Farmers in Rebellion: The Rise and Fall of the Southern Farmers Alliance and People's Party in Texas 9780292769731

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Farmers in Rebellion

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Farmers in Rebellion

The Rise and Fall of the Southern Farmers Alliance and People's Party in Texas

By Donna A. Barnes

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS PRESS, AUSTIN

Publication of this book was assisted by a grant from The Littlefield Fund for Southern History, The University of Texas at Austin.

Copyright © 1984 by the University of Texas Press All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America First edition, 1984 Requests for permission to reproduce material from this work should be sent to: Permissions University of Texas Press Box 7819 Austin, Texas 78713 L IB R A R Y OF C O N G R ESS C A T A L O G IN G IN P U B LIC A TIO N D A T A

Barnes, Donna, 19 5 4 Farmers in rebellion. Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. People's Party (Texas)— History— 19th century. 2. National Farmers' Alliance and Industrial Union— History— 19 th century. 3. Populism—Texas—History— 19th century. I. Title. JK2374.T4B3

1985

ISB N 0 - 2 9 2 - 7 7 0 3 0 - 8

3 2 4 . 2 7 6 4 ' o2

84-10373

To my father, who left me with many special memories

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Contents

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Preface and Acknowledgments ix Introduction 1 Sociological Perspectives on Protest Movement Emergence and Development 7 A Critique of Structural Strain Theories of Protest Movement Formation 21 The Elaboration and Refinement of the Mobilization Perspective on Protest Movements 32 The Rise and Development of the Texas Farmers Alliance, 1877-1886 51 Creative Escalation, 188 7-18 91 78 The Politicization of the Alliance 108 The People's Party: An Alliance Protest Strategy, 1892-1894 136 The Betrayal of Alliance Principles 160 The Demise of the People's Party 189 Notes 199 Bibliography 217 Index 223

Tables

1. Average Farm Prices per Pound of Cotton, 1875-1900 52 2. Electoral Strength of States in Which Support for the People's Party Presidential Candidate Was Weak (1892) 146 3. The Showing of the People's Party by State in the 1894 Congressional Elections 157 4. The 1896 Convention Vote for the People's Party Presidential Candidate (by State) 179 5. Redemption of U.S. Notes and Treasury Notes, 1880-1899 195

Preface and Acknowledgments

In this book I provide a detailed account and analysis of the develop­ ment of the Southern Farmers Alliance—its emergence, growth, and decline. Given the incredibly rich archival material available, some delimitation of the field of study seemed essential. I chose, there­ fore, to focus primarily on the Texas Alliance organization. Not only did the Southern Farmers Alliance originate in Texas, but the Texas state organization was responsible for initially proposing and imple­ menting the most innovative Alliance strategies. Thus, an analysis of the Alliance movement in Texas is long overdue. My interpreta­ tion of the movement differs at times from that of other scholars writing on the Alliance and its political arm, the People's party— scholars like Lawrence Goodwyn, Sheldon Hackney, John Hicks, Richard Hofstadter, Roscoe Martin, Michael Schwartz, and James Turner. For this reason, historians should find the book interesting. The objective of this book, however, is not merely to chronicle the developmental history of the Alliance. Most importantly, I use this history to reflect on the theoretical literature on protest move­ ments. Both structural strain and mobilization theories of protest movement emergence and development are discussed and evaluated in light of the historical details of the Alliance movement. Although structural strain theories have been criticized by many sociologists in addition to myself, mobilization theories—particularly the newly developed resource mobilization theories—have largely been spared critical appraisal. This book represents one of the first empirical studies that evaluates the various tenets of the mobilization per­ spective on protest movements. Many people have earned my gratitude for assisting in the prep­ aration of this book. I owe special thanks to Joe Feagin for his strong support of my research; he was largely responsible for my initial interest in the Farmers Alliance and People's party movements, and his encouragement never waivered. Michael Schwartz deserves a

x

Preface &) Acknowledgments

particular word of thanks. He carefully read an initial draft of the manuscript and gave me many constructive suggestions for improv­ ing it. Appreciation is also expressed to Gil Cardenas, Lewis Gould, William Kelly, and Susan Marshall for their helpful comments on an early draft of the manuscript. Finally, I extend my gratitude to the staff at the Barker Texas History Archives and the Texas State Li­ brary Archives, who provided valuable assistance in locating impor­ tant research materials. A personal debt is owed to both Richard Machalek and Stella Capek. They listened with patience to my expressions of anxiety during the various stages of my research and writing. Their support meant a great deal to me. Last, but certainly not least, I wish to thank my family for their enthusiasm concerning this project; it was up­ lifting. My mother in particular deserves acknowledgment. She pos­ sesses that incurable tendency of some mothers to believe that their children are capable of nothing but the best. While at times that ten­ dency can be embarrassing, at other times it can be quite reassuring.

Farmers in Rebellion

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i. Introduction

Protest movements have always been of great interest to sociolo­ gists. Until the 1970s, sociologists interested in protest movements focused primarily on the issue of movement emergence. The central question posed was: What conditions are favorable to the emergence of protest movements? But there are other very important and, until recently, curiously neglected sociological questions. Under what conditions do protest movement organizations remain relatively weak, never obtaining the support of but a small number of people? Under what conditions do they prosper, gaining support from mass numbers of people? Finally, under what conditions do successful protest movement organizations lose their momentum and die? The Southern Farmers Alliance and People's party movements of the late nineteenth century offer an excellent vantage point from which to reflect on the existing theoretical literature on protest movements. The Farmers Alliance, which emerged during the eco­ nomically depressed post-Civil War years, grew to be one of the most powerful protest movements in American history. The postCivil War years were difficult for Southern farmers, since their eco­ nomic mainstay—cotton—was steadily dropping in price. Prior to 1875, cotton prices fluctuated within the tolerable range of from $.12 to $.18 per pound. In 1875, though, the average price of cotton fell to $ .11 per pound and was not to rise above this price for the remainder of the century. In fact, by 1885, the average price of cotton had fallen below $.09 per pound.1 Since, on many farms, $.08 per pound went to cover the cost of cotton production, the economic situ­ ation was extremely dire.2 Given the falling market price of cotton, many farmers did not make enough money both to provide for their present needs and to buy the supplies necessary to produce the next year's crop. The sys­ tem that arose to address the farmers' need for money was the croplien system. Under this notorious system of finance, the merchant

2

Introduction

or landlord shouldered the responsibility of financing the farmer— not by lending money but by advancing supplies and goods that the farmer needed in return for a lien on the growing crop. The workings of the lien system were essentially the same throughout the South. The merchant agreed to advance the farmer a certain amount of credit. The legal interest rate for this credit was typically 8 percent. However, the actual rate charged was considerably higher, because the farmer paid interest on the borrowed credit for the entire year, even though some of the credit was not used until the closing months before harvest. The director of the Louisiana Agricultural Experi­ ment Stations said of the actual rate of interest: That varies very much. From 20 percent up. I do not know of any less than 20 percent. I mean it. Frequently they will buy stuff in August, and may pay for it with the picking of the first crop in September or October; and when you calculate the an­ nual interest, it is 200 percent. That is what I mean. I do not mean to say they were charged that rate throughout the year.3 In addition to the interest charged on the credit extended to the farmer, the indebted farmer was charged inflated "time prices" on goods and supplies. The extent of the markup entailed in these prices varied by region, merchant, and customer. Firsthand accounts report that the average markup was at least 25 percent above the regular retail price. One observer commented that merchants charged "from 25 percent to grand larceny." The extent of the markup de­ pended on the merchant's perception of the degree of risk entailed in a particular customer's lien, as well as the possibility of the farmer's choosing another source for future crop liens. The largest markup took place where the risk was perceived as great and competition from other merchants was minimal or nil.4 The effect of the crop-lien system was to establish a condition of peonage for many farmers throughout the South. The farmer who gave a lien on his crop delivered himself into the hands of the lien merchant until the account was settled in full. He had to have every purchase scrutinized by the merchant, whose constant concern was whether the farmer's accumulating debt could possibly be paid off by his crop. He was able to buy only what the merchant chose to sell him and he had to pay whatever price the merchant chose to ask. He could not trade with any other merchant, except for cash; since the only acceptable security, his crop, had been forfeited, no other mer­ chant would sell him anything on credit. Furthermore, the farmer ensnared in the lien system of financing lost all flexibility in the

Introduction

3

marketing of his crop. The lien came due at harvesttime, so the crop could not be held off the market to wait for higher prices. It is obvious that the lien system of financing offered the farmer little, if any, economic leverage in the purchasing of supplies or in the marketing of his crop. But with the declining market price of cotton, more and more farmers were forced to rely on lien financing. In an 1893 investigation into the conditions of cotton growers in the United States, the government sent questionnaires to various cotton districts in the South. The responses from Texas, as well as else­ where, were bleak. In most of the counties responding, the majority of the farmers were reported to rely on crop-lien financing. The per­ centage of those who could not pay their debts at the end of the year varied from 10 to 50 percent.5 While the farmers dependent on crop liens were the most economically desperate, even those who fared well enough to avoid lien financing bitterly complained about the agricultural depression. There was always the fear that, should the depression continue, they too might have to resort to lien financing. Declining cotton prices left no Southern farmer untouched. Prompted by these hard times, farmers in Lampasas County, Texas, gathered to discuss what, if anything, could be done. This gathering in the fall of 1877 marked the beginning of the Southern Farmers Alliance.* The degree of support given to this protest orga­ nization varied greatly over time. Prices on cotton, the major South­ ern crop, began to drop in the 1870s. Yet in 1880, three years after the Texas Alliance was founded, it had a mere 500 members.6In fact, the sheer survival, not to mention the vitality, of the Alliance orga­ nization was constantly threatened until 1885. Clearly hard times do not automatically precipitate a mass protest movement. Then in 1885, the Texas Alliance began to experience a dramatic, spiraling growth that culminated in a membership height of approximately 200,000.7 Given this phenomenal success, the Texas Alliance leader­ ship launched a national organizing campaign. By 1891, it claimed to have mobilized approximately 3 million farmers.8 *The official title of the organization was the National Farmers A l­ liance and Industrial Union. This title is confusing, however, since there was another farmers' organization with the official title of the National Farmers Alliance. To avoid confusion, historians have tended to regard the Alliance organization originating in Texas as the Southern Farmers A l­ liance. The other organization, originating in the upper Mississippi Valley, is most commonly referred to as the Northern or Northwestern Alliance. It was smaller than the Southern Farmers Alliance in membership and was less influential in American politics.

4

Introduction

Prior to 1890, the Texas Alliance focused on economic strate­ gies of protest. In its early years, it attempted local trade agreements with merchants, local cotton bulking, and local cooperative stores. Later, large-scale economic strategies were instituted. The Alliance Exchange—the largest and most dramatic effort to build a counter­ institution ever attempted by a protest organization in America— was founded. The Exchange served as a wholesale purchasing and marketing house for the Alliance membership. There was also the Great Jute Boycott—one of the largest confrontations between con­ sumers and manufacturers in American history. However, such eco­ nomic efforts were more or less halted in 1890, and full attention was devoted to reform through politics. Political insurgency had always been present in the Alliance. As early as 1886, a series of political demands were formulated at the annual Texas Alliance convention at Cleburne. The so-called Cleburne Demands created an uproar among more politically con­ servative Alliance members and threatened to permanently split the Alliance apart. The schism was healed only by the proposal of largescale economic action through the establishment of the Alliance Ex­ change. Because the Exchange plan promised Alliance members sig­ nificant savings, the political insurgents and political conservatives within the Alliance deferred their quarrel. By 1890, though, the po­ litical insurgents were in control again, and the focus of Alliance at­ tention shifted to reform through politics. The Alliance practiced heavy-pressure politics within the old parties, but to no avail: they refused to endorse its reform demands. Thus, in 1892 the Alliance endorsed a new political party—the People's party. This party repre­ sented the final protest strategy of the Alliance movement, and the demise in 1896 of the People's party signaled the death of the A l­ liance movement that had for over two decades struggled, to a large extent futilely, for major economic reform in the United States. The death of the Alliance was not simply a case of returning prosperity; the Southern farmers' chief mainstay—cotton—was still selling at less than $.07 per pound, which was about the average cost of cotton production.9 Many questions arise from a cursory examination of the devel­ opment of the Alliance and People's party. For example, what were the reasons for the sluggish growth of the Alliance during its early years? What can account for its phenomenal growth following 1885 ? Why did the Alliance focus on political activities after 1890 rather than continuing with its economic strategies? Why was support in Texas for the principles of the People's party so strong compared to most other states? What were the causes of the rapid decline of the

Introduction

5

national People's party? A major purpose of this study is to address these, as well as other, questions concerning the development of the Alliance and People's party. In describing and analyzing this devel­ opment, I pay special attention to the adequacy of existing theories of protest movement emergence and development. Protest movements have always been of great interest to so­ ciologists, and voluminous books and articles have been written on the subject. As one theorist puts it, "theories of violence and protest have proliferated like honeysuckle vines. A thousand flowers have bloomed and faded." However, he adds that "if we brush our way past the leaves, the bees, and the hummingbirds, we find almost all the flowers springing from two old parent vines."10 These "two old parent vines" can be broadly labeled the structural strain perspective and the mobilization perspective on protest movements. The structural strain perspective, which was dominant in Ameri­ can sociology until the 1970s, focuses on the issue of protest move­ ment emergence. The distinctive feature of this perspective is its de­ piction of protest movements as by-products of strains that result from disruptive social change. In its barest outline form, the struc­ tural strain perspective assumes that members of society share a common set of values. Since the society's social, economic, and po­ litical structures are patterned in accordance with these shared val­ ues, normally there is no conflict. Conflict and protest occur only when there are temporary structural strains, and such strains are most likely to occur during periods of rapid social change. In contrast to the structural strain perspective, the mobilization perspective does not view the source of conflict and protest as ema­ nating directly from disruptive social change. Rather, the source of conflict is viewed as inherent in the stratification system; no disrup­ tive change is needed to cause discontent. While the structural strain theorist may be puzzled by the occurrence of mass protest move­ ments, the mobilization theorist is curious why they do not happen more often. It seems that people's capacity to act upon shared griev­ ances is fraught with difficulty. It is to these difficulties that mobili­ zation theorists turn their attention. In the chapters that follow, the details of the developmental his­ tory of the Farmers Alliance and People's party movements are used to reflect on both the structural strain and the mobilization perspec­ tives on protest movements. In chapter 2, a description of both of these two broadly delimited perspectives is elaborated. Criticisms of the structural strain perspective, which have abounded since the late 1960s, are discussed in chapter 3, and details of the Alliance and People's party movements are used as evidence supporting the criti­

6

Introduction

cisms. Since the widespread use of the mobilization perspective has occurred only recently (especially in American sociology), the body of literature evaluating that perspective is sparse. There is a real need for careful empirical research that attempts to evaluate, elaborate, and refine tenets of mobilization theories. This is a major aim of this study. To this end, mobilization theories are evaluated in chapter 4, and suggestions are made for needed elaborations and refinements. As modified, the mobilization tenets allow for a more accurate un­ derstanding of the emergence and development of protest move­ ments like the Farmers Alliance and People's party. Initial support for the modifications is provided by briefly citing evidence from the Alliance and People's party movements. More detailed support ap­ pears in chapters 5 through 10, where rich historical details of the development of both the Alliance and People's party movements are intermixed with analytical comments relating the historical details to relevant theoretical issues. This study is delimited primarily to the Texas Alliance and Peo­ ple's party. The reason for this delimitation is that intensiveness was preferred to extensiveness. A close examination of the development of a protest movement organization—in this case both the Alliance and the People's party organizations—entails a tremendous amount of archival research. Over fifteen years of archived newspapers had to be tapped, not to mention the other relevant materials. To be fully able to utilize the rich sources available, some delimitation proved essential. Texas was an excellent choice of focus, for it was in Texas that the Farmers Alliance was born and that its most innovative strategies were formed. Thus, a close look at both the Alliance and People's party movements in Texas is long overdue.

2 . Sociological Perspectives on Protest Movement Emergence and Development

The Structural Strain Perspective The distinctive feature of the structural strain perspective is its de­ piction of protest movements as by-products of strains that result from disruptive social change. Emile Durkheim stands in this tradi­ tion. Indeed, he fashioned the structural strain perspective into a standard interpretation of conflict and protest movement formation. Writing in the late nineteenth century amidst the turmoil that was rocking the European societies, Durkheim chose to focus his atten­ tion on the problem of social order. His work deserves close atten­ tion because it has been highly influential, particularly in American sociology. In his work, Durkheim portrays modern society as a unified whole, with each part of that whole fulfilling a vital function. He argues that this unity or solidarity of the whole is a product of the advancing division of labor. Precisely because individuals engage in differentiated activities, they become dependent upon one another. This interdependence serves as the basis for the so-called organic solidarity of modern society. Perceiving society as an organic whole, he argues that there is a congruence of interests among the different occupational and class groupings: . . . it is not the strongest who control but those most capable in science and industry. They are not summoned to office be­ cause they have the power to exercise their will but because they know more than others, and consequently their func­ tions do not consist in saying what they want but what they know. . . . Things will occur as they are now occurring in in­ dustry, where for example, chemists can tell us the laws of combination of bodies, physicists of their resistance, and engi-

8

Sociological Perspectives

neers deduce their application, without any place provided in all this for play of capricious . . . wishes. It is no longer men controlling men. It is truth alone which speaks.1 Durkheim goes on to say: "Those who direct are not above those who are directed; they are not their superiors. They fulfill a different function—that is all."2 Durkheim's vision of the social system as a unified, organic whole often results in his reifying, even deifying, society. Attention is focused on Society with a capital S, with careful attention given to the functions and dysfunctions of this or that social phenomenon. The significance of the division of society into socioeconomic classes that might have conflicting interests is only dimly perceived. Class conflict and power play no significant part in Durkheim's con­ ception of society. This unified vision of the social order is also found in Durkheim's discussion of the modern state, in which he uses a biological analogy to discuss its operations. He depicts the state as the "brain/7 or coordinating mechanism of the society. Nowhere is the possi­ bility considered that power blocs might develop within the state structure that serve to undermine its openness; Durkheim simply assumes that the state performs "coordinating77functions in the in­ terest of society.3 The vision of harmonious social order that pervades Durkheim7s work forms the basic foundation of the structural strain approach to protest movements. As noted in the introduction, the basic struc­ tural strain approach assumes that members of society share a com­ mon set of values. Since the social, economic, and political struc­ tures are patterned in accordance with these shared values, there is normally no conflict. Conflict and protest occur only when there are temporary structural strains, and such strains are most likely to oc­ cur during periods of rapid social change. While sharing this broad view of the workings of the social order, theorists who adopt a structural strain framework can differ in their views of the exact nature of the process by which rapid change promotes protest. One variant of the structural strain perspec­ tive argues that in a stable society, behavior is typically guided by "institutionalized normative expectations.77 Rapid change disturbs these established expectations and it takes time for new norms to be established. During the transitional period, people tend to behave irrationally rather than patiently waiting for adjustments to occur. The strain that emerges during this period of rapid social change is

The Structural Strain Perspective

9

viewed as temporary, with adjustments naturally occurring in the social system. No permanent, structured source of strain is recog­ nized; there is no consideration that an inherent conflict of interest emanating from the stratification system might prevent the auto­ matic adjustments required to alleviate situations of strain. Thus, if the aggrieved population would just be patient, the source of strain would be eliminated.4 Neil Smelser, operating within this variant of the structural strain perspective, claims protest movements are guided by "generalized beliefs" that are akin to magical beliefs. Gen­ eralized beliefs disregard the many steps involved in an effective so­ lution; they present compressed, short-circuited solutions. That is to say, since protest movements are guided by generalized beliefs, they are doomed to fail in their attempts to eliminate the source of strain: Collective behavior, then, is the action of the impatient. It contrasts with the processes of social readjustment that do not short-circuit the journey from generalized belief to specific sit­ uations. Historically, collective behavior is closely associated with the processes of structural reorganization. . . . In fact, episodes of collective behavior often constitute an early stage of social change; they occur when conditions of strain have arisen, but before social resources have been mobilized for a specific and possibly effective attack on the sources of strain.5 A second variant of the structural strain approach—the "mass society" variant—states that protest movements are most likely to emerge when disruptive social change, such as rapid urbanization or severe economic depression, weakens and even destroys the exis­ tence of secondary associations. The argument is as follows: In­ volvement in secondary associations creates overlapping affiliations that reduce the likelihood of sharp cleavages that might precipitate protest movements. Furthermore, secondary associations provide a channel for a routine flow of influence between the masses and the nation's political leaders, thereby eliminating the need for protest movements. If these secondary associations are weakened or de­ stroyed, as is often the case during periods of disruptive social change, a mass society emerges in which there are no intermediaries between the masses and political leaders. Protest movements emerge and spread rapidly due to the high susceptibility of the now isolated masses. These movements do not seek pragmatic solutions to social problems. To understand the motivating force behind such move­

10

Sociological Perspectives

ments, one must look beyond economic interests to the deep-seated psychological needs of the movement participants, such as the need to overcome feelings of alienation and anxiety.6 A third variant of the structural strain perspective—a social psychological variant—links rapid social change to the emergence of protest movements through the psychological concept of relative deprivation. Relative deprivation is depicted as a necessary precondi­ tion to protest movement formation; social inequalities, however extreme they may be, will not in and of themselves precipitate pro­ test. Relative deprivation occurs when there exists a discrepancy be­ tween an individual's expectations—the conditions of life to which one feels entitled, and an individual's perception of system capabili­ ties—the condition of life one feels is possible under the existing system. The wider the discrepancy between expectations and per­ ceived system capabilities, the greater the relative deprivation and, hence, the greater the likelihood of protest. Rapid social change is linked to protest, in that the rapidity of change creates fertile ground for the emergence of a discrepancy between expectations and per­ ceived system capabilities.7 In sum, the mechanism or process by which rapid social change promotes the emergence of protest movements is depicted differ­ ently by various structural strain theorists. But the differences should not lead one to overlook the important commonality: rapid social change, through an intervening mechanism, is seen as caus­ ing the discontent that is responsible for the emergence of protest movements. HISTORICAL USES OF THE STRUCTURAL STRAIN PERSPECTIVE

The structural strain perspective has been and continues to be im­ plicitly employed in a number of historical writings on the Farmers Alliance and People's party. In his classic work on the agrarian revolt of the late nineteenth century, John Hicks states that Under railway leadership, the population came in too rapidly to permit of thoughtful and deliberate readjustments. A society at once so new and so numerous was immediately confronted with problems that it could not comprehend, much less hope to solve. . . . The various agrarian movements, particularly the Alliance and People's party revolts, were but the inevitable at­ tempts of a bewildered people to find relief from a state of eco­ nomic distress.8

The Structural Strain Perspective

11

Hicks' argument, in a manner reminiscent of at least one of the vari­ ants of the structural strain approach discussed above, depicts pro­ test movements as the result of rapid social change that disturbs established expectations. In fact, Hicks adopts a strong version of the structural strain approach, stating that structural strain is not only a necessary factor in precipitating protest movements, but is in itself a sufficient factor. Richard Hofstadter, in his award-winning book The Age of Reform, adopts a "relative deprivation" perspective on protest move­ ment emergence. He belittles the economic problems of the Ameri­ can farmer in the late 1800s, arguing that "improving his [the farmer's] economic position was always possible."9 According to Hofstadter, the agrarian revolt was in large part due to status anxiety. He states: Rank in society! That was close to the heart of the matter, for the farmer was beginning to realize acutely not merely that the best of the world's goods were to be had in the city . . . but also that he was losing in status and self-respect as compared with them.10 Thus, Hofstadter contends that the changes in the social order pre­ cipitated status anxiety on the part of farmers. It was this social psy­ chological fact that was largely responsible for the emergence of protest organizations like the Alliance and People's party. Just as the structural strain perspective is used implicitly by his­ torians to account for the emergence of protest movements, it is also used to account for their decline. Roscoe Martin writes that as the pall of depression began to lift, the Third Party found itself facing certain death through a process of gradual disin­ tegration and decay which was consummated with a return of normal times.11 In his treatment of the Alliance and People's party movements, John Hicks also stresses the role that returning prosperity played in the collapse of the People's party after 1896.12 The mass society variant of the structural strain approach also finds its way into historical writings on the Alliance and People's party. Sheldon Hackney argues that as intense as the economic dis­ tress of the late 1800s was, it did not in and of itself precipitate the People's party revolt; rather, the revolt was the result of the eco­ nomic crisis interacting with a poorly integrated, "atomistic" so­ ciety. In Hackney's words, the People's party "was the product of

12

Sociological Perspectives

people whose social positions and relationships did not link them securely to their society."13 In a similar vein, James Turner contends that the primary cause of the People's party revolt was the impact of economic distress on socially isolated farmers.14 He argues that Populists lived in relative isolation from the larger society, and had rather limited contact with other human beings. Under such circumstances, they were consid­ ered to be more vulnerable to the propaganda of the People's party.

Mobilization Theories As a result of major inadequacies in the structural strain approach to protest movements, many of which will be discussed in depth in the following chapter, many sociologists have turned to mobilization theories of protest in search of more promising explanations of pro­ test movement activity. In contrast to structural strain theories, mo­ bilization theories do not view the source of conflict or protest as emanating directly from disruptive social change. Indeed, the source of conflict is viewed as inherent in the stratification system; no dis­ ruptive social change is needed to cause discontent. Given the con­ tention that the potential for conflict is ever-present, the key ques­ tions become: Why do protest movements not emerge more fre­ quently? Once they emerge, what factors affect their growth? Karl Marx is parent to the mobilization perspective, much as Durkheim is to the structural strain perspective. Marx argues that there is a basic conflict of interest between persons who own and control the means of production (the capitalist class) and those who do not (the proletariat class). He criticizes the idea that there is a congruence of interests among different groups in society. In his writings, he devotes a great deal of effort to the documentation of the exploitation of the proletariat by the capitalist class. In contrast to the image of the class-neutral state conjectured by most structural strain theorists, Marx maintains that the state typi­ cally acts in the interest of the capitalist class. One of the ways the interests of the capitalist class can be translated into political reality is for it to contribute a disproportionate number of its members to the controlling political institutions and key decision-making groups. This method of control has been emphasized by such theo­ rists as C. Wright Mills and G. William Domhoff.15 Yet an emphasis on this method of ruling underestimates the degree to which the government, even if it were not under the influence of such a ruling

Mobilization Theories

13

class, acts with the best interests of the capitalist class in mind. The reason for this lies in the fact, emphasized by Marx, that the class character of capitalism is rooted in the exigencies of the economic structure. As long as the economic structure remains unchanged, the state must try to create and maintain the conditions within that structure for profitable capital accumulation. The subject of the functions of the state remains a central issue in more recent analyses that adopt a Marxian perspective. It is ar­ gued that the state must fulfill two functions: the stimulation of the capital accumulation process and the legitimation of the social and economic order. According to James O'Connor: . . . the state must try to maintain or create the conditions in which profitable capital accumulation is possible. However, the state must try to maintain or create the conditions for so­ cial harmony. A capitalist state that openly uses its coercive forces to help one class accumulate capital at the expense of other classes loses its legitimacy. . . . But a state that ignores the necessity of assisting the process of capital accumulation risks drying up the source of its own power, the economy's ^ surplus productive capacity and the taxes drawn from this surplus.16 The contradiction between these two functions of the state is re­ solved by the use of ideology to legitimate governmental policies. The mechanisms of legitimacy are intensively analyzed by scholars like Miliband and Wolfe.17 Given the existence of this dominant ideology, a mass protest movement cannot be depicted as an auto­ matic response to deprivation. Both the development of an effective counterideology by protest movement leaders and of a political orga­ nization to disseminate that ideology are crucial to the emergence and development of a mass protest movement. The emergence and development of a protest movement entails what Marx terms a transformation from a "class in itself" to a "class for itself." In contrast to those structural strain theorists who depict protest movement participants as impatient and irrational, Marx contends that the transformation from a class in itself to a class for itself requires that individuals finally become aware of their objec­ tive class interests. The process underlying this transformation is based in part on the frustration and discontent arising from the ex­ ploitative arrangement of production. But Marx stresses that objec­ tive and subjective deprivation are not sufficient conditions for the emergence of a mass protest movement; at numerous points in his

14

Sociological Perspectives

writing, he notes a number of intervening conditions. His discus­ sion, in The Eighteenth Brumaire, of the French peasantry is impor­ tant in this regard: The small-holding peasants form a vast mass, the members of which live in similar conditions but without manifold rela­ tions with one another. Their mode of production isolates them from one another instead of bringing them into mutual intercourse. The isolation is increased by France's bad means of communication and by the poverty of the peasants. Their field of production . . . admits . . . no wealth of social relations. Each individual peasant family is almost self-sufficient. . . and thus acquires its means of life more through exchange with nature than in intercourse with society. In so far as there is merely a local interconnection among these small-holding peasants and the identity of their interest begets no commu­ nity, no national bond, and no political organization among them, they do not form a class [for itself].18 A passage from The Communist Manifesto again clearly shows Marx's awareness of intervening conditions between objective and subjective deprivation and the emergence of protest movements: The proletariat goes through various stages of develop­ ment. . . . At first. . . the labourers still form an incoherent mass scattered over the whole country, and broken up by their mutual competition. . . . But with the development of industry the proletariat not only increases in number, it becomes more concentrated in greater masses, its strength grows, and it feels that strength more. The various interests and conditions with­ in the ranks of the proletariat are more and more equal­ ized. . . . Thereupon the workers begin to form combinations (trade unions) against the bourgeoisie. . . . This union is helped on by the improved means of communication that are created by modern industry, and that place the workers of different lo­ calities in contact with one another. . . . This organization of proletarians into a class . . . is continually being upset by com­ petition between the workers themselves. But it ever rises up again, stronger, firmer, mightier.19 While Marx focuses on the conditions favorable to an urban pro­ letariat uprising, his work also offers insights into conditions favor­ able to the emergence and development of protest movements in general, including rural protest movements. Marx speaks of the im­

Mobilization Theories

15

portance in protest movement formation of the concentration of the proletariat during industrialization. Ever greater numbers of workers congregate in factories in ever-growing urban centers and subse­ quently and uniformly are subjected to exploitative conditions. This concentration, together with improved means of communication, facilitates protest movement formation. Marx also describes the poverty-stricken, but scattered, peas­ antry in contrast to urban workers. Rural peasant families are said to be almost totally self-sufficient; their mode of production in no way provides linkages within the peasantry or with the outside world. Their isolation is almost complete, with little communication among themselves. Marx argues that this isolation is a major factor in the peasantry's inability to organize and fight for a better life. Isolation is correctly identified by Marx as a major obstacle to protest movement formation. But the isolation that he attributes to the French peasantry—and the consequent difficulty of mobilizing that peasantry into a protest movement—is not necessarily true in every agrarian population. For example, the American farmers of the late nineteenth century who were mobilized by the Alliance were very definitely linked with the larger political-economic system. They perceived many of their economic woes to be directly caused by that system. While they were not congregated in factories in large urban centers, communication was possible through social net­ works that pervaded the agricultural community: various local clubs, churches, the local press, and interactions at the country store or marketplace. Sufficient opportunity, therefore, existed among the farmers to discuss their common grievances and unite in an attempt to eliminate, or at least alleviate, these grievances. Thus, while iso­ lation is correctly depicted as an obstacle to protest movement for­ mation, it is not correct to impute that all rural populations are char­ acterized by isolation. THE RESOURCE MOBILIZATION PERSPECTIVE

A conflict-oriented vision of the social order is also adopted by a newly developed perspective on protest movements: the resource mobilization perspective. Resource mobilization theorists insist that neither the emergence nor the growth of protest movements is adequately explained by the presence of structural strain. They ar­ gue that structural strains have often existed without precipitating large protest movements,- support for a movement is not automatic on the part of an aggrieved population. This is primarily because po­

16

Sociological Perspectives

tential participants rationally balance the possible benefits from col­ lective action against the perceived costs of that action. Before lend­ ing their support to a protest movement, members of an aggrieved population must be convinced that the struggle is viable. The issue of viability, argue resource mobilization theorists, rests primarily on the protestors', or challengers', control of important resources. Con­ sequently, an essential precondition for both the emergence and de­ velopment of a protest movement is a significant increase in the re­ source base controlled by the challengers or a significant contraction in the resource base controlled by the polity members.20 In regard to the balance of resources, resource mobilization the­ orists argue that changes in group resources result from large-scale social changes like industrialization, urbanization, and economic crises. Contrary to structural strain theorists, resource mobilization theorists contend that the stresses and strains of rapid social change do not directly impel groups to protest. Rather, social change simply enables groups to protest by providing them with resources crucial to effective protest, and by undermining the political status quo and thereby weakening the position of polity members. In sum, social change promotes mass insurgency only indirectly, through a restruc­ turing of the resource base of various groups in society. Once the bal­ ance has tilted in favor of the aggrieved population, a number of other factors interact and thereby significantly affect the develop­ ment of the protest movement. The importance of effective strategies to protest movement growth is a major point of emphasis in the writings of resource mo­ bilization theorists. These theorists stress that for a protest move­ ment to maintain its vitality and to grow, it must implement strate­ gies that have significantly beneficial results. Fireman and Gamson state: Low collective efficacy is a central problem in efforts to orga­ nize the oppressed, and those in the business of doing this organizing have many suggestions to offer on dealing with it. The basic strategy is to demonstrate influence by picking a tar­ get that offers promise of a quick success, thus showing poten­ tial constituents that the social movement actor is one to be . reckoned with and that opportunities exist for collective action.21 Failure to obtain limited objectives significantly affects future mobi­ lization potential. It may even result in demobilization to the point of organization collapse.22

Mobilization Theories

17

Resource mobilization theorists also stress the importance of a unifying structure within the aggrieved population. Protest move­ ment participants are not typically unorganized, individual decision makers. Oberschall states that this type of decision maker is but one possibility, and perhaps not even the most frequent one. Discontented groups can be members of a . . . community. It is precisely in this type of social structure that social re­ wards are powerful incentives for participation in an opposi­ tion movement.23 This line of thought closely follows that of the Marxian perspective, which stresses the importance to the development of a mass pro­ test movement of a communication network within the aggrieved population. Another major concern of resource mobilization theorists is the response of the established structure to the protest challenge. The response of the government to the protest movement is especially crucial. Indeed, government authorities shape the direction and even the very existence of protest movements. Tilly points out that the government's response is always selective and always consists of some combination of repression, toleration, and even facilitation.24 That is to say, the government responds selectively to different pro­ test groups and to different types of strategies and demands. It can repress, partially incorporate, or even use the state apparatus to fos­ ter a protest movement. Whatever the reaction, it has a crucial im­ pact on protest movement development and therefore should be a central focus of analysis. Aside from the reactions of the government, resource mobiliza­ tion theorists are attentive to the response of other interest groups that may be threatened by the protest demands. In his article on the strategies external groups use to damage protest movements, Gary Marx describes such strategies as the promotion of an unfavorable public image of the protest organization, image-damaging efforts aimed at the movement leaders, vehement attacks on the protest ideology, and the creation of internal conflicts by encouraging fac­ tionalism and suspicion among the movement participants.25 Resource mobilization theorists note, however, that external, nonbeneficiary groups—groups that do not stand to benefit from re­ alization of protest demands—will not always be hostile to the pro­ test. Indeed, the theorists stress that crucial resources for effective protest may be obtained from sources external to the aggrieved population. In fact, some resource mobilization theorists argue that

18

Sociological Perspectives

extremely deprived or negatively privileged groups are dependent upon external support for their mobilization and strategy implemen­ tation. This is evidenced in the following quotes: There is always enough discontent in any society to supply grass-roots support for a movement if the movement is effec­ tively organized and has at its disposal the power and resources of some established elite group.26 . . . a negatively privileged minority is in a poor position to initiate a social protest movement through its own efforts alone.27 . . . are deprived groups like farm workers able to sustain challenges, especially effective ones, on their own? We think not. . . . For a successful outcome, movements by the power­ less require strong and sustained outside support.28 Charles Tilly, while not focusing so explicitly on the need for exter­ nal support, does contend that protest movements are linked to rapid social change that alters the balance of power in society. Thus, one can infer from his argument that in normal times (that is, times when the pace of change is slow) the aggrieved population is not able to mobilize sufficient resources to challenge the powers-that-be.29 HISTORICAL USES OF THE MOBILIZATION PERSPECTIVE

The rudiments of the mobilization perspective on protest move­ ments are quite apparent in Lawrence Goodwyn's acclaimed ac­ count of the Farmers Alliance and People's party movements, Demo­ cratic Promise. Goodwyn stresses the difficulties of mobilizing masses of people into a protest movement organization that de­ mands major, radical changes in the existing socioeconomic struc­ ture. He points out that the primary difficulty faced during the mo­ bilization process is not necessarily, or even typically, repression by armed force. Rather, the primary difficulty is the need to surmount cultural obstacles to mass protest: A far more permanent, and thus far more desirable, solution to the task of achieving domestic tranquility is cultural—the cre­ ation of mass modes of thought that literally make the need for major additional social changes difficult to imagine. . . . The ultimate victory is nailed in place, therefore, only when the population has been persuaded to define all conceivable ac­ tivity within the limits of the existing customs. Such a society

Mobilization Theories

19

can genuinely be described as "stable." Thenceforth, protest will pose no ultimate threat because the protestors will neces­ sarily conceive of their options as being so limited that even should they be successful, the resulting "reforms" will not al­ ter significantly the inherited modes of power and privilege.30 Fully understanding the tremendous obstacles facing the mobiliza­ tion of a mass protest movement, Goodwyn explores in detail the developmental history of the Southern Farmers Alliance for clues to successful movement building. The mobilization perspective is also found in Radical Protest and Social Structure, Michael Schwartz's book on the Farmers Al­ liance and People's party movements. Schwartz analyzes the develop­ ment of both the Alliance and People's party, stressing the important interplay between the social structure and protest movement orga­ nizations. He notes that any social structure contains within itself the possibility of a power strong enough to alter it. This latent power resides in the fact that an aggrieved subordinate group has the ability to disrupt the routine operation of the social structure. This disrup­ tive ability serves as leverage in altering the social structure. Latent power is not activated by the normal functioning of the system; it only becomes a force to be reckoned with when the aggrieved popu­ lation "can form and maintain an organization independent of the original structure. That organization must have a membership ex­ tensive enough and disciplined enough to call into question the combined functioning of the system."31 Schwartz notes that once the aggrieved population does successfully exercise its latent struc­ tural power, those who had benefited from the status quo do not idly sit by. A vigorous counterattack is typically launched. Schwartz likens the interaction between the established structure and a pro­ test organization such as the Alliance to a game of chess: Basing its calculations on the routine operation of the system, the Alliance made a move which, if the system continued to function smoothly, would work to the advantage of the farmer. When the Alliance successfully executed its action, it did gain the advantage temporarily. However . . . when other parts of the system felt the pressure, they reorganized themselves and performed nonroutine actions to prevent Alliance success. These were the responding moves in the chess game—new moves which caught the Alliance organizationally off guard by creating a mismatch between the Alliance, which was orga­ nized to attack one level of the system, and the structure, which counterattacked on another level.32

20

Sociological Perspectives

The difficulties of building a mass protest movement are fully appreciated by both Goodwyn and Schwartz. Some of their inter­ pretations that are specific to the events surrounding the Alliance and People's party movements are incorporated into the present study, while other basic points of interpretation are challenged. For example, I argue that Goodwyn tends to romanticize the Alliance movement and to avoid discussing serious internal dissensions, and I challenge Schwartz's interpretation of the shift from economic to political strategies. Schwartz argues that the shift was due to oligarchization within the Alliance. I contend that the shift was an­ other move in the "chess game," and that the motivating forces be­ hind the shift were radical, not conservative. The conservative and hindering influence of oligarchization occurred later, within the na­ tional People's party structure. Flaving summarized both the structural strain and mobilization perspectives and looked at their usage in historical writings on the Alliance and People's party movements, let us now turn to a critical appraisal of these two broadly defined perspectives on protest move­ ment emergence and development.

3- A Critique of Structural Strain Theories of Protest Movement Formation

The structural strain approach to protest movements is vulnerable to criticism on three counts. First, many of its basic assumptions have been challenged. Second, questions have been raised about the adequacy of the explanations of movement emergence that fall within this perspective. Third, the perspective neglects the issue of movement development. Each of these main criticisms will be dis­ cussed, respectively, with evidence supporting the criticisms drawn from the experiences of the Alliance and People's party movements.

Assumptions of the Structural Strain Approach There are four particularly dubious assumptions underlying the structural strain approach: 1 . the assumption of a congruence of interests and a value con­ sensus among different groups in the social structure except under abnormal conditions that emerge during times of rapid social change; 2. the assumption that the state acts in the interest of society; 3. the assumption that structural strain is temporary and will naturally disappear,- and 4. the assumption that protest movement participants are ir­ rational or at best nonrational. All four of these assumptions can be traced to the Durkheimian image of the social order as a nonpolitical, organic whole, in which class conflict and power play no significant part. Let us look at each of these assumptions in turn. Robert Merton has strongly criticized the first assumption, that of the congruence of interests. He states that items may be functional for some individuals and subgroups and dysfunctional for others. It is necessary, therefore, to con-

22

Critique of Structural Strain Theories

sider the range of units for which the item has designated con­ sequences: individuals in diverse statuses, subgroups, the larger social system, and cultural system.1 Whether elements of the social system mutually benefit all mem­ bers of society should be, according to Merton, a question of fact rather than an assumption. Examining the assumption of congruence of interests empiri­ cally, one finds clear evidence that such congruence does not always exist. The external reactions to the Alliance movement are a good case in point. There was a great deal of opposition by the established business structure to various Alliance economic strategies. For ex­ ample, the first strategy utilized by the Alliance, the trade agree­ ment strategy, met with strong opposition. This strategy entailed the local Alliance membership appointing a committee to confer with various merchants to see who would offer the lowest prices in return for a guarantee of the entire local or county Alliance membership's business. In areas where the Alliance membership was large, a trade agreement with one merchant could mean a serious loss of custom­ ers for other merchants. A common reaction of the merchants hurt by the trade agreement strategy was to pressure the merchant coop­ erating with the Alliance. This pressure was usually exerted through the wholesaler. Since many retail merchants were in debt to whole­ salers, wholesalers had a stake in retail profits. An unprofitable re­ tail store threatened the debt payment. Thus, wholesalers were pro­ tective of the profitability of these stores. When that profitability was threatened, they applied pressure on the source of the threat— in this instance, on the merchant cooperating with the Alliance. The pressure often consisted of denying the merchant future credit. This action on the part of wholesalers forced many cooperating mer­ chants to back out of trade agreements. Thus, whether elements of the social system mutually benefit all members of society should be a question of fact, not an assump­ tion. On a general level, there may be a similarity of interest—every­ one wants things like a healthy, prosperous economy. But on a spe­ cific level, the similarity of interest often dissipates. The question becomes, who benefits, and to what extent, from that prosperity? In any given stratification system, some people benefit more than oth­ ers, and those benefits that are threatened are typically not given up without resistance. The controversies and hot debates of the Alliance period also clearly demonstrate the faultiness of the assumption of value con­ sensus. As will be discussed in more detail later, opposition of much

Assumptions of the Structural Strain Approach

23

of the media to the Alliance protest demands was very strong. While most of the population may agree on the desirability of such vaguely defined values as liberty and justice, in concrete situations the con­ sensus on such values often disintegrates. This is evident in the con­ troversy over the establishment in Texas of a railroad commission. The Alliance was a strong advocate of the commission, claiming that its establishment was an essential reform that would enable the people to control the powerful railroad corporations and to ensure that the corporations did not engage in collusion and price-fixing. Concerned over the rise of powerful trusts in the late 1800s, reform­ ers insisted that the government should serve as a countervailing power—if the people, through the government, did not control the corporations, then the corporations would control the people. Some newspapers, however, saw the matter differently. The Dallas Morn­ ing News claimed that the issue was the rights and liberties of the people with respect to property, business, and industry versus the call for a government of centralized authority and arbitrary discre­ tion. Clearly, the News and the Alliance were not in consensus. Structural strain theorists who assume value consensus ignore examples of value conflict like the railroad commission debate in the nineteenth century. The process of value conflict and resolution is one that sociologists need to address; it should not be ignored be­ cause of an a priori claim of consensus. The second assumption of the structural strain approach—that the state acts in the interest of society—likewise has flaws. It must be remembered that society is composed of many individuals and subgroups. A given action may be beneficial for some individuals and subgroups and have negative consequences for others. To deter­ mine the interest of society, one has to ascertain the net balance of benefit versus loss. This is often very difficult, and leaves much room for subjectivity to operate. Conflict over what is in the best interest of society is inevitable. Such conflict was pervasive in the late 1800s. For example, on the issue of railroad regulation, the Alliance (and later the Populists) claimed that regulation was essential to protect the people from the abuses of the powerful railroad corporations. The people were more numerous than the railroad magnates and stockholders; thus, the interest of society necessitated the establishment of a regulatory agency. The railroads, not surprisingly, had a rather different inter­ pretation of the matter, which was echoed in much of the daily press. It was argued that regulation would threaten future invest­ ments in railroads. Stiff regulation would cut into profits, and thus investments would have to be cut back. Yet there were many areas

24

Critique of Structural Strain Theories

that still needed railroad lines to tie them into the commercial mar­ ket. Thus, regulation would stunt the pace of progress and thereby be a serious detriment to the interest of society. In sum, people are not superrational. Different opinions emerge as to what action would be the most beneficial to society. The ambi­ guity that plagues the decision-making process has been largely ig­ nored by the structural strain theories. Granted that ambiguity may exist, one may still make the point that the state typically adopts the view of "the best interest of so­ ciety" held by the dominant class, that is, the class that owns and/or controls the major means of production. Concessions to the subordi­ nate classes or groups are occasionally won from the state, but only when the demands for such concessions appear to threaten the continued existence of the political-economic order.2 This fact is rooted in the exigencies of the economic structure: as long as the economic structure remains unchanged, the state must try to main­ tain or create conditions within that structure for profitable capital accumulation. A good illustration of this point is the reaction in 1890 of the state government in Texas to the idea of a railroad commission. As the Galveston Daily News pointed out, "the democratic party in Texas for fifteen years has been importuned, petitioned, threatened, and bulldozed to create a commission."3 The News was proud of the fact that the party had refused to comply. It claimed that a commis­ sion would undermine railroad investment in Texas. Yet the organi­ zation of the Alliance and its strong support of the commission changed the tune of the Democratic party. The Alliance threatened to support a third party in 1890 if the Democratic party did not en­ dorse the railroad commission idea. The threat was viable, and after fifteen years of waiting, reformers finally saw a railroad commission plank added to the Democratic party platform. The following year the plank became reality. The third assumption of the structural strain approach—that the structural strain is temporary—is closely tied to the previously discussed assumption that the state acts in the interest of society. A superrational, class-neutral state promptly alleviates the source of strain. Thus, strain is temporary, and protest movements are simply the action of the impatient. The assumption of temporary strain is implicated by association with the previously criticized assumption of a superrational, class-neutral state. Doubt is also cast on the assumption of temporary strain by reference to the economic problems of the late 1800s that the Al­ liance and People's party movements sought to address. As will be

Assumptions of the Structural Strain Approach

25

argued in more detail later, contracted currency was one of the major causes of the economic depression of the late 1800s. The contraction was the result of the dominant economic belief that currency had to be tied to a metallic base; many believed that a monometallic gold standard was essential to economic stability. Far from representing temporary strain, the depression was in large part a result of the dominant economic beliefs of the time. Had it not been for the dis­ covery of new gold mines, a newly developed extraction technique, and the discontinuance of gold hoarding, the depression might have even intensified. As it was, the returned prosperity did not alleviate many strains. Prosperity did not trickle down to the economically beleaguered cotton farmer or other deprived population groups; in general, the economic situation of the Southern farmer continued to deteriorate after 1900. Indeed, many of the same problems experi­ enced by the Southern farmer in the 1800s continue to this day. The final assumption of the structural strain approach to be criticized is that protest movement participants are irrational in the sense that the means they adopt—protest movement participa­ tion—will not get them the desired result. At best, participants are viewed as nonrational individuals who are emotionally acting out their anxieties and frustrations irrespective of results. The assump­ tion of irrationality or nonrationality denies by definition that a pro­ test movement may be a sensible, well-reasoned, and successful method of redressing grievances. In vivid contrast to this assumption are many of the Alliance's proposals that represent sophisticated attempts to address the eco­ nomic ills that beset farmers in the late 1800s. For example, the A l­ liance Exchange's joint-note credit program (which is discussed in detail in chapter 6) was an ambitious attempt to provide the A l­ liance farmer with a way to produce crops independent of the lien merchant. Under the joint-note credit plan, local Alliance members who depended on liens collectively estimated their supply needs for the year. A joint note for the total estimate was then drawn. These notes pledged cotton worth three times the amount of credit re­ quested. The signers of the note also specified the number of acres cultivated in cotton and grain, and the value of their livestock. The joint note was then sent to the county business agent of the Al­ liance, along with the order for supplies. The county business agent examined the notes and, if acceptable, forwarded them to Exchange headquarters. There the notes were examined again by a special committee of acceptance that was responsible for final authoriza­ tion allowing the Exchange business manager to make transactions on the basis of the note. Farmers who joined the Alliance movement

26

Critique of Structural Strain Theories

with hopes that the joint-note program would bring economic relief could hardly be labeled irrational or nonrational. These four assumptions of the structural strain perspective, taken together, have had important consequences on the study of protest movement formation. They have resulted in the ubiquitous depiction of conflict and protest as deviant, abnormal, pathological, irrational (to name a few of the adjectives), and thus, undesirable. Such a depiction spurs a markedly unsympathetic attitude toward protest movements. It also precludes the investigation of causes in society of conflicts of interest and the processes or structures that make conflict resolution problematic.

Structural Strain Explanations of Protest Movement Emergence and Development In addition to questioning the assumptions of the structural strain approach to protest movements, it is important to take a critical look at how the major theorists of this approach conceptualize the emergence of such movements. In their writings on protest move­ ments, many structural strain theorists, though not all,4 rely pri­ marily on a one-factor model. Theorists such as Durkheim, Talcott Parsons, and William Kornhauser focus on structural conditions caused by rapid social change, such as the breakdown in institu­ tionalized normative expectations and the destruction of intermedi­ ary secondary associations. Others, like Ted Gurr, focus on such psychological conditions as relative deprivation; the structural or psychological condition so identified is said to precipitate protest movements. One-factor structural strain theories have been heavily criti­ cized.5 Critics have forcefully and convincingly argued that more factors should be considered before protest movement activity can be adequately understood. The utility of one-factor structural strain theories, according to the critics, is confined to post-factum explana­ tions; that is, after a protest movement has emerged a researcher can look for evidence of structural strain and argue that this strain was the key factor in precipitating the movement. But what about those places and times where no movement emerged? Can one simply say that structural strain was not present? If so, the argument becomes a mere tautology. It is an empirical question, and numerous studies have found that both objective structural strain and subjective depri­ vation can be present without precipitating a protest movement.6 Thus, one-factor structural strain models provide a very limited un­

Protest Movement Emergence &) Development

21

derstanding of protest movements. The formation of protest move­ ment organizations is much too complex to expect a one-factor ex­ planatory model to provide much insight. Probably more than any other one-factor structural strain model, the "mass society" variant has been attacked. This variant has been criticized not only for the limitations of one-factor models noted above, but also for its attempt to explain the emergence of protest movements by reference to a structural abnormality known as "mass society." Indeed, sociological research has found the pattern of protest movement participation to be the reverse of that predicted by the "mass society" thesis: the most integrated individuals are the most likely to join protest movements. The structural strain perspective fares no better in its handling of the important issue of protest movement development. The mem­ bership statistics of the Alliance illustrate the problematic process of movement development. Prices of the major Southern crop, cot­ ton, began to drop in the 1870s. Yet in 1880, three years after the Texas Alliance was founded, the Alliance had a mere 500 members. Clearly, hard times in and of themselves do not precipitate a mass protest movement. Furthermore, hard times will not sustain a pro­ test movement organization. In 1894, cotton was selling at an alltime low of $.046 per pound, yet the president of the Texas Alliance commented that active membership had dropped dramatically from its peak in 1887 of over 200,000. At least some of this inactive mem­ bership had become active in the People's party organization. This party grew rapidly from 1892 to 1896. However, in spite of continued hard times for the Southern farmer, the People's party suffered a rapid decline after 1896. This suggests that structural strain alone cannot adequately explain the rise, growth, or decline of mass pro­ test movements. The above theoretical points are summarized in the following statements: 1. The assumption by structural strain theorists that there is normally a congruence of interests among different groups in society is false. Whether elements of the social system mutually benefit all members or groups in society should be an empirical question, not an assumption. Similarly, the assumption of value consensus is questionable. While one might speak of value consensus at a very vague or general level, such consensus often evaporates when ap­ plied to specific situations. The process of value conflict and resolu­ tion is one that sociologists need to address; it should not be ignored because of an a priori claim of consensus. 2. Equally objectionable is the assumption by structural strain

28

Critique of Structural Strain Theories

theorists that the state acts in the interest of society. It must be re­ membered that society is composed of many individuals and sub­ groups. A given action may be beneficial for some individuals or subgroups and not for others. To determine the interest of society, one must ascertain the net balance of benefit versus loss. This is dif­ ficult to do, and leaves a lot of room for subjectivity; thus, conflict over what is in the best interest of society is likely. Granted that ambiguity exists, one may still note that the state tends to adopt the view of the "best interest of society" held by the dominant class, that is, the class that owns or controls the means of production. Concessions to less privileged classes may be won occa­ sionally, but only when the demands for such concessions threaten the continuation of the existing political-economic order or some faction therein. This fact is rooted in the exigencies of the economic structure. As long as the economic structure remains unchanged, the state must try to maintain or create the conditions within that structure for profitable capital accumulation. 3. The contention that protest movement participants are irra­ tional or at best nonrational is unfounded. The basic contention of mobilization theory—that potential protest movement participants are rational and weigh the costs of participation against the benefits of participation—is immensely preferable. 4. Also questionable is the assumption by structural strain theo­ rists that structural strains are temporary consequences of rapid so­ cial change. The emphasis on temporality is misplaced. While it may be true in some instances that the strain is temporary, this is not always, or even typically, the case. The strain may very well be caused by facets of the socioeconomic order that have long-term negative consequences. 5. The "mass society" variant of the structural strain perspec­ tive errs in its contention that isolation is a key factor in protest movement emergence. On the contrary, empirical research has dem­ onstrated that it is the most integrated individuals who are the most likely to participate in protest movements. 6. A one-factor structural strain model depicts protest move­ ments as automatically emerging as the result of discontent. Such a model of protest movement formation is inadequate. Numerous studies have found that strain (both objective and subjective) can be present without precipitating a protest movement. Thus, a crucial question becomes how individual discontent is translated into largescale collective action. This important and problematic process of movement mobilization needs to be carefully examined. Without

Use of the Structural Strain Perspective

29

such an examination, no explanation of protest movement emer­ gence and development is complete.

A Critical Look at the Use of the Structural Strain Perspective by Historians Historians who have implicitly adopted a structural strain perspec­ tive in their writings on the Alliance and People's party movements face criticisms of their work similar to those discussed above. In his classic work on the Populist movement, John Hicks claims that the Alliance and People's party movements were "the inevitable at­ tempts of a bewildered people to find relief from a state of economic distress."7 But, as just noted in the general critique of the one-factor structural strain approach, there is nothing "inevitable" about the emergence of a mass protest movement during a time of economic hardship. Hicks' work is one clear example of how an interchange between sociological theory and history is invaluable. Sociological theory and the concomitant theoretical debates serve to inform the historian about key questions that must be addressed if an event or phenomenon is to be adequately understood. Hicks is not alone in his implicit use of a one-factor structural strain approach. Richard Hofstadter contends that the agrarian re­ volt was the result of anxiety on the part of farmers who were losing status in an era of increasing urban industrialization.8 Even those uninformed about the agrarian revolt of the late 1800s should be sus­ picious of the adequacy of such a simple explanation; sociological research on protest movements has shown time and time again that the development of protest movements as massive as the agrarian revolt of the 1800s is too complex to be explained by one factor. The transition from individual discontent to large-scale organized pro­ test should not be depicted, implicitly or explicitly, as automatic. Just because farmers might have been experiencing status anxiety does not mean that a mass protest movement was inevitable. The use of the "mass society" variant of the structural strain ap­ proach in writings on the Alliance and People's party is very inter­ esting. Both Sheldon Hackney and James Turner argue that isolation was a key factor in the emergence and growth of the Populist move­ ment.9This flatly contradicts empirical research in sociology. To support his contention that isolation was a key factor in pre­ cipitating the Populist revolt, Hackney misuses sociological findings. He cites studies that found that disasters striking well-integrated

30

Critique of Structural Strain Theories

communities do not create dissension and conflict, but rather strengthen existing bonds between community members. He infers from this that the conflict engendered by the economic crisis of the late 1800s is indicative of a poorly integrated, atomistic society. Hackney overlooks the fact that the studies he refers to focused on natural disasters: such disasters are quite distinct from economic crises. The difference is one of kind, not merely degree. A natural disaster is attributed to the impersonal forces of nature and strikes everyone, the economically fortunate as well as the unfortunate. The origins of an economic crisis are not always, or even typically, re­ garded so impersonally. A powerful protest ideology can develop that attributes blame to certain social actors or certain social policies. This is not likely to foster harmony. Since Hackney offers no other evidence that isolation was important to the emergence and develop­ ment of the Populist revolt, his argument can be disregarded. Turner's study is the most detailed of the "mass society" ac­ counts of the Populist movement. He similarly contends that the primary cause of the Populist revolt was the impact of economic dis­ tress on socially isolated farmers. His support for the argument is rather weak. He labels as "Populist" those counties in Texas that voted for the Populist gubernatorial candidate in every state elec­ tion from 1892 through 1896. "Democratic" counties are neighbor­ ing counties that never voted for a Populist gubernational candi­ date. These are rather rigid definitions of Populist and non-Populist counties. For example, Turner labels Brown, Coryell, Hood, Hunt, Hopkins, Montgomery, and Stephens counties "Democratic," yet in 1894 each of these counties reported a Populist vote of at least 40 percent.10 This hardly qualifies them as Democratic strongholds. In­ deed, Hopkins County (a "Democratic" county) cast a larger percent­ age of its total vote for the Populist candidate in 1894 than Blanco County (a "Populist" county) and the same percentage Populist vote as Nacogdoches County (a "Populist" county). A more accurate analysis of the election return data would necessitate an interval level data analysis rather than Turner's crude nominal level analysis. Turner's work is replete with questionable interpretations of his statistics. First, he claims that railroad lines were more prominent in the Democratic than in the Populist counties, and that the rela­ tive scarcity of railroad lines in the Populist counties resulted in the isolation of the population of those counties from the larger society. Turner's data on this matter, however, are unconvincing. In seven of the fifteen counties that he designates as either "Democratic" or "Populist," the number of railroad lines was identical. In three cases, the number of lines was greater in the "Populist" county. Only five

Use of the Structural Strain Perspective

31

"Democratic" counties had more lines, and in only one of these five counties was the difference greater than one line. These statistics do not convincingly demonstrate that "Populist" counties were more isolated. Turner also looks at variations in counties of the number of foreign-born, the number of sects and denominations, the per­ centage of church members in the population, and the amount of farmland improved. How these variables relate to "isolation" is never spelled out, but Turner uses the differences between "Demo­ cratic" and "Populist" counties on these variables to support his isolation thesis. The link between these variables and isolation is questionable. Turner also uses the population of each county seat as a variable reflecting isolation. He finds that the county seats of the "Demo­ cratic" counties averaged a population of 1,630 (remember that some of these "Democratic" counties had relatively strong Populist elec­ toral showings), while the "Populist" counties averaged 927. He con­ cludes from this difference that "Populist" counties were more iso­ lated from the larger society than "Democratic" counties. Why an average county seat population of 927 as opposed to an average of 1,630 would make a county population more isolated is never explained. A final variable that Turner looks at is the number of manufac­ turing employees within the "Populist" and "Democratic" counties. He finds that manufacturing employees were more prevalent in "Democratic" counties. He claims that this supports his contention that Populists lived outside of the mainstream social and economic structure. Why the manufacturing industry should be termed "main­ stream," and nonmanufacturing viewed as outside of that "main­ stream," again is never explained. Thus, Turner's support for his contention that isolation from the larger society and other individuals in general bred Populism is weak. The "mass society" thesis, which has been questioned and se­ verely criticized in sociology, is once more found to be lacking as a convincing explanation of protest movement formation.

4. The Elaboration and Refinement of the Mobilization Perspective on Protest Movements

The potential for mobilization theories to significantly advance our understanding of protest movements is considerable. The wide­ spread use of the mobilization perspective has occurred only re­ cently (especially in American sociology), and the refinement and elaboration of mobilization tenets are just beginning. This study, based on an intensive examination of two of America's largest pro­ test movements, contributes to that beginning. When examined in light of the developmental history of the A l­ liance and People's party movements, the following tenets of vari­ ous mobilization theories were found to be in need of refinement and elaboration: i. Protest movement participation and rationality. The corner­ stone premise of mobilization theories is that, contrary to the claims of certain structural strain theorists, potential protest move­ ment participants are rational: they balance the possible benefits from collective action with the perceived cost of that action. This basic premise of rationality is immensely preferable to the assump­ tion of irrationality or nonrationality. If protest movement partici­ pants behave irrationally, how does one explain the peaks and lows of protest movement membership—by irregular bouts of irration­ ality? It seems much more plausible to view membership fluctua­ tion as a rational response dependent upon perceived viability and effectiveness. For example, from 1880 to 1884, the growth of the A l­ liance was very sluggish and the membership was rather apathetic. At the 1883 state Alliance convention in Texas, only 30 of the 100 or so local alliances even bothered to send representatives. In 1884, there was a dramatic turnabout: over 180 delegates were present at the annual convention. In 1885, the number of delegates rose to over 600. One could argue that the farmers were all simultaneously struck with bouts of irrationality, but by assuming rationality and

Elaboration &) Refinement of the Mobilization Perspective

33

examining the strategies of the Alliance at that time, one is far more likely to understand the causes of its dramatic growth. One finds that, beginning in 1884, serious discussion and implementation of economic strategies were evident. Such discussion and implementa­ tion definitely played a very important role in movement mobiliza­ tion. The correlation of strategy discussion and implementation with membership growth also throws into doubt the contention that movement participants are nonrational—that is, that they are acting out frustrations and are engaged in protest irrespective of ends. However, it is important not to overstate the rational behavior of protest movement participants. The behavior of participants can be influenced in crucial ways by affective factors. For example, dur­ ing the early mobilization period of the Alliance movement, its membership could have employed political pressure tactics and/or pressure tactics and counterinstitutional strategies in the economic sphere. A sizable faction within the Alliance was adamant that eco­ nomic self-help strategies should be the sole focus of the Alliance. Given that the pre-1887 strategies this faction supported had all been implemented by another farmers' organization—the Grange— with little economic relief forthcoming, advocacy of these strategies cannot be labeled unqualifiedly rational. Affective factors were in­ fluencing the selection of protest strategies. Farmers, still emo­ tionally moved by the North's degradation of the South, were likely to feel uncomfortable with the idea of political insurgency that could threaten the unity of the Democratic party. This is not to say that such emotions override the rational decision-making process. The point is merely that affective factors should not be altogether ignored. A recognition of their role in protest movement mobiliza­ tion is critical. 2. The idea that discontent is constant and therefore cannot be im ­ portant to understanding protest movements. John McCarthy and Mayer Zald argue that "there is always enough discontent in any so­ ciety to supply the grass-roots support for a movement if the move­ ment is effectively organized."1 While it may be true that discontent is always present to some extent within a social system, the conten­ tion that the degree of discontent is more or less constant over time is questionable. For example, the economic ills of the Alliance farm­ ers were not constant. Prior to 1875, prices on their economic main­ stay, cotton, fluctuated within a tolerable range of $.12 to $.18 per pound. In 1875, however, cotton prices fell to $ .11 per pound and were not to rise above this level for the remainder of the century. In 1894, cotton prices plummeted to the unprecedented low price of

34

Elaboration &? Refinement of the Mobilization Perspective

$.046 per pound. At this price, all farmers—even those with the most fertile land—were growing cotton at a loss. The difference be­ tween $.046 per pound and $.12 per pound should not be minimized as a factor in the emergence and growth of protests. It is true that deprivation and discontent are not sufficient causes of protest movement emergence and growth. Yet resource mobilization theorists like McCarthy and Zald should not overstate the point by arguing that deprivation and discontent play no causal role. Rather, a compromise is needed between the one-factor struc­ tural strain model that depicts deprivation and discontent as a suffi­ cient cause of protest and McCarthy and Zald, who deny the role of deprivation and discontent altogether. Such a compromise is easily achieved by incorporating the effect of deprivation and discontent into the "rational choice, cost-benefit" model of protest movement participation proposed by resource mobilization theorists. The costbenefit model contends that the greater the perceived benefit rela­ tive to the perceived cost of movement participation, the greater the likelihood of such participation. There are many factors that re­ source mobilization theorists recognize as affecting both sides of the cost-benefit equation—factors such as the viability of movement strategies, the government's response to the protest, and the amount of funds available for recruitment efforts. The extent and intensity of deprivation and discontent should simply be included as additional factors that can significantly affect the cost-benefit analysis intu­ itively conducted by potential participants. Deprivation of a minor nature or deprivation perceived as temporary may make potential movement participants leery of supporting the movement. As the deprivation becomes more intense, or is perceived as long-term, it is more likely that risks will be taken to alleviate that deprivation. 3. The importance of latent power. While sharing many common­ alities, the Marxian mobilization perspective and the resource mobi­ lization perspective do differ on a crucial point of emphasis. While the Marxian mobilization perspective focuses on the use of the ever­ present but latent power of the aggrieved population, the resource mobilization perspective puts more emphasis on the need for exter­ nal support. The details of the emergence and development of the Alliance indicate that the emphasis of many resource mobilization theorists on the need for a healthy input of resources from an external sponsor is problematic. First, these theorists give little attention to the conse­ quences of trying to both obtain and maintain external support. Yet the ability to attract external support is dependent upon the meth­

Elaboration &) Refinement of the Mobilization Perspective

35

ods of change the protest organization is employing and its goals. Some methods and goals are not likely to attract outside support. For example, the demand by both the Alliance and early People's party platforms for a federally administered subtreasury was not a demand that would attract much external support. It was labeled as visionary, heretical, and socialistic. To gain external support for the People's party, the national party chairman espoused what he termed a "prac­ tical politics" philosophy. He proposed that the movement follow a "line of least resistance," which entailed deemphasizing, if not alto­ gether dropping, the more radical protest demands. Outside support was indeed gained, but at a significant cost of principle. The emphasis of certain resource mobilization theorists on the need for external support also draws attention away from the poten­ tial leverage that all groups have over the social structure. There are basically two types of power leverages that can be exercised: what may be termed routinized power and latent power.2 Routinized power is the power exercised through the normal, everyday func­ tioning of the system. All social organizations have an established power hierarchy to ensure an orderly functioning of the organiza­ tion. Those individuals occupying positions in this hierarchy exer­ cise routinized power by virtue of their positions. In contrast, latent power is not activated by the routine functioning of the system; rather, it is merely potential power that requires organization on the part of the holders to make it a reality. This potential power resides in the ability of its holders to disrupt the normal functioning of the system or to totally bypass that system. Latent power can be exer­ cised by making life so unpleasant or unprofitable for the holders of routinized power that their welfare is diminished. This can be done through strategies such as strikes, boycotts, riots, picketing, and sabotage. Or, rather than applying pressure tactics targeted at chang­ ing the existing system, protest strategies might attempt to bypass the system through the establishment of counterinstitutions. The Alliance used both methods of protest. Its strategies illus­ trate the extent of protest activity possible without the infusion of external resources. In its attempt to address grievances concerning the purchasing system, the Alliance mobilized the latent power of its membership through such pressure tactics as local trade agree­ ments. This tactic required the members of the local or county Al­ liance to give all of their business to the merchant who would fur­ nish them with the lowest prices. This tactic was based on nonroutinized or latent power and thus necessitated organization on the part of the farmers to carry it out. The jute boycott of the Alliance is another example of the exercise of latent power. It entailed the sub­

36

Elaboration &) Refinement of the Mobilization Perspective

stitution of cotton bagging for jute bagging by the Alliance mem­ bership. The boycott was not intended so much to pressure the jute trust into rescinding its price increase as to provide an alternative bagging product that would give the farmers the ability once and for all to bypass, and thereby destroy, the jute trust. The same type of bypassing strategy was inherent in the Texas Alliance Exchange, which was probably one of the most ambitious attempts at a counterstructure ever undertaken by a protest organization. It was estab­ lished to enable bulk purchasing direct from the manufacturers by coordinating the purchasing of the Alliance membership. These examples of Alliance strategies bring into question such statements by resource mobilization theorists as "a negatively privi­ leged minority is in a poor position to initiate a social protest move­ ment through its own efforts alone."3 While it may be true that it does not exercise routinized power, with some creativity numerous strategies can be devised that utilize the group's latent power. The strategies employed by the Alliance also cast doubt on Tilly's notion that a "balance tilt" is a necessary precondition of pro­ test movement emergence. The protest strategies of the Alliance were always hypothetically possible; the latent power utilized by the farmers had always been present. Thus, protest movement emergence does not have to wait for disruptive social change to alter the balance of power in the social system. That balance may be al­ tered by the creative development of strategies that actualize the la­ tent power of the aggrieved population. In sum, mobilization theorists are directed to the following questions: What factors affect the likelihood that significant amounts of external support for protest movements will be forthcoming? What effects do appeals for external support have on the original goals of a movement? If co-optative, what are the strategies possible that utilize the latent power of the protest movement membership? What are the limits of such strategies? Which of these strategies seem most effective? The developmental history of the Alliance pro­ vides the opportunity to reflect on these questions in the analytical chapters that follow. 4. The importance of “equalization” or “shared i n t e r e s t s Marx­ ian variants of mobilization theory have always stressed the impor­ tance to protest movement development of "equalization" within the ranks of the aggrieved population. Without equalization, differ­ ing interests within the aggrieved population can inhibit the emer­ gence of organized protest and can disrupt existing protest activities.

Elaboration et) Refinement of the Mobilization Perspective

37

The issue of equalization is not treated uniformly by all resource mobilization theorists. Whereas McCarthy and Zald virtually ignore the issue, Tilly recognizes its importance. His terminology differs, however. He speaks of the importance of the variable of "shared in­ terests," which he defines as the shared advantage or disadvantage likely to accrue to the aggrieved population from interaction with other groups.4 However, even those mobilization theorists sensitive to the is­ sue of equalization or shared interests have not adequately exam­ ined the consequences of differing interests within the aggrieved population or of incompleted equalization. That is to say, the conse­ quences of various protest strategies may not be the same for all members of the population that the protest organization is trying to recruit. For example, there were four groups of farmers from which the Alliance could recruit: a. farmers hopelessly ensnared in the crop-lien system of financ­ ing; that is, farmers who were perpetually in debt; b. farmers who were forced to rely on lien financing but were able to pay out at harvesttime; c. farmers who were able to make purchases on a cash basis but operated on such a low margin of cash flow that they constantly feared becoming future victims of lien financing; d. farmers who made cash purchases with a generous amount of money to spare. Generally these farmers had either saved sizable sums of money from more prosperous farming years or had invest­ ments outside of farming. The Alliance was based on a shared interest held by all four of these groups—with cotton prices declining to $.09 or less per pound, no cotton farmer was economically prospering. Broadly stated, the goal of the Alliance was to provide a much-needed boost to the agrarian economy. However, the consequences of the Alliance strate­ gies that were developed to address this common interest varied widely for each group. For example, it will be shown that the early strategies of the Alliance neglected the first two groups altogether; indeed, at times the strategies even worked against their interests. Thus, when examining the consequences of protest strategies, it is important not to depict the protest group as monolithic. Protest organizations are typically composed of diverse subgroups for whom the consequences of protest strategies can be quite different. In order to understand how they can be a limiting factor in the development of protest movements, the different consequences of Alliance strate­ gies will be examined in this study.

Elaboration &) Refinement of the Mobilization Perspective

5. The concept of escalation. The concept of escalation is crucial to an understanding of protest movement development. The concept is grounded in the acknowledgment that in any given stratification system, some classes or groups benefit more than others. If and when a protest movement emerges to challenge the existing distri­ bution of economic resources, those classes or groups benefiting from the status quo will act to preserve the existing distribution. Their opposition to the protest movement typically creates obstacles to protest strategies that must be overcome if the movement is not to collapse. This situation has been termed "escalation," and a pro­ test movement is only as successful as it is able to surmount or cir­ cumvent the obstacles created by the existing structure. Although crucial to our understanding of the development of protest movements, the issues of protest strategy outcome and the related process of escalation are generally neglected in studies of pro­ test movements.5 This neglect needs to be remedied in future re­ search efforts. Protest movement development must be viewed in a dialectical manner: protest organizations continually mobilize re­ sources, utilize those resources in a chosen strategy, and then experi­ ence the consequences of that strategy in a manner that affects sub­ sequent rounds of strategy selection and strategy outcome. A linear, nondialectical model does not properly capture the dynamics of pro­ test movement development. The need for a dialectical model of protest movement develop­ ment is made clear in the experience of the Alliance. This protest organization excelled in the art of escalation. The dialectical inter­ play between movement strategy and external opposition is evi­ denced throughout the developmental history of the Alliance. This interplay should be, and in the present study is, a major focus of attention. 6 . The importance' of ideology as a movement resource. The im­ portance of ideology as a movement resource is stressed by the Marx­ ian variant of the mobilization perspective. Marxist theorists have always been sensitive to the need for a movement ideology that effectively counters the dominant, legitimating ideology. The exis­ tence of this legitimating ideology ensures that protest movements are not automatic responses to deprivation. For example, in the early years of the agricultural depression, farmers were told that the de­ pression was due solely to overproduction. Crop acreage reduction and more "scientific" farming were the answers to the farmers' plight. The development of an alternative explanation of the depres­ sion was the first step toward Alliance mobilization.

El a bora ti on &) Refin em en t of the Mobiliza ti on Perspec ti ve

39

In contrast to the Marxian variant of the mobilization perspec­ tive, resource mobilization theorists have not stressed protest ideol­ ogy as an important resource for protest organizations. For example, in Tilly's theoretical framework for protest movement analysis (de­ veloped in his book From Mobilization to Revolution), explicit mention of ideology occurs only twice, and then only in passing. This lack of attention to protest ideologies is a major oversight on the part of resource mobilization theorists. The importance of the particulars of a protest movement ide­ ology is illustrated by the early growth of the Alliance. Goodwyn has explained this growth by noting the "pioneering" efforts of the Al­ liance in cooperative marketing and purchasing.6 However, in this book, the contention that the economic strategies of the Alliance in the pre-1887 period were pioneering is challenged. In fact, the coop­ erative strategies of this period were very similar to those utilized by the Grange. Despite the similarities, however, the Alliance was much more successful at mobilizing farmers. The reason for this success seems to lie in the fact that the Alliance couched its call for coopera­ tive strategies in a political-economic framework. Alliance lecturers and organizers spoke of the exploitation of the farmer by the existing economic structure. They spoke of the capitalists who needed to control the channels of information to protect themselves against the development of protest ideologies. The farmer was told that he had to organize to get economic relief. This political-economic ide­ ology did not remain vulnerably abstract. The opposition faced by the cooperative strategies of the Alliance lent weight to its protest ideology: farmers could directly experience the opposition of the es­ tablished structure to its self-help strategies. The Grange, on the other hand, had a rather anemic protest ide­ ology. It cautioned farmers not to oppose or abuse other classes; all classes were said to be essential to the proper functioning of society. The farmer was told by Grange organizers that the betterment of the farmer rested solely on improving himself. Therefore, when Grange self-help strategies ran into problems, there was not a politicaleconomic protest ideology to buffer the movement from the conse­ quences of strategy failure. The early Alliance cooperative program, so similar to that of the Grange but cloaked in a more radical ideology, succeeded in generat­ ing significantly more movement momentum than the Grange. At its height, the Grange numbered less than 40,000. With the emer­ gence of the Alliance movement, the membership in the Grange rapidly declined. By 1887, it numbered less than 5,000. An ineffec­ tive movement ideology played a major role in its decline.

40

Elaboration e) Refinement of the Mobilization Perspective

Thus, resource mobilization theorists need to be more attentive in their future research to the role of protest ideology in the growth of protest movement organizations. An effective protest ideology should be conceptualized as a vital resource to be utilized in the mo­ bilization process. The inability to develop an effective protest ide­ ology and to disseminate that ideology can severely limit the growth potential of a protest organization and even cause demobilization. 7. Protest movements and protest organizations. Resource mobi­ lization theory, particularly the McCarthy and Zald variant, dis­ tinguishes between protest movements in general and the various protest organizations that in their entirety make up the protest movement; typically there are a multitude of protest organizations that vie for an aggrieved population's support. An important re­ search issue concerns factors affecting the relative success in mem­ bership recruitment of the various protest organizations that com­ prise a widespread protest movement. That is, why are some protest movement organizations so much more successful than others at re­ cruiting members? What explains large-scale shifts in membership from one protest organization to another? The farmers' movement of the late nineteenth century provides ample opportunity to reflect on such questions. In this study, the success in membership recruitment of the early Alliance organiza­ tions (pre-1887) is contrasted to the recruitment problems of the Grange. As argued above, the reason for the Alliance's early recruit­ ment success is located in the differences in the protest ideologies of these two organizations. The height of Alliance membership in the post-1887 period is explained by a combination of protest ideology and the development of new strategies that for the first time ad­ dressed the plight of the most disadvantaged group of farmers— those trapped in the crop-lien system of finance. Given the rational, cost-benefit approach of potential members, it is understandable that providing a direct benefit for the first time to a large group of people will foster success in membership recruitment. In sum, two key factors are important in explaining the greater recruitment success of one protest organization than of another: protest ideology and protest strategies. Future research should ad­ dress additional factors that may explain the success and failures of the various protest organizations that vie for a given population's support. 8. Strategy success and protest movement growth. One of the main tenets proposed by resource mobilization theorists has been the

Elaboration et) Refinement of the Mobilization Perspective

41

linking of strategy success to protest movement growth. They argue that if the membership of a protest movement organization is to in­ crease, the organization must establish definite strategy objectives and then successfully achieve these objectives. Failure to achieve the stated objectives significantly affects future mobilization poten­ tial. It may even result in demobilization to the point of organiza­ tional collapse. The linking of protest movement growth to strategy success has appropriately received the support of resource mobilization theo­ rists. It is an important tenet; however, it is in need of refinement. While it is true that the failure to fully obtain strategy objectives can affect future mobilization potential, it does not always result in demobilization. A crucial but neglected research issue concerns the conditions that affect whether or not strategy failure or limited strategy success brings about demobilization. This research issue is addressed in this study through a close examination of the develop­ mental history of the Alliance, and it is concluded that two impor­ tant factors can prevent or mitigate demobilization when movement strategies have limited success or fail: the creative escalation of strategies, and a movement ideology that effectively externalizes blame for strategy failure or limited success. The Alliance experi­ ence indicates that when both of these factors are present, not only can demobilization be prevented when strategy success is partially or completely stymied, but movement growth may even occur. However, the combination of these two factors is essential in pre­ venting demobilization. If one of these factors is absent, the demobi­ lization process will likely be activated. 9. The importance of organization to protest movement develop­ ment. Frances Piven and Richard Cloward have challenged the em­ phasis of the mobilization perspective on the importance of organi­ zation to effective protest. They argue that formal organization is antithetical to effective protest. Efforts to build such organizations are, according to Piven and Cloward, futile and even counterproduc­ tive. Whatever the aggrieved population may win is due to their tur­ bulence, not to their organized numbers.7 Thus, Piven and Cloward are commending a particular type of protest: turbulence in the streets and a general, unspecified demand for change. The details of reform are left up to the government, which in order to regain legiti­ macy must propose some type of reform legislation. However, this type of protest is inherently conservative, because the specifics of re­ form are developed by politicians who can have very different inter­ ests from those of the protesting population. Piven and Cloward's

42

Elaboration e) Refinement of the Mobilization Perspective

strategy recommendation—simple turbulence—might be effective in getting piecemeal reform, but their recommendation is not appro­ priate for protest movements fueled by the radical belief that major changes in the existing socioeconomic structure are needed. Perhaps they believe that piecemeal reform is all that can be expected. However, if one is not convinced of the truth of such a pessimis­ tic conclusion and is desirous of more radical change, Piven and Cloward's strategy advice should be ignored. For protest movements seeking major changes in existing structures, the experience of the Alliance makes the inappropriateness of the anti-organization argu­ ment clear. An organizational context was essential to the develop­ ment of specific reform proposals of the Alliance; it was particularly important to the creative escalation of strategies when implemented strategies had been thwarted. The organizational communication network was also crucial for the generation and maintenance of commitment to the specific reform proposals of the Alliance. The importance, indeed the necessity, of organization to protest move­ ments will be noted at numerous points in the historical analysis of the Alliance and People's party that follows. 10. The generation and maintenance of commitment to reform prin­ ciples. Another aspect of Piven and Cloward's anti-organization ar­ gument is that leaders and recruiters of protest movement organiza­ tions are so preoccupied with organizational maintenance that they tend to curb their former insurgency: "organizations endure, in short, by abandoning their oppositional politics."8 While it is true that organization can lead to acquiescence and frustrate the attain­ ment of goals, the problem is better viewed not as organization per se, but as organizations that fail to develop and maintain commit­ ment to movement goals. As noted above, organization played a chief positive role in the implementation of the various Alliance strategies, in the development of reform demands, and in the cre­ ation and maintenance of Alliance commitment to these demands. Commitment to movement goals only began to waiver noticeably with the establishment and growth of the People's party. Further­ more, the commitment on the part of the Texas People's party lead­ ership and membership to the full range of Populist reform demands did not waiver nearly so much as the commitment of other Populists. Thus, organization per se is not the inevitable problem that Piven and Cloward claim it is. Rather, the generation and mainte­ nance of commitment to protest movement goals is affected by cer­ tain organizational features. Research is needed to address the issue concerning the organizational features under which commitment to

Elaboration e) Refinement of the Mobilization Perspective

43

movement goals can be both generated and maintained. The Texas Alliance and People's party organizations provide the opportunity to address this research issue. The Alliance organization had two important organizational features: a grass-roots organizational network and the readily per­ ceived common interest of its membership. The early reliance of the Alliance on local strategies resulted in strong local and county Al­ liance organization. Later, economic strategies such as the joint-note program of the Texas Alliance Exchange depended extensively on the coordination of county alliances into a statewide network. Also, while the farming community was diverse, there was a strong shared interest simply on the basis of occupation and the falling crop prices that affected all farmers. These two features—a readily perceived shared interest and a strong grass-roots organizational network—have important conse­ quences for the maintenance and generation of commitment to pro­ test movement goals. In regard to the degree of perceived shared in­ terest, the more heterogeneous a protest group becomes, the less obvious shared interests will be. Therefore, a heavy burden is placed on the leaders of the protest movement to effectively transmit an ideology that clearly links protest demands to the interests of the varied groups. Without the transmission of such an ideology, there will not be sufficient unity behind these demands. The tendency will then be for leaders to stress a minimal "common denominator." In regard to grass-roots organization, such an organization helps im­ mensely in the transmittal of movement ideology in its entirety— not just a "common denominator." It also allows for the buffering of the movement participants from harsh external criticisms of its more radical demands. That is to say, it allows for the development of a plausibility structure, which is important to both the creation and maintenance of ideological commitment. Since a substantial proportion of Texas Populists were also Al­ liance members, or had been so at one time, the Texas People's party benefited immensely from the prior grass-roots organizational net­ work established by the Alliance. This network was by far more ex­ tensive than any other state Alliance organization, in large part be­ cause the Texas Alliance successfully mobilized that large group of farmers that was slighted in the cooperative projects of other states: the debt-ridden farmers dependent on crop liens. The Alliance lead­ ership also employed lecturers at the local level, and organized huge political rallies and camp meetings to generate and renew commit­ ment to protest demands. In regard to the variable of perceived shared interest, the People's party in Texas did seek to mobilize out­

44

Elaboration &) Refinement of the Mobilization Perspective

side the farming community. Thus, its membership was more di­ verse than that of the Alliance, and this diversity did create some problems in maintaining commitment. Again, however, the Texas People's party benefited from past Alliance organizing efforts. A cer­ tain faction of the Alliance had worked closely with labor organiza­ tions like the Knights of Labor, so some groundwork had already been laid for a possible urban laborer-farmer coalition with readily perceived common interests. In sum, in large part because of the prior organizing efforts of the Alliance, the Texas People's party was successful in maintaining commitment to the entire slate of A l­ liance and Populist reform demands. The national People's party organization is a different story. It could not build upon a strong Alliance organizational structure in each and every state, yet outside the organizational structure of the Alliance, the People's party possessed few institutional means to reach the masses with its message. Thus, it was hard for the national party to effectively communicate its more complex and controver­ sial reform demands. In addition, the national People's party was a composition of a varied assortment of reform groups with quite dif­ ferent aims. Realizing the difficulties facing the third party, its na­ tional leaders moved to adopt a "common denominator" approach to reform. They dropped the more complex and controversial reform demands and solely emphasized the one reform demand that the multitude of protestors had in common—the institution of a bi­ metallic monetary standard. To summarize, two factors—perceived shared interests and grass-roots organization—are crucial organizational features related to commitment creation and maintenance. Contrary to the conten­ tions of Piven and Cloward, it is not organization per se that under­ mines commitment, but specific organizational features. i i . The response of the government to protest organizations. An important research issue concerns the reactions of the government to protest movements once they have emerged. The Alliance and Peo­ ple's party experiences support three important points concerning the relationship between protest organizations and the government: a. Any given protest organization will experience different gov­ ernment reactions; the government might accept some of its more "tolerable" demands, and vehemently condemn the more radical de­ mands. The more tolerable demands may be endorsed in the hope that protestors will be persuaded that the government has their best interests at heart. This tactic of selective issue endorsement can re­

Elaboration &) Refinement of the Mobilization Perspective

45

store legitimacy to the government and deflect protestors from pur­ suing more radical demands. This is illustrated by the action of the majority faction in the Texas Democratic party in the 1890 state election. In this election, the majority faction utilized the selective issue endorsement tactic. It endorsed James Hogg for governor on a reform platform calling for the establishment of a railroad commission to regulate the railroad industry. Given the railroad commission endorsement, most Al­ liance members became Hogg supporters despite the fact that Hogg stood on a platform that contained a plank condemning the Al­ liance's subtreasury reform demand. The selective issue endorse­ ment tactic had worked. b. The relationship between the government and a protest orga­ nization is dynamic. A government that at one time ignores the pro­ test organization may at a later date launch a vigorous counterattack against the organization, or one that was at one time repressive may later opt for a selective issue endorsement tactic. Thus, in examin­ ing the relationship between protest organizations and the govern­ ment, researchers must be aware of the temporal dimension. Aside from being sensitive to the possibility of shifts in the protest organi­ zation-government relationship, researchers also should address the reasons for such shifts. One major factor in any explanation of such shifts is the government's perception of the power of the pro­ test organization. If such power is seen as increasing, a formerly unsympathetic government may feel forced to implement the selec­ tive issue endorsement tactic in order to restore its legitimacy and undermine the protest organization. The above point is illustrated by contrasting the response of Democratic politicians in 1892 with their response in 1896. In 1892, the majority faction of the Democratic party did not perceive sup­ port for the People's party to be great enough to cause any serious threat electorally. American elections are based on a "winner-takesall" philosophy rather than a proportionate representation philos­ ophy. The majority faction was confident that support for the third party would never reach proportions where it would amount to a plurality. Thus, no concessions to reform demands were made in the campaign of 1892. In fact, far from making concessions, the domi­ nant faction of the party launched an extensive campaign that called into question the accuracy of the third party's analysis of the na­ tion's woes. Their chief theme was that the tariff was at the root of the current economic problems. The problem was not inherent in the existing financial system, so the demands of the third partyites

46

Elaboration &) Refinement of the Mobilization Perspective

for the reform of the monetary system were unnecessary and ludi­ crous. The campaign worked sufficiently well. The Democratic presi­ dential candidate, Grover Cleveland, received a plurality of votes, as did the vast majority of state and local Democratic candidates in the Democratic-stronghold states. However, hard times merely increased under the Cleveland ad­ ministration, and criticism of his theory concerning the causes of the nation's economic problems grew. The People's party benefited from this growing discontent. By 1894, the Democratic party was growing nervous. The electoral results of that year show that the third party was gaining on the Democratic party in states like Texas. Many Democrats began to fear that the Democratic party might lose, both nationally and in the state races, in 1896. A strategy shift was necessary to forestall this possibility. The strategy chosen was the tried and true selective issue endorsement strategy. The issue chosen—free silver—was of a financial reform nature. Thus, mone­ tary reform, which the national Democratic party had labeled un­ necessary and ludicrous just four years previously, had now become the chief theme in its 1896 campaign. c. The government is not a monolithic group that reacts to pro­ test movements and their demands in a uniform way. One cannot talk of the government's response. Various factions within the gov­ ernment may be affected differently by the protest movement and its demands. In such a situation, these factions will tend to react differ­ ently to the activities of a particular protest organization. These reactions can be depicted as basically two types: a reaction primar­ ily concerned with the capital-accumulation function of the gov­ ernment and a reaction primarily concerned with the legitimacy function. The above point can be illustrated by discussing the "soundmoney" advocates and their "free-silver" opponents. These two fac­ tions in the government championed the capital-accumulation function of the government and the legitimacy function, respec­ tively. The sound-money advocates saw free silver as disastrous for the capital-accumulation process. They argued that the cries for free silver were leading to gold redemption and hoarding. The soundmoney advocates were correct in analyzing the consequences of freesilver advocacy within the existing cultural and monetary system. Business leaders believed that free silver would have disastrous effects on the stability of the economy, and given a redeemable monetary system, they responded with both a dramatic increase in currency redemption in gold and in gold hoarding. This gold re­

Elaboration &) Refinement of the Mobilization Perspective

47

demption and hoarding aggravated the existing currency contraction problem. However, free silverites were correct in their contention that sound-money policies aimed at placating American business in­ terests were undermining the legitimacy of the government. These two factions, each espousing concern for basic functions of the gov­ ernment, struggled for political control. Within the Democratic party, the free silverites won. Members attending the national Democratic convention feared the conse­ quences should they not restore legitimacy to the government. In the 1894 elections in those states from which the Democratic party typically received its primary support, support for the Democratic ticket had declined, while support for the People's party had signifi­ cantly increased. In contrast, the Republican party convention was controlled by the sound-money advocates. The Republican party had not experienced an electoral threat as significant as that received by the Democrats in 1894, so there was not the powerful push to ad­ dress the legitimacy function of the state, thereby allowing the Re­ publican party to continue addressing the interests of the business community. The theoretical points of this chapter are capsulized in the fol­ lowing twelve statements: 1. Contrary to the contentions of structural strain theorists, po­ tential protest movement participants are rational; they weigh the costs of participation against the perceived benefits of participation. However, this is not to deny that affective factors can influence the rational decision-making process, and thereby play a role in the de­ velopment of a protest movement. 2. Structural strain theorists often overstate the role of depriva­ tion in protest movement emergence, while resource mobilization theorists tend to ignore the role of deprivation. A compromise is pro­ posed wherein the extent and intensity of deprivation are included among the factors that can affect the cost-benefit analysis intuitively conducted by potential protestors. Deprivation of a minor nature or deprivation perceived to be temporary may make potential partici­ pants leery of supporting a protest movement. As deprivation be­ comes more intense or is perceived as long-term, it is more likely that risks will be taken to alleviate that deprivation. 3. The emphasis of certain resource mobilization theorists on the importance of external sponsors for protest movements by nega­ tively privileged groups is problematic. First, it neglects the conse­ quences that external support can have on the original goals of a

48

Elaboration &) Refinement of the Mobilization Perspective

protest movement. Second, it deflects attention from the needed analysis of the limits and possibilities of an aggrieved population's latent power. 4. Protest movement organizations are typically composed of di­ verse subgroups for whom the consequences of protest strategies can be quite different. In Marx's terminology, unless there is a completed state of "equalization" within the aggrieved population, the conse­ quences of protest strategies will tend to be different for the diverse subgroups. Researchers interested in protest movement develop­ ment need to be sensitive to these differential effects in order to understand how they might be a limiting factor on movement development. 5. Protest movement development must be viewed dialectically; protest organizations continually mobilize resources, utilize those resources in a chosen strategy, and then experience the conse­ quences of that strategy in a manner that affects subsequent rounds of strategy selection and outcome. Linear, nondialectical models do not capture the dynamics of movement development. 6. The concept of escalation is crucial to an understanding of protest movement development. A protest organization is only as successful as it is insightful and creative in its attempts to surmount or circumvent the obstacles created by the existing structure. In­ deed, creative escalation by the leadership of any protest organiza­ tion is essential if demobilization is to be avoided. 7. Resource mobilization theorists have neglected the impor­ tance of protest ideology as a resource that fosters movement mobi­ lization. In future research, ideology should be conceptualized as a vital resource to be utilized in the mobilization process. The in­ ability to develop an effective protest ideology and to disseminate that ideology can severely limit the growth potential of a protest or­ ganization and even cause demobilization. 8. Typically, there are a multitude of protest organizations that vie for an aggrieved population's support. Thus, a widespread pro­ test movement generally encompasses many different protest orga­ nizations. An important research issue concerns the factors that af­ fect the relative success in membership recruitment of these various protest organizations. Two factors are crucial in explaining shifts in membership among these organizations and the success of member­ ship recruitment of one protest organization relative to another: the particular protest ideology adopted by the protest organization, and the protest strategies implemented by the various protest organiza­ tions. Future research should address additional factors that may ex­

Elaboration o) Refinement of the Mobilization Perspective

49

plain the successes and failures of the various protest organizations that vie for the support of the aggrieved population. 9. The mobilization theory tenet linking strategy success to pro­ test movement growth needs to be refined. Two important factors can prevent or mitigate demobilization when movement strategies have limited success or fail: the creative escalation of strategies, and a movement ideology that effectively externalizes blame for strategy failure or limited success. When both of these factors are present, demobilization can not only be prevented when strategy success is partially or totally stymied, but movement growth may even occur. However, the combination of these two factors is essential to pre­ venting demobilization. If one of these factors is absent, the demobi­ lization process may be activated. 10. Contrary to the contentions of Piven and Cloward, organiza­ tion is essential if radical change in the socioeconomic structure is desired. Organization is particularly important to the creative esca­ lation of strategies when implemented strategies are thwarted. The organizational communication network is also crucial to the genera­ tion and maintenance of commitment to reform principles that run counter to the dominant ideology. 11. The generation and maintenance of protest movement goals is affected by certain organizational features. Contrary to the claims of Piven and Cloward, organization per se does not undermine com­ mitment. Two specific aspects of organizational structure have a de­ cisive impact on commitment: the extent to which the members comprising the protest organization readily perceive their common or shared interests, and the degree of grass-roots organization. 12. An important research issue concerns the reactions of the government to protest organizations once they have emerged. Three points concerning the relationship between protest organizations and the government are stressed: a. Any protest organization will experience different reactions from the government. Some of its more "tolerable" demands might be accepted, while its more radical demands are condemned. The more tolerable demands might be endorsed in hope that protestors will be convinced that the government has their best interests at heart. This tactic of selective issue endorsement can restore legiti­ macy to the government and deflect protestors from pursuing their more radical demands. b. The relationship between the government and a protest orga­ nization is dynamic. A government that at one time ignored a pro­ test organization may launch a vigorous counterattack against that

50

Elaboration &) Refinement of the Mobilization Perspective

organization at a later date, or a government that was repressive at one time may later opt for a selective issue endorsement tactic. The key factor in explaining such shifts is the perception of the govern­ ment authorities of the protest organization's attractiveness to the aggrieved population. If support for the organization is dramatically increasing, a formerly unsympathetic government may attempt to co-opt the movement by using the selective issue endorsement tactic. c. The government is not a monolithic group that reacts to pro­ test organizations in a uniform way. Thus, one can not always talk of the government's response. The various factions within the gov­ ernment may be affected differently by the protest demands. Conse­ quently, these factions will often react differently to the activities of protest organizations. These reactions are basically of two types: a reaction primarily concerned with the capital accumulation func­ tion of the government, and a reaction primarily concerned with the legitimacy function of the government. With these elaborations and modifications of the theoretical lit­ erature in mind, let us now turn to the detailed description and analysis of the developmental history of the Alliance and People's party movements in Texas.

5. The Rise and Development of the Texas Farmers Alliance, 1877-1886

The Farmers Alliance had its beginnings in a time of great hardship for many, if not most, farmers. Falling crop prices were seriously af­ fecting the quality of life of millions of farmers. Texas farmers were particularly affected by declining cotton prices. Prior to 1875, cotton prices fluctuated within a tolerable range of from $.12 to $.18 per pound,1 but in 1875 the average price of cotton fell to $ .11 per pound and, as Table 1 shows, was not to rise above this price for the re­ mainder of the century. Since, on the average, $.05 to $.08 per pound of cotton went to cover the cost of production—the cost varying ac­ cording to soil quality—many farmers did not make enough both to provide for their present needs and to buy the supplies necessary to produce the next year's crop. It was in these hard times that a group of farmers gathered in Lampasas County, Texas, to discuss their grievances. This gathering in September 1877 represented the be­ ginnings of the Farmers Alliance. The Alliance organization that resulted from the Lampasas gathering soon spread to surrounding counties. By the summer of 1878, a "Grand State Farmers Alliance" was formed. The members agreed that the Alliance should be a selfhelp organization, but there was a diversity of views on just how the farmers were to help themselves. "There were about as many objects in view for organization as there were farmers participating," said one of the founding members.2 Some believed that the cause of the farmers' problems was found in governmental land, money, and transportation policies, and thus called for independent political ac­ tion. Loyal Democrats in the organization were appalled at this and argued that all necessary political reform could be obtained through the Democratic party. Others wanted to avoid politics altogether and be a strictly social and educational order. Then there were those who were strong advocates of economic, cooperative efforts. There were even some members whose main concern was to halt cattle rustlers

52

Rise e) Development of the Texas Farmers Alliance

Table 1 . Average Farm Prices per Pound of Cotton, 1875-1900 1875 $.111 1876 .099 1877 .105 1878 .082 1879 .102 1880 .098 1881 .100 1882 .099 1883 .090 so u rce :

1884 $.092 1885 .085 1886 .081 1887 .085 1888 .085 1889 .083 1890 .086 1891 .073 1892 .084

1893 $.070 1894 .046 1895 .076 1896 .066 1897 .066 1898 .057 1899 .070 1900 .086

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Yearbook of Agriculture, 1901, p. 754.

and horse thieves. No strategy of action held these members to­ gether. Thus, when certain members of the Lampasas County A l­ liance pushed for Alliance endorsement of the independent Green­ back party candidates in the 1880 elections, a schism occurred that proved fatal.3 But the organizational "sprouts" in the surrounding counties, having been spared the blow of internal political dissension, con­ tinued to slowly take root. But growth was very slow. In 1881, total membership was reported at i,ooo, up a mere 500 members since 1880.4The movement continued on rather sluggishly. At the annual state convention in August 1883, only 30 of the 100 or more local alliances even bothered to send representatives.5 Yet these were clearly years of economic distress. In 1879-80, a terrible drought caused widespread damage to the cotton crop; some counties pro­ duced as little as one bale of cotton from every five acres.6 At this bale-per-acreage ratio, farmers were growing cotton at a loss. Fur­ thermore, the price of cotton was continuing to decline. Clearly, eco­ nomic distress, or structural strain, in and of itself will not precipi­ tate a mass protest movement. Key officials in the Alliance movement attributed its early slug­ gish growth to the lack of funds for printing and distributing Alli­ ance literature and for supporting the work of Alliance organizers. In 1880, the state organization claimed only $50 in assets.7But growth was not the only problem the Alliance faced. Attendance at the 1883 state convention showed that apathy was also a serious problem. The apparent indifference of existing local Alliance members cannot be explained away by lack of funds. The Alliance movement lacked the needed vitality not only to grow, but to survive. It was clear to the leaders of the movement that if something were not done soon, the Alliance movement would collapse from sheer apathy. Recogniz­

Rise &) Development of the Texas Farmers Alliance

53

ing this, the newly elected Alliance president, W. L. Garvin, created a new full-time, salaried post: that of traveling lecturer. In January 1884, he appointed S. O. Daws to that post and gave him instruc­ tions to organize new local alliances throughout the state and to ap­ point suborganizers and sublecturers where needed. The appointment of Daws was a pivotal point in the history of the Alliance. For almost seven years, the Alliance had been confined to a mere 12 of 254 counties in Texas, and where it was organized, it was in a very unhealthy condition. By the time of Daws' appoint­ ment, only 15 local alliances out of 152 that had been officially char­ tered were known to be active.8Daws immediately interjected a des­ perately needed element into the Alliance organization: a critical discussion of possible strategies to financially aid the farmer. At the semiannual Alliance convention in February 1884, economic strate­ gies were openly discussed; apparently for the first time such a dis­ cussion was on center stage.9 A perusal of the state organ of the Farmers Alliance, the Rural Citizen, indicates that prior to this time there had been very few references to possible economic strategies; much of the paper was devoted to articles on "scientific farming" and to subjects of supposed interest to the farmer like the proper coordination of color in dress, proper sleeping positions, Southern women's courage, the origins of the stars and stripes, and mistletoe. The redirection evident at the February 1884 convention is read­ ily traced to Daws. The results of this redirection were immediate and dramatic. At the annual state convention in August 1884, there were 180 delegates, a rather dramatic increase from the 30 delegates present at the August 1883 convention. Growth continued at this pace. By the August 1885 convention, the more than 600 delegates were more than could be handled, and for the first time a limit had to be placed on the number of representatives from each county.10 Thus, as mobilization theorists have stressed, an aggrieved popula­ tion does not automatically participate in a protest movement. Po­ tential participants are rational; they balance the possible benefits against the perceived cost of participation. Strategies that are per­ ceived to be beneficial are crucial if mobilization is to be a success. The momentum gathered by the redirection of the Alliance and its focus on economic cooperative strategies was tremendous. These strategies were generally of two types. First, farmers could look at their plight in terms of the purchasing system, stressing the exces­ sive prices on needed supplies. Second, they could focus on the mar­ keting system, stressing the falling price of cotton and the absorp­ tion of much of the profit of cotton production by the middlemen that stood between the farmer and the consumer. Both types of

54

Rise e) Development of the Texas Farmers Alliance

strategies originated in the pre-1887 period, and both utilized the ever-present latent power of farmers. Latent power is not active power; that is, it is not activated by the routine functioning of the social system. Rather, it is activated by the disruption of that routine functioning or by totally bypassing the existing system. The Alliance leaders were very much aware of the latent power of the farmers and sought to activate it through numerous strategies. These leaders would undoubtedly have disagreed with current state­ ments made by resource mobilization theorists who claim that a negatively privileged population is in a poor position to initiate a protest movement through its own efforts alone. They would also have likely argued against Tilly's notion that balance tilts caused by rapid social change embolden aggrieved populations, allowing them to successfully mobilize and push for reform. The protest strategies of the Alliance were always hypothetically possible; they simply utilized the latent power of the farmers that was ever-present. Any alteration of the balance of power that benefited the Alliance organi­ zation was derived from the creative development of strategies that took into account the latent power of the farmers. Let us now take a closer look at the Alliance strategies of the pre-1887 period.

Economic Strategies THE PURCHASING SYSTEM

The first cooperative attempt to address perceived problems in the purchasing system was the trade agreement arrangement. The county Alliance would appoint a committee to confer with various mer­ chants to see who would furnish the lowest prices in return for a guarantee of the entire county Alliance membership's business. There seemed to be a definite incentive for a merchant to enter into one of these agreements: a trade agreement meant a significant in­ crease in future customers. The decrease in profit per sale could be offset by the increase in sales. To not enter into an agreement meant a possible serious decline in future customers. Many county alli­ ances tried the trade agreement strategy, with some reporting that merchants were actually soliciting Alliance patronage by offering liberal reductions of prices.11 While the trade agreement strategy did marginally improve pur­ chasing conditions for thousands of Alliance farmers—at least tem­ porarily—it was not long before this strategy was termed a failure by key Alliance officials. Although statements concerning the trade agreement strategy were quite abbreviated, there appear to be three

Economic Strategies

55

primary reasons for the limited success of the trade agreement. First, and most important, the trade agreement strategy had little utility for many Alliance members. For those farmers not in debt, the cash terms of their purchases had typically gotten them reasonable prices. The merchants usually competed among themselves for cash cus­ tomers; these customers were crucial to maintaining an adequate cash flow. The indebted farmer, who was forced to buy goods on time, was the one direly in need of economic help, yet the cash terms of the trade agreement made this strategy irrelevant to the in­ debted farmer's needs.12 Second, trade agreements were under constant threat of viola­ tion. Although the agreements stipulated a certain charge above the wholesale cost, in general farmers were uninformed about the whole­ sale price of a given product. Thus, disputes over pricing were inev­ itable. At the 1885 state convention of the Alliance, the county al­ liances were urged to appoint a committee to examine the books of merchants with whom they had trade agreements. If a merchant re­ fused to give the committee access to the account books, then the trade agreement was to be terminated.13 Within six months, key of­ ficials in the Alliance were labeling the trade agreement strategy a failure. Apparently, either many merchants refused to open their ac­ count books, or the account books were opened and Alliance mem­ bers did not like what they saw. Finally, in areas where the Alliance was very strong, a trade agreement with one merchant often meant a serious loss of cash cus­ tomers to other merchants in that town or nearby towns; sometimes the other merchants closed down. The merchant with the trade agreement now had no competition and thus no incentive to keep prices down. The editor of the Rural Citizen was critical of the trade agreement, stating that Alliance members would soon find them­ selves at the mercy of a monopoly they had helped create.14 Flowever, the merchants in the vicinity were not always so pas­ sive. A typical reaction of those merchants hurt by the trade agree­ ment strategy was to pressure the merchant cooperating with the Al­ liance, often through the medium of the wholesaler. Many retail merchants were in debt to wholesalers, so wholesalers had a stake in retail profits. An unprofitable or bankrupt retail store meant that debt payment was unlikely; thus, wholesalers were protective of these stores. When their profitability was threatened, they applied pressure at the source of the threat—in this case, the merchant co­ operating with the Alliance. In many cases, this pressure consisted of refusing future credit. This forced many cooperating merchants to back out of trade agreements.15

56

Rise e) Development of the Texas Farmers Alliance

The relationship between the local retail merchant and the wholesaler was a crucial one, and should be examined in more de­ tail. It played a major role in problems of successfully implementing the trade agreement strategy and other future Alliance strategies. Banks typically would not extend loans to retail merchants who lived too far from the bank's location for it to accurately assess the credit risk. Bank loans were, however, readily given to wholesalers, whose business headquarters generally were in the city. The whole­ salers, in turn, had to extend credit to the retail merchants, if busi­ ness transactions were to be conducted. The local retail merchants simply did not have enough ready cash to run their businesses; with their own limited capital, they could not carry farmers on lien ac­ counts until harvesttime. Without lien accounts, however, many farmers would not be able to make a crop. Thus, the proper func­ tioning of the agricultural order necessitated the wholesaler-retail merchant credit relationship. Given the importance of the wholesalers' credit, local retail merchants had to keep their profits large enough to ensure it. Given the hard times, money was inevitably lost when farmers did not "pay out" at harvesttime. This loss had to be spread to all of the trade; good risks were held responsible for bad ones. One retail mer­ chant who charged a 100 percent markup of the wholesale price for time prices, when asked if this were not excessive, responded that this was not profit in the pockets, only on the books. He then turned the pages of his account book to show his extensive liabilities.16 Many retail merchants, therefore, did not have as prosperous busi­ nesses as one might suspect when noting the interest rates charged on some lien accounts. Indeed, the bankruptcy rates reported in the Monthly Summary of Commerce of the United States for the late 1800s show that retail merchants had one of the highest failure rates of any business.17 Since their profit rate was somewhat insecure, any serious loss of customers—particularly cash customers—could be financially ruinous. An unprofitable or bankrupt retail store meant that debt payment to the wholesaler was unlikely. For this reason, wholesalers were protective of local retail merchants. Thus, an irony emerged that was to plague the Alliance through­ out its existence: the very success of Alliance efforts called forth a reaction from the established structure that dealt the Alliance a se­ rious blow. This triggering of a strong counteraction created a situa­ tion where the Alliance was forced to either create a new strategy to surmount the counteraction, or suffer a decline in membership due to the ineffectiveness of current strategies. This situation has been referred to as "escalation," and a protest movement organization is

Economic Strategies

57

only as successful as it is insightful and creative in its attempts to surmount or circumvent the obstacles created by the existing structure.18 Given the lack of success with the trade agreement strategy, county alliances were encouraged to establish Alliance-owned coop­ erative stores. This strategy was quite different from the trade agree­ ment tactic. The latter was a pressure tactic on the existing supply structure; the former represented an attempt to develop a new sup­ ply structure. The goal of the cooperative stores was to reduce the cost of supplies by eliminating the profits made by the retail mer­ chant. The prices of supplies would be even cheaper than prices un­ der the trade agreement, or so said Alliance organizers; furthermore, there would be no merchants violating the terms of the trade agree­ ment or becoming uncooperative due to pressure. The capitalization features of the various local cooperatives dif­ fered. A local cooperative in Guadalupe County reported that its stock had been divided into $10 shares. No dividends were paid on stock, but one had to own stock in order to buy goods at the store. Goods were sold at cost, with absolutely no profit made. Each quar­ ter, transactions were examined, and if a profit had been made after deducting minimal operating costs, prices were further reduced. This plan was preferred by Guadalupe County Alliance members, who criticized the joint-stock plan that paid dividends to stockholders. Under the joint-stock plan, the stockholder who had only been able to invest $10 had to wait six or twelve months to get his 10 percent annual interest payment of $.50 or $1. It was argued that for these small stockholders, lower prices at the time of purchase would be more helpful.19 This business arrangement did not go unquestioned. One A l­ liance member praised the Guadalupe cooperative store for its "ex­ treme practice of charity," but he questioned its business judgment: I do not believe any business institution built upon such a foundation will be able to stand until the millenium is ushered in. All principles built upon the will of man must more or less conform to the laws governing human nature, and it is against nature for men to give up their hard earned dollars . . . without recompense or special favor. I am sure the farmers of this state could not raise money enough in this plan to run a cross-road candy store.20 From the various newspaper accounts of local cooperative prac­ tices, it is clear that the dividend-paying feature prevailed. The vast majority of the cooperatives did not choose to practice "extreme

58

Rise et) Development of the Texas Farmers Alliance

charity/' This fact illustrates a main source of tension in the Al­ liance organization. Clearly, the Guadalupe County cooperative plan would have resulted in the most significant price reduction on sup­ plies. It was this plan that would have been most helpful to the small stockholders, often the farmers who, while not yet ensnared in the crop-lien system of financing, were tottering on the edge of indebtedness. This plan, however, was not often used. It was be­ lieved that it would not attract the large sums of capital essential to the proper functioning of a retail business. Not all of the potential $io-shareholders would be able to tome up with the money. Some were already ensnared in the crop-lien system and therefore bound to one merchant until their debt was paid. Still others had to buy supplies on credit, and the local cooperatives were all run strictly on a cash basis. For these farmers, a local cooperative store was of no more help than the trade agreements. For farmers who could afford not only $10, but significantly more, without the dividend payments there was no incentive to invest that money in a cooperative. While there might be some who would act altruistically, most would not. Indeed, one county cooperative reported that its stockholders were upset about the poor dividends and demanded a higher return on their investment in the future.21 Thus, out of a sense of economic reality, the cooperatives appealed to the more prosperous farmers by offering dividend payments on stock. These payments clearly added to the cost of the supplies, and consequently prices were not reduced as much as some farmers had hoped. In addition to this limitation, there were numerous localities that were not able to utilize the joint-stock cooperative strategy at all. A certain amount of ready cash was necessary not only to pro­ vide sufficient capital for the stores, but to be able to take advantage of their reduced prices. Since local cooperative stores did not have sufficient capital to carry the farmer and were not likely to receive credit, they had to be run on a cash basis. Attempts to deviate from a cash basis failed. In sum, the cooperative strategies of the early mobilization pe­ riod tended to cater to those farmers whose latent power was most easily activated—that is, those farmers with adequate monetary re­ sources for fighting the existing marketing and purchasing systems, or supplanting them. The cooperative store strategy was primarily beneficial to the least disadvantaged farmers—those who could make cash purchases, with money to spare. Generally, these farmers had either saved sizable sums of money from more prosperous farm­ ing years or had profitable investments outside of farming. Farmers who could only afford the required minimum share of $10 benefited

Economic Strategies

59

significantly less, while farmers ensnared by crop-lien financing did not benefit at all. The Alliance leadership had not yet envisioned a strategy that could effectively attack or bypass the crop-lien system of finance. This is not to say that the joint-stock stores did not play any role in mobilizing Alliance support. These stores reported sales ranging from $5,000 to $36,000 a year, and many claimed that goods were sold at 20 to 30 percent below pre-organization prices.22 Such reports of success did not go unheralded and must have brought a significant number of farmers into the Alliance movement. But where the stores were successfully operated, they soon met the same fate as the trade agreement strategy. Several options were available to merchants in their struggle against the Alliance stores. They could, and often did, cut their cash prices down below the local cooperative stores.23 Any losses the merchants suffered could be compensated for by increasing "time prices." This action not only undermined the Alliance store, but it increased the hardship faced by the farmers en­ snared in the lien system of financing. Thus again, the interest of one group of farmers worked against the interest of another more impoverished group. Another counterattack available to the merchant was to again bring the wholesaler into the struggle. As early as August 1885, A l­ liance members were complaining of wholesaler opposition to their cooperative stores. They complained that wholesalers would not trade with their stores, even for cash. They noted that wholesalers were trying to protect the trade of retailers with whom they had long-term credit relations. If for any reason a wholesaler was tempted to trade with an Alliance store, there was often retaliation on the part of retail merchants. If an alternative wholesaler was available, merchants would band together and boycott the guilty wholesaler.24 Again, Alliance strategies ran afoul of the established business hier­ archy. The Alliance stores were not able to surmount the obstacles created by the existing status quo. The failure of this strategy was heralded in Alliance journals: Reports of local co-operative stores, with few exceptions, do not encourage such ventures. They doubtless can be suc­ cessful, but experience proves they generally are not.25 Members were warned that: Standing amid the wreck of hundreds of co-operative stores and with the fact staring us in the face that twelve out of thir­ teen men fail who engage in merchandising in the south, we would be unfaithful to our trust as the organ of our order did

60

Rise &) Development of the Texas Farmers Alliance

we fail to seriously admonish our brethren to go very slow in this matter, and if they must embark on this exceedingly haz­ ardous business, to do so with very great caution.26 An attempt was made as early as 1885 to circumvent the retail merchant-wholesaler obstacle. Certain purchasing efforts were cen­ tralized by naming William Lamb the Alliance's Traveling Business Agent. Lamb was to represent the entire membership in a bulkpurchasing plan for farm implements and machinery. It was believed that if Alliance purchasing efforts were centralized, thereby making it possible to purchase in bulk, then manufacturers would be w ill­ ing, even eager, to deal directly with the Alliance.27 In this bulkpurchasing plan, both the retail merchant and the wholesaler would be bypassed. The plan, however, had major limitations. The most se­ rious limitation was that most farmers were not able to buy farm implements and machinery for cash, however reduced the price might be, and the manufacturers would only sell such articles on cash terms. A mere three months after the plan was begun, Lamb was lamenting that he could furnish wagons in carloads at very cheap prices, but could not get them on credit.28 Another complaint concerning the Traveling Business Agent program was that, even when goods were purchased cheaply, by the time they were shipped to individual purchasers at the high local freight rates much of the savings had disappeared. Lamb himself stated that the local rates of freight were too high to enable the program to succeed.29 In sum, the idea of escalation is clearly illustrated by the pattern of those Alliance strategies that focused on the purchasing system. The joint-stock cooperative stores were an attempt to bypass retail merchants and thereby surmount the problems faced by the trade agreement strategy. This strategy had necessitated the constant vigi­ lance on the part of Alliance members to ensure that the merchants did not violate the agreement. If the merchants did not allow inspec­ tion of their account books, then there was no way to settle price disputes. Under pressure from the wholesalers, merchants who ini­ tially cooperated with the Alliance often turned quite uncooperative. The cooperative store, too, had its share of problems. One of the most serious of these was the opposition that the farmers faced from wholesalers who refused to trade with them, even for cash. Most wholesalers had long-term credit relationships with the established retail merchants. If these merchants lost significant sums of money due to Alliance competition, wholesalers risked the default of the merchants' debts. One of the earliest attempts of the Alliance to sur­

Economic Strategies

61

mount wholesaler opposition was the creation of the state Traveling Business Agent program. Though limited to the purchasing of farm implements and machinery, this program represented an effort to link the Alliance leadership directly to the manufacturer and there­ by avoid both the retail and the wholesale merchant. Unfortunately, manufacturers would only sell for cash, and most farmers could not make major purchases on cash terms. Thus, each time an Alliance strategy ran into opposition, a new strategy was proposed to surmount the problem. This gave the Al­ liance vitality. Be assured, the attack of the Alliance on the purchas­ ing system did not stop with the measures discussed: one of the most creative and truly significant Alliance strategies was to find ex­ pression in 1887, with the founding of the Alliance Exchange. The Exchange will be discussed in great detail in chapter 6. THE MARKETING SYSTEM

The centers of the cotton trade in the United States were the twenty or so cotton exchanges. The business of these exchanges was con­ ducted by cotton brokers who bought or sold cotton for a flat rate per bale, usually $.50 to $1. Someone who wanted to buy cotton would hire a broker to purchase the cotton, specifying the grade, quantity, and price or price range. Someone who wanted to sell cotton would also hire a broker, informing him of the grade, quantity, and accept­ able price or price range. A process of negotiation would then take place. Only very large crops could be handled through the cotton ex­ changes; therefore, the small farmer could not sell directly to an exchange. The small farmer had two options: to sell to the home merchant or to sell to a cotton factor. The cotton factor purchased from small producers and, after amassing large quantities, resold to a broker at the exchange. Often large cotton factors sent agents to the farms to buy cotton, or set agents up for a few days in small towns to purchase cotton from the farmers in the vicinity. These agents stored the purchased cotton in nearby warehouses and sent grade, quantity, and price information to the big city factor. The factor ne­ gotiated a sale with an exchange broker on the basis of this informa­ tion, and then had the cotton shipped directly from the local ware­ houses to the customer.30 Thus, as an individual the farmer had little leverage in the cot­ ton market. He was more or less at the mercy of his home merchant or the traveling cotton buyer. As early as the August 1884 state Al­

62

Rise &) Development of the Texas Farmers Alliance

liance convention, Alliance members were being encouraged to es­ tablish cotton yards for the purpose of bulking cotton.31 The tactic of bulking was an attempt to give Alliance farmers more leverage in the selling of their cotton crop. Because buying in bulk was conve­ nient, the cotton was to be sold at higher prices, and the farmers act­ ing as a unit were to hold out for these prices. It was hoped that the bulked cotton sales would attract numerous buyers, and thereby in­ troduce competition into the bidding process. County alliances throughout the state enthusiastically em­ braced the bulking strategy, bulking anywhere from 150 to 1,100 bales of cotton for sale. Reports began to circulate of success with the bulking strategy. At one bulked cotton sale, farmers received about $.85 more per bale than the prevailing price. As news of the sale was received, wagons began to crowd all the streets and celebra­ tions began.32 The results of all cotton-bulking attempts were not so pleasing. Some local alliances reported problems with individual Alliance farmers not holding out for better prices and breaking the bulk sale attempt. This seriously undermined the bulking strategy and led to tension and hostility within these local alliances.33 Another problem that many local alliances faced was in attracting buyers to their bulked sales. A sufficient number of bales could not be bulked to at­ tract more than one buyer to the sale. Without competition between buyers, the premium price set on the bulked cotton was often not received.34 Unfortunately, it was often the alliances in the most eco­ nomically distressed localities that faced this problem. Many, if not most, of the Alliance members in these localities had to rely on crop liens. Therefore, at harvest the great bulk of their cotton crop, if not the entire amount, was turned over to the home merchant to cover their debt. This served as a major obstacle to Alliance bulking at­ tempts in these localities. Even the bulking of a large number of bales by a local or county Alliance did not always ensure buyer competition and premium cot­ ton prices. Tarrant County Alliance reported bulking from 900 to 1,100 bales, yet it could find no interested buyers in Fort Worth. The buyers were able to buy all the cotton they needed from individual farmers and did not want to pay a premium price for the bulked cot­ ton.35 This dilemma represented a critical flaw in the local bulking strategy. The local character of the strategy limited its success. The Alliance members still had to negotiate with merchants or factor agents; they had no direct access to the exchange brokers. Yet the merchants or factor agents made their profit by buying at the lowest

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63

possible price from hundreds of small farmers and then bulking and selling through the exchange. As long as they could amass a suffi­ cient quantity of cotton in this fashion, it was not to their advantage to pay a premium price for bulked cotton. The only way an Alliance bulking strategy could work was to go beyond the local level and at­ tempt to either bypass the merchant and factor agent altogether or to successfully mobilize the cotton belt so that the merchant and fac­ tor agent could not get sufficient quantities of cotton through indi­ vidual, nonbulked sales. Once again, the Alliance was hindered by the fact that it had not yet envisioned and implemented a strategy to undermine the croplien system of financing. As noted above, crop-lien financing pre­ vented many farmers from participating in and benefiting from Alliance cotton-bulking attempts. Furthermore, by limiting the number of farmers who could participate in the bulking strategy, crop-lien financing ultimately undermined that strategy—a suffi­ cient amount of cotton could not be bulked to ensure a premium price for Alliance-bulked cotton. The bulking strategy of the post1886 years, which attempted to deal with these obstacles, is dis­ cussed in chapter 6. Another strategy utilized in the Alliance's attack on the mar­ keting system was the building of cooperative mills and gins. In 1885, the Traveling Business Agent for the Alliance, William Lamb, began urging county alliances to set up cooperative mills. He noti­ fied them that he could provide them with a complete line of mill machinery at very reasonable prices. The response was immediate. Flouring and corn mills, as well as cottonseed oil mills and cot­ ton gins, were on the drawing board of numerous county alliances throughout the state. Each time one of these mills or gins opened for business, it was touted as a great achievement for the Alliance. The savings from these mills and gins were claimed to be significant. One sub-alliance reportedly saved its members $15,000 in one year by virtue of owning a cotton gin.36 The enthusiasm for the cooperative mills and gins was to con­ tinue through the late 1880s. As late as 1890, county alliances were still planning such enterprises and obtaining sufficient capital to make the plans a reality.37 If well managed, the flouring and corn mills proved to be successful wherever wheat and corn were grown in sufficient volume. Because wheat and corn were generally not subject to crop liens, Alliance members had control over the pro­ cessing and marketing of these two crops. But, as noted previously, where farmers relied extensively on crop-lien financing, the mer­

64

Rise &) Development of the Texas Farmers Alliance

chant controlled the bulk of the cotton crop—both its processing and marketing. Alliance cotton gins did not fare too well under these circumstances. While the savings resulting from cooperative mills and gins should not be minimized, the mills and gins did not directly address the problem of seriously low crop prices. Furthermore, they did little or nothing to extricate farmers caught up in lien financing. If the growing number of farmers forced to rely on such financing was to be successfully mobilized and their loyalty to the Alliance move­ ment sustained, something more was required.

Alliance Mobilization, 18 77 -18 8 6 Each of the strategies discussed above was initially met with hope and great enthusiasm on the part of the Alliance membership. But the limitations of these strategies were soon recognized, with A l­ liance leaders labeling the trade agreement and joint-stock local cooperatives generally unsuccessful. The limitations of the state business agent program, the local cotton-bulking strategy, and the cooperative mills and gins were also noted. A common limitation of each of these strategies was that they all failed to address the plight of the farmer ensnared in the crop-lien system of financing. None of these strategies allowed the farmer to make a crop independent of the merchant. Thus, significant numbers of farmers were still faced with extremely high "time prices." The Alliance attack on the pur­ chasing and marketing systems was of little or no economic benefit to them. A major contention of the mobilization perspective on protest movements is that for such movements to be successful, effective strategies must be implemented. Yet despite the limitations on the strategies noted in this chapter, the Alliance was still able to grow in membership from approximately 5,000 in 1883 to 75,000 members in August 1886.38 In his well-known account of the Alliance move­ ment, Goodwyn attributes the rapid mobilization of this early pe­ riod in large part to the economic strategies of the Alliance. After noting the dramatic increase in membership from 1884 to 1885, he states: The rise of the Alliance was a direct result of its determination to go beyond the cash stores of the Grange and make pioneer­ ing efforts in cooperative marketing as well as purchasing.39

Alliance Mobilization

65

However, the contention that the economic strategies of the Al­ liance in the pre-1887 period were new and innovative is not well founded. The cooperative strategies of this period were similar to those used earlier by the Grange. The similarity left one Alliance member puzzled: Why is it the Alliance is following very nearly the old paths of the Grange? First we organized as did the Grange and then we seek relief through a trade house. Both adventures were a fail­ ure in this particular. I notice the Alliances in many parts of the state . . . are forming co-operative stores. So did the Grange. . . .40 Indeed, over 150 local cooperative stores had been established by the Grange and bulk marketing of the cotton crop of the Grange membership was encouraged.41 In 1875, a leading Grange official noted that "cooperative buying and selling seems to absorb the at­ tention [of the members] to the exclusion of everything else." Rankand-file Grangers agreed with this observation, reporting that "finan­ cial cooperation" was the most important factor in the growth of the Grange.42 In fact, many of the problems faced by the Grange in executing its cooperative plans foreshadowed the problems of the Alliance. For example, Grangers complained that merchants were trying to undermine the cooperative stores by temporarily cutting prices. In some cases, merchants banded together, each selling one staple at below cost until the Grange store failed. The merchants also put pressure on wholesalers not to trade with Grange stores; they feared that they would lose a large number of cash customers if these stores were successful. The loss of cash customers could have a critical im­ pact on their cash flow and jeopardize their debt payment to the wholesaler. Thus, wholesalers acted to protect the merchants with whom they had established business relationships, resulting in an uncooperative stance toward the fledgling Grange stores.43 Grange marketing strategies were at times grandiose. In 1875, the Texas Grange petitioned the state legislature for a special charter for shipping bulked cotton directly to England. The legislature re­ fused to grant the charter, and the matter was finally dropped. The bulked cotton strategy that was implemented was said to have saved Grangers $27,750 on commission rate reductions alone in 1883.44 Two important points are illustrated by comparison between the early Alliance and the Grange: the important influence of affec­

66

Rise &) Development of the Texas Farmers Alliance

tive factors on protest strategy selection, and the important role of protest ideology in protest movement growth. In regard to the first point, mobilization theorists must be careful not to adopt a superrational analysis of protest movements. The behavior of movement participants can be influenced by affective factors. During the early mobilization period of the Alliance movement, its membership could have employed political pressure tactics or pressure tactics and counterinstitutional strategies in the economic sphere. The "strictly busi­ ness" advocates within the Alliance were adamant that economic self-help strategies should be the sole focus of the Alliance. Since the pre-1887 strategies that they supported had all been implemented by the Grange with little economic relief forthcoming, their advocacy of these strategies cannot be labeled as unqualifiedly rational; affec­ tive factors influenced their selection of protest strategies. Farmers still emotionally moved by the experiences of the Civil War were likely to be reluctant to employ politically insurgent tactics that might threaten the unity of the Democratic party. A second major point illustrated by a comparison between the early Alliance and the Grange is the importance of protest ideology to protest movement growth. Despite the similarities between the early Alliance cooperative efforts and the cooperative strategies of the Grange, the Alliance was much more successful at mobilizing the Texas farmers. At its height, the Grange numbered less than 40,000. This membership fell dramatically in the early to mid-i88os; by January 1887, the Grange numbered less than 9,000. A Grange organizer wrote: "Where I have been at work, the Grange is to some extent overshadowed by the Alliance and I have done what I could."45 Just why was the Alliance so much more successful than the Grange? The answer lies in the fact that in its organizing attempts the Alliance couched its call for cooperative strategies in a politicaleconomic framework. Alliance organizer S. O. Daws warned that "the capitalists have bought and are controlling through the princi­ pal avenues of intelligence, the perceptions of trade, commerce, and finance in this country." By controlling the channels of information, "the capitalist holds your confidence with one hand, while with the other he rifles your pocket." Daws called on farmers to organize and educate themselves on political and economic matters in order to protect themselves. The atomized farmer had remained vulnerable for too long and the consequences had been disastrous. Alliance organizers and lecturers also spoke of the political dangers of cen­ tralized wealth. The holders of such wealth lobbied to secure legisla­ tion favoring their special interests with no regard for the public

The Alliance et) Politics

67

good. Farmers could control or counteract this power only if they themselves united.46 Contrast this political-economic ideology espoused by Alliance organizers to the following press release by A. J. Rose, the Worthy Master of the Texas State Grange: The Grange educates farmers that the improvement of their condition is . . . not to be compassed by revolutionary meth­ ods, nor by opposing or abusing other classes. It rather endeav­ ors to educate them in the idea that they can best improve the condition of agriculture by first improving themselves. The Grange recognizes that the merchant, banker, lawyer, journal­ ist, doctor, etc., are all as necessary as the farmer to constitute the completed organization of society.47 The self-help strategies of the Grange, cloaked as they were in a rather anemic political-economic analysis, were not able to generate the momentum necessary for a mass protest movement. The A l­ liance cooperative program, so similar to that of the Grange, but cloaked in a more radical movement ideology, did succeed in gener­ ating such momentum. This illustrates that protest ideology can be a critical resource in the mobilization process. While stressed by the Marxian variant of mobilization theory, it is a resource that is neglected by resource mo­ bilization theorists. For example, in From Mobilization to Revolu­ tion, Tilly develops a framework for analyzing protest movement de­ velopment: explicit mention of the importance of protest ideology to development only occurs twice. The experience of the Alliance, however, clearly shows that the ideology adopted by a protest orga­ nization can be critical to the growth of that organization. Thus, fu­ ture researchers in the resource mobilization perspective should be sensitive to the role of protest ideology in protest movement develop­ ment. Let us now turn to a closer examination of the Alliance's pro­ test ideology during its early period of rapid mobilization.

The Alliance and Politics, Pre-1887 A challenge was made by Alliance organizers like Daws for the farm­ ers to organize for the purpose of studying and discussing politicaleconomic matters. Many local alliances were formed in response to this challenge. One early Alliance recruit wrote:

68

Rise &) Development of the Texas Farmers Alliance

Methinks I see a grand future for the Alliance. The people have become convinced that there is something wrong with the machinery of the government and they are studying to find a remedy for the wrongs.48 This same recruit stressed that the monopolies were "sapping the life-blood" from the people. Another Alliance member argued that the conflict of the times was between capital and labor, with both the old parties taking the side of capital. He urged Alliance members to discuss political is­ sues in their local and county alliances and then establish political opinions. These political opinions should thereafter guide Alliance members' actions. Principle was to be put before party. Various county and local alliances endorsed this stance.49 Such political pronouncements were disturbing to Alliance out­ siders. Warning the Alliance to stay clear of politics, the Comanche Town and Country editor stated that if the Alliance could solve "the two questions of how to raise the largest crop at the least expense and how to sell them at the greatest profit, they will have all that one organization can attend to at home."50The editor of the Overton Sharp Shooter advised Alliance members that "the further you keep from politics, the better it will be for your order." The editor re­ minded the Alliance that its major objective should be to help the farmer economically.51 Such cautionary statements were not without echo within the Alliance membership itself. Aware of the growing political insur­ gency, the vice president of the Alliance argued that the leading aim of the Alliance was to bring the farmer face to face, or as near as pos­ sible, with the consumer of his product. Politics would only serve to undermine this aim.52 The editor of the Rural Citizen, the state A l­ liance mouthpiece, became increasingly conservative. In 1885 he had written that one of the purposes of the Alliance was to educate the farmer politically so that he would vote wisely. Within a year, this same editor, clearly threatened by the tone of the growing po­ litical insurgency, was advocating an antipolitical stance. The follow­ ing comment received the full endorsement of the Rural Citizen's editor: Here let me ask what the mass of its [the Alliance] members are going to gain from politics even if you should elect your ticket? . . . How much would your financial state be bettered? Does not the whole history of politics teach you that your corn, wheat, oats and cotton would not sell for a cent more? and that goods could not be purchased one cent cheaper?53

The Alliance &) Politics

69

But the political insurgency was not to be quelled. This was at least in part due to the tenacity and growing severity of the agri­ cultural depression. In 1885, the price of cotton fell to a mere $.085 per pound. Given that, for many farmers, the production cost was $.08 per pound, the situation was dire. The cotton farmer had had enough and, urged on by the Alliance movement ideology, became increasingly ready to revolt. Clearly, something was wrong, and farmers were intently listening to the political diagnosis of Alliance organizers like Daws. Thus, the presence of intense deprivation played an important role in the mobilization process of the Alliance. That is not to say, as have some structural strain theorists, that deprivation or discontent alone explains the emergence and successful mobilization of protest organizations like the Alliance. It is clear that other factors such as strategy selection and protest ideology played major roles in Al­ liance mobilization. But deprivation was one of the factors affecting the willingness of farmers to join the Alliance and be politicized. A l­ though ignored by most resource mobilization theorists, deprivation is one of many factors that affect the intuitive cost-benefit analysis conducted by potential protest movement participants. When de­ privation is intense, and perhaps even increasing, potential partici­ pants will tend to accept greater hardship due to protest movement participation if the strategies of that movement are perceived to be viable. If deprivation is not severe, or is perceived to be temporary, there is less likelihood that key persons will be motivated to organize a protest organization, or that the aggrieved population will take the risks or accept the costs of participating in such an organization. The political insurgency in the Alliance was not only fostered by the increased deprivation of the farmers, but also by the problems faced in the cooperative, self-help efforts. Many farmers who could not participate directly in the cooperative efforts because they were tied to the crop-lien financing system still knew of the difficulties faced in these efforts and were thereby politicized. The political di­ agnosis of Alliance organizers did not remain vulnerably abstract; it was reinforced by the example of opposition to the Alliance coop­ erative efforts. In their history of the Alliance, Garvin and Daws noted that cases of opposition were a benefit and a great blessing in every way, for they brought the farmers face to face with the evils and wrongs that stand opposed to their interests in marketing their produce. The efforts on the part of enemies of the Al­ liance in some of the markets to break the combination of the

70

Rise &) Development of the Texas Farmers Alliance

farmers have done so much good for the Order as any one thing. It taught them who and where the enemies of their in­ terests were and in what manner their opposition was manifested.54 The tensions between the political insurgents and political con­ servatives developed into a major confrontation in 1886. The back­ drop against which this confrontation emerged was the Great South­ western Strike initiated by the Knights of Labor. The Knights of Labor had reached a peak in power in 1885, when they won a rever­ sal of a wage reduction from the notorious Gould railroad lines. Shortly thereafter, the union mushroomed to include almost half of the nonfarming laborers in Texas.55 However, in 1886, Jay Gould and company moved to destroy the union. About seventy-five temporary men had been hired to help complete a project; when the project was completed, instead of terminating the temporary help, the manage­ ment fired old employees who had been prominent in the 1885 strike. They also fired a leading Knights of Labor official who had asked, and been granted, permission to attend a three-day district conference of the Knights of Labor. The excuse for his firing was that he was absent from his work duties when he was needed.56 The conditions leading to the strike represented to many Al­ liance members a clear example of the exploitation of the laborer and his victimization at the hands of monopoly capital. Key Alliance members like William Lamb were supportive of the Knights of Labor and their attempt at self-protection. Similarities between the plight of the urban laborer and the farmer were emphasized. Thus, when the Knights of Labor asked for Alliance support of their boycott of goods shipped over the lines involved in the labor dispute, some county alliances were quick to respond. The Dallas County Alliance resolved to support the Knights of Labor boycott. Its formal resolu­ tion was a clear expression of the growing political insurgency within the Alliance: Whereas, The great mass of laborers are organized . . . for self protection against monopolies and soulless corporations linked and banded together to deprive honest labor of the just fruits of its toil, and Whereas, Laborers and producers are organized under various names such as Grangers, Knights of Labor, Farmers Alliance, and many other names; and Whereas, Their interests are closely aligned together, and they should therefore work together whenever and wherever they can, and not allow themselves to abuse each other, and

The Alliance e) Politics

71

Whereas, We believe the present boycott to be honorable and efficient in a fight between the producer and the grinding mo­ nopolistic companies and firms who ignore the just demands and rights of labor and refuse to submit to arbitration, thereby forcing upon themselves the inevitable boycott—the best, most efficient, and most just weapon of defense of organized labor,Resolved, That we, the Dallas County Farmers Alliance, hereby pledge ourselves to join the Knights of Labor in main­ taining and carrying on a just and reasonable boycott.57 This resolution was soon followed by another in which the Dallas County Alliance stated that the present labor troubles were an out­ growth of class legislation, and in the future, county Alliance mem­ bers would require a pledge to repeal such legislation from officeseekers whom they supported. This political insurgency was alarming to political conserva­ tives in the Alliance and an intense debate over the boycott activity ensued. The editor of the Rural Citizen, f. N. Rogers, strongly op­ posed the Knights of Labor strike and was even more strongly op­ posed to Alliance support of the boycott. He argued that it trampled the fundamental principles of liberty, law, and order. By boycotting, the Knights of Labor were as guilty in his eyes of tyranny as were the railroad corporations.58In regard to the conflict between the strikers and strikebreakers, Rogers claimed that "it is a dog in the manger pol­ icy which says I won't work and you shan't."59 Rogers also wrote at length of the conflict of interest between the farmers and the Knights of Labor. He argued that the Knights' demand for an eight-hour work day would significantly increase the price of commodities, since fixed capital would not be employed for 20 percent of the time previ­ ously employed. The demand for higher wages would also increase prices. He estimated an overall price increase of about 20 to 30 per­ cent. Wholesalers and merchants simply increased their prices to protect their profit margin, but farmers could not pass the buck. Thus, a very heavy burden would be placed on the already hardpressed farmer.60 William Lamb argued most cogently against Rogers' position. He defended the boycott strategy, arguing that it was a crucial de­ fense strategy for both urban laborers and for the farmer. Utilizing his experience as the state Alliance Traveling Business Agent, he noted that already many manufacturers were refusing to trade with the Alliance except through their established wholesale and retail agents. Faced with such a situation, what leverage did the Alliance

72

Rise &) Development of the Texas Farmers Alliance

have to get the manufacturer to trade directly with the Alliance? His answer: boycotting. Without boycotting, economic cooperative at­ tempts would be successfully undermined. Successful boycotting called for large numbers of boycott participants. The large member­ ship of the Knights of Labor, approximately 500,000, would ensure such success. To get the Knights of Labor support of Alliance strate­ gies, the Alliance needed to support the Knights in their present struggle. The debate continued, with some county alliances siding with Rogers and others with Lamb. A fight concerning organizational pol­ icy was in full swing. The Great Southwestern Strike finally ended in May. The members of the union were destitute and the union it­ self seriously weakened, but the issues brought forth still remained and were being adamantly discussed in the local and county al­ liances. During this time, the Alliance membership grew from 55,000 in early 1886 to 75,000 in August of that year.61 Clearly, the political insurgency debate was not hurting the Alliance's recruit­ ment efforts. The discussion of the Knights' struggle also had a posi­ tive function, in that it provided an opportunity for the Alliance membership to gain some awareness of an underlying unity with the urban proletariat. That some farmers did indeed grasp that unity is evident from resolutions such as those by the Dallas County Al­ liance during the Knights of Labor strike. When in later years the Texas People's party tried to form a coalition of urban and rural populations that would enable it to implement reforms proposed by protest organizations like the Alliance, the awareness of such unity was a valuable resource. The August 1886 state Alliance convention opened in Cleburne amidst much excitement and uncertainty about the "Alliance in politics." Actually, the struggle in the Alliance was not simply be­ tween those advocating political action and those advocating eco­ nomic action: the former advocates wanted both political and eco­ nomic actions. Both were seen as essential actions to helping the farmer improve his financial standing. The latter advocates wanted to define the Alliance as a purely business organization, with no in­ volvement in political matters. The Cleburne convention was the battleground on which these two groups fought for control over the direction the Alliance was to take. At this convention, a committee of seven was appointed to for­ mulate a statement of grievances. However, this committee went beyond a mere listing of grievances. It demanded specific legislative action in regard to stated grievances. The demands sought "such leg­

The Alliance &) Politics

73

islation as shall secure to our people freedom from the onerous and shameful abuses that the industrial classes are now suffering at the hands of arrogant capitalists and powerful corporations." Since they represent the first major document of Alliance political insurgency the Cleburne Demands warrant close attention.62 Five of the Cleburne Demands were related to the labor issues that had been highlighted by the Knights of Labor strike. It was de­ manded that (i ) the government recognize the legality of organiza­ tions formed by the industrial classes to improve their economic condition; (2) the government establish a national bureau of labor statistics to keep tabs on the condition of the laboring masses; (3) the government force corporations to pay their employees in lawful money, not, for example, in credit at the company store; and (4) the practice of convict leasing to private employers be stopped. The final labor plank was more of a suggestion than a demand; it called for a national conference of all labor organizations to discuss the plight of the laborer. Several of the remaining planks addressed agrarian grievances concerning governmental land policy. By 1886, the existing policy had seriously reduced the amount of affordable land available to homesteaders. The railroads had been given 179 million acres of land by the federal and state governments, and speculators in general had engrossed huge tracts of land.63 The Cleburne Demands called for all land held for speculative purposes to be taxed at "such rates as they are offered to purchasers"—in other words, a higher tax rate. It was furthermore demanded that any forfeited land immediately be opened for sale by the government to actual settlers in tracts not ex­ ceeding 320 acres per settler. Addressing the issue of foreign land speculators, the Cleburne Demands insisted that steps be taken to prevent aliens from acquiring title to U.S. land and to force titles al­ ready held by aliens to be relinquished for sale to actual settlers and to U.S. citizens. In respect to railroad reform, the Cleburne Demands pressed for the passage of an interstate commerce law that would secure "rea­ sonable" rates of freight. These rates should then apply "to all per­ sons for the same kind of commodities according to the distance of the haul, without regard to amount of shipments." That is to say, the interstate commerce law should prohibit rebates to select custom­ ers. It was also demanded that this law prohibit pooling arrange­ ments between railroad lines to shut off competition. The most controversial of the Cleburne Demands related to monetary reform. With crop prices declining, more and more farm­

74

Rise e) Development of the Texas Farmers Alliance

ers were plagued by debt. With each passing year, more of them were ensnared in the crop-lien system of financing. Significant relief was believed possible by an expansion of the existing currency supply. To address the immediate problem of currency contraction, the committee of seven at Cleburne proposed a purposefully inflation­ ary measure: the "rapid extinguishment of the public debt of the United States, by operating the mints to their fullest capacity in coin­ ing silver and gold." The Cleburne Demands also called for a re­ vamping of the entire monetary system. Specifically, the Alliance demanded that the government establish a federally administered banking system that would ensure adequate currency supply. The federal government would issue legal tender treasury notes based on a predetermined per capita circulation total. Thus, circulation would be increased as the population of the country expanded. This federally administered treasury-note plan was to substitute for the existing national banking system that gave tremendous powers to private financiers to expand or contract the currency supply at will. The controversy of the monetary reform demands stemmed from the fact that they would thrust the Alliance movement into the middle of a hotly debated monetary issue that had occupied the country's attention since the close of the Civil War. During the war, the nation had gone off the gold standard to relieve the financial drain the war had imposed on the treasury. The Treasury Depart­ ment regarded the abandonment of the gold standard as a temporary, emergency measure that would be corrected as soon as possible fol­ lowing the cessation of the war. However, in 1865 the resumption of the gold standard was hotly debated, with opinions varying widely on the proper course to take in regard to the currency system. There were the "hard-money" advocates who were wedded to the orthodox belief that currency must be backed by metal. The bimetallist wanted both gold and silver to serve as legal tender. The mono­ metallist insisted that the use of both gold and silver was infeasible and that, forced to choose between the two metals, gold was pre­ ferred, since its value had proven more stable over time than silver.64 Finally, there were the fiatists, or Greenbackers, who argued that a metallic-based currency was not essential and that the amount of currency in circulation should be dictated by the needs of the coun­ try, not the availability of gold and silver. The debate raged among these opinion groups, with the mono­ metallists securing at least a partial victory with the passage in 1875 of the Specie Resumption Act, the purpose of which was to begin retiring greenbacks from circulation in order to put the nation back on a gold standard. By the summer of 1875, the currency was con­

The Alliance &) Politics

75

tracted by $13 million.65 Given the economic recession accompany­ ing the currency contraction, the debate concerning the currency system continued strongly. So, in 1886, at the Cleburne convention, the Texas Alliance was confronted with whether or not to take a decided stance on the cur­ rency controversy. The grievance committee formed at this conven­ tion responded affirmatively and proposed platform planks endors­ ing, interestingly, both hard-money bimetallism and fiatism. Its motive seems to have been to appeal to any and all dissident groups that were demanding an increase in the currency supply. The griev­ ance committee obviously felt that while a bimetallic standard might ease the contracted money supply to a certain extent, signifi­ cant relief necessitated a fiat money supply. The Cleburne grievance committee's stand on monetary re­ form, if endorsed, was one that assured the Texas Alliance of politi­ cal feuds with the Democratic party. The Democratic party, at both state and national levels, had been torn by Greenbackism in the past. In the Texas gubernatorial elections of 1882 and 1884, the Greenback party candidate had captured 40 percent and 27 percent of the vote, respectively. Democratic loyalists within the Alliance were very worried that endorsement of the grievance committee's report could eventually lead to another, even stronger, third-party challenge. Thus, when the Cleburne Demands were finally presented to the convention—some charged that a small minority of delegates had used every parliamentary tactic to prevent their presentation—a bitter debate broke out. The final vote was 92 to 75 in favor of the demands. The political insurgents had won. They won on another point, too. The Rural Citizen was stripped of its title as the state A l­ liance organ. The new mouthpiece was to be the Southern Mercury, an antimonopoly paper that had been sympathetic to the Knights of Labor.66 A minority faction of the Alliance issued a dissenting report condemning the political tone of the Cleburne Demands and the sacrifice of the original purity of the order as a "social, moral, educa­ tional, and financial fraternity." Those signing the minority report began maneuvers to establish a rival Alliance organization. Once again, political insurgency had created a serious schism in the Alliance. In his account of the Alliance movement, Michael Schwartz argues that, in order to take advantage of the position of the large planters in the political power structure, the Alliance orga­ nization tailored the Cleburne Demands to the needs of the planters. By such tailoring, the Alliance leadership hoped to unite the power­

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Rise e) Development of the Texas Farmers Alliance

ful planters with yeoman and tenant farmers under the banner of fighting finance and industrial capitalism. In Schwartz's analysis, the Cleburne Demands were a turning point for the Alliance organi­ zation, because as planters became more involved in the Alliance, an oligarchy crystallized. Planters with class interests different from those of yeoman and tenant farmers soon dominated leadership roles, and the Alliance organization became less and less sensitive to the need to formulate strategies that addressed the plight of the yeo­ man and tenant farmers. Schwartz's interpretation of the Cleburne Demands can be faulted on several grounds. First, contrary to his argument, the Al­ liance did not become less sensitive to the needs of the yeoman and tenant farmers. In fact, the exact reverse is true. Before the Cleburne convention, the Alliance had failed to address the plight of the many tenant and small yeoman farmers who had to depend on crop-lien financing. It was not until after the convention that the Alliance fi­ nally devised and implemented strategies that attempted to address the needs of these farmers; these strategies will be discussed at length in later chapters. Second, one might question Schwartz's con­ tention that the Cleburne Demands, particularly those relating to railroad reform, were directed toward attracting the support of large planters. It is true that tenant and yeoman farmers had little to gain from railroad reform, since, as noted earlier, the amount of cotton they had to market was not large enough for them to ever ship di­ rectly to a buyer by rail. Flowever, one should not infer from this fact that the railroad reform planks were directed solely toward attract­ ing the support of large planters who did have direct dealings with the railroads. Such an inference ignores the highlighting of the rail­ road reform issue by the Knights of Labor-Alliance struggle that had dominated the news reporting in the Alliance-endorsed newspaper the Rural Citizen in the period immediately preceding the Cleburne convention. Finally, one can question the argument that the Cle­ burne Demands were meant to entice the support of large planters who had political power within the Democratic party. Given the controversial monetary planks of the Cleburne Demands, this inter­ pretation is suspect. Democratic loyalists were not likely to be won over by the endorsement of Greenbackism or fiatism. Such an en­ dorsement more likely threatened their interests. In the 1882 Texas gubernatorial elections, a Greenback third-party revolt had success­ fully garnered 40 percent of the vote. For the first time since the Civil War, the solid Democratic voting bloc had cracked. Thus, under­ standably, Greenbackism was feared by Democratic power holders.

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The schism in the Alliance that occurred at the Cleburne con­ vention illustrates well that the obstacles facing successful mobi­ lization are many. First, agreement must be obtained about which protest strategies to utilize. Protest strategies are not a given; they are highly debatable and can lead to organizational failure even be­ fore they are implemented. Second, such strategies must either bring significant benefit or be cloaked in a protest ideology that explains their failure in a way that generates momentum for a new strategy to surmount or bypass the obstacles that faced the previous strategies. It is clear that structural strain alone is no guarantee of the growth of a protest movement.

6. Creative Escalation, 1887-1891

The rift in the Alliance created by the issue of political insurgency was temporary. The president of the state Alliance, Andrew Dunlap, issued a call for all officers and committee members of the regular state Alliance to meet with those of the new state Alliance in No­ vember of 1886. At this meeting, it was agreed that the new Alliance organization would be held in abeyance until another state conven­ tion could be called to act upon the ideological differences between the political insurgents and noninsurgents. The delegates to this convention were to discuss with their fellow Alliance members the political stances taken at the Cleburne convention and be ready to vote the feelings of the majority. With this course agreed upon, Dunlap—a "strictly business" sympathizer—resigned and the chairman of the state Executive Com­ mittee, C. W. Macune, assumed the powers of president pro tem.1 Macune was to become the chief tactician of the Alliance. He was a master of the art of escalation, responding to movement obstacles in most innovative ways. He was first to illustrate his organizational skills by unifying the Alliance after the Cleburne rift. He set the date for the special convention for January 1887. About 500 dele­ gates attended, and a stormy time seemed imminent. Harmony pre­ vailed, however, because of the enthusiasm engendered by Macune's opening address. Macune acutely realized that the past local efforts at economic cooperation of the Alliance were seriously limited in their benefits. A single town or county could not initiate a move that could significantly affect either the purchasing or marketing system. Macune proposed a central, statewide Alliance Exchange that would both coordinate the marketing of the cotton crop of the entire A l­ liance membership and act as a central purchasing house. In addi­ tion to outlining the plans for establishing this Exchange, Macune spoke of the need to unite the entire cotton belt in an attempt to

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combat the existing marketing and financial monopolies. Macune argued that these monopolies were so powerful that interstate unity among the farmers was necessary. Toward this end, a merger with the Louisiana Farmers Union was proposed and subsequently ap­ proved by the convention. A new organization had been established, the National Farmers Alliance and Cooperative Union.2 A euphoric atmosphere had been created by Macune's proposal. The Alliance had taken a new direction in its economic strategies and was to be national in scope. The "strictly business" Alliance members were pacified, and so were the political insurgents, because the Cleburne Demands were reaffirmed. This time not one dissent­ ing vote was cast.3 The "strictly business" advocates were evidently willing to remain silent in their opposition as long as they believed that economic strategies would dominate the movement. Their ob­ jection to the Cleburne Demands was suppressed in the face of the new economic strategies that Macune had proposed. Remember that a similar rift among the Alliance membership had occurred in the original Lampasas County Alliance and had re­ sulted in the demobilization of that organization. The fact that a re­ occurrence of the rift in 1887 did not result in demobilization, and actually was followed by a significant growth in membership, is worthy of comment. In 1877, the time of the Lampasas crisis, the Alliance had no strategy focus. In fact, most Alliance activity con­ sisted of talk about what should or should not be done. Such initial stages of movement development are highly vulnerable to conflict. There are no viable strategies to bind movement participants to­ gether despite differences on other fronts. By 1887, the Alliance had experienced several years of strategy implementation and strategy escalation. When the rift reoccurred between the politically oriented and the "strictly business" factions of the Alliance, a common bond had fortunately been forged. The politically oriented faction wanted both political and economic action; both types of action were viewed as viable and necessary to help the economically distressed farmer. The "strictly business" faction wanted the Alliance to focus solely on economic self-help strategies and to steer clear of politics. To heal the rift between these two factions, Macune wisely focused on their common denominator: the belief that economic action was impor­ tant. The presence of such a strong common denominator is an in­ valuable resource to any protest organization in handling the prob­ lems that emerge as a result of strategy disagreements or ideological clashes within the organization.

80

Creative Escalation

The Texas Alliance Exchange Local cooperative attempts had met with much opposition from both wholesale and retail merchants. The statewide Alliance Ex­ change plan proposed to deal with this opposition by bypassing both types of merchants and trading directly with the manufacturers; creative escalation had occurred once again. With this escalation, not only were obstacles created by the merchant to be avoided, but larger sums of money were to be saved than were ever hoped for with local cooperative attempts. Alliance leaders spoke of the "vast mil­ lions of dollars that are being paid annually by Southern farmers to feed, clothe, and keep in good style an army of men that farmers could do very well without." It was noted that 40,000 wagons were sold annually in Texas at an average cost to the farmer of $80. If bought directly from the factories, a wagon would cost only $60. An $800,000 profit was thus made by unneeded middlemen on just one product. The self-binder sold for $335 in Dallas, yet one of its manu­ facturers said it cost a mere $57 to produce. Sulky plows, for which the farmer paid $65, cost only $20 at the factory, plus $5 shipping. The Alliance leaders claimed that, overall, 25 percent, or $6.25 mil­ lion, could be saved on the $25 million spent annually in Texas on farm implements and machinery. The bulk purchasing plans also in­ cluded the purchase of nonperishable food items at substantial sav­ ings to the farmer.4 The purchasing system was not the sole target of the A lli­ ance Exchange plan; the entire marketing system was to be shortcircuited. In the past, cotton farmers had been forced to sell to mer­ chants or factor agents, who amassed large numbers of bales and stored them in various local warehouses. Quantity, grade, and price information were then sent along with crop samples to an exchange broker. After a sale was negotiated, the cotton was shipped from the local warehouses directly to the customer. This eliminated the great expense of shipping to the cotton exchange and then reshipping to the customer. The small farmer could not sell directly to the ex­ change broker because only very large crops were handled by these brokers. Local Alliance bulking attempts were not able to bypass this marketing structure. It was still necessary to sell at some sec­ ondary point to a cotton factor. Although at times certain local or county alliances had succeeded in amassing a large number of bales, they were not established suppliers, and did not have any capital to back sales contracts. Therefore, they could not simply send price, quantity, and grade information or samples to the exchange broker. If they wished to sell directly to the cotton exchange, they had to

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ship their entire crop to the exchange market. This was quite expen­ sive; the cost of such a move could more than wipe out any profit. This weakness of local bulking attempts was to be overcome by the state Alliance Exchange marketing program. In the Alliance Exchange marketing program, county business agents working through an Alliance cotton yard were to gather samples of each bale in separate packages, and place tickets in them stating yard number, weight, and grade. When twenty-five or more samples had been accumulated, they were to be sent to the Alliance Exchange. There they would be displayed in a sample room where buyers could examine them. In this fashion, the Alliance Exchange was to perform the function of both the cotton factor and the cotton exchange broker, all for a mere $.25 per bale.5 The proposed Alliance Exchange was an ambitious attempt to establish a counterstructure. It was to provide an alternative market­ ing and purchasing system that promised the hard-pressed farmer greater economic returns for his hard work. The details of the Ex­ change plan are a vivid contrast to the contention of structural strain theorists that protest movements are irrational, or at least nonrational, responses to strain. The Exchange plan was a systematically developed means to a clearly specified end—the economic better­ ment of the farmer. In no way could participation in the Exchange program be said to be either irrational or nonrational. To make the Exchange plan a reality, the verbal support of the farmers had to be translated into financial support. If direct trade links were to be made with manufacturers, adequate capitalization of the Exchange was crucial. Large sums of money were needed to underwrite purchasing contracts properly. The total capitalization of the Exchange was placed at $500,000. To raise this amount, each Al­ liance member was asked to pay a $2 Exchange assessment. Mean­ while, a charter was secured and several cities were vying for the location of the Exchange. Dallas was eventually chosen in considera­ tion of a $10,000 conditional cash subsidy, a city lot for future build­ ings, and other special inducements.6 The assessments had barely begun to trickle in when the Exchange opened its doors for business in September of 1887. Since harvesttime was close at hand, the Exchange concentrated on its marketing program. County agents from all over the state began sending cotton samples from their Alliance cotton yards to the Exchange. Cotton buyers visiting the Exchange sample room were sufficiently impressed. In one large transaction, 1,500 bales of cotton were selected from the samples sent to Dallas, and bales were shipped to England, France, and Germany from twenty-two different

82

Creative Escalation

cotton yards in Texas.7 Such successes were reported in Exchange circulars and Alliance farmers were quite proud of their Exchange. There was a serious limitation, however, to the Exchange mar­ keting program, a limitation that had characterized Alliance strate­ gies from the beginning. The marketing program was of no help to farmers who were tied to the crop-lien system of finance. The busi­ ness manager of the Exchange, Macune, was sensitive to the fact that Alliance strategies had not addressed the plight of those farmers most in need. If the widespread mobilization and then continued participation of this group were wanted, innovative strategies were needed. Macune addressed this need by proposing a joint-note pro­ gram that was unprecedented in the long history of agricultural pro­ test. One Alliance member noted that the Alliance was brought to "the highest pitch of excitement in contemplation of abolishing the awful credit system which is a veritable millstone about the neck of the improvident farmer." He added that there was "the most hopeful and enthusiastic spirit possible to imagine, amounting to almost a universal conviction that financial salvation was come."8 Under the joint-note plan, the members of the various local al­ liances who depended on liens were to collectively estimate their supply needs for the year. They were then to make a joint note for the total sum, pledging cotton worth at least three times the amount of credit requested. Each signer, and there were typically from eight to forty signers, was to specify the number of acres cultivated in cot­ ton and grain, and the value of his livestock. The joint note was then sent to the county business agent along with the order for supplies. The county agent scrutinized the note and, if acceptable, signed and forwarded it to Exchange headquarters. There the note was again ex­ amined by an acceptance committee comprised of the secretary of the Exchange and two of its directors. This committee gave final au­ thorization for Macune, the business manager of the Exchange, to make transactions with the local organization. Relief seemed immi­ nent for the poor Alliance farmers who had been ensnared in the lien system of financing. Under this joint-note program, there were to be no "time prices"; this fact alone could mean significant savings to the farmer. In addition, the interest charge on the credit was only i percent per month from the date of shipment until the date of payment.9 The elaborate Exchange marketing and purchasing strategies clearly relied on a grass-roots organizational network. This fact count­ ers the argument made by Piven and Cloward in their well-known work on protest movements.10Taking a decidedly anti-organizational stance, they argue that protest organizations are of little or no use to

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an aggrieved population seeking ameliorative reforms. Their strat­ egy recommendation is simply to take to the streets and create tur­ bulence. However, implicit in such a recommendation is the fact that the demand for change be left general and unspecified. There is no organizational network by which the aggrieved population may gather to discuss particular reform proposals, and choose those that deserve its unified, and therefore more powerful, support. Piven and Cloward's "turbulence in the streets" recommendation entails leav­ ing the details of reform to the government, which, in order to re­ gain legitimacy, must propose some type of reform legislation. Such a recommendation is inherently conservative, in that the specifics of reform are developed by politicians who often have interests very different from those of the protesting population. The "simple tur­ bulence" recommendation may be effective in getting piecemeal re­ form, but it is not appropriate for a protest movement fueled by the belief that either major changes in the socioeconomic structure must be made or the structure should be bypassed altogether by the cre­ ation of alternative structures. Because the Alliance organization was based on just such a belief, an organizational context was essential to the development of Alliance strategies and to their implementation. Another theoretical issue that arises at this point concerns the link between strategies and membership growth. The Exchange pro­ posal was followed by a dramatic increase in Alliance membership. In the year following Macune's announcement of the Exchange plan and its joint-note program, Alliance membership increased from ap­ proximately 75,000 to over 150,000.11 Again we find that the mobi­ lization perspective's premise of rationality is immensely preferable to the assumption of irrationality or nonrationality by the structural strain perspective. A clear link is evident between Alliance strate­ gies and membership growth. The economic benefits anticipated from the statewide Exchange program were to reach many farmers who were previously slighted by Alliance strategies—those farmers forced to rely on crop-lien financing. In addition, farmers who had stood to gain from earlier local strategies were reassured by Alliance leaders that the economic benefits of statewide cooperation would be much greater. Thus, it is not surprising that dramatic member­ ship growth followed the proposal of the Exchange and its joint-note program. Following the official announcement of the Exchange plan, the Texas countryside became alive with lecturers in the joint employ­ ment of the state Alliance and Exchange who urged members to pay their Exchange assessment of $2. Originally, it had been hoped that the capital of the Exchange would be sufficient to make the neces­

84

Creative Escalation

sary purchases, allowing the joint notes to remain in the hands of the Exchange; this would only be possible if the Exchange collected the assessment fee from most Alliance members. By April 1888, it was evident that this would not happen. The Exchange committee of acceptance had authorized joint notes worth $200,975, yet only $20,215 had been collected in assessment fees.12 Faced with this critical situation, the Exchange board of direc­ tors authorized the use of the joint notes as collateral security with which to negotiate bank loans. Bank loans were considered the most desirable source of funding. The Exchange directors argued that it was cheaper to borrow money to purchase supplies on the regular cash market and pay interest on the borrowed money than to pur­ chase goods on credit. Credit prices were not subject to significant reductions, as were cash prices.13 With loan negotiations beginning, the Exchange ordered goods necessary to fill the numerous local supply orders. The value of these ordered goods was $108,3 7 1.14 Unfortunately, the negotiations for loans to pay for these goods were unsuccessful. Macune spent much of his time scurrying around Dallas, Houston, Fort Worth, Galveston, and even New Orleans, desperately seeking bank loans. In Houston he acquired one loan for $6,000, but had to pledge $20,000 in joint notes as collateral. With few exceptions, the answer else­ where was no. When the bill came due in May on the supplies or­ dered, the Alliance Exchange was in serious trouble.15 An emergency meeting of the state Alliance Executive Commit­ tee was called. After examining the Exchange books, the following circular was issued: Members of the Farmers Alliance of Texas: Brethren: Grave and important issues confront us to-day. Unjust combinations seek to throttle our lawful and legitimate efforts to introduce a business system more just and equitable than is now prevailing. . . . In order that the proof of the exis­ tence of this combination may be submitted to you, and that a full, free conference may be had with the brethren, it is most earnestly recommended that a mass meeting be held at the court house in each county of the State on the second Saturday in June, at which documentary evidence disclosing facts of vast importance will be laid before you.16 In addition to this circular, the Exchange directors issued their own circular. It charged that Dallas wholesale merchants, manufactur­ ers, and bankers had entered into a combination to crush the Ex­

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85

change. The Dallas bankers refused to grant loans to the Exchange on any terms or security and "kept the mails full and the wires hot" to prevent the Exchange from getting loans from bankers in other cities.17 The reaction of Alliance members to the circular was immedi­ ate. McLennan County Alliance declared: The action of the bankers of Texas of recent date in . . . com­ pletely boycotting the State Exchange has given the Alliance new life. It has aroused a spirit in the hearts of the members in our Alliance that nothing else never [sic] has, and they have expressed a determination to stand by the Exchange, sink or swim. I think they are now taking the steps they ought to have taken at the outset; to create the needed amount among them­ selves, independent of the bankers. . . . If we fail to rally to the standard, our children are slaves for the bankers and moneyed monopoly. God forbid that their [sic] should be an Alliance man or woman in the state that should falter at this time and surrender in the hands of the task master. Three cheers for the State Exchange.18 In another county the following resolution was unanimously adopted: Resolved, . . . that we endorse our Alliance principles anew with tenfold vigor. Resolved, that we fully endorse the bold and worthy stand taken by the officers of the Exchange against the undermining efforts of the Dallas merchants and bankers. Resolved, that we, in support of our principles and institu­ tions, will bear hardship, suffer privations, make common stock of what we possess, weather the storm of oppression through, and gain an honorable victory, or starve in the attempt.19 The president of the state Alliance, Evan Jones, challenged Alliance members to support the Exchange: "It is time for each brother to re­ alize the fact that faltering now means unconditional surrender. It means a perpetuation of the invidious discriminations which do now and have in the past deprived us of the just share of the proceeds of labor."20 The second Saturday in June, June 9, was set as the day to re­ deem the Alliance Exchange. Macune had met with the alarmed

86

Creative Escalation

creditors and agreed upon a plan whereby the Alliance membership would be assessed an additional $2 each and the entirety of this sum would then be prorated among the various creditors for the purpose of decreasing the Exchange's indebtedness.21 On June 9, county Al­ liance members throughout the state gathered at their courthouses. The gatherings varied in size from a few hundred to over a thousand Alliance members. Pledges of financial support from the various county alliances ranged from a few hundred dollars up to $i7,ooo.22 Commitment to the Alliance seemed strong, with numerous county alliances pledging to stand by the financially battered Exchange. Condemnation of the merchant-banker opposition was the cry of the day. Macune was quite pleased with this grass-roots response to the Exchange crisis. He reported that the response had exceeded expec­ tations and that the Exchange was on solid footing. The journal of the Alliance, the Southern Mercury, was even more optimistic. It predicted that as a result of the July 9 meetings, the Exchange would have $1 million in capital by the end of the year.23 The Texas A lli­ ance leadership had attempted to prevent the stymieing of its strate­ gies by promulgating an ideology that externalized blame for strat­ egy problems and by proposing to surmount those problems by adequately capitalizing the Exchange, thereby making it indepen­ dent of the banks. In this manner, the Alliance leadership hoped to forestall the demobilization that might result from the Exchange crisis. The optimistic predictions concerning the capitalization of the Alliance Exchange, however, proved unfounded. The Exchange never received more than $78,000 from the Alliance membership. By Sep­ tember 1888 the joint-note program was discontinued and purchases again had to be made in cash. The beleaguered Exchange survived on a limited cash-purchasing plan until the end of 1889; at this time the creditors foreclosed and the Exchange building was sold at auction. Ironically, it was bought by a group of Alliance members and reorga­ nized into the Alliance Commercial Agency.24 More will be said about this cooperative later. The dream of many Alliance farmers—to free themselves from the credit system—had been destroyed. The Exchange had been forced to retreat from its joint-note program, and as a result a vast number of farmers had their hopes of financial salvation dashed. In his acclaimed history of the Alliance, Lawrence Goodwyn attributes the Exchange crisis to the hostility of the established business sys­ tem. Michael Schwartz draws similar conclusions in his recent work on the Alliance. But it will be argued here that such an explanation

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of the crisis and eventual failure of the Exchange overlooks other significant factors that contributed to its demise. The Exchange crisis offers an excellent opportunity to examine the difficulties faced by a protest movement organization in mobilizing internal resources. Hostility from the established business system was certainly a factor in the demise of the Alliance Exchange, but not the only one. Another factor in the banks7refusal to loan money to the Exchange was that it was inadequately capitalized. As the Southern Mercury itself recognized, "a safe business cannot be done without capital commensurate with the magnitude of the undertaking.77 The Mer­ cury argued that a minimum of $500,000 in capital was essential to the proper operation of the Exchange.25 The Exchange never received even one-sixth of this amount. Joint notes did not help the capital status of the Exchange. City banks had never loaned money on farm­ ers7joint notes: the makers of these notes lived too far away for the bank to decide whether such a loan was a good risk.26 In refusing to give the Exchange loans with only joint notes as collateral, city bank­ ers were simply implementing a long-standing loan policy. It is quite likely that the inadequate capitalization of the Ex­ change simply gave the bankers a legitimate excuse for doing some­ thing they would have done anyway. The city banks that the Ex­ change had turned to for loans had strong ties with the established business hierarchy that the Exchange was seeking to bypass. These banks had loan arrangements with various city merchants and whole­ salers. The wholesalers needed bank loans to enable them to extend credit to the country retail merchants with whom they did business; city banks, again, would not lend to the country merchants because the distance was too great to enable the banks to adequately assess the degree of risk. There was a definite symbiotic link between the country and city merchants, the wholesalers, and the city banks, and it was definitely not in the banks7best interests to jeopardize the profitability of the merchants and wholesalers. A successful Alli­ ance Exchange would pose a threat; thus, the banks had a clear motive for wanting to immobilize the Exchange. Granted that bankers may well have wanted to see the Alliance Exchange fail, the fact remains that, as a business proposition, the Exchange was too risky due to poor capitalization. Macune himself was well aware of this fact. In his address at the national convention of the Southern Farmers Alliance in 1889, he stated that the Texas Exchange effort was only partially successful, owing principally to the small amount of capital paid up. The notes, if ever so good, could not

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Creative Escalation

be used at their face value in borrowing money; the borrower must have some capital or ability to pay of himself.27 Most important, if it had been properly capitalized, the Exchange would not have been dependent on the banks and would therefore have avoided the consequent problems of such dependence. The only obstacle the Exchange would have then encountered was that of reluctant manufacturers refusing to sell to the Exchange because they had established business relationships with other wholesalers. In fact, during the state Alliance's earlier Traveling Business Agent program, the hesitance of certain manufacturers in dealing with the Alliance had been noted. The director of that program, William Lamb, had recommended boycotting those manufacturers until their cooperation was gained. Other manufacturers, however, were more than willing to cooperate. At one point, Lamb had lamented that he could obtain farm items like wagons in carloads at very cheap prices if manufacturers were paid in cash, but they were almost universally opposed to dealing with the Alliance on credit terms.28 The experi­ ence of the Traveling Business Agent program suggests that, had the Exchange been properly capitalized and the banks bypassed, the A l­ liance might have successfully established a direct cash business re­ lationship with many manufacturers and boycotted the uncoopera­ tive ones. But such speculation is rather moot; the fact is that the Exchange was not sufficiently capitalized, and thus could not estab­ lish direct cash trade relations. The crucial question becomes: Why was the Exchange so poorly capitalized? The membership of the Alliance peaked in 1888, with reported figures varying from 200,000 to 300,000 members.29If the $2 assessment fee had been collected from 250,000 members (the av­ erage of the estimates), then the Alliance would have netted the needed $500,000 capital. But the capital paid in never exceeded $80,000. Clearly, something was amiss. Goodwyn has suggested that much of the Alliance membership was simply too poor to pay the Exchange assessment.30 There is some merit to this argument. Fre­ quent mention was made in letters to the editor of the Mercury of the inability to pay the assessment. Callahan County Alliance mem­ bers wrote that they strongly supported the Exchange, but "as we have had two years drouth and there is absolutely no money in the county, we could do nothing but wish the Exchange Godspeed." A member of the Alliance in Houston County noted that his group had voted for the assessment, but, owing to the "pressure in money matters, few have been able to pay as yet."31 Another Alliance mem­ ber queried with great concern:

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I am sorry to see the brotherhood so slow in responding to the call of the Exchange. Have we got no monied men in the A l­ liance, are they all as poor as I am? If so, they are excusable. If I had the money the Exchange should be made able to accom­ plish that for which it was intended.32 But the poverty explanation, while certainly having some valid­ ity, is not sufficient. Capital was successfully raised to conduct nu­ merous local cooperative projects such as stores, mills, gins, and cotton yards. One could argue that by 1887 the funding of such local cooperative enterprises had so depleted Alliance members' resources that they were financially unable to properly capitalize the Exchange. But such an argument would ignore the fact that local alliances con­ tinued to fund local cooperative enterprises during the Exchange cri­ sis. While the Exchange was pleading for money that was vital to its survival, funds continued to be invested in various local cooperative attempts. The Mercury even encouraged such activity, urging each county Alliance to take an active role in its own salvation by estab­ lishing a local Alliance mill, gin, or store. Many county Alliance members were apparently of the same mind as the editor of the Mercury. In the spring of 1888, numerous county alliances reported the establishment of new mills, gins, and cooperative stores. Ellis County Alliance opened a cooperative grocery and agricultural im ­ plement store at Waxahachie. Alliances in Collin, Rockwall, and McKinney counties were finalizing plans for a mill and elevator with capital stock of $10,000, divided into $500 shares. De Witt County Alliance was planning a cotton yard and cooperative store. Four other counties—Eastland, Stephens, Shackelford, and Calla­ han— put their monies together and purchased a milling company for $12,000.33 This local activity continued through 1890, both dur­ ing the most critical period of the Exchange's struggle for survival and after its failure. Atascosa County Alliance wrote of its plans to establish a cottonseed oil mill at a cost of from $30,000 to $50,000, as well as a canning factory. A cooperative gin and mill were being erected in Center, Texas. Grayson County Alliance reported that it had finally succeeded in securing $27,000 for a flouring and corn mill at Sherman.34 Thus, visions of financial salvation were not confined to the Ex­ change. They included a myriad of different enterprises, all of which taxed the rather limited resources of the Alliance membership. The Exchange had to compete with these enterprises for funds. An A l­ liance member commented: "We are friends of the Exchange, but lo­ cal interest in our mill and cotton yard has kept us back, and many

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good men are overt axed.7,35 Another Alliance member complained about this situation: "Six months ago I was as zealous for coopera­ tive stores as any man, but today I wish there was not one in exis­ tence. Why? Because they do not work in harmony with the Ex­ change."36An important Alliance leader, Harry Tracy, also expressed grave concern about "disintegrating independent action," yet he and other Alliance leaders were unable to control such action. A lli­ ance resources continued to be sapped by various local cooperative schemes while the Exchange futilely appealed for the resources es­ sential to its survival. If an adequate explanation of the poor capitalization of the Ex­ change is not found by simply noting the poverty of many Alliance members, we must look for other possible factors contributing to the Exchange's failure to successfully mobilize Alliance resources. Some of the financial problems that faced the Exchange seem to have been rooted in the particulars of its capital stock arrangement. The needed capital was to be raised by a $2 assessment of each A l­ liance member. Macune was a strong advocate of this method of capitalization. He said it was pure and simple cooperation, with no joint-stock features whatever, and differs from similar plans before introduced in several important particulars. It is calculated to benefit the whole class, and not simply those who have surplus money to invest in capital stock; it does not aspire to, and is not calcu­ lated to be a business for profit in itself.37 Dividend payment under a joint-stock arrangement would have meant higher prices. The "pure cooperation" arrangement ensured that supplies were offered to the farmers at the lowest possible cost. For a mere $2 charge, a farmer would benefit from substantial sav­ ings on supply purchases. Thus, the "pure cooperation" arrangement was chosen after careful consideration. It was believed that Alliance members would be able to afford $2 and would willingly give that amount to set the Exchange on a sound financial basis. Unfortunately, the "pure cooperation" plan was not successful in obtaining the necessary capital. As discussed earlier, many farm­ ers were so ensnared in the crop-lien trap that they had no cash at all with which to pay their Exchange assessment. Remember that un­ der the crop-lien system, goods and supplies, not money, were ad­ vanced to the farmer. Thus, however willing they might have been, many farmers could not pay their assessment. At the same time, the "pure cooperation" plan offered no monetary incentive for the more prosperous farmers to pay more than the required $2 assessment.

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Any extra money a farmer might have to invest in cooperative selfhelp strategies would most likely be funneled into local joint-stock cooperative enterprises that paid dividends. While some of the more prosperous farmers might have acted on the basis of solidarity incen­ tives, most of them apparently held their self-interest in high regard. The lack of solidarity incentives was a critical factor in the poor capitalization of the Exchange. Creating such incentives is very diffi­ cult for protest organizations such as the Alliance, where the state of equalization among the membership is far from achieved.38 Because many Alliance farmers could not afford the $2 Exchange assessment and the more prosperous farmers had no financial incen­ tive to pay more than $2, the Exchange was not able to obtain suffi­ cient operating capital. Four months before the Exchange defaulted, the critical weakness of the "pure cooperation" plan was fully recog­ nized. Alliance members were asked to loan the Exchange money; in return they would earn 8 percent on their investment. The move came too late to save the Exchange.39 Thus, one of the reasons for the inadequate capitalization of the Exchange was divergent interests among its members, or an incom­ pleted state of equalization. This fact well illustrates the limitations of the Durkheimian assumption, often implicitly made in the struc­ tural strain theories of protest, that there is a congruence of interests among the members of a society. Not only was there a lack of con­ gruence between the economic interests of the Alliance farmer and the banker, but there were even divergent interests among Alliance farmers. It is true that all Alliance farmers had a common interest in raising cotton prices and reducing supply costs, but to look only at their common interests and ignore their divergent ones is a mistake. To understand the poor capitalization of the Exchange, one needs to be aware of the fact that the self-interest of more prosperous Alliance farmers led them to generously support dividend-paying Alliance projects rather than "pure cooperation" projects like the Exchange. Another major factor contributing to the poor capitalization of the Exchange was the internal dissension that arose concerning the Exchange crisis. The dissension centered around the proper explana­ tion of the financial problems of the Exchange. At the onset of the Exchange crisis, circulars were sent to the local alliances that related tales of merchant-banker opposition to the Exchange. These circu­ lars, as noted previously, were responsible for mobilizing Alliance support for the Exchange. Local alliances reported that knowledge of merchant-banker hostility had given them "new life," with Alliance principles being endorsed "anew with tenfold vigor." Amidst allega­ tions of merchant-banker opposition, Alliance members pledged

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some $200,000 to put the Exchange on solid financial ground.40 However, the Exchange never received more than $78,000 from the Alliance membership. Goodwyn again employs a poverty explana­ tion, arguing that the gap between the amount pledged and the amount given is explained by the extreme poverty of the Alliance membership: "The farmers' pledges represented their hopes for the exchange,- the actual contribution measured the reality of their means."41 Poverty was undoubtedly in part responsible for the fail­ ure of the Alliance membership to stand behind its pledges of finan­ cial support, but, again, poverty in and of itself is not a sufficient ex­ planation. A complete explanation must consider the internal dissension that arose in the summer of 1888 over the cause of the Exchange crisis. The harmony that resulted from blaming the Exchange crisis on merchant-banker opposition did not last much beyond the June 9 mass pledge meetings. Criticism of that explanation of the crisis be­ gan with an incriminating article published in the Texas Fanner. The article charged that the directors of the Exchange were hiding their incompetence and inexperience behind misrepresentations. It argued that "it would take a battery of very large gold mines to fur­ nish all the money needed to run a business on the plan and magni­ tude proposed." Alliance members were warned not to put their hardearned money into a venture that was doomed to fail: "If. . . any good farmer wants to put up his money, it will only add to other historical evidences that fools and their money part with expediency."42 Not long after, even the Alliance's own mouthpiece, Southern Mercury, began underplaying the idea of merchant-banker opposi­ tion: " . . . for argument's sake, grant that . . . Dallas bankers and merchants did combine to break up the Exchange (a charge in its fullness we do not for one moment believe). . . ,"43 By September 1888, the Mercury was taking a definite anti-Exchange, anti-Macune stance. It reported the highly critical findings of the investigatory Committee of Five. This committee, appointed by the directors of the Exchange to investigate its operations, reported: Regarding the manner of transacting the business of the Ex­ change, we find the methods pursued demand severe condem­ nation,- the actual cost to the purchaser in transacting business through the Exchange is as great, if not greater, than through ordinary channels of trade. . . . in the end there is no percep­ tible savings in the cost of goods to the consumer . . . ; as we conceive the objects and aims in establishing the Exchange is to enable the customer to purchase his supplies cheaper than

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heretofore, hence from the above it is evident that the manage­ ment of this enterprise have so far failed to accomplish the purpose for which it was inaugurated.44 A key member of the Committee of Five charged that Macune's ambition to control and rule is unlimited, arbitrary, and uncon­ trollable—beyond bound—with no sound business judgment to sustain it. . . . When asked on various occasions by the board what percent he was charging, he simply replied that some articles would stand more than others, which is the style of a fourth-class Jewshop, but not . . . for a brotherhood who have sent up their money and notes, in order to be freed from the unfair country merchant, depriving themselves of the nec­ essaries of life.45 Macune was frequently lambasted throughout the September and October 1888 issues of the Mercury: Let Brother Macune retire on his ear and his laurels, taking with him all the glories he has earned from his pet scheme, then let the Alliance start afresh. . . . Brother Macune, step down and out. . . . You are a stumbling block in the way of unity, good fellowship, and success in our order.46 The Mercury also stated: Brethren, . . . you must not think that the Exchange is the A l­ liance, or that the fate of one depends upon the fate of the other. . . . the order is too solidly entrenched in the principles of right and justice, to be dragged into disrepute by a set of schemers, whose sense of duty is blinded by their love for per­ sonal greed.47 The reaction of the rank-and-file Alliance members to the Ex­ change crisis controversy was bitter. One member, accepting the ac­ curacy of the Committee of Five's report, expressed his feelings: To say that we are overwhelmed with disappointment and deep mortification is expressing it lightly. With blind faith we have read private circulars, and with a zeal which had no paral­ lel, we have responded to every appeal, but to find that bad management, not to say dishonest methods, have blasted all our hopes. While we have been working and sacrificing to build up a business through which we might obtain implements and supplies at living rates, those entrusted with this business, by recklessness of extravagance . . . have put their hand deeper in

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our pockets than the common merchants or middlemen would have done. . . . Our hopes are in the dust; our zeal for the order has an ocean of damp thrown upon it. . . .48 Though the Mercury argued that the fates of the Exchange and the Alliance were not inextricably linked, this was simply wishful thinking. Local alliances began reporting significant declines in membership and the decline was attributed to the anti-Exchange stance of the Mercury *9 Since the Mercury's stance on the Exchange crisis was so devas­ tating to the Alliance organization, it is important to look at the probable reasons behind it. First, the Mercury was not under the edi­ torial control of the Texas Alliance; it was privately managed. The state Alliance had endorsed the Mercury—an antimonopoly paper— in 1886 as a result of ideological differences with the editor of the paper that had been serving as the official Alliance organ, the Rural Citizen. The state Alliance had been interested in buying the Mer­ cury, but did not have sufficient funds to do so. An agreement had been made that the Mercury would continue under private manage­ ment, while the Alliance slowly paid the owners of the Mercury the purchase price of the paper. Editorial control of the paper would be given to the state Alliance once the purchase price was paid in full.50 In the meantime, the state Alliance was promised a paper sympa­ thetic to its cause that could inform its members of relevant news and educate them in regard to Alliance reform demands. The A lli­ ance's lack of editorial control of the paper created no problems until 1887, with the onset of the Exchange crisis; at that time, however, it had devastating consequences. The paper printed vehement attacks against key Alliance leaders. These attacks were largely responsible for the significant decline in Alliance membership that occurred in 1888; they also caused many, if not most, of the remaining Alliance members to be very cautious and reluctant to provide the Exchange with the necessary capital to survive the crisis. The Alliance's absence of editorial control over the Mercury ex­ plains the means for the attacks in that paper against the Exchange and key Alliance leaders, but it does not explain the motive for them. Macune may well have correctly assessed the motive when he ac­ cused the Mercury of betraying the Alliance to avoid losing advertis­ ing patronage.51 Sensitive to the fact that the decline in membership was linked to the anti-Exchange, anti-Macune stance of the Mercury, the Texas Alliance Executive Committee finally issued a proclamation stating that the Mercury would not be recognized as the official organ of the

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state Alliance unless editorial control of the paper passed into their hands. This was accomplished by the October 9 issue of the Mer­ cury .52 A shift in the stance of the Mercury was immediately evi­ dent. Readers of the paper were informed that an investigatory Com­ mittee of Eleven had been formed, with one member from each congressional district. This committee fully vindicated Macune and the Exchange of any wrongdoing. An expert accountant was also called in to audit every transaction in the Exchange books. The audi­ tor's report was a positive ratification of the Committee of Eleven report.53 So where did the blame lie for the Exchange crisis? Surprisingly, the new editors of the Mercury did not point an accusatory finger at either the merchants or the bankers. On this matter, they main­ tained the editorial stance of the ousted Mercury editors: they pub­ lished a report vindicating the merchants and bankers of any wrong­ doing in regard to their transactions with the Exchange.54But instead of attributing the crisis to Exchange management, as the previous editors had, the new editors located the root of the problem in the failure of Alliance members to adequately capitalize the Exchange: For every mistake that has been made in management there are ten failures of the brotherhood to carry out their virtual promises. If the Exchange had received the support it had rea­ son to expect, there would not have been a mistake, because the only mistake made was in over-calculating the support of the order. . . . The legitimate business of the Farmers Alliance Exchange of Texas cannot be handled with the paltry capital it now has.55 The editors also charged that it cannot be denied that the greatest mistake was an overconfi­ dence in the sticking qualities of the Alliance people.56 The Mercury attempted to rally the Alliance membership be­ hind the Exchange by continually reiterating that the fate of the Ex­ change was in the hands of Alliance members. If the Exchange failed, the fault would have to be borne by Alliance members. No scape­ goating of merchants and bankers would be allowed. But the Alli­ ance membership was hesitant; the previous accusations concern­ ing the management of the Exchange were vividly remembered. These accusations had fatal results in regard to Alliance members' unquestioned devotion to the Exchange. The Mercury did a less than adequate job of allaying the suspicions of the membership. For example, it never adequately addressed the serious charge leveled by

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the Committee of Five concerning the high prices allegedly charged by the Exchange. Counterclaims were made that the Exchange had saved farmers at least 20 percent on farming implements and ma­ chinery and at least 10 percent on all supplies, but the contradiction between this claim and the Committee of Five's charge was never directly confronted.57 Were the members of this committee simply liars? The Alliance membership was left to its own conclusions or, more aptly stated, to its own confusion. The most probable explanation of the contrary statements is that the Committee of Five was simply comparing the Exchange prices to the cash prices of retail merchants. In such a comparison, it is quite possible that the Exchange did not seem very beneficial to farmers. The hope that the Exchange would be sufficiently capi­ talized to enable it to do cash trade directly with the manufacturer and thereby get cut-rate prices on all its supplies and goods was never fulfilled. The Exchange's assertion that it had saved farmers millions of dollars was most likely based on a comparison of Ex­ change prices to the "time prices" of retail merchants. Remember that the Exchange did not have a two-tiered price system. Thus, farm­ ers who traded with the Exchange through the joint-note program reaped substantial financial benefits. They were temporarily freed from the hated lien pricing system. Thus, the Committee of Five's conclusions were true only for a small section of Alliance mem­ bers—the more prosperous farmers who had successfully avoided the dreaded lien system. The conclusions reflected the economic status of the Commit­ tee of Five members. Although biographical information on all five members could not be found, the two members for which such in­ formation was available—A. L. Kessler and A. R Cagle—were afflu­ ent farmers who at one time or another had investments outside of farming. Kessler had earned much of his money from earlier ven­ tures in merchandising; he owned 1,000 acres of the finest farmland in Comal County and had "accumulated a fortune."58 Cagle also had in earlier years owned a successful merchandising business, and he leased out several hundred acres of farmland in Cooke County.59 These two men were clearly not trapped by the crop-lien system of financing and thus were never forced to pay "time prices" on pur­ chased goods. That they should compare the prices of Exchange goods solely to the cash prices of retail merchants is, therefore, not surprising. Once again, problems were created by the lack of economic equalization within the Alliance membership. More affluent A lli­ ance members evaluated the Exchange by how much it saved them

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in comparison to the cash prices of retail merchants; the question of how much the Exchange benefited those formerly subjected to "time prices" was of no interest to them. Thus, there seems to have been a definite class bias in the Committee of Five's report. This bias was never made clear to the Alliance membership. The new editors of the Mercury simply pretended that the report had never existed. This was a fatal mistake. The only attempt to ad­ dress the report was in Macune's bimonthly newsletter published by the Exchange printing office. This was not adequate; suspicions sur­ rounding the Exchange crisis lingered. Comal County Alliance mem­ bers refused to give any more money to the Exchange unless all dis­ crepancies were cleared: "Let the blame fall where it may; we want to find the guilty parties." A Collin County Alliance member wrote that the people would be slow to give money to the Exchange unless they were assured that it would be judiciously handled, "which has not been the case heretofore." Another Alliance member stated that he feared the Mercury was trying to throw a cloak of protection around Macune. Fayette County Alliance resolved to investigate the true condition of the Exchange. Rusk County Alliance reported that its local alliances were opposed to sending any more money to the Exchange until they could see some chance of being benefited by it. Gillespie County Alliance resolved to cease even discussing the Ex­ change "until the institution went down or up."60 Given the confusion about the cause of the Exchange crisis, it is not surprising that Alliance members did not fully stand behind their June 9 pledges of financial support to the Exchange; without this support, the Exchange defaulted. As noted earlier, the Exchange building was sold at auction and bought by a group of Alliance mem­ bers. These members reorganized the Exchange and reopened for business under the name of the Alliance Commercial Agency. This agency was a rather pathetic approximation of the original Exchange. In a desperate attempt to increase its business, it resorted to raffles. For example, it urged Alliance members to buy farm wagons before a given date in order to be eligible for a drawing for a free sewing ma­ chine; also, for every $10 purchase they would get one chance for a free cooking stove.61 The Alliance Commercial Agency was just an­ other merchant house vying desperately for customers. The dream of a statewide Alliance cooperative house that would bring financial salvation was dead. It is important, however, to stress that the latent power of the Alliance could have been sufficient to bring economic relief to the Alliance farmer. Contrary to the claims of certain resource mobilization theorists,62 outside support for a protest movement by a negatively privileged group is not essential. It

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may not even be desirable, in that such support might curtail origi­ nal movement goals. Sociologists must be careful not to interpret a failure in strategy—such as the Alliance Exchange and its joint-note program—as inevitably caused by the insufficient latent power of the aggrieved population. Rather, the causes of the failure should be closely examined to determine whether the resources within the ag­ grieved population were indeed insufficient to launch a successful strategy, or if the protest organization simply did not effectively uti­ lize them. In the case of the Texas Alliance Exchange failure, the latter explanation seems more appropriate. Due to the pure coopera­ tion capitalization feature of the Exchange, the Alliance had diffi­ culties raising sufficient money for the Exchange to operate. The at­ tack on the Exchange and its business directors by the Mercury fur­ ther complicated the capitalization drive to save the Exchange. But the extensive and continued funding of other local and county A l­ liance projects indicates that the monetary resources among the A l­ liance membership could have made the Exchange plan a reality. In sum, the fall of the cornerstone of Alliance economic strate­ gies—the Exchange and its joint-note program—cannot be used as supportive evidence of the claim that poor, negatively privileged groups do not have sufficient latent power to obtain social reform. The failure of a protest organization to effectively mobilize the la­ tent power of an aggrieved population in order to implement a par­ ticular strategy should not be confused with the supposition that the aggrieved population has insufficient power to bring about social reform. With the demise of the Exchange, the Texas Alliance member­ ship began a rapid decline. The Alliance leadership had failed in administering the antidote that had previously been successful in preventing demobilization after strategies had been stymied—pro­ mulgation of an ideology externalizing blame for the problems, coupled with escalation of strategies whereby obstacles to existing strategies are surmounted or altogether new strategies are proposed. Irreparable harm was done by the complete roundabout that oc­ curred with the vindication of the merchants and bankers in the Ex­ change crisis. The Alliance membership began looking for internal sources to blame, and the result was fatal to the ability of the A l­ liance to surmount the obstacles facing the Exchange. Surmounting these obstacles required the adequate capitalization of the Exchange, and the debate and consequent confusion over the cause of the Ex­ change crisis was fatal to this attempt. The demobilization process thus began.

The Great Jute Boycott

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In January 1889, we find an Alliance lecturer assuring his mem­ bership that the Alliance would survive: We are not dead. . . . we have been discouraged and halted, in doubt, not knowing what to think or where to move, for our building had been too rapid, like some huge undisciplined army rushing into conquest. . . . Many who flowed in with the tide rushed out with the "I told you so's," and has made us weaker in point of numbers, but I hope better in point of love for the principles of our order.63 At the 1889 Texas Alliance convention, President Evan Jones re­ ported that the past year has been the most trying and critical period in the history of our order. The last five months of 1888 was a period of sore trials, disappointments, heartaches, dissensions, disintegration, and desertion. A period that threatened the very existence of our order and its business enterprises, and tried the very souls and patriotism of our membership. . . .64 Jones conceded that the trials and tribulations caused by the Ex­ change crisis had resulted in the loss of considerable numerical strength. Indeed, the fall of the Exchange would most likely have en­ tailed the death of the Alliance had there not arisen an altogether different strategy that promised some economic relief. As the Ex­ change faltered, the attention of the Alliance members was diverted to the ensuing struggle with the jute trust.

The Great Jute Boycott The tactical switch in emphasis from the Exchange to the jutebagging boycott had definitely taken place by the August 1889 Texas Alliance convention. The Exchange was referred to as "the big ele­ phant," with all enthusiasm being reserved for the discussion of the ensuing struggle with the jute-bagging trust. The jute boycott excel­ lently portrays the numerous obstacles that tend to plague most or­ ganized protest attempts. Jute bagging was an essential part of the cotton-marketing pro­ cedure. Cotton bales were held together with about 6V2 yards of this bagging. In August 1888, the price of jute jumped from $.07 to $ . 1 1 $.125 per yard, a price increase of over 60 percent.65 Immediate pro­ tests issued from farmers. On a per bale basis, this jump may not

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Creative Escalation

seem too significant; it amounted to less than a $.30 additional charge per bale. For the nation's farmers in toto, however, it repre­ sented a cost increase of from $1.8 million to over $2 million.66 The already hard-pressed farmer was angered by the increase. It repre­ sented not only additional financial hardship but, more importantly, the ability of manufacturing combinations to extract unjust tribute from unorganized consumers. A government investigation clearly revealed that the increase was due to the organization of a jute-bagging consortium composed of the eight American bagging corporations. These corporations were bound by a price agreement that was determined by a majority vote of the eight involved parties. The corporations were reaping lu­ crative benefits from their price agreement; one of them placed the cost of manufacturing the jute bagging at a mere $.033 per yard.67 Had there been no pre-existing organizational structure to uti­ lize in organizing a protest against the jute trust, the farmers' anger would probably have come to naught. Most likely the farmers would not have been motivated sufficiently by the $.30 per bale loss to exert the effort necessary to initiate and coordinate a nationwide protest organization structure. But there was the Alliance, and its members immediately called for the development of a protest strategy that would undermine the jute trust. Throughout the summer of 1888, talk of a jute boycott was ex­ tensive. County alliances throughout Texas passed jute boycott res­ olutions.68 However, with the cotton harvest rapidly approaching, some jute substitute was essential. The cotton had to be wrapped be­ fore it could be marketed. The president of the Texas Alliance, Evan Jones, called for cotton growers to withhold their cotton from the market until a jute substitute could be found.69By October, arrange­ ments had been made for the Lane Cotton Mills in New Orleans to manufacture a bagging substitute made of cotton. On such short no­ tice, though, the mills could not supply enough of this substitute bagging, so many farmers begrudgingly had to wrap their cotton in jute. The advantages of cotton bagging, however, continued to be lauded. The substitution of cotton bagging was heralded as a progres­ sive idea that would greatly promote the interests of the cotton states. First, the production of sufficient quantities of cotton bagging to wrap the entire annual crop would require about 125,000 bales of cotton. This increased demand for cotton would in return increase the market value of cotton, a result that would gladden the hearts of the economically distressed Southern cotton farmer. In addition, the

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production of cotton bagging would create a market for low-grade cotton. Second, cotton bagging was to be manufactured in the South­ ern states, thus providing employment for thousands of loom opera­ tors at a time when the Southern economy desperately needed the boost. Third, cotton bagging had many qualities more desirable than jute. It was less flammable, and cotton insurers were reported as say­ ing that they would charge no more than half the present insurance rate on a bale covered with the cotton-bagging substitute. It was also said to be more impervious to moisture, as well as more resistant to sand and dirt. It was lighter, so freight costs would be lowered. It also possessed more utility after having served its purpose as bagging. Not one bad thing could be said about the use of cotton bagging in­ stead of jute.70 The advantages of cotton bagging, coupled with the anger di­ rected at the jute trust, led the Alliance to intensify its efforts to make the jute boycott a success. The first major problem that had to be tackled in this effort was the procurement of a sufficient supply of the new cotton bagging. The jute boycott was only viable if an alter­ native bagging supply was provided at an acceptable price. At first, the Alliance was overly optimistic about the ease with which this problem could be eliminated. In mid-April of 1889, the Mercury claimed that the cotton and woolen mills in Dallas would soon be working at full capacity in order to produce the necessary supply of cotton bagging. By early May, optimism had turned to concern. The committee that had been appointed by the Texas Alliance to study the cotton-bagging issue reported that they had been informed by the president of these mills that the present looms could not pro­ duce cotton bagging. The mills either did not have the needed capi­ tal to invest in new looms or, more likely, were not willing to make the risky investment. If the Alliance wanted the mills to produce cotton bagging, it would have to finance the new looms. The cost of the looms would be recovered by the Alliance since the president of the mills agreed to pay for the looms in cotton bagging.71 However, a substantial capital investment was initially needed, and this capital was not forthcoming; thus, the arrangement with the Dallas mills never materialized. In late 1889, there was talk of financing an Al­ liance cotton-bagging factory at Marble Falls.72 The idea of an Alli­ ance bagging factory was very appealing. Not only would the produc­ tion of an alternative bagging product help break the back of the jute trust, but the fact that the production would be Alliance-controlled ensured that there would always be price control. Never again could the private bagging corporations manipulate production or price to

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Creative Escalation

reap exorbitant profits at the farmers' expense. The strategy sounded great, but again, sufficient capital could not be mobilized to allow its implementation. Given the failure to establish more cotton bagging production facilities, the sole major supplier of cotton bagging continued to be the New Orleans-based Lane Cotton Mills. To alleviate the produc­ tion burden, local alliances were instructed to stagger their orders.73 For example, if a local alliance needed 12,000 yards of cotton bag­ ging, it might order 2,000 yards to be delivered on September 1, 6,000 yards due on October 1, and 4,000 yards due on November 1. This staggered-order arrangement was of limited success. The 1889 har­ vest brought forth renewed complaints about the difficulty of pro­ curing cotton bagging. One Alliance member noted that cottonbagging resolutions made by county alliances accomplished little, since cotton bagging was so difficult to obtain. The 1890 harvest brought no change. Cotton bagging was scarce relative to demand.74 The problem with the cotton-bagging supply was compounded by its price. As the Mercury explained to its Alliance readers, cotton bagging would initially be expensive since its production required the purchase of new looms. In 1889, cotton bagging sold at $.125 per yard; this price was the same as the jute price that had precipitated the boycott effort.75 But despite the price of the jute bagging sub­ stitute, the boycott continued to be strongly supported. The boycott had become a symbol of the consumers' ability to control corporate America. The threat of a successful boycott was serious enough to cause the jute producers to reconsider their price hike. In the summer of 1889, representatives from the jute producers approached the na­ tional Alliance leadership with a proposition. Jute would be reduced to $.087 per yard if the boycott were terminated. Surprisingly, at least to the jute representatives, the deal was refused. The Alliance leaders argued that if the boycott had not been called, the price of jute would not have been reduced. If the boycott was now ended, in subsequent years farmers would be vulnerable to renewed pricefixing. The ultimate goal of the boycott was to kill the jute trust once and for all by promoting the development of cotton bagging. It was argued that there was too much cotton and too many cotton mills for a cotton-bagging trust to ever form.76Besides, as noted pre­ viously, cotton bagging was found to have many advantages over the traditional jute bagging. Fearing for their economic survival, the jute producers went ahead with their price reduction. If they could not tempt the A l­

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liance leadership, they would appeal directly to the economic inter­ est of the individual farmer. Jute was reduced to $.09 per yard. Cot­ ton bagging continued to sell for $.125 per yard.77 Not only would there be no savings to the farmer using cotton bagging, but there would be an economic loss. As if the supply and pricing of cotton bagging were not suffi­ cient problems facing the boycott effort, another major problem loomed large. Cotton bagging weighed about eight pounds less than jute bagging—a significant difference. The established practice of the cotton exchanges was to weigh a bale, bagging and all. To deter­ mine the weight of the cotton alone, a standard 6 percent was de­ ducted from the gross weight. This reduction, known as a "tare/7re­ flected the fact that the 6 Vi yards of jute bagging necessary to properly wrap a bale weighed about 24 pounds, or 6 percent of the 400-pound bale that was the standard when the tare was set in the 1860s. If the 6-percent tare was used indiscriminately for both cotton-wrapped and jute-wrapped bales, farmers using cotton bagging would lose about $.65 per bale.78 Thus, the farmer would lose money not only on the purchase price of cotton bagging, but also as the result of the tare formula. The Alliance was quick to act on the tare problem. A jute boy­ cott convention was called in May 1889. A major issue on the agenda was the tare problem. Responding to this convention's demand for a tare formula adjustment on cotton-wrapped bales, the New York and New Orleans exchanges promised to implement such an adjust­ ment. The Alliance was ecstatic and talk of freedom from the jute trust was widespread. But the excitement was premature. By Au­ gust, the Liverpool cotton exchange was taking a definite stand against cotton bagging.79 Since Britain was the largest single market for the U.S. cotton crop, the stance of the Liverpool exchange led the American exchanges to reconsider their receptivity to the idea of a tare adjustment. The position of the Liverpool exchange is not hard to under­ stand. Jute was a very important product of the British empire. The Alliance had once more become a victim of escalation. Britain's eco­ nomic self-interest had been threatened by the jute boycott, so a move was made to weaken the boycott. It was a highly effective move. Liverpool's stance had serious repercussions on the American exchanges. If these exchanges granted the tare adjustment, they would lose money if and when the cotton was sold to the Liverpool exchange, or to any other exchange following Liverpool7s example. The $.65 loss per bale would quickly assume major proportions for

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Creative Escalation

the larger exchanges. The receptivity of the American exchanges to the idea of a tare adjustment soon cooled. As late as 1890, demands were still being futilely made for a tare adjustment of cotton-covered bales.80 Given the lack of a tare adjustment, the economically distressed farmer was being asked not only to take a loss on the purchase price of cotton bagging, but also to take a loss as a result of the unadjusted tare. One Texas farmer complained that honoring the jute boycott meant losing almost $1 per bale. Another farmer sharply rebuked the complainer: Well, is money worth more than principle? . . . this is not a fight for dollars and cents, but upon principles of justice to the producer of King cotton, and in keeping with the spirit of our ancestors when they threw the tea overboard, and in their struggle for liberty, they were ofttimes tracked by the blood from their barefeet.81 The "fight for principle" was decried by some outsiders and praised by others. The Texas Farmer, the journal of the Grange, argued that Alliance leaders like Macune should have looked into the tare issue before committing the Alliance membership to the cotton-bagging substitute. The editor of this paper queried: "How can our Alliance brethren ever expect to gain the road to prosperity, while a man of Macune's mental caliber is permitted to assume leadership in such important issues as that under discussion?" Macune was labeled a "leading visionist" and "a man monumentally unsafe as a leader/'82 The Galveston Daily News called the jute boycott "an ill-advised and futile effort," and stated that it was "incredible that men with even the slightest intellect should have been led into so great an er­ ror as those farmers who have placed faith in their ability to sup­ plant jute with cotton bagging/783 In vivid contrast to this view, the editor of the small weekly the Cotton Belt admired the farmers for their pluck in trying "to destroy one of the great curses of today—the jute bagging trust that is op­ pressing the people."84 The widely circulated Houston Daily Post noted that the farmers were taking the jute boycott seriously and would not, and ought not, to turn back. The Post agreed that relief was needed "from the exactions of the greedy trust."85 But relief at what cost? By 1890, the price of cotton bagging had increased to $.14 per yard and the tare remained unadjusted.86 A l­ though there was still some talk of continuing the jute boycott, the boycott had definitely faltered. In his analysis of the jute boycott, Michael Schwartz blames the

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faltering of the boycott on oligarchization within the Alliance. He argues that the Alliance began the year 1890 in a good position to attack the elements of the cotton-marketing system that had re­ sisted the jute boycott attempt; this attack never occurred because Alliance leaders had determined that a continuation of the boycott was not in their own best interests. Their interests had increasedly been directed toward the political sphere. Success in this sphere de­ pended in part on their ability to maintain good relations with other structures. A continued attack on the cotton-marketing system threatened these political aspirations.87 Contrary to Schwartz's contention, the Alliance was not in a good position to attack the cotton-marketing system in 1890. For this reason, and not oligarchization, the boycott faltered. The first serious weakness in the Alliance's position was the lack of a suffi­ cient supply of alternative bagging. An adequate supply was vital to future success in the struggle with the jute trust. If the supply of cot­ ton bagging was going to be a persisting problem, then there was no real threat to jute sales and the price of jute could again be raised. Unfortunately, most major cotton mills remained leery about the capital investment necessary for the manufacture of cotton bagging. Their hesitancy became even more pronounced when the tare ad­ justment on cotton-wrapped bales was not forthcoming. Would farmers stay loyal to cotton bagging? The fall in the price of jute led to even greater doubt about the farmers' commitment to a jute sub­ stitute. Even the national organ of the Alliance pondered if the farm­ ers would "stand true."88 Thus, the production of cotton bagging by cotton mills throughout the South was an Alliance vision that never materialized. There was talk by Alliance members of financing Alliance cotton-bagging facilities, but such facilities never got beyond the ini­ tial planning stage. In Texas, plans for a bagging facility were dis­ cussed at a very inopportune moment: the discussion occurred as final appeals were being made on the behalf of the failing Alliance Exchange. Also, other local cooperative attempts continued to sap Alliance members of their limited monetary resources. Even if there had been no supply problem, the Alliance was far from being in a good position to attack the cotton-marketing system in 1890. The tare problem was a major bane to the jute boycott ef­ fort. In the spring of 1889, a few American exchanges had responded to the Alliance's demand for a tare adjustment, so the Alliance had planned to market all of its cotton-wrapped bales through these co­ operating exchanges. It was hoped that enough business would be re­ routed to pressure the uncooperative exchanges into adjusting their

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tare formulas. However, after Liverpool's stance against cotton bag­ ging, the cooperating American exchanges changed their tune. They were unwilling to suffer the $.65 loss per bale on the cotton-wrapped bales that were annually shipped to Liverpool. At this point, the Al­ liance had only one pressure tactic left: to hold the cotton off the market until exchanges adjusted their tare formulas. The viability of this tactic was open to question. As pointed out before, many A l­ liance farmers were ensnared in the lien system of financing; there­ fore, they did not control the marketing of their crop. Many others, while not having liens on their crop, were barely managing to stay out of debt and would not have been able to hold their cotton off the market for very long, if at all. The cotton exchanges knew this and, therefore, the threat of a long-term boycott was not real. There were still other Alliance farmers who had not wrapped their bales with cotton bagging either because they had not been able to procure it or because they had acted in their own short-term economic interest and used the now cheaper jute bagging. In sum, the volume of cotton that the Alliance could have realistically expected to hold off the market for an indefinite period of time was not sufficient to pressure the cotton exchanges into giving in on the tare adjustment issue. The jute boycott effort of the Alliance was a victim of the process of escalation, and, contrary to Schwartz's claim, the Alliance was not in a good position to successfully engage in counterescalation tactics. One might argue that the Alliance should have accepted the jute trust's offer to reduce the price of jute bagging if the boycott was abandoned.89The Alliance leadership, however, realized the vulnera­ bility of such an agreement. The price of jute bagging would increase if the threat of cotton bagging as a jute substitute was not viewed as viable by the jute trust. If the Alliance had abandoned its cottonbagging plans immediately upon receiving a proposition from the jute trust, the mills that had produced cotton bagging might become reluctant to begin cotton-bagging production again. They would un­ derstandably fear that the Alliance would strike another deal with the jute trust and leave them with a large amount of unsold cotton bagging. With the faltering of the jute boycott, the curtain closed on the major economic strategies of the Farmers Alliance. Many strategies had been tried: the formation of trade agreements with local mer­ chants; local cooperative stores, mills, and gins; the local bulk mar­ keting of cotton; the statewide purchasing and marketing strategies of the Alliance Exchange; a joint-note program to free the farmer from the lien system; and finally the Great Jute Boycott. None of

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these strategies had succeeded in giving farmers what they so des­ perately needed—significant and lasting relief from economic hard times. Thus, by 1890 the economic strategies of the Alliance had been exhausted. These economic strategies highlighted both the possibili­ ties and the limitations of the latent power of the farmers. Time and time again, the Alliance had developed strategies that utilized the latent power of the farmers' position in the economic structure. Each time, the long-term success of the strategy had been blocked by more powerful business interests and the limited resources of the Alliance membership. The collapse of the Alliance Exchange was the most critical failure because it was essential for a viable, effec­ tive attack on the agricultural purchasing and marketing structures. The various pressure tactics that were employed—local trade agree­ ments, cotton bulking, and the jute boycott—had one major limita­ tion in common: the amount of pressure that could be exerted was significantly constricted because of the large number of farmers tied to the crop-lien system of financing. These farmers could not give cash business to merchants signing a trade agreement with the Al­ liance; they could not hold their bulked cotton off the market until a premium price was obtained, nor could they hold it off the market to force the cotton exchanges to accept cotton bagging and make tare adjustments. Without a strategy successfully rescuing Alliance farm­ ers from their dependence on crop-lien financing, the Alliance's at­ tempt at economic pressure tactics was to a large extent futile; the organization did not have a sufficient power leverage. The Texas A l­ liance Exchange and its joint-note program would have provided that leverage. If it had succeeded in Texas and then been emulated by other state alliances, it might well have broken the hold of crop-lien financing on Southern farmers. If this had been accomplished, the possibility of successfully employing tactics that utilized the latent power of the Alliance farmers would have been significantly en­ hanced. The Alliance would have been in a much better position to surmount the obstacles created by those opposing its economic strategies. With the faltering of the Alliance's major economic strategies, the future of the Alliance was at stake. A major redirection of the movement was needed to avoid disbandment. The leaders of the Al­ liance were acutely aware of this fact, and it was to the political sphere that they turned in developing a new dominant focus for the Alliance movement.

7- The Politicization of the Alliance

The politicization of the Alliance was a touchy process. Twice be­ fore, the survival of the Alliance had been seriously threatened by disagreement over the role of politics in the Alliance. In 1880, the original Lampasas County Alliance had struggled with the issue of politics. Some Alliance members had argued that the root cause of the farmers7problems was in the government's land, transportation, and financial policies, and thus necessitated independent political action. Loyal Democrats in that county Alliance organization were upset with this suggestion; they argued that all necessary political reforms could be achieved through the "party of our fathers." Still others contended that the problems of the farmer could best be ad­ dressed through economic self-help strategies, and that the farmer should avoid the quagmire of politics altogether. The schism proved fatal, and the Lampasas County Alliance disbanded in 1880. A simi­ lar schism was experienced on a statewide basis after the passage of the Cleburne Demands in 1886, but the economic visions of the Alliance's chief strategist, C. W. Macune, had managed to pacify the different opinion groups. Political activism continued, but the "strictly business" advocates did not bolt as long as they believed that the main focus of the movement was on economic strategies. While the political activists within the Alliance conceded that economic strategies were important, they continued to argue that the root causes of many of the problems facing farmers were best ad­ dressed in the political sphere. At the 1888 Texas Alliance conven­ tion, a series of demands similar to the Cleburne Demands were written by a specially appointed Committee on Industrial Depres­ sion. The demands were targeted at what were perceived to be major sources of the country's economic problems: the monetary system, governmental land policies, the practices of the railroad companies, and the emergence of powerful trusts. Several demands concerned the U.S. monetary system, which was increasingly being blamed as

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the primary cause of the economic problems besetting the country. To reform the monetary system, the committee recommended: (i) abolishing national banks, (2) increasing the nation's money supply by the unlimited coinage of silver as well as gold, (3) issuing U.S. treasury notes to supplement silver and gold in order that there might be an adequate volume of currency per capita, and (4) passing a con­ stitutional amendment prohibiting the further issuance of interestbearing bonds. Other demands proposed by the Committee on In­ dustrial Depression related to the regulation of railroads, both intra­ state and interstate, and the passage of antitrust regulation. The de­ mands were endorsed by the convention.1 Clearly, the political spirit manifested at Cleburne was still alive. Aware of this political activism, the "strictly business" advo­ cates frequently cautioned the activists: While we have our business enterprises in the Alliance to fos­ ter, protect and encourage, and while these engage our deepest solicitude and strongest consolidated efforts, we must do noth­ ing in a party conflict that would impair our strength or break the force of our unity in this direction. . . . First and foremost . . . the Alliance has a great business enterprise in her fold, and the greatest possible care must now be taken to preserve our unity in this direction.2 Moreover: For God's sake let us not lose the hold that we have! Stand firm to the business methods inaugurated and in two years from today we will be free from debt and can put a price on our productions; this is the aim. A long step has been taken; we are almost out of the woods. Don't let us go back into slavery because there are a few Alliance men who want to shove us into politics. . . .3 Such statements of caution did little to dampen the ardor of the political activists. One Alliance member wrote that "the people seem to have politics on the brain down here, as well as elsewhere, but it seems hard to make some believe the Alliance is a business organization."4 With the fall of the Alliance Exchange and the faltering of the jute boycott, the Alliance as a business organization suffered greatly. The Alliance movement was very vulnerable at this point; either new strategies had to be developed and implemented or the move­ ment would suffer from disintegration. As early as the 1889 state Al­ liance convention, leaders of the Texas Alliance were moving toward

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a redirection of strategies. In the opening address of the convention, the Alliance delegates were told: The monopolization and contraction of the circulating me­ dium forces on our people the necessity of credit or mortgage for the obvious reason that there is not enough money in their hands to enable them to transact their business upon a cash basis. To this unjust manipulation of our finances and trans­ portation can be traced most all of the oppression of our people. Control these and you have solved the vexed question of the cause of industrial depression; this can only be effected by just and intelligent legislative reformation.5 The Alliance's chief strategist, C. W. Macune, was also well aware of the strategy crisis. In December 1889, his address to the na­ tional convention of the Alliance coaxed the delegates toward politi­ cal strategies. In his address, he noted that farmers have three basic methods available to them to gain economic relief: "scientific farm­ ing/7business cooperation in buying and selling, and a united effort to pressure political authorities into passing corrective legislation that would address the present economic problems. Macune was quick to dismiss the "scientific farming" method. What good would it do farmers to produce seventy-five bales of cotton rather than fifty if the cotton had to be sold for the cost of production? Between the second and third alternatives, Macune now advocated the latter— political pressure methods: Those mentioned as advocating the second or business line of teaching as the remedy seem to have drunk a little deeper at the fountain of thought and wisdom, and those of the third class seem to have pursued the investigation even further than the second class.6 Such was Macune;s introductory statement to his advocacy of a redirection of Alliance strategies. As pointed out by Schwartz, "the task of a protest group is to . . . initiate actions that test the practi­ cality of competing ideas."7Farmers had been exposed to three basic relief strategies during the hard times of the late 1800s. Macune ar­ gued that two of these strategies had been tried—the "scientific farming" strategy and the business cooperation strategy. The "scien­ tific farming" strategy had been popular in the early Grange years, and its benefits had been so minimal that there were few farmers who continued to speak of it as a viable relief strategy. The business cooperation strategy had been extensively employed by the Alliance for the past five years, yet farmers continued to suffer economically.

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Crop prices were still dismally low. The low prices were just one symptom of a deepening general economic depression. Now that the business cooperation strategy had faltered, just what was the Alliance to do? Macune gave the Alliance delegates a quick lesson in economics before proposing a specific relief strategy. He said that Alliance members first needed to understand a generally known and universally acknowledged maxim of po­ litical economists, that a general rise in prices always attends an increase in the volume of the circulating medium of the country, and a general fall in prices always attends a general decline in its volume.8 He then argued that low crop prices and general economic depres­ sion were due to an insufficient supply of currency. The contraction of currency was the root cause of not only the agricultural depres­ sion, but the deepening general depression: 'The evils which now afflict agriculture are of a general character. . . . The relief measures must be general in character/79 Macune stressed that previous Al­ liance strategies had attempted to gain relief without changing the root cause of the present depression: the inadequate supply of cur­ rency. Past strategies were therefore by their very nature limited in the economic relief they could bring. Following Macune's address, a Committee on the Monetary System was appointed to formulate a specific relief strategy that took Macune's "economic lesson" into account. The relief strategy devised—the subtreasury plan—was to take an important place alongside other political reform issues that had been debated since the 1870s and had been incorporated into the Cleburne Demands of the Texas Alliance in 1886. The subtreasury plan represented an al­ ternative to existing monetary practices. It called for a halt to the federal government's practice of using certain national banks as U.S. depositories. It was charged that these banks had contracted the sup­ ply of currency so as to maximize their profits. This contraction of currency was the root cause of the present economic woes of the farmer and was responsible for the general economic depression. It was the responsibility of the federal government to regulate the sup­ ply of currency to ensure the economic health of the country. Nothing was new about these reform ideas; they had found ex­ pression in the Alliance movement from the very beginning. What was new was the attention given to a specific plan of implementa­ tion and the added contention that the supply of currency should be flexible, contracting and expanding to meet fluctuating demand caused by the great bulk of crops marketed in the fall and winter

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Politicization of the Alliance

months. A larger supply of currency was needed, but a larger per cap­ ita supply was not sufficient in and of itself. If the supply of currency remained unresponsive to the need for it, for one-half of the year there would be too much money, and for the other-half, too little.10 How was the federal government to maintain this sufficient and flexible currency supply? The Alliance proposed as its answer the subtreasury scheme. This scheme called for both federal land-loan and commodity-loan programs. The details of the subtreasury plan are a vivid contrast to the contention of certain structural strain the­ orists11 that leaders of protest movements propose myopic, overly simplistic remedies to social problems that are doomed to fail. The subtreasury plan's focus on the volume of circulating currency is consonant with leading economic ideas of our times.12 Far from being myopic, the underlying economic analysis of the subtreasury was decades ahead of its time. The basic purpose of the land-loan feature of the subtreasury plan was to provide a sufficient currency supply. These loans were to be made until the volume of money in circulation reached the level of $50 per capita. Loan applicants were to receive an 80 percent loan on the value of their farmland, with a maximum loan of $3,000. The maximum maturity of the loan was to be fifty years. The ceiling on the interest rate for these loans would be 2 percent.13 The basic pur­ pose of the commodity-loan program was to provide a flexible money supply while simultaneously extricating the farmer from the hated lien system of financing. Under this program, federal warehouses were to be established in every county in the nation that annually produced farm products worth at least $500,000. In these ware­ houses, or subtreasuries, farmers could store their nonperishable products and wait for higher crop prices. They could borrow up to 80 percent of the local market price on the products deposited; the in­ terest rate on these loans would be 2 percent per annum. Additional charges would be made for handling, storage, and insurance; how­ ever, the charges would be nominal.14 Macune explained how commodity loans would provide for a flexible currency supply. Every year, approximately $300 million worth of cotton was sold at the marketplace, much of it in the months of September and October. Macune noted that the Treasury Depart­ ment had determined that the gross amount of U.S. currency in cir­ culation was $1.8 billion. Thus, to move the cotton crop alone de­ manded the use of one-sixth of the total U.S. currency in circulation. This put a tremendous strain on the money market, causing the se­ rious deflation that was responsible for the hard times experienced by farmers. The commodity-loan aspect of the subtreasury plan, by

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providing inexpensive storage facilities and loan advances to farm­ ers, would allow a staggering of sales of agricultural products. It would also increase the volume of money in circulation at harvest­ time. These two factors would operate to prevent deflation. When the commodity loan was terminated by the withdrawal of the stored crop, the loan money would return to the government and be with­ drawn from the money market. Thus, the supply of money would expand and contract as needed.15 A further advantage of the subtreasury plan was that it repre­ sented a cheaper and more just method of getting currency into cir­ culation than the present bond-backed, national bank system of dis­ tribution. This system of distribution had been instituted with the National Banking Act of 1863. The act was originally designed to en­ courage the sale of government bonds during the Civil War. Under the bylaws governing bank establishments, banks had to purchase a minimal amount of bonds, but this act encouraged additional bond purchases by authorizing banks to issue bank notes worth up to 90 percent of the face value of any purchased bonds for a mere 1 -percent interest charge. This meant that banks could profit twice—from col­ lecting interest on the bonds themselves and from collecting inter­ est on its bond-backed bank notes. The subtreasury plan would save the government the sizable sum of money that currently went to pay off the 3-percent interest on government bonds. If money was dis­ tributed through the subtreasury plan, no interest would be charged. Indeed, farmers would pay the government nominal interest for the use of its money. Also, the subtreasury plan would be more just. Why should the national banks be allowed to twice reap profits from its bond purchases? Such a privilege was definitely class legislation. The bond-backed bank notes for which the banks paid a nominal 1 -percent interest were in turn loaned to the public for not less than 8-percent interest.16 The subtreasury plan was touted as having far-reaching rami­ fications for the beleaguered farmer. If implemented, it would not only prevent deflation at harvesttime, but it would also effectively shatter the merchant crop-lien system. Farmers who had formerly been victims of the exorbitantly high interest rates associated with the crop-lien system of financing would be able to obtain needed money through the federally sponsored land-loan or commodityloan programs for a mere 2 percent annual interest charge. The bene­ fits promised the farmer by subtreasury supporters were reminis­ cent of those associated with the joint-note financing program of the collapsed Texas Alliance Exchange. Financial salvation was again promised, but this time the necessary resources were to come from

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Politicization of the Alliance

the federal government, not the Alliance membership itself. The high-interest crop mortgage to the merchant was to be replaced y a very low-interest crop mortgage to the federal government. The dream of financial salvation that had once been tied to the Alliance s economic program had now been transferred by means of the subtreasury proposal to the Alliance's political program. The subtreasury proposal was to have a major impact on the fu­ ture development of the Alliance. Surprisingly, some accounts of the Alliance movement have given this proposal scant attention, and their analysis of the Alliance movement suffers accordingly. A prime example of this is Schwartz's study of the Alliance; he devotes only a few sentences to the subtreasury proposal. Missing the important nature of this proposal, he proceeds to question the logic of the A l­ liance's shift into politics. He argues that the redirection of Alliance strategies toward the political realm was motivated by the conserva­ tism of Alliance leadership. He alleges that economic strategies of the Alliance were a threat to the planters' interests within the A l­ liance. Elaborating on this point, Schwartz points out that many of the larger planters served as retail merchants to their tenants. These planters were particularly threatened by the joint-note strategy of the Texas Alliance Exchange. This strategy aimed to free small yeo­ man farmers and tenant farmers from the merchant crop-lien sys­ tem of financing, and thereby free them from planter-merchant con­ trol. The threat of Alliance economic strategies to planter interests in the Alliance was, according to Schwartz, the motivating force behind the shift to politics.17 This interpretation, however, is with­ out grounds when the subtreasury proposal is fully understood. As pointed out previously, this proposal served as a substitute for the former joint-note strategy of the Alliance Exchange. It held out the same promises to the economically hard-pressed farmer, including freedom from the existing merchant-lien system of financing. The shift of Alliance strategies toward the political realm was completed with the introduction of the subtreasury proposal to the Alliance membership. No longer was the major source of contention in the Alliance centered on the issue of politics or no politics. The columns of the Mercury were filled with discussions of various po­ litical reform issues. The shift to politics, which had once been so strongly resisted, was now generally accepted. This major shift in strategy focus within the Alliance illustrates the importance of a dynamic approach to protest movements. Pro­ test movement organizations continually mobilize resources, apply those resources to a chosen strategy, and then experience the conse­ quences of that strategy in a manner that affects future strategy se-

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lections. A strategy once strongly resisted may later be endorsed if other, initially more desirable strategies have been exhausted. A study of a protest movement or a protest organization such as the Alliance at any one moment in time will not provide an understand­ ing of the process of protest development; the potential for shifts in protest strategies is always present. These strategy shifts are due primarily to two factors: external opposition to movement strategies, and a reconsideration of the ade­ quacy of the primary causal explanation of existing grievances that has been adopted by the protest organization. In regard to the first factor, in any given stratification system, some classes or groups benefit more than others. If and when a protest movement emerges to challenge the existing distribution of economic resources, those classes or groups benefiting from the status quo will act to preserve the existing distribution. Their opposition to the protest creates obstacles that must be overcome if the protest is to be successful. Effectively surmounting the obstacles often requires a strategy shift. External opposition was the primary factor in the shift of Alliance strategies from the early local bulking and purchasing strategies to the statewide Exchange program. In regard to the second factor associated with strategy shifts, protestors often are faced with competing explanations on the root causes of their grievances. Protest movement organizations initiate actions that test the accuracy of these competing explanations. Strat­ egies suggested by a given explanation are implemented and, should they fail to effectively address the grievances, doubt may be cast on the explanation that prompted the chosen strategy. This doubt prompts a serious reexamination of the competing explanations for the grievances, and, should another explanation be endorsed, a ma­ jor strategy shift is likely to follow. This explains the shift of the A l­ liance from economic self-help to political strategies. The collapse of the Texas Alliance Exchange prompted Alliance strategists like Macune to re-examine competing explanations for the grievances of farmers. Two explanations and their concomitant strategy suggestions had always vied for Alliance support: the existence of a noncompeti­ tive, exploitative marketing and purchasing system that could best be addressed through business cooperation strategies on the part of farmers to undermine or bypass that system; and imbalances within the economic system—particularly the monetary system—that were best addressed by utilizing the political power made possible by a farmers' voting bloc. The former explanation and accompanying solution to the farmers' grievances dominated the Alliance in the

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pre-1889 period. The latter explanation, as evidenced by the passage of the Cleburne Demands in 1886, was also present. Those demands, however, created serious tensions within the Alliance and thus re­ mained subordinate in focus to the business cooperation strategies. A fatal blow to the business cooperation approach occurred with the collapse of the Texas Alliance Exchange, which had promised so much and had been touted as an example of what other state al­ liances should do. Without the Exchange and its joint-note program, the Alliance promised little in the way of economic relief for the many small yeoman and tenant farmers entrapped by crop-lien fi­ nancing. Unless these farmers were extricated from this entrap­ ment, the power that the Alliance could wield was undermined. Thus, the utility of business cooperation-economic pressure tactics began to be seriously questioned. The Alliance organization was very vulnerable at this point. A l­ liance strategists quickly acted to protect the organization by advo­ cating a legislative approach to future Alliance strategies. Hindsight, strategists like Macune argued, showed that the business coopera­ tion approach was limited in what it could accomplish. Root causes of the agricultural and general economic depression could not be eliminated, or even significantly alleviated, through self-help busi­ ness cooperation strategies. In sum, the business cooperation ap­ proach had been tested and found wanting, thus precipitating a ma­ jor strategy shift. With the shift to political action, contention now centered on the manner in which the Alliance was to be political. Many Alliance members felt that the needed reforms could be achieved in the exist­ ing two-party system, while others argued that a new party structure was crucial. Alliance members calling for reform within the existing party structure expressed their opinions quite strongly: Now friends, I am "up to snuff" when it comes to recognizing the fact that the farmers are oppressed, but you are "way off" if you think you can rid yourself of this oppression by tacking yourself to a third party's political kite—don't let them hood­ wink you. . . . you will simply aid in putting into office a class of renegades that don't know enough to blow hot soup.18 Moreover: there are more ways leading from out of the wilderness of op­ pression than the one marked out by those agitators who rant and rave about such things as they know so little of, and say "unless you vote as we say" the iron hand of oppression will fasten its screws tighter and tighter around our throats.19

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According to these party loyalists, the people controlled the parties. If the people wanted reform, they would get it. Comments to this effect abound in letters to the editor of the Mercury. One writer quipped: "When the horses are hitched to the Democratic wagon, we clod-hoppers mount it and crack our whip and if the other fellows . . . don't like it [they] can just lump it."20 Those Alliance members advocating a new party structure pointed out that many of the root causes of the present economic ills required reform at the federal level. With farmers north of the MasonDixon line remaining loyal to the Republican party, and Southern farmers remaining loyal to the Democratic party, reform was un­ likely. The belief that reformers would be able to control the old party machinery was thought of as wishful thinking by third-party advocates. One such advocate commented: If enough of you can get together and control the convention of the old parties to such an extent that you can write down the demands made by the various industrial orders in the platform, do so, and while I hope and wish you success I can only believe you will meet in disappointment.21 Another third-party advocate stated: I am not in favor of departing from old and familiar paths when those paths lead to the right place, but it seems to me a man would be a fit subject for an asylum when he continues to stay in a path that takes him in a circle and he never gets anywhere.22 Once again, the stage was set for a possible schism in the Al­ liance. The debate between the third partyites and party loyalists in the Texas Alliance continued unabated. The party loyalists were at least initially larger in number, and the third partyites had to bide their time. Most Alliance members were not yet convinced that they were "going in circles and getting nowhere."

The 1890 State Election and Alliance Political Pressure Tactics As the 1890 state election year got under way in Texas, most Al­ liance members saw great potential for reform. James Hogg was a candidate for the Democratic party nomination for governor. As the former attorney general, he had gained great popularity by address­ ing railroad abuses. He had filed for an injunction against the rail­

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road lines in Texas that had formed a "traffic association." He argued that the association represented an unlawful combination in restric­ tion of trade. He also filed suits against certain railroads for the recovery of lands given them by the state. Now, as candidate for gov­ ernor, he was endorsing the idea of establishing a railroad commis­ sion to regulate the railroad industry, particularly intrastate freight charges. Hogg's ideas on reform did not go unchallenged by political con­ servatives. The idea of a railroad commission was hotly debated. The railroads used their economic leverage to fight the commission idea. In an interview with a Dallas Morning News reporter, railroad mag­ nate fay Gould stated that he did not think there would be much more railroad building in Texas because capital had "'grown timid for certain reasons." One railroad line was reported to have informed the town of Bonham that the proposed new line extension to Bon­ ham had been indefinitely postponed "owing to the prospect of hos­ tile legislation."23 The powerful economic leverage wielded by the railroads had a strong impact on attitudes toward the railroad commission proposal. Most of the major news dailies opposed the proposal: There can be no doubt that the creation of a railroad commis­ sion in answer to the demand of an anti-railroad sentiment, speaking through politicians and demagogues, would put a stop to investments in railroads.24 They charged that the idea for a railroad commission was probably more a measure of the office-hungry manipulators and ringsters than it is of the people or the parties that have been forced to adopt it. The democratic party in Texas for fifteen years had been importuned, petitioned, threatened, and bull­ dozed to create a commission. As long as the party kept itself pure and homogeneous, the political mercenaries were cut off, for the Texas democracy was governed by principles. . . ,25 The principles referred to were the fundamental principles of laissez faire. The Dallas Morning News asked whether the "rights and lib­ erties of the people with respect to property, business, and industry under the guarantee of law shall be surrendered to a government of centralized authority and arbitrary discretion."26 Given these hostile attitudes toward the railroad commission idea, the Mercury began a weekly column on the issue of railroad regulation. Tom Brown, a Texas lawyer, wrote the column, and in it

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he stressed the need for the state to exercise control over the rail­ roads. The railroad commission issue soon became a symbol of the struggle of the people to control the increasingly powerful corpora­ tions. Given the persistence of a strong anti-Hogg and antirailroad commission sentiment, the Mercury declared that the campaign hinged on the railroad commission issue and took a decidedly proHogg stance. Hogg was said to have "struck out from the shoulder at corporations, and trusts, and combines, and monopolies of every sort/' He was praised for having challenged "those who would make his party the tool of corporations and money-extorting combines of every kind/'27 To put some force behind its support for Hogg, the Alliance, through its official mouthpiece the Mercury, stressed that if the Democratic party did not support Hogg and a railroad commission plan at its convention, Alliance Democrats would seriously consider bolting the convention. To put some realism behind this threat, a call went out to Alliance members and sympathizers to attend a Fort Worth meeting on September 8. The purpose of this meeting was to decide on the stance to be taken in the 1890 election campaign. There was a real possibility that if Hogg and his reform platform were not supported by the Democratic party, a separate, independent ticket would be fielded.28 The threat worked. On August 13, the Galveston Daily News headline read: "The Extremists Easily Capture the Day." Hogg was nominated by a vote of 836V4 to i8 3/4; the railroad commission plank in the platform won over a dissenting minority report by a vote of 701 to 159.29 Having obtained the Democratic party nomination, Hogg easily won over his Republican opponent in the November election. Democratic party loyalists within the Alliance were jubilant; they were now more than ever convinced that necessary reforms could be achieved by the people gaining control of the Democratic party. They argued that the victory for Hogg and the railroad com­ mission reform illustrated the usefulness of political pressure tac­ tics in achieving reform. Formation of the commission had been a reform demand for fifteen years, and only after a powerful organiza­ tion like the Alliance had stood solidly behind it was it finally en­ dorsed by the Democratic party. In sociological parlance, pressure politics—if sufficiently intense—can force a government to make reform concessions that it previously had refused in order to restore legitimacy to the government. Without such pressure, the govern­ ment tends to side with powerful business interests that claim that

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the reforms will be devastating to business and will undermine the process of capital accumulation that is so essential to a healthy economy. The jubilation derived from the railroad commission victory was tempered for many Texas Alliance members by the fact that at its convention the state Democratic party had openly declared itself against the sub treasury proposal of the Alliance. At the state A lli­ ance convention, which followed closely on the tails of the Demo­ cratic convention, the subtreasury issue was the issue. Should the Alliance insist that the Democratic party support the subtreasury proposal, as it had insisted on the railroad commission? The debate extended for two days. In the final roll-call vote, 16 counties ab­ stained, 23 voted no, and 75 voted yes.30Thus, two-thirds of the dele­ gates had declared themselves in opposition to the Texas Demo­ cratic party on a fundamental issue. For most Alliance members, this opposition merely meant that the Alliance faced another challenge: to gain Democratic support for the subtreasury proposal by using in future election years the politi­ cal pressure tactics that had worked so effectively in 1890 in obtain­ ing an endorsement of the railroad commission. But in the present election, their support for Hogg was not seriously affected. They would be patient and obtain reform piecemeal.

The Subtreasury Debate The Texas Democratic party leadership was disturbed by the A lli­ ance's firm stance on the subtreasury. In a letter to Hogg, Texas Sen­ ator John Reagan requested the names of the Texas delegates to the national convention of the Southern Farmers Alliance, scheduled for December. He stated that he wished to communicate with them be­ fore they left for the convention to make sure they realized the importance of that meeting taking no step which will prevent the members of the Alliance from co-operating with the de­ mocracy in the future. The Sub-Treasury bill is the danger­ ous question and I hope they may be willing to omit to en­ dorse it.31 He added that he wished Macune and other leading subtreasuryites would be shunned by the Alliance because if he is not being paid to [break] up [the] democratic party, he is

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doing that work as effectually as if he was; and for the good of the country ought to be squelched.32 Senator Reagan's views on the subtreasury were echoed by other Democratic leaders. Texas Congressmen C. Stewart and f. W. Bailey openly declared against the subtreasury. Representatives R. Q. Mills and Richard Coke followed suit.33 Clearly, the party leaders were only willing to endorse certain reform demands, like the regulatory railroad commission. The sub­ treasury proposal was too radical; the scale of reform entailed in the proposal was frightening to most Democrats. It would involve mon­ umental and unprecedented intervention by the federal government into the agricultural commodities market and would totally alter the monetary system of the United States. The potential impact of the subtreasury, however promising it might have been for tenant and yeoman farmers, was threatening to three powerful interest groups: bankers, agricultural commodity speculators, and profiteers of the crop-lien system of finance. The subtreasury plan was an economic threat to bankers since its implementation would halt the use of national banks as deposito­ ries for federal monies. Instead, these monies would be used for land and commodity loans directly to the people. It would abolish the National Banking Act of 1863, which had originally been passed to encourage the sale of government bonds during the Civil War. Under this act, banks could issue bank notes worth up to 90 percent of the face value of any purchased government bond. The cost of these notes to the banks was a mere 1 -percent interest charge, payable to the federal government. These bond-backed bank notes were in turn loaned to the public for not less than 8 percent. Thus, banks profited twice—from collecting interest from the bonds themselves and from collecting interest on bond-backed bank notes. It was clearly in the bankers' interest to oppose the subtreasury plan, and oppose it loudly and aggressively. The subtreasury plan also threatened the interests of agricul­ tural commodity speculators. The commodity-loan aspect of the plan, by providing inexpensive storage facilities and loan advances to the farmers, would result in staggering the sales of agricultural commodities. No longer would farmers be forced to sell immedi­ ately after harvest out of economic necessity. In essence, every farmer could now be a speculator, closely watching market prices and sell­ ing when they were favorable. The third powerful group whose interests were threatened by the subtreasury plan was the large planters. These planters often

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served in the role of retail merchants to their tenants, extending to them crop-lien financing. This role benefited the planter in two ways. First, the profits from goods sold to tenants on credit could be substantial; second, for tenants who could not pay their debt at har­ vesttime—and those falling in this category were often numerous— the legalities of the crop-lien contract effectively tied them to the land until their debt was paid. Thus, the large planter was assured of a sufficient (and cheap) labor supply after the abolishment of slavery, and, most importantly, the competitiveness of the agricultural labor market was kept to a minimum. Despite such strong opposition, the Alliance did not back down on its commitment to the subtreasury proposal. Ignoring the warn­ ings of the Democratic party leaders, the delegates to the December 1890 national convention of the Southern Farmers Alliance in Ocala, Florida, had unanimously declared in favor of the subtreasury. The Alliance as an organization was solidly behind the subtreasury pro­ posal; the battle had begun. In regard to third-party support, how­ ever, key Alliance leaders like Macune were still arguing that the Al­ liance should for the moment continue to press for the subtreasury and other reforms through the existing party structure. In an at­ tempt to appease ardent third partyites within the Alliance, Macune proposed that the Alliance meet with other reform organizations in February 1892 in St. Louis to discuss the desirability of a third party. The time lag would give reform organizations time to test the utility of pressure politics by the Alliance organization, as well as get ac­ quainted with the desires of members at the grass-roots level: "If the people by delegates coming directly from them agree that a third party move is necessary, it need not be feared."34 Recognizing the firm commitment of the Alliance to the sub­ treasury plan, opponents of that plan began a serious media cam­ paign attacking it. The subtreasury debate became a major news issue. Much of the attack was of a very nonspecific nature. Without examining the details of the subtreasury plan, opponents simply la­ beled it "visionary," an "absurd heresy," a "wild idea." One promi­ nent Democrat claimed it would "increase a hundred fold our suffer­ ing," but no explanation for this dire prediction was offered. The editors of the Fort Worth Gazette claimed that the subtreasury plan was a ploy of the Republican party to aid in the destruction of the Democratic party; it was "nothing more than an abominable sub­ stitute for the bloody shirt." Advocates of the Republican-ploy "the­ ory" ignored the fact that the subtreasury plan was created and advo­ cated by Democratic loyalists within the Alliance.35

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The more specific arguments against the subtreasury generally revolved around three points: that the subtreasury represented class legislation, that it would result in an increased tax burden, and that it would promote the centralization of power in the federal govern­ ment. In regard to the first criticism—that the subtreasury repre­ sented class legislation—it was argued that many groups in eco­ nomic need would not benefit from the implementation of the subtreasury plan. It would be of little or no benefit to the farm la­ borer, livestock owner, or fruit and vegetable farmer. Neither would it be of any use to the laborer in the manufacturing sector. In fact, far from benefiting from that plan, many would suffer economically if it were implemented (or so the critics alleged). As a result of the ware­ housing and loan privileges of the subtreasury plan, farmers would hold their crops off the market until crop prices escalated. While this was pleasing to the farmer, it would not be pleasing to the con­ sumer.36 Critics were quick to remind the Alliance of its original motto: "Equal justice for all, special favors to none." How could the Alliance justify its pleading for the special favors entailed in the sub­ treasury plan? Then there was the issue of funding the subtreasury plan. Large sums of money would be needed to fund the land-loan program, con­ struct the warehouses needed for the commodity-loan program, staff these warehouses, and provide funds for the commodity loans. Where would this money come from? Some critics wailed that the source would be increased taxes. They were quick to remind Alliance mem­ bers of their complaints about the already heavy tax burden.37 Finally, there was the criticism that the subtreasury plan would promote the centralization of power in the federal government. The memory of the Civil War and the cry for states' rights were still strong in the South. The Democratic party leaders took advantage of this fact; they argued that the subtreasury plan called for a significant increase in the patronage powers of the federal government. Thou­ sands of warehouse workers and managers would be needed and the federal government would use its patronage powers to fill these posi­ tions with Republican federal officeholders.38 The Alliance leadership launched a major educational campaign to counter these attacks. They fully realized the importance of es­ tablishing some type of plausibility structure for what was coming to be labeled a heretical idea. L. L. Polk, the current president of the Southern Farmers Alliance, revealed plans to extend the lecturing system, since attempts were being made to undermine the Alliance and its support for the subtreasury. He stressed that

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the ultimate, inevitable and triumphant success of our prin­ ciples is assured, if this system be actively and faithfully prose­ cuted. . . . If prosecuted as designed, this system will engage the services during the year of not less than 35,000 lecturers in our cause.39 L. L. Polk well understood the importance of organization to commitment. When advocating a controversial plan, it is essential to establish a communication network that can defend the plan. Contrary to the claims of Kornhauser, Turner, and Hackney,40 the isolation of an aggrieved population is not a positive factor when at­ tempting to mobilize that population behind a controversial reform proposal. The generation and maintenance of commitment to a spe­ cific reform proposal necessitates an organizational network. This assertion also runs counter to the contention of Piven and Cloward that organization is antithetical to commitment generation and maintenance,41 According to Piven and Cloward, organization re­ sults in the tempering, if not total abandonment, of commitment to protest demands. The Alliance's large-scale educational campaign to buttress commitment to the subtreasury idea indicates that they have overstated their point. While it is true that organization can lead to acquiescence and frustrate the attainment of protest demands, the problem is better viewed not as organization per se, but as cer­ tain structural features that affect the ability and willingness of an organization to develop and maintain protest goals. The Alliance or­ ganization had two features that served it well in its task to generate and maintain commitment: a grass-roots organizational network, and a readily perceived common interest among its membership. As will become apparent, these features were crucial to the success of the subtreasury educational campaign. Texas Alliance leaders launched the subtreasury educational campaign with vigor; they made sure that Texas was canvassed by scores of additional lecturers. These lecturers explained the details of the subtreasury proposal and other Alliance principles to hun­ dreds of local alliances. But the educational campaign was not con­ fined to the traditional practice of short lectures delivered to local alliances; the idea of Alliance encampments was born. Notice of these grand encampments began in the summer of 1890, with their frequency picking up in 1891. In the summer of 1891, several county alliances participated in a four-day encampment at Sulphur Springs. The estimated number of people present on any given day varied from 8,000 to 15,000. A similar encampment in Collin County was attended by some 5,000 to 10,000 people.42 These encampments

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served a crucial function: they mitigated the intimidation felt by Al­ liance subtreasury supporters. The subtreasuryites, as they were often called, faced the vehement and persistent hostility of oppo­ nents of the subtreasury plan. The encampments, with thousands of subtreasuryites in attendance, served as a buttress against this hostility. The Alliance's reform press also served a crucial function in the subtreasury campaign. It provided a routine forum through which to defend the subtreasury proposal from attack. The Alliance's na­ tional mouthpiece, the National Economist, was founded in the summer of 1889 under the editorship of C. W. Macune. Its weekly circulation soon soared to over 100,000.43 In Texas, the National Economist was supplemented by scores of small town and county reform papers, as well as the state organ of the Texas Alliance, the Southern Mercury. In 1891, the Mercury had a circulation of 26,000.44 The editors of the various reform papers attempted to protect Al­ liance members against the cries of heresy by frequent reference to political tradition and to religion: It requires just as much patriotism to be loyal to the principles of the Farmers Alliance and fight its enemies as it did for our forefathers to wrest control from the British crown. . . .The same principles are involved and every member of the Farmers Alliance who now deserts his organization is as much a traitor to his country and the freedom of his children as was Benedict Arnold.45 Statements likening Alliance principles to those of revered political leaders of the past such as Thomas Jefferson were common. Alliance members were also told that Alliance principles were in line with the teachings of Christ.46 The attempt to legitimate Alliance principles by linking them to culturally sanctioned principles occurred simultaneously with an educational campaign attacking subtreasury criticism. The reform press addressed each of the major criticisms of the subtreasury pro­ posal. It labeled as unfounded the charge that the subtreasury was class legislation and that its implementation would hurt the con­ sumer as well as raise taxes. Although the farmers, particularly those relying on crop-lien financing, backed the subtreasury plan because they believed it would benefit them, some were sensitive to the charge that they, like the bankers and industrial capitalists, were just out for their own economic interests; other groups, say consum­ ers, might lose as a result of the subtreasury plan. To counter this charge, the Alliance reform press stressed that the subtreasury plan

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represented an alternative to the present monetary system. Its pur­ pose was to ensure a sufficient and flexible currency supply; this would benefit the entire country. Money was the lifeblood of the economy and its scarcity was responsible for the present depression that touched the lives of almost every American. It was true that the warehousing feature of the subtreasury proposal in a very direct way benefited the farmer, but not at the expense of the consumer, as some critics were charging. It was pointed out that corn was cur­ rently selling at $.70 per bushel, yet the farmer received only $.20 per bushel when he had to sell at harvesttime. Speculators reaped the $.50 differential. The same situation occurred in the wheat and cotton market. Farmers who produced the crop by the sweat of their brow earned very little compared to the speculator. The subtreasury plan would eliminate the speculator. With low-interest crop loans, farmers would no longer be forced to sell to speculators at harvest­ time. If they took advantage of these loans and held their crops for a higher price, they would merely reap the profit that formerly had gone to speculators. The attitude of the agrarian reformers was that the consumer might as well pay the hard-working farmer as the speculator.47 The reform press also labeled the charge that implementation of the subtreasury plan would significantly raise taxes grossly inaccu­ rate and a clear sign that subtreasury opponents did not understand the plan that they so vigorously opposed. After all, a chief purpose of the subtreasury plan was to increase the volume of money in cir­ culation. To take money from the taxpayers and loan it to farmers would defeat this purpose. The subtreasury plan called for the gov­ ernment to use its constitutional right to coin and print money.48 Finally, the reform press answered the charge that the subtreas­ ury would increase the patronage powers of the federal government and thus increase the number of federal officeholders in the South. It asked, should the postal system be abolished because it increased the number of governmental officeholders? It was argued that the critics of the subtreasury would certainly not respond affirmatively to this question. They merely chose to use their logic discriminately. Furthermore, the officeholders necessitated by the subtreasury plan could very easily be elected during state and local elections, thereby eliminating the criticism of federal patronage powers altogether.49 In sum, organization was crucial to the Alliance's subtreasury campaign. Without an organizational structure to disseminate a de­ fense of the subtreasury, maintenance of commitment to that pro­ posal would have been very difficult. Largely, as a result of the educa­

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tional campaign, the Alliance as an organization stood solidly behind the proposal, both in Texas and nationwide. However, the subtreasury plan was not without its critics within the Alliance. In most states, including Texas, there were outspoken anti-subtreasuryites. The attempt to mobilize the anti-subtreasury faction in the Alliance began in earnest with the publication of what became known as the Austin Manifesto in March 1891. The mani­ festo declared that the subtreasury plan was a scheme of third party ites within the Alliance. These third-party advocates fully realized that the Democratic party would never endorse a proposal as hereti­ cal as the subtreasury. Alliance members would be forced to desert the Democratic party if they required its endorsement of the sub­ treasury in return for their electoral support. The authors of the manifesto argued that the Alliance was in an excellent position to purify the Democratic party if it would just put aside its support for the subtreasury. They asked the Alliance membership to do just that. The manifesto was signed by eleven Alliance members, eight of whom were state legislators.50 The manifesto caused alarm within the Alliance and tempers flared. Indeed, a little over a week after its publication, one of its signers got in a fist fight in the corridors of the capital with a promi­ nent subtreasuryite. It was front-page news.51 The Texas Alliance called a special convention of Alliance officers in Waco in late April to discuss the manifesto. The convention was also front-page news. The Alliance was obviously being watched carefully. It was recog­ nized as a power with which the Democratic party had to reckon. There were reported to be from 168 to 400 delegates in attendance at various times during the four-day convention. Two issues were dis­ cussed: the issue of continued support for the subtreasury plan and, if endorsed, the issue of how best to secure legislation implement­ ing it. Macune attended the convention to speak on behalf of the sub­ treasury scheme. In his speech, he stressed that the present depres­ sion was due to an insufficient currency supply. The subtreasury represented the only plan currently proposed that adequately dealt with the currency problem. At the end of his speech, Macune was cheered, with the cheers being "of the regulation degree of deafen­ ing.;/ A reporter from the Galveston Daily News conjectured that out of the hundreds of delegates present, all but about a dozen were subtreasuryites. With subtreasury support so strong, a resolution de­ nouncing the Austin Manifesto signers passed easily.52 The issue of reform through the Democratic party or a third

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party was not so easily resolved. After much debate, a vote was taken. A third-party move was defeated 95 to 83, with a number of dele­ gates abstaining.53 Although third-party sentiment was growing, it had not yet gained the support of the majority. The plurality of Al­ liance delegates still felt that an endorsement of the subtreasury could be forced on the Democratic party. The reaffirmation of reform within old party lines did not quiet Alliance anti-subtreasuryites. While Texas Alliance delegates may have expressed a reluctance to desert the Democratic party, on the national level the creation of a third party was being seriously con­ templated. A national meeting of reform organizations had been called for May 1891 in Cincinnati to discuss the desirability of es­ tablishing a third-party organization. Three hundred to 400 dele­ gates from over seven different reform organizations, including the Southern Farmers Alliance, gathered in Cincinnati. Over 1,400 peo­ ple were in attendance. This convention made headlines across the nation when the majority of the delegates voted in favor of establish­ ing a third party—the People's party—to promote needed reforms. It was agreed that the new party would adopt as its reform platform the one endorsed at the recent convention of the largest existing pro­ test organization—the Southern Farmers Alliance. This platform had called for the abolition of the existing national bank system and the substitution of the subtreasury plan; it also demanded the free and unlimited coinage of silver; the removal of the tariff tax on the necessities of life; a graduated income tax; direct election of U.S. senators; government control of public communication and trans­ portation, with eventual ownership if control did not remove present abuses; and an anti-land speculation plank.54 While a third-party organizational structure was formed, no nominations were made at the convention; they were postponed un­ til after the St. Louis convention, which was to meet in February 1892. As noted earlier, the national organization of the Southern Farmers Alliance had at its annual convention in 1890 decided to continue to press for reform through the old parties until the 1892 election year. At that time, they had invited other reform organiza­ tions to join them in St. Louis to discuss the desirability of a third party. The time lag would give reform organizations time to evaluate the effectiveness of pressure politics within the two-party structure. The almost nine-month wait to nominate third-party candidates seemed worthwhile. The Cincinnati conventioneers hoped that the South, which was poorly represented at the Cincinnati convention, would warm to the idea of a third party, given additional time.55 The Texas press made much of the sparsity of Southern representatives

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at the Cincinnati convention; there were only thirty-six delegates from the entire South. The Houston Daily Post praised the Southern farmers, saying that they heatedly discussed political issues but when it comes to politics they are democrats and recognize in the fullest sense the fact that to follow a third party will mean to play stool pigeon to the Republicans.56 But of the South's thirty-six delegates to the Cincinnati convention, twenty-seven were from Texas.57 These delegates returned to Texas and promptly began to establish a state third-party organization. With the emergence of a third-party organization, the gravest fears of the Alliance anti-subtreasuryites became reality. In Texas, they worked harder than ever to try to get the Alliance to drop the subtreasury proposal from its reform platform. They felt that the Democratic party might endorse the Alliance platform if mention of the subtreasury proposal was deleted. To aid in their anti-subtreasury campaign, they established a new paper, Farmer's World, to present their views. They hoped to sway Alliance opinion on the subtreas­ ury issue before the state Alliance met for its regular annual conven­ tion in August. The plan was to control the August convention and ensure that it voted down the subtreasury. An anti-subtreasury con­ vention was planned; it was to meet in Fort Worth on July 10 to organize the anti-subtreasury campaign. Invitations to the conven­ tion were extended to all Alliance members who opposed the sub­ treasury and other like impracticable and visionary schemes of finance and who do not endorse the efforts of certain Alliance bosses to browbeat and drive the democratic and independent thinking element of the order into the support of those measures.58 This schism in the Alliance was regarded with relief by out­ siders who had feared the growing power of the Alliance and its pro­ subtreasury stance. The Houston Daily Post stated that it was now clear that the "thinking members" of the Alliance were not in agree­ ment with the Mercury's stance on the subtreasury. It predicted that the newly established Farmer’s World would quickly become the major organ of the Alliance. The Fort Worth Gazette also predicted that Farmer’s World would become a strong force in the Alliance, with the "sensible element" of the order backing its anti-subtreasury view. It wondered whether the Mercury was quietly repenting the "political folly" of its strong subtreasury advocacy now that it was to have serious competition from the anti-subtreasury Alliance paper.59 The anti-subtreasuryites convened as planned in Fort Worth

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Politicization of the Alliance

in July. The turnout was anything but impressive: one observer claimed that there were only thirty-seven people present.60The fail­ ure of the anti-subtreasury faction of the Texas Alliance to mobilize a sizable following is also evidenced by the fact that it never won the support of more than four county alliances and various local al­ liances in about a dozen other counties.61 The proceedings of the an­ nual state Alliance convention in August 1891 decisively showed that the anti-subtreasuryite faction had failed. The delegates passed a resolution to the effect that they would support no politician who did not advocate the subtreasury proposal. While the Alliance had backed Hogg in 1890 as their reform candidate, they now declared that, in future political campaigns, their support would hinge on a candidate's subtreasury stance.62The same delegates, however, voted down a resolution supporting the third-party organization estab­ lished three months earlier in Cincinnati. They supported the con­ tinuation of pressure politics in the old parties until the time of the St. Louis convention in early 1892. Thus, they were sending the Democratic party leaders a clear message: we want to be loyal to the party, but if you do not support Alliance reform measures, you will force us to support the new People's party. The Democratic party leaders had six months—until the St. Louis convention—to decide if they would support the Alliance reform demands in full. The anti-subtreasuryites within the Alliance did not give up. They continued their campaign against the subtreasury on the na­ tional level. But their national effort to gain control of the Alliance was also a failure. A national anti-subtreasuryite convention was held in St. Louis in September 1891. About seventy persons from six different states were in attendance; however, none of those at­ tending were authorized delegates from state Alliance organizations. The convention heatedly debated whether or not to establish a per­ manent organization to rival the present Alliance organization that they claimed was controlled by political bosses like Macune. W. S. McAllister, who chaired the resolutions committee, stated that "Macunism is a fatal octopus encircling with its slimy coils the es­ cutcheon of the order, stifling its original purity and destroying its virtue." After much debate, the convention decided to make a fight within the existing order. A committee was appointed to present an anti-subtreasury report to the national convention of the Southern Farmers Alliance that was to meet in Indianapolis in December.63 At the opening session of the national Alliance convention in Indianapolis, the anti-subtreasury committee asked for a hearing of its report. This request was met with angry protest, and a two-hour

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debate on the granting of the request commenced. Those opposing the request argued that the anti-subtreasuryites had caused more harm to the Alliance than all the other enemies of the Alliance put together. They stressed that the Alliance as an organization had al­ ready affirmed its commitment to the subtreasury and that the antisubtreasuryites should fall in step with the majority or leave the or­ der. Finally a compromise was reached. The anti-subtreasuryites were to give their report to a specially appointed committee, which would then judge whether the report merited presentation before the entire convention. The anti-subtreasuryites balked at the compro­ mise and threatened to set up a rival Alliance organization. Their at­ tempt to establish such an organization was completely unsuccess­ ful.64 The anti-subtreasuryites had clearly failed to gain control of the Alliance. Who were the anti-subtreasuryites? Why did they persist in at­ tacking the subtreasury when it had been so strongly endorsed by a democratic vote within the Alliance? The answer is clear: the antisubtreasuryites had a political reason for adamantly opposing the subtreasury plan. Eight of the eleven Texas Alliance members who signed the first anti-subtreasury document—the Austin Manifesto— were state legislators.65 At the first anti-subtreasury convention in Fort Worth, most of those present had leadership roles in the state Democratic party. The composition of those attending the conven­ tion led the Galveston Daily News to state in its coverage of the convention that "there is no bones made of the fact that the govern­ ment is in it."66The link of the anti-subtreasuryites with the Demo­ cratic party machine did much to discredit them in the eyes of fel­ low Alliance members. The Alliance membership, for the most part, perceived the anti-subtreasuryites as attempting to protect their po­ litical careers in the Democratic party. After failing to undermine Alliance support for the subtreasury proposal by attacking it directly, the Democratic party leadership switched to an even more repressive tactic: the forced resignation from the party of subtreasury supporters. In October 1891, the Demo­ cratic Executive Committee in Dallas asked one of its members who was an Alliance subtreasuryite to resign. This member, W. R. Cole, was told: In Texas we have but two parties—the democratic and the sub­ treasury. The subtreasury men . . . are fighting us all over the state. We cannot fight them while they are still on our committee.67

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Politicization of the Alliance

The forced resignation of Cole was the "sensation of the hour in politics/768 A heated debate ensued on whether the Dallas Demo­ cratic Executive Committee had the authority to demand Cole's res­ ignation. Many major newspapers editorialized against the action of the committee. The Galveston Daily News charged that if the Demo­ crats forced out those who did not endorse each and every plank of the 1890 state Democratic party platform, the party would have few remaining members. The Houston Daily Post and the Dallas Morn­ ing News offered a similar argument: they insisted that the Demo­ cratic party had never forced its members to unquestioningly en­ dorse the entire party platform.69Other papers, such as the Fort Worth Gazette, endorsed the committee's actions.70 The state Democratic Executive Committee was called upon to resolve the debate. The chairman of this committee, N. W. Finley, not only ruled in favor of the Dallas Executive Committee, but went one step further by issu­ ing the following ultimatum: . . . men who owe allegiance to the now political subtreasury Alliance of Texas will have to abandon the subtreasury theory, in submission to the action of the democratic party in Texas, before they become competent to participate in democratic primaries.71 The Democratic party had finally taken the offensive with the sub­ treasuryites. Not only could they not hold official positions within the Democratic party, they could not even vote in the Democratic primaries. Thus, the same Democratic party in Texas that had just one year earlier courted Alliance support by advocating a railroad com­ mission was now seeking to destroy the Alliance by giving its mem­ bers an ultimatum: forsake their support for the subtreasury plan or leave the Democratic party. This dramatic change in the DemocratAlliance relationship illustrates the importance of recognizing a tem­ poral dimension when analyzing protest organization-government interactions. In 1890, the Democratic party had solicited Alliance support with a strategy of selective issue endorsement. A "tolerable" reform demand—the regulatory railroad commission—had been en­ dorsed in hopes that Alliance members would be persuaded that the government had their best interests at heart. In this manner, the per­ ceived legitimacy of the government would be enhanced and the Al­ liance protestors would be deflected from more radical demands like the subtreasury. However, the particular issue selected for endorse­ ment was only temporarily successful in achieving deflection. While

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the majority of Alliance members in 1890 did indeed support the re­ form Democratic ticket with its promise of a regulatory railroad commission, immediately after the election a renewed push for the subtreasury occurred. The Alliance voted to support as an organiza­ tion in the future only those politicians who supported the subtreas­ ury proposal. The Democrats were once more faced with the chal­ lenge of the growing insurgency of the Alliance membership. The challenge became all the more serious as a result of the de­ cision made at the Alliance-called reform convention that met in St. Louis in February 1892. The refusal of the Democratic party to sup­ port the key Alliance demand—the subtreasury—exhausted the cry for reform through pressure politics in the old parties. The reform convention endorsed the creation of a third party and a call for a na­ tional nominating convention was issued for 4 July 1892.72 The pa­ tience of the Cincinnati conventioneers who had voted for a third party almost nine months earlier had paid off. The sparsity of South­ ern representation at the Cincinnati convention had indicated a lack of support for a third-party protest movement in the South. By 1892, though, Southern support for a third party was on the increase. After the formation of a third party, Finley briefly questioned his ultimatum to Alliance Democrats. In March 1892, he wrote to Governor Hogg offering his resignation if Hogg thought it would be in the best interests of the party and the upcoming election cam­ paign. Hogg did not accept the resignation, and made no move to override Finley's ruling.73 As the campaign of 1892 approached, the subtreasury Democrats were faced with a crucial decision: Was prin­ ciple to be placed above party loyalty? A third party, the People's party, had been formed, and it had endorsed all of the demands of the Alliance. The Democratic party was clearly not going to act simi­ larly. With hopes blasted for a Democratic endorsement of the A l­ liance reform platform, serious consideration of third-party support was now necessary. Thus, a link between the Alliance and a third party had finally been formally established with respect to reform platforms. The A l­ liance had come a long way from its strong anti-third party stance of the pre-1890 years. The forms of Alliance protest since its incep­ tion in 1877 had continually evolved from the interaction between the chosen strategies and the reactions of established structures to those strategies. This evolution of Alliance strategies clearly shows that a strategy that is endorsed at one time may have at an earlier time been totally unacceptable. Nothing illustrates this point better than the position of the Alliance toward third-party politics. Third-

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Politicization of the Alliance

party advocacy was not considered a desirable reform strategy by the vast majority of Alliance members until all other relief attempts had failed. Ironically, the shift of Alliance strategies from tactics in the eco­ nomic sphere to those in the political sphere was simultaneously the best and worst move it could make after the collapse of the Ex­ change and its joint-note program. The subtreasury plan of the Al­ liance addressed for the first time a key cause of the economic de­ pression, an inadequate money supply, and proposed an economic solution that would link the expansion of the money supply to the freeing of poor farmers from entrapment in the crop-lien system of financing. The subtreasury plan was an amazingly creative substitute for the Alliance Exchange program and its joint-note program. However, the sub treasury plan (and the concomitant shift to electoral political tactics) was as short-sighted strategically as it was brilliant in its economic logic. The American political system has a "winner-takes-all" electoral arrangement rather than a proportion­ ate representation rule; this arrangement makes it very difficult for a third party to win an election. A third-party organization faces two difficult challenges: It must convince a majority of the people that the reforms it is advocating are necessary, and it must convince them that the third party has a reasonable chance of receiving a majority of votes in a sufficient number of congressional races so that the re­ form package has a chance of passage. Both of these challenges must be met. If the former, but not the latter, challenge is successfully ad­ dressed, many voters who agree with the third-party platform will nevertheless choose the least objectionable of the two old-party can­ didates. The Democratic and Republican parties are well aware of the almost insurmountable obstacles facing third parties. Therefore, their responses to such parties tend to be of two types: an attack on the necessity of the reforms demanded by the third party, or a selec­ tive issue endorsement tactic, whereby only the most "tolerable" of the third-party reform demands are endorsed in the hope of enticing voters who question the viability, although not necessarily the desir­ ability, of a third-party victory. Electoral protest movements in a "winner-takes-all" electoral system are particularly vulnerable to this last strategy. To summarize, the electoral power of an aggrieved population is significantly constricted in a "winner-takes-all" electoral system. The dominant parties realize the vulnerabilities of a third-party chal­ lenge. This makes them disinclined to respond to threats of a thirdparty protest by endorsing the full slate of protest demands. At best, only the most tolerable demands are endorsed. Radical demands,

The Subtreasury Debate

135

like the subtreasury, that threaten powerful interest groups are highly unlikely to be endorsed and implemented simply because of a thirdparty electoral challenge. Thus, the subtreasury plan was ironically both one of the most brilliant and one of the most politically naive Alliance strategies, in that Alliance subtreasuryites thought pres­ sure politics alone could force the implementation of the plan.

8. The People's Party: An Alliance Protest Strategy, 1892-1894

Not unexpectedly, the Texas Democratic party met the challenge of the third party with the reliable strategy of selective issue endorse­ ment. The Democrats again attempted to deflect Alliance attention from the subtreasury demand, this time by advocating one of the A l­ liance's—and now the People's party's—financial reform demands: the demand for "free silver." The Democratic free silverites con­ ceded that a root cause of the present hard times was the insufficient supply of money in circulation; thus, they supported the logic be­ hind the Alliance's subtreasury proposal. However, they proposed to address this problem solely by remonetizing silver. In 1873, a con_ gressional bill had demonetized silver and placed the country on a gold standard. With the growing economy and population size, the rigid gold standard had contracted the currency supply to such an extent that it had precipitated the present depression. Democratic free silverites insisted that free silver alone would provide an amply sufficient volume of currency. They argued that the "grandiose and visionary" subtreasury plan was not necessary.1 So, as it once had done with its endorsement of a railroad commission, the Texas Dem­ ocratic party again co-opted an aspect of the Alliance reform pro­ gram in an attempt to prevent the desertion of Alliance members to the third party. The Alliance leadership commenced an educational campaign attacking the effectiveness of free silver in treating present eco­ nomic ills. First, they claimed that free silver would not provide much relief from the severe currency contraction. During the pros­ perous years immediately following the Civil War, the per capita currency in circulation was approximately $50. The present volume of circulating currency was placed at approximately $5 per capita. Alliance subtreasuryites pointed out that there was no conceivable way that the silver supply could add $45 per capita to the volume of currency. Thus, as long as Americans stayed tied to a belief in the

The People’s Party

137

necessity of a metallic-based, redeemable currency, economic de­ pression would remain a threat. The sufficient expansion of the cur­ rency necessitated fiat, irredeemable money.2 Second, it was argued that free silver coinage was a very limited reform because it left the existing national banking system intact. An anti-national banking plank had been included in every na­ tional Alliance platform thus far adopted. This plank had been de­ clared by the current president of the Southern Farmers Alliance, L. L. Polk, to be one of the most important Alliance demands. Not only did Alliance reform principles call for an increased volume of circulating currency through the issuance of fiat, irredeemable trea­ sury notes, they also called for the issuance of those notes directly to the people through the subtreasury or some similar plan. In a manifesto addressed to the state Democratic chairman in November, Alliance subtreasuryites reaffirmed their commitment to the principle behind the subtreasury plan: The principle as we understand it is that national banks as banks of issue shall be abolished, that all money should be is­ sued direct by the government itself in sufficient volume to conduct the business of the country on a conservative cash basis . . . , that the volume shall be placed beyond the reach of private manipulation and rendered incapable of marked rela­ tive contraction and expansion. On this [principle] . . . we have no compromise to offer.3 This shows that more than simply the volume of currency was at issue. The subtreasuryites were calling for a much more radical change in the existing monetary system—a change that the Demo­ cratic party was not willing to endorse. The first national nominating convention of the People's party opened in Omaha on 2 }uly 1892. The party platform proposed at the Cincinnati convention—one identical to past platforms of the South­ ern Farmers Alliance—was formally presented to the delegates for a vote. This platform included the important demand of the Southern Farmers Alliance for a flexible currency issued by the federal govern­ ment through the subtreasury or a similar plan. When the platform received an unanimous vote of support, the convention "went wild." Shouts and applause continued for twenty minutes. An observer noted that "the crowd broke forth time and again in applause until the leaders finally concluded to stem the tide, and after a vigorous effort secured it."4 The delegates then proceeded to nominate Gen­ eral James Weaver as their candidate for president. Weaver had long

138

The People's Party

been an advocate of monetary reform. Eight years earlier he had re­ ceived the presidential nomination of the Greenback reform party. The vice presidential nomination went to James Field, who nar­ rowly won over Ben Terrell, a national lecturer of the Alliance and a staunch subtreasury supporter.5 The significance of the People's party reform platform was am­ plified by the conservative platforms endorsed by the national Re­ publican and Democratic conventions that had met in June. Both the Republicans and the Democrats had nominated presidential can­ didates, Benjamin Harrison and Grover Cleveland, respectively, who represented the conservative faction of their parties. The platform endorsed at both the old-party conventions was very cautious con­ cerning any change in the existing financial system. The old-party loyalists who had tried to co-opt the third-party movement with the issue of free-silver coinage had not been able to control the national conventions. The free-silver Democrats of Texas fared better in their own state, where a red-hot battle was being waged between the two con­ tenders for the Democratic nomination for governor: the present governor, James Hogg, and George Clark. The free silverites were aligned with Hogg and fighting to get a free-silver plank into the state Democratic platform. This move was opposed by the Clark fac­ tion. The two factions struggled for control of the party. At the Bexar County Democratic convention, Hogg delegates at­ tempted to drown out Clark supporters, not allowing them a voice in the convention. For a while it looked as if violence would break out. Police drew their pistols in anticipation. Faced with this atmo­ sphere, the Clark faction of some 180 delegates bolted the conven­ tion. Two days later, the Harris County Democratic convention split; this time it was the Hogg faction that had bolted.6This behavior was of great concern to many Democratic loyalists; they feared its conse­ quences. Their fears were warranted: when the state Democratic convention met in mid-August, the Clark faction bolted. Clark la­ beled the platform of the Hogg convention a strange admixture of socialism and third partyism and is a weak and cowardly surrender of democratic principles. In fact it is practically a condemnation of our National platform.7 Indeed, the Hogg reform platform did represent an attempt to appeal to potential defectors to the newly formed People's party. The platform called for the free and unlimited coinage of silver, the abol­ ishment of the national banking system as it presently existed, a

The People’s Party

139

graduated income tax, and a halt to the practice of hiring out penal convicts to corporations and private employers. It pledged fealty to the Texas railroad commission as it presently existed, subject only to changes that might become necessary for its effectiveness. It com­ mended the action of the Hogg administration in attempting to re­ cover lands unlawfully obtained by railroad companies from the state. It also called for the enactment of a law prohibiting the further operation of land corporations in Texas. It denounced as false the charge that the Hogg administration was hostile to legitimate cor­ porate enterprises or the investment of foreign capital in Texas; it claimed that the administration was simply striving for the just and equitable protection of labor as well as capital. In regard to the labor­ ing class, the platform vaguely pledged itself "to the support of all measures necessary to the promotion of their welfare." But nestled among these reform planks was another one: We denounce all acts and efforts by the Federal government whereby it in fact does or proposes to advance or lend money to any citizen, corporation, or class upon any sort of security; and we oppose government ownership of railroads, telephone, and telegraph lines.8 Though hoping that the overall platform would appeal to potential third-party supporters, the Hogg faction of the Democratic party would only go so far. It would not bend on the subtreasury issue and on that of government ownership of transportation and communica­ tion facilities. The 1892 election was to serve as a test of the degree of Alliance commitment to the subtreasury and government-ownership prin­ ciples. The Democrats used every means possible to undermine sup­ port for the People's party: selective endorsement of reform mea­ sures, character assassination of the leadership of the People's party, appeals to sectionalism, and appeals to party loyalty. For example, the Texas Farmer, an agricultural paper supportive of the Hogg ticket, devoted a whole issue to attacking the People's party and making personal attacks against its leaders in Texas. It attacked the gubernatorial candidate of the People's party, Thomas Nugent, call­ ing him a "slick lawyer" who had deserted the Democratic party simply because he could not get an appointment to the bench. The leaders of the People's party were generically labeled "broken down carpet-baggers and political prostitutes." The worst charge was re­ served for the presidential nominee of the People's party, General James Weaver. Weaver was said to have a "perfect hatred of the South­

140

The People's Party

ern people/7 and took "delight in abusing, persecuting and robbing them. . . ." Voters were warned that "the farmer or third partyite, now galling under his yoke, licks the hand of a man worse than Judas Iscariot."9 Appeals to sectionalism and party loyalty were common. The Dodd City Speculator claimed that the People's party was formed to benefit the Republican party. The Ladonia News stated that no de­ cent Southern man could vote for Weaver "without blushing with shame." The Bonham News chimed in that a vote for Weaver was a vote for Harrison.10 An attempt was made to strengthen sectional­ ism and party loyalty appeals by reference to the "force bill." This bill, designed to supervise federal elections, was introduced to Con­ gress in the summer of 1890 by a young Republican congressman, Henry C. Lodge. The bill stated that when $0 persons in a county with a population size of 500 or more signed a petition stating that unfair election methods were prevalent in the area, federal authori­ ties would supervise the election. Passage of the bill would have en­ sured increased federal activity in the South and would have also af­ fected state elections held concurrently with federal elections. The bill was defeated, but the Democratic party held out the specter of the reintroduction and passage of the bill in the future. Democrats were urged to stand united in the 1892 national election, because if the Republican party should win there would be no more free ballot in the South. The force bill which Harrison so strongly urges, would be passed and the polls would be surrounded, as in the old days of reconstruc­ tion. . . . The only people's party in the South is the demo­ cratic party.11 John Reagan, a prominent Texas Democrat, asked: And is it possible in the face of the action of the republicans or the last congress in trying to pass the force bill and in view of the action of the recent National republican convention en­ dorsing that measure that the white people of the Southern states will divide and waste their strength on impracticable is­ sues, and thus invite the overthrow of constitutional govern­ ment and the adoption of permanent negro and radical rule in the South?12 At times the platform of the People's party was attacked. Men­ tion was made of the "peculiar theories" for which the party stood. However, a much more frequent strategy to undermine support for the third-party movement was not so direct: the strategy of issue di­

The People's Party

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version. At the national level, Cleveland and his followers pushed to make the tariff the major issue of the 1892 campaign. Cleveland's views on the tariff issue found expression in the major dailies in Texas. The Dallas Morning News located the root of the current economic problems in the tariff. It argued that there was an artificial overproduction of farm products because, due to U.S. tariff policy, possible markets for those products were closed. Free trade was the remedy, and it was this issue that the Democratic party should and would base its 1892 campaign on. The News was confident that if the Democrats could secure on this the great change for which they have con­ tended so long, the country would not need unlimited coinage or any increase whatever in the circulating medium except such as would come to us naturally when the barriers and throngs and fetters of an obstructing, congesting, and stran­ gulating system were broken up and cast off.13 The Houston Daily Post joined the tariff bandwagon. It criticized the farmers' demand for "cheap money": ". . . the craze for 'cheap money' [is] a fallacy. The road to . . . buoyant prosperity and a more equitable distribution of wealth lies . . . in the steady tread of the army of reform in the tariff laws." It further contended that were it not for the robber tariff, profit from the crop of 1891 alone would lift every farm mortgage in America. The statistical support for such a statement was highly questionable, but the message of the Post was clear: reform measures such as the subtreasury and free coinage were not necessary to economic recovery.14 There were Democrats who wanted to make free-silver coinage the major issue in the upcoming campaign.15 However, they were not successful in getting a free-silver Democrat nominated as presi­ dent, nor were they able to obtain a pro-free silver plank in the na­ tional Democratic platform. Therefore, after the national convention it was hard to continue to agitate for free silver as the main issue. The stance of the Texas free-silver Democrats is concisely expressed in their state platform: While we yield to the wisdom of a majority of the National Democracy in making the reduction of revenue taxation to the necessities of the government, economically administered, the paramount issue in this campaign, upon the policy that it is safest to make the struggle to secure one reform at a time, we nevertheless proclaim our adherence to the principles, justice, and necessity of free and unlimited coinage of silver.16

142

The People's Party

This particular plank of the platform was adopted by a vote of 693 to 168.17 Thus, a large majority of Texas free-silver Democrats agreed for the present campaign not to create waves by agitating on the freesilver question. The 1892 election in Texas was an interesting test case, measur­ ing the degree of electoral threat posed by the People's party. In no other state in the South or Southwest did the People's party benefit more from the communication network that had developed as a re­ sult of years of local, county, and state Alliance projects. No other state was better equipped to deal with the dual challenge facing third parties: to convince the majority of the population of the need for the major reforms proposed by the third party, and to convince them of the viability of a third-party win so that they did not simply vote for the least objectionable of the two old-party candidates. The communication network created by the Texas Alliance organization provided the People's party leaders with the means to reach the people and maintain commitment to third-party reform demands. Because Texas had the largest Alliance organization in the nation, a victory for the People's party, which had fully endorsed Alliance re­ form demands, was at least at the state level a possibility. Thus, the Texas election results were anxiously awaited as a sign of the politi­ cal power potential of the newly formed People's party. The returns for the Texas state election were as follows:18

J- Hogg G. Clark T. Nugent D. Prendegast A. Houston

190,486 133,395 108,483 1,605 1,322

(43.7% (30.6% (24.9% (.4% (.3 %

Nugent placed third, obtaining the support of what amounted to roughly half of the Alliance membership at its height. Clearly, many Alliance members could not see their way to breaking ties with the Democratic party. However, there was some expression of surprise that the People's party had garnered even 25 percent of the vote. For example, the Houston Daily Post reported "Nugent running better than most people thought he would," and observed that, "owing to the unexpectedly large vote for Nugent, the democratic majority in Texas is not so large as was anticipated."19 One might argue that the People's party would have fared better in Texas had it not been for the Hogg-Clark split. In his past admin­ istration, Hogg had implemented certain important reforms relating to railroad and land policy. Shortly after taking office, he engineered the passage of a railroad commission bill that gave him the power

The People’s Party

143

to appoint three commissioners to establish and maintain "reason­ able" rates of railroad charges for the transportation of passengers and freight having origin and destination within the state limits. The Alliance was not pleased with the appointive feature of the bill,20but it was certainly a step in the right direction. The first rates established by the commission dealt with the transportation of grain, meal, and flour within state lines. These rates were 15 to 30 percent below the existing rates. Soon afterwards, a rate was estab­ lished on cotton freight transportation. This resulted in a reduction of $.50 per bale. Overall, it was claimed that the new rates reduced freight charges by over $1 million. 21 The railroad commission idea was dear to the hearts of Texas farmers. Clark had been opposed to the idea and had labored hard to defeat the commission bill. In the 1892 campaign, he admitted his past opposition, but said he would now bow to the will of the major­ ity and uphold the commission. There was a great deal of skepticism concerning his sincerity.22 Hogg had also successfully pushed for the passage of an "anti­ alien" land bill. This bill was initiated in response to the Alliance demand for reform in government land policy It prohibited aliens from obtaining title to Texas land. The columns of the state dailies were filled with comments on the land bill. One opponent of the bill suggested that the bill be entitled a "Law to Bankrupt those who have been trying to build up Texas." The Fort Worth Gazette claimed that the bill was a crime against Texas development. It claimed that the law was driving out an estimated $50 million that foreign moneylenders had planned to loan Texans on the basis of land security. The foreign moneylenders were going elsewhere with their money rather than hassle with the legal red tape involved in the case of a loan foreclosure. The Alliance was even accused of en­ dorsing the bill in order to drive money out of Texas and force the people to support the subtreasury in desperation.23 The anti-alien land bill was strongly supported by the Alliance, which argued that the intent of the bill was to keep large foreign land speculators from monopolizing the land in Texas. It was not in­ tended to, and did not, strike at loan agencies. Foreign moneylenders could still extend loans on land security. If foreclosure occurred, the foreign lender, unable to personally hold the title, would have to sell the land to cover the debt. This legality should not have caused any problems unless money was recklessly loaned on land in lieu of a good assessment of resale value.24 Thus, while another term of the Hogg administration promised little further reform, if Clark were elected, some fought-for reforms

144

The People's Party

might be rescinded. This possibility was driven home to potential supporters of the People's party. The cry went out that "a vote for Nugent is a weakness to Hogg."25 In the aftermath of the election, third partyites claimed that Clark was the scarecrow that frightened many possible Nugent supporters into voting for Hogg.26 The Hogg-Clark split, however, was not the only reason for the third-place showing of the People's party in Texas. The results of the national election returns from Texas gave Cleveland a strong major­ ity. The returns were as follows:27 G. Cleveland B. Harrison J. Weaver Scattering

239,148 81,444 99,418 2,165

(56.6%) (19.3%) (23.5%) (.5%)

By no stretch of the imagination could Grover Cleveland be labeled a reformer. The choice was not between the People's party candidate and a reform Democrat; the choice was between the People's party candidate and archconservative old-party candidates. Yet the Demo­ cratic party still received majority support. The equivalent of less than half of the Texas Alliance membership at its peak voted for the People's party in the national election. The results of the election of 1892 indicate a major vulnerability of third-party reform strategies. As noted earlier, the "winner-takesall" rule of American elections is a serious handicap to a third-party organization. Such an organization faces two difficult challenges: It must convince the majority of the population of the necessity of the reforms it is advocating, and it must convince them of the viability of the third-party challenge. Both of these challenges must be met. If the first—but not the second—challenge is successfully addressed, many voters in agreement with the third-party platform will never­ theless choose the least objectionable of the two old-party candi­ dates. Faced with a choice between Hogg and Clark in the 1892 elec­ tion, Texas reformers clearly preferred Hogg. To vote for the People's party candidate would split the reform vote and possibly result in Clark's victory. Many potential third-party supporters were not will­ ing to risk that possibility. The "winner-takes-all" rule of American elections also had a part in the poor performance of the national People's party candi­ dates. The probability of the national People's party slate of candi­ dates obtaining a plurality of votes was remote. This fact, coupled with the great similarity between the Republican and Democratic presidential candidates, resulted in many people voting in a manner consistent with their affective ties. Southerners, still emotionally

The Post-1892 Campaign

145

moved by the North's degradation of the South, were influenced by such slogans as "vote as you shot/728 This is not to say that emotions always override the rational decision-making process. The point is that affective factors should not be altogether ignored. A recognition of their role in protest movement mobilization is critical. While structural strain theorists overstate the role of affective factors, mo­ bilization theorists tend to understate it. The "winner-takes-all" rule of U.S. elections makes the issue of viability a problem for third-party organizations. The People7s party presidential candidate, James Weaver, received only 8.5 percent of the vote nationwide. As Table 2 indicates, twenty-six (out of a total of forty-four) states gave the third party less than 10 percent of their vote. In fact, the People's party polled less than 5 percent of the vote in twenty-one states, or about half of all states voting in 1892.29 If that weren't bad enough, an examination of the power of these states in the electoral college draws a very dismal picture. Seventyfour percent of the total electoral vote was controlled by those twenty-six states where the People's party performed so pitifully. There was no reason to expect a sudden surge of sympathy for the People's party in those states. There was no infrastructure to build upon compared to that provided by the Alliance organization. Such an infrastructure is crucial to the dissemination of a protest ideology. The generation and maintenance of commitment to such an ideology is not an automatic response to hardship. Mobilization theorists stress that the aggrieved population must be convinced that the reforms proposed are both desirable and viable. This is not an easy task, since opponents of a protest movement typically use either counterideology tactics or the tactic of selective issue en­ dorsement in their attempts to undermine support for the move­ ment. The struggle in Texas of the Farmers Alliance and its People's party counterpart excellently illustrates this fact. Even with the benefit of the Alliance grass-roots organization and its widely dis­ seminated paper, the Southern Mercury, educating the aggrieved population on reform principles, the struggle to maintain commit­ ment to the particular protest ideology was a difficult one.

The Post-1892 Campaign After the 1892 election, the Texas People's party leadership pro­ ceeded with optimism. For a newly formed political party to capture one out of every four votes cast in the state was no small accom­ plishment. The leadership was optimistic that support for their party

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The People's Party

Table 2 . Electoral Strength of States in Which Support for the People's Party Presidential Candidate Was Weak (1892) States in Which the People's Party Polled Less Than 10 % of the Popular Vote

Electoral College Voting Strength

1. Arkansas

8

2 . California

9

*3 . *4. *5. *6. * 7. 8. *9. *10 . * 11. * 12 . * 13. 14. * 15. * 16. * 17. * 18. * 19. *20. *2 1. 22. * 23. * 24. * 25. * 26.

Connecticut Delaware Illinois Indiana Iowa Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Missouri New Hampshire New Jersey New York Ohio Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina Tennessee Vermont Virginia West Virginia Wisconsin Total

6 3 24 15 13 13

8 6 8 15 14 17 4

10 36 23 32 4 9

12 4

12 6 12 323

* Indicates less than 5 percent. Svend Petersen, A Statistical History of the American Presidential Elec­ tions, p. 60. so u rce :

could be significantly increased if the educational campaign on Pop­ ulist principles were intensified. The leadership was seemingly un­ aware that, given the national showing of the People's party in the 1892 election, the prospects for a win were dismal at best. An exam­ ination of the postelection struggle by the Texas Populists is inter­ esting, however, in that it not only further illustrates the difficulties of generating and maintaining commitment to particular protest de­

The Post- 1 892 Campaign

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mands, but it also provides the opportunity to reflect on the factors affecting the degree of success in this task. Following the 1892 election, the leaders in both of the old par­ ties began a propaganda campaign to forestall further desertions to the People's party. This campaign was of a dual nature; the con­ servative faction of the old parties initiated a campaign that differed significantly from that launched by the reform faction. The former utilized counterideology tactics, while the latter employed the se­ lective issue endorsement tactic. The counterideology campaign waged by the conservative faction consisted of the claim that the ag­ ricultural depression was primarily caused by three factors: over­ production of commodities, tariff policy, and the fear of business leaders that there might be radical changes in the government's monetary policy. In contrast, the reform faction chose to endorse one of the reform demands being made by the People's party: the call for "free silver." A key argument advanced in the counterideology campaign was that the agricultural depression was due solely to overproduction of agricultural commodities. It was argued that no legislative changes that the Alliance and People's party sought would remedy the eco­ nomic problems that farmers faced. This argument was reiterated over and over again: It seems the farmer will never be made to understand that the price of cotton is governed by the law of supply and demand which also controls all commodities. If the production is greater than the consumption, the price of course will decline, and the reverse is true; there is nothing new in this statement; for it has been preached to farmers for the last twenty-five years.30 Another critic argued: I am skeptical as to the financial cause alleged. When the hens lay too many eggs, and the farmer finds the merchant over­ stocked, he reduces the price per dozen to get the trader to take them. This is overproduction, and the fall in the value of eggs is the result. When the hens combine and quit laying, the farmer finds the merchant short on eggs and up goes the price. This is the effect of cutting egg production to advance the value.31 This general overproduction argument was commonplace in the late 1800s, and the remedy frequently proposed was crop diversification.32 The tariff argument of the counterideology campaign of the con­

148

The People’s Party

servative faction of the old parties was tied to the overproduction argument. The excess supply relative to demand of agricultural com­ modities was related to the lack of sufficient export markets. Pos­ sible markets for these commodities were closed because of govern­ mental tariff policies. Free trade was the remedy. Cries for changes in the nation's monetary policy were misplaced. The last major argument advanced by the counterideology cam­ paign consisted of the charge that the economic depression was in large part caused by business leaders' lack of confidence in the na­ tion's monetary system. Cleveland believed that this lack of confi­ dence was due to the passage of the Sherman Silver Purchase Act of 1890. This act instructed the secretary of the Treasury to purchase 4.5 million ounces of silver each month and to issue silver certifi­ cates to cover the cost of purchase. The acquired silver was to be stored. Cleveland reasoned that speculation of imminent silver coin­ age had led to gold hoarding on the part of business leaders, thereby disrupting the normal functioning of the monetary system and caus­ ing the current economic state of affairs. Immediately upon taking office, Cleveland called a special session of Congress and pushed through a repeal of the Sherman Act.33 The Texas People's party leaders launched a major educational campaign to attack these counterideology arguments. They lost no time in criticizing the overproduction explanation of the agricul­ tural depression. They stressed that agricultural production had be­ come unprofitable on account of the pauperized condition of the people, disabling them from consuming. The problem was under­ consumption, not overproduction. The overproduction argument amounted to saying that "the reason why so many men are hungry is too much meat and bread in the world."34 The Mercury queried: Is it overproduction of cotton that causes the producers of the raw material [that] clothes are made [from] to go half clad through the summer's heat and winter's cold? Is it overproduc­ tion that causes thousands of children of the "common herd" to stay out of public schools on account of not having clothes fit to appear in public? Is it overproduction that causes mil­ lions of this "common herd" to go hungry half the time, and not have enough to eat the other half?35 In current economic jargon, "effective demand" was directly linked to the problem of currency contraction. "Effective demand" was determined by the number of people and the volume of money in the hands of consumers with which exchanges between producer

The Post- 1 892 Campaign

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and consumer could be made. With a contracted currency, "effective demand" would be lowered and, concomitantly, prices would fall.36 The analysis of the root causes of the agricultural depression es­ poused by the People's party received some support from the release of a Senate report entitled Agricultural Depression: Causes and Remedies. This report criticized the overproduction argument sta­ tistically. Using wheat as their focus, the authors of the report noted that in 1884, the world production of wheat was 2,290,069,000 bush­ els. In 1892, it was 2,253,860,000—over 36 million bushels less. The world's supply of wheat was actually smaller in 1892 than it had been in 1884. Given that there was population growth in this eightyear period, the per capita production of wheat had significantly de­ clined. Yet wheat sold at $.04 less per bushel in 1892. The report also pointed out that farm products were not the only articles that had fallen in price. The prices of manufactured products were also de­ clining. Was this to be explained by overproduction as well? The re­ port replied negatively; it concluded that the general depression that was taking hold of the U.S. economy was caused by an insufficient supply of currency.37 The People's party educational campaign also addressed the ar­ gument that the Southern farmer could improve his condition by di­ versification of crops. It was pointed out that the Western farmer had a significant advantage in growing wheat and corn. Census data indicated that wheat-belt farmers harvested, on the average, 16 bush­ els per acre; in the cotton belt, the average was only 7 bushels per acre. In the corn belt, farmers produced 32V4 bushels per acre, while in the cotton belt the average was only 13 bushels. Also, the inter­ connectedness among farmers was recognized. Corn and wheat farm­ ers were cotton consumers. If the cotton farmer ceased buying corn and wheat, the demand for his own product—cotton—would fall.38 Recent econometric analysis supports this argument against di­ versification. S. SeCanio demonstrates that the extent of cotton culti­ vation in the postbellum South was economically rational. He ar­ gues that by 1880, cotton led all alternative Southern crops in value productivity.39 In the educational campaign of the People's party, the tariff issue that had dominated the 1892 election was also addressed. It was ar­ gued that the old parties were trying to divert the attention of the masses from the real problem by agitating the tariff question. When the amount of tariff paid by the average farmer for the necessities of life that he typically bought per year was examined, it was shown that under the tariff law of 1861—when the farming community

150

The People’s Party

was fairly prosperous—the farmer had paid $.60 more than he was currently paying. The extent of tariff charges was therefore not likely to be the key to the farmers' prosperity. Furthermore, the differencer between charges under the Republican tariff law of 1890 and charges under the Democratic tariff law of 1894 was $21.12. This amount paled in significance compared to the sum of money farmers lost due to falling crop prices caused by the contraction of currency: Let us take as the average crop of the cotton farmer 10 bales, weighing 500 pounds each, a total of 5,000 pounds. We find that the price of cotton in 1872, the year before silver was de­ monetized, was from $.18 to $.25 per pound, the average being about $.20. The 10 bales of cotton at that time at 20 cents per pound would net the farmer $1,000. The same 10 bales of cot­ ton now at the present price of $.05 per pound would net him $250. We find from these figures that somehow . . . the cotton farmer has been robbed of $750 on his year's production of cotton.40 Thus, while farmers were fighting in the old parties over the $2 1.12 tariff differential, the contraction of currency was costing him $750. The tariff had been used as a decoy to divert minds from the cur­ rency question, which was as much above the tariff question in im­ portance as was $750 above $2 1.12 in value. In a speech before the Texas Alliance, Thomas Nugent, the People's party candidate for governor in 1892, stressed that tariff re­ form would cure little, if any, of the existing economic problems be­ setting the nation. He pointed out that England had had a tariff sys­ tem for more than fifty years that more closely approximated free trade than anything now being proposed by the old parties in the U.S., yet England was currently convulsed with serious strikes, ex­ treme poverty, and wealth accumulated in the hands of the few. A lesson was to be learned from England: the tariff issue was not the key to the current economic problems besetting the American farmer and the American economy in general. The key was to be found in the calls for reform of the monetary system.41 The Texas People's party also attacked the claim made in the counterideology campaign that the economic depression was in large part caused by a lack of confidence among business leaders in the government's monetary policy. They stressed that the depres­ sion would be cured not by "sound-money" policy or monometal­ lism, but rather by fiatism. To support this argument, they pointed to the disastrous consequences of Cleveland's monetary policies. In

The Post- 1 892 Campaign

151

1893 alone, there were some 500 bank failures and nearly 1600 busi­ ness failures. Unemployment soared as large numbers of workers were laid off.42 Cleveland had claimed that if the Sherman Silver Act was repealed and the nation stood firmly on sound-money policies, the economy would improve; however, the repeal of the act was not the panacea that Cleveland had believed it would be. The economy did not improve and there was little evidence that the confidence of the business community had improved under his policies. Indeed, wary of the stability of the country's economy, people were present­ ing paper currency for redemption in gold with increasing frequency. The swift outflow of the Treasury's gold reserves was viewed with alarm by Cleveland, who subscribed to the prevailing view that a gold reserve of at least $100 million was essential if the gold stan­ dard were to be preserved. To maintain this reserve, he was com­ pelled to sell $50 million of government bonds for gold. No sooner was the gold reserve replenished by the bond money than redemp­ tion of paper currency began to diminish it. Cleveland was forced into another bond issue in November 1894, which only sustained the gold reserve at the "required" $100 million level for ten weeks. One bond issue followed another with disconcerting rapidity. Inter­ est on the bonds escalated into the millions and an increased con­ traction of circulating currency was reported by Cleveland's secre­ tary of the Treasury, John Carlisle.43 Thus, under Cleveland's sound-money policies, the economy was not getting better. Indeed, the suffering of the Southern farmer increased under the Cleveland administration. In 1894, cotton prices hit rock bottom. Cotton was selling at less than $.05 a pound.44 As previously noted, even on the best soil for cotton growing, a pound of cotton cost $.05 to produce. At best, then, cotton farmers were financially breaking even in 1894. Farmers not fortunate enough to till fertile land were actually growing cotton at a loss. The difference between $.05 per pound and the $.08 to $.09 per pound typical of the 1885-1892 period should not be minimized as a factor in the growth of protest. The management of the economy by the Democratic administration was increasingly under question. The economic theories of the administration that abstractly might have puzzled the population were suspect since the economy was in shambles and recovery was not in sight. In fact, the depression was even intensifying, particularly for Southern farmers who were de­ pendent on cotton for their livelihood. More and more of the popu­ lace were at least listening to the arguments for monetary reform. Thus, resource mobilization theorists should be careful not to ne-

152

The People's Party

gleet "deprivation intensity" in explanations of protest movement growth. It is true that deprivation and discontent alone are not suffi­ cient causes of protest movement emergence and growth, but re­ source mobilization theorists like McCarthy and Zald45 should not overstate the point by arguing that deprivation and discontent play no important causal role. Rather, a compromise is needed between the one-factor structural strain model that depicts deprivation and discontent as sufficient causes of protest and those mobilization the­ ories that deny them an important role altogether. Such a compromise is easily achieved by incorporating the ef­ fects of deprivation and discontent into the "cost-benefit" model of protest movement participation proposed by resource mobilization theorists. The extent and intensity of deprivation and discontent would be among the many factors that significantly affect the costbenefit analysis intuitively conducted by potential protest partici­ pants. Deprivation of a minor nature or deprivation perceived as temporary may make potential participants leery of supporting the movement. As the deprivation becomes more intense, or is per­ ceived as long-term, it is more likely that risks will be taken and en­ ergy expended in an attempt to alleviate that deprivation. The following complaint is indicative of the role played by deprivation in the increasing disaffection of Southerners with the Democratic party: We want to know where is the sound money of the Cleveland and Carlisle republican democracy? Why have the producers of the wealth of this nation not got any of it? Why have they not had an opportunity to examine it and ascertain its quality of soundness?46 Other similar condemnations of Cleveland and his sound-money policies frequented the pages of the reform press in Texas. One ob­ server noted that the Democratic party in the panhandle of Texas had been "gutted" by the actions of Cleveland. Another observer commended Cleveland on the good work that he was doing for the People's party.47 A disgusted Democrat wrote Governor Hogg to in­ form him that the democratic party is [annihilated]. Trust them—the demo­ crats again! No sir—the people will never do it. I have always voted democratic but I won't do so again and I know I am not alone.48 The Texas People's party educational campaign was of para­

The Post- 1 892 Campaign

153

mount importance, not only for attacking the arguments of the counterideology campaign of the conservative faction of the old par­ ties, but also for addressing the selective issue endorsement cam­ paign of the reform factions. The reform factions of the old parties continued to demand the remonetization of silver and a bimetallic monetary policy. They charged that a monometallic gold standard was too rigid. The gold supply was insufficient for the growing popu­ lation size and the needs of the economy. The free silverites, however, would only go so far in their reform demands. They insisted that free silver alone would provide a sufficient volume of currency; grandiose and visionary reforms like the subtreasury were not necessary. In its educational campaign, the Texas People's party noted that the free silverites were correct in locating the root cause of the pres­ ent economic ills in the contracted currency supply. But their solu­ tion was ill-advised. The Populists stressed that the first necessary step toward reform was for the federal government to assume con­ trol of the currency supply and to ensure that the volume of circulat­ ing currency was always adequate to the business needs of the coun­ try. Noting that the per capita circulating currency of the most prosperous period since the war was about $50, the People's party demanded that the sum of circulating currency be immediately in­ creased to that level. To achieve this level, reform had to go beyond the free-silver demands of reform Democrats. It had been estimated that the annual production of silver in the U.S. was approximately $60 million. With the U.S. population hovering around 64 million, free silver would add only about $1 per capita to the circulating cur­ rency.49 Without further population growth, at this annual rate of production it would take many a year to increase the circulating cur­ rency from the present low level to $50 per capita. For this reason, the People's party advocated fiat money. The culturally dominant belief in the intrinsic value of the dol­ lar was heavily criticized. Voters were told: "Pin your faith to the intrinsic value dollar idea, vote for it, swear by it, starve by it."50 In their educational campaign, Texas Populist leaders stressed that money was a creature of law, created for the sole purpose of serving as a medium of exchange. Stones, beads, or any other material could serve the same purpose as gold or silver if the law made them legal tender for debt and controlled their quantity. To address the con­ tracted currency problem of the economy, the People's party called for the circulation of an irredeemable paper currency that would en­ sure both an adequate and flexible medium of exchange. Adequacy and flexibility would not be obtained if the currency supply con­ tinued to be tied to gold and silver availability.51

154

The People’s Party

To make sure that the counterarguments of the People's party were known and understood, the third-party leaders in Texas pro­ posed the establishment of discussion clubs throughout the state. It was suggested that each voting precinct be divided into sections covering about two and a half square miles, with each section hav­ ing a People's party club. These clubs would hold weekly meetings at the house of one of their members to read and discuss press re­ leases and speeches. Monthly meetings of all clubs within a given voting precinct would be held and a report compiled on the state of the People's party in the precinct. With precinct information such as this, the state People's party organization would be better able to coordinate the educational campaign. Grass-roots organization was viewed as essential to the effectiveness of the campaign.52 The task of establishing People's party clubs was taken seri­ ously. Reports of clubs being organized started to fill the columns of Texas reform papers. People's party encampments became quite fre­ quent. The lecturing system remained in full swing and the number of reform papers supportive of the People's party soared.53 A total effort was being made to educate the people on the principles of the People's party.

The 1894 Election in Texas The rebellious spirit of the people chafing under the burden of con­ tinued hard times did not go unnoticed. The Texas Democratic party recognized that a repetition of the split in the Democratic ticket of 1892 might prove disastrous. At the 1894 convention, the party moved to mend fences between its two factions. It announced that there would be no bolting from the convention: "Whether the pill is coated with sugar or quinine, the side that loses will swallow it without a grimace." It was soon clear which side would have to swallow the pill with respect to the platform. Cleveland supporters won 18 out of 31 places on the platform committee. The majority platform endorsed the national Democratic party platform of 1892 and the Cleveland administration for its efforts to redeem the pledges of that platform. Cleveland's administration was labeled as "emi­ nently wise, patriotic, and statesmanlike." The platform even specif­ ically commended Cleveland on his exercise of the federal govern­ ment's constitutional rights by sending federal troops to suppress labor "insurrection" in Chicago. In reference to strikebreaking, it stated that the government must maintain the right of a worker to

The 1894 Election in Texas

155

"pursue his labor and occupation without molestation or hindrance from any source."54 For the reform Democrats, then, the pill was bitter. They were being asked to endorse a platform that would alienate not only many Texans disgusted with Cleveland's monetary stance, but was sure to alienate much of the laboring class. The final vote was 451 to 415. The headlines the following day read "Cleveland Wins."55 The re­ form Democrats had lost; the Texas Democratic party in 1894 did not contain any selective endorsements of reform. The reform Democrats fared better when it came to candidate nominations. They won most of the nominations, including that of free silverite Charles Culberson for governor. This resulted in an un­ comfortable situation: the candidates opposed the platform of the party that had nominated them. This state of affairs was to give the Democrats many a headache during the 1894 campaign. The laboring class was upset about the platform planks that commended Cleveland's actions in sending federal troops into a strike situation and that endorsed governmental protection of the rights of strikebreakers. John Reagan, a leading re­ form Democrat, wrote Governor Hogg that many Democrats were "out of humor" because of these planks and something had to be done if their support was to be salvaged. Culberson also wrote Hogg to ask him to address the laboring class at Houston and Palestine, the two places where there seemed to be the most dissatisfaction among laborers about the platform.56 The free silverites were upset about the platform's endorsement of Cleveland's sound-money poli­ cies. They were equally disturbed by the straddle that Democratic nominees were having to make. Culberson opened his campaign with a free-silver speech. But the free silverites were suspicious of the integrity and sincerity of any candidate that would let himself be nominated on a platform that was repugnant to him. A once staunchly Democratic paper, the Texas Farmer, noted Culberson's "political cowardice." It said that he lacked political nerve and had joined the "large army who sacrifice patriotism and principle to greed for place."57 Dissatisfaction was expressed in letters to Hogg from rank-and-file Democrats. One writer stated that he proposed to stand by principle and "let the party go to the Devil." He noted that he had always stood by reform Democrats only to now see their principles and his own "crushed out by a lot of corporation manipulators."58 The People's party lost no time in pointing out that the Demo­ cratic party stood for anything and everything necessary to get and keep a political office. How could the voter expect to secure reform

156

The People’s Party

from a party with so little integrity and without a genuine, unified commitment to principle? In regard to Democratic candidates cam­ paigning for monetary reform, the People's party press contended that: For candidates to desert their own platform and partially adopt the populist platform solely for the purpose of securing elec­ tion by a conglomerate of democratic and populist votes, is po­ litical treachery of the most despicable character. No honest man can support such deliberate traitors, sneaks, and demogogues.59 If voters sincerely wanted monetary reform, they had no choice but to vote for the only party that sincerely advocated such reform in both its platform and its campaign speeches: the People's party. A vote for the Democratic ticket was a vote for Cleveland's soundmoney policies and continued hard times. The returns from the election were anxiously awaited. The final count showed that twenty-two Populists had been elected to the state House of Representatives and two to the state Senate. In eight of the thirteen national Flouse of Representatives races, the Populist candidates polled over 40 percent of the vote. Culberson won the gu­ bernatorial election. He received, however, only 49 percent of the total vote,- this represented a 2 5-percent decline in the support of the state Democratic ticket since 1892. The People's party candidate, Thomas Nugent, received about 36 percent of the total vote; this rep­ resented an 1 1 -percent increase in support for the third-party state ticket since 1892. In fifty-nine counties, Nugent had polled more votes than Culberson. In many other counties, the vote had been very close.60 The People's party press voiced enthusiasm about the growth of the third-party movement since 1892. The strength of the People's party had increased despite reported illegalities in the electoral pro­ cess. Intimidation by Democrats was reported in various parts of the state. For example, in Huntsville, penitentiary employees who re­ fused to sign a pledge of support for the Democratic party were dis­ charged. Fear for job security subsequently spread through the ranks of state employees. Similar types of intimidation were experienced by workers in the private sector.61 The black population was particularly vulnerable to intimida­ tion and fraud. In fact, Culberson's margin of victory was main­ tained by the suspiciously large Democratic vote in many of the heavily black-populated counties. For example, in Harrison County,

The 1 894 Election in Texas

157

Table 3 . The Showing of the People's Party by State in the 1894 Congressional Elections

State Alabama Arkansas California Colorado Connecticut Florida Georgia Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska Nevada New Hampshire New Jersey New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Vermont Virginia Washington

No. Reps

Wins

Close Losses (Over 40 % of Vote)

7

1 0 0

2

1 (Dp-Pp)*

4

0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

9

6

2 11 22 13

11 7

11 6 4

6 13

12 7 7 15

1 6 1 2 8 35 9

1 21 2 28

2 7

1 10 13

2 10 1

2 0 0 0 0 0 5

0 0 4 (Dp-Pp) 4 (Dp-Pp)

Total Losses

8 6 7

1 4

2 11 22 13

11 6 11 6

0 0 0 0 0

13

1 (Dp-Pp)

12

1 1 0 0

7 7 15

1 (Dp-Pp)

3

5

0 0 0 0

0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 8 0 0 0

1 2 8

4 (Rp-Pp) t

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

4

6

1

35 5

1 21 2 28

2 7

1 10 13

2 10 1

158

• The People’s Party

Table 3.—Continued

State West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming Total

No. Reps 4

10 1 350

Wins

Close Losses (Over 40 % of Vote)

0 0 0 8 (2% )

Total Losses

0 0 0 3 3 (10%)

4

10 1 342

* Democratic-People's party fusion, t Republican-People's party fusion. s o u r c e : Congressional Quarterly, Guide to U.S. Elections, pp. 672-676.

where the population was 68-percent black, Culberson received 94 percent of the vote. Such large margins of victory for Culberson did not occur in parts of the state less susceptible to blatant and exten­ sive manipulation of election results.62 Allegations were leveled in a federal investigation into fraud in the Sixth Congressional District in Texas. Jerome Kearby, the Popu­ list candidate for Congress for that district, charged that his Demo­ cratic rival had won the election through fraufl. The methods al­ legedly used by the Democratic machine to "steal" the election were varied. One method consisted of not counting the total vote cast when filing the formal election returns. For example, Kearby charged that there were 5 , 2 1 9 votes cast in Dallas, yet 7 0 6 of these votes were not counted. Fie claimed that these votes were cast for the People's party ticket. A second method was that of ballot box stuff­ ing. Kearby charged that in certain precincts there were a larger number of ballots found in the ballot box than there were voters in the precinct. A third method allegedly used by the Democrats was the destruction of election tickets. In the town of Terrell, no People's party tickets were left by 1 0 a m on election day. Kearby stressed that more than enough tickets had been provided; the tickets either had to have been intentionally mislaid or destroyed. A fourth charge was that the People's party was denied representation on the board of judges and managers of the election. Because of this, there was no way to confirm the honesty or dishonesty of the election proceed­ ings, and dishonesty was certainly suspected. Why else would the Democrats resist third-party representation? A final method noted was the early closing of the polls. At one precinct, forty Populists reported that they were prevented from voting because of the pre­ mature closing of the polls.63

The 1894 Election in Texas

159

In spite of the alleged use of intimidation and fraud, the strength of the People's party had significantly increased in Texas. The Mer­ cury optimistically predicted that the People's party would sweep Texas in the 1896 elections "as day follows night," provided they continued their campaign of education.64 The expressed optimism of the Texas People's party leaders should have been more guarded. The key demands of the People's party—demands such as the revamping of the monetary system— could only be implemented at the national level. Although in eight of the thirteen congressional races in Texas the Populist candidates had polled over 40 percent of the vote, this was not the case in other states. As indicated in Table 3, Populist congressional candidates had obtained over 40 percent of the vote in only 33 of the 350 races. In fact, in certain key states that were heavily represented in the elec­ toral college (such as Illinois, Ohio, New York, and Pennsylvania), few Populist candidates were fielded, and those who were performed very poorly. The fate of the People's party in these states was not going to magically change; they had weak communication struc­ tures for disseminating and defending Populist principles. This con­ trasted sharply with the situation in Texas, which had one of the best grass-roots communication structures available for disseminat­ ing and defending Populist principles. That communication struc­ ture had been formed by the Alliance, at little or no expense of en­ ergy by the People's party leadership. A comparable communication structure was lacking in states where the Alliance movement had been weak or nonexistent. As mobilization theorists have stressed, such a structure is vital to the effective mobilization of support. In sum, in the aftermath of the 1894 election, despair was the warranted response within the Populist circle. The expressed opti­ mism of the Texas Populist leaders was either a facade or an exercise in wishful thinking.

9. The Betrayal of Alliance Principles

The viability of the People's party in national elections became more dubious in the election years after 1894. This decrease in viability was in large part due to changes in the political issues that dominated the attentions of the old parties. Prior to 1894, the na­ tional Democratic and Republican party organizations had virtually ignored the monetary reform issue. In the 1892 presidential cam­ paign, tariff policy was the focus of attention. Cleveland had argued that renewed prosperity was to be achieved by the "steady tread of the army of reform in the tariff law."1 Since the reform of the U.S. monetary system was viewed as unnecessary for economic recovery, it was afforded little attention in the national campaign. The People's party was alone in its consistent support for major monetary reform. But the groundswell of interest in monetary reform could not be ig­ nored after 1894. Consequently, a major propaganda blitz concerning monetary reform was launched by both the reform and conservative factions of the Republican and Democratic parties. The coverage of this reform issue by the major news dailies concentrated on the de­ bate between these two factions. The press all but ignored the dis­ tinctive Populist monetary reform ideas. These ideas were over­ shadowed by the coverage of the fierce debate waging in the old parties. This put an incredible burden on the leaders of the People's party. They faced a task as overwhelming as it was important: sig­ nificant numbers of people had to be reached by a third-party cam­ paign stressing the distinctiveness of Populist reform demands. They had to ensure that past sympathizers did not forget the essen­ tialness of Populist demands, and new supporters were vital. In this chapter, the monetary reform debate and propaganda campaign of the old parties and the response of the leaders of the People's party to this campaign will be examined. The hotly debated monetary reform issue, as highlighted by the nation's major dailies, pitted the "free-silver" reformers against the

The Betrayal of Alliance Principles

161

"sound-money" advocates. Nationwide there was a flood of pamph­ lets and press releases proclaiming free silver as the panacea for the present economic ills. A free-silver book, Coin's Financial School, became a national bestseller with hundreds of thousands of copies sold and circulated. In an attempt to abate the growth of free-silver forces, sound-money advocates stressed that although bimetallism as demanded by the free silverites sounded good, in practice it would have disastrous economic results. They frequently referred to Gresh­ am's law. This law of economics states that when a bimetallic money standard is used, if there is a difference between the commercial value of the metals and their mint value, the metal with the lowest mint value relative to its commercial value will be driven from the money market; holders of this metal will divert it to the higher­ valued commercial market. In debates across the country, Gresh­ am's law was stated and restated; it was said to be "as irrevocable as the law of gravity."2 In a well-published free-silver debate between Hoke Smith and former Speaker of the House Charles Crisp, gold-standard advocate Smith appealed to this principle. He stressed that the value of gold was more than thirty-two times that of silver, yet most free silver­ ites were advocating silver coinage at a ratio of 16 to i. That is to say, 1 6 ounces of silver would be equivalent to i ounce of gold when the government redeemed paper currency in coin. Smith stressed that this meant a 50-percent devaluation of gold, and would result in an outflow of gold from the mint. Before long the U.S. would have a monometallic standard again, and this time the metal would be sil­ ver. Silver was in much shorter supply at that time than was gold, so this would result in an unprecedented currency contraction.3 Crisp, a free silverite, insisted that when silver became accepted for coin­ age, the increased demand for silver would increase its price. Silver would quickly assume the value appropriate for the 16 to 1 redemp­ tion ratio. With the parity issue between silver and gold resolved, a bimetallic monetary base would allow the volume of currency to ex­ pand and thereby alleviate the economic depression that had been precipitated by past currency contraction.4At the level of state poli­ tics, bimetallic, free-silver leagues proliferated. In Texas, the various local leagues were guided by a statewide executive committee that coordinated speaking tours. The goal was to canvass the state and spread the message that reform Democrats had to organize and gain control over the state and national party machinery to ensure that the 1896 party platform would declare for free-silver monetary re­ form. This executive committee was instrumental in organizing a major speaking tour for popular reform Democrat and former gover­

162

The Betrayal of Alliance Principles

nor James Hogg. The expressed intent of the Hogg speaking tour was to counteract the influence of the People's party, which was claim­ ing that there was no hope for monetary reform through the old parties.5 In Texas, as on the national level, the Democratic party leaders split on the monetary reform issue. The sound-money Democrats in Texas were alarmed at the spread of bimetallic leagues. They met for a conference in Waco in May 1895. Although small in num­ bers, they expressed determination to fight the "cause of silver monometallism'': These advocates of free and unlimited coinage of silver at a ratio of 16 to 1 . . . seriously propose that the United States of America, alone of all great powers, is able to double by legisla­ tion the market and intrinsic value of the silver bullion of the world, for such is necessarily the meaning of free and unlim­ ited coinage under present conditions.6 They expressed dismay that free-silver Democrats would agitate for a reform that was in clear defiance of the 1892 national Democratic party platform and of the state Democratic platform of 1894. They balked at the idea of the free silverites gaining control of the party that had always stood for "sound and honest currency." They ended their meeting with the following resolution: We call upon all Democrats who love their party for itself and not for office, and who take a patriotic pride in the honor and glory of their country, to come and unite with us in preserving the party from the dangers which now seriously threaten its very existence, and in saving our country and its people from the misery and destruction which must ensue from the driving from our shores of $600,000,000 of gold coin now in circula­ tion among us, and the adoption of silver as the sole basis of value in this country.7 Given the attempted organization of gold-standard Democrats, the Texas free-silver Democrats decided to take no chances on a re­ peat of the 1894 straddle between platform and candidates. After fill­ ing three vacancies on the state Democratic Executive Committee with free-silver advocates, the chairman of the Texas Democratic party, James Dudley, proposed to submit the "pending issue on the financial question" to the voters in the same primary elections in which the delegates to the state convention would be selected. The delegates elected would consider themselves instructed by the out­ come of the referendum. This proposal was passed by a vote of 16 to

The Betrayal of Alliance Principles

163

15. The primary was scheduled for 6 June 1896. The sound-money Democrats were outraged by Dudley's proposal. They claimed that the only way it passed was by Dudley's willful manipulation of the composition of the Executive Committee. George Clark, the Demo­ cratic rival of Hogg in 1892, argued that the referendum undermined the power of county conventions. He was strongly opposed to this relinquishing of power to the people.8 Another state conference of gold-standard Democrats was held in Dallas and a decision was made to set up a rival Democratic party organization. A straight sound-money ticket would be fielded in the upcoming election. The platform adopted strongly denounced Dudley and his "packed" committee for conducting a "series of usur­ pations subversive of party practices and destructive to party prin­ ciples." The emasculation of the power of county conventions in favor of primary elections was condemned, as was the intention of the free silverites to commit the Democratic party to "Populist prin­ ciples." The convention called on all Democrats to abstain from vot­ ing in the Dudley primaries: "Touch not, handle not the unclean thing."9 Despite the opposition of sound-money Democrats, the primary election was held as planned. The vote was overwhelmingly in favor of free silver. The Houston Daily Post called it a "tidal w ave."10 The free-silver fever seemed to be growing to proportions where there was no controlling it. The city dailies and county weekly papers were giving close at­ tention to the free-silver debate, particularly the debate over the proper mint value of silver relative to gold—the so-called parity de­ bate. The extensive coverage of the parity issue put a tremendous burden on the leaders of the People's party to stress the distinction between the monetary reform ideas of the free-silver Democrats and those of the People's party. As noted in the sound-money Demo­ cratic platform, free silver was often associated with Populism. A major key to the future performance of the People's party lay in its ability to effectively emphasize such distinctions in its educational campaign. To the extent that it failed, the free-silver Democrats would co-opt the monetary reform movement: this was exactly what the free-silver Democrats were hoping would happen. In the educational campaign following the 1894 election, the leaders of the Texas People's party continued to address the issue of free silver as a reform measure.11 They noted that free-silver re­ form could alleviate the contracted currency situation to a certain degree by enlarging the metallic base on which paper currency could circulate. The Mercury explained that it was for this reason that the

164

The Betrayal of Alliance Principles

People's party favored free silver. That is to say, it would afford people some relief under the present system of redeemable, metallic-backed currency. The limitations of free silver as a monetary reform, however, were stressed. The Populists questioned whether free silver could increase the circulating currency to an adequate volume, both pres­ ently and in the future. In a public speech, Harry Tracy—a leading Populist lecturer and former Alliance lecturer—stressed the limited relief free silver would provide without any other change in the present monetary system. He noted that the U.S. had a public debt of $32 billion, the interest on which was approximately 5 percent per annum, or $1.6 billion annually. This amount had to be paid every year to the "creditor class." This class was in a position to re­ deem this sum in gold and withdraw it from circulation if it per­ ceived such action to be in its best interests. Since the annual pro­ duction of silver did not amount to more than $75 million annually, the significant contraction of currency could in no way be offset by free-silver coinage.12 The major problem that had to be addressed was the power of the "money Kings" to control the money supply in their own best interests. Free-silver reform ignored this problem completely. Only when a fiat, irredeemable monetary system was instituted would the power of the "money Kings" be diminished. The People's party, therefore, had to remain firm in its demand for fiat money and not be misled by the free-silver reform movement.13 The Populists also stressed that the currency supply needed to expand and contract in response to the needs of the business sector and the growth of the population. Free-silver reform would not alter the fact that the U.S. was tied to an inflexible, redeemable metallic currency base. The Texas People's party constantly reiterated its op­ position to such a currency base. Granted, a redeemable metallic currency base had always been the norm, but that did not automati­ cally make it a sacred system. One Texas Populist argued by analogy that if the fact that a redeemable money system had been the stan­ dard for thousands of years proved that it should continue to be such, then the fact that oxen and donkeys were the principal means of transportation for thousands of years "is a effective impeachment of the genius which has subtituted steam and electricity in their stead."14 In sum, the People's party leaders in Texas argued that the most important monetary reform issue was not the free-silver issue, but rather the issue of fiatism versus redeemable currency. They charged that free silver in a redeemable money system would have as much

The Betrayal of Alliance Principles

165

effect on the present economic problems as "a barrel of water could have upon the ocean."15 As long as a redeemable currency system was in operation, the ultimate control of the currency supply resided outside of the government, in the hands of "money gamblers" who could expand and contract the currency at will to suit their best in­ terests. True reform of the monetary system necessitated that the government control the volume of money in circulation. No longer was it acceptable that the control of the lifeblood of the economy— money—resided in the hands of bankers or money gamblers. The most difficult task facing the People's party was to prevent the debate of free silver versus sound money from deflecting atten­ tion from the important issue of control. This task was increasingly complicated by the fact that all the major news dailies were defining the monetary reform issue as gold monometallism versus bimetal­ lism. The third-party press had only a small fraction of the circula­ tion of the major dailies and weekly newspapers. In addition, the funding of the existing third-party newsletters was extremely sparse compared to the funding of other news media. The task facing the People's party would have been difficult enough even if the party had remained unified in its thrust. But the action of the national People's party leadership following the 1894 election dashed all hope for a unified defense of Alliance-Populist principles. While the Texas People's party leadership was stressing the dis­ tinctiveness of its reform demands, the national People's party lead­ ership began maneuvers to fuse with the free silverites. These ma­ neuvers began almost immediately after the 1894 elections. The national People's party chairman, H. E. Taubeneck, began to argue that the campaign of 1896 should be confined to the free-silver issue: The secret to success in making platforms and nominating candidates is this: Expose as little surface to the enemy's guns as possible. Make the target he is to fire at as small as you can without sacrificing a living issue. The enemy in politics, like in war, always attacks the most vulnerable point, and if you don't present any, he is compelled to attack your strong ones.16 A similar view was evident in a letter Taubeneck wrote to W. S. Morgan, secretary of the People's party National Reform Press Asso­ ciation. In this letter, Taubeneck stated: The trouble, Mr. Morgan, is that you are dealing with theories and abstract ideas. I have to deal with men and conditions.

166

The Betrayal of Alliance Principles

That is the difference between you and I. Mine is a cold­ blooded, practical politics, and yours is a dreamland, living on theories and abstract ideas.17 Taubeneck had always been willing to pare Populist reform de­ mands so as to, in his words, "expose as little surface to the enemy's guns as possible." For example, he had supported Walter Gresham as the presidential nominee in 1892. Gresham opposed the subtreasury plan, and Taubeneck was asked about this by the press. The ex­ change was as follows: p ress in t e r v ie w e r : D o you m ean to say that in order to get h im to accept the nom ination, the subtreasury plank w ill be left out?

I mean to say that Judge Gresham has only one objection to accepting the nomination at the hands of the People's party, and that is its subtreasury ideas, and I mean that Judge Gresham will be the nominee of the party. You may draw your own inferences.18

ta u b e n e ck :

However, in 1892 there had been sufficient constraints on Tau­ beneck. The People's party desperately needed Southern support, and the South had been reluctant in its support of the third party. Southern representation at the Cincinnati convention in 1891 that had voted to form the People's party had been sparse. The leaders of the new party therefore had to cater to the Southern Farmers A l­ liance—the key to Southern support. This it did by fully adopting as the People's party platform the entire Alliance platform. Taubeneck may have wanted to drop the subtreasury, but the party leadership in general realized the danger of alienating the South. Thus, the sub­ treasury remained part of the platform. But the realities of the 1894 election result emboldened Tau­ beneck and the number of his supporters grew. The People's party did not have the support to win a national election without gaining the support of the free-silver factions of the Democratic and Repub­ lican parties. In the "winner-takes-all" electoral arrangement, con­ tinued loyalty to uncompromised principles meant an assured elec­ toral loss. On the belief that some reform was better than none, Taubeneck again pushed for the paring of Populist reform demands to facilitate fusion of the People's party with the reform factions of the old parties. Taubeneck and his supporters were hoping for a major political realignment similar to that occurring after the 1824 election. In 1824, the Democratic Republican party had split into two factions,

The Betrayal of Alliance Principles

167

with one supporting Andrew Jackson and the other supporting John Quincy Adams. Jackson won a plurality, but not a majority, of the popular vote. This forced the election into the House of Representa­ tives, which chose Adams. This decision permanently destroyed the unity of the Democratic Republican party. Jackson supporters bolted and formed the Democratic party and Adams supporters founded the National Republic party (which was absorbed into the Whig party and then in the 1850s became the present-day Republican party).19 Taubeneck and his supporters believed that the dominant parties would refuse to make concessions to the reform factions, thereby forcing them to bolt and support their own candidate. It was Taubeneck's dream that they would bolt to the People's party and, if concessions were made, endorse its candidate. In this manner, the People's party stood a chance of displacing either the Democratic or the Republican party as a dominant party. In Texas, the Mercury expressed disgust with Taubeneck and his practical politics philosophy. It stressed that the People's party was a party of principle, not spoils. Indeed, a major criticism that third partyites had consistently leveled against the old parties was that they were always trying to bait voters with false promises— anything to gain office. Was the People's party now to be put in a similar situation? The Mercury adamantly insisted that this could not be allowed to happen. The People's party must remain true to the entire platform endorsed at the last national convention in Omaha. The Mercury warned Taubeneck that "to trim the Omaha platform will be fatal to the party. It would alienate the Farmers Al­ liance element and without the Farmers Alliance the People's party is as sounding brass and a tinkling cymbal of discordant elements."20 It charged that in the free silverites the Populists had found their worst enemies, who sought to destroy the vitals of the party. The party needed to act now to protect itself. Party members who could not stand on the entire Omaha platform should be told to return to the old parties until better educated in the cause of reform. Allowing such members to remain in the People's party would only undermine the original purposes of the party. It was stressed that the People's party was "a party of education, based on fundamental principles. It should not grow any faster than its adherents can be educated."21 Through his mouthpiece, the National Watchman, Taubeneck pushed his single-issue fusion proposal. He grew increasingly impa­ tient with reform papers like the Mercury that refused to endorse his proposal and his "practical politics" philosophy. He was not the only national People's party official with a free-silver paper. J. H. Turner, secretary of the national People's party, was business manager of the

168

The Betrayal of Alliance Principles

Silver Knight, which the Mercury called a "Washington decoy duck." Turner's paper stated that: It is surprising that the Mercury should oppose a combination of financial reformers when such opposition can only be based upon a desire for the perpetual rule of the gold Kings. And par­ ticularly it is surprising that the Mercury should oppose such combination when he knows that in such a union victory is certain. The editor of the Mercury is probably honest, but it may do no harm to watch him.22 The Mercury was undaunted by such criticism and accusations. It claimed to receive hundreds of letters every day from Texas Popu­ lists who supported its antifusion stance. One Populist wrote: You voice the sentiments of every populist in old Cooke [County] in your uncompromising fight for every plank in the Omaha platform. I recommend the Mercury in large doses . . . to any man who wants to compromise away any part of our platform to a few free silver stay-in-the-partyites.23 Other Texas Populists expressed similar sentiments: I pity those who are so blind as to see nothing good but 16 to i. Free silver will help us a little, but we must have other prin­ ciples of the Omaha platform too. . . . This democrat free sil­ ver play is to side-track our Omaha platform.24 Fight it out on the Omaha platform if it takes until the Twen­ tieth Century to win.25 The Watchman's grade of populists do not exist in Hood County.26 We are opposed to fusion in any manner and propose to have victory on the Omaha platform or defeat.27 The columns of the Mercury were replete with such statements from individual Populists. Resolutions by county Populist clubs also be­ gan pouring in, with county after county resolving to stand true to the entire Omaha platform.28 At one point, a well-known Texas Populist, "Cyclone" Davis, sided with Taubeneck and called for cooperation with the free silverites. He stressed that if the sound-money advocates won the 1896 election, disaster would follow. The only way to avert this disaster was for all opposed to the gold standard to temporarily consolidate outside of established party lines and nominate free-silver candi­

The Betrayal of Alliance Principles

169

dates. Again, the "winner-takes-all" arrangement of the electoral sys­ tem had created doubts in some third partyites as to the wisdom of chancing a win by the sound-money advocates. The reaction to Davis7stance was generally one of outrage. The Mercury angrily commented that Davis put way too much stress on free silver, ignoring the fact that the whole financial system needed revamping. It was suggested that Davis consider resigning from his leadership role in the People's party. Other responses to the position taken by Davis were similarly condemning. One staunch Populist wrote: When I read his letter, I could not believe my eyes. . . . we pops [populists] down in this neck of the woods are not in the proper frame of mind to be handed over, bag and baggage to the free silver contingency of the democratic party by any one.29 The Populist club at Floresville in Wilson County wrote that: Neither Cyclone nor anyone else can fool the people . . . into dickering or trading our principles for the paltry offices of state or nation.30 The educational campaign of the Texas People's party seemed to have paid off in terms of commitment of most of the rank-and-file to Populist reform principles. This commitment was to be seriously tested by the events of 1896. Tensions between fusion and antifusion, or "middle-of-theroad," Populists mounted.* By early 1896, there were expressions of fear by Texas Populists that an attempt at betrayal would be made at the upcoming national People's party convention. In March 1896, the headline of the Mercury read: "The Plans Are Already Laid to Capture the Populist Convention." Taubeneck and his supporters were accused of playing a foolish and double game. They had planned a late convention; the People's party convention was to follow on the tail of the Republican and Democratic national conventions. Since they were expecting both old-party conventions to declare for "sound money," the People's party would then be left as the sole bearer of the free-silver banner. Most Texas Populists were distressed by this late convention call. One Texas Populist argued: "It is bad policy to wait for others *The label "middle-of-the-road," or "midroader," was coined to denote those Populists who envisioned their party creating a new multisectional party organization that would steer a course between the Republican party of the North and the Democratic party of the South.

170

The Betrayal of Alliance Principles

when you have your own duty to perform." He said that an early convention was needed so that the People's party would have ade­ quate time for an educational campaign based on Populist reform principles.31 The Mercury continued to condemn any attempt to pare the Populist monetary reform demands to a single free-silver demand that would facilitate fusion with old-party free silverites: Let no populist be decoyed by a few crumbs from the pie counter. . . . Let every populist in Texas see to it that no weakkneed compromising half-hearted platform trimmer goes as a delegate to the St. Louis convention.32 Taubeneck's strategy to gather the free-silver forces under the People's party banner was soon to be shattered. He and other Popu­ lists of similar mind had reasoned that the Cleveland administra­ tion, with its power over patronage and other resources of the execu­ tive branch, would have sufficient strength to block the endorsement of free silver at the national Democratic convention. There seemed even less hope for free silver at the national Republican convention. Taubeneck and his allies were at least right concerning it; convening in mid-June, the Republican party crushed any hope of free silver through that party. The convention declared for the gold standard by a vote of SiSVi to iosYi.33 The chairman of the Democratic national convention predicted, as had Taubeneck, that the gold-standard Democrats would also dominate the national Democratic conven­ tion.34 They both were mistaken. Three weeks later, the national Democratic party declared for free silver amidst the wild cheering of the delegates. The reform Democrats were definitely in power at the convention. They managed to obtain passage of a reform platform that included not only a free-silver plank, but also several planks ex­ plicitly condemning the actions of the Cleveland administration. Cleveland's bond-selling policy was condemned, as well as his "gov­ ernment by injunction." His policy of sending federal troops to sites of strike disputes was branded as a "crime against free institutions." The platform also called for stricter control of railroads, and it de­ manded as an offset to the Supreme Court decision invalidating the income tax law of 1894 a constitutional amendment authorizing Congress to levy such a tax.35 No straddle would have to be made between the platform and the presidential nominee, either. The reform Democrats were also successful in their efforts to get a free-silver reform Democrat elected as the party's presidential nominee. William Jennings Bryan received the nomination. He was a prominent free silverite and had also been

The Betrayal of Alliance Principles

171

a major figure in the fight in 1894 for a graduated income tax. Bryan swept the Democratic convention into enthusiasm with his famed "Cross of Gold" speech. In his speech, Bryan acknowledged that gold-standard advocates were complaining that free silver would hurt U.S. business interests. Bryan counterargued that gold mono­ metallists had too narrow a definition of the businessman. Bryan put forth a broader definition: The man who is employed for wages is as much a business man as his employer. . . . The farmer who goes forth in the morning and toils all day, . . . who by application of brain and muscle to the national resources of the country creates wealth, is as much a business man as the man who goes upon the board of trade and bets upon the price of grain. For these "businessmen," free silver would bring economic relief. In­ deed, free silver would hurt no one but the money gamblers. Bryan closed his speech with the now-famous words: "You shall not press down upon the brow of labor this crown of thorns [the gold stan­ dard]; you shall not crucify mankind on a cross of gold." Upon hear­ ing these final words, the silver delegates to the convention went "collectively crazy" for almost twenty-five minutes.36 More difficulty was experienced with the vice presidential nomi­ nation. Arthur Sewall, a possible candidate for the nomination, was opposed by many of the reform Democrats. He was a conservative Eastern banker and shipping magnate, and this fact did not sit well with many reform Democrats. But more desirable possibilities like "Silver Dick" Bland were persistent in their refusals to be consid­ ered. Finally, on the fifth ballot, Sewall received the nomination.37 He was to prove a thorn in the side of the Democratic party through­ out the campaign. Although the nomination of Sewall for vice-president was not a victory for reform Democrats, it was the only decision at the con­ vention in which the reform faction was not victorious. Clearly, the electoral threat evidenced in the 1894 election had been sufficiently threatening to the Democratic party that its leadership was forced to make concessions on the monetary reform issue. Thirty-one of the forty-one narrow losses and People's party wins in the 1894 con­ gressional races (70 percent) had been in formerly strong Democratic strongholds.38 Democratic leaders feared that antipathy for their party might have further increased in the two-year period following the last election, since a recovery from over a decade of hard times had still not occurred, and had even intensified while the Democrats

172

The Betrayal of Alliance Principles

were in power. The endorsement of a reform platform and the nomi­ nation of a free-silver advocate as their presidential nominee were seen as necessary steps to dissociate the party from the unpopular Cleveland administration. The Democratic party on the national level had finally employed a tactic that many Democratic leaders had long been employing at the state level: the selective issue en­ dorsement tactic. The switch from a counterideology tactic—the denial of the need for monetary reform—to a selective issue endorse­ ment tactic had occurred only after the electoral threat posed by po­ litical dissidents was perceived to be serious enough to threaten the viability of the Democratic party in national elections. Once again, the importance of the dynamic approach to protest movements adopted by the mobilization perspective is illustrated. The national Democratic party, which had in the 1892 presidential election waged a counterideology campaign that stressed tariff re­ form, was agreeing four years later that monetary reforms like silver coinage were essential to recovery. Close attention to the interaction between the protest movement and the government is essential to understanding the growth experience of a protest movement. The unanticipated outcome of the Democratic convention threw Taubeneck and his allies into confusion. The reform factions would not be forced to bolt from the Democratic party. By making conces­ sions, the Democratic party had undermined the fragile viability of the People's party. The likelihood of a new party winning a sizable portion of the vote, especially a majority, and thereby displacing one of the older parties, is strongly dependent on the older parties' refus­ ing to make concessions to a large dissident faction. Thus, the pass­ ing of a reform Democratic platform in 1896 dealt a major blow to the People's party. This fact illustrates the vulnerability of electoral protest in a "winner-takes-all" system. Such protest is highly vul­ nerable to the co-optative effects of selective issue endorsements by one of the dominant parties. Major or radical reforms such as that entailed in the subtreasury plan are rarely, if ever, endorsed by the dominant political parties. More "tolerable" reforms like free silver are endorsed, and the third party has to deal with members' inclina­ tion to settle for partial reform. In such a situation, it is extremely difficult for protest leaders to generate and maintain commitment. Uncertainty and anxiety ran high as the Populist delegates be­ gan gathering for their national convention in St. Louis on 22 July 1896. A bolt was feared, because neither the free-silver sympathizers nor the middle-of-the-road, or antifusionist, Populists were in the mood to compromise. The antifusionists organized a steering com­

The Betrayal of Alliance Principles

173

mittee that was firmly committed to a straight People's party ticket. The free-silver Populists were equally adamant about their support of Bryan. They accused the antifusionists of being tools of the Re­ publican party and unwittingly aiding in the destruction of reform. The antifusionists responded that the free-silver sympathizers had not been properly educated in the reform principles of the People's party—monetary or otherwise. At one point, a fight broke out. Nei­ ther side seemed willing to back down. Dallas County Populists sent a telegram of support to the Texas antifusionist delegation: "Five hundred populists say never surrender. Bryan means death."39 The first significant battle of the convention was the election of a permanent chair. This position was important because the chair was in charge of the machinery of the convention. The convention proceedings would be greatly affected by rulings from the chair. The free-silver faction put forth Senator William Allen, a well-known Bryan supporter from Nebraska. The antifusionists made a tactical error in nominating fames Champion, a little-known Populist from Maine. Their reasoning behind this nomination, to the extent that it existed, was never made explicit, but they lost the vote, which fa­ vored Allen by 758 to 564. The announcement of Allen's election was greeted with almost twenty minutes of cheering by the freesilver, Bryan supporters.40 But the antifusionists were not to be outmaneuvered for long. They fully recognized that their best chance for defeating the freesilver Populists would not be gained by a direct attack on Bryan, but by an attack on Sewall. They moved to change the regular order of nominating so that the vice-presidential nominations would be held first. Their motion was carried by a vote of 738 to 658.41 This time the antifusionists won. They were confident that the convention delegates would not support Sewall. This would make it next to im­ possible, or so they believed, for Bryan to accept the People's party presidential nomination if it should be offered to him. Alarmed by this turn of events, the principal Democratic repre­ sentative at the convention, Senator James Jones, wired Bryan of the need for him to state his intentions if the Populists extended him the presidential nomination, but rejected Sewall. Bryan responded that he would not accept the nomination unless Sewall was also nominated.42 Jones then announced Bryan's reply to the convention delegates, hoping that such information would ensure the nomina­ tion of Sewall. But the delegates were not swayed. Tom Watson was nominated for vice-president along with Sewall, and strong speeches were made on Watson's behalf. One delegate stressed that nobody

174

The Betrayal of Alliance Principles

had ever accused Watson of "trying to put the new wine of populism into old democratic bottles." He went on to criticize the Sewall nomination: I do not understand why this convention should nominate a president of a national bank in order to put down banks. I do not understand . . . why we should nominate a railroad mag­ nate to check the oppression and monopolies of railroads. Nor can I conceive how sensible men could select the greatest corporationist of New England in order to destroy the encroach­ ment of organized corporate greed.43 Tremendous applause followed, and it was clear that Jones' hopes would not be realized. Sewall lost heavily in the balloting to South­ ern Populist Tom Watson. The antifusionists also prepared for a struggle over the platform. They pushed for a full endorsement of the Omaha platform of 1892. Contrary to the claims of historians such as Goodwyn,44 they were not totally successful. The call for government ownership of the means of transportation and communication was reaffirmed, as were the platform planks demanding land policy reform. Taubeneck's efforts to trim the Omaha platform to the bare essentials of mone­ tary reform in the name of "practical politics" had definitely failed. There were, however, two significant changes in the wording of the monetary reform planks.45 These changes reflected the desire of the free-silver Populists to make that part of the platform as unobjec­ tionable as possible. One change in wording occurred in the plank demanding that the federal government issue money directly to the people and by­ pass the national banks. In 1892 this plank had read: We demand a national currency, safe, sound, and flexible, is­ sued by the general government only, a full legal tender for all debts, public and private, and that without the use of banking corporations, a just, and equitable, and efficient means of dis­ tribution direct to the people, at a tax not to exceed 2 percent per annum, to be provided as set forth by the subtreasury plan of the Farmers Alliance, or a better system, also by payments in discharge of its obligations for public improvements. In 1896, the demand that currency be distributed through the sub­ treasury plan or "a better system" was omitted: We demand a national currency, safe and sound, issued by the General Government only, without the intervention of banks

The Betrayal of Alliance Principles

175

of issue, to be full legal tender for all debts, public and private; a just, equitable, and efficient means of distribution, direct to the people, and through the lawful disbursement of the Government. This omission of the specific reference to the subtreasury plan was the coup de grace of a process begun as early as 1894 of weaning the People's party supporters from any commitment to the details of the subtreasury plan. The plan that had once given farmers en­ tangled in the crop-lien system hope of financial betterment was dealt a death blow without so much as one complaint being recorded in the proceedings of the convention. Now the farmers were left with the mere hope that some of the increased currency that would be issued by the government directly to the people would trickle down to them. The farmers were told that the increased currency would restore prosperity, but there was no specific plan or program to en­ sure that they would directly benefit from that prosperity The demise of the once crucially important subtreasury plan il­ lustrates the difficulty of advocating highly specific plans for reform in an electoral struggle for power. The temptation to make reform planks less specific and therefore less vulnerable to attack is always present. The People's party succumbed to this temptation after the 1894 election. The extensive discussions of the details of the sub­ treasury plan that had previously been so frequent were now very uncommon. Indeed, in the year preceeding the 1896 convention, there was only one reference to the details of the subtreasury plan in the Southern Mercury. Furthermore, when the subtreasury prin­ ciple was mentioned, the reference was often accompanied by a request that it be substituted with a call for the establishment of postal banks that would loan money directly to the people.46 The secretary of the People's party National Reform Press Association advocated this substitution. He maintained that the People's party platform says that we favor the distribution of money through the sub­ treasury, or a better system. Our opponents think there is a better system, and I think so too. In fact, I believe that nearly all our party thinks so. I believe that the Omaha convention thought so when it put a declaration in the platform favoring government postal banks. We had made excellent strides edu­ cating the people along the subtreasury lines. It was thought best by our people not to drop it entirely at that time. The principle involved is all right. . . . It is generally conceded now that the only utility of the subtreasury plan is to furnish demo-

176

The Betrayal of Alliance Principles

cratic orators a theme to talk about—something they know nothing of—in order to give the people a rest on the tariff racket.47 Though having once played a central role in the formation and growth of the People's party in the South, the subtreasury plan had by 1895 been discarded. All that remained was a commitment to the subtreasury principle—the issuance of fiat money by the govern­ ment directly to the people in sufficient quantities to conduct the business of the country. The Mercury stated that the subtreasury principle was "the basic rock upon which the People's party rests and on this [principle] absolutely no compromise would be made."48 Thus, after the 1894 elections, Populists had taken the line of least resistance. That is to say, since the subtreasury principle was easier to defend than the details of the subtreasury plan, they opted for the former and neglected the latter. On this one matter, the Texas Popu­ lists were as guilty as the national Populist leaders with whom they were to soon clash over the issue of "practical politics." Given the lack of attention to the specifics of the subtreasury plan after 1894, it is no surprise to find that mention of the plan was absent from the 1896 platform. The second change in the monetary planks was the demand for simply a "safe and sound" currency; the 1892 demand for a flexible currency was dropped. The flexible currency demand was inextric­ ably related to the idea of irredeemable, fiat money. A monetary sys­ tem tied to the volume of gold and silver reserves could hardly be termed flexible; thus, the dropping of that adjective was another sign of the free-silver Populists' attempt to tone down the Populist mone­ tary reform planks. A "safe and sound" currency was entirely consis­ tent with bimetallism. Thus, this new monetary reform plank would be completely acceptable to the advocates of free silver and redeem­ able currency. Another change in the monetary planks concerned the amount of circulating currency. The Omaha platform of 1892 had demanded that the amount of circulating currency be speedily in­ creased to not less than $50 per capita. In the 1896 platform, the mini­ mum level of per capita expansion was not specified. The plank sim­ ply demanded that the volume of circulating currency be speedily increased to the "amount sufficient to meet the demand of the busi­ ness and population, and to restore the just level of prices of labor and production." The change in the wording was probably motivated by the knowledge that silver at its current level of production could not feasibly increase the circulating medium to $50 per capita: to obtain that volume, fiat money would have to be issued. Perhaps the plat­

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177

form committee decided that many an argument would be avoided by not being specific about the per capita volume of circulating currency necessary to "meet the demand of business and population." In sum, Taubeneck's desire to moderate the Populist monetary reform planks had been realized. Not only was mention of the sub­ treasury plan dropped, but there was not even a strong plank em­ bodying the subtreasury principle—a principle that called for a flex­ ible, fiat currency supply issued directly to the people by the govern­ ment. Taubeneck's faction had won a major victory The next major struggle at the convention concerned the allimportant presidential nomination. Tension was high. It was known that Senator Jones had wired Bryan after the Populists had over­ whelmingly voted for Watson over Sewall. Bryan's answer was awaited. Meanwhile, nominations for president were in order. The nominating address on Bryan's behalf was delivered, and free-silver delegates began a demonstration march to show their support of Bryan. The antifusionists were nervous. The leader of the antifusion steering committee, Texas Populist H. S. P. "Stump" Ashby, took over the podium and pointedly stated that he and other midroaders were ready to endorse Bryan if and only if Bryan openly endorsed the entire People's party platform. This statement brought forth a great deal of contention, and soon the convention became, according to one outside observer, a "howling mob." As opposed to Bryan as the antifusionists were, they had diffi­ culty finding a well-known antifusionist Populist to nominate in opposition to Bryan. Initially they had supported Eugene Debs, a prominent labor leader who had been jailed over his actions in the Pullman railroad strike, but Debs had declined the offer. Finally, they nominated S. F. Norton, a reform editor committed to revamp­ ing the existing redeemable-money financial system, which he ar­ gued gave extraordinary powers to the national banks. Although a true midroader, Norton was far from a national figure.49The roll-call vote on the presidential nominees was soon to commence. In a last desperate effort to ensure the election of Bryan, the leaders of the free-silver faction attempted to allay the delegates' reservations about Bryan by circulating the rumor that Sewall had agreed to relin­ quish the vice-presidential nomination and allow Watson to take his place. Thus, a genuinely Democratic-Populist ticket would be cre­ ated. This rumor probably had a decisive influence on delegates who were uncertain or wavering. The roll call by state commenced. It was interrupted three times by "Stump" Ashby, who inquired each time whether or not the convention chairman had received a reply from Bryan. Would he

178

The Betrayal of Alliance Principles

stand on the People's party platform and accept the nomination? The chairman repeatedly denied that he had heard from Bryan. Many delegates were suspicious of the denial, but they were power­ less to do anything about it. The midroaders' strategy to ensure a straight People's party ticket had collapsed. They were sure that Bryan would neither stand on the Populist platform nor accept the nomination with Watson as his running mate, but without a definite reply from Bryan, they could not press the issue. A motion was made to adjourn the convention in order to telegram Bryan. Chairman A l­ len declared the motion out of order. The roll call proceeded, with Bryan receiving an overwhelming majority of the votes. The final count was 1,042 to 321. Texas cast all 103 of its votes for Norton.50 The Texas delegation was thereafter termed "the immortal 103." They had remained true to the spirit of that telegram from the Dallas County Populists: "Five hundred populists say never surrender. . . ." They did not have much company; only 218 votes were simi­ larly cast. Table 4 breaks the vote down by state. As is evident from this table, the states most effectively organized by the Southern Farmers Alliance cast only about 30 percent of their vote (207V4 out of 663) for a straight People's party, nonfusion ticket. If Texas is ex­ cluded from that calculation, the remaining states mobilized by the Alliance cast only 20 percent of their vote for a straight People's party ticket. That was not significantly better than the 18 percent cast for that ticket by those states with no or very weak links to the cooperative project of the Southern Farmers Alliance and its lectur­ ing system. This voting record indicates the difficulty of generating and maintaining commitment to a full slate of reform demands in an electoral struggle.51 Texas was an exception; it cast all of its votes for a nonfusion ticket. Thus, one must be careful not to assume that the extreme difficulties of creating and sustaining commitment render that task an impossibility. Nor should one use the People's party experience to support without qualification Piven and Cloward's contention that organization and commitment are antithetical.52 A key argu­ ment of this book—that organization is crucial to protest move­ ments seeking major changes in the socioeconomic structure—is the exact opposite of Piven and Cloward's. Piven and Cloward have argued that protest organizations are of little or no use to an ag­ grieved population seeking ameliorative reforms. Their strategy rec­ ommendation is simply to take to the streets and create turbulence. Implicit in such a recommendation is the fact that the demand for change should be left general and unspecified. There is no organiza-

The Betrayal of Alliance Principles

Table 4 . The 1896 Convention Vote for the People's Party Presi­ dential Candidate (by State) Bryan

Norton

States Most Effectively Mobilized by the Alliance* Alabama 38 y4 153/4 — Arkansas 23 — Florida 8 Georgia 56 5 Mississippi 12 6 North Carolina 70 25 South Carolina NA NA — Texas 103 — Oklahoma 9 — Kansas 92 Kentucky 15% 10% Tennessee 67 10 — South Dakota 17 — North Dakota 12 Missouri 6 32 — Louisiana 30 Subtotal 4553/4 (69%) 207% (31%) Other States Arizona Colorado Connecticut Delaware Idaho Illinois Indiana Indian Territory Iowa Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minnesota Montana Nebraska Nevada New Hampshire New Jersey New Mexico New York

6 45 6 3 7 39 20 6 29 3 9 21 19 49 11 57 7 4 10 6 34%

— — — — — 15 10 — 1 5 — — 11 4 — — — — 2 — 9%

Total Vote

54 23 8 61 18 95 NA 103 9 92 26 77 17 12 38 30 663

6 45 6 3 7 54 30 6 30 8 9 21 30 53 11 57 7 4 12 6 44

179

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The Betrayal of Alliance Principles

Table 4 .—Continued Norton

Bryan Ohio

21

Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island Utah Vermont Virginia Washington West Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming Subtotal

94/9 35 —

6 (plus 1 1 votes for others) 75/9 7 3

5 3 50 10 5% 84/s 6 545 V2 (82%]1

— —

3 6

2 Vs 16 Vs —

119^2 (18%)

Total Vote 38 17 42 3 5 3 53 16 8 25 6 665

*The states listed here correspond to those mentioned in Goodwyn, Democratic Promise, p. 312. Goodwyn points out that the sixteen states mobilized by the cooper­ ative, self-help economic strategies of the Alliance had a stronger organizational net­ work than states mobilized after 1890. The latter states generally represented small pressure groups rather than large grass-roots constituencies. s o u r c e : New York Times, 26 July 1896.

tional network by which the aggrieved population may gather to dis­ cuss various reform proposals and determine which ones deserve its unified, and therefore more powerful, support. The "turbulence in the street" recommendation necessarily entails leaving the details of reform to the government, which is pressured by the turbulence into proposing some type of reform legislation in order to regain legitimacy. This recommendation is inherently conservative, in that the specifics of reform are developed by politicians who typically have very different interests from those of the aggrieved population. The "simple turbulence" approach to reform may be effective in getting piecemeal reforms, but it is not appropriate for a movement fueled by the belief that major changes in the socioeconomic structure are needed, or that the structure is best bypassed by the creation of alter­ native structures. The Alliance organization and its political arm, the People's party, were based on just such a belief. Radical changes in the economic structure do not result from street protests for re­ form of an unspecified nature. An organizational context is essential to the development and maintenance of commitment to specific radical demands, and therefore was essential to the Alliance move­ ment and the People's party.

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181

The research task facing sociologists is to examine the factors that influence the relationship between organization and commit­ ment. Piven and Cloward's contention that organization and com­ mitment are inherently antithetical unfortunately directs attention away from this area of research. If, as is argued here, organization is essential to protest movements based on major reform proposals emanating from the grass-roots level, then attention must be focused on how to create such an organization and both generate and main­ tain commitment to original movement goals. To this end, the Texas People's party—being both highly organized and nonfusionist—war­ rants close attention. To understand the success of the Texas People's party, one must understand the distinctiveness of the Texas Alliance movement on which it was built. The Texas Alliance organization, like no other state Alliance, designed and implemented a daring, grandiose, state­ wide cooperative project: the Exchange and its joint-note program. While the Exchange encountered various obstacles and subsequently failed, it did succeed in mobilizing an incredible number of Texas farmers. The year that the Exchange opened its doors for business, Alliance membership doubled.53 A large group of farmers—those de­ pendent on crop-lien financing—had previously been slighted by the cash-only policy of Alliance projects. While this policy was to con­ tinue in other states, Texas Alliance leaders developed a joint-note financing program that was in large part responsible for the doubling of Alliance membership the year it was initiated. When the Ex­ change and its joint-note program failed, all that the farmers depen­ dent on crop liens had to pin their dreams of financial salvation on was the subtreasury plan. If implemented, this plan would free the debt-ridden farmers from crop-lien financing, just as the Exchange joint-note program had promised to do. The politics surrounding the subtreasury plan were particularly radicalizing for this group of Al­ liance farmers. No other state Alliance had effectively mobilized this large group because their cooperative projects were run solely on a safe, cash-only policy. Thus, the Texas People's party not only had the advantage of building upon the largest existing state Alliance or­ ganization, but its members more than any other state Alliance membership understood the personal financial benefits of the sub­ treasury plan. The Texas reform press worked hard to maintain this commitment; it strongly and unqualifiedly condemned the fusion movement in the People's party as a betrayal of Alliance principles. The Texas delegation and other antifusionists were angered at the refusal of the convention to give Watson a committed Populist as a running mate. A Houston Daily Post reporter overheard one Popu­

182

The Betrayal of Alliance Principles

list declare that he "would not go to heaven" if he "had to go in democratic company."54 Bitter accusations were made concerning the manipulation of the national People's party convention. The ap­ portionment of delegates to the convention was said to have been unfair and even intentionally rigged. Each state was apportioned i delegate for each senator and congressman, as well as i additional delegate for each 2,000 votes (or majority fraction thereof) cast for the People's party in 1892 or 1894, whichever was higher. Texas Populists pointed out that this basis of representation favored more populous states like New York without regard for the intensity of commitment to Populist reform principles. For example, Texas was allowed 103 delegates, largely on the basis of the 155,000 votes the People's party had received in the 1894 election. New Yorkers had given the People's party only 8,000 votes; yet New York was appor­ tioned 54 delegates, largely on the basis of population size. It was further argued that those states where the People's party had fused with the Republicans or Democrats received a greater number of dele­ gate positions than was warranted on the basis of genuine commit­ ment to Populist reform principles. For example, the People's party in North Carolina had 95 delegates based on a fusion PopulistRepublican vote of 148,344 in 1894. In 1892, the People's party in that state had polled a mere 45,000, with the Republican ticket poll­ ing 100,342 votes. In a square fight on the issues, the state People's party had proven weak. It was, however, rewarded by the delegate apportionment formula for its fusionist stance. In sum, the antifu­ sionists claimed that the deck had been stacked against them even before the convention had opened.55 The support for this charge is mixed. The formula for delegate apportionment in 189256 did indeed favor both the most heavily populated states and states that had made fusion arrangements in past elections. But one must be cautious in inferring from this favor­ itism that Taubeneck had deliberately rigged the convention by ma­ nipulating the apportionment formula. If Taubeneck had wanted to stack the convention with fusionists, he could have simply bor­ rowed the formula of both the Democratic and Republican parties at that time. Their delegate apportionment was based purely on a state's strength in the electoral college (regardless of the past Demo­ cratic or Republican vote in that state). The granting of additional delegates based on past strength of the People's party vote was a novel move; such a "bonus vote" formula was not adopted by the major parties until 1916.57 Furthermore, the charge that the appor­ tionment formula underrepresented the South, and more specifi­ cally the states mobilized by the Southern Farmers Alliance, is un­

Th e Betrayal of Alii an ce Prin ciples

183

founded.58 As Table 4 indicates, states mobilized by the Alliance controlled roughly one-half of the votes at the convention. Had they remained unqualifiedly loyal to the original and full demands of the People's party, Bryan would not have won the presidential candidacy of the party Delegate apportionment was not the only complaint of the anti­ fusion Populists. They noted with anger the deceitful manipulations of Chairman William Allen. Mention was made of the action from the floor of the convention to postpone presidential nominations un­ til Bryan replied to the telegram inquiring whether he would accept the nomination and stand on the Populist platform in a joint ticket with Watson. Allen had declared the motion out of order and then proceeded with the roll-call vote on the presidential nominations. Antifusionists called this declaration a gross example of foul play.59 Suspicions also continued to exist that Allen had possessed Bryan's reply to the telegram all along and did not divulge its contents out of fear it would jeopardize Bryan's nomination. Historians have tended to support these suspicions.60 There is the possibility that, had it not been for such manipula­ tions of the convention by Allen, a straight People's party ticket would have been nominated. If Allen indeed did hold Bryan's tele­ graphed reply in his hands, it was assuredly either a negative or, more likely, an ambiguous or conditional reply. Following his nomi­ nation by the People's party, Bryan stated in a press interview that his acceptance would depend entirely upon the conditions attached to the nomination: "I shall do nothing which will endanger the suc­ cess of bimetallism, nor shall I do anything unfair to Sewall."61 It is impossible to know with assurance how the delegates to the Popu­ list convention would have reacted had a telegram like this been read before the convention, but there is a possibility that it would have made the delegates from the Alliance states less willing to compromise. In that case, their control over almost 50 percent of the convention vote could have been fatal to Bryan's candidacy. Bryan might have been rejected in favor of a straight People's party ticket. In looking for explanations of the convention's mixed-ticket de­ cision, however, the antifusion Populists should have also pointed to the failure of a strong national educational campaign on Populist principles. Chairman Allen's views on Democratic-Populist coopera­ tion are aptly stated in the following quote from his address to the convention: I do not want them to say to me that the Populists have been advocates of reform when they could not be accomplished, but

184

The Betrayal of Alliance Principles

when the first ray of light appeared and the people were look­ ing with expectancy and with anxiety for relief, the party was not equal to the occasion, . . . It was stupid; it was blind; it kept in "the middle of the road" and missed the golden opportunity.62 The equation of a "golden opportunity" with free silver and the ap­ plause following Allen's speech were definite indications that the People's party educational campaign on its monetary reform planks had failed on the national level. The distinctiveness and importance of the Populist demand for fiat, irredeemable currency issued di­ rectly to the people by the federal government was not recognized as being of crucial importance. Many Populists believed that free silver represented a major reform, major enough to necessitate fusion with the Democrats. The serious limitations of free silver as a sole mone­ tary reform were not understood. Given this state of affairs, the pro­ clivity of many Populists toward Bryan is not surprising. They wanted to give their endorsement to the presidential nominee most likely to win the election and implement free-silver coinage. In the late 1800s, the fiat-money ideas embodied in the Populist platform amounted to cultural heresy. To obtain a genuine under­ standing and commitment to fiatism was an extremely difficult and challenging task. It necessitated an extensive campaign like that conducted in Texas by the reform press and the traveling lecturers. This campaign, even if seriously conducted, would have encoun­ tered many problems—finance being a paramount one. However, the national chairman of the People's party, Taubeneck, and his supporters did not even attempt such a campaign. In the aftermath of the 1894 election, they had concluded that a na­ tional victory was not possible without gaining the support of the dissident free-silver factions of the Democratic and Republican par­ ties. Continued and uncompromising loyalty to the Omaha People's party platform (the Alliance platform) and its monetary planks as­ sured an electoral loss. The coverage of the monetary reform issue by the press concentrated on the debate between the two factions of the old parties: gold standard/monometallist advocates versus bimetallist/free-silver advocates. The major news media, which over­ shadowed the reform media, all but ignored the Populist reform de­ mands. The communication network for reaching sufficient numbers of people and educating them on the distinctiveness of Populist prin­ ciples did not exist in most states. So Taubeneck, taking a "practical politics" philosophy, made a key decision: he began pushing for a single-issue, free-silver campaign. He chose the line of least resis-

The Betrayal of Alliance Principles

185

tan ce— that of free silver— in order to enhance the v ia b ility of the People's p a rty Free silver w as the com m on denom inator that tied to ­ gether a m o tle y group of reform advocates. Taubeneck erroneously predicted that neither the D em ocratic nor the Republic party w ou ld m ak e con cession s to its free-silver factions; the factions w ould then probably bolt, and the People's party w ould w elcom e them under its banner and thereby gain a chance for victory.

In sum, Taubeneck and his supporters within the People's party did not even attempt a national campaign of education on the impor­ tance and distinctiveness of Populist monetary reform demands and its other reform principles. They did just the opposite,- they stressed the importance of free silver as a reform and the need for all free silverites—Democrat, Republican, and Populist—to join forces and push for victory. As a result of the lack of a national educational campaign stressing the distinctiveness of Populist reform principles, many Populists were quick to accept what the Texas middle-of-theroad Populists had termed "crumbs from the pie counter." The antifusionist faction of the People's party was thrown into a state of confusion by the results of the national party convention. This confusion was apparent as the Texas People's party conven­ tion began one week after the national convention. "Stump" Ashby opened the convention as chairman. Soon thereafter, a midroader Populist marched on stage with a banner reading: "July 22, 1896. St. Louis Middle-of-the-road Populist Ticket. 103." Wild cheering broke out. The endorsement of the attempt by "the immortal 103" to ob­ tain a straight People's party ticket seemed widespread.63 But what was to be done now that the attempt to obtain a straight party ticket had failed? Conflict was soon to emerge over this issue. The convention appointed a three-person committee to send a message to several other state Populist conventions. All three members of the committee were firm antifusionists. When the word­ ing of the telegram was presented to the convention, dissension was immediately manifested. The telegram read simply: "No Watson, no Bryan." C. H. Jenkins, chairman of the platform and resolutions committee, strongly opposed the wording. He stated that he too had wanted a straight Populist ticket, but the national convention dele­ gates had seen fit to nominate Bryan just as they had nominated Watson. The decision reached at the national convention was seen by Jenkins as a binding majority decision. If Bryan accepted the nomination—it was still not known if he would—the Texas Popu­ lists should support him. They should not concern themselves with Sewall. He was on the Democratic ticket. If Bryan should accept, the Populists would have their own Bryan-Watson ticket. Jenkins' state­

186

The Betrayal of Alliance Principles

ment was applauded at least by some of the delegates. There was never a vote taken on whether to send the telegram as worded or not. The matter was postponed; the committee finally withdrew the tele­ gram from consideration, saying that the other state conventions had adjourned, so no purpose would be served by wiring them.64 A similar stalling tactic killed the Reedy resolution. This reso­ lution stated that Bryan would not be supported unless Sewall with­ drew in deference to Watson. The resolution gave the state Execu­ tive Committee of the People's party plenary power to select a presidential nominee to run with Watson if Sewall did not withdraw before the first of September. The Reed resolution was proposed from the floor of the convention, and promptly sent to the commit­ tee on platform and resolutions. Jenkins, who had opposed the tele­ gram of "No Watson, no Bryan," was head of this committee: this fact did not bode well for the resolution. Indeed, Jenkins told a Houston Daily Post reporter that the committee would definitely re­ port adversely on the resolution. In the end, Jenkins did not have to deliver that negative report; the resolution was simply pigeonholed. The committee on platform and resolutions delayed making its gen­ eral report to the convention until after a majority of the delegates had returned home. No mention of the Reedy resolution was made in the general report. Reedy later explained that he had agreed to the suppression of his resolution because he had been assured by "tried and true" Populists that such an action would be in the best inter­ ests of the party.65 Thus, the Texas Populists were cheated out of an open debate and a democratic vote on the actions of their party in the upcoming election. A Houston Daily Post reporter wrote that the convention had been manipulated by Populist leaders to avoid sticky national party issues.66 Similarly, but in a more forceful fashion, the Gal­ veston News noted that: It was a hard battle—the hardest they have ever undertaken— but the populist leaders won and the convention adjourned without any official declaration that Texas would have none of Bryan. A dozen times has it appeared that the convention was getting beyond their control and on each occasion it has seemed that nothing could stop the offering and adoption of a resolution that "no Watson, no Bryan" was the unanimous dec­ laration of Texas populism. But by hook and crook they kept it down. . . . But it was a hard fight. Not a smoother piece of po­ litical engineering has ever been done in Texas by any set of politicians.67

The Betrayal of Alliance Principles

187

The Mercury reported that it was receiving a large number of letters calling for a straight Populist ticket if Bryan did not explicitly accept the Populist nomination soon and ask Sewall to withdraw. Other letter writers denounced Bryan altogether, saying that they would have nothing to do with anything but a straight Populist ticket.68 The new chairman of the national People's party Executive Committee, Marion Butler, was also besieged with inquiries, pleas, and threats from Populists across the country.69The national Execu­ tive Committee finally scheduled a meeting for 1 8 August to decide upon the stance to be encouraged in the upcoming election. The Mercury extended its advice to this committee. It argued that the only safe and honorable course for the committee to take was to give Watson a Populist running mate. Sewall was apparently not going to withdraw. Thus, the campaign would have to be conducted with a "three-cornered ticket." The national Executive Committee did not see the matter in quite the same fashion as the Mercury. Most of its members argued that both Bryan and Watson had been nominated by the national convention, and neither would be sacrificed in the interest of the other. No change would be made in the People's party national ticket. Assuming that Sewall would not withdraw, the Executive Committee then set out to arrange for a division of the electoral vote between the Bryan-Watson and the Bryan-Sewall ticket. Such fusion was deemed necessary if the reform forces were not to be divided. If such a division occurred, McKinley would win the election. Butler hedged about notifying the candidates of their nomina­ tion; he claimed that it had not been the custom of the People's party to notify its candidates in the past, and it would not be done now. Clearly, he was nervous that Bryan might not accept the nomi­ nation if formally tendered.70 The Mercury was angered by Butler's refusal to formally notify Bryan, and it was also displeased with the suggestion of a fusion ar­ rangement between Bryan-Watson and Bryan-Sewall electors. It was believed that Sewall's refusal to withdraw was an indication that the Democratic party was trying to swallow the People's party. The Mercury also proclaimed the Bryan-Sewall platform of redeemable money as totally unacceptable. No Populist could vote for a single Bryan-Sewall elector; this amounted to selling out for a mere in­ crease of $ i per capita per year, because that was all the relief that free silver would provide.71 Under increasing criticism, Butler finally felt compelled to no­ tify Bryan and Watson of their nomination. When the letters of noti­ fication were released to the press, the Mercury labeled them the "fi­

188

The Betrayal of Alliance Principles

nale to a series of blunders and treachery by the People's party na­ tional leaders." In his letter to Bryan, Butler had declared that: It has at no time been expected nor is it now, that you will abandon your adhesion to the Chicago platform, nor that you will accept all that is declared in the People's party platform. . . . The People's party will exact of you no promises further than those made in your public utterances.72 Butler's notification to Watson declared that: If the Democratic party had been true to the people and its platform in the election of a candidate for vice-president, we would not have the honor of addressing you . . . in this official capacity, for in that event the People's party would have nomi­ nated the whole Democratic ticket. . . .73 Clearly, the national People's party chairman was not committed to the People's party platform; he had expressed a willingness under certain minimal conditions to sacrifice the Populist demand for an irredeemable money supply, as well as many of its other reform planks. The basic reform principles that had been stressed over and over again in the Texas People's party educational campaign were not even recognized by the chairman of the national People's party Executive Committee, or, if recognized, did not engender any ex­ pression of commitment. Bryan accepted the People's party nomination, saying that the nomination had been made "in such a generous spirit and honorable way that I am able to accept the same without departing from the platform adopted by the Democratic convention at Chicago."74Thus, the threats of "no Watson, no Bryan" and of "no Populist platform endorsement, no Bryan" had gone unheeded. Not only had Sewall's removal not been made a condition of Bryan's nomination, but Bryan had flatly been told that he could ignore the Populist platform. There would be no fight for Alliance-Populist principles on a na­ tional level in 1896. The national leaders of the People's party had betrayed those principles in their bid for national office.

io. The Demise of the People's Party

The Texas People's party leaders were determined that the betrayal of the 1896 election year would not be repeated in future election years. They called for a reorganization of the People's party along antifusionist lines. Such a reorganization required a national party convention at the earliest possible date to implement a campaign of education by a united party. An educational campaign was believed to be of supreme importance to the continued viability of Populism. The Mercury declared that the very life of the People's party de­ pended upon a speedy rebuilding of the party around the Omaha platform. Similar declarations were made by individual Populists throughout the state, as well as other Populist papers.1 Voters had to be made to understand the distinctiveness of the Populist reforms advocated in the Omaha platform. The Mercury declared that the bombastic declaration of W. J. Bryan that the battle of 1900 is now on and will be fought to the finish on the single question of "bimetallism," is simply a scheme to substitute the specie basis for the worn out "tariff howl." Bimetallism can bring no substantial relief to the people under existing conditions. Specie basis means interest bearing bonds and the perpetuation of national banks. In short, it means the per­ petuation of a financial system that has produced more pov­ erty, misery, and degradation than all other evils combined.2 A campaign of education stressing just this point had to be com­ menced at once. The success of the campaign hinged on the ability of the Populists to reunite under a middle-of-the-road banner. The Texas Populists were optimistic that this could happen; such opti­ mism was to be slowly but surely dispelled. A conference of antifusion Populists was held in Nashville in July 1897, eight months after the 1896 election. Over 600 Populists were present, with 355 of them being approved as voting delegates

190

The Demise of the People's Party

by the committee on credentials. The chair of the Texas People's party, J. S. Bradley, presided over the conference. A decidedly antifu­ sion stance was taken by the delegates and a national organizing committee was established to plan the reorganization of the party and the strengthening of the antifusion sentiment among the Popu­ list rank-and-file. Each state was to elect three members to this im­ portant committee. Milton Park headed this committee; Park was the editor of the Mercury and a staunch antifusionist.3 A meeting of the national Executive Committee of the People's party was finally called by Chairman Butler in June 1898. Fearing great dissension, Butler had put off calling the meeting as long as possible. The state elections of 1898, however, were approaching, and a meeting was essential. The national committee gathered in Omaha for a three-day meeting that quickly turned tense. The antifusionists demanded Butler's resignation because of his actions in the 1896 campaign. Butler steadfastly refused to comply, and the antifusion­ ists could not obtain enough support for a forced-resignation move. After three days of wrangling, an agreement was finally reached, later referred to as the Omaha agreement. In its original form, the agreement declared that no People's party convention would be held in 1898 to outline national party policy. Each state would be left to pursue whatever policy it thought best. Furthermore, the Butler fac­ tion of the national committee was to abstain from any fusion prop­ ositions or encouragement of fusion in any fashion or form. A final provision of the original agreement called for a national convention in March 1899. This provision was later deleted because of strong protestations from the Butler faction. A provision was substituted that merely stated that the national convention would be held before the Democratic and Republican national conventions. The antifu­ sionists, who had all agreed to the original agreement, were dis­ turbed by Butler's strong protest against an early convention. Sus­ picion set in and they refrained from voting on the agreement as amended. Milton Park, the chairman of the national organizing committee of the antifusion Populists, issued a call for a convention of antifusionists to meet in Cincinnati in September.4 The Cincinnati convention was beset with dissension. It was soon clear that even the antifusion Populists were not unified. Al­ though they were in hearty agreement that Populists should stay in the middle-of-the-road, they were badly divided as to the proper specific actions that the antifusion faction should take. Some anti­ fusionists argued that a national straight Populist ticket should be fielded in 1900 even if a bolt from the regular convention was nec­ essary. Others argued that a strong antifusion campaign should be

The Demise of the People's Party

191

conducted, but the stance taken at the national convention should be endorsed, whatever it was. Populists of the former opinion dominated the Cincinnati convention. They pushed for the nomi­ nation by the presently assembled convention of a straight People's party ticket. Such a nomination, almost two years in advance of the 1900 regular nominating convention, would allow plenty of time for an antifusion campaign that could include the espousal of particular candidates. This proposal created such an uproar that the manager of the convention hall threatened to vacate the hall if or­ der could not be maintained. After some semblance of order was restored, and it became clear that the nomination of a ticket was to actually occur, a large number of delegates bolted. Those that re­ mained proceeded to nominate Wharton Barker for president. Bar­ ker was the editor of the American, a staunch antifusion Populist paper. Ignatius Donnelly was nominated as vice-president. Both Barker and Donnelly had vigorously opposed the fusion of the 1896 campaign.5 The continued wrangling between antifusion and fusion fac­ tions of the People's party was taking its toll, both nationally and in Texas. The consequences for the Texas People's party became quite clear in the 1898 election, which the Mercury had been quite op­ timistic about. As the election returns were filed, however, the results were very discouraging. The Mercury admitted that the People's party gubernatorial nominee, Barney Gibbs, had been "snowed under by a heavy majority." Gibbs received less than 115,000 votes, or a mere 21 percent of the total vote: support for the state People's party ticket had dropped below the 1892 figure of 25 percent. The Mercury expressed exasperation with people who voted "to keep yokes of bur­ den around their necks." It noted that "the election just over proves the people are no wiser than they were before the election."6But per­ haps the people were wiser than the Mercury gave them credit for being. What could be expected of a reform party with such internal bickering? Approximately six months after the Cincinnati convention, an­ other meeting of the People's party national Executive Committee was called to set the date and location of the national conven­ tion. This meeting proved to be even more turbulent than the last. William Allen, who had chaired the 1896 convention and was still a strong Bryan supporter, wanted to call the convention for the same day and place as the Democratic national convention. This was in direct opposition to the provisions of the Omaha agreement; the antifusionists were outraged. Allen's next move was to push for the

192

The Demise of the People’s Party

exclusion from the committee of any member who had participated in the Cincinnati convention; this would have resulted in the exclu­ sion of approximately one-third of the committee. Another uproar was created. Finally, Butler ruled that the matter of exclusion would be decided by a specially appointed committee of credits. He then proceeded to appoint William Allen, James Weaver, and Harry Tracy to the committee. The first two appointees were, and always had been, avid fusionists. Tracy had once been an antifusionist, but was now desperately trying to straddle the line. In response to Butler's blatantly biased appointments to this committee, the antifusion fac­ tion bolted. They called for a separate national convention with duly elected delegates "straight from the people" to meet in Cincinnati on 9 May.7 The fusion wing of the national committee proceeded to carry on its meeting in the absence of the antifusion "troublemakers." The Texas representatives to the national committee had not bolted; they remained to fight it out within the regular party organization. They pushed hard against Allen's proposal for the simultaneous meeting of the Democratic and Populist conventions. They said the proposal was "cowardly and truckling to the Democrats." Allen re­ lented, saying that the time and the place of the convention were not really that crucial, since Bryan would receive both the Populist and Democratic presidential nominations regardless. The convention was set to meet in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, on 9 May.8 The Texas representatives to the national committee had some explaining to do back home. When some 350 delegates gathered for the state Populist convention, a major decision had to be made. Should the delegates endorse the actions of the Texas representa­ tives to the national committee and send their elected convention delegates to Sioux Falls, or should these delegates go to the Cincin­ nati antifusion convention? The Texas representatives to the na­ tional committee adamantly pushed for attendance at the Sioux Falls convention. They argued that sending the delegates to the Cin­ cinnati convention would place Texas Populists out of the sphere of influence of the regular People's party organization. At this point, one of the delegates from the floor rose and declared in disgust that he would have nothing more to do with this "Texas crowd." He said that in the future he would refer to himself as an "Independent so­ cial Debs democrat." Having spoken his mind, he promptly left the convention hall. This scene created quite a commotion. When order was finally restored, and a vote taken on the matter at hand, the opinion of the Texas national committee representatives was voted

The Demise of the People's Party

193

down: the Texas delegation was going to the Cincinnati antifusion convention. Harry Tracy, a Texas representative to the national committee, was angered by the vote. He called on those who shared his opposi­ tion to bolt along with him. Amidst hisses and jeers, he left the con­ vention hall and was followed by few, but prominent, Texas Popu­ lists. All three representatives to the national committee bolted, as well as most of the members of the state Executive Committee.9The Texas People's party party had split on the issue of fusion. The Cincinnati antifusion convention was attended by nearly 700 delegates. All but five states were represented. The Barker and Donnelly ticket was reaffirmed. The Sioux Falls convention was at­ tended by a roughly equal number of delegates. Bryan received the presidential nomination by acclamation; so pervasive was the proBryan sentiment that no trouble was taken with a roll-call vote. The nomination of a vice-presidential candidate did not proceed as smoothly. Allen, true to form, proposed that the vice-presidential nomination be made by a committee of conference. This committee would be composed of one delegate from each state and would con­ fer with the Democrats on the matter of a vice-presidential candidate acceptable to both the Democrats and the Populists. This way, the three-tailed 1896 presidential race would not be repeated. Another proposal called for the convention to elect several candidates for vicepresident, and then let the Democrats choose their favorite. Neither of these proposals was adopted, but the fact that they were even made indicates the degree to which the People's party had lost its vitality. It had to a large degree become a mere appendage to the free-silver oldparty loyalists, who manipulated it however they saw fit. Though the proposals were defeated, almost one-third of the delegates voted to adopt them. In the end, the convention nominated Charles Towne, a free-silver Republican, as vice-president. Thus, neither of the candi­ dates on the ticket nominated at Sioux Falls was a Populist.10 Towne was certainly no Tom Watson. Following his nomina­ tion, he publicly declared that he had been in favor of a committee of conference between the Populists and free-silver Democrats and Re­ publicans.11 Since it seemed that the majority of Populists had felt differently and extended him the nomination, though, he would gra­ ciously accept. He also "graciously" resigned when the Democratic party convention met in early July and refused to choose him as their vice presidential candidate. He received only 89Vi votes com­ pared to Adlai Stevenson's 559^ votes.12 Marion Butler, who again had been elected to the chair of the

194

The Demise of the People’s Party

national Executive Committee of the People's party, made no move to call a convention to replace Towne. Complete fusion was ac­ cepted between the Sioux Falls Populist ticket and the Democratic ticket. The antifusionist ticket was to remain the only Populist ticket fielded, and its showing in the 1900 election returns was piti­ ful. Only 50,000 votes were cast for this ticket nationwide. The newly formed Social Democrat party outpolled the straight People's party ticket, receiving almost 87,000 votes. Clearly, the People's party had lost its viability as a national reform party. In Texas, the straight Populist ticket obtained only 5 percent of the total vote. The gubernatorial candidate of the People's party did not fare much better; he received only 7 percent of the total vote. The days of strong Populist electoral showings were over. The party, factionalized and demoralized, had for all practical purposes died. Future attempts to revive it proved futile. The demise of the People's party has often been attributed to the return of prosperity. In his classic study of the Populist movement, John Hicks states that prosperity was returning by 1898. He at­ tributes the return of prosperity to an increase in the volume of cir­ culating currency. According to Hicks, this increased volume came from an unexpected source: gold. He notes that the world's gold sup­ ply in 1899 was almost triple that in 1890. Since the 1896 election year, the annual production of gold had increased from about $202 million to almost $307 million. The boost in gold production had resulted from the discovery of new gold fields, as well as from the development of a cyanide extraction process that made greater ex­ traction of gold from ore possible. Hicks argues that the resulting in­ flation of currency dealt a death blow to the Populist movement by making its call for an increased volume of currency irrelevant.13 Roscoe Martin also links the demise of the People's party di­ rectly to the return of prosperity: As the pall of depression began to lift, the Third Party found itself facing certain death through a process of gradual disin­ tegration and decay which was consummated with the return of normal times.14 The role of "returned prosperity" in the fall of the People's party is also noted by Alwyn Barr, Richard Durden, and George Tindall.15 Although these historians are correct in arguing that the post1896 years were characterized by increased currency volume, the ex­ planation of the cause of that increase is incomplete; the increased gold supply was not the only reason for the increased currency vol­ ume. Another major cause was the significant drop in the amount of

The Demise of the People’s Party

195

Table 5 . Redemption of U.S. Notes and Treasury Notes, 1 8 8 0 - 1 8 9 9 Redemption of U.S. Notes 1880 1885 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 so u rce:

$

Redemption of Treasury Notes

3,780,638 2,222,000 732,386 5,986,070 5,352,243 55,319,125 68,242,408 109,783,800 153,307,928 68,378,928 22,301,710 18,645,015

_ — — — $ 3,773,600 46,781,222 16,599,742 7,570,398 5,348,365 9,828,991 2,696,253 6,997,250

Total $

3,780,638 2,222,000 732,386 5,986,070 9, 125,843 102, 100,345 84,842,150 117,354,198 158,655,956 78,201,914 24,997,963 25,642,265

World Almanac: 1900, p. 179.

U.S. notes presented for redemption in gold. As indicated in Table 5, the redemption of U.S. and treasury notes dramatically declined after the defeat of the free-silver forces in the 1896 election. From 1880 to 1893, redemption of currency in gold never ex­ ceeded $10 million. In 1893, redemption soared to over $102 mil­ lion. In 1896, redemption reached an unprecedented $158.7 million. The depletion of gold reserves and the hoarding of gold dramatically dropped with the defeat of the free silverites in 1896. This drop took a tremendous burden off the existing monetary system. It was the increased gold supply coupled with this slowdown in gold redemp­ tion that was responsible for the replenished gold reserves of the United States. The increased volume of currency was ironically a vindication both of Cleveland's analysis of the economic ills of the 1890s and of the Populist analysis of those ills. Cleveland and his advisers were correct in arguing that given the existing monetary system, the eco­ nomic ills were in part due to the lack of confidence of business leaders in the American economy and the subsequent redemption and hoarding of gold. The Populists were correct in arguing that the economic ills could be alleviated by changing the existing monetary system. They were critical of redeemable currency and the resultant contraction and expansion caused by the decisions of business lead­ ers to redeem or not redeem. They argued that the power to contract and expand the currency should reside solely with the government.

196

The Demise of the People's Party

The government would then be responsible for keeping the volume of currency at a level appropriate to the needs of a healthy economy. There is little question that at the turn of the century the eco­ nomic health of the U.S. in general was improving. However, the "return of prosperity" explanation of the demise of the People's party has been criticized by Goodwyn. He notes that farm tenancy continued to increase steadily and consistently from 28 percent in 1890 to 38 percent in 1910. The 180 counties in the South where at least half the farms were tenant-operated in 1880 had increased to 890 counties by 1935. Many of those who avoided tenancy did so with great effort; by 1930, over half of all farm owners were depen­ dent upon the crop-lien system of financing. If one includes tenants in the statistics on lien accounts, fully 70 percent of Southern farm­ ers were dependent on crop liens.16 The Department of Agriculture farm price statistics also pro­ vide a bleak picture of the prosperity of the Southern farmer. While the price on the Southern farmers' mainstay, cotton, had increased from the low of $.046 per pound in 1894, it still brought only $.086 per pound in 1900.17 Considering that the cost of producing cotton for many farmers was about $.08 per pound, one may safely say that the "renewed prosperity" had not trickled down to the cotton farmer. The failure of prosperity to reach the farmer was recognized by the Texas press. A headline in a May 1900 issue of the Dallas Morn­ ing News concisely summed up the situation: "Prosperity of the Trusts." The article discussed the contradiction between prosperity and hard times. It noted the problem of unemployment and low wages. Unemployment was attributed to the control and restriction of production by the various trusts and industrial combines. It was charged that industrial production was being artificially restricted to shore up corporate profits. The low wages earned by the laborer were contrasted to the unprecedented profits earned by the trusts. The basic problem was diagnosed as an unequal distribution of profits between labor and capital.18 In lieu of a "return to prosperity" explanation of the demise of the People's party, Goodwyn attributes its demise to the demoraliza­ tion caused by fusion. While this factor is not to be minimized, he overlooks another factor that played a major role in the collapse of the People's party. Even if the fusion and antifusion factions of the Peo­ ple's party had been reconciled, the party would have faced a major issue crisis. A currency contraction explanation of the economic de­ pression was the theme of the vast majority of Populist speeches. This contraction was to be alleviated by free-silver coinage, supple­ mented with fiat treasury notes. Time and again it was stressed that

The Demise of the People's Party

197

the gold supply could not furnish an adequate volume of currency, and that supplementing the supply with silver would help. The opin­ ions of Populists on the degree to which it would help varied. There were Populists who thought that free silver would bring significant monetary relief. Others thought it would bring little relief, and stressed the importance of a flexible currency composed of fiat treasury notes that the government would control to ensure a sufficient volume of circulating currency. The point is that the Populists as a unit stressed the evils of currency contraction and the hardships it had imposed on the debt-ridden farmers and the poor in general. Consequently, when the problem of currency contraction disappeared, the Populists were in a weak position to generate and maintain loyalty. The volume of currency was held to be the most important fac­ tor affecting the economy's health. This emphasis on a volume or quantity theory of money was a crucial factor in undermining the vitality of the People's party at the turn of the century As the volume of currency soared, the monetary reform ideas of the People's party became suspect. The diagnosis of economic ills that had been put forth by the People's party in its educational campaign seemed faulty. The volume of currency had significantly increased without free silver or fiat treasury notes, yet poverty still abounded, and the maldistribution of wealth persisted. These persisting problems were associated with the distribution system. An increased per capita cur­ rency did not ensure that the increase would benefit all classes. This was a basic economic fact that many Populists were guilty of ignor­ ing. The platform planks of the party that would have been most relevant to the problems in the distribution system had been slighted when the party leaders began pursuing a "line of least resistance" policy. For example, the subtreasury plan represented a specific al­ ternative to the existing currency distribution system. It called for the government to issue money directly to the people on the basis of land and crop securities. This plan would have established a direct link between the increased currency supply and the pockets of a large number of previously economically distressed farmers. The farmers would not have had to wait and wonder if the benefits of an increased currency supply would eventually trickle down to them. However, rather than stress the subtreasury plan, by 1894 it was being altogether ignored by pro-fusion Populists. Even antifusionists ceased discussing the details of the plan and instead just affirmed their strong adherence to the general subtreasury principle—the is­ suance of a fiat currency by the government directly to the people "through the lawful disbursement of the government" in quantities sufficient to meet the business needs of the country.

198

The Demise of the People’s Party

Both the free-silver fusion crisis and the neglect of the subtreas­ ury plan after 1894 and its complete omission from the Populist platform in 1896 were consequences of "practical politics" in a "winner-takes-all" electoral system. The leadership of the People's party faced an overwhelming dual mobilization challenge: Signifi­ cant numbers of people had to be reached by a third-party campaign stressing the distinctiveness and importance of Populist reform de­ mands, and voters had to be convinced that the People's party was viable in a national election; otherwise, believing that some reform was better than none, they would choose the least objectionable of the old-party candidates. Consequently, the People's party, or any third-party challenger in a "winner-takes-all" electoral arrangement, was extremely vulnerable to co-optative attempts by the old, estab­ lished parties. Realizing that the resources and communication net­ work of their party were inadequate for reaching significant numbers of voters with detailed and complex reform demands like the sub­ treasury, certain party leaders such as Taubeneck argued for a single­ issue, free-silver campaign. Since the demand for free silver was get­ ting significant attention in the major press, the People's party would not be burdened with the sole responsibility for awakening the voters' interest in demanding free-silver coinage. Other Populist leaders, particularly those in Texas, were angered at the stance of Taubeneck and his allies, but even they made their "practical poli­ tics" concession by ceasing to discuss the details of the subtreasury plan. They began to advocate the more easily transmitted general subtreasury principle. No longer were there discussions of distri­ bution schemes that would ensure that the benefits of an increased volume of currency would trickle down to the farmers and the poor in general. Embittered by the free-silver fusion debate, and suffering from its past emphasis on a simple "volume of currency" explanation for the depression, the People's party continued to decline. All attempts to revitalize the party failed. By 1900 it was politically dead.

Notes

1. Introduction 1. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Yearbook of Agriculture, 19 01, p. 754. 2. On the average, $.05 to $.08 per pound of cotton went to cover the cost of production— the cost varying according to soil quality. On land producing one bale of cotton per acre, the cost of production was esti­ mated at $.05 per pound. On land producing one-third bale per acre, the cost of production rose to about $.08 per pound. In 1880, about 45 percent of the cotton-producing counties in Texas were reporting aver­ ages of one-third bale or less per acre. See Report on the Condition of Cotton Growers in the U.S. (Senate Report 986, 53d Congress, 3d ses­ sion), 1895: 351, 353, 364, 367; Tenth Census of the United States (1880), vol. 5, Cotton Production, pp. 5-9 . 3. Quoted in Report of the Industrial Commission on Agriculture and Agricultural Labor (House Document 179, 57th Congress, 1st session), 19 0 1: 776. 4. Ibid., pp. 47, 445, 909, 912; Michael Schwartz, Radical Protest and So­ cial Structure, p. 36. 5. Report on the Condition of Cotton Growers, pp. 364, 366, 368, 370. 6. Southern Mercury, 22 August 1895. 7. National Economist, 14 March 1889; Southern Mercury, 27 August 1889. 8. Southern Mercury, 1 January 1891. 9. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Yearbook of Agriculture, 19 01, p. 754. 10. Charles Tilly, Louise Tilly, and Richard Tilly, The Rebellious Century, 18 3 0 -19 3 0 , pp. 3- 4-

2. Sociological Perspectives on Protest Movement Emergence and Development 1. Emile Durkheim, Socialism and St. Simon, pp. 1 5 0 - 1 5 1 . 2. Ibid., p. 15 1.

200

Notes to Pages 8 - 1 8

3. Ibid. 4. In particular, see Talcott Parsons, "An Outline of the Social System /7 in Theories of Society, ed. Talcott Parsons, Edward Shils, and Jesse Pitts, pp. 30 -38 ; Neil Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior. 5. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior, pp. 7 2 -7 3 . 6. The major proponent of the "mass society" variant is William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society. 7. See Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel. 8. John Hicks, The Populist Revolt, p. 2. 9. Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, p. 35. 10. Ibid., p. 33. 1 1 . Roscoe Martin, The People's Party in Texas, p. 59. 12. Hicks, The Populist Revolt. 13. Sheldon Hackney, Populism to Progressivism in Alabama, pp. 3 -4 . 14. James Turner, "Understanding the Populists," Journal of American History 67 (1980): 354—373* 15. C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite-, G. William Domhoff, Who Rules Am ericaI 16. James O'Conner, The Fiscal Crisis of the State, p. 6. 17. Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society-, Alan Wolfe, The Limits of Legitimacy. 18. Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, pp. 12 3 - 1 2 4 . 19. Idem, The Communist Manifesto, pp. 7 1- 7 3 . 20. See especially Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution-, Charles Tilly, Louise Tilly, and Richard Tilly, The Rebellious Century, 18 3 0 1930-, John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements," in American Journal of Sociology 82 (1977): 12 12 -12 4 1. 21. Bruce Fireman and William Gamson, "Utilitarian Logic in the Re­ source Mobilization Perspective/' in The Dynamics of Social M ove­ ments, ed. Mayer Zald and John McCarthy, p. 30. 22. Ibid.; David Snyder and William Kelly, "Strategies for Investigating Violence and Social Change," in The Dynamics of Social Movements, ed. Zald and McCarthy; Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution-, and Mayer Zald and Roberta Ash, "Social Movement Organizations," in Social Forces 44 (1966): 3 2 7 -3 4 1. 23. Anthony Oberschall, Social Conflict and Social Movements, p. 117 . 24. Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, p. 106. 25. Gary Marx, "External Efforts to Damage and Facilitate Social Move­ ments," in The Dynamics of Social Movements, ed. Zald and McCarthy. 26. McCarthy and Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements," p. 12 15 . 27. Oberschall, Social Conflict and Social Movements, p. 214. 28. J. Craig Jenkins and Charles Perrow, "Insurgency of the Powerless," in Am erican Sociological Review 42 (1977): 249-268.

Notes to Pages 1 8 - 3 0

201

29. See Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution. 30. Lawrence Goodwyn, The Populist Moment (an abridged version of Democratic Promise), p. xi. 31. Ibid., p. 173. 32. Ibid., p. 215.

3. A Critique of Structural Strain Theories of Protest Movement Formation 1. Robert Merton, On Theoretical S o c i^ g y , p. 106. 2. G. William Domhoff, Who Rules Am erica!; Larry Isaac and William Kelly, "Developmental Modernization and Political Class-Struggle Theories of Welfare Expansion," in Journal of Political and M ilitary Sociology 10 (1982): 2 0 1-2 3 5 ; James O'Conner, The Fiscal Crisis of the State} Frances Piven and Richard Cloward, Poor People's Movements. 3. Galveston D aily News, 2 July 1898. 4. One notable exception is Smelser, who in Theory of Collective Behav­ ior posits a six-factor model, with the interactive processes among all six factors determining whether a protest movement would rise in re­ sponse to structural strain. 5. Seymour Spilerman, 'The Causes of Racial Disturbances/' in A m eri­ can Sociological R e view 35 (1970): 627-649; David Snyder and Charles Tilly, "Hardship and Collective Violence in France, 18 30 -19 6 0 ," in American Sociological Review 37 (1972): 520-532; Clark McPhail, "C ivil Disorder Participation," in American Sociological Review 36 (1971): 10 5 8 -10 7 3 ; James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin, "Miners and Agrarian Radicalism," in American Sociological Review 32 (1967): 578-586; Maurice Zeitlin, "Economic Insecurity and the Political Attitudes of Cuban Workers," in American Sociological R eview 31 (1966): 3 5 - 5 1 ; Denton Morrison and Allan Steeves, "Deprivation, D is­ content, and Social Movement Participation," in Rural Sociology 32 (1967): 4 14 -4 34 ; Alejandro Portes, "On the Logioof Post-Factum Ex­ planations," in Social Forces 50(1971): 26—44; Edward Muller, "A Test of a Partial Theory of Potential for Political Violence," in American Political Science Review 66 (1972): 928-959; Anthony Oberschall, So­ cial Conflict and Social Movements. 6. See the studies cited in the previous footnote. 7. John Hicks, The Populist Revolt, p. 2. 8. See Richard Hof stacker, The Age of Reform. 9. Sheldon Hackney, Populism to Progressivism in Alabam a} James Tur­ ner, "Understanding the Populists," in Journal of American History 67 (1980): 3 5 4 -37 3. 10. Texas Secretary of State, election returns by county, 1894 (Texas State Library Archives).

202

Notes to Pages 3 3 - 5 7

4. The Elaboration and Refinement of the Mobilization Perspective on Protest Movements 1. John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements/' in American Journal of Sociology 82 (1977): 12 15 . 2. See Michael Schwartz, Radical Protest and Social Structure, p. 172, for a similar discussion. 3. Anthony Oberschall, Social Conflict and Social Movements, p. 214. 4. Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, p. 54. 5. This fact is also lamented by David Snyder and William Kelly in "Strategies for Investigating Violence and Social Change/' in The D y­ namics of Social Movements, ed. Mayer Zald and John McCarthy, pp. 2 12 - 2 3 7 . 6. Lawrence Goodwyn, Democratic Promise. 7. Frances Piven and Richard Cloward, Poor People's Movements. 8. Ibid., p. xxi.

5. The Rise and Development of the Texas Farmers Alliance, 18 7 7 -18 8 6 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

U.S. Department of Agriculture, Yearbook of Agriculture, 19 01, p. 754. Quoted in Lawrence Goodwyn, Democratic Promise, p. 34. Ibid., pp. 33 —34* Southern Mercury, 22 August 1895. W. L. Garvin and S. O. Daws, History of the National Farmers A l­ liance and Co-operative Union of America, p. 37. Tenth Census of the United States, 1880, vol. 5, pp. 5-9 . Garvin and Daws, History of the National Farmers Alliance, p. 30. Ibid., pp. 14 1 - 1 4 2 . Ibid., p. 38. Ibid., pp. 38 -39. See, for example, Alexander Tribune, 28 January 1886. Garvin and Daws, History of the National Farmers Alliance, p. 38; Rural Citizen, 4 February 1886; Overton Sharp Shooter, 3 July 1886 and 20 October 1887. Garvin and Daws, History of the National Farmers Alliance, p. 39. Rural Citizen, 6 May 1886 and 1 1 February 1886; see also Overton Sharp Shooter, 12 November 1886. Michael Schwartz, Radical Protest and Social Structure, pp. 205-206. Quoted in Thomas Clark, Pills, Petticoats, and Plows: The Southern Country Store (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1944), p. 316. Schwartz, Radical Protest and Social Structure, p. 39. For development of the concept of escalation, see in particular Schwartz, Radical Protest and Social Structure. Southern Mercury, 6 November 1888.

Notes to Pages 5 7 - 6 8

203

20. Ibid., 22 November 1888. 2 1. See ibid., 28 August 1890. This attitude concerning dividends con­ trasts sharply with the image of Alliance farmers presented by Good­ wyn in Democratic Promise. In his work, Goodwyn speaks of the altruistic, more prosperous farmers who willingly sacrificed mon­ etarily in order to help the less fortunate farmers. While I do not argue that such altruism never occurred, I do question whether it was the norm. 22. Southern Mercury, 6 December 1888, 16 January 1890, 23 January 1890, 10 July 1890, and 28 August 1890. 23. Ibid., 10 May 1888, 18 May 1888, and 28 March 1889. 24. Rural Citizen, 13 August 1885. 25. Southern Mercury, 10 January 1889. 26. Progressive Farmer, quoted in Southern Mercury, 29 November 1888. 27. Rural Citizen, 26 November 1885. 28. Ibid., 4 Feburary 1886. 29. Quoted in Goodwyn, Democratic Promise, p. 48. 30. See Schwartz, Radical Protest and Social Structure, pp. 46-56. 31. Garvin and Daws, History of the National Farmers Alliance, p. 38. 32. Kaufman Sun, 15 October 1885; see also Dallas Morning News, 10 October 1885 and 18 October 1885; Rural Citizen, 8 October 1885. 33. Dallas Morning News, 6 October 1885, 9 October 1885, and 18 Octo­ ber 1885; Rural Citizen, 12 November 1885. 34. See, for example, Beeville Bee, 1 November 1888. 35. Dallas Morning News, 9 October 1885. 36. Southern Mercury, 13 December 1888. 37. Ibid., 29 May 1890. 38. Rural Citizen, 16 August 1883; Southern Mercury, 22 August 1895. 39. Goodwyn, Democratic Promise, p. 47. 40. Southern Mercury, 19 April 1888. 4 1. A. J. Rose Papers, speech, 1888; Overton Sharp Shooter, 1 1 March 1887; see also Robert Calvert, "The Southern Grange" (Ph.D. disserta­ tion, University of Texas at Austin, 1970.) 42. Quote from Calvert, "The Southern Grange/' p. 22 1; A. J. Rose Papers, summary of quarterly reports, received March 1883. 43. Calvert, "The Southern Grange," p. 231. 44. Ibid., pp. 2 12 and 253-254 . 45. Solon J. Buck, The Granger Movement, p. 58a; Goodwyn, Democratic Promise, p. 86; A. J. Rose Papers, undated personal letter. 46. Garvin and Daws, History of the National Farmers Alliance, p. viii. 47. Clipping in the A. J. Rose Papers; also printed in Cleburne Chronicle, 15 March 1889. 48. Rural Citizen, 22 May 1884. 49. Comanche Town and Country, 8 July 1886; McKinney Enquirer, 12 June 1886 and 28 August 1886; Rural Citizen, 4 March 1886. 50. Comanche Town and Country, 6 May 1886.

204 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66.

Notes to Pages 6 8 - 8 4 Overton Sharp Shooter, 12 June 1886. Rural Citizen, 29 October 1885. Ibid., 18 February 1886. Garvin and Daws, History of the National Farmers Alliance, p. 40. Robert McMath, Populist Vanguard, p. 23. Dallas Morning News, 13 March 1886; see also Goodwyn, Democratic Promise, p. 52. Overton Sharp Shooter, 6 March 1886. Rural Citizen, 1 1 March 1886 and 1 April 1886. Ibid., 25 March 1886. Ibid., 1 April 1886; for similar views, see McKinney Enquirer, 13 March 1886 and 27 March 1886. Rural Citizen, 1 1 February 1886; Southern Mercury, 22 August 1895. The Cleburne Demands are printed in Ernest Winkler, Platforms of Political Parties in Texas, pp. 235 -2 37 . E. K. Hunt and Howard Sherman, Economics, p. 297; see also Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform, pp. 5 3 - 54. J. Laurence Laughlin, The History of Bimetallism in the United States, p .6. Irwin Unger, The Greenback Era, p. 265. Dallas Morning News, 8 August 1886; Galveston Daily News, 31 A u­ gust 1886.

6. Creative Escalation, 188 7-18 9 1 1. Charles W. Macune, Farmers Alliance Narrative (personal memoirs), 1920. 2. In 1889, the name was changed to the National Farmers Alliance and Industrial Union. 3. W. L. Garvin and S. O. Daws, History of the National Farmers A l­ liance, pp. 66-67. 4. Ibid., pp. 89 and 91. 5. Macune, Farmers Alliance Narrative. 6. Garvin and Daws, History of the National Farmers Alliance, p. 6o; Southern Mercury, 29 May 1890. 7. Macune, Farmers Alliance Narrative. 8. Clarence Ousley, "A Lesson in Co-operation," in Popular Science M onthly 36 (1890): 822. 9. Ibid.; Macune, Farmers Alliance Narrative) Fort Worth Gazette, 8 June 1888. 10. See Frances Piven and Richard Cloward, Poor People's Movements. 1 1 . Southern Mercury, 22 August 1895. 12. Ousley, "A Lesson in Co-operation," p. 824; Southern Mercury, 29 May 1890. 13. Fort Worth Gazette, 5 June 1888.

Notes to Pages 8 4 - 9 2

205

14. Ousley, "A Lesson in Co-operation/' p. 824; Southern Mercury, 29 May 1890. 15. Ralph Smith, " 'Macuneism/ or the Farmers of Texas in Business," in Journal of Southern History 13 (1947): 234. 16. Ousley, "A Lesson in Co-operation," p. 825. 17. Quoted in ibid.; see also Southern Mercury, 3 May 1888. 18. Southern Mercury, 31 May 1888. 19. Ibid., 5 July 1888; for similar statements see Dallas Morning News, 1 1 June 1888 and 14 June 1888; Southern Mercury, 7 June 1888; Luling Signal, 31 May 1888. 20. Southern Mercury, 31 May 1888. 21. Macune, Farmers Alliance Narrative. 22. Galveston Daily News, 12 June 1888; Dallas Morning News, 1 1 June 1888 and 12 June 1888. 23. Southern Mercury, 21 June 1888. 24. National Economist, 25 May 1889; Southern Mercury, 4 September 1888 and 9 January 1890. 25. Southern Mercury, 7 February 1889 and 4 September 1890. 26. See Michael Schwartz, Radical Protest and Social Structure, p. 44. 27. Southern Mercury, 13 December 1889. 28. Rural Citizen, 4 February 1886. 29. Southern Mercury, 13 December 1888 and 22 August 1895; Macune, Farmers Alliance Narrative-, Luling Signal, 24 May 1888. 30. Lawrence Goodwyn, Democratic Promise, pp. 13 3 - 1 3 4 . 31. Southern Mercury, 19 April 1888 and 31 July 1889. 32. Ibid., 22 August 1889. 33. Dallas Morning News, 2 April 1888, 3 April 1888, 15 April 1888; Southern Mercury, 19 April 1888, 31 May 1888, 5 July 1888, and 20 December 1888. 34. Southern Mercury, 7 March 1889, 21 March 1889, and 29 May 1890. 35. Ibid., 1 1 July 1889. 36. Ibid., 27 December 1888. 37. Ibid., 13 December 1889. 38. Marxist variants of mobilization theories of protest movements are particularly sensitive to these difficulties. See, for example, John Fos­ ter, Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution. 39. Southern Mercury, 5 September 1889. This discussion of the capi­ talization crisis of the Exchange contrasts sharply with Goodwyn's romanticization of the solidarity of Alliance farmers in his book Democratic Promise. Given the funding success of local Alliance strategies based on dividend paying rather than "pure cooperation" plans, as well as the last-minute effort to get more affluent Alliance members to loan the Exchange money to save it from bankruptcy, the existence of such solidarity is doubtful. 40. Goodwyn, Democratic Promise, p. 133. 41. Ibid., p. 134.

206 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51.

52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60.

61. 62.

63. 64. 65.

66.

67. 68.

Notes to Pages 9 2 - 1 0 0 Republished in the Fort Worth Gazette, 31 May 1888 and 5 June 1888. Southern Mercury, 28 June 1888. Ibid., 1 1 September 1888. Ibid., 2 October 1888. Ibid., 25 September 1888. Ibid. Ibid., 2 October 1888. Ibid., 20 December 1888 and 24 January 1889. Ibid., 25 June 1888. Ibid. Macune presented his accusations and defense through a bi­ monthly circulating newsletter that was independent of the Mercury. He had full editorial control over the newsletter, which was printed at the Exchange headquarters in Dallas. None of these newsletters have been found; however, at times the Mercury would print excerpts from them, and these excerpts provide us with fragments of Macune's de­ fense of himself and his management of the Exchange. Southern Mercury, 2 October 1888, 9 October 1888, and 16 October 1888. Ibid., 13 November 1888. Ibid., 7 March 1889 and 21 March 1889. Ibid., 20 December 1888. Ibid., 7 August 1890. Ibid., 27 December 1889. L. E. Daniell, Personnel of the Texas State Government with Sketches of Representative Men of Texas, pp. 504-505. B. B. Paddock (ed.), A Twentieth-Century History and Biographical Record on North and West Texas, vol. 2, pp. 28 9 -29 1. Southern Mercury, 18 April 1889, 2 May 1889; 30 May 1889, 25 July 1889; Smith, "'M acuneism,' or the Farmers of Texas in Business," P- 235Southern Mercury, 17 April 1890. See in particular John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, "Resource Mobiliza­ tion and Social Movements," in American Journal of Sociology 82 (1977): 1 2 1 2 - 1 2 4 1 ; Anthony Oberschall, Social Conflict and Social M ovements; J. Craig Jenkins and Charles Perrow, "Insurgency of the Powerless," in American Sociological Review 42 (1977): 249-268. Southern Mercury, 17 April 1889. Ibid., 22 August 1889. Report on Cotton Bagging (House Report 4165, vol. 8, 50th Congress, 2d session), 18 8 8-18 89 : 98. It took 45.5 million yards of bagging to cover the average 7 million bales produced in the U.S. A price increase of $.04 to $.045 per yard therefore meant a $1.8 million to $2 million extra charge for total bag­ ging consumption; see Report on Cotton Bagging, p. 99. Ibid., pp. 97, 105, 157, and 187. Southern Mercury, 1 August 1888, 8 August 1888, 18 September 1888,

Notes to Pages 1 0 0 - 1 1 2

69. 70.

71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89.

207

25 September 1888, 9 October 1888, and 16 October 1888; Beeville Bee, 1 1 October 1888; Overton Sharp Shooter, 13 September 1888. Southern Mercury, 18 September 1888. Ibid., 30 May 1889, 10 July 1890, 17 July 1890; National Economist, 15 June 1889 and 27 July 1889; Castroville Anvil, 4 June 1889; Cotton Belt, 24 August 1889. Southern Mercury, 18 April 1889 and 2 May 1889. Ibid., 12 December 1889. Comanche Pioneer Exponent, 2 j June 1889. Southern Mercury, 31 October 1889 and 25 September 1890. Ibid., 6 June 1889. National Economist, 1 June 1889. National Economist, 15 June 1889. Southern Mercury, 30 May 1889; National Economist, 14 March 1889. Houston Daily Post, 29 August 1889; Galveston Daily News, 10 A u­ gust 1889. Southern Mercury, 18 January 1890 and 25 January 1890. Cotton Belt, 24 August 1889. Texas Farmer, quoted in the Fort Worth Gazette, 12 August 1889. Galveston D aily News, 10 August 1889. Cotton Belt, 24 August 1889. Houston D aily Post, 15 August 1889. Southern Mercury, 12 June 1890. Schwartz, Radical Protest and Social Structure, pp. 244-246 and 265-268. National Economist, 22 June 1889. This is the argument made by Schwartz in Radical Protest and Social Structure.

7. The Politicization of the Alliance 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Southern Mercury, 28 August 1888. Ibid., 3 May 1888. Ibid., 14 June 1888. Ibid., 17 May 1888. Ibid., 22 August 1889. National Economist, 14 December 1889. Michael Schwartz, Radical Protest and Social Structure, p. 142. National Economist, 14 December 1889. Ibid. Charles W. Macune, Farmers Alliance Narrative} Bruce Palmer, Man Over Money, p. 81. 11 . See, in particular, Neil Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior, pp. 7^-73-

12. The work of economist Milton Friedman in particular focuses on the importance of the money supply to the health of the economy.

208

Notes to Pages 1 1 2 - 1 2 6

13. Harry Tracy, "The Subtreasury Plan," in James H. (Cyclone) Davis, A Political Revelation, p. 298. 14. National Economist, 3 April 1890; Tracy, "The Subtreasury Plan," p. 298. 15. Macune, Farmers Alliance Narrative-, National Economist, 3 May 1890. 16. National Economist, 3 May 1890. 17. Schwartz, Radical Protest and Social Structure, pp. 274 -275. 18. Southern Mercury, 13 February 1890. 19. Ibid., 20 February 1890. 20. Ibid., 13 March 1890. 21. Ibid., 16 January 1890. 22. Ibid., 20 February 1890. 23. Quoted in ibid., 24 April 1890. 24. Fort Worth Gazette, 30 August 1889. 25. Galveston D aily News, 2 July 1890. 26. Dallas Morning News, 3 July 1890. 27. Southern Mercury, 8 May 1890. 28. Ibid., 25 July 1890,• Galveston Daily News, 24 July 1890. 29. Galveston Daily News, 14 August 1890. 30. Lawrence Goodwyn, Democratic Promise, p. 223. 3 1. Hogg Letters Received, 16 November 1890. 32. Ibid. 33. Dallas Morning News, 23 January 1891; Galveston D aily News, 29 April 1891 and 30 August 1891; Southern Mercury, 9 April 1891. 34. National Economist, 13 December 1890 and 31 January 1891. 35. Houston Daily Post, 28 October 1891; Hogg Letters Received, 25 Oc­ tober 18 9 1; Galveston Daily News, 30 August 1891; Fort Worth G a­ zette, 23 May 1891, 14 August 1891, 15 August 1891, 12 September 1891. 36. Hogg Letters Received, 19 May 1891; Burnet Bulletin, 15 May 18 91; Texas Farmer, 8 October 1892. 37. Galveston Daily News, 29 April 1891. 38. National Economist, 28 June 1890. 39. Southern Mercury, 21 May 1891; National Economist, 25 April 1891. 40. William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society-, James Turner, "U n ­ derstanding the Populists," in Journal of American History 67 (1980): 3 5 4 -3 7 3 ; Sheldon Hackney, Populism to Progressivism in Alabama. 41. Frances Piven and Richard Cloward, Poor People's Movement. 42. National Economist, 15 August 1891; Fort Worth Gazette, 22 July 1891 and 28 July 1891. 43. Macune, Farmers Alliance Narrative. 44. N. W. Ayer and Sons, American Newspaper Annual and Directory. 45. National Economist, 30 May 1891. 46. Ibid., 23 August 1890, 6 December 1890, 14 November 18 91; G al­ veston D aily News, 23 April 1891; Fort Worth Gazette, 28 July 1891. 47. Interview with Macune in the Dallas Morning News, 8 March 18 91;

Notes to Pages 1 2 6 - 1 3 2

48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54.

55.

56. 57. 58. 59. 60.

61.

62. 63.

64.

65. 66. 67. 68. 69.

209

National Economist, 2 May 1891 and 31 May 1891; Lampasas People’s Journal, 19 August 1892 and 28 October 1892; Southern Mer­ cury, 27 November 1890. Southern Mercury, 27 August 1891. National Economist, 18 April 1891. Dallas Morning News, 6 March 1889; Southern Mercury, 27 August 1891. Dallas Morning News, 19 March 1891. Ibid., 22 April 1891; Galveston Daily News, 23 April 1891 and 24 April 18 91; Houston Daily Post, 24 April 1891. Galveston D aily News, 24 April 1891. Houston Daily Post, 19 May 1891; Dallas Morning News, 21 May 18 9 1; Galveston D aily News, 19 May 1891; National Economist, 30 May 1891. Houston D aily Post, 19 May 1891; Dallas Morning News, 21 May 18 9 1; Galveston Daily News, 19 May 1891; National Economist, 30 May 1891. Houston D aily Post, 22 May 1891; see also Fort Worth Gazette, 20 May 18 91; Galveston Daily News, 22 May 1891. Galveston D aily News, 22 May 1891. Farmer’s World, 27 June 1891. Houston Daily Post and Fort Worth Gazette, quoted in Farmer’s World, 12 May 1891, 15 May 1891, and 23 June 1891. Dallas Morning News, 18 August 1891; Fort Worth Gazette, 30 July 18 91. Attendance at the second state anti-subtreasuryite convention, which met at Corsicana in November, was also poor: only forty people attended. See Galveston D aily News, 27 November 1891. This information is derived from examining copies of Farmer’s World from June through December 1891. By early 1892, Farmer’s World was in serious economic trouble, from which it was never to recover. See Hogg Letters Received, 14 April 1892 and 6 June 1892. Galveston Daily News, 21 August 1891. Dallas Morning News, 16 September 1891, 17 September 18 91; Fort Worth Gazette, 16 September 1891; Galveston Daily News, 17 Sep­ tember 1891 and 19 November 1891; National Economist, 3 October 18 91. Galveston D aily News, 19 November 1891 and 20 November 1891; Fort Worth Gazette, 19 November 1891; Dallas Morning News, 19 November 1891; Houston Daily Post, 20 November 1891. Dallas Morning News, 6 March 1889; Southern Mercury, 27 August 1891. Galveston D aily News, 12 July 1891; see also Fort Worth Gazette, 10 July 1891 and 1 1 July 1891. Dallas Morning News, 6 October 1891. Ibid., 7 October 1891. Galveston D aily News, 7 October 1891; Houston Daily Post, 10 Oc­ tober 18 9 1; Dallas Morning News, 6 October 1891.

210 70. 71. 72. 73.

Notes to Pages 1 3 2 - 1 4 5 Fort Worth Gazette, 26 October 1891. Houston D aily Post, 25 October 1891. Ibid., 2 April 1892; Macune, Farmers Alliance Narrative. Hogg Letters Received, 1 March 1892.

8. The People's Party: An Alliance Protest Strategy, 1 8 9 2 - 1 8 9 4 1. Galveston Daily News, 12 April 1891 and 16 December 18 91; Fort Worth Gazette, 5 July 1891; Dallas Morning News, 25 March 1891. 2. Fort Worth Gazette, 18 August 1891; Dallas Morning News, 18 A u­ gust 1891 and 19 August 1891; Houston D aily Post, 20 October 18 91. 3. Galveston D aily News, 26 November 1891. 4. Dallas Morning News, 5 July 1892. 5. Ibid. 6. Houston Daily Post, 29 May 1892 and 1 June 1892. 7. Ibid., 19 August 1892. 8. Ernest Winkler, Platforms of Political Parties in Texas, pp. 3 1 8 - 3 2 1 . 9. Texas Farmer, 2 July 1892 and 1 October 1892. 10. These local papers are quoted in ibid., 27 August 1892. 11 . Houston D aily Post, 5 June 1892. 12. Ibid., 26 June 1892. 13. Dallas Morning News, 16 February 1891. 14. Houston D aily Post, 1 October 1891 and 7 October 1891. 15. Dallas Morning News, 25 March 1891; Galveston D aily News, 16 De cember 1891. 16. Winkler, Platforms of Political Parties in Texas, p. 319. 17. Ibid. 18. Texas Alm anac: 19 8 2 -19 8 3 , pp. 493-495. 19. Houston Daily Post, 9 November 1892 and 1 1 November 1892. 20. Dallas Morning News, 3 March 1891 and 1 1 March 1891. 21. Fort Worth Gazette, 9 November 1891. 22. Houston D aily Post, 1 April 1892. 23. Fort Worth Gazette, 2 July 1891, 27 July 1891, 1 1 August 1891, and 21 August 18 9 1; see also Hempstead Weekly News, 17 December 18 91. 24. National Economist, 10 October 1891; Dallas Morning News, 1 July 18 9 1 and 18 August 1891. 25. Texas Farmer, 29 October 1892. 26. Lampasas People's Journal, 18 November 1892. 27. Texas Alm anac: 19 8 2 -19 8 3 , p. 504. 28. Only seven states gave the national People's party slate 40 percent or more of the total vote cast— Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Nebraska, N e­ vada, North Dakota, and Wyoming. Six of these states (all except Kan sas) were admitted to statehood after the Civil War; thus, affective factors linked to participation in the war were missing.

Notes to Pages 1 4 5 - 1 55

211

29. Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, New Mexico, and Utah had not yet been granted statehood. 30. Quoted in Southern Mercury, 3 January 1895. 31. Quoted in ibid., 4 April 1895. 32. The general overproduction argument and the concomitant crop diver­ sification remedy have been adopted by many historians writing on the agrarian revolt. See John Hicks, The Populist Revolt; Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform} Roscoe Martin, The People’s Party in Texas. 33. Louis Koenig, Bryan} Peter Argersinger, Populism and Politics. 34. Texas Advance, 28 October 1893; see also ibid., 30 June 1894; South­ ern Mercury, 7 February 1895, 7 March 1895, and 16 May 1895. 35. Southern Mercury, 1 1 April 1895. 36. Ibid., 3 January 1895 and 21 February 1895. 37. Report on the Agricultural Depression (Senate Report 787, 53d Con­ gress, 3d session), 1894. 38. Southern Mercury, 4 April 1895. 39. Stephen SeCanio, "Cotton Production in Late Nineteenth-Century Southern Agriculture/' in Journal of Economic History 33 (1973): 608-633. 40. Southern Mercury, 4 October 1894. 41. Galveston Daily News, 25 August 1894. 42. Samuel Rezneck, "Unemployment, Unrest, and Relief in the United States during the Depression of 18 9 3-9 7 ," in Journal of Political Economy 41 (1953): 324- 34543. Hicks, The Populist Revolt, p. 321; Koenig, Bryan, pp. 12 7 - 1 2 8 ; G al­ veston D aily News, 6 August 1894; Southern Mercury, 18 January 1894. 44. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Yearbook of Agriculture, 19 01, p. 754. 45. John McCarthy and Mayer Zald, "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements," in American Journal of Sociology 82 (1977): 12 15 . 46. Undated newsclipping of The Patriot’s "Eureka" column by Populist Cyclone Davis, found in the Rushing Papers collection. 47. Texas Advance, 7 April 1894 and 19 May 1894. 48. Hogg Letters Received, 2 August 1894. 49. Dallas Morning News, 18 August 1891. 50. Coming Nation quoted in Texas Advance, 4 August 1894. 51. Castroville Anvil, 10 February 1893; Hempstead News, 23 August 1894; Texas Advance, 23 September 1893, 13 October 1893, 28 Oc­ tober 1893, 28 April 1894, 19 May 1894, 2-1 July 1894; Southern Mer­ cury, 19 April 1894. 52. Southern Mercury, 15 November 1894 and 6 December 1894. 53. Texas Advance, 3 February 1894, 3 March 1894, 10 March 1894, 19 May 1894, 14 July 1894, 28 July 1894, 4 August 1894, and 25 August 1894. 54. Fort Worth Gazette, 14 August 1894, and 15 August 1894; Galveston

212

55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62.

63. 64.

Notes to Pages 1 5 5 - 1 6 6 D aily News, 15 August 1894; Winkler, Platforms of Political Parties in Texas, pp. 339 -342. Fort Worth Gazette, 16 August 1894. Hogg Letters Received, 8 October 1894 and 22 October 1894. Texas Farmer, 25 August 1894. Hogg Letters Received, 25 August 1894. Southern Mercury, 1 1 October 1894. Texas secretary of state election returns by county, 1894 (Texas State Library Archives). Texas Advance, 28 July 1894. Texas secretary of state election returns by county, 1894 (Texas State Library Archives); Alwyn Barr, Reconstruction to Reform, pp. 15 8 -15 9 . Southern Mercury, 31 January 1895; Report on Electoral Fraud (House Report 1596, 54th Congress, 1st session), 18 95-18 96. Southern Mercury, 29 November 1894.

9. The Betrayal of Alliance Principles 1. Houston D aily Post, 1 October 1891. 2. Quoted in the Castroville Anvil, 28 June 1895. 3. Fort Worth Gazette, 1 April 1896; Houston Daily Post, 1 April 1896 and 3 April 1896. 4. Fort Worth Gazette, 1 April 1896. 5. Hogg Letters Received, 1 January 18 9 5 - 1 August 1903. 6. Ernest Winkler, Platforms of Political Parties in Texas, p. 350. 7. Ibid., p. 352. 8. Houston D aily Post, 6 April 1896, 18 April 1896, and 22 April 1896. 9. Winkler, Platforms of Political Parties in Texas, pp. 362-366; see also Houston D aily Post, 18 April 1896, 22 April 1896, and 3 May 1896. 10. Houston Daily Post, 8 June 1896 and 9 June 1896. 1 1 . Southern Mercury, 29 November 1894; see also earlier arguments in National Economist, 23 August 1890 and 2 May 1891; Fort Worth G a­ zette, 18 August 1891; Dallas Morning News, 18 August 1891 and 19 August 1891. 12. Southern Mercury, 24 October 1895. 13. For a discussion of fiatism, see Southern Mercury, 29 November 1894, 3 January 1895, 17 January 1895, 31 January 1895, 7 February 1895, 6 June 1895, 20 June 1895, 1 1 July 1895, 18 July 1895, 25 July 1895, 17 October 1895, and 24 October 1895. 14. Ibid., 20 June 1895. 15. Ibid., 20 August 1896. 16. Ibid., 1 1 July 1895. 17. Quoted in Peter Argersinger, Populism and Politics, p. 209. 18. Galveston Daily News, 5 July 1892; Dallas Morning News, 2 July 1892.

Notes to Pages 1 6 7 - 1 7 8

213

19. Edward Schapsmeir and Frederick Schapsmeir, Political Parties and Civic Action Groups, pp. 13 7 - 13 8 , 15 9 -16 0 , 308, 468. 20. Southern Mercury, 23 January 1896. 21. Ibid., 14 February 1895; see also 31 January 1895, 9 May 1895, and 31 October 1895. 22. Quoted in ibid., 14 November 1895. 23. Ibid., 9 January 1896. 24. Ibid., 15 August 1895. 25. Ibid., 31 October 1895. 26. Ibid. 27. Ibid., 19 December 1895. 28. Ibid., 18 April 1895, 25 April 1895, 9 May 1895, 16 May 1895, 23 May 1895, 6 June 1895, 20 June 1895, 27 June 1895, 1 1 July 1895, 25 July 1895, 12 August 1895, 13 February 1896, and 27 February 1896. 29. Ibid., 26 September 1895. 30. Ibid.; see also 12 September 1895, 3 October 1895, 10 October 1895, 17 October 1895, and 24 October 1895. 3 1. Ibid., 23 January 1896; see also 24 October 1895, 14 November 1895, and 19 December 1895. 32. Ibid., 23 April 1896. 33. Houston D aily Post, 19 June 1896. 34. Ibid., 2 1 June 1896. 35. John Hicks, Populist Revolt, p. 356. 36. The quotes, as well as the general statements on the national Demo­ cratic convention, are taken from Louis Koenig, Bryan, pp. 19 6 -19 7 . 37. Houston Daily Post, 12 July 1896. 38. See Table 3, pp. 15 7 - 15 8 . 39. Houston D aily Post, 23 July 1896. 40. Ibid., 24 July 1896. 41. Ibid., 25 July 1896; Southern Mercury, 30 July 1896. 42. N ew York Times, 25 July 1896; Houston Daily Post, 25 July 1896. 43. Quoted in the Louisiana Populist, 7 August 1896. 44. Lawrence Goodwyn, Democratic Promise, pp. 482-483. 45. See O. B. Johnson (ed.), National Party Platforms, vol. 1: 18 4 0 -19 56 . 46. Southern Mercury, 23 January 1896, 27 February 1896. 47. Louisiana Populist, 22 March 1895. 48. Southern Mercury, 7 November 1895; see also 17 January 1895, 2 May 1895, 28 November 1895, 23 January 1896, and 27 February 1896. 49. N ew York Times, 24 July 1896 and 25 July 1896. 50. Southern Mercury, 30 July 1896; Houston Daily Post, 26 July 1896. 1896. 51. This analysis differs sharply from that of Goodwyn in Democratic Promise. Goodwyn argues that commitment to the full slate of reform demands found in the Omaha platform was significantly greater in the states mobilized by the Southern Farmers Alliance than in other states where a "shadow" Populist movement had emerged.

214 52. 53. 54. 55.

56.

57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 7 1. 72. 73. 74.

Notes to Pages 1 7 8 - 1 9 1 Frances Piven and Richard Cloward, Poor People’s Movements. Southern Mercury, 22 August 1895. Houston D aily Post, 30 July 1896. Southern Mercury, 30 January 1896, 27 February 1896, and 12 Novem­ ber 1896. In his book on Populism, Democratic Promise, pp. 459-460, Goodwyn repeats this charge. At the 1892 convention, there being no previous elections in which People's party candidates were fielded, delegate apportionment was naturally different. Each reform organization was allowed a specific number of delegates based on membership size. Congressional Quarterly, Guide to U.S. Elections, p. 9. This charge is made by Goodwyn, Democratic Promise, p. 460. Southern Mercury, 16 August 1896 and 12 November 1896. See Hicks, Populist Revolt, pp. 366-367; Goodwyn, Democratic Promise, pp. 4 88 -4 9 1; Koenig, Bryan, p. 216. Koenig, Bryan, p. 218. Quoted in Goodwyn, Democratic Promise, pp. 480-481. Southern Mercury, 13 August 1896; Houston Daily Post, 6 August 1896. Houston Daily Post, 7 August 1896 and 8 August 1896. Ibid., 7 August 1896, 8 August 1896, and 9 August 1896; Galveston D aily News, 9 August 1896. Houston D aily Post, 9 August 1896. Galveston Daily News, 9 August 1896. Southern Mercury, 20 August 1896 and 27 August 1896. See comment on the Butler manuscript papers in Robert Durden, The Clim ax of Populism, p. 54. Southern Mercury, 27 August 1896. Ibid., 3 September 1896 and 10 September 1896. Ibid., 17 September 1896. Ibid., 24 September 1896. Galveston D aily News, 4 October 1896; San Antonio Express, 4 Oc­ tober 1896.

10. The Demise of the People's Party 1. Southern Mercury, 5 November 1896, 12 November 1896, 10 De­ cember 1896, and 17 December 1896; see also excerpts from People's Tribune, Cleburne Herald, Hallettsville Era, and Cuero Truth that are quoted in Southern Mercury, 26 November 1896. 2. Ibid., 26 November 1896. 3. Dallas Morning News, 6 July 1897. 4. Ibid., 17 June 1898 and 18 June 1898. 5. Ibid., 6 September 1898 and 7 September 1898. 6. Southern Mercury, 10 November 1896 and 8 December 1896; for the election statistics, see the Texas Almanac: 19 8 2 -19 8 3 , p. 493.

Notes to Pages 1 9 2 - 1 9 6 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

215

Dallas Morning News, 20 February 1900. Ibid., 21 February 1900. Ibid., 4 May 1900 and 5 May 1900. Ibid., 9 May 1900, 10 May 1900, and n May 1900. Ibid., 12 May 1900. Arthur Schlesinger (ed.), History of U.S. Political Parties, p. 1725. John Hicks, The Populist Revolt, pp. 388-389. Roscoe Martin, The People’s Party in Texas, p. 59. Alwyn Barr, Reconstruction to Reform-, Robert Durden, The Clim ax of Populism-, George Tindall, "The People's Party," in Schlesinger (ed.), History of U.S. Political Parties, pp. 1 7 0 1 - 1 7 3 1 . 16. Lawrence Goodwyn, Democratic Promise, p. 544. 17. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Yearbook of Agriculture, 19 01, p. 754. 18. Dallas Morning News, 2 May 1900.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

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Index

Allen, William, 173, 178, 18 3 -18 4 , 19 1, 193 Alliance Commercial Agency, 86, 97 Anti-alien land bill, 143 Anti-fusion Populists, 16 7 -17 0 , 17 2 - 1 7 4 , 17 7 - 17 8 , 18 1, 18 5 - 18 7 , 18 9 -19 4 Anti-subtreasuryites, Alliance, 1 2 7 - 1 3 1 , 209n.60 Ashby, H. S. P. "Stum p," 177, 185 Austin Manifesto (1891), 127, 13 1 Bailey, J. W., 12 1 Barker, Wharton, 19 1 Barr, Alwyn, 194 Bimetallism. See Free silver Bland, "Silver Dick," 17 1 Bradley, J. S., 190 Brown, Tom, 1 1 8 - 1 1 9 Bryan, William Jennings, 17 0 - 1 7 1 , 173/ 17 7 -18 0 , 18 3 -18 9 , 192 Butler, Marion, 18 7 -18 8 , 190, 19 3 - 19 4 Cagle, A. P., 96 Carlisle, John, 1 5 1 - 1 5 2 Champion, James, 173 Cincinnati national reform conven­ tion (1891), 12 8 - 13 0 Clark, George, 138, 14 2 -14 4 , 163 Cleburne Demands, 4, 72 ~ 79, 10 8 109, h i Cleveland, Grover, 138, 144, 15 4 155; disaffection with, 46, 152,

15 5 - 1 5 6 ; economic policies of, 148, 1 5 0 - 1 5 1 , 160, 195 Cloward, Richard, 4 1-4 4 , 49, 8 2 83, 124, 178, 18 0 - 18 1 Clubs, People's party discussion,i54 Coke, Richard, 12 1 Cole, W. R., 1 3 1 - 1 3 2 Commitment, generation and maintenance of, 42-44, 49, 142, 145, 159, 169, 178, 18 0 - 18 1, 184 Conventions, national Democratic party, 138, 17 0 - 17 2 Conventions, national People's party, 137, 17 0 -17 9 , 1 8 1 - 1 8 3 , 19 0 - 1 9 1, 193 Conventions, national Republican party, 138, 170 Conventions, Southern Farmers A l­ liance, n o , 122, 1 3 0 - 1 3 1 Conventions, Texas Alliance: before 1887, 32, 53, 55, 6 1-6 2 , 7 2 -7 5 ; 1887 and after, 78 -79 , 99, I 08 - I I

0, 120, 127- 128,

I30

Conventions, Texas Democratic party, 1 1 9 - 1 2 0 , 13 8 - 13 9 ,

154-155

Conventions, Texas People's party, 18 5 -18 6 , 19 2 - 19 3 Cooperative gins and mills, 63-64, 89 Cooperative stores, 4, 5 7 -6 1, 89-90 Cotton: marketing system of, 6 1 62; market price of, 51; produc­ tion cost of, i99n.2

224

Index

Cotton bulking, 4, 62-63, 80-82 Crisp, Charles, 16 1 Crop diversification, 14 7 -14 9 , 2 iin .3 2 Crop-lien system, 1 - 3 , 56, 196; at­ tempts to address, 82, 107, 1 1 3 114 , 116 ; failure to address, 37, 59, 64, 82, 107, 175 Culberson, Charles, 1 5 5 - 1 5 7 Currency contraction, 7 4 -7 5 ; as cause of depression, 25, 74, 10 8 109, h i , 12 6 - 12 7 , 136, 19 6 197; remedied, 19 4 -19 5 , 197 Davis, "Cyclone," 16 8 -16 9 Daws, S. O., 53, 66-67, 69 Debs, Eugene, 177 Demobilization, People's party: rea­ sons for, 19 4 -19 8 Deprivation: effect of, on protest movement emergence and growth, 3 3 -3 4 , 47, 52, 69, 15 1-15 2 Domhoff, G. William, 12 Dudley, James, 16 2 - 16 3 Dunlap, Andrew, 78 Durden, Richard, 194 Durkheim, Emile, 7 -8 , 26

Finley, N. W., 1 3 2 - 1 3 3 Fireman, Bruce, 16 "Force bill," 140 Free silver: criticisms of, 13 6 - 13 7 , 153, 16 1, 16 4 -16 5 , 187, 189, 197; endorsed by Alliance and People's Party organization, 7 4 -75 , 128, 16 3 - 16 4 , 174, 176; as a selective issue endorsement tactic, 46, 136, 153; Texas Democrats' support of, 136, 138, 14 1, 16 2 - 16 3 Free-silver leagues, 1 6 1 - 1 6 2 Fusion: arguments for, 16 6 -16 9 , 18 4 - 18 5 ; Texas Populists' at­ titude toward, 16 8 -17 0 , 173, 178, 185, 189, 19 2 - 19 3 Gamson, William, 16 Garvin, W. L., 53, 69 Gibbs, Barney, 19 1 Goodwyn, Lawrence, 18, 86, 88; criticism of, 19, 88-90, 92, 174, 196, 203n.2i, 205n.39, 2 1 3 -

2i4n.51 Grange, 33, 39-40, 64-67 Great Southwestern Strike, 7 0 -7 2 Greenback party, 52, 75-76 , 138 Gresham, Walter, 166 Gresham's Law, 16 1 Gurr, Ted, 26

Election returns: national, 14 4 146, 15 7 - 15 9 , 17 1, 194; Texas state, 142, 156, 19 1, 194 Electoral fraud, 15 6 - 15 7 Encampments, Alliance, 12 4 - 12 5 Equalization of interests, 36 -37, 48, 91, 96-97 Escalation, 38, 4 0 -4 1, 48-49, 56 57, 6 o -6 i, 1 1 4 - 1 1 5 , 1 3 3 - 1 3 4 Exchange, Texas Alliance, 4, 2 5 26, 36, 78, 8 0-82; crisis and collapse of: causes and conse­ quences, 83-99, 1 1 5 - 1 1 6

Hackney, Sheldon, 1 1 - 1 2 , 29 -30, 124 Harrison, Benjamin, 138, 144 Hicks, John, 1 0 - 1 1 , 29, 194 Hofstadter, Richard, 11 , 29 Hogg, James, 4 5 , 1 1 7 - 1 1 9 , 1 3 3 , 1 3 8 139, 14 2 - 14 4 ; and post-1892 Texas reform politics, 152, 155, 16 1-16 2 Houston, A., 142

Fiatism, 7 4 -7 5 , 176, 184, 19 5 -19 6 ; and argument against free silver, 153, 16 4 -16 5 , 189, 197 Field, James, 138

Ideology: importance of, 13, 3 8 -4 1, 43, 48-49, 65-67, 98; neglected by resource mobilization theo­ rists, 39, 48, 67