Geopolitical Turmoil in the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean 3031343174, 9783031343179

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Geopolitical Turmoil in the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean Edited by Hall Gardner

Geopolitical Turmoil in the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean

Hall Gardner Editor

Geopolitical Turmoil in the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean

Editor Hall Gardner American University of Paris Paris, France

ISBN 978-3-031-34317-9 ISBN 978-3-031-34318-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34318-6 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgments

This book was initiated as a proposal by my former American University of Paris student, Armend Reka, after he completed his Ph.D. at the Sorbonne, to edit a book on the Balkans. Armend was one of many excellent students from Eastern Europe who grew up in the Communist era, in his case in North Macedonia, and who then came to the American University of Paris in the 1990s. Largely because of the Covid pandemic, and then the advent of the 2022 Russia-Ukraine war, the book took more than a year to put together as it was not organized as an integral part of an academic conference. Instead, the expert contributors were largely drawn together by reputation. I want to thank my editors, Anca Pusca, Alina Yurova, Lucy Everitt, Aishwarya Balachandar, Matthew Savin, and Nandakini Lahiri at Palgrave Macmillan/Springer Nature for their patience. I also thank both David Felsen and Armend Reka for helping to edit chapters, though any errors are ultimately my own. And I likewise want to thank both Haldun Solmaztürk and Marco Rimanelli for helping find contributors, plus Blerim Reka who changed hats from campaigning as a North Macedonian presidential candidate to becoming the Kosovo Ambassador to the UN in the midst of working on his chapter. In any case, the fact that we did not rush to press permitted each chapter to be refined, revised, and updated to include the impact of the 2022 Ukraine-Russia war on the two interlinked regions. Let us hope v

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

that horrific and unnecessary war will find a diplomatic solution as soon as realistically possible—so that the conflict will not expand any further to the Balkans and eastern Mediterranean, among other possible regions. Paris, July 2023

Hall Gardner

Introduction

Hall Gardner’s General Introduction; The Widening Gyre of Alliances in the Western Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean shows how the countries of the Western Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean have become the focus of regional and major power rivalries in the period after the 1995 Dayton peace accord and particularly the 1999 NATO air war “over” Kosovo. The chapter raises questions as to whether socio-political tensions in Kosovo, the western Balkans, and between Greece and Turkey, will once again be manipulated by both major and regional powers in a new interlinked “widening gyre” of global geostrategic, political economic, and socio-cultural rivalries. In Chapter 2, The Balkans and the Geopolitics of Populations, GérardFrançois Dumont introduces the Western Balkans from an ethnological perspective that shows how the populations of the region are interwoven across state boundaries. Dumont examines Balkan dynamics not from the perspective of legal nationalities as conferred by States (the inhabitants of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia...), but from the ethnic groups’ perspective (i.e. Albanians, Bulgarians, Croats, Greeks, Serbs...) whatever their state territory of residence or legal affiliation, thus exposing the region’s complexity. In Chapter 3, EU Enlargement and Regional Geopolitics of the Western Balkans, Blerim Reka more closely examines the geo-strategy and political-economics of the region, with a focus on NATO and European Union (EU) relations with the western Balkans in rivalry with the

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burgeoning influence of Russia, China, and even NATO-member Turkey. He argues that the region remains in a post-Cold War vacuum—out of the EU, and just partly in NATO—and that the new, more restrictive, EU approach to the region since February 2020 will slow the EU enlargement process down and cause an unpredictable development in two directions: globally and regionally. If the Balkan countries are excluded from EU integration, they could return to previous forms of national integration and demands for pan-national projects that would create an opportunity for Russia, China, if not Turkey, and other states, to enter and exploit the regional geopolitical vacuum. Chapter 4, External Autocratic Influence, the Balkans, and Democratic Decline by Mieczysław P. Boduszynski ´ and Calla Li examines how external authoritarian state involvement, such as Russia, China, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), in the western Balkans has already begun to undermine democratic progress there. Whereas the EU, NATO, and the United States (U.S.) put democratic conditionality at the center of their engagement with the region, the new outside players in the Balkans are less interested in democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, but offer commercial opportunities, security assistance, and energy deals in their place. The chapter points in particular to the irony of close relations between Serbia and Turkey, and between their respective authoritarian leaders, despite their historical and religious rivalries. In Chapter 5, Geostrategic Tendencies and Challenges for the Western Balkans and Serbia, Negoslav P. Ostoji´c, Aleksandar Weisner and Luka V. Ili´c argue that the EU is being forced once again after the Bosnian and Kosovo wars to devote more attention to the Western Balkans, primarily because of new security problems and violent conflicts in the region. While two former Yugoslav republics, Slovenia and Croatia, have become members of the EU, the ex-Yugoslav republics of Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia are still seen more as potential spoilers than as reliable European partners that possess a clear path of integration into the EU. In the process of discussing the Serbian position toward Kosovo, the EU, as well as EU sanctions on Russia in response to the Russia-Ukraine conflict since 2014, the authors raise concerns that many Western Balkan countries lie in a condition of “state capture” in that they suffer from corruption, organized crime, and a lack of legal institutions and democracy.

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In Chapter 6, The Geopolitics of the Orthodox Church in the Balkans , Oleg Kobtzeff examines the interwoven nature of the Orthodox religious community throughout the Balkans. He explains how the Patriarchate of Constantinople has been openly and energetically supporting Ukrainians to distance themselves from century-old Russian influence by actively helping them break cultural ties and religious ties, while the Patriarchate of Moscow blatantly supports the Putin regime’s war on Ukraine. Kobtzeff advances the thesis that the “great schism” between Ukrainian and Russian Orthodox Churches could be “considered as part of what led to the Russia-Ukraine war of 2022” while the latter conflict risks digging deeper social and geopolitical divisions in the Balkans and eastern Mediterranean. In Chapter 7, Albania’s Foreign Policy in the Twenty-first Century, David Felsen explores three eras of Albania’s foreign relations: (1) the 1991–2005 transition era; (2) the 2005–2013 era of prime minister Sali Berisha; and (3) the current 2013–2023 era of prime minister Edi Rama. He argues that the post-Cold War transition era has been marked by Albania’s reintegration into global structures and developing ties with the United States and European institutions after its Cold War isolation. While prime minister Berisha engaged in efforts to join the NATO alliance and further Albania’s EU membership prospects, prime minister Rama has thus far focused on moving forward Albania’s EU goals toward accession talks, increasing Albania’s engagement in the Western Balkans, while raising the country’s international profile. Armend Reka’s Chapter 8, Energy and Regional Geopolitics in the Western Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean analyzes how these two interacting regions have emerged as key areas of both competition and collaboration in the hydrocarbon sphere that overwhelmingly impacts regional alignments and geopolitics. While the Western Balkans has raised its profile as a key transit region, the Eastern Mediterranean has gained importance due to its recent large discoveries of natural gas. Reka argues this is especially relevant in the context of the unfolding Russo-Ukrainian conflict, as he seeks to analyze the motivations and goals behind the major producers of natural gas (for example Russia), major consumers (such as the EU member states), as well as existing and potential transit countries (Turkey and Western Balkan states) as they relate to vital energy needs. By focusing on vital energy concerns, the Chapter provides an excellent backdrop for the final two chapters on Greece and Turkey.

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In Chapter 9, Greece Countering Regional Instability and a Hostile Neighbor: A Perspective from Athens , Panayotis Tsakonas and Ioannis Armakolas argue that the major changes in the post-Cold War international security environment (including the search for energy resources) present the countries of the Balkans and eastern Mediterranean with an urgent need to reassess their security goals and priorities as well as to reform their defense and national security establishments with respect to the significance of the “new asymmetric threats.” The latter are seen as emerging from instability in the wider Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, as well as a result of Greek-Turkish animosity. The authors argue that Greece must engage in a dual strategy of containing and cooperating with Turkey, what they call “balancing engagement” or “containgagement.” In examining Turkey’s roles in the Balkans, in Chapter 10, Turkey in the Balkans: Bridging the ‘Balkan’ Gap, Haldun Solmaztürk argues that the war in Ukraine has made the geopolitical situation in the Balkans even more precarious given NATO force projection toward Russia, and that the migration crisis, that is now compounded by that originating from Ukraine, is doomed to get out of control with dire consequences for the Balkans—and beyond. In downplaying the possibility of bringing Balkan states into full NATO and the EU membership, he argues that the EU and U.S. will both need to play more active roles in encouraging Balkan countries to overcome their differences and to integrate closer into Europe, while Turkey can help bridge the “Balkan Gap” by helping to reconcile the Balkan states, particularly, Albania and Serbia and Serbia and Kosovo. Hall Gardner in Chapter 11, Future Scenarios, concludes by synthesizing differing perspectives argued in the book and by critiquing several policy options. One option is to sustain the status quo policy approach which foresees only hesitant steps toward full EU and NATO membership for the Balkan states, and that keeps open the question of Kosovo “independence.” A second is to strengthen the post-Cold War US and EU policy approach by seeking to bring as many Balkan states as possible into NATO and the EU as full members, including support for an “independent” Kosovo. The third option is for the US and EU to help build up a more integrated and “re-confederated” Balkans (in the process of seeking mutual Serbian-Albanian-Kosovo recognition) as a means to counterbalance, engage, and eventually transform relations with China, Russia, plus the “wild card” Turkey—but without necessarily bringing all

INTRODUCTION

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the western Balkan states into “full” NATO and EU membership, while concurrently seeking to press NATO members Greece and Turkey into a closer political-economic, sustainable energy and defense rapprochement. All three options are fraught with perils so that the possibility of a fourth option—the renewal of ethno-nationalist conflict in the Balkans involving demands for territorial expansion and partition—cannot be excluded.

Contents

1

General Introduction: The Widening Gyre of Alliances in the Western Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean Hall Gardner

1 37

2

The Balkans and the Geopolitics of Populations Gérard-François Dumont

3

EU Enlargement and Regional Geopolitics of the Western Balkans Blerim Reka

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External Autocratic Influence, the Balkans, and Democratic Decline Mieczysław P. Boduszynski ´ and Calla Li

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4

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Geostrategic Tendencies and Challenges for the Western Balkans and Serbia Negoslav P. Ostoji´c, Aleksandar Weisner, and Luka V. Ili´c

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The Geopolitics of the Orthodox Church in the Balkans Oleg Kobtzeff

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7

Albania’s Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century David Felsen

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8

Energy and Regional Geopolitics in the Western Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean Armend Reka

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Greece Countering Regional Instability and a Hostile Neighbor: A Perspective from Athens Panayotis Tsakonas and Ioannis Armakolas

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Turkey in the Balkans: Bridging the ‘Balkan’ Gap Haldun Solmaztürk

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Future Scenarios Hall Gardner

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Bibliography

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Index

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Notes on Contributors

Ioannis Armakolas is a tenured Assistant Professor in Comparative Politics of Southeast Europe at the Department of Balkan, Slavic and Oriental Studies, University of Macedonia and the Stavros Costopoulos Senior Research Fellow at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), where he set up in 2011 the South-East Europe Programme and has remained its Head since. Moreover, Armakolas is the Editor-in-Chief of the scientific journal Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, published by Routledge (Taylor & Francis Group, United Kingdom) and the Editor-in-Chief of Political Trends and Dynamics in Southeast Europe, the regional publication of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Dialogue Southeast Europe (FES SOE), based in Sarajevo. He is also the Editor of The Southeast Europe and Black Sea Series, a book series published by Routledge. Mieczysław P. Boduszynski ´ teaches US. Foreign Policy at Pomona College, as well as courses on the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and the Balkans, democracy promotion and democratization. Previously, he was a diplomat with the U.S. Department of State at postings in Albania, Kosovo, Japan, Egypt, Libya, and Iraq. A member of the Pacific Council, Boduszynski ´ is an expert on the Balkans and the modern Middle East and North Africa, especially Iraq, Libya, and Egypt. A frequent op-ed contributor to publications such as the The Hill, Foreign Affairs, and The Washington Post/Monkey Cage, Boduszynski previously published a book on democratization in the Balkans, and has just published a new xv

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book entitled U.S. Democracy Promotion in the Arab World: Beyond Interests vs. Ideals. He is also the co-author of a forthcoming textbook entitled Research Methods in Politics and International Relations. In addition to English, Boduszynski speaks Arabic, Japanese, Serbian-Croatian-Bosnian, Albanian, French, and Polish. Gérard-François Dumont is a geographer, economist, and demographer, and a professor at the university in Paris IV-Sorbonne, president of the journal Population & Avenir, author notably of Populations et Territoires de France in 2030 (L’Harmattan), and of Géopolitique de Europe (Armand Colin). David Felsen is an Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the Faculty of Law and Social Sciences of Epoka University in Tirana, Albania. He also serves as Vice-Rector for International Relations at the university. He holds a D.Phil. (Ph.D.) in Politics from the University of Oxford in the United Kingdom and Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees from McGill University in Montreal, Canada. He has been a Visiting Teaching Fellow at LUISS University in Rome where he taught a course on immigration policy in Europe, a Visiting Scholar at the Center for International Development at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, and a Visiting Researcher at the Faculty of Political Science at the University of Bologna in Italy as a recipient of Oxford University’s Scatcherd European Scholarship. Hall Gardner is a Professor (and former Chair) of History and Politics Department, 1993–2019, at the American University of Paris. He completed his Ph.D., 1987, at the Johns Hopkins Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Washington D.C. He was a Visiting Professor at the Johns Hopkins University-Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Washington, D.C. (1989– 1990) and at Johns Hopkins-Nanjing Center for Chinese and American Studies, Nanjing, China (1988–1989). He has taught at Science Po in Paris. He has written or edited 16 books in International Relations theory and politics. He has served on the Advisory Board: New Policy Forum (Mikhail Gorbachëv); Cicero Foundation (Maastricht; Paris); Geostratégiques (French Journal of International Politics); Institute for Euro-Atlantic Integration, Kosovo; Oxford University Press, Online Bibliography; Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies; Other News: Voices

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Against the Tide. He is a member World Association of International Studies (WAIS), founded at Stanford University. Luka V. Ili´c Research Assistant at the European Centre for Peace and Development at the UN University for Peace, and is engaged in International Relations and Diplomacy. He is the Academic Secretary of the Global Youth Forum, which is focused on the place of young leaders in building peace and global stability. He graduated from the Faculty of Political Sciences in Vienna, and before that completed the International American High School. He has published articles, especially in the field of National Security Affairs, with a special focus on border issues and border security in conditions of increased migratory movements. Calla Li is a Downing Scholar at the University of Cambridge, where she is an MPhil Candidate in Politics and International Studies. Previously, she studied International Relations and Russian and Eastern European Studies at Pomona College. Her research interests are centered around Russia-China relations and its effect on soft power projection in Eastern Europe and Northeast Asia. Oleg Kobtzeff is an Associate Professor in the International and Comparative Politics Department at the American University of Paris; a Fellow of the Royal Geographic Society; Visiting Professor in the history of the Russian Orthodox Church, Institut Saint Serge (prof. Anton Kartachov’s chair); Regular commentator on Russian, Ukrainian and Russian-American affairs on French national television and radio channels; Co-founder of an ethnographic museum in Alaska (Veniaminov Institute, Kodiak); Publisher of a regional periodical in the Pacific Northwest of the United States; Author, editor-in-chief, and founding publisher of Nature & Cultures geographic magazine. He obtained his Ph.D., 1985, in East-European studies, University of Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1). Negoslav P. Ostoji´c Prof. Dr. Dr. h.c., is an Executive Director of the European Center for Peace and Development at the UN University for Peace (ECPD), with Headquarters in Belgrade, and also Director of the Regional Institute for Development Studies in North Macedonia. He is a Full Professor of International Economics and Sustainable Development at ECPD UN University for Peace, with Ph.D. in Economics. Prof. Ostoji´c is the Founder and President of the International Study Group which systematically deals with inter-ethnic relations, religious tolerance,

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human rights and human security in Europe, and Founder and President of the Editorial Board of The European Journal of Management and Public Policy (London). For his Contribution to Peace, Tolerance, and International Cooperation, he was awarded The Gusi Peace Prize for 2012. He is a Member of The European Academy of Sciences and Arts. He is the author of numerous books, monographs, and other publications, articles, and scientific papers. Armend Reka has been working in international business development and resource mobilization in several international organizations and foundations. In this role, he has led and supported partnerships with the private sector, foundations, NGOs, and governments. Moreover, he has experience in resource mobilization and advocacy at the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as well as at the U.S. Congress during his studies in the United States. Armend received a Bachelor of Arts at the American University of Paris in International Relations and International Economics, a Master’s degree from Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, and a Ph.D. from Sorbonne Université where in April 2019 he defended his thesis on geopolitics of energy and the Western Balkans. Blerim Reka is an academic and diplomat. He is a professor of “International Public Law,” “International Relations,” and “EU Law,” in which fields he has published 20 books, and more than 200 studies. For 25 years, he lectured at: University of Prishtina, UBT Prishtina, SEEU Tetovo, and State University of Tetovo. He was visiting professor at: University of South California, (USC), USPF Florida, University of Bologna, University of Graz, University of Gent, University of Calabria; and was a Ph.D. committee member at the University of Sorbonne (2018) and the University Catholic de Leuven (2011). He was a Post- Doctoral Fulbright senior fellow at USC Los Angeles (2003) and Harvard Executive Education fellow at John F. Kennedy School of Government (2005). He was ViceRector of South East European University (2010–2018) and the Dean of Law Faculty (2016) and the Dean of the faculty for Political Science and Public Administration (2003–2005) at the latter university. He holds a Ph.D. in International Public Law (Joint Ph.D. program of Law faculties of University of Prishtina and University of Graz, 2002), Master in Civil and Economic Law (University of Prishtina, 1993), and B.A. in Law (University of Prishtina, 1982). He was the Ambassador of the Republic of Macedonia to the EU in Brussel (2006–2010), Minister of European

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Integration in the Government of The Republic of Kosovo (2020), and since 2022 he is Ambassador/Chief of Mission of The General Consulate of the Republic of Kosova in New York. Haldun Solmaztürk Bgd. Gen. (Ret’d) is the Chairman of Incek Debates at the twenty-first Century Turkey Institute, a non-partisan think-tank in Ankara, Turkey. A specialist in international security and political affairs, he writes a weekly column for Gazette Pencere and is an active political commentator. A career infantry officer, he held various command and staff posts at national and international headquarters and participated in UN, OSCE, or NATO/coalition Partnership for Peace operations in Somalia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, Kosovo and the Republic of North Macedonia. He received his M.A. in IR at Boston University and his Ph.D. in political science at Istanbul Bilgi University. Prior to joining the twenty first Century Turkey Institute, he was a senior fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) with the International Security Department, in London. Panayotis Tsakonas is a Professor of International Relations, Security Studies, and Foreign Policy Analysis at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Athens. He has been a Research Fellow at the Institute of International Relations, Athens (1993–1996), post-doctoral Fellow at Harvard University (1998–1999), NATO Research Fellow (1999–2000), Fulbright Visiting Scholar at Yale University (2003) and Academic Visitor at St Antony’s College, Oxford University (2015). He has also worked as a Special Advisor at the Ministries of National Defense (1996–1998) and Foreign Affairs (1999–2003). He has taught for fifteen years at the Department of Mediterranean Studies, University of the Aegean and at various Universities and institutions in Greece, Turkey, Great Britain, Germany, the United States, and Canada. His monographs, books, articles in peerreviewed academic journals, and contributions in edited volumes have been published in Greek, English, German, French, and Italian. He has authored/co-authored and edited/co-edited ten books. Aleksandar Weisner is an Assistant Professor at European Center for Peace and Development, University for Peace established by the UN. He received his Ph.D. in Peace Studies, Human Rights, and Human Security. Dr. Weisner is a senior lecturer at the Institute for Peace&Dialogue (Basel) and an experienced international trainer for peace education and

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conflict transformation subjects and has significant professional experience gained in the war- and post-war Western Balkan region (Serbia, Croatia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia) related with establishing peace movements and long-term peace education projects. He works as a consultant, trainer, and evaluator for many international organizations (UNICEF, OSCE Mission to Serbia, HELVETAS Swiss Intercooperation, People in Need...). Dr. Weisner is the founder of the School Without Violence program, the current violence prevention program coordinated by the Ministry of Education and UNICEF in Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bulgaria, and Kyrgyzstan.

CHAPTER 1

General Introduction: The Widening Gyre of Alliances in the Western Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean Hall Gardner

In the aftermath of German unification and both Soviet and Yugoslav disaggregation, the geo-economic rivalries of the major powers (the U.S.NATO, the European Union, a resurgent Russia and China) as well as disputes between the significant regional powers, most importantly NATO-EU member Greece and NATO-member Turkey, are increasingly impacting the states of the western Balkans (Albania, BosniaHerzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia) as well as states of the eastern Mediterranean (Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, the Palestinians, Syria). This widening gyre of major and regional power interaction presently involves a mix of both cooperation and confrontation, but risks alliance polarization (the U.S., EU and their allies versus Russia, China, and their allies)—particularly if the Russia-Ukraine war persists much longer.1

H. Gardner (B) American University of Paris, Paris, France e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Gardner (ed.), Geopolitical Turmoil in the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34318-6_1

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In this widening gyre, a number of states that were once part of the Ottoman Empire or under Ottoman suzerainty are being drawn into the fray within the western Balkans and eastern Mediterranean—in what can be called the “new Near East.” Serbia has sought stronger politicaleconomic ties with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Azerbaijan. Libya has forged an alliance with Turkey while the UAE has forged a counter-alliance with Greece at the same time that both Turkey and the UAE have become major investors in the western Balkans. And Israel, for example, in a significant step, recognized Kosovo independence in 2021, while concurrently siding with Greece, backed by France, against Turkey over energy and pipeline disputes in the eastern Mediterranean. Demands for Kosovo independence (backed by Albania, but opposed by EU member Greece) have augmented tensions with Serbia as the latter has looked back to both Beijing and Moscow for defense supports. This General Introduction will outline how the “widening gyre” of major and regional power interaction has begun to interlink both the western Balkan and eastern Mediterranean in the “new Near East” with a particular focus on how the issue of the 1999 air war “over” Kosovo and demands for Kosovar independence have impacted regional and global relations. The chapter will first examine the evolving post-Cold War role of major powers (the U.S./NATO, the European Union, Russia, China and Turkey) in the western Balkans. It will then show how the 1999 NATO air war over Kosovo had worked to alienate both Moscow and China while likewise helping to catapult a then-unknown Vladimir Putin to power in Russia. Section I: The Western Balkans will discuss events in the post-Dayton peace era since 1995, with a focus on NATO’s air war over Kosovo in 1998–99. The chapter accordingly raises the question as to whether the 1995 Dayton “peace” settlement and June 1999 Military Technical (or Kumanovo) Agreement2 that followed the air war “over” Kosovo will prove to be long-lasting or whether socio-political tensions in Kosovo and the western Balkans, essentially pitting pan-Serb versus pan-Albanian interests, will once again be manipulated by major and regional powers. Section II: Greece and the Turkish “Wild Card” then examines the contemporary role of the regional powers of NATO-EU member Greece and NATO-member Turkey, as well as states, such as Israel and Arab Gulf states, particularly the UAE, in the eastern Mediterranean. Moreover, Greece-Turkey rivalry risks undermining both NATO and EU cohesion and sustainable energy cooperation in the eastern Mediterranean, while

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helping to create a “new Near East” zone of inter-state disputes that Russia and China, as well as Turkey, among other states and anti-state movements, may seek to take advantage of—or act as spoilers against U.S., and EU interests—as the U.S. engages in a “neo-constrainment” strategy vs. Russian and Chinese influence in eastern Europe, the wider Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and in the Far East in backing closer ties between NATO and the new U.S.-UK-Australian AUKUS pact, plus Japan and possibly India.3

Section I: The Western Balkans Impact of the 1995 Dayton Accord From a global geostrategic perspective, one can trace the rise of the postCold War antagonism between the U.S./NATO and Russia in the 1990– 95 Bosnia war and most particularly in the 1999 air war over Kosovo, which alienated both Russia and China. The 1995 Dayton agreement after the Bosnian wars led to an uneasy peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina resulting in a socio-political situation that is still not entirely settled, and that can still be manipulated by Russia, China, Turkey, and other outside powers.4 The 1995 Dayton Agreement and the Peace Implementation Committee established a High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Office of the High Representative (OHR) under Annex X. The High Representative has the power to dismiss judges, ministers, civil servants, and members of parliaments. After the 2002 elections in Bosnia, the OHR has had the right to vet all political candidates for major ministerial positions at both the Entity and State levels.5 The fact that the High Representative possesses veto powers over local Bosnian politics has, over time, tended to alienate the three major factions of the Bosnian socio-political community, Serbs, Croats, and Muslim Bosniaks. The strong powers of the High Representative and OHR have accordingly worked to provoke a legitimacy crisis given the fact that the power of the OHR has not yet devolved to the local level. This legitimacy crisis has led to contemporary speculation as to whether Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is still governed as a Bosniak and Croat federation along with a Serb-majority entity, Republika Srpska, can govern itself in its present territorial form or whether it should be dissolved. (See also Chapters 3, 5, 10 and 11, this book.)

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NATO’s Air War “Over” Kosovo and Russian and Chinese Opposition The Bosnian war and its aftermath raised Russian eyebrows, particularly after the U.S. deployed sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles in 1995 against Bosnian Serb positions; yet it was the NATO air war “over” Kosovo in 1999 that most alienated both China and Russia. The Bosnian war had been fought under a UN mandate, yet U.S.-NATO actions in the 1999 Kosovo conflict bypassed the UN Security Council and snubbed UNSC members, Russia and China. In December 1992 and December 1993, during the 1990–95 Bosnian war, both the Bush and Clinton administrations had warned Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic that if Serb forces moved into Kosovo, Belgrade would be crossing a “red line.” At that time, Kosovars, under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova, who argued for passive non-violence, as opposed to a more militant non-violent position backed by Adem Demaçi, had begun to demand a return to “autonomy,” after Milosevic abrogated Kosovo’s constitutional autonomy in 1989 that had been granted, along with Vojvodina in the north and Metohija in the south, autonomy by then Yugoslav leader, Marshall Tito—in large part in an effort to dilute the power of Serbia within the Yugoslav Federation. By 1996, given violent Serb opposition to Kosovo “autonomy”, even under a UN protectorate, and the refusal/failure of the 1995 Dayton accords to deal with the Kosovo question, initial demands for Kosovo “autonomy” transformed into more militant demands for “independence.” By February 1998, Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) forces, under the leadership of Hashim Thaçi, had clearly begun an armed “liberation struggle” that resulted in Serb regular and para-military “counterterrorist” actions that were dubbed by the U.S. and Europeans as “ethnic cleansing.” In effect, Belgrade feared that Kosovo independence would strengthen the power and influence of pan-Albanian movements within Serbia as well as in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Montenegro. For its part, Washington feared the conflict would spew over Kosovo’s borders and further destabilize the Balkans. In March 1999, the U.S. and NATO opted for what was essentially an air war “over” Kosovo, but without a UN Security Council mandate. On the one hand, NATO military intervention would most likely have been vetoed by Moscow or Beijing or both; on the other hand, the U.S. and NATO did not look very hard for alternative options. The European NATO allies were, for the most part, cautiously supportive of the

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1999 NATO-led intervention. France appeared, for its part, very reluctant to oppose its historic Serb ally, but nevertheless engaged air forces. Neighboring NATO-member Greece (a major investor in Serbia, with close Orthodox religious ties to the Serb population) refused to deploy forces; Athens did, however, provide NATO with ports and fuel lines, but “no facilities for the passage of NATO forces to invade Yugoslavia.”6 Despite Boris Yeltsin’s pleas to Bill Clinton not to engage militarily in Kosovo for (correctly) fearing that it would provoke a Russian revanchist backlash, NATO’s decision to intervene in the name of what was belatedly called an “exceptional humanitarian intervention” was made after Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic refused to agree to U.S. and NATO demands at the Rambouillet summit. That summit, as Henry Kissinger argued at the time, “was not a negotiation—as is often claimed— but an ultimatum.”7 Once NATO struck Serbian military targets and infrastructure, what was dubbed “ethnic cleansing” then intensified.8 For their part, both Russia and China threatened to veto any UN resolution advocating force and likewise tried to stop the actual use of force after the war had begun. Moscow proposed a joint U.S.-NATO-Russia peacekeeping and inter-positionary force that would seek to check the advance of Serb forces.9 The latter option was rejected by the Clinton administration and the U.S. Congress who did not want to risk any American lives in peacekeeping operations, particularly after the 1993 Somalia “Black Hawk down” operation in which U.S. special forces were killed. The U.S. “zero death syndrome” meant that all fighting was to be done by air strikes so as to minimize American losses, a policy that augmented the risk of “collateral damage” to the civilian population, and that led many ethnic Serbs and others to become internally-displaced refugees. The U.S./NATO decision to intervene militarily shocked the Russian elite who hoped the new Russia would be treated on the basis of parity even in the aftermath of Soviet collapse.10 Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov ordered his plane to turn around in mid-flight after NATO started bombing Serb positions without first talking to Moscow. Even though he could not be certain that NATO and Russia could have agreed to a joint policy with respect to the Kosovo conflict, then U.S. Secretary of Defense, William Perry, stated, “I don’t think NATO tried very hard” to reach a common approach with Russia over Kosovo.11 NATO’s military action in Kosovo had just followed the first wave of NATO enlargement to the central European countries, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, in which the latter harbors irredentist

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claims to Serbian territory in Vojvodina province. The military intervention indicated to Moscow that NATO had not transformed from a collective defense organization to a political security organization and that NATO would not necessarily act in a peaceful fashion in support of expanding U.S. and European interests—contrary to the promises of both the Bush and Clinton administrations.12 The air war “over” Kosovo accordingly raised Moscow’s concerns that NATO expansion was aimed at undermining historical Russian spheres of influence and security in Serbia and throughout the region. Moscow accordingly threatened to drop out of arms reduction talks and more strongly support Serbia. As NATO’s military-technological supremacy appeared to represent a potential future threat to the defenses of both Moscow and Beijing, the 1999 NATO air war “over” Kosovo also represented a major factor leading Beijing and Moscow to accelerate the high-tech modernization of their respective militaries and to eventually take steps toward a closer defense alliance.13 U.S. military superiority and use of information technologies, satellites, computer-guided weaponry, stealth capabilities of air power, and electronic warfare were all seen as posing a future threat to both Russian and Chinese defenses. NATO’s air war “over” Kosovo, not to overlook NATO’s “open enlargement,” furthermore played a major role in undermining Boris Yeltsin and the power of the pro-Western neo-liberals in Russia, while abetting Vladimir Putin’s rise to power.14 In effect, in addition to opposing Yeltsin’s domestic policies of neo-liberalism and political decentralization, Putin had promised to avenge Soviet collapse (seen as a consequence of U.S., NATO, Japanese “capitalist encirclement’) and to counter U.S., NATO, and European efforts to encroach into former Soviet (and Tsarist Russian) spheres of influence and security throughout eastern Europe and with regard to Serbia and Russophile communities in the Western Balkans in particular.15 In likewise seeking to crush the Chechen independence movement, Moscow saw its interests and those of its Central Asian allies threatened by U.S. allies, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, who were both seen by Moscow as backing pan-Islamist movements in the Balkans (in Bosnia and Kosovo) and in the Northern Caucasus (in Chechnya and Dagestan).16 And in later backing the Assad regime in Syria in 2011 against both Arab Spring and pan-Islamist movements, and by seeking deals with Turkey, Moscow has also sought to strengthen Russia’s political-economic and military influence in the eastern Mediterranean.

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China, Russia, and the Air War “Over” Kosovo Having quietly moved into the region during and at the end of the 1990– 95 Balkans war (as Milosevic began to appeal to China to counter Serbia’s isolation from U.S. and European sanctions and to help rebuild Serbia’s war-torn economy), Beijing condemned NATO’s bombing of Kosovo as an act of “aggression.” To this day, Beijing has refused to accept the U.S. excuse that a B-2 Stealth bomber under CIA (and not NATO) command, struck the Chinese embassy in Belgrade with five precision bombs by “accident” (the State Department blamed it on a faulty map) and has argued “that the existing norm of nonintervention, regarded by most countries as a peremptory norm from which no exception was permitted, had been violated by the U.S.-led NATO in the moment of Russia’s geopolitical weakness and vulnerability.”17 One theory is that Washington believed that Beijing had purchased from Yugoslav authorities the components of a F-117 Nighthawk stealth fighter-bomber that had been shot down and that could permit China to figure out how to develop stealth technology and radar systems. The U.S. had thus tried to destroy those components before they were sent back to China.18 Not only did the air war “over” Kosovo bring China and Russia closer together, but it also came very close to drawing NATO and Russia into direct conflict as Moscow sought to back Serbia with supplies. At the very end of the war, there was a near clash of NATO forces with Russian troops at the Pristina airport. British General Michael Jackson refused to carry out the orders of U.S. General Wesley Clark. Jackson told Clark that he would “not start World War III for him.”19 (See Chapter 10, this book.) The dispute came about as Washington opposed Russian demands for peacekeeping sector independent of NATO that could possibly lead to a partition of Kosovo between a Serb-controlled north protected by Russia and essentially ethnic Albanian south protected by NATO. The U.S. and Russia then opted for joint peacekeeping—an option that if pursued earlier to stop the advance of Serb forces, might have initially prevented the war in the first place, as previously argued. The war “over” Kosovo concluded with the 9 June 1999 Military Technical Agreement (or Kumanovo agreement) that was signed between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia. The agreement established new relations between Yugoslavia and KFOR and deployed peacekeeping

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forces in Kosovo, while UN Resolution [3] 1244 (1999) placed the territory of Kosovo under the mandate of the UN.20 The latter agreement sanctioned a UN role for Kosovo ex-post facto given belated Russian support—even if the UN Security Council did not initially back the NATO military intervention.21 Over time, the 1999 NATO air war over Kosovo set the stage for a Russia-China defense “axis” that became more evident once Moscow began to assist Beijing to develop a major missile defense system.22 Moreover, in February 2022, Beijing and Moscow announced a major “no limits” cooperation agreement just before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, with China then accusing “the U.S.-led NATO” of having “pushed Russia-Ukraine tension to the breaking point.”23 Demands for Kosovo Independence On February 17, 2008, Kosovo declared itself independent from Serbia. The U.S., the UK, France, Germany, and Turkey, and more than 100 countries, subsequently recognized Kosovo’s independence. Russia, China, Spain, Slovakia, Romania, Greece, and Cyprus, as well as Serbia, however, have not recognized Kosovo at the time of this writing for fear that Kosovo independence could inspire secessionist movement demands within their own countries. Due to EU non-recognition, unlike other states in the Balkans region, Kosovo has lacked a visa-free movement scheme with the EU. For their part, Russia and Serbia continue to prefer the formation of either some form of confederation or a swap of territories. By 2013, some diplomatic progress appeared to be made. The “historic” 2013 Brussels Agreement sought the normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo, and opened the door to possible Kosovo membership in the EU particularly after the International Court of Justice had judged Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of independence to be legal despite Serb (and Chinese and Russian) opposition that has continued to obstruct Kosovo independence demands.24 Then, on September 4, 2020, Serbian and Kosovar leaders signed the Washington agreement on the “normalization of economic relations” under then-U.S. President Donald Trump, once again opening the door to the eventual recognition of Kosovo by many of the above states—assuming Belgrade and Pristina can continue to abide by that agreement (See Chapter 11).25

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The Washington Agreement also linked the Balkans with the eastern Mediterranean. Serbia pledged to move its embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and Kosovo agreed in September 2020 to mutual recognition with Israel. Previously, Belgrade had voted in favor of the UN General Assembly draft resolution A/ES10/L that had urged countries not to locate their embassies in Jerusalem as Israel’s capital.26 Ironically, Serbia and Kosovo have now recognized Israel, yet Serbia and Kosovo, and Israel and Palestine, have not recognized each other. Serbia had been the only country in the western Balkans to support Palestine’s successful bid in 2012 for non-member observer status in the UN.27 The Washington deal also required Belgrade to recognize all factions of Hezb’allah as a “terrorist” organization so as to strengthen sanctions against Iran, which has tried to mobilize Muslim dissidents in Bosnia and elsewhere in the Balkans since the 1990–95 Bosnian war. (See Chapters 3, 9, 10 and 11, this book.) The “Big Bang” Phase of NATO Enlargement The western Balkans remained a focal point of U.S.-Russian contention when the second “Big Bang” wave of NATO enlargement brought in the former Yugoslav state of Slovenia, in addition to the “eastern” Black Sea states of Bulgaria and Romania that joined NATO as well in 2004. Whether Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania are geographically in the Balkans can be debated, but each country certainly influences the states of the western Balkans region in geostrategic, political-economic, social, and/or religious terms. By 2008, Moscow interpreted the uncoordinated NATO and EU double enlargement as an effort to both isolate Russia in the Black Sea and to “encircle” Serbia, while concurrently impacting Russian security concerns in the Near East. The 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest further drew the Balkans into the U.S. strategic fulcrum when NATO membership was offered to Albania and Croatia in 2008–09. At that time, NATO also promised Georgia and Ukraine the eventual possibility of full membership in accordance with NATO’s “open enlargement” policy, but not a Membership Action Plan due to French and German opposition. This open NATO membership drive into former Soviet spheres of influence and security helped to further rationalize Putin’s revanchist pan-nationalist or “civilizationist” backlash. In Putin’s view, Moscow’s participation in 2002 NATO-Russia Council (providing Russia with a

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voice, but not a veto over NATO decisions) and in the Partnership for Peace, plus Russian membership in the G-7, did not augment U.S.NATO-Russia power sharing, nor did it stop NATO from expanding its defense infrastructure closer and closer to Russian borders as a “collective defense” organization. In addition to fears of its relative weakness with respect to superior NATO military capabilities, the deeper, less articulated, Russian concern has been that an expanded NATO could potentially support, directly or indirectly, the irredentist claims of its new-found allies against Russia and its allies, and also against other states as well. This deeper reality raised fears of Russia and other states with historically “oppressed” identity groups that the political demands of those latter groups for independence from their control, or for unity with third states, could be backed by NATO. Technically under President Clinton’s Open NATO enlargement policy, all states that joined NATO were supposed to renounce irredentist claims. Yet NATO members Greece, Turkey, and Hungary possess irredentist claims, as do post-Cold War NATO members, Bulgaria and Croatia. NATO-member Albania, which possesses territorial disputes with NATO and EU member Greece, likewise possesses potential irredentist claims in support of the Albanian diaspora in Kosovo and elsewhere.28 While NATO member Hungary possesses irredentist claims to both Serbia (Vojvodina) and Ukraine (the Zakarpattia Oblast), one could also argue that historical claims of NATO members Poland and Lithuania to a greater commonwealth with Ukraine, given the fact that there was never a formal full-fledged Russian-Ukrainian agreement to delimit borders, also represent a form of irredentism, particularly given Moscow’s (and Belarusian) opposition to what it sees as a “Baltic-Black Sea alliance” backed by the U.S., EU, and NATO. By 2008–09, after admitting Balkan states, Albania and Croatia, into NATO, the U.S. proposed the full NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine at an indefinite time in the future, thereby raising uncertainty for future Russian defense planning. The widening gyre of Balkan conflict began to further interlink with NATO-Russian geostrategic rivalry when Moscow justified, tit for tat, its recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia (on the Black Sea littoral) in August 2008 after the Georgia-Russia war in response to the U.S. recognition of Kosovo independence in April 2008.29 And as Russian president Dmitri Medvedev’s calls for negotiations to implement a new European Security order in June 2008 and in

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2009 were largely ignored by the U.S. and NATO despite Obama-Biden administration calls for a “re-set” of U.S.-Russian relations,30 Moscow then threatened a new military build-up against the deployment of NATO military infrastructure closer to Russian territory (such as deployments in Romania and Bulgaria) that it considered as breaching the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act.31 Then, at roughly the same time that NATO promised membership to Georgia and Ukraine in 2008-09, the EU, pressed by the Czech, Polish, and Swedish governments, began its expansion toward former Soviet bloc states, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, through its “Eastern partnership.” This raised Moscow’s concerns that Russian interests would be politically and economically excluded from its former Soviet sphere of political-economic influence and security. In response, Moscow sought to more strongly support Slav-Orthodox identity and pan-nationalist groups in North Macedonia, Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro, and BiH’s Republika Srpska to counter Croatian, and primarily Albanian and Islamist, influence. Strong Russian support for pan-Slav and pan-Serb political movements, for example, has been indicated by Moscow’s alleged coup attempts in Montenegro in October 2016 and in Macedonia in March 2017 (both actions were denied by Moscow).32 For its part, North Macedonia has become a focal point in the geostrategic rivalry between the U.S., NATO, and Russia. Reportedly, Putin played an active part in trying to hinder the country from joining NATO and the EU. Yet by 2022, Putin’s military intervention against Ukraine had deeply divided Orthodox Christians: Not all Orthodox necessarily support Putin. (See Chapter 6, this book.) NATO and the Western Balkans In the new post-Cold War (dis)order at the beginning of the twentyfirst century, the U.S. and NATO have begun to see the Western Balkans (and the eastern Mediterranean) as increasingly linking together “threats” to a unified Europe from the East from Russia, Iran and increasingly China, and from the South (rise of terrorism, illicit smuggling, human trafficking and excessive migration). As NATO hopes to keep “the Mediterranean region free to Allied navigation as a prerequisite to sustaining its military effort across Alliance territory,”33 the Adriatic has essentially become a “NATO lake” following the expansion of NATO membership to Slovenia (2004), Croatia (2008) and Montenegro (2017).

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NATO then expanded to North Macedonia in 2020 after years of opposition from NATO and EU member Greece. (See discussion of FYROM, this chapter.) For its part, Montenegro became a NATO member in the period 2015–2017 after declaring independence in May 2006 once Yugoslavia itself formally ceased to exist in 2003, and when the federation of Serbia and Montenegro was established. Unlike Georgia and Ukraine that had both obtained promises that they could join NATO at an indefinite time in the future, but with no formal Membership Action Plan (MAP), Montenegro had obtained a MAP. NATO membership for Montenegro was seen by the U.S. as a strategic and preclusive measure that would “seal… off the entire Adriatic coast for NATO” and prevent a “Kaliningrad on the Mediterranean.”34 In this respect, the western Balkans and Adriatic are now seen as the new barriers to “threats” arising from both the East and the South, while NATO seeks to protect Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) in the region. The Three Seas Initiative In mid-March 2021, U.S. Secretary of State Blinken met with the Visegrad 4 of Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia. Blinken urged these states to assist the integration of the Western Balkans into both the EU and NATO. In response, Hungary urged the U.S. to support the Three Seas Initiative (TSI) as a means to sustain close ties between the U.S and central Europe.35 In geo-economic terms, the TSI involves 12 EU member states, including Slovenia and Croatia that border the Baltic, the Adriatic, and the Black Sea. Concurrently, Budapest, which is generally seen as pro-Russia and pro-China, nevertheless supported Romania’s efforts to join the Schengen Area and the accession of Croatia to the EU in 2013; Budapest also supported the proposed EU membership of Serbia. In July 2022 the EU Council adopted the final three acts required to enable Croatia to introduce the euro on 1 January 2023. (See also Chapter 8.) It was becoming increasingly recognized, prior to the 2022 RussiaUkraine war, that the TSI represented one possible means for the U.S. and EU to back the efforts of European states to diversify away from Russian energy initiatives, such as NordStream 2 from Russia to Germany (bypassing Poland), as well as TurkStream from Russia to Turkey and then

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to Greece (bypassing Ukraine)—in which the latter pipeline possesses a more direct impact on the western Balkan states. At the same time, Russia has not always been successful in expanding its geo-economic interests, as the EU has been able to challenge Gazprom’s efforts to achieve a monopoly in Serbia and Bosnia.36 And at present, Moscow does not play a significant economic role in the Western Balkans: only 6.6% of foreign direct investment in the region comes from Russia and Russia’s share of regional foreign trade is only 3.9% for exports and 5.3% for imports. Nevertheless, Serbia, North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are still highly dependent upon Russia for its energy supply, but this dependence is expected to decline with the rise of new energy suppliers, such as Azerbaijan, among others.37 Members of the TSI have accordingly hoped that U.S. government and transnational corporations would view these energy projects “as strategic rather than financial ventures” so as to gain greater investment despite their higher relative expense. The TSI has ostensibly gained even greater political traction since the 2022 Russia-Ukraine war following U.S. and EU efforts to sanction Russia and to limit importing Russian energy and other Russian products as much as possible in a new form of economic “constrainment.” At the same time, some European states have been critical of the TSI project in that it was seen as either favoring American corporate shale gas interests or that the U.S. is not truly interested in the European project. The Europeans have thus looked to Qatar, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Norway, and potential sources from the eastern Mediterranean, the Caspian Sea, and the Ionian-Adriatic, to diversity energy supplies away from Russia and Iran, while still hoping that UN-EU Contact Group diplomacy can eventually restore EU-Iran energy ties. Israel and the UAE in the Western Balkans It was in the immediate aftermath of the August 13, 2020 Abraham peace agreement38 between Israel and the UAE during the Trump administration that Kosovo and Serbia took steps toward economic normalization. This new alliance once again revealed the widening gyre that has begun to link the eastern Mediterranean, the western Balkans, and the Sunni Arab Gulf countries. The latter, along with the UAE, have been providing loans and development assistance for the western Balkans, while investing in tourism, construction (such as the Belgrade Waterfront), agriculture, aviation (Air Serbia), and military technology.39 The UAE now represents

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a major investor in the western Balkans, first in Albania, then Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia. Qatar and Saudi Arabia have also begun to invest more recently the Balkans. (On the UAE, see Chapter 4, this book). In effect, while U.S. and NATO policy has often been seen by panSerb hardliners as supporting pan-Albanian and pan-Moslem movements in Kosovo and elsewhere in an effort to contain and “encircle” Serbia— while concurrently seeking to contain, if not eliminate, Russian and Iranian political-economic influence from the region in general, the geoeconomic game appears more complex after entry of UAE investments into the region, plus those of Turkey and China. From FYROM to North Macedonia The Chinese veto in the UN Security Council—largely due to Macedonia’s recognition of Taiwan in January 1999 and the promise of Taiwanese direct aid and investment—that led to the removal of the UNPREDEP peacekeeping mission from FYROM—was a major indication that China had seriously entered the western Balkans geostrategic and politicalmilitary arena. This was after Beijing had begun to “penetrate” Serbia in particular in terms of political, social and economic influence both during and after the 1990–95 Bosnian war. As the demands for the independence of what is now called North Macedonia raised Greek concerns, UN preventive war forces (UNPREDEP) were deployed from March 1995 to February 1999 (just prior to the war over Kosovo) as a means to prevent conflict between FYROM and Greece and between Albania and the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). UNPREDEP was accordingly canceled by Beijing despite the fears of UN, U.S. and European officials that (1) the mission was needed to control gun running and other illicit activities to Kosovo; (2) there was a danger of increased tensions along the Albanian-Yugoslav border; (3) the situation in Albania was highly unstable; and (4) there was a lack of progress in the demarcation of FYROM’s border with Yugoslavia/Serbia as well was with Greece. For its part, China argued that the situation in FYROM had already stabilized and that its relations with its neighbors had improved. Beijing argued that there was no reason to protect FYROM against either Serbia or Greece, by supporting FYROM’s claims to independence, and that the

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UN’s peacekeeping resources could be better used to manage conflicts in Africa where they were more needed. One can argue, however, that, by February 1999, during the escalating socio-political conflict in Kosovo, the real geostrategic concern of both Russia and China was that FYROM had authorized the deployment of the NATO Extraction Force (EF) on its territory—as the NATO Extraction Force had been working with the OSCE-led Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). The latter had conducted aerial observation over Kosovo, while preparing to bring KVM observers, as well as diplomats and important Kosovar figures, to safety if necessary. In effect, Moscow and Beijing saw the NATO EF as a surveillance and potential intervention force.40 For these reasons, NATO’s EF strained relations between Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (as an ally of China and Russia) and FYROM just before the air war “over” Kosovo, when NATO opposed Serb “ethnic cleansing” in Kosovo. Russia accordingly abstained (as Yeltsin sought Clinton’s support), while China vetoed the UNPREDEP mission, upsetting FYROM. In effect, in using its UN Security Council veto for only the fifth time, China’s drive to unify with Taiwan trumped the need to sustain peace in ex-Yugoslavia by working in concert with the UN Security Council. Beijing’s UN veto indicated that China was entering into post-Cold War global geopolitics and was not merely pursuing its economic interests.41 China’s veto against UNPREDEP upset the EU in particular. The Europeans had seen the mission as a stabilizing and peace-promoting element that could help promote dialogue and understanding among the different rival socio-political factions in FYROM. As it was the first UN “preventive war deployment” force, the UN and EU hoped that it could serve as a model for future such deployments, particularly given the refusal/failure to deploy a preventive war force in Bosnia in 1992 that could possibly have helped to prevent the war—when it had been requested by the Bosnian government.42 It took 27 years before Greece and FYROM finally resolved their disagreements in 2018. This occurred despite the rise of ethnic tensions since 2001 that nearly resulted in a civil war between Macedonia’s Slav majority and the ethnic Albanian minority that was calmed with the help of the August 2001 Ohrid agreements. Political instability and protest in the period from 2014 to 2015 once again stalled Macedonia’s path to joining the EU. By March 2017, Moscow accused Albania, NATO, and the European Union of trying to impose a pro-Albanian government on

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Macedonia in supporting Albanian irredentism, while the U.S. and EU accused Russia of attempting a coup.43 At that time, Athens had feared that pro-Albanian Macedonian groups in the new state would sustain irredentist claims to Thessaloniki, Greece’s second-largest city, among other regions. In addition, Greece feared FYROM would attempt to appropriate Greek culture and history. This issue also divided those North Macedonians who identified with Greek or classical history, those who identified with Slavic culture, and those of Albanian and Moslem descent. Unlike the situation with Kosovo independence, the U.S., Russia, and China quickly recognized North Macedonia’s independence. On 12 June 2018, after Greece had blocked FYROM’s membership in the Alliance for at least a decade by demanding that “Macedonia” change its name, FYROM was finally recognized as the Republic of North Macedonia under the Prespa agreement. North Macedonia joined NATO just before the ratification of that accord. (See Chapters 3, 9 and 10, this book.)

Section II: Greece and the Turkish “Wild Card” It is largely in the quest to secure access to eastern Mediterranean energy and resources44 that one can trace the rise of the renewed regional power antagonisms between NATO and EU member Greece, which has been increasingly backed by France as a major aspect of EU solidarity, as well as by the U.S., among other states, against NATO-member Turkey. This rivalry is taking place in a “new Near East” geopolitical context in which a more independent Turkey has begun to assert its irredentist interests as a “protector” of Moslems in the western Balkans and in other areas once controlled by the former Ottoman empire, while seeking defense supports from Russia. In such a way, Turkey has sought a forge a post-Cold War policy more independent of the U.S. and NATO particularly since Ankara had opposed the 2003 Iraq war which it feared would “liberate” the Kurds in northern Iraq, thereby also strengthening Kurdish autonomy, if not independence, movements in Iran, Syria, and within Turkey (much of Anatolia) itself. Under Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu, Turkey embarked on a major diplomatic venture into the Western Balkans and eastern Mediterranean. In 2009, Davutoglu sought to bring peace

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to Bosnia by bringing Bosnian Serbs, Croats, and Muslims together— while also seeking to assert Turkish influence in the region. This effort was partly a consequence of the failure of the EU-led Butmir Process in 2008/09; that process had hoped to implement constitutional reforms, but which were not adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina.45 In January 2010, Davutoglu then established a Turkey-Bosnia Herzegovina-Croatia trilateral advisory council within the context of the Southeast Europe Cooperation Process Presidency that Turkey had assumed from June 2009–June 2010. By April 2010, the leaders of Serbia, Bosnia Herzegovina, and Turkey signed the Istanbul Declaration, with the Serbian and Bosnian presidents coming together for what was then hailed as a “historic” summit.46 In 2014, Britain and Germany launched the EU Initiative and the Reform Initiative47 on Bosnia and Herzegovina which emphasized socio-economic and related reforms over political reforms.

Failure of NATO to Resolve Greek and Turkish Disputes The fact that NATO has not been able to resolve disputes between two of its member states, Greece and Turkey, has raised problematic concerns that prevents NATO and EU security cooperation and sharing of intelligence. Both Athens and Ankara have additionally threatened to withdraw from the Atlantic Alliance at different points of time or else move closer to Russia and/or China. For its part, given fears that the U.S. and NATO may not back perceived Turkish interests, coupled with its rivalry with Israel and Iran, Turkey has also threatened to develop an independent nuclear weapons capability—a not-to-be excluded possibility that could possess dangerous repercussions throughout the “new Near East” and beyond.48 Seeing itself in the crossroads of the Middle East, Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia, Caspian Sea, Mediterranean, as well as the Gulf and Black Sea, Turkey has not only begun to assert its “neo-Ottoman” interests in the western Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean, including support for Hamas versus Israel, but also versus Syrian Kurds, including the U.S.backed Syrian Democratic Forces, as well as in the Caucasus in support of Azerbaijan in the 2020 drone war over Nagorno Karabakh versus Turkey’s historical nemesis Armenia, which was weakly backed by Moscow.49

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Prior to the February 2022 Russia-Ukraine war, Ankara had been regarded as a possibly no longer trustworthy ally given its gradual alienation from both the U.S. and Europeans at least since the 1990 and 2003 wars with Iraq and given the refusal of the EU to accept Turkey as a full member despite recurrent EU promises to do so since the 1980s. Moreover, the 2016 “Gulenist” coup attempt provided the EU with additional human rights concerns to refuse to admit Turkey as a full member—due to “continued negative developments in the rule of law, fundamental rights and the judiciary”50 under Erdo˘gan’s leadership after he began to repress alleged “Gulenist” opponents of his regime, while seeking to expand his government’s control over most of the Turkish media. In addition to sending its armed forces to back Qatar during the 20172020 blockade of Doha by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt, who all opposed the alleged support of both Qatar and Turkey for the Muslim Brotherhood, plus close ties to Iran, among other issues, Ankara has additionally enhanced its political-economic and military influence in Libya in support of the UN-backed Government of National Accord in Tripoli which claims to be the legitimate government. By contrast, the opposition Libyan House of Representatives is backed by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army that is in turn supported by the UAE, plus Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and France, as well as the Russianbacked Wagner “private” militia that shows no sign of withdrawing from Libya and Syria despite its clash over Russian military strategy in Ukraine in 2023. The Wagner Group may also possess some limited links to Serbian pan-nationalists in the Balkans.51 In effect, Turkey has aligned with UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli to develop its own pipeline across the eastern Mediterranean. In November–December 2019, Turkey signed a memorandum of understanding that delimits maritime boundaries with the GNA. The issue raised here is that the state-determined delineations of maritime zones often overlap each other so that these states counteraccuse each other of violating rights and sovereignty. Turkey wants to become an energy supplier for Cyprus and for southern Europe and hopes, if possible, to reduce its dependence on Russian and Iranian energy. In so doing, Ankara has played NATO and EU members against each other, while also playing the U.S. versus Russia. The expansion of Turkish regional and energy claims has put Ankara into near military conflict with both Greece and France. In July, 2020, during NATO’s Operation Sea Guardian, France and Turkey disputed the

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inspection of a cargo ship that was suspected of smuggling arms to Libya; Turkish forces were then accused of having targeted French ships. This incident, combined with Greek-Turkish tensions over drilling operations, led France to temporarily increase its military presence in the eastern Mediterranean.52 At that time, France had opted to deploy additional frigates and Rafale fighters, to “monitor the situation in the region and mark its determination to uphold international law.” NATO then set up a military “deconfliction mechanism,” which included the setting up of a hotline between Athens and Ankara.53 Turkish-Greek rivalry over energy exploration in the eastern Mediterranean, and particularly Turkey’s drilling for gas off Cyprus and other Greek islands54 in accord with Turkey’s Mavi Vatan (Blue Homeland) doctrine,55 has brought together a coalition of NATO, the EU, and Greece (with France taking the lead) into closer defense cooperation with the UAE, plus Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, and Israel to counterbalance Turkey (as well as Iran). Before the 2022 Russia-Ukraine war, Moscow had hoped to present itself as a mediator between Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey. This complex situation has, at least in appearance, begun to change in 2022 under the Biden Administration and after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. (See Chapter 11). The complexity derives in part from the fact that Turkish energy claims compete with the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum that aims to link gas fields in the Eastern Mediterranean with the European market. The latter gas project of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum represents an initiative that is backed by the Republic of Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, and Palestine. NATO and EU members, including Italy and France, have also hoped to join the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum. The major concern of these states is that Turkish policy flip-flops and militancy could sabotage energy contracts that are already established and undermine potential investments in the future—if a U.S., EU, and Greek rapprochement with Turkey does not succeed. (See Chapters 7, 8, 9, and 10 this book.) China’s Burgeoning Influence China is now considered the third most prominent actor in the western Balkans after the EU and U.S.56 China has begun to institutionalize new relations in the Western Balkans by seeking out social and political ties in areas including culture and media. The Chinese Communist Party has

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likewise established close ties with sympathetic political parties in each country. Beijing sees the western Balkans primarily as an entry point into Europe for its Belt and Road initiative at the Port of Piraeus in Greece with most of the financing of China’s Export–Import Bank going to Serbia for transport and energy projects.57 Since 2010–12, China has accordingly begun to invest in critical infrastructure, including shipping ports,58 rail systems, and highways in Europe and elsewhere.59 With regard to the Western Balkans in particular, China has thus far focused on the port of Vlora, Albania’s second largest port after Tirana. Another port option for possible Chinese investment is the port of Shen Gjini that leads to Kosovo. Beijing has also begun to construct highway projects in BiH and Macedonia, plus railway links that run through Croatia, North Macedonia, and other countries on the Adriatic, as well as into central European states. (See Chapters 3, 8, 9 and 10, this book.) In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chinese companies are slightly more active in the Republika Srpska (RS) than in the other regions, but this could change as China has begun to strengthen ties with Zagreb and Tirana, among other Balkan countries.60 In 2012, just prior to launching its Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, Beijing established the China-Central Eastern European Cooperation Forum. The latter 16 + 1 framework (or 17 + 1 with Greece) has been billed as Chinese-led multilateralism. Yet the actual deals, coupled with the implementation of development projects, are often actualized between China and the individual Eastern European countries on a bilateral level. The key dilemma is that China’s economic practices often threaten to undermine EU regulatory standards so that the Balkan states, as is the case with Montenegro, could become increasingly caught up in Beijing’s “debt trap” and the corruption of “state capture.” Perhaps more so than other regions throughout the world, China has offered huge, state-guaranteed loans for transport and energy projects to the states of the western Balkans. China’s “nostrings attached” financing of Belt and Road Initiative projects (ports, pipelines, highways, railways) appears aimed at undermining the U.S. and EU’s political-economic reform-oriented approach to the region that often places political conditions on loans, aid and assistance.61 The risk for the governments of the Western Balkans is that if they are unable to pay Chinese loans for such projects, they could be legally obliged to transfer ownership of various ports and land assets to

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Beijing—a possibility that would provide Beijing with significant political and economic leverage, if not strategic access in the future. Even if China’s political-economic influence in the Western Balkans remains relatively small, as compared to that of the EU, China has been gradually establishing a presence in key areas of energy, infrastructure, and finance.62 Beijing appears to be taking advantage of low labor costs in exYugoslavia in an effort to set up investments before EU memberships are expected to be extended to western Balkans countries. For this reason, unlike Moscow, Beijing initially appeared to be more willing to accept EU rules and regulations and was more receptive to EU expansion at least up to 2020. Yet by 2021, however, China began to strongly react against major EU sanctions imposed in response to allegations of China’s repressive policies toward the Hong Kong democracy movement and toward Uighur Moslems in Xinjiang province. China, Greece, and Europe There is nothing that more clearly illustrates the burgeoning strategiceconomic linkage between the eastern Mediterranean and the western Balkans, and between China and the rest of Europe, than the Greek port of Piraeus. The latter port, the majority of which is owned by China’s COSCO Shipping since 2016, could soon begin to rival ports in Hamburg and Rotterdam. It represents “the head of the Dragon” of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), or really an “Achilles Heel” of Europe that will permit China to penetrate both western and eastern Europe. This is because China’s BRI seeks to finance and construct a global infrastructure of ports, pipelines, railways, and highways throughout eastern Europe in the aftermath of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and Yugoslavia, while providing China with a strategic advantage and significantly lower prices in container transshipments as compared to ports in northern Europe, in part due to reduced shipping times. Here, for example, the Port of Piraeus is expected to link to a Chinese constructed train route to Belgrade to Budapest. Given the fact that the war over Ukraine has made east–west transport corridors more difficult to use, the Budapest-Belgrade railway will augment trade opportunities in Europe, particularly if it is extended to Montenegro’s largest port at Bar. Concurrently, regional integration projects aim to construct railway lines that link Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.63

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Greek and Chinese maritime interests appear complementary. In 2019, Greece and China signed 16 memorandums of cooperation, with an emphasis on Chinese energy investments in Greece, including solar power. On the one hand, Greece controls some 25% of the global merchant fleet, and hopes to engage with China in shipping services such as ship management, ship repair, finance and insurance. On the other hand, Beijing hopes to make Piraeus its biggest port in Europe, in rivalry with Hamburg and Rotterdam.64 To do so, Chinese banks have made significant loans to Greek shipowners; China has helped to build, for example, more than 1000 Greek ships in Chinese shipyards. Overall, the Port of Piraeus, plus the Budapest-Belgrade transit route (that could possibly go to Bar, Montenegro) will significantly boost China’s political-economic influence in eastern Europe in the 16 + 1 (or 17 + 1) “multilateral” framework.65 This could prove true at least until China and Russia can develop shipping routes through the Arctic Silk Road if the latter project proves feasible. U.S. Warnings About China and Turkey In 2019, the Trump administration warned western Balkans states against “the risks of Chinese investment and sensitive technologies” as well as of “China’s bribe-heavy strategy for infrastructure deals.”66 Then, in Athens, the U.S. and Greece signed a revised defense-cooperation pact intended to increase joint U.S.-Greece and NATO activity on Greek territory in addition to implementing infrastructure and other improvements at the Souda Bay naval base on Crete—the largest naval base for the U.S. and NATO in the eastern Mediterranean. At that time, then Secretary of State Mike Pompeo asserted that the deepening U.S. defense ties with Greece were not related to increased tensions between Washington, Athens and Istanbul. Instead, U.S.-Greek defense ties were ostensibly designed to counter Iranian and Russian influence both within Greece and among Greek neighbors (i.e. Turkishcontrolled Northern Cyprus).67 Nevertheless, while Turkey has been required to possess a demilitarized status in the Aegean under international treaties, Ankara has accused Athens of deploying forces and militarizing 18 out of 23 islands in the Aegean Sea in addition to deploying Russian-made S-300 missiles on the Greek island of Crete. As Greece sees the S-300 as a counterforce to Turkish F-16s, it has refused to send the missile to Kyiv to fight Moscow without a quid pro quo.68

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In addition to purchasing French Belharra frigates and Rafale aircraft,69 Greece signed, in September 2021, the first intra-NATO alliance deal that does not specifically refer to the NATO treaty. This would theoretically permit France and Greece to engage in bilateral mutual defense assistance outside a NATO operation, i.e. against NATO member, Turkey.70 At the same time, Greece and the U.S. signed a Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement (MDCA) in October 2021 that permits the U.S. military to use the northern Greek port of Alexandroupolis that now represents an energy hub and alternative land transport route to Turkey and the Balkans after Ankara closed the Bosphorus to all warships when the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022 started, and that can be expanded to host large U.S. warships, in addition to the U.S. base at Souda Bay in Crete. (See also Chapters 9 and 10, this book.) Greece’s close ties to Beijing have accordingly raised concerns. Athens has always expected Ankara to respect the UN Law of the Sea (which Turkey has not signed); yet in June 2016, Greece (along with Hungary) blocked a joint EU statement calling on China to respect the UN International Law of the Sea. This was just after Philippines had won its arbitration case at the International Court of Justice at The Hague versus China. The Hague ruling had disputed, on legal grounds, Beijing’s territorial claims to the South China Sea that conflict with the claims of Manilla. Slovenia and Croatia had also opposed the joint EU statement, in part, due to their own conflicting maritime claims.71 In 2017, Athens once again blocked EU criticism of China in arguing that “selective criticism against specific countries does not facilitate the promotion of human rights in these states, nor the development of their relation with the EU.”72 Although it ratified UNCLOS in 1996, Beijing opposes aspects of the UN Law of the Sea that impact its maritime concerns in the South and East China Seas.73 For its part, the U.S. Congress has thus far refused to ratify the UNCLOS Treaty, making it politically more difficult for Washington to enforce its global hegemony over the “international rules-based order.”74 Russia, Greece, and Europe While Greek and Chinese economic and financial ties have grown closer, Russia and Greece also took initiatives to tighten their military and economic relationship in the period 2015–19 even after the Russian

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annexation of Crimea in 2014. In 2015–16, Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras sought to delay EU sanctions on Russia, establish closer defense ties with Russia, while also working with Moscow to construct the new TurkStream gas pipeline that went through Turkey to Greece, bypassing Ukraine and thereby canceling SouthStream to Bulgaria and Turkey.75 In February 2015, Tsipras argued: “Greece and Cyprus can become a bridge of peace and cooperation between the EU and Russia.”76 After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, however, Tsipras’s hope for Athens to become a bridge of peace and cooperation between the EU and Russia appears dubiously possible as long as the Russia-Ukraine war is not eventually settled by some form of peace treaty. As a troubled revanchist state, Moscow has also begun to penetrate Greece and Cyprus (Greek Cyprus) through defense and economic ties while concurrently attempting to rebuild its interests and influence in the western Balkans, along with China—in what can be called the “Achilles heels” of Europe. In addition to establishing closer political ties to other European states, such as Hungary (for which Russia is Budapest’s second most important partner after Germany) as well as Poland and Serbia, Russia’s drive into the western Balkans and eastern Mediterranean appears to represent a tit for tat effort to counterbalance the U.S.-led expansion of NATO and the EU into eastern Europe. The geostrategic importance of Cyprus is evident due to the fact the island lies in the cross routes of Europe, Africa, and Asia that connect the eastern Mediterranean with the Arabo-Persian Gulf to the Indo-Pacific through Egypt’s Suez Canal. Its geo-economic importance lies in the fact that huge discoveries of gas and oil have been found off Cyprus waters, plus those of the shores of Israel, Greece, and Lebanon.77 At the same time, as the north of Cyprus has been occupied by Turkey since 1974, both Greece and Turkey have begun to claim the resources around Cyprus. UN discussions to unify the island on the basis of a bizonal and bicommunal federation have thus far failed to achieve an agreement. (See Chapter 9.) In 2008, at the time when the EU was extending its eastern partnership to former Soviet states, Russia and Cyprus signed a joint declaration aimed at enhancing bilateral cooperation, permitting Russian firms to register in Cyprus and engage in banking and real estate. Largely due to the corruption of “state capture,” Cyprus has become a tax haven, a place for laundering of money, and a transit point for migration to Europe. It has been estimated that Russian individuals and firms (and criminal

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organizations) may have transferred over $30 billion (around $1 trillion rubles) to Cyprus over the past twenty years.78 During the 2013 financial crisis in Cyprus, the EU was accordingly concerned that Moscow might ask for a naval port and access to Greek Cypriot gas reserves in return for financial assistance.79 Then, in 2015, after the Russian annexation of Crimea, and as Moscow begin to search for a second base outside of Syria, Russia and Cyprus discussed the options of letting the Russian Air Force use the air base, Andreas Papandreou, along with the international airport of Paphos, as well as the air base of Limassol which borders on the British air base of Akrotiri, at least temporarily.80 The latter base serves NATO operations and raises fears that Moscow could eavesdrop on NATO’s electronic surveillance and communications systems. Russian Pressures and Influence Much as the U.S. and EU have begun to penetrate former Soviet space through NATO enlargement and the EU Eastern Partnership, Russia and China have attempted to penetrate the European political-economy in Greece, Cyprus, Serbia, and the western Balkans, as well as in Hungary and Bulgaria—given the failure/refusal of the U.S. and EU to reach out for a rapprochement with both Russia and China. In an effort to counter the uncoordinated NATO and EU enlargements toward post-Soviet space, a more assertive Russia has thus sought to sustain and expand its spheres of influence and security from the Black Sea to the eastern Mediterranean particularly after the Ukraine–European Union Association Agreement—that was described as Ukraine’s “first but most decisive step” toward EU membership—was signed on 27 June 2014. The danger is that this mutual penetration into each other’s spheres of influence and security will continue to provoke disputes and political tensions. As both NATO and the EU continued their advance into former Soviet spheres of influence and security, Putin has believed it to be crucial to sustain Russia’s sea lines of communication from the Black Sea to the eastern Mediterranean. At the time, after negotiations, Kyiv refused to renew its lease of the Sevastopol military bases to Russia while Moscow did not want to move its Sevastopol base at significant cost and loss of geostrategic positioning—a fact that led Moscow to surreptitiously annex the isthmus in February 2014 in an act of preclusive imperialism during

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the chaos of the Euro-Maiden and Revolution of Dignity movements that Moscow saw as backed by the U.S. and EU. In essence, Putin did not want to eventually cede Russia’s Sevastopol military base to Ukrainian/ NATO controls. By 2015, in an effort to check the rise of pan-Sunni and proTurkish Islamist movements, Putin opted for direct military intervention to support the beleaguered regime of Bashir Al-Assad in Syria, in cooperation with Iran’s Revolutionary Guards. It was a war that came close to drawing NATO-member Turkey and Russia into direct confrontation in November 2015 and that almost drew the U.S. and Russia into direct conflict in the Battle of Khasham in February 2018 as well. By intervening militarily, Putin sought to protect Russian sea lines of communication from the Sea of Azov and the energy export port of Novorossiisk, through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles and then into the Aegean through the eastern Mediterranean to the Syrian port of Tartus. In addition to seeking military bases in Syria, Putin has also sought to rent military bases in Cyprus and Turkey to provide access to the eastern Mediterranean, as previously discussed. (See also Chapter 10.) In short, as a “spoiler,” Moscow has been attempting to check NATO and EU influence where possible so as to sustain and expand its own spheres of influence and security beyond the Caspian Sea and Northern Caucasus with a focus on the Black Sea region (Abkhazia, Crimea, Sea of Azov, eastern Ukraine, Moldova and Transdniestria); the western Balkans (primarily Serbia and pan-Serb movements in North Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Bosnia); and the eastern Mediterranean (Syria, Cyprus and Libya). With hybrid warfare and “sharp power” tools that include control over energy supplies, plus political pressures, bribery, cyber sabotage, media dis/mis-information and cultural warfare, and threats of destabilization, Moscow has thus hoped that it can eventually displace NATO and EU influence in working as much as possible with Beijing although not always in agreement. (See Chapters 3, 4, 6, 8, 9 and 10.) It is now up to the U.S.—in helping to build a stronger and more unified EU—to develop a new transatlantic diplomatic strategy, with new forms of defense supports and political-economic cooperation, that would be intended to counterbalance, engage, and eventually transform, U.S. and EU relations with Turkey and with China, and then ultimately with Russia once, and if, a peace settlement can be achieved in

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the Russian-Ukraine war. In addition to dealing with multiple major challenges with respect to migration, transnational organized crime, Islamist radicalization, and international terrorism, cyber-threats, and major environmental problems, such a new, more coordinated, U.S.-EU transatlantic strategy of diplomatic engagement would also seek to bring peace and security to the Balkans with respect to Serbia and Kosovo in particular, and in the eastern Mediterranean with respect to Greece and Turkey. Evidently not an easy prospect and one that can only be achieved in the assumption that it will prove possible to prevent the Russia-Ukraine war from exploding further into the Balkans region and beyond. (See Chapter 11.)

Notes 1. Hall Gardner, IR Theory, Historical Analogy and Major Power War (New York: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2019). 2. “NATO & Kosovo: Military Technical Agreement—9 June 1999.” n.d. Www.nato.int. https://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990609a.htm. 3. Hall Gardner, Toward an Alternative Transatlantic Strategy: Biden, the EU and the ‘New’ Multilateralism; Vers une Stratégie Transatlantique Alternative—Biden, l’UE et le nouveau multilatéralisme, Éditions Ginkgo, avril 2022. 4. From the U.S. perspective, the 1995 Dayton accords were achieved by U.S.-NATO “lift and strike” actions in 1995 that were seen as forcing the Bosnian Serbs to the bargaining table. From the European perspective, however, it can be argued that the 1993 Vance-Owen plan would have prevented two more years of horrific violence, that included the 1995 Srebrenica massacre—that is, if the Vance-Owen Peace Plan had been strongly backed by the U.S. and by the imposition of international peacekeeping forces. Filippo Andreatta, The Bosnian War and the New World Order, Institute for Security Studies October 1997. https://www.iss.eur opa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/occ001.pdf. The U.S. had refused to deploy peacekeepers in 1993 in large part after the death of U.S. special forces in the Somalia “Black Hawk Down” attack. 5. Office of the High Representative. “Bosnia and Herzegovina 1998: SelfSustaining Structures.” PIC Bonn Conclusions, 6 June 2016. http://www. ohr.int/pic-bonn-conclusions/?print=pdf. 6. Name Redacted, Kosovo: Greek and Turkish Perspectives CRS Perspectives, May 27, 1999. https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/19990527_ RS20149_96f2ebfbadc8c59ea820d196032fc8f8ce1f1e4f.pdf.

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7. “The Clinton-Yeltsin Relationship in Their Own Words.” National Security Archives, October 2, 2018. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefingbook/russia-programs/2018-10-02/clinton-yeltsin-relationship-theirown-words. Henry Kissinger, “New World Disorder.” Newsweek, 30 May 1999. https://www.newsweek.com/new-world-disorder-166550. 8. Noam Chomsky, “A Review of NATO’s War over Kosovo.” Z Magazine, May 2001. https://chomsky.info/200005__/. “Kosovar Refugees” Nearly 600,000 Albanian Kosovar refugees were driven into Albania (375,000), Macedonia (150,000), and Montenegro and Bosnia, with about 400,000 Kosovars remaining as internal refugees. Roughly 200,000 Kosovars had left Kosovo before NATO started bombing. Migration News May 1999, Volume 6, Number 5. https://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/ more.php?id=1801. 9. Joe Lauria, “Yugoslavia: China, Russia Threaten to Block UN Kosovo Resolution.” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, June 09, 1999. https:// www.rferl.org/a/1091495.html. 10. Vsevolod Samokhvalov, Russian-European Relations in the Balkans and Black Sea Region (Palgrave, 2017). 11. William Perry, My Journey at the Nuclear Brink (Stanford University Press, 2015), 148. 12. See Hall Gardner, Dangerous Crossroads (Praeger, 1997). 13. Sakaguchi Yoshiaki, Mayama Katsuhiko, “Significance of the War in Kosovo for China and Russia.” NIDS Security Reports, No. 3 (March 2002), pp. 1–23. http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/ pdf/bulletin_e2001_1.pdf. 14. “The Clinton-Yeltsin Relationship in Their Own Words.” National Security Archives, October 2, 2018. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefingbook/russia-programs/2018-10-02/clinton-yeltsin-relationship-theirown-words. Branko Marcetic, “Diplomatic Cables Show Russia Saw NATO Expansion as a Red Line.” ACURA ViewPoint, January 16, 2023. https://usrussiaaccord.org/acura-viewpoint-guest-post-by-branko-mar cetic-diplomatic-cables-show-russia-saw-nato-expansion-as-a-red-line/. 15. As early as in May 1999, Vladimir Putin, then Secretary of the Security Council, argued that Russia had to revise its National Security Concept to take into account the possibility of military invasion of Russia by foreign countries. On 5th of October, 1999, then President Boris Yeltsin stated that Moscow needed to draw up the new “Security Concept” considering the serious situation in Kosovo. Yeltsin argued that the costs of conventional and nuclear modernization would be great, and that Moscow would need to rely, in part, upon tactical nuclear weaponry. Sakaguchi

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17.

18.

19.

20. 21. 22.

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Yoshiaki, Mayama Katsuhiko, “Significance of the War in Kosovo for China and Russia,” NIDS Security Reports, No. 3 (March 2002), pp. 1– 23. www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/pdf/bulletin_e2001_ 1.pdf; Hall Gardner, NATO Expansion and U.S. Strategy in Asia (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina possessed one of the highest proportions of Sunni “foreign fighters” in Europe as compared to their total population. In 2015–17, 317 Kosovars out of a total population of 1.8 million have been identified by police as IS members. The cultural and economic impact of the Sunni Arab Gulf states, and the influence of Wahabi or Salafi Islamist movements (in conflict with Turkish Sufi interpretations of Islam), grew significantly in the region since the Balkan and Kosovo wars. The Balkan states of Bosnia, Kosovo, and Montenegro, are all areas of jihadist recruitment for fighting in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. There is concern that jihadists will eventually return to their respective homelands to continue their struggle. The Influence of External Actors in the Western Balkans: A Map of Geopolitical Players, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Berlin, 2018, pp. 20–20. https://www.kas.de/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=194 afc48-b3be-e3bc-d1da-02771a223f73&groupId=252038. Ramesh Thakur, “China and Russia Have Learned Well from Failed U.S. Promises,” Japan Times, February 16, 2022. https://www.japantimes. co.jp/opinion/2022/02/16/commentary/world-commentary/china-rus sia-u-s-promises/. Nova, Redazione Agenzia, “Nuove Rivelazioni Sul Bombardamento Dell’ambasciata Cinese a Belgrado Nel 1999,” 2021. Agenzia Nova, June 3, 2021. https://www.nova.news/nuove-rivelazioni-sul-bombardamentodellambasciata-cinese-a-belgrado-nel-1999/. John Bull, “Pristina: An Airport Too Far.” Medium, September 1, 2019. https://medium.com/lapsed-historian/pristina-an-airport-too-far42e010e19f12. “United Nations Resolution 1244.” 2016. UNMIK, January 18, 2016. https://unmik.unmissions.org/united-nations-resolution-1244. “NATO & Kosovo: Military Technical Agreement—9 June 1999.” n.d. Www.nato.int. https://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990609a.htm. Zhao Huasheng, “Should China and Russia Form an Alliance?” RIAC, January 12, 2021, RIAC: Should China and Russia Form an Alliance? (https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/ana lytics/should-china-and-russia-form-an-alliance/). Odd Arne Westad, Majalla, April 15, 2022. https://eng.majalla.com/ node/216046/politicsnext-sino-russian-split.

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24. “Serbia and Kosovo Sign Historic Agreement.” The Guardian, April 30, 2013. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/30/serbiakosovo-historic-agreement-brussels. 25. Sandy Tolliver, “Serbia-Kosovo Agreement Results from Trump’s Different Brand of Diplomacy.” The Hill, September 4, 2020. https:// thehill.com/opinion/international/515125-serbia-kosovo-agreement-res ults-from-trumps-different-brand-of. 26. Israel Praises Serbian Pledge to Open ‘State Office’ in Jerusalem | Balkan Insight (https://balkaninsight.com/2020/03/02/israel-praisesserbian-pledge-to-open-state-office-in-jerusalem/). https://www.un.org/ press/en/2017/ga11995.doc.htm. Albania’s hosting of the anti-Iranian Mujahedin-e Khalq, or MEK put it in conflict with Iran. 27. Bojana Barlovac, “Serbia Breaks Balkan Ranks on Palestine Vote.” Balkan Insight, November 20, 2012. https://balkaninsight.com/2012/11/30/ serbia-supported-palestine-un-bid/. 28. Hall Gardner, Dangerous Crossroads (Praeger, 1997). 29. See Hall Gardner, NATO Expansion and U.S. Strategy in Asia. I was told by a high-level Georgian official in the post-Saakashvili government that it was President Saakashvili who had provoked Russia into attacking. This action represented a gambit designed obtain greater U.S. financial assistance for Georgia’s defense, if not possible NATO membership, even though the U.S. State Department itself had previously warned Saakashvili against taking any risky moves. 30. “There is talk of exchanging further NATO expansion to the east for ‘something else’, but I think this is just so many illusions. I think that in such a case our relations with NATO would be completely… ruined for a long time to come. There will not be confrontation of course, but the price would nonetheless be high indeed and would cause serious damage…. We need… (to take) time out to look at where we have come to and what we are now sinking in, whether the issue be Kosovo, NATO expansion or missile defense.” Dmitri Medvedev, Speech, German Political, Parliamentary and Civic Leaders, Berlin (June 5, 2008). https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/doc uments/dv/d_ru_20080617_04_/D_RU_20080617_04_en.pdf. On the U.S.-Russian “re-set,” see Hall Gardner, NATO Expansion and US Strategy in Asia (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2013). 31. Branko Marcetic, “Diplomatic Cables Show Russia Saw NATO Expansion as a Red Line,” ACURA ViewPoint, January 16, 2023. https://usrussiaa ccord.org/acura-viewpoint-guest-post-by-branko-marcetic-diplomatic-cab les-show-russia-saw-nato-expansion-as-a-red-line/.

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32. Agencies, “Kremlin Rejects Claims Russia Had Role in Montenegro Coup Plot,” The Guardian, February 20, 2017. https://www.thegua rdian.com/world/2017/feb/20/russian-state-bodies-attempted-a-coupin-montenegro-says-prosecutor. 33. As NATO’s 2030 Reflection Group argued “A clear cut separation between the two flanks is losing relevance… the South and the East are joined at the seams (and geographically through the Western Balkans) with regard to Russia, which is acquiring an increasing role in the Mediterranean region. In the next ten years, therefore, the 360-degree approach to security will become an imperative and the South will likely grow in importance for NATO.” https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/ass ets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf. 34. Evelyn N. Farkas, “Montenegro Will Join NATO—And That Matters,” Defense One, December 23, 2015. Accessed January 6, 2016. http:// www.defenseone.com/ideas/2015/12/montenegro-will-join-nato-andmatters/124733/. 35. Alpár Kató, “Blinken Met the Foreign Ministers of the Visegrád Group in Brussels,” Daily News Hungary, March 23, 2021. https://dailynewshun gary.com/blinken-met-the-foreign-ministers-of-the-visegrad-group-in-bru ssels/. 36. Stanislav Secrieru, “European Union Institute for Security Studies.” Russia in the Western Balkans | European Union Institute for Security Studies, July 2, 2019. https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/russia-westernbalkans#_what_drives_the_shift_. 37. “The Influence of External Actors in the Western Balkans a Map of Geopolitical Players Www.kas.de.” n.d. https://www.kas.de/c/doc ument_library/get_file?uuid=194afc48-b3be-e3bc-d1da-02771a223f73& groupId=252038. 38. “Full Text of Joint Statement on UAE and Israel Normalizing Ties.” Arab News, August 13, 2020. https://www.arabnews.com/node/1718951/ middle-east. 39. “The Influence of External Actors in the Western Balkans a Map of Geopolitical Players Www.kas.de.” n.d. https://www.kas.de/c/doc ument_library/get_file?uuid=194afc48-b3be-e3bc-d1da-02771a223f73& groupId=252038. 40. Ministerie van Defensie, “NATO Verification Mission and Extraction Force (EF)—Historical Missions—Defensie.nl.” English.defensie.nl, September 8, 2017. https://english.defensie.nl/topics/historical-mis sions/mission-overview/1999/nato-verification-mission-and-extractionforce-ef. 41. Nicole Winfield, “China Vetoes” Associated Press, February 25, 1999.https://archive.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/chinav99.htm.

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42. “The Clinton-Yeltsin Relationship in Their Own Words.” National Security Archives, October 2, 2018. Hall Gardner, “The Genesis of NATO Enlargement and War ‘Over’ Kosovo” in Hall Gardner, Central and South Eastern Europe in Transition (Praeger, 2000). 43. EURACTIV.com, “Russia Accuses NATO, EU and Albania of Meddling in Macedonia,” March 3, 2017. https://www.euractiv.com/section/glo bal-europe/news/russia-accuses-nato-eu-and-albania-of-meddling-in-mac edonia/. 44. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, the reserves of blue fuel offshore Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, and Palestine are 122.4 trillion cubic feet (approximately 3.4 trillion cubic meters). https://112.internati onal/politics/greek-turkish-conflict-battle-for-resources-and-nato-crisis54675.html. 45. Ahmet Davutoglu was chief advisor to Erdo˘gan from 2003 to 2009, Foreign Minister from 2009 to 2014 and then Prime Minister from 2014 to May 2016. Alida Vraˇci´c, Turkey’s Role in the Western Balkans Ssoar.info. Berlin, 2016. https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/han dle/document/50173/ssoar-2016-vracic-Turkeys_role_in_the_Western. pdf?sequence=1. Mirela Grünther-Ðeˇcevi´c, “A Never-Ending Accession Process? Bosnia and Herzegovina and the EU.” Green European Journal, August 24, 2017. https://www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu/a-never-end ing-accession-process-bosnia-and-herzegovinas-long-road-to-the-eu/. 46. “From Myth to Reality: How to Understand Turkey’s Role in the Western Balkans.” n.d. ECFR. https://ecfr.eu/publication/from_myth_to_reality_ how_to_understand_turkeys_role_in_the_western_balkans/. 47. “Reform Agenda for Bosnia and Herzegovina 2015–2018.” n.d. Accessed January 21, 2023. http://europa.ba/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Ref orm-Agenda-BiH.pdf. 48. “Conventional Wisdom Says Turkey Won’t Go Nuclear. That Might Be Wrong.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 7, 2020. https://thebul letin.org/2020/07/conventional-wisdom-says-turkey-wont-go-nuclearthat-might-be-wrong/. 49. For the first time in U.S.-Turkish relations, President Joe Biden accused Turkey of engaging in “genocide” in Armenia in 1915. France, Germany, Russia, and Canada had previously accused Ankara of “genocide”. After becoming president, however, Biden has appeared to downplay his criticism. The geostrategic reality is that Turkey controls the Straits to and from the Black Sea to the eastern Mediterranean and is a crucial interlocutor with Moscow, not to overlook its threats to go nuclear and break out of NATO. At the same time, fears of confronting Turkey permit Ankara to assert its neo-Ottoman interests.

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50. “Press Corner.” n.d. European Commission–European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/country_20_ 1791. 51. Maxim Samorukov, “What’s Behind the Posturing of Russian Mercenaries in the Balkans?” Politika, Carnegie Foundation (June 4, 2023) https:// carnegieendowment.org/politika/89463. 52. “France to Bolster Mediterranean Military Presence over Turkish Gas Exploration in Disputed Waters.” France 24, August 13, 2020. https:// www.france24.com/en/20200813-france-to-bolster-military-presence-inmediterranean-over-turkish-gas-explorations. 53. Reuters. “Greece, Turkey Set Up Hotline to Avoid Clashes in Eastern Mediterranean, NATO Says,” October 1, 2020, sec. World News. https:/ /www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-turkey-nato/greece-turkey-set-uphotline-to-avoid-clashes-in-eastern-mediterranean-nato-says-idUSKBN26 M6LZ. 54. BBC News. 2019. “Turkey Ramps Up Drilling off Cyprus on Eve of Peace Talks,” August 8, 2019, sec. Europe. https://www.bbc.com/news/ world-europe-49275949. 55. Ryan Gingeras, “Blue Homeland: The Heated Politics Behind Turkey’s New Maritime Strategy.” War on the Rocks, June 2, 2020. https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/blue-homeland-the-heatedpolitics-behind-turkeys-new-maritime-strategy/. 56. Vladimir Shopov, “Decade of Patience: How China Became a Power in the Western Balkans—European Council on Foreign Relations,” ECFR, February 2, 2021. https://ecfr.eu/publication/decade-of-patience-howchina-became-a-power-in-the-western-balkans/. 57. Asia Policy Brief—China’s Economic Footprint in the Western Balkans.” n.d. www.bertelsmann-Stiftung.de. https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung. de/en/our-projects/germany-and-asia/news/asia-policy-brief-chinas-eco nomic-footprint-in-the-western-balkans. 58. Eleanor Albert, “China’s Global Port Play.” Thediplomat.com. May 11, 2019. 59. Vladimir Shopov. “Decade of Patience: How China Became a Power in the Western Balkans—European Council on Foreign Relations,” ECFR, February 2, 2021. https://ecfr.eu/publication/decade-of-patience-howchina-became-a-power-in-the-western-balkans/. 60. Funded in large part by the Chinese Ex-Im Bank, the China Road and Bridge Corporation has been constructing the controversial 41 km section of highway running from Smokovac to Matesevo in Montenegro as part of 170 km route that will extend from the Adriatic port of Bar Montenegro to Boljare on the Serbian border. The highway has been seen by critics as unnecessary, ecologically damaging, and

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61.

62.

63.

64.

65.

66.

67.

68.

69.

over-priced due to corruption. Hans von der Brelie, “The BillionDollar Motorway Leading Montenegro to Nowhere.” Euronews, May 28, 2021. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2021/05/07/the-bil lion-dollar-motorway-leading-montenegro-to-nowhere. Vladimir Shopov, “Decade of Patience: How China Became a Power in the Western Balkans—European Council on Foreign Relations.” ECFR, February 2, 2021. https://ecfr.eu/publication/decade-of-patience-howchina-became-a-power-in-the-western-balkans/#_ftn29. The Diplomat. “The Western Balkans: Low Hanging Fruit for China?” August 15, 2020. https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/the-western-bal kans-low-hanging-fruit-for-china/. “Foreign Secretary Szijjártó Calls Stalling EU Enlargement ‘Shameful.’” Hungary Today, June 15, 2022. https://hungarytoday.hu/hungarian-for eign-minister-peter-szijjarto-podgorica-european-union-eu-enlargementstalled-montenegro/. John Psaropoulos. n.d. “Greece and China Hail Strategic Partnership.” www.aljazeera.com. https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2019/ 11/11/greece-and-china-hail-strategic-partnership-as-us-and-eu-look-on. Vladimir Shopov. “Decade of Patience: How China Became a Power in the Western Balkans—European Council on Foreign Relations.” ECFR, February 2, 2021. https://ecfr.eu/publication/decade-of-patience-howchina-became-a-power-in-the-western-balkans/#_ftn7. “US Warns Balkans of Chinese Encroachment.” n.d. Www.occrp.org. Accessed January 21, 2023. https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/10840-uswarns-balkans-of-chinese-encroachment. “Pompeo Inks New Defense Pact with Greece, Criticizes Russia, Iran, China.” n.d. RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty. Accessed January 21, 2023. https://www.rferl.org/a/pompeo-greece-defense-pact-natoturkey-russia-iran-china/30201427.html. Dilara Aslan, “Greece Militarizing Aegean Islands close to Turkey’s Mainland Poses National Security Threat.” Daily Sabah, September 20, 2020. https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/news-analysis/greece-milita rizing-aegean-islands-close-to-turkeys-mainland-poses-national-securitythreat. Paul Iddon, “Does Greece ‘Need’ Those Russian S-300 Missiles On Crete?” Forbes (June 30, 2022). https://www.forbes.com/sites/pau liddon/2022/06/30/does-greece-need-those-russian-s-300-missiles-oncrete/?sh=1675962c3787. John Psaropoulos. n.d. “Greece, France Tout European Defence Autonomy with Warships Deal.” www.aljazeera.com. Accessed January 21, 2023. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/9/28/greece-francetout-european-defence-autonomy-with-warships-deal.

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70. John Psaropoulos. n.d. “Greece Approves Its Biggest Naval Modernisation in 20 Years.” www.aljazeera.com. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/ 2022/2/25/greece-approves-its-biggest-naval-modernisation-in-20-years. 71. Reuters. “EU’s Statement on South China Sea Reflects Divisions,” July 15, 2016, sec. Energy. https://www.reuters.com/article/southchinasearuling-eu/eus-statement-on-south-china-sea-reflects-divisions-idUSL8 N1A130Y. 72. “Greece Blocks EU Statement on China Human Rights at UN.” Www. euractiv.com. June 19, 2017. https://www.euractiv.com/section/china/ news/greece-blocks-eu-statement-on-china-human-rights-at-un/. 73. Xinmin Ma, “China and the UNCLOS: Practices and Policies,” The Chinese Journal of Global Governance, March 15, 2019. https:// brill.com/view/journals/cjgg/5/1/article-p1_1.xml?language=en#:~: text=China%20was%20among%20the%20first,Convention%20on%2015% 20May%201996. 74. Robert Beckman, Fulcrum, August 5, 2022. https://fulcrum.sg/on-theunited-states-the-un-convention-on-the-law-of-the-sea-and-us-freedomof-navigation-operations/. 75. Elena Holodny. n.d. “Russia Just Made a Bold Move to Keep Its Gas Leverage on Europe.” Business Insider. Accessed January 21, 2023. https://www.businessinsider.com/russia-turkey-black-sea-pipeline2015-1?IR=T. 76. “Tsipras Says Greece and Cyprus Could Be ‘EU Bridge to Russia.’” 2015. Www.euractiv.com. February 3, 2015. https://www.euractiv.com/ section/global-europe/news/tsipras-says-greece-and-cyprus-could-be-eubridge-to-russia/. 77. According to the U.S. Geological Survey, the reserves of blue fuel offshore Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, and Palestine are 122.4 trillion cubic feet (approximately 3.4 trillion cubic meters). https://112.internati onal/politics/greek-turkish-conflict-battle-for-resources-and-nato-crisis54675.html. 78. “Dynamics behind Russia and Cyprus Relationship—Indian Council of World Affairs (Government of India).” n.d. www.icwa.in. Accessed January 21, 2023. https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1& level=3&ls_id=5106&lid=829. 79. Financial Times. 2020. “Moscow on the Med: Cyprus and Its Russians,” May 15, 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/679180129403-11ea-abcd-371e24b679ed. 80. BBC News. “Cyprus Denies ‘Russia Deal on Military Bases,’” February 9, 2015, sec. Europe. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-312 93330.

CHAPTER 2

The Balkans and the Geopolitics of Populations Gérard-François Dumont

The geographical limits of the Balkans are often considered as those of the territories that the occupation of the Ottoman Empire, for four centuries, separated from the rest of Europe. Other definitions are based on the regions that were under the influence of the Orthodox Church during the Byzantine period, even though certain populations were Islamized from the fourteenth century onwards. This simple attempt at definition already shows several possible territorial approaches. Let us choose here as boundaries of the Balkans1 nine states, namely Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia, as well as Greece, even if the study of the Balkans often leaves out Bulgaria and Greece insofar as these countries are part of the European Union. In 1932, Albert Londres,2 a master of investigative journalism, demonstrated the great difficulty in understanding the region. Is it possible to refute that?

G.-F. Dumont (B) Paris-Sorbonne University (Paris IV), Paris, France e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Gardner (ed.), Geopolitical Turmoil in the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34318-6_2

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With this context, let us study the geopolitics of the Balkans by adhering to an innovative approach that frees itself from the logic of a state-by-state study, analyzing the region not from the legal nationalities as conferred by States or by residence in States (the inhabitants of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia…), but from the ethnic groups perspective (i.e. Albanians, Bulgarians, Croats, Greeks, Serbs…) whatever their state territory of residence or legal affiliation. The angle adopted here is that of nationality, in the common sense of use in different countries,3 based on an ethnic conception: a set of common characteristics shared by a human group, very often the language or, particularly in the Balkans, religion. It is thus a question of examining the “human groups” present in the Balkans, independently of the intra-Balkan political borders: “A human group is defined as a set of people attached to the territory where they have been living for a long time, and having characteristics that make them unique in this territory where they live”.4 Yet, the existence of human groups has an impact, directly or indirectly, on internal and external geopolitical situations and trends. This chapter will also consider diasporas5 in the Balkans, but these do not have a widespread presence there—although only one community of this type has significant importance: the Turks.6 It is therefore important to assess the distribution of groups according to nationalities, the greater or lesser compactness of their population and their distribution according to States.

A Wide Variety of Nationalities As in many other parts of the world, it is difficult to determine the exact population of each ethnic group in the Balkans, for two main reasons. The first reason is that declarations of nationality in censuses can vary according to the type of questionnaire, the political context of the moment,7 or the way in which census operations are implemented. The second reason is that the data are always provided at the State level, and thus never at the nationality level. Estimates of the distribution of nationalities in the Balkans are therefore based on adding the results of the censuses of several States that do not necessarily take place at the same time and whose definitions, methods, and information vary. However, the two biases previously mentioned must be put into perspective, as the Balkans have a long tradition of censuses and the major nationalities are fairly clearly defined,8 resulting in generally acceptable results.9

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Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that the history of this region is also one of challenging the declared nationalities of some groups by others. For example, Macedonians have long been considered by Serbian and Bulgarian nationalists as Serbs or Bulgarians, Montenegrins as Serbs, Bosnians as Serbs or Islamized Croats, etc. In fact, the designation of nationalities seems to be as much a reality on the ground (people asserting themselves as such) as a strategic and political instrument. The Balkans, within the nine states specified above, had a population of 38.6 million in 2021,10 comparable to Poland (38.2 million) and much smaller than Spain (47.4 million).11 This population has tended to decline under the dual effect of a “demographic winter”,12 i.e., a fertility rate that has fallen below the generation replacement threshold, and a migratory growth rate that is often negative. However, demographic trends may differ from country to country.13 An examination of the distribution of the population of the Balkans according to nationality shows, first of all, the absence of a dominant nationality. Indeed, the most numerous nationality, the Greeks, does not exceed one quarter of the total population of the region. Secondly, the difference between the number of Greeks and the second largest nationality, the Serbs, is less than a third. Third, no less than five nationalities each account for more than 10% of the population of the Balkans: Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians, Albanians, and Croats.

The Most Numerous Nationalities: Greeks, Serbs, and Croats The Greeks, the most numerous nationality in the Balkans, number more than 10 million people. Their identity can be summed up by their character as non-Slavic populations having freed themselves in the first half of the nineteenth century14 from a long domination by the Ottoman Empire and by their predominantly Christian Orthodox religion. In addition, the Greeks are distinguished by their language, written in their specific alphabet, derived from ancient Greek. The Serbs form the second nationality of the Balkans and are, with 8 million people, the most numerous Slavic people of the Balkans. Like the Greeks, part of their heritage is Byzantine, and their religion is Christian Orthodox. But they differ from the Greeks by their Slavic language, normally written in the Cyrillic alphabet. In Serbia, Serbian can be written in two alphabets, Cyrillic and Latin. The Cyrillic alphabet is used by the

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newspapers of reference. The newspapers in Latin alphabet are often more general, less “elitist” and more “popular”, or “progressive”. The two alphabets are almost bijective, i.e., the transition from one to the other follows mechanical rules; nevertheless, some words are exceptions. The third largest Balkan nationality, the Bulgarians, comprise 6.5 million people. This Slavic national group speaks a South Slavic language, Bulgarian, which is written in the Cyrillic alphabet.15 The majority of Bulgarians are Christian Orthodox. In 1870, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church rejected the jurisdiction of Constantinople, dominated by the Greeks, on which it had previously depended, forming a Bulgarian Exarchate, i.e., an autocephalous church independent of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. This separation of almost a century ended when the recognition of the Patriarchate of Bulgaria by Constantinople was formalized in 1961. Autonomous and headed by a patriarch, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church is an important part of the Bulgarian national identity.16 It has played an essential role in the preservation of Bulgarian culture, both during the Ottoman occupation and during the communist regime. A minority of Christians in Bulgaria do not, however, consider themselves Orthodox, and participate in Byzantine or Latin rite Catholic churches.

The Linguistic and Religious Specificities of Albanians and Croats The Albanians, with 6 million people, are the fourth most numerous nationality in the Balkans. They claim to be natives, descendants of the Illyrians, a protohistoric Balkan people who appeared in the twentieth century BC. Their second cultural heritage comes from Rome, the conquest of this region by the Roman Republic beginning with the capture of Dyrrachium17 in 229 BC in order to put an end to piracy in the Adriatic Sea. Located in the area of contact and confrontation between Catholicism and Orthodoxy, the Albanians converted to Islam during the four centuries of Ottoman occupation, but have a Christian minority whose ethnicity is difficult to know if it is Albanian or Greek. Their specific language, Albanian, is written in the Latin alphabet and has been the subject of significant efforts at codification only since the midnineteenth century. It is this recently unified language that is used by the vast majority of Albanians, regardless of their country of residence.

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Behind the five main nationalities of the Balkans, the Croats number 4.5 million people. This Slavic people is characterized by its religious affiliation, with a strong Catholic majority. The term “Serbo-Croatian” is often used to designate Croatian and Serbian indistinctly, but this is done inadvertently or by mistake, since they are two different languages, albeit close.18 In reality, the Croatian orthography was definitively fixed and standardized in the middle of the nineteenth century, under the impetus of Ljudevit Gaj, an eminent figure of the Croatian national revival. Their ancient distinction, which predates the establishment of Yugoslavia (1918–1991), continued under the Yugoslav communist regime (1945– 1991), in which four official languages were recognized: Slovenian and Croatian, which are written in Latin characters, and Macedonian and Serbian, which are written in Cyrillic characters. For reasons that were less linguistic than political and ideological, the Yugoslav communist leadership had undertaken to exploit the proximity of Serbian and Croatian in an attempt to merge them into a single language in defiance of their respective literary traditions. This project did not prevail: Croats and Serbs continued to use each other’s language, but there was an increase in barbarisms and borrowings on both sides. However, the regime tried to impose, with some success, the hybrid name of Serbo-Croat (in Serbia) and Croat-Serb (in Croatia). Since the democratic transition in 1990, Croatian has once again become the official language in Croatia. Croatians use the Latin alphabet exclusively, unlike the Serbs who use the Cyrillic or Latin alphabet depending on the case. Their difference in alphabet results largely from the mode of Christianization of the two peoples: most Croats were and have remained Christianized by the Roman Catholic Church while the Serbs follow the Byzantine Church called, after the schism of 1053, Orthodox.

A Semantic Shift from “Muslim” to “Bosnian” In addition to the five main nationalities analyzed above, there are other, less numerous, nationalities, two of which stand out as having a population of over one million. The first is the “Muslim people”, a title created for the 1971 census by Tito for Slavs who do not recognize themselves as Croats or Serbs. It is generally considered that the term “Muslim” does not necessarily mean religious affiliation. Since the end of Tito’s regime, the term used is “Bosnians”, which refers to about 2 million people. More precisely, in September 1993, the decision to abandon the name

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“Muslim” for that of “Bosnian” regarding the naming of the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which reflects a desire to redefine the Muslim/ Bosnian identity, was taken in order to affirm the transformation of the Bosnian Muslim community into a sovereign nation. These Bosnians are Slavs like the Serbs and Croats, but converted to Islam during the Ottoman period. They speak a very recent Slavic language, Bosnian, written in Latin alphabet. Indeed, the Bosnian language (bošnjaˇcki) can be considered to date from the day after the Dayton Agreement (1995) for the purpose of differentiation from the Serbian and Croatian languages. In fact, the real differences stem from the use of Turkish words (“Turkicisms”) which are much more present in the Bosnian language than in the Serbian or Croatian languages. The second nationality of medium importance concerns the Macedonians, numbering 1.3 million individuals. This Slavic ethnic group, speaking a Slavic language written in the Cyrillic alphabet, is mostly Christian Orthodox. Their historical knowledge owes much to Albert Londres, whose articles on the “Balkan powder keg” constitute his last book.19

From the Wide Range of Nationalities to the Concept of “Balkanization” After analyzing five major and two medium-sized nationalities, the others all number less than one million people. Of these groups, only one, the Montenegrins, with about 300,000 people, is the majority in the independent state of Montenegro since 2006. Their national character is less clear, judging by the difference in the number of people who identify themselves as Montenegrins in different censuses and the sharp change in this nationality in the 2003 census.20 Montenegrins use a Slavic language close to Serbian, Montenegrin, which was standardized in the 1990s and written in the Cyrillic alphabet. They are mostly Christian Orthodox. Their differences with the Serbs are mainly due to political reasons. The presence of other nationalities in the Balkans is due to political legacies and migratory movements: the most important are the Turks, 950,000 people, Turkish-speaking Muslims. Then comes another nationality that does not refer to any eponymous state: the Roma, 540,000 at least.21 Finally, many other minorities, therefore less numerous, exist, such as the Hungarians (especially present in the Serbian province of Vojvodina), the Aromanians (Vlachs in Epirus), the Pomacs (generally Muslims in Bulgaria and Greece), the Armenians, and the Jews…

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The absence of a dominant nationality in the Balkans results in two possible options: on the one hand via the establishment of peaceful modes of cohabitation, thus a desire for Balkan rapprochement, or else sustained disputes and tensions on the other. The latter may stem from an internal geopolitical situation in the Balkans, with possible alliances changing according to the geopolitical context, with the allies of one moment becoming the enemies of the next. Such tensions may also be due more to geopolitical factors from outside the Balkans, under the impact of interventions and rivalries between great powers.22 Combining these two effects, the cycle of tensions at the beginning of the twentieth century, considered as one of the causes of the First World War, leads to the use of the term “Balkanization”, a word applied to a region experiencing territorial fragmentation considered as having harmful consequences. But, in order to analyze this fragmentation, we must not remain only at the level of nationalities, with their complex and sometimes debatable distinctions. It is also necessary to consider the greater or lesser degree of homogeneity of each nationality, in other words, their degree of uniqueness.

Between Fairly Homogeneous and Multi-Ethnic Nationality The Greeks appear as the nationality with the strongest uniformity. Their specific alphabet clearly distinguishes them from other peoples. They can claim to have been the first Balkan people to gain their independence in 1830 by freeing themselves from the yoke of the Ottoman Empire. Four other main nationalities, all Slavs, the Bulgarians, Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians, also have a high degree of uniqueness, despite having regional differences, especially depending on the state where they are mostly resident. In contrast, one nationality, the Albanians, is characterized by a certain heterogeneity, mainly ethnic. In fact, Albanians are traditionally divided into two groups, originally separated geographically by the Shkumbin River: the Gegs in the north, including Albanians from Kosovo and the majority of Albanians from North Macedonia, and the Tosks in the south, including southern Albanians from North Macedonia around Bitola. The former are presented as mountain people, having lived in isolation for a long time, respecting a customary law, and having a tribal organization that has enabled them to overcome the hardship of their geographical

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isolation. The latter, originally living in the plains and valleys, had a more open tradition. In addition to the variety of geographical origin, there are differences between the southern (or Tosk) and northern (or Geg) dialects. However, the process of unification of the Albanian language, now used by the vast majority of Albanians, appears more influenced by the southern (or Tosk) dialects. In addition, there are differences between Albanians in Albania and those in Kosovo at the cultural and, to a lesser extent, linguistic level. For lack of being able to transcend these differences, the Albanians have had a reduced political weight for a long time in the Balkans. The proclamation of Albanian independence came in 1912 and was recognized by the great powers in 1913, but with a restricted state perimeter, resulting from the bargaining of the conference of ambassadors in London. As for Kosovo’s independence, it is even more recent (2008) and, in 2022, in the absence of sufficiently broad international recognition, the country is not a member of the UN. In terms of uniqueness within a state, it is the Albanians who appear to be in a less favorable geopolitical situation than the other nationalities of the Balkans.

Geography of Nationalities and Geography of States One of the characteristics of the Balkans is the differentiation between territories of nationalities and state territories. Three types of state distribution of Balkan nationalities can be distinguished. The first is the three multi-state Balkan nationalities, mainly because of their cross-border character. Among them, the nationality with the largest number of members outside the borders of its eponymous state is the Albanian nationality, with a quadri-state geography. In fact, only half of the Albanians in the Balkans live in Albania. The highest concentration of Albanians outside the eponymous state is found in Kosovo (more than nine-tenths of the population) and in northern Macedonia (a quarter of the population), as well as in Greece, due to emigration since the 1990s.23 This mismatch between the borders of the Albanian state and the Albanian nation partly explains the armed conflicts in the territories where the Albanians were in the majority. In Kosovo, under the sovereignty of the Yugoslav state and then of the Serbian state, the numerical domination of the Albanians allowed them to proclaim independence, which was also a consequence of the 1999 war, which saw the

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intervention of NATO, which officially came to “defend” the Albanians against Serbian attempts to control the territory. In North Macedonia, the Albanian minority rebelled against the central government in 2001, which resulted in a state-forming status following the Ohrid agreements of August 13, 2001. And some Albanian nationalists have been calling for a Greater Albania project that would bring together Kosovo, Albania, and the Albanian part of North Macedonia. The second multi-state nationality, essentially tri-state, concerns the Serbs. Three quarters of them live in Serbia. Another 1.4 million Serbs live in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where they make up a large third of the total population of that state. Then there are 200,000 Serbs in Montenegro, where their share is close to that of Bosnia. In Croatia, the number of Serbs is the same, but they now make up only 4.5% of the population, their presence in the latter country having been reduced as a result of the wars in the former Yugoslavia. In Kosovo, the Serbs are now less than 100,000, concentrated in enclaves, constituting 5% of the total population. For the Serbs, as above for the Albanians, there is a mismatch between the state territory of Serbia and the Serbian population in the Balkans. There is therefore a risk that the tensions caused by this situation will continue, at least in part of the former Yugoslavia. Finally, a third nationality, Montenegrins, is rather bi-state: three quarters of Montenegrins live in Montenegro, a percentage close to that of Serbs in Serbia, the rest of Montenegrins are mainly in Serbia, that is to say 70,000 people, which is low for Serbia, but a significant percentage of all Montenegrins in the Balkans. The second type of state distribution of Balkan nationalities concerns two nationalities with a partially cross-border character. In addition to a significant concentration of their population in one state, they have a community in a neighboring state. Thus, 87% of Croats live in Croatia, a state in which they represent almost 90% of the population. However, other Croats live in the neighboring state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where they are estimated at half a million, or 14% of the population. There is also a small community of 70,000 Croats in Serbia, barely 1% of the total population of that state. A second nationality, the Bosnians, is partly cross-border. Of course, 90% of them live in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where Bosnians are the largest nationality and make up half the population. But a secondary concentration of Bosnians lives in the Serbian state.

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A third and final type of state distribution of nationalities in the Balkans involves three, essentially mono-state, and therefore more than 95% within the borders of a single state. The first nationality of this third type is the Greek. Indeed, almost all the Greeks in the Balkans live in Greece, where they represent 92% of the country’s population. Greece is, therefore, in this region of the world, a country where the territory of the state corresponds most to that of a very largely dominant nationality. This phenomenon has become more pronounced as the small Greek minority living in southern Albania has been reduced by emigration to Greece since the fall of Albanian communism. The Bulgarians form the second nationality of the Balkans largely mono-state, since 99% of Bulgarians live in Bulgaria, where they represent 83% of the population. The correspondence between the Bulgarian population and the borders of Bulgaria is very largely adequate, since the principal minority of this country, Turkish, is not compact on the territorial level.24 As for the Macedonians, 97% of them live in North Macedonia, but they constitute a little less than two-thirds of the country’s population. The Macedonian state thus has a population with a much wider multinational range than Bulgaria or Greece. The Balkans region combines a number of factors that make the situation complex. Indeed, no single nationality is dominant. Their homogeneity appears uneven. Many of the Balkan nationalities have a crossborder character. Thus, the different aspects of the Balkan settlement offer several possible combinations depending on whether one considers the geographical distribution of nationalities, their languages, their alphabets, their state affiliations, their respective relations with countries outside the Balkans… The Balkan settlement thus undoubtedly presents a geopolitical kaleidoscope, the analysis of which requires that any simplification be ruled out. In particular, when the conditions of inclusion of minority human groups in the various states are not considered satisfactory, the cross-border character of certain Balkan nationalities, mainly Albanians and Serbs, can be, as history teaches us, a factor of geopolitical tensions. In this context, how should one think about the future of the Balkans? Will it be in the continuity of previous centuries, that is to say, a source of confrontations, or can the geopolitical situation experience a certain stabilization? The latter development could only occur if all the member countries of the region became clear partners of the European Union, or even joined it, which would allow the entire territory to be anchored in a

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strongly pacified space. This would imply, while respecting the real differences, historical, linguistic, or religious, to transcend those differences by the recognition of a common universal which is belonging to a southern European regional crossroads. This would mean proposing to the Balkans that they make an essentially European choice, which presupposes one condition: that the European Union gives itself the means to ensure peace and stability in this region, and that it has the capacity to ward off the risks of intrusion, or even destabilization, that might come from other powers. For, despite their relatively low economic level, the Balkans, particularly because of their geographical position and their cultural specificity, attract strong geopolitical interest by many foreign countries, including Turkey, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and even China.

Notes 1. The name “Balkan”, from Turkish meaning “mountain”, originally referred only to the Bulgarian mountain range, before being extended to the entire Balkan Peninsula. 2. Londres, Albert, Les Comitadjis (1932), Paris, coll. «Motifs», Le serpent à plumes, 1997. 3. Regarding the case of Russia, cf. Wackermann, Gabriel (Direction), La Russie, Paris, Ellipses, 2007. 4. Dumont, Gérard-François, Démographie politique. Les lois de la géopolitique des populations, Paris, Ellipses, 2007, p. 209. 5. On the difference of nature between the human groups and the diasporas and therefore of their geopolitical effects, ibidem. 6. For example, the Turks living in Greece, especially in Western Thrace, have a diasporic behavior. They claim their Turkishness and have chosen, for example, as allowed by the exchange convention of January 3, 1923, and then the treaty of Lausanne of July 24, 1923, to apply the Islamic sharia as family law and not the family law of Greece. 7. For example, declaring oneself “Serbian” in 2003 in Montenegro is not necessarily a criterion for asserting one’s identity, but a symbol of rejection of the ruling pro-independence party and, therefore, of attachment to Serbia. Cf. Cattaruzza, Amaël, «Le recensement dans les Balkans, enjeu politique», Population & Avenir, n° 672, mars-avril 2005. https://doi. org/10.3917/popav.672.0014. 8. Nevertheless, it is necessary to point out the problem of mixed couples, quite numerous in the former Yugoslavia, from which some people have a multi-ethnic identity.

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9. In the case of North Macedonia, Jean-Paul Sardon shows that the results concerning ethnicity are reliable at the national level, even if locally there may be significant variations from one census to another. Cf. Sardon, Jean-Paul, «À propos de quelques biais de déclaration de l’appartenance ethnique dans les Balkans», Démographie et Cultures—XV° colloque de l’Aidelf. Québec, 25–29 août 2009. 10. Sardon, Jean-Paul, «La population des continents et des pays», Population & Avenir, n° 755, novembre-décembre 2021, www.population-dem ographie.org/revue03.htm. 11. These figures will probably be revised in view of the Ukrainian emigration linked to the war that began on 24 February 2022, an emigration that has increased considerably in Poland; cf. Dumont, Gérard-François, «L’Ukraine face à la guerre: géopolitique et population», Population & Avenir, n° 758, mai-juin 2022. 12. Dumont, Gérard-François, Géographie des populations. Concepts, dynamiques, prospectives, Paris, Ar-mand Colin, 2018, https://doi.org/ 10.3917/arco.dumon.2018.02. 13. For example, the differences in demographic evolution between Albania and North Macedonia; cf. Dumont, Gérard-François, «Les populations de l’Europe: des évolutions démographiques très fragmentées», Les Analyses de Population & Avenir, n° 11, décembre 2019, https://doi.org/ 10.3917/lap.011.0001. 14. Greece celebrated the second centenary of its independence in 2021, considering not the year of its de jure independence, but the year in which the process of independence started. 15. However, many street signs in Sofia indicate their names in both the Cyrillic and Latin alphabets. The prayer book of the main Catholic church in Sofia also includes texts in the Cyrillic and Latin alphabets, but also in other languages (especially for visiting tourists). 16. Symbolized by the monastery of Rila, “the most famous monument of Bulgarian architecture and culture”, 120 km south of Sofia, which includes a fourteenth-century tower. 17. Today known as Durrës, the second most inhabited city of Albania. 18. Cf. also the linguistic analysis of a Croatian: Kacic, Miro, Le croate et le serbe: illusions et falsifications, Paris, éd. Honoré Champion, Bibliothèque de grammaire et de linguistique, 2000. Others claim that the differences between Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian are minimal. Cf. Garde, Paul, «Les mythes et les mots. Comment lire l’histoire des Slaves du sud», p. 15, dans: Gerverau, Laurence et Tomic, Yves (dir.), De l’unification à l’éclatement. L’espace yougoslave, un siècle d’histoire, Nanterre, Musée d’histoire contemporaine—BDIC, 1998 (Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian differ only in lexical or stylistic details that are of little importance for understanding);

2

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20.

21.

22.

23. 24.

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Thomas, Paul-Louis, «La désintégration de la Yougoslavie et la question linguistique», p. 227, dans: Gerverau, Laurence et Tomic, Yves (dir.), De l’unification à l’éclatement, 1998: These three linguistic names—Serbian, Croatian and Bosnian—refer to a single linguistic system whose skeleton, syntax and morphological system (declensions, conjugations, etc.) are the same. There are phonetic differences, but these are minimal and do not prevent mutual understanding between the nations. Precisely, Albert Londres visited Sofia in 1931 when King Boris II’s Bulgaria was shaken by clashes between terrorists and counter-terrorists: a latent civil war was chronically opposing communists, revolutionaries and fascist leagues in the Balkans. Albert Londres meets on this occasion the head of the Macedonian Internal Revolutionary Organization, a clandestine association of opponents also called the Comitadjis. Cf. Londres, Albert, Les Comitadjis (1932), Paris, coll. «Motifs», Le serpent à plumes, 1997. Parant, Alain; Penev, Goran; Remikovic, Snezana, «Les Monténégrins au Monténégro: majoritaires hier, minoritaires demain ?», Démographie et Cultures—XV e colloque de l’Aidelf . Québec, 25–29 août 2009. Traditionally, this minority is difficult to count and their numbers are often underestimated by States. Cf. Dumont, Gérard-François, «Les Roms, révélateurs de certaines contradictions européennes», L’Ena hors les murs, n° 437, décembre 2013. For example, via the energy diplomacy; cf. Reka, Armend, L’énergie dans les Balkans et ses enjeux pour la géopolitique régionale, thèse de doctorat, Sorbonne Université, 11 April 2019. It is worth noting that at the end of May 2022, Serbia extended its low-cost Russian gas supply agreement by three years, at a time when the European Union was working to limit, or even eliminate, its imports of Russian gas by asking Algeria, the United States and Qatar to supply it. More generally, the Balkans is a region where several external powers are confronting each other; cf. Garcin, Thierry, «La géopolitique mondiale en forte fragmentation. Quelles dynamiques de puissance pour l’Europe, les États-Unis et la Chine ?», Les analyses de Population & Avenir, n° 37, novembre 2021. https://doi.org/10.3917/ lap.037.0001. Without forgetting other emigrations outside the Balkans, such as the importance of Albanian immigrants in Italy. Dumont, Gérard-François; Sougareva, Marta; Tzekov, Nikolai, «La Bulgarie en crise démographique», Population & Avenir, n° 671, janvierfévrier 2005, https://doi.org/10.3917/popav.671.0017.

CHAPTER 3

EU Enlargement and Regional Geopolitics of the Western Balkans Blerim Reka

Introduction In the aftermath of the global pandemic in 2022, the Western Balkans is facing renewed and serious security challenges due to the unprecedented Russian invasion of Ukraine,1 further dividing the region between proRussian and pro-Western countries. Serbia will continue to ambiguously support Kremlin’s position. Bosnia and Herzegovina has not declared its official stand due to the veto of Milorad Dodik as the Serbian president of the BiH tripartite Federal Presidency. Montenegro, a NATO member, but with huge pro-Russian influence, is trying to form a new pro-western government, after the former pro-Serbian one collapsed. Three other Balkans states: Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia are loyal to the Euro-Atlantic position, condemning Russian invasion on Ukraine and joining western sanctions against Moscow. As a result, a destabilization of the region is not to be excluded. To prevent it, NATO and EU should

B. Reka (B) International Law and EU Law, New York, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Gardner (ed.), Geopolitical Turmoil in the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34318-6_3

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adopt a new proactive approach: EU to end its enlargement status quo and NATO to consider seriously Kosovo’s membership. The pandemic also caused massive loss of human lives, erosion of liberal democracy, weakened economies, and led to the return of the interventionist role of the state. After the world economic crisis in 2008 and the global health crisis of 2020–2022, the state’s dominating role in the de-regulated world of liberal democracy has returned. Political elites in the Balkans continued their domestic battles for power.2 In these unusual circumstances, “The crisis is being used as an excuse to backslide on previously achieved progress”3 Kosovo was the only country where the government was toppled during the pandemic. Apart from an internal pandemic effect, countries in the region show different affiliation with foreign players who expanded their “mask diplomacy”, which created a kind of pandemic geopolitics. The European Commission then publicly identified Russia and China as the main perpetrators of the spread of online misinformation about COVID-19 in the EU.4 Russia and China also pose security challenges to the region with the possible spillover of the Ukrainian conflict toward the Balkans. International experts warn against proxy and hybrid war. Strander5 warned that “is not excluded that the Balkans would be a next battle”, and for Serwer,6 Russia represents a threat for the Balkans; not through invasion, but via the destabilization of the region. Warnings of NATO and the EU NATO, in its extraordinary meeting in March 2022, warned that after Ukraine, possible destabilizations are expected in Georgia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.7 The NATO Summit in Madrid in June 2022 re-defined its role within a new strategy declaring “Russia as direct threat”, and enlarging NATO presence in the Europe.8 And since April 2022, the EU introduced a new enlargement condition for the Western Balkans countries: their policy toward Russia as additional conditionality for their accession.9 According to EU High Representative for CFSP, Joseph Borrell, the Ukraine crisis after Russian invasion could be “spread in Moldova, Georgia, and the Western Balkans.”10 Russia intensified its proxy and hybrid war in the region and EU officially banned “Russia Today” and “Sputnik”.11 Kosovo and North Macedonia followed suit and banned Russian channels too.12 Kosovo PM Albin Kurti, warned that Russia’s

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invasion of Ukraine shows that “the Western Balkans is in even greater danger than the Baltic countries and Moldova, because Serbia could be added value to their military aggression”.13 German foreign minister Annalena Baerbock, in her first visit to the region, clearly said that border changes will not be allowed in the Western Balkans.14 In the following sections, we will analyze the future of EU enlargement and NATO enlargement in the Western Balkans and possible influence to this process of different key powers, divided into three categories: 1. Euro-Atlantic powers (EU, NATO and USA) 2. Non-Euro-Atlantic powers (Russia and China) and 3. Turkey (in between, being a NATO member but out of EU).

Euro-Atlantic Powers and the Western Balkans The EU and the Western Balkans The EU represents a post-World War II peace project having as the main goal the prevention of recurrence of war and further division of the continent during the cold war. That strategic goal, though, was only partly fulfilled. This is because the EU enlarged in the former Central and Eastern Europe communist countries and only partially in South-eastern Europe. Although launched in 1999, the EU Stabilization and Association process for the Western Balkans, it achieved poor results as only Croatia joined the EU (2013). The remaining six countries are still waiting in Brussels’s anti-chamber. General opinion in the main EU members remains skeptical about EU enlargement to the Western Balkans.15 The EU’s strategic compass dubbed “global gateway” announced in 2022 contemplates ambitious goals striving to become a global geopolitical actor, but lingering its south-eastern part in a geopolitical vacuum—out from EU. This doesn’t align with that long-term strategy.16 The EU accordingly applied a more restrictive approach for the Western Balkans and Turkey, after post-cold-war enlargements (2004/ 2007). Two decades of that enlargement status quo created a perfect ground for Russia and China to penetrate the region. This caught the eye of Washington resulting in a policy aiming to integrate this region into

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the Euro-Atlantic sphere. This vacuum demonstrated a real risk for European security as seen in the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the previous invasion of Georgia (2008), as well as continued Russian military presence in Moldova. The same risk remains if the Western Balkans is kept out of the EU. Even after war in Ukraine, the EU has sustained its restrictive enlargement approach, reconfirmed lately by its top diplomat Joseph Borell, who in March 2022, repeated that there is no date for the start of accession negotiation for these countries.17 The accession of the six Balkan countries will face new delays so that the accession of the EU for Balkan countries after two decades remains unpredictable. Negative opinion in the main EU members has persisted. Such opinion is positive for Ukraine membership (42–60%). On the other hand, there is still low acceptance for the accession of the six Balkans countries to EU (around from 20 to 30%).18 By contrast, the European Commission fast-tracked Ukraine’s EU accession by awarding candidate status together with Moldova at the EU Summit in June 2022. The EU furthermore introduced new criteria for accession following the Russian aggression of Ukraine: candidate countries’ policies toward Russia.19 The first test of this new EU conditionality will be applied to Serbia, which is negotiating accession, but has the lowest level of alignment with EU common foreign and security policy. Thus far, Belgrade has not applied economic sanctions against Russia and continues to buy weapons from both Russia and China. If Brussels is serious about introducing a new “Russia condition”, it should not tolerate that preferential status for Serbia, as it did until now, thereby ending Belgrade’s game “with the EU and with Russia”. Strategic Importance of the Adriatic Peninsula Some authors argue that this region is part of broader geopolitical change where instead of the Western Balkans, the “Adriatic Peninsula” as a part of the Mediterranean will obtain increasing strategic importance.20 Since 1999, the EU launched a new strategy aiming to include the Western Balkans within its enlargement process. EU enlargement in the Western Balkans is one of the key foreign policy instruments based on the Copenhagen and Madrid criteria (1993 and 1995) and Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA),21 based on strict conditionality.22 The Stabilization and Association process, however, was too complicated with

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“overloaded agendas and weak incentives”,23 which was implemented through accession negotiations by opening and closure of 35 chapters of acquis communautaires. As CEPS analysis noted, “EU enlargement agenda did not respond to its aim”.24 In 2019 France initiated the change of EU enlargement model in order to strengthen the process, because it was: too long, not effective and not predictable. Based on French President Macron’s doctrine “deeper instead of expanded EU”, the whole process of enlargement should be “gradual” and “reversible”.25 The main concern of Western Balkans countries was that this new approach would cause possible delay of the accession of the next candidate countries.26 The French approach was a result of questioning further EU expansion.27 Some EU member states asked for “a pause in enlargement”, due to “enlargement fatigue” and the lack of “absorption capacities” of the EU to accept newcomers.28 Later, this new approach was justified by requesting the deepening of the EU integration before widening, implying that there will be no external enlargement before an internal institutional reform. Some member states even spoke of replacing enlargement altogether: either by “close partnership”29 or “special status with the EU”30 ; and scholars mentioned: “new enlargement”31 ; or “EEZ as transit phase toward full accession of the countries from Western Balkans”, as Knauss suggested32 ; or as a “pre-entrance” through economic relations of the region with the EU through its accession into EUCU (EU Custom Union) and enlarged access to the common market and in the “EU budget”.33 The new French approach influenced the October 2019 EU Council resulting in the delay of accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania. Later France announced its unofficial “Non- Paper”, which did not mention enlargement at all, but used different wording such as “gradual association”, and “accession process”.34 That document announced new principles to be complied with in future accessions: “gradual association, stringent conditions, tangible benefits, and reversibility”. Instead of 35 chapters (based on opening and closing each one of them), this document introduced a 7-phase process. Each phase includes more chapters in the separate clusters, but different from the current enlargement process. Once a chapter has been finalized, it remains subject to re-opening. As a result, this new mechanism will become reversible without any guarantee that any phase may not be reversed, thus leading to a delay of enlargement.

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The European Commission adopted the “New Methodology” in February 2020, and a month later, the European Council enhanced and endorsed the new enlargement methodology.35 The latter was based on 4 key principles: gradual association, stringent conditions, tangible benefits, and reversibility. These basic principles are to be implemented in each of the 7 phases of the process,36 with the right of not only the European Commission (as it was until now), but also of EU member states to intervene and even ask for re-opening of an already closed chapter. In contrast with the previous EU enlargement approach, whereby accession negotiations were led by EC, the responsibility is shared between EC and the EU member states. Politically, EU member states will get more political weight in the enlargement process. Technically, in contrast with the previous model of opening and closing of acquis chapters, candidate states will negotiate within clusters. To avoid repetition of the Montenegro case (which for eight years of negotiations opened 32, but closed only 2 chapters); or the Serbia case (which opened 18 out of 35, but in 2020 could not open a single chapter),37 a new methodology gave way to a more predictable and credible process, more dynamic and stronger political steering.38 The “New Methodology” aside, North Macedonia’s and Albania’s accession was blocked due to Bulgaria’s dispute on historical, linguistic, and identity issue of Macedonia. As regards to North Macedonia, Bulgaria openly repeated39 that it would veto the EU inter-governmental conference for North Macedonia, if the country does not respect their bilateral “Agreement for Cooperation and Friendship” signed in 2017.40 In the beginning of August 2020, Bulgaria sent to all EU member states: an “Explanatory Memorandum”41 that asks that the bilateral treaty on cooperation and good neighbor relations between Bulgaria and North Macedonia be part of EU’s negotiation framework, and part of accession negotiations Chapter 35.42 Through this Memorandum, Bulgaria expressed key concerns toward North Macedonia: its history and its language. Although Germany, which led the EU presidency at the time, reacted that those “bilateral relations could not be part of EU’s negotiation framework,”43 Sofia insisted that without resolving these bilateral issues, North Macedonia could not start accession negotiations. The Bulgarian Parliament adopted a resolution demanding change of North Macedonia history and language,44 which stirred a negative Macedonian popular attitude against Bulgaria.45 The position of Bulgaria was that: “Bulgaria has nothing to change in its politics; it will not

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vote for inter-governmental conference, due to the official position of the Bulgarian government”.46 Bulgaria reconfirmed its tough position in January 2021, asking for a new “12 points annex,”47 with North Macedonia as a precondition for convoking the first inter-governmental conference. It is this less likely that the start of accession negotiation will be in the first half of 2021 during the Portugal’s EU Presidency, which is supporting the enlargement, but still has not elevated it as its top priority.48 The EC, in its annual progress report for North Macedonia dated October 2020, regarding good neighborly relations noted “the importance of continuation of the implementation of bilateral agreement with Greece and Bulgaria.”49 After resolving the 22 years long dispute with Greece regarding the constitutional name of the country in the Prespa agreement, now North Macedonia is facing a new blockade from Bulgaria about its language.50 Although a candidate since 2005, North Macedonia had hoped that after 15 years long waiting, the country will start accession negotiations with the EU. This did not take place in 2020. Despite three changes of government in Bulgaria, the veto remains51 because the Bulgarian Prime Minister holds the same position of previous governments that he could not act alone out of Parliament’s resolution on his issue.52 EC President Ursula von der Layen asked Bulgaria to help on the implementation of EU Council decision of 2020 or start of accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania, during her visit in Sofia in April 2022, then announcing a 6.2 billion Euro support plan for Bulgaria until 2026.53 Albania, internal conditions aside (electoral and justice reform, and rule of law), is facing additional unresolved bilateral issues of the “sea border dispute” with Greece, which would potentially threaten a veto. As far as the second external issue, it seems it is even harder because it involves not just bilateral relations with Greece, but a broader geopolitical context of East Mediterranean tensions. Two NATO members, Turkey and Greece, almost went to war over the sovereignty of islands in a zone rich with natural gas reserves. Similarly, two NATO members, Albania and Greece, are formally still “at war”54 due to the unabrogated Greece’s “Law of War” of 194055 as they dispute sovereignty over islands in the Ionian Sea that are potentially endowed with natural gas reserves, where Greece is planning to establish its EEZ.56 Ahead of the EU Council of December 2020, Albania and Greece had intensive diplomatic communication for resolving this bilateral territorial

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dispute.57 Maritime concessions by Albania in favor of Greece provoked angry popular reactions in Albania, because the Maritime Treaty was abrogated in 2009 as unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court of Albania.58 Albanian civil society asked the government and the president to not re-discuss it, even calling for a referendum in order to reject this once-closed issue with Greece.59 In 2020, the Greek government doubled its request by extending its territorial waters to 12 miles in the Ionian Sea—into Albanian territorial waters.60 In response, the Albanian government asked for help resolving the dispute under International Arbitrage, but the Albanian President, declared that he would not sign any decree of any law which ratifies any agreement by which Albania would lose its territorial waters. Both countries agreed to continue their efforts to find a solution after Albania’s Parliamentary Elections of April 2021.61 In the “negotiation framework” for accession negotiations of Albania with EU (adopted on 19 July 2022), the EC noted that expect “Albania’s engagement to solve peacefully any border’s dispute in accordance with UN Convention on Law on Sea, including if necessary obligatory jurisdiction of International Court of Justice62 : “It means that Albania should agree with Greece conditions of the Sea Agreement as requested by Athens.”63 In its annual “Enlargement Package”, the European Commission noted that: “in the case of Albania and North Macedonia commission looks forward to the first Inter-Governmental Conference to be convoked as soon as possible after adoption of negotiation framework by the Council”.64 The EU High representative for CFSP Joseph Borrel declared that “the Western Balkans belongs to EU,”65 but many questions remain open. Waiting in limbo decades is a risky approach, because the EU’s geopolitical stability depends on Balkan stability too,66 and delaying EU membership of these countries would open the door to Russian and Chinese influence. To avoid such a negative scenario, EU commissioner Várhelyi suggested that “the transformative reforms of the Western Balkan countries need to be supported by solid and accelerated economic growth and developing functioning market economies, which will help to speed up reforms and their delivery”.67 In parallel with this new accession methodology, the EC adopted by mid-2019 a “Blueprint Action Plan for Rule of Law,”68 by which this principle becomes a key shared European value,69 and introduced an obligation for member states to ensure effective judicial protection.70 Based

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on this new EC document, the rule of law will be high priority of EU Council,71 and the “rule of law review cycle”, was established to monitor the situation in EU member states.72 In Hungary, it was noted that independent media and NGOs were threatened, and public administration and the judiciary were politicized. In Poland, PiS party’s attempts to control the Polish Constitutional Tribunal led to the launch of a dialogue under the Rule of Law Framework with the Commission.73 If the rule of law monitoring of EU Member States by Brussels has become problematic, what can one expect from Brussels toward candidate countries? For sure, this monitoring system will be strictly implemented for candidates from the Western Balkans. The whole enlargement process will be strict, but fair; less geopolitical and more technical, based on European common values, rather than on security reasons. It will be also more politically credible and more measured. More rigid, but at the same time, it will keep candidates vigilant during each phase. Nevertheless, the inclusion of the EU Council will give the process more political weight within the new methodology. Putting the rule of law as a key watching parameter for monitoring of EU member states will result in additional pressure for candidate countries that without closing the first negotiation Chapters 23 and 24, no progress would be noted in the negotiations process. But this does not mean that the region will be out of Brussels’ radar, because “the Western Balkans is at the heart of Europe, and we are working on bringing the region much closer, much faster to the EU, as a priority number one.”74 This is a new context of EU enlargement: new accession methodology and a new rule of law monitoring system. North Macedonia and Albania were supposed to be the first to start their negotiations based on this new mechanism. In 2019, they conducted a “pre-screening,”75 and had expected to continue their accession negotiations under previous-chapterbased EU methodology. Following a positive assessment of the EC, on 25 March 2020, the EU Council, as the EU highest decision-making institution decided to open accession negotiations with these two countries.76 The expectation was that the first inter-governmental conference would be convoked by the German Presidency. But a Bulgarian veto against North Macedonia due to identity and historical reasons, blocked the start of accession negotiation for both candidate countries,77 postponing it in 202178 then again until mid-2022.

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Neither the German Presidency nor the Portugal or Slovenian presidencies (2021) could overcome that blockade. It was the French Presidency (2022) when a last-minute compromise was reached: the “French Proposal” was accepted by North Macedonia and Bulgaria.79 North Macedonia and Bulgaria signed a “bilateral protocol,”80 and then the first inter-governmental conferences were held with the two countries in July 2022 in Brussels. The inter-governmental conference of EU with Albania was unconditional, although with North Macedonia, as only “political”, and the real inter-governmental conference will be convoked after North Macedonia changes its constitution and includes Bulgarian in its constitutional preamble.81 Even without this preclusive condition, both countries should start the screening process which will take at least 18 months, before starting the real accession negotiations in 2024, possibly opening the first cluster in which Chapters 23 and 24 remain the most important. The first chapters of the first cluster will be 23 and 24, which includes judiciary, human rights, security, corruption, and organized crime. As the hardest chapters, they will be the first to be open, but the last which will be closed. Therefore, a long way ahead of accession negotiation for both countries remains in addition to bilateral disputes of both countries with their neighbors. The EU Enlargement status quo has lasted too long and the actual replacement of enlargement by “close partnership” for the Western Balkans is under discussion, because the region is “unprepared for the EU”.82 Countries from this region are worried that a kind of “special status with EU” for Turkey83 will be applied to them too; although new President of EC Ursula Von den Leyen announced that “Western Balkans would be one of her main focuses”.84 The Case of Kosovo On 17 February 2008, Kosovo Parliament declared its Independence. This declaration was legalized internationally by the UN International Court of Justice (2010) whose opinion noted that: “the declaration of independence of Kosovo did not violate international public law”.85 As Krisafi rightly pointed “the ICJ proved Kosovo’s new political and legal reality”.86 Serbia did not recognize the Republic of Kosovo and a process of “normalization” of their bilateral relations was introduced by EU. The EU then lost two decades to integrate the region (1999–2019) and last ten years in mediation of “Brussels Dialogue” (2011–2021) between

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Kosovo and Serbia “toward a Normal Relationship.”87 The asymmetric approach of EU mediated “Brussels Dialogue” was gradually replaced by new “mutuality recognition approach” of the international community. Earlier, at the end of the “Brussels Dialogue”, the EU asked only Kosovo to withdraw its customs tax against Serbia, but did not request Belgrade to stop its diplomatic blockade against Kosovo. Furthermore, the EU tolerated Serbia for not imposing sanctions against Russia; although Belgrade is negotiating its accession with EU. As a candidate country, it was obligated to follow EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and align with all measures (including those of sanctions against Moscow). Serbia, in fact, had decided to join the Eurasian Union, a “strategic alternative” to the EU, launched by Russia in 2014. Only by the end of August 2019, did the EU react by warning Serbia that it would not become an EU member if, at the same time, it was joining the Eurasian Union.88 The EU-mediated dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia after the pause of 2018–2020, restarted shortly by mid-2020, but stopped again waiting for the formation of the new Kosovar government after early elections of 14 February 2021. After two meetings in Brussels in 2021 of Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti and Serbia President Vuˇci´c, the high-level dialogue paused until April 2022 due to elections in Serbia without a date as to when it would continue. A decade of the “Brussels Dialogue” did not finalize the last unfinished peace in the Balkans. The key problem with that dialogue was the fact that EU collectively did not recognize the Republic of Kosovo, but just individually; letting each of its member states take its own decision.89 As Weller noted: “the statement only confirmed the inability of the EU to act as a unified entity in the matter of recognition”.90 Weaknesses of the EU As a multilateral organization, the EU has become a hostage of unilateral decisions of its members. With that unprecedented EU position, its institutions and its member states had different positions. Inter-governmental institutions (like the EU Council and the Council of Ministers) due to its five-member states do not recognize Kosovo; by contrast, the European Parliament treated Kosovo as a state,91 while European Commission established official contractual relations.92 This ambiguous position of the EU toward Kosovo produced asymmetric negotiation mediated by Brussels, treating differently Kosovo and

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Serbia, based on the “footnote agreement”.93 Only a jointly mediated negotiation process by the U.S. and the EU for a final agreement with mutual recognition in existing borders will close these last unfinished Kosovo-Serbia peace talks in the Balkans, particularly after the blockade of EU accession negotiation for North Macedonia and Albania, in July 2022. The first dilemma is that both Serbia and Kosovo are non-member states of EU, and the European Union is nevertheless mediating between them. The second dilemma is that any EU member state can use their veto power to block the membership of a candidate state. Without a change of consensual decision-making mechanism, each member states can block other non-member states. As it stands now, the first EU member states from the Western Balkans will block each neighboring non-member states due to unresolved historical open issues between six Balkans countries. Because of this, instead of the Europeanization of the Balkans, it will produce Balkanization of the EU. The new German initiative by Chancelor Sholtz against using veto for decisions at the level of EU common foreign and security policy is a step in the right direction. The U.S. and the Western Balkans History has demonstrated that the EU soft power—without U.S. hard power—does not have leverage in the Western Balkans. The last American involvement in 1999 in the Balkans marked “the end of the American century”.94 The EU’s sole post-conflict transition (1999–2022) did not bring regional stability but instead “opened the doors” for other major players,95 which alarmed Washington, who decided to return to the region after absence of two decades.96 The Russian invasion of Ukraine has proved how risky it is to let the region remain in a geopolitical vacuum out of the Euro-Atlantic umbrella. In the following sub-sections U.S. foreign policy will be analyzed for the Western Balkans during the Trump administration and the expectations raised by the new Biden administration. An Overview of President Trump’s Record The end of Balkans wars brought EU leadership into the region, however, with modest achievements for progress and stability. After neglecting

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the Western Balkans during the two mandates of the Obama Administration, this region returned from the back burner by the end of President Trump’s mandate. Since the resolution of the long-lasting “name dispute” between Macedonia and Greece (2017), the question of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the unfinished Kosovo-Serbia peace, remain the most challenging security concerns. In particular, during U.S. disengagement from the region, Russia and China orchestrated their soft landing and entrance into the region during the last two decades. American disengagement that permitted the EU stewardship of the Balkans represented a mistake that opened the doors of influence for other non-Euro-Atlantic players. Washington realized the serious consequences of the power vacuum and decided to return in the region to fill that gap. Earlier experiences showed that all Balkans crises were closed only with U.S. active involvement in: Dayton (1995), Rambouillet (1999), and Ohrid (2001), which brought peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Macedonia. The consequences of American disengagement from the region in the last two decades were obvious. After the Balkans wars in the 1990s, the EU introduced the “Stabilization and Association Process” and in the Zagreb Summit (2000) proclaimed the “European Perspective” for Western Balkans. Nevertheless, Croatia aside, no country in the region has yet joined the club. The “Holbrooke model” of shuttle diplomacy manifested the U.S. active presence in the region. This model ended the Balkans wars in 1990s.97 This hailed the return of the preventive approach spearheaded by Washington’s Special Envoys striving to prevent the erosion of peace in the Western Balkans.98 As a result, in 2019, the State Department appointed Mathew Palmer as a special envoy for the Western Balkans and later designated Richard Grenell as U.S. President’s special envoy for the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue. As Daniel Serwer pointed out, this new appointment was an attempt to clarify U.S. foreign policy in the region and to speed up the closure of this pressing Balkans issue before the presidential elections in November 2020.99 All these developments cast doubt on the EU-mediated dialogue, which was interrupted in the summer of 2018. The U.S. and QUINT100 (the U.S., plus France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom) asked to restart the negotiation process, introducing a new principle in this dialogue: “reciprocity of two states” which was missing in “Brussel’s

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Dialogue”. Therefore, the U.S. State Department requested continuation of the negotiations for the normalization of Kosovo-Serbia relations toward a “final agreement with mutual recognition between the two states”.101 American’s return in the region materialized. Not just because of Kosovo-Serbia relations; but also because of political crises in Albania and in North Macedonia, given that they were severe security challenges for the region.102 This American comeback was expected to stabilize the region, but it also opened a silent diplomatic “war” between Washington and Brussels. In order to speed up stabilization processes, the U.S. special envoy for the Balkans advocated a proactive approach on the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, returning both sides to the negotiation table, aiming to close a deal, but also to speed up EU accession of Albania and North Macedonia as well as to reform Bosnia and Herzegovina into a functional state.103 That U.S. and QUINT’s new approach was a reaction against EU’s asymmetric treatment of Kosovo and Serbia during the “Brussels Dialogue”, which failed to produce the expected results in its quest to normalize their relations.104 By the mid-2019, the negotiation process entered in the hardest phase as it was seeking to achieve a final outcome: UN membership (for Kosovo) and EU membership (for Serbia), or as U.S. Senator Johnson said to Pristina and Belgrade “to prepare people for final agreement”.105 American involvement in Kosovo-Serbia talks came after November 2019 when the EU appointed Joseph Borell as the new High Representatives for Common Foreign and Security Policy and the new mediator of that dialogue. A former Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, who replaced Mogherini and Ashton who had earlier mediated the “Brussels Dialogue”, Borell comes from the “5 NO” EU members who do not recognize the Republic of Kosovo. By contrast, the U.S. envoy for the Western Balkans, Mathew Palmer, was very clear: “the United States would like to see mutual recognition as central point of the agreement”.106 The U.S. declared that it was willing to be included in the dialogue when both states came back to the negotiating table.107 Until June 2020, Washington persevered in closing the last remaining open issues in the Balkans before its Presidential elections, “expecting agreement by July 2020”,108 signed by both states in White House, like that of Camp David 1978, of U.S. President Carter who ended the Israel-Egypt conflict. In

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this context, President Trump sent a letter to Kosovo and Serbia presidents. Hence, Serbian media speculated that “U.S. President Trump will visit Serbia on 25 August 2020” when it will “decide on the final agreement between Kosovo and Serbia”.109 This never happened. Instead, Kosovo Prime Minister Hoti and Serbian President Vuˇci´c were in the White House on September, 4, 2020, where, in the presence of President Trump, they signed a unilateral commitment for “economic normalization”110 which will financially be supported by the DFC office in Belgrade.111 These unilateral commitments of both sides (apart from Kosovo-Serbia issues), instead of the pure bilateral accord, were a broader framework because it included “other issues”112 and “recognition of the Republic of Kosovo by Israel.”113 Until that meeting, Serbia had pretended to obtain territorial compensation from that final deal, but Kosovo was against any form of territorial swap, repeating the well-known official position since the governments of Haradinaj and Kurti, that the only outcome from this negotiation process should be the mutual recognition of the two republics in their existing borders. Hoti had promised that Kosovo was going to the White House to sign “only an agreement for mutual recognition”, but as it turned out, he signed a unilateral Agreement without recognition of the Republic of Kosovo by Serbia.114 In short, after two years of pause of Brussels Dialogue, by the end of 2019, the U.S. pushed ahead Kosovo-Serbia talks, under Trump’s unilateral foreign policy agenda—without the EU. This, however, represented a historical achievement for Serbia, after more than two decades without high-level communication with the White House. In Kosovo, however, there were only rare public figures who hailed it as “historical”. Only the government of Hoti praised it, but not the main opposition party Lëvizja Vetëvendosje, which considered that the “Washington Papers” advanced Serbia’s position and weakened that of Kosovo.115 For Serbian President Vuˇci´c, Serbia did not sign such a good agreement in the last 140 years”.116 After Washington’s “economic normalization”, it was expected for the Brussels dialogue to continue and address the hottest political issues. The EU reacted that many infrastructural and financial projects agreed in Washington were already implemented since 2014 within the “Berlin Process”.117 Brussels tried to return the process, but after seven rounds till the end of 2020, no progress was achieved. The “Brussels dialogue” was stopped after Serbian’s requests for full implementation of the “Brussels Agreement” (2013) related to the establishment of “Association of

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Serbian Municipalities”. Kosovo replied that this was a closed issue after a decision by the Constitutional Court of Kosovo in 2015, which declared as unconstitutional certain paragraphs of that agreement.118 As far as Washington’s Economic Normalization was concerned, none of its 16 points has been implemented thus far, and it is not expected to be after President’s Trump defeat.119 Albanians and Serbs remain the last two Balkans nations who did not sign a peace treaty in the Balkans. As Noel Malcolm rightly noted: “Kosovo is one of the most complicated conflicts in the Balkans”120 with one century of enemy relations between them, since the annexation of Kosovo by the Serbian Kingdom in 1912. Since 2021, the Biden administration pushed forward the dialogue through a more robust approach by the new diplomatic team for the Balkans. But apart from two high-level meetings in Brussels in 2021, no other meeting between Kosovo Prime Minister Kurti and Serbia President Vuˇci´c happened until the end of July 2022. And as Joseph Borell, the EU Special Representative for CFFSP, declared at the beginning of 2022, “the dialogue Kosovo-Serbia is not going in a right direction”.121 Biden’s Foreign Policy in the Western Balkans President Biden has started to implement its electoral vision for a new U.S. multilateral foreign policy based on his promises: “we will lead the world and not to withdraw from it.”122 He clearly said that the U.S. will return trans-Atlantic strategic axis, through the “renewal of NATO”123 indicating Russia as an “opponent”.124 Earlier in December 2020, Russia was qualified as “NATO’s biggest military threat until 2030.”125 But, up to February 2022, when Russia invaded Ukraine, France, and Germany maintained a moderate attitude: the Russian gas pipeline “North Stream 2” was supported by Germany126 as well as by French President Macron.127 The Russian invasion in Ukraine changed that German position, when new Chancellor Sholtz, decided to stop “North Stream 2”.128 Biden’s foreign policy then turned a new diplomatic page by returning to multilateralism and global democracy by supporting multilateral treaties (Paris Climate Agreement,129 Iran Nuclear Agreement, and multilateral organizations, like WHO130 ) and by fighting authoritarian regimes in the world. The global summit on democracy has represented the general framework for his global human foreign policy agenda. Instead

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of Trump’s focus on a domestic America First agenda, President Biden will turn toward a global agenda. President Biden will try to manage that which Nye called: “cooperative rivalries,”131 and most likely will see that the Euro-Atlantic strategic alliance between NATO and EU will be re-enforced. President Biden is a well-known advocate for Balkans peace: from Bosnia to Kosovo (1995–1999) with his robust approach against Milosevic, requesting “bringing him in front of justice with a public trial like in Germany and Japan after the Second World War, and taking off his mask of victimization”.132 His position toward the Republic of Kosovo is clear: Kosovo is an independent country and Kosovo-Serbia agreement should end with their bilateral recognition. The current State Secretary Anthony Blinken is also well-known diplomat from President Clinton’s administration. In an interview in 2017, he recalled “successful intervention in Kosovo, for which we fought for 78 days”,133 and in his tweet in 2015 wrote that “Kosovo should be a full member of UNESCO”.134 In a hearing on foreign policy for the Western Balkans at the U.S. Congress, Professor Daniel Serwer asked for President Biden and Chancellor Merkel to push EU member states that did not recognize the Republic of Kosovo to do so and to convince Russia and China to not use veto at UNSC for Kosovo membership.135 For former state secretary Madeline Albright, Kosovo as a normal state should be part of EU and with its own right to protect its territory.136 U.S. Presidential change will have a definitive geopolitical impact in the Western Balkans. Replacing Trump’s isolationist foreign policy, Biden’s multilateral approach seeks to re-establish Euro-Atlantic links through strengthening NATO and the EU. For its part, Europe has focused on rebuilding a relationship with the Biden administration, re-strengthening transatlantic axes, and re-engagement with both strategic allies. Not surprisingly, the EU called for a “new founding cooperation pact” with the U.S.137 It is expected that President Biden will offer a new approach for the closure of the order to resolve the last Balkan unsolved political issue. According to the Serbian media “Biden’s goal is that Serbia should recognize Kosovo”.138 It is less likely that President Biden will apply Trump’s unilateral approach (without EU), as he did in the White House on 4th September 2020, because unilateral texts signed in White House between Kosovo PM Hoti and Serbian President Vuˇci´c were neither an international treaty, nor a Presidential Executive Order.

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Based on this regional geopolitical environment, it is expected that President Biden will work together with the EU and NATO, on a new strategy for Balkans peace based on his well-known position that KosovoSerbia talks should end with a final legally binding agreement of two states through bilateral recognition. As concrete steps to this new U.S. proactive diplomacy, Washington announced a new top diplomatic team for the Western Balkans, when Biden appointed Gabriel Escobar as a new special envoy for the region, together with three new U.S. ambassadors in: Kosovo, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, in order to speed EuroAtlantic way of the region and prevent any destabilization by other non Euro-Atlantic players.139 Russia and the Western Balkans During the last two centuries, three regimes took place in Russia: Czarist, Soviet, and post-communist, but the same hegemonic mentality remains. Putin has continued to misuse the “issue of Russian minority” outside and to instrumentalize Slavic-Orthodox communities in the Balkans, mainly through Serbia and Republika Srpska. Pushing the world’s attention from Ukraine to this region, possible provocations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Montenegro are not to be excluded. Russia under Putin, demonstrated its sphere of interest by expanding its political-military and energy presence in the Balkans through Serbia and Republika Srpska—after unsuccessful attempts in Montenegro and Macedonia. The Russian strategy is the re-federalization of Serbo-Slavia with: Serbia, Republika Srpska, and Montenegro. NATO membership of the last one spoiled that plan, but the victory of pro-Serbian/Russian parties in the last parliamentarian elections of 2020 re-actualized it. Actually, Russia maintains a “humanitarian” base in south Serbia, and continues weapons delivery for the Serbian Army140 ; Moscow announced the opening of the Office of the Defense Ministry of Russia in Belgrade,141 which continued receiving Russian weapons.142 This demonstrated clearly Serbia’s re-militarization, whose militarist attitude was supported by majority of its citizens. In a survey in Serbia: 52% of its citizens think that the army should intervene in Kosovo, and 47% of Serbs are ready to fight against Kosovo.143 In addition, the re-militarization of Serbia was, in a way, announced by the Serbian President Vuˇci´c, who declared that without an agreement, the war will return between Serbia

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and Kosovo as it has in Nagorno Karabakh,144 which was interpreted by the Republic of Kosovo as a call for war.145 To prevent the possible destabilization of the region by Moscow’s allies Serbia and Republika Srpska, NATO and EU should take a new proactive approach: The EU to end its enlargement status quo and NATO to consider Kosovo’s membership. Bosnia and Herzegovina did not declare officially on Russian invasion in Ukraine, due to veto at Federal Presidency of Milorad Dodik, a Putin’s ally in the deepest inter-ethnic division among three nations, which for EU Senior Representative Joseph Borrell represents “a great concern - the biggest till now”.146 “In Bosnia and Herzegovina is no war, but there is a deep political crisis”, said International Representative Christian Schmidt, with the EU mission Althea deploying 1100 troops to keep the peace in the country. But still since 2019, the BiH did not fulfill 15 EU reform priorities, due to Dodik’s blockade of federal laws.147 In Montenegro, a pro-Serbian government failed in the beginning of 2022 and pro-Belgrade parties did not allow the formation of a new prowestern government until May 2022. The only legitimate institution—the Presidency of Milo Dukanovic—firmly stands with the West, and gave the mandate to Deputy PM Dritan Abazovic from the coalition, URA, which formed a minority government on 28 April 2022. Pro-Serbian/ Russian political forces won the 2020 elections in Montenegro, although the country is a NATO member and is currently negotiating its EU accession. In February, that pro-Serbian and pro-Russia Government failed and from March 2022 Montenegro was in process of formation of the new pro-western government. Strong links to the Serbian and Russian Orthodox Church remain the key instrument of Russian influence in the region, whose narrative is spreading through Sputnik as the main propaganda tool. Russian has increased its influence not just in Serbia, Republika Srpska, and Montenegro, but as well as in North Macedonia. The President of North Macedonia Stevo Pendarovski raised concerns about large pro-Russian support among ethnic Macedonians.148 According to a survey published on 25 February 2022, 40% of citizens of North Macedonia, preferred the Eurasian Union before European Union,149 and in another survey 64% declared good relations with China and 60% with Russia.150 After the victory of pro-Serbian/Russian forces in Montenegro, it is unclear whether this country will fall within Moscow’s “share” of influence?

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Yet falling under the Russian “umbrella” is less likely to happen due to Montenegro’s NATO membership. As for other parts of the Western Balkans, Albania, and North Macedonia do not possess a very strong Russian presence, they will remain in the western hemisphere as NATO members. So too will Kosovo— the most pro-American country in the region—with a NATO/KFOR base inside. In particular, after Joe Biden, who clearly said that he will rebuild the trans-Atlantic strategic axis, became president, he indicated that Russia was an “opponent”151 and at NATO extraordinary Summit, the north-Atlantic alliance decided to form eight military groups in its eastern borders.152 To strengthen ties with the U.S. and NATO, the U.S. has now opened a U.S. special military unit in Albania in March 2022 and has started to build a NATO air base in Kuchovo (Albania). For its part, Kosovo has decided to apply for NATO membership after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. According to NATO Founding Treaty of 1949, to become a NATO member, it is not necessary to be a UN member, but it should be a European state which accepts the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and contribute to Euro-Atlantic security153 —which are conditions that Kosovo fulfills. In addition, the absolute majority of Kosovo citizens are pro-NATO membership for Kosovo. According to a survey in March 2022, 95% of them declared that Kosovo should be NATO member, and 93, 9% for EU membership.154 Kosovo has obsessed Putin, since his annexation of Crimea in 2014, when he tried to sell to the west false “analogy between Kosovo and Crimea”, although these are two totally different issues. Kosovo declared its independence because of genocide and apartheid ruling by Serbia, which is not a case in Crimea where Ukraine did not repress the Russian population there. Finally, Kosovo fought for liberation against the Milosevic regime. Crimea, on the other hand, was occupied by a foreign country, Russia. On March 7, Putin signed a decree which designates Albania, North Macedonia, and Montenegro as “non-friendly nations” together with the U.S., Canada, UK, and EU member states.155 China and the Western Balkans After the Russian invasion in Ukraine, China was one of the biggest world’s powers which tried to balance between Russian friendship and frozen relations with the U.S. At the UN Security Council on 25

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February 2022, China abstained in voting a resolution condemning Russia for the violation of territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine and did not apply western sanctions against Moscow.156 And later, when a resolution against the Russian invasion in Ukraine was adopted in a special session of UN General Assembly, 141 member states voted the resolution against Russian invasion in Ukraine, 5 against and 34 abstained— including China157 In this perspective, China remains a Russian ally, although not explicitly, even if Beijing denied the U.S. accusation that it had supplied weapons to Russia. Beijing officially declared that “it will protect its national interest if it should support Russia.158 Moscow has hoped for China’s support not only diplomatically, but as well as for material support during the war in Ukraine. The U.S. warned China to abstain and to avoid involvement in Putin’s war, otherwise it will bear “high strategic costs”.159 The world’s biggest importer of oil in the first month of the war in Ukraine implicitly supported Russia, but as the overall annual trade of China with U.S. and EU is $1.2 trillion,160 it is less likely that China will openly take Russian side. Apart from friendly bilateral relations between Russia and China and their common position against the U.S., Beijing could not support Russian invasion in Ukraine because the precedent of a violation of the territorial integrity of one sovereign state by another will harm its position of “one China policy” for Taiwan. Recognizing the Russian occupation of Crimea earlier, and now of two separatist provinces of Eastern Ukraine, will mean that Beijing would implicitly accept the loss of Taiwan. In addition, China’s biggest strategic interest in Euro-Asia is its megaproject “New Silk Road”/Belt and Road Initiative which indicates that Ukraine and countries around it in eastern, central, and south-eastern Europe, would not be sacrificed for Russian military adventures. Apart from Russia, China has its interests in the Western Balkans too. Instead of military, energy, or cultural influence, China will expand in the next decade’s economic presence, as a part of its engagement strategy in the Mediterranean region. China’s foreign policy toward the region, “is centered more on soft power than hard power” and it emphasizes “its economic strengths building, converting financial wealth into soft power”.161 If the EU continues to neglect the region, by continuously delaying the EU accession of Balkans states, will be a strategic mistake. Letting the Balkans leave the EU would fulfill China’s dream of an entrance into this region: by means of China’s “16+1” or “17+1” Initiative”, as a part of

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“New Silk Road”/Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI is the soft power strategy of China, which has led China to invest substantially in the Balkans region: infrastructures, ports, transport, real estate, but also technology, finance, and logistics. It extends China’s influence through its financial strength. The BRI combined with “16+1” initiative, and ITI initiative162 of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan for a transnational railway, will connect the Far East with the Europe. It is expected that ITI will be the first regular railway between China and Turkey.163 The Balkans of 20 million inhabitants does not represent an important market for Chinese products, but is more important as a crossroads of Europe with the Mediterranean which represent China’s major strategic axes. Compared with Russia’s interests in energy and military weapon sales, and Turkish trade and cultural interests, China is more interested in the Balkans as its transit route toward the EU market. In the beginning of twenty-first Century, the biggest nation in the world, with the most increasing economy, is searching to expand internationally. With the prediction that the Chinese economy in 2030 will represent a quarter of the world GDP,164 all serious global analysis cannot neglect the rise of China’s global position and its plan for regional expansion. By contrast with the other big powers who seek political influence, China is oriented toward economic priorities which have become the key goal of its foreign policy since its economic reforms of the 1980s. Although initially named as an economic project, the Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road, launched in 2013, represents a key foreign policy priority of Beijing that aims at better connectivity between different regions for transfer of goods, resources, technology and investments, and building of transport networks by land and sea—including a new Eurasian land bridge that will increase its economic weight, and its political influence too, globally and regionally, in areas such as Central Europe, Balkans, and the Mediterranean. Globally, the Silk Road attempts not only to create a better economic climate for China’s growing economy, but also a greater influence on global economic policy by speeding the circulation of goods and people and reducing time and transport costs far from the EU market, as a transnational corridor. Apart from this global dimension, the Balkans’ importance for such projects should not be underestimated due to China’s connection with South and South Eastern Asian countries, Russia, Central Asia, the Middle East and East Africa, the Mediterranean, and Europe. Instead of engaging in a military grouping of Russia and NATO around the Baltic and Black

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Sea, China is establishing financial groupings in Central and Southeast Europe. And because it possesses difficulties with the EU as a union, China is developing a “state by state” strategy by establishing individual projects with European countries (within or outside the EU), including Balkan states, while seeking to connect the Far East with Europe, through its biggest long-term project: “Silk Road”. The Balkan countries are the perfect ground for this economic expansion strategy of China in Europe. They are in the borders of EU and possess custom union regimes with the EU. Serbia has advanced its cooperation with China. Not only economically, but politically as well, due to China’s support for Serbia in the UN via its non-recognition policy of Kosovo. By not establishing bilateral diplomatic relations, China is therefore not present in Kosovo. An increased Chinese economic presence in Serbia in the coming years would accordingly represent a high political price for Kosovo, due to China’s position at the UNSC against Kosovo’s membership.165 With one UN permanent member at Security Council (Russia) already against it, a second NO of “P-5” (China) would further delay Kosovo UN membership. China’s relations with Albania were different than those with Serbia and Kosovo. Leaving the former Warsaw Pact in 1968, as the only member of this military alliance of Soviet Union166 and ignored by NATO, Albania had left the two blocks and turned to a “brotherhood alliance” with China. In the 1970s, Albania established close bilateral relations with China, based on ideological common ground. Now postCommunist Albania has been increasing its economic cooperation with China.167 In the coming years, China’s goal to possess as many sea harbors in Europe as possible: this would be the key factor for the improvement of Albanian-Chinese economic cooperation. Durrës, Vlora, and Shen Gjini are the three biggest Albanian ports in Adriatic and Ion seas.168 After Greek Piraeus, one of these three Albanian harbors would be a possible strategic point of entry-plan for China into Europe169 by which China will obtain access to the Mediterranean. In such a way, by improving its economy, Albania could eventually obtain China’s diplomatic support for Kosovo’s UN membership, which is now missing due to China’s non-recognition of Kosovo. Two key “Pan-European Corridors” that are crossing the Balkans are of great importance to China’s “Silk Road” project. These corridors

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include the separate interests of each state: Corridor 8 (Albania-North Macedonia-Bulgaria) and Corridor 10 (Serbia-North Macedonia-Greece), because they are passing through different strategic corridors, between NATO members (Albania, North Macedonia and Bulgaria) and “Russified Serbia”.170 Apart from sea and land corridors of the Western Balkans, the region is also a crossroads of energy corridors, such as Russian “Turkish Stream” and the West pipeline “TAP” that will possess additional geopolitical implications.171 How China Will Approach the Balkans in the Future? There are two possible answers. The first is: state by state approach, where China will continue its bilateral cooperation with each state in the region. In the next few years, the Albanian-Serb battle for regional dominance will be also a struggle for attracting as much as possible economic and political support from China. For use of their territory not only for Chinese products, but as a transit corridor for EU markets; both countries will count on the financial support of Beijing. And due to the importance of both pan-European corridors 8 and 10, Beijing will continue close bilateral relations with both Albania and Serbia. On the other hand, as the EU is developing its trade protection strategy toward Beijing, it is less likely that any candidate state would oppose EU policy and apply its own policy in contradiction to EU laws. This appears true even if Serbia opposed EU sanctions against Russia since 2014 and has kept close economic relations with China. The second is the regional approach, by which China, instead of approaching individually each Balkan state, would increase its economic presence and diplomatic influence regionally. The already launched “16+1” or “17+1” process for SEE will continue in the upcoming years to provide financial support for infrastructure and rail- and high-ways, excluding Kosovo, due to the latter’s non-recognition by China. Yet Albania, which part of the “16+1” or “17+1”, would eventually not accept China’s refusal to recognize Kosovo from the regional “16+1” or “17+1” process. Having developed a strategic interest with the EU, in which the “Berlin Process” included Kosovo, China could not ignore the reality of Albanian interests in Kosovo. If China is planning to enter into the second European harbor, like Albanian Shen Gjini on the Adriatic Sea (connected through a highway with Kosovo), Beijing could not

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ignore the newest state in Europe and would thus recognize the Republic of Kosovo. Turkey and the Western Balkans After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Turkey’s international role increased, becoming a mediator balancing between its dual interest with Ukraine and Russia. With the former, Turkey has a major trade exchange; regarding the latter, energy dependence. Being a NATO member, Ankara carefully plays its equidistance game, bringing the opposing sides for negotiations in Antalya and Istanbul (10 and 29 March 2022).172 Turkey has thus become a potential mediator for an eventual peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia, and has been preparing for possible high-level peace negotiations between Putin and Zelensky in Ankara. Turkey has considered the Balkans as “their sphere”, not just in a literary sense due to Turkish origin of the name of the region, but largely due to five centuries of Ottoman domination. Here, the Balkans could be the next bargaining point between Russia and Turkey for the respective sphere of interests, as it was the case in the past. Historically, Serbs and Montenegrin insurgents under the Ottoman Empire enjoyed a kind of an autonomous status, but not the Albanians, without similar collective rights of its neighbors, like permitting schools in the Albanian language. In the first two decades of this century, Turkey, mostly through investments and export,173 and its culture,174 did a regional come back: “Turkey tried to fill the vacuum after American absence in the region”, according to Dorsey.175 In parallel, since 2017, Turkey improved bilateral relations with Russia, through the “Turkish Stream” (a Russian gas pipeline),176 by a strategic partnership, and by contracting Russia rocket system “S-400” for Turkey’s army.177 Turkey, a NATO member was almost at war with the other NATO member, Greece, and in November 2020, during 66th NATO annual parliamentarian assembly, their leaders exchanged their views regarding their “island contest”.178 Since 1951, Turkey is a NATO member and one of its key southern branches, with NATO base in Incirlik—strategically important for the Middle East. In 1987, Turkey applied for EU membership and from 2005 started accession negotiations. Although these negotiations in the last decade marked stagnation, President Erdo˘gan recently reconfirmed that: “Turkey’s place is in the EU, and the union should keep its promises. We chose the Europe, until the time when Europe does not oblige

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us to favor something else”.179 He sent a clear message that the west needs an inclusive policy for Turkey in order to return the country in its Euro-Atlantic orbit. In the beginning of 2022 Turkey President Erdo˘gan requested from EU to continue the accession negotiation process, which started in October 2005 but then were on hold, in particular after 2016, when Brussels criticized Ankara for massive political prisoners. By the end of 2020, the European Commission stated that “Turkey continued to distance from EU with serious regression in the field of rule of law and fundamental rights.”180 As far as the Western Balkans, Turkey will continue its regional presence, mostly through Bosnia and Herzegovina in the name of the Muslim community. Bosnia and Herzegovina will be a new hot spot of Turkish-Russian controversial interests. The eastern part of the Federation-Republika Srpska (together with Serbia) is the strongest ally of Russia in the Balkans. Central Bosnia, with mostly Muslim Bosnian population has shown admiration for Turkey. Other parts of the Western Balkans, such as Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia do not have such clashes as does Bosnia and Herzegovina. Albania and North Macedonia are NATO members, and Kosovo is the most pro-American country, with a NATO/KFOR base inside. Turkey was among the first states which recognized the Republic of Kosovo, sharing close bilateral relations, as with Albania and North Macedonia. Turkey remains one of the key defenders of Albanian sovereignty, during 1997 internal political turmoil, and Kosovar and Albanian military staff were continually trained in the Turkish Military Academy.181 Turkey improved its relations with Serbia also, expanding its export and infrastructural investments, and by sale of Turkish military drone to the Serbian army.182 So Turkey’s presence in the Western Balkans will continue although clashing with other global and regional players.

Conclusions The future of the Western Balkans is becoming an unpredictable geopolitical issue. The region remains in a post-Cold War vacuum- out of the EU, and just partly in NATO. EU membership of Western Balkan countries is not expected before 2030 at best. Albania and North Macedonia, for example, until July 2022, had still not commenced the inter-governmental conference to formally start their accession process with the EU. The

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“European perspective” for the Western Balkans, proclaimed in 2003 by the “Thessaloniki Agenda” is pending. In February 2020, the European Commission adopted a new enlargement methodology, based on its 4 key principles: “gradual association, stringent conditions, tangible benefits and reversibility” by which the whole process will become reversible and without guaranties that every phase is final. This new approach will slow the whole process and will open the doors for other non-western players to enhance their influence in this region. This restrictive EU position against new member states will cause an unpredictable development in two directions: geopolitically and regionally. The Russian invasion in Ukraine showed how non-EuroAtlantic players could threaten countries that are not in the EU and NATO. Putting on hold EU enlargement would create a strategic vacuum in the region and diminish the hope of the Western Balkans to become part of a United Europe without borders. The failure of the Pan-European project would empower the old ethno-nationalistic dreams for unification and give way to pan-national projects.

Notes 1. 141 member states voted the resolution against Russian invasion in Ukraine, 5 against and 34 abstained; see www.gazetaexpress.com, 02.03.2022. On 16 March 2022, the Council of Europe expelled Russia whereas the EU initiated expulsion against Russian membership from the IMF and the World Bank as well ending its most favorable trade status at the WTO. U.S. President Biden called Putin a war criminal, and a procedure against him for war crimes was initiated at the International Criminal Court. 2. Reka, B., “Balkans Geopolitics: from Cold War to Hot Peace”, Jalifat Publishing, Huston and Geopolitical Intelligence Service, Vaduz, 2020, p.4. 3. TEN: “Policy Brief: Opening Governments in times of lockdown”; lessons learned from citizens oriented administrations, from the COVID 19 crisis in the Western Balkans, June 2020, p. 1. 4. www.euobserver.com, 11.06.2020, 07:01. 5. Ivana Stradner, “American Enterprise Institute”, “Koha”, 23.02.2022, p. 11. 6. Daniel Server, “Koha”, 05.03.2022, p. 2. 7. “Cloboden Peqat”, 25.03.2022, pp. 1–3. 8. “Hova Makedonija”, 04.07.2022, p. 10.

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9. Statement of EU spokesperson Peter Stano, on April 2022 (www.koh a.net, 09.04.2022, 23:01; “Koha”, 11.04.2022, p. 3). 10. Radio Free Europe, 27.02.2022, 21, 40. 11. www.euobserver.com, 02.03.2022, 14:31. 12. “Koha”, 03.03.2022, p. 7. 13. His interview for “The Independent”, 03.03.2022. 14. “Cloboden Peqat”, 2–13.03.2022, p. 9. 15. According to a survey made by www.yougov.uk (from 9 to 21 March 2022 with 1020–2046 respondents in four EU member states: France, Germany, Italy and Spain) more than one third of them are against new accession, or maximum pro-accession were only for Montenegro (22%), but 42–60% of them were for Ukraine (Radio Free Europe, “Hova Makedonija”, 09–10.04.2022, pp. 1–2). 16. “The National Interest”, April 2022; “Hova Makedonija”, 09– 10.04.2022, p. 11. 17. “Cloboden Peqat”, 15.03.2022, p. 1; “Koha”, 15.03.2022, p. 1. 18. According to a survey made by www.yougov.uk from 9 to 21 March 2022 with 1020–2046 respondents in four EU member states: France, Germany, Italy and Spain, one third of them are against new accession but from 42 to 60% of them were for Ukraine (Radio Free Europe, “Hova Makedonija”, 09–10.04.2022, pp. 1–2). 19. Statement of EU spokesperson Peter Stano, on April 2022, www.koh a.net, 09.04.2022, 23:01; “Koha”, 11.04.2022, p. 3. 20. Korski, D., “Goodbye Balkans, Hello Adriatic Peninsula” (ECFR, 08.04.2008). 21. The Secretariat of the Council of EU: “Working Document”; Draft General Position for Negotiation with the Republic of North Macedonia/Republic of Albania (revised text), Brussels 23 September 2020, WK 9995/2020 INIT; related to Working Paper of September 2020 (WK 8913/2020/INIT), point 4, p. 4. 22. Gateva, E., “European Union enlargement conditionality”, Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics, 1st Edition, 2015. 23. Elbasani, A., “The Stabilisation and Association Process in the Balkans: Overloaded Agenda and Weak Incentives?” EUI Working Paper SPS, European University Institute, 2008. 24. CEPS: “EU enlargement agenda did not responds to its aim”, Brussels, January 2021 (“Hova Makedonija”, 20.01.2021, p. 7). 25. REUTERS, Euro news, Euroactiv, 17.10.2019. 26. Reka, B., “Balkans Geopolitics: from Cold War to Hot Peace”, Jalifat Publishing, Huston and Geopolitical Intelligence Service, Vaduz, 2020. 27. Sjuarsen, H., “Why expand? The question of legitimacy and justification of European Union enlargement policy” (Journal of Common Market Studies, 2003).

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28. Reka, B., “The Geopolitics and the Techniques of EU Enlargement”, Aspect, Brussels, 2010. 29. French MEP Natali Loazowas declared that: “Western Balkan” is absolutely un-prepared for EU, and for them should be applied “close partnership” (“Hezavicen Becnik”, 17.07.2019, p. 7). 30. Slovenian President Borut Pahor at: “Bled Strategic Forum”, declared that for Turkey instead of EU enlargement should applied “special status in the relation with EU” (Radio Antena 5, morning news 09:00, 04.09.2019). 31. Swoboda, H.E., “A new approach for Western Balkans enlargement” (European Council for Foreign Relations, 2018), Busek, E., “Assessing EU Membership Hopes in the Western Balkans”, “Europe’s World”, N.11/Spring 2009. 32. The interview of Geralld Knauss, Director of EIS (“Cloboden Peqat”, 20.01.2021, p. 2; “Koha”, 20.01.201, p. 3. 33. Trinkwalder, M., “Në marrëveshje e re e BE me Ballkanin: Koha për ‘paradhomën’ e unionit” (“Koha”, 11.01.2021; “Geopolitical Monitor”, January 2021). 34. On 17 November 2019, France sent to EU members that paper on new methodology for accession process, based on a guiding principle: deepening before widening of EU (www.politico.eu, 17.11.19, 11:44); “Koha Ditore”, 18.11.2019, p. 3. 35. “Enhancing the Accession Process—A Credible U Perspective for the Western Balkans” (Joint Statement of Member States for the European Council Endorsing and Enhancing Enlargement Methodology), COM(2020)57 Final, 20 March 2020. 36. Annex 1, pp. 1–5. 37. Mirel, P, “EU needs a strong financial package to push reforms in the Western Balkans”, EWB, 04.05.2020. 38. The Secretariat of the Council of EU: “Working Document”; Draft General Position for Negotiation with the Republic of North Macedonia/Republic of Albania (revised text), Brussels 23 September 2020, WK 9995/2020 INIT; related to Working Paper of September 2020, WK 8913/2020/INIT, p. 2. 39. The statement of Deputy PM and Minister of Defense of Bulgaria Karakashanov, than of Bulgarian member of European Parliament Kovachev, August 2020. 40. “Treaty of friendship, good neighborliness an cooperation”, signed on 1 August 2017 and came in force on 14 February 2018. 41. “Explanatory Memorandum on the Republic of Bulgaria with the Republic of North Macedonia in the context of EU enlargement and Association and Stabilization Process”. 42. “Cloboden Peqat”, 18.09.2020, pp. 4–5; “Koha”, 19.09.2020, p. 3.

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43. Interview of German Ambassador in Skopje, Holshtajn given to Radio Free Europe, 18.09.2020; see also “Koha”, 19.09.2020, p. 3. 44. By this resolution: “Cyril and Methodius were not creator of Slavic alphabet, but of Bulgarian alphabet”, as a first step for recognizing at EU of Cyrillic alphabet as Bulgarian alphabet. In the voting for the first reading in the Bulgarian Parliament on 29 September 2020, 73 members voted for, 4 against and 34 abstained. See more: “Cloboden Peqat”, 05.10.2020, p. 2. 45. In a survey in North Macedonia at the end of 2020: 42% of the citizens declared negative towards Bulgaria, 23% of them had positive position, and only 1% considered Bulgaria as friendly country. 77, 88% of Macedonian citizens, considered Bulgaria as “biggest national threat”, or three times more than in the survey in 2019. A survey of Eurometar, from 10 to 21 December 2020 (“Koha”, 31.12.2020, p. 3). 46. Deputy PM of Bulgaria Krasimir Karakachanov “Cloboden Peqat”, 24.09.2020, p. 3; 26–27.09.2020, p. 2. 47. Interview of Bulgarian Defence Minister Krasimir Karakachanov to TV Nova on 10 January 2021, in which he asked “12 points Annex” to existing bilateral treaty of 2017 (“Cloboden Peqat”, 11.01.2021, p. 2); “Koha”, 12.01.2021, p. 3). 48. Presentation of the priorities of Portugal Presidency with EU by Ana Paula Zakariash, Portuguese State Secretary for EU, in Brussels o 19.01.2021 (“Koha”, 20.01.2021, p. 3). 49. European Commission, “North Macedonia Report”, SWD (2020)351, Final, Brussels 06.10.2020, p. 6. 50. The main agreement on “name issue” of 2017 was ratified by both Parliaments, but three other memorandums of North Macedonia with Greece, till end of September 2020 were not ratified; one of them of the great importance for EU integration: “The Memorandum for speeding the process of the integration of North Macedonia in EU”; “Koha”, 26.09.2020, p. 4. 51. According to press conference of Lena Borislavova, The Chief of Cabinet of Bulgarian PM Kiril Petkov on 30.03.2022; “Cloboden Peqat”, 31.03.2022, p. 4. 52. “Cloboden Peqat”, 09–10.04.2022, p. 3. 53. “Cloboden Peqat”, 09–10.04.2022, p. 10. 54. Krisafi, K., “Diplomac pas lufte” (“Dita”, Tiranë, 2009). 55. Greek Law no.2636/1940; and Greek King’s Decree no.2636/1940 of 10.11.1940. 56. Reka, B., “Greece slams the EU door to Albania in maritime dispute”, Geopolitical Intelligence Services, 29.08.2014.

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57. In August Greek PM Mitsotakis declared that: “Greece will lay its west territorial waters from 6 to 12 miles”, by which confirmed previous statement of its MFA Dendias that Greece is deciding to close a sea agreement with Albania (www.lajmpress.org, 28.08.2020; “Lajm”, 28–31.08.2020, p. 7. 58. Reka, B., “EU Accession talks will Albania likely despite misgivings”, Geopolitical Intelligence Services, 19.02.2016. 59. “Cloboden Peqat”, 17.09.2020, p. 4 “Cloboden Peqat”, 7– 8.09.2020, p. 2. 60. On 19 January 2021, Greek Parliament will discuss Government’s proposal for extending territorial water to 12 miles (“Koha”, 14.01.2021, p. 8). 61. In the meeting of Albanian Prime Minister Rama and Greek Foreign Minister Dendias on 8 January 2021 (“Koha”, 13.01.2021, p. 13). 62. “Guiding Principles for Negotiations” of “negotiation framework”, article 3, point 5, page 11. 63. Murati Sh, “Kurthi Grek në kornizën negocuiese të BE për Shqipërinë”, “Dita”, 20.07.2022. 64. European Commission: “Communication on EU enlargement policy and the 2020 enlargement package” Brussels 06.10.2020, p. 1. 65. “Cloboden Peqat”, 01.10.2020, p. 11. 66. Interview of EU H for CFSP Joseph Borell to “Financial Times”; 13.09.2020. 67. The speech of EU Commissioner Oliver Varhelyi at: at the Forum on Western Balkans organized by Konrad Adenauer Stiftung: “The Future of Enlargement from a European Perspective” (Berlin 07.09.2020). 68. “Rule of Law: Blueprint for Action”, European Commission, Brussels 17.07.2019, COM(2019)343 final. 69. The Treaty of the European Union, (Article 2). 70. “Rule of Law: Blueprint for Action”, European Commission, Brussels 17.07.2019, COM(2019)343 final, p. 2, which is in line with the (article 19) of Treaty of The European Union. 71. Ibid., p. 2. 72. Ibid., p. 13. 73. Grabbe, H., and Lehne, H., “Defending EU values in Poland and Hungary” (Carnegie Europe, 2017). 74. Varhelyi, O., “The Future of Enlargement from a European Perspective” (K.A.S., Berlin, 2020). 75. “Explanatory meeting on the Acquis with Albania and North Macedonia”, DG NEAR, Brussels, 26.09.2019. 76. European Commission-Press Release: “Commission welcomes the green light to opening of accession talks with Albania and North Macedonia” (Brussels, 25 March 2020, p. 1).

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77. As the last minute try, on 16 December 2020, a revised draft of EU Council conclusions included Bulgarian concerns, but was rejected by the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Austria (“Cloboden Peqat”, 17.12.2020, pp. 1–2; “Hova Makedonija”, 19–20.12.2020, p. 3). 78. Suzane Sic, Director for South East Europe, Turkey and EFTA at German Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Deutche Wele, 25.12.2020; “Cloboden Peqat”, 26–27.12.2020, p. 3). 79. The Parliament of the Republic of North Macedonia in its session of 16 July 2022 with 68 votes approved that French proposal and the Government in the same day approved it (“Koha”, 18.07.2022, p. 1; “Cloboden Peqat”, 18.07.2022, p. 1). 80. The whole document was published by “Beqep”, 19.07.2022, pp. 11– 14. 81. “Bilateral Protocol” between the Republic of North Macedonia and the Republic of Bulgaria signed in Sofia on 17.07.2022, part I, par. 1. 82. French MEP Natali Loazowas; “Hezavicen Becnik”, 17.07.2019, p. 7. 83. Slovenian President Borut Pahor at: “Bled Strategic Forum”, declared that for Turkey instead of EU enlargement should applied “special status in the relation with EU”, Radio Antena 5, morning news 09:00, 04.09.2019). 84. “Cloboden Peqat”, 12.09.2019, 10. 85. International Court of Justice, Doc. No. 2010/25, The Hague, 22 July 2010, https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/141/141-201 00722-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf (accessed on August 11, 2020). 86. Krisafi, K., “Për token dhe Detin e Shqipërisë: Qasje juridikondëkombëtare”, UET Press, Tirana, 2014. 87. Lehne, S., “Kosovo and Serbia: Toward a Normal Relationship”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Brussels, 2012. 88. www.euronews, 29.08.2019; see also “Hezavicen Becnik”, 30.08.2019, p. 8. 89. Council of the European Union, General Affairs and External Relations: External Relations, Press Release, 2851st Council meeting, C/08/41, 6496/08 (Presse 41), Brussels, 18 February 2008. 90. Weller, M., Negotiating the final status of Kosovo, Institute for Security Studies, European Union, Paris—Chaillot Article, n° 114/2008. 91. European Parliament Resolution for Kosovo in the period: 2009–2020, which asked EU five member states to recognize The Republic of Kosovo. 92. Official statement of EU commissioner Oliver Varhely from the meeting of Kosovo Acting President Vjos Osmani in Brussels, 7–8 January 2021; EC AV Service, where he wrote that: “receives Acting President of The Republic of Kosovo” with the official photo with the flag of EU and

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94. 95. 96.

97. 98.

99. 100. 101.

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103. 104.

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the flag of The Republic of Kosovo”; see also: “Beqepnje Hovocti”, 14.01.2021, p. 3. Brussels Agreement, “First agreement of principles governing the normalization of relations”, Brussels, April 19, 2013; see also: Brussels Agreement, “Implementation Plan—First Agreement”, 25 May, 2013. Packer, George, “Our Man Richard Holbrooke and The End of the American century”, 2019. Reka, B., “Balkans Geopolitics: from Cold War to Hot Peace”, Jalifat Publishing, Huston and Geopolitical Intelligence Service, Vaduz, 2020. On 1 September 2019, US State Secretary Mike Pompeo appointed Mathew Palmer as Special Envoy for the Balkans, sending clear message that only EU—without USA—would not stabilize the region (Deutche Welle, 10.09.2019). Packer, G., “Our Man Richard Holbrooke and The End of the American century”, 2019. Within few months of 2019 after the State Department appointed Palmer as Special envoy for the Balkans, US President Trump appointed Richard Grenell as his special envoy for the Dialogue Kosovo—Serbia. Interview of Daniel Serwer to Voice of America, 02.09.2019; see also TV RTK, 02.09.2019; “Koha”, 03.09.2019, p. 2. QUINT is informal contact group of NATO’s members: USA, UK, Germany, France and Italy, dealing will Balkans issues. Statement of Spokesperson of US State Department Morgan Ortacus, after the meeting of US State Secretary Mike Pompeo and Serbian President Vuqiq in New York on 20.08.2019 (RTK, main news, 21.08.2019). Macedonian President Pendarovski even announced “40–50 turbulent days” till the end of 2019, according to “Cloboden Peqat”, 06.09.2019, p. 2; and neighboring Tirana is afraid from “hot autumn” of 2019, not knowing: if when, and how a political crisis between the Government and opposition and the Prime Minister and the President will be closed? “Koha”, 4.09.2019, p.16; RFE, 10.09.2019. The QUINT position was criticized by Serbian MFA Ivica Daqiq as an “un-equilibrated” on, which implicitly shows Belgrade support for previous “Brussels Dialogue”; His interview to TV Pink, 16.08.2019; also: “Koha”, 17.08.2019, p. 2. Interview of US Senator Ron Johnson with Voice of America (VoA), 12.09.2019; see also: “Cloboden Peqat”, 13.09.2019, p.12. His interview to RTVCG, 10.09.2019; see also; “Koha”, 12.09.2019, p. 2. Phillip Reeker, Acting Assistant Secretary of State, in the interview to VoA, 18.07.2019, transmitted by “Koha”, 19.7.2019, p. 16.

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108. “Blic”, 21.08.2019, p. 1; “Cloboden Peqat”, 22.08.2019, p. 11; “Danas”, 23.8.2019, p. 1. 109. “Kurir”, 16.08.2019, p. 1. 110. www.koha.net, 04.09.2020; KTV, 04–05.09.2020. 111. www.koha.net, 05.09.2020; “Koha”, 05–06.09.2020, “Beqepnje Hovocti”, 05.09.2020, p. 1, “Cloboden Peqat”, 05–06.09.2020, p. 1. 112. Like: “fighting Hezbollah”, “avoiding 5G”, “natural gas use diversification”, or fighting anti-LGBT campaigns. 113. www.koha.net, 07.09.2020; “Koha”, 08.09.2020; “Beqepnje Hovocti”, 23.09.2020, pp. 2–3; “Cloboden Peqat”, 20.09.2020, p. 3. 114. KTV, 04–05.09.2020. 115. www.lajmepress, 10–13.10.2020, p. 7. 116. “Beqepnje Hovocti”, 25.09.2020, pp. 2–3. 117. “Koha”, 24.09.2020, p. 8. 118. “Koha”, 15.10.2020, p. 9; “Beqepnje Hovocti”, 14.10.2020, p. 2, 09.11.2020, p. 9; “Cloboden Peqat”, 24.10.2020, p. 15; “Koha”, 15.19.2020, p. 9. 119. Wolf, M., Fire and Fury inside the Trump White House, 2018. 120. Malcolm, N., Kosovo, A Short History, London, 1999. 121. “Koha”, 17.03.2022, p. 8. 122. “Beqepnje Hovocti”, 26.11.2020, p. 9. 123. “The National Interest”, November 2020; “Hova Makedonija”, 28– 29.11.2020, p. 12. 124. “Koha”, 11.11.2020, p. 9. 125. “Cloboden Peqat”, 03.12.2020, p. 11. 126. Zalan, E., “What do new CDU chief’s pro-Russia views mean for Europe?” (www.euobserver.com, 19.01.2021, 07:07). 127. “What do new CDU chief’s pro-Russia views mean for Europe?” (www. euobserver.com, 19.01.2021, 07:07). 128. “Koha”, 16.03.2022, p. 9; Germany According to German Federal Network Agency depends by Russian gas by 55%; “Koha” (16.03.2022, p. 17). 129. It was announced that one of his first Presidential Executive Orders, will be return to “Paris Climate Treaty” (“Cloboden Peqat”, 18– 19.01.2021, p. 9), and it was one of its first 10 Executive orders in the first day in office (“Cloboden Peqat”, 22.02.2021, p. 9). 130. “Beqepnje Hovocti”, 14.01.2021, pp. 16–17. 131. Nye, J., “Does International Liberal Order has the future”, “Koha”, 14.01.2021. 132. His interview in: “Meet the Press”, NBC, 09.05.1999; “Beqepnje Hovocti”, 06.12.2020, p. 4.

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133. David Axelrod’s podcast: “Ex files”, “Cloboden Peqat”, 28– 29.11.2020, p. 6. 134. “Nedeljnik”, Beograd, 26.11.2020; “Cloboden Peqat”, 28–29.11.2020, p. 6. 135. US Congress Hearing, 8 December 2020; “Beqepnje Hovocti”, 09.12.2020, pp. 2–3; “Cloboden Peqat”, 10.12.2020, p. 3: “Koha”, 10.12.2020, p. 2. 136. https://telegrafi.com/albright-kosova-duhet-ti-kete-te-drejtat-nderko mbetare-per-ta-mbrojtur-territorin-e-saj/08.12.2020. 137. The President of the EU Council, Charles Michel, in his speech at European Parliament on 21.01.2021, congratulating Biden presidential inauguration announced a forthcoming EU-USA summit (“Koha”, 22.01.2021, p. 9). 138. “Beqepnje Hovocti”, 30.10.2020, p. 2. 139. During 2021–2022, Escobar, for example, had worked hard together with EU mediator Lajchak to bring back a prolonged Brussels dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. After two Brussels meetings in 2021 between Kosovo PM Kurti and Serbia President Vuˇci´c that “dialogue for normalization” paused until mid-2022. 140. “Beqepnje Hovocti”, 23.10.2020, p. 4. 141. “Beqepnje Hovocti”, 21.10.2020, p. 3. 142. By the end of October 2020, Serbian Minister of Defense Stefanovic, confirmed the arrival of the Russian donation of 30 tanks T-7, after previously received Russian military air-crafts (Radio Free Europe, 02.11.2020 10:28; “Novosti”, 31.10.2020, p. 3). 143. Belgrade Center for Security Policies, TheAlbanian.co.uk, 24.11.2020. 144. “Euronews Albania”; TV RTK, 12.11.2020. 145. TV 21, Telegrafi, RTK, 12.11.2020, 13.11.2020. 146. His statement at Munich Security Conference 17–19 February 2022, “Koha”, 22.02.2022, p. 7. 147. “Cloboden Peqat”, 19–120.03.2022, p. 9. 148. His Interview to: “Cloboden Peqat”, 26–27.02.2022, p. 3. 149. A Survey funded by Konard Adenauer Stiftung in Skopje; “Cloboden Peqat”, 26–27.02.2022, p. 3. 150. A survey of IRI, www.ina.com, 07.03.2022, 14:24. 151. “Koha”, 11.11.2020, p. 9. 152. In: Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Slovakia; in addition to the previous four in: Poland, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia (“Cloboden Peqat”, 25.03.2022, pp. 1–3). 153. Article 10. 154. Survey of UBO Consulting with 1605 citizens of Kosovo, “Koha”, 18.03.2022, p. 7.

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155. www.almakos.com, 07.03.2022, 13:05; “Cloboden Peqat”, 08.03.2022, p. 2. 156. Fox News, AFP, Washington Post, Telegraph, Independent, Newsweek, Wall Street Journal, Zeit, 24–25.02.2022. 157. www.gazetaexpress.com, 02.03.2022, 18:24. 158. “Koha”, 16.03.2022, p. 9. 159. Richard Hass, President of ACFR, “Koha”, 18.03.2022, p. 11. 160. “The Hill”, 17.03.2022; “Koha”, 19.03.2022, p. 10. 161. Ohlberg, M., Yellinek, R., “China’s Soft Power Strategy in the Mediterranean Region”, GMF, 13.01.2021. 162. ITI was launched on 2009, based on economic cooperation of 10 countries from Central Asia under ECO, planning a railway of 6450 km, connecting these countries with China’ s Uighur Xinjiang region (“Hova Makedonija”, 8–10.01.2021, pp. 1–2). 163. Jasmina Pavlovska: “Megappoekt xto ima mo´k da ja ppomeni anemiqnocta na (evpo)integpaciite”, “Hova Makedonija”, 8– 10.01.2021, pp. 1–2; By the end of 2020 a first transport train from Turkey arrived in China. On 19 December 2020 that train which arrived in Jian, transported goods for China passing through: Georgia, Azerbaijan, Caspian Sea and Kazakhstan. 164. Based on CEBR during: 2021–2025, China will achieve 5, 7%, compared with USA which will have 1, 9% economic rise (“Koha”, 05.01.2020, p. 9). 165. “Beqepnje Hovocti”, 08.11.2020, p. 5. 166. Krisafi, K., “Diplomac pas lufte” (“Dita”, Tiranë, 2009). 167. Albanian Prime Minister Rama, since its visit in Beijing in 2014, announced new railway infrastructure projects within corridor 8: Durres (Albanian Adriatic coast) to Varna (Bulgarian Black Sea coast) and 1.5 million USD for its education reform. 168. On 9 January 2021, Albanian Government announced the plan to give a concession for 35 years its second biggest port Vlora. 169. Albanian Government offered to China a 25-year concession to invest in the port’s infrastructure and modernization of Shen Gjini, its Adriatic harbor—only a few miles from the EU waters (Italy); but till the beginning of 2021, without concrete answer from Beijing. 170. CEAS Report, Belgrade, 2017; “Koha”, 20.09.2017, p. 14. 171. Reka, B., “The Energy Security Challenges of the Western Balkans: TAP vs. Turkish Stream”, in: “Regional Cooperation in the Western Balkans”, Aspen Institute Berlin, 2015. 172. “Cloboden Peqat”, 30.03.2022, pp. 1–10; “Koha”, 24.03.2022, p.10. 173. “Turkish logistic centers” (Anadoly Agency; “Cloboden Peqat-CP Hedelnik”, 31.10–01.11.2020, p. 6. 174. Movie industry, education and TIKA-agency.

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175. James M. Dorsi, School for International Relations, Singapor, quoted by Jasmina Pavlovska: “Megappoekt xto ima mo´k da ja ppomeni anemiqnocta na (evpo)integpaciite”, “Hova Makedonija”, 8– 10.01.2021, pp. 1–2. 176. Which was officially started to work in Serbia on 30 December 2020, by the inauguration event of the President Vuˇci´c (“Beqepnje Hovocti”, 31.12.2020, p. 2). 177. The U.S. reacted, warning Ankara that this is not allowed for NATO member states, cancelling participation of Turkey in the program of the U.S. secret aircraft “F-35”, and, announcing U.S. sanctions by the Assistant State Secretary Clarke Cooper, but Turkey rejected these criticisms. 178. Greek PM Micotakis, said that “if dialogue will not be continued, the disputes should be sent before the International Court”; and President Erdogan asked the EU “to not discriminate Turkey”; (“Efermerida ton Sinktakton”, www.efsyn.gr, 20.11.2020; “Cloboden Peqat”, 21– 22.11.2020, p. 6). 179. Radio Free Europe, 22.11.2020; “Hova Makedonija”, 23.11.2020, p. 6. 180. “Cloboden Peqat”, 24.03.2022, p. 8. 181. Turkish President Erdogan and Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama have excellent relations which were confirmed by the official visit of Albanian PM Edi Rama in Ankara on 6–7 January 2021 (Top Channel, TV Klan 06.01.2021). 182. Statement of Albanian Minister of Diaspora Pandeli Majko, TV ABC, 14.11.2020.

CHAPTER 4

External Autocratic Influence, the Balkans, and Democratic Decline Mieczysław P. Boduszynski ´ and Calla Li

Introduction How has the growing influence of external authoritarian actors shaped the path of democratization in the Balkans? The small states of the region have long adjusted to outside hegemony, starting with their centurieslong incorporation into multinational empires. At the beginning of the new millennium, it appeared that liberal Western democracies were poised to exercise unchallenged supremacy over the Balkans. Rather than being a revived form of imperial domination, however, the new post-Cold War hegemony was rooted in an overarching foreign policy goal which united all states in the region: membership in the European Union (EU) and NATO. In exchange for admission to these ‘clubs’ of the richest and

M. P. Boduszynski ´ (B) Pomona College, Claremont, CA, USA e-mail: [email protected] C. Li University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Gardner (ed.), Geopolitical Turmoil in the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34318-6_4

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most technologically sophisticated nations in the world, the Balkans were expected to democratize their polities and liberalize their economies. Nevertheless, between 2001 and 2021, progress on democratization and related liberal norms like the rule of law—notably in Albania, Kosovo, Bosnia–Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia—has been challenged, stalled, or dramatically reversed.1 None of these countries have succeeded in joining the EU, although some of them (Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia) have entered NATO (while Serbia does not seek to join the alliance).2 Freedom House’s 2021 report notes that Croatia is the only Western Balkan state classified as ‘free’, while Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and North Macedonia all fall under the ‘partly free’ category.3 EU officials bemoan that Western Balkans states continue to fail to meet accession criteria, particularly on the rule of law, media, judiciary, and foreign and security policy.4 Meanwhile, the West has lost its privileged position as the ‘only game in town’ in the Western Balkans. Challenges such as the European debt crisis, the rise of populism, mass migration, EU ‘enlargement fatigue’, conflicts in Libya, Syria, and Ukraine, as well as the American ‘pivot’ to Asia, shifted the West’s attention elsewhere.5 In its place, a number of external actors with authoritarian political systems at home and grand ambitions overseas have entered the scene: China, Russia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). These authoritarian powers ‘strive to redefine the rules’ to the disadvantage of the EU, NATO, and the U.S.6 Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 represented the dramatic apex of these trends. But to what extent does the growing influence of outside authoritarian states explain the Balkan democratic reversals? Undeveloped and in many cases characterized by deep ethnic divisions, one might argue that these states were poorly prepared for democracy in the first place, and the latest declines are simply a reflection of that.7 One could also point to the stalled EU enlargement process, combined with a lack of U.S. engagement, as helping open the space for authoritarian-populist actors to fill the void.8 From these vantage points, democratic decline and reversal are not necessarily driven by the influence of outside autocratic actors. Moreover, the idea that these actors have contributed to a democratic decline in the Western Balkans could also rest on a false assumption that they seek to promote any particular form of governance rather than simply pursuing economic interests.

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In this chapter, we take a more pessimistic view of external autocratic influence in the Balkans. Engaging a growing body of scholarship on autocracy promotion, we argue that Russia, China, Turkey, and UAE involvement has undermined democratic progress. The pathways through which this autocratic influence has been exerted and the motivations underlying it are to some extent common to all four but also distinct for each of these autocratic states. All four have helped strengthen the position of authoritarian and corrupt Balkan elites, offering them alternative sources of political and economic support. This, in turn, has provided the elites with the ‘reverse leverage’ to resist Western demands and conditionality. At the same time, the growing influence of external autocratic actors has lowered the penchant for Western powers to promote democracy and the rule of law since they fear pushing the local elites even further into the hands of—paradoxically—autocratic powers. Russia uses tools such as disinformation to exploit historical grievances and ethnic cleavages with the goal of dividing society, strengthening likeminded elites, and ultimately turning Balkan countries away from the West. China and the UAE have geopolitical objectives in the region which are more closely linked to their economic motives and do not necessarily run counter to democracy and EU or NATO accession. But investment and aid from Beijing and Abu Dhabi often reflect these states’ preference for opaque, elite-driven deals that serve to reinforce existing practices of patronage and corruption among ruling autocratic elites, thereby helping to entrench them in power. Turkey represents an intermediate case in this regard. Like Russia, Turkey has a long history in the region. It has sought to harness this history and its religious ties to Muslim populations in the Balkans to promote a ‘neo-Ottoman’ vision. However, Turkish involvement also has a pragmatic, transactional undercurrent that does not necessarily seek to undermine democracy or the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of Balkan states but nevertheless reinforces tendencies toward personalistic rule and weak rule of law. We proceed as follows. First, we survey the literature on autocracy promotion—and a related literature on ‘sharp power’—which seeks to explain why, how, and when nondemocratic powers export autocracy beyond their borders. Then, we proceed to analyze how Russia, China, Turkey, and the UAE have helped entrench Balkan autocratic actors in power over the past decade. We focus on the case of Serbia, a country which has experienced both the sharpest democratic decline in the Western Balkans and has been disproportionately exposed to influence from all four of the autocratic powers analyzed in the chapter.

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Autocracy Promotion and Sharp Power While the literature on democracy promotion and democratic diffusion is vast, the scholarship on how authoritarianism gets exported beyond its borders remains more limited.9 Yet, autocracy promotion is hardly a new phenomenon. The United States effectively promoted autocracy during the Cold War, propping up repressive right-wing governments as a way to contain Soviet expansion.10 In the post-Cold War period, Russia has backed authoritarian and corrupt governments in Armenia, Belarus, and Ukraine and blocked these states from closer association with the EU.11 France has supported autocrats in former colonies such as Cameroon and Gabon.12 China has provided aid and investment with ‘no strings attached’ to autocratic African states.13 The burgeoning literature on ‘sharp power’ to some extent addresses such shortcomings by focusing on a particular set of tools used by autocratic states to undermine democratic norms. Sharp power describes how countries such as China and Russia spend billions of dollars to shape public opinion and perceptions around the world, employing diverse strategies that include people-to-people exchanges, cultural activities, educational programs, and the development of media enterprises and information initiatives with global reach.14 The way in which China and other autocratic states carry out influence operations beyond their borders is not ‘hard’ insofar as it is not explicitly coercive, but it is not fully ‘soft’ either.15 This is because sharp power does not aim to merely win hearts and minds by explaining a country’s values through the media, think tanks, or cultural exchanges. Indeed, sharp power is not about attraction or even persuasion. Rather, its favored tools are distraction and manipulation.16 These are tactics autocratic powers like China and Russia have used to great success at home and have now turned to in pursuit of foreign policy goals. Thus, ‘sharp power’, according to those who study it, ‘pierces, penetrates, or perforates the political and information environments in the targeted countries’.17 If contemporary international relations are in part a competition between autocratic and democratic states, then sharp power can be seen as the ‘tip of their dagger—or indeed as their syringe’.18 In countries with young and fragile democratic institutions, a history of state-controlled media, and deep distrust of ‘official’ narratives—the Western Balkans are a case in point here—such sharp power tactics can be particularly useful for outside powers seeking to prop up favored local authoritarians.

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In the empirical analysis that follows, we seek to understand how, why, and when China, Russia, Turkey, and the UAE have exercised counter-democratic influence in the Western Balkans. While none of these powers have explicitly attempted to overturn democratic progress in the region (with the possible exception of the murky 2016 Russianbacked attempted coup in Montenegro, described below),19 they have offered alternative economic and political support mechanisms that have been seized by authoritarian-leaning elites to strengthen their positions while sidelining opponents and diminishing the potential democratic leverage of the West. In countries where democratization was already hanging in the balance, this has helped tip the scales decisively in the direction of autocracy. Moreover, we argue that while none of these external actors has succeeded in acting as a challenger to Western democratic leverage by themselves, where they exercise influence together— especially in Serbia, where China, UAE, Turkey, and Russia all play a major role—they have a significant effect in underpinning autocratic tendencies.

Russia Russia has a long and complicated relationship with the Balkans, characterized by periods of rapprochement and tension. In broad strokes, the Western Balkans has long been a region of interest for Russia due to the potential expansion of Western European influence. For centuries, Balkan leaders balanced Russian, Western European, and Turkish influences, with the degree of friendliness toward Russia dependent on the regime in power. When several Balkan countries united under the Yugoslavia following World War Two, relations with Russia worsened despite a shared communist ideology. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito disagreed on a number of key issues such as the geopolitical role of Albania and Bulgaria, which ultimately resulted in the Tito-Stalin Split and the end of Russian-Yugoslav diplomatic relations.20 The dissolution of the USSR and Yugoslavia occurred almost simultaneously around 1990. As a result, Russia—preoccupied with its own chaotic internal transition—did not engage meaningfully with the Balkan region until the NATO-led Kosovo intervention of 1999, a bombing campaign against Serbia which the Russian leadership strongly condemned. Since the 2000s, Russia has stepped up its involvement both politically and economically in the Western Balkans, mostly to counter Western

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influence. Some analysts have argued that Moscow sees the Balkans as a part of its ‘weak periphery’, meaning it is an area of interest, albeit one that does not necessitate the same level of engagement as former Soviet republics, since Russia does not have the economic strength to establish itself as the pre-eminent power in the region.21 Russia’s regional strategy is thus framed by obstructionism and the objective of undermining the EU and NATO, making use of the Balkans’ internal vulnerabilities.22 In other words, Russia seeks to cultivate political sympathy in the region primarily through sharp power—co-opting the information space and stoking ethnic and cultural division—supported by economic tools such as investment in energy and transport sectors.23 Russia’s other goal in the Western Balkans is to bring about ‘multipolarity’, understood as an arrangement which repudiates European integration as the organizing idea of regional order and installs a great powers ‘directorate’ that will manage regional competition and cooperation.24 This aligns with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s more aggressive posture in recent years, as outlined by Shevtsova.25 She documents the Kremlin’s use of ‘hybrid warfare’, which employs covert military force and tactics such as customs wars, natural gas wars, information wars, culture wars, and history wars.26 Bechev describes Moscow’s autocracy-promoting toolbox according to three main categories: coercion, cooptation, and subversion, arguing that the latter two are more common in the Western Balkans.27 Coercion refers to hard power and potential military involvement; cooptation refers to backchannel economic deals with local leaders for regional leverage; while subversion refers to disinformation and conflict-sowing tactics meant to pull the Western Balkans away from Europe and the West. Specifically, Moscow uses energy investment projects and energy supply deals to maintain a hand in the Balkan energy market and create a certain level of dependence on and interest in Russian energy.28 On the political front, Russian foreign policy aims to fan the flames of nondemocratic ethno-nationalism in the area, mostly in support of ethnic Serbian nationalists who have felt neglected by democratic development in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Serbia itself. Because Russians and Serbs have a shared Slavic Orthodox religious background, Russian leaders are able to exploit Serbian anxieties of losing power to other religious groups. Stronski and Himes argue that by playing up traditional Serbian grievances against the West, Russian propaganda undermines public and elite support for the West, which remains the region’s main

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trading partner, source of foreign investment, and preferred destination for migrant labor.29 This, in turn, weakens Western democratic conditionality in the Balkans. Another example of Russia’s appeal to shared religious tradition manifests in Montenegro, where Russia has wielded political influence by mobilizing the Serbian Orthodox Church, Montenegro’s main religious authority. In fact, many of the Church’s activities in Montenegro espousing conservative social viewpoints and encouraging followers to take a stand against Western liberalism are supported, both financially and politically, by Russian ultra-nationalist oligarchs with close ties to the Kremlin.30 Although it has been difficult to measure the exact impact of Russia’s religious appeals on fomenting sociopolitical division and anti-democratic attitudes in Montenegro, it is no coincidence that Russian-intelligence-affiliated actors were arrested in the October 2016 coup attempt against the Montenegrin parliament and the then-Prime Minister Milo Ðukanovi´c. The attempted coup was carried about by a group of 20 Serbian, Montenegrin, and Russian individuals who were planning to storm the parliament and assassinate the prime minister prior to a scheduled vote on Montenegro’s NATO membership. Furthermore, officials later discovered evidence of the Serbian Orthodox Church hosting meetings for coup instigators, thus revealing that the Church’s staunch anti-EU attitudes and Russia’s involvement in support of said attitudes translated into tangible action that physically endangered civilians and parliament members, thereby threatening Montenegro’s fledgling democracy.31 In 2019, 14 of the instigators were convicted of plotting a coup by a Montenegrin court and jailed,32 but in 2021, on appeal, a Montenegrin judge overturned the conviction on the basis that the previous trial was marred by violation of criminal law and ordered a new trial.33 The 2016 attempted coup in Montenegro is perhaps the most dramatic example of the dangers that Russian covert action poses for Western Balkan democracies, where existing ethnic divisions and religious views compounded by EU accession discourse makes for an atmosphere ripe for exploitation and conflict. While Russia’s actions in the Balkans have mostly remained limited to hybrid warfare and sharp power, Putin’s decision to launch a full-scale military invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 exemplifies the extremes he is willing to employ in order to prevent countries in what Russia sees as its sphere of influence from growing closer to the West. Western Balkan reactions to the invasion have been mixed. President Vuši´c attempted to

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play both sides, emphasizing Ukraine’s right to territorial integrity, while refusing to join European and U.S. sanctions against Russia. Putin’s narrative of historical victimization by Western alliances resonated strongly in Serbia, where NATO launched a bombing campaign in 1999 during the Kosovo War.34 During the 1999 intervention, pro-Russia rallies organized by far-nationalist right groups popped up all over Serbia as they did after Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.35 Milorad Dodik, the ethnic Serb member of the Bosnian presidency who maintains close ties with Russia, urged Bosnia to take a neutral foreign policy stance on the war in Ukraine, unsuccessfully attempting to stop the Bosnian ambassador to the UN from joining the vote to condemn Russia.36 Supporters of Dodik and Putin in Serb-majority areas of Bosnia also held rallies in support of Russia, with some attendees holding posters of Putin, Dodik, and Xi.37 Popular support for Russia among Serbs both in and outside Serbia speaks to the success of Russia’s tactic of emphasizing ethnic divisions and historical victimization.38 Russia’s main sharp power tool in the Western Balkans is its use of disinformation and misinformation campaigns, which seek to sow discord and inflame existing divisions.39 A report published by the European Parliament in 2021 found that Russia’s main objective with regard to information manipulation in the Western Balkans is to ‘amplify existing political-economic division between “EU idealists” and “EU realists” by manipulating stories about the EU’s intentions, capabilities, strengths and weaknesses, while opportunistically improving their own country’s image’.40 Russia co-opts media and information sources in the Western Balkans, often forming strong connections to ruling autocrats who themselves holds way over local media content, as well as publishing extreme viewpoints that inflame ethnic and religious tensions. For example, Sputnik, Russia’s state-run news agency, broadcasts disinformation throughout the region from its local base in Belgrade, including stories designed to discredit the EU and NATO.41 Similarly, in multiethnic states like North Macedonia, Russia’s disinformation campaigns aim to stoke fear of the EU and NATO by emphasizing anti-Bulgarian, anti-Greek, and anti-Albanian sentiments.42 Ultimately, Russia’s manipulation of media and information markets largely supports and supplements parts of its foreign policy agenda and allows for both direct and indirect channels of influence which act as powerful source of counter-leverage against U.S. and EU-led democracy promotion efforts. This active interference in digital political discourse represents a Russian effort to combat

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not only a Western-led political world order, but also an attempt to undermine Western democratic values by demonstrating their fallibility. Such tactics play directly into the hands of corrupt and populist Balkan autocrats such as Milorad Dodik, Aleksandar Vuˇci´c, and Nikola Gruevski. A 2022 Balkan Insight report highlighted Russia’s efforts to inject the Bosnian information sphere with misinformation on the war in Ukraine. Russian institutions used less-moderated forums such as Telegram to publish announcements in English, Russian, and Bosnian Serbo-Croatian justifying Russian military action in Ukraine. One of the leading narratives compares Ukrainian nationalist battalion military activity in the Donbas region to the Srebrenica Genocide of 1995, thus manipulating a deeply traumatic moment in recent Bosnian history to promote Russia’s antiWest agenda.43 Although most of the ‘truths’ propagated by Russian channels have been proven false by fact checkers, their influence and reach should not be underestimated, especially among populations that were already sympathetic to Russian causes. In addition to active engagement in media and information production, Russia also tries to insert itself into regional markets, with the similar goal of offering economic alternatives to the EU. Increasingly, Russia has chosen to leverage one of its main exports—energy—as a foreign policy tool used to reward or punish states and incentivize alliances. This tool proves especially effective in the Western Balkans, where many countries are still reliant on Russian energy. For Serbia, BiH, and North Macedonia, energy trade has been a common denominator in the persistent trade deficits. In all three countries, crude oil and natural gas comprise between 75 and 95 percent of imports from Russia.44 Besides striking energy deals with Western Balkan nations, Russia has also invested significantly in local energy production and infrastructure projects. In 2008, Russia’s Gazprom Neft, a subsidiary of the state-run enterprise Gazprom, took a $450-million-dollar worth controlling stake in Serbia’s Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS) oil and gas company and committed to invest at least $600 million more in the company.45 In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russia similarly holds a stake in oil refineries and maintains partial control of extraction processes.46 In 2020, Serbia’s Vuˇci´c announced that construction would begin on ‘Balkan Stream’, an extension of the TurkStream pipeline carrying Russian gas that runs through Serbia and Bulgaria. Russia’s strengthening economic ties to the region’s energy sector make it far more difficult for Western Balkan countries to integrate into the EU market. The influence of Brussels is diminished as the

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Western Balkans’ reliance on cheap Russian gas prevents EU leaders from exerting too much economic or political pressure to counter Russian influence.47 Energy dependence is thus another a significant source of Russia’s nondemocratic counter-leverage in the region. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, European leaders faced even more pressure to decide between sanctioning Russia and suffering economic losses. The European Commission released a plan known as ‘RePowerEU’, which seeks to invest more in alternative energy sources and use pipelines that do not go through Russia.48 On the other hand, many Balkan nations are turning to coal due to surging energy prices from the Ukraine crisis, halting the region’s move toward decarbonization.49 As larger European economies such as France and Germany struggle to readjust their energy sources in the face of rising energy prices, the Balkan states, which are even more reliant on Russian gas imports, are facing new challenges in finding alternative energy sources. Western Balkan leaders thus navigate a complex geopolitical landscape with regard to balancing Russian and Western interests, especially after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. In Serbia’s case, while Vuˇci´c did not join Western sanctions on Russia, he also refused to recognize the results of Putin’s September 2022 referendum in four eastern Ukrainian regions.50 Though the referendum pointed to majorities in all four regions voting for joining Russia, Kyiv, and the West denounced the referendum as a sham built upon forced voting and fabricated votes. These referendums exemplify the geopolitical dilemma Serbia faces when it comes to Russia´cs land grab in Ukraine. On one hand, by supporting Russian succession referendums in Ukraine, Vuˇci´c is able to signal his political support for Moscow and receive tangible political and economic support. On the other hand, in legitimizing breakaway regions in Ukraine, Serbia indirectly lends credence to Kosovo’s secession. In justifying his refusal to recognize the 2022 referendums, Vuši´c references respecting Ukraine’s ‘territorial sovereignty’, which follows the same narrative used to justify Serbia’s claim to Kosovo. Although other Western Balkan leaders do not necessarily face the same diplomatic dilemma as Serbia, they are similarly caught in a delicate balancing act between receiving benefits from both Russia and the West with as little political friction as possible. Unlike the other cases of autocracy promotion examined here, Russia is motivated by the explicit objective of preventing Western Balkan integration into NATO and the EU and thus seeks to directly challenge the

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democratic leverage of the West. Put differently, Russia’s vested interests in the Western Balkans run counter to the goal of democratization. While Moscow cannot deploy the economic largesse of China or the EU, it does possess a centuries-long understanding of the societal vulnerabilities—especially local ethnic divisions—that it has successfully exploited to further the agendas of local autocratic ethno-nationalist figures and groups, thereby exacerbating the challenge of building inclusive multiethnic democracies. Sharp power tools such as disinformation campaigns round out the Russian effort to countervail Western democratic leverage. Local autocratic, nationalist, and kleptocratic elites see a model of their approach to rule in Moscow.

China While China does not have the same historical or cultural ties to the Western Balkans as Russia or Turkey, Beijing’s interest and rising influence in the region comes from a place of geopolitical and economic interest. China maintains its economic connection with Western Balkan countries via two main organs: the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the 17+1 Agreement. BRI, perhaps the best-known tool of Chinese influence overseas, is an ambitious infrastructure strategy project that began in 2013, with the goal of investing in various projects in over 70 countries along the historical Silk Road route, in order to build overland and sea trade networks.51 In the Western Balkans, these projects have taken the form of infrastructural and industrial development, such as Chinese firm Everbright helping renovate the Tirana airport in 2016 or Chinese company Hebei taking over Serbian steel mill Zelezara Smederevo in 2016.52 Western Balkan countries are eager for investment stemming from BRI projects despite the debt risks involved, especially given that many struggle to attract aid and investment from the EU and the United States. Not only do Chinese BRI loans have fewer strings attached compared to their Western counterparts, but they are also more opaque, which helps facilitate endemic corruption.53 The 17+1 agreement is an equally important aspect of Chinese economic strategy in the Western Balkans. The agreement, which brings together China and 17 Eastern and Central European (ECE) countries— the Balkans included—serves to promote Chinese business interests, and specifically, BRI projects. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs initiated the program in 2012, and since then, China and the 17 countries

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meet annually at a summit to discuss business interactions and facilitate cultural and educational exchanges. Some scholars have charged that the 17+1 agreement is a ‘sham’ or a ‘trojan horse’, decrying the lack of substantive economic benefits for the ECE countries.54 Other scholars focus on the foreign policy aspect, arguing that China’s main goal is to affect the 17+1’s relationship to the EU, especially those countries that have not yet attained EU membership.55 Some even see the traditional bipolar power structure in ECE countries (EU/U.S. vs. Russia) shifting into a tripolar power structure. China’s engagement in the Western Balkans ties together economic investment and political goals. Beijing employs a hub-and-spoke strategy that centers investment in Serbia, the most populous Balkan country (the ‘hub’), which in turn is designed to demonstrate success to neighboring states (the ‘spokes’).56 The focus on Serbia reinforces mutual diplomatic objectives: China does not recognize Kosovo’s independence, while Serbia supports China’s territorial claims relating to Taiwan and the South China Sea.57 By providing such diplomatic support, China thus has helped buttress the rule of authoritarian elites in Belgrade. But Chinese economic statecraft has also helped to reinforce autocratic and corrupt local power structures. One key criticism leveled against BRI in particular is the lack of transparency and subsequent tendency toward debt-trapping, whereby smaller, lower-income countries are enticed into lucrative infrastructure loan packages that leave them in debt and dependent on Chinese financing.58 For example, in Montenegro, China’s Exim Bank was the only available actor to finance a highway that Podgorica has deemed of national significance for decades, proving that Chinese investors now offer a reliable source of investment for struggling Western Balkan infrastructure projects.59 Although some countries have seen economic growth and financial success from participating in BRI projects, other countries, usually those with high levels of corruption and investment risk, including Western Balkan countries, are particularly vulnerable to debt distress from Chinese creditors.60 Inevitably, these debts and close economic collaboration carry geopolitical implications, as China seeks some level of political support in return for the economic and security benefits related to BRI projects.61 With relation to sharp power, Rolland references ‘strategic economy’, a term coined by Shi Yinhong, to describe China’s shift toward using economic tools to achieve political goals, in this case, counterbalancing U.S. and Western security and foreign policy influence.62 This ‘strategic

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economy’ BRI framework provides a more comprehensive look not just into the intersection of China’s political and economic goals, but also seeks to understand how recipient countries’ security and economic interests influence regional geopolitics. In sum, through economic collaboration efforts such as offering low-interest loans, financing infrastructure projects, and engaging in technological transfers, China leverages the Belt-and-Road initiative as a strategy to expand its trade base, as well as promote its political goals. In order for China’s economic tools to take on a ‘strategic’ edge, initiatives such as BRI and 17+1 require political support. Although China employs a strong system of digital authoritarianism at home when it comes to internet censorship and propaganda campaigns, it does not use the same level of targeted attacks as Russia to gain influence abroad. Rather, China’s political efforts are focused toward emphasizing its political sovereignty and criticizing Western countries and their allies for judging Chinese political decisions.63 For example, in response to a 2018 UN Human Rights Commission investigation into the internment of Uyghur Muslims in the Xinjiang region, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson urged UN officials to ‘scrupulously abide by the mission and principles of the U.N. charter, respect China’s sovereignty, fairly and objectively carry out its duties, and not listen to one-sided information’.64 In 2019, a group of 22 states issued a joint letter to the UN Human Rights Council, condemning China’s mass detention of Uyghurs in Xinjiang.65 This was followed by a letter from a group of 55 states that backed the PRC’s policies in the Xinjiang region. While no Western Balkan country signed either letter, Serbia did sign on to a second letter in October 2019 supporting China’s position.66 Whether due to its own Kosovo-related geopolitical goals or due to a desire to strengthen political relations with China, Serbia’s expression of support signals a potential shift of Western Balkan nations toward governance value alternatives put forth by the Chinese government. China’s foreign policy goals are especially applicable to its selection and application of cultural tools in the Western Balkans. Promoting the Chinese language and culture through educational exchange programs serves as one important aspect of China’s cultural diplomacy strategy. Most notably, starting in 2004, the Hanban, a Chinese-language teaching council affiliated with the Chinese Ministry of Education, established over 129 Confucius Institutes, or Chinese-language teaching and research centers that partner with host universities around the world.67 The largest

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Confucius Institute in the Western Balkans, located in Belgrade, opened in 2020 and features a multi-level cultural study space as well as multiple associated office spaces.68 Although the Confucius Institutes do serve as a legitimate avenue for cultural and linguistic exchange, studies have shown that the Chinese government uses these cultural institutes to advance their political narratives through limiting academic freedom and restricting curriculum diversion from official Chinese viewpoints.69 China has also sought to expand its ‘network of influence’ in the Balkans through the creation of new academic programs, regular exchanges of personnel, joint research projects, and the commissioning of analyses on areas such as economics and politics at the individual and institutional levels, the establishment of new teaching positions; and other initiatives.70 These networks, founded on academic collaboration, allow for greater access points to promoting Chinese talking points in regions where China would not otherwise have cultural ties. Another tool that lies at the intersection of cultural and political strategy is media collaboration. China uses media agency partnerships to help bolster its public image abroad by broadcasting pro-regime material in their spheres of influence. Shopov identifies three mechanisms that Chinese state media agencies use to strengthen their ties with Western Balkan agencies: (1) extensive agreements between entities such as Xinhua and local state news agencies, which supply China-related content to clients across the region (2) Chinese embassies and pro-Beijing intermediaries, such as BRI centers, produce content to promote projects and relay to the public via a range of outlets (3) content agreements between China Radio International (similar to the US’ Voice of America programs) and major media organizations in the Western Balkans to create mutually beneficial content.71 While media partnerships lie on the softer side of the sharp power spectrum, they serve as a powerful tool to influence the perspectives of internationally minded citizens who traditionally interact with European or American media. Traditional democracy promotion tools, such as Voice of America or Radio Free Europe, are no longer the only players in delivering international news, and thus, China’s emergence into the media market serves to counterbalance democratic viewpoints and promote Chinese authoritarian talking points. The COVID-19 pandemic has presented yet another opportunity for China to capitalize on the economic disparities between the Western Balkans and the European Union. In February 2021, a little more than a year after the COVID-19 pandemic upended life around the

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world, Serbian President Aleksandar Vuˇci´c declared in a speech regarding upcoming vaccination efforts that, ‘the world has hit an iceberg, like the Titanic, and the rich and the richest only save themselves and their loved ones’. The rich and the richest in question here are European Union countries, who had failed to negotiate a substantial vaccine export contract with Serbia and other Balkan nations, many of whom are aspiring EU members.72 As a result, Vuˇci´c turned to purchase Russia’s Sputnik and China’s Sinopharm vaccines, rather than waiting for Western European vaccines. Serbia was not alone in this trend, as Bosnian and North Macedonian leaders also expressed interest in Russian and Chinese vaccines after failing to secure any European vaccines. Both China and Russia have been eager to fill the void left by the European Union, as China has offered its vaccines in Serbia at the Belgrade Confucius Institute, which has traditionally served as a site for Chinese cultural soft power.73 The economic, political, and social consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic revealed the vulnerabilities of Western Balkan democracies—an observation that was clearly not lost on authoritarian powers such as China and Russia, who took the opportunity to use vaccine diplomacy further their own political agendas. In sum, China’s influence in the Western Balkans is exacted primarily through economic sharp power, bolstered by political and cultural tools. By investing in infrastructure and industry projects in the Western Balkans, China not only offers a viable alternative from European and American investment, but also an alternative that does not require the same adherence to democratic and rule of law standards. The lack of ‘strings attached’ and the nontransparent nature of some of China’s foreign direct investment (FDI) in the region also enables local corruption and fosters democratic backsliding. As the Clingendael Institute reported, EU objectives of fostering good governance are directly and indirectly affected by economic engagements between the Western Balkans and China that bypass public procurement law, take place in a nontransparent manner, or may be neither economically nor environmentally sustainable from the EU’s point of view. EU state aid rules, as well as macroeconomic sustainability objectives, are put aside in these engagements. Simply put, the Western Balkan region’s engagement with China or the European Union comes with a very different set of strings attached.74 The dangling ‘carrot’ of EU accession for Western Balkan countries has thus lost some of its power in the face of China’s increased involvement in the region. Furthermore, through its economic interactions, China also

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increases its number of access points to Western Balkan institutions, business elites, and politicians, which provides China with political leverage and credibility in pushing key talking points, such as countering Western criticisms of Chinese sovereignty and human rights issues. While there is little evidence of an explicit Chinese foreign policy to promote authoritarian governance in the Western Balkans, China’s use of economic, political, and cultural sharp power tools demonstrates a shift toward a more proactive stance in the Western Balkans, thereby undermining EU and U.S. leverage.

Turkey Turkey has emerged as a major player in the Western Balkans over the last decade.75 Like China, Ankara does not seek to block the region’s membership in NATO or the EU. Its interests lie primarily in pursuing economic opportunities in the region and building ties to Muslim communities. Like China, Turkey does hold out the promise of an alternative source of economic investment backed by a particular model of authoritarian rule, all of which provides illiberal elites with greater leverage to reject Western conditionality. Turkey has deep historical ties to the Balkans through the former Ottoman Empire. Many Turks—especially elites—have roots in the region. There is a popular sense of kinship in Turkey with Muslim populations in the Balkans such as the Bosniaks and Albanians. But this does not mean that the Balkans occupy the imaginations of ordinary Turks or their leaders on a daily basis in the way Syria has over the last decade. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan’s neo-Ottomanism notwithstanding, his foreign policy is also often characterized by pragmatism and a focus on Ankara’s core economic interests in the region rather than a desire to dominate the region politically. If anything, Turkey has more pressing foreign policy preoccupations in other places, from Syria to Libya to Nagorno-Karabakh. President Erdo˘gan has gone to great lengths to cultivate personal relationships with key leaders in the Western Balkans, notably Aleksandar Vuˇci´c of Serbia, Hashim Thaçi of Kosovo, Bakir Izetbegovi´c of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama. All of these leaders either moved in a populist authoritarian direction in recent years and/or sit at the helm of patronage-driven power structures that have captured the state. All went out of their way to cultivate strong ties with Erdo˘gan. For example, when in July 2018 Erdo˘gan held a swearing-in

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ceremony in his newly built palace compound in Ankara, most European leaders snubbed the event because of the Turkish president’s escalating steps against democratic norms and institutions. But this did not stop Western Balkan leaders from attending. Heads of state and government from Bulgaria, Macedonia, Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo, and Serbia took front row seats at a grand celebration that marked the consolidation of absolute power in the hands of the Turkish president. They sat alongside close Erdo˘gan allies such as the emir of Qatar and the president of Venezuela.76 In the same year, Balkan leaders showed up for the opening of the new Istanbul airport, while senior EU officials stayed away. Erdo˘gan’s personalistic diplomacy—which he has pursued with special vigor in his relationships with Izetbegovi´c, Thaçi, Rama, and Vuši´c—was reinforced by offering Turkish investment and the model of a regional paternalistic strongman. Erdo˘gan has not explicitly sought to pick favored leaders or parties in any of these countries. But the ‘special relationship’ with Turkey and its president, writes Aydınta¸sba¸s, has allowed ‘Balkan leaders to show other great powers, such as Europe, that the Western Balkans is not without alternatives when it comes to alliances’.77 This, in turn, becomes a source of de facto nondemocratic counter-leverage acting against Western conditionality. In other words, Turkish influence in the Balkans offers political backing, prestige, investment, and assistance, at times exceeding that which Brussels is willing and able to provide and doing so without any conditionality or other strings attached. Regional elites were therefore quick to seize upon Erdo˘gan’s overtures. Furthermore, over the past two decades, Turkish investment in the countries of the region—which encompasses fields such as construction, transport, and finance—has increased steadily, reaching nearly $20 billion. Turkish exports to the region have reached nearly $10 billion, one-third of which goes to Serbia. Turkish contractors, which play an outsized role in the Arab world as well, are involved in various regional infrastructure projects, including the construction of a highway between Serbia and Bosnia, the construction of the new Pristina airport, and the privatization of coal mines in the region.78 A Turkish consortium bought a share in the Albanian telecommunications company after its privatization in 2007, and Turkish Airlines bought 49% of Bosnia’s B&H Airlines. Turkish companies and banks such as the state-owned Halkbank are active across the Western Balkans. There are over 30 branches of Halkbank in Serbia alone. The surprise of Turkish involvement in the Western Balkans is the extent to which Erdo˘gan has courted Serbia, which is reflected in the

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economic statistics presented above. In 2017 alone, twenty Turkishowned factories and other facilities opened in Serbia, many of them in undeveloped parts of the country with few Western investors.79 When Erdo˘gan visited Belgrade in 2017, he was received warmly. In Belgrade, ordinary Serbs cheered as the Turkish president explored the old Ottoman Kalemegdan fortress.80 All of this is surprising given that Serbian nationalists—among them former president and indicted war criminal Slobodan Miloševi´c—have long defined themselves by Orthodox Christian Serbia’s historic struggle against the Muslim Ottoman Empire. This struggle was invoked in the 1990s wars as Bosnian Serbs and their supporters in Belgrade fought the Muslim-dominated Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was supported by Turkey. Moreover, Serbia (as part of Yugoslavia) and Turkey had been on opposite sides of the Cold War. Yet, Belgrade political elites have been willing to pay homage to Erdo˘gan since Turkish support and investment have helped them consolidate their increasingly authoritarian rule. It is no coincidence that this deepening of Serbian-Turkish ties, personified in the relationship between Erdo˘gan and Vuˇci´c, has coincided with Serbia’s democratic retreat. Since Vuˇci´c first became president in 2017, the quality of Serbian democracy has fallen from ‘free’ to only ‘partly free’, according to Freedom House and a number of other indices of democratization. Freedom House concluded in 2020 that Serbia no longer qualifies as a democracy given the control Vuˇci´c wields over the judiciary, the electoral process, and both state and private media.81 Election monitors from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) said that the 2020 presidential election which led to a Vuˇci´c victory was marred by an uneven playing field, which is a hallmark of competitive authoritarianism. Since then, Vuˇci´c has moved to consolidate the ruling party’s grip on Serbia even further. The Serbian government controls all daily newspapers and nationwide television channels and gives significant loans to private media companies, evidence of how the country has the worst press freedoms in the Western Balkans. Meanwhile, in January 2022, Serbian ambassador to Turkey Zoran Markovi´c said that ‘Relations between the two countries are at their historic zenith and continue to evolve with new challenges and opportunities emerging’.82 Turkey’s role as a source of counter-democratic leverage in Serbia and other Western Balkan countries, thus, has not entailed outright support for any particular party or figure, nor has it deployed sharp power tools

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such as media and disinformation campaigns to promote Erdo˘gan’s autocratic template or attempt to discredit Western democracies. Rather, by harnessing its historical and religious ties to the Balkans and pursuing its economic interests—as well as deploying Erdo˘gan’s personal diplomacy— Ankara has offered a powerful alternative structure of external support to ruling elites, one that does not question their autocratic tendencies and kleptocratic ways. Meanwhile, Turkish-owned media in the region have helped amplify the narratives of local, state-owned media.

United Arab Emirates The UAE has no historical or cultural ties to the Balkans beyond nominally sharing a religion with the region’s Muslim populations. But in recent years Abu Dhabi has harnessed its impressive oil wealth to flex its diplomatic muscle around the world. In the post-Arab Spring Middle East and North Africa, this muscle-flexing has been unequivocally detrimental to democratization. This is because the prospect of more pluralistic politics struck fear in the hearts of rulers in Abu Dhabi and other Gulf capitals.83 Democratization threatened not only their absolutist rule, but also economic privileges. Meanwhile, the rising fortunes of political Islam after the Arab Spring presented a religiously rooted ideological challenge to the continued absolutist rule and also a governance-rooted one. This is because the Muslim Brothers in Egypt and other countries claim to support a model of state and society in which an ‘Islamic’ government can and should be a democratic one. The Emiratis and Saudis thus acted with incredible resolve, using all the tools available to them—backing military coups, financing strongmen, carrying out military operations— to roll back the democratic gains of the Arab Spring. They also worked hard to lobby Washington and various European governments to support their uncompromising worldview, which in turn led Western actors to dial back their democracy promotion agendas toward states such as Egypt.84 By contrast, the Western Balkans are too distant for the Emiratis to fret about whether a friendly autocrat is in power. As in the cases of China and Turkey, it is ultimately in the UAE’s economic interests for the Balkan states to join the European Union. The UAE sees the Western Balkans as a place to make money as it contemplates a post-petroleum future. But the absence of a strong autocratic or geopolitical motive does not change the fact that the UAE is among the powers that reinforce local

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tendencies toward the centralization of power, close ties between politics and business, and various forms of corruption. The first UAE embassy in the Balkans opened in 2012 in Montenegro, within the luxury Atlas Capital shopping center in Podgorica, which itself was built by the Abu Dhabi Financial Group. UAE officials stressed at the time that they hoped Montenegro would be their ‘gateway to the Balkans’ where they hoped to gain a foothold as a stepping stone to Western European markets. To pave the way, the UAE used economic aid as a means of building relations with the leaders and peoples of the region. Official development assistance in the form of grants and concessional loans from the UAE to the Balkans amounted to US$61 million from 2009 to 2013, with most of this aid going to Albania, and to a lesser extent Montenegro and North Macedonia. For example, the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development (ADFD) provided a e36.7 million concessionary loan to Albania for the construction of the Tirana–Elbasan highway and e16 million to build the Sheik Zayed airport in Kukës. Over time, the UAE became the second largest non-EU donor to North Macedonia, just behind the United States.85 The most consequential UAE engagement has targeted Serbia. As in the case of Turkey’s relations with Serbia, Abu Dhabi–Belgrade ties are somewhat of a surprise considering the UAE’s criticism of Serbiafor its past involvement in war crimes and its strong support of Kosovo’s independence. UAE involvement in Serbia began in 2013, when then-Deputy Prime Minister Vuˇci´c announced several high-profile business deals and a US$1 billion Emirati state loan. In 2014, then-President Tomislav Nikoli´c met in Belgrade with UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed bin Sultan al Nahyan. Nikoli´c subsequently spoke effusively about the UAE, and productive relations reportedly developed between Serbian and UAE intelligence agencies.86 The most visible commercial deal was the strategic partnership between the old Yugoslav JAT Airways and Etihad under which the latter acquired a 49 percent stake in the Serbian airline as well as management rights for a period of five years, while the Serbian government retained the remaining 51 percent and held five of nine governing board seats in the company. JAT Airways was reorganized and renamed Air Serbia in October 2013 and launched its first inaugural flight from Belgrade to Abu Dhabi. The move followed Abu Dhabi’s goal of centralizing part of the global airline system in Abu Dhabi and Dubai, making the airports a global hub for connecting flights. Increased revenues and passengers helped pay off JAT’s $79 million

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debt.87 After the multi-year management contract expired, Etihad Airlines sold 20 percent of their stake back to the Serbian government in 2021 given losses from the COVID-19 pandemic. Although the level of ownership decreased, the aviation partnership remains strong. As of 2021, Air Serbia was considering restarting Belgrade–Dubai flights as a key part of its post-pandemic expansion.88 Another crowning UAE investment in Serbia—albeit one mired by accusations of corruption—is the massive development called ‘Belgrade on the Water’ on the banks of the Sava in Belgrade. Evidence supports the project’s early success: 2021 profits rose above $30 million; Belgrade Waterfront’s financial statements show a $13 million growth since 2015; as of 2022 the company’s business assets are worth $740 million.89 When the coronavirus pandemic hit in 2020, Serbia turned to the UAE for investments in public health. In 2021, UAE’s Mubadala joined Beijing in a joint investment to build a factory for the Chinese vaccine producer Sinopham valued at $32.5 million.90, 91 An unusually close relationship between Vuˇci´c and UAE ruler Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ) has underpinned many of these projects. Central to this analysis is the way in which this relationship has helped fortify Vuˇci´c’s increasing monopoly on political power over the years. This, in turn, has spurred allegations that Vuˇci´c (as well as former Montenegrin President Milo Ðukanovi´c around whom allegations of criminality and corruption have swirled for decades) have profited from their relationships with Mohammad Dahlan, a shadowy intermediary who holds both Montenegrin and Serbian citizenship, to line their pockets and those of their cronies. Evidence of strong-arm tactics used against Serbs opposing the Belgrade Waterfront project and the exorbitant cost of construction and rents at the new complex has only furthered the perception that the project is meant to benefit politically connected oligarchs.92 Put differently, much like China, the way in which the UAE operates in Serbia serves to reproduce corruption among local elites and state-owned companies who have profited handsomely from the Belgrade–Abu Dhabi relationship. At the same time, Abu Dhabi’s rule of law-undermining approach to investment and the personal basis of Serbian-UAE ties reinforces a backsliding toward authoritarianism, an undermining of EU conditionality, and the weakening Western democratic leverage more generally.

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Conclusions The preceding analysis has documented and analyzed the growing influence of external autocratic actors—Russia, China, Turkey, and the UAE— on democratization in the Balkans. There is little doubt that in countries such as North Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Albania, domestic structural challenges to democratization remain formidable. Moreover, a stalled EU accession process has underpinned the rise of populist authoritarian political forces throughout the region. However, as this chapter has demonstrated, the growing influence in the Balkans of the four external autocratic actors has helped to empower and entrench authoritarian elites. Given the uncertainties and complications associated with ongoing negotiations with Brussels, it is natural that Balkan elites would gravitate toward the condition-free, simpler bargain being offered by external autocratic powers. All four of these powers have deployed sharp power and other tools to offer illiberal elites alternative sources of political and economic support, and thus the means to resist Western conditionality. Put differently, external autocratic actors have provided Balkan elites with counter-leverage in their engagement with the EU and the United States, but also—and perhaps more importantly—with their own publics.93 Meanwhile, investment and aid flowing from autocratic powers reflect both the Balkan preference for opaque, elite-driven deals that serve to reinforce existing practices of patronage and corruption among ruling autocratic elites, thereby helping to entrench them in power. In the case of Russian influence in the Balkans, external autocratic influence has reinforced existing divisions and strengthened anti-Western elites seeking to slow down the process of Euro-Atlantic integration. As Bassuener writes, [Authoritarian actors] employ a mode of governing through personalized power that blurs the line between public and private resources. This has deep congruence throughout the region, where institutional mechanisms meant to ensure accountability and enforce the rule of law remain shallow. Opaque deal-making is notably facilitated by the weakness of independent media in the host countries, where Balkan political elites tend to dominate domestic media narratives through control of major broadcast stations and other key outlets. Under these conditions, authoritarian powers attempting to exert influence on leaders and publics through state media initiatives in the Western Balkans are pushing on an open door.94

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Any one of these countries might not have made a dent as a source of counter-democratic leverage were they operating alone. Even Russia, with its ‘active measures’ designed to subvert Western influence in the Balkans, could not single-handedly turn the clock back on democratization. But as part of a larger package of external autocratic influence, the impact is notable. Take the example of Serbia, where democratic decline has been the most pronounced in recent years such that the country is no longer classified as democratic on most indices. All four of the autocratic powers examined here have exerted substantial influence in Belgrade, helping President Vuˇci´c and his Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) entrench their increasingly autocratic and clientelist form of rule. Vuˇci´c, in turn, has used support from Russia, China, Turkey, and the UAE to resist Western democratic leverage. Russia’s war in Ukraine has further demonstrated the stakes that Putin attaches to broadening Russia’s influence. Russia’s willingness to employ sharp power tactics that exacerbate democratic backsliding in the region is rooted in Moscow’s goal of securing its continuing influence in south and eastern Europe. Thus, one lasting consequence of external autocratic influence is diminished Western will to promote democracy in the region. This is in part because the influence of external autocratic powers has reinforced existing views and prejudices in the West about the democratic deficiencies of Balkan countries. Moreover, there is fear in Western capitals that too much pressure will only serve to further push the Balkans into the hands of non-Western powers. Some of the Western reticence to actively promote democracy also has to do with competing goals, such as the fear of mass migration and the key role Balkan states play in curbing it, not to mention securing the support of Balkan states for Ukraine. In recent years both the United States and Europe have noticeably ratcheted down their democratic pressure on Serbia and other Balkan states.95 As one senior Western official told us, ‘there is a sense that Serbia is drifting away, to China, Russia, and other countries… and the fear in Brussels and Washington has been that if we push too hard on the democracy file, we will lose influence altogether’.96 Yet, if this was a conscious strategy, it has hardly worked. Instead, in 2023, Belgrade is closer to its autocratic allies than ever before. The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine may yet strengthen the resolve of the European Union to hasten enlargement to the Balkans while strengthening the West’s will to more robustly promote democracy in

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the region, thereby mitigating the autocratic influence of non-Western powers. But that outcome is still far from certain.

Notes 1. Florian Bieber, The Rise of Authoritarianism in the Western Balkans. London: Springer, 2020. 2. EWB. 2021. “Freedom House: Western Balkans Saw Both Setbacks and Progress,” European Western Balkans, March 3, 2021, https://europe anwesternbalkans.com/2021/03/03/freedom-house-western-balkanssaw-both-setbacks-and-progress/. 3. Ibid. 4. Florian Bieber and N. Tzifakis, “The Western Balkans as a Geopolitical Chessboard? Myths, Realities and Policy Options,” Social Science Research Network, 2019. 5. Ivan Krastev, After Europe. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2017. 6. Ibid. 7. Arolda Elbasani, European Integration and Transformation in the Balkans: Europeanization or Business as Usual? London: Routledge, 2014. 8. Jelena Džanki´c, Soeren Keil, and Marko Kmezi´c, eds. The Europeanisation of the Western Balkans: A Failure of EU Conditionality? London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019. 9. Katsiaryna Yakouchyk, “Beyond Autocracy Promotion: A Review,” Political Studies Review 17, no. 2 (May 1, 2019): 147–60. 10. Sarah Snyder, From Selma to Moscow: How Human Rights Activists Transformed U.S. Foreign Policy. Columbia University Press, 2018. 11. Nelli Babayan, “The Return of the Empire? Russia’s Counteraction to Transatlantic Democracy Promotion in Its Near Abroad,” Democratization 22, no. 3 (April 16, 2015): 438–58. 12. Adam Nossiter, “Ill Will Grows in a Former Colonial Region,” New York Times, November 12, 2019. 13. Julia Bader, “China, Autocratic Patron? An Empirical Investigation of China as a Factor in Autocratic Survival,” International Studies Quarterly 59, no. 1 (2015): 23–33. 14. Christopher Walker, “What Is ‘Sharp Power’?,” Journal of Democracy 29, no. 3 (2018): 9–23. Also see Erich Schwartzel, Red Carpet: Hollywood, China, and the Global Battle for Cultural Supremacy. New York: Penguin, 2022. 15. Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Power,” Foreign Policy, no. 80 (1990): 153–71. 16. Walker, “What Is ‘Sharp Power’?”. 17. Ibid.

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18. Ibid. 19. Mersiha Gadzo, “Russian Spies Found Guilty of Montenegro Coup Attempt,” Al Jazeera, May 9, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/ 2019/5/9/russian-spies-found-guilty-of-montenegro-coup-attempt. 20. Jeronim Perovi´c, “The Tito-Stalin Split: A Reassessment in Light of New Evidence,” Journal of Cold War Studies 9, no. 2 (April 1, 2007): 32–63. 21. Annie Himes and Paul Stronski, “Russia’s Game in the Balkans,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 6, 2019, https://carnegiee ndowment.org/2019/02/06/russia-s-game-in-balkans-pub-78235. 22. Dmitri Bechev, “Russia’s Strategic Interests and Tools of Influence in the Western Balkans,” Atlantic Council, December 20, 2019, https://www. atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/russia-strategic-interests-andtools-of-influence-in-the-western-balkans/. 23. Even in ethnically homogenous states such as Albania, Russia has funded political parties to stoke divisions on NATO and the EU. See Dan Freidman, “Report: US Intel Officials Believe Russia Secretly Backed Albanian Candidate,” Mother Jones, September 15, 2022, https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2022/09/report-us-intelofficials-beleive-russia-secretly-backed-albanian-candidate/. 24. Stanislav Secrieru, Russia in the Balkans: Tactical Wins, Strategic Setbacks. European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), 2019. 25. Lillia Shevtsova, “Forward to the Past in Russia,” in Authoritarianism Goes Global: The Challenge to Democracy. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016, 40–56. 26. Shevtsova, “Forward to the Past in Russia.” 27. Bechev, “Russia’s Strategic Interests and Tools of Influence in the Western Balkans.” 28. Rem Korteweg, Energy as a Tool of Foreign Policy of Authoritarian States, in Particular Russia. European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, April 27, 2018. 29. Himes and Stronski, “Russia’s Game in the Balkans.” 30. Heather A. Conley and Matthew Melino, “Russian Malign Influence in Montenegro: The Weaponization and Exploitation of History, Religion, and Economics,” CSIS Briefs (Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 14, 2019), https://www.csis.org/analysis/russian-maligninfluence-montenegro. 31. Conley and Melino, “Russian Malign Influence in Montenegro.” 32. Andrew E. Kramer and Joseph Orovic, “Two Suspected Russian Agents Among 14 Convicted in Montenegro Coup Plot,” The New York Times, May 9, 2019, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/09/ world/europe/montenegro-coup-plot-gru.html. 33. “Montenegro Overturns Coup Verdict for Two Russians, 11 Others,” Al Jazeera, February 5, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/ 5/montenegro-overturns-coup-verdict-for-2-russians-11-others.

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34. Andrew Higgins, “Bound by a Sense of Victimhood, Serbia Sticks With Russia,” The New York Times, March 30, 2022, sec. World, https://www. nytimes.com/2022/03/30/world/europe/ukraine-serbia-russia.html. 35. Sonja Gocanin, “In Serbia, Threats and Insults Are a Cost of Reporting on Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 18:34:32Z, sec. Serbia, https://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-russia-ukraine-inv asion-threats-harassment/31756534.html. 36. Reuters, “Bosnia’s pro-Russian Serb Leader Tried to Stop Country’s UN Vote -Report,” Reuters, March 3, 2022, sec. Europe, https://www.reu ters.com/world/europe/bosnias-pro-russian-serb-leader-tried-stop-cou ntrys-un-vote-report-2022-03-03/. 37. Associated Press France, “Russia Accused of Stoking Divisions in Bosnia amid War in Ukraine,” France 24, April 29, 2022, https://www.fra nce24.com/en/live-news/20220429-russia-accused-of-stoking-divisionsin-bosnia-amid-war-in-ukraine. 38. Andi Hoxha, “Ukraine War: Serbia Is Shifting Closer to Russia—Here’s Why,” The Conversation, November 7, 2022, https://theconversat ion.com/amp/ukraine-war-serbia-is-shifting-closer-to-russia-heres-why192472. 39. Bechev, “Russia’s Strategic Interests and Tools of Influence in the Western Balkans.” 40. Samuel Greene et al., “Mapping Fake News and Disinformation in the Western Balkans and Identifying Ways to Effectively Counter Them,” February 2021, 104. 41. Greene et al., “Mapping Fake News and Disinformation in the Western Balkans and Identifying Ways to Effectively Counter Them.” 42. Ibid. 43. Irvin Pekmez, “Russia Targets Bosnia With Disinformation About Ukrainian War,” Balkan Insight (blog), May 9, 2022, https://balkanins ight.com/2022/05/09/russia-targets-bosnia-with-disinformation-aboutukrainian-war/. 44. Martin Vladimirov et al., Russian Economic Footprint in the Western Balkans. Center for the Study of Democracy, February 2020, https:// www.cipe.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/WESTERN_BALKANS_ WEB_pdf.pdf. 45. Himes and Stronski, “Russia’s Game in the Balkans.” 46. Vladimirov et al., “Russian Economic Footprint in the Western Balkans.” 47. Korteweg, “Energy as a Tool of Foreign Policy of Authoritarian States, in Particular Russia.” 48. Tim Gosling, “War in Ukraine Triggers Energy Dilemma in Central Europe,” Balkan Insight, March 15, 2022, https://balkaninsight.com/ 2022/03/15/war-in-ukraine-triggers-energy-dilemma-in-central-europe/ .

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49. Fatos Bytyci and Ognen Teofilovski, “Balkans Turns to Coal as Energy Crisis Trumps Climate Commitments,” Reuters, April 19, 2022, sec. Energy, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/balkansturns-coal-energy-crisis-trumps-climate-commitments-2022-04-19/. 50. Reuters, “Serbia Won’t Recognise Results of Russia’s Referendums in Ukraine—Vucic,” Reuters, September 28, 2022, sec. Europe, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/serbia-wont-recogniseresults-russias-referendums-ukraine-vucic-2022-09-28/. 51. Heather A. Conley et al., China’s ‘Hub-and-Spoke’ Strategy in the Balkans. Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2019, https://csiswebsite-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/200427_Chi naStrategy.pdf. 52. SEE Energy News, “Belt and Road Initiative—Connecting China and the Balkans,” serbia-energy.eu, February 4, 2020, https://serbia-energy.eu/ belt-and-road-initiative-connecting-china-and-the-balkans/. 53. Henrik Boesen Lindbo Larsen, “The Western Balkans between the EU, NATO, Russia and China,” CSS Analyses in Security Policy, no. 263, May 2020, p. 4, https://doi.org/10.3929/ETHZ-B-000412853. 54. Xavier Richet, “The Chinese Presence on the Periphery of Europe. The ‘17 + 1 Format’, The Trojan Horse of China?,” Global Economic Observer 7, no. 1 (2019), https://ideas.repec.org/a/ntu/ntugeo/vol7-iss1-19152.html. 55. Dragan Pavli´cevi´c, “Structural Power and the China-EU-Western Balkans Triangular Relations,” Asia Europe Journal 17, no. 4 (December 1, 2019): 453–68, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-019-00566-y. 56. Heather A. Conley et al., China’s ‘Hub-and-Spoke’ Strategy in the Balkans. Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2019, https://csiswebsite-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/200427_Chi naStrategy.pdf. 57. Conley et al., “China’s ‘Hub-and-Spoke’ Strategy in the Balkans.” 58. John Hurley, Scott Morris, and Gailyn Portelance, “Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective,” Journal of Infrastructure, Policy and Development 3, no. 1 (June 28, 2019): 139. 59. Zweers et al., “China and the EU in the Western Balkans: Different Strings Attached.” 60. Hurley, Morris, and Portelance, “Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective.” 61. Nadège Rolland, China’s Eurasian Century? Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative. Seattle, WA: NBR, The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2017. 62. Rolland, China’s Eurasian Century?

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63. Jacob Stokes, “Does China Really Respect Sovereignty?,” The Diplomat, March 23, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/does-china-reallyrespect-sovereignty/. 64. Sophie Richardson, “China’s ‘Slanders and Smears’ at UN Human Rights Council,” Human Rights Watch, March 11, 2021, https://www.hrw. org/news/2021/03/11/chinas-slanders-and-smears-un-human-rightscouncil. 65. Wouter Zweers et al., “China’s Approach to the Western Balkans | China and the EU in the Western Balkans,” August 2020, https://www.clinge ndael.org/pub/2020/china-and-the-eu-in-the-western-balkans/1-chinasapproach-to-the-western-balkans/. 66. Ibid. 67. Peter Mattis, “Reexamining the Confucian Institutes,” The Diplomat, August 2, 2012, https://thediplomat.com/2012/08/reexamining-theconfucian-institutes/. 68. Ekapija, “Construction of Chinese Cultural Center Building Close to Completion,” Britic (The British Serb Magazine) (blog), May 2020, https://bit.ly/2LTOc0A. 69. Human Rights Watch, “China: Government Threats to Academic Freedom Abroad,” Human Rights Watch, March 21, 2019, https:// www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/21/china-government-threats-academicfreedom-abroad. 70. Vladimir Shopov, “Decade of Patience: How China Became a Power in the Western Balkans—European Council on Foreign Relations,” ECFR (blog), February 2, 2021, https://ecfr.eu/publication/decade-ofpatience-how-china-became-a-power-in-the-western-balkans/. 71. Shopov, “Decade of Patience.” 72. Valerie Hopkins, “Balkan Nations Turn to China and Russia for Jabs,” February 2, 2021, https://www.ft.com/content/7508a3eb-c36b-4f6bbd13-4a3a248b0686. 73. Michael Leigh, “Vaccine Diplomacy: Soft Power Lessons from China and Russia?,” Bruegel (blog), April 27, 2021, https://www.bruegel.org/ 2021/04/vaccine-diplomacy-soft-power-lessons-from-china-and-russia/. 74. Clingendael Institute, “China and the EU in the Western Balkans: Different strings attached.” 75. Graham Fuller, Turkey’s New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to Western China. London: Routledge 2019. 76. Asli Aydınta¸sba¸s, “From Myth to Reality: How to Understand Turkey’s Role in the Western Balkans.” European Council on Foreign Affairs, March 2019. https://ecfr.eu/publication/from_myth_to_reality_how_ to_understand_turkeys_role_in_the_western_balkans/ 77. Ibid.

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78. There is evidence that Turkey also engaged in translational repression in Kosovo targeting opponents of the ruling regime. See Fatos Bytyci, “Kosovo investigates seizure of Turkish nationals,” Reuters, March 31, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kosovo-security-turkey/ kosovo-investigates-seizure-of-turkish-nationals-idUSKBN1H70CC. 79. Aydınta¸sba¸s, “From Myth to Reality.” 80. RFE Balkan Service, “Turkey’s Erdo˘gan Gets Warm Welcome In Serbia’s Mostly Muslim Sandzak Region,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, October 11, 2017, https://www.rferl.org/a/turkey-serbia-/28785717. html. 81. Freedom House, “Serbia 2020 Country Report,” Freedom in The World 2020 (Freedom House, 2020), https://freedomhouse.org/country/ser bia/freedom-world/2020. 82. Daily Sabah, “Turkey-Serbia Ties at Peak, Continuing to Improve,” January 18, 2022, https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/tur key-serbia-ties-at-peak-continuing-to-improve-serbian-envoy. 83. Mieczysław P. Boduszynski, ´ U.S. Democracy Promotion in the Arab World: Beyond Interests vs. Ideals. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 2019. 84. Ben Freeman, The Emirati Lobby: How the UAE Wins in Washington. Center for International Policy, 2019. https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/ 3ba8a1_cc7f1fad2f7a497ba5fb159a6756c34a.pdf?index=true. 85. Tena Prelec, “UAE in the Balkans: Meeting Point Between ‘Sultanism’ and Authoritarianism?” European Western Balkans, July 13, 2018, https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2018/07/13/uae-balkansmeeting-point-sultanism-authoritarianism/. 86. Ibid. 87. CAPA, Etihad Aviation Group Airline Group Profile. CAPA Centre for Aviation, 2021. https://centreforaviation.com/data/profiles/airline-gro ups/etihad-aviation-group. 88. Vuk Vuksanovi´c, Serbia’s Best Friend in the Arab World: The UAE. Middle East Institute, 2021. https://www.mei.edu/publications/serbias-best-fri end-arab-world-uae. 89. Belgrade Waterfront. Belgrade Waterfront Construction Updates. Belgrade Waterfront, 2022. https://www.belgradewaterfront.com/en/property/ bw-vista/. ˇ ci´c, Serbia’s Emergence as China’s new Strategic Hub, 2021. https:/ 90. D. Caˇ /www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/opinion/serbias-emergence-aschinas-new-strategic-hub/. 91. Quoted in Bartlett, Ker-Lindsay, Alexander, and Prelec. “The UAE as an emerging actor in the Western Balkans: The case of strategic investment in Serbia.” 92. Prelec, op. cit.

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93. Bassuener, “Foreign Authoritarian Influence in the Balkans,” p. 3. 94. Ibid. 95. Jasmin Mujanovi´c. Hunger and Fury: The Crisis of Democracy in the Balkans. Oxford University Press, 2018. 96. Authors’ interview with senior Western diplomat in Belgrade, May 2020.

CHAPTER 5

Geostrategic Tendencies and Challenges for the Western Balkans and Serbia Negoslav P. Ostoji´c, Aleksandar Weisner, and Luka V. Ili´c

Introduction The Western Balkans today is a far less interesting and important region for the process of EU Enlargement, compared to countries of Central and Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989). However, now the European Union (EU) is practically forced to devote more attention and efforts to the Western Balkans (WB), primarily because of new and potential security problems and violent conflicts in the region. It is still an open question about the final results and consequences of the transformation in the WB countries (Bosnia–Herzegovina, North Macedonia,

N. P. Ostoji´c · A. Weisner (B) · L. V. Ili´c European Center for Peace and Development (ECPD), United Nations University for Peace, Belgrade, Serbia e-mail: [email protected] N. P. Ostoji´c e-mail: [email protected] L. V. Ili´c e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Gardner (ed.), Geopolitical Turmoil in the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34318-6_5

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Serbia, Albania, Montenegro and Kosovo—as a territory with a special status), which began with the collapse of the communist regimes and the disintegration of Yugoslavia at the end of last century. Two former republics, federal autonomous units of Yugoslavia, Slovenia, and Croatia, managed rather quickly to become members of the EU (Slovenia in 2004, and Croatia in 2013). Other ex-Yugoslav republics (Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia–Herzegovina, and Macedonia), today sovereign countries, even more than two decades after the breakup of Yugoslavia, are still seen more as potential trouble-makers, than as stable and reliable European partners, with a clear perspective of integration with the EU. The situation in the WB countries is most often described in reports as “state capture”, implying that these countries continuously suffer from corruption and organized crime, in general from lack of democratic institutions and procedures, human rights and freedoms, and lack of rule of law. Numerous inter-ethnic, inter-national, inter-religious and civil wars, uprisings, and rebellions over the entire century have left enormous consequences for the citizens of the Balkans. Almost all of these conflicts, from the far and recent past, are still active and threatening. Scholars describe them as frozen, deep-rooted, protracted, cyclical conflicts. These conflicts and traumas are an important part of collective memories, social capital, and identity problems, and as such impede the process of stabilization, peacebuilding, and development in the region. While the average period of full integration of Central and Eastern European countries into the EU was about a decade, for countries of the Western Balkans, this period has already lasted for two decades1 with still uncertain dynamics and perspectives. Due to the prolonged crisis (Kosovo, Bosnia–Hercegovina, Brexit and now also the war in Ukraine), the last stage of the integration process of the WB countries with the EU seems far from certain. The stability and resilience of the WB region toward conflicts and crisis significantly depend on the international environment in general, and particularly on the role, presence, and activities of the key international actors in the region—the U.S., the EU, Russian Federation, Turkey, and China. Individually, with the exception of Serbia, each of the countries of the WB is recording some kind of progress in getting closer to the EU (with Bosnia–Herzegovina just receiving the Candidate status), while, at the same time, in the majority of cases, they are not getting a clearer

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perspective of joining the EU—many even feel becoming further away from EU membership.

Challenges and Trends of Post-Communist and Post-Yugoslav Transformation Since the 1990s, when the transformation started, the countries of Western Balkans are still going through, at least, six key, complex, and very demanding processes of transformation. All these reform challenges and demands were taking place at the same time, which made them much more difficult to manage (especially since the processes of transformation were started after a decade of armed conflicts in the region). These transformation processes include the following: 1. Post-communist socio-political transformation (including issues of territorial integrity and sovereignty, building a multi-party parliamentary system, transformation of the judicial and educational systems, and establishing new democratic institutions, regulations, and practice); 2. Reindustrialization and economic transformation building a new economic infrastructure and replacing the former centrally planned economic model by a neoliberal economic model; 3. Post-war reconciliation and building of intra-regional trust, cooperation, and religious and ethnic tolerance, including the development of a number of regional cooperation initiatives, organizations, and networks; 4. Re-positioning of the region into the world markets in response to the demands of global economic competition and facing the consequences of the economic crisis (started in 2008, and now reappearing due to the Coronavirus pandemic); 5. Challenges arising from exposure to the consequences of the Middle East wars, and war in Ukraine; including refugee flows and economic migration—contributing to the rise of radical and extreme religious and political organizations; 6. Geopolitical transformation, (re)positioning, and building of new strategic partnerships in restructured international relations involving countries with long-term geostrategic interests in the WB region (EU members, Russia, U.S., China, and Turkey).

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After three decades of reforms and implementation of the SLP 2 transformation model in the Balkans, some progress, compared with the 1990s, has been made in many areas: greater economic stability, financial and monetary discipline and inflation control, integrated market and global economic exchange, structuring of parliamentary democratic institutions, civilian control of security structures, and compatibility with international institutions in the field of border control and organized crime (Europol, Interpol, OSCE). At least that’s how it looked before the Coronavirus pandemic (2020), and the war in Ukraine (2022). But, the Coronavirus pandemic and the related economic crisis brought new challenges. Within just a few weeks, the Coronavirus 19 has become, not only a serious medical/health issue, but, also a challenge for the concept of human security, a new understanding of the sustainability of economic development, a need for the development of new educational activities and models, a redefinition of many international political relations and attitudes, a challenge of how to implement and adopt the Public International Law and values, understanding of globalism, and new social theories about the future of the interconnected, interdependent global world. The WB region, already characterized as unstable, fragile, and a potential source of new serious conflicts, was further destabilized by the war in Ukraine, and the fact that Russia has marked three countries in the Western Balkans (Montenegro, Albania, and Northern Macedonia) as “enemy” countries, while it is developing special relations with only one specific territorial unit (Republic of Srpska), within the internationally recognized sovereign state of Bosnia–Herzegovina, also represents a new strategic element in the WB region.

EU Partnership and Integration With the exception of Serbia and Bosnia–Herzegovina, the rest of WB countries, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Albania, are NATO members, and the majority of their citizens are welcoming future EU membership, as they believe that it would greatly contribute to strengthening the strategic resilience of the region to internal or external violent conflicts. Not only does the WB belong to the European socio-economic area according to geographical, cultural, and historical criteria, likewise the most important economic and political partner for the entire Western

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Balkans has been and remains the EU. The structural weaknesses, political divisions, and potential instability inherent in the situation in the Western Balkans cannot be overcome, neither can more dynamic GDP growth be achieved without the positive action of an external integrative factor, such as the European Union. Thanks to this partnership, obvious progress has been made in the areas of building and integrating transport/communication infrastructures and standards (including IT), establishing institutions of the security system and justice (War Crimes Prosecutor, Ombudsman, Commissioner for the Protection of Equality, Supreme State Auditors …). Without support for economic growth, the integration process and the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (Den Haag), the security situation, human rights standards, and conditions for coexistence would be much more difficult. The whole region is developing all industrial infrastructure on EU standards, and the region receives most of the financial assistance from the EU funds for cultural, youth, science, sport, security, and other kinds of exchanges, programmes, and networking. These are just some of the reasons why European integration remains the best strategic option for each WB country. Progress in EU negotiations for WB countries also implies progress in building the rule of law, improving bilateral and regional relations, as well as speeding up the overall EU integration process and liberalization of the “four freedoms”.3 At the same time, already for several consecutive years, the annual country reports from the European Commission (starting in 2016) have highlighted that the region has been characterized by stagnation or by little progress in democratic governance, human rights, and the rule of law. In spite of its efforts, disintegration inside the region continues to dominate in the political, cultural, and educational domains, and it is unclear and uncertain when and how this trend will change. According to The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions report from 2019 (“Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament”), the Western Balkan countries show clear elements of state capture, including links with organized crime, such as human trafficking, drugs and weapons, and corruption at all levels of government and administration. Despite everything that has been done over the last three decades by many international organizations (OSCE, UNDP, EU, USAID …) to begin a process of reconciliation and progress, and despite the fact that

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the number of intra-regional bi- or multilateral economic, political, scientific, and cultural agreements keeps increasing, the region is still suffering from mistrust, animosities, and tensions, mainly on ethnic and religious basis, and also from the high level of corruption and organized crime. None of the international political and economic initiatives and strategies implemented in the WB over the last thirty years (e.g. Dayton Agreement 1995, Southeast European Cooperative Initiative 1996, Stabilisation and Association Process 1999, Stability Pact for South East Europe 1999, UN Resolution 1244, Thessaloniki Declaration 2003, Regional Cooperation Council 2008, Brussels Agreement 2013, Berlin Initiative 2014, Regional Youth Cooperation Council 2016, Washington Agreement 2020 …), nor their cumulative effects, has yet succeeded in reversing the tendency of further regional disintegration along ethnic, religious, and national divisions. For the further process of transformation and EU integration, it would be crucial to investigate and understand the reasons for this state of affairs.

EU Integration---The Case of Serbia To understand the current position of Serbia in the relation to the EU accession negotiations, especially in the context of the war in Ukraine and the achievement of full alignment with the EU’s policy toward Russia, two key problems arise: (a) the issue of energy supply and security and (b) the problem of the status of Kosovo. For the last fifteen years, the issue of privatization, reconstruction, and development of the energy sector of Serbia (destroyed during the NATO bombing in 1999) has been resolved mainly through bilateral agreements with companies from Russia. In addition to the energy aspect, the contracts also have strong (geo)politically motivated content and goals. The negotiations, that preceded the contracts, were conducted at the highest political level—among the presidents, governments, and prime ministers of the two countries. In 2008, the Government of Serbia and Gazprom signed a contract to sell the Serbian Oil Industry (NIS) to the Russian state company “Gazprom Neft” for around 400 million euros. That included the sale of all refineries, oil and gas reserves, and additional state-owned infrastructure, not only in Serbia, but also the oil-shares of the Republic of Serbia in Angola. After several years of ownership transformation and reform of the oil and gas complex, Serbia confronted the

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energy crisis, caused by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the sanctions imposed by the EU against Russia, in a situation where the majority of the economy and citizens depended on energy sources (including gasoline) that are wholly or mostly owned by Russian companies. Negotiations between the Government of Serbia (essentially the negotiations are led by the president of the state) and the Government of Kosovo on the status of Kosovo, which Serbia considers part of its territory (Kosovo was an autonomous region within Serbia in Yugoslavia), with the European Commission (EC) in the role of moderator/facilitator and mediator, had already started in 2006. The period from 2006 to 2022 was then used by the Government of Kosovo to strengthen its international status, territorial integrity, and jurisdiction over infrastructure, while some institutions (juridical, health, educational …) that were part of the legal and political system of Serbia were continuously disappearing. The neuralgic point, the territory that is at the center of all negotiations so far and the place of occasional violent conflicts, is North Kosovo, where significantly most of the population consists of citizens who have Serbian ethnic identity and express loyalty to the state of Serbia. The EC’s role as a moderator/facilitator and mediator of the negotiations has been compromised to a certain extent since 24 EU states (out of 27) recognized Kosovo as an independent state. While for the President and the Government of Serbia, the negotiations with Kosovo are a struggle to preserve the right to territorial integrity, in accordance with international law and historical rights, for the EC, the negotiations are a process of succession, the transfer of jurisdiction over the territory from the institutions of the state of Serbia to the state of Kosovo, and for the Government of Kosovo, and the majority population of Albanian origin, the negotiations are the confirmation of a new internationally recognized state and the achievement of full sovereignty. In the fight to preserve territorial integrity, for decades Serbia has been relying on diplomatic support from Russia, especially Russia’s right of veto in the UN Security Council. The final success of the European integration process for Serbia is additionally burdened by a new challenge which, in fact, is a derivative of the two previously described problems. With the last resolution from 2022, the European Parliament clearly explained to Serbia that, as a candidate for EU membership, it is expected to join the sanctions imposed by the EU on Russia, and that the process of Serbia’s integration (which is already significantly stagnant, accompanied by years of continuous increase in the negative attitude of Serbian citizens toward the idea

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of joining the EU), depends on whether Serbia will join and support the EU’s foreign policy measures. In this case, Serbia has received two paradoxical demands from the EU—to give up on the fight for her own territorial integrity (Kosovo), and to impose sanctions against Russia to support Ukraine’s fight for territorial integrity. However, in the cost– benefit analysis of Serbia, the problem of energy dependence on Russia has already been included, as well as the problem of the potential loss of Russia’s support in the UN body in representing Serbia’s interests in solving the problem in Kosovo. Not only today has Serbia had the least success in the integration process since 2008 when the Stabilization and Association Agreement between the Republic of Serbia and the European Union was signed, but even the perception of key political subjects of Serbia of integration with the EU as a key national strategic goal has been questioned to an extent like never before. After the early 1990s, the EU has again been launching the question of whether, or to what extent Serbia can be counted on as a constructive and reliable partner. At the same time, the Euroscepticism of the citizens of Serbia is successively strengthening, already for several years. The impression is that with each new challenge for the EU (Brexit, immigration from Asia and Africa, the war in Ukraine), Serbia is less and less considered a candidate for the EU, and that the integration process is increasingly breaking through a labyrinth in which no path leads to a solution in accordance with national interests.

The Current Situation In the Western Balkans region there are still open issues of: (a) ethnic and national divisions with the claim to the historical rights over the territory—questions which started with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the First World War, (b) ideological divisions from the Second World War, but also (c) social conflicts between the oligarchs and the political elite, on one side (basically the profiteers of the Yugoslavia dissolution war of the 1990s), and, on another side, the losers of the transformation who became the lowest paid workers in Europe. The social inequalities between the rich and the poor in the WB are the largest in Europe.

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Also, the current situation in the WB is characterized by: • The decades-long trend of militarization of the public space, collective memory, political culture, and the education system. This includes the aspiration of the state security apparatus to dominate the public sphere, to take more and more control over the lives of citizens, and that military goals and military values (hierarchy, discipline, obedience, combat readiness, and xenophobia) dominate national culture, education, media, religion, politics, and economy. The process implies that militarization is always striving to impose an understanding of national security as the most important public interest and priority. • High level of ethnic, national, and religious intolerance and distance, especially among young people (with further growing tendency). It is worrying that many young people demonstrate increasingly conservative attitudes, ethnic and religious intolerance, accompanied by inclinations toward extreme political ideas. In comparison with other European countries, the WB has a very high number of young people mobilized for extreme political ideas, or as foreign fighters in Ukraine, Syria, and Iraq. • The growing reappearance of tendencies of the rhetoric of ethno-chauvinistic ideas from the 1990s in the media, and the strengthening of right-wing GONGs (government-sponsored nongovernmental organizations) and paramilitary organizations. In all states of the WB, a huge majority of the political elite believes that the state must be formed on the basis of the ethnic majority, that the ethnic-national identity is a key characteristic of every member of society, and that the institutions of the state system should be centralized and authoritarian in order to defend the interests of the ethnically or nationwide majority. Such an attitude obviously leads to discrimination against the minorities and intolerance toward diversity. This list could be expanded by several additional facts. For example, Bosnia–Herzegovina is destabilized by Bosnian-Serb-Croats animosities, and by obviously non-functioning Dayton (1995) political system. Even, Bosnia–Herzegovina is often referred to “a failed-state”; yet it still somehow keeps the inter-ethnic peace. Montenegro and Serbia, whose

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scores on the global index of democracy have declined each year for five years, registered a further decline in the Nations in Transit in 2020 and left the “Democracy” group in the 2019 Report. Also, WB countries are at the top of the list4 of all countries in the world in terms of the number of small arms in legal and illegal possession by civilians. The former EU-Commissioner for European Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations, Johannes Hahn, in 2017, compared the Western Balkans to a pan of oil. A single match would be enough to put everything on fire.5 Former president of the European Commission, JeanClaude Juncker, warned in 2018 that there is a danger of new military conflicts in the Balkans.6 If the countries of the region are left without European perspective, Europe will experience again, sooner rather than later, the Balkans traumas from the 1990s. Juncker emphasized that the history of the 1990s still has not been overcome in the Balkans, because the past decades and centuries had not been dealt with properly. Political analysts warn that inter-state relations between most WB countries have never been worse in the last 25 years, and in December 2022, the prime minister of the Republic of Serbia, Ana Brnabi´c, stated that the situation in Kosovo is on the verge of war. This is contrary to the expectations that the EU’s reform policies would balance and increase the socio-economic development of the whole region, and that NATO’s enlargement and collective security policies would result in stability and peace. Obviously, lack of stability and development could mean that the deep-rooted symptoms of malaise in the region were not yet given the attention they deserve.

Prerequisites for Further Process of EU Integration of WB Countries In recent years, the situation, standards and status of Kosovo and Bosnia– Herzegovina are probably the key problem for the peace, stability, and prosperity of Serbia and other countries in the region. The question is whether these problems of Kosovo and Bosnia–Herzegovina (actually related to one of the B&H autonomous entities —Republic of Srpska), hinder the democratization of Serbia and EU integration process, or whether the lack of democracy in Serbia generates a problem on Kosovo and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. An honest answer is that both are true, and it is harmful to the broader European interests.

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The current strategy of the U.S. and the EU, along with Serbia’s lack of democratic capacities, did not bring the desired results. A critical, but proEU (not Eurosceptic) part of the democratic parliamentary opposition in Serbia, and representatives of non-governmental organizations of civil society are calling out the EC for being co-responsible for the decline of the democratic capacity of political institutions in Serbia due to EC longterm contribution to strengthening the authority of the president of the state, the hegemonic position of his political party, and an authoritarian system in which the legislative and judicial systems are subordinated to the executive power, while, at the same time, recognizing persons from Kosovo accused of war crimes, as legal representatives and negotiators in the name of the Kosovo government. The consequence of the cumulative effect of the mentioned problems is the absence of socio-political changes directly related to the development of social capital and social cohesion based on democratic values—tolerance, reconciliation, trust, pluralism, inclusiveness, and interculturality. At the same time, this kind of social capital and social cohesion is a precondition and potential for democratic socio-political-cultural change.

Conclusion The whole WB region suffers from various social/ethnic conflicts and remains strongly influenced by traumas from the recent and distant conflicts and wars (encouraged by the actual ruling autocratic and populist governments—playing on collective memory policy). Even some young people express ethnic/religious distances and inclinations toward extreme political ideas, while national formal education systems generate new divisions, mistrust, and atomization of society, with long-term consequences for the goals of developing regional peace and stability, and the region’s European integration process. All international political and economic initiatives and strategies implemented in the WB over the last thirty years have not yet succeeded in: (a) reversing the tendency of further regional disintegration, (b) establishing regional cooperation, tolerance, reconciliation, democratic institutions, and a stable peace, and (c) changing the most common understanding of peace as a “period between two wars” or as “a period of preparation for war”. Disintegration of the WB region along ethnic, religious, and

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national divisions continues to dominate the political, cultural, and educational spheres, and it is unclear and uncertain when and how this trend will start to change. After more than 20 years since the end of the last armed conflict, the ethnic and religious intolerance and distance not only remain high, but even demonstrate a tendency to increase, especially among some young people. The WB countries have not yet accumulated the experience of democratic institutions and procedures used in consolidated democracies, and therefore the capacity of all WB countries to solve problems within relevant institutions and in a democratic way is a significant issue. All the described past and present conflicts are an important, perhaps dominant part of collective memories, social capital, and identity narratives, and, as such, prevent the process of stable peace and development in the region. This kind of historical heritage should also be seen and understood as the West Balkans’ lack of key capacities for the constructive resolution of conflicts and crises, with which even the EU societies are also struggling to solve the consequences of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the pressure of refugees and migrants from Asia and Africa, and the energy crisis, corruption, populist governments, and extreme political ideologies. The lack of key capacities is particularly noticeable and burdensome in the WB in the areas of fight against organized crime, transparent governance, and the autonomy of the legislative and judicial authorities. In conclusion, the countries of the WB region and the EU are facing a common problem, but instead of engaging in a productive dialogue, they continue a communication which can hardly bring the desired results. Still, it should be emphasized that the process of WB European integration has very important implications for the stability and peace in the region, as well as beyond. In Milton Friedman’s preface to Capitalism and Freedom,7 Friedman explained that when a crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around and our basic function should be to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and available until the politically impossible becomes the politically inevitable. In political theory, there is a phenomenon known as the “window of opportunity” (a critical short period during which a desired action and development can be taken, and once this period is over and the window closes, the opportunity for change may never come again, and the desirable outcome is no longer possible). Who will be the creators of that new reality, designers of change, and inspirers of alternatives in the WB?

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What are the necessary and key competencies of the society to meet new reality—unemployment, poverty, destroyed democratic institutions and values, social conflicts, political radicalization, domestic violence, deteriorated mental health, absence of rule of law? National education policies and programs in the WB tend to accept most of the national policies that were dominant during the war of the 1990s. While worldwide experience is that peace education has grown significantly over the last 50 years, including recognizing its potential to restore peace and stability, similar programs in the WB region have been extremely rare and sporadic so far. There is a permanent lack of integration of education in peacebuilding and, also, a lack of integration of peace pedagogy and peace education into schools.

Notes 1. Almost 20 years have passed since the Summit in Thessaloniki in 2003, when all the WB countries were proclaimed as “potential candidates” for membership in the EU. 2. SLP—the common name for the model of economic reform applied after the collapse of communist regimes in all countries of Central and Eastern Europe—includes: stabilization, liberalization, and privatization. 3. Free movement of people, goods, capital, and payments and services. 4. Institute of International Studies (2013) [Internet]. Small Arms Survey; Small Arms Survey (2007), Annexe 4. The largest civilian firearms arsenals for 178 countries, Guns, and the City. www.smallarmssurvey.org/ fileadmin/docs/A-Yearbook/2007/en/Small Arms Survey 2007 Chapter 02 annexe 4 EN.pdf [13.08.2016]. 5. U. Ladurner [Internet] (10.02.2017). https://www.zeit.de/politik/aus land/2017-02/johannes-hahn-kommissar-eu-erweiterung-westbalkanst aaten. 6. Europeanwesternbalkans [Internet] (05.10.2018). https://europeanwest ernbalkans.com/2018/10/05/juncker-without-european-perspective-mil itary-conflicts-possible-balkans/. 7. Friedman Milton, Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1982.

CHAPTER 6

The Geopolitics of the Orthodox Church in the Balkans Oleg Kobtzeff

It is now obvious that a second Cold War (or maybe something even worse) has begun. One of its key elements in soft power battles is religion. In the Balkans, the dominant religion is Eastern Orthodox Christianity1 which is being torn apart by two rival poles matching the divide between Washington and NATO versus Putin’s Moscow. The Patriarchate of Constantinople has been openly and energetically supporting Ukrainians’ distancing themselves from century-old Russian influence by actively helping them breaking cultural ties and religious ties. The Patriarchate of Moscow blatantly supports Putin’s regime’s war on Ukraine.

O. Kobtzeff (B) History and International & Comparative Politics Department, American University of Paris, Paris, France e-mail: [email protected] St. Sergius Institute of Orthodox Theology, Paris, France © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Gardner (ed.), Geopolitical Turmoil in the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34318-6_6

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How are the countries of the Balkans affected, not only in their religious life but in their position on the geopolitical chess board?

The Resilience and Revival of Orthodoxy in the Balkans This is a crucial question because (contrary to century-old popular literature and the historiography of the Eastern European Marxist regimes) the Orthodox Church, is deeply rooted in the cultures and mentalities of the Balkans as a catalyst for national identity in the past, during Ottoman rule, and even more during the struggles for independence and nationbuilding. Once again it became that catalyst, after the fall of communism. That fall was more than a failure of a governmental, economic, social, and cultural system. It was the collapse of a twentieth-century urban civilization imposed through social engineering by ideocratic governments to replace century-old rural cultures. Now thrown into the arena of aggressive free-market capitalism, the populations of the Balkans—including Greeks (another relatively poor, very rural, and traditional society facing the impossible economic and cultural challenges of globalization)—seem to be reconstructing their identities through the Orthodox Church. Ahead of thirty other countries surveyed in Europe in 2018, 76% of Greeks said that their nationality is defined by Christianity, behind Serbia (78%).2 92% of Greeks believe in the existence of God. 76% of Bulgarians believe in God3 30% with absolute certainty while 40% are “fairly certain” according to other polls.4 88% of the inhabitants of Serbia identify as Orthodox5 as well as 35% of Bosnians and 4% of Croatians.6 Identity is one thing, however, and actual faith is another: the number of persons in Serbia believing in God with absolute certainty is only 58% and of those not believing at all in God is at 10% (26% believe in God with relative certainty and 5% are uncertain).7 Only 34% of Bulgarian Orthodox Christians explain that they identify as such because of a personal faith while 37% declare that they identify as Orthodox out of national, cultural, and family tradition.8 But just as identifying as Orthodox may not signify faith, the absence of religious practice or distancing from organized religion does not mean a lack of faith in the beliefs of Orthodoxy. What needs to be remembered, is that, while religious practice is quite low in the Balkans compared to Poland or to the United States, Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, or to Muslims in the Middle East and North

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Africa, it still seems considerably higher than in Western Europe, where the importance of Catholicism, Protestantism, and other religions is still taken seriously by the social sciences and political observers.9

The Ecumenical Patriarchate: A Western Piece on the Chessboard? The politics and geopolitics involving the Patriarchate of Constantinople are defined by the disparity between the assets allowing its ambition to be a global actor and the quasi-absence of control over any distinct territory with a significant Orthodox population. It is never redundant to repeat that the Patriarch of Constantinople, a rank held since 1991 by Vartholomeos or Bartholomew I, is not the head of all the Orthodox in the world. However, he disposes of important tools of soft power. The Ecumenical Patriarchate, for many centuries has been recognized as having a certain responsibility for the entire Church as a center of consensus with a “primacy of honor.” This is why it is called the “Ecumenical Patriarchate.” (…) It is unquestionable that the Orthodox conception of the Church recognizes the need for leadership of the world episcopate, for a certain spokesmanship by the first patriarch, for a ministry of coordination without which conciliarity is impossible…10

The difficulties in exercising this soft power can seem, however, overwhelming while conducting Church affairs from Turkey. A 1991 document reported that after “an appalling history of pogroms and expulsions(…), the Greek population in Turkey has declined from about 110,000 at the time of the signing of the Lausanne Treaty in 1923 to about 2,500 today”.11 Since then, the situation has barely improved despite a few efforts by the Turkish state to comply with human rights standards imposed by the international community and, probably by discreet pressure from U.S. diplomacy. But this has not prevented new acts of individual vandalism.12 The Patriarch of Constantinople has direct jurisdiction only over fragments of Greece. But only fragments. These are the archipelago of the Dodecanese, Crete, and the monasteries on Mount Athos. Thirtysix dioceses of Northern Greece are also under the jurisdiction of Constantinople but almost nominally: they simply commemorate the patriarch in their services and have a right to appeal to him in case of an

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ecclesiastical dispute. Practically, these 36 Northern dioceses are administered by Athens. None of the other 81 bishops of Greece are under the ecumenical patriarchate.13 All this forces the Patriarchate to reinvent itself as a force not local but global which compels it to overcompensate its extreme territorial and demographic weakness with means of soft power alternatives. To counterweigh his limitations, Patriarch Bartholomew, like his predecessors, but with greater effort, has developed an unprecedented strategy even greater than his famous predecessor Athenagoras. Achieving nomination as one of the 100 most influential people in the World by Time magazine in 2008 is only one example of his international public recognition.14 To make himself relevant, the Patriarch has engaged in activities that gained him leadership in global societal debates: Christian ecumenism (like his predecessors Athenagoras and Dimitrios), interfaith dialogue with all other existing religions in the World (like John Paul II), human rights, and especially environmentalism (the media labeled him “Green Patriarch”).15 The very first signs of an evolving attitude toward LGBTQIA+ issues may be on the horizon.16 The decision by Archbishop of America Elpidophoros—the de facto most important hierarch after Bartholomew I, with a flock of one million Americans—to baptize the twin children of a gay couple in Athens in July 2022 appeared in numerous newspapers and magazines in Greece as well as in North America. Athens’ Synod of the Greek Church protested, but Constantinople remains silent. But the real influence of the Ecumenical Patriarchate is its jurisdiction over the Greek diaspora. Several million Orthodox Christians identifying as Greeks or of Greek descent—equivalent to over half of the population of Greece and Cyprus—populate the great cities or provincial areas of all of Western Europe, Australia (over a quarter of a million residents, not far from 2% of the population),17 and many other countries. But it is especially in the United States where more than a million Orthodox parishioners or sympathizers are in many ways connected directly or indirectly to the Ecumenical Patriarchate through the networks of the Greek diaspora which include prominent members of the North American elite in politics, media, and business. Several studies have considered that ethnic lobbies were of secondary importance in influencing the U.S. legislators’ foreign policy. Nonetheless the same studies recognized that between 1974 and 1978, the Greek-American lobby presented a good example “of how Congress’ initiative can be aided by an ethnic lobby”.18

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In addition, when one thinks in terms of donations and fundraising organized by numerous Greek-American business owners and celebrities, this American population also constitutes one of the main sources of revenue for the Constantinople patriarchate. But this is a two-way lane. In exchange for support from America through organizations such as the powerful American Hellenic Institute and its lobbying arm, the American Hellenic Institute Public Affairs Committee, it must also return favors.19 Thus the Hellenic world became an essential part of the security strategies of the United States in the Eastern Mediterranean. From the point of view of soft power, the Ecumenical Patriarch, with his power of leverage in the Hellenic and Orthodox world, became its major asset in this Great Game. In the twenty-first century, this can serve the US competition against Russia. Support from the U.S. government to the Patriarchate comes in many forms. It could be American financial support to influencers such as the news outlet Orthodox Times and numerous other advantages. The most important form of support is the influence that the US government could exercise over the Turkish government.20 A central political problem inside the Orthodox Church today is the suspicion that the Phanar (the geographic area in Istanbul where the Patriarchate holds its headquarters, a term used in the same way as “the Vatican”) seems to wish exercising more than just soft power. Whether or not the perception is accurate, it is fueled by the language used by the Phanar, or its agents. For example, the Archons, a powerful order of prominent lay leaders somewhat comparable to the Vatican’s Order of the Holy Sepulcher, when protesting on their website that “Turkish authorities do not allow the use of the term or title ‘Ecumenical’ for any religious activity whatsoever” were offended that “Turkey regards the Ecumenical Patriarchate as an institution whose leader is seen as the spiritual head of Orthodox Christians in Turkey alone rather than the leader of 300 million Orthodox Christians worldwide”.21 This is not a claim that the Patriarch is the head of the entire Church like a pope, but the expression seems far from representing him as a strictly honorific figurehead among other Orthodox Patriarchs and bishops. Such slips of the tongue are frequently heard in Hellenic ecclesiastical circles. But do they reveal any real ambitions? A significant claim directly affecting the Balkans is Constantinople’s demand to exercise greater control over those northern regions of Greece

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barely more than symbolically under its jurisdiction. Another claim is to be recognized as the sole autocephalous Church to have jurisdiction over “barbarous lands”, i.e. territories beyond the traditional boundaries of the ancient Hellenic-Roman Christian world where Orthodoxy had never grown historic roots since the schism of 1054. In practice, it is a claim to exercise authority over any diaspora, Greek or other. In 2018, Patriarch Bartholomew’s administration, abolished the archdiocese of Western Europe founded by Russian exiles in the 1920s which had been under Constantinople’s jurisdiction but with a great amount of autonomy and, without any consultation with the concerned clergy and tens of thousands of parishioners, ordered them to submit to the authority of the nearest Greek hierarchs representing the Ecumenical see. Another of its growing demands is to be recognized as the sole authority competent to authorize the granting of autocephaly to any Orthodox Church in the world. In that vein, Constantinople unilaterally created two autocephalous Churches—the Ukrainian Church, in January 2019, which was on the territory of the Moscow patriarchate, and the Macedonian Church, in May 2022, which was on the territory of the Belgrade patriarchate. Two autocephalies in less than four years, and without any significant consultation with the two Patriarchates that held authority over the concerned regions is unprecedented in the history of the Orthodox Church. In the case of the new Church of Macedonia, the Phanar could have, like Greek irredentists, claimed jurisdiction over the South-East of the Republic of Northern Macedonia and, after at least negotiating diocesan borders with the Patriarchate of Belgrade, granted the territory its autocephaly. Instead, it unilaterally recognized the autocephaly of all dioceses in all of North Macedonia.22 Contrary to the Catholic Church, structured in a pyramidal shape like a unitarian state, The Orthodox Church is structured as a confederation, not even a federation. Unlike other confederal organizations, the Orthodox Church does not even have a permanent office or an assembly meeting regularly (like the EU or the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva). The only body having authority over the entire Church is a pan-Orthodox council (to be called “ecumenical” again when Roman Catholics and the Orthodox will be reunited). Very few have taken place in the past thousand years. The first one to be assembled in generations took place in Crete on 19 June 2016. But the Church of Antioch, Church of Bulgaria, Church of Georgia, and the Russian Church, did not participate. For most of the twentieth century, the Ecumenical Patriarchate

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had been making countless efforts to achieve greater unity. Recognition of these efforts would have advanced Constantinople’s soft power if not more. Suddenly, however, after seven decades of international pre-conciliar work, just before the council’s inauguration, the authorities of the Russian Orthodox Church announced that they would not participate. The pretexts, based on technicalities, were almost insignificant compared to the gravity of such a boycott. The Bulgarian Church and the Church of Antioch followed suit, evoking other technicalities. But evidently there was more to this. Under communism, competing with Constantinople to gain prestige during the council, and during its preparatory phase, just like participation in the World Council of Churches and other interfaith forums, was seen by the Kremlin and the Moscow Patriarchate under its control, as an opportunity for gaining soft power. The strategy has recently changed. What the war in Ukraine revealed, and what should have been observed and analyzed much earlier, is that the Kremlin is losing interest in using Soviet-era strategies of seduction. In the form of a syncretic mix of Leninism, Realpolitik and Orthodox Christianity, primitive Machiavellian logic has survived the transition from Stalinist socialism to Putinist capitalism. Thus, a pan-Orthodox council is probably seen as no more interesting for exercising influence than participating in a girl scout jamboree. As mentioned by wellknown French expert journalist and Orthodox theologian Jean-François Colosimo, Moscow chose to boycott the event simply to demonstrate its power of nuisance and mark its territory.23 Without the Russian Church “the Holy and Great Council of the Orthodox Church” was no longer pan-Orthodox. The boycott of the Russian Church and of the Churches of Bulgaria and Georgia means that more than half of the Orthodox population of the planet could not be represented. The affair of the autocephaly of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church could be one day remembered as the event that triggered the great schism of the Orthodox Church. It could also be considered as part of what led to the Russia–Ukraine war of 2022. The Kremlin and Pennsylvania Avenue-Capitol Hill are deeply involved in this affair. In 1992, a dissident group of Ukrainian bishops proclaimed itself the autocephalous Church of Ukraine promoting the Metropolitan of Kyiv Philaret as Patriarch of a Ukrainian Orthodox Church— Kiev Patirarchate (UOC-KP). The Russian Orthodox Church issued a

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vigorous condemnation, eventually defrocking Philaret. A second separatist group of bishops then proclaimed themselves “Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church” (UAOC). A large majority of bishops of the autonomous Ukrainian branch of the Russian Orthodox Church remained loyal to Moscow’s patriarch until even several months into the 2022 war.24 Moscow replaced the dissident Patriarch Philaret by Metropolitan Vladimir (also a former candidate for the chair of Patriarch of Moscow) who, after his death in 2014, was succeeded by Metropolitan Onufriy (Berezovsky). After the Maidan revolution, the Ukrainian government, became increasingly involved in the affair and offered diplomatic support by negotiating with the Ecumenical Patriarchate which was rumored to be willing to take the two self-proclaimed autcephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Churches under its jurisdiction. Constantinople argued that when, centuries ago, it had agreed to recognize the Russian dioceses as an autocephalous Church, its jurisdiction would include only Muscovy, not Ukraine or Belarus. Moscow’s refutation of Constantinople’s position is that its sudden revival of claiming jurisdiction over Ukraine, after centuries of silence (a tacit acceptance of the situation?) was politically motivated. On November 3, 2018, Patriarch Bartholomew and President Poroshenko signed an agreement in Istanbul to organize an all-Ukrainian Church council in order to unify Philaret’s UOC-KP, the UAOC, and the autonomous Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. Held in Kyiv on December 15, 2018, it resulted in the two separatist factions merging and being integrated into the Ecumenical Patriarchate. On January 7, 2019, Constantinople granted this united Church its autocephaly. From a spiritual point of view, the noncanonical groups now reunited with the Orthodox Church through this procedure could be interpreted as an accomplishment for the Ecumenical Patriarchate and a personal victory for Patriarch Bartholomew. But it was taken by the Patriarchate of Moscow as a slap in the face. What led to a rapid aggravation of the conflict with Moscow was the pressure that Onuphriy’s loyalist Ukrainian Orthodox Church (still a large majority of parishes, monasteries, and institutions such as the Kiev Theological Academy) began to feel from the Ukrainian government (harassment and threats to confiscate church property). To be fair, numerous stands by some (not all) of Onuphriy’s clergy (blatant proPutinism, plus authoritarian leadership methods influenced by Moscow’s

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pastoral practices) and Onuphriy’s ambiguous acts (for example, refusing to stand for a minute of silence in memory of Ukrainian soldiers killed in the Donbas conflict during a meeting with state officials) must be considered as Kremlin manipulation. Hence Western seizing this opportunity to offer a counter-offensive in soft power and the collusion throughout this affair of American officials such as Joe Biden, Antony Blinken, and the Ecumenical Patriarch25 or the entire State Department which, in an interesting departure from the separation of church and state, on December 17, 2018, congratulated Metropolitan Epiphaniy upon his election as a primate (in replacement of Patriarch Philaret) at the end of the unification council, noting that the United States “maintains unwavering support for Ukraine and respects the freedom to worship unhindered by outside interference”.26 The cooperation between ecclesiastical leadership and the U.S. government to advance each other’s agendas has been demonstrated in a spectacular way during the decline and fall of the Soviet bloc coinciding with the papacy of John Paul II.27 The Ecumenical Patriarchate has not been neglected by Capitol Hill and Pennsylvania Avenue as a tool of soft power in its chess game against Russia. It is simply more discreet than the instrumentalization of the Russian Orthodox hierarchy by Vladimir Putin. What remains to be seen is the reactions of the other Orthodox Churches, in particular, the Churches of the Balkans the faithful of which had often supported the idea of a Athens–Sofia–Belgrade–Moscow axis.

Friendly Competitor of Constantinople: The Church of Greece The main question in any debate about Orthodoxy among the Greeks is whether Greece can still be defined as an Orthodox society. Or has it become a secularized? Has it evolved like most Western European societies toward an open pluralistic liberal model or is it influenced by a model of a closed homogeneous society? What are the international implications of this and what could be the Orthodox Church’s involvement? Despite the growing influence of modernity and secularism, the words of the constitution of 2008 could not be clearer about the intimate relations between the Orthodox Church and the Greek state: “The prevailing religion in Greece is that of the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ. The Orthodox Church of Greece, acknowledging our Lord Jesus Christ as its head”.28

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During the Cold War, Greece was far more exposed to Western culture, contrary to other Balkan countries through its open borders (with the exception of Yugoslavia where limitless traveling abroad and back was allowed) and normal relations with Western countries, which eventually integrated it into NATO as early as 1952 and into the Common Market—the future European Union—in 1981. Millions of Western tourists coming to Greece annually, and up to seven million Greeks living abroad exposed Greece to Western culture. Yet, the secularization that affected Western Europe has not been witnessed among Greeks. Several factors could explain this. The Greek Orthodox leadership—clergy, monks, lay theologians, intellectuals, or lay and clerical activists in organizations such as the highly influential missionary brotherhoods Zoe and Sotir or other modern components of late nineteenth and twentieth-century civil society— played a foundational role in all the great historic chapters of Greek nation-building from the struggles for independence to the present including exemplary activity during the occupation by Axis forces (resistance, systematically saving as many Jews as possible, humanitarian aid).29 The record of the lower and high-ranking clergy of Greece during the war (exceptional in Europe according to the Raoul Wallenberg Foundation) placed it in a position to play a crucial role in the social and political life of the country in this past half-century, perpetrating a modern version of the Byzantine symphonia between clergy and State, Church, and society.30 It also limited the damage that the collusion of some (not all) of the clergy with the dictatorial régime of 1867–1973 may have inflicted, as well as the hostile measures that could have been taken by the far-left government when it was in power recently; it never seriously threatened the statu quo of the Church–State relations. At the same time, one figure published in 2017 must be taken very seriously: 70% of Greeks completely or mostly agreed with the statement “A strong Russia is necessary to balance the influence of the West”.31 Nevertheless, it seems that it would have taken much more than push Greek society and the Church into an openly pro-Russian position. First of all, the far-left government of Tsipras became very rapidly tame showing increasing signs of cooperation with such powerful Western organizations like the IMF or the EU. With their economy in dire straits, even left-leaning Greeks could not afford to refuse financial aid from these organizations and all the strings attached to the West. Eventually,

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SYRIZA lost half of its parliamentary seats in the legislative elections of 2019. Greece was not going to become another Venezuela. A clear break with the West would have simply shattered the Hellenic world. From a perspective of Church politics, Athens and Constantinople compete, indeed, for the domination of the Hellenic world which includes instruments of soft power in Crete, in the diaspora, as well as key positions in the high clergy of Alexandria and Jerusalem where, for reasons of successful Greek cultural domination for centuries and local politics, the hierarchy can only be ethnically Greek or highly Hellenized. But Athens and Constantinople cannot afford to be enemies. Siding with Russia would turn the Greek Orthodox Church into an enemy of the ecumenical patriarchate. Also, the powerful Greek diaspora—the same one that supports both the Greek Orthodox Church and the Ecumenical Patriarchate—would never allow a pro-Russian attitude that would become so divisive. On Capitol Hill or in state legislatures, the friends of the powerful Greek Americans would immediately intervene. Until a movement as powerful as Brexit emerges in Greece, or until an anti-NATO project among the most powerful Greek decision-makers becomes a reality (none of these two scenarios seem realistic), Greece remains anchored in the Western camp and so does its Church as well as the Churches of Constantinople and Alexandria, no matter how distasteful the alliance may seem to many clergymen and laypersons. Additionally, the 2022 Ukraine War has probably further erased many pro-Russian sympathies whether these were on the left or on the right, among still vocal ultra-conservatives in Church circles who may have once been seduced by the Russian Orthodox Church’s rising crusade for “Christian values” and by the Putin government also playing the card of extreme rightist ideology.

The Unique Case of the Church of Albania: Its Ties to Constantinople In 1988, after Enver Hoxha’s four decades of policies terrorizing religion,32 in a country with a total population of under three million, and fewer than 300,000 professing the Orthodox faith, how much weight can Albania throw into the balance of power in the Balkans and in the Orthodox Church? After the era of anti-religious terror (comparable to China’s Cultural Revolution), the Orthodox clergy was almost

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extinct in Albania. The handful of survivors turned for help to the Patriarch of Constantinople who sent Archbishop Anastasios (Yannoulatos) to become, in 1992, the first primate of the Orthodox Church of Albania since 1973. This Greek bishop, scholar and missionary in Africa, well versed in modern American evangelical missionary methods and surrounded with a team of American Orthodox laymen also well experienced in modern missionary methods, first opposed by numerous hostile Albanians, eventually became an exceptionally respected figure of reconstructing the country after the Hoxha régime. As one of the presidents of the World Council of Churches, having accomplished so much for the religious revival of the Albania (a spectacular and successful program of reconstructing of Churches and creating a vast network of health and educational institutions and charities serving not only Orthodox but also tens of thousands of Muslims and Catolics), Archbishop Anastasi, exercises a moral authority which is obviously heavier than the international power enjoyed by average religious leaders in the Orthodox Church. How is this moral authority being used in the religious and political Great Game of the Orthodox world and in the Balkans? Some may have observed that, although there was no conflict nor tension, there were at least divergences of view between Constantinople and Tirana. Archbishop Anastasi expressed doubts about the Ukrainian autocephaly and in the Spring of 2019, he called for another panOrthodox council to be held to avoid a break-up of the Church on a Constantinople–Moscow fault line.33 His language toward Russia remains prudent, diplomatic, which is why suspicions that he was complacent toward Moscow were raised.34 However, if there are sides that are forming in a division of Orthodoxy into two camps, the agenda of the Orthodox Church of Albania is, although prudent and seeking conflict resolution, clearly not on the side of the Patriarch Kirill of Moscow. Anastasi’s position on Russia’s agenda is restrained but unambiguous. He has increasingly criticized Russia for its intransigence on the Ukrainian issue and using excommunication of other bishops (anyone supporting the Ukrainian autocephaly) as a weapon.35 In his 2019 call to gather another pan-Orthodox council, he had explicitly blamed the risk of schism inside the Orthodoxy on Moscow’s refusal to participate in the 2016 council in Crete.36 A year later, he reconsidered the idea of a new and immediate pan-Orthodox council and became strongly critical of the Patriarch of Jerusalem’s own attempt to gather a council of clergy in Jordan.37 In the words of an article that reported on

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the conference “The real purpose of the meeting in Amman was to downgrade the Ecumenical Patriarchate”.38 Although Anastasi’s language has been indeed very diplomatic, the Albanian primate has clearly condemned Russia’s war against Ukraine and Kirill’s Patriarchate for encouraging it: “In these days, when the pain, grief, and confusion caused by Russia’s fratricidal war against Ukraine overwhelm our thoughts and souls, the reference to love may seem strange”, he declared, “in our calls for peace during our liturgies, the clergy has been instructed to add the following reference: we pray for the immediate cessation of Russia’s fratricidal war in Ukraine…”.39 Thus, the Albanian Orthodox Church, with all necessary precautions, may be placed in the “Western camp” on the side of Constantinople. The next choices of the leadership of the Albanian Orthodox Church will depend not only on the evolution of the war in Ukraine that is becoming dramatically divisive among the Orthodox, but it will also most likely be influenced by European Union politics as the eyes of so many populations of Eastern Europe, including a portion of Albanians, are upon Brussels as a solution to achieve prosperity and stability. Albania has been a full member of NATO since 2009 and received candidate status for EU accession in 2014. No matter how much Anastasi and the new Synod of the Orthodox Church of Albania have established themselves as an independent body, the ties with the Hellenic world that initially set in motion its resurrection and growth can never be entirely disengaged and those ties are bound to the Western world.

Leaning East or Leaning West? The Unpredictable Patriarchate of Bulgaria The difficulties and contradictions of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church’s positioning in Christian, European and global affairs may very well be a reflection of Bulgaria’s conflicting choices in foreign policy since the very foundation of the country as a sovereign state when it was already torn between Western and Russian influences. This and the recent attitudes of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (conservatism, and refusal to participate in the pan-Orthodox council) should identify the position of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church as pro-Russian. But the capacity of that Church to exercise any influence in the cultural wars dividing the world and the Balkans has been seriously compromised by decades of internal dysfunction.

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The state of Bulgarian Orthodoxy looks healthy. In a country of roughly seven million inhabitants, the patriarchate of Bulgaria counts a large majority of persons declaring themselves Orthodox Christians. The 2011 Census of National Statistics Institute of Bulgaria reported that out of 7,364,570 inhabitants of Bulgaria, 76% declared themselves Orthodox Christians.40 Article 13:3 of the 1991 Constitution, while granting religious freedom to all, proclaimed that “Eastern Orthodox Christianity shall be considered the traditional religion in the Republic of Bulgaria”.41 Several other documents with constitutional value confirm this special status of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church.42 However, the recent history of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and its dysfunctional relationship with Bulgarian society, added to its internal problems, have undermined its authority domestically and internationally. Indeed, 62% of Bulgarians consider that religious leaders should have little or no influence at all in political matters.43 As in every other Orthodox country of the Balkans, the Orthodox Church, was intimately involved in the movement of independence and of constructing a national identity. Until 1989, policies on religion, slightly more liberal but basically similar to the Soviet Union, were established and the clergy was pressed into full collaboration. In the 1980s, The Communist régime’s desperate need for rebranding generated an instrumentalization of nationalism. As in Serbia at the same time and as in Russia today, individual clergymen saw nationalism as an opportunity to regain influence. The moribund régime’s “process of national rebirth” was mainly about persecuting the Muslim minority by introducing legislation meant as a provocation, forcing them to change their Muslim surnames and family names into Slavic-Christian names. Failure to comply caused police harassments and arrests. Church officials’ support for this campaign expressed itself in such initiatives as organizing a major conference on the subject. The Church’s participation in this divisive activity disqualified the Orthodox clergy as builders of consensus and in constructing the post-Communist society. Then, in 2012, a scandal erupted when it was revealed by a special commission investigating past employees of the Bulgarian security services, that eleven of the bishops of the Synod (its quasi totality) had been agents.44 Before that, in 1992, it had already been revealed that the 1971 election of Patriarch Maxim had been entirely planned and ordered by the government in an act signed by Secretary General Todor Zhivkov and that the patriarch had violated canons, Bulgarian Church

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bylaws, and civil laws of the country.45 Several canonical and civil legal battles ensued as Maxim vigorously resisted any form of sanctions against him or any review of his authority. The same year, the situation immediately degenerated into a schism with an alternative patriarch, Pimen, being proclaimed by an alternative synod of bishops in 1996.46 To complicate matters, the Socialist Party (the former Communists) supported Maxim, while the right wing supported the breakaway faction withdrawing that support when it was revealed that several of its bishops had also been government agents.47 The schism began to be resolved in 1998 by two exterior interventions.48 The first one was by the Bulgarian government of President Stoyanov (who had been solicited by a petition of laymen) and the second one was a forum, in Sofia, of six patriarchs, from Alexandria, Antioch, Serbia, and Romania plus Bartholomew I of Constantinople and Alexis II of Moscow. After Maxim’s and Pimen’s factions were reconciled, the unity of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was restored with Maxim remaining as the undisputed patriarch. Dissent and more intrigues continued for several years but eventually, attempts to reboot the alternative patriarchate progressively dwindled until they died out. This affair could be considered as a victory for the Orthodox Church as a whole, because the forum of the six patriarchs (could it be considered as a pan-Orthodox event, even a council?) demonstrated its ability to function in a collegial way and make difficult decisions collectively. But at what cost for Bulgarian Orthodoxy if compromise could only be reached by maintaining the divisive and disreputable Maxim in power? What about the intrigues, disputes, and lawyering between the two factions (without even mentioning the existence of a third actor, the breakaway “old calendrist” Church that had separated from the Bulgarian Orthodox Church when it had adopted the Gregorian calendar in 1968), dragging on well into the twenty-first century when even European institutions were asked to arbitrate? Finally, and more critically, conflict resolution carried out by the exterior interventions of the state and foreign bishops, damages the credibility of the Bulgarian clergy in creating unity in Bulgarian society and assuming leadership in a country that is still struggling with the old problems of transition—corruption, economic drawbacks, and insufficient consociationalism.49 If this was not enough, the clergy of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church continues to commit two damageable mistakes. One is continued attachment to very conservative, if not fundamentalist interpretation of canons,

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traditions, and scripture which will only continue to alienate the most educated elements in society as education continues to progress (as a result of at least some positive achievements of the state and the possibility to widen student horizons with such programs as Erasmus or other opportunities to study abroad). The second mistake is to have withdrawn from the World Council of Churches in 1998 and to continue refusing participation in the ecumenical movement in general. The inability to recognize the strategic advantage that this would otherwise represent, and the lack of theological competence that would allow the clergy to understand that ecumenical activity does not necessarily compromise one’s faith is symptomatic of the lack of leadership skills of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church, and has led to a lack of support for Orthodox Church projects within the population.50 For this reason, unless fundamental changes occur very soon, it is not possible to consider the leadership or the faithful that are expected to be led by them, as able to exercise any significant influence in international affairs. However, some analysts believe some modest influence may still be exercised by the Bulgarian Orthodox Church over at least Bulgarian society. Recently, the Bulgarian Church has appeared to drift in the direction of Constantinople. “Russian websites point out that the Bulgarian Patriarch Neofit (Dimitrov) recently met with the ambassadors of Greece and the United States, becoming complicit in the ‘international conspiracy’ against Russia and its Church”, recently complained an obviously pro-muscovite journalist.51 But Constantinople should not count this as a great victory. The fact that Bulgaria is after all a member of NATO and of the EU could explain this drift. But mostly, it is out of weakness that the Bulgarian Orthodox hierarchy is letting itself be influenced by the side that appears to be showing the greatest strength. Until the war on Ukraine, it is after all the Western camp, advancing further and further East that seemed to be the winner of the new Great Game, while Russia’s aggressiveness translated into pseudo-religious terms by the Moscow patriarchate may frighten away a population of Orthodox brothers that may have had pro-Russian sympathies. The new Russian ideology is so much about despising weakness that being weak, Bulgarian Orthodoxy can only now fear its former protector and turn to the West.

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Russia’s Close Ally---For How Long? The Patriarchate of Belgrade, Its Dioceses of Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia, and Its International Position Despite Tito’s successful attempts to keep Yugoslavia outside of Soviet influence, it is evident to anyone who knows the Serbian population that Serbs and Russians have always represented themselves as the privileged allies in international affairs. These representations have only become stronger when in both countries Orthodoxy became not only legal after the fall of communism but a major institution. Just as in modern Greek culture, Orthodoxy is a foundation of modern Serbian, Montenegrin, and Macedonian identities. What gave the Orthodox Church an even more important role during the construction of modern Serbia and Montenegro (which merged with Serbia in 1918) and Macedonia is that it served the essentialist representation of a distinct ethnicity. Its use of the Slavonic language (so close to modern SerboCroatian, Bulgarian, and especially Macedonian languages) provided that essential distinctness from Turkish administrators or the Greek agents who were their collaborators. In a pan-Slavic strategy, this would be very useful (mostly for Russia) to attempt to unify the Southern Slavs. Another Serbian-Montenegrin (less Macedonian) particularity is the intimate relation with Russia seen (since at least the early nineteenth century) as a nation of Orthodox brothers. One characteristic example is how the Serbian Orthodox Church allowed the Russian bishops expelled or evacuated from Soviet territories to reorganize, in the city of Sremski Karlovci (Vojvodina) as a so-called Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia (ROCOR) although according to canons, those of the exiled Russian bishops who lived in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes should have placed themselves under the jurisdiction of the Serbian synod. When these bishops split into two factions (the ROCOR was monarchist, ultra-nationalist, and rigorist, while the other faction was much less politicized) and then, when both factions came under fire from the high clergy remaining in the USSR (forced at gunpoint to collaborate with the communist régime), the Serbian ecclesiastical leadership made remarkable efforts to serve, if not as arbitrator and conciliator, at least as a go-between, the three factions. The Belgrade patriarchate’s maintaining normal relations with the ROCOR prevented hundreds of its parishes to become completely marginalized and excluded from the

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communion of Orthodox Churches. This allowed the ROCOR’s relatively smooth reunification with the Moscow Patriarchate in 2007. This attitude of the Serbian Orthodox Church, the only autocephalous Church (with the Patriarchate of Jerusalem) to entertain normal relations with the ROCOR, shows not only a form of Russophilia, but reveals a conservative connection between the faithful and clergy of that branch of Russian Orthodoxy and a like-minded section in Orthodox Yugoslavia. This is only an illustration of deeper Russian-Serbian connections that exist through religion. Observing what was happening in the Balkans in the 1990s, Swiss security and religion expert Jean-François Mayer has made excellent observations about the cultural changes occurring during the period of transition from communism.52 In the late 1980s, the Marxist-Leninist utopias collapsed into chaos after decades of violence while the economies of welfare states in Western Europe began to decline after their “30 glorious years”. The new countries of the Balkans, particularly Serbia, had to turn to the past to construct their national narrative. Religion then becomes crucial. It could explain the sudden revival of the Orthodox faith in Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and in the Orthodox parts of Bosnia and in other Orthodox communities of ex-Yugoslavia. Unfortunately, the reconstruction of the national Serbian or Macedonian historical narrative became basically negative—a representation of the nation above all as a victim. 1989 was the 600th anniversary of the battle of Kosovo where the élites of Serbia were literally wiped out, a date which marks the end of the medieval Serbian state and the beginning of Ottoman rule. Those familiar with the Serbian media and religious life at the time, will recall how this became the focus of the new national narrative at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s. What follows is a romantic essentialized story of Christians (Serbs in this case) living under murderous Turks, and, worse of all, under traitors converted to Islam. Such representations refuse to acknowledge periods of peaceful coexistence and even cooperation. The reconstruction of a national identity based on martyrdom was aggravated by the relaxing of censorship over the memory of the genocide committed against the Serbs in World War II. The sudden emergence of that event added to the commemoration of 1389 at a time when Bosnian Muslims and Kosovars were trying to reinvent (or even invent) themselves like all other reemerging nations in the region, with the first signs of interethnic strife, was an explosive mix.

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During the wars of succession of Yugoslavia, the average position of clerics can be illustrated by the proclamations of the meek Patriarch Pavle read in all Serbian churches in Yugoslavia and abroad prudently criticizing nationalism and fanaticism. The general picture is very complex, though. Nationalism increasingly dominated among the Serbian Orthodox faithful as the forces of the Yugoslav Federation and Serbian militias retreated on all fronts. Then, the bombing of Belgrade by NATO and the consequences of uranium-depleted ammunition abandoned in piles scattered across Serbia only exacerbated Serbian nationalism. Today, in the words of a Serbian Orthodox theologian rising in international academic circles and interfaith dialogue, the attitude of the Serbian Orthodox Church hierarchy toward the great political questions in the Balkans and in the Orthodox world presents “rather than a divergence of points of view, a diversity”.53 After a rough estimate, it is easy to characterize the overall atmosphere of the Serbian Orthodox Church like the political trend of Serbian voters who elected and then re-elected a nationalist president, Alexander Vuˇci´c. What prevents the Orthodox clergy to objectively debate past war crimes and the causes of extremism that lead to war, like the German Catholic or Lutheran clergy did after 1945, is above all, public opinion. A perceived anti-Serb sentiment on the part of NATO and the West tends to push the Serbian population and its Church into the arms of Russia and the Moscow patriarchate. There is a strong anti-Western flavor in some of the declarations coming from patriarchal circles. Until recently, the website of the Belgrade patriarchate reported on the 2019 visit of the late Patriarch Irenej in Syria quoting President Assad pointing out “that what Syria and Serbia are exposed to, in terms of foreign interference and attempts to undermine their sovereignty and social fabric, as well as the persistence of the two countries in facing such attempts, is a solid basis for building people’s dialogue and cooperation. for long-term relations that serve the interests of both peoples”. This was followed by the patriarch’s praise for Assad’s support of the Serbian position contesting the independence of Kosovo.54 Although the Church of Serbia has participated in the pan-Orthodox council, collusion with Russia seemed inevitable (at least, as we will see, until the events of 2022). The new Patriarch Porfirije has not explicitly approved of Patriarch Kirill’s support of the invasion of Ukraine, but his attitude toward his Russian peer has been more than complacent as revealed by the websites of both patriarchates.

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While the current Serbian President Aleksandar Vuˇci´c seems to increasingly praise Putin’s Russia and, like the majority of Serbs, dreams of winning back Kosovo (which seems however increasingly utopian), it must not be forgotten that he is also working on the candidacy of his country for European Union membership. Renouncing these aspirations, only because Russia may, or may not be useful in protecting Serbia’s interests, would be unimaginably frustrating. Moreover, while NATO is still the enemy in the eyes of mainstream Serbian public opinion following the Kosovo War and present ethnic strife between Serbs who feel threatened and Kosovars, Russia has no specific project or model of society to propose—other than banning LGBTQ rights and seeking geostrategic revenge over the West by taking it out on Ukraine, an Orthodox country. At the same time, Russian theological schools seem to be no longer producing any original young theologian. Meanwhile, the Serbian Orthodox Church continues to produce theologians that are sufficiently interesting to maintain dialogue with leaders in all of Christendom and leaders of other religions. Recently, two extremely important events have occurred that prevent placing Serbia in a clearly pro-Muscovite or anti-Constantinopolitan position. Suddenly, in the summer of 2022, the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I recognized the autocephaly of the Macedonian breakaway Church. But an even greater surprise fell upon the Orthodox world in June when the Patriarchate of Belgrade recognized in its turn the Macedonian autocephaly without any criticism or discussion. Asked about why the Serbian hierarchs would accept this, the primate of the Patriarchate of Moscow’s “Archdiocese of Orthodox Churches of Russian Tradition in Western Europe” headquartered in Paris, Metropolitan Jean of Dubna, one of the three or four most experienced and highest-ranking hierarchs in Orthodox international relations, simply answered “they had no choice!”. According to him, protesting would have brought absolutely nothing except a sterile conflict with the Ecumenical Patriarch dragging on, possibly, for decades if not generations. Accepting the situation prevents the Serbian Church from losing face and appearing wiser, a modest gain in reputation, but better than nothing.55 But there is another explanation. It is an obvious quid pro quo. The other great crisis that faced the Serbian Orthodox Church was the attempt by the political leadership of Montenegro, immediately after the independence of the country, to create a Montenegrin autocephalous Church as a mark of national identity. The Serbian Orthodox

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Church protested, and as the Montenegrin government became more and more aggressive against its representatives and buildings in Montenegro (nationalization of ecclesiastical properties, harassment of clerics faithful to Belgrade, etc.). But then, a large popular movement opposed to the Montenegrin government campaign rallied around the exceptionally charismatic religious leader of the country, the Metropolitan of Montenegro Amfilohij. It should be investigated whether the population supporting Amfilohij coincides with (1) the minority that came close behind the majority in the referendum against the independence of Montenegro, and (2) many other Montenegrins who supported independence from Serbia but still identify as ethnic Serbs. What has been overlooked by the media is that a decisive measure was taken by the patriarchate of Constantinople: it supported Belgrade against the ecclesiastical separatists whose movement eventually declined and is now on its way toward extinction. Therefore, the future of the Serbian Orthodox Church must not necessarily be seen as unconditionally linked to Moscow. What could even push Belgrade into the arms of Constantinople would be greater aggressiveness coming from Putin and from Patriarch Kirill. The latter’s complete neglect of even the physical security of Kyiv’s Metropolitan Onufriy, head of Ukraine’s Orthodox dioceses that had been unconditionally loyal to Moscow until February 23, is a clear warning to Belgrade’s Patriarch: alignment on Russia can be rewarded by reckless abandonment. A cold-blooded unsentimental objective analysis of the evolution of the Russian Orthodox Church and of the state that it supports would indicate that a small country like Serbia and its Church would not be treated as equals if Moscow succeeded in its hegemonic ambitions, no matter how friendly it had been for generations.

*** At least one lesson can be learned from this panorama of religious politics with its extremely complicated web of interests, perceptions, strategies, representations, conflicts, and collusions: It reveals how much Huntington’s theory of the clash of civilization and his mapping of an Eastern European Orthodox civilization made of one bloc is nonsense. It merely shows the need for deeper investigation of religious politics in the Balkans

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and in Eastern Europe, and for more education on the Orthodox Church in general.

Notes 1. For further reading on the Eastern Orthodox Church see Kobtzeff, Oleg. “The Orthodox Church: What it is and how it is an actor in Global Geopolitics”, Nature & Cultures, No 7, Winter 2022–2023, online, http://www.natureandcultures.net/orthodox-church.html. 2. The electronic version of Kathimerini provides an article on the subject in English: Anonymous. “Religion is key part of identity for most Greeks”, eKathimerini, 29.10.2018, 22:25. https://www.ekathimerini.com/news/ 234129/religion-is-key-part-of-identity-for-most-greeks/. Retrieved on April 28, 2022. The numbers were obviously taken from Sahgal, Neha et al., Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe, Pew Research Center: Washington D.C., 2017, p. 12. 3. Muslims represent 10% of the population. Anonymous. Ppebpo vane 2011 (okonqatelni danni). Pepyblik Blgapi , Hacionalen Ctatictiqecki Inctityt Cofi 2012. This is a summary. For far more ample details see Deciclava Dimitpova et al. (eds.), Ppebpo vane na nacelenieto i iliwni fond ppez 2011 godina. Kniga 2. Demogpafcki i cocialni xapaktepictiki. Pepyblika Bl.gapi , nacionalen ctatictiqecki inctityt Cofi 2012. 4. Ibid., p. 84. 5. Sahgal, Religious Belief… Op. cit., p. 20. 6. Ibid. The figures for Bosnia and Croatia signify that the quasi totality of the non-Catholic and non-Muslim minority (Ibid., p. 52) identifies as Orthodox. Unfortunately, similar polls remain to be conducted in Montenegro, Macedonia, and Albania. Figures are available at the same source foremost other Orthodox countries. 7. Ibid., p. 84. See pages 20, and 52 to confirm all the above-mentioned statistics. 8. Ibid., p. 56. 9. Sahgal, Neha et al., Religious Belief… Op. cit., p. 6. 10. Meyendorff, John. “Needed: The Ecumenical Patriarchate,” in Meyendorff, John. Vision of Unity. Crestwood, New York: Saint Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1987, p. 133. It is ironic to note that Meyendorff, one of the 20th Century’s most reputable Orthodox theologian and Church leader affirmed this, while having marked the history of the Orthodox Church in America as one of the main artisans of its autocephaly in 1970, an autocephaly denounced and still opposed by Constantinople. 11. Whitman, Lois. Denying Human Rights and Ethnic Identity: The Greeks of Turkey. A Helsinki Watch Report. New York: Human Rights Watch,

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16. 17.

18.

19.

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Washington, Los Angeles, London, 1992, p. 1. Retrieved online, April 19, 2022, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/TUR KEY923.PDF. Whitman. Op. cit. See also the article by former State Chief Justice Bozonelis, Theodore, “The Systematic Persecution of Religious Minorities in Turkey”, Public Orthodoxy, Orthodox Christian Studies Center of Fordham University, Retrieved on 15 February 2018, https://publicOrt hodoxy.org/2018/02/09/religious-persecution-in-turkey/. Accessed 19 April 2022. After the bishops of Greece self-proclaimed autocephaly immediately following the country’s independence, the Church of Greece was eventually recognized as autocephalous by Patriarch Anthimus (or Anthimos) IV in 1850. Williams, Archbishop Rowan. “The 2008 Time 100.” Time, Time Inc., 12 May 2008. http://content.time.com/time/specials/2007/article/0,288 04,1733748_1733757_1735535,00.html. Accessed 10 June 2022. See Marianne Ejdersten. “His All-Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew: The Patriarch of Solidarity”. World Council of Churches. 22 December 2016. https://www.oikoumene.org/news/his-all-holinessecumenical-patriarch-bartholomew-the-patriarch-of-solidarity. Accessed 25 May 2022. See Kallistos Ware, Metropolitan of Diokleia. “Foreword”, The Wheel, 13/ 14, Spring/Summer 2018, pp. 8–10. The Australian census of 2011 reports 378.300 persons claiming Greek ancestry for a total population of 21.507.717. Australian Bureau of Statistics, https://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/[email protected]/Lookup/2071. 0main+features902012-2013. Accessed 25 May 2022. Kitroeff, Alexander & Constantinides, Stephanos. “The Greek-Americans and US Foreign Policy since 1950”, Etudes helléniques/Hellenic Studies. Vol 6, No 1 (1998), p. 11. Although their article has become somewhat dated, Kitroeff and Constantinides offer a good history and analysis of the influence the leadership of the Greek-American diaspora could exercise on the structures of power in American society. It can be completed with more recent articles by Stephanos Constantinides, especially by his “A Global World Greek Lobby”, Etudes helléniques/Hellenic Studies. Vol 23, No 2, Autumn 2015, pp. 49–104. Evriviades, Marios L., “The Umbilical Relationship: Greece and the United States”. Etudes helléniques/Hellenic Studies. Vol 5, No 2, Automne 1997, p. 153. “Project Grant FAIN SGR10018GR0034.” USAspending.gov, Executive Office of the President of the United States, Office of Management and Budget. https://www.usaspending.gov/award/69820508. Accessed online 13 June 2002.

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21. https://www.archons.org/religious-freedom-issues/non-recognition-ofecumenical-status. 22. A short analysis of the politics behind the two new autocephalies follows below. 23. Colosimo, Jean-François. “Kirill va briser l’unité Orthodoxe”, La Croix, 7 March 2022. https://www.la-croix.com/Debats/Kirill-briser-lunite-Ort hodoxe-2022-03-07-1201203659. Accessed online 21 June. 24. This article is being completed only fifteen months after the invasion, as events are still rapidly unfolding. 25. See for example RFE/RL newsroom, “Patriarch Bartholomew Praises Biden As ‘Man Of Faith’ As U.S. Offers Support To Orthodox Leader”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. https://www.rferl.org/a/bar tholomew-biden-meeting-Orthodox/31529821.html. Accessed 29 March 2022. 26. Robert Palladino, Deputy Spokesperson [U.S. Department of State], Washington, DC “Press Releases: Establishment of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine.” U.S. Embassy in Ukraine, https://ua.usembassy.gov/pressreleases-establishment-of-the-Orthodox-church-of-ukraine/. Accessed 29 March 2022. 27. See Bernstein, Carl, and Marco Politi. His Holiness: John Paul II and the History of Our Time. Penguin Books, 1997. 28. “The Constitution-Hellenic Parliament as revised by the parliamentary resolution of May 27th 2008 of the VIIIth Revisionary Parliament”, Hellenic Parliament. https://www.hellenicparliament.gr/en/Vouli-tonEllinon/To-Politevma/Syntagma/. Accessed 8 May 2022. 29. Anonymous. “The Greek Orthodox Church and the Academic World of the Greek People Protest against the Persecution of Greek Jewry”, The International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation. https://www.raoulw allenberg.net/general/greek-Orthodox-church-academic/. Retrieved on April 28, 2022 (includes the letter from Archbishop Damaskinos and several clergyman and intellectuals to the collaborationist Prime Minister Logothetopoulos); Anonymous. “Salomon Asser”, The International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation. https://www.raoulwallenberg.net/ general/salomon-asser/. Retrieved on April 28, 2022; Burns, Margie. “Archbishop Damaskinos”, The International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation. https://www.raoulwallenberg.net/es/generales/archbishop-damask inos/. Retrieved on April 28, 2022; Karagozian, Adriana. “Remembrance Day of the Holocaust for the Greek Jewry”, The International Raoul Wallenberg Foundation. https://www.raoulwallenberg.net/news/rememb rance-day-holocaust/. Retrieved on April 28, 2022. 30. See Makrides, Vasilios M. “9. The Orthodox Church of Greece”. InLeustean, Lucian N. (Ed.). Eastern Christianity and Politics in the TwentyFirst Century. Routledge: pp. 181–209 which focuses essentially on these

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33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

39. 40.

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three figures (although at the expense of less biographic and larger social issues). Sahgal, Religious Belief… Op. cit., p. 15. Pano, Nicholas. “The Orthodox Autocephalous Church of Albania.” Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twenty-First Century, edited by Lucian N. Leu¸stean, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, London, 2014, p. 152. NewsRoom. “Archbishop of Albania calls for a Pan-Orthodox Council for the crisis in Ukraine”, Orthodox Times (En), 8 March 2019. https://Orthodoxtimes.com/archbishop-of-albania-calls-for-a-panOrthodox-council-for-the-Orthodox-church-crisis-in-ukraine/. Accessed 14 June 2022. See for example his defending himself in the NewsRoom article “Archbishop of Albania: I Did Not Avoid Naming Russia in the War Statements”, Orthodox Times (En), 13 May 2022. https://Orthodoxt imes.com/archbishop-of-albania-i-did-not-avoid-naming-russia-in-thewar-statements/. Accessed 14 June 2022. The Russian Orthodox Church considers itself no longer in communion with Constantinople nor with any hierarch and his flock who agrees with Bartholomew’s granting autocephaly to Ukraine. NewsRoom. “Archbishop’s of Albania letter to Patriarch of Jerusalem: You make things worse”, Orthodox Times (En), 8 March 2019. https:// Orthodoxtimes.com/archbishop-of-albania-calls-for-a-pan-Orthodox-cou ncil-for-the-Orthodox-church-crisis-in-ukraine/. Accessed 14 June 2022. NewsRoom. “Archbishop’s of Albania letter to Patriarch of Jerusalem: You make things worse”, Orthodox Times (En), 11 February 2020. https://Orthodoxtimes.com/albanian-archbishops-letter-to-patria rch-of-jerusalem-you-make-things-worse/. Accessed 14 June 2022. Hieromonk of Pantokratoros Monastery, Nikitas. “The real purpose of the meeting in Amman was to downgrade the Ecumenical Patriarchate”, Orthodox Times (En), 6 March 2020. https://Orthodoxtimes.com/thereal-purpose-of-the-meeting-in-amman-was-to-downgrade-the-ecumen ical-patriarchate/. Accessed 14 June 2022. “Archbishop of Albania: I Did Not Avoid Naming Russia in the War Statements.” Op. cit. Muslims represent 10% of the population. Anonymous. Ppebpo vane 2011 (okonqatelni danni). Pepyblik Blgapi , Hacionalen Ctatictiqecki Inctityt Cofi 2012. This is a summary. For far more ample details see Deciclava Dimitpova et al. (eds.), Ppebpo vane na nacelenieto i iliwni fond ppez 2011 godina. Kniga 2. Demogpafcki i cocialni xapaktepictiki. Pepyblika Bl.gapi , nacionalen ctatictiqecki inctityt Cofi 2012.

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41. Official English translation (Constitution, National Assembly of Bulgaria. https://www.parliament.bg/en/const. Accessed 19 June 2022. 42. See the quite detailed analysis of this legal status in Kalkandjieva, Daniela, “The Bulgarian Orthodox Church”, Eastern Christianity in the TwentyFirst Century, edited by Lucian N. Leu¸stean, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, London, 2014, pp. 114–116. 43. Ibid., p. 100. 44. Kalkandjieva, Daniela, “The Bulgarian Orthodox Church”, Eastern Christianity in the Twenty-First Century, edited by Lucian N. Leu¸stean, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, London, 2014, pp. 125–126. 45. Kalkandjieva, Daniela, “The Bulgarian Orthodox Church”, Eastern Christianity and the Cold War, 1945–91, edited by Lucian N. Leu¸stean, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, London, 2010, p. 91; Kalkandjieva, Daniela, “The Bulgarian Orthodox Church”, op. cit., 2014, pp. 116–117. 46. Kalkandjieva, Daniela, “The Bulgarian Orthodox Church”, op. cit., 2014, p. 117. 47. Ibid. 48. Ibid. 49. Much has been achieved in building sufficiently, although relative, stable and potentially prosperous democracy by successive Bulgarian governments, without which their country would not have been accepted into the European Union. Yet, according to the reports of that same institution and other organizations, much progress is still needed. 50. For example in 2006 a mere 2% of students eligible to take religious classes that had become available in the school system were pursuing classes. See Kalkandjieva, “The Bulgarian Orthodox Church”, op.cit., 2010, p. 93. 51. Vladimir Rozanskij, “Bulgarian Metropolitan expresses communion with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church”, Asia News, 12 February, 2019. https:/ /www.asianews.it/news-en/Bulgarian-Metropolitan-expresses-commun ion-with-the-Ukrainian-Orthodox-Church-48697.html. Accessed online 29 June 2022. 52. Mayer, Jean-François, Religions et sécurité internationale, Office Central de la Défense: Berne, 1995, pp. 19–20. 53. Julija Naett-Vidovi´c, personal communication. 54. The page has just been suppressed as the URL was being accessed to complete these citations. The essentials of the declarations by Irenej and Assad can be reconstituted in Hassoun, Gh. A. & Sabbagh, Hazem, “President al-Assad receives Patriarch Irinej of Serbia”, Syrian Arab News Agency, 3 June 2019. https://sana.sy/en/?p=166822. Accessed 30 June 2022. 55. Metropolitan Jean (Renneateau), personal communication, June 18, 2022.

CHAPTER 7

Albania’s Foreign Policy in the Twenty-First Century David Felsen

Introduction The Republic of Albania is a former communist country of 2.8 million people situated along the Mediterranean coast in the region of Southeastern Europe. It proclaimed its independence from the Ottoman Empire on November 28th, 1912.1 Following the collapse of communism in 1991, Albania began transitioning away from its totalitarian and isolationist past toward rejoining the global community and developing closer ties to Western democracies and international institutions.2 Albania joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2009, became a candidate country to join the European Union in 2014, and formally began EU accession talks in 2022.3 In 2020, Albania chaired the 57-member Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and currently is a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (2022–2023).4

D. Felsen (B) Epoka University, Tirana, Albania e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Gardner (ed.), Geopolitical Turmoil in the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34318-6_7

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Albania generally has sought friendly relations with all countries, while addressing its interests and priorities in four foreign policy areas: (1) Relations with the United States and NATO; (2) Relations with the European Union and its member states; (3) Relations with Kosovo and other Western Balkans neighbors; and (4) Relations with key large regional powers, notably Turkey, China, and Russia. By and large, Albania has succeeded in advancing its interests over the past 30 years on key foreign policy issues. The transition era was marked by Albania’s reintegration into global structures and developing ties with the U.S. and Western institutions after its Cold War isolation. The era of Berisha’s prime ministership saw efforts expended on joining the NATO alliance and furthering Albania’s EU membership prospects. Finally, the current Rama prime ministership has focused on moving forward Albania’s EU accession talks, increasing Albania’s engagement with its Western Balkans neighbors, and raising the country’s international profile. The Context of Albanian Foreign Policy Albania’s foreign policy interests have been shaped by geography, demographics, and history.5 Albania borders Montenegro, Kosovo, North Macedonia, and Greece, and sits across the Adriatic Sea from Italy. Albania is part of the six-country Western Balkans region which also encompasses five former Yugoslav states: Bosnia & Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia, and North Macedonia. All presently remain outside of the EU, although they aspire to join (Serbia is the least interested in joining owing to its ties to Russia). The wider Balkans region also comprises Slovenia, Croatia, Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania, who are members of the EU (and NATO). A large Albanian-speaking population lives outside of Albania in neighboring countries of the Western Balkans region: Over 90% of the population of Kosovo is Albanian. There are sizeable Albanian minorities living in North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Greece. Albania supports the interests of the Albanian-speaking populations in neighboring countries. Albania is a Muslim-majority, multi-religious, and multi-ethnic nation. Approximately 57% of the population is Sunni Muslim, 10% Catholic, 7% Greek-Orthodox, 2% Bektashi Muslim, while a significant number, 24%, profess either another religion or else no religion.6 Ethnically, Albania has a significant Greek-speaking Orthodox minority in the south of the country and a small Roma community residing throughout the country.

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Despite these differences, Albanians are united by a strong sense of nationalism. During the Cold War era (1945–1991), Albania was governed by the Communist Party—for most of this period they lived under the ruthless dictator Enver Hoxha, until his death in 1985.7 Hoxha’s repressive policies were paralleled by unstable and ever-shifting foreign alliances. Desperate for technical assistance and foreign aid to modernize Albanian industry and agriculture, Hoxha successively turned to Yugoslavia, then the USSR, and finally to China for help, but fell out with each over the course of the post-war era. In the late 1940s, Hoxha broke with Tito out of fear that Yugoslavia wanted to annex Albania. Then, after establishing close ties with Stalin’s USSR against Yugoslavia and the West, Hoxha broke with Khrushchev over his criticism of Stalin’s legacy. Turning to China following the 1963 Sino-Soviet Split, Albania signed a joint statement of cooperation in 1964 only to break relations with China over China’s hosting of U.S. President Nixon in 1971. As a consequence of the rupture in relations with all three powers, Albania remained essentially isolated in diplomatic affairs from the late 1970s until the end of communism.8 With Hoxha’s death in 1985 coupled with evolving international developments—notably, Gorbachev’s domestic ‘glasnost’ policy in the USSR and the thawing of U.S.–USSR relations in the 1980s, the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, and Eastern Europe’s concurrent anticommunist revolutions—Albanian leaders sought to establish new foreign relations objectives in the post-communist period.9 Albania’s Foreign Relations During the Transition Era: 1991–2005 As Albania transitioned away from communism, its foreign policy focused on ending its diplomatic isolation and reintegrating the country into the community of nations. At home, Albania adopted a multi-party system and a new constitution in 1990–1991 that supported free markets and pluralism. The country embraced a pro-European and pro-U.S. orientation. In early 1991, Albania joined the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the Western security organization that was the forerunner of the OSCE.10 Furthermore, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker’s visit to Tirana in June 1991 bolstered the country’s pro-American foreign policy alignment.11

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Nonetheless, the fledgling democracy suffered from successive fragile governments for much of the 1991–2005 transition era. But the decisive victory of the right-wing Democratic Party (PD) and its leader Sali Berisha in April 1992—who served as president from 1992 to 1997— helped better establish and navigate Albania’s foreign policy priorities.12 Yet the economic turmoil of 1996–1997, stemming from the collapse of a government-condoned pyramid scheme in the financial sector, brought down the PD and led to the electoral victory of the Socialists (PS).13 A new constitution was subsequently adopted in 1998 putting governing powers firmly in the hands of the prime minister rather than the president. However, the political vicissitudes of 1991–2005 did not deter Albania from its central foreign policy objective—shared by all members of the political class—which was to bring Albania back into the international fold. Relations with the U.S. and NATO With the fall of communism, the U.S. actively promoted democracy and free markets throughout post-communist Eastern Europe. Strengthening Albania’s democratic institutions was viewed as important in helping to stabilize the Western Balkans region, as NATO and the EU confronted the escalating Yugoslav Wars during the 1990s.14 Albania also sought to draw closer to the lone remaining superpower and to integrate into Western security structures. It welcomed American support for its transition toward democracy and free markets. Albania also remembered U.S. President Wilson’s intervention on the country’s behalf following World War I—and were very much predisposed toward the U.S. and the West. President Berisha (1992–1997) emphasized Albania’s importance as a key regional actor that could help stabilize the region and moderate Kosovo Albanians’ behavior (specifically the Kosovo Liberation Army). As a result, Berisha was twice invited for talks at the White House—in 1992 by President George H.W. Bush and in 1995 by President Bill Clinton. Furthermore, Albania remained aligned with NATO’s actions during the Bosnia and Kosovo crises of the 1990s, supporting the 1995 Dayton Accords that brought an end to the Bosnian conflict, and eventually committing troops to NATO’s peacekeeping efforts.15 Under the Socialist government that succeeded the Berisha presidency, Albania backed the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999 to bring about a ceasefire in Kosovo.16 While Albania sympathized with Kosovo’s drive for greater

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independence in the years that followed, Tirana respected Western countries’ concerns regarding the risk of provoking the escalation of tensions between Kosovars and Serbs.17 Albania–NATO institutional linkages became stronger during the transition era. Albania joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1992 and NATO’s ‘Partnership for Peace’ in 1994, which enhanced cooperation between the Alliance and former communist countries. Separately, Albania submitted a formal application to join NATO that same year.18 The early 2000s saw a significant deepening of Albania–U.S. relations following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, with Albania demonstrating strong support for America’s ‘War on Terror’. While Europe’s largest powers, France and Germany, remained unwilling to commit troops to the Iraq War in 2003, Albania stepped up as one of only eight European countries to send soldiers. It was a diplomatic gesture that did not go unappreciated by the U.S., and it served to hasten Albania’s candidacy process for NATO membership a few years later.19 Relations with the European Union and Its Member States Albania’s foreign relations with the European Union in the 1990s were also shaped by the goal of reconnecting with Europe and its institutions after years of isolation.20 The EU and its member states, like the U.S., wanted to stabilize the political institutions and the economies of the Western Balkans and, more immediately, to prevent the intensification of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. Bridge-building between the Western Balkans and the EU began in 1991 with the ‘Stabilization and Association Process’ (SAP)—an initiative to strengthen political institutions in the Western Balkans and to coordinate EU–Western Balkans cooperation. Following the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, which saw EU intervention alongside the U.S. and NATO, there was a renewed push for closer ties between the EU and Western Balkans countries in the early 2000s.21 The EU’s Thessaloniki Summit of June 2003 ended with a declaration expressing support for reforms in the Western Balkans region and asserting that the EU would remain incomplete without the eventual membership of Western Balkans nations. The EU pledged financial resources toward social and economic development of the region, as well as for the protection of minority groups. However, the EU also expected

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the countries of the region to demonstrate greater political will to tackle corruption, strengthen the rule of law, and reform institutions.22 The Western Balkans countries, however, were disappointed to be excluded from the NATO and EU Eastern European enlargements that took place the following year. These eastward expansions of NATO and the EU, both occurring in 2004, took in most of the former communist countries and proved to be the largest organizational enlargements in the history of both NATO and the EU, resulting in 7 new NATO members and 10 new EU members.23 Among the countries left on the sidelines, Albania redoubled its foreign policy efforts to bring about NATO and EU membership. Albania’s foreign relations with individual EU member states during the transition era posed challenges as well. With the economic collapse of Albania in 1997–1998 which resulted from the collapse of the financial sector, Italy was called upon to lead the NATO multinational force ‘Operation Alba’ to help stabilize the country.24 However, following Albania’s recovery, Italy, along with other leading European countries, notably, France and Germany, backed Albania’s NATO and EU bids. Relations with its neighbor Greece were thornier during the 1990s. Albania had to address contentious border issues, historical wounds over the expulsion of Cham Albanians from Greece in the mid-twentieth century, language and property rights disputes with the Greek-speaking minority in Southern Albania, and tensions over uncontrolled Albanian migration into Greece in the years that followed the collapse of communism.25 In 1993, Greece formally demanded that Albania address Greekspeaking Albanians’ rights and curtail migrant flows into the country. The Berisha government retaliated in 1994 by arresting five parliamentarians from an ethnic Greek political party, prompting Greece to threaten to veto Albania’s attempt to seek membership in the EU. The dropping of charges against the parliamentarians in 1995 deescalated Greece-Albania tensions.26 Relations with the Western Balkans Neighborhood The conflicts that arose in the former Yugoslavia during the 1990s were of central concern to the countries of the Western Balkans region.27 Albania was fully aligned with the U.S. and EU over the Bosnian conflict and the subsequent Dayton negotiations of 1995. In the case of Kosovo,

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escalating conflict between the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the Yugoslav (Serb) military forced an exodus of over half a million Kosovar Albanians in 1998–1999 and prompted NATO’s intervention in Kosovo. Albania fully backed NATO’s actions in Kosovo as well as the subsequent ceasefire terms in 1999.28 Albania was also concerned with protecting ethnic Albanian minority rights in other parts of former Yugoslavia. North Macedonia and Montenegro, both with sizeable Albanian minorities, became flashpoints of unrest in the 1990s, with Albanians in these border territories protesting their treatment. Tirana’s solidarity with these Albanian communities abroad sparked tensions between Albania and its neighbors, who, at times, expressed suspicion that Tirana’s interference stemmed from its intention to achieve a “Greater Albania” outcome.29 In time, however, the Western Balkans gradually achieved greater stability. Albania increasingly took part in cooperative initiatives with its neighbors to help advance peace and security in the Western Balkans region. One central area of collaboration was the fight against organized crime. Another issue that brought regional actors together in the early 2000s was the support of several Western Balkans nations for America’s ‘War on Terror’. Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, and North Macedonia sent troops to fight in Iraq.30 Relations with Regional Powers: Turkey, China, and Russia Albania sought to reengage with larger regional powers following decades of isolation. Pivotal for both Albania and the U.S. at this time were Albania’s relations with NATO member Turkey, with whom Albania had strong historical ties. The U.S. viewed the strengthening of Albania– Turkey ties as a positive development for the Atlantic Alliance as well as a means to stabilize the Western Balkans. Turkey, for its part, backed Albania’s diplomatic aspirations, including Albania’s application to join NATO. Turkey also provided Albania with much-needed humanitarian aid and technical assistance. Several bilateral cooperation agreements were signed in the 1990s, including a defense cooperation pact in 1992.31 By contrast, Albania–China relations during the transition era remained less propitious—two decades after Hoxha broke with China. China strongly supported Serbia during the 1998–1999 Kosovo War, given its sizeable investments in Serbia. It openly criticized the NATO-led intervention, denouncing it as illegal because it did not receive UN

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backing—which would have been impossible given Russia and China’s Security Council vetoes. The accidental NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 further exacerbated China’s tensions with Western powers and, by extension, dampened Albania–China relations.32 Albania–Russia relations during the transition era were cordial, conditioned on the one hand by the two countries’ shared communist past, and on the other by Russia’s historical interests in the region, specifically its cultural and historical connections to Serbia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia. Despite Russia’s diplomatic support for Serbia during the Kosovo War, Russia under President Yeltsin also remained relatively open to engaging with the West and tried to smooth over any dissonance over regional issues. Like Albania, Russia backed the Dayton Accords.33 Nonetheless, by the late 1990s, Russia’s political class pushed back against Yeltsin’s conciliatory policies vis-à-vis the West within the Balkans arena, and Russia became ever more critical of NATO’s perceived antiSerb bias, its disregard for Russia’s interests in the region, and its failure to obtain UN Security Council authorization before attacking Serb positions in Kosovo. Yeltsin’s moderately pro-Western orientation was then replaced in the 2000s by a more hard line and anti-Western foreign policy under Vladimir Putin.34 Meanwhile, Albania became increasingly anchored to the U.S. and the West. Albania’s Foreign Relations During the Berisha Prime Ministership, 2005–2013 The Berisha Prime Ministership marked former President Sali Berisha’s second time as post-communist Albania’s leader, this time as prime minister.35 Albania’s foreign policy from 2005 to 2013 focused on pursuing NATO and EU membership, managing tensions with Albania’s Western Balkans neighbors, and balancing relations with larger regional powers.36 Relations with the U.S. and NATO Relations between the U.S. and Albania stood at a highpoint by the mid2000s. Albania was enjoying American goodwill owing to its continued support for American policies. Albania had sent peacekeeping troops to Bosnia, participated in NATO’s multinational force in Kosovo, firmly

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backed America’s ‘War on Terror’ following the September 11th terrorist attacks, sent troops to participate in NATO’s multinational force in Afghanistan (ISAF) in 2002, and was one of the few European countries to send troops to join the 2003 U.S.-led coalition in Iraq.37 In short, Albania’s foreign policy actions backed key U.S. goals in the global arena. Prime Minister Berisha derived the benefits of this warm relationship. It resulted in an official visit by President George W. Bush to Albania in June 2007—the first time that a sitting U.S. president visited the country.38 The two leaders spoke about cooperation across an array of areas. President Bush also expressed support for Albania’s entry into NATO and sympathy for eventual Kosovo independence. The visit to Albania by President Bush accelerated the push for the incorporation of Albania into the NATO Alliance. At the NATO Bucharest Summit in 2008, Albania was invited to sign the NATO accession protocols. Albania formally joined the Atlantic Alliance in April 2009, following the ratification by NATO member states of the accession protocols.39 The foreign policy outcomes of the Berisha government helped the prime minister secure a second term in office in 2009. Relations with the European Union and European Member States Albania’s foreign relations with the EU and its member states moved forward gradually during the Berisha Prime Ministership. Albania successfully completed negotiations over the ‘Stabilization and Association Agreement’ (SAA), begun in 2003 and fully realized in June 2006, thus clearing a major hurdle regarding Albania’s efforts to apply for EU membership.40 Furthermore, in 2008 the Berisha government successfully negotiated travel visa liberalization for Albanians under the Schengen Visa regime. The Albanian government began implementing Schengen framework guidelines and issuing biometric passports in 2009. In 2010, the Council of the EU formally approved visa-free travel for Albanians within the EU and, in 2011, Albanians were officially able to travel for up to 90 days within any six-month period inside Europe’s Schengen zone.41 Albania formally applied for EU membership in April 2009. The Albanian government held out much hope for a speedy process, given its successful 2009 entry into NATO. Nevertheless, following the submission of its application, Albania witnessed little progress made toward advancing its candidacy. The slow pace of the process caused Prime Minister Berisha

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to express frustration at the perceived lack of EU procedural transparency during his final days in office.42 At the same time, Prime Minister Berisha succeeded in securing improved bilateral relations and cooperation with individual EU member states during 2005–2013. He hosted Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi in November 2008 and earned Italian support for NATO membership, the liberalization of visas under Schengen, and backing for Albania’s EU candidacy—positions shared by Germany, France, and the UK. Moreover, Albania and Italy also proceeded to sign several bilateral cooperation agreements.43 Berisha’s style with respect to neighboring Greece was less confrontational compared to the 1990s. Greece, for its part, provided diplomatic backing for Albania’s application to NATO and the EU. It was, in fact, during the Greek Presidency of the EU Council in 2014 that Albania was granted EU candidate status. Greece and Albania also successfully reached an agreement over a longstanding maritime dispute in 2009—regrettably, the Albanian Constitutional Court struck down the deal in 2010, ruling that the treaty was incompatible with Albanian law.44 Relations with the Neighborhood of the Western Balkans The Berisha government demonstrated assertiveness with respect to regional foreign policy, but provoked tensions with its Western Balkans neighbors, particularly concerning Albania’s support for Kosovo independence. In his visit to Albania in 2007, U.S. President Bush, had professed sympathy for Kosovo’s eventual independence, helping to galvanize Kosovars to make a formal declaration of independence in February 2008. The declaration was strongly supported by Albania’s government which recognized Kosovo’s statehood immediately and established diplomatic relations with the fledgling nation the following day.45 Kosovo’s declaration of independence was also recognized by the U.S. and by most Western powers. This greatly antagonized Serbia and its key regional backers, Russia and China.46 Prime Minister Berisha further inflamed a volatile geopolitical climate by making provocative statements about taking down customs barriers between Albania and Kosovo and asserting that the two nations should not view each other as foreign countries. The Serbian government viewed Berisha’s statements as unnecessary

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and incendiary, and responded with a note of protest to the Albanian government.47 The Albania–North Macedonia border was another hotspot during the Berisha era. In 2006, for instance, the North Macedonian VMRODPMNE party took power and played upon Macedonian Slavic nationalist resentment against the sizeable Albanian minority in North Macedonia. Skirmishes and protests erupted, though neither Albania nor North Macedonia wanted to further inflame tensions and risk their future EU candidacies—the two countries found themselves under pressure from European Union member states to resolve the crisis peacefully.48 While strains between the two nations over the Albanian minority in North Macedonia have ebbed and flowed over the years—as has also been the case with the Albanian minority in Montenegro49 —the unrest has been contained as a result of bilateral dialogue and EU pressure. Relations with Regional Powers: Turkey, China, and Russia Albania’s foreign relations with Turkey were largely cooperative during the Berisha era. As was the case in the earlier transition era, Turkey continued to support Albania’s bid for NATO membership. Turkey also expressed sympathy for Kosovo independence. Tirana and Ankara reciprocated high-level visits, while Albania welcomed growing Turkish investment inflows into the country. Several trade and cooperation agreements were signed, and visa-free travel was established between the two countries.50 Toward the end of the Berisha government’s mandate, Prime Minister Berisha pursued closer ties with Turkey owing to his frustration with the EU’s delay in moving forward in considering Albania’s candidacy application. The Berisha government enthusiastically promoted a Turkish alliance, culminating in a two-day visit to Ankara by Berisha in April 2012, and the signing of multiple economic and defense agreements between the two countries.51 Albania’s relations with China gradually warmed up during the period of Berisha’s mandate but were not without tensions. At the level of geopolitics and regional issues, the two countries found themselves on opposing sides regarding the matter of Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008. China enjoyed robust economic ties with Serbia, and

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therefore strongly supported the Serb position and criticized Kosovo’s unilateral declaration, while Albania remained Kosovo’s strongest backer. To this day, China refuses to recognize Kosovo’s independence.52 Despite diplomatic disagreements, the Berisha government actively cultivated Chinese investment, particularly after the onset of the global financial crisis of 2008. The ‘Great Recession’ battered the U.S. and other Western economies, but China was left much less impacted. Albania invited Chinese firms to make infrastructure investments in the country. Following Prime Minister Berisha’s state visit to China in April 2009 to mark the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Albania and China, both countries agreed to increase bilateral cooperation in various sectors, including IT, energy, and mining.53 The rise of Xi Jinping to the post of General Secretary of the Communist Party of China in 2012 and subsequently to the position of President in 2013 heralded a strident Chinese foreign economic grand strategy. In 2012, China launched its ‘16 + 1 Initiative’ aimed at promoting stronger economic and commercial ties with Eastern Europe and the Balkans, and then inaugurated its global ‘Belt-and-Road Initiative’ (BRI) in 2013.54 The two policy initiatives have resulted in greater Chinese commercial involvement in the Western Balkans over the past decade. BRI alone has resulted in Chinese strategic investment in a plethora of large-scale land and maritime infrastructure projects in over 100 countries. While welcoming investment by China, the Berisha government (like the Rama government after 2013) chose not to borrow from Chinese entities to finance BRI investment and thus did not become highly indebted to China, a situation that has befallen other nations across the globe and in the Western Balkans in particular, most notably neighboring Montenegro.55 By contrast, Albania–Russia relations cooled during the Berisha era, given Albania’s NATO entry, its support for Kosovo, and its support for U.S. policies more generally in the Western Balkans and elsewhere. Russia, for its part, was rattled by the significant NATO and EU expansions to Eastern Europe that took place in 2004. It increasingly played the role of geopolitical spoiler, seeking to weaken ties between the Western Balkans on the one hand, and the U.S. and EU on the other. Most notably, Russian and Albanian interests were diametrically opposed over Kosovo independence—Moscow has always been Serbia’s main diplomatic supporter, including during the ex-Yugoslavia wars of the 1990s. Russia condemned Kosovo’s declaration of independence in

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2008. To date, Russia does not recognize Kosovo. It openly criticized the Berisha government’s strong backing for Kosovo and its blatant advocacy of closer Albania–Kosovo political and commercial ties.56 Russia’s overarching foreign policy goals, addressed explicitly in its Foreign Policy Concept Note in 2013, sought to achieve Russian superiority and hegemony at both the regional and international levels. Russia considers the Western Balkans to be a key strategic arena for geopolitical confrontation with the West, given the historical, cultural, and political ties it enjoys in the region. Hence, Albania is viewed as a strategically relevant target by virtue of its geography. Russia’s destabilizing influence in the Western Balkans grew throughout the Berisha prime ministership period, and had an increasingly adverse impact on Albania-Russia relations.57

Albanian Foreign Policy During the Rama Prime Ministership: 2013–Present In 2013, Prime Minister Edi Rama’s Socialist Party came to power. The Rama government is now serving its third term in office. In the current period, Albania has continued to advance its interests in its four foreign policy spheres, with an emphasis on deepening Albania’s commitments to NATO, realizing EU accession negotiations, strengthening regional ties in the Western Balkans, and seeking to raise the country’s international profile. The country has had some recent foreign policy wins, including its 2020 OSCE chairmanship and its UN Security Council seat (for 2022– 2023).58 Relations with the U.S. and NATO Under the Rama government, Albania has further strengthened its ties to the U.S. and its resource commitments to NATO. Prime Minister Rama has maintained positive relations with three successive U.S. administrations. During the Obama years, Washington and Tirana signed a strategic partnership to intensify joint cooperation on bilateral and global issues, including energy security, strengthening the rule of law, and promoting economic development, education, and cultural exchanges.59 During the Trump years, Albania became the first country in the Western Balkans to join the White House’s ‘Clean Network Initiative’, a strategic initiative to challenge the dominance of China in 4G and 5G

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mobile technology.60 The U.S. also invested in two large local energy projects—the Skavica hydropower project and the Vlora thermal power station—to respond to China’s investment in the Patos-Marinza oil field near Fier, one of the largest onshore oil reserves in Europe.61 Relations with the Biden administration have also been cooperative. Following Iranian cyberattacks on Albania’s infrastructure, which knocked out the country’s ‘e-Albania’ online platform in July 2022 and its national border system network in September 2022—in apparent retaliation for Albania’s hosting of an Iranian dissident militia on its soil—the U.S. backed Albania diplomatically by condemning the cyberattack and placing additional sanctions on Iran.62 The U.S. also backed Albania’s expulsion of the Iranian Ambassador from Tirana. Moreover, FBI cybercrime experts were dispatched to Albania to investigate the cybercrime attacks.63 Furthermore, NATO commitments have also increased under the Rama government. In August 2018, Albania offered to invest over $50 million to renovate a former Soviet airbase at Kucove for NATO use.64 In the summer of 2021, Albania hosted NATO military exercises in Durres as part of ‘Defender Europe 21’, the largest operation held in Southeastern Europe since World War II.65 In January 2022, U.S. Special Operations Command-Europe (SOCEUR), based in Germany, announced that it was establishing a satellite headquarters in Albania. In July 2022, the Rama government announced that it was in talks with NATO to build a new naval base at Porto Romano, an Adriatic coastal town near Durres.66 Albania’s commitment of resources has been well received by NATO. One delicate issue in U.S.–Albania relations in recent years has resulted from the U.S. Department of State’s invoking of Section 7031 (C) in May 2021 to ‘publicly designate’ former Prime Minister Sali Berisha persona non grata, noting that he was involved in ‘significant corruption’, including misappropriating public funds, interfering with public processes, and using his power to enrich himself and his allies.67 Given Berisha’s historically sizeable influence in Albanian politics over the past three decades, the State Department’s public designation action—an action not taken without justifying grounds—has unwittingly impacted Albania’s political climate. The action was questioned by Berisha-leaning parliamentarians of the Albanian Democratic Party (PD) and their supporters, and has resulted in the surprise return of Berisha himself into daily political life thereby fragmenting the PD into two camps, weakening Albania’s parliamentary opposition. The current Rama government may

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be on track to win an unprecedented fourth consecutive term in office in 2025. Relations with the European Union and Member States The Rama government’s foreign relations with the EU have proceeded in fits and starts over the past decade—not unlike his predecessor’s. Early in the Rama mandate, the EU launched the ‘Berlin Process’ to help prepare the Western Balkans nations for EU entry. The 2014 initiative was welcomed by all governments of the region. At the same time, Albania was formally accepted as a candidate country for the EU in 2014. Nonetheless, elation over this progress was dampened as multiple delays stalled the process leading up to formal accession negotiations— EU member states and the European Commission expressed concerns over the pace of political and institutional reform in Albania, much to the chagrin of the Albanian government.68 In 2018, the European Commission ultimately made a recommendation that Albania begin accession talks with the EU.69 However, individual EU member states continued to show reluctance to allow the start of talks. Opponents argued that there was a need for more substantive judicial reform and additional rule-of-law and anti-corruption measures.70 However, in 2020, the European Council gave its approval for Albania to advance to the negotiations phase.71 But Albania was held up again by a Bulgarian veto threat to North Macedonia—the two countries’ accession candidacies were being considered together by the EU.72 The North Macedonia–Bulgaria impasse was finally settled in 2022— not least because of mounting EU pressure to find a solution to the situation in the wake of rising global tensions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Accession negotiations were formally begun at an intergovernmental conference in Brussels in July 2022.73 Nevertheless, these talks are now proceeding under a new, tougher EU enlargement formula (methodology) and are fraught with more procedural hurdles and difficulties for Albania and other Western Balkans candidate countries.74 The EU expects more concrete anti-corruption measures, judicial and rule-of-law reforms, and other institutional changes—Albania continues to receive criticism for being slow at implementing such reforms.75 Albania’s relations with individual EU member states have for the most part been productive under the Rama government. While France and the

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Netherlands at times have expressed reservations about Albania’s accession candidacy due to the slow pace of reform, most EU states—including other large EU states like Germany and Italy—have been largely encouraging to Albania throughout the recent process. Greece has also been a key ally in recent years, offering its full backing for Albania’s candidacy and helping to push for the start of formal accession talks.76 Additionally, Greece also has demonstrated solidarity with Albania in other ways, by providing medical and logistical support following the 2019 Albanian earthquake and by offering vaccines during the COVID-19 epidemic. The two countries continue to work together to resolve their maritime border dispute—the issues are currently being heard at the International Court of Justice at The Hague.77 Relations with Its Western Balkan Neighbors While Albania’s ties to Kosovo remain fundamental to its regional diplomacy, foreign relations between the Rama government and other Western Balkans neighbors have also improved in recent years, notably through the Open Balkans initiative. This initiative seeks to increase commercial and trade linkages between Western Balkans nations, as well as the crossborder free movement of workers and regional recognition of educational credentials. Thus far, the Open Balkans initiative involves Albania, Serbia, and North Macedonia, but, controversially, excludes Kosovo (which is not recognized by Serbia). Moreover, there is discussion of Montenegro joining in the near future.78 It is a regional initiative supported by the U.S. Unsurprisingly, but not unexpectedly however, Albania’s participation in the initiative has spurred criticism by Kosovo’s government and has become a sore point in their normally mutually supportive bilateral relations.79 At the same time, rising border tensions between Kosovo and Serbia in recent years may also potentially harm Albania–Serbia relations. Since 2022, Albania has supported Kosovo in a border dispute with Serbia over the use by Kosovo’s Serb minority of Serbian license plates and identity cards inside Kosovo. Kosovo government legislation was passed aimed at ending recognition of these documents—a move that mirrors Serbia’s non-recognition of Kosovo identity documents in Serbia. This has resulted in a flare-up of violence along the northern Kosovo border. The U.S. and the EU have put pressure on both sides to defuse the crisis, urging the Kosovo government to delay the implementation of the new

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law.80 Violence also erupted in northern Kosovo in May 2023 in the wake of local elections—boycotted by the ethnic Serb population that make up a majority in the contested localities. Following the boycotted vote, the Kosovo government tried to install the elected ethnic Albanian mayors into their offices in the four Serb-majority towns, angering the Serb population. While recent Serbia-Kosovo bilateral tensions have produced, as might have been predicted, widespread Albanian support for Kosovo, the EU and the U.S. criticized Kosovo for installing the mayors and provoking the situation. On the other hand, thus far the current flare-up has not hurt Albania–Serbia collaboration in other areas. Relations with Regional Powers: Turkey, China, and Russia Albania’s relations with Ankara under the Rama government have become much closer, with a solid friendship having developed between the two leaders. Turkey has made significant investments in Albania’s energy, banking, telecommunications, and construction sectors.81 The Turkish government has also funded cultural projects in Albania such as a large mosque in the center of Tirana. In 2021, Albania and Turkey upgraded their political and military relations to a ‘strategic partnership’.82 President Erdo˘gan also visited Albania in January 2022 and the countries signed bilateral agreements in the areas of law enforcement, emergency management, tourism, and culture.83 Still, areas of discord do exist between these two allies. Albania has become a more committed NATO partner, while Turkey has emerged in recent years as an unpredictable and difficult NATO member. A key source of tension between Turkey and its NATO partners has been over Turkey’s controversial S-400 missile purchase agreement with Russia and Erdogan’s closer ties with Vladimir Putin. Turkey also recently blocked Sweden and Finland’s 2022 emergency accession to NATO following the Russian invasion of Ukraine owing to these countries’ failure to comply with Ankara’s extradition demands regarding Kurdish dissidents. In 2023, Finland eventually did join NATO, but Sweden’s accession is still pending.84 Turkey has also pressured the Albanian government to hand over adherents to a dissident Turkish Muslim cleric, Fetullah Gulen, and to close Gulen-affiliated institutions in Albania. The elderly Gulen, who resides in the U.S., has been deemed by Erdo˘gan to be responsible for a failed coup in 2016, a notion that is not accepted by the U.S. or EU

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countries—the U.S. has refused Turkey’s repeated requests to extradite Gulen.85 Bilateral relations with China have expanded but Albania continues to keep China largely at arm’s length, out of interest in remaining close to the U.S. and other Western powers. Unlike other nations of the region, Albania has avoided taking on risky loans from Chinese entities to fund infrastructure projects under China’s BRI and ‘16 + 1’ initiatives.86 At the same time, China has established investment interests in Albania’s energy sector, including the Patos-Marinza oil field near Fier, owned by China’s Geo-Jade Petroleum.87 U.S. and EU concern over Chinese investments in Albania encouraged the recent U.S. foray into the Skavica hydropower project and the Vlora thermal power station.88 Additionally, a recent divestment by China also appears to be a response to Western pressure. In 2019, China’s Everbright Group sold off its recently purchased Tirana International Airport concession to the Kastrati Group—one of Albania’s largest conglomerates.89 On the other hand, Albania recently passed legislation to allow Chinese citizens to enter the country visa-free—it is only the second Western Balkans country to do so after Serbia, China’s close ally.90 By all appearances, this delicate balancing of Chinese and Western interests in Albania seems to be a purposive government strategy to maintain good relations with China, the world’s second-largest economic power, while staying firmly in the Western camp. Albania’s relations with Russia continue to be strained over Albania’s growing commitment to NATO and Russia’s increasing hostility to the West under President Putin. Russia was particularly incensed by NATO’s expansion to Montenegro and North Macedonia in 2017 and 2020, respectively.91 Russia has not only backed the Serbs in the Kosovo license plate dispute, encouraging more aggressive Serb behavior, but has also inflamed tensions in Bosnia & Herzegovina through its support of the radical Republika Srpska (Bosnian-Serb) leader Milorad Dodik’s secessionist challenges to the Bosnian Federation’s institutions—which were established under the 1995 Dayton power-sharing agreement.92 Furthermore, Albania has aligned itself closely to U.S. and NATO positions on Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. Albania condemned Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, supporting, as a non-permanent U.N. Security Council member, the introduction of sanctions by the U.S. against Russia’s political and economic élite.93 Recently, additional bilateral tensions have

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emerged over revelations that Russia interfered in Albania’s domestic political process94 and over the discovery that Russian nationals were engaged in espionage activities in Albania (in August 2022 two Russian citizens were arrested for trespassing on a military base).95 Difficulties in Albania–Russia relations are expected to continue as the Ukraine–Russia War drags on and against the broader backdrop of escalating tensions between Russia and the West.

Conclusion Contemporary Albania’s foreign relations have evolved considerably over the past 30 years following the end of its isolation under communism and its pro-Western reengagement with the international community. During the transition era (1991–2005), Albania prioritized reinserting itself into the community of nations and was also called upon to play a stabilizing role in the Western Balkans during the Yugoslav conflicts. Albania was also one of few European countries to support and participate in the post-September 11th U.S. intervention in Iraq in 2003. The era of Berisha’s prime ministership (2005–2013) witnessed further Albanian integration into Western institutions—specifically Albania’s accession to NATO and the advancing of Albania’s EU candidacy. The country also played a pivotal role in helping to legitimize Kosovo’s Independence declaration in 2008. During the present era, the Rama government (2013–present) has seen Albania cultivate more robust ties with NATO, achieve the formal start of EU accession talks, embark on a more deliberate cooperative regional strategy by way of the Open Balkans initiative, and achieve greater status on the world stage. In sum, Albania, a small post-communist state in the volatile Western Balkans region, has been relatively successful in addressing a complex foreign policy environment over the past 30 years. In all likelihood, the country will continue along the same foreign policy trajectory for the foreseeable future in its four key arenas, but it will also need to adjust its foreign policy calculus according to the opportunities and threats that may present themselves. Key foreign relations challenges for Albania will remain the growing strains in relations between the West and Moscow and the possibility of the latter increasing its aggressive behavior in the Western Balkans as a strategic tactic against the U.S., NATO, and the EU; the expanding economic pull of China in the Western Balkans;

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and Albania’s continued vulnerability to cyberattacks and other forms of interference by Iran and other international actors.

Notes 1. Miranda Vickers, The Albanians: A Modern History (London: IB Taurus, 2001). 2. Fred C. Abrahams, Modern Albania: From Dictatorship to Democracy in Albania (New York: NYU Press, 2016). 3. Alice Tidey, “‘Historic Moment’: EU opens accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia”, www.euronews.com, July 19, 2022. 4. Edith Lederer, “Brazil, UAE, Albania, Ghana, and Gabon win UN Council Seats” apnews.com. Accessed September 1, 2022 at https://apn ews.com. 5. Lani Remzi and Fabian Schmidt, “Albanian foreign policy between geography and history,” The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs 33:2 (1998), pp. 79–103. 6. “Albania: Traditional religious groups”, Encyclopedia Britannica, www.bri tannica.com, Accessed November 11, 2022. 7. Bledi Fevziu, Robert Elsie, and Majlinda Nishku, Enver Hoxha: The Iron Fist of Albania (London: IB Taurus, 2016). 8. Vickers, 2001. 9. Remzi and Schmidt, 1998. 10. S. Liechtenstein, “Albanian OSCE chairmanship,” Security and Human Rights Monitor (March 12, 2020). Accessed December 1 at www.shrmon itor.org. 11. Frank T. Csongos, “Baker’s visit to Albania stirs pro-US emotions,” United Press International (June 24, 1991). Accessed on September 5, 2022 at https://www.upi.com. 12. See Michael Schmidt-Neke, “A burden of legacies: The transformation of Albania’s political system,” in Robert Pichler, ed., Legacy and Change: Albanian Transformation from Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Munster: LIT Verlag, 2014). 13. See Christopher Jarvis, “The rise and fall of Albania’s pyramid schemes,” Finance and Development: A Quarterly Magazine of the IMF 37:1 (March 2000). Access online September 6, 2022 at www.imf.org/external/pubs/. 14. Anton Bardhaj, “Albanian foreign policy relations with the United States of America after the Cold War,” European Scientific Journal 16:8 (March 2020), pp. 8–16. 15. A. Permeti, “Foreign Policy Strategy of the Republic of Albania, 1992– 1997,” Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 6:2 (March 2015).

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16. Fjori Sinoruka, “U.S. designates Albania as Special Operations ‘Forward HQ’,” Balkan Insight (January 7, 2022). Access on August 17, 2022 at https://balkaninsight.com. 17. Barry Posen, “The War for Kosovo,” International Security 24:4 (Spring 2000), pp. 39–84. 18. R. Hendrickson, “Albania and NATO, Regional Security and Selective Intervention,” Security Dialogue 30:1 (1999), pp. 109–116. 19. Bardhaj, 2020. 20. See Mirela Bogdani, John Loughlin, and Judith Hoffmann, Albania and the European Union: The Tumultuous Journey towards Integration and Accession (London: IB Taurus, 2007). 21. G. Qorraj and G. Jusufi, “The EU Stabilisation and Association Agreements for the Western Balkans: Between challenges and opportunities,” Croatian International Relations Review 24:81 (May 2018), pp. 51–68. 22. Abdurrahim Aydin and Erjada Progonati, Albanian Foreign Policy in the Post-Communist Era. UNISCI Discussion Paper n. 26 (May 2011), pp. 257–280. 23. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania Slovakia and Slovenia joined NATO in 2004. Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia joined the EU. 24. P. Tripodi, “Operation Alba: A Necessary and Successful Preventive Deployment,” International Peacekeeping 9:4 (December 2002), pp. 89– 104. 25. Benet Koleka, “Albania’s Chams want Greek apology for wartime expulsion,” Reuters (February 24, 2018). Accessed on September 8, 2022 at www.reuters.com. 26. G. Konidaris, “Examing policy responses to immigration in the light of interstate relations and foreign policy objectives,” in Russell King and Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers, eds., The New Albanian Migration (Brighton: Sussex Academic, 2005); Aydin and Progonati, 2011. 27. Richard Caplan, “International diplomacy and the crisis in Kosovo,” International Affairs 74:4 (1998), pp. 745–761. 28. Posen, 2000. 29. Veton Zejnullahi, “Different Aspects about the Position of Albanians in Montenegro,” Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 6:2 (April 2015), pp. 273–279. 30. Bardhaj, 2020. 31. Permeti, 2015. 32. P. H. Gries, “Tears of Rage: Chinese Nationalist Reaction to the Belgrade Embassy Bombing,” The China Journal 46 (July 2001), pp. 25–43. 33. Alexei Arbatov, “The Kosovo Crisis: The End of the Post-Cold War Era,” Atlantic Council Occasional Paper (March 2000). 34. Ibid.

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35. The new constitution of 1998 shifted the power to govern on a day-to-day basis from the President to the Prime Minister. 36. Ditmir Bushati, “Reflections on the past and the present in Albanian foreign policy,” Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs 8:3 (January 2014), pp. 91–94. 37. “Albania stands with US in Iraq,” Washington Times (March 26, 2005), accessed December 1, 2022 at www.washingtontimes.com. 38. Sheryl Stolberg, “Thousands hail Bush in visit to Albania,” New York Times (June 11, 2007). Accessed September 5, 2022 at https://www.nyt imes.com. 39. Sebastien Borodij, “Involvement of Central European states in the military operations of NATO,” in Lucyn Czechowska and Krysztof Olszewski, eds., Central Europe on the Threshold of the 21st Century: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Challenges in Politics and Society (Newcaste upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012). 40. Qorraj and Jusufi, 2018, pp. 51–68. 41. Not all EU countries are in the Schengen zone. Ireland, Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia are in the EU but not in Schengen. Conversely, nonEU countries Switzerland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland are part of Schengen. 42. Besar Likmeta, “Albania’s Berisha Courts Turkish Alliance,” Balkan Insight (April 9, 2012). Accessed September 10, 2022 at https://balkan insight.com. 43. “Italy’s Berlusconi visits Albania to sign energy deals,” Australian Pipeliner (January 6, 2009). Accessed December 20, 2022 online at www. pipeliner.com.au. 44. Semini, Llazar “Albania, Greece take maritime dispute to international court,” Associated Press (October 20, 2020). Accessed on November 2, 2022 at https://news.yahoo.com. 45. See G. Bardos, “The Regional and International Implications of Kosovo Independence,” Mediterranean Quarterly 19:4 (October 2008). 46. O. Tansey, “Kosovo: Independence and Tutelage,” Journal of Democracy 20:2 (April 2009), pp. 153–166. 47. “Serbia formally protests Berisha’s statement,” RAS Daily Serbian News (August 19, 2009). Accessed December 1, 2022 at www.rasnews.blogspot. com. 48. M. Zlatecska, “Trouble in Macedonia as ethnic tensions run high,” The Conversation (May 9, 2017). Accessed on July 30, 2022 at https://the conversation.com. 49. Zejnullahi, 2015. 50. Albert Rakipi, “Albanian Turkish Relations – The Perils of Change,” Tirana Observatory: Foreign Policy and International Relations (March 9, 2022). Accessed on November 1, 2022 at https://tiranaobservatory.

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51. Likmeta, 2012. 52. Ana Krstinova, “What to expect from China’s Kosovo Policy,” China Observers (September 13, 2022). Accessed December 20, 2022 online at www.chinaobservers.eu. 53. A. Brady and H. Higashi, “Are we real friends? Albania-China relations in the Xi era,” Sinopsis (September 17, 2019), Accessed on December 20, 2022 online at www.sinopsis.cz. 54. V. Bennett, “What China’s “Belt and Road Initiative Means for the Western Balkans,” European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (September 11, 2017). Accessed on December 1, 2022 online at www. ebrd.com. 55. Montenegro is the most indebted Western Balkan country. See B. Stojkovski et al., “China in the Balkans,” Balkan Insight (December 15, 2021). Accessed on December 1, 2022 at https://balkaninsight.com. 56. Bardos, 2008; Tansey, 2009. 57. Francisco J. Ruiz Gonzalez, “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation: A Comparative Study,” Instituto espanol de estudios estrategicos (IEEE) no. 6, (April 2013). Accessed November 10, 2022 at https://iee e.es. 58. Lederer, 2022. 59. Sinoruka, 2022. 60. Amanda Coakley, “Albania is a new Belt and Road Battleground,” Foreign Policy (January 24, 2022). Accessed online September 10, 2022 at https:/ /foreignpolicy.com. 61. Ibid. 62. Elona Elezi Tirana and Niloofar Gholami, “Albania blames Iran for cyberattacks,” Deutsche Welle (September 16, 2022). Accessed November 4th at https://www.dw.com. 63. Harun Karcic, “How Albania ended up in Iran’s cyber crosshairs,” Foreign Policy (November 8, 2022). Accessed on November 12th at https://for eignpolicy.com. 64. “Albania’s former ‘Stalin City’ looks West with NATO airbase,” France 24 News (April 12, 2022). Accessed November 2, 2022 at https://www. france24.com. 65. “Defender-Europe 21 Military Exercises come to an end after 2 months,” Exit News Online (June 27, 2021). Accessed on October 11, 2022 at www.exit.al. 66. “NATO in talks to build naval base in Albania, prime minister says,” Reuters (July 1, 2022). Accessed on November 1, 2022 at https://www. reuters.com. 67. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, “Public Designation of Albania Sali Berisha Due to Involvement in Significant Corruption,” Press Statement (May 19, 2021). Accessed December 15, 2022 at state.gov.

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68. “Albanian PM warns EU against leaving ‘vacuum’ in the Balkans,” Reuters (November 30, 2016). Accessed November 15, 2022 online at www.reu ters.com. 69. Report on the 2018 Commission Report on Albania (October 16, 2018). Accessed December 1, 2022 at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/ document/A-8-2018-0334_EN.html. 70. “The Netherlands opposes starting EU negotiations with Albania,” EuropeanWesternBalkans (June 13, 2019). Accessed online December 1, 2022 at www.europeanwesternbalkans.com. 71. Michael Peel, “North Macedonia and Albania set to begin EU accession talks,” Financial Times (March 24, 2020). 72. D. Boffey, “Mind our language: Bulgaria blocks North Macedonia’s EU path,” The Guardian (November 17, 2020). 73. Tidey, 2022. 74. “New EU Enlargement’Methodology’,” Europe Diplomatic. Accessed December 1, 2022 online at www.europediplomatic.com. 75. A. Ivkovic, “Insufficient fight against corruption haunting Albania as it heads into election,” EuropeanWesternBalkans (March 31, 2021). Accessed November 15, 2022 online at www.europeanwesterbalkans.com. 76. “Greece backs EU ambitions of North Macedonia and Albania,” Deutsche Welle (November 14, 2019). Accessed on September 20, 2022 at https:/ /www.dw.com. 77. See “Albania and Greece seek joint maritime border resolution from the Hague,” Deutsche Welle (October 21, 2020). Accessed September 20, 2022 at https://www.dw.com. 78. Georgi Licovski, “Open Balkans shows no sign of delivering promised freedoms,” Balkan Insight (June 16, 2022). Accessed October 15th at http://www.balkaninsight.com. 79. Perparim Isufi, “Kurti’s opposition to Open Balkans leaves Kosovo looking isolated,” Balkan Insight (June 14, 2022). Accessed November 10, 2022 at https://balkaninsight.com. 80. Jovana Gec, “US, EU envoys meet with Serbian president on Kosovo,” Associated Press (August 25, 2022). Accessed on September 22, 2022 at https://apnews.com. 81. Albert Rakipi, “Albanian Turkish Relations – The Perils of Change,” Tirana Observatory: Foreign Policy and International Relations (March 9, 2022). Accessed on November 1, 2022 at https://tiranaobservatory. com. 82. Llazar Semini, “Turkish leader Erdogan visits Albania to boost ties,” Associated Press (January 17, 2022). Accessed November 10, 2022 at https:/ /apnews.com. 83. Ibid.

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84. Dorian Jones, “NATO’s Expansion in doubt over Turkey’s objections,” Voice of America (October 25, 2022). Accessed November 10, 2022 at https://www.voanews.com. 85. Hamdi Firat Buyuk, “Turkey pressures Albania to hand over wanted fugitives,” Balkan Insight (November 2, 2022). Accessed on November 10, 2022 at https://balkaninsight.com. 86. There are 120 Chinese-related projects in the Balkans worth $32 billion. See Coakley, 2022. 87. “China’s Bankers denies abusing dominant oil position in Albania,” Reuters (October 24, 2019). Accessed July 22, 2022 at https://www. reuters.com. 88. Coakley, 2022. 89. Alice Taylor, “Transfer of Rinas airport to Kastrati complete,” Exit News (December 25, 2020). Accessed on November 8, 2022 at https://exit.al. 90. F. Sinoruka, “Albania backs scrapping visas for Chinese in snub to EU,” Balkan Insight (December 28, 2022). Accessed on January 2, 2023 online at https://balkaninsight.com. 91. Zlatko Hadzidedic, “What Russia wants in the Balkans Modern Diplomacy” (February 14, 2021). Accessed on November 1, 2022 at https:// moderndiplomacy.eu. 92. Hamza Karcic, “Putin’s most loyal Balkan client,” Foreign Policy (October 7, 2022). Accessed November 10th at https://foreignpolicy.com; Andi Hoxhaj, “Ukraine War: Serbia is shifting closer to Russia – here’s why,” The Conversation (November 7, 2022). Accessed on November 11, 2022 at https://theconversation.com. 93. Kristi Ceta, “Albania imposes sanctions against Russia,” Albanian Daily News (February 27, 2022). Accessed November 1, 2022 at https://alb aniandailynews.com. 94. Edward Wong, “Russia secretly gave $300 million to political parties and officials worldwide, US says,” New York Times (September 13, 2022). Accessed on November 10, 2022 at https://nytimes.com. 95. Martin Farrer, “Two Russians and one Ukrainian arrested after suspected spying raid on Albanian arms factory,” The Guardian (August 21, 2022). Accessed November 10, 2022 at https://theguardian.com.

CHAPTER 8

Energy and Regional Geopolitics in the Western Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean Armend Reka

Introduction Energy has long been the exclusive domain of sovereign states. Since the industrial revolution, control over energy sources and routes of supply and exchange constituted geostrategic prizes for empires and states competing to gain advantages in the balance of power capabilities. Modern times have followed the same logic albeit with exponentially higher complexity as energy technologies (extraction, transportation, storage, consumption, etc.) have advanced. While technologies have evolved over time, the politics have more or less remained the same: the fundamental interest of power actors has focused on using such technologies and geographic advantage to attain, first and foremost, energy security and, if possible, independence and domination. Such actors strive moreover to project influence and power over their peers via a tool or a combination of energy

A. Reka (B) Doha, Qatar e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Gardner (ed.), Geopolitical Turmoil in the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34318-6_8

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policy tools in their national security toolbox: either via the domination of energy markets or through the control of vital energy infrastructure (hydrocarbon fields, pipelines, power plants, ports, terminals, etc.) often involving the need to secure extraterritorial access to energy resources, whether within maritime boundaries or overseas. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the energy instrument in the regional geopolitics of the Western Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean.1 These two regions have emerged as key areas of competition and collaboration in the hydrocarbon sphere overwhelmingly affecting regional alignments and geopolitics. This is especially more relevant in the context of the unfolding Russo-Ukrainian conflict. While the former region has raised its profile as a key transit region, the latter has gained importance due to its recent large discoveries of natural gas. To facilitate and provide a clearer analysis, we will use the consumer–producer–transit foreign policy analytical framework. This framework will analyze motivations and goals behind the major producers of natural gas having a bearing on these two regions (for example Russia), major consumers (such as the EU member states) and existing and potential transit countries (Turkey, Western Balkan states). We start this chapter with a brief analysis of conceptual tools in the field of energy studies followed by a quick overview of Western Balkans energy context. After these overviews, we will delve into the analysis of foreign energy policies of the EU, Russia and Eastern Mediterranean actors leading to the analysis of energy in the U.S.–Sino strategic competition over the geographic area of interest. Of particular interest will be Chinese influence and U.S. policy response via its support for the Three Seas Initiative. For the sake of analytical clarity, we define the Western Balkans as the region in Southeastern Europe comprising of the 6 non-EU member states such as Albania, Bosnia–Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia. As for the Eastern Mediterranean, we refer to the geographic area covering the coastal states of Greece, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, Egypt, Cyprus and Libya.

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Energy, The Ultimate Geopolitical Tool: A Two-Edged Sword? Energy is inherently a geopolitical tool because of its vital importance for economic activity. As a result, sovereign actors compete for access and control of energy sources and resources. Historically, evoking the “energy” weapon conjures to the oil “weapon” used by the Arab states in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War in 1973. At the time of writing this chapter, Europe is undergoing probably the equivalent of an “energy war” against the backdrop of the russo-ukranian conflict and its consequences are yet to be assessed. This unfolding crisis has raised energy security at the top of international agenda and it is probable that it will remain so in the distant future.2 In light of energy’s strategic essence, governments devise energy policies, a set of rules and regulations governing their energy market as well as their external energy relations. The latter plays a key role given the dependencies and interdependencies in the global energy markets. A country’s energy policy also has effects on the regional and/or international balance of power. Energy thus becomes a valuable tool in the theatre of confrontation and collaboration between countries which leads to the development of policies reflecting such power relations. To the extent that such interactions play out in a spatial dimension, in which confrontation most often wins out over cooperation, this thus constitutes for us the proposed definition of the geopolitics of energy.3 Inherent to energy strategies is the concept of energy security, which has been increasingly integrated into policies with the goal to diminish any risks to national security and economy arising from market failures and volatilities as well as intentional “opportunistic” energy policies from rival states and actors. To illustrate this, the case of Serbia is a good case in point as it represents an extreme case wherein a foreign state-controlled entity (Gazprom) controls its natural gas, oil and petrochemical sectors as well as its natural gas and oil pipeline infrastructure.4 We will elaborate more on this in the later sections. As a result, such power relations in the energy sphere within a given space constitute the geopolitics of energy. Geopolitics of energy is one aspect of an entity’s energy security. Any entity, in our analytical framework, the nation-state as the main actor,5 strives to achieve the optimal state where it’s less dependent on others to satisfy its energy needs. In this

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vein, the nation-state’s behavior is shaped by where it sits on the chessboard of energy geopolitics: is it a producer state, a consumer state, a transit state, or a combination of these. The producers are mostly obsessed with the security of demand. In other words, their optimal interest is to maintain the highest possible prices generating stable revenues through steady and long-term demand. The consumers, logically, strive for security of supply to ensure long-term and stable supplies of hydrocarbons at an affordable price. It is natural that these power relationships between these actors create dependencies and interdependencies that are constantly shifting affected by the complex reality of markets, prices, supply and demand, technology, regulation, geopolitics of energy and geopolitics in general. To conclude this section, the uneven distribution of fossil energy resources and its heavy concentration in a few key geographies (the Middle East, Caspian, Central Asia, Africa, the Eastern Mediterranean and recently, the South China Sea, if not the Arctic) has lent the producing states unprecedented power and leverage but also economic dependence on natural resources. However, history has indicated that the energy “weapon” can be used with limited impact and often backfires as the oil shocks of the 1970s, or more recently in 2014, the gas arm-twisting between Russia and Ukraine/EU, demonstrate.6

Pipeline Diplomacy: Energy as a Catalyst of Regional Competition and Cooperation? The defining feature of energy in the Western Balkans is its excessive dependence on foreign supply of oil and natural gas as well as old infrastructure heavily relying on coal for electricity production (Albania is an exception as it relies on hydropower plants7 ). To modernize their sectors, Balkan governments are striving to diversify their energy mix by investing more on renewable sources as well as investing on new natural gas production capacity given that renewable energy is intermittent. These efforts are combined with half-baked regulatory reforms and energy efficiency modifications. As of 2022, all Western Balkan countries are heavily dependent on foreign imports to satisfy their hydrocarbon needs. For example, Serbia is 85% dependent on foreign imports (overwhelmingly Russia) for its oil and natural gas imports.8 North Macedonia9 and Kosovo depend on 100% for such imports as they do not possess any domestic production.

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As mentioned above, the energy infrastructure of this region is mostly outdated as most of the electricity generation capacities were built during the communist period. For example, North Macedonia relies to this very day on two outdated thermal power plants running on high sulphur lignite (Bitola 1 & 2). Likewise, the Kolubara coal-based industrial complex in Serbia produces 53% of its electricity. The same applies to Kosovo as it has been relying on the outdated Kosova B coal plant for 90% of its electricity production. Despite the lack of indigenous hydrocarbon indigenous resources, the Balkan peninsula in general, and the Western Balkans in particular, are betting on their attractive geographic position as a catalyst to modernize their energy sector and enhance their energy security. Moreover, from a regional geopolitical perspective, their goal is to enhance their relative power and influence vis-à-vis their rivals in the region and as a bargaining chip in their interaction with regional and great powers. In addition, they have been trying to leverage foreign powers to finance their energy projects, which are capital-intensive and require serious financial firepower. Examples to support this claim are ample. We highlight the Serbian example and the grand bargain with Russia concluded in 2008 (elaborated in the next section) and the linkage created in relation to the Kosovo question. The reward for this bargain was making Serbia a regional gas hub through the ill-fated South Stream project as well as Russian full support regarding the Kosovo question. On the other side, Albania has aggressively courted the TAP pipeline as a way to raise its profile in the energy map and in relation to the EU and other energy players. This has been demonstrated by virtue of energy project economic windfalls as well as becoming as an alternative (non-Russian gas) regional supplier for natural gas via the Ionian-Adriatic Pipeline10 (IAP), the ALKOGAP11 pipeline to Kosovo and other interconnectors part of the Western Balkans Gas Ring.12 In this regional game, energy questions entangle political agendas both bilaterally and multilaterally. Balkan states tend to conduct a policy of maximum gains in collaboration with each other whenever expedient and of competing whenever their interests align with foreign powers.

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Russia and the EU: Geopolitics vs the Market Approach If there are two dominating powers waging a full-blown decade-long struggle in the energy sector in Europe, it is without doubt the European Union (EU) and Russia. This confrontation has boiled over as a result of the Ukraine crisis with all its consequences for both sides. This scramble is felt also in the Balkans, as the main geographic conduit of large energy infrastructure projects connecting the hydrocarbon-rich regions of Russia, the Caspian Sea, Central Asia and the Eastern Mediterranean, specifically in the natural gas sector. EU’s power hails from its buying power (EU is the second largest natural gas market in the world) while Russia is the top holder of reserves and a major producer of natural gas in the world.13 It is imperative therefore to analyze their motivations and strategies. Russia’s Balkans strategy is but one piece of Kremlin’s overall grand strategy: undermine NATO unity and enlargement in the Balkans as well as vigorously erode the liberal democratic model which it sees as a threat to its interests. Energy resources are but a tool in its national security toolbox and they are employed effectively and ruthlessly. As part of this strategy, state-owned energy companies, such as Rosneft and Gazprom, operate as departments of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In natural gas, its pipeline policy is overwhelmingly influenced by geopolitics by rewarding allies and punishing foes.14 Nord Stream and Turk Stream (the latter a replacement for South Stream) reconfigure the flow of natural gas by removing Ukraine as the key transit country as a punishment for its realignment toward the West in 2014. Turk Stream is the key pipeline of influence that attempts to nullify the effects of supply diversification promoted by the EU’s Southern Gas Corridor. Pipeline politics is but one tool in Kremlin’s energy policy toolbox to influence policies and markets in its favor. Prior to the war in Ukraine, Kremlin’s strategy in the Western Balkans had been to leverage its energy resources, especially natural gas, by dominating, and even exerting monopolistic control, over energy markets as well as controlling key energy infrastructure such as oil and natural gas fields, pipelines, refineries, power plants, underground storage and others. The current oil and natural gas monopoly of Gazprom in Serbia is the model which Moscow is striving to replicate elsewhere in the Balkans, although the sanctions instituted on Russian energy companies and exports will greatly reduce Russian energy influence. In the context

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of the ukrainian crisis, Moscow currently relies on Serbia and Republika Srpska to weaken the unity of European sanctions even though the war in Ukraine has prompted all Western Balkan countries to undertake serious and consistent efforts to reduce their dependence on Russian energy. As mentioned, the two exceptions at this stage are Serbia and Republika Srpska. In fact, Serbia signed a 3-year gas contract extension with Gazprom at favorable prices which contravene the EU sanctions regime.15 Let’s consider the “Serbian model”. This model has resulted in what specialists call state capture, in other words, by influencing “political appointees in state-owned companies, flawed public procurement, mismanagement of investment projects, lack of transparency and public scrutiny, etcetera”16 in a particular economic sector. In the case of Serbia, the 2008 deal between Belgrade and Moscow which allowed the sale of NIS (Naftna Industrija Srbije) to Gazprom sealed Russian dominance of Serbian energy market for generations to come. While this deal domestically in Serbia has been dubbed the “deal of the century”, it has been a lopsided arrangement as it has given Moscow unprecedented influence in Serbian economy17 and a possible deal-breaker for Serbia’s EU integration process.18 There are several reasons for this claim. First, one of the most valuable Serbian public companies, it was sold under its real value for only 500 million USD (real value was considered in billions at that time) for 56% of its shareholder value having in its portfolio 63 gas extraction fields, 650 oilfields, 2 major refineries (Panˇcevo and Novi Sad), gas underground storage as well as other geothermal stations.19 According to many observers of Serbian-Russian relations, the 2008 deal constituted a geopolitical deal which was supposed to lock-in Russian support on the Kosovo issue in the UN Security Council including placing Serbia as the regional hub for gas and transit for the ill-fated South Stream gas pipeline which was canceled in 2014 and rebranded as Turk Stream. As the largest contributor to the Serbian budget, the financial cost is immense. In addition, the cancellation of South Stream has dealt a considerable financial blow to Serbian businesses and government in forfeited contracts, taxes and transit fees. Worse, it has dealt a blow to Serbian ambitions to become a regional gas hub and locked-in its gas market into a heavy domination by Russian suppliers. The latter could have serious political implications for its EU integration process as it does not comply with EU law on energy markets and specifically the Third EU energy package.20

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In view of this severe challenge to EU energy security, Brussels and key EU member states duly noted and took action. The EU counteracted through its power of regulatory authorities in its member states and via its power of conditionality for candidate countries, four of whom are based in the Western Balkans. Up to the Lisbon Treaty, energy had been the exclusive domain of member states. Yet, the 2006 and 2009 “gas wars” between Ukraine and Russia galvanized the pooling of certain regulatory powers21 in Brussels to develop a more perfect Energy Union based on competition and market forces. Naturally, the EU strives to project this model to its periphery as a way to ensure its energy security. Currently, the EU is implementing far-reaching reforms within the Union to develop an Energy Union. The aim is to modernize energy infrastructure and regulate it to reduce the risk of supply cuts. In the external dimension, it strives to export its model of governance to its neighborhoods. These actions should contribute to the diversification of supply (the implementation of energy corridors such as the Southern Gas Corridor, rolling out of new LNG terminals). They will also promote the development of new technologies and competition in markets to make the energy sector united in a single market, more efficient and less dependent on imports.22 In the technology aspect, more reliance on domestic renewable energy sources would render both EU Member States as well as current and future candidate countries less dependent on supply disruptions. This is the main idea between the Energy Union and the Green New Deal. In the Western Balkans, EU policy in the energy sector is coordinated via the Energy Community Treaty originally launched in 2006 and dedicated to this region but which now has expanded to include Ukraine and Georgia, two key transit states.23 The Energy Community has provided a legal and regional political framework for Western Balkans to undertake the necessary reforms (Europeanization process) in order to prepare them for EU membership specifically for the energy sector having regional cooperation and infrastructure development connectivity an important theme. It monitors for compliance with relevant EU laws (for example the much touted Third Energy package) in its member countries in electricity, natural gas, oil, renewables, infrastructure, state aid, statistics and other themes related to the energy sector. Moreover, such institutional approaches in order to influence policy in EU’s periphery and neighborhood are strengthened via relatively substantial financial means allocated for the Western Balkans, including financing

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for energy projects. As part of the Berlin Process, the EU finances key energy projects (for example projects of common interest (PCI24 ) via the Western Balkans Investment Framework (WBIF) which until now has co-financed (in grants, loans and technical assistance) 5.1 billion euros essentially focusing on inter-connectivity projects in electricity and gas sectors (for example the IAP gas pipeline, gas inter-connectors between Greece and North Macedonia, Albania–North Macedonia electricity interconnector to name a few) as well as renewable energy production capacity and enhancing energy efficiency of Western Balkan countries.25 Moreover, Brussels has earmarked 9 billion euros of grants for the Western Balkans as part of its Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) for the 2021– 2027 budget. This support has been further reinforced as a result of the Ukraine crisis whereby the EU has ramped up financial support for the Western Balkans. In conclusion, Brussels cannot be outcompeted financially and has put its cash in its Western Balkans mouth, yet the jury is still out on the Energy Community record. This is even more amplified in the context of the ongoing Ukrainian war due to comprehensive economic sanctions against Russia.26 Seventeen years since the inception of the Energy Community, it is a mixed record at best. While there have been significant advances in renewable energy, energy efficiency and promoting projects essential for energy inter-connectivity, necessary reforms have not been forthcoming in certain sectors where the power of non-European stakeholders dominates the sector (the case of Gazprom and Serbia in non-compliance of the Third Energy Package in the natural gas sector). In addition, certain countries (Bosnia–Herzegovina, Kosovo) lag with the necessary comprehensive reforms due to not being EU candidate countries. Nonetheless, this approach has stopped the replication of the “Serbian model” in key energy sectors by strengthening the regulatory framework, providing necessary financing and making energy security a key condition for EU integration. In addition, the Ukrainian conflict has prompted the EU to pay serious attention to this region by revitalizing the European integration process and providing additional funding for key energy projects important to wean off the region from Russian energy dependency.

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The Western Balkans as a Natural Gas Gateway to Europe We define the Eastern Mediterranean as the body of water bordering the coastal countries of Turkey, Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, Egypt and Libya. From a geographic and strategic perspective, this is a decisive region as the world’s key maritime transport passes through the Suez Canal. Geopolitically, this region has been troubled by the IsraeliPalestinian conflict since 1948, the Cyprus crisis since 1974, and other antagonisms recently known as the “Arab Spring”. The discovery of significant natural gas deposits since 2009, their production and export will be adversely affected by the geopolitical situation hampering the efforts of this area to become a credible gas platform in the future. The Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean are geographically contiguous regions as Greece and Turkey are part of the Balkans peninsula. As a result, any efforts to tap into energy reserves from this region in order to diversify EU supplies will require regional collaboration among the stakeholders in these two regions. First and foremost, it is important for our analysis to determine the facts on the ground regarding natural gas reserves in this region. The Tamar (282 BMC27 ) and Leviathan (621 BMC) fields were discovered in 2009 and 2010 by the Israeli company Delek and the American Noble Energy, 135 kilometers from Haifa. The Aphrodite deposit (128 BMC) lies in the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus (southern Cyprus), discovered by Noble Energy as well the fields Calypso and Glaucus-1. In 2015, the giant Zohr field (845 BMC) was discovered by ENI off the coast of Egypt. To put this in perspective, whatever quantity of gas was discovered in Eastern Mediterranean, it corresponds to the capacity of Norway, the number one producer in Europe barring Russia.28 Table 8.1 lists these deposits and their production capacity. In view of this, economic and geopolitical implications are clear: given the massive amounts of natural gas, Israel, Egypt and Cyprus may have the spare capacity to export this lucrative fuel if all developments reach fruition,29 especially toward the EU market as part of the Southern Gas Corridor. The geopolitical implication lies in what routes and technology will the newly exporting countries choose from a commercial, technological and political perspective. Geopolitically, the extraction and transportation are hampered given the complex and unrecognized maritime boundaries between coastal countries. In addition,

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Table 8.1 Data on natural gas fields in the Eastern Mediterranean Name of gas field

Reserves (in BMC)

Production capacity (in BMC/ year)

Development costs (in USD billions)

Project progress

Tamar (Israel)

282

7.5

3

Leviathan (Israel) Aphrodite (South Cyprus)

621 128

21 unknown

5–6 unknown

Calypso (South Cyprus) Glaucus-1 (South Cyprus) Zohr (Egypt)

200

unknown

unknown

Operational: provide 60% of electricity in Israel Operational since 2019 Under development, expected commissioning in 2026 Under development

est 147–220 845

unknown

unknown

Under development

27

4

Operational since December 2017

Total discovered reserves

2296

bilateral relations impact the configuration of future supply chains. Effectively, pipeline routes are impacted by regional geopolitical realignment with Turkey–Libya on one side and Egypt–Greece–Cyprus–Israel on the other.30 The outcome of such shifts is the Eastern Mediterranean Natural Gas Pipeline (also known as EastMed 31 ) circumventing Turkish territory and infrastructure. The latter may be more commercially attractive. In addition, Egypt, as the beneficiary of the Zohr field and imports from Israel, could serve as the exporting platform for natural gas via its two LNG terminals in Idku and Damietta if Cyprus decides to link the gas fields with pipelines heading southwards. Naturally, Turkey has been pushing back by insisting on the exclusive economic zone of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and by making deals with other actors in the region, such as the maritime border deal with Libya, effectively blocking EastMed’s 2000 km route from Israel–Cyprus to Italy via Greece. This has made the likelihood of EastMed seeing fruition less likely. The Turkey– Libya maritime border delineation deal of 2019 will have to withstand the test of time as the latter emerges from years of civil war and no clear path

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to unity as the Tripoli-based GNA competes with the Benghazi-based government as the sole political representative of the Libyan people. The signing of the Abraham Accords between the UAE and Israel in 2020 has opened a unique opportunity for Abu Dhabi to increase its influence in this region via its special relationship with Israel to pursue its geopolitical and geo-economic interests in this key region by principally checking Turkish power via an anti-Ankara coalition (Egypt–Greece– Cyprus–Israel–France–UAE). Russia has not played a major role in the energy map of this region and we expect this will remain so in the short to medium term due to the fallout from the Ukrainian war. Russia’s muscular intervention in the Syrian civil and geostrategic presence through its naval base in Tartous has not translated adequately in the energy field. Somewhat timid steps have been taken in Egypt as Rosneft has acquired a 30% participation in the Shourouk concession off Egypt’s shore, which includes the Zohr field.32 As the exploration and discovery of gas fields are led by American, Israeli and Italian energy companies, the role of Russian energy companies will be severely limited due to the debilitating sanctions regime. The U.S. projects unique power capabilities in the Eastern Mediterranean via its 6th Fleet as well as its dominating power over Middle Eastern affairs in addition to ensuring open international waterways such as the Suez Canal. In addition, U.S. energy companies as well as financial institutions play a key role in developing these energy sources. Thus, the United States views this as a possible diversification of the supply of natural gas for the EU while navigating the tensions between its NATO allies (Greece, Turkey) as well as its major non-NATO ally, Israel. In this vein, the U.S. Congress in 2019 adopted the “Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019” explicitly stating “to strongly support the completion of the Trans-Adriatic and Eastern Mediterranean Pipelines and the establishment of liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals across the Eastern Mediterranean as a means of diversifying regional energy needs away from the Russian Federation”.33 Given such a complex geopolitical and energy map, the militarization of this region bodes ill for EU energy security and regional energy development. At this stage, the risk of any miscalculation is between Greece and Turkey, especially as Ankara sends hydrocarbon exploration missions into contested waters. Moreover, the tensions in the Black Sea could easily exacerbate risks in this part due to Russian naval presence in Syria. On the other hand, energy diplomacy has bolstered cooperation between Israel

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and its Arab neighbors as the former uses its newfound supplies to provide gas supplies to Jordan and Egypt and has engaged in talks with Lebanon on maritime boundary delimitation despite not having any peace treaty.

Great Power Competition and Energy: Between Pax Americana and the Silk Road? The Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean regions have been traditionally geopolitical chessboards wherein great powers executed their strategies. Historically, given their buffer zone status, powerful empires (Ottoman, Russian, Austro-Hungarian, British and French empires) decided the fate of these areas. In the current context, empires have been replaced by nation-states (Turkey, Russia, UK, France) and new players such as the United States, China, and others. As highlighted throughout this chapter, energy is just another facet of this great power competition but in which such interactions are further amplified by shifting geopolitical and energy contexts. We are therefore interested in the U.S.-Sino strategic competition and how it exerts influence in these two regions in the energy sector. The global energy system is built on American hegemony. Second to none, it is no coincidence that crude oil and petrochemicals are paid for in U.S. dollars. The United States is the largest producer but also consumer of oil with, respectively, 17.178 million bpd and 16.476 million bpd in 2020.34 American military power ensures the physical security of international trade which allows the delivery of hydrocarbons to the various markets of the planet, starting with its own. Thus, we summarize below the U.S. energy policy: • Promote competitive markets based on supply and demand as a determinant of prices for hydrocarbons • The implementation of energy diplomacy to develop resources outside OPEC + countries in order to weaken the power of this cartel • Finally, to take care of the role of alliances with crucial producers (a good example is the historic and strategic alliance with Saudi Arabia) in order to ensure the stability of world energy markets

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In the Balkans, competition between Washington and the EU on one hand, and Beijing on the other, manifests itself above all in influencing and controlling key infrastructure and natural resources, in which Chinese state-owned enterprises are very active. However, the Pax Americana established in the Balkans in the 1990s and which the EU tries to preserve, is starting to erode due to the lack of commitment of the United States and the weakness of the Europeans. Beijing took advantage of this void by implementing the regional dimension of its “new silk roads”, its “One Belt One Road” strategy (OBOR) or the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It is a massive investment plan aimed at creating new trade routes between China and Europe. The Balkans, as a transit space between Asia and Europe, plays a key role. As many have asserted, this ambitious program can stimulate local economies in the short term but it risks weakening the reform dynamic of the framework of European integration: “China’s approach to the region is anchored on the use of an economic policy calibrated to serve its main foreign policy objectives”.35 These projects are characteristically untransparent and exert a negative influence on the governance of the Balkan countries. They can undermine reforms undertaken in the EU accession process. In addition, the Chinese investment model puts fragile economies in the Western Balkans into unsustainable debt because Beijing finances projects mainly with loans. Let us analyze for example the stakes of these “new silk roads” in the Balkans. Serbia is China’s main partner in the Balkans. In 2015, they signed a strategic partnership. Beijing has targeted Belgrade especially because of its central geographic position but also in view of its policies toward NATO and the United States. However, China, unlike Russia, is not seeking to overturn the status quo but just to profit commercially and to enter Europe through its Balkan “back door”. The list of infrastructure projects is long and impressive. The most salient are: the TGV line between Belgrade and Budapest; the Adriatic Highway which will connect Albania, Montenegro, Greece and Italy; the port of Piraeus in Greece which already serves as the main gateway for trade with the region, and beyond, with Europe. Moreover, on the energy front, China uses its checkbook diplomacy to fund fossil fuel projects causing debt sustainability issues plus undermining commitment to EU integration in general and the energy acquis specifically. The example of the Tuzla 7 coal plant in Bosnia–Herzegovina is a case in point as Chinese financing of polluting plants puts the latter

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in violation of its commitments undertaken as a member of the Energy Community. Globally, China is deeply concerned about a fundamental issue: maritime access to energy supply. For this reason, Beijing, as a land power at present, is developing political alliances in Eurasia to avoid any adverse geopolitical phenomena. The Western Balkans and the Balkans in general, as a back door to Europe, is not an exception to this. The American strategy on the Western Balkans is centered on NATO (at this stage, U.S. multilateral support for NATO and the EU is expected to be revived under the Biden Administration after the former Trump Administration’s policy approach had denigrated multilateralism) with regard to the security aspect. It supports the European integration of this area on the politico-economic aspect to protect its geopolitical investment in the Western Balkans and preserve the Pax Americana established by the Clinton Administration. During the 2000s, Washington and Brussels came to an agreement: the first left the management of this region to the Europeans because the former had to manage the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. It remains to be seen what will be the approach of the Biden Administration in relation to the Three Seas Initiative in the context of the Ukrainian imbroglio, a group of EU member states between the Baltic, Black and Adriatic Seas36 that is aiming to connect this area via energy, digital and infrastructure projects. Thus far, given the fact that this initiative has not made ground-breaking investments and policy decisions out of fear that it would weaken the EU and alienate the larger EU founding member states, there is no expectation for the Biden Administration to dramatically increase its support and shape this entity as some form of a bulwark protecting its interests in Europe. On the energy front, the United States is banking on new infrastructure to reduce Balkan energy dependence on Russia and for the benefit of the American gas industry. For example, the installation of the Krk LNG terminal in Croatia can be interpreted as a geo-economic strategy because this terminal (and others) could receive American LNG replacing Russian supplies. In sum, American energy diplomacy is working to diversify supply but also paths by bypassing producers (Russia, Iran) and undesirable transit countries (Russia, Iran).

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Conclusions The purpose of this chapter is to analyze and highlight key correlations between energy (natural gas) and regional geopolitics in key neighboring regions for European energy security: the Balkans/Western Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean. While the former has raised its profile as an important transit region, the latter is set to become an important natural gas-producing area providing opportunities for energy security for Europe but also challenges given the existing geopolitical setup, especially the ongoing Ukrainian conflict. This chapter has highlighted and attempted to demonstrate that energy can be a factor of regional collaboration and/or competition between nation-states and can play an important role in the bilateral and multilateral framework of statecraft. We have used the consumer–producer–transit foreign policy analytical framework to analyze the motivations of the nation-state actors and their behavior depending on their perception of energy (in)security as they attempt to attain optimal outcomes for their interests. For example, in the Western Balkans, as well as in the Eastern Mediterranean, states nurture collaborative relationships to gain influence over key energy infrastructures as a means to become regional hubs and pocket economic windfalls. To this backdrop, regional and global powers jockey for influence and control via financial investments and energy projects pursuing their strategic goals. The main difference between the Western Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean is the fact that the EU and the United States to a certain extent, have a strong grip on the Balkan region institutionally (NATO, EU integration, Energy Community) as well as financially as a means to dissuade other actors (China, Russia, Turkey, etc.) not to challenge the status quo. In fact, EU resolve has strengthened as a result of Chinese, Russian and Turkish efforts to extend their influence, and especially after the Russian aggression toward Ukraine. In the Eastern Mediterranean, on the other hand, the lack of such security and economic architecture, has destabilized the region where weak U.S. leadership has allowed infighting between NATO allies (Greece and Turkey) and the militarization of the region. Energy has been a factor of conflict as states try to mark their maritime boundaries and benefit from its economic windfalls further complicating inter-state relations and engineering geopolitical realignments between former foes and friends. While energy is not the only

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factor affecting such shifts, its power to impact inter-state relations should not be underestimated.

Notes 1. This chapter has been extracted from the Ph.D. thesis “L’énergie dans les Balkans occidentaux et ses enjeux pour la géopolitique régional e” under the mentorship of Recteur Gérard-François Dumont and defended by the author at Sorbonne Université on 11 April 2019. 2. At the writing of this text, unprecedented energy wars are taking place between the West and the Russian Federation as the West has instituted sanctions on Russian energy exports (and in general) covering virtually the whole spectrum of energy trade. The outcome of this strategy remains to be seen and at the writing of this chapter, we cannot draw a definitive conclusion of the impact of the energy weapon in this particular case. As of end of May, the United States has banned the import of all Russian gas and oil, the EU has decided to end all seaborne oil imports and pipelines by end of 2022 (with certain exemptions) and Germany has suspended the controversial NordStream 2 pipeline. In addition, the UK has undertaken to phase out Russian oil imports by end of 2022. Such energy decoupling is unprecedented in modern history and its consequences for the international energy system and the world economy remain to be seen. Guy Chazan, Henry Foy, Marton Dunai, “EU steps up action on Russian oil sanctions”, The Financial Times, 1 May 2022, https://www.ft.com/con tent/c8eedb92-9512-4648-8146-d1450fcbd7e9. 3. The geopolitics of energy is shaped principally by the unequal distribution of hydrocarbon resources between producing and consuming countries. 4. Gazprom currently controls production, transmission and import of natural gas in Serbia in clear violation of EU’s Third Energy package which stipulates the unbundling of energy companies. 5. This analytical framework also takes into account the role of non-state or inter-state actors such private or state-owned oil/energy companies, international organizations (OPEC, IEA) and civil society. 6. The unfolding russo-ukranian conflict in 2022 has an inherent energy dimension which has destabilized not only European energy security but also the international energy system. As this is an ongoing conflict without a clear endgame, we cannot make any conclusion about the impact of the “energy” weapon in this particular case. 7. In Albania, 90% of electricity production comes from 3 hydro power plants on the river Drin. Yet, they are not sufficient to cover electricity needs due to growth in demand as well as the insufficient rate of precipitation making them sensitive to climate change and rain variations.

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8. Despite EU sanctions, Serbia renewed its contract with Gazprom for 3 years. See Martin Dunai, “Serbia under pressure to choose EU as Ukraine war raises stakes for Vuˇci´c”, Financial Times, 15 March 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/45d30dc9-c2c9-48dd-9ce5-5350e7ffc49a. 9. North Macedonia hopes to reduce dependency on russian gas via the floating liquid natural gas (FLNG) terminal in Alexandropolos, Greece which is expected to be operational in 2023 and connected to both TAP and IGB (interconnector Greece Bulgaria) inter-connector. 10. IAP capacity is estimated at 5 BCM/year and is supposed to connect TAP to Montenegro, Bosnia–Herzegovina and Croatia and help these countries decrease their dependence from Russian gas. This project is supported by the EU and Western financial institutions. 11. The ALKOGAP pipeline is planned to connect Kosovo with TAP via Albania. This pipeline is supposed to supply a future gas power plant (to replace the aging Kosova coal plants) and the gasification of industry and households in Kosovo. 12. Western Balkans Gas Ring is part of EU strategy to inter-connect natural gas networks of Western Balkan countries in order to improve security of supply. 13. Russia holds the largest natural gas reserves in the world estimated at 38 trillion cubic meters. In 2019, it produced 679 BCM and exported 256.6 BCM overall out of which 188 BMC went to EU Member States. BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2020. 14. Gazprom implements price differentiation strategy with allied former Soviet Union states getting the lowest prices, while West Europe and Southeast Europe price variation is higher and depends on access to other sources. 15. Robert F. Ichord, Jr, “The war in Ukraine and gas in the Western Balkans”, Atlantic Council, 30 June 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil. org/blogs/energysource/the-war-in-ukraine-and-gas-in-the-western-bal kans/. 16. Dimitar Bechev, Rival Power: Russia in Southeast Europe, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017, page 214. 17. Gazprom NIS is the largest contributor to Serbia’s state budget effectively financing 16% of public expenditure or 2.6% of Serbia’s GDP. 18. Serbia has not joined EU in implementing sanctions against Russia due to the aggression on Ukraine. 19. Serbia’s NIS extracts around 1 million metric tons of crude oil a year which is approximately 200,000 barrels a day. See Armend Reka, “Ph.D. Thesis”, page 381. 20. The third EU energy package came into force in 2009 and requires the unbundling of production, transmission and distribution of natural gas and electricity companies. So far, Serbia is in violation of the package in the gas

8

21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

26.

27. 28.

29.

30.

31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36.

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sector due to fact that Gazprom NIS controls both production and is part of joint ventures for transmission. Under the current arrangement, Serbia cannot close Chapter 15 of its EU negotiations effectively hindering its EU integration process. For example, the determination of the energy mix is regulated on the level of the Member States. Armend Reka, “L’énergie dans les Balkans occidentaux et ses enjeux pour la géopolitique régionale”, Sorbonne University, Paris, page 313. Armenia is an observer party to the Treaty as well as Turkey and Norway. The PCI project must have a significant impact on energy markets and market integration in at least two EU member states. As of March 2022, WBIF provided e1.3 billion in grants and e6.1 billion in loans for a general portfolio of projects amounting to e21 billion in the sectors of energy, transport, social development, environment, digital infrastructure and development of the private sector. As mentioned above, not all Western Balkans countries have sanctioned Russia. Serbia and Republika Srpska are cases in point and this could have adverse impact on Belgrade’s European integration process. BMC stands for Billions of Metric Cube, the industry standard for measuring natural gas reserves. Samuele Furfari in radio show “Affaires étrangères”: géopolitique du gaz en Méditerranée, France Culture, 28 avril 2018, https://www.francecul ture.fr/emissions/affaires-etrangeres/affaires-etrangeres-du-samedi-28avril-2018. According to the US Geological Survey (USGS) in 2010, it estimated the presence of nearly 9800 BCM of undiscovered technically recoverable gas and more than 3.4 billion barrels of oil resources in the region. Due to complex interlinked factors and principally an economic crisis affecting Turkish economy, Ankara has reached out to its geopolitical foes for a détente in order to improve economic conditions. Whether this will be sustained in view of the 2023 presidential elections remains to be seen. Initial capacity is estimated at 10 BMC per year for a cost of 6 billion USD. Pier Paolo Raimondi, “The new energy geopolitics of “EastMed”, Aspenia Online, 5 October 2020. https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1102/text. BP Statistical Review, 2021. Michal Makocki, “China in the Balkans: The battle of principles,” European Council on Foreign Relations, 6 July 2017. Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.

CHAPTER 9

Greece Countering Regional Instability and a Hostile Neighbor: A Perspective from Athens Panayotis Tsakonas and Ioannis Armakolas

Introduction: Old and New Threats to Greece’s Security The paramount changes in the post-Cold War international security environment presented countries in Southeast Europe (SEE), the Black Sea region, the Mediterranean, and the wider Middle East with an urgent need to reassess their security goals and priorities as well as to reform their entire defense and national security establishment. Particularly after the tragic events of 9/11, Greek security analysts and officials have been to a considerable extent re-assessing their security priorities and highlighting the significance of the so-called “new asymmetric threats”, which are seen

P. Tsakonas National and Kapodistrian University of Athens (NKUA), Athens, Greece e-mail: [email protected] I. Armakolas (B) University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Gardner (ed.), Geopolitical Turmoil in the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34318-6_9

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as emerging from instability in the wider Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Unsurprisingly, being an integral part of a fragile and unpredictable security environment, Greece is a prime recipient of many of the new security problems appearing in its wider neighborhood, including: (i) illegal migration and the influx of refugees, mainly due to armed conflict, poverty, and environmental degradation in the MENA region, subSaharan Africa, the Caucasus, Southeast Europe, and Central Asia; (ii) international organized crime, which is sometimes also directly and/or indirectly linked to various terrorist groups; (iii) the spread of international terrorist activities across Greece’s Mediterranean borders; (iv) the challenge associated with the explosion and increased significance of Information Technologies (IT); (v) The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, and/or chemical), and (vi) environmental problems due to degradation and scarce water resources and natural and man-made disasters (e.g., earthquakes, fires, major industrial accidents, and epidemics). All these have challenged the traditional security “paradigm”, which focuses on threats against territorial integrity, by highlighting the new asymmetric weaknesses and vulnerabilities a state has to deal with. Yet, besides improvement in Greek–Turkish relations since the late 1990s, Turkey remains—and will likely remain in the foreseeable future— Greece’s central security concern and the main factor underpinning its foreign and security policies and initiatives.1 By implication, especially over the last couple of years, Greece is called upon to deal with what it perceives as Turkey’s assertive and destabilizing behavior in the Eastern Mediterranean concurrently with some of the aforementioned challenges and vulnerabilities to Greece’s national security, such as the migration challenge, transnational organized crime, Islamist radicalization and international terrorism, cyber-threats, and—above all—environmental problems and the damaging consequences of climate change. In other words, Greece is called upon to be vigilant and institutionally prepared by dealing effectively with “poly-crises”, namely with traditional and new threats and challenges that evolve simultaneously in Greece’s immediate security environment. A case in point is the summer of 2021 when Greece had to deal simultaneously with the pandemic’s third wave and a series of catastrophic forest fires the length and breadth of the country, though chiefly in Attica and Evia. Although no lives were lost, the country proved unable to deal

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with this particular “poly-crisis” adequately and effectively, and according to the European Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS), Greece is now in the number one spot when it comes to the average area burnt per forest fire, ahead of the fourteen other Mediterranean nations on the list.2 In this chapter we outline a perspective on Greece’s security and foreign policy during the turbulent last couple of years, when relations with Turkey reached boiling point. The analysis is informed by the strategic considerations and the policy thinking of policy makers and analysts in the Greek capital. Therefore, the chapter should be read as a perspective from Greece, rather than a full-fledged and comprehensive consideration of all sides and perspectives in the issues considered. Unsurprisingly, the chapter focuses primarily on Greece’s complex relations with Turkey and the multi-level crisis mode existing at present in the Athens–Ankara relationship. As a result, the analyses focus mostly on developments in the Eastern Mediterranean. But a section is also devoted to Greece’s role and policies in the Balkans. The following section outlines the Greek perspective on Turkey’s role in the Eastern Mediterranean and how Greece is challenged by Ankara’s policies. Subsequently, the chapter focuses on the Greek policy responses to the challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans. We find that Greece works to “punch above its weight” in the Eastern Mediterranean, but, in contrast, fails to use its full potential in Southeast Europe.

Turkey’s Destabilizing Role in the Eastern Mediterranean The Eastern Mediterranean does not resemble the adjacent Middle East, namely a region with the lowest relative degree of regional integration in the contemporary world. Yet it is a region where the long-standing trends of disintegration, confrontation, and potential armed conflict remain a constant feature of an unstable and turbulent security environment. The most recent addition to the region’s instability is the assertive, provocative, and illegal behavior of the Turkish government. Especially after the 2016 failed military coup and the 2018 Presidential elections, President Erdo˘gan has adopted an assertive foreign policy featuring military interventions and challenges to the legal order in the Eastern Mediterranean. The range of the bilateral Greek–Turkish conflict has thus been broadened. To the old disputes and conflictual issues over the Aegean and in

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Cyprus, a number of new hotspots in the MENA region, primarily Libya and to a certain extent in Syria, have been added to Greece’s agenda of addressing challenges in relation to Ankara. Turkey Filling the Power Vacuum in the Region The beginning of the U.S. departure from the region predates the Trump administration, going back to the “Asia pivot” under the Obama administration. The U.S. retreat from the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East subsequently reduced its military presence in the wider region. Moreover, there was a delegation of U.S. responsibility for the Western Mediterranean and parts of sub-Saharan Africa to the EU and for the Eastern Mediterranean to regional partners and allies. The retreat of the U.S. strategic attention from the Eastern Mediterranean was viewed by President Erdo˘gan as a window of opportunity, prompting him to fill the power vacuum by deploying hard-power means and tactics for achieving short-term strategic gains. It is worth noting that the U.S. withdrawal from the Eastern Mediterranean has also consolidated NATO’s endemic weakness in remaining a passive observer of Turkey’s aggressive behavior toward Greece. Indeed, despite a series of rifts between Turkey and its allies (notably Turkey’s relationship with Russia, coupled by the purchase of the Russian-made S-400 antiaircraft system), the Atlantic Alliance remains fragmented over a strategically important Turkey. That is the case even though Turkey has kept distancing itself from the U.S. and NATO, as well as from the EU, the latter not constituting a “strategic priority” for Turkey any longer. Russia’s invasion in Ukraine on 24 February 2022 has undoubtedly upgraded Turkey’s geopolitical value and importance. Being the gatekeeper of the Black Sea and due to its geographic proximity and cordial relations with both disputants, Turkey’s initiatives for a mediating role were acknowledged by the West (both the U.S. and the EU). Turkey has thus managed to take the credit for playing a direct role in orchestrating an UN-backed deal signed in Istanbul, which resumed Ukrainian grain deliveries across the Black Sea for the first time since Russia’s invasion.3 Interestingly, Putin’s war in Ukraine is smashing Erdo˘gan’s attempt to break the country’s isolation and undertake rapprochement efforts with most countries in the Eastern Mediterranean, i.e., Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Israel but Greece and Cyprus. Indeed, Turkey’s assertive

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behavior in the Eastern Mediterranean has kept defining her as a revisionist outlier for Greece and Cyprus and as a problematic and unreliable ally of the U.S. and the EU given that Russia’s war in Ukraine made the West less tolerant to revisionist regimes. Turkey is thus expected to continue its policy of “coercive diplomacy” aiming at the aggressive pursuit of its regional goals by relaying on threats (i.e., the Blue Homeland doctrine and the war-like narratives) and the limited use of force to either stop or undo the consequences of actions already undertaken (i.e., in Syria, Libya, Iraq and especially on in Greece and Cyprus). Adopting Hard-Power and Provocative Policies Greece’s perceived Turkey problem is grounded on a number of policies pursued by Ankara. Turkey’s harsh reactions to Cyprus’s delimitation agreements on Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) with Egypt (2003), Lebanon (2007), and Israel (2010), as well as to the plans for the construction of the EastMed natural gas pipeline are good cases in point. Turkey has claimed that these security arrangements regarding the exploration, monetization, and transfer of Cypriot natural gas aimed to isolate Turkey from energy developments in the Eastern Mediterranean. Moreover, while considering himself the leader of a global power and a “central state” in the international system, Erdo˘gan could not put up with the emergence of the Republic of Cyprus (which Turkey does not recognize) as a key-player in the Eastern Mediterranean. Erdo˘gan’s strong counter-offensive to his rivals in the Eastern Mediterranean included: i. Turkey’s decision to purchase its own drilling vessels and the beginning of its own explorations (2017 and 2018) in an illegally delineated area, part of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Cyprus. In some cases, Ankara’s actions followed licenses issued by the self-proclaimed but internationally unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). ii. Turkey’s direct involvement in the Libyan civil war and the November 2019 signing of a military and maritime zone delimitation agreement between the government of Turkey and the Tripolibased Government of National Accord (GNA). This agreement sparked harsh reactions in Athens, as it infringed upon maritime zones adjacent to the Greek islands of Crete, Kassos, Karpathos,

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Rhodes, and Megisti, purposely violating the principle of international law that the islands are taken into account when delineating an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). iii. Turkey’s promotion of short-sighted policies on the Greek-Turkish borders on the river Evros in northern Greece in late February– early March 2020 through the “instrumentalization” of migrants and refugees with the aim to blackmail the EU and secure additional economic aid as well as other concessions, e.g., visa liberalization for Turkish citizens.4 iv. Turkey’s deployment of a research vessel, escorted by several warships, in a non-delineated continental shelf and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) claimed by both Turkey and Greece. This unilateral decision by Turkey to conduct research activities in a nondelineated zone is considered by Greece as illegal under the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS). It followed the agreement concluded between Greece and Egypt in the beginning of August 2020—an agreement that Athens sees as in full accordance with the provisions of the UNCLOS. The delineation of maritime zones between Greece and Egypt has infuriated Ankara, as it had successfully rammed both the illegal MoU between Turkey and Libya, and, most importantly, Turkey’s maximalist doctrine of “Mavi Vatan” (“Blue Homeland”).5 Greece views these actions in the Eastern Mediterranean as illegal and provocative. In addition, Turkish senior officials introduced an inflammatory rhetoric against Greece and certain EU members along with the nationalist narrative of “Mavi Vatan”. Evidently, Turkey has abandoned the “security-based” foreign policy that it followed since the mid-2000s (which was limited to certain ambitions of Turkey vis-à-vis its periphery) by moving further down the path of a “power-based” assertive foreign policy that exhibits the same pattern of aggressive behavior in Cyprus, in the Aegean Sea against Greece, as well as in Syria, Libya, and Iraq. This assertive strategy is also revisionist and embraces the “geography of the Ottoman empire”.6 By mid-2020, it was clear that Turkey has become a revisionist outlier attempting to limit if not undermine multilateral regional institutional arrangements that would not conform with its own regional ambitions. More importantly, what became clear to the U.S., the EU, as well as most of Turkey’s neighbors, was that Turkey’s illegal and assertive behavior in

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the region, if left unchecked, would carry certain negative repercussions for the coherence of the Atlantic Alliance as well as for the stability of the EU’s Southern neighborhood.

Greece Called Upon to “Punch Above Its Weight” With an economy still burdened by the Covid-19 crisis and the effects of the decade of serious economic crisis, Greece has been called upon to “punch above its weight” by dealing effectively with the challenges posed by Turkey’s policies and behavior, as well as with a series of new security risks and challenges. It is worth noting here that Greece’s economic crisis has also had detrimental implications not only for the country’s credibility within the EU but also for its ability to influence developments in its immediate environment. One should note at this point, however, that Greece’s underperformance on foreign policy initiatives in wider neighborhood should not be exclusively attributed to the economic crisis, as it remained an established characteristic of Greece’s foreign policy since the mid-2000s, and after a period of successful and energetic diplomacy toward Turkey, in the EU and in the Balkans. With the exception of the Prespa Agreement signed between Greece and North Macedonia in June 2018, which ended the long-standing dispute over the name “Macedonia”, Greece has, in recent years, rarely taken the initiative to respond to challenges by actively shaping the policy environment it operates. With economic means being substantially curtailed Greece is obliged to make the smartest use possible of the limited resources available so as to better manage a series of current (Turkey’s assertive behavior along with the migration challenge), as well as emerging security challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean. Greece will thus seek to strengthen its security in the extremely turbulent and unstable region, which is of critical importance for both Europe and the U.S., where non-Western powers (China and, especially, Russia) have been steadily increasing their presence and influence, and where Turkey’s destabilizing policies are challenging the legal order. Thus, shoring up Greek security will be linked to the taking of initiatives which will allow Greece to play a role in shaping both the EU’s and the U.S. policies vis-à-vis two key threats and/or challenges: dealing with Turkey, and managing the migration challenge.

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Shaping the EU’s Agenda of “Containgaging” Turkey As has already been noted, Turkey will highly likely remain the main threat to Greece’s security in the coming years. One should also bear in mind that the domestic and foreign pressure on Turkey’s “one-man regime”—pressure which may intensify ahead of the Presidential elections in 2023—will not necessarily force President Erdo˘gan into an aboutturn in his stance toward the U.S. and/or the European Union. Indeed, Erdo˘gan has failed to meet either EU or U.S. expectations following their decision to tighten the screws on Turkey, either through the threat of sanctions (the EU in December 2020)7 or the implementation of specific CAATSA sanctions against Turkey (the U.S. in January 2021).8 It is also not certain that Erdo˘gan will necessarily adopt a less aggressive and/ or more conciliatory stance in the Eastern Mediterranean, either toward Greece or—far more so—Cyprus. Traditionally, the Cyprus problem has tended to aggravate the Greek– Turkish dispute, while it appears over the last decade to have been responsible for broadening the bilateral dispute geographically beyond the Aegean and into the Eastern Mediterranean. Unfortunately, the prospects of a peace settlement, especially on the basis of a bizonal and bicommunal federation, seem more remote than ever following the election in October 2020 of Ersin Tatar, a fierce supporter of a “two-state solution”, as the new leader of the Turkish-Cypriot community, and Erdo˘gan’s ordering in July 2021 the Turkish army to open the “ghost town” of Varosha, an act widely considered as a provocation toward Greece and the Greek-Cypriots.9 It is thus anything but certain that the months ahead of the Turkish Presidential elections in June 2023 will bring a return to a state of “conflictual normality” in the stand-off between Greece and Turkey. By implication the first challenge Greece faces in the short run is “crisis stability”, meaning Greece must prove itself capable of preventing the high tension which Turkey is fomenting in the Eastern Mediterranean from escalating into a “hot incident”. Keeping the tension between Greece and Turkey at relatively low levels was certainly made easier by the resumption in January 2021 of the “exploratory talks” between Greece and Turkey; these talks, which had been paused in 2016, aim to delineate the maritime zones between the two countries. This resumption of contact became possible following the “decoupling” of the Cyprus issue from the tensions between

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Greece and Turkey, which allowed the Greek government, in agreement with the Republic of Cyprus, to begin “exploratory talks” with Turkey independently of any resolution to the Cyprus issue. While waiting either for a “volte-face” or a gradual return on the part of President Erdo˘gan to a less confrontational foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, Greece has embarked upon a policy of balancing Turkey: both internally, by doubling the defense budget in 2021 to strengthen its defense capabilities and externally, by investing in bilateral partnerships and strategic alliances with key neighboring countries like Israel and Egypt and certain pro-Western Arab states like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.10 Most notably the Greek-French defense accord, signed in Paris in September 2021, has not only strengthened Greece’s internal balancing efforts through the purchase of the French frigates Belharra and the Rafale fighter jets, but also its external balancing ones, through the inclusion of a Mutual Defense Clause in Article 2 of the bilateral agreement, which strengthened Greece’s deterrent ability toward any Turkish attempt to create a “fait accompli” in the Eastern Mediterranean.11 By the same token, the defense accord with the U.S. signed in October 2021 was also viewed by Greek decision-makers as strengthening Greece’s internal and external balancing efforts. More specifically, the use of the northern Greek port of Alexandroupolis by the American military was described by the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Nikos Dendias as “one of the most important elements of the U.S.-Greece Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement (MDCA)”—and as “the primary consideration for Thrace— the history of the region has changed with the creation of an energy hub. Geopolitically, the crisis in Ukraine affirmed what we are doing”.12 Greece’s second and still more crucial challenge will be advancing a coherent and holistic strategy toward Turkey—presumably “with a little help from its friends”, namely the EU and the U.S. Drawing on a new sense of national confidence, its geostrategic value, and its renewed stance as a “beacon of stability” in the Eastern Mediterranean, Greece should continue to invest in anchoring Turkey to the broader European and transatlantic framework. To this end, Greece should opt for devising a concerted “carrot and stick” strategy—lacking by both the EU and the U.S.—with the aim to deter Turkey’s assertiveness while preserving the anticipation of mutual benefits inherent in a policy of engaging with Turkey.

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More specifically Greece should be an active contributor to the advancement of the EU “balancing engagement” or “containgagement” strategy by shaping Turkey’s new relationship with the European Union.13 It must not be forgotten that an effective strategy the EU may devise for dealing with Turkey should not only address the immediate challenge of Turkey’s assertive behavior in the Eastern Mediterranean but also the future of EU relations with Turkey along with the pressing migration/refugee challenge. Specifically, the EU approach should represent a balanced position which protects EU interests while remaining open to dialogue and cooperation. This “dual-track approach” suggests that the EU and its member states have to be united and firm on issues where their interests are at stake but also on the need to get Turkey to engage constructively. In the post-pandemic era, and given the new challenges posed by the Russian aggression on Ukraine, it is most likely that pressure will increase upon both Turkey and the EU member states. The EU should thus make use of and build upon Erdo˘gan’s current and future needs. In that context, the EU should take into account Turkey’s aspirations for status and recognition of a regional power, a “central state”, with a role in European and regional politics. The question of status cannot be eschewed. Moreover, Erdo˘gan believes in transactional politics, and opts for deals with leaders on a personal basis. The launch of negotiations between EU and Turkey for the modernization of the EU-Turkey Customs Union will be an essential part of the EU’s policy of engaging Turkey.14 This arrangement should seek not only to effectively address the issue of modernization of the EU-Turkey Customs Union, but also to develop a holistic and effective migration policy. The EU should thus embark upon building a new EU-Turkey understanding consisting of two pillars: trade/economy, with a view to updating/modernizing the EU-Turkey Customs Union; and migration, with a view to repackaging the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement. The Customs Union is indeed an important instrument and the only leverage at the EU’s disposal for concluding an agreement with Turkey. The EU should not necessarily put the discussions outside the context of the EU accession negotiations but deal with it as an agreement that needs to be negotiated with a very important partner.15 Negotiations can indeed lead to an agreement that would balance the European and Turkish interests. Yet for EU-Turkey negotiations on the Customs Union modernization to begin, Greek and Cypriot concerns about Turkey’s aggressive and

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illegal behavior in the Aegean and in Cyprus’s and Greece’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) need to be considered. Moreover, various European Council conclusions in 2020 and 2021 have set out that the European Union will engage with Turkey so as to enhance cooperation in a number of areas of common interest, such as the modernization of the Customs Union between EU and Turkey—and yet in a phased, proportionate and reversible manner—only under the condition that there will be a sustained de-escalation of Turkey’s provocative and assertive behavior in the Eastern Mediterranean.16 Modernization of the Customs Union needs to be linked with an updated EU-Turkey Statement with regard to migration. Updated arrangements on migration between EU and Turkey (through a repackaging of the existing EU-Turkey Statement) remain at the top of the policy list the EU is called upon to adopt. An updated EU-Turkey Statement should rectify certain provisions of the EU-Turkey Statement on migration regarding Greece.17 It goes without saying that the EU should guarantee adequate, if not generous, financial support for Turkey, which is hosting the largest population of refugees in the world, and provide funding of the same magnitude as that in the 2016 EU-Turkey agreement.18 Turkey on its part is interested in a “restart” in its relations with the EU through an agreement that would not only promote revitalization of the existing EU-Turkey Statement but also include other forms of cooperation, such as the modernization of the EU-Turkey Customs Union or the issue of visa liberalization. Indeed, we should keep in mind that the EU-Turkey Statement is not only about migration. In this regard, Turkey is expected to seek the recommitment of the EU to issues other than migration and trade and the economy, e.g., visa liberalization, accession negotiations and chapters, Syria, and so on. Seven years on from the tragic annus horribilis, namely the year 2015 when Greece was called upon to deal with the inflow of nearly a million refugees on the coasts of Greek islands in the Aegean Sea, Turkey continues to “hold the keys” to managing the migration challenge in Europe’s southeastern borders. At the same time the EU’s “common migration policy” remains limited to protecting its external borders in the light of new and stricter terms. It is here that Greece taking the initiative on behalf of the “front-line states” of the European South, which continue to bear the brunt of the migration challenge, could turn the EU’s “Mediterranean component” (including the EU South member states, i.e., France, Italy, Spain, Greece, Malta, and Cyprus) into a factor

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for formulating a comprehensive European agenda for migration management. An agenda that will not view the EU’s Mediterranean member states as “Europe’s shield” and will not limit itself to supporting them financially and/or through the provision of equipment. The adoption by the EU of a strategy of “balancing engagement” or “containgagement” of Turkey is undoubtedly in Greece’s interest. In fact, a similar strategy of “conditional engagement” was adopted by Greece vis-a-vis Turkey in the late 1990s with the aim of bringing Turkey into the European integration orbit while giving equal attention to deterrence and hedging against the possibility that a strong Turkey might challenge Greek interests.19 By referring to a “sticks and carrots” approach as the strategy the EU follows toward Turkey, the President of the European Council Charles Michel seems to also share (along with other top officials in the EU, such as HRVP Josep Borrell) the rationale of the “balancing engagement” strategy. Yet the EU is still in search of identifying the particular tools it should use for improving relations with Turkey while making clear to Turkey that the EU should be respected. This was made apparent in the proposal introduced by the President of the European Council during his visit to Athens in September 2020. Following its special meeting of 1 and 2 October 2020, the European Council called for a “Multilateral Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean” and invited the High Representative Josep Borrell to engage in talks about its organization.20 The conference would involve the “key parties” in the Eastern Mediterranean and NATO in order for the thorny issue of maritime boundaries in the region but also other issues, such as energy, security, and migration, to be discussed. The proposal includes a number of difficult issues which should have been addressed and clarified before its introduction, such as the agenda of the conference and/or the status of the participants. Greece should be an active supporter of this initiative and seek to shape both the agenda and the terms of the conference. Greece is interested in having Turkey anchored in the broader European and transatlantic framework. Yet this partnership should be rulesbased and function in accordance with international law and agreements. Greece should be an active contributor to the advancement of the EU strategy by co-shaping Turkey’s new relationship with the EU. To this end, Greece could introduce the “positive aspects” of a Greek-Turkish

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bilateral agenda by choosing to highlight the prospects for bilateral cooperation on issues of common interests, such as Covid-19, organized crime, climate change, and terrorism.

Greece in the Balkans: Under-Performing in a Favorable Policy Environment The above analysis has made evident that Greek strategic thinking is at present almost entirely preoccupied with the growing tensions in the East Mediterranean and the escalating multi-level disputes with Turkey. In fact, the focus on developments in Greece’s East and South is such, that Athens seems to invest very little diplomatic capital in the developments in South-East Europe. This is a fair assessment, despite the fact that Greek diplomacy continues to frequently declare its commitment to the region’s European future. The latter declarations aside, Athens seems to be little engaged in active diplomatic initiatives that would shape developments in the Western Balkans, the only part of South-East Europe that remains outside the EU and in which tensions and geopolitical uncertainty are growing. There are two main reasons why Greece is not adequately engaged in a region where it has traditionally had a diplomatic advantage and important economic presence.21 The first is an obvious conclusion deriving from the above analysis. The challenge of Turkey, the fact that relations between Athens and Ankara have been at their worst shape since at least the 1990s, consumes Greek policy and decision-makers. Athens finds that it does not have the resources, and possibly even the culture and knowledge, to develop autonomous, energetic, and creative diplomatic moves at several fronts. Over-exposed on the policy challenge posed by Turkey, Greece seems unable to maintain its political and diplomatic stronghold in other areas; never mind that the Balkans has traditionally been among the top areas of geopolitical interest for Greek policy makers. The reality of over-extension and lack of culture for multi-focused foreign policy has taken its toll. The second reason has more to do with a general inaction caused by the controversial in Greece—Prespa Agreement. The New Democracy government of Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis came to power in July 2019 amidst the furor surrounding the leftist SYRIZA-led government signing of the agreement.22 The latter was hailed by the Americans and European partners as a milestone development for the stabilization

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and Europeanization of the region, as it ended the nearly three-decades long diplomatic spat over the name of Greece’s neighbor, today named Republic of North Macedonia.23 The Greek diplomatic effort was recognized at the time as significantly contributing to the stability of both North Macedonia and the region. The signing of the Prespa Agreement finally allowed North Macedonia to join NATO, a membership that was pending since 2008, when Greece managed to effectively block Skopje from joining the Alliance together with Albania and Montenegro.24 The compromise on the name dispute with North Macedonia was a highly unpopular political move of the government then led by Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras.25 The compromise with North Macedonia, as well as a more lenient policy toward the Balkan neighbors, were even more unpopular among conservative and right wing voters of New Democracy.26 While in opposition, New Democracy fiercely opposed the Prespa Agreement, mainly on the grounds that it allegedly made unacceptable concessions on identity issues. New Democracy made the opposition to the agreement one of its electoral campaign issues. When in government, it rejected the option of withdrawing from the agreement and pledged to implement it, even though it considered it harmful to Greek national interests. The lukewarm relationship to the agreement and the relations with North Macedonia made the diplomatic moves of the Greek government more difficult. Essentially, the government appeared comfortable with the fact that the diplomatic “hot potato” of the name dispute was resolved by another government and without political cost for it. But at the same time, there was enough opposition of hardliners within its ranks as well as its own electorate that continued to oppose the agreement to allow it to develop unhindered relations with Skopje and use the full potential of the Prespa Agreement for increasing its influence in North Macedonia and the region.27 As a result, implementation of the Prespa Agreement slowed down under New Democracy government and multi-level relations between Athens and Skopje did not flourish, at least not to the extent that was expected or hoped for.28 The controversy and ambiguity over such a central tenet of recent Greece’s Balkan policy has contributed to a feeling of diplomatic aporia and inertia. To these reasons that contributed to Greece under-performing in the Balkans one may add the fact that as a result of a decade of earth-shattering economic crisis, Greek economic activity in the region— especially the previously significant investment footprint—has severely weakened.29 Important Greek state-owned and private businesses have

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undergone a process of disinvestment from the region, and Greece maintains a significant place among foreign investors in only a couple of Balkan countries. Additionally, the flagship diplomatic success of Greece, the EU’s commitment to integrate the entire Balkans into the Union’s fold, a “promise” that was famously officially extended at the European Council and the EU-Western Balkans Summit held in Thessaloniki in 2003, has received a number of serious blows in recent years. The European perspective of the Western Balkans is these days anything but in good health. And this also weakens the diplomatic clout of Greece for a number of reasons. Greece being the oldest EU member state in the region, and priding itself in promoting the Europeanization of the Balkans, finds that with the weakening of the accession perspective of the remaining non-EU Balkan states its own ability to shape the policy agenda in the region is also diminishing. Greece has also failed to protect the legacy of the Thessaloniki Summit in light of severe challenges to the European future of the region. Greece failed—in reality it did not even try—to prevent France and Bulgaria to delay and weaken the EU accession. Even though the Europeanization of the region, its full inclusion in the EU and its exclusion from the geopolitical influence of non-EU countries, is of utmost importance for Greece, policy makers in Athens evidently did not consider the frustration of the process as a result of repeated delays and blockages as a diplomatic cause worth mobilizing against. And that’s despite the fact that both France (fully aligned with Greece on Turkey and East Mediterranean politics) and Bulgaria (highly connected with Greece through the U.S.led efforts to disengage from Russian fossil fuel) are countries with which Athens has in recent years strong diplomatic, political, and economic connections. Finally, with the geopolitical future of the region “up for grabs”, Greece finds that a number of non-EU actors are increasing their political and economic footprint and overall influence. This point refers primarily to global competitors of the EU, like Russia and China.30 But, importantly for Greece, it includes also regional heavyweights, like Turkey, which has in recent years increased its influence among Muslim populations in the Balkans, but also managed to build diplomatic and economic inroads with key regional countries, especially Serbia which remains ambiguous about its full integration to Western institutions. The geopolitical limbo, and especially the EU’s reluctance to reassure the Western

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Balkan politicians about the realistic prospect of a full integration of the region in the Union, increases the demand for non-European cooperation and influence. Thus, in contrast to a linear geopolitical future that one could predict at the time of the Thessaloniki Summit, there is growing evidence that both the leaders and the populations of the Western Balkans become increasingly open to other geopolitical options.31 In contrast to the above trends, one area in which Greece seems to be increasing its influence and possibly “punching above its weight” is energy security. As a result of the newly formed special relationship with the U.S., for which the Balkans’ energy independence from Russia remains a top priority, but also due to significant energy policy decisions that have been made in recent years in order to strengthen Greece’s role as regional energy hub, Athens has put itself in the center of energy diplomacy and has been made a leader in energy security projects of the region. This role has been further strengthened since Russia invaded Ukraine. The Greek government’s unequivocal support for Ukraine, despite the cultural ties to Russia and the lenience of the Greek public opinion toward Russia’s aggressive geopolitics, has made Athens a cornerstone for American and European plans for disengaging the Balkan region from energy dependence on Russia. It remains to be seen how this newly found role of Greece will play out in the coming period, depending also on how long the war in Ukraine will last and how severe the West’s rift with Moscow will prove to be. Greece’s investment in renewables as well as the increasing volume of liquified natural gas flowing through Greek terminals and ports may prove crucial for the energy future of the region, especially if sanctions and energy warfare with Russia are prolonged well into the future. Other challenges to Greece’s increased role in the Balkans also remain. Greece is still one of the five EU non-recognizers of the independence of Kosovo. The policy of solid engagement but no recognition that Greece follows has been successful and has managed to create a sense of intensive engagement with the de facto independent country.32 But the non-recognition of Kosovo remains one of the key obstacles in the full implementation of the agenda of integrating the Western Balkans to all Western institutions. Despite its constructive engagement with Kosovo, Greece finds it difficult to maintain and increase its role, or even promote the stabilization of the region, without attempting a bold policy change on the question of Kosovo’s independence. At the same time, as a result of years of dodging the question of recognition, it is unclear what the

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reactions of Serbia will be in case Greece decides to follow the U.S. and EU partners in recognizing Pristina. Greece has missed plentiful opportunities to recognize Kosovo, including when the International Court of Justice in its ruling on Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2010 explicitly differentiated it from the case of Cyprus, and now, after almost fifteen years of non-recognition it will be probably highly challenged by a more assertive and “less Western” Serbia if it decides to change policy. In a regional security environment in the Balkans that is changing fast and with uncertain geopolitical parameters, Greece has significant political, diplomatic, geographic, and economic advantages that offer opportunities for greater influence. But a number of decisions made by successive Greek governments as well as the preoccupation with the “Turkish threat” curtail Greece’s ability to play a high-profile role in the region. In essence, Greece is under-performing in the Balkan region and this has also consequences for its broader competition with Turkey, since the Balkans are also an important receiver of Ankara’s diplomatic activism. Yet more worryingly, the dimming of the Western Balkans’ European perspective means that Greece will likely have to counter increasing influence by non-EU actors of all sorts as well as little less incentive by Balkan neighbors to recognize the primacy of EU member states or to align with the EU in forcing and security policy questions. Given that Greece has traditionally used the European integration and the accession prospects of its Balkan neighbors in order to resolve disputes in a favorable manner or, more generally, to increase its diplomatic clout and political influence,33 Athens should be prepared for even more challenges in the Balkans. That will be the case unless Greece, together with other like-minded EU member states, manages to shape European policy toward more intense engagement with the Western Balkans and, eventually but not in a distant future, to accepting all countries of the region as members.

Notes 1. There had indeed been real possibilities for the resolution of the Greek– Turkish conflict about two decades ago, when Greece emerged as a supporter of Turkey’s EU membership ambitions and granted Turkey EU candidacy status at the December 1999 Helsinki European Council. Yet although the Helsinki decisions heralded an era of comprehensive political and economic reform in Turkey and in 2004 Cyprus joined the European Union neither the Cyprus problem was solved (with the

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2.

3.

4.

5.

Annan Plan referendum) nor the Greek–Turkish disputes in the Aegean were referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The favorable conditions for conflict resolution have thus dissipated and the prospects for a resolution of the conflict are today dim. For Greece’s strategy of promoting long-term solutions to disputes with Turkey through the latter’s EU accession process, see Panayotis Tsakonas, The Incomplete Breakthrough in Greek-Turkish Relations. Grasping Greece’s Socialization Strategy (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2010). The establishment of the Ministry of Climate Crisis and Civil Protection in the aftermath of the catastrophic fires (9 September 2021) marked an attempt to address the institutional deficit in this area, but it remains a stop-gap solution. If Greece is to develop into a “Modern National Security State”, it will need to push through far more radical institutional reforms. See “Erdogan emerges a key mediator in Ukraine war”, France 24, 22 September 2022, retrieved from: https://www.france24.com/en/livenews/20220922-erdogan-emerges-a-key-mediator-in-ukraine-war. On 28 February 2020, Erdo˘gan proclaimed Turkey’s border with Europe “open”, and his country’s authorities were told not to hinder any refugees attempting to cross into the EU. Within 48 hours, nearly 13,000 refugees had arrived at the Greek-Turkish border, while hundreds more had landed on Greek islands. At the same time, the Turkish police were deployed to prevent any refugees from returning to Turkey. This situation forced Greece to deploy its military and request additional assistance from Frontex, the EU’s border police. The Turkish government has even gone as far as engaging in a disinformation campaign against the Greek government, falsely stating that Greece is murdering refugees and comparing the border situation to Auschwitz. See Paul Gadalla,”Turkey’s track record of weaponising refugees, 26 March 2020, E-kathimerini, retrieved from: https://www.ekathimerini.com/opinion/251025/tur key-s-track-record-of-weaponising-refugees/. The Commission “strongly rejected” Turkey’s use of “migratory pressure for political purposes”, see European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document – Turkey 2020 Report, p. 7, retrieved from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020SC0355&from=en. This weaponization of migrants, to the extent that some commentators have described the phenomenon as a “hybrid war”, lies in stark opposition to the European ideal of respect for human rights. See Roman Gerodimos, Hybrid War, Amagi, 3 March 2020, retrieved from: http://amagi.gr/ content/yvridikos-polemos. The Blue Homeland doctrine includes an area upon which Turkey claims it has sovereign rights although this includes parts of the continental shelf

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of Cyprus as well as a series of sizeable Greek islands, such as Rhodes, Karpathos, Kassos, and the Eastern part of Crete. 6. Alan Mikhail, “Why Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan’s love affair with the Ottoman empire should worry the world”, TIME, 3 September 2020 Retrieved from: https://time.com/5885650/erdogans-ottoman-worry-world/. 7. On 1 October 2020, the European Council stressed that: “In case of renewed unilateral actions or provocations in breach of international law, the EU will use all the instruments and the options at its disposal in order to defend its interests and those of its Member States”, see European Council, European Council Meeting (1–2 October 2020), retrieved from: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/45910/ 021020-euco-final-conclusions.pdf. On 10–11 December 2020, the European Council noted that “Regrettably, Turkey has engaged in unilateral actions and provocations and escalated its rhetoric against the EU, EU Member States and European leaders. Turkish unilateral and provocative activities in the Eastern Mediterranean are still taking place, including in Cyprus’ Exclusive Economic Zone”. See European Council, European Council Meeting (10 and 11 December 2020)—Conclusions, p. 11, retrieved from: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/47296/101112-20-euco-conclusions-en.pdf. Moreover, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP), Josep Borell, in his report in 2021 to the European Council stipulated that “Turkey’s increasingly assertive foreign policy collided with EU priorities under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). While the institutional framework enabling Turkey’s participation in CFSP and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is in place, in 2020 Turkey recorded a very low alignment rate of around 11 percent. Turkey continued not to align with most Council decisions (restrictive measures), including related to Russia, Venezuela, Syria and Libya, and with EU declarations such as on NagornoKarabakh”. See European Commission, High Representative of the EU for Foreign and Security Affairs, State of play of EU-Turkey Political, Economic and Trade Relations. Joint Communication to the EU Council, Brussels, 2021, p. 4, retrieved from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-con tent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52021JC0008&from=EN. 8. Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 air defence system from Russia led to the Trump administration’s decision to remove Turkey from the F-35 programme, America’s most expensive weapons platform, as the S-400 is said to pose a risk to the NATO alliance as well as Lockheed Martin’s F-35 stealth fighter, see Amanda Macias,”US Cuts Turkey from F-35 Program after Russian Missile Deal ”, CNBC, 17 July 2019, retrieved from: https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/17/uscuts-turkey-from-f-35-program-after-russian-missile-deal.html. Moreover,

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the possibility that Turkey will fully activate the purchased S-400 air defence system, or pursue deeper cooperation with Russia in response to sanctions imposed on Turkey by the U.S. on 14 December 2020 under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), continues to seriously undermine the U.S.–Turkey relationship, see Amanda Macias, U.S. sanctions Turkey over purchase of Russian S-400 missile system”, CNBC, 14 December 2020, retrieved from: https://www. cnbc.com/2020/12/14/us-sanctions-turkey-over-russian-s400.html. It is also worth noting that the separate threat of sanctions against Turkey’s state-owned Halkbank for avoiding Iran sanctions is already hanging over the already-weakened Turkish economy. 9. The EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy stressed that Turkey’s unilateral actions in the fenced-off area of Varosha, as well as its repeated statements, were “directly questioning the agreed basis for the solution to the Cyprus problem as provided by the relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR), the latest of which was adopted on 29 January 2021 (UNSCR 2561). See European Commission, High Representative of the EU for Foreign and Security Affairs, “State of play of EU-Turkey Political, Economic and Trade Relations ”, Joint Communication to the EU Council, Brussels, 2021, p. 3, retrieved from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-con tent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52021JC0008&from=EN. On 25 March 2021, the European Council has also reiterated its commitment “to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem in accordance with the relevant UNSC resolutions (notably 550, 789, 1251)” See “Statement of the members of the EU Council”, Brussels, 25 March 2021, p. 7, retrieved from: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/48976/ 250321-vtc-euco-statement-en.pdf. 10. For Greece’s strategic partnerships in the Eastern Mediterranean see Charalambos Tsardanidis, “Greece’s Changing role in the Eastern Mediterranean” in Zenonas Tziarras (ed.), The New Geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean, Nicosia: PRIO Cyprus Centre, p. 79. 11. See Dorothée Schmid, Elisa Domingues Dos Santos, “The France-Greece Partnership Beyond the Eastern Mediterranean”, IFRI , February 2022. The Greek-French defense accord functions also as a “wake-up call” for EU member states to come out of their naivety over Turkey and more importantly it shows the way forward for the EU or even part of the EU (through “coalitions of the willing”) to transition into a credible “security provider” as the evolving global context and circumstances demand as well as to revive NATO through the strengthening of its European pole. For obvious reasons Greece supports the strengthening of the EU’s “strategic autonomy” and it strongly believes it will be the main beneficiary.

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12. Tasos Kokkinidis, “Alexandroupolis a “Key Port” for U.S. Military Presence in Greece”, Greek Reporter, May 10, 2022, retrieved from: https:/ /greekreporter.com/2022/05/10/alexandroupolis-military-u-s-greece/. 13. Panayotis Tsakonas, “Containgaging Erdogan: An EU Strategy towards Erdogan’s Turkey”, Policy Paper No. 39, Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy-ELIAMEP, Athens, September 2020. 14. See Panayotis Tsakonas—Athanasios Manis, “Modernising the EU-Turkey Customs Union: The Greek Factor”, Policy Paper No. 35, July 2020. 15. Turkey’s accession process to the EU is for some years now in limbo: about half of the 33 chapters of the acquis that require negotiations have been opened and just only one has provisionally closed. The main stumbling block in 2000s was Turkey’s failure to implement the 2005 Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement and to extend its Customs Union with the EU by opening its ports and airports to Greek-Cypriot traffic. As a result, the EU suspended at the end of 2006 the opening of eight chapters related to the Customs Union and announced that no more chapters would be provisionally closed until Turkey had fulfilled its commitment. France and Cyprus have unilaterally blocked other chapters. Apparently, Turkey is still far from meeting the conditions for membership, and one may argue that Turkey—especially over the last decade—has broken both the spirit and the letter of the Copenhagen political criteria. Moreover, Turkey’s unceasing democratic backsliding, the violations of democratic values, fundamental rights and the rule of law, the widespread corruption along with its provocative and illegal behavior toward two EU members, i.e., Greece and Cyprus, had led the European Parliament, the European Commission and successive EU Councils to certain negative statements or decisions including: further cuts in EU financial support to Turkey; threats of imposing sanctions due to gas drilling operations off Cyprus, and the postponement of the modernization of the existing EU-Turkey Customs Union. 16. See “Statement of the members of the EU Council”, Brussels, 25 March 2021, retrieved from: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/48976/ 250321-vtc-euco-statement-en.pdf. It should also be considered that the modernization of the Customs Union has been already frozen since June 2018, namely well before the beginning of Turkey’s drillings in the EEZ of Cyprus. That was due to its human rights record and the fact that Turkey is not implementing the current Customs Union toward Cyprus. By implication, there might be certain member states not fully agreeing to negotiations for a modernized Customs Union to begin even if the environment in the Eastern Mediterranean becomes more favorable. 17. These most notably include: the readmission to Turkey of migrants crossing to the EU through the land borders; the possibility of transfers from the Greek islands to the mainland (without losing the right for

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readmission to Turkey); and the inclusion of explicit provisions in the Statement that returns can take place via regular and charter flights from airports on the mainland as long as the initial registration has taken place on the islands. It should be noted that the Commission proposed, and the European Parliament agreed in its July 2020 Plenary to top up the humanitarian aid to refugees in Turkey by 485 million euros. The financial support to Turkey may take place through the Multiannual Financial Framework (2021–27), perhaps linked with a suspension clause in case Turkey decides to “instrumentalize” again migrants and refugees. For an analysis and assessment of Greece’s “socialization strategy” vis-àvis Turkey in the late 1990s, P. Tsakonas, The Incomplete Breakthrough in Greek-Turkish Relations, op.cit. For an analysis of several priorities from the prism of different countries and perspectives in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin, see George Tzogopoulos (ed.), The EU and the Eastern Mediterranean: The Multilateral Dialogue Option, (CIFE Studies: The EU in World Politics, 2021). For overviews of Greece’s foreign policy and diplomatic presence in the region, see Marilena Koppa, “Ελληνική Βαλκανική Πολιτική: Τριάντα Χρόνια Μετά. [Greek Balkan Policy: Thirty Years Later].” In 30 Χρόνια Ελληνικής Εξωτερικής Πολιτικής 1974–2004 [30 Years of Greek Foreign Policy 1974– 2004], ed. Konstantinos Arvanitopoulos and Marilena Koppa, (Athens, Livanis, 2005); Sotiris Serbos, Ελλάδα και Δυτικά Βαλκάνια. [Greece and the Western Balkans.] In Ελληνική Εξωτερική και Ευρωπα¨ική Πολιτική 1990–2010 [Greek foreign and European policy 1990–2010], ed. Yiannis Valinakis, (Athens, Sideris Publications, 2010). For the signing of the Prespa Agreement and the turbulent process of ratification, see Ioannis Armakolas, Igor Bandovic, Dimitar Bechev, Bodo Weber, North Macedonia: What ’s next?, (Brussels, Open Society European Policy Institute, 2019); Ioannis Armakolas, Ljupcho Petkovski, Blueprint Prespa? Lessons learned from the Greece-North Macedonia agreement, (Skopje, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2019). For overviews of developments in the name dispute see George Kalpadakis. 2012. Το Μακεδονικό Ζήτημα 1962–1995. Από τη Σιωπή στη Λαική Διπλωματία [The Macedonian Question 1962–1995. From Silence to People’s Diplomacy], (Athens, Kastaniotis, 2012); Aristotle Tziampiris, Greece, European Political Cooperation and the Macedonian Question, (Aldershot, Ashgate Press, 2000). The much-hoped for after the Prespa Agreement new push for the European integration of the region was effectively soon blocked; first by France, which by insisting on the introduction of a new methodology for enlargement frustrated the hopes of North Macedonia and Albania for quick

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progress in their accession process; and then by Bulgaria, which vetoed Skopje’s start of accession negotiations with the objective to force the country to make concessions on bilateral issues, including on disputes over identity and cultural questions. Before the start of the negotiations 57 percent of the Greek public was against any reference to the term “Macedonia” in the new name of Greece’s northern neighbor; essentially that meant that they rejected any realistic compromise and also the official negotiating position of all Greek governments, which aimed to achieve a deal that would include a geographic qualifier to the name Macedonia for the neighboring state. During the negotiations the opposition to any compromise jumped to 71.5 percent. See details in Ioannis Armakolas and George Siakas, Greek Public Opinion and Attitudes towards the ‘Name Dispute’ and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, (Athens, ELIAMEP, 2016); Ioannis Armakolas and George Siakas, What ’s in a name? Greek Public Attitudes towards the “Name Dispute” and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 2018, (Athens, ELIAMEP, 2018). Ioannis Armakolas and George Siakas, “Why Did It Take So Long?” Exploring Greek Public Opinion as an Obstacle to the Settlement of the Macedonia Name Dispute, Nationalities Papers, Volume 50, Issue 3, 2022. For the prospects of multi-level cooperation between Greece and North Macedonia after the signing of the Prespa Agreement, see Ioannis Armakolas, Veli Kreci, Yorgos Christidis, Panagiotis Paschalidis„ Islam Jusufi, Cooperation in education, culture, and civil society after the Prespa Agreement: How to move forward, (Skopje and Athens, Analytica and ELIAMEP, 2019); Panagiotis Paschalidis, Ioannis Armakolas, Islam Jusufi, Yorgos Christidis, Mary Drosopoulos, Cvete Koneska, Veli Kreci, Broadening multilevel connectivity between Greece and North Macedonia in the post-Prespa environment, (Skopje and Athens, Analytica and ELIAMEP, 2020); Islam Jusufi, Yorgos Christidis, Panagiotis Paschalidis, Cvete Koneska, Veli Kreci, Ioannis Armakolas, Alexandra Voudouri, From Dispute to Connectivity: Greece-North Macedonia-Bulgaria between a Difficult Past and a European Future, (Skopje and Athens, Analytica and ELIAMEP, 2022). For the implementation of the Prespa Agreement see Ioannis Armakolas, Ljupcho Petkovski, Alexandra Voudouri, The Prespa Agreement one year after ratification: from enthusiasm to uncertainty?, (Skopje, Eurothink, 2020). See overview in Ritsa Panagiotou, Nikolaos Tzifakis, Deciphering the Greek Economic Diplomacy towards the Western Balkans: actors, processes, challenges, (London, Hellenic Observatory Discussion Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe, No. 169, 2022).

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30. See overviews and case studies in Florian Bieber and Nikolaos Tzifakis (eds.) The Western Balkans in the World: Linkages and relations with non-Western countries, (Routledge, 2020); Ioannis Armakolas, Barbora ˇ Chrzov´a, Petr Cermák and Anja Grabovac (eds.) Western Balkans at the Crossroads: Ways Forward in Analyzing External Actors ’ Influence, (Prague: Prague Security Studies Institute, 2021). 31. For a demand side analysis of the non-European powers’ influence in the Balkans, see Ioannis Armakolas, Conclusion—Foreign Actors ’ Influence in the Western Balkans: Openings, Closures and Inside-Out Perspectives, in: ˇ Ioannis Armakolas, Barbora Chrzov´a, Petr Cermák and Anja Grabovac (eds.) Western Balkans at the Crossroads: Ways Forward in Analyzing External Actors ’ Influence, (Prague: Prague Security Studies Institute, 2021). 32. Ioannis Armakolas, Greece: Kosovo’s most engaged non-recognizer, In Ioannis Armakolas, James Ker-Lindsay (eds.) The politics of recognition and engagement. EU member states relations with Kosovo, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020). 33. See more details in Ioannis Armakolas and Giorgos Triantafyllou, Greece and EU enlargement to the Western Balkans: understanding an ambivalent relationship, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Volume 17, Issue 4, 2017.

CHAPTER 10

Turkey in the Balkans: Bridging the ‘Balkan’ Gap Haldun Solmaztürk

The geographical term ‘the Balkans’ denotes, in general, Albania, BosniaHerzegovina (BiH), Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, the Republic of North Macedonia,1 Moldavia, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia. ‘Conceptually’ it also involves Slovenia, Greece and Turkey. The Turks—in competition with the Habsburg and Russian Empires—ruled in the region for over 600 years, that is longer than two times the entire length of the history of the U.S. Most of the Balkan countries gained their independence from and developed their national identity against the ‘Turkish’ Ottoman Empire. Yet, hundreds of years left behind a common history—albeit not always with pleasant memories—overlapping cultures, cuisine, music, many thousands of common words in languages of the region, and in certain cases even a common religion.

H. Solmaztürk (B) 21st Century Turkey Institute, Ankara, Turkey e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Gardner (ed.), Geopolitical Turmoil in the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34318-6_10

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There are not only Turkish minority communities in each and every Balkan country, but also what Turks call ‘friendly and kin’ communities. Besides, there are sizable communites of respective ‘nations’ inside Turkey. In some cases, such ‘minorities’ would outnumber the total populations of their respective ‘homelands’. Finally, there are millions of Turks—muhajir—whose ancestors had to leave the Balkans—what they knew as home—as the Ottoman Empire lost territory in the course of eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.2 Despite physical, psychological, even existential sufferings on an immense scale on all sides, the Balkan bond survived the time. In the aftermath of the World War II, Turkey and Balkan nations were positioned on opposite sides of the ideological walls. The end of the Cold War offered Turkey new opportunities to reach out to its ‘brothers and sisters’. Although the civil wars in Yugoslavia and the internal strife in Albania complicated Turkish initiatives, successive governments maintained the momentum. Justice and Development Party (AKP) governments—led by Tayyip Erdo˘gan—further boosted these relations with slightly changed priorities. Turkey aims to contribute to stabilization and confidence building in the Balkans and attaches primary importance to the preservation of ethnic and cultural diversity. The complex and intricate majority–minority relations remain the major challenge. As the integration of the Balkans in Trans-Atlantic institutions progresses, Turkey’s role is increasing, rather than diminishing. But the ‘Balkan gap’ based on learned distrust and a deep sense of insecurity stands in the way… In the midst of all this, the Serbs stand out and almost each and every question in the Balkans, directly or indirectly, is ultimately connected to the Serbs and the Kosovo Myth.

The ‘Balkan’ Gap Between Traumatized Peoples Intergroup tensions have always remained high across the Balkans and led to venomous nationalism and ethno-fascist para-military organizations. The declaration of independence by Slovenia and Croatia in 1991—and the hasty EU decision to recognize both countries—paved the way for yet another series of ‘Balkan Wars.3 Chetniks and the Ustaše resurrected and the conflict between Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks continued until the U.S. brokered an agreement in 1995. By the Dayton Agreement, BiH became independent with Republika Srpska (RS) as an entity within it.

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But the state structure imposed from outside further traumatized Serbs more than others. In 1999 Yugoslavia was forced to leave the control of Kosovo—where the Kosovo Myth was born—to the United Nations. Kosovo would declare its independence in 2008.4 The Republic of (North) Macedonia had already been declared in 1991, depriving Serbs from yet another part of their ‘promised land’. Finally, Montenegro where Serbs are the second largest ethnic group, declared its independence in 2006, leaving the Serbs with Serbia proper only. The Kosovo Myth of many centuries has virtually been ruined, but is still alive.5 The irredentist ideals of the past also obsess others in the form of ‘greater’ Bulgaria, Albania, even Croatia, not to mention Bessarabia, Vojvodina, Krajina or other dormant ‘myths’. While war-time massacres, disappearances, missing-persons continue to torment minds and souls, the denial of war crimes and the glorification of war criminals continue in certain circles. Yet, there is a certain nostalgia associated with the past because the past came to represent identities. Now the war in Ukraine, once again, resurrected images of earlier times. The already complicated psychological background is made even more problematic by the Old Guard—assisted by the ‘old’ media—who incited conflicts and now resist change and reconciliation with ‘others’.6 Gazimestan Monument and Kosovo Myth Vidovdan (St. Vitus Day) marks the 1389 Battle of Kosovo. It is celebrated by Serbs on June 28th. The battle took place between the Serb-led Christian army (Bosnians, Albanians, Greeks, Hungarians) and the Ottoman army in the Kosovo Plain near Pristina. Serbian Prince Lazar was killed during the battle. Ottoman Sultan Murat was also killed—by a Serb assassin—on the battlefield and buried there. Ottomans won the battle but the Kosovo Myth that was created became instrumental in formation of the modern Serb ethnic and national identity. Lazar’s son—Stefan Lazarevi´c —erected a marble column in the battlefield in memory of his father. The modern Gazimestan Monument was built by Serbs in 1953, in the shape of a medieval tower. The location is named after Turkish ´ standard-bearer Gazi Mestan, buried nearby. Lazar’s tomb is in Cuprija (Köprü). Vidovdan never lost its central role in preserving the Kosovo Myth. In 2018 the National Museum of Serbia was reopened on Vidovdan. It was

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under renovation due to extensive damage caused by NATO air strikes during the 1999 Kosovo War. The tomb of Sultan Murat, 2 km to Serbs’ Gazimestan Monument and the tomb of Gazi Mestan, only 500 m away, attest to an epic episode of a complex history.

The Central Dividing Line Huntington argued in his—now classic—1996 book that “In this new world, local politics is the politics of ethnicity, global politics is the politics of civilizations. The most dangerous cultural conflicts are those along the fault lines between civilizations”.7 The central dividing line in Europe was now “the line separating the peoples of Western Christianity on the one hand, from Muslim and Orthodox peoples on the other [in the Balkans and in Ukraine]” he warned. The Balkans has many of Huntington’s faultlines—hence multifold challenges and conflicts. There are substantial ethnic and religious minorities in each country and border disputes are mostly connected with them because there is a mismatch of political and ‘national’ boundaries. Temporary border settlements were enforced from outside—by UN or, as authorized by UN, by NATO/U.S., EU and/or Russia.8 Many countries suffer from poor governance, corruption, poverty and unresponsive political systems. Widespread discontent incites ethnic nationalism, religious radicalism, disputes over territory and identity. Since multi-ethnicity failed and ended up in a deep dissatisfaction with the status quo, popular demand for change is on the rise. The resulting clash involves both the church and the mosque, but contrary to Huntington’s thesis, it is hardly civilizational in nature. National identity has always been associated with religious identity and ‘religion’ plays a prominent—in some cases critical—role in domestic politics as it did throughout the history.9 The involvement of the church in various nationalistic movements since the nineteenth century—particularly in independence movements against the Ottoman Empire—has led to the development of clericalism10 and various forms of Christian nationalism.11 Today groups of Orthodox, Catholics, Muslims, Protestants, Bahais— and others, and their sub-denominations—with largely common

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languages and ethnic makeup but a blend of religions live in separate states. While Bosnia, Albania12 and Kosovo are Muslim-majority nations, Greece, Northern Macedonia, Bulgaria, Serbia and part of Montenegro are mostly Orthodox, but Croatia, Slovenia and the rest of Montenegro Roman Catholic. Romanians and Moldovans—of Latin-descent—are Orthodox, but their language is Romance. Political movements are influenced and cooperate with the clergy. Christian nationalism today is transforming into a cooperation across denominational lines—and national borders—fostering ecumenism.13 The involvement of other denominations—Islam and Catholicism— makes the interplay even more complicated. Deep-seated xenophobia and negative conditioning against ethnic and religious minorities, now coupled with anti-migration sentiments, are also on the rise. The regional religio-politics has an intra-Orthodox dimension too. The Istanbul Phaneriot Roman Orthodox Patriarchate14 and the Russian Church, both play prominent roles in this ‘competition for souls’. The Macedonian Orthodox Church—of Yugoslavia—had declared its independence from Istanbul in 1967; now having had political independence, they want to develop relations again.15 In Catholic-majority Montenegro, there are religious frictions between minority Serbs, Albanians and the central state. The law on ‘Freedom of Religion’, adopted by the Parliament in 2019, causes anxiety about the properties owned by the Serbian Church. In the 2020 elections in Montenegro, ethnic Albanians from abroad traveled to vote for the ‘Albanian coalition’. Afterward, Muslims were targeted in racist attacks in Podgorica, Nikši´c, Pljevlja, Sanjak.16 Late 2022, Montenegro experienced yet another political deadlock over ‘denominations’ for months. The parliament passed a no-confidence motion on the Cabinet of Prime Minister Dritan Abazovi´c over signing the critical deal with the Serbian Orthodox Church—recognizing its ‘official status’. President Dukanovic rejected an opposition candidate for forming the new government, on constitutional grounds. However, the Constitutional Court was not functional because the parliament could not agree on the appointment of a new judge. In the end the Parliament declared Miodrag Leki´c, founder and current president of Democratic Alliance, as Prime Minister-designate in a vote disputed by the president. It is to be seen if Leki´c will ever be able to realize his chief goal of “Making Montenegro into a legal and decriminalized country”. Graft, organized crime and corruption—legacies of the Communist rule—are institutionalized in local cultures. They lead to accumulation of

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political power and wealth in the hands of a few, cripple economies and damage international image. Organized cross-border crime has flourished since ‘the War’. There has been little progress in aligning judiciaries with EU norms even in some EU member countries. Economies struggle to cope with the challenges of transition to a free market but public sectors are still bloated. Early January 2022, Serbian authorities were informed by Europol that a criminal gang was plotting to assassinate President Aleksandar Vuˇci´c.17 Since the 2000s when PM Zoran Ðind-i´c was assassinated along with many other politicians, Serbia took a long road in fighting organized crime but criminal gangs still have a strong infrastructure throughout the Balkans. The Kavaˇc-Škaljari drug war among others to control the ‘trade’ in the region has intensified. It is understood that some police— and politicians—have sided with Kavaˇc. The conflict stretches across the Balkans and beyond—Spain, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Greece and Turkey.18 In a sense, current problems are byproducts of failing democracies. Democracy has been slow in taking roots. Economic stagnation leads to the perception of an undelivering democracy.19 Elections continue to become problematic.20 They are mostly an extension and instruments of domestic power game. In BiH, November 2020 local elections in Srebrenitsa and Doboj were canceled due to irregularities.21 In Mostar, for example, efforts since 2010 to form a functioning city administration have failed, mainly due to gerrymandering and patronage networks. Certain local actors adamantly struggle to further entrench ethnic discrimination into the political system. The dominant political cultures, playing by the ‘old rules’, continue to block the democratic process. Even in EU member Slovenia opposition media is intimidated.22 Foreign policy, based on often nationalist—even irredentist—rhetoric plays a major role in elections. Such an environment makes alternative political programs— and leaders—more attractive, thus creating a favorable ground for the Old Guard to make a come-back. In such an environment there is much room for less than constructive two-level games.23 Nevertheless, there are some important developments promoting democratic pluralism such as the agreement on electoral reform in Albania and elections in Mostar.24 In Croatia, an MP from the Independent Democratic Serbian Party joined the government as the Deputy Prime Minister for Social Affairs and Minority Rights, in July 2020. In Romania, the National Liberal Party (PNL), USR-Plus alliance and Democratic

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Union of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) formed a coalition government in December 2020. Although the coalition collapsed in the 2021 crisis, the political system was able to form a ‘grand coalition’ in less than 3 months.25 Similarly, in December 2020, Moldovan Prime Minister Ion Chicu announced his resignation for snap elections to “Bring the country back to normal”. In Muslim-majority Albania, Catholic Edi Rama with a Muslim wife and two Orthodox children has won five elections and has been prime minister since 2013. In Serbia, Prime Minister Ana Brnabi´c has challenged one of the strongest Orthodox values related to family and yet has been in office since 2017.26 In Bulgaria, Kiril Petkov’s coming to power on an anti-corruption platform of four parties27 signals a fundamental transformation of the dominant political culture as well as a major shift in regional politics vis-a-vis its Balkan neighbors.28 Similarly the Open Balkan initiative of Albania, North Macedonia and Serbia has great potential to improve regional confidence and security through economic cooperation. These three countries aim to open their national borders without restrictions. Above all, most amazingly, the ‘best friend’ of Serbian President Vuˇci´c, and President of Republika Srpska (Formerly, BiH Presidency Serb Member) Milorad Dodik, is President Erdo˘gan of Turkey who is a proud Islamist. Yet all three are authoritarian and advocate—and practice—illiberal political regimes. Nevertheless, Vuˇci´c plays a historic role in the Balkans. Immediately after the Kosovo War in 1999, PM Zoran Ðind-i´c had initiated strong democratization and ground-breaking reforms in Serbia but he was assassinated in 2003. Vuˇci´c became prime minister in 2014 and, against all odds, followed a similar path as Ðind-i´c. He has the vision for reconciliation and the courage to return to Srebrenica to pay his respects to Muslim victims of the 1995 Srebrenica massacre, four months after being attacked by a stone-throwing mob there. Perhaps, Balkan reality is more complex than Huntington’s simplistic and deterministic thesis. The central dividing line in Europe—and elsewhere—is not the line separating Western Christianity from Islam and Orthodox Christianity, it is actually across ‘civilizational’ boundaries and within ‘civilizations’; between ‘civilizationists’ and those who oppose them. Under such circumstances bridging the ‘Balkan gap’ stands as

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a formidable task. The project of integration with the Euro-Atlantic community was intended to this end but it came to a standstill.

Waiting in Limbo The countries in the Balkans have either joined the EU or have been given a ‘perspective’. Bulgaria, Croatia,29 Romania and Slovenia are already members of the EU. Of the ‘Balkan six’, accession negotiations have been opened with Montenegro and Serbia; North Macedonia, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina are official candidates while Kosovo remains a ‘potential’ candidate.30 Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Romania and Slovenia have joined NATO. While BiH and Kosovo remain hopeful, Serbia has no appetite at all for NATO membership. The full integration with the Euro-Atlantic community would ease tensions by eliminating the sense of insecurity and pave the way toward genuine democratic transformations. However, the EU has not recovered from the deep shock of the 2015 refugee crisis and now has second thoughts about remaining countries. Some EU members are rather uneasy about further enlargement and put obstacles in the way. It is more about domestic politics—under pressure from the far-right—than the so-called ‘Copenhagen criteria’. The existence of substantial ‘Muslim’ populations in all of these countries is likely to contribute to the hesitation on the part of the EU.31 As a result, the EU dream—along with its appeal and inspiration—is fading away. Albania’s Prime Minister Rama, in his third term, has been the standard-bearer of the EU road and the leading advocate of the common market of ‘Balkan six’ agreed to in 2020. Albania, Serbia and North Macedonia maintain a rather close practical cooperation—symbolized by the Open Balkan initiative—but the other three maintain a distance. BiH is disabled, even paralyzed by the ongoing political crisis. Montenegro takes the EU membership for granted and Kosovo is held back by the political deadlock with Serbia. However, frustration grows. When Bulgaria vetoed32 the start of talks with North Macedonia and—by consequence—Albania, Rama portrayed himself and Prime Minister Zaev as ‘Waiting for Godot’ who wait for a titular character ‘Godot’ who never arrives—in Samuel Beckett’s famous play of the 1940s.33 EU membership paths for ‘candidate’ Serbia and Montenegro have also stalled.

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As the road to the EU becomes thornier, democracy declines and major questions remain unresolved. Among them, consolidation of BiH, Kosovo and North Macedonia stands out. It looks as if Serbia seeks a political role in BiH Republika Srpska and Serb-majority parts of Kosovo and Montenegro. Similarly, Albania maintains a close interest in Kosovo and in Albanian-majority areas of North Macedonia. Bulgaria, despite some progress, continues to hamper North Macedonia’s EU accession process based on its own ‘national’ narrative of history and language. The political leaders of Serbia, Albania and North Macedonia, out of desperation, in a joint op-ed piece in December 2021, said that their populations were disappointed by the obstruction of their wish to join the EU.34 “As political leaders of these countries we can either complain or do something about it. We have decided on the latter”, they explained. Renewed East–West rivalry and now the war in Ukraine further complicate the situation and precarious political settlements based on delicate compromises are increasingly challenged. The EU, concerned about Russian influence in the Balkans decided to devote more energy to improving relations with the six Balkan countries despite continuing reluctance to enlarge the EU further. Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission in the Western Balkans tour in October 2022, visited North Macedonia, Kosovo, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro. Bosnia and Herzegovina is now joining Albania, Moldova, the Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey and Ukraine as a formal EU candidate, mainly out of a fear that instability may spread to the Western Balkans. The Tirana Summit between the EU and Western Balkans states on December 6, 2022, was introduced as ‘the first-ever summit between EU and Western Balkans leaders’ as part of the EU’s ‘strategic cooperation’ with Balkan countries. The EU, at the Tirana summit reconfirmed its commitment to the membership perspective of socalled the Western Balkans.35 Later, mid December 2022, Kosovo leaders signed the application for EU candidacy taking the country a step closer to the EU.

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Cold War and ‘Frontline Ukraine’ Pristina: An airfield too far In the late 1990s, while President Clinton faced impeachment, President Yeltsin’s political power alongside his mental faculties had begun to fade. In June 1999, during the Kosovo War, a deal was struck with the Germans behind-the-scenes. Russia’s stipulation was that the subsequent occupation would be under a UN Mandate rather than as NATO. They also believed that they had been promised their own, independent sector of Kosovo to manage. As soon as President Miloševi´c agreed to NATO’s terms, Russians moved into Kosovo. This led to a confrontation between NATO and Russian troops for the control of the runway in the Pristina Airfield. The incident involved civil and military officials from battalion level up to presidents, including British LTG Michael Jackson, KFOR commander, Adm. Jim Ellis (USN) CINC Allied Forces Southern Europe, Gen. Wesley Clark (USA) SACEUR, Sir Charles Guthrie, Chief of the British Defence Staff, Gen. Hugh Shelton, US CJCS, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Russian FM Igor Ivanov and both presidents—Clinton and Yeltsin. LTG Jackson refused to obey Gen. Clark’s order to “Move and occupy Pristina Airfield” and said “Sir, I will not start World War III for you”. The tense stand-off was eventually resolved as both sides agreed that the Russian KFOR would deploy independently of NATO. This was a turning point in history but went largely unnoticed at that time. The chain reaction started then ended up in the war in Ukraine.

As the Cold Peace turns Cold War again, the Balkans became yet another battleground for the competition between the West and Russia. It all started in 1999 with the incident at the Pristina airport in Kosovo. (See Chapter 1.) Then, some members of the Russian political elite felt that the Kosovo War was the last instance for Russia to be humiliated and they vowed to ‘make Russia great again’. Among them was Vladimir Putin who came to power in May 2000. Eight months later, President George W. Bush came into office. Bush and his successors, over the course of twenty-odd years—inadvertently, if not unwisely—gave Putin whatever excuse, opportunity and motivation he needed for realization of his ambitious scheme of reversing the collapse of the Soviet Empire.36 Following the NATO Bucharest Summit in 2008 and the War in Georgia, Russia, in addition to insisting that NATO halt its eastward expansion, demanded the alliance pull its forces back to its 1997 boundaries when they declared they “Do not consider each other as adversaries”.

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NATO did not envisage any “Additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces” beyond the existing boundaries.37 At the time, in 1997, no former Warsaw Pact countries or ‘Soviet’ republics were yet members of NATO. The Alliance then rotated forces in the new NATO member states after 1999 rather than stationing them in Eastern Europe permanently. But in 2014, after the Russian invasion of Crimea, NATO started permanent ‘forward stationing’ of limited forces in the Baltic countries and Poland. Meanwhile the unannounced but evolving ‘Putin Doctrine’ found an ideal ground for application in the Balkans.38 Today, new realignments— between those who are pro-Russian and those who are not—are taking shape. This gives Russia an advantage and facilitates politico-emotional manipulation. Russia uses Slav-Orthodox ties and pursues a policy of supporting pro-Russian political movements. Its influence is greater in North Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, BiH’s Republika Srpska and particularly in Serbia. Russia, Ukraine and Moldavia have not recognized Kosovo yet. Russia did not support Montenegro39 and North Macedonia joining NATO and today openly opposes such an eventuality for Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.40 The war in Ukraine provided yet another opportunity for standardbearers on both sides to further their policies.41 As President Zelensky signed an official application for Ukraine to join the EU, Croatian President Zoran Milanovi´c invited the EU to grant membership to Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina, ‘candidate’ status to Ukraine and start negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia. Milanovi´c was worried that the “Crisis could spread and the Balkans could [indeed] be the next battlefield”.42 Russia’s suspension from decision-making in the Council of Europe gave Kosovo the opportunity to apply for membership.43 There were also calls to put Moldova and Georgia on the path of reforms to boost the process of European integration.44 In addition to the EU, U.S. and Russia, China is also active in the region45 and the EU, in order to counter the increasing influence of Russia and China, cooperates with U.S. Serbia is the key country in this geopolitical rivalry and realignment.

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Serbia and Serbs In the 1990s, UN interventions in the former Yugoslav republics were difficult to stomach for Russians. It became clear to the world— and to Russians—that Russia was no longer a great power. The First Chechen War46 just strengthened this perception. NATO’s intervention in Kosovo—without a clear UN mandate—was both infuriating and humiliating for Russians, perhaps even more than Serbs. It became the straw that broke the camel’s back. Russia then readopted the role of the protector of Serbia, backed Slobodan Miloševi´c and stood by its ally.47 Serbia, while cultivating ties with the EU, maintained good relations with Russia.48 Russian preferential treatment of Serbia in the form of incredible deals on gas and other items has provided a much-needed booster for the Serbian economy. With the Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Serbia was faced with a dilemma as it put Serbia at odds with the EU and the U.S. President Vuˇci´c declared ‘support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine’ and backed the U.N. resolution that deplored Russia’s aggression but he refused calls on sanctions—just as Russia had refused to impose such measures on Serbia during the 1990s. When the EU closed its skies to flights from Russia, Air Serbia increased its services to Moscow. A European Parliament resolution condemning Russia’s war in Ukraine singled out Serbia for criticism on the subject.49 The Lavrov letter of 1 February 2022 led to a political controversy in Albania.50 Ex-president Sali Berisha called it ‘a threat’ to every Albanian, describing Russia as “Surpassing, as a force of evil, any threatening force known to history”. He accused the Rama government of being led “by a Belgrade mercenary” i.e., Aleksandar Vuˇci´c, calling for an end to Serb influence on Albania. President Putin visited Serbia several times and was warmly welcomed as a ‘friend’ by both the political leadership and large sections of the population.51 The pro-Russian bias is based on the Slavic and Orthodox values prioritizing the Serbian nation and religion over others. As a result, advocating Serbian territorial integrity (i.e., Kosovo) and protection of Serbs across the Balkans play a major role in application of the Putin Doctrine in the Balkans. Serbs constitute 35% of the population in BiH, 30% in Montenegro and 5% in Kosovo. Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia in 2008, but it remains an open issue for Serbia and stands in the midst of the much wider question of Serbs.52 There are tensions between Serbs,

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Bosniaks and Croats of BiH. In Serbia, anti-Albanian sentiments are also on the rise.53 In Montenegro, a significant Serb minority turns more nationalistic and presents challenges.54 As a consequence of the sanctions imposed on Russia, gas, oil and even electricity are now being used as geostrategic weapons with detrimental impact on fragile economies of the Balkans.55 Serbia, due to its particular reliance on Russia feels the effects more than others. In the face of the deepening energy crisis, the Southern Gas Corridor has gained a critical importance to meet urgent needs and the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) forms its backbone.56 In this context mutual visits by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and President Vuˇci´c are testament to rapidly developing ties between Serbia and Azerbaijan and shifting balances in the wider region to secure energy supplies on ‘favorable’ terms.57 Turkey and Russia are both likely to be behind this unique association.58

Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Sirpska Bosnia and Herzegovina is where Huntington’s ‘civilizations’ meet each other. The Dayton Agreement ended the war and formed Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995. But the dream of a neutral, demilitarized and unified BiH did not come through. It remains under the gravitational forces of Serbia and Croatia and Republika Srpska continues to drift apart from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Agreement, from the beginning, was accepted by all parties as a temporary alternative to ongoing conflict.59 It brought a very complex political system which continues to be the main source of many crises60 and needs a major update for strengthening the state institutions—the army, intelligence agency, taxation system, council of judges and prosecutors—and a new system of government. But there is no consensus on how to achieve this. Miracle of Tuzla The experience of the city of Tuzla in northwest Bosnia during the 1992– 95 Bosnia War is unique. The city had a mixed population of 110.000; about 60% Muslim, 15% Croat, 15% Serb, 10% ‘other’. They lived together which was common throughout the Balkans. However, what distinguished Tuzla, was that the propulation remained mixed—and united. Ethnicity

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mattered elsewhere but not in Tuzla. As tensions rose, the Serbs felt a lot of pressure because the war had become a fight of Serbs against Muslims— that is Bosniaks. Some Serbs did leave but the majority stayed and fought side-by-side with Muslims and Croats of the city for about three years— against Serbs. Army units became more mixed over the course of the war. The police force too, remained multi-ethnic. They avoided attitudes of group hatred but maintained civilized, pluralist attitudes even in the face of immense socio-psychological pressure. The civic and military leadership clearly played a key role in preserving the sense of ‘shared identity’ even under the most unfavorable conditions. Religious holidays were celebrated together, neighborhoods cooked food, bread and shared. Generational replacement in time led to an inevitable value change and the spirit largely disappeared, but the ‘Miracle of Tuzla’ became a legacy to learn from.

By contrast with Tuzla, BiH has failed to build a common ‘Bosnian’ identity that is embraced by the majority of the population. Rooted in the Ottoman past, Bosniak identity is largely associated with the Muslim identity. The typical Serb—to a certain degree, also Croat—psyche is stirred toward anti-Bosniak attitude and vice versa. On the surface there is an appearance of relative harmony between Croats and Bosniaks. However, even Croats are upset by ‘the flaws’ in the election laws which they perceive as depriving them of legitimate representation.61 A potential dissolution of the Bosniak-Croat federation would lead to a total collapse of the state of BiH. In BiH, rivers, forests and arable land do not belong to entities but to the central state. However, Serbia, supported by Russia, maintains claims—as property of the State of Serbia—to agricultural land and forests. The declaration of the Croatian Exclusive Economic Zone in the Adriatic in 2020 as well as the ongoing construction of the Pelješac bridge without formal consent of BiH have been added to a list of problems.62 Milorad Dodik, in February 2020, repeated demands for a referendum over the status of RS.63 The crisis caused by FM Lavrov’s visit to BiH in December 2020 re-manifested the deepening rift between the two entities.64 Serbs of BiH believe Republika Srpska will become independent in “the next five to ten years and later on form a joint state union with Serbia”.65 BiH applied for EU membership in 2016. However, the expressed mutual political commitment to the goal of European integration did not

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turn into concrete action. The political environment remained polarized and most substantive issues remain outstanding. Of the fourteen priorities set up by the EU, BiH has only partly fulfilled four of them.66 The economy has been suffering from structural problems and there is an exodus of disappointed and disillusioned people—Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs alike. After decades of growing social and economic stagnation, nationalist— and hardline separatist—parties that have dominated Bosnian politics are now losing ground and voters turn to coalitions of reformist democratic political actors. However, Croatia is not playing a particularly positive role in this respect.67 The authority and functions of the High Representative (HR) for Bosnia and Herzegovina further complicates the political situation.68 Following October 2022 elections, BiH inaugurated the members of its new tripartite presidency, which for the first time in over a decade was dominated by moderate politicians.69 It also marked the first time a woman was elected to the top office. The Presidential Council appointed Borjana Krišto of the Croatian Democratic Union to form the government. In the process of forming the new government, the moderate Bosniak and Croatian parties cooperated, leaving the highestvoted Bosniak Party—the Democratic Action Party (SDA) founded by the late Alija Izetbegovi´c—out. Secular Bosniaks, unlike Serbs and Croats who opt for an ethnic and cultural identity, are adopting an identity very much similar to their former ‘Yugoslav’ identity. Given cultural codes embedded in the ‘Muslim’ ethnic identity, this is not easy but if the new Bosnian identity gains tract, this is likely to lead, in the long term to a sense of Bosnian ‘nationhood’.

Kosovo and Kosovska Mitrovica Kosovo is recognized by more than 100 countries, including U.S., U.K., France, Germany, Israel70 and Turkey. But Serbia continues to see Kosovo as its own territory. While Russia and China are among the countries which have yet to recognize Kosovo, Albania has special relations.71 Serbia lost control of Kosovo in 1999 and Kosovo declared its independence in 2008. The two parties have been trying to resolve their differences under EU mediation since 2013.72 Since Serbs consider Kosovo as the cradle of Serbian national identity, its loss is not acceptable.

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For Kosovo what is crucial is ‘mutual’ recognition. At the center of the controversy is the Serb-majority North (Kosovska) Mitrovica, north of Ibar river. About half of Kosovo Serbs live in this area and refuse to recognize the ethnic Albanian-run government in Pristina. The landswap scheme involving N. Mitrovica and Albanian-majority areas in south Serbia has been on the table as a way out of this impasse.73 The status quo is unsustainable. But, mainly due to political uncertainties there is no sincere wish for dialogue either in Kosovo or in Serbia. Neither is there the energy from the West to provide the impetus by moving forward the EU integration process. As a result, the EU-facilitated dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade is almost dead.74 At the 2020 White House75 meeting hosted by President Trump, Kosovo reportedly suspended its efforts to become member of an ‘international organization’ and Serbia agreed to stop lobbying against Kosovo’s recognition for a year. President Biden, in a letter to President Vuˇci´c, also ‘encouraged’ mutual recognition, but Serbia clearly refused.76 Meanwhile the EU, like Russia, sees this as a ‘European’ problem that needs to be solved by Europeans—not Americans.77 After the White House agreement there was significant progress from free movement to trade, but the question of autonomy for Mitrovica Serbs has not been resolved yet. The September 2021 crisis at the Kosovo-Serbia border rapidly escalated and damaged progress in normalization. While Albania sided with Kosovo, Serbia sent troops to the ‘border’.78 There is an expectation that NATO as well as the EU should now make it easier and ‘quicker’ for candidate countries to access. However, Kosovo is not recognized by four of 30 NATO members.79 Bearing in mind the rule of ‘unanimous vote’ for NATO decisions, Kosovo’s NATO membership cannot be envisaged for the foreseeable future. Actually, given the war in Ukraine,80 increased instability in the region and particularly the unresolved status of Serbs within Kosovo, NATO membership is now even more complicated and a bridge too far.81 On the other hand, Kosovo has been in a period of domestic political crisis and is undergoing political transformation. PM Albin Kurti and former president Thaçi have been in disagreement over many issues and have been political rivals.82 Thaçi seemed ready to sign a peace deal with Serbia that wouldn’t be welcomed by Kurti government. President Thaçi, after having been indicted for war crimes by the Hague-based Kosovo Specialist Chambers, resigned in November 2020.83 Albin Kurti’s SelfDetermination Movement (LVV) won February 2021 elections by a large

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margin and Kosovo had its third government in less than two years.84 Kurti’s political partner Vjosa Osmani is now the President of Kosovo but the political turbulence continues. In May 2022, PM Albin Kurti and President Vuˇci´c had dinner with Mr. Miroslav Lajˇcák, EU Special Representative, in Berlin, after they met separately with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz. The informal dinner was an attempt to revive the dialogue which had remained frozen since July 2021. However, in mid-Summer 2022 another crisis erupted over the use of ID cards to cross the Serbia-Kosovo border. Immediately after the ID crisis was resolved came yet another one over registration plates and driving licenses. Escalating crisis led to erection of roadblocks closing border crossings between Serbia and Kosovo. Tensions further escalated when the Serbian Patriarch was banned in December 2022 from entering Kosovo ahead of the Orthodox Christmas—January 7th. These developments led Serbia to place its security forces in a state of combat readiness again. The crisis was eventually—albeit temporarily—resolved by the intervention of the EU to flare-up again in May 2023 over the outcome of local elections boycotted by Serbs. For Serbs, Kosovo is ‘the heart of Serbia’ and nothing will ever change this perception. Any approach to the Kosovo question has to take this fundamental given into consideration. Today, Kosovo is worried about an increased Russian involvement in the Kosovo question, throwing its political and even military weight behind Serbia. Now, it is probably high time for the EU to firmly engage Serbia—and Albania.

Question of ‘Macedonians’ and ‘B-complex’ The Republic of Macedonia declared its independence as early as 1991 when the state of Yugoslavia disintegrated. The dispute with Greece over the name of ‘Macedonia’ was only resolved in 2018 and the country renamed itself as the Republic of North Macedonia. With the Prespa Agreement with Greece and the Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendship with Bulgaria in 2018, North Macedonia showed its goodwill and became a NATO member in 2020. It now expects EU membership. However, the path to the EU is thornier than ever now due to reasons characteristic of the Balkans.85 The majority of the population are ethnic Macedonians, followed by Albanians (25%), Turks (4%), Bulgarians and other minorities. Eastern

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Orthodox Christianity is the majority faith while Muslims (mainly Albanians and Turks) make up 33% of the population. Political parties tend to divide along ethnic lines. ‘B-complex’ is how Bulgarian factor is referred to. Bulgaria was the first country to recognize the Republic of Macedonia in 1992—followed by Turkey. However, although the two countries developed very close relations up until 2009, these relations started to deteriorate afterward. While there are groups with self-declared Bulgarian identity in North Macedonia, and other groups with ethnic Macedonian identity within Bulgaria, Bulgaria has refused to recognize a separate Macedonian nation and a separate Macedonian language.86 Despite a Joint Commission and the Treaty of Friendship, the issues of ethnicity, history and language remain unresolved. In November 2020, the Bulgarian government officially announced that it did not approve of the EU negotiation framework for North Macedonia’s accession and practically blocked the process.87 In response, Foreign Ministers of Slovakia and Czechia, quite unusually, wrote an article openly opposing Bulgarian position on North Macedonia’s EU accession process and said that the EU was not “to determine who was right or wrong on issues related to history, language or identity” and called for a consensus on the framework for North Macedonia and Albania.88 A substantial number of Albanians—in areas close to the border with Albania—represents another factor that can be called ‘A-complex’. There have been certain frictions with Skopje. Both ‘complexes’ condition Macedonian politics. PM Zoran Zaev who led the country toward EU and NATO and resolved the long-standing dispute with Greece, after winning 2020 elections only by a small margin, attempted to bridge the divide between ‘Macedonians’ and Albanians.89 While using an anti-Bulgarian rhetoric, he introduced a law giving Albanians the right to speak their language at state institutions and installed Albanian signage in settlements with Albanian populations. Zaev stepped down in December 2021 and was succeeded by Social Democrat Dimitar Kovaˇcevski backed by 62 MPs only in the 120-seat parliament. In June 2022, the proposal put forward by the French Presidency of the EU to resolve the dispute led to political crises in both countries. Yet, eventually some tangible progress was achieved; the Bulgarian parliament lifted the veto and the Assembly of North Macedonia gave approval. The EU accession negotiations with the Bulgarian parliament, in February 2023, expressed concern about the escalation

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of ‘anti-Bulgarian campaign’ in North Macedonia and warned that this could endanger the EU accession process. Even so, Macedonian politics as well as bilateral relations with Bulgaria remain complicated and the EU accession stalled.

Ottoman Legacy and ‘Evlad-i Fatihan’ The Turkish reality and the Turkish image in the Balkans are quite complex and difficult to fathom for outsiders. It is simply a mixture of affection, hatred, fear and admiration. The Ottoman Empire conquered most parts of the Balkans in the course of the fourteenth through the sixteenth centuries and remained the dominant power up to the nineteenth century. The word ‘balkan’ comes from Turkish90 and since the eighteenth century the name ‘Balkans’ has been in use to describe the wider area between the Adriatic and the Black Sea.91 The region has always had a major significance for Turks and the term Rumeli still evokes certain nostalgia connected to lost lands and everything left behind, particularly Evlad-i Fatihan—Sons of the Conquerers.92 As Balkan countries spent many centuries as part of the Ottoman Empire, majorities in some of them converted to Islam and still practice it. In spite of phonological and grammatical differences, local languages swarm with thousands of ‘Turkish’ words93 due to sheer length of the Ottoman rule. There is also some sympathy due to an image of the protector of the ‘Orthodox’ against ‘Catholic’ powers. Certain communities served in posts ‘reserved’ for particular ethnicities in the Ottoman army, state bureaucracy, diplomatic corps or in other high offices. Others served as local rulers, governors, beys authorized by the Sultan—in later years by Bâb-ı Âli (Sublime Porte). Even under the Ottoman rule, they did develop their own national—and European—identity. Yet, all maintained some form of connection with Turkey and Turks. The Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 was a turning point for the Turkish presence in the Balkans. The developments that followed these wars not only laid the foundation for Turkey’s place in the region but also set the psychology of controversial relations across the Balkans. All sides committed atrocities, but Turks and other Muslims suffered most because it was the Ottoman Empire that lost large territories. Hundreds of thousands were forced to leave what they knew ‘homeland’ to seek refuge in remaining parts of the Empire joining those who had arrived from Crimea, Caucasus or the Balkans in earlier wars of the nineteenth century.

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This was followed by a series of population exchanges. But substantial ethnic-religious minorities remained in each and every country. In time, polarization was deepened and it is not limited to any one group.94 “We don’t particularly like Turks, but we know them.” When the Implementation Force (IFOR) was established to enforce the 1995 Dayton Agreement, a Turkish force was already in Zenica— in the Muslim-Croat Federation—as part of UNPROFOR since 1994. The Turks’ Bosniak-majority area of responsibility (AOR)—close to two Croatian enclaves—also included separate Croat villages with a rooted hatred of Turks. (No dogs, no Turks.) The Turkish Regimental Combat Team remained equidistant to Bosniaks and Croats in support and assistance, with complete neutrality and won hearts and minds. IFOR had three multinational divisions. The U.S.-led MND North, with its HQs in Tuzla, included two US brigades and brigades from Turkey, Russia and the Nordic-Polish (NordPol) brigade. The MND-N commanding general intended to amend the AORs so that the Croats would stay within NordPol zone. Turkish soldiers questioned the reason for this change and whether the opinion of Croats was taken. The American general had already had his Psyops teams conduct a public opinion poll and to his surprise, Croats wanted to remain with the Turks. The research was repeated but the result was the same. But this time the Croats were also asked why they opted for Muslim Turks over a Christian nation. The Croats did not particularly like the Turks, but they ‘knew’ and trusted them. The American general abandoned earlier decision, partly out of desperation partly in anger at ‘ungrateful’ Croats, leaving these strange peoples of the Balkans alone.

Today 11 to 13 million Muslim people of ‘Ottoman descent’ live in the Balkans; Tatars, Albanians, Pomaks, Bosniaks, Torbeshi, Gagauz, Székelys95 and more than one million Turks. They constitute majorities in Albania, Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Substantial numbers live in Bulgaria, Serbia (Sanjak), Romania (Dobruja), North Macedonia, Croatia, Montenegro, Greece (Western Thrace). Due to kinship, common religion or language and/or national affinity—in some cases, in the form of patriotism—they maintain bonds with 10 to 15 million Turkish citizens of Balkan origin. They have significant social and political networks and media outlets. These groups form a robust bridge between Turkey and the Balkans.

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Turkey in the Balkans Because of the existence of large Turkish and kin communities in Balkan countries on the one hand, the citizens of Balkan origin in Turkey on the other, any crisis in the Balkans affects Turkey closely and thus the preservation of peace and stability in the Balkans bears vital importance. For the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, due to its historical, cultural and human ties as well as political, economic, geographical reasons “The Balkans is a priority for Turkey” and Turkey aims for “High level political dialogue, security for all, economic integration, the preservation of the multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious social structures” so that the rights of the Muslims, kin communities and Turkish minorities are protected, and relations with the region progress positively.96 Throughout history, Turkey evoked a ‘military’ power and a ‘threat’. This has almost entirely changed. Turkey’s economic might97 is greater now, hence its international standing and regional roles.98 Although Turkey’s ability to compete with the EU, Russia and China and make direct investments on its own is relatively limited, it is the third largest foreign trade partner of the countries in the region after Germany and Italy.99 Albania, for example, declared Turkey one of its five ‘strategic partners’ in 2013.100 Turkey provided substantial aid to Albania during the 2019 earthquake and the Coronavirus pandemic. It is understood that such aids are ‘grants’ more than favorable loans. The fact that Turkish governments continue to provide such ‘aid’ despite the deepening economic crisis that Turkey has been in for a long time shows that, in addition to their political significance, multidimensional dynamics play in the background.101 Turkey also needs to maintain favorable relations with Balkan countries and to make the Balkans stable for export and transit routes to its leading trade partner—the EU. TIKA102 and Yunus Emre Institute103 represent soft power of Turkey and serve as main facilitators of Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans as well as elsewhere. Turkey has been a firm supporter of the integration of the Balkans into Euro-Atlantic institutions. But Turkey itself—particularly after the purchase of S-400 missile defense systems from Russia—is increasingly being considered a kind of Trojan Horse in NATO despite the supply of invaluable armed drones to Ukraine in the war against Russia.104 But Turkey is hardly part of ‘something’ any longer. It became a largely independent force in regional geopolitics and regional conflicts. It is, in and

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of itself, a middle-sized power, investing in the Balkans diplomatically, economically, culturally, and in some cases, even militarily. Turkey’s active involvement in the Balkans goes back to early 1990s. Turkey took part first in NATO naval operations in the Adriatic and in air operations launched from NATO bases in northern Italy in support of United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia. Then, Turkish ground forces with substantial combat power were deployed to central Bosnia. Turkey participated in Implementation Force (IFOR), Stabilization Force (SFOR) operations in BiH, Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo and bilaterally involved in internal security, stabilization and rebuilding efforts in Albania and in the Republic of Macedonia.105 At the very beginning, there was a clear unwillingness among NATO members to include Turkey—particularly ground forces—in military operations in support of UNPROFOR. This only happened in 1994. Relations with Serbia and Albania—the two key countries—are prioritized. Turkey has also been supporting Kosovo’s NATO aspirations and PristinaBelgrade dialogue.106 Recently, Prime Minister Rama of Albania appealed to Balkan leaders to reject overtures from what he called ‘outside powers’ (an implicit reference to Russia, China and Turkey) and to keep the faith in their EU membership dream. Although it was ‘frustrating’ to wait, “Albania will never give up on Europe and on the EU” he said.107

˘ The ‘Erdogan Factor’ in Turkish Foreign Policy Turkey has been under the rule of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) and effectively governed by President Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan, since 2002. AKP, once in the government, first consolidated its power and gradually formed a ‘dominant-party’ system which turned almost a one-party state, seriously undermining its legal legitimacy. In the course of the last twenty-odd years the Turkish state has undergone an almost complete deinstitutionalization and now Turkey hardly has a foreign ‘policy’ as it is commonly understood. The ultimate decision unit is a single individual; closed to input and insensitive to the environment. Because of his limited grasp of world affairs, his foreign policy—hence Balkans policy—decisions and actions are intended to further his three-pillar political agenda: Islamism, Pan-Islamism and commercialism with a mercantilist cover. His apparent erratic behavior has its inherent rationality. Based on simple calculations, opportunites

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for bargaining and pragmatism, he aims to maximize his political and commercial gains. His vision—and conduct—is short-term, therefore full of mistakes and prone to frequent course-corrections. Erdo˘gan’s foreign policy discourse is dominated by the notion of ‘Ummah’ and Islamic brotherhood. He strives, “to resurrect Muslim selfconfidence that has been battered for years”.108 As a Muslim, he sees himself as responsible and in charge of standing by “Wherever in the world there is an oppressed, aggrieved, miserable person [read Muslim] whose rights and dues have been violated”.109 He portrays himself as the guardian of Islam—coded as ‘our civilization’—and believes that Turkey has a historical responsibility in the Balkans to this end.110 Preservation of Turkish-Islamic cultural works and items, “testimonies of a great civilization”, has a central place in his Balkans policy.111 However, Erdo˘gan clings to NATO membership and even wants NATO to assume ‘more active’ roles in a wider geography, “from Europe to Asia”.112 He has never shied away from supporting Ukraine. During his visit to Kiev, as the Russian military build-up continued, he expressed firm support to the territorial integrity of Ukraine.113 On the day of the invasion, he was critical of NATO’s inaction and urged the Alliance to adopt a firmer stance.114 But the day after Finnish and Swedish leaders announced their intention to apply for NATO membership, Erdo˘gan opposed the latter states joining NATO on grounds that they were home to “terrorist organizations”, that is the PKK and the Gülenist network, and blocked the process. This was despite NATO SecGen Stoltenberg—evidently supported by the majority of NATO members—saying both countries would be “warmly welcomed”.115 Erdo˘gan—in Huntingtonian fashion—believes that civilizations are essentially separate, so there can only be a ‘zero-sum’ relationship, if not an inevitable conflict between civilizations.116 According to him, hostility toward Islam is a global threat and the struggle against it will only succeed when “the Islamic world establishes unity among itself”.117 He attributes Turkey’s humiliating rejection by the EU to its ‘Muslim’ identity.118 Yet, speaking to the ambassadors of the EU member states in Ankara, in January 2022, he said that the EU “continues to be Turkey’s strategic priority and that it is committed to the goal of full membership”. Erdo˘gan has repeatedly expressed his dissatisfaction with the established international order based on the UN Charter—and the exclusive role of the UN Security Council—and his desire to replace it with another more ‘participatory’ order.119 Far-fetched it may sound, he appears to be

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implementing his vision for a ‘new world order’ wherever he can, starting from the Balkans—and the Middle East.

˘ Erdogan and the Migrant Crisis The way the migration crisis developed under Erdo˘gan’s watch and how different his take on this mammoth catastrophe of international scale is reflective of his eccentric foreign policy behavior. Turkey has the world’s largest refugee population and hosts about 8–10 million people from all over the world, particularly from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and any other Asian or African country—and now from Ukraine.120 Turkey and the EU reached an extremely unbalanced agreement—at the expense of Turkey’s welfare and security—in 2016 to address the migration crisis.121 But the miniscule EU contributions so far amount to nothing. The agreement would limit the influx of irregular migrants to the EU and it did work turning Turkey into a Tower of Babel. The migrant crisis has had a disproportional impact on Turkey and its relations with the EU—and the Balkans. The control of migrants transiting the Balkans is a major source of grave concern within the EU. There is an ever-increasing resistance to ‘camps’ where migrants wait for an opportunity to cross the EU border. Meanwhile, the crisis in Turkey grows and deepens. The problem—for Turkey, not Europe—is that Erdo˘gan, seemingly, is happy with this development. Erdo˘gan’s discourse on migrants—like his foreign policy—followed an inconsistent course. The contention of “We will not send them back” was maintained over an analogy of ‘Ansar-Muhajir’ for a long time.122 But it was gradually replaced by “Volunteer and honorable return” and finally by “When there is a peaceful environment, they will leave voluntarily”.123 However his government’s wide-open door policy and his personal enthusiasm—and religious zeal—to host millions is hardly shared by the majority of the Turkish people. Even more bizarrely, Erdo˘gan has been eager to give Syrians citizenship and residence rights in Turkey. He wants to increase the number of ‘citizens’ because, he explains “So that these people do not live (in Turkey) illegally but to find a job in any institution or organization and work there”.124 In his address to the EU ambassadors in Ankara he said that “It is not realistic to expect migration pressure to decrease unless the current

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crises around Europe and Turkey are resolved”. However, he doesn’t seem to have any plan to do something either about those crises in the origin or the explosive situation in Turkey—particularly for “crises around Turkey”. His vision does not go beyond “building hundreds of thousands of briquette houses in Syria”. Meanwhile, the Coronavirus pandemic took its toll with rising unemployment and a severe economic crisis as well as with the sharply increasing humanitarian burden of migrants, resulting in a triple emergency. With respect to the EU-Turkey ‘migration’ agreement, he naively expected some tangible progress in visa liberalization and in updating the 1995 EU-Turkey Customs Union, neither of which came true. So, one may conclude that as the situation in Turkey exacerbates, the migration pressure—on Europe and the Balkans—is likely to increase.

Turkey the ‘Honest Broker’ Turks do take much pride in becoming a regional—sometimes exaggerated as global—power and such sentiments are indeed fed back into domestic politics. The war in Ukraine and the way Erdo˘gan and his government took advantage of it, gave a typical example of how such opportunities are manipulated to make best use of them for domestic consumption. However, focusing on the practical outcomes, the Turkish reality in the Balkans and the actual role played by Turkey—even with the Erdo˘gan factor—is quite different. In search of a leading motive for Turkey’s new assertiveness in foreign policy, explanations range from Neo-Ottomanism to Islamism, to dreams of creating a twenty-first-century world Khalif or establishing a Muslim Brotherhood crescent in the Middle East. The ‘Erdo˘gan factor’ added a new dimension and gave some credibility to such speculations. Many people believe that Turkish governments try to reach their ulterior goals through political, cultural and economic instruments. There is a higher degree of suspicion among Serbs and other non-Muslim populations, while Turkey’s increased self-confidence and activism is viewed more positively among populations in Albania, Bosnia, North Macedonia, Kosovo and Sanjak region of Serbia. However, Turkey had already returned to the Balkans long before AKP came to power, even before Erdo˘gan entered into politics. Traditionally, cultural ties and mutual interests drive Turkish policy toward the Balkans. Despite a change in tone and color, the AKP government policies are no different.125 Above all, with its unique history and culture, the Balkans

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is not the Middle East or north Africa! There are certain limits to what stubborn Balkan peoples could possibly accept and tolerate. Turkish governments did try first to achieve peace between Croats and Bosniaks and then to initiate a dialogue between Bosniaks and Serbs in BiH on the one hand and Albanians and Serbs over Kosovo on the other. They offered mediation to address political deadlocks. They provided political and military support to newly declared republics from the Republic of Macedonia to Moldavia as early as 1991. They helped Albania during the difficult times of the mid-1990s. The South East European Cooperation Process brought together the Balkans for the first time in history and promoted dialogue and cooperation in a number of fields. The South-Eastern Europe Brigade amalgamated militaries of the former Warsaw Pact, NATO and Yugoslavia into a joint military formation. The NATO-affiliated Partnership for Peace Training Center was inaugurated in Ankara in 1998 with the primary aim of training ‘partners’ in the Balkans.126 In each and every initiative in the Balkans, successive Turkish governments took part as primary facilitators. The Turkish role for bridging the Balkans gap is widely recognized. Turkish-Serbia relations is key to how Turkey is perceived in the Balkans and Turkey-Serbia state-to-state relations are at an almost perfect level. According to Turkish MEF, in recent years “Relations between Turkey and Serbia have reached the highest level” in history and “Both countries consider each other as neighbors” with a common objective of ‘strategic partnership’.127 Besides, interpersonal relations create a unique synergy augmenting the former. President Vuˇci´c always reaffirmed his support to territorial integrity of BiH and Erdo˘gan always acknowledged Serbia’s critical role in the Balkans.128 The dominant political rhetoric clearly reflects the spirit of trust and goodwill between the primary actors involved in relations. The visit of the BiH Presidency trio to Ankara in March 2021 represented a milestone. Milorad Dodik who was leading the rotational body during this visit gave an historic account of Turkish—that is Erdo˘gan’s—positive and critical role in the Balkans. In November, he traveled to Ankara—this time alone—for a working visit. He reiterated his favorable discourse and invited ‘everyone’ to commit to peaceful resolution of problems.129 Erdo˘gan, on his part, said that Turkey would “continue to work for the

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well-being of Bosnia Herzegovina and the entire Balkans” and “certainly not allow Bosnia and Herzegovina to experience the sufferings of the 1990s again”.130 Some groups in the Balkans may still have misgivings about Turkish role and some leaders may have certain caveats, but major actors do respect and trust Turkey as an honest broker now.131 Killing the common memory They called it ‘Stari Most’, Old Bridge—of Mostar. Dominating Neretva from a height of 24 m, it connected the Croat and Bosniak parts. It was designed by Mimar Hayruddin, a student of renowned Ottoman architect Mimar Sinan in the time of Suleiman the Magnificent. Its construction began in 1557 and took nine years. When completed, it was the widest arch bridge in the world. It symbolized the peaceful co-existence of a multicultural society. Stari Most stood for 427 years over Neretva— until it was destroyed on 9 November 1993. More than 60 tank-gun shells were fired to the bridge until it collapsed. It did not have any tactical, let alone strategic, material value. But it was targeted for killing the ‘common memory’. It was deliberate destruction of common cultural heritage, further deepening an already large gap of distrust and insecurity. In 1998 UNESCO established an international committee to oversee the reconstruction work. The bridge was re-built, as similar as possible to the original one, using Ottoman construction techniques by a partnership of civil engineering companies. Turks led the effort but many other countries and institutions gave a hand. The World Bank, UNESCO, the Aga Khan Trust, Italy, the Netherlands, Croatia. the Council of Europe, the Government of BiH and Turkey provided funding for the construction. Stari Most was reopened in 2004, but the gap its destruction created is yet to be bridged.

Bridging the Balkans Gap The Balkans today is as bewildering and mystifying as it has always been. North Macedonia’s NATO membership was obstructed by Greece for over 25 years because of the use of Vergina Sun 132 on the national flag of the Republic of Macedonia. In a region where even the ‘national’ origin of baklava is hotly disputed, this was a big deal. The moment this controversy was resolved and the Republic of North Macedonia became a NATO member in 2020, Bulgaria—that first recognized the Republic of

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Macedonia in 1991 and supported it all along—blocked its EU membership because Macedonians insisted that their national identity, history and culture were distinct from those of Bulgarians. The destiny of Serbs and Albanians, to a certain degree, that of Bosniaks, Croats and ‘Macedonians’ stand prominent among a cluster of challenges. The Balkans needs to set the sufferings and resentments of the history aside, overcome the basic instincts of survival, and look to the future from a novel perspective. After century-long bitter experiences since the Balkan Wars, it simply makes sense to work toward a better, more peaceful future. Yet, it is all about bridging the Balkans gap—learned distrust and a deep sense of insecurity—which lies at the bottom.133 The war in Ukraine has made the geopolitical situation in the Balkans even more precarious. NATO force projection into the Balkans has been boosted and there are new deployments.134 Russia is particularly irritated by deployments in Romania and Bulgaria which Russia considers as breaching the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act.135 Such deployments are likely to continue and will have an impact on Balkan geopolitics. The unnerving migrant crisis—now compounded by that originating from Ukraine—is growing exponentially and is doomed to get out of control with dire consequences over the Balkans—and beyond. It is just around the corner. The role of the international community in general seems to be indispensable for the short-to-mid term. The internal stability and relative calm are only maintained by the presence of international organizations and institutions, especially in Kosovo and BiH. While exchange of territory is a dead-end road, international community’s ‘carrot and stick’ approach may not be sustainable any longer too. The U.S. administration—ideally in close cooperation with the EU—is likely to play a more active role now in encouraging and helping Balkan countries to overcome their differences and integrate into Europe.136 However, the complete integration of the Balkans in the Transatlantic alliance—if it ever happens—will take longer time than initially anticipated. The Balkans is likely to be the next battlefield of the new Cold War—perhaps it already is. More active involvement of NATO/U.S. and Russia will not help bridging the Balkans Gap unless the EU choses to play a genuinely moderating role. Eventually, local and popular ownership seems to be the key to a settlement of the Gap. Only political leaders of the Balkans, working together, can build a better future for the Balkans. In recent elections, populist,

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chauvinist, even racist rhetoric rose across the Balkans, but the majority of the leaders did demonstrate that they learned from the 1990s and now from the devastating war in Ukraine. As the Old Guard is gradually being replaced by younger generations of political leaders, political culture transforms. Democracy is taking root and principles of goodgovernance are adopted across the Balkans. The Serbs carefully play ‘the victims’ with respect to the situation in BiH, Kosovo, Montenegro. Yet, despite tensions, the Serbian leadership puts itself forward as a reasonable player in regional cooperation as in the Open Balkan initiative or Turkey-facilitated schemes. The political elites across the Balkans, particularly those in Albania, are no different. But they still need whatever help they can get to bridge the Balkan Gap. Turkey with its unique presence, local expertise and institutional ‘emotional intelligence’ has advantages over many other actors to help resolve a multiplicity of differences and pave the way to a lasting, peaceful order in the Balkans. It has not only the ability, capacity and the political will to this end but—disproving Samuel Huntington—also enjoys the trust of all parties. Turkey went to polls in 2023 at the most critical juncture in its history. Erdo˘gan had already launched his election campaign as early as May 2022 by raising anti-Western, overtly pro-Putin, nationalistic rhetoric, blaming foreign conspirators for all his failures, criminalizing political opposition and announcing more assertive policies.137 Both the presidential and parliamentary elections ended with his victory securing a plurality of seats in the parliament and extending his already 20-year rule by further five years. He is now in an even stronger position to continue to play the honest broker in the Balkans. However, the worst economic crisis of his rule, the fall out from devastating earthquakes in February 2023 and the upcoming critical local elections in March 2024 temporarily shifted his priorities to domestic politics. The near future in the Balkans offers much hope and optimism as well as risks. The Miracle of Tuzla and Stari Most stand testimony to extraordinary achievements against all odds. Turkey, with or without Erdo˘gan, will always be around to help bridge the Balkans gap—as it has always been…

Notes 1. Greece, in 1991, did not recognize the Republic of ‘Macedonia’. The international community—except for Bulgaria, Turkey and later on the

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2. 3. 4.

5.

6.

7.

8. 9.

10.

11.

U.S.—used the provisional naming of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia/FYROM. The dispute was resolved by the 2018 Prespa Agreement that went into force in 2019. The founder of the modern Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was born in the Balkans—Thessaloniki. Slovenia would be the first EU country to recognize Kosovo’s independence from Serbia in 2008. Ethnic tensions and local conflicts continued beyond Kosovo borders between ethnic Albanians and the Serb and Macedonian security forces respectively, in and around Preševo, Bujonovac, Medved-a and Tetovo. “Prince Lazarus sacrificed his life right here for Jesus, for religion and for Kosovo and Metohijah. … We once fought here with the Turks, now we have another war, … we will not give up, we will stay, not with our own strength, but with the power of God and our religion”. Raška-Prizren Bishop Teodosije (Živko) Šibali´c, in the ceremony marking the 631st anniversary of the ‘Kosovo Victory’, 28 June 2020. “Gazimestan’da Sırplar Vidovdan’ı Kutladı, iki Ki¸si Tutuklandı,” Kosova Haber, 28 Haziran 2020, https://www.kosovahaber.net/?page=2,12,58256. After the decision to renew the 2022 elections for the Presidency of the Republika Srpska, Milorad Dodik’s election rally in Banja Luka turned into a nationalist mobilization. Serbs were called to the ‘defence of the homeland’ in the name of Serbian ‘heroes’ to include King Lazar who fought the Ottomans in Kosovo in 1389 and Gavrilo Princip, who assassinated Franz Ferdinand of Austria in Sarajevo in 1914. The relevance of the civilizational paradigm to the emerging world is illustrated by the events fitting that paradigm which occurred during a six-month period in 1993: Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 21, 38. From the 1999 Kosovo crisis on, even the need for authorization by the UN Security Council was disregarded. In former Yugoslavia, the word ‘Muslim’ was used to designate a ‘religioethnic’ nationality for Bosniaks, Muslim Serbs and others. During the war, the word ‘Turks’ was used pejoratively for this group. Pope Francis at Synod 2018 described clericalism as “A power to be exercised rather than a free and generous service to be given”. “Address by Pope Francis at the opening of the Synod of Bishops”, Synodus Episcoporum, Vatican, 3 October 2018. Christian nationalism is some form of religious nationalist ideology affiliated with Christianity. It corresponds to Pan-Islamism in Islamist ideology which advocates the unity of Ummah under one Islamic state—Caliphate.

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12. In Albania, Orthodox are concentrated in areas close to the border with Greece, Catholics in the north close to the border with Montenegro. Muslims are throughout the country. Urban centers generally have mixed populations. 13. The doctrine that promotes cooperation among different denominations, aiming at universal Christian unity. 14. ‘Ecumenical’ role and status of the Roman Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul is not recognized by Turkey. 15. The Prime Minister of N. Macedonia Oliver Spasovski with his predecessor Zoran Zaev visited Patriarch Bartholomew in 2020. 16. In February 2021, a mosque in Nikši´c was marked as ‘Turks’, the pejoratively used word for all ‘Muslims’ regardless of their ethnicity. The graffiti read ‘Niksic will be [a new] Srebrenica’. On the wall of another mosque in Podgorica, they put ‘4S’ standing for ‘Only Unity Saves the Serbs’, the popular motto of Serbian nationalism. 17. “If we’ve brought the country to the point where criminals can kill even the president, that shows what kind of people we are. It doesn’t even cross my mind to hide from my own people. … I’ll be in public and never wear a steel vest. In the fight against the mafia, the state has prevailed, but there are still problems.” President Aleksandar Vuˇci´c. 18. Škaljari leader Jovan Vukoviˇc was killed in central Istanbul in September 2022 by criminals of Turkish nationality contracted by Kavaˇc. Press release by the Turkish Police, Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime Department. ‘Jovan Vukotic hakkında açıklama’. 8 December 2022. KOM Ba¸skanlı˘gı @KomBaskanligi ÖS 1:48, 8 Ara 2022. 19. Albania, BiH, Kosovo, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia are ‘Partly Free’ while Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania are ‘Free’ countries. Global Freedom Scores, Freedom House, 2022. 20. In the context of upcoming elections in Albania in April 2021, both U.S. and U.K. ambassadors publicly voiced criticism about inclusion of those with criminal past in electoral lists and called for transparency. 21. It was argued that many vehicles with Serbian plates brought in ‘voters’ on the election day. 22. Slovenia: ‘Free’ with a score of ‘95’. Political rights, 39/40, civil liberties 56/60. Freedom House, 2021. The EU Commission condemned attacks by Slovenian Prime Minister Janes Jansa on journalists over a Politico article which he said the reporter had been “instructed not to tell the truth”, and accused Politico of “laying [sic] for a living”. 23. Leaders’ behavior reflects the imperatives of both a domestic political game and an international game. Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games”, International Organization 42, 3 (Summer 1988): 427–460.

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24. The Croatian Minister of Foreign Affairs Grli´c Radman during a meeting with HDZ BiH President and Croatian National Assembly leader Dragan ˇ c in Mostar expressed support for amendments to the BiH Election Covi´ Law so that Croats could elect ‘their’ representatives (Croatian National Assembly is an organization of Croat political parties in BiH and the HDZ BiH is a major political party of Bosnian Croats.). 25. The Ciuc˘a Cabinet of PSD, PNL and UDMR is referred to as the National Coalition for Romania. 26. Prime Minister Ana Brnabi´c is openly lesbian with a partner and a son. Her election and coming to office challenged a taboo head-on. 27. The Petkov government is composed of We Continue the Change (PP) party with three other left-wing and center-right groups. ‘Zero tolerance for corruption’ is their motto. They control 134 seats in Bulgaria’s 240seat parliament. President Radev said that it was their responsibility “To reform the vicious power model inherited from 12 years of authoritarian rule, to tackle corruption and lawlessness, the inequalities and poverty they create”. 28. Prime Minister Petkov’s visit to the Republic of North Macedonia in January 2022 was criticized by President as ‘rushed’ and succumbing to external pressure. But Petkov described his visit to Skopje as ‘terribly late’: “If we do not want the Balkans to remain the poorest, most corrupt, most uncoordinated place in the EU, the approach must be changed”. 29. As of January 1, 2023, Croatia became part of the now 27-member Schengen Area and controls on borders with other Schengen countries were lifted. 30. The Stabilization and Association Process (SAP) is the European Union’s policy toward the Western Balkans and sets out common political and economic goals. SAP was launched in June 1999 and strengthened at the Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003. It rests on bilateral Stabilization and Association Agreements among others. In the Economic and Investment Plan put forward by the European Commission in 2020, e9 billion was pledged in grants and up to e20 billion in loans was leveraged by the Western Balkans Guarantee Facility. The Plan aims to spur the long-term recovery leading to sustained economic growth and implementation of reforms on the EU path. 31. Prime Minister Rama, quoting a social media message “Because you stand so close to President Erdo˘gan that if you were Muslim, who knows what those in the EU would say?” said that “No one in Albania or the EU should be disturbed by the relations between the two countries”. Rama and Erdo˘gan press conference, 17 January 2022, Tirana. 32. Bulgaria blocked the official start of EU accession talks with N. Macedonia until late 2022 because of disputes over history and language

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33. 34.

35.

36.

37.

38. 39.

40.

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and accused N. Macedonia of failing to implement the 2017 bilateral Friendship Treaty. ‘Albanian PM compares EU entry and Waiting for Godot’, Reuters, 23 June 2021. “Albanien, Serbien und Nordmazedonien sehen ihre Initiative Open Balkan als einen großen Schritt in Richtung einer EU-Mitgliedschaft.” Ein Gastbeitrag. ‘Eine Perspektive für den Balkan’ von Edi Rama, Aleksandar Vuˇci´c und Zoran Zaev, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 21 Dezember 2021. “The EU reconfirms its full and unequivocal commitment to the European Union membership perspective of the Western Balkans and calls for the acceleration of the accession process... In particular, the EU welcomes the holding of the first Intergovernmental Conferences with Albania and North Macedonia.” EU-Western Balkans Summit, Tirana Declaration, 6 December 2022. https://www.consilium.europa. eu/media/60568/tirana-declaration-en.pdf. Sakwa lists four issues that provoked Russia’s neo-revisionism: the gradual deterioration of the relationship with the EU, the breakdown of an inclusive pan-European security system, American claims to ‘exceptionalism’ and global leadership, the ideology of ‘democratism’. Richard Sakwa, Frontline Ukraine, Crisis in the Borderlands (London: I.B. Tauris, 2015), 31–35. ‘Founding Act’ on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation signed in Paris, France, 27 May 1997. https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm. Angela Stent, ‘The Putin Doctrine’, Foreign Affairs, 27 January 2022. Montenegro’s historic NATO membership course in 2017 was dramatic. An alleged coup attempt involving political opposition and ‘Russian’ intelligence aimed to prevent membership. In 2019, NATO (U.S.) deployed a counter-hybrid warfare team to Montenegro and President Dukanovic accused Serbia and President Vuˇci´c of interfering in Montenegro’s internal affairs and pursuing a “Greater Serbia policy”. The Court of Appeals of Montenegro annulled the first instance verdict on all counts of the indictment related to ‘coup attempt’, in 2021. “The US has been speaking for a while about the destructive role of Serbs in Bosnia, slowing down the path of that country to NATO. It is not about the overall good of Republika Srpksa but it is about joining NATO. That’s what Russia cannot agree with”. Sergey Lavrov. ‘Rusi protiv ulaska BiH u NATO’, BN Tv, 16 January 2019. “Russia has nothing against Serbia joining EU. But it doesn’t see any benefits for Serbia of joining NATO. Russia supports [Serbia’s] current status of military neutrality”. Alexander Bocan-Harchenko, Ambassador

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41.

42.

43. 44.

45.

46.

47.

48.

49.

50.

51.

of Russia to Belgrade, ‘Bocan Harˇcenko: Rusija nema ništa protiv ulaska Srbije u EU, ali ne i u NATO’, N1, 10 December 2019. In the Presidential Council of BiH, Serb member Milorad Dodik demanded that “BiH maintain its neutrality between Russia and Ukraine”. He believed that “two new countries” had emerged on the territory of Ukraine. Croat Member Željko Komši´c and Bosniak Member Šefik Džaferovi´c reacted and accused Dodik of ‘destabilizing BiH’. NATO SecGen Stoltenberg, on 4 March 2022—eight days after the invasion of Ukraine was launched—spelled out Bosnia and Herzegovina—and Georgia—as ‘a partner who is at risk’. NATO SecGen Jens Stoltenberg, press conference on the Extraordinary Meeting of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Brussels, 4 March 2022. Kosovo officially applied for membership in the Council of Europe on 12 May 2022. Even in Greece there are clear signs that they are now more willing to negotiate with Turkey over a number of issues which have hampered efforts to establish good-neighborly relations for decades. China initiated the ‘Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries’, known as ‘17+1’ to promote Belt and Road Initiative. The last two C-CEEC summit was held in April 2019 in Dubrovnik, Croatia and in February 2021 via video link, due to Covid pandemic. Despite the devastating battles in Grozny and elsewhere, very high numbers of civilian deaths and injured, almost half a million displaced persons, the 1994–96 War in Chechnya was resulted in Chechnya’s de facto independence from Russia, despite Russia’s overwhelming power. NATO ignored open threats from Russia: “The world in this decade has never been so close to nuclear war. I appeal to NATO leaders to show courage and suspend the air raids”. Viktor Chernomyrdin, ‘Bombs Rule Out Talk of Peace’, Washington Post, 27 May 1999. A13. Russia refuses to recognize Kosovo. Likewise, Serbia was among 17 countries that voted against the UN General Assembly Resolution (GA/ 12295, 7 December 2020) calling on Russia to withdraw its forces from Crimea. “…Strongly regrets Serbia’s non-alignment with EU sanctions against Russia, which damages its EU accession process”. ‘Russian aggression against Ukraine’ P9_TA (2022)0052, European Parliament resolution, 1 March 2022. ‘Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Sergey Lavrov‘s written message to the Heads of Foreign/External Affairs Ministers/Secretaries of the US, Canada and several European countries’, 1 February 2022. https:/ /www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1796679/. In Serbia, about half of the population are against the EU while only 3% look NATO favorably. However about 40% believe that Russia and China

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53.

54.

55.

56.

57.

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are their best friends. In contrast, 93% of citizens of Kosovo support EU process. The UN General Assembly adopted a ground-breaking resolution in 2010 (GA/10980, 9 September 2010) acknowledging the International Court of Justice’s opinion on Kosovo—that the declaration ‘did not violate’ general international law—and welcoming the EU’s readiness to facilitate process of dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo. Serbia called the declaration illegal but did recognize that the UN text would ‘create an atmosphere conducive for creating peace between Serbs and Albanians’ thus offering some hope at least for some form of normalization. When Serbian Minister of Internal Affairs publicly used the offensive term ‘shqiptari’ in 2019, the Serbian Supreme Court—contradicting an earlier decision—decided this use was not ‘discriminatory or ‘hate speech’. The Democratic Front, a political alliance of ethnic Serb parties, is against President Dukanovic’s Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) of Montenegro. Dukanovic, longstanding leader of the party, abandoned the joint vision in favor of an independent Montenegro. The Democratic Front saw any ‘Serbian’ politician who supported a minority government from outside as a ‘disgrace of the [Serbian] nation’. In April 2022, the DF boycotted the new minority government of Dritan Abazovic, supported externally by DPS. Abazovic is an ethnic Albanian and a Muslim and played a key role in Montenegro’s decision to impose sanctions on Russia over Ukraine. The EU allocated 1 billion euros for the Western Balkans energy crisis. Half of this will be used to help families and the other half to strengthen the energy infrastructure. However, in October 2022, in the EU’s new sanctions package against Russia, Serbia was added to the part on the restriction of Russian oil—at the initiative of Croatian PM Andrej Plenkovi´c. Thus, Serbia will not be able to buy Russian oil through Croatia. Prime Minister Ana Brnabi´c defined this decision as ‘a kind of sanction’. TANAP originates at the Georgian-Turkish border and connects to the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) at the Greek border. The Southern Gas Corridor would require capacity increase and additional reserves from Azerbaijan and possibly from Turkmenistan and Iraq. The Azerbaijan-Serbia Declaration on Strategic Partnership was signed in 2013 and followed by the Joint Action Plan on Strategic Partnership in 2018. During Aliyev’s visit to Serbia in November 2022 a Strategic Partnership Council was established. Vuˇci´c returned his visit—rather unusually—following month, “…to deepen this strategic partnership with concrete agreements and tangible steps”.

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58. In September 2022, Turkish Foreign Minister Çavu¸so˘glu addressing Open Balkan Summit in Belgrade vowed to help the initiative address its energy needs. Bulgaria also relies on Azerbaijan for about one third of its gas needs. 59. “Although this is not a fair deal, it is more just than continuing the war. …a better peace cannot be achieved in such a world” Alija Izetbegovi´c. “The agreement has a lifespan of 15 years …” Richard Holbrooke. 60. The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina was signed by the President of Bosnia and Herzegovina Alija Izetbegovic, the President of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic and the President of Croatia Franjo Tud-man at the official ceremony in France on December 14, 1995. It recognized Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs as the “founding peoples” of the country. BiH consists of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBIH) and Republika Srpska, and the Brcko Region with a special status. Both entities have presidents. The FBIH has 10 cantons, each with its own government and parliament. Tripartite Presidency Council alternate between Bosnian, Serb and Croat members every 8 months for 4 years. Office of the High Representative represents the Peace Implementation Council. 61. The tripartite Presidency of BiH collectively serves as head of state. Bosniaks make up about 70 percent of the population of the Federation and have de facto control over who is to be elected—and represent Bosnian Croats—in the Presidency. While the Serb member is elected by voters in Republika Srpska, the Bosniak and Croat members are elected from a joint constituency in the Federation. Croats want to appoint—elect—their own representatives. 62. Pelješac Bridge will connect the county of Dubrovnik-Neretva with the Croatian mainland—bypassing BiH Neum. It is built by China, financed by the EU and has a clearance of 55 meters. It is argued that it threatens Bosnia and Herzegovina’s access to open seas. 63. President Aleksandar Vuˇci´c invited BiH Presidency Member Milorad Dodik, Republika Srpska President Željka Cvijanovi´c and representatives of the Serbs in Montenegro to discuss the situation facing ‘Serbs’. Daniel Kovacevic, ‘Bosnian Serb Leader Repeats Demand for Secession Referendum’, BIRN, BalkanInsight, 15 February 2020. 64. Lavrov, visiting Belgrade afterward, met President Vuˇci´c who stressed Serbia’s ‘military neutrality’. “Serbia will not be part of military blocs, but wants to protect its freedom on its own”. ‘Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation’, the President of the Republic of Serbia, 15 December 2020. 65. ‘Leader of Bosnia Serbs expects Serb entity to become independent, then join Serbia’, dtt-net.com, 14 February 2022.

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66. European Commission, Bosnia and Herzegovina 2021 Report. Strasbourg, 19 October 2021 SWD (2021) 291 final/2. 67. Croatia secretly negotiated with HR for months prior to the elections regarding changes to the electoral law which favored the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the Croatian nationalist party in BiH. 68. Both Bosniaks and Serbs were equally unhappy with the involvement of High Representative, in October 2022 elections, to impose wide-ranging amendments to the election law, especially his decision to increase the number of seats in the People’s Assembly of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina from 58 to 80. The position of High Representative was created under the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, usually referred to as the Dayton Peace Agreement, that was negotiated in Dayton, Ohio, and signed in Paris on 14 December 1995. http://www.ohr.int/?lang=en. 69. The three members of the Presidency are Bosniak Denis Be´cirovi´c and Bosnian Croat Željko Komši´c, from the multi-ethnic center-left SDP and DF political parties, and Željka Cvijanovi´c from the Bosnian Serb party SNSD. 70. Kosovo and Israel mutually recognized each other in 2020. They established diplomatic relations and Kosovo opened its Embassy in Jerusalem in March 2021—despite opposition from the EU. Muslim-majority Kosovo became the third country after U.S. and Guatemala to open an embassy in Jerusalem. 71. Albania openly supports Kosovo. In July 2020, Albanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Gent Cakaj (of Kosovo origin) declared that Copenhagen Embassy of Albania would serve citizens of both Albania and Kosovo. 72. The 2013 Brussels Agreement—First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations—between Serbia and Kosovo was negotiated under the auspices of the EU, but not signed by either party; yet it led to, albeit vague, ‘normalization’. 73. A potential land-swap would have a ‘domino effect’ on other issues such as Sanjak (Serbia & Montenegro), Vojvodina (Serbia), Tetovo and Strumica (North Macedonia), Republika Srpska, to start with. 74. During a video conference—involving also Chancellor Merkel and President Macron—in 2020, Prime Minister Avdullah Hoti listed five objectives of the dialogue: mutual recognition, Kosovo’s recognition by the remaining EU countries, UN membership, an EU perspective, missing persons. President Vuˇci´c found these “completely meaningless”. 75. The agreement, signed by President Vuˇci´c and Prime Minister Hoti on 4 September 2020 at the WH, aims to establish highway and railway links, improving economic ties, but remains short of recognition of Kosovo by Serbia.

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76.

77.

78.

79.

80.

81.

82.

83.

84.

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‘Serbia, Kosovo sign economic pact at White House’, Euractive, 4 September 2020. “We understand this is America’s new policy. There were attempts in Washington D.C. [on 4 September 2020], too, to force the term upon us as something that we were supposed to accept as a final solution. I made it very clear at the White House … my answer would be no different this time”. President Vuˇci´c, 7 February 2021. In 2019, the U.S. first announced Matthew Palmer as the U.S. Special Representative to the Western Balkans, then Richard Grenell, U.S. Ambassador to Germany was given the double-hat of U.S. Special Envoy for Serbia-Kosovo reconciliation. In April 2020, EU assigned Miroslav Lajcak as its Special Representative for the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue and Western Balkans in general. Germany, France and Turkey followed suit. Kosovo Serbs blockaded two border crossing points between Kosovo and Serbia to protest decisions about new vehicle license plates introduced by the Kosovo government. The crisis was the most serious since 2011 shattering the already fragile trust between two peoples. It was deescalated by intervention of U.S. and the EU. As Kosovo special police units withdrew, KFOR troops moved in and took over border crossings and dismantled roadblocks. NATO and EU members Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain as well as the Republic of Cyprus (Member of the EU but not NATO) do not recognize Kosovo’s independence. The Serb Lista Srpska party members of the Kosovo parliament boycotted the vote on a resolution condemning the Russian aggression against Ukraine. The resolution passed with 94 out of 120 votes. NATO-led international peacekeeping force Kosovo Force (KFOR) is operational since the end of the war and will remain in place until Kosovo Security Force becomes self-sufficient. Late March 2020, the Kurti government was toppled by a no-confidence vote reportedly orchestrated by President Thaci. It was argued that this crisis was linked to the exchange of letters between Thaci and U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and had to do with a ‘deal’ for the partition of Kosovo and the abolition of the Specialist Chambers. The Kosovo Specialist Chambers will try ex-Kosovo Liberation Army (UÇK) guerrillas for wartime and post-war crimes—from 1 January 1998 to 31 December 1999. Thaci was the political director of the KLA during the war. This was considered a ‘political earthquake’, a popular reaction to the old-style governance inherited from former Yugoslavia. Kurti’s party campaigned on a platform against corruption and the old political class. In 2017, Macedonian Prime Minister Zoran Zaev signed the Treaty of Friendship, Good-neighborliness, Cooperation with Bulgaria, opening

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the path for EU accession. Despite high expectations in Skopje, in October 2019, France opposed the initiation of the accession talks for North Macedonia and Albania. (The Netherlands and Denmark were for Albania only). Then, Bulgarian position also changed and they tied accession to conditions related to language and history. Bulgaria wants North Macedonia to accept that the Macedonian language is a Bulgarian dialect and Macedonian nation was artificially created. Even ‘Gotse Delchev’, a historical figure for both, has been a subject of dispute. Similarly, Albania is yet to meet the conditions set by the Council before the start of accession talks. Hence, the enlargement as a topic was removed from the EU agenda in December 2020. The Foreign Minister of Bulgaria Ekaterina Zaharieva, on 24 February 2021, reiterated Sofia’s ‘principled’ support to Macedonia’s EU accession process. “…the accession process is already complex and demanding and we must avoid introducing elements that include a high degree of interpretation and emotion. … The EU is not here to determine who is right or wrong on issues related to history, language or identity. … Open historical bilateral issues need to be solved bilaterally.” Tomáš Petˇríˇcek & Ivan Korˇcok, Opinion, ‘EU should not be a judge of historical issues’, euobservor, 8 February 2021. Prime Minister Zaev called early elections after EU failed to start talks with N. Macedonia. France had already blocked N. Macedonia’s EU accession process, but then let it go forward—only after Zaev called for early elections in despair. However, Bulgaria continues to oppose to North Macedonia’s EU application. In Turkish, ‘balkan’ means ‘densely forested mountain’. It has been in use since mid-fourteenth century in referring to the main mountain range in Bulgaria: Ctapa Planina Bul (Old Mountain), Koca Balkan Tur (Great Balkan). Ottomans came to calling the same geography as Rumeli ‘Land of the Romans’ long before the name ‘Balkans’ was coined rather recently in the nineteenth century. ‘Evlad-i Fatihan’ is the name given to the descendants of those who participated in the conquest of the Balkans in Ottoman armies and settled there. This term is also used for the Balkan Turks who were left behind. Hugh Pope, Sons of the Conquerors: the Rise of the Turkic World (New York: Overlook Press, 2006). Turkish is member of Turkic language family of Altaic group. Modern Turkish is the descendent of the Ottoman Turkish which absorbed many Arabic and Persian words. There are about 7000 Turkish words in Serbian alone.

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94. The term ‘Ethnic’ takes on a different meaning in the Balkans. The words ‘Turks’ and ‘Muslims’ are used interchangeably. In Yugoslavia, Bosniaks were officially named ‘Muslims’ along with other ethnicities. 95. Pomaks are Bulgarian-speaking Muslims living in Turkey, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, N. Macedonia. Torbeshi are Macedonian Muslims, Gagauz are Christian Turks of Moldavia and Székelys descendants of Huns in Romania. 96. ‘Relations with the Balkan region’, MFA Turkey. https://www.mfa.gov. tr/relations-with-the-balkan-region.en.mfa. 97. Turkey is the 19th largest economy in the world, with a GDP of $719.95 billion in 2020. World Bank, 2021. 98. In 2020, Turkey accounted for 26% of global humanitarian aid— $30.9 billion—and spent $8.04 billion, up 5.9% on a yearly basis. It came only second after the U.S., which spent $8.9 billion, increasing 6.9% compared to 2019. Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2021, 22 June 2021. https://devinit.org/resources/global-humanitarian-assist ance-report-2021/. 99. The foreign trade volume of Germany with the countries of the region is approximately $90 billion, and Italy’s is approximately $55 billion. Turkey is in the third place with approximately $24 billion. Balkan countries export about $43 billion to Germany alone. While it is $26 billion for Italy, it is only $9 billion for Turkey. ‘Türk dı¸s politikasının in¸sasında Balkanlar’daki de˘gi¸simi öngörmek’, balkannews.com.tr, 11 October 2021. 100. One of the first friendship agreements concluded by the modern Turkish Republic is the 1923 Turkey-Albania ‘Eternal Friendship and Cooperation Agreement’. Turkey is the largest foreign investor with a total investment of $3.5 billion. 101. “What we’ve done with respect to the disaster caused by this earthquake is not based on the law of obligations, but on the law of brotherhood. We quickly built these works [sic] there. Likewise, those related to historical monuments are also based on the law of brotherhood.” President Erdo˘gan, Tirana, 17 January 2022. ˙ 102. Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), established in 1992, is an ‘implementing intermediary’ for the Turkish foreign policy, particularly in the countries Turkey has ‘shared’ values. TIKA operates in 150 countries through its 62 Programme Coordination Offices located in 60 countries across 5 continents. @tikaenglish1 “We, as TIKA, extended Türkiye’s friendly hand to those in need in 92 countries from the Balkans to Africa, to Central Asia, to Latin America, with the iftar [breaking fast] programs we organized and the food packages we distributed during Ramadan”. 2 May 2022.

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103. The Yunus Emre Foundation is a public foundation. Founded in 2007, it promotes Turkey, Turkish language, its history and culture and art, to improve friendship between Turkey and other countries, including the Balkans. 104. The U.S. informally asked the possibility of transferring S-400 systems to Ukraine. It was found “quite unrealistic”. ‘U.S. suggested Turkey transfer Russian-made missile system to Ukraine’, Humeyra Pamuk, Reuters, 20 March 2022. 105. Turkey was the second country, after Bulgaria, that recognized the Republic of Macedonia in 1991 by its constitutional name and maintained this political stance until after the name controversy was resolved in 2018. 106. However, there are certain limits to even ‘cordial’ relations. In both Albania and Kosovo—despite the personal and persistent efforts of President Erdo˘gan—no concrete steps were taken against the FETÖ structure. ‘Fethullahist Terrorist Organization’ (Fethullahçı Terör Örgütü, FETÖ) is the name given—by the government and judiciary of Turkey— to the formerly ‘Gülen movement’. It was an Islamist fraternal movement with a cultish hierarchy, led by Fethullah Gülen who has been living in the U.S. since 1999. The ‘movement’ was an ally of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Tayyip Erdo˘gan against the military and the Turkish secular elite. They attempted a coup to overthrow Erdo˘gan in 2016 but failed. This paved the way for Erdo˘gan to establish his own regime—Neo-Patrimonial Sultanism. Since then, Erdo˘gan and Gülen—former allies—are arch-enemies. 107. ‘Albania PM says western Balkans should never give up on EU dream’. Financial Times, 17 January 2022. 108. “Muslims seek the cure for their troubles not in their religious brethren, but in foreigners, Westerners, Western capitals. An understanding that sees personal quarrels above the interests of the Ummah has nothing to offer to Muslims. We have carried out work in every field to clear the dead soil sprinkled over the Islamic world. We have struggled … to resurrect Muslim self-confidence that has been battered for years.” Erdo˘gan, 6th Religious Council, Ankara, 28 November 2019. 109. “The history of today’s West, from America to Europe, is full of the most serious human rights violations. On the contrary, we [Muslims] do not have such a shame… Wherever there is an oppressed, aggrieved, needy person … we have stood by them with all our might and we continue to do so. From Syria to Palestine, from Somalia to Arakan (Rakhine, Myanmar), we are setting an example for humanity…” Erdo˘gan, World Human Rights Day, 10 December 2019. 110. “We will continue to safeguard the testament trusted upon us [me] by the deceased Aliya by holding our [my] hand right before his death:

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‘Tayyip, my brother, these are the lands of Evlad-i Fatihan. It is you who will protect the lands of the Sons of the Conquerors”. Erdo˘gan, speaking to AKP parliamentary group, 18 May 2022. “Turkey is in a new rise as today’s heir to a great civilizational heritage that embraces everything that belongs to the east and the west. … There is no other nation in the world that has left its mark on such a wide area with its monuments, martyrdoms, mosques and many historical artifacts. By following these traces, we are protecting the works belonging to us everywhere, from the depths of Mongolia to the Adriatic shores, from the gates of Vienna to the legendary gardens of the Crimea.” Erdo˘gan speaking on the 950th anniversary of the ‘Manzikert Victory’, 26 August 2021. “Member states must uphold its founding principles and strengthen the Alliance. Wherever the umbrella of … NATO is needed, from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea, from Europe to Asia, the Alliance must take an active role. The period is not for escaping from responsibility, it is a time to take responsibility. …NATO needs to take more effective initiatives in the face of global challenges.” Erdo˘gan, NATO Summit, Brussels, 14 June 2021. “We support the territorial integrity and sovereignty of our strategic partner and neighbor, Ukraine. …we invite all parties to be moderate and engage in dialogue … the dispute should be resolved by peaceful methods and on the basis of international law.” Erdo˘gan, 10th Meeting of the Turkey-Ukraine High Level Strategic Council, Kiev, 3 February 2022. “So, it shouldn’t turn into a play of rebuke. A more decisive step should have been taken by NATO. … Unfortunately, the EU, as well as all Westernist [sic] mentalities, have not taken a serious and determined stance. All of them give plenty of advice to Ukraine. Of course, it is impossible to get anywhere with advice [only]. I hope that today’s NATO Summit will take a more determined stance.” Erdo˘gan, Istanbul, 25 February 2022. “(Finland and Sweden) should not bother sending delegations to convince Turkey (of their bids to join NATO) because they harbor terrorists and impose sanctions on Turkey. NATO’s enlargement is meaningful to us only to the extent that our sensitivities are respected”. Erdo˘gan, speaking to AKP parliamentary group, 18 May 2022. Hungary also opposed the two countries joining NATO due to ‘finger-pointing’ by Nordic countries questioning the state of democracy in Hungary. Eventually both Turkey and Hungary ratified the accession protocol for Finland and it became the 31st member of NATO on 4 April 2023 but Sweden’s accession remained blocked.

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116. In 2004, the President of the Spanish Government Jose Luis Zapatero proposed ‘an Alliance of civilizations between the Western and the Arab and Muslim Worlds’ so as to prevent hate and incomprehension from building a new wall. Soon after, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan joined President Zapatero as co-sponsor of the Alliance of Civilizations. In July 2005, UN SecGen Kofi Annan formally launched UNAOC as a joint effort by the international community “to build bridges, overcome prejudices and prevent polarization”. The Alliance has failed to deliver any concrete results and has turned into a slow, cumbersome bureaucratic organization, doing tedious work. 117. “The challenge before us is not Islamophobia, that is, the fear of Islam, but outright ‘hostility towards Islam’. Islamophobia is spreading rapidly … especially in the West, just like cancer cells. …continues with very insidious and covert methods. The strategy of ‘demonizing Muslims’, initiated by the U.S. administration after the September 11 attacks, served as a trigger for the virus of ‘hostility towards Islam’ that already exists in the cultural structure of many societies.” Erdo˘gan, 1st International Symposium on Media and Islamophobia, Ankara, 25 May 2021. 118. “The EU has never approached Turkey sincerely. The real reason is (that) we are Muslims.” Erdo˘gan, World Human Rights Day, 10 December 2019. 119. “It is imperative to establish a new global security architecture that will protect peace instead of the status quo, and serve all humanity instead of the interests of five countries.” Erdo˘gan, Antalya Diplomacy Forum, 11 March 2022. 120. Registered Syrian refugees only amount to 3,762,686 and this is the ‘official’ figure of the Turkish government. Ismail Catakli, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of Turkey, 8 May 2022. 121. ‘EU-Turkey statement’, 18 March 2016. https://www.consilium.europa. eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/. 122. The words Ansar and Muhajir appeared in the early days of Islam, during the migration of Muslims from Mecca to Medina in 622. Muhajir are the Muslims who come from Mecca. The people of Medina who help those coming from Mecca are called Ansar. Two hundred and twenty-six were the first to migrate from Mecca to Medina. 123. “Yesterday they came from Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, today they come from Ukraine, we do not know where they will come from tomorrow. We will not send back the refugees in this country. Because we know very well what Ansar is and what Muhajir is, as a prophetic (inherited from Muhammad) method. We will continue to host them. … our civilization, history, culture and values require it.” Erdo˘gan, ‘6th International Goodness Awards’ programme, Ankara, 15 March 2022.

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124.

125.

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“Turkey is … home to 5 million refugees, 3.5 million of whom are Syrians. Even though we are left alone, we do our best for the voluntary … return of our Syrian brothers.” Erdo˘gan, ‘Iftar dinner to foreign ambassadors’, Ankara, 18 April 2022. “There are 3 million 768 thousand Syrians in Turkey. If we did not take precautions, the number of illegal immigrants would exceed 10 million. About 500 thousand people returned (to Syria) voluntarily. As of March 31, 200 thousand 950 Syrian nationals became (Turkish) citizens. 113,654 of them are adults (i.e., they can vote), 87,296 of them are children.” Minister of Internal Affairs Süleyman Soylu, NTV , 22 April 2022. “Establishing an environment of lasting peace, trust and stability, ensuring good neighborly relations and regional cooperation in the Balkans are among the top priorities of Turkish foreign policy.” Erdo˘gan addressing the Albanian Parliament, Tirana, 17 January 2022. PfP TC-TUR provided training to thousands of military personnel in resident courses and deployed many Mobile Training Teams across the Balkans. ‘Relations between Turkey and Serbia’ MEF Turkey. https://www. mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-serbia.en.mfa. Accessed on 31 March 2022. “Serbia’s support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina is very important for the peace and stability of our region. It is also obvious that the international community needs to act together in order to overcome the crisis regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina. Both Vuˇci´c and I are trying our best, and we will continue to do so.” Erdo˘gan. “I said that it is very important to comply with the Dayton Agreement. I think we have a common understanding on this matter. I told President Erdo˘gan that we are extremely respectful of the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. … The interests of the Republika Srpska (entity) are also important, and this is also part of the Dayton Agreement. Only in this way can we preserve security.” Vuˇci´c. Joint press conference. 18 January 2022, Ankara. “The goodwill of [Serbian President Aleksandar] Vuˇci´c, Erdo˘gan and [Croatian President Zoran] Milanovic can be useful, but everyone else should agree on that ‘peace has no alternative’ and ‘the threat of force cannot solve any problem’. Erdo˘gan is a man who is not prepared to do anything in Bosnia and Herzegovina that would be harmful for Serbs and Croats.” Milorad Dodik, 10 November 2021, Ankara. Serbian President Vuˇci´c also paid an official visit to Turkey in September 2021 and after meeting with Erdo˘gan said that “Good relations between Serbia and Turkey are a condition for maintaining stability in the

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Balkans”. Vuˇci´c would travel to Ankara in January 2022 again. Then, in March 2022, Erdo˘gan would meet members of the tripartite Presidency of BiH in Turkey on the margins of Antalya Diplomacy Forum. @Milan_Tegeltija “If Bakir says that Alija Izetbegovi´c bequeathed Erdo˘gan the responsibility for Bosniaks in BiH, it is logical involving Erdo˘gan in the talks on BiH. After all, regardless of the wars, Serbs have a long history of reasonable agreements with the Turks. That reasonableness is what is missing to the Bosniak political elite” 11:57 30 August 2021. Milan Tegeltija, adviser to Milorad Dodik. A sixteen rayed solar symbol taken by Greeks as the symbol of the ancient Kingdom of Macedonia (fourth century BC), connected to Alexander the Great. Even Dodik has one caveat: “I’m not naive and I know that … Erdo˘gan will always be on the side of Muslim-Bosniak interests. But he respects everyone and as long as his policy is like that, I will respect him.” Milorad Dodik. https://www.syndicationbureau.com/en/ turkeys-balkan-balancing-act/. Spain deployed aircraft and support personnel to Bulgaria for air policing. France offered to send troops to Romania. The U.S. sent nearly 3000 additional troops to Poland and Romania—to include 1,000-strong Stryker squadron. The U.S. donated two Black Hawk military helicopters to Croatia. NATO already has a multinational land force in Romania as well as American units stationed at separate bases in Romania—and in Bulgaria. Romania also houses Aegis Ashore missile defense facility of NATO’s integrated air defense system. The 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, on troop deployments, stipulates that NATO would “Carry out its collective defense and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces”. Russia would “exercise similar restraint in its conventional force deployments in Europe”. “The exchange of territories between Kosovo and Serbia would be very dangerous. The Biden administration feels a historic responsibility due to the political and human commitment of the U.S. in the region. The American-European unity is a key factor for success in the Balkans”, Miroslav Lajcak, EU special envoy for Kosovo-Serbia. ‘Un échange de territoires entre la Serbie et le Kosovo serait une idée très dangereuse’, Le Monde, 27 janvier 2021. Erdo˘gan announced military operations at Tal Rifat and Manbij in Syria and indefinitely withdrew from bilateral talks with Greece—two months

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after he and Greek PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis had agreed to improve bilateral relations and to focus on positive agenda. This policy statement—connected to the 2023 elections—is doomed to bring him—and Turkey—into conflict with both Russia and U.S. and further isolate Turkey. “We broke our High Level Strategic Council agreement with Greece. We no longer have bilateral talks with them. … We are clearing Tal Rifat and Manbij [of Syria] from terrorists. Then, step by step, we will do the same in other regions”. Erdo˘gan addressing AKP Parliamentary Group, 1 June 2022.

CHAPTER 11

Future Scenarios Hall Gardner

This concluding chapter, Future Scenarios, argues that the present “status quo” approach involving limited steps toward NATO enlargement and even slower steps toward EU membership is permitting Russia, China, and Turkey to become “spoilers”—so that conflicts stemming in part from the Russia-Ukraine war could soon widen into the Balkans and eastern Mediterranean. At the same time, in seeking to synthesize the views of those in favor of further NATO and/or EU enlargement into the western Balkans and those who are more skeptical of such a possibility, this chapter argues that the post-Cold War “open” NATO and EU enlargement approach no longer appears feasible as the EU suffers from “enlargement” fatigue (if not strong domestic opposition to further enlargement in general) and because Washington, in a time of domestic financial restraints, but apparent willingness of most Democrats and Republicans to augment defense spending, appears to be focusing more of its strategic attention on the East, due to the rising potential for war with North Korea, China, as well as with Iran, in addition to Russia.

H. Gardner (B) The American University of Paris, Paris, France e-mail: [email protected] URL: https://www.hallgardner.com © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Gardner (ed.), Geopolitical Turmoil in the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34318-6_11

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The chapter argues for an alternative more cooperative transatlantic strategy to prevent the polarization of the Balkans region as the U.S., EU, and their allies begin to face off with Russia, China, and their allies. While the U.S. and EU need to mediate Greek-Turkish conflict, in part in the effort to foster greater interstate cooperation on sustainable energy development, NATO-member Turkey in particular can play a role as mediator between Serbia and Albania, and between Serbia and Kosovo, for example, along with the U.S. and EU, among other interested states, such as the UAE, as well as non-governmental actors. The goal would be the “re-confederation” of the Balkan states—but without necessarily advocating “full” EU or NATO membership for all Balkan states—as means to counterbalance, engage, and eventually transform, relations with China, Turkey, Serbia, and then with Russia, once and if, the latter’s war with Ukraine comes to an end—in the process of forging a wider “European Political Community” or “New European Confederation.”

Hopes and Risks The near future in the western Balkans and eastern Mediterranean does offer much hope and optimism—as well as great risks. In many ways, the post-Cold War break-up of former Yugoslavia and the wars for independence in Bosnia and Kosovo, followed by the slow steps taken by the U.S., NATO, and Europeans to enter the region, have permitted China, Russia, Turkey, and the Arab Gulf states, to enter as well. Concurrently, the discovery of massive energy reserves in the eastern Mediterranean has set the grounds for either potential cooperation or conflict between Greece and Turkey, among other states (see Chapters 7, 8, 9 and 10). And while the influence of China and Russia in these two interlinked regions raises concern, Turkey’s neo-Ottoman regional ambitions, in addition to those of pan-Islamic “terrorist” movements, cannot be ignored. Much like the pre-World War I period when Ottoman Turkey moved into an alliance with Imperial Germany, Turkey represents a “wild card” that could shift to either side—even closer to Russia and/or China or closer to the U.S. and NATO, as it advances its own neo-Ottoman interests throughout the region. Whether or not China will eventually play a greater military and security role in the Balkans and eastern Europe, much like Russia, it is clear that U.S. and the EU have entered into a political economic and hightech digital and Artificial Intelligence competition with China, plus a

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geostrategic energy supply rivalry with Russia. From this perspective, there is a real risk that the disputes and conflicts in a number of regions discussed in this book could deepen, if not widen, in the coming years. This could prove true particularly if the Ukraine-Russia conflict intensifies and both regional and major powers begin to more overtly back differing political factions and socio-political movements in the Balkan states much as was the case for the Balkans before World Wars I and II—but now in very different geostrategic circumstances, with Moscow generally backing Serbia and pan-Serb goals and with the U.S./NATO and EU backing Croatia and Albania.

The Balkans and the Ukraine-Russia War On February 27, 2022, the EU High Representative Josep Borrell declared at a press conference that the EU was worried that the crisis in Ukraine might spread to the western Balkans. Tensions could begin to arise as the first wave of Ukrainian refugees arrived in Serbia, North Macedonia, and Albania, and particularly as the high costs of energy, agricultural products, fertilizer, and strategic raw materials began to augment in general due the war itself, sanctions, supply chain shortages, plus financial and commodity speculation.

Serbia For its part, the Serbian ruling coalition, led by Serbian Progressive Party (SPP), under Aleksandar Vuˇci´c, did not back the EU’s foreign policy with respect to sanctioning the Russian Federation. Belgrade did, however, support the UN General Assembly Resolution that demanded an end to Russia’s offensive in Ukraine. Serbia’s leadership has, thus far, sought to respect the principles of territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine, although it still opposes Kosovo independence as it sees Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia. At the moment, Belgrade is on the tightrope in the effort to remain neutral between the U.S./NATO and Russia, but wants to join the EU if possible, even though it had considered joining the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union, but was told by the EU in 2019 that it could not join both (see Chapter 3, this book). Another concern from Russia’s perspective is that EU membership for Serbia (given the presence of NATO in the region) may not be seen as a position of “neutrality” by Moscow.

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On the one side, most of the right-wing opposition parties, who see Russia as a historical protector, and supporter of the Serbian position toward Kosovo, oppose the imposition of sanctions on Russia and thus staged protests in support of Russia on March 4, 2022, for example. On the other side, opposition democratic parties, who see Serbia’s future as a member of the EU, are divided between those who condemn Russia (such as The Movement of Citizens of Serbia, Moramo, and Ligue of Social Democrats of Vojvodinaà) and who support EU sanctions on Russia versus those who have expressed their solidarity with Ukraine, but do not necessarily support sanctions on Russia. The fact that Serbia has become highly dependent on Russian gas imports, with thus far subsidized prices, makes it difficult for Belgrade to support sanctions on Moscow in fear of domestic opposition—if not Russian retaliation. At the same time, Serbia is potentially a source of lithium for batteries1 for the so-called “green economy” and thus it could play a role in lessening EU dependence on Russian gas and oil, thereby making the country a potential focal point of geo-economic rivalry. Here, Serbia and other Balkan states will not only need greater U.S. and EU assistance to develop new energy strategies and sources that will reduce their dependence on Russian gas and oil where possible, but also help in reducing the use of coal, while averting the risk that the polluting nature of lithium mining could help cause a popular backlash against the “green economy.” The expulsion of Serbs from Croatia, the loss of Kosovo-Metohija and of Krajina, and the loss of control over the roughly 20% over their historical hegemony in Bosnia-Herzegovina, have all led the pan-Serb movement to fear the further loss of Vojvodina and Sanjak in the near future—particularly if Russia loses the current battle over the Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics since 2022. There is thus a danger that ethno-nationalist factions in the Republika Srpska, and possibly in northern Kosovo, could, much like case for Donetsk and Luhansk in Ukraine, ask for—or be pressured by Moscow’s “sharp power” into accepting—Russian “protection.”

Bosnia and Herzegovina Along with Bosnian state authorities, the presiding member of the BiH Presidency, Željko Komši´c, strongly condemned Putin’s invasion of ˇ c, who previously Ukraine. The Croat HDZ BiH-leader, Dragan Covi´

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maintained a strong relationship with Russia and even with Putin himself, has been cautious not to directly condemn the invasion. For his part, Milorad Dodik, the Serb member of Bosnia’s tripartite presidency, and leader of the SNSD party, supported Putin’s military “interventions.” Other officials of Republika Srpska have backed Putin. Prior to the Russia-Ukraine war, the inability of UN, NATO, and the EU to fully develop Bosnia-Herzegovina under the governance of the UN Office of the High Representative (UN OHR) has already led to a major social-economic and crisis and political legitimacy crisis that has been largely caused by the failure of the UN OHR to devolve power to the local communities.2 The profound nature of this political legitimacy crisis, coupled with hikes in food and fuel prices, and financial insecurity, has led to speculation as to whether Bosnia-Herzegovina, which is still governed as a Bosniak and Croat federation along with a Serb-majority entity, Republika Srpska, can govern itself in its present territorial form or whether it should be dissolved. For its part, Moscow has sought to close the Bosnian Office of Human Rights and alter electoral laws in BiH. In the extreme, Moscow could seek to break up the Bosnian Federation by supporting pan-Serb demands3 versus what it sees as the Albanian pan-nationalist opposition particularly if its war with Ukraine continues. Due to these fears, London has called for reinforcements to its NATO mission in the western Balkans, and especially in BiH, in the effort to promote stability and counter Moscow’s disinformation campaign.4 Likewise, the EU has opted to increase the EUFOR presence in February 2022 by deploying an additional 500 troops (for a total of 1100) and to augment the visibility of military forces for deterrence purposes5 (see also Chapter 10, this book).

North Macedonia Among the western Balkans countries, North Macedonia has most strongly backed the EU sanctions policy toward Moscow in accord with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. It has closed North Macedonian airspace for Russian aircraft and has provided military assistance to Ukraine. While dependent on natural gas imports from Russia, its share of the total energy consumption of natural gas is only 9% and its trade with Russia is limited.6 On the one hand, it is dubious (unlike the case for Montenegro) that possible Russian retaliatory measures or further sanctions that cover oil

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and gas would significantly harm North Macedonia or lead to strong antiEuropean domestic opposition. On the other hand, popular support for the EU has waned given lack of strong EU backing for North Macedonia in the EU accession process (see Chapters 3, 5, and 9 this book). In addition, Bulgaria’s pan-nationalistic and revisionist influence in the country has been providing support for anti-U.S. and anti-European populist/ radical political forces in North Macedonia.

Montenegro Despite deep political and social divisions for and against Russia that have split its National Security Council, Montenegro nevertheless condemned the Russian invasion and backed EU sanctions, even if it has not necessarily carried out concrete actions to sanction Moscow. The previous ruling party Democratic Front (DF), which lost the elections in 2020, was generally seen as pro-Russian, but nevertheless attempted to sustain Montenegro’s neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. And the DF had, for example, opposed discussion as to whether Montenegro should send army units to join NATO crisis-response missions, for example. After Montenegro expelled a Russian diplomat, Viktor Antipin, in March 2022, the Kremlin added Montenegro to its list of “enemy states.” By April 2022, with the support of 45 deputies out of a total of 81, linking together pro-Serb and pro-EU parties, the Montenegro parliament approved a new minority government led by Prime Minister Dritan Abazovic. The proposed goals of the new Abazovic government—which is supported by his own Civic Movement (URA), as well as by the pro-Serbia Socialist People’s Party (SNP), the Social Democratic Party (SDP), and the national parties of Albanians, Bosniaks, and Croats—are to strengthen rule of law and fight against corruption, while engaging in sustainable investments and development, environmental protection, and accession to the EU. The dilemma, however, is that as Montenegro is an import dependent country, with Russia as its largest foreign investor (accounting for 18.3% of all direct foreign investments in 2021), the Ukraine-Russian war risks generating high inflation. And given its high dependence on tourism (25% of the GDP) the loss of Russian and Ukrainian tourists (in 2021, 21.3% of all overnight stays) is expected to significantly hurt the economy.

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Kosovo With respect to Kosovo, the difficulties in obtaining mutual recognition between Serbia and Kosovo, despite some progress in establishing the Washington economic accord brokered by the Trump administration, have likewise raised concerns that Serbia is backing the predominantly Serb population in the Northern Kosovo and that NATO is still backing the predominantly Albanian Kosovars population in the South. The situation remains tense: In late December 2022, the U.S., EU and NATO’s KFOR worked to defuse military tensions along the northern KosovoSerb border7 (see Chapters 3, 6, 8, 9 and 10, this book). Tensions flared again in May 2023 after Serbs boycotted the local northern Kosovo elections in April, thereby permitting ethnic Albanians to come into office, with roughly only 3% of the vote. In calling for restraint, France, Italy, Germany, the UK and the U.S. all condemned Kosovo’s decision to force access to municipal buildings in northern Kosovo as well as Serbia’s decision to raise the level of readiness of its armed forces at the Kosovo border. Given pan-nationalist sentiment on both sides, any further provocation could make it very difficult to quell this dispute. Russian pressures and threats during the Ukraine-Russia conflict have led Kosovo to urge NATO to put a permanent base in Kosovo and to speed the membership of the country in NATO, as argued by the Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti in response of Putin’s claims to the region8 — Kurti’s demands were backed by both Turkey and Croatia. In addition to seeking closer NATO backing, Kosovo has sought EU membership even though the membership drive has thus far stalled for all western Balkans states at least in the period before the war between Russia and Ukraine when France began to call for a slowdown of further EU expansion. Not only do Russia and China not recognize Kosovo, but neither do EU members Spain, Slovakia, Cyprus, Romania, and Greece. As argued (see Chapter 9, this book), Greek non-recognition of Kosovo remains one of the key obstacles in the full implementation of the agenda of integrating the western Balkans to all western institutions. Greece has missed plentiful opportunities to recognize Kosovo, including when the International Court of Justice, in its ruling on Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2010, explicitly differentiated Kosovo from the case of Cyprus. At the same time, it is unclear what the reactions of Serbia will be in case Greece eventually decides to follow the U.S. in recognizing Pristina.

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For their part, Paris and Berlin then made the “EU proposal”9 that stops short of mutual Kosovo-Serbia recognition, but seeks to strengthen an EU dialogue that would lead to “a legally binding agreement on comprehensive normalization of relations” so that “both parties shall mutually recognize their respective documents and national symbols, including passports, diplomas, license plates, and customs stamps.”10 On the one hand, Serbia should agree not to object to Kosovo’s membership in any international organizations while Pristina should formalize the status of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo, protect Serbian religious and cultural heritage sites, in addition to permitting “[an] appropriate level of self-management for the Serbian community in Kosovo, including the possibility for financial support by Serbia” (which was already part of the 2013 Brussels agreement between the two sides). The two sides should furthermore exchange permanent missions and support each other’s aspirations to join the EU in “the assumption that neither of the two can represent the other in the international sphere or act on its behalf.”11 In such a case, Kosovo could join the UN, UNICEF, and Interpol, even if Serbia still refuses to recognize Kosovo. It is possible, but dubious, that the 2022 Ukraine-Russia war could lead the EU to speed up the enlargement process with respect to Ukraine and Moldova, and then to Albania and North Macedonia, and possibly other states, including Kosovo. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz asserted in March 2022 that the EU should speed up the integration process.12 But whether that happens will depend, in part, on whether Balkans states can thoroughly reform and whether Russia would act as a spoiler.

Albania While the Albanian National Parliament has condemned the UkraineRussia war and fully supported EU sanctions against Russia, the war has already resulted in rising inflation and social protests that are often linked to fuel hikes. As Albanian electricity is more dependent on hydroelectric than on natural gas, however, the war should have lesser impact on its general power needs. Nevertheless, it has been feared that prices of wheat and agricultural products will soon increase if alternative import markets cannot be found. In addition, Russian and Ukrainian tourism has begun to drop.

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Interestingly, Article 8 (1) of Albania’s Constitution obliges Albania, which has been a NATO member since 2009, to protect the rights of the Albanian population outside the borders of the country, which could include those Albanians in Kosovo or elsewhere in the region. Technically, NATO should not be backing what can be considered “irredentist” claims, as all states that joined NATO are supposed to renounce such claims. Such claims could put NATO, backing Albania, in potential conflict with Serbia and other Balkan states. Yet Albania, which also possesses territorial disputes with NATO and EU member Greece, is not the only new NATO member with potentially irredentist claims, as Bulgaria, Croatia, and Hungary possess such claims, as do Greece and neo-Ottoman Turkey13 (see Chapters 2, 6, 9 and 10, this book).

Alternative Scenarios: Re-Confederation? This burgeoning regional and global rivalry in the widening gyre raises the question as to whether NATO and the EU will expand their full memberships into the region, particularly at time when the EU appears to be suffering from “enlargement” fatigue, if not strong domestic and elite opposition to further EU enlargement in general, at the same time the U.S. and NATO have been considering “burden shifting” to the Europeans in an effort to build up a more unified European defense capability.14 While the Biden administration has sought to strengthen NATO (and indirectly constrain French demands for greater European autonomy) by way of augmenting U.S. and NATO military supports for Ukraine, and thereby seeking an ostensibly cheap way to weaken or even “bleed” Russia,15 there are concerns (expressed long before President Trump came to power) that the U.S. has been overextending itself, given the additional costs of the Ukraine war, plus the real possibility that Russia will not give up, but will further militarize, and that Washington needs to shift greater degrees of the defense burden onto the EU so that the U.S. can focus more attentively on China, North Korea, and Iran—as well as on Russia in the Far East. On the one hand, the Biden administration has called for greater degrees of multilateralism, as opposed to President Trump’s more blatant America First unilateralism. On the other hand, Biden’s socalled multilateralism still represents “America-First multilateralism.” This

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is seen symbolically in Berlin’s purchase of 35 U.S. F-35 nuclear— capable fighter jets in 2022 (as opposed to Germany’s purchase of greater numbers of Future Combat Air Systems or other French/European fighter jets)16 ; the U.S. taking the lead over the Europeans in distributing advanced weaponry to Ukraine against Russia17 ; coupled with fears that the Biden Administration’s Inflation Reduction Act and laws, that are meant to increase American microchip and electric vehicle production, will shift investment and production away from the domestic industries of Britain, France, Germany as well as from Japan, South Korea, among other U.S. Allies, and toward the U.S., thereby instigating either a U.S.-EU trade war or else a general “subsidy race.”18 The danger that U.S. and European trade and subsidy tensions could lead to a refusal to cooperate strategically with respect to Russia, China, and Turkey is further magnified by the general rise in the costs of energy, agricultural products, fertilizer, and strategic raw materials largely due the Russia-Ukraine war itself, coupled with sanctions on Russia and China, supply chain shortages, plus commodity speculation. These contending issues will make it more difficult for the U.S. and Europeans to cooperate on defense (and “green” environmental) matters, and instead of building European unity, possibly risk the further break-up of the European Union after Brexit, as warned by French President Emmanuel Macron.19 What Macron seeks is a stronger EU pillar that permits the Europeans to act more autonomously from NATO. This does not necessarily mean greater defense spending by the Europeans, but greater geopolitical and defense coordination. The dilemma, however, is that Brussels does not appear sufficiently unified in terms of political governance (given apparently greater French and German disaccord after Brexit, the RussoUkraine war, and the fact that Paris has appeared to be more concerned with potential “threats” from the South than is Berlin) for new defense and security responsibilities. At the end of the Bosnian and Kosovo wars, the “ideal” scenario from the U.S.-European perspective was that NATO-EU expansion into the Balkans would help to integrate the countries of the western Balkans into a larger “cosmopolitan” Europe that downplays religious and pannationalism (but which is ironically subsumed under a pan-European project with tacit American backing). So far, however, in part due to the fact that NATO and EU enlargement was largely uncoordinated, most Balkan states remain in a post-Cold War vacuum, in which most are not members of the EU while a few are only partially in NATO.

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And while NATO membership is still pending for some Balkan states, EU membership of western Balkan countries is not expected before 2030 at best. In February 2020, the European Commission adopted a new enlargement methodology, based on its 4 key principles: “gradual association, stringent conditions, tangible benefits and reversibility.” Here, given growing dissatisfaction within the European Union, the EU has appeared to be halting the widening of its membership so as to concentrate on “deepening” its political economic structures after Brexit and the political challenges to Brussels from Poland and Hungary and others who have challenged EU values and directives by moving in an authoritarian direction, and in part due to the fact that many prospective new members have not transcended their status as corrupt “captured states.” (See further discussion, this chapter).

The Open Balkan Initiative As a possible step toward EU membership, the October 2019 Open Balkan initiative or a “mini-Schengen zone” has been proposed. This initiative is intended to open national borders without restrictions and provide a larger economic zone for free trade and travel throughout the Balkans. It has been supported by Serbia, and NATO members, North Macedonia and Albania; yet Montenegro, Kosovo, and BiH have not yet joined at the time of this writing. The initiative appears to have great potential and if properly developed, it could help to improve regional confidence and security through economic cooperation20 (see also Chapters 3, 9 and 10, this book). The Open Balkans Initiative could also help to forge a “re-confederation” of the Balkans. For his part, Serbian President Aleksandar Vuˇci´c has supported the Open Balkan initiative in what he argues will prove a step toward EU membership. Vuˇci´c won the presidential election again in April 2022; he has affirmed that he will continue his policy of aiming for EU membership, while concurrently expanding energy ties with Russia despite EU calls to reduce dependence on Russia in the aftermath of Putin’s intervention in Crimea. On January 1, 2021, regardless of EU criticism, Vuˇci´c presided over the ceremonial opening of the Serbian section of the Russia-led BalkanStream natural gas pipeline that is linked to TurkStream.21

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In addition to some EU opposition to the Open Balkan initiative, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina have refused to join Open Balkans for fear that Serbia would obtain most of the free trade benefits if the plan was not well structured. Kosovo has also been opposed to the initiative for fear it will privilege the economic interests of Kosovar Serbs over Kosovar Albanians.22 BiH and Montenegro have also said they see no particular benefits from the Open Balkans initiative in that it parallels the wider CEFTA trade agreement between countries in South-East Europe (SEE), while Kosovo has sought an improved version of the CEFTA agreement.23 While some argue that the Open Balkan membership should help Balkan states obtain EU membership by better integrating the region, others see it as a means to assert Serb hegemony. The plan has also been criticized for opening the door to human trafficking, smuggled narcotics, cigarettes, and other criminal activities. Critics have argued that the Open Balkan initiative is “not designed to compel Serbia to adopt EU standards on democratic practices, media freedom, and rule of law, nor curtail its regionally destabilizing role”.24

The U.S., Serbia, and the Open Balkans By contrast with the critics, the Biden administration appears to believe the Open Balkan initiative could help draw Serbian President Vuˇci´c away from his strong ties with China and Russia. In his discussions with President Biden, in part in an effort to downplay threats to support Bosnian Serb secession from Bosnia Herzegovina, Vuˇci´c has asserted that Serbia has no interest in a “greater Serbia,” but only a stronger economy, and the hope of joining the EU.25 Serbia has also sought closer relations with NATO through NATO’s Partnership for Peace, but claims not to want to join any military bloc. On the U.S. side, the Biden administration has stated that it will support Serbia’s quest for EU membership (in a situation in which the expansion of EU membership has thus far been put on hold)—but only if Serbia takes “necessary reforms” and reaches “a comprehensive normalization agreement with Kosovo centered on mutual recognition.”26 So far, Belgrade has opposed U.S. demands that it recognize Kosovo “independence”27 despite economic normalization talks and the signing of the Washington Agreement between Kosovo and Serbia in 2020 that promises to assist refugees and displaced persons, protect

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minority rights and religious freedom, and renew interfaith communication. The latter agreement offers U.S. financial development for road and rail infrastructure, in part to counter Chinese and Russian investments.28 If strongly backed by the U.S., this approach provides an alternative to traditional concepts of NATO and EU full membership. Yet if the Open Balkan initiative is to prove viable, then U.S. policy must be better coordinated with the EU in the effort to bring Serbia and other Balkan states somewhat closer to EU standards and to settle the Kosovo question. Here, even if an essentially landlocked Kosovo eventually became “independent,” it would still need to make trade deals, border arrangements, access to the sea, and agree to the mutual protection of minority groups with its neighbors. Kosovo could possibly implement joint systems of security in working with neighbors, Serbia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Albania, with strong security assurances from the UN, the EU, and NATO’s Partnership for Peace, as well as from Turkey, but not full NATO membership. And much like non-EU members Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway, countries of the western Balkans, including Serbia and Kosovo, could all adopt the rules governing the common market. A more unified Balkans could then begin to counterbalance Russian, Chinese, and Turkish influence in finding common political economic standards—until an eventual U.S.-EU rapprochement with Turkey, China, and ultimately Russia proves possible—once and if the RussiaUkraine war winds down.

Turkey, Greece, and the Russian Invasion of Ukraine In turning to the eastern Mediterranean, Greece fully condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine and has supplied Kyiv with Kalashnikov rifles and ammunition. Despite close historical and cultural ties to Russia, the majority of political parties opposed the invasion, but have proposed different policies to deal with Moscow while fearing the drop in Russian and Ukrainian tourism. Greece has begun to further augment its naval capabilities in an effort to deter a possible war with Turkey, which is also upgrading its fleet, over territorial waters and rights to exploit undersea energy and mineral wealth. In opposing Greek claims since the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, the Turkish president Recyp Erdo˘gan has claimed islands (such as Lesbos, Chios, Samos, Icaria, Lemnos, and Samothrace) as part of Turkey’s “Blue

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Homeland” and that generally possess large deposits of natural gas and petroleum (see Chapters 8, 9, and 10, this book). Nevertheless, despite the apparent rise in geo-economic tensions, the Russia-Ukraine conflict could possibly bring the two sides to cooperate more extensively, as hoped by the meeting between President Erdo˘gan and Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis in March 2022 that focused on bilateral relations and the Russia-Ukraine conflict. While disputes over Cyprus and Libya remain, issues discussed included how to reach $10 billion trade volume target, while also reaching compromises over the Aegean disputes, minorities, the struggle against “terrorism”, as well as irregular immigration.29 In backing the U.S. and NATO, and in support of Ukraine, Turkey refused to recognize Moscow’s annexation of Crimea. Ankara has sold drone weaponry to Ukraine (the Bayraktar TB2 uninhabited combat aerial vehicles) to use against Russian forces in Ukraine (while Iran has supplied Moscow with drones as well). Turkish drones had proved very effective against Armenian forces (backed weakly by Moscow) in the 2021–2023 war versus Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh. On the one hand, Ankara has closed its straits linking the Mediterranean and Black Sea to warships by invoking 1936 Montreux Convention’s wartime provisions. This means the movements of Russian warships and submarines into and out of the Black Sea can be effectively controlled by Ankara so that Turkey also has the potential to undermine the Russian military presence in Syria and the eastern Mediterranean.30 Ankara, for example, closed its airspace to Russia in April 2022, no longer permitting Moscow to support the Syrian government operations in southern Idlib with its air force. At the same time, Ankara’s decision to enforce the Montreux Convention limits NATO’s ability to deploy warships in the Black Sea, leading the Pentagon to expand its use of the northern Greek port of Alexandroupolis that now represents an energy hub and alternative land transport route to Turkey and the Balkan region. By offering to mediate between Russia and Ukraine in their conflict, Erdo˘gan has hoped to rebuild his own and Turkey’s international reputation as a regional peacemaker during the years when Ankara had engaged in a foreign policy dedicated to “zero problems with its neighbors” (including the Kurds) under Foreign Minister/ Prime Minister Ahmet Davuto˘glu. This was before Erdo˘gan’s drive toward authoritarianism and his repressive crackdown against those suspected of supporting the July 2016 “Gulenist” coup.

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Although the U.S., as the major arms supplier to Kyiv, has most weight in the dispute between the U.S. and Russia over Ukraine, Ankara can nevertheless try to prevent the conflict from destabilizing the Black Sea region. The July 22, 2022 grain accord between Russia and Ukraine that was negotiated by Turkey, along with the UN, has indicated that even in the midst of war, that steps toward a multilateral “peace and sustainable development community” are possible and not utopian. This important step helps reduce world grain shortages, but it obviously did not put an end to the conflict and needs to be sustained by the concerted international efforts of Turkey and those countries most directly impacted to try to prevent a wider and deeper destabilization of the global political economy. At the same time, the U.S., EU, Ukraine and Russia must soon engage in real diplomacy to put an end to the conflict. Given the fact that both the Blue Stream and Turkish Stream pipelines flow from Russia into Turkey, Turkey did not join U.S. and EU economic sanctions against Russia, and sees Turkish-Russia bilateral ties as a profitable opportunity for Turkish firms (along with Chinese firms) to replace American, British, and European firms in Russia. Moscow has thus continued to trade with Turkey, while constructing a major nuclear power plant that is purportedly to be protected by radar and Russian S-400 surface-to-air missiles. Moscow has also acquired rights to build commercial ports that can be possibly used as a forward base to meet the logistical needs of Russian naval vessels in the Mediterranean. Erdo˘gan reportedly pledged not to challenge these plans for Russian naval access to the port of Mersin—even though those plans were not approved by the Turkish parliament.31 Ankara’s efforts to play NATO versus Moscow have evidently not put it on good terms with Washington. In response to Turkish purchases of Russian military equipment, such as the S-400, seen as threatening NATO defense and communications capabilities, the U.S. had expelled Ankara from participating in the lucrative (and overpriced) the F-35 combat aircraft program and imposed Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA 231) sanctions in December 2020.32 Washington has now offered Ankara an ostensibly second-best option to buy U.S. F-16 fighter jets, while the U.S. Congress has demanded stronger guarantees from Turkey that it will respect Greek airspace and U.S. interests in northern Syria—in an effort to check Turkish threats against Syrian Kurds, Christians, and Yezidi before Congress approves the sale of F-16s.

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In response, Erdo˘gan threatened to block Swedish, but also Finnish, membership applications to NATO ostensibly due to their alleged sponsorship of Kurdish partisans seen as “terrorists” opposed to Turkey.33 While Ankara eventually dropped its opposition to Finnish membership in NATO, it appears dubious that Turkey can overcome its current economic crisis without U.S. and European financial supports, Erdo˘gan will do most anything to assure his political survival, even if that means turning to Russia and China, as well as countries such as Iran and Venezuela. At the same time, Turkey’s ability to talk to both Russia and Ukraine, its positive relations with both Serbia and Albania, plus Ankara’s apparent willingness to negotiate with both Greece and Israel, can both help to counterbalance the interests of Russia and China and benefit Balkan and eastern Mediterranean cooperation, while its control over the Dardanelles and the Bosporus straits concurrently gives it leverage versus both the U.S. and Russia. This factors make Turkey a key geo-strategic actor that requires close U.S. and EU attention.

The Question of China While Russia poses a potential threat given its role in providing states in these two regions security and defense supports, China is a significant political economic influence in the Balkans and eastern Mediterranean, and is beginning to assert its own political military interests in both regions as it did in the case of FYROM in 1999. As China begins to assert its global geostrategic interests along the Silk Road, in Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia as well as Myanmar (to whose junta Belgrade, Moscow, and Beijing have all sold arms34 ), Beijing could likewise strengthen defense sales and military ties to Hungary, Greece, North Macedonia, and to Serbia, to which it significantly sold its FK-3 air defense surface-toair missile system.35 And if China begins to align more closely with Russia, and/or begins to secure, if not militarize, its control of significant maritime ports, it could expand its defense ties to Balkan and eastern Mediterranean states given its political-economic interests and presence in key areas of energy, infrastructure, and finance. Interestingly, while the potential for a stronger military and security role for China in the region appears to be growing, China’s strong political economic ties to both Serbia and Albania could possibly lead Beijing press for the eventual UN Security Council recognition of Kosovo (see Chapter 3, this book). And despite China’s refusal to recognize Kosovo as an independent state, given Beijing’s present unwillingness to oppose

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Moscow’s interests, Kosovo has thus far refused to recognize Taiwan’s independence.36 The latter strategy could represent a bid for Kosovo to obtain greater diplomatic and financial support from Beijing for its quest for “independence.” Yet it concurrently permits Beijing to obtain greater influence in Serbia, Albania, Kosovo, North Macedonia, as well as in Hungary and Greece, thus strengthening the hand of China in the region.

Options for the Eastern Mediterranean In the eastern Mediterranean, both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy should seek to implement a joint sustainable development/joint sovereignty approach to all disputes between Greece and Turkey over energy resources, financial arrangements for sharing gas revenue, migration, and maritime delimitation, plus the development of decentralized green energy alternatives, such as solar, wind, geothermal, accompanied by a resolution to the Cyprus dispute. On the one hand, the U.S. has begun a rapprochement with Ankara due to Turkey’s strategic position in controlling the Straits and in fear of deeper Russian and Chinese penetration of the country. On the other, Turkey appears to be trying to make amends. In this regard, after backing the Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt and elsewhere, especially during the so-called “Arab Spring” movement in 2011, Erdo˘gan has been seen as working to improve relations with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, as well as with Egypt and Greece, in large part in his successful bid to be reelected by means of attempting to alleviate the severe economic crisis facing Turkey.37 In general, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Israel have thus far responded positively to Ankara’s outreach.38 Turkish goals, however, are not very clear and it is not certain Erdo˘gan can use the war in Ukraine to manipulate Russian and U.S. policies to his favor. Moreover, the prospects of a Cyprus peace settlement, especially on the basis of a bizonal and bicommunal federation, do not seem feasible in the near future following the election in October 2020 of Ersin Tatar, who strongly supports a “two-state solution,” as the new leader of the Turkish-Cypriot community, and whose position is backed by Turkey’s president Erdo˘gan.39 How will an alienated and sanctioned Moscow react to a possible new plan for Cyprus in the UN Security Council? Will China support such a new plan for a “unified” Cyprus? And what about Greece and the EU?

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In arguing that priority should be given to interconnecting the electricity grids of countries in the region, coupled with presumed environmental concerns over the use of natural gas, the Biden administration announced in January 2022 that it would rescind its support for the Greece–Cyprus–Israel EastMed pipeline. The latter pipeline has been opposed by Turkey as a threat to its gas-exploration and maritime rights in the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey sees itself, and not Greek Cyprus, as the only viable route for Israeli gas sales to Europe and argued that normalization could lead to a greater energy cooperation.40 Given the pressure on Europe to find alternatives to Russian gas imports, an IsraeliTurkish-Greek rapprochement could open the door to investments in new pipeline routes. In working with Greece and Turkey, U.S. and EU strategy needs to look for areas where both sides can agree to a de-escalation of tensions, while helping to shape Turkey’s new relationship with the European Union. Here, Ankara needs to reengage diplomatically with the PKK and Syrian Kurdish factions. With U.S. backing, the EU and Turkey should launch negotiations for the modernization of the EU-Turkey Customs Union, which should likewise address the issue re-packaging the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement. What is needed is a multilateral regional conference/ mediation dealing with Greek–Turkish relations that finds ways to engage in maritime delimitation, joint sustainable development of energy resources, financial arrangements for sharing gas revenue, and to deal jointly with migration issues, among other concerns. It is also crucial that Turkey, Greece, the U.S., and EU manage the migration challenge in Europe’s southeastern borders under the condition that there will be a sustained mutually agreed de-escalation of tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. Here, the U.S. and EU should engage with Turkey and Greece, among other regional powers, in joint sustainable development projects, based on the post-World War II precedent of the European Coal and Steel Community, in the eastern Mediterranean and MENA regions that would be intended, in part, to restrict waves of migrants where possible, while concurrently working together for the same purposes in Central America and the Caribbean. Such a joint U.S.-EU project would likewise seek to better channel Russian and Chinese political economic influence in both the Americas and the Euro-Mediterranean while seeking to defuse military tensions where possible.41

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The Future? As Homo Geopoliticus enters a new period of “Great Power Competition,”42 much depends upon whether the 2022 Russia-Ukraine war remains limited to Ukraine, or whether that war proves to be Phase 1 of a series of U.S.-European-Russian conflicts that could draw states of the western Balkans and eastern Mediterranean, among other possible regions, including North and South Korea, China and Taiwan, into more direct conflict. It is essential that the U.S. and Europeans look to resolve as many as regional conflicts as possible in order to prevent the global system from polarizing into rival alliances in which the U.S., NATO, and the Europeans, plus Japan and Australia intensify their rivalry against a newly forged “Axis” of Russia and a rising China, plus their “partners” that could include North Korea, Iran, if not Serbia, and possibly, the wild cards, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, among others. On the one hand, in the most negative scenario, Russia, China, and Turkey could play a role of rival “spoilers”—particularly given interethnic and “civilizational” strife in Bosnia and Herzegovina, plus anti-U.S. and anti-NATO sentiment in Serbia, north Kosovo, and in Montenegro and in opposition to Albanian and Macedonian hopes to enter the EU. Russia, Turkey (and possibly China behind the scenes) could more strongly support rival ethno-nationalist or Islamist parties against the U.S. and EU interests in the Balkan region, while Turkey and Greece continue to face off militarily in the eastern Mediterranean depending in large part upon the nature U.S. and EU relations with Istanbul.43 (See critique of Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” in Chapters 6 and 10. The danger in this negative scenario is that the rise of conflicting ethno-nationalist and religious “civilizational” socio-political movements will augment demands for either changing or trading borders in the effort to place as many members as possible of one particular ethnic or religious identity into one state. The states of Serbia and Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina (plus other Slavophile and pro-Russian Orthodox communities), backed by Russia, could then forge a counter-alliance versus the generally pro-U.S./NATO and pro-European countries of Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia. For its part, Montenegro, although a NATO member, represents a pivot state with large pro-Russian Serbian community that could potentially shift sides or else splinter the country.

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If ethno-nationalist and religious pan-“civilizational” socio-political movements do come to power, the U.S. and Europeans could find themselves confronted with Churchill’s realpolitik dilemma that resulted in the so-called “percentages agreement” or what Churchill himself called his “Naughty Document” with Stalin that impacted Anglo-Soviet relations in the Balkans.44 While Churchill was concerned that the Americans would oppose the deal as granting spheres of influence to Moscow, that deal (that was supposed to be temporary until an expected international conference decided differently), turned out to be fairly accurate: Britain dominated the vital Sea Lines of Communication with Greece (90% British, 10% Soviet) while Yugoslavia was divided 50–50, as a neutral country. In short, diplomatic realpolitik with a neo-Stalinist Putin or authoritarian leaders such as Turkey’s Erdo˘gan and China’s Xi Jinping, along with other Balkan state leaderships, might eventually be considered, for better or for worse. This, in effect, would mean choosing “less” threatening dictators and human rights abusers on “our” side versus “more” threatening dictators on “their” side. A possible partition of Ukraine as part of a diplomatic settlement to the 2022 Ukraine-Russia war might also represent such a realpolitik approach—but dubiously a long-lasting one— in order to prevent U.S., NATO, and Russian conflict from widening into the Balkans and elsewhere—and assuming the Russia-Ukraine war does not eventually draw NATO and Russia into direct confrontation. A second option is for the U.S., NATO, and EU to more strongly renew their pursuit of bringing the western Balkans into full NATO and EU membership in the face of Russian geo-political and military pressures as well as Chinese geo-political economic influence. Yet the first dilemma with this NATO-EU approach is that the extent of domestic corruption and “state capture” raises questions as to whether many Balkan states should even be accepted as “full” members of the EU or NATO in the first place, not to overlook the major political economic challenges for these states to enter the EU. As it takes time to eliminate mafias and corruption even in advanced European states, such as Italy, it appears very dubious that NATO and EU membership can magically put an end to corruption in the Balkans in short order, particularly given the fact that the “Balkan Route” for heroin and opiates to fill European drug demand from Afghanistan is one of the most important in the world—not to overlook significant arms, illegal

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migration and sex trafficking through the same region45 (see also Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6, this book). U.S. State Department efforts to expose major degrees of corruption, for example, have moreover appeared to backfire in political terms in the case of Albanian former Prime Minister Sali Berisha who had brought the country into NATO (see Chapter 7, this book). In the eastern Mediterranean, efforts to bring down Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on charges of corruption have backfired as Netanyahu returned to power in 2023 as head of an even more extreme right-wing coalition government that has sought to expand Israeli settlements into Palestinian claimed territories.46 This is not to overlook the extreme difficulties involved in bringing in Ukraine, Moldova, and other post-Soviet states into the European Union, if not Ukraine and Georgia into NATO, as full members anytime in the near future given their apparently endemic corruption.47 The point raised here is that the U.S., EU, and NATO must not ignore corrupt situations of “state capture” in the Balkans and eastern Europe, while they need to better practice what they themselves preach.48 On a deeper level, it not clear NATO and the EU possess the resources and political will to handle the complexities of the Balkans. Given the conflicting nature of irredentist claims of the differing national, ethnic, and religious groups in the region, the drawing of boundary lines by NATO and EU members can become divisive as different political factions dispute the strategic, political, and economic ramifications of NATO and EU membership. A major dilemma is that membership in NATO or the EU does not necessarily prevent states from pursuing irredentist policies given the reality that national group identities spill over state boundaries (see Chapter 2, this book). NATO and EU membership for Greece and NATO membership for Turkey has not prevented war between the two countries, nor an ongoing arms race. Moreover, it is dubious that the complex interwoven social, economic, and political issues confronting the Balkans can be handled within the framework of traditional “nation-state” models. Other forms of governance such as federation, confederation, and joint sovereignty should be considered. Toward the “Re-Confederation” of the Balkans It is in the latter perspective that the U.S. and EU should encourage local and popular participation in major decisions so that the political leaders of the Balkans themselves, working together, can build a better

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future for the Balkans, by bringing these states as close to general U.S. and EU standards as possible. A “re-confederation” of the Balkans can be implemented if the U.S. and EU help the Balkan states and populations to help themselves. Despite calls to speed up EU enlargement to Ukraine and Moldova due to Russia’s war with Ukraine, the concerns with the difficulties in integrating even older members of the EU after Brexit, will most likely continue to slow down the whole EU (and NATO) enlargement process. While it is feared that slowing down NATO and EU enlargement could create a strategic vacuum in the region that could then be filled by Russia and China, if not by Turkey, that vacuum could also be filled by new, stronger, more coordinated, forms of U.S. and EU transatlantic cooperation and development assistance that would seek to build up the region as a more integrated whole. In this regard, the U.S. and EU will need to mediate relations among the Balkan states themselves and vis-a-vis Russia, China, and Turkey so as to prevent the polarization of the region between essentially pro-Serb, pro-Orthodox factions vs. pro-Albanian, pro-Muslim, and pro-Croat factions. Assuming the Balkan states can soon begin to unify sufficiently in a general agreement to counterbalance the major and regional power influence of the U.S., Europeans, Russia, China, and Turkey as a larger unit, then a “re-confederation” of ex-Yugoslav states might be possible, but in a looser and a less centralized and less authoritarian manner than the former “neutral” Yugoslavia established by force under Marshall Tito after World War II. In this perspective, the U.S., France, Germany, Italy, and other interested EU members could recommit themselves to stronger transatlantic cooperation in helping to build up the political and economic and defense unity of the western Balkans.49 This means that the U.S. and EU will need to more than counterbalance, but also thoroughly engage, and then eventually transform, relations with “authoritarian” and “corrupt” states. On one side, the U.S. and EU will need to take the lead in mediating disputes between Greece and Turkey over a divided Cyprus, and energy and islands in the eastern Mediterranean. On the other, backed by the U.S. and EU, Turkey will need to help conclude a rapprochement between Serbia and Albania while seeking mutual recognition between Serbia and Kosovo, in the effort to “re-confederate” the Balkans.

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The U.S. and EU could then help the Balkan states as a whole come to terms with Russia and China from a position of greater political economic unity and strength by trying to mitigate the influence of the latter two powers where possible. This means counter-balancing and channeling the burgeoning geo-political economic interests of China through joint international investment in infrastructure projects in the Danube basin, for example. And, in the aftermath of the Russian intervention in Ukraine in February 2022, the U.S. and EU also need to take stronger steps to counter-balance the Russian monopoly over energy supplies and transit routes through the Three Seas Initiative or else diversify energy suppliers, including the Arab Gulf states, Algeria, Norway, Azerbaijan, and the U.S, as well as from potential sources in the Ionian-Adriatic and eastern Mediterranean. (see Chapter 8). This should not mean eliminating Russian and Chinese interests altogether, but mitigating their influence through the EU’s new approach of “de-risking”, for example, as opposed to fully “de-coupling” relations with rival powers. Implementing a transatlantic strategy of “balancing engagement” visà-vis Turkey, China, and eventually Russia (see Chapter 9) could work if all sides are willing to compromise in areas that are not considered “vital” or in areas in which the strategic, economic, ecological, cultural, and religious importance can be redefined through bilateral and multilateral negotiation/ mediation. Such a peacemaking approach can be achieved through the UN-backed Contact Group formats50 or else through behind-the-scenes bilateral and multilateral diplomacy intended to build new forms of security and sustainable development. Here, for example, the U.S. and EU could assist the Three Seas Initiative as a means to support greater Balkan political economic integration, while concurrently seeking out political economic and energy compromises with Turkey, and eventually Russia, where possible. Another option is for the U.S. and EU to more strongly pursue a Danube strategy of development that seeks to protect the environment, while strengthening and better connecting infrastructure and trade among all the countries along the Danube river basin, so as to provide alternatives to China’s BRI, or at least lessen Beijing’s financial influence.51 Greater economic integration could help stop the brain drain that is taking place because of weak economic growth and a lack of political stability. The region is projected to lose more than half of its citizens in the next two decades.52

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In his May 9, 2022 speech at the Conference on Europe’s Future in Strasbourg, French President Macron called for a wider “European Political Community” that would extend beyond present EU membership.53 As it appears unlikely that the EU will take steps to rapidly expand its full membership, such a Community or Confederation could nevertheless permit states now outside of the EU to find a new space for political cooperation in issues involving alternative approaches to security, energy, transport, investment, infrastructure, ecology, sustainable development, and the migration of people. Such a new European Political Community or New European Confederation could possibly include Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and the Balkans as a unified whole. As opposed to being full members of the European Union or NATO, these states could form a loose “confederation” that would be backed in politically, economically and militarily by the U.S. and EU. Such a “community” or “confederation” would be neutral and would eventually, depending on the political outcome of the ongoing war over Ukraine, seek out peace accords with Russia and its neighbors in cooperation with the U.S., NATO and the EU. In such way, the Balkan states, possibly including Turkey as well, could become “associate” members of the EU. These states would not, however, obtain “full” EU membership and voting rights. The issue of voting rights based on the size of the national population, combined with the complex nature of EU voting procedures, such as qualified majority voting versus consensual decision-making processzs, has plagued the EU decision-making process. (EU voting procedures have blocked Kosovo’s EU membership goals, for example, see Chapter 3). These factors make present EU member states less willing to accept potential new members that could alter the balance of power and interests within the EU—as states with large populations (i.e. Turkey and Ukraine) that would possess more votes than many EU members could challenge the votes of major powers such as France and Germany, as could coalitions of less populated EU member states. As the details of EU membership discussions evolve, perhaps states could obtain limited voting rights not related to population size through a new form of “associate membership” in cooperation with a differentiated European Union.54 The establishment of a wider “European Political Community” or preferably called a “New European Confederation”—that could work to “re-confederate” the Balkans and other eastern European states into a more “neutral” and non-threatening polity—depends to a large extent on

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whether Russia and Ukraine can reach a point where neither side is willing to continue their struggle and that some form of Russia-Ukraine peace accord can then be implemented that is generally accepted as “legitimate” by all sides despite the evident injustices caused by that horrific war. If, however, a possible negative post-war Russia-Ukraine “peace settlement” results in a highly instable “frozen conflict” or, even more pessimistically, if the war over Ukraine continues to widen to new areas from the “new Near East” to the Far East, then the greater the chance that the U.S., NATO, China, and Russia would begin to more directly clash in the ideological formation of rival “democratic” vs. “authoritarian” alliances, thereby polarizing the Balkan states. To prevent the latter negative scenarios, it is crucial that the U.S. and EU, plus as many mediators as possible, including Greece, Turkey, and Israel, in addition to China, France, India, Brazil, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, among others, all attempt to reach out to Moscow—whether Putin remains in power or not—in order to eventually bring Russia into new association with Europe and with a new Balkans as well—so as to prevent a spirit of hatred and vengeance from dividing the international body politic in the troubled and dangerous years to come.

Notes 1. “‘It’s [Not] Over’: The Past, and Present, of Lithium Mining in Serbia,” (2022) Balkan Insight, April 13, 2022. https://balkaninsight.com/ 2022/04/13/its-not-over-the-past-and-present-of-lithium-mining-in-ser bia/. 2. The complex constitutional structure of BiH stemming from the Dayton Peace Agreement is still highly dysfunctional and inefficient. The country of 3.5 million people has 13 constitutions, 14 legal systems and 152 ministries. Its public sector is oversized and underfunded and plagued by corruption. There is a high unemployment rate (27%); as youth unemployment stands at 62.7% many are migrating, and the aging population with a negative birth rate has shrunk from 4.3 million to an estimated 3.5million. Mirela Grünther-Ðeˇcevi´c, “A Never-Ending Accession Process? Bosnia and Herzegovina and the EU,” Green European Journal (August 24, 2017). https://www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu/a-never-ending-accessionprocess-bosnia-and-herzegovinas-long-road-to-the-eu/. 3. In Bosnia, when Milorad Dodik advocated for the secession of the Serb-controlled parts of the country, Berlin then announced that it would freeze e120 million worth of infrastructure projects in Bosnia’s

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4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11. 12.

13. 14.

Serb regions. And London announced sanctions in April 2022 against Dodik, including a travel ban, for undermining the region’s stability. Andi Hoxhaj, “ Russia’s Influence in the Balkans is Growing Just as the Region’s Fragile Peace is Threatened,” The Conversation (July 20, 2022). https://www.other-news.info/russias-influence-in-the-balkans-isgrowing-just-as-the-regions-fragile-peace-is-threatened/. NATO and EU member Croatia has backed the ethno-nationalist Bosnian Croat leader ˇ c. Kurt Bassuener and Toby Vogel, “Bosnia’s Dangerous Path Dragan Covi´ How U.S. Policy Is Making a Bad Situation Worse,” Foreign Affairs (May 18, 2022). Andi Hoxhaj, “ Russia’s Influence in the Balkans is Growing Just as the Region’s Fragile Peace is Threatened,” The Conversation (July 20, 2022). https://www.other-news.info/russias-influence-in-the-balkans-isgrowing-just-as-the-regions-fragile-peace-is-threatened/. EWB, “EUFOR to Deploy Additional 500 Personnel to BiH,” European Western Balkans (February 24, 2022). https://europeanwesternbalkans. com/2022/02/24/eufor-to-deploy-additional-500-personnel-to-bih/. Degordian. http://www.degordian.com, and Elena Petkovska, “Western Balkans: Reactions and Implications of the Russian Aggression of Ukraine,” BiEPAG (March 11, 2022). https://biepag.eu/blog/westernbalkans-reactions-and-implications-of-the-russian-aggression-of-ukraine/. “What’s Behind the Tensions between Kosovo and Ethnic Serbs? – DW – 12/27/2022,” Dw.com (n.d..) https://www.dw.com/en/whats-behindthe-tensions-between-kosovo-and-ethnic-serbs/a-64093299. “Make Membership Easier, Kosovo PM Tells NATO, EU,” France 24 (March 8, 2022). https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220308make-membership-easier-kosovo-pm-tells-nato-eu. Marina Vulovi´c, “The Normalisation of Relations between Kosovo and Serbia,” Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (March 15, 2023). https:// www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2023C17/. Rikard Jozwiak, “The Conundrum Of Kosovo’s EU Application,” RFE/ RL Wider Europe. https://mailchi.mp/d3f08c0151b8/wider-europe-bri efing-more-sanctions-on-russia-belarus-more-cash-for-kyiv-489810?e=d13 5283f69. Rikard Jozwiak, op. Cit. “Borrell Says North Macedonia’s EU Accession Process Should Start as Soon as Possible,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty (n.d.). https://www. rferl.org/a/macedonia-eu-accession-borrell/31752298.html. Hall Gardner, Dangerous Crossroads (Praeger 1997). “Reconfiguring NATO: The Case for Burden Shifting,” Defense Priorities (n.d.). Accessed January 21, 2023. https://www.defensepriorities. org/explainers/reconfiguring-nato-the-case-for-burden-shifting.

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15. Tom Stevenson, “America and Its Allies Want to Bleed Russia. They Really Shouldn’t,” New York Times (May 11, 2022). https://www.nyt imes.com/2022/05/11/opinion/russia-ukraine-war-america.html. See also, Trita Parsi, “No, Weakening Russia Is Not “Costing Peanuts” for the U.S.” (January 20, 2023). The Soap Box. https://newrepublic. com/article/170088/cost-ukraine-war-weakening-russia?mc_cid=a9bf20 847e&mc_eid=68a7808f85. 16. “Germany to Buy Dozens of U.S. Fighter Jets in Spending Spree.” France 24 (March 14, 2022). https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/ 20220314-germany-to-buy-dozens-of-us-fighter-jets-in-spending-spree. 17. “Arms Transfers to Ukraine,” Forum on the Arms Trade (n.d.). https:// www.forumarmstrade.org/ukrainearms.html. 18. Olivier Knox and Caroline Anders, “Europe’s not happy with Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act” (January 17, 2023). https://www.washingto npost.com/politics/2023/01/17/europe-not-happy-with-bidens-inflat ion-reduction-act/. 19. Olivier Knox and Caroline Anders, “Europe’s Not Happy with Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act” (January 17, 2023). https://www.washingto npost.com/politics/2023/01/17/europe-not-happy-with-bidens-inflat ion-reduction-act/. These factors could also result in a lack of political military coordination within NATO as well—if the latter cannot permit the EU greater power and responsibility sharing coupled with “burden shifting” so that the Europeans themselves define how to deal with Moscow, what kind of weaponry to provide Kyiv, what kind of pressures and sanctions to place on Russia, for example. 20. The Open Balkan initiative started as an economic and political zone of Albania, North Macedonia, and Serbia with the aim of improving political and economic relations and strengthen cultural ties between the three nations. BiH participated in the September 2022 Open Balkan summit in Belgrade, but Montenegro and Kosovo remain out of it. 21. “Serbian President Opens Key Section of Russia-Led Balkan Pipeline,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty (n.d.). Accessed January 21, 2023. https://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-vucic-balkan-stream-natural-gas-pipelineopening/31029293.html?ltflags=mailer. 22. Burcu Ozcelik, “Turkey Eyes Opportunity for Geopolitical Realignment in Ukraine Crisis,” IISS (n.d.). https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2022/ 02/turkey-opportunity-geopolitical-realignment-ukraine-crisis. 23. Samir Kajosevic, “Montenegro Being Urged to Join ‘Risky’ Open Balkan Initiative: Analyst,” Balkan Insight (January 18, 2022). https://balkan insight.com/2022/01/18/montenegro-being-urged-to-join-risky-openbalkan-initiative-analyst/.

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24. Kurt Bassuener, “U.S. Focus on ‘Open Balkan’ Economic Project Risks Open Season Instead,” Just Security (November 11, 2021). https:// www.justsecurity.org/79176/us-focus-on-open-balkan-economic-projectrisks-open-season-instead/. 25. Todd Prince, “Serbian Leader Talks Up Ties to Biden, Says ‘No Interest’ in ‘Greater Serbia,’” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty (n.d.). Accessed January 21, 2023. https://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-vucic-us-ties-biden-gre ater-serbia/31217926.html. 26. Blerim Reka, “The Biden Presidency and Its Impact on the Western Balkans,” Western Balkans (March 10, 2021). 27. Mladen Lakic, “Bosnia Should Recognise Crimea as Russian, Says Dodik,” Balkan Insight (November 20, 2018). https://balkaninsight.com/2020/ 02/15/bosnian-serb-leader-repeats-demand-for-secession-referendum/. 28. The Washington Agreement includes a U.S.-brokered rail and roadway between the capitals and a rail line to a deep-sea port on the Adriatic, thereby providing both Kosovo and Serbia with access to the sea. These Serb-Kosovo deals were to be financed by the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation and Export– Import Bank. Matthew Holroyd; Sofía Sánchez, “Western Balkan Leaders Plot their Own ‘Mini-Schengen’ Zone,” Euronews, November 11, 2019. https://www.euronews.com/2019/11/11/western-balkan-lea ders-plot-their-own-mini-schengen-zone. 29. TRT world Now (@TRTWorldNow), “Talks between Türkiye’s President Erdogan & Greek PM Mitsotakis” (March 13, 2022). https://twitter. com/TRTWorldNow/status/1503014034756493312. 30. “Turkey’s Black Sea Warning May Impact Syria More than Ukraine - Al-Monitor: Independent, Trusted Coverage of the Middle East,” (n.d.) www.al-Monitor.com. Accessed January 21, 2023. https://www.almonitor.com/originals/2022/03/turkeys-black-sea-warning-may-impactsyria-more-ukraine; Fehim Tastekin, “Ukraine War Shakes Up Turkey’s Ties with Both Russia and NATO - Al-Monitor: Independent, Trusted Coverage of the Middle East,” (n.d.) www.al-Monitor.com. Accessed January 21, 2023. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/03/ukr aine-war-shakes-turkeys-ties-both-russia-and-nato#ixzz7PhULQ9A3. 31. Abdullah Bozkurt, “Russia to Install Radar and Missile Systems Close to Critical NATO Facilities in Turkey, Prompting Security Concerns,” Nordic Monitor (November 14, 2022). https://nordicmonitor.com/2022/11/ russia-to-build-radar-and-missile-base-in-turkey-close-to-critical-nato-facili ties-prompting-security-concerns/. 32. “CAATSA Section 231 ‘Imposition of Sanctions on Turkish Presidency of Defense Industries,’” U.S. Embassy & Consulate in Greece (December 14, 2020). https://gr.usembassy.gov/caatsa-section-231-imposition-of-sancti ons-on-turkish-presidency-of-defense-industries/.

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33. Semih Idiz, “Praise for Erdogan’s Mediation in Ukraine Grain Deal Has Its Limits - Al-Monitor: Independent, Trusted Coverage of the Middle East,” (n.d.) www.al-Monitor.com. Accessed January 22, 2023. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/07/praise-erd ogans-mediation-ukraine-grain-deal-has-its-limits#ixzz7ak9ehKQj. 34. Sasa Dragojlo, Balkan Insight (November 3, 2022). https://balkanins ight.com/2022/03/11/serbia-russia-china-condemned-for-selling-armsto-myanmar-junta/. 35. Vuk Vuksanovic, “Serbia’s Arms Deals Show It’s Tilting Away From Russia and Toward China,” Foreign Policy (May 11, 2022). https://for eignpolicy.com/2022/05/11/serbias-arms-deals-show-its-tilting-awayfrom-russia-and-toward-china/. 36. Vladimir Shopov, “Decade of Patience: How China became a Power in the Western Balkans ECPF,” Policy Brief (February 2, 2021). https://ecfr.eu/publication/decade-of-patience-how-china-bec ame-a-power-in-the-western-balkans/. 37. Mustafa Sonmez, “Turkey’s Runaway Inflation Soars to near 79%,” (n.d.) www.al-Monitor.com. Accessed January 21, 2023. https://www.al-mon itor.com/originals/2022/07/turkeys-runaway-inflation-soars-near-79. 38. Semih Idiz, “Praise for Erdogan’s Mediation in Ukraine Grain Deal Has Its Limits,” (n.d.) www.al-Monitor.com. Accessed January 22, 2023. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/07/praise-erdogans-med iation-ukraine-grain-deal-has-its-limits#ixzz7ak9ehKQj; Nazlan Ertan, “Turkey, Israel Initial Accord to Pave Way to Resume El Al Flights to Turkey Al Monitor,” (July 7, 2022). https://www.al-monitor.com/origin als/2022/07/turkey-israel-initial-accord-pave-way-resume-el-al-flightsturkey. 39. The EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy stressed that Turkey’s unilateral actions in the fenced-off area of Varosha, as well as its repeated statements, were “directly questioning the agreed basis for the solution to the Cyprus problem as provided by the relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR), the latest of which was adopted on 29 January 2021 (UNSCR 2561). See European Commission, “High Representative of the EU for Foreign and Security Affairs,” State of play of EU-Turkey Political, Economic and Trade Relations, Brussels: Joint Communication to the EU Council, 2021, p. 3. Retrieved from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-con tent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52021JC0008&from=EN. On 25 March 2021, the European Council has also reiterated its commitment “to a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem in accordance with the relevant UNSC resolutions (notably 550, 789,

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41. 42.

43.

44.

45. 46.

47.

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1251)” See “Statement of the members of the EU Council,” Brussels, 25 March 2021, p. 7. Retrieved from https://www.consilium.eur opa.eu/media/48976/250321-vtc-euco-statement-en.pdf. On the other hand, On the other hand, Turkish Cypriot President Ersin Tatar argues the Greek Cypriots have blocked all opportunities for a UNbacked resolution: “The UK Should Support the Two-State Solution,” (November 9, 2022). https://www.kktcb.org/en/president-ersin-tatarthe-uk-should-support-the-two-state-solution-10384. Muhdan Saglam, “Can Israeli Gas Bridge Turkey-Israel Rift?,” Al-Monitor (January 21, 2022). https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/01/ could-new-israeli-gas-pipeline-bridge-long-standing-rift-turkey. Hall Gardner, “Toward an Alternative Transatlantic Strategy,” op. cit. Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress (Updated March 10, 2022) Renewed Great Power Competition: Implications for Defense—Issues for Congress (fas.org). Speaking to the European Parliament, Emmanuel Macron declared that he did not want the Balkans “to turn towards Turkey or Russia.” From Myth to Reality from Myth to Reality: How to Understand Turkey’s Role in the Western Balkans, Author(s): Asli Aydınta¸sba¸s, European Council on Foreign Relations (2019) Stable URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/res rep21609. Churchill listed how much “influence” the Soviet Union and Britain should have in the Balkans after the war. Romania would go 90% to Moscow, 10% to Britain. Greece would go 90% to the U.S. and U.K. and 10% to Moscow. Yugoslavia would get an equal split. And Churchill thought Bulgaria should go 75% to Moscow and 25% to the other Allies, but Stalin scratched that out and made it a 90–10 split. Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977. UNODC, Drug Money, 2015. https://www.unodc.org/documents/ rpanc/Publications/other_publications/Balkan_route_web.pdf. Simon Tisdall, “Netanyahu is Israel’s Own Worst Enemy. Why Won’t Western Allies Confront Him?,” The Guardian (January 15, 2023). https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/jan/ 15/netanyahu-israel-western-allies-religious-coalition. Transparency International Ukraine. https://www.transparency.org/en/ countries/ukraine; Ivana Kottasová, Kostan Nechyporenko and Jo Shelley, “Zelensky Shakes Up Ukrainian Government Amid Growing Corruption Scandal,” CNN (January 24, 2023). https://edition.cnn.com/2023/ 01/24/europe/ukraine-anti-corruption-zelensky-intl/index.html. High level EU officials have been accused of “Qatargate” among other activities. Eddy Wax, “EU Parliament Chief Readies Plan to Prevent

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51. 52.

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54.

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305

Qatargate 2.0,” Politico (January 11, 2023). https://www.politico. eu/article/eu-parliament-roberta-metsola-transparency-qatargate-corrup tion-scandal. In the U.S., the Epstein prostitution affair has implicated Presidents Clinton and Trump, while the billion dollars of “dark money” from undisclosed contributors to political campaigns and political NonGovernmental Organizations raises major questions as to how those contributions influence the decisions of those politicians elected. See Open Secrets. https://www.opensecrets.org/dark-money/basics. Morina, Tefta Kelmendi, and Engjellushe, “How Macron Can Strengthen the EU in the Western Balkans – European Council on Foreign Relations,” ECFR (February 24, 2021). https://ecfr.eu/article/how-macroncan-strengthen-the-eu-in-the-western-balkans/. While the 1999 NATO air over Kosovo alienated Russia and China as it was not a military operation sanctioned by the UN Security Council, the results of other UN-backed military operations, including the 1990–1995 Bosnian War and 2011 Libyan War, have not been optimal, to say the least. And the Trump administration decision to drop out of the UNbacked JCPOA nuclear talks with Iran, plus the UN failure to quell the 2022 Russia-Ukraine war, raises questions as to whether even UN-backed Contact Groups can ever succeed in their missions. “EUSDR,” EUSDR - Danube Strategy Point (n.d.). https://danube-reg ion.eu/. Andi Hoxhaj, “Russia’s Influence in the Balkans is Growing Just as the Region’s Fragile Peace is Threatened,” The Conversation (July 20, 2022). https://www.other-news.info/russias-influence-in-the-balkans-isgrowing-just-as-the-regions-fragile-peace-is-threatened/. Emanuel Macron, “Closure of the Conference on the Future of Europe,” (May 9, 2022). https://www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2022/05/ 09/closure-of-the-conference-on-the-future-of-europe. Hall Gardner, “Chapter 8: Toward New Euro-Atlantic, EuroMediterranean Security Communities,” In Hall Gardner (Editor), NATO and the European Union: New World New Europe New Threats. London: Ashgate, 2004; IR Theory, Historical Analogy and Major Power War. New York: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2019; Toward an Alternative Transatlantic Strategy. Paris: Gingko Press, 2022.

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Index

A Abazovi´c, Dritan, 69, 233, 263, 280 Adriatic, 11, 12, 20, 33, 73, 86, 172, 196, 242, 247, 250, 270, 302 Albania (Tirana), 1, 2, 9, 10, 14, 15, 20, 37, 38, 44–46, 48, 51, 55–60, 62, 64, 70, 73, 74, 76, 80, 81, 90, 93, 105, 108, 110, 113, 120, 122, 143–145, 154, 159–177, 186, 188, 189, 193, 198, 218, 229–231, 233–237, 239, 240, 243–246, 248–250, 253, 254, 257, 276, 277, 282, 283, 285, 287, 290, 291, 293, 296 Greater Albania, 45, 165 Al Nahyan, Abdullah, 108 American Hellenic Institute, 137 Aphrodite, 195 Arab Spring, 6, 107, 194, 291 Armenia, 11, 17, 32, 92, 203 Athenagoras, 136 AUKUS Pact, 3 Australia, 136, 293

B Balkans. See States; Wars Balkan initiative, 177, 235, 236, 257, 285–287, 301 definition, 38 re-confederation of, 276, 285, 295, 296 Bartholomew, Ecumenical Patriarch, 135, 136, 138, 140, 147, 152 Belarus, 11, 92, 140 Berisha, Sali, 160, 162, 164, 166–172, 177, 240, 295 Berlin Initiative 2014, 124 Biden, Joe, 62, 66–68, 70, 141, 172, 244, 283, 286, 292 Biden’s foreign policy, 62, 66 Black Sea, 9, 10, 12, 17, 25, 26, 73, 196, 205, 208, 247, 288, 289 Borrell, Joseph, 52, 58, 69, 216, 277 Bosnia and Herzegovina Butmir Process (2008/09), 17 Miracle of Tuzla, 257 Mostar, 234 Stari Most , 257

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 H. Gardner (ed.), Geopolitical Turmoil in the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34318-6

315

316

INDEX

Brexit, 120, 126, 143, 284, 285, 296 Brnabi´c, Ana, 128, 235 Brussels Agreement 2013, 8, 65, 282 Budapest-Belgrade transit route, 22 Bulgaria (Sofia), 9–11, 24, 25, 37, 38, 40, 42, 46, 56, 57, 60, 74, 80, 85, 93, 97, 105, 139, 145, 146, 148, 160, 173, 179, 180, 203, 219, 227, 229, 231, 233, 235–237, 245, 246, 248, 255–257, 259, 260, 264, 266–269, 273, 280, 283, 304 C Canada, 32, 70, 262 Carter, Jimmy, 64 Caspian Sea, 17, 26, 86, 190 Catholic/Catholicism, 40, 41, 48, 135, 160, 232, 233, 247, 259 CEFTA trade agreement, 286 Chechnya, 6 Chechen independence movement, 6 Chicu, Ion, 235 China (Beijing) Belt and Road/Silk Road, 20, 71–73, 99, 290 China Radio International, 102 Confucius Institute, 101–103 COSCO Shipping, 21 influence in Balkans, 21, 24, 290 US bombing of Chinese embassy Belgrade, 7, 166 Xinjiang province, 21 Christian/Christianity, 40, 134, 136, 145, 150, 232, 233. See also Orthodox Christianity Churchill, Winston, 294 Clark, Wesley, 7 Clash of civilizations, 153, 293 Clinton, Bill, 67, 162 Contact Group, 297

Corona virus/Corona vaccines, 122 ˇ c, Dragan, 278 Covi´ Croatia, 1, 9–12, 17, 20, 23, 37, 38, 41, 45, 53, 63, 90, 120, 160, 199, 229–231, 233, 234, 236, 241, 243, 248, 277, 278, 281, 283 Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), 194, 209, 210, 242 Cvijanovi´c, Željka, 264 Cyprus, 1, 8, 18, 19, 22, 24–26, 136, 186, 194, 195, 208–210, 212, 213, 215, 221, 281, 291, 292 peace settlement, 291

D Dahlan, Mohammad, 109 Davutoglu, Ahmet, 16, 17 Dayton Peace Agreement, 265, 299 Debt trap, 20 Demaçi, Adem, 4 Dimitrios, Patriarch, 136 Ðind-i´c, Zoran, 234, 235 Dodik, Milorad, 51, 69, 96, 97, 176, 235, 242, 254, 264, 279 Drug/drug war, 123, 234, 294 Dukanovic, Milo, 69, 95, 109, 233

E Eastern Europe, 6, 20–22, 24, 53, 111, 119, 145, 154, 161, 162, 170, 239, 276 16+1 (or 17+1) multilateral framework, 20, 22 Eastern Mediterranean, 1, 2, 6, 9, 13, 16–19, 21, 22, 24–27, 137, 186, 188, 190, 194–197, 200, 206–214, 216, 275, 276, 287, 288, 290–293, 295, 296

INDEX

Egypt, 1, 18, 19, 24, 32, 35, 64, 107, 186, 194–197, 208–210, 213, 291 Suez Canal, 24, 194 Elpidophoros, 136 Energy BalkanStream, 285 Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, 19 EastMed, 195, 209 Natural Gas Fields, 190, 195 Aphrodite (South Cyprus), 195 Calypso (South Cyprus), 195 Leviathan (Israel), 194, 195 Tamar (Israel), 194, 195 NordStream 2, 12 SouthStream, 24 sustainable development, 289, 292, 298 Three Seas Initiative (TSI), 12, 297 Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), 74, 189, 263 Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), 241 TurkStream, 12, 97, 285 Erdo˘gan, Tayyip, 75, 76, 104–107, 175, 207–209, 212, 213, 230, 235, 250–254, 257, 287–291, 294, 296 Escobar, Gabriel, 68 Eurasian Union, 61, 69 European Union (EU) \"associate membership", 298 Brussels Agreement, 8, 65, 282 Brussels dialogue, 60, 61, 64, 65 Coal and Steel Community, 292 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), 52, 54, 61, 62, 64, 279 Copenhagen criteria, 236 Council of Europe, 239 EU commission, 58

317

EU Eastern partnership, 25 EU enlargement, 25, 53–56, 59, 60, 77, 90, 119, 173, 275, 284, 296 EU Initiative, 17 European Parliament, 61, 96, 125, 240 European Political Community, 276, 298 Madrid criteria, 54 New Methodology, 56, 59 Operation Althea, 69 Reform Initiative, 17 Thessaloniki Summit, 163, 219, 220 Tirana Summit, 237 F France (Paris), 2, 5, 8, 16, 18, 19, 23, 32, 55, 66, 78, 79, 83, 92, 98, 163, 164, 168, 173, 197, 215, 219, 225, 226, 243, 264, 266, 267, 273, 281, 284, 296, 298, 299 influence in Balkans, 197, 219 Franjo Tud-man, 264 Friedman, Milton, 130 G Georgia (Tblisi), 9–12, 52, 54, 139, 192, 239, 298 Germany (Berlin), 8, 12, 17, 24, 32, 56, 66, 67, 78, 83, 98, 163, 164, 168, 172, 201, 234, 243, 249, 266, 268, 276, 284, 296, 298 Great Power Competition, 197, 293 Greece (Athens), 1, 2, 5, 8, 10, 12–20, 22–25, 37, 42, 44, 46, 57, 58, 63, 74, 75, 135–137, 141–143, 148, 160, 164, 168, 174, 186, 193–196, 198, 200,

318

INDEX

206–221, 229, 233, 234, 245, 246, 248, 255, 276, 281, 283, 287, 290–296, 299 Greek-American lobby, 136 Port of Piraeus, 20–22, 198 Gruevski, Nikola, 97 Gulen, Fetullah, 175, 176

H Haftar, Khalifa, 18 Hahn, Johannes, 128 Hezb’allah, 9 Hoti, Avdullah, 65, 67, 265 Hoxha, Enver, 143, 161, 165 Hungary (Budapest), 5, 10, 12, 21, 23–25, 59, 283, 285, 290, 291 Huntington, Samuel, 153, 232, 241, 257, 293 clash of civilizations, 153, 293

I Immigrant/immigration, 126, 288 Iran, 9, 13, 16, 17, 19, 72, 172, 178, 199, 275, 283, 288, 290, 293 influence in Balkans, 290 Irredentist ideals/irredentism, 10, 16, 231 Islam/Muslim, 17, 40–42, 76, 91, 104, 106, 107, 134, 146, 150, 160, 219, 232, 233, 235, 236, 242, 243, 246–249, 251 Israel (Jerusalem), 1, 2, 9, 13, 17, 19, 24, 64, 65, 186, 194–196, 208, 209, 213, 243, 290, 291, 299 influence in Serbia, 191, 291 Istanbul Declaration (2010), 17 Izetbegovi´c, Bakir, 104

J Jackson, Michael (General), 7

Juncker, Jean-Claude, 128 K Kirill, Patriarch, 144, 145, 151, 153 Kissinger, Henry, 5 Komši´c, Željko, 278 Kosovo autonomy, 4 independence, 2, 4, 8, 10, 16, 44, 60, 70, 100, 108, 151, 163, 167–170, 177, 220, 221, 231, 240, 243, 277, 281, 286 Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), 4, 162, 165 Kumanovo agreement (1999), 7 Pristina, 7, 105, 238, 250, 282 Rambouillet summit (1999), 5 Krišto, Borjana, 243 Kurds, 16, 17, 288, 289 Kurti, Alban, 52, 61, 65, 66, 244, 245, 266, 281 L Lavrov, Sergey, 240, 242 Lebanon, 1, 24, 186, 194, 197, 209 Leki´c, Miodrag, 233 Leviathan, 195 LGBTQ/LGBTQIA+, 136, 152 Libya (Tripoli), 2, 18, 19, 26, 90, 104, 186, 194, 195, 208, 210 Government of National Accord (GNA), 18, 196, 209 Libyan House of Representatives, 18 M Macron, Emmanuel, 55, 66, 265, 284, 298, 304, 305 Medvedev, Dmitri, 10, 30 Merkel, 265 Michel, Charles, 216

INDEX

Middle East, 17, 72, 75, 107, 121, 134, 188, 205, 207, 208, 252–254 Milosevic, Slobodan, 4, 5, 7, 67, 70, 106 Mitsotakis, Kyriakos, 217, 288 Muslim Brothers/Brotherhood, 107, 253 N Nationalism, 146, 151, 230, 232, 233, 284 NATO \"Big Bang"expansion, 9 Bucharest summit (2008), 167, 238 Defender Europe, 172 Implementation Force (IFOR), 250 Incirlik base, 75 Kosovo International Security Force (KFOR), 7, 70, 76, 166, 281 Membership Action Plan (MAP), 9, 12 NATO enlargement, 5, 9, 10, 25, 275 NATO Extraction Force (EF), 15 NATO-Russia Founding Act, 11, 256 Operation Sea Guardian, 18 Partnership for Peace, 10, 163, 286, 287 Netanyahu, Benjamin, 295 New European Confederation, 298 Northern Caucasus, 6, 26 North Korea, 275, 283, 293 North Macedonia, 11, 12, 14, 16, 20, 37, 43, 45, 46, 48, 51, 52, 55–60, 62, 64, 69, 70, 74, 76, 78–80, 90, 96, 97, 103, 108, 110, 119, 122, 138, 160, 165, 166, 169, 173, 174, 176, 186, 188, 189, 193, 202, 211, 218, 226, 227, 229, 235–237, 239,

319

245, 246, 248, 253, 255, 259, 261, 265, 267, 277, 279, 280, 282, 287, 290, 291, 293, 300, 301 Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), 4, 12, 14–16, 290 O Ohrid agreements (2001), 15, 45 Open Balkan initiative, 177, 235, 236, 257, 285–287 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 15, 106, 122, 123, 159, 161, 171 Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM), 15 Orthodox Christianity American Orthodox, 137 Bulgarian Exarchate Patriarchate, 40 Ecumenical Patriarchate/Phanar, 135–137, 140, 141, 143, 145 Greek Orthodox, 142 Patriarchate of Constantinople, 40, 133, 135, 153 Russian Orthodox, 141, 150 Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia (ROCOR), 149, 150 Serbian Orthodox, 151 Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, 140 Ukrainian Orthodox, 139 Ottoman empire, 2, 16, 37, 39, 43, 75, 104, 106, 126, 159, 210, 229, 230, 232, 247 P Pakistan, 72, 290 Palestine, 9, 19, 186, 194 two-state solution, 212, 291

320

INDEX

Papandreou, Andreas, 25 Pendarovski, Stevo, 69 Petkov, Kiril, 235 Poland, 5, 10, 12, 21, 24, 39, 48, 59, 81, 85, 134, 179, 203, 239, 273, 285 Pompeo, Mike, 22 Porfirije, Patriarch, 151 Poroshenko, Petro, 140 Primakov, Yugeny, 5 Protestant, 232 Putin, Vladimir, 2, 6, 9, 11, 25, 26, 28, 68–71, 75, 77, 94–96, 98, 111, 133, 141, 152, 153, 166, 176, 208, 238, 240, 278, 279, 281, 285, 294, 299 Putin Doctrince, 239, 240 Q QUINT, 63, 64 R Rama, Edi, 81, 87, 104, 105, 160, 170–177, 235, 236, 240, 260, 261 Realpolitik, 294 Regional Cooperation Council 2008, 124 Republika Srpska (RS), 3, 11, 20, 68, 69, 94, 176, 191, 203, 230, 235, 237, 239, 241, 242, 258, 264, 265, 272, 278, 279, 293 Romania (Bucharest), 8, 9, 11, 12, 85, 147, 160, 180, 203, 229, 234, 236, 256, 259, 266, 268, 273, 281, 304 Rugova, Ibrahim, 4 Russian Federation (Moscow) energy pipelines, 98, 186, 190 Gazprom, 13, 97, 124, 187, 190, 191, 193

influence in Balkans, 21 New European Security Order (2008), 10 NordStream 2, 12 Russia Today, 52, 146 Sputnik, 52, 69, 96, 103 Wagner Group, 18 S Saudi Arabia (Riyad), 18, 19, 47, 197, 213, 290, 291 Serbia (Belgrade), 1, 2, 4–9, 11–14, 17, 20, 24–26, 37, 39, 41, 45, 49, 51, 53, 54, 56, 60–70, 73, 74, 76, 85, 87, 90, 91, 93, 94, 96–98, 100, 101, 103–106, 108–111, 120, 122, 124–129, 134, 146, 147, 149–153, 160, 162, 165, 166, 168, 170, 174–176, 186–191, 193, 198, 201–203, 219, 221, 229, 231, 233–237, 239–245, 248, 250, 253, 254, 258, 259, 261–266, 272, 273, 276–278, 280–283, 285–287, 290, 293, 296, 301 EU Stabilization and Association Agreement, 54, 126, 167 Naftna Industrija Srbije (NIS), 97, 191 Serwer, Daniel, 52, 63, 67, 83 Shi Yinhong, 100 Slovenia, 9, 11, 12, 23, 41, 120, 160, 229, 230, 233, 234, 236 State capture, 20, 24, 123, 191, 294, 295 States, 1–3, 8–13, 16–20, 22–24, 37–39, 46, 51, 55, 56, 58, 59, 61, 62, 64, 67, 68, 70, 71, 73, 76, 77, 89–92, 96, 97, 100, 101, 107, 111, 125, 127, 150, 160, 163, 164, 167–169, 173, 174, 185–189, 192, 199, 200, 213,

INDEX

214, 219, 221, 233, 237, 251, 276, 277, 281–287, 290, 293–298 Strategy balancing engagement, 214, 216, 297 carrots and sticks, 216 constrainment, 3, 13 containgagement, x, 214, 216 contain(ment), x joint development, 291 joint sovereignty, 291, 295 re-confederation (Balkans), 276, 285 sustainable development, 297, 298 Syria, 1, 6, 16, 25, 26, 90, 104, 127, 151, 186, 194, 196, 208–210, 215, 252, 253, 288, 289

T Tamar, 195 Tatar, Ersin, 212, 248, 291, 304 Thaçi, Hashim, 4, 104, 105, 107, 244, 266 Thessaloniki Declaration 2003, 124 Tito, Josip Broz, 93 Tomislav, Nikoli´c, 108 Trump, Donald, 8, 63, 65–67, 83, 171, 244, 283 Tsipras, Alexis, 24, 142, 218 Turkey (Ankara) Blue Homeland, 19, 209, 210, 288 Bosphorus, 26 Dardanelles, 26 influence in Balkans, 99, 105, 110

U Ukraine (Kyiv) Maidan revolution, 140 Sevastopol military base, 25, 26

321

Ukraine–European Union Association Agreement, 25 United Arab Emirates (UAE/Abu Dhabi), 2, 13, 14, 18, 19, 90, 91, 93, 107–109, 111, 196, 208, 213, 291, 299 influence in Balkans, 91, 110 United Nations (UN) Human Rights Commission, 101 Office of the High Representative (OHR), 3, 279 Operation Alba, 164 UN General Assembly draft resolution A/ES10/L, 9 UNPREDEP, 14, 15 UN Resolution [3] 1244 (1999), 8 UN Security Council, 4, 8, 14, 70, 125, 166, 171, 191, 251, 290, 291 United States (U.S./Washington) Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA 231), 289 F-35 fighter jet, 284 Radio Free Europe, 102 Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR), 172 U.S. Congress, 23, 67, 196, 289 Voice of America, 102 V von der Leyen, Ursula Gertrude, 237 Vuˇci´c, Aleksandar, 61, 65–68, 85, 87, 95, 97, 98, 103–106, 108, 109, 111, 151, 152, 202, 234, 235, 240, 241, 244, 245, 254, 259, 261, 264–266, 272, 277, 285, 286 W Wars

322 in in in in

INDEX

Balkans, 7, 62, 63 Chechnya, 6 Georgia, 10, 11, 52, 238 Kosovo, 2, 3, 6–8, 14, 15, 96, 128, 152, 165, 166, 235, 238, 284 in Libya, 1, 209 in Ukraine, 1, 11–13, 18, 19, 21, 24, 27, 54, 71, 96, 97, 111, 120–122, 124, 126, 139, 145, 190, 191, 208, 209, 220, 231, 237, 239, 240, 244, 253, 256, 257, 299 Washington Agreement, 8, 9, 286 World Council of Churches, 139, 144, 148

X Xi Jinping, 170, 294

Y Yeltsin, Boris, 6, 166 Yezidi, 289 Yugoslavia (ex-), 15, 21, 150, 170

Z Zaev, Zoran, 236, 246, 261, 266, 267 Zelensky, Volodymyr, 75, 239 Zohr, 195