräfe, Dec. 13]). 47 Ibid., pp. 26-27 (Rickert, N o v . 23, 1893). 48Ibid., pp. 27 (Rickert, N o v . 23), 53 (Schoenlank, N o v . 24), 63 ( R i c h t e r ) , 71 (Marschall, N o v . 25), 427 (Bennigsen, Dec. 13), 82-85 (Boeckel, N o v . 25). 49Ibid., pp. 33 (Kanitz, N o v . 23), 78 (Kardorff, N o v . 25), 86 ( D z i e m b o w s k i - P o m i a n ) , 396-97 (Schaedler, Dec. 12), 429 (Kalmring, Dec. 13), 433 ( R a d z i w i l l ) , 435 ( L u t z ) , 438-39 ( S i g l ) .

THE

RUMANIAN

TREATY,

2 2

1893

9

greater degree of sharpness between big business and agriculture. Industry wanted to preserve the bond of friendship with agriculture—provided, of course, that it could do so without sacrificing the treaties. Stumm and Bennigsen hoped to persuade the agrarians. S t u m m ' s statements regarding the currency have already been noted. H e agreed with the agrarians that for agriculture and industry the domestic market w a s more important than export. H e considered the interests of both identical. Questions which separated them, such as, the fact that agriculture raised industrial wages, ought to be kept in the background. It w a s the large cities, he held, which increased the w a g e s af both occupations. D i f f e r i n g a shade from Caprivi he professed to believe that for political and economic reasons agriculture should be given first place unconditionally in the life of the state. Furthermore he boldly asserted that reducing the grain tariff in the A u s t r i a n treaty from 5 to 3.50 marks had been a bad economic mistake. H e reminded the agrarians that he had protested in 1891 against the reduction. H o w e v e r , he regarded K a n i t z ' s proposal that Germany ask Austria to revise its commercial treaty as impracticable: it w a s better to hold fast to the 3.50 mark tariff, for just as there w a s the agitation of the Farmers' League, it w a s conceivable that there could be agitation from the other side, with the same or greater success for the A n t i - C o r n T a r i f f League. Then if the opposition should be too severe the government would fall into the hands of free traders. 6 0 Representatives of agriculture said they still desired to cooperate with industry, but on equal terms. A n d the Conservatives were not to be caught by Stumm's professions of good will or by his criticism of the tariff policy of 1891. H a m m e r stein reminded S t u m m that he had not agreed to vote against the

new

treaties.

To

the

latter's contention

that

100,000

50 Ibid., pp. 55-57 ( S t u m m , Nov. 24). Caprivi had said that it was a question of etiquette whether agriculture or industry should be given first place.

230

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workers were interested in the export to Rumania, Mirbach parried with 6,000,000 agricultural workers who would be injured if the treaties were accepted. 51 A s Stumm and Bennigsen alternately threatened and sought to conciliate agriculture, further evidences of friction developed. Richter and the Social Democrats tried to widen the breach. T h e Radical leader said that the iron tariffs, which he had been fighting for twenty years, injured agriculture, and that the solidarity of Stumm's interests with agriculture was by no means as great as the latter liked to represent. Schoenlank of the Social Democratic party hoped the day would come when those around Krupp and Stumm would cross swords with those around Kardorff and Mirbach. Then perhaps a political follower of Hermann Wagener would arise to thunder again against the robber barons sitting behind their high chimneys. All that would come about when the government had been compelled to lower and gradually remove the agrarian tariffs. H e warned the members of the Farmers' League that their organization was weak and insignificant beside the Central Association of German Industrialists. " If Stumm and Krupp and so forth throw down the gauntlet before you, you will see that in spite of all their knightliness you will be thrown to the ground in this tournament." 82 W h e n on the last day of the debates Herbert Bismarck spoke against the treaties, he expressed his regret that the new commercial policy had driven a wedge between industry and agriculture. W i t h a witty reference to Stumm and K a r dorff he mildly suggested that they drop their differences. 63 51 Ibid., pp. 67 (Hammerstein, N o v . 25), 60 (Stumm, (Mirbach, Dec. 12), 435 (Lutz, D e c . 13).

N o v . 24),

401

52Ibid., pp. 60 (Richter, N o v . 24), 52, 431-32 (Schoenlank, N o v . 24 and Dec. 13). 53 Herbert Bismarck made the following reference to the leaders of the Imperialist party: " Stumm und Kardorff H a n d in Hand, Alles sonst aus Rand und Band." (Kardorff, p. 285; Reichstag,

1893-94, I, 476 [ H . Bismarck, Dec. 15, 1893]).

THE

RUMANIAN

TREATY,

1893

23I

The remarks of Herbert Bismarck and others and the votes on the treaties made it clear that the pendulum had swung far since 1879. Before that time the agriculturists like the representatives of commerce and trade were ardent free traders. In 1879 a change had come which brought agriculture and industry together in support of the protective tariffs. N o w the industrialists and Rickert's party were working together, and agriculture found itself at variance with all other occupational groups. The agriculturists were at loggerheads with the government also. They claimed that it was indifferent to their plight. There was some justification for this charge. Caprivi had taken an unfortunate attitude toward the agrarians during the debates on the Austrian treaty. H e had mercilessly ridiculed then and later the suggestions which Kardorff and other bimetallists had made relative to currency reform. Both the Kaiser and Caprivi had given repeated assurances of their benevolent interest in agriculture; but except for the effort in the summer of 1893 t o counteract the effects of the fodder shortage, nothing had been done since 1891. T h e Rentenguter law, the one agricultural measure which Caprivi had sponsored before that time, was considered of doubtful value to the large landowners of the East. The government had continued, despite the formation of the Farmers' League, to negotiate treaties which granted agricultural concessions. T h i s was the situation when the Reichstag met in November, 1893. Shortly afterwards Caprivi informed Manteuffel that the government would do what it could for agriculture: agricultural chambers would be established; and a bill would be brought in to modify the residence requirements for local relief. But no plan had been worked out to remedy agricultural indebtedness. 84 Instead Caprivi was said to have suggested that the indebted landowners should simply " write off " fifty per cent, as those in other occupations were compelled to do. Manteuffel soon corrected this report. While 54 Wippermann, 1893, ii, 93-94.

232

GERMAN

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he stated that Caprivi had not used the words " fifty per cent " during their conversation, the Conservative leader left no doubt that Caprivi advised writing off. 85 The whole matter caused a tremendous stir in the agrarian press, for many agriculturists claimed that they would have nothing left if they wrote off to the extent suggested. The reforms which the government contemplated now, though included in the program of the Farmers' League, were those which agriculturists considered least important. And they found cold comfort in Caprivi's analysis of the ills of agriculture: indebtedness, a lack of workers, and prices for agricultural products which were dependent upon the world market. Nor were they impressed by his statement that it would take decades and the meditation and work of the wisest and noblest men of the nation to remedy these evils.68 Caprivi's attitude toward the new agricultural organization did not calm the ruffled spirits of the agriculturists. Both he and Marschall charged the Farmers' League with agitating and stirring up discontent in the agricultural population. Caprivi said the League had turned away from old conservative principles, which emphasized authority rather than majorities. He conceded that perhaps universal suffrage brought them to this; but he thought that a little more study at the council table and a little less agitation would bring more salutary results. The state idea was receding, he said, and the interests of individuals were coming to the fore. 87 Caprivi and Marschall, supported by Rickert of the Radical party and Paasche of the National Liberal party, subjected articles and figures in the publications of the Farmers' League to scathing criticism. Because of the League's articles, said Marschall, nine-tenths of all German farmers did not know that 55 Allg. Ztg., Nov. 21, 1893 ( N o . 329 A B ) , p. 2. 56 Reichstag,

1893-94, I, 51 (Caprivi, Nov. 24).

57 Ibid., p. 49. " The individual who is egotistical in a restricted sense when he is alone, is so much the more egotistical in the mass and things happen against which a Fichte and an Ernst Moritz Arndt would speak with the most righteous indignation."

THE

RUMANIAN

TREATY,

1893

233

it was not a question of lowering the existing tariffs but of maintaining the tariffs they had. Marschall charged the League with circulating other untruths or half-truths which gave the peasant incorrect information. He denied that Germany was being swamped with Russian grain: against Russia there was a war tariff of 7.50 marks and the certificates of origin worked correctly.88 He reproached the Association of T a x and Economic Reformers for implying that Rumania had a debased currency. This was not the case: Rumania had had gold currency since 1890. Furthermore, said Marschall, the League and other representatives of agriculture gave the wrong impression by constantly reiterating that the government was carrying on a weak free trade policy in connection with its commercial treaties.6* Caprivi greatly weakened his position, while defending himself against the attacks of the agrarians, by attempting to disclaim a responsibility for agriculture. He pointed out that article 4 of the federal constitution expressly stated that agriculture was reserved to the several states, and that since he was no longer Prussian minister president, agriculture was not in his competence. Yet in the very same speech, he turned about completely. Referring to the campaign which he said the press close to Limburg-Stirum had been carrying on against him for months, he said that not all the gentlemen who had criticized his policy had thrashed and plowed themselves. Even though he had " no acre and blade of straw " he would care for agriculture to the best of his ability.60 The charges of inaccuracy and exaggeration against the League Ploetz took rather lightly. He admitted that inaccuracies had crept into statements made in the League's publica58 Ibid.,

pp. 23 ( R i c k e r t ,

N o v . 23), 40 ( P a a s c h e ,

N o v . 24), 16, 71-72,

391 ( M a r s c h a l l , N o v . 23, N o v . 25, D e c . 12). 5 9 M a r s c h a l l said that t h e A s s o c i a t i o n o f T a x and E c o n o m i c

Reformers

had decided that no t r e a t i e s could b e concluded with R u m a n i a and as long a s they had no regulation o f t h e i r c u r r e n c y (ibid., 6 0 Ibid.,

pp. 47, 49-50 ( C a p r i v i , N o v . 24).

p. 3 9 1 ) .

Russia

234

GERMAN

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tions or by its leaders. " I acknowledge at once that in an association of 160,000 members, which supports two newspapers, which has to deal with over 1,000 district chairmen and over 10,000 workers (Vertrauensmänner), errors and mistakes can occur." But the statistics, he held, were not as bad as Rickert claimed; nor were exaggerations confined to the Farmers' League. T o prove his point he quoted from an article in a Radical newssheet, entitled Through Night to Light. Its assertions concerning the League were false, Ploetz claimed. 61 Caprivi, Marschall and other speakers had criticized the " tone " of the League's articles. Kardorff disclaimed all responsibility for the League's publications and regretted their tone. H e held, however, that in a measure their tone went back to the tone which they fought. The best example of that, thought Kardorff, was in the Radical party and in Representative Richter. But even in the semi-official Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung Kardorff said he could find just as good examples of exaggeration as those quoted from the League's publications.®2 The government itself w a s not without responsibility for statistical difficulties. Both the Centrists and the National Liberals commented upon the government's failure to include in its Memorandum accompanying the treaties the statistics of trade between Germany and the countries with which the new treaties had been concluded, together with figures to show the financial effects of the treaties. During the course of the debates it was evident that there was considerable uncertainty on the part of the government regarding trade statistics. T h e legislators were advised by government officials to use the Ru61 Ibid., p. 45 (Ploetz, Nov. 24). T h e quotation which Ploetz read was as follows: " Peasants, beware of the F a r m e r s ' League. F o r the League's use to you is now so truly shown in connection with the new wine tax. Even National Liberal leaders have recognized that the d r a f t of the wine t a x law, in case it becomes a law, will ruin the wine peasants. T h e agricultural societies have also given a like opinion. Accordingly it ought to be t h e duty of the League to take a stand against this pernicious bill. T h e F a r m e r s ' League, however, does not lift a finger." 62 Ibid., pp. 77-78 ( K a r d o r f f , N o v . 25).

THE

RUMANIAN

TREATY,

1893

235

manian statistics rather than those of the German Empire.* 4 Caprivi was assured that no one doubted the honorableness of his character or the sincerity of his conviction. T h e attacks were directed not against Count Caprivi, but against the Imperial Chancellor and his policy. 64 In all seriousness Ploetz emphasized the loyal opposition of the Farmers' League. T h e meeting at Tivoli had been patriotic, he said. T h o u g h the military bill was not a part of the League's program, Ploetz believed that not a single member had voted against it. H e claimed also to have worked for months to avoid as much as possible in the League's newssheets any personal attack upon government officials. But since November 24 the government press had been publishing articles about the League which were so immoderate, he said, that they would stir up a veritable " northeast storm " in peasant circles. T h e peasant would not understand, if the Farmers' League were willing to answer them in the tone of the drawing-room. " T h e peasant demands stronger, clearer expressions." 68 The agrarian leaders denied that they were stirring up the peasants for their own selfish ends. T h e Farmers' League had not brought about the excitement in the agricultural population, said Ploetz. " T h e excitement was already there because the agricultural population had lost confidence in the Imperial government." The men at the head of the Farmers' League had not sent out the first summons; but their leadership had aided in preventing the movement from degenerating into excesses. 46 Nor was the League painting agricultural distress, Ploetz continued, blacker than it really was. 67 Agriculture, according to the testimony of the agrarians, was no longer paying. If the 63Ibid., pp. 30 (Lieber, Nov. 23), 22 ( M a r s c h a l l ) , 40 (Paasche, Nov. 24). See also, ibid., p. 387 (Limburg-Stirum, Dec. 12). 64 Ibid., p. 66 (Hammerstein, Nov. 25). 65Ibid., pp. 46-47 (Ploetz, Nov. 24), 418-19 (Dec. 13). 66Ibid., pp. 31 (Kanitz-Podangen, Nov. 23), 46 (Ploetz, N o v . 24). 67 Ibid., p. 46 (Ploetz, Nov. 24).

236

GERMAN AGRARIAN

POLITICS

lowered grain rates were extended to Rumania and then later to Russia, the largest single occupation in the state and the backbone of the German population would be ruined. If the government continued to give agriculture second place in the economic life of the country, it would soon be reduced to the condition of agriculture in Great Britain. The opposition emphasized also the increased and wide-spread distress amongst peasants.48 The agrarian leaders admitted that they were agitating, but said that it was necessary. Kardorff reminded the government that in the rural districts they had to fight against the Social Democrats and the Radicals, who in a way incited the large landowners against the small farmers and servants against masters. If the agrarians did not wish to be defeated as a party, he said, they must fight with almost the same weapons that their opponents used. Otherwise, Ploetz contended, only the Social Democrats would have any advantage from the treaties. Then perhaps upon entering the villages with threatening steps they would be cordially received, if the peasants were already in despair. For despair, incitement, and desertion to Social Democracy all hung together. 69 To the chancellor's charges that the League " played majorities against authorities," Ploetz replied that it had to make use of " majorities." He reminded the government that it made use of them also. This had been necessary in the case of the military bill. The League had the same right as other parties, he maintained, to attempt to secure representatives in the Reichstag who would care for the interests of agriculture to the extent that those of other classes were protected. The government should have no uneasiness, however, for the farmer would " always intercede for the majesty of the throne and for the authority of the state." 70 68Ibid., pp. 33 (Kanitz, Nov. 23), 76-78 (Kardorff, Nov. 25), 47 (Ploetz, Nov. 24), 436-37 (Lutz, Dec. 1 3 ) . 69/Wrf., pp. 77 (Kardorff, Nov. 25), 46 (Ploetz, Nov. 24). 70Ibid., p. 420 (Ploetz, Dec. 1 3 ) .

THE

RUMANIAN

TREATY,

1893

237

A t this point Bennigsen, the leader of the National Liberals, came to the support of the League. He maintained that agriculture's attempt to secure effective representation through organization was justifiable. Y e t its efforts to do what commerce, industry, and labor had done for years had been greeted with derision not only in the press but even in the Reichstag. Bennigsen was not surprised that the ridicule of the Left had caused a certain amount of ill-will and exasperation amongst those who belonged to this large and important calling. 71 On November 25 Hammerstein undertook to refute Caprivi's statement that the agriculturists were lacking in creative ideas. The Association of T a x and Economic Reformers, he said, had long advocated remedies which would assist agriculture : reform of the currency; reform of the exchange, especially the commodity exchange; relief for indebted landed property; and raising the grain tariffs. Marschall, the next speaker, said that he had been waiting for three days for any evidence to prove that the treaties would really injure agriculture. 72 Then Kardorff took the floor. Marschall would concede, he said, that it was extraordinarily difficult to demonstrate with figures how far through imports, through tariffs, the price was influenced and the country could be injured. He called attention to the fact that indebtedness was not confined to the large landowners. H e agreed with Paasche 73 that the larger landowners were of subordinate importance. But if the whole peasant population, including even the smallest peasants, was becoming indebted, it was a different matter. He then reviewed for Caprivi his " whole register of agricultural sins." The sugar export premiums had been repealed, as a result of which France and Austria and other countries which produced sugar were gradually pushing German sugar from the world market. Then came 71 Ibid., p. 424 (Bennigsen). 72Ibid., pp. 67 ( H a m m e r s t e i n ) , 71 ( M a r s c h a l l ) . 73 Schoenlank of the Social Democratic party and Rickert of the Radical party had made like statements.

238

GERMAN

AGRARIAN

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the release of American pork. This occurred about the time of the Austrian treaty and the loosening of the boundary inspection on cattle from Moravia and Galicia. His own loss from the hoof and mouth disease in a herd of 125 cows was 11,000 marks. In 1891 there was the further injury to agriculture from the lowered tariffs. The government had been advised to suspend the tariffs, but this advice had not been followed. If, like France, Germany had suspended them for a time, they would not have been swept away, as the chancellor and Lieber asserted. Kardorff then dealt with the currency question. Finally he reminded the legislators that several motions made by Hammerstein relative to peasant inheritance had been ignored. It was the task of a statesman, said Kardorff, to provide a means of help when there was a great outcry in the country. Though he was not so malicious as to wish the chancellor had an estate—especially an indebted estate—he felt that if statesmen were paid in part as in olden times by land donations and were dependent in part for their salaries upon revenues from land ownership, they would possess a somewhat better knowledge of agricultural matters. 74 During the second reading feeling ran higher and the opposition of the Conservatives became more pronounced. 76

They

were no longer on the defensive. Marschall had asked them not to assert what they could not prove, said Lutz. He turned the tables and requested Marschall to prove the correctness of his 74Kardorff, p. 286 (Nov. 26, 1 8 9 3 ) ; Reichstag, 1893-94, I, 76-78 (Kardorff, Nov. 2 5 ) . 75 During the interim between the first and second reading the committee met. On it were six Centrists, four Conservatives, three National Liberals, three Social Democrats, two Radicals, two Imperialists, and one Pole. The chairman was Dr. Hammacher, a National Liberal. The committee reported in favor of the treaties. The minority came out of the committee very much disgruntled, because their views had not been included in the committee report and because after a 6 to 5 vote to include in the report some figures which von Staudy, a Conservative, had provided, the decision was later reversed in the latter's absence inasmuch as Baron Marschall "set such weight on accuracy" (ibid., pp. 3 8 s , 387, 393, 3 9 9 [Dec. 1 2 ] ) .

THE

RUMANIAN

TREATY,

1893

2

39

statement that 50,0c» to 70,000 workers would be without employment, if the commercial treaty with Rumania were rejected. T o Marschall's contention that the excitement in agricultural circles rested upon false information, he replied that the best information was the full grain warehouses and the empty money bags of the German peasants and farmers. " Better information no one can offer us than that we can not sell our products." 76 It was now evident that the vote on the Rumanian treaty would be extremely close. Each side tried to win over those who were wavering. Dr. Schaedler, a Centrist from Bavaria, broke from the position of the party leader. H e agreed with Lieber that the Rumanian treaty should be considered on its merits, but with Limburg-Stirum that agriculture would be injured by it. " W i t h a great majority of his party," he announced, he would vote against it. Thereupon Lieber read several telegrams from Silesia in favor of the treaties. 77 Krober, a Bavarian member of the South German People's party, spoke in favor of the treaties. H e disagreed with Schaedler, who had said that sentiment in Bavaria was almost wholly against the treaty. Barley was used there for the brewing industry, said Krober, and in unfavorable years almost all of it came from outside the country. But Sigl of the Lower Bavarian Peasant's League was convinced that three-quarters of his electors were thoroughly against the treaty and the later one with Russia. T h e Conservative delegate Lutz was of a like mind. 78 Schoenlank, of the Social Democratic party, made a final effort to stir the delegates against the Conservatives. H e attempted to show their inconsistency by quoting from a speech which Kanitz had made in the Reichstag on January 28, 1892, advocating the acceptance of the provisional agreement with Rumania. A n d Schoenlank charged Mirbach with speaking in the interest of 76Ibid., pp. 421 (Marschall, Dec. 13), 436 ( L u t z ) . 77Ibid., pp. 396 (Schaedler, Dec. 12), 414 (Lieber, Dec. 13). 78Ibid., pp. 434 (Krober, Dec. 13), 438-39 ( S i g l ) , 436 ( L u t z ) .

24O

GERMAN

AGRARIAN

POLITICS

17,000 manorial districts, but not in behalf of 12 million workers. H e warned the delegates that the labor movement had not yet reached its height, and that Social Democracy was gaining ground in the rural districts. 78 Bennigsen and Stumm meanwhile ably supported the government. The former reminded the agrarians that they must not follow their own interests exclusively. 80 T h e government was in a precarious position. During the first reading Hammerstein had asked pointedly whether a statesman would really consider it possible to govern Germany and Prussia permanently without the support of the Conservative party. Bennigsen deplored the fact that in the great questions which had engaged the members for a fortnight, the government had been obliged to depend upon shifting majorities. A n d Dr. Barth of the Radical Union insisted that the rejection of the Rumanian treaty would make it necessary for the government to quit and appeal to the country in a new election. Thereupon Caprivi was obliged once more to defend his action. H e asked how he could have foreseen the objection to the treaty with Rumania. Inasmuch as the Reichstag had accepted the lowered rates in the Austrian treaty by an overwhelming majority, and had authorized without opposition the provisional extension of those rates to Rumania, he felt justified in negotiating for a permanent treaty with Rumania on the same basis. 81 T o the very last moment no one knew just how the Poles would vote. A t first it was thought that they would reject the treaties. But it was soon evident that they were wavering on account of a number of considerations, and that they wished to use the occasion to win further concessions from the government. One of their number, Dziembowski-Pomian, blamed the 79 Ibid., pp. 430-32 ( S c h o e n l a n k ) . 80Ibid., p. 429 ( B e n n i g s e n ) . 81 Ibid., pp. 66 ( H a m m e r s t e i n , N o v . 25), 428 (Bennigsen, Dec. 13), 405 ( B a r t h , D e c . 12), 437-38 ( C a p r i v i , D e c . 13).

THE

RUMANIAN

TREATY,

1893

24I

Prussian government for the sorry state of agriculture in Posen. By expelling 4,000 workers, the government had caused a labor shortage so that wages in Posen were much higher than in many places in Saxony. Posen needed as good means of communication as the East and West enjoyed. Mortgages placed upon property when it was divided for inheritance overburdened estates there as in other sections of Germany. He complained also that the Poles had too little opportunity to send their sons into the government and military service. This criticism was directed fully as much against Bismarck and the strong Conservative element in the Prussian government as against Caprivi. Dziembowski made known at the same time his misgivings concerning relations between the Poles and the Conservatives. He asked whether it was really true, as he had been told, that the Farmers' League in the last election had decided to support even an anti-agrarian rather than a Pole. 82 The position of the Poles was still uncertain when the committee to which the treaties were referred voted on December 6; for the one Polish member, though he was known to be against them, was absent.83 It was not until the day the Reichstag voted on the Rumanian treaty that Prince RadziwillPolczynski informed the house that the Poles would vote for the treaties. The party had decided after much consideration, he said, that agricultural interests would not be injured to such an extent that the treaties should be rejected. The party, moreover, did not wish to call forth a political and economic crisis by rejecting them. Radziwill made the urgent request, however, that the government do something to relieve the great unrest caused " by the increased importation of agricultural products into domestic agricultural districts already suffering under a deep depression." 84 82 Ibid., pp. 85-86 ( D z i e m b o w s k i - P o m i a n , N o v . 25). 83 Allg.

Ztg., Dec. 8, 1893 ( N o . 340 M B ) , p. 3.

Si Reichstag,

1893-94, I, 433 (Radziwill, Dec. 13).

242

GERMAN

AGRARIAN

POLITICS

The lively discussion on December 13 was followed by a roll-call vote on Article 1 of the Rumanian treaty. Seldom had the Reichstag been as well filled as on this occasion in anticipation of the vote. 85 Only 42 delegates were absent. T h e treaty was accepted by a close margin of 189 to 165 votes. T h e Radicals of both parties, the South German People's party, the Social Democrats, and the Poles voted for the treaty. The German Reform party was against it, as were the independent Anti-Semites, the Bavarian Peasants' League, and four nonpartisans. W i t h the exception of two associates of the party, all the German Conservatives also voted against the treaty. T h e Imperialist party gave 20 votes against and only 6 votes in favor of the treaty. Over one-half the Centrists and about onequarter of the National Liberals present voted against it. Without the 15 Polish votes in favor of the treaty, it would have been rejected by 180 to 174 votes. T h i s vote showed that the Right and the middle parties had changed their attitude toward the tariff treaties markedly since 1891. While the Conservatives gave 18 and the Imperialists 14 votes for the Austrian treaty, only two associates 86 of the Conservative party and 6 Imperialists supported the Rumanian treaty. All the Centrists present ( 8 2 ) voted for the earlier treaty, whereas they gave more votes ( 4 9 ) against than for ( 4 4 ) the treaty of 1893. The National Liberals mustered a few more votes for the Rumanian ( 3 4 ) than for the Austrian treaty ( 3 1 ) ; but their opposition was increased from 5 in 1891 to 13 in 1893. The policy of the Polish party toward the tariffs had been reversed completely since 1887. T h e n the Poles voted solidly with the Conservatives and some of the Imperialists for the 85 Ibid., p. 401 (Mirbach, Dec. 12) ; Allg. Ztg., Dec. 13, 1893 (No. 345 A B ) , p. 1. 86 The membership list of most of the Reichstag parties included at the end a few " g u e s t s " or "associates" ("Hospitanten"). These persons, while generally supporting the party to which they were attached, were not actually members.

T H E RUMANIAN TREATY,

1893

243

VOTING ON ARTICLE I o r THE R U M A N I A N TREATY

Parties

For

Conservatives Imperialists German Reform Centrists Poles National Liberals Radical Union German Radical People's party South German People's party . Social Democrats Nonpartisan

2 6 ..* 44 15 34 13 23 0 38 5

Nonpartisan: Alsatians Anti-Semites Guelphs Dane Bavarian Peasants' League Others

Against Absent Vacant Totals Seats 62 20 11 49 13

3 2 1 6 4 6

. .

•«

10

2 6 12

189

165

42

1

...

7 2 2 1

•.. 1

2

•..

3

4 4

5

10

67 28 12 99 19 53 13 23 11 44 27

... 12

1

396 397 8 4 3 1 4 7 27

6-mark tariff for wheat and rye, and when that failed to pass, for the 5-mark tariff. In 1891 eight Poles voted for the Austrian treaty; the other eight members were absent. But in 1893 only four Poles were absent and 15 supported the Rumanian treaty. Rumor had it that the party position in 1893 turned on a few votes. Inasmuch as the Poles held the balance of power, the government, according to the Allgemeine Zeitung, was getting a weighty decision from an accidental majority. 87 It has already been shown that the agrarian movement had spread over a much wider area than just the six eastern provinces of Prussia. An analysis of the geographical distribution of the vote shows clearly that other sections of Germany than SlAllg. Ztg., Dec. 13, 1893 (No. 345 A B), p. 1.

244

GERMAN

AGRARIAN

POLITICS

those in which the large landowners predominated were hostile to the Rumanian treaty. Seventy of the 165 votes against that treaty were given by non-Prussian delegates. In Prussia itself not all the rejecting votes came from the East Elbe districts. Those districts 88 cast 69 votes against the treaties, while the Prussian districts to the west of the Elbe gave 26. The non-Prussian districts recorded one more vote than the districts of the Northeast against the treaty. While the opposition vote from the latter section was 69, it was 96 for the rest of Germany. T h e treaty was accepted by a margin of 27 votes by the representatives of Prussia, whereas, it was rejected with a balance of 3 votes by the nonPrussian delegates. T h e eastern provinces cast 60 out of a total of 140 votes at their disposal in favor of the treaty. Nearly all of these, with the exception of the Polish votes, came from the delegates representing urban, industrial, and commercial centers. T h e great ports on the Baltic—Danzig, Memel, Königsberg, and Stettin—all favored the treaty. Berlin, Potsdam, Breslau, and two or three smaller urban areas gave 18 votes, and the mining and industrial districts of Silesia 17 votes for the treaty. T h e vote by parties for the treaty in this section of Prussia was as foll o w s : Poles, 1 5 ; Social Democrats, 1 3 ; Radical People's party, 1 2 ; Radical Union, 7 ; Center, 7 ; National Liberals, 4 ; and Imperialists, 2. It will be noted that the Poles gave the largest vote of any single party in this section of Germany for the treaty. T h e most striking fact, however, which is revealed by this analysis of the votes, is that Bavaria with only 9 votes in favor and 35 against the treaty was the center of the opposition. 8 * 88 The districts included in this tabulation are East and West Prussia, Brandenburg (together with Berlin), Pomerania, Posen, Silesia, and the province of Saxony. 89 Schulthess, 1893, p. 162. Schulthess gives 44 opponents to the treaty in Bavaria, but this is not correct.

T H E RUMANIAN TREATY, 1 8 9 3

245

GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION o r T H B VOTE ON T H E R U M A N I A N T B I A T T

For Prussia: Eastern province» East Prussia West Prussia Berlin» Brandenburg Pomerania Posen Silesia Saxony

4 6 6 5 2 10 19 8

Western provinces Schleswig-Holstein Hanover Westphalia Hesse-Nassau Rhine Province Hoheoiollem

7 11 10 0 27 1

Bavaria Saxony Württemburg Baden Hesse The two Mecklenburgs Smaller principalities ** Hansa cities Alsace-Lorraine

9 11 12 8 2 1 15 4 5

Against

12 5

60

62

12 12 2 15 11 2 5 7 6 6

122

«9

26 95

35 12 3 3 4 6 6 67 189

1

70 165

* Berlin, in the province of Brandenburg. ** These included Saxe-Weimar, Oldenburg, Brunswick, etc. Not a single member of the Centrist party from Bavaria voted for the Rumanian treaty. The Bavarian votes in favor of the treaty were given by 2 Radicals, i Social Democrat, 90 and 6 National Liberals of the Bavarian Palatinate. Such a large vote against the treaty from a section of Germany where 90 Two of the three Social Democrats representing Bavaria were absent when the vote was taken.

246

GERMAN

AGRARIAN

POLITICS

middle-sized and small holdings were the general rule was a striking commentary upon the doctrine of the Social Democrats and the Radicals, namely, that only the large landowners had any advantage from the grain tariffs. Furthermore it was clear that the opposition to the treaty there could be laid at the door of the Farmers' League only in slight measure. F o r the Center and the Bavarian Peasants' League were chiefly responsible for the votes against the Rumanian treaty, and both parties had refused to join the Farmers' League. 81 T h e Bund tier Landwirte may have stimulated resistance to the treaty by its agitation, but the fundamental cause for the opposition in Bavaria lay deeper. It is possible that Bavaria's opposition to the grain tariff reductions came as a complete surprise to the government and the parties of the Left. For the government in 1891 took the same position as the Radicals and the Social Democrats: that the vote in 1887 had been a test of strength of the parties in power and did not express the real needs of agriculture. In 1887 Bavaria did not give a single vote in favor of the six-mark tariff for wheat and rye. Only 5 delegates from B a v a r i a — 4 National Liberals and one Conservative—voted against the Austrian treaty. There had, in fact, been scarcely any evidence of a desire either in southern or western Germany for the six-mark tariff in 1887 or for maintaining the five-mark tariff in 1891. 92 91 The Bavarian vote by parties follows: Parties Centrists National Liberals Bavarian Peasants' League . . . . Conservatives Radical People's party Social Democrats

For 6

Against

Absent

Total

28 2 4 1

2

2

30 8 4 1 2 3

4

48

2 1 9

35

92 All delegates of southern and western Germany voted against the six-mark tariff in 1887 except the following: 2 Conservatives from Baden, 3 Conservatives from the Prussian district of Minden, and 1 Conservative

THE RUMANIAN

TREATY,

1893

247

If the government was guided by these facts in its decision to reduce food tariffs, it no doubt received a rude shock when it contemplated the size of the Bavarian vote against the Rumanian treaty. Viewed from an entirely different angle, however, this vote was a significant victory for the Social Democrats, Radicals, and Poles. The Farmers' League had been organized in order that agrarians might oppose more effectively any further grants of the grain tariff reductions. Despite the agitation of the League and the gains which the parties of the Right had made in the elections of the previous summer, the Right was outvoted. A n analysis of the vote showed that it was defeated not only in the Empire as a whole but in Prussia as well, and that in both cases the Poles held the balance of power. Had the 1 5 Polish votes been cast against rather than for the treaty, there would have been a balance of 3 votes against the treaty in Prussia. Even with the Polish votes the Right could have maintained its position against the Left only with difficulty in Prussia, the principal seat of conservatism. In itself the vote in Prussia is of no particular significance. But when it is recalled that the Social Democrats and the Radicals were demanding a reform of the Prussian electoral system and a redistribution of seats in the Reichstag on the basis of recent population changes, it is obvious that the predominance of the Conservatives in Prussia was threatened by the Social Democrats and the Radicals, and also by the small Polish party. and 1 Centrist from the Prussian district of Arnsberg. The latter was the only Centrist who voted in favor of this increase. The bill was defeated by 238 to 108 votes. As already indicated, only 9 (or with Hesse only 12) delegates of southern and western Germany voted against the Austrian treaty.

CHAPTER THE

RUSSIAN

IX

TREATY,

1894

THE unsatisfactory commercial relations between Germany and Russia prior to 1890 have been discussed. For years Prussia and later Germany had tried in vain to secure a trade agreement with that country. In the autumn of 1890 when it seemed likely that Germany would reduce its agricultural duties for Austria, Russia began to show a different attitude. Apparently in October, Vishnegradsky, the Russian finance minister, 1 asked von Giers, the Russian foreign minister, to see what could be done to ease the trade between the two countries. 3 Conversations between Marschall and Shuvalov, the Russian ambassador to Germany, began a short time before December 3, 1890.® The Russians were shrewd bargainers. 4 They wanted the concessions in grain and wood which were to be granted to Austria, and besides tariff reductions for petroleum and some other articles. But they were reluctant to commit their government to any concessions which would be of advantage to Germany. It is to be remembered that for years Russia had followed a policy of meeting its heavy obligations on account of foreign loans by forcing agricultural exports and drastically curtailing imports. 1 Vishnegradsky was Russian finance minister from 1887 to 1892. Witte was appointed to take over this office on September I, 1892 (Schulthess, 1892, pp. 298, 302). 2 Grosse Politik, VII, No. 1627 (Feb. 20, 1891). 3 Ibid., No. 1626 (Dec. 3, 1890). It is to be remembered that commercial negotiations between Germany and Austria began in Vienna on December 2, 1890. 4 For the discussion of the Russo-German negotiations, the following references were used: Grosse Politik, VII, 364-65 (No. 1618), 389-403 (Nos.

1626-34), 256-57

(No.

1536). 443-58

(Nos.

1661-71);

Zweig,

pp.

32-51. See also, A. Human, Der devtsch-russische Handels- und Schiffahrls• vertrag vom 20. Mdrz 18(14 (Leipzig, 1900) ; V. Wittschewsky, " Die Zollund Handelspolitik Russlands wahrend der letzten Jahrzehnte," Schriften des Veretns fur Socialpolitik, X L I X (1892), 361-449. 248

T H E RUSSIAN TREATY,

1894

249

No sort of understanding between the two governments was reached in 1891 for a number of reasons. It will be recalled that during that year Germany was attempting to secure the renewal of the Triple Alliance and also negotiating commercial treaties with Austria, Italy, Belgium, and Switzerland. Until these negotiations were safely concluded, Germany would naturally hesitate to make any definite agreement with Russia. 6 On May 23, 1891, the Austrian ambassador asked pointedly whether a change had come about in Germany's policy and if Germany had now decided to give Russia the agrarian concessions made for Austria. 6 He was reassured by Marschall then and by Holstein on November 30, though on both occasions Germany made no promises for the future.7 The Russian representatives kept emphasizing the view that it was not possible for two countries to be on friendly terms politically and at war commercially, using the very argument which Caprivi offered in defense of the Austrian treaty.8 But the German officials were skeptical of Vishnegradsky's offer of commercial friendship.® They considered his fiscal and tariff policy responsible for the great decline in Germany's export trade to Russia. 10 Besides there were those who said that he 5 See Caprivi's remarks in the crown council meeting of Feb. 18, 1894 (Grosse Politik, VII, No. 1666). 6 The Austrians had been told when the Austro-German treaty was being negotiated that Germany " had no idea at that time of giving to Russia the agrarian concessions made for Austria-Hungary" (ibid., No. 1632). 7 Marschall replied on May 23 that nothing had yet occurred to modify the earlier view (ibid.). Holstein said that Russia had closed its doors from within against grain export; and that its reduced buying power offered no special advantage for Germany's export even in the improbable case that Russia would wish to reduce its tariffs (ibid., No. 1634). 8 Ibid., Nos. 1626, 1630, 1633. 9 Ibid., No. 1662. 10 If the Russo-German grain trade were disregarded, it was Vishnegradsky's idea that Germany's exports to Russia almost balanced Russia's exports to Germany. Marschall said this might be true according to Russian statistics, because presumably the transit trade was included in the figures. But if the transit trade, in which Germany had only a secondary interest,

25O

GERMAN

AGRARIAN

POLITICS

had increased the exchange rate of the ruble in order to raise the import duties against German manufactures, but had lowered it again when Russia had grain to export. 1 1 In any case, Marschall pointed out, when the ruble had risen in value, the Russian finance minister had increased the tariffs, especially those which affected German imports; with the last 20 per cent increase in 1890, the tariffs on a number of important German articles had become prohibitive. 12 It was Shuvalov's understanding that Germany desired stability more than anything else. H e accordingly proposed fixing the Russian tariffs on a number of articles. 13 But Marschall stated emphatically then and on a number of occasions later that Germany had no interest in fixing prohibitive rates. F o r certain groups of articles Germany wanted tariff reductions which would go beyond a mere abolition of the 20 per cent supplementary tariff of 1890 and would make possible the entry of German products into Russia. It also wanted the differentials against German coal, coke, pig iron, and cotton removed. 14 O n May 6, 1891, when the Triple Alliance was signed, the German government did not know whether Russia was really serious, or was merely trying to ascertain the tendency of Gerw a s left out of consideration, the value of Russia's exports to Germany in 1889 w a s about 230 million marks, while that of Germany's exports t o Russia was only 160 million marks. T h i s left a balance of 70 million marks. Marschall pointed out also that about one-half the wares which entered Germany from Russia were tariff free, but that the German exports to Russia were all subjected to heavy tariffs and that these had been repeatedly increased during the preceding decade. In consequence with an adverse balance of 70 million marks Germany's exports were decreasing, while Russia's exports to Germany were increasing (ibid., N o . 1630). 11 Ibid., N o s . 1626-27. Vishnegradsky, on the other hand, held Bismarck responsible for the sinking of the exchange rate of the ruble t w o or three years earlier (ibid., N o s . 1629, 1633). 12 Ibid., N o . 1629. 13 Ibid., N o . 1628.

14 Ibid., N o s . 1628-31. Russia made a distinction between sea-borne and land-borne trade, which gave England the advantage over Germany.

THE

RUSSIAN

TREATY,

1894

25I

many's commercial policy. It was thought that they were wavering in St. Petersburg between the fear of being treated differentially with reference to grain and wood, and the hope that out of consideration for its eastern provinces Germany would be forced to offer these concessions. 16 It will be recalled that at this time free trade agitation in Germany was running high. H a d Germany acceded to Russia's wishes, Germany's Baltic ports, which were largely dependent upon the grain trade with Russia, would have benefited greatly. But German officials wanted to foster industry as well as commerce. B y June 24 tariff negotiations between the two countries were at a standstill. 16 Russia had shown no inclination to meet Germany's demands. T h e new Russian tariff had been approved by the Tsar on June 10, and was to go into effect on July 1. O w i n g to the serious crop failure in Europe and the threatened famine in Russia, Russia's need for the treaty w a s becoming less urgent. T h e Tsar's ukase prohibiting rye exports in August was followed in November by a similar ban on wheat exports. Incidentally these measures aggravated the price rise in Germany and played into the hands of the free traders. Y e t it is scarcely to be supposed that these steps were deliberately taken in the hope of bringing Germany to terms, for Russia's own economy was seriously injured by them. T h e Russian government, on the other hand, was probably not averse to making difficulties between Germany and A u s tria by continuing the tariff discussions, even though temporarily Russia was without a basis for negotiation. It will be recalled that after Germany's failure to renew the Reinsurance treaty, relations between Russia and France became more cordial, and that at this very time—in August, 1 8 9 1 — t h e Franco-Russian entente was signed. It is probable also that the Russian government wished to use a favorable moment to secure a treaty which would be of benefit in the future. In these circumstances it is not surprising that the proposal which the 15 Ibid., No. 1631. 16 Schweinitz, Denkwürdigkeiten,

II, 424 (June 24, 1891).

252

GERMAN

AGRARIAN

POLITICS

Russian government finally presented in October, 1891, as a basis of understanding proved to be wholly unacceptable to Germany. The Russian tariffs on iron, chemicals, and textiles of all stages—articles which made up the bulk of Germany's exports to Russia—were kept at their former level. There was no certainty that the German articles would be free from later tariff increases. And Russia's tariffs on cotton, coal and iron via the land route were maintained at a higher rate than via the sea route, which gave England the preference over Germany. 17 Because of another poor harvest in 1892, Russia did not remove the prohibitions against wheat and rye exports until July and August of that year. Russian grain exported to Germany after that had to pay the five-mark tariff. Meanwhile in July Russia had asked Germany to give a detailed list of the articles upon which tariff reductions were desired. This was undertaken by the German department of the interior in August; but the agrarians showed such violent opposition to a reduction of the agricultural tariffs for Russia that Germany's proposal was not given to Russia until March of the next year. 18 A s already shown, the Russian negotiations called forth heated debates in the Reichstag and in the Prussian diet in February, 1893, just prior to the formation of the Farmers' League. The German government took care in working out its terms to secure the advice of the chief industries engaged in Russian trade. 19 Russia, however, considered Germany's demands exorbitant, and they were not accepted. In the hope of coercing Germany, Witte, the new Russian finance minister, set up a maximum and a minimum tariff on June 1. The tariff of 1891 with a few modifications became the minimum tariff and was granted to those states which accorded Russia most-favored-nation treatment. Against those countries 17Zweig, p. 38. 18 Grosse Politik,

V I I , 443; Schulthess, 1893, pp. 99-103.

19 Allg. Ztg., J a n . 14, 1893 ( N o . 14), p. 1; J a n . 20, 1893 ( N o . 20), p. 3.

THE RUSSIAN

TREATY,

1894

253

which treated Russian products differentially the maximum tariff might be called into operation. It provided for increases over the minimum tariff of about 30 per cent in the case of fully manufactured goods, of 20 per cent for half-manufactured goods, and of 15 per cent for some important colonial wares. 20 In a further effort to bring Germany to terms, Russia concluded on June 17 a commercial convention with its new political ally, which gave that country some tariff reductions from the rates of 1891 on a limited number of articles. On July 11 Russia asked Germany to grant provisionally until December 13 the tariff concessions she had already extended to other countries by treaty. 21 In return Russia would concede the tariff reductions given to France. But the German government pointed out that a provisional agreement, like the one with Rumania, would require the approval of the Reichstag, and that that body could not be kept in session after the passage of the military bill. Thereupon Russia indicated its willingness to continue negotiations, but announced that beginning on August 1 the maximum tariff would be applied against Germany. This was the signal for a tariff war between the two countries. Germany placed a 50 per cent surtax on all Russian goods liable to duty. Russia retaliated by adding a 50 per cent tax to the maximum tariff on German goods. It also raised the dues levied on German ships entering and leaving Russian ports from 5 kopecks to 1 ruble for two tons,22 and made the war tariffs applicable to Finland. Germany likewise put a 50 per cent surtax on Finnish imports.23 This state of affairs was favorable for trade in neither country, and treaty negotiations were resumed in September. The first conference met in Berlin on October i. 24 From then until 20Zweig, p. 39. 21 Grosse

Politik,

N o . 1662.

22 Zweig, p. 40. Since there were 100 kopecks in a ruble, this was a 1900 per cent increase. 23 Ashley, p. 95. 24 Grosse

Politik,

V I I , N o . 1666.

254

GERMAN

AGRARIAN

POLITICS

early December, press reports of the discussions were alternately hopeful and despairing. A provisional suspension of hostilities, which would have enabled Russia to get rid of its 1893 grain crop, was opposed by Germany. 2 8 Germany would make no concessions in the grain tariff until Russia granted for a term of years tariff reductions and provisions which would enable German industry to engage in the Russian trade. In the end the T s a r himself stepped in to break the impasse. H e had been impressed by the serious condition of Russian agriculture when he returned to Russia after a visit to Denmark, and he had let it be known toward the end of October that he personally w a s eager to have the negotiations come to a successful conclusion. 26 But it was not until just before Christmas that he took a decisive part in them. Meanwhile Prince F r a n z von A r e n b e r g , a member of the Center party w h o had formerly been legation secretary at St. Petersburg, explained to Shuvalov, the Russian ambassador, the critical state of affairs. A r e n b e r g told Shuvalov that getting the approval of the Reichstag for the commercial treaty with Russia would be extremely difficult in any case, but that it would be totally impossible unless the Russian negotiators would grant certain concessions which the Germans considered indispensable. Thereupon Shuvalov reported direct to the Tsar, w h o commanded that the concessions be granted to Germany. 2 7 Germany also wished to speed the negotiations, for political as well as commercial relations between the t w o countries were so tense that it was feared that actual war might result if a better understanding was not achieved at once. It has already been seen that after Germany cut the wire to St. Petersburg by allowing the Reinsurance treaty to lapse, Russia turned to France. In A u g u s t , 1892, the entente of 1891 w a s supplemented by a military convention. Germany did not know of these secret agreements, but it was obvious that the relations between 2 5 Ibid., N o . 1664. 7&Allg.

Zig.,

N o v . i, 1893 ( N o . 303), p. 2.

2 7 B a c h e m , V , 343; Grosse Politik,

V I I , N o . 1666.

THE RUSSIAN

TREATY,

1894

255

Russia and France were becoming steadily more cordial. After the visit of the Russian squadron to Toulon on October 1 3 , 1893, and the enthusiastic reception which the Russians received during their two weeks' stay in France, there could no longer be any doubt that a formal pact existed between the two countries. 28 In Germany, on the other hand, government officials had talked too freely during the long months while the German military bill was before the Reichstag about a possible war on two fronts. After the bill was passed, more and more Russian troops were massed in Russian Poland. Germany hoped therefore by means of a commercial treaty with Russia, not only to re-establish the disrupted trade, but also to restore the traditional friendship between the two countries, and incidentally to break up the Franco-Russian rapprochement. 29 In the efforts to accomplish this end William took a lively interest. Just before Christmas a more conciliatory attitude on both sides was noticeable. The negotiations thereafter progressed smoothly, and the commercial treaty was finally ready for signature on February 10, 1894. 30 It was to remain in force for ten years. After that it might be denounced upon a year's notice by either contracting party. Actually it was effective until March 1 , 1906. In this treaty most-favored-nation treatment was granted mutually in respect to trade, shipping, and the citizens of one country in the territory of the other. 31 This gave Russia the 28Langer, The Diplomacy

of Imperialism,

I, 11-27, 39 50.

29 Ibid., pp. 42-48. 30 Meanwhile on January 4, 1894, the Franco-Russian Alliance was concluded (ibid., p. 48). For the Russo-German commercial treaty of 1894, see: Zweig, pp. 45-48; Ashley, pp. 97-98; Sartorius von Waltershausen, pp. 387-88; Lotz, loc. cil., pp. 122-23. 31 Each of the contracting powers agreed to treat the citizens of the other in reference to taxes, tariffs, and dues on its highways, canals, and railroads like its own citizens. Import and export prohibitions were renounced except when required by state monopoly, or in order to secure human and animal health, or safety and public order. Germany soon made use of the latter provision and restricted in great part the import of Russian cattle because of veterinary considerations (Zweig, p. 45).

256

GERMAN

AGRARIAN

POLITICS

lower rates for agricultural products and for wood which it desired. In addition Germany fixed the tariffs on a number of Russian articles. Some, such as flax, oilseeds, and wool, were allowed to enter duty free. Russia renounced its discrimination against goods crossing the western border by the land route, and agreed not to introduce a differential tariff while the treaty was in force. Because of the most-favored-nation provision Germany secured the reductions already granted to France in the rates on 15 articles. In addition Russia fixed 20 entire articles of its tariff of 1891 and 53 articles partially, most of them at lower rates. For Germany's most important articles of export the tariff reductions were slight. But for all of these articles except textiles Germany secured stabilization for the period the treaty was in force. E v e r y sign pointed to a close contest over the Russian treaty. T h e Rumanian treaty, which was generally considered of secondary importance to German farmers, had been passed with a narrow margin of only 24 votes. Even while those debates were going on there were repeated references to the proposed Russian treaty, and several party spokesmen made it clear that in voting for the Rumanian treaty they were not committing themselves in favor of the one with Russia. T h e agrarian campaign which had been going on during the summer was continued during the debates on the " small treaties." The shafts of discontent were directed " now against the bureaucracy, now against the revolutionary statisticians, and now against the Imperial Chancellor personally." 32 The latter was accused of creating a gulf between himself and the Conservatives, and of accepting the guidance of Radicals and Social Democrats in agricultural matters. 33 T h e complaint was made that " since a high German Imperial official" had boasted of having no acre and blade of straw, all those who likewise possessed neither were coming forward as experts in the agricul32 Wippermann,

1893, ii, 99-100 (quoting

Vossische

Zeitung,

Dec. 22,

1893)3 3 Ibid., pp. 96-97 (quoting Volk, zeitung, Dec. 20, 1893).

Dec. 16, 1893), 97-98 (quoting

Kreus-

THE RUSSIAN TREATY,

1894

257

tural crisis. Radical and Social Democratic journalists, teachers and professors, and—to cap the climax—privy councillors knew exactly what would help agriculture. The latter could prove, said the writer, that the prosperity of agriculture was dependent upon commercial treaties, and that the ambition of the farmer should be to economize. When the reply was made that many farmers could no longer earn anything, they were told to write off fifty per cent.34 One of the more daring agrarians did not hesitate, after the Rumanian treaty had been passed, to follow Ruprecht's advice and carry the complaint " to the very steps of the throne." Thungen-Rossbach 35 announced in a published article that anything might be expected of the Imperial government, for " the well-being of the fatherland " was no longer the determining factor, but the " higher will." This had been made clear at a parliamentary dinner, where Caprivi had argued that the Conservatives would have to support his policy, " which in any case was conservative, for it was not his own but that of his Imperial Master." The author went on to say that it was becoming more and more the fashion amongst government officials " to cover their backs with the crown " ; and they demanded that the bearer of the crown should not be drawn into the discussion or criticized. This he considered a thoroughly perverted idea, which could not be maintained much longer. For the monarch was, " according to a great king, 'the first servant in the state' and as such subject to public criticism all the more " if he did not withdraw like the Dalai Lama, but intervened everywhere. Caprivi, said the author, seemed to assume that a monarch could carry on only conservative politics. There were, however, examples to the contrary. 38 34 Ibid., pp. 98-99 (quoting Reichs-Heimstatten-Korrespondenz, 1893).

Dec. 21,

35 Thungen-Rossbach was President of the Peasants' League of Franconia. He had taken an active part in the protective tariff movement of the late '7o's and the '8o's. He was not a member of the Farmers' League. 36 Wippermann, 1893, ii, 98 (quoting the declaration of Baron von Thungen-Rossbach in Nieder Bayerische Landes-Zeitung, Dec. 20, 1893).

258

GERMAN AGRARIAN

POLITICS

Even before the Russo-German commercial treaty w a s signed, the government began to prepare for the parliamentary battle. A s a preliminary precaution it sought to restrain g o v ernment officials who were connected in any way with the agrarian movement. The ministry of the interior directed an order to all government presidents on December 20, 1893, in which they were reminded that the Imperial decree of January 4, 1882, required officials to support the government on all occasions. They would be expected to perform their duty in the coming economic struggle. They were asked also to call the attention of their subordinates to the order. 37 This was a clever use of Bismarck's methods, which Bismarck's admirers could hardly criticize. T h e Kaiser himself took an active part in the efforts to w i n friends for the Russian treaty. He tried to conciliate the Conservatives, and he used his personal influence in the hope of swaying party leaders and individual members of the Reichstag in favor of the treaty. In his speech from the throne at the opening of the Prussian diet on January 16, William spoke appreciatively of the exertions which the self-governing bodies and the agricultural societies had made to assist the government in overcoming the threatened shortage of straw and feed during the previous summer. He expressed his grave concern over the state of agriculture, and said that it would be the task of his government to foster agricultural prosperity. Agricultural chambers would be established. W i t h the government they would work out measures to improve the credit system and to do away with the excessive indebtedness of real estate. A bill providing for the erection of agricultural chambers would be introduced during 3 7 I b i d . , p. h i . Hohenlohe asked Caprivi on December 28, 1893, about the government presidents and the district presidents (Landräte) who were agitating with the Peasants' League against the commercial policy of the government. Caprivi thought it inadvisable to proceed against the Landräte, but he believed the government presidents could be taken by the ears (C. Hohenlohe, II, 507).

THE RUSSIAN

TREATY,

1894

259

38

that session. This was an attempt to conciliate the Farmers' League, for the demand for agricultural chambers and for the relief of rural indebtedness were two items in its program. The Kaiser's next move was to stage a dramatic reconciliation with the former chancellor. The latter had not seen the Emperor or visited Berlin since the March days in 1890 when he laid down his office. 3 ® He was now asked to come as William's guest. The invitation was a complete surprise to Wilhelmstrasse. The great event took place on January 26. Not even Caprivi was invited to the reception for the Prince, and none of the ministers was informed in advance. So striking was the tribute paid to Bismarck that the King of Saxony protested privately: " Such honors belong only to such as ourselves!'" 4 0 There can be little doubt concerning the Kaiser's motives. T o secure the passage of the Russian treaty, he needed all the support he could gain from Bismarck's prestige with the agricultural population. William had even contemplated a visit to Friedrichsruh in the previous November when the " small treaties " were before the Reichstag. But Bismarck was then recovering from a serious illness and his physician forbade all visitors. 41 T w o days after Bismarck's triumphal return to Berlin, the Kaiser remarked to Levetzow, one of the Conservative leaders: " Now I hope you will behave reasonably." According to Kardorff, who reported the conversation, this meant " with reference to the Russian commercial treaty." 42 Kardorff felt 3 8 A l l g . Ztg., Jan. 16, 1894 ( N o . 15 A B ) , p. 1; Wippermann, 1894, i, 189-190. 39 Lerchenfeld, p. 269. 40 Kardorff, p. 288; Wippermann, 1894, i, 23-26. 41 Kardorff, p. 286 ( N o v . 24, 1893). 42 Ibid., p. 288. Levetzow was president of the Reichstag. It was reported by Waldersee that the Kaiser had had a violent scene with his mother over the reconciliation. The latter thought it much too soon to bring this about and reproached the Kaiser because he had not consulted her. William was said to have replied that he needed Bismarck to pass the Russian commercial treaty, and that, besides, the situation was such that Caprivi would soon

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even after Bismarck's visit that " the miscarriage " of the treaty was " still probable." 43 But on February 9 an article by Bismarck appeared in the Hamburger Nachrichten, which was " variously interpreted in Berlin." Kardorff and others regarded it as a sign that Bismarck would declare himself for the acceptance of the treaty. Kardorff thought that if Bismarck should speak against it its passage was doubtful, but if he should speak in its favor, it would be " assured of a splendid majority in spite of the Farmers' League and the Bavarian votes." 44 During the next few weeks a series of great dinners were given for the purpose of influencing Reichstag representatives to vote for the treaty. 46 The Kaiser was present on each occasion. The Chancellor gave a dinner on February 5 ; Count Eulenburg, the Prussian minister president, followed suit on February 13; Boetticher, Prussian vice-president and secretary of state for the interior, on February 23; and von Heyden, the Prussian minister of agriculture, on March 8.** B y the 25th of February Kardorff wrote that the Kaiser was eating all the time with ministers and that only representatives of the Reichstag were invited in order that the former might work upon the latter for the Russian commercial treaty. 47 retire (op. cit., II, 305). But Waldersee thought the Kaiser was deceiving himself and would find that Bismarck was not to be bought by attentions (ibid., p. 307). Schweinitz asked Herbert Bismarck just before the reconciliation took place whether he would vote for the Russian treaty. H e said: " N o . " When asked what "Papa said to that," he replied that his father had told him that he must vote against it. Schweinitz himself felt that the treaty would have to be accepted. H e hoped the Prince would change. If he embroiled Germany then with the Tsar, Bismarck would be denying his whole past (Briefwechsel..., pp. 311, 313). 43 Kardorff, p. 289 (Feb. 2, 1894).

44Ibid., p. 290 (Feb. 9, 1894). 45 Ibid., pp. 288-92 (Jan. 28-Feb. 25, 1894). 46 Wippermann, 1894, i, 6-12. 47 Kardorff, p. 292 (Feb. 25, 1894).

T H E RUSSIAN TREATY,

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2ÖI

At the first dinner at Caprivi's the chief ministers of Prussia and the Empire and the officials of the Reichstag and of the two houses of the Prussian diet were present. 48 But for the most part the guests from the Reichstag were purposely restricted to " unimportant people." Not a single Conservative party leader was bidden.49 On this occasion the Kaiser spoke at length on the economic and political importance of the treaty. Both his fear of a Russian war and his desire to re-establish more friendly personal relations with the Tsar were evident from his remarks. If, he said, the Russian treaty should be rejected by the Conservative party, to whom almost all the most respected men in the government and at court belonged, it would be misconstrued in Russia. The Russians did not fully understand how the German government was restricted by parliament; they would " entertain the suspicion that in authoritative circles enmity toward Russia decided the issue." 80 The Tsar had shown great interest in all the details of the recent negotiations and it was owing to him, said William, that they had run so smoothly.61 The Kaiser then spoke of his own pride in being a Prince of Peace. He hoped that the devoted patriotism which had characterized the representatives of agriculture from time immemorial would still guide their action.62 Waxing more vehement, he declared that he had no desire to go to war with Russia on account of a hundred stupid Junkers. Should the treaty be rejected there would be war within three months and then Germany would lose the right bank of the Vistula. 63 48 Wippermann, 1894, i, 6. 49Waldersee, II, 306. Kardorff said none would go (op. cit., pp. 28990). 60 Wippermann, 1894, i, 6-7. 51 Ibid., p. 7 (quoting the Kölnische Zeitung, Feb. 6, 1894). 52 Ibid., p. 7 (quoting Kreuzzeitung

and Kölnische Zeitung, Feb. 6).

53 Waldersee, II, 306. East Prussia was on the right bank of the Vistula. Raschdau thought that the Kaiser's speech was chiefly for the benefit of

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A t this point the usually calm and taciturn president of the Reichstag, Levetzow, raised an excited voice of protest. T h e agitation against the treaty, though unfortunately much exaggerated, he said, had come about to a certain extent because of the extreme distress of agriculture. Y e t the loyalty of the Conservatives could not be questioned even though the party felt duty-bound after examining the treaty to vote against it. 54 Despite Caprivi's efforts to prevent it, the Kaiser's words became known outside and caused a tremendous stir.60 A few days later William told the Conservatives " that he considered it their duty at least to withhold their votes on the Russian treaty." T o this Kanitz replied that " that would be the surest way to ruin the Conservative party." 66 T h e later dinners took a more peaceful course and the needs and interests of agriculture were discussed. A t the same time the Emperor was insistent about the Russian treaty and in March, shortly before the debates on the treaty began, he said to Kanitz that it must be put through, because he had given his word to Tsar A l e x ander that it would pass. 57 Meanwhile Caprivi had been seeking repeatedly but in vain to win K a r d o r f f ; the latter refused all overtures. He would not give his card at the Chancellor's house, nor did he answer the card which Caprivi sent to him. B y February 14, Caprivi had been sending messengers to Kardorff day after d a y ; they urgently pressed the need of negotiation. Rickert, Botticher, and Lerchenfeld had come, and finally Stumm. T o the petition of the co-leader of the party, Kardorff replied that if Caprivi the East Prussian opponents of the Russian treaty, but that its sharpness w a s occasioned also by the threatened opposition f r o m the " Bavarian side " ( L . Raschdau, Unler Bismarck und Caprivi [2d ed.; Berlin, 1939], p. 337). 54 Waldersee, II, 306; Wippermann, 1894, i, 7. L e v e t z o w was thoroughly shaken up by this incident and reported that it was the saddest day of his life (Waldersee, II, 306). 5 5 I b i d . ; Raschdau, p. 3375 6 K a r d o r f f , pp. 290-91 ( F e b . 13, 1894). 57 Waldersee, II, 310 ( M a r c h 12, 1894).

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requested an interview with him as chairman of the budget committee he would consider it necessary to obey, but that if the information came to him as a representative he would decline. Stumm was greatly troubled by this reply. 68 A s chairman of the budget committee, Kardorff was in a strong position. Supported by the Social Democratic members of the committee—Bebel, Singer, and Meister—he w a s slashing the government's budget bills, and " especially all the demands which his M a j e s t y " was raising " for his private views " were finding no favor. Never had " the necessity for strenuous economy " found " such a practical expression." 59 Kardorff expected to have Prince Henry, the Kaiser's son, approach him about the marine budget. Since the Prince's estate had brought in only 30,000 marks instead of 45,000 on the new leasing, Kardorff's answer was ready. T h e farmers no longer had any returns and the last were said to be taken from them by the Russian treaty; therefore he would fear that heavy reductions would be proposed by the majority. 8 0 Members of the two Conservative parties who had given their pledge to the Farmers' League for the most part remained firm, despite the pressure of the Kaiser and government officials. T w o German Conservatives and one Imperialist weakened. When it became known that they were no longer willing to vote against the Russian treaty, the Farmers' League insisted that they redeem their promises or give up their seats in the Reichstag. The Imperialist withdrew from the Reichstag, but stated that he was doing so for reasons of health. 61 One of the Conservatives had left that party because he did not like 58 Kardorff, pp. 289, 291 ( F e b . 2 and 14, 1894). 59 Ibid., 291-92 (Feb. 14 and 25, 1894). GO Ibid., p. 289 (Feb. 5, 1894). 61 Wippermann, 1894, i, 49, 50, 73, 270, 273. T h e Imperialist w a s U n r u h e Bomst. H e announced his decision on February 2, 1894. H e had already fallen into financial difficulties in the spring of 1893 and had given up the office of district president in Bomst, which he had held for years (ibid., p. 50; K. von Westarp, ¡Conservative Politik [Berlin, 1935], I, 1 ) .

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the tone of the Kreus2eitung ; but he remained in the Reichstag and voted for the Russian treaty. 62 The other Conservative, Count Dönhoff-Friedrichstein, 63 agreed to give up his seat, if his electors wished him to do so. When they released him from his promise, the chairman of the branch of the Farmers' League in Dönhoffs electoral district contested the right of the electors to do this. The Count, however, kept his seat and gave his vote in favor of the Russian treaty. The Kaiser followed all this closely. A great sensation was created when he sent Count Dönhoff-Friedrichstein a telegram commending him warmly for acting " courageously like a true nobleman." 64 Such were the people whom the Kaiser admired, it was said,—those who broke their pledges! 65 Instead of following Dönhoffs example, the Conservative party censured him and let him withdraw from the party. The Allgemeine Zeitung reported that one would have to go far back in the annals of Prussian history to find a parallel to this criticism of the Kaiser.66 The same newspaper had suggested earlier that the Poles might change their minds about the Russian treaty at the twelfth hour.67 At the parliamentary dinner at Caprivi's it was observed that William repeatedly directed his remarks to Komierowski,68 who had raised serious objections to the treaty 62Uhden, a district councillor (Amtsrat), (Wippermann, 1894, i, 49-50).

left the party before Jan. 23

63 Count Dönhoff-Friedrichstein represented the rural section of Königsberg, a port which was engaged in the grain trade. It will be recalled that he withheld his vote on the Austrian treaty because he feared the effects of the tariff on his home province. 64 Wippermann, 1894, I, 73, 270, 273; Raschdau, p. 339; Waldersee, II, 310 (March 11, 1894). Dönhoff had formerly belonged to the diplomatic service. Raschdau thought he had always been somewhat forward, that now he was ambitious to play a role too big for him, and that he had been influenced by the Kaiser to act as he did (op. cit., p. 339). 65Waldersee, II, 310. 66 Allg. Ztg., March 13, 1894 (No. 71), p. 2. 67 Ibid., Jan. 4, 1894 (No. 3 M B ) , p. 1. 68 Wippermann, 1894, i, 7.

THE

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with Rumania. B y the middle of February Kardorff was convinced that the government had made an " insane concession " to the Poles in order " to buy " them for the Russian treaty. The Polish recruits, which until then had been divided among the German regiments, were henceforth to be only in the Fifth Army Corps. Thus, said Kardorff, in the future the Poles would " need but shoot their officers dead to get a Polish national army." In a French war this army could fall upon Germany in the rear.® 9 The Conservatives looked askance upon any concessions to the Poles. Since the government decided about this time, also, in order to secure the Polish votes for the marine budget, to permit the use of the Polish language in the elementary schools of the province of Posen, the Conservatives were highly critical. 70 Except for a few individuals who hesitated or refused to oppose the policy of their monarch, the Conservatives did not slacken in their resistance to the Russian treaty. Some members of both parties were nevertheless considering the possibility of securing concessions in case they should fail to secure a majority against the treaty. Immediately after the passage of the Rumanian treaty, a committee of sixteen members of the East Prussian Conservative Association passed a resolution petitioning that compensation for agriculture be found in a repeal of the certificates of identity. The resolution was sent to the chancellor, together with a letter asking the government to settle this question speedily and to take the initiative in solving the currency question. The letter of December 20 was ambiguous, but it opened the possibility of compromise between the chancellor and the Conservative party. Caprivi did not answer it until January 5, when he published both communications as well as his reply. He noted that the resolution did not reject the Russian commercial treaty on principle. He would not agree that agricul69 Kardorff, p. 291 (Feb. 17, 1894). 70 Wippermann, 1894, i, 284-85.

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ture was injured by the commercial treaties with Rumania, Spain, and Serbia; instead he maintained that the commercial policy " followed by his Majesty the Emperor and King in association with his high confederates " was beneficial " to the commonweal (Gesamtheit) and to the economic interests," and that the treaty with Russia would impose upon agriculture no new sacrifices. He promised to place before the federal council a bill to repeal the certificates of identity and to try to have it ready at the same time as the commercial treaty. He admitted that recent events in India and the United States made the currency question more important; but he was convinced that a renewed attempt to restore the price of silver then through conferences with foreign governments would be fruitless. Caprivi did not try to hide the fact that popular interest in this question threatened to make it a subject of public controversy. In order to keep in the hands of experts the study of this difficult matter which touched all economic interests, he now proposed to have experts of various occupational classes and doctrines present their views before those already engaged in the official investigation of the subject. 71 The Kreuzzeitung and the Conservative press of East Prussia denied emphatically that the chancellor's letter had cleared the way for the Russian treaty. The declaration of the East Prussian Conservative committee had reference, it was insisted, to compensations which would offset the injuries which agri71 Ibid., pp. 37-39. Among those who signed the East Prussian resolution were Count Ddnhoff-Friedrichstein, von der Groben, Count MirbachSorquitten, Count zu Eulenburg-Prassen, and Count zu Dohna-Lauck, the chairman. The first three were members of the Reichstag. According to the Allgemeine Zeitung the signature of Eulenburg-Prassen was the most important. He was a cousin of Botho Eulenburg, the Prussian minister president. Eulenburg-Prassen was superior marshal of the kingdom of Prussia and chairman of the provincial Landtag of East Prussia. He owned 14,000 morgen of land which had been in his family four or five centuries. One of his sisters was mother of Hammerstein, the editor-in-chief of the Kreuzzeitung (Allg. Ztg., Jan. 8, 1894 [No. 7], p. 1). Count Mirbach was also the owner of an immense estate.

THE RUSSIAN TREATY,

1894

267

culture was suffering on account of the " small treaties." T i The Kreuzzeitung said that the Conservatives of East Prussia were " too honest and sensible " to let themselves be caught in this w a y for the Russian treaty. A n d Volk refused to accept " the b a i t " offered. 73 Ostensibly to clarify their position towards the Russian treaty, Count Mirbach telegraphed to the Silesian provincial assembly of the Farmers' League that the East Prussian Conservatives would vote against the Russian treaty unless bimetallism was assured. 74 Count Kanitz, also a resident of East Prussia, announced that he would not vote for the Russian treaty unless it was a short-term agreement and the government first regulated the currency. 76 T h e East Prussians were not the only agrarians interested in concessions. Though Kardorff refused to yield to government pressure, he wrote to Herbert Bismarck on February 9 that compensation for agriculture might be obtained in return for his father's support of the Russian treaty. In this letter Kardorff suggested that it would be " desirable for the Prince to give out the word clearly and definitely " as soon as he considered the moment proper. 76 By the 16th of February K a r dorff had received word that Bismarck advised against rejecting the Russian treaty outright; rather they should press for compensation. 77 But Bismarck made no clear public statement regarding the treaty, and there was a good deal of uncertainty about his position. Though Kardorff considered the abolition of the certificates of identity very important, no doubt because he felt that their repeal would stimulate the export of grain from the eastern 72 Allg.

Ztg.,

J a n . 12, 1894 ( N o . 11, 2d M B ) , p. 5.

73 Wippermann, 1894, i, 39. 74 Allg. Ztg., Jan. 13, 1894 (No. 12 A B ) , p. 1; Schulthess, 1894, p. 2. 75 Wippermann, 1894, i, 46 (Jan. 16, 1894). 76 Kardorff, p. 290. TJ Ibid., p. 291.

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provinces, 78 he thought " the simplest compensation " for agriculture's ills would be relief from the existing " incompetent personal." 7 9 H i s chief demand, however, was that the government establish bimetallism. Failing that he wanted something done to offset the effect upon grain prices of a depreciated currency in Russia and some other grain-exporting countries. Kardorff moved therefore on the second day of the debates on the Russian treaty that a supplementary tariff on rye, wheat, and meal be established for those countries with debased currencies. H i s motion was lost. 80 It nevertheless focused attention upon one of the chief objections to a treaty with Russia. T h e German agrarians held that the Russian agriculturist already had an advantage over his German competitor on account of the low ruble value, and that the Russian farmer should not be given the further benefit of a tariff reduction. N o doubt the agrarians had in mind that German grain traders could change their German marks into Russian rubles, and thus purchase Russian grain at a considerable saving in price. T h e difference in price between the Russian grain purchased in this way and the German, it was thought, would offset the tariff which the Russian grain had to pay when it entered Germany. This whole subject had been discussed for some time in the agrarian press. T h e Kreuzzeitung had repeatedly demanded a regulation of the Russian currency as the only solution of the economic problems which agriculture had faced as a result of the commercial treaties. In October, 1893, the Allgemeine Zeitung reported some of the arguments put forward by the Kreuzzeitung. It was said that before Germany introduced the gold standard in 1873, the Russian silver ruble had been valued both in Germany and Russia at 3.25 marks of German money; and the paper ruble, of lower value than the silver ruble, had likewise had an equal value in both countries. A f t e r the introduction of the gold standard, there was no longer a difference 78 [bid., p. 287, 290, 292. TQIbid., p. 290. 80 Ibid., p. 287.

THE

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in the value of the silver and the paper ruble in Germany, but in Russia the paper ruble was still lower in value than the silver ruble. On that account it was held that Russia had an advantage. B y October, 1893, the value of the silver ruble had fallen to 2.12 marks of German money. It was maintained that this drop in the value of the silver ruble had given the Russians an additional benefit; and it was estimated that Germany would need a tariff of 6 or 6.50 marks to offset the lowered value of Russia's currency. Austria was also at a disadvantage, it was claimed, because its currency, though depreciated, had not fallen so low as Russia's. 81 If the treaty with Russia should be accepted, the agrarians contended that Germany's partner in the Triple Alliance would be treated less favorably than Russia as far as the real tariff rate was concerned.82 During the debates on the Rumanian treaty the government had begun to show a more conciliatory attitude toward the bimetallists. It was remarked that Caprivi in his reply to the East Prussian Conservatives took a more benevolent position than formerly on the currency question.83 The Kaiser also appeared to be interested in and familiar with the latest opinions on the subject. A t one of the parliamentary dinners he referred to the recent discovery of gold in the Transvaal. He regretted that this highly technical matter had become the subject of popular agitation.84 For a time there was some hope that the government might tackle the currency question seriously. A currency commission was appointed, as the chancellor had promised in his reply to the East Prussian Conservatives. It had its first meeting on February 22, four days before the debates on the Russian treaty began. But the bimetallists complained almost at once that the commission was packed with 81 Allg. Ztg., Oct. 19, 1893 ( N o . 290 M B ) , p. 2. It w a s reported that Austria's currency in relation to Russia's was as 2.70 to 2.12, expressed in German marks. 8 2 I b i d . ; Reichstag, 83 Allg.

1893-94, II, 1445 ( K a r d o r f f , Feb. 27, 1894).

Ztg., Jan. 8, 1894 ( N o . 7), p. 1.

8 4 Wippermann, 1894, i, 10-11 ( F e b . 23, 1894).

2JO

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POLITICS

adherents of the gold standard. Count Mirbach withdrew from the commission in protest, stating that it was quite impossible for a commission in which a majority of the members were unconditional advocates of the gold standard to decide upon practical measures to solve the silver question. 85 W h e n the sessions of the commission closed on July 6, 1894, no agreement had been reached. 86 T h e government had no doubt hoped by means of the commission to silence the opposition of the bimetallists during the debates on the Russian treaty. A year later the council of state under the chairmanship of the Kaiser studied this question as well as the general condition of agriculture. 87 But in the end nothing was done to satisfy the demands of the bimetallists. T h e certificates of identity and origin, which the agrarians wished to abolish, had been introduced in 1879 at the same time as the grain tariffs. T h e law of 1879 provided for the refund of the import duty paid on foreign grain in transit over Germany. 88 But in order to obtain the refund of the tariff the exporter had to prove by means of certificates of identity and origin that he was exporting the very same grain he had imported. Most of the grain in this transit trade came from Russia, passed over the narrow strip of German territory on the Baltic to the ports of Danzig, Königsberg, Memel, and Stettin, and was then exported to foreign countries. In effect this law of 1879 enabled German grain traders on the Baltic to trade in Russian grain without paying the import duty. But since this law did not permit them to substitute German grain for Rus86 Reichstag, 1893-94, II, 1448 ( K a r d o r f f , Feb. 27, 1894) ; Croner, p. 226; Wippermann, 1894, i, 290-91. 86 Lötz, loc. eil., p. 128; W i p p e n n a n n , 1894, i, 291. 87 Hellwig, p. 487. 88 T h e following references were used for the discussion of the certificates of identity: Sartorius von Waltershausen, pp. 394-95; Lötz, loe. cit., pp. 129-32; H . C. F a r n s w o r t h , loc. cit., p. 320; Wippennann, 1894, i, 14143; Allg. Ztg., J a n . 8, 1894 ( N o . 7), p. 1. P r i o r to 1894 millers who e x ported meal made of domestic grain were permitted to import a corresponding amount of foreign grain duty f r e e (Lötz, loe. cit., pp. 129-30).

THE

RUSSIAN

TREATY,

1894

2JI

sian when they exported, the German grain producers in East Prussia and the other eastern provinces lost a means of disposing of their grain in large quantities. Before the introduction of the certificates of identity the grain export trade of Danzig and Stettin depended chiefly upon shipping abroad German and Russian grain in a fixed mixture called " Danzig " or " Stettin " mixture. 89 A f t e r 1879 the large landowners in the eastern provinces who had good roads for transporting their grain and needed a quick and certain market for considerable quantities of it suffered especially from this regulation. F o r in the East the law stimulated trade in Russian rather than German grain, and it was felt by many on that account that the five-mark tariff was not fully effective in this part of Germany. Even the shipowners, grain dealers, and brokers in the East felt that the regulation was a hardship. Efforts had been made in 1887 and again in 1889-90 to abolish the certificates of indentity, but without success. 80 A s a concession to agriculture, the government now proposed to do away with the certificates of identity in a w a y that would foster the export of German agricultural products and stimulate prices in the eastern provinces. Import certificates were to be issued for all wheat, rye, oats, legumes, barley, colza, and rapeseed exported in quantities of 500 kilograms or more, as well as for meal and malt. These import certificates ( E i n juhrscheine) were to be equal in value to the import duty on a like quantity of the same product. They were to be transferable and valid anywhere in Germany for ten months from the date of issue. During the first four months they could be used for the importation of exactly the same kind of grain as that against which the certificates had been issued. F o r the next two months they could be used to import either grain or other specified products, but in the last four months they might be 89 T h e poorer quality Russian grain was mixed with the better quality German.

90 Allg. Ztg., Jan. 8, 1894 (No. 7), p. 1.

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applied only against the imports of other specified products." 1 A s it was only through the use of the import certificates that any grain could be brought into Germany without paying the tariff, and these import certificates could be obtained only by exporting German grain, it was felt that the tariff would now be as fully effective in the East as in the West. While the contemplated repeal of the certificates of identity was thus considered of great advantage to the eastern provinces, the farmers of other sections, especially of western and southwestern Germany, viewed it with alarm. It is to be remembered that under the law of 1879 Russian grain exported via Danzig, Memel, Königsberg, or Stettin had to pay a tariff unless it went to a foreign country. If the certificates of identity should be abolished, Russian grain entering Germany over the eastern border might be sent by water to western Germany rather than to foreign countries; and the old trade in " Danzig " or " Stettin " mixtures might be revived and then these mixtures might also find their way by water to western Germany. If the Russian treaty with its lowered tariff rates for grain should also be accepted, it was thought that both Russian grain and these mixtures, which could be sent more cheaply by water than by rail, would be coming in great quantities to western and southwestern Germany. It was feared that this would bring about a competition which would be highly injurious there, where production costs were greater than in the East or in Russia. T h e farmers of western and southwestern Germany felt, moreover, that they would he hard hit by the Russian treaty unless the " graduated freight rates " (Staffeltarife) for grain were first done away with. These graduated freight rates had been introduced on September 1, 1891, in an effort to relieve 91 They could be used from the beginning of the fifth month to the end of the tenth month for the importation of colonial wares, petroleum, tea, caviar, and other things (Lötz, loc. cit., p. 130). Because of these special features, " the law of 1894 created a regular market for the sale of import certificates, and helped to maintain their prices close to face value" ( H . C. Famsworth, loc. cit., p. 320).

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the distress caused by the grain scarcity at that time. In order to facilitate the movement of grain supplies overland from the eastern provinces to the West, all grain and meal carried for a distance of more than 1200 kilometers on the Prussian railways were granted a reduction from 4 J/2 to pfennigs per 92 kilometer in the mileage rate. These graduated freight rates had been kept after grain prices dropped, partly because they enabled the eastern provinces to market their grain more readily in the West, and partly because the increased use of the railroads for grain shipments brought the Prussian government an additional yearly revenue of several million marks from this source. Agriculturists, the milling industry, and grain traders in the eastern provinces generally approved the graduated freight rates.83 Because of an earlier railway agreement with Russia the Prussian railways had been obliged to carry Russian grain also at the lower rate after 1891. 94 But up to this time that railway agreement had had little effect, for the export of Russian grain had been prohibited in 1891 and a part of 1892, and during the tariff war which began in the summer of 1893, the German tariff on Russian wheat and rye was 7.50 marks per 100 kilograms. Article 19 of the Russian commercial treaty, however, stipulated that Russian goods carried on German railways could not be tariffed higher than German wares of the same sort. This article of the treaty made agriculturists outside the six eastern provinces almost as apprehensive as those nearer the Russian border concerning the effects of that treaty.95 92 Wippermann, 1894, i, 41; Allg. Ztg., Jan. 8, 1894 (No. 7), p. 2; Jan. io, 1894 ( N o . 9), p. 3. 93 Schulthess, 1894, p. 68; Wippermann, 1894, i, 41. 94 Lotz,

loc. cit.,

p. 126;

Reichstag,

1893-94, III, 1761.

95 There was nothing new in this railroad agreement with Russia. Ever since 1857, as Baron von Thielmann, the government's commissioner, pointed out, mutual most-favored treatment had been agreed upon in all RussoGerman railroad treaties (ibid.).

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W h a t action the government ought to take regarding the graduated freight rates and the certificates of identity, in the event the Russian treaty should be accepted, became the subject of heated controversy, and threatened to produce a rift in the agricultural opposition. T h e farmers of middle, western, and southern Germany felt that a repeal of the certificates of identity would benefit only the farmers of the East. Sponsors of the bill to repeal argued that while exports from the East would be stimulated by the proposed import certificates, they would not cause an artificial importation of grain in the South and the West, because the certificates could be used for wares other than grain. T h e farmers of the East considered it essential not only to repeal the certificates of identity but also to retain the graduated freight rates as compensation for the anticipated increase in competition from Russian grain. In the West and the Southwest, on the other hand, the farmers insisted upon repeal of the graduated freight rates: for until repealed they would be applicable to Russian grain as well as that from the eastern provinces under Article 19 of the Russian commercial treaty. These matters caused friction in the federal council during January and February. Württemberg, Baden, Hesse, Saxony, and Bavaria were all ranged against Prussia in varying degrees of hostility, for they all feared that their own interests were about to be sacrificed for those of Prussia. 9 6 Saxony's opposition was mild. T h e Conservatives interpellated the Saxon government in the Saxon house of delegates on February 13 concerning its policy with respect to the graduated freight rates and the Russian treaty. That government replied that Saxony would not make its approval of the Russian treaty in the federal council dependent upon the repeal of the graduated freight rates. Metzsch, the government representative, admitted nevertheless that this regulation, which had been introduced in 1891 96 Kardorff, pp. 290, 291, 293; Raschdau, pp. 337-39.

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to relieve distress, might well be repealed now that there was a surplus instead of a dearth of grain. 97 This interpellation occurred two days after the Prussian ministry of state decided to propose to the federal council the repeal of the certificates of identity.98 It was evident that millers and grain traders in southwestern Germany agreed with the farmers there that the graduated freight rates ought to be repealed.9® The difficulties which the government had with Baden, Hesse, and Württemberg were not aired in public, but they made the Kaiser uneasy.100 It was Bavaria, however, which became most aroused about the graduated freight rates. In January without the knowledge or consent of the federal council, whose deliberations were secret, someone divulged the nature of the conflict in the council, and on January 10 the Hamburg Correspondent reported that Bavaria would make its agreement to the commercial treaty with Russia dependent upon the repeal of the graduated freight rates and the promise that they would not be introduced again while the treaty was effective.101 In great consternation— for the publication caused a tremendous sensation and he did not wish to have his government involved—Count Lerchenfeld, the Bavarian ambassador to Berlin, urgently requested Marschall to deny the report. This the latter did in the Post.102 97 Wippennann, 1894, i, 43. 96 This was done on February 11, 1894, and a bill to this effect was laid before the federal council on the next day (ibid., p. 40). 99 On January 29, 1894, a meeting was held at Mannheim in Baden, which was attended by 100 persons interested in the milling industry and the grain trade in southwestern Germany. They gave a unanimous vote in favor of repeal of the graduated freight rates which were held to be detrimental to the agricultural, industrial, and commercial interests of the Southwest (ibid., p. 43). 100 Kardorff, p. 291; Wippermann, 1894, i, 43. 101 Ibid., p. 41. 102 Raschdau, p. 338; Wippermann, 1894, i, 42 (quoting the Post [Jan. 11, 1894]).

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But on January 19 the Bavarian lower chamber accepted by a close majority a Centrist motion requesting the Prince Regent to instruct the Bavarian plenipotentiaries to exert every effort in the federal council to preserve in the Russian treaty the former grain tariff protection, and to prevent the abolition of the certificates of identity. The minister president, Baron von Crailsheim, declared at once that it would be impossible to carry out the first part of this motion. Rather the Bavarian government was doing everything in its power to win compensations for agriculture to offset the grain tariff reductions in the Russian treaty. He told the delegates that negotiations were still in progress. Concerning the vote of the Bavarian government in case the treaty should be concluded, he could give no information.103 Though Marschall's statement in the Post minimized the importance of the crisis, it was actually as serious as the Hamburg Correspondent indicated. According to Raschdau, Crailsheim had told the Prussian ambassador that his state would not accept the treaty unless the graduated freight rates were removed. Furthermore Crailsheim said that if Prussia reproached him on that account he would consider it his political duty to hand in his resignation after the voting in the council. Then the matter would rest squarely on the shoulders of Miquel and Thielen, who opposed their repeal.104 The question was of considerable importance to Prussia, because the graduated freight rates had added about five million marks to its railroad receipts, and it was thought that the system should be extended in the future. 105 Some Prussians, furthermore, resented the attempt to make Prussia pay for Bavaria's consent to the commercial agreement with Russia. 10 ® In 103 Schulthess, 1894, p. 29. 104 Raschdau, pp. 337-38. 105 Wippermann, 1894, i, 42 (quoting [Jan. 12, 1894]). 106 Raschdau, p. 338.

Berliner Politische Nachrichten

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the article in the Hamburg Correspondent already mentioned, it was pointed out that the great national interests which were involved in the conclusion of the Russian treaty were being used to restrict a federal state in its freedom to order affairs which rightly belonged to its exclusive competence. The use of the Imperial lever to prevent Prussia from determining its railroad rates according to its own economic and financial needs was considered questionable.107 It was resented the more because Bavaria was said to have planned to introduce graduated freight rates for wood on its railroads, and these would work a hardship upon Prussian wood producers.108 The question of the graduated freight rates evidently came to a head in Bavaria and Prussia as in Saxony just after the Prussian ministers decided to repeal the certificates of identity. At this crucial moment the Kaiser took matters into his own hands.109 Without consulting the Prussian ministers, he assured the Bavarian military plenipotentiary Haag on February 11 that the graduated freight rates would be abolished. Unware of this conversation, the Prussian ministers met the next day, gave a divided vote on the matter, and then adjourned. 110 Shortly after this the Bavarian ambassador Lerchenfeld informed Caprivi of William's promise. Caprivi at once said that the government would stand behind the Kaiser. The graduated freight rates would be repealed; but Bavarian railroad rates would also be subjected to certain restrictions, and so far as the 107 Wippermann, 1894, i, 41-42. 108 Ibid. 109 W e have only the authority of Raschdau for this statement (op. cit., p. 338). Lotz, whose treatment of the commercial policy of Caprivi and Hohenlohe appeared in 1901 long before Raschdau's book, said: " W h e t h e r the consent of the South German governments could have been secured in the federal council without the repeal of the Prussian graduated freight rates, cannot be d e t e r m i n e d " (Joe. cit., p. 132, note 2 ) . 110 According to Raschdau, the voting at the meeting on Feb. 12 was as follows: for the repeal of the graduated rates, Caprivi, Botticher, Berlepsch and Bosse; against the repeal, Eulenburg, Thielen, and Heyden. Miquel expressed some hesitation (op. cit., p. 338).

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public was concerned the graduated freight rates were to be kept entirely separate from the commercial treaty. 1 1 1 The matter could not be finally settled, however, without the approval of the legislative assemblies. On February 21 two motions were laid before the Prussian house of delegates. The Conservative party petitioned the government to do nothing about the graduated freight rates until after a decision had been reached regarding the Russian treaty. The Free Conservatives asked that the decision on the graduated freight rates be postponed until after the government had decided upon and reported to the Landtag the measures which it would take to relieve agricultural distress. 112 Both the graduated freight rates and the certificates of identity were discussed in the Reichstag in connection with the Russian treaty. The basis of compromise reached there will be described later. Bismarck had always taken care to avoid a decision in the federal council which would offend Bavaria, because he was desirous of preserving the federal character of the Empire. 118 The particularism in the South German states, which the conflict over the graduated freight rates revealed, may have been stirred in part by some remarks which Bismarck made in the summer of 1893. 1 1 4 It was intensified by the government's proposal to increase the wine and tobacco taxes to provide an additional source of revenue. The representatives of Württemberg 111 Ibid., pp. 338-39. 112 Wippermann, 1894, i, 43 (Feb. 16, 1894); Schulthess, 1894, p. 68. Raschdau said, however, that the later negotiations in the Prussian railroad council, in the Prussian Landtag, and in the Reichstag were of no further significance (op. cit., pp. 338-39). On March 6 the Prussian railroad council voted 20 to 14 in favor of repeal (Schulthess, 1894, p. 9s). A decree issued on March 17, 1894, made the repeal of the graduated freight rates effective on August I, 1894 (Wippermann, 1894, i, 43). 113 Lerchenfeld, pp. 192-93, 236. 114 In a talk at Kissingen to a delegation from Frankfort, Bismarck suggested a constitutional means which could be taken by any federal state to protest against any measure proposed by the federal government, such as the wine tax (Allg. Ztg., Oct. 20, 1893 [No. 291], p. 2).

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were greatly aroused over the contemplated wine tax. They claimed that it contradicted an unwritten understanding which had been reached in 1870 when the Empire was established. 115 In Bavaria there was great dissatisfaction on account of the government's commercial policy. Early in January the Allgemeine Zeitung of Munich discussed the effects of the separation of the chancellorship from the office of Prussian minister president. It will be recalled that Caprivi gave up the latter office in 1892 after the Prussian education bill was withdrawn. According to the Allgemeine Zeitung the chancellor had lost thereby his real significance and the roots of his power, and he had been compelled to establish a strong Imperial government in place of the federal government. In the case of the commercial treaties this Imperial government was absorbing even the Reichstag and was concentrating the entire political action of the Empire in the person of the Imperial chancellor. This, said the writer, was felt perhaps far more in South Germany than in Prussia. 114 This was not the first time that the separation of the two offices had been the subject of discussion. It was felt in Prussia as well as Bavaria that it signified an undesirable constitutional change. Since 1892, moveover, the attitude of some Prussian officials had grown steadily more hostile toward Caprivi. It was well known that his chief opponents were Miquel, the Prussian minister of finance, and Eulenburg, the Prussian minister president. Each of these two ministers had been discussed by prominent agrarians as a possible successor to Caprivi. If we may accept the authority of Raschdau, it was Eulenburg who was responsible for the disclosure of the conflict in the federal council. He had his friends informed and they raised the alarm. 117 But it was William and not Caprivi who made the arbitrary decision regarding the graduated freight rates and forced its acceptance upon Eulenburg and other Prussian 115 Wippermann, 1894, i, 129-30.

116Allg. Ztg., Jan. 5, 1894 (No. 4 M B), p. 1. 117 Raschdau, p. 338.

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ministers who opposed it. 118 T h e Kaiser called a meeting of the crown council on February 18, at which he presided. T h e members were informed of the details of the Russian tariff agreement and the government's reasons for negotiating the treaty.11® But the real purpose was apparently to impress upon the ministers present their duty to give the treaty their wholehearted support. W h e n the Kaiser spoke of those w h o wore their consent " more on their lips than in their hearts," it was thought that he spoke especially for the benefit of Miquel, whose wavering attitude had been criticized in the Radical press. 120 If these incidents were evidence of arbitrary government, there had been similar examples in the past. In his efforts to prevent a dispute with Bavaria over a fundamental issue William acted on the graduated freight rates very much as Bismarck had done before under similar circumstances. A n d those who knew what actually happened on February n and 12 commented upon the method used and made comparisons with the not so distant past. 121 Because of his difficulties with the agrarians and the Prussian ministers, Caprivi was becoming more and more unpopular in Berlin society and was being cut socially. Stephan, a member of the Imperialist party, gave a dinner on February 19, where the chancellor was " air " ( L u j t ) for all the Conservatives. A s Caprivi moved about before and after the meal among the groups of guests half of them would turn their backs to him. Bronsart, the war minister, who sat opposite Caprivi at dinner, said " quite distinctly across the table that he had no 118 Ibid. On the evening of the day the Prussian ministers gave a divided vote on the graduated freight rates the Kaiser announced himself at Count Eulenburg's and had all the ministers invited also. Meanwhile Caprivi had had his talk with Lerchenfeld. The Kaiser confirmed before the ministers present at Eulenburg's what Caprivi had told Lerchenfeld. 119 Grosse Politik, VII, No. 1666. 120Raschdau, p. 339. 121 Ibid.

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acre and blade of straw and knew exactly how miserable agriculture was." 122 In the Farmers' League, despite the government's promise to establish agricultural chambers and to seek other means of relief, there was no talk of compromise, and every effort w a s being made to bring about the defeat of the Russian treaty. Members were admonished if they showed signs of weakening. They were warned not to let an economic treaty be " bullied out " of them by " threats of a foreign war." The League reported in the middle of February that it was receiving addresses and letters by the thousands, and that hundreds of reports had come from its local branches, endorsing its stand against the Russian treaty. Ploetz declared that the more " enticement " the government offered to move Reichstag members to accept the treaty, the more the League gained ground in the country. 128 O n February 17 the Farmers' League held its first general assembly in Berlin. T h e meeting came opportunely, nine days before the debates on the Russian treaty began. Because of its size the meeting had to be divided into two sections as in 1893. In the first section over 5,000 were present and in the second more than 2,000. It was announced that the League's membership had increased from 152,646 at the end of October to 178,939 on February 10. 124 The loyalty of the German farmers was manifest by their unanimous participation in the three-fold cheer to " H i s Majesty, our beloved Kaiser, and the exalted German Federal Princes, long may they live! " Later when Bismarck's name was mentioned, there was thunderous applause, and all arose and joined enthusiastically in a like " Hoch, hoch, hoch!" to the former chancellor. 125 122 Kardorff, pp. 289-91 ( F e b . 5 and 19, 1894). 123 Wippermann, 1894, i, 58 (quoting Kreuszeitung), respondenz des Bundes der Landwirte). 124 Ibid., pp. 61-62. 125 Ibid., pp. 62, 64.

61 (quoting

Kor-

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President Ploetz warned those present not to weaken, but to fulfill their promises faithfully. " What humbug," he declared, was carried on with the slogan " imperative mandate! " He asked if each electoral candidate had not had to express himself in May of the previous year either for or agrainst the military bill. And woe unto him, had he voted differently! He asked his audience to just think what would have happened if anyone from the parties of Richter or Bebel had voted for the bill! The pressure which the Farmers' League was using was child's play in comparison to that being exerted by other sides.12® In particular he urged the assembled farmers not to be influenced by proposals concerning certificates of identity, graduated freight rates, and Polish recruits, or by threats which had recently been circulated in the East that rejection of the treaty would mean war. 127 According to Lutz of Bavaria the war threat was being used so that the Russian treaty would be considered from the political rather than from the economic standpoint. He reminded the members that the chancellor had urged the acceptance of the Austrian treaty so that Germany's political allies would be strengthened. This Lutz held to be the chief argument against the treaty with Russia. The " fear of the Cossacks " which had been stressed of late had no weight, he said, with the German farmers. They loved peace as much as anyone else, but they would not agree to a peace which would make the German people as it were tributary to Russia. The economic standpoint alone, not the political, must be the determining factor in concluding the Russian treaty. 128 Dr. Rosicke, the vice-president of the Farmers' League, emphasized the unity of German agriculture. What the Freisinn had always tried to separate—the large and the small landowner—was joined together in the League. In the League 1261 Ibid.,

pp. 62-63.

127 Ibid. 128 Ibid.,

p. 64.

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there was no difference: all were farmers (Bauern). H e urged his listeners not to permit this unity to be disturbed. Here and there in the German Empire particularist tendencies were unfortunately noticeable, but in the League the strength of union prevailed. Thus the League gave the idea of relationship and German nationality. 130 The assembly decided by a unanimous vote to petition the Reichstag to reject the Russian commercial treaty. In support of this action a formal resolution was drawn up : German agriculture has been placed in the most distressing situation imaginable by the commercial treaties already concluded. In view of agriculture's fundamental importance in the economic life of the people, and of the intimate connection of the several branches of industry to one another, numerous members of the middle class engaged in agriculture, trade, and commerce will be ruined financially, if agriculture experiences further injuries through the tariff policy of the Empire. We are combating the annihilation of German agriculture not for the sake of special interests, but for the sake of the whole fatherland and of the monarchy, because we consider it the surest foundation of throne and altar, mindful as we are of Frederick William I's political legacy to Frederick the Great : a full treasury, a strong army, protection of agriculture, maintenance of high import duties, and rigorous control over civil servants are the basic requirements for the success of the state.131 Throughout the two months prior to the signing of the Russian treaty, the Radical press supported the chancellor. And there was plenty of evidence that commerce and industry approved the treaty. 132 The opposition in Conservative circles 129 The use of the word Bauer rather than Landwirt recognition of the numerous peasants in the League.

was a tactful

130 Wippermann, 1894, i, 63. 131 Ibid., p. 65. 132 The Association of German Iron and Steel Industrialists, a large gathering of industrialists and merchants of the Duchy of Brunswick, a meeting in Berlin composed of 2,000 persons representing German industry

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continued unabated, despite the activity of the government and the Kaiser, and the talk of concessions. W h e n the debates on the Russian treaty began on February 26 its fate was by no means certain. If we may trust the authority of Kardorff, the feeling within the parties for and against the treaty was about the same at the end of February as it had been at the beginning. Commenting upon the Kaiser's efforts to work upon the representatives, Kardorff wrote on February 25 : " W i t h the Conservatives, that is in vain and also with us." H e added that his party would have 5 or 6 votes for and 23 against the treaty, and that the Center would have 70 noes and only 20 yeses. 138 Had the three parties mentioned in Kardorff's letter voted as he indicated, the treaty would have been rejected. Actually when the roll-call vote was taken on March 10 on Article I of the Russian treaty, there was a majority of 54 votes for the treaty instead of a majority of 25 or more against it. 134 For months the agrarians had been fearful that the government would grant Russia the grain tariff reductions which Austria had received in 1892. T h e reasons for their fears had been expressed repeatedly. Because of circumstances which favored the Russian producer, there was the threat that he would be able to undersell his German competitor in the German market. In many sections of the Ukraine, soil and climate

and the Central Association of German Industrialists all expressed themselves at this time ( F e b . 17-19) in favor of the Russian treaty. On Feb. 21 the German T r a d e Congress, to which 146 chambers of commerce and trade as well as 6 economic associations belonged, met in Berlin in e x t r a ordinary plenary session and declared themselves in favor of the treaty. Like declarations came f r o m chambers of commerce and town councillors of a number of localities, but the Rhenish-Westphalian News, which represented the interests of industry in Essen was against it (ibid., pp. 61, 67-73)133 Kardorff, pp. 289, 292 ( F e b . 2 and 25, 1894). 134 W i t h its 6 associates the Conservative party numbered 67 in March, 1894. If 60 of t h e Conservatives had voted against the treaty and the others had absented themselves, and if the Centrist and Imperialist votes had fallen as Kardorff predicted, there would have been 190 votes against and 165 votes for the treaty.

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were more favorable for grain cultivation than in Germany. The soil in the six eastern provinces which bordered on Russia was poor and the growing season was short. Yet it was there that most of Germany's rye and much of its wheat was raised. Germany and Russia had a common boundary 1 2 0 0 kilometers long with practically no geographic barriers. Numerous rivers and waterways afforded a means of bringing supplies cheaply from the interior of Russia through the eastern provinces to German seaports on the Baltic. According to Count Mirbach, the rivers played a much more important part than graduated freight rates in Russian competition. 135 Russia's lower standard of living reduced its production costs. Its debased currency was a further aid to the Russian farmer. Russia usually had a large surplus of grain beyond the needs of its own population. A s Russia extended its railways further into the interior, greater supplies were likely to become available for export in the future. The proximity of Russia, the largest producer of rye in the world, to Germany, the largest consumer of rye, and to Germany's own granary caused German agriculturists to be more apprehensive about the reduction in the rye tariff than about any other item in the treaty. Again and again they asserted that in consequence of this reduction of 1.50 marks per 100 kilograms, Russian rye would flood the German market. On the other hand German industry and commerce considered the Russian treaty of paramount importance. It has already been noted that the value of Germany's exports to Russia had dropped significantly between 1880 and 1890. The tariff war brought a further sharp reduction in Germany's export of manufactured goods to Russia. In his report for 1893 the British consul at Stettin stated that during the first seven months of the year Germany had exported 54,000 tons of iron and steel to Russia, but only 13,000 tons during the following five months, that is, after the tariff war began. Before August 1 Germany had exported to Russia 8,400 tons of machinery; 135 Reichstag, 1893-94, II, 1418 (Mirbach, Feb. 26, 1894).

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thereafter, only 4,200 tons.18® He also stated that the Finnish market for the chemicals and refined sugar which Stettin manufactured was completely closed after August 1, and the resulting loss amounted to about £25,000. T o replace this sugar Finland had imported via Stettin 1,700 tons of Austrian sugar during the last five months of 1893.187 The Upper Silesian iron and coal industry had been working under difficulties even before the tariff war in 1893, because Russia levied a higher tariff for land-borne than for sea-borne imports, which gave England and Belgium an advantage over Upper Silesia in the export of coal and iron to Russia. The dislocation of trade after 1891 brought even greater hardship to Germany's commercial ports on the Baltic than to German industry. For those cities suffered from the reduction in Germany's exports to Russia and also from the shift in the grain trade. Russia's grain export bans in 1891-92 and the tariff war of 1893 led Germany to import grain in greater quantities than formerly from Rumania, United States, and Argentina. These imports did not go via the Baltic ports but via Amsterdam and Antwerp to Mannheim and other grain trading centers of western Germany. From the port of Stettin alone 155 steamers ceased to ply to Russia in 1891 as a result of the grain prohibitions; and in 1892-93 259 more steamers were taken off the trade.188 The excessive harbor dues placed on German ships in Russian ports after August 1, 1893, still further crippled shipping in the East. A ship of 700 tons, which formerly had to pay 35 rubles in a Russian port, had to pay 700 in the latter part of 1893 and early 1894. Some lines paid 136 The British consul, Wilfred Powell, was of the opinion that Germany must have suffered a serious loss on account of the German manufactured goods excluded from the Russian market for which it was unable to secure other buyers (Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1894, vol. L X X X V I [Accounts and Papers, Vol. 36], Cmd. 1366, " Preliminary Report for the Year 1893 on the Trade of S t e t t i n " ) . 137 Ibid. 138 Ibid.

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the high harbor dues demanded after August I, so that they would not be " ousted from the trade by foreign flags," but this could not be continued for long. 189 Because of the increased harbor dues in Russia, said the Radical leader, Rickert, who represented Danzig, shipping in the Baltic was as good as over. 140 The Baltic ports, as already shown, handled a large transit trade as well as commerce between Germany and Russia. Grain exports from Russia passed via these ports to foreign countries, and British, French, and Belgian manufactures entered Russia by the same route. This transit trade was also disrupted by the tariff war. 1 4 1 The Russian treaty was designed to overcome these obstacles to trade with Russia. At the crown council meeting held on February 18, 1894, Berlepsch, the minister of commerce and industry, stated that the chief benefits from the Russian treaty would go to the Upper Silesian iron and coal industry and to the Baltic ports. 142 Both the Russian and the German war tariffs would disappear, as well as the excessive port dues. Russia's renunciation of higher tariffs for land-borne than for seaborne products would place the Upper Silesian iron and coal industry on an equal footing with that of England and Belgium. Trade between Germany and Finland was likewise regulated. Russia in addition granted concessions in its tariffs on wrought iron, which would be of advantage to Germany's iron industry. 1 4 3 It is evident, therefore, that there was a sharp conflict of interests within the very section of Germany where the greatest 139

See also, Zweig, p. 44.

140 Reichstag, 1893-94, II, 1435 (Rickert, Feb. 26, 1894). Berlepsch asserted that if the Russian border should remain closed to the trade of Königsberg, Danzig, and Memel, those ports would fail almost completely (Grosse Politik, VII, No. 1666). 141 Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, 1894, vol. L X X X V I I (Accounts and Papers, vol. 37), Cmd. 1330, "Report for the Years 1892-93 on the Progress of Russian Trade." 142 Grosse Politik, 143 Reichstag,

VII, No. 1666.

1893-94, III, 1788; Lötz, loc. cit., p. 126.

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amounts of grain were raised—the six eastern provinces of Prussia. T h e demands of the mining industry of Upper Silesia and the commercial interests of the Baltic ports were ranged against those of the East Prussian Junkers. In addition to the grain tariff reductions the agrarians criticized certain special provisions of the Russian treaty. They said, for instance, that the final clause of Article 2 would enable Russia to make the provision of the article illusory as far as the Germans were concerned. T h e article provided that nationals of each country should be privileged to acquire and own property in the other country; but in the terminating clause of the article, the reservation was made that this privilege was granted only so far as the law of the land did then or should in the future extend the right to the citizens of any foreign country. It will be recalled that in 1887 Russia passed a law requiring all aliens who inherited property in the Baltic provinces to dispose of it within three years. Though this law was directed more against Germany than any other country, it was extremely doubtful whether Article 2 would give the Germans relief. Even if it did some Germans would still be affected by a much older Russian law, which prohibited Roman Catholics from inheriting property in Russia. According to the agrarians the final clause of Article 2 would therefore have the effect of emasculating the article. Mirbach referred to the wide discussion of Princess Hohenlohe's inheritance in both the Russian and the German press, and to the treatment which she had received. T h e Hohenlohes, it should be noted, were Roman Catholics. One would have thought, said Mirbach, that if it were possible for the Tsar to set aside the laws requiring the sale of inherited property in any case, a certain latitude would have been exercised for the Princess in view of her birth. Y e t the Russian press, notably the Nowoje Wremja, had expressed the sharpest opposition to any delay in the compulsory sales. Though Mirbach did not doubt that the pressure of the tariff negotiations would work favorably in this special instance, he thought the attitude of the Russian press showed what Ger-

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man subjects who wished to acquire property in Russia would have to expect. 144 There was objection also to the supplementary protocol to Article 19. In the article itself each country granted mostfavored treatment to the other with respect to freight rates on its state railroads and agreed not to impose higher rates for goods of the other country than for its own. The supplementary protocol to this article was an agreement relative to through rates, which would enable the ports of Danzig, Königsberg, and Memel to continue to handle overseas trade to and from Russia, and would prevent Russia from establishing more favorable through rates for grain, flax, and hemp for its own ports of Libau and Riga than for the German Baltic ports. The agrarians objected because the protocol did not restrict these through rates to overseas exports as formerly: now, it was said, the through rates would compete with domestic freight rates, and would give the preference to Russian grain. The farmers feared that even East and West Prussia would be " flooded " with Russian grain. 1 4 6 The government commissioners made a statement on March 5 regarding this point. The cost of unlading, cartage, and relading would make impossible a profitable importation of Russian grain into the eastern provinces for a radius of 50 kilometers from Königsberg and Danzig, as Mirbach feared. A practical importation of Russian grain would be possible, according to the commissioners, for only a third of that distance. 146 In connection with Article 1, the Anti-Semites attempted to inject a more violent tone into the debates, by stirring up race 144 Reichstag, 1893-94, II, 1417 (Mirbach, Feb. 26, 1894); Anlageband II. 957. 993 (No. 190). See also, Appendix I. As already noted, the Russian law of 1887 made an exception in the case of property in commercial places and in cities. 145Reichstag, 1893-94, II. 1418 (Mirbach, Feb. 26, 1894). 146 Lötz, loc. cit., p. 127. Since only the state railroads were required to give a reduced through rate for Russian grain, the treaty did not in any way interfere in the affairs of the private railroads (ibid., p. 126).

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hatred. T h e article provided that citizens of either country w h o settled in the territory of the other or stopped there temporarily should enjoy the same rights and privileges as citizens of most-favored nations and that in matters of trade and commerce they should be treated like nationals. T h e Anti-Semites contended that this article would call forth a mass immigration of Russian Jews. Marschall replied that the German government w a s entirely free at any time to prevent Russian subjects from entering German territory, or to expell them if they did enter the country. 1 4 7 Much to the surprise of the government there w a s vehement opposition to the concession which Russia had made in the hops tariff. In the Austrian treaty Germany had reduced its hops tariff to 14 marks per 100 kilograms, and A u s t r i a fixed its tariff for hops at about the same level. Germany extended the same rate to Russia and Russia lowered its hops tariff f r o m 10 to 6.50 rubles per pud. T h e chief hops-cultivating areas of Germany were in the governmental districts of Franconia in Bavaria. T h i s was the area of the Frankish Peasants' League, of which Baron Thiingen-Rossbach was the president. Germany regularly exported about one-third of its hops crop, much of which went to Russia. Instead of accepting with gratitude the concession which the government had obtained f r o m Russia, the hops cultivators complained that Russia's tariff w a s five times as high as Germany's. T h e German government replied that the hops farmers need not fear Russian competition, because they produced hops of superior quality, while most of the Russian hops was of cheap grade. T h e fact that the German hops cultivators had suffered from a very poor harvest in 1893 was undoubtedly the cause of their violent opposition. In any 147 Reichstag, 1893-94, III, 1734 (Hasse, March 10, 1894), 1737 (Lotze) (Rickert), 1736 (Marschall). At this time there were two motions before the Reichstag requesting the government to lay before that body a bill to deny Israelites who were not citizens the right to immigrate over the German border (ibid., p. 1734 [Hasse, March io, 1894]).

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29I

case their exports to Russia were not hampered by the new tariff.1« Aside from these special objections to the treaty, the discussion followed about the same course as that on the Rumanian treaty. W h a t had been said hundreds of times by both sides was repeated. Some new arguments were advanced. The agrarians felt that the government should have been able to secure greater concessions from Russia, because Russia's exports to Germany far surpassed those of Germany to Russia. Germany could live without Russia, but Russia would have difficulty in getting along without Germany. German industry, furthermore, was deceiving itself if it expected lasting benefits from the sacrifice which agriculture alone had to bear. For as Russia's industry grew stronger year after year, German exports would decline. It was pointed out that Marschall and others had said on several occasions that acceptance of the Rumanian treaty in no w a y obligated the members to take the one with Russia. Mirbach did not believe that political considerations should enter into a decision concerning a commercial treaty. But even if the delegates were to let political considerations guide them, that would not necessitate the acceptance of the Russian treaty. F o r the government had argued in 1891 that Germany's political allies should be strengthened. Even if the delegates were to admit that point, they should not on that account vote to give economic advantage to Russia, the country which threatened the Triple Alliance the most. Claiming that he was quoting from a Social Democratic publication, Mirbach said that if the well-being of a country were to be based upon its exporting industry, the population would be drawn in a very short time to Social Democracy, for the export of industry at any price would shatter all patriarchal relations. It 148 Lotz, loc. cit., pp. 124-26. Only in 1893, that is, during the tariff war, did Russia inclusive of Finland send more hops to Germany than it received from there. From 1894 to 1900 the value of Germany's hops exports to Russia and Finland exceeded each year the value of the hops received from there, though during some of this period Russia exported to Germany a greater amount of hops than it imported from there (ibid., p. 126).

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would ruin agriculture; it would draw the people to industrial centers, to cities, and then after foreign industry became strong, the industrial workers of the country would be without work. 1 4 * These and other arguments were brought forward. T h e major problem before the legislators, however, proved to be the working out of a compromise between those who desired the abolition of the graduated freight rates on Prussia's railroads and those who wanted the repeal of the certificates of identity. T h e chief credit for engineering this compromise belonged to Lieber of the Centrist party and Stumm of the Imperialist party. 160 They were supported by Bennigsen of the National Liberal party. A t first the latter had been opposed to a repeal of the certificates of identity. H e now felt that the repeal would make the tariff of 3.50 marks as fully effective in the East as it was in other parts of the country. The use of the import certificates for other wares than grain would prevent " an artificial importation in the South or West " while grain was being exported from the East. Those in the East who wanted to keep the graduated rates on the railroads and abolish the certificates of identity were reminded that the graduated freight rates helped the East only because the certificates of identity existed. T h e better grain, said Bennigsen, could not be taken away by sea; therefore it had to seek a way by land. But if through the removal of the certificates of identity, export by sea—the most natural and the cheapest w a y — w e r e made possible, the graduated rates would then have no more significance. Bennigsen thought that the government would have to decide to repeal the graduated freight rates. 181 Lieber informed the members that many of his party wanted certainty before deciding in favor of the Russian treaty that the graduated freight rates would be removed and never be re149 Reichstag,

1893-94, H. 1416-17, 1424 (Mirbach, Feb. 26, 1894).

150 Kardorff, p. 294; Hellwig, p. 486. 151 Reichstag,

1893-94, H . 1462 (Bennigsen, Feb. 27, 1894).

T H E RUSSIAN TREATY,

1894 152

293

established while the treaty was in force. Count von Bernstorff of Hanover said that the agricultural representatives of northern Hanover had declared themselves eight days before unanimously for the treaty, provided the graduated rates and the certificates of identity were abolished. 153 Stumm advocated the repeal of both. He held that these two compensations together were more important for agriculture than the conclusion of the Rusian treaty, and that they would equalize the disadvantages of the Austrian treaty also. The repeal of the graduated freight rates, he added, would raise the price of bread for the worker in the West, but industry would very gladly bear the additional expenditure in the interest of solidarity, provided it could find sufficient business. He held that for the German worker it was not so much a question of eating the cheapest bread possible as of earning enough money so that he could eat the most bread possible. 154 Even Kardorff considered that the repeal of the certificates of identity in a form which would give German grain an export premium of 3.50 marks per 100 kilograms would guarantee " a very sufficient compensation for agriculture." In a private letter he said that he would vote against the treaty on principle ; but that if it were not a matter of principle he could just as well vote for it. 185 A roll-call vote was taken on Article i of the treaty on March 10. The members voted 200 to 146 in favor of acceptance. This gave the government a majority of 30 more votes than it had had for the Rumanian treaty. The Social Democrats, the Radicals, and Poles, and the South German People's party voted solidly for the treaty; with them were 3 Guelphs, 2 Alsatians, 1 Dane, and 2 nonpartisans, making a total of 106. The German Reform party, together with the four representatives of the Bavarian Peasants' League, 2 Anti-Semites, and 132 Ibid., p. 1483 (Lieber, Feb. 28, 1894). 153 Ibid., p. 1500 (Bernstorff, Feb. 28, 1894). 154Ibid., pp. 1495, 1498 (Stumm, Feb. 28, 1894). 155 Kardorff, p. 292 (Feb. 28, 1894).

294

GERMAN AGRARIAN

POLITICS

4 nonpartisans gave 21 votes against the treaty. The Conservatives and the two middle parties gave a divided vote, as follows: Against

For German Conservatives Imperialists National Liberals

54 16 16

6 9 34

Total for the old " cartel " Center

49 45

86 39

94

125

VOTING ON ARTICLE I o r T H E R U S S I A N TREATY

Parties Conservatives Imperialists German Reform Centrists Poles National Liberals Radical Union German Radical People's party South German People's party . Social Democrats Nonpartisan Nonpartisan: Alsatians Anti-Semites Guelphs Dane Bavarian Peasants' League Others

For

Against

Totals

45 15 34 12 22 9 40 8

... 10

7 2 1 15 4 3 1 1 2 4 9

200

146

49

2

6 2

2

4 4

1

8 4 3 1 4 7

8

10

9

27

6 9

54 16 11 39

Absent

16

2 3 1

1 1

... • . .

2»

67 28 12 99 20 53 13 23 11 44 27 397

• Unruhe-Bomst of the Imperialist party withdrew from the Reichstag on February 2, 1894. Von Koscielski, a leader of the Polish party, gave up the seat which he had held in the Reichstag since 1884 immediately before the second reading of the Russian treaty (AUg. Ztg., March 13, 1894 [No. 71], p. 2).

T H E RUSSIAN TREATY, 1 8 9 4 GBOOBAPHICAL D I S T R I B U T I O N o r T H E V O T E O N T H E R U S S I A N

For Prussia: Eastern provinces East Prussia West Prussia Berlin» Brandenburg Pomerania Posen Silesia Saxony Western provinces Schleswig-Holstein Hanover Westphalia Hesse-Nassau Rhine Province Hohenxollern

4 7 6 6 2 10 20 9

295 TREATY

Against

9 4

64

13 11 2 14 9

82

64

3 2 4 5 4 1

1®

7 15 9 5 28 128

Bavaria Saxony Württemberg Baden Hesse The two Mecklenburgs Smaller principalities ** Hansa cities Alsace-Lorraine

9 12 11 10 3 15 4 8

81

32 10 4 2 5 6 6 72

65

200

146

* Berlin in the province of Brandenburg. •• These included Saxe-Weimar, Oldenburg, Brunswick, etc.

296

G E R M A N AGRARIAN

POLITICS

V o n ON D R . VON FSBGE'S MOTION

Parties Conservatives Imperialists German Reform Centrists Poles National Liberals Radical Union German Radical People's party South German People's party Social Democrats Nonpartisan Nonpartisan: Alsatians Anti-Semites Guelphs Dane Bavarian Peasants' League Others

For 58 14 10 42 1 16

AbVacant Totals Against Absent stained Seats 4 9

47 17 36 13

. ..

67 28 12 99 20 53 13

22

1

23

9

9 41 7

2 3 8

3

11 44 27

150*

205

37

3

1

4 3

3

. .

1

5 4 2 10 1 1

1

...

3 1 4 4

2

1

9

7

8

2

397 8 4 3 1 4 7

3

27

* According to the official record, 359 members were present, 3 withheld their votes, 205 voted " no " and 151 " yes." However, the actual count of those who voted " yes " was 150 and of the absences 37. Hence there was evidently an error in the official statement. It will be recalled that the Poles held the balance at the voting on the Rumanian treaty. In 1 8 9 4 their vote was important, but not decisive. The most significant differences between the voting in 1 8 9 3 and 1 8 9 4 were in the Centrist and Conservative parties. S i x Centrists were absent from the voting on the R u manian treaty, while 1 5 were away on March 10, 1894. The efforts to work upon the Conservatives had weakened resistance in that quarter. T h e joint vote of the two Conservative parties was 82 to 8 against the Rumanian treaty, but only 7 0 to 1 5 against the Russian treaty.

THE

RUSSIAN

TREATY,

1894

297

N o Centrists in Bavaria voted for the Rumanian treaty, and none voted for the one with Russia. Twenty-three Bavarian Centrists voted against the Russian treaty and seven were absent. That state rejected it by 32 to 9 votes. It w a s again the center of opposition. F o r even in the six eastern provinces of Prussia there was a total of two more votes for than against the treaty. Before the final decision on the treaty was reached, the Conservatives made one more attempt to defeat the bill. Frege moved to establish the tariff for rye in the treaty at 5 marks per 100 kilograms. T h i s would, of course, have meant the rejection of the entire treaty. O n March 13 a roll-call vote was taken on this motion. It was rejected by 205 to 150 votes. Bennigsen, Lieber, and Stumm gave no support to K a r d o r f f ' s motion that a supplementary tariff be established for those countries with debased currency. N o r was serious consideration given to Count Moltke's proposal that the treaty be limited to three years. There was a good deal of speculation about the unexpected retirement from the Reichstag of the Polish leader, Koscielski, immediately before the second reading of the Russian treaty. H e had held his seat since 1884. It was said at first that he w a s moved to give up his seat because the Poles, provoked by the abolition of the graduated freight rates, were contemplating a rejection of the Russian treaty. B y retiring Koscielski would be saved from voting against it. But at this time the marine bill was also under consideration. W h e n the vote on this bill was taken, the Poles were absent, though they were in the Reichstag building. T h e report was that they were having a very heated discussion in a party meeting. Koscielski withdrew after this meeting. H e seems to have fallen out with his party because of his efforts to secure the passage of the government's marine demands and the " small treaties." It w a s felt by party mem-

298

GERMAN AGRARIAN

POLITICS

bers that he had not accomplished enough for Polish national interests. 156 One may speculate also about the reason for the smaller Conservative vote against the Russian than against the Rumanian treaty. Were the Conservatives of the eastern provinces satisfied with the repeal of the certificates of identity? Or did some members of the party absent themselves in order to prevent the Poles from holding the balance as they had when the votes on the Rumanian treaty was taken? Or did some members stay away, or vote for the treaty, because they were told that they would be dismissed from office, if they voted against the Russian treaty ? 167 Perhaps all these considerations were influential. Whatever the cause for the weakening of Conservative resistance, it saved the government from being completely dependent upon the small Polish party. IS&Allg. Ztg., March 12, 1894 (No. 70), p. 2 ; March 13, 1894 (No. 7 1 ) , p. 2. 157 Hohenlohe asked the Kaiser after the treaty had been accepted whether it was true that Kanitz, the chief master of ceremonies, had been told that he was either to leave his office or to vote for the treaty. The Kaiser replied with an energetic " y e s " (C. Hohenlohe, II, 5 1 1 ) . Actually both the master of ceremonies and his relative, Kanitz-Podangen, the agrarian leader, were absent. Prince zu Hohenlohe-Oehringen, William's chief chamberlain, voted for the Russian treaty, though he voted against the one with Rumania. Alexander Hohenlohe, Prince Chlodwig Hohenlohe's son, voted for both the Rumanian and the Russian treaties. Hohenlohe was governor of Alsace-Lorraine. One Imperialist and two other associates of the Conservative party (besides Alexander Hohenlohe) in that district voted for the Russian treaty.

CHAPTER X THE FALL OF CAPRIVI THE Kaiser was immensely gratified over the acceptance of the Russian treaty. Another domestic crisis had been weathered and further complications avoided in the already troubled relations with Russia. On the very day of the treaty's acceptance William sent a congratulatory telegram to Tsar Alexander, who promptly reciprocated.1 In recognition of Caprivi's services in putting through the treaty, the Kaiser bestowed upon him on the same day the chain of the House Order of Hohenzollern. Marschall, the foreign secretary, Witte, the Russian minister of finance, and two other Russians who had had an important share in the difficult negotiations were also decorated. 2 Caprivi was honored as well by the merchants of Danzig at a banquet which he attended there in company with Bòtticher, Thielen, and the Bavarian ambassador, Count Lerchenfeld.8 The chancellor complimented Danzig and the other Hansa cities upon their public spirit. Not once during the tariff war, in which they had suffered so greatly, had any complaint from them reached the ears of the government. On the following day at another banquet celebrating the launching of a new steamship of the North German Lloyd line, Caprivi referred to the Russian treaty, which had become effective that day, and emphasized the Kaiser's part in its successful conclusion. His Majesty, said Caprivi, not only considered it an act of economic advantage to Germany, which would bring the country closer to its neighbor and afford a new security for peace ; but he was also of the opinion that the coming century demanded the close co-operation of European nations; a single 1 Wippermann, 1894, i, 14; Treue, p. 89. 2 Wippermann, 1894, i, 13. Timirjasew, a Russian privy councillor, and Koumasine, an attaché of the Russian embassy in Berlin, were decorated. 3 Ibid., p. 76. Bòtticher and Thielen were Prussian ministers. 399

3

GERMAN

AGRARIAN

POLITICS

nation would lack the power to arm against future eventualities. 4 T h e Conservative party and the Farmers' League naturally did not share the satisfaction felt by the Kaiser and Caprivi over the acceptance of the treaty. Its passage meant the defeat of the principal agrarian demand. Most agrarians felt that no remedy would offset the injury which the reductions in the grain tariffs would bring. A n d since the treaties were to be in force until December 31, 1903, the agriculturists would have no recourse until that time from the injurious effects of those reductions. A s grain prices continued to fall during the next several months, until in October they stood at the lowest level reached at any time between 1885 a n d 1900, the direst forebodings of the agrarians seemed to be fully confirmed. By March 16, when the Russian treaty was accepted, the government had already taken into account some of the other items in the program of the Farmers' League. Agricultural chambers were to be established. These would provide a means whereby agriculturists and the government might study together the problem of restoring agriculture. Contrary to expectation, the agricultural population received the announcement regarding the chambers without enthusiasm. They were to be more or less under government control. It was therefore feared that they might replace the very popular agricultural societies, and that the government might attempt through them to curtail the political activity of the Farmers' League. 8 T h e government also put through early in 1894 the desired legislation relative to relief residence.® A special commission, fur4 Ibid., pp. 76-77. 5 T h e government laid before the Prussian house of delegates on J a n u a r y 18, 1894, the bill to establish obligatory agricultural chambers. T h e members accepted the obligatory clause by a vote of 230 to 109 on April 24, 1894. On M a y 22, 1894, at the third reading the bill was accepted by 213 to 126, and on June 30 it became a law (Croner, p. 146). See also, Kiesenwetter, p. 40. 6 Wippermann, 1894, i, 183; Reichstag, 1893-94, I I , 893-906, 977-84, 110102. This bill became a law on M a r c h 12, 1894.

THE

F A L L OF C A P R I V I

3