States, Actors and Geopolitical Drivers in the Mediterranean: Perspectives on the New Centrality in a Changing Region 3030689999, 9783030689995

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States, Actors and Geopolitical Drivers in the Mediterranean Perspectives on the New Centrality in a Changing Region Edited by Francesca Maria Corrao · Riccardo Redaelli

States, Actors and Geopolitical Drivers in the Mediterranean

Francesca Maria Corrao · Riccardo Redaelli Editors

States, Actors and Geopolitical Drivers in the Mediterranean Perspectives on the New Centrality in a Changing Region

Editors Francesca Maria Corrao LUISS University of Rome Rome, Italy

Riccardo Redaelli Catholic University of the S. Heart Milan, Italy

ISBN 978-3-030-68999-5 ISBN 978-3-030-69000-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69000-7 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Foreword

This volume collects several and important contributions on the historical, cultural, social, economic, political, geo-strategic features of the Mediterranean area. The volume is the outcome of the research on the complex issues of the MENA (Middle Eastern and North African) Region that Francesca Corrao is conducting with high scientific expertise and deep intellectual commitment. A work that has enriched the academic community of the Luiss Political Science Department that I am directing, but also the larger European community of scholars working on the various aspects of the area, particularly on the relation between the MENA Region and Europe. Luiss University aims to become, thanks to scholars like Francesca Corrao, one of the privileged European academic sites for investigating, researching, discussing on the Mediterranean area’s past, present and future. The volume is edited with the precious contribution of Riccardo Redaelli, Director of the Centre for Research on the Southern System and the Wider Mediterranean (CRiSSMA) at the Catholic University of the S. Heart of Milano, and it is recommended because of the breath of the contributions that are collected. I am aware that I will not make justice to the richness of those contributions highlighting some aspects that stroke my intellectual attention. Forgive me for doing that. The volume discusses the cultural and religious features of the Mediterranean region, through an historical perspective focused on interchange of trade between the opposite sides of the Mediterranean that thrived despite frequent wars and conflicts, as well as epidemics that widened v

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the gap. It investigates the main causes that led to the Arab revolts, the ensuing civil wars and establishment of authoritarian regimes. There is no one single cause able to explain that outcome. Different components are considered at this regard, as lack of alternation in political power, economic investments that were inadequate for development, disregard for social welfare by domestic ruling elites, corruption, economic crisis, demographic growth, Europe’s closure of access to economic migrants, failure of Western countries to support democratic movements. It is also discussed the features of the Arab Mediterranean Islam, showing its internally pluralism (Ultra-Conservative or Salafi Islam; Conservative or Orthodox Islam; Progressive or Critical Islam), a pluralism that has generated tensions and conflicts between the various components. The volume considers the socio-economic situation of the MENA Region. A significant focus is on gender. In the MENA region, young women are more exposed than their counterparts to unemployment, underemployment or informal employment. The Arab uprisings have highlighted the precarious and marginalized situation of women and young people in the region. Evidence shows that reducing gender inequalities may help reduce the number of people suffering from hunger (e.g. favouring positive relation between micro-financing to women and improved economic growth). The youth’s issue, too, is considered. MENA Region’s countries are undergoing a phase of demographic transition (moving from high to low fertility and mortality rates) and have become particularly vulnerable to geopolitical instability. Indeed, the Arab uprisings have been triggered by a youth surplus. The 2008 economic crisis contributed to aggravating youth unemployment, providing further motivation for the explosion of protests. If the beginning of the century presented a demographic curve of prevailing instability in the MENA region, we should now worry about the demographic situation in subSaharan Africa. The volume considers how internal difficulties to the MENA Region created opportunities for external intervention. Libya is a very crucial example. Following the recent energy discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean, Libya has drifted to the centre of the geopolitical dynamics of the Mediterranean due to its geographical position. Regional and international powers extended their interests in the country. Russia, the Gulf monarchies and Turkey are now ready to divide up Libya to exert their influence. This would trigger a reaction by Italy because the latter would not accept a partition of Libya, not only for the economic interests of Italy

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in the country but also because Italy fears that it could cause further instability. At the same time, the US does not want Russia to consolidate its power in the region. The Jazira region constitutes another example. Jazira, a region between Syria and Iraq, is Isis’ bid for Syraq. The reduced threat represented by the Islamic State temporarily set aside the quarrels among the major international actors over the Syrian battleground. The liberation of Mosul and Raqqa, the two capitals of the Islamic state, deprived Isis of its Syrian-Iraqi heartland. Yet, this change brought to the elimination of the Jaziran buffer zone and to the opening of a new phase of protracted instability and competition among international actors (e.g. Iraq, Kurds, Turkey, US). The unresolved Israel-Palestine conflict represents another example. Trump intervened, with his peace plan, for meeting all Israeli requests while ignoring requests from the Palestinians. The plan is unlikely to be implemented in near future; negotiation between the camps will not resume any time soon. However, the current impasse serves Israeli interests, jeopardizing instead Palestinian prospects. Meanwhile, Israel’s policy of setting “facts on the grounds” allows it to gain ever increasing control over the West Bank. The volume considers the role of other international actors. Qatar is one of them. Qatar has sub-contracted its policy in the Mediterranean area to Turkey, also because of the considerable strength of the Turkish army. Qatar shares with Turkey interests and goals, including the support of the Muslim Brotherhood. China, too, has become a significant actor in the area. China is playing a geo-economic role, combining both the commercial elements with the energy-related and infrastructure ones. China is pushing its economic and commercial interests, trying to remain as much as possible neutral vis-à-vis the plurality of political conflicts and sectarian crises. At the end of the day, China is already an economic giant in the Mediterranean, representing the second largest trading partner of the MENA countries after the European Union (EU). Here comes the role of the EU discussed in the volume. Despite the considerable European investments made in the area, the EU has not been able to gain real, substantive political and economic leverage. The impact of EU policies remains limited and the EU is not perceived as a game changer by the countries in the region. The EU cooperation model does not have the flexibility necessary to diversify programs and interventions, in order to consider local population’s needs or to promote bottom-up solutions to the region’s problems or to bring more effective coordination to bear on issues like the migratory emergency and mobility. Nevertheless,

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a more engaged role of the EUin the MENA Region appears existential for both, in the framework of European Neighbourhood Policy and the Refugee Compact. One has only to think to migration flows from the region and across it and directed to Europe. The case of Jordan is appropriately discussed in this volume. Jordan has become a migration hub in the Mediterranean. It hosts the greatest numbers of Palestinian refugees and it is the second recipient of Syrian refugees. Amman’s economic system and domestic/foreign policy have changed over time alongside the flows and nature of the migration. Yet, the EU policies towards Jordan are timid, if not inattentive. In addition, think about the terrorist threat. Isis has not disappeared yet. The “post-territorial” phase of the organization is aiming at preserving its remaining resources and at creating the conditions to wage prolonged guerrilla warfare. The organization is in fact resilient due to the huge resources accumulated and the influence exerted over the region for more than five years. Finally, think about the implications of the COVID-19 pandemic, with special reference to Tunisia. The economic crisis and the growing political crisis are seriously destabilizing Tunisia, jeopardizing the positive results achieved since 2011. The pandemic has represented a terrible challenge to the democratic and economic transition making its outcome even more uncertain. In sum, the volume is a commendable example of scholarship aiming to understand one of the most complex area of the world. Let me congratulate all the contributors on the work done. Rome, Italy October 2020

Sergio Fabbrini Dean, Political Science Department, Professor Political Science and International Relations; Intesa Sanpaolo Chair on European Governance

Introduction

A Sea easy to navigate, with relatively calm waters, the Mediterranean has all the characteristics to favour travel, commerce, exchanges of ideas and people as well as projects of conquest and conflicts. Always shifting between peaceful interaction, interdependence, holistic perceptions and hostile antagonism between its competing shores, the Mediterranean for millennia represented the pivot of history between East and West. For the French historian Jacques Le Goff, the beginning of the antagonism between East and West started with the conflict between Greeks and Persians. Instead, for the Syrian poet Adonis, the clash was also the reason for an engagement, and to explain it, he recalls the abduction of Europa, daughter of the King of Tyre, by Zeus who wants to rape her and she resists him; but then, having succeeded, he showers her with gifts and marries her to the King of Crete. Other historians posit the disputes of the Crusaders and the mixed fortunes in commercial relations between the Maritime Republics and the various Islamic powers among the causes of the current Mediterranean conflicts. The dynamics of power and the internal clashes of the governments of the opposite shores reverberated on the confrontations with the Other, the enemy, Christian for them and Muslim for us. The battle of Lepanto, though probably over-estimated, represented the epitome of the division of that sea between competing Eastern and Western spheres of influence. To be sure, the Mediterranean, point of departure and arrival of the Silk Road, lost its centrality following the circumnavigation of Africa

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(Bartolomeo Diaz, 1488), changing the route towards India, and with the discovery of America that diverted economic interests towards new horizons. As the great historian Fernand Braudel writes incisively, “the Mediterranean leaves History”. For centuries, it has remained at the margins of the dominant geopolitical trends of the international system. The fall of the Ottoman Empire, with the consequent division into mandate areas (1919), and the birth of the Turkish Republic with the end of the Caliphate (1924), marked another crucial moment in the history of the Mediterranean; so the balances were broken and the European powers dominated without limits on the southern shore. However, the last wave of European colonial expansion and the process of decolonization which characterized the first half of the last century did not restore its centrality: despite its importance, the Mediterranean remained an object of international politics, never an independent actor. This ancillary condition was maintained throughout the Cold War period, when that basin simply represented the “southern flank of NATO”. It is due to the changed geopolitical landscape of the post-bipolar world that the Mediterranean has rediscovered a new centrality, often as a centre of crises and a battlefield for proxy wars among regional and international powers: the rise of different movements of violent Islamic activism and of the global jihad ideology which undermined regional stability; the crisis of the post-First World War political system; the increase of polarization and sectarianism within the d¯ar al-Isl¯am; military adventures by the US and its allies in Iraq and Afghanistan; the outbreak of multiple civil wars; amplified migration trends; and so on. At the same time, the changes in the diffusion of power within the international system towards the Asian macro-continent, new commercial initiatives such as the Road and Belt Initiative and China’s growing role in the Mediterranean are forging a new centrality of the Mediterranean also from the geo-economic and maritime economy perspectives. There are many hypotheses and theories, looking at that Basin either as a frontier or as a bridge: sometimes a limes or a limen, sometimes a common liquid space.1 For Matvejevi´c, the term Mediterranean is used to define and individualize those peculiarities that gather together the behaviours and qualities of its societies and territories, under the same common imagined prospective, without considering that contradictions exist inside every side of the Mediterranean and its other sides.2

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The history of the Mediterranean is written from different and even contrasting views. Here we propose an Italian perspective, without the ambition to present the opinions of dozens of experts who have written on the subject, but to whom reference is made. We present the research of a group of scholars who have been working for years on the first-hand sources of the countries examined, and who met together during the Seminar on “Perspectives on the New Centrality of the Mediterranean. States, Actors and Geopolitical Drivers in a Changing Region”, held at LUISS University of Rome on 4 December 2019 and jointly organized by the Master MISLAM in Economy, Law and Institution of the MENA Countries and by the Centre for Research on the Southern System and the Wider Mediterranean (CRiSSMA), Catholic University of the S. Heart of Milan. The Italian view, unlike others, has the advantage of presenting a particular perspective because it is linked to the geographical position and the consequent and related historical and social conditioning of the peninsula. Italy is indeed one of the European countries most involved in the plurality of crises and transformations affecting this basin. And that is not only due to its geographic position at the centre of the Sea, but also to its deep relations with the southern shore throughout its long history. No other European country can boast a legacy of millennia of political, military, commercial, cultural and religious intercourses and cross-fertilization. Italy has interacted with and been influenced by the other side of the Mediterranean in the last thousand years even more than Greece, even though, like Greece, it has been exposed on three fronts. The Romans and the Phoenicians, as well as the various Muslim peoples, were followed by the merchants of the Maritime Republics living in Istanbul and Egyptian Alexandria. The artisans of the architectural renewal of the Ottoman capitals contributed to producing a particular osmotic relationship; as did the Italian economic emigrants in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt, among them the families of the poets Ungaretti and Marinetti. This interaction and inter-influence are ancient and the traces are evident in art, in popular traditions, in culture; we can recall the different Arab monuments of Palermo, the silk mantle of Roger II, the citrus groves, the Salerno school of medicine, the manuscripts with the translations of Averroes, the stories of the oral tradition of Giufà, the astronomical measurement tools kept at the Geographic Museum of Florence and much more. The transition from Islamic to Christian culture, thanks to the Normans, produced a cultural continuity different from what

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happened in Spain where, despite the more lasting relationship with Muslims, Reconquista and overseas expansion caused a sudden and violent rupture. For these and other considerations, Cassano speaks of the “meridian thought” as an essential feature of contemporary history, as is also highlighted by Massimo Mazzetti.3 In synthesis, Galasso affirms that “the “Mediterranean” (...) is not an entity, but a historical, dynamic reality, with its continuity and its ruptures, with its specific characteristics and its openings, with its unity and its variety”4 . The Mediterranean region, according to Bono, is a polycentric system whose legitimacy requires a sense of unity based on a shared history of clashes and integrations 5 . However, we did not want to focus on a “localist” perspective of Italy and the Mediterranean. On the contrary, we wanted to address and depict the new centrality of this sea underlying its general trends and focusing on the most important crisis hotspots. In fact, in this book, there are almost no specific references to Italy and its role in the basin. In other words, this is not a book about Italy and the Mediterranean, rather a book about the transformations that are modifying the role and perspective of that sea, written by Italian authors. It aims to analyse this new, critical centrality in the global scenario and to uncover the interactions and intertwinings of those trends and dynamics, offering a historically holistic perspective in order to understand the current geopolitical, social and economic challenges which involve the Mediterranean as well as the entire international system. The volume, which represents the spin-off of the above-mentioned Seminar, is organized in two main sections, one devoted to the most important drivers and broadest issues and the second one focusing instead on single countries and geopolitical actors. In the first section (The new centrality of the Mediterranean Basin: trends and dynamics ), Francesca Corrao (Notes on a new reading of the Mediterranean: a history of trade, culture and wars ) frames the historical and cultural background of the relations between the northern and southern shores, with a long-term perspective. Then, Riccardo Redaelli (A geo-historical compass for the “new Mediterranean” ) describes the geopolitical evolution since the twentieth century and the challenges that these transformations are posing to local actors. Umberto Triulzi (An overview of the changed EU -MENA economic landscape: from cooperation to migration) offers an interesting overview of the economic relations between the European Unionand the MENA region, focusing on the variation of economic politics. The demographic

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transformations and the geopolitical effects of the so-called youth bulge generation are analysed by Alfonso Giordano (Youth bulge dynamics in the Mediterranean region: the geopolitical implications of human capital on security and stability). Mohammad Hashas’s chapter (Arab Mediterranean Islam: intellectual and political trends ) provides a comprehensive representation of “Mediterranean Islam” and outlines the intertwining “territories” between theoretical and practical Islam of the most vital period of the twentieth century. Ersilia Francesca (Gender and economics in Mediterranean: looking for new opportunities for North African women) investigates the gender gap in North Africa in the economic sphere and the attempts to reduce it through specific women’s empowerment policies. The last chapter of the first section, written by Cecilia Attanasio Ghezzi and Renzo Cavalieri (Is the Mediterranean Sea still the mare nostrum? The Belt and Road Initiativeand Chinese investments in the region), deals with the growing Chinese presence in the Mediterranean and the potential long-term economic and geopolitical changes for power relations in the region. The second section (Hotspots of crisis and regional interferences in the Mediterranean) tries to assess the situation in some of the Mediterranean countries involved in the waves of protests and uprisings of 2011– 2012, also analysing the role of two “external” powers such as Turkey, extremely active in all the hotspots of crisis, and the Gulf monarchies. Gennaro Gervasio and Andrea Teti (Ferocious and fragile: Egypt and the myth of “Authoritarian Stability” ) focus on Egypt, openly criticizing the cautious approach of the West towards authoritarian regimes in the region. The new, more aggressive posture by Turkey in the Mediterranean and its geopolitical projection are described by Lea Nocera (Perspectives on the new centrality of the Mediterranean states. Actors and geopolitical drivers in a changing region), while Andrea Plebani (Periphery no more: the Jazirabetween local, regional and international dynamics ) devotes his essay to the tragic situation in the so-called Syraq and the effects of the rise of radical jihadist movements for the “al-Jazira” region. Alessia Melcangi (Chaos in the heart of the Mediterranean: the Libyan crisis after the fall of al-Qadhafi’s Jam¯ah¯ıriyyato the present war (2011–2020)) offers a historical-political perspective for understanding the collapse of the Libyan state and the complex dynamics among the local, regional and international actors involved in that country. Renata Pepicelli (The unfinished transition. The post-revolutionary path of Tunisia and the test of Covid-19. A historical and socio-economic perspective) describes the limits of Tunisia’s

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“unfinished transition” and the risks for the stability of this North African country, while Arturo Marzano in his essay on The Israeli-Palestinian Empasse describes the complex political dynamics in the two camps, and how the growing polarization affects any prospect for the peace process. The section closes with an assessment of the role in the Mediterranean of the Arab Gulf monarchies by Odetta Pizzingrilli and Luigi Giorgi (Mashreq monarchies’ role in the Mediterranean sea). Francesca M. Corrao Riccardo Redaelli

Notes 1. Cook, M. (Apr. 1999) Mediterranean Thinking; From Nitizen to Medizen, Geographical Review, vol. 89, n. 2, Oceans Connect, American Geographical Society. Luiss University organized a conference on 2004 discussing on the plurality of Mediterranean view, see Aymard, M., Barberini, G., Maffettone, S. (2004) Il Mediterraneo: ancora Mare Nostrum? Rome: Luiss University Press. Naples University l’Orientale has also dedicated many conferences and studies to the subject; see also Gillespie, R., Volpi, F. (2017) Routledge Handbook of Mediterranean Politics, Routledge; Litsas, S.N., Tziampiris A. (2016)The Eastern Mediterranean in Transition: Multipolarity, Politics and Power (The International Political Economy of New Regionalisms Series). Routledge. 2. Matvejevi´c, P. (2008) The Mediterranean and Europe. Quaderns de la Mediterrània, n.10. Barcellona, IEMed: 128 3. Cassano, F. (2003)Il pensiero meridiano Bari-Rome: Laterza; Mazzetti, M. (1969) L’accelerazione storica come carattere della storia contemporanea. Rome: Armando Editore. 4. Galasso, G. (2007) Il Mediterraneo: un nesso totale tra natura e storia, Mediterranea Ricerche storiche, anno IV: 20. 5. Bono, S. (2008) Un altro Mediterraneo. Una storia comune tra scontri e integrazione. Rome: Salerno.

Contents

The New Centrality of the Mediterranean Basin: Trends and Dynamics Notes on a New Reading of the Mediterranean: A History of Trade, Culture and Wars Francesca Maria Corrao A Geo-Historical Compass for the ‘New Mediterranean’ Riccardo Redaelli An Overview of the Changed EU-MENA Economic Landscape: From Cooperation to Migration Umberto Triulzi Youth Bulge Dynamics in the Mediterranean Region: The Geopolitical Implications of Human Capital on Security and Stability Alfonso Giordano Arab Mediterranean Islam: Intellectual and Political Trends Mohammed Hashas Gender and Economics in Mediterranean: Looking for New Opportunities for North African Women Ersilia Francesca

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Is the Mediterranean Sea Still the Mare Nostrum? The Belt and Road Initiative and Chinese Investments in the Region Cecilia Attanasio Ghezzi and Renzo Cavalieri

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Hotspots of Crisis and Regional Interferences in the Mediterranean Ferocious and Fragile: Egypt and the Myth of ‘Authoritarian Stability’ Gennaro Gervasio and Andrea Teti

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Perspectives on the New Centrality of the Mediterranean States: The Role of Turkey in a Changing Region Lea Nocera

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Periphery No More: The Jazira Between Local, Regional and International Dynamics Andrea Plebani

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Chaos in the Heart of The Mediterranean: The Libyan Crisis After the Fall of Al-Qadhafi’s Jam¯ah¯ıriyya (2011–2021) Alessia Melcangi The Unfinished Transition. The Post-revolutionary Path of Tunisia and the Test of Covid19. A Historical and Socio-Economic Perspective Renata Pepicelli

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The Israeli–Palestinian Impasse Arturo Marzano

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Mashreq Monarchies’ Role in the Mediterranean Sea Odetta Pizzingrilli and Luigi Giorgi

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Index

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Notes on Contributors

Cecilia Attanasio Ghezzi is a journalist specialized in China-related topics. She graduated in Oriental Studies in Rome and published extensively on contemporary Chinese politics and society. The main focus of her research is the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and its role in the Xi Jinping Era. Currently, she holds a research grant of Ca’ Foscari University focused on Chinese Investment in Italy, and the BRI. Renzo Cavalieri is Associate Professor of International Business Law and East Asian Law at the University of Venice “Ca’ Foscari” and head of the China desk of the largest Italian law firm, BonelliErede. In the recent past, he served also as Adjunct Professor of Chinese Law at the Pontifical Lateran University (Rome) (2012–2016) and as Professorial Research Associate at the School of Oriental and African Studies (London) (2010–2016). His research is mainly concentrated on the development of Chinese legal institutions, in particular in the field of international trade and investment law, but he has worked also on research projects related to China’s constitutional framework and legal theory and to Chinese political and social matters. By a professional viewpoint, he is active in assisting Italian companies in China/Asia-related transactions as well as Chinese companies in their projects in Italy. Francesca Maria Corrao is Full Professor of Arabic Culture and Language at the Faculty of Political Science in LUISS University of Rome,

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and Director of MISLAM Program (Master in Economics and Institutions of Islamic Countries) of the School of Government at the same university. She is Professor at University of Naples “L’Orientale” (1996– 2011) and Visiting Professor at the École Pratique des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (2007), at Fudan University (Shanghai, 2017), Science Pò (Menton 2017/19), Cairo, Beirut, Amman, Cambridge and Oxford. The main focus of her scholarly activity is on Arabic and Islamic Culture and History, Mediterranean Studies. She chairs the Scientific Committee of the Fondazione Orestiadi in Gibellina (Sicily); Overseas Research member of the Institute of Oriental Studies (Soka University, Tokyo); Member of the European Union of Arabist and Islamist (UEAI), the Scientific Council of the Cortile dei Gentili (Pontifical Council for Culture, Vatican), International Affairs Institute IAI-Rome, the European Teachers of Modern Arabic Literature (EMTAR). She is Member of the Editorial Board of the open access e-journal titled, Arabic and World Literature: Comparative and Multidisciplinary Perspectives; Member of the Scientific committee of the Journals: Rivista Africa e Orienti, Semicerchio, ARABLIT , Journal of Arabic Literature, Itinerari Di Culture—Collana di Studi e di ricerche lingue, linguaggi e Culture migranti, Dialoghi Mediterranei, open access e-journal of the Istituto Euro-Arabo. Among her books: I cavalieri, le dame e i deserti. Storia della poesia araba(2020); In guerra non mi cercate. Poesia araba delle rivoluzioni e oltre, with O. Capezio, E. Chiti e S. Sibilio (2018); L’Islam non è terrorismo, with L. Violante (2018); Islam, State and Modernity. Mohammed Abed Al-Jabri and the Future of the Arab World, with Z. Eyadat and M.Hashas (2017); Islam, religion and Politics (2017); Le Rivoluzioni Arabe. La transizione Mediterranea, (2011); Costruire la democrazia: un progetto mediterraneo, with S. Maffettone (2008); Le opinioni e l’informazione nei Paesi araboislamici dopo l’11 settembre, ed. Corrao, (2003); Poeti Arabi di Sicilia (1987, 2002); Giufà il furbo, lo sciocco, il saggio(1991, 2001); La rinascita islamica (1985). Ersilia Francesca is Associate Professor of Islamic History at University of Naples “L’Orientale”, dep. Asia Africa and Mediterranean, where she teaches courses on Gender Studies in Islamic Context (MA) and on Contemporary History of Economics in Middle East and North Africa (MA). She is Director and Chief Editor of the scientific journal Studi Magrebini. ˙ In 2015, she was Visiting Scholar at SOAS (London)—school of law—and in 2018, she was Directrice d’Études at École Pratique des

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Hautes Études, Section des Sciences Religieuses (Paris). The main focus of her scholarly activity is on the origins and the development of the Ibadi school of law and its relationship to the Sunni schools in the early centuries of Islam. Moving from her interest in Islamic law, she started to research also in gender studies and in history of Islamic economics. On this subject, she published in 2013 a book titled Economia, religione e morale nel mondo islamico (Carocci, Roma 2013). Among her recent publications on Ibadism, there are: «Law and Politics in the Early Ib¯ad.¯ı Communities: Ab¯u ‘Ubayda al-Tam¯ım¯ı’s Ris¯ala to Ab¯u ’l-Khat.t.¯ab al-Ma‘¯afir¯ı», in Cyrille Aillet (ed.), L’ibadisme dans les sociétés de l’islam médiéval. Modèles et interactions, De Gruyter, Berlin/Boston 2018; «Self-defining through Faith: the wal¯aya and bar¯a’a dynamics among the early Ib¯adis», in Camilla Adang, Hassan Ansari, Maribel Fierro, Sabine Schmidtke (eds.), Accusations of unbelief in Islam: A diachronic perspective on takfir, Brill, Leiden 2015; «The Concept of Sunna in the Ib¯ad.¯ı School», in Adis Duderija (ed.), the Sunna and its Status in Islamic Law. The Search for a Sound Hadith, Palgrave MacMillan: New York 2015 (ottobre), chap. 5; «Generosity versus Avarice in Medieval Islam», in Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam, volume 42 (2015). Gennaro Gervasio A graduate of University of Naples ‘L’Orientale’, Gennaro Gervasio is currently Associate Professor in History and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa at University Roma Tre’s Department of Humanities in Italy. Prior to that, he has worked at the University of Bristol (UK), the British University in Egypt and Macquarie University in Sydney, Australia, where he was Director of the Centre of Middle East and North African Studies (2009/11). His research interests include secularism and Marxism in the Arab world, the political role of Arab intellectuals, and civic activism and social movements in the Arab World (especially Egypt and Morocco). Among his most recent publications, he has co-edited the volume Informal Power in the Middle East: Hidden Geographies (London: Routledge, 2014 & 2016) and is currently co-editing a Special Issue on “Gramsci and the Uprisings in North Africa”. Alfonso Giordano is Associate Professor (national scientific habilitation as full professor) of Economic and Political Geography at the Niccolò Cusano University in Rome and Adjunct Professor of Political Geography at the LUISS University in Rome. In addition, he is Director of the “Anna Lindh Chair in Euro-Mediterranean Studies” at the University

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of Salerno and Head of international relations at the Italian Geographical Society in Rome. He has been an Affiliate Researcher at the Institute of European Studies, Free University of Brussels and national expert in the Research Group on “Options for the Greater Middle East” coordinated by the Institute for Security Studies of the European Union in Paris. Mr. Giordano worked as scientific expert at the Permanent Representation of Italy to the European Union and served at the Council of the European Union. His main fields of research concern international migration and the interactions between demographic dynamics and geopolitical implications. Luigi Giorgi is Research Fellow (Department of Political Science, Luiss University) and Ph.D. Candidate (Department of History, Cultural Heritage, Education and Society, Tor Vergata University of Rome) in History of Islamic Countries. His research interests include history, politics and economics of the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, and sociopolitical mobilizations in the region. He is currently developing a research on the history of bilateral and multilateral relations among the Gulf States and on the role of media in the political mobilizations of contemporary Bahrain. He gained work and research experiences in Kuwait, Qatar, Iraq and Tunisia. Publication: S¯ıd¯ı B¯ uz¯ıd e la rivoluzione ripudiata, 209–214. Limes, rivista italiana di geopolitica, VIII:2015 (09/2015). Mohammed Hashas is currently an affiliated Research Fellow at Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient in Berlin, and a non-Resident Research Fellow at the Center for Islam in the Contemporary World at Shenandoah University in Virginia, US. He is also a Faculty Member (docente a contratto) at Luiss Guido Carli University of Rome. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Theory from LUISS (2013). His research areas are Contemporary Arab-Islamic Thought, European Islamic Thought, and Islamic Ethics. He was previously a Research Fellow at Babylon Center for the Study of the Multicultural Society in Tilburg, the Netherlands, at the Center for European Islamic Thought at the University of Copenhagen, a Visiting Research Fellow at Oxford Center for Islamic Studies, and a Senior Research Fellow at La Pira Research Center on the History and Sciences of Islam in Palermo. Hashas has authored The Idea of European Islam (2019), Intercultural Geopoetics (2017), and led the edition of Islam, State, and Modernity (2018), Imams in Western Europe (2018), Islamic Ethics and the Trusteeship Paradigm (2021), and Pluralism in Islamic Contexts (2021). His papers have appeared with the Journal of

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Muslims of Europe, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, the Journal of Studia Islamica, The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, and Oriente Moderno. Arturo Marzano (Rome, 1973) is Associate Professor of History of the Middle East in the Department of Civilization and Forms of Knowledge, University of Pisa. He got his Ph.D. in Contemporary History at the Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna, Pisa, and has been Post-doc Research Fellow at the International Institute for Holocaust Research–Yad Vashem, Jerusalem; Senior Research Fellow at the Université Panthéon-Assas (Paris 2); Marie Curie Fellow at the European University Institute; Visiting Researcher at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, and at the American University Beirut. His research mainly deals with history of Judaism, Zionism, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the relationship between Italy and the Middle East in the XX century. Among his main publications, there are the volumes Una terra per rinascere. Gli ebrei italiani e l’immigrazione in Palestina prima della guerra (1920–1940)[A land to be born again: The Italian Jews and Their Migration to Palestine before the War (1920–1940)], Milano, 2003; Onde fasciste. La propaganda araba di Radio Bari (1934–1943) [Fascist Waves. Radio Bari’s Arab Propaganda (1934–1943)], Roma 2015; Storia dei sionismi. Lo stato degli ebrei da Herzl a oggi [History of Zionisms. The State of the Jews from Herzl to nowadays], Roma 2017. Alessia Melcangi is Tenure Track Assistant Professor of History of North Africa and the Middle East and of Globalization and International Relations in the Department of Social and Economic Sciences of La Sapienza University of Rome. She collaborates with the Centre of Research on the Southern System and the Wider Mediterranean (CRiSSMA—Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milan) and she is faculty member of the Master in “Migrazione e Sviluppo—Migration and Development”, Department of Social Sciences and Economics (DiSSE), Sapienza University, of the “Master in Middle Eastern Studies”—MIMES, Graduate School of Economics and International Relations (ASERI), Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milan and member of the scientific committee of ReaCT—Osservatorio sul Radicalismo e il Contrasto al Terrorismo. Her researches are mainly focused on the Contemporary history of North Africa; geopolitics and international relations in the Euro-Mediterranean area; ethno-religious minorities (in particular

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the Copts and the Berbers); identity dynamics and dynamics of polarization in the contemporary Middle East; political and social issues in contemporary Egypt and Libya. Regarding these issues, she has published several monographs, peer review articles in Italian or international Journals, papers in edited works and policy papers. Her last monographs are: Melcangi A.,Statualità e minoranze: meccanismi di resistenza e integrazione in Medio Oriente. Il caso dei cristiani copti in Egitto (Ledizioni, Milano 2018); Melcangi A.,I copti nell’Egitto di Nasser. Tra politica e religione (1952–1970) (Carocci, Roma 2017). She also has co-edited the volume North African Societies After the Arab Spring: Between Democracy and Islamic Awakening (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle upon Tyne 2016). Lea Nocera is Tenure Track Assistant Professor in Turkish Language and Literature at University of Naples L’Orientale. Scholar in Turkish Studies she also teaches subjects related to politics and society of contemporary Turkey. She was Visiting Research Fellow at the ZMO in Berlin and at the Türkei-Europa-Zentrum in Hamburg. Her research interests on Turkey include social and cultural history, gender studies, urban transformations and social movements. As Turkey expert, she regularly collaborates with prominent Italian newspapers and magazines publishing on current affairs. Her Ph.D. dissertation on Turkish female migration in West Germany was awarded the First Prize “Pieroni Bortolotti” of the Italian Association of Women Historians. Among her publications: “Manikürlü Eller Almanya’da Elektrik Bobini Saracak”: Toplumsal Cinsiyet Perspektifinden Batı Almanya’ya Türk Göçü (1961–1984), The Gülen Media Empire(Arab Media Report/Reset, 2015) as editor, The Turkish touch. Neo-ottoman Hegemony and Turkish Television in the Middle East (Arab Media Report/Reset, 2014; as co-author); #Gezipark. Coordinate di una rivolta(Alegre, 2013), La Turchia contemporanea. Dalla repubblica kemalista al governo dell’Akp 3 (Carocci, 2011). She also authored several articles in Italian and international academic journals. In 2017, she founded Kaleydoskop.it an online magazine on Turkish cultural and social issues. Renata Pepicelli is Associate Professor of “History of Islamic countries” and “Islamic Studies” at the Department of Civilization and Forms of Knowledge of the University of Pisa. Her research interests include social and cultural contemporary history of North Africa, gender issues, youth, Islamic thought and movements, Islam in Europe. Her main case studies

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are Tunisia and Morocco. Among her recent publications: “Gihad e donne: evoluzioni storiche e risignificazioni sematiche e teologiche in età contemporanea” in Manduchi, Melis, Gihad. Definizioni e riletture di un termine abusato, Mondadori, 2019; “From «hero» to «zero»: rethinking youth in post-revolutionary Tunisia. A focus on family, state and public discourse”. In L. Queirolo Palmas, L. Stagi (eds), “Winou el shabab. Images of transformations between the two shores of the Mediterranean”, GUP, Genova, 2018, pp. 56–80; Being young and post-feminist in Morocco: the emerging of a new women’s activism, in A.M. Di Tolla— E. Francesca (eds.), Emerging Actors in Post- Revolutionary North Africa. Gender Mobility and Social Activism, vol. 1, “Studi Magrebini”, N. S. Vol. XIV/2016, Università di Napoli “L’Orientale”, Napoli 2017, pp.419–446; Rethinking Gender in Arab nationalism: women and the politics of modernity in the making of nation-states. Cases from Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria in “Oriente Moderno”, numero monografico dedicato a “Arab nationalism(s) in the Twentieth Century” a cura di Massimo Campanini, Vol. 97, Issue 1, 2017, pp. 201–219. Among her books: “Il velo nell’Islam. Storia, politica, estetica” (“The veil in Islam. History, politics, aesthetics”), Rome, 2012; “Femminismo islamico. Corano, diritti, riforme” (“Islamic feminism. Quran, rights, reforms”), Rome, 2010 (new edition is forthcoming, spring 2020); “2010, un nuovo ordine mediterraneo?” (“2010, a new Mediterranean order?”), Messina, 2004. Pisa University. Odetta Pizzingrilli is a Post-Ph.D Research Fellow in History of Islamic Countries in the Department of Political Science at LUISS Guido Carli University in Rome and Adjunct Professor of Arabic Culture and Literature in the Humanities Department of the University of Macerata and of Arabic Language in the Political Sciences Department of Federico II University (Naples). Her research focuses on: nation-/state-building process of the Arab states, national identity formation, legitimacy foundation of the MENA region governments, the concept of hybrid sovereignty, minorities and minoritization processes. She gained research experiences in Syria, Jordan and Kuwait while working on her Ph.D. project “State and Legitimacy within an Arab-Muslim context. Understanding the identity criteria in Jordan and Kuwait”. Among her publications: Pizzingrilli, O. Circassians: An Identity in Exile. The Case of Jordan, a Minority at the

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Royal Palace, 159–186. Studi Magrebini, XVI:2018. (02/2019); Pizzingrilli, O. “Transnational identity and Circassians in contemporary Jordan (1991–2018)” in Maggiolini, P. & Ouahes, I. (ed.) Minorities and StateBuilding in the Middle East: The Case of Jordan. Palgrave Macmillan, London (10/2020); Pizzingrilli, O. Translation of the novel Shajarat albu’s (1944) by Taha Husayn, Istituto per l’Oriente Carlo Alfonso Nallino (To be published in 2022). Andrea Plebani is Research Fellow at the Catholic University of the S. Heart and Associate Fellow at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies. His research focuses on socio-political and security issues related to the broader Middle East as well as on the evolution of the Islamist galaxy. Among his publications: Andrea Plebani, La terra dei due fiumi allo specchio. Visioni alternative di Iraq dalla tarda epoca ottomana all’avvento dello “Stato Islamico” (The Land of the Two Rivers in the Mirror. Alternative Visions of Iraq from the Late Ottoman Era to the “Islamic State”), Rubbettino editore, 2018; Andrea Plebani (ed.), After Mosul: Re-Inventing Iraq, Ledizioni LediPublishing, 2017; Andrea Plebani, Jihadismo globale. Strategie del terrore tra Oriente e Occidente (Global Jihadism. Strategies of Terror between East and West), Giunti, 2016; Andrea Plebani (ed.), New (and Old) Patterns of Jihadism: alQa‘ida, the Islamic State and beyond, Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, 2014; Andrea Plebani—Omar Al-Ubaydli (eds), GCC Relations with post-War Iraq: A Strategic Perspective, Gulf Research Center, 2014; Andrea Plebani—Riccardo Redaelli, L’Iraq contemporaneo (Contemporary Iraq), Carocci, 2013. Riccardo Redaelli is the Director of the Center for Research on the South and the Wider Mediterranean System (CRiSSMA) and Director of the Master in Middle Eastern Studies (MIMES) of the Catholic University of the S. Heart (Milano of the Catholic University of the S. Heart, Milano (Italy), and Full Professor of “Geopolitics”, “History of Asia” and “Post Conflict and Emergency Management”. He is a Member of the “Observatory on Religious Minorities in the World and the Respect for Religious Freedom” of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since 2004, he has coordinated several Track-2 programs sponsored by the

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Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Middle Eastern region (especially in Iraq and Libya) on national reconciliation and international cooperation in the education sector. He published more than 100 monographs, edited books, essays and articles on the history and contemporary politics of the Middle East (see the complete list of his publications is available at the following link: https://docenti.unicatt.it/ppd2/it/#/bac koffice/it/docenti/05078/riccardo-redaelli/pubblicazioni). Among his latest publications: (ed), Mediterraneo 2035: la trasformazione degli scenari geopolitici (2018); The Osmotic Path: The PMU and the Iraqi State (2018); TheBroken Mirror: How the Contemporary Jihadist. Narrative is Re-Shaping the Classical Doctrine of Jihad (2016); Islamismo e democrazia (2015); L’Iraq contemporaneo(with Andrea Plebani) (2013); L’Iran contemporaneo (2011). Andrea Teti is Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Aberdeen, Associate Editor of Middle East Critique, Trustee of the British Society for Middle East Studies, and co-founder and of the Critical Middle East Studies group. Previously, he was Visiting Professor at the universities of Bologna (2020), Cagliari (2018), Ghent (2017/18) and Amsterdam (2015), and he was Principal Investigator for the EUfunded Arab Transformations Project (2015–2016). He was co-editor with Gennaro Gervasio and Luca Anceschi of Informal Power in the Greater Middle East (2014) and lead author of The Arab Uprisings in Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia (2018) and of Democratization Against Democracy: How EU Policy Fails the Middle East (2020). He has also published several articles on EU policy in the Middle East, on conceptions of democracy, on Michel Foucault and on the production of knowledge about the “Middle East” in Social Science. Umberto Triulzi is Full Professor of Economic Policy at the Sapienza University of Rome where he has been, from 2009 to 2011, Head of the Department of Economic and Social Sciences and from 2013 to 2016 Director of the Master Migration and Development. In the last years, he has coordinated many projects in the areas of Monitoring Water Policies (European Commission, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, FAO, World Bank, UNDESA), Finance for Development (UNIDO), SME Internationalization (Confindustria, Italian Foreign Trade Institute), Economics of Crime (Ministry of Interior). He published more than 90 monographs, edited books and articles in the fields of Economic and Regional

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Development, European Economic and Monetary Integration, International Economics and Oil Price Dynamics. Among his recent Books: From the Common Market to Euro (1999); International Economics, with V. Del Punta (2001); International Economic Policy, with P. Montalbano (2006); International Economic Policy. Interdependence, Institutions and Global Governance, with P. Montalbano (2012); The Economic Policies of the European Union (2010, 2016). Recent articles: “Crimes against humanity and migration flows: the Role of International Institutions and of Civil Society”, in Conflitti, Vittime Civili e Diritto Internazionale, 2017; “The Ethics of Labour and the Role of Finance in the Economy in Democracy, Institutions, Ethics of Public Service”, Editoriale Scientifica, Naples, 2018; “From the Complexity of finance to a proposal for real economy growth”, Centro Studi in Intelligence Economica e Security Management, Università degli Studi di Roma Tor Vergata, Roma, 2018; “Democracy and Growth”, with G. Leonetti, Eurilink University Press, Bari, 2019; “Geofinance Between Market Dynamics And Political Strategies”, with F. Sergiani, in Geoprogress Journal, december 2019; “Ethics and Economics in the World of Globalized Finance”, Journal of Contemporary Management Issues, n°2/2020; “The Smuggling of Migrants: A Legislative Proposal”, with E. Cannizzaro, M.T. Trapasso, P. Bronzo, E. Cimiotta, Cassazione Penale, fascicolo 9, 2020.

List of Figures

Youth Bulge Dynamics in the Mediterranean Region: The Geopolitical Implications of Human Capital on Security and Stability Fig. 1 Fig. 2 Fig. 3

Fig. 4

Fig. 5

Fig. 6

Under 30 percentages in the world (Source Population Reference Bureau by New York Times [Sengupta, 2016]) The youth bulge and children bulge in the world (Source Euromonitor International, 2013) Median age in the MENA countries (left); Youth percentage of the total working-age population (right) (Source Roudi, F. (2011). Youth population & employment in the Middle East & North Africa: Opportunity or challenge. Population Reference Bureau) Youth unemployment in some MENA countries (Source Paasonen, K., & Urdal, H. (2016). Youth bulges, exclusion and instability: The role of youth in the Arab Spring. Peace Research Institute Oslo) Percentage of over-65 in MENA region, 1950–2100 (Source United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (2017). World population prospects: The 2017 revision. UNDESA) Youth bulge in some countries of the MENA region, 1950–2050 (Source Paasonen [2016])

116 117

118

119

120 121

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LIST OF FIGURES

Gender and Economics in Mediterranean: Looking for New Opportunities for North African Women Fig. 1

Women’s participation in the labor force in North Africa (Source ILO database)

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The New Centrality of the Mediterranean Basin: Trends and Dynamics

Notes on a New Reading of the Mediterranean: A History of Trade, Culture and Wars Francesca Maria Corrao

Contents 1 2

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Notes for Rereading the History of the Mediterranean: After the Discovery of the Americas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Reform and Culture in Contemporary Islam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Reformism Between Innovation and Tradition-Imitation . . . . . . . . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Introduction

The Mediterranean represented for millennia the pivot of history between East and West with its endless shifting from peaceful interaction, interdependence and holistic perceptions to hostile antagonism between its competing shores. According to Ferdinand Braudel, the history of the Mediterranean has been defined starting from its rich environment, its peoples and above all its endless conflicts (Braudel, 1972).

F. M. Corrao (B) Department of Political Science, LUISS University, Rome, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 F. M. Corrao and R. Redaelli (eds.), States, Actors and Geopolitical Drivers in the Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69000-7_1

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As Jared Diamond points out, the generous Mediterranean microclimate has in the course of the millennia generated a diversified natural environment that sees olives and vines flourishing. Fruit trees scatter their seeds on fertile ground, pastoralism has developed and extensive wheat fields have fed among others, also Greeks, Romans and Muslims in times of war and peace.1 Moreover, the abundance of convenient landing points has facilitated shifts of populations from one side of the Mediterranean to the other, century after century generating new civilizations. As from the first millennium A.D., many peoples engaged in trade over these Seas—Greeks, Etruscans, not to mention the Egyptian and the Phoenicians who travelled from present-day Lebanon to the coasts of Tunisia, to find themselves confronting the Romans. From the furthest East numerous waves of invading armies advanced, almost always stopping in the Middle East, that eternal battlefield of ancient and modern times. Trade in slaves, gold, precious metals, spices, leather and every other sort of good made the fortune of many merchants, and these products stimulated the creativity of the people on land, who developed rich and varied crafts. From ceramics to silks, tanned Moroccan leather and utensils in copper and inlaid wood, this great and varied wealth has given rise to a multiplicity of artistic and cult forms that hardly find comparison with the examples some scholars have identified in other ‘Mediterraneans’ (Abulafia, 2003:14–17). The cradle of civilizations has also generated myths inspiring the great authors of world literature from Shakespeare to Dante and Adonis. The three monotheistic religions born on these shores have for millennia disseminated principles, values and moral rules shared by millions of people. This wealth is also the result of the permeability of the borders in this part of the world, inhabited by diverse populations that have lived sideby-side, alternating periods of conflict with times of fruitful exchange, and at the same time having to respond to military and commercial aggression from the East. The French historian Jacques Le Goff considers the first conflict between Greeks and Persians as the very beginning of the East–West antagonism (Le Goff, 2005). For the Syrian poet Adonis, there is no East or West; they are mental fictions to justify wars, and also there is not only confrontation because this becomes a way or reason for meeting of minds. Adonis observes the conflict from a different cultural perspective and points to a mythological narrative at the origin of the clash between East and West; the poet recalls Zeus’ design to rape Europa, the daughter

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of the King of Tyre, her resistance and the final abduction, compensated for by the god with a rich dowry (Adonis, 2020: 78). At the end of the Great Pagan Empires from the budding of the most ancient monotheism, Judaism, Christianity was born, affirming itself as the official religion of the Roman Empire with Emperor Constantine’s conversion to Christianity (312 A.D.). The ancient conflict between Greeks and Persians over time had been supplanted by the endless war between the Byzantines and the Sasanids, blocking passage along the Silk Road that joined East and West with its rich trade. The need to bring oriental spices to the Mediterranean had opened up a new trade route through the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and the Arab Peninsula. This path, in addition to the particular climate change, created the economic fortune of the fertile crescent, where Islam was revealed in Mecca (612 A.D.)—a faith that gave law and order to a community of people empowered to manage an immense area from the fertile crescent to Baghdad and Iran in the East and to Spain through North Africa. A long season of Islamic dominion of the Mediterranean facilitated the growth of an important civilization, heir to the ancient culture; starting from the 680 the Umayyads developed the Islamic state in Byzantian territory, taking advantage of the Roman civil laws (Crone, 1987), and promoting the poetic oral tradition of the desert. 150 years later, the Abbasid Caliphate expanded Islamic territory far beyond Iran, from which it had inherited the ancient administrative culture. The cultural achievements of the Abbasids, thanks to the pacification of the Silk Road, favoured the trade and economic empowerment of the region. The Caliphs promoted translations of the cultural and scientific products of the ancient civilizations, including Greek philosophy, medicine, chemistry, Indian mathematics and astronomy. The cultural heritage was spread throughout the Islamic world until Spain and Sicily (Corrao, 2017). The seeds of these intellectual activities nourished the Mediterranean area with fruitful growth from which humanism and then the Renaissance would blossom. Byzantium had for centuries been engaged in conflict against the Bulgar and Hungarian/Magyar potentates, and on their fall, this centuries-old contention was inherited by the Ottomans, who continued to alternate victories and defeats until the First World War (Fine, 1983; Gjuzelev, 1988; Sedlar, 1994).

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Western historians specialized in Middle Eastern history sometimes forget the ancient disputes among Christians of different creeds or ethnicities in the Balkans and Middle East, and see the persisting rivalry between Christendom and Islam—the Crusades—as the source of the current Mediterranean conflicts (Lewis, 2004: 37–38). In the Mediterranean conflict over control of the ports, and therefore of trade and markets with the East, combined with the need to protect the pilgrims and holy places of Jerusalem; the results were alterning fortunes in the relations between the Italian maritime republics and the various Islamic sultanates of Middle East and North Africa (MENA) (Gabrieli, 2009; Cardini & Musarra, 2019; Cardini, 2020). The dynamics of economic power and the political rivalries within the ruling classes, occurring on both sides of the opposite shores, had repercussions on the confrontations with the ‘Other’, the ‘Muslim enemy’. On both sides, the spokesmen of the Lord of ‘holy’ wars were the poets, and both opponents had their writers to record the events, so a rich narrative was produced on both shores of the Mediterranean (Corrao, 2020). In the end of the tenth century, the heirs of the Umayyad Caliphate, in the South of Andalusia, reached a short living apogee, torn by rivalries and clashes. Cordova was the biggest Mediterranean city attractive to artists and intellectuals, with a huge library provided with 400.000 volumes and a wonderful Mosque. In the North, Christian kingdoms were setting about Reconquista, while in North Africa the emerging Shiite Fatimid power (Middle Eastern refugees allied with Berbers and Bedouins) was steadily defeating the Sunni governors, settling in Tunisia. The Fatimids were attacking Malta, Sardinia, Corsica, plundering the French coasts and even conquered Genoa (935). Just ten years later, their emissary Emirate was installed in Palermo (948), taking the place of the Sunni Aghlabids, and Jawhar, a Fatimid Sicilian general conquered Egypt and founded Cairo and the university-mosque of al-Azhar. To put a stop to their relentless advance in control of the Mediterranean, the Arab Sovereign of Andalusia formed an alliance with the Byzantines. To the East, Byzantium sought control of the Balkans and through various vicissitudes clashed with the Russians. To the South, in the SyrianPalestinian area, Christian advance was obstructed by the small Hamdani dynasty, vassal of the caliph of Baghdad (940). The extraordinarily rapid rise of this Potentate was recounted by the classical Arabic poet, alMutanabbi (al-Mutanabb¯ı, 915–965), who evoked the sieges of the Byzantine cities. The poet immortalized the memory of his patron Sayf

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al-Dawla (916–967) and his small dynasty that remained a model forever despite its brief success; while the West witnessed the legendary conquest of Syria and Jerusalem by the Byzantine Emperor 975), short-lived as it proved to be (Salvadori, 2004a). The Fatimids made inroads in the Middle East and, on arriving in Jerusalem, destroyed the Holy Sepulchre (1009). Just a few decades later, Pisa and Genoa, the newborn Maritime Republics, formed an alliance with the Byzantines against the Fatimids and in 1050 reconquered Sardinia, taking up the burden of supporting the wars and finances of the crusaders to the East, while at the same time maintaining trade with the Arabs to the West. To appreciate the complexity of the dynamics of the time, we should bear in mind that the economic fortunes of Pisa and Prato depended largely on the purchase of wool from Morocco, which brought down the market prices hitherto dominated by French wools. While some sovereigns squandered fortunes and laid lands to waste to assert their rule, elsewhere rulers were sealing agreements to promote trade, safeguarding peace on the seas. We might take the example of Berta, Queen of the Franks and wife of the Marquis of Tuscany who sent gifts and a missive full of praise to the Abbasid caliph al-Muktafi (al-Muktaf¯ı) in 906. A similar initiative was undertaken by the Umayyad caliph of Andalusia Abd al-Rahman III (Abd al-Rah.m¯an, 913–961), who in 939 granted maritime truce to Hugh of Arles, King of Italy (926–947).2 A rather different story is offered by a cultural history rich in exchanges and fruitful trade. Glazed ceramics and paper were introduced with the administration of the Fatimids in Sicily, evidenced in documents of the Norman period drawn up in Greek and Arabic.3 In Andalus the caliph Abd al-Rahman III introduced the court to the sciences and astronomical discoveries of Eastern origin, equipping himself with the first astrolabe (Menocal, 1990). The geographers compiled the first pilot books, subsequently used by the Italian merchants, and the poets celebrated medical and measuring instruments like the compass. The aspirations of the Church to prevail over Islam and regain the holy lands of Jerusalem went hand-in-hand with the interests of sovereigns and merchants seeking control of the ports and trade with the Middle East; so it was that in 1095 Pope Urban II announced the first crusade. His appeal was taken up by the French, Norman and German nobles, and found the support of the fleets of Venice and Genoa.

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In the twelfth century, despite the military military clashes, some sovereigns gave a warm reception to Arabic scholars, like the Norman king Roger II, who commissioned the Moroccan geographer al-Idrisi (al-Idr¯ıs¯ı, 1099–1165) to produce the first geographical atlas, The book of Roger. Collaboration between craftsmen of different religious persuasions is also attested in the field of architecture; the Norman period saw the creation of the wooden ceiling of the Palatine chapel and Roger’s Room in the Royal Palace, as well as the Cathedral of Monreale. Coexistence between Christian, Jewish and Muslim intellectuals characterized the age—not only in Palermo, where they worked in the administration in the aftermath of the Christian conquest of Sicily, but also in other capitals of the Mediterranean where they collaborated in commercial activities (Metcalfe, 2003). From the discovery of the Cairo Geniza, we learn that merchants of the three faiths worked together and exchanged favours (Lo Jacono, 2018). In the thirteenth century these collaborations continued with the Emperor Frederick II, whose court saw the participation of Arabic scholars who, with the help of Jewish colleagues, translated works of philosophy, medicine and the art of government, like the book Consolation of the Ruler During the Hostility of his Subjects by the Siculo-Arab scholar Ibn Zafar (Hrair Dekmejan & Thabit, 2000: 125–137). In Spain, too, King Alfonso the Wise of Castile had works of Arabic science, literature and philosophy translated to circulate them among the intellectuals of the time. Among the translations, we find the celebrated Book of the Ascension, which recounts the journey of the Prophet in the after-world, various references to which are to be found in Dante’s Divine Comedy (Cerulli, 1971). Frederick II received the intellectuals of the time in his court and corresponded with Arabic scholars, including the philosopher from Murcia Ibn Saba‘in (Ibn Sab¯ın). On the occasion of his journey to Jerusalem, he stopped off in Egypt where the Sultan al-Kamil (al-K¯amil) received him with various men of learning to answer the Emperor’s enquiries. He then succeeded in gaining the crown of Jerusalem (1229) without engaging in conflict thanks to his connections and diplomatic skills (Stasolla, 1999). The Mediterranean is morphologically a landlocked sea; events even occurring at considerable distances affect its fortunes and reflect interdependence. The wars for control of North Europe between French, British, Danes, Germans and Norwegians saw many knights making their way down to Rome. Similarly, the ceaseless conflict in the Balkans, on one side, and in Central Asia on the other weakened powerful empires, like

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the Byzantine Empire and the Abbasid Caliphate (1258). In the meantime, the advance of the Mongols contained the expansive efforts of the Turkish potentates, but the Mameluke Baybars stopped them at ‘Ayn Jal¯ut (the Spring of Goliath, 1260) and, having proclaimed himself Sultan, appointed as caliph one of the last Abbasids to escape the destruction of Baghdad. Shortly after the incursion of the Mongols, a pandemic broke out in Egypt, documented by the doctor poet Ibn D¯aniy¯al (Corrao, 1996a). The devastation resulting from military invasions drove the peasants away from their fields, causing famine and a massive flow of indigent immigrants to Cairo. In the early years of the fourteenth century, famine came to Europe, too, followed all too soon by the Black Death, as recounted by Boccaccio in the Decameron. The huge toll of deaths led to radical changes in Europe: the dwindling of the labour force focused attention on ways to automate work, the printing press being one of the inventions that followed on this dramatic event (Diamond, 1998: 155, 185). The end of the Abbasid Caliphate (1258) saw a major turning point in the history of Islam, according to the analysis of the historian Ibn Khaldun (Ibn Khald¯un, 1332–1406) (Campanini, 2019: 24–25); ‘as.abiyya, the sense of belonging to a group, lost ground, and to cope with the crisis of the values of the Caliphate resort was made to the force of arms and the ‘as.abiyya of the Mameluke Turks, who succeeded in governing the region and ensuring peaceful conditions for the trade routes between East and West for three more centuries, before the arrival of the Ottomans. In this fateful moment, another major cultural transformation marked a crossroad, with diversification of the traditions on the opposite shores of the Mediterranean. While the year 1000 saw in Genoa the first Comune, a city government system based on an agreement between the shipping merchants and religious representatives, in Cairo the appointment of the Caliph by the Mameluke Sultan Baybars sealed an alliance between formal faith and military forces. Moreover, with their military power, the Mamelukes had command over the great families controlling craftwork and commerce, made use of the products of their estates and levied taxes at will while, having control over the labour force and building materials, enjoying total rule over the city (Lapidus, 1967: 77–78).

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Notes for Rereading the History of the Mediterranean: After the Discovery of the Americas

The balance of power between North and South, which had even survived the fall of the Roman Empire and the end of Mediterranean unity, was interrupted—according to Pirenne—by the Islamic presence, while the historian Bono observes it persisted more or less steadily from the Christian victory at Poitiers (732) to the Reconquista (1492) and pirate raids (Bono, 1999; Pirenne, 1992). If we look at the Basin from a broader perspective, we observe that the Mediterranean had been the point of departure and arrival of the Silk Road until 1498, when it lost its centrality following on from the pioneering circumnavigation of Africa by Bartolomeo Diaz (1498), which changed the route towards India. Furthermore, the discovery of America (1492) diverted economic interests towards new horizons, leaving the Basin in the hand of the pirates. Gold and silver arrived from America and slaves from western Africa, while Sudan was left to its destiny. As the great historian Fernand Braudel wrote incisively, ‘the Mediterranean leaves History’ (Braudel, 1995, I: 42–47). Braudel, and many after him, identified in the discovery of the New World the cause of the declining centrality of the Mediterranean, with the paradox that navigation was with techniques learned from the Arabs for the Europeans to traverse the new routes. Pier Giovanni Donini brought the date forward, identifying the first cause of explorations in the wars of the Ottomans with the Mamelukes (1485–1491) and subsequently the Venetians (1499–1503), compelling merchants to seek new routes to the Far East (Donini, 2003: 199). When the Mediterranean lost its centrality and the Star of Islam started its slow and long decline, the so-called ‘holy’ wars did not cease but moved on for a few more centuries to pirate wars, with kidnappings and forced conversions in two directions: from Christianity to Islam and vice versa (Bono, 2016). The area remained on the side-lines of the dominant geopolitical trends of the international system for centuries. From the fifteenth century the emergence of the great powers shifted the major bankers’ economic activities from commerce in ‘Mare nostrum’ to international loans. Spain and the Church were clients of the Ligurian bankers, and Genoa became the capital of Baroque thanks to the wealth accumulated in this new phase of overseas commerce. Alliance with the

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Church led Genoa to the loss of Constantinople (1453), where the Venetians had ensured the conquering Turks sale of arms and safe passage on the sea. The decline of the Maritime Republics saw the rise of the Ottomans, placing the newborn fleet under the Greek pirate Khayr al-Din Barbarossa, who set out from Algiers to plunder the merchant vessels in the Mediterranean. Through all the vicissitudes of conflict, the Ottoman fleet prevailed, conquering key ports to make away with the goods of others. Nevertheless, despite the conquest of the ports of Tunis, Oran and Algiers, trade between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean continued: from Africa came wool, honey, sugar, leather, slaves and gold in exchange for the products of the North, including silk, salt, lacquer, coral and other precious goods (Braudel, 1972, 2: 914–915). In Europe, the year 1500 saw the ascent to the throne of Charles V, Emperor of the Germanic Holy Roman Empire, which extended from the Netherlands to Spain, Italy, Austria and even the Castilian territories in the Americas. Opposing its power over territory to the East was the Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent, whose empire spanned from Algeria to Persia and, in Eastern Europe, after the conquest of Serbia and Hungary it came to threaten Vienna (1529). Moreover, with his expansive efforts outside the Mediterranean Suleiman gained the Gulf of Aden, pressing ahead as far as Indonesia where he took the side of the Muslims of Aceh against the Portuguese. But piracy remained a problem for transport of groups, pilgrims and merchants, leading to a clash between the fleets of Charles V and Suleiman at Algiers, where the Turks, allied with Francis I of France, won out. The Ottomans even conquered Malta, seat of the Knights Hospitaller entrusted by Charles Carlo V with the fight against piracy in the Mediterranean, which they held for some time. With the ascent to the throne of Philip II, the fight against the Turks waxed even fiercer, given also the proliferation of attacks aiming to conquer the Spanish and Italian coasts. Towers and fortifications were erected for protection of the population and sighting of the Turks, at considerable cost to the state, coming on top of the costs borne to maintain the army. The sovereign, inspired by the sense of a mission to re-establish Christianity, succeeded in forming the Holy League with Venice, Genoa and the Pope against the Ottomans, getting the better of them (1571) after a series of skirmishes at Lepanto (Braudel, 1972, II: 1166–1177).

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Defeat did not stop the Sultans from continuing to dominate in the Mediterranean for two centuries, while in the Atlantic development of the mercantile economy and shipbuilding technology catalysed the advance of states through the Companies of the Indies—Dutch, French and, in particular British—which eventually subdued the Mogul Empire of Delhi. If the battle of Lepanto (1571) marked the beginning of the slow Ottoman decline, it above all opened the way to a new Mediterranean balance between the Christian powers on the northern shore and the Islamic powers to the South and East. While the countries on the northern shore of the Mediterranean strove to gain positions of power and independence from the control of the Church and the great empires, the Ottoman Empire fell into the same traps as the Byzantine Empire, shedding its lifeblood in wars in the Balkans and with Persia, the old Shiite enemy that sought not only strategic but also religious leadership in the Middle East. On the military and economic dynamics that saw the powers on either side of the Mediterranean playing leading roles, there is no lack of specific studies. Here I will illustrate only some of the causes underlying the shifting patterns that led to change in the Ottoman strategy. The Sultan, and the family of Othman, held sway over lands and peoples; even the military were seen as his slaves (kul), but the legitimacy of his power was bound up with military success, with his capacity to fulfil the jihad in the name of the glory of Islam. Just a century after the times of Suleiman, the propulsive power of the ghazi (conquerors) was waning and expansion stagnating, with negative effects on the Empire’s economic fortunes and the army’s prestige. Moreover, with its great variety of mystical confraternities, Persia was undermining the Sunni sovereign’s authority, threatening the very heart of the Empire (Mardin, 1973a: 173). The military nature of the Empire had reinforced the more markedly Muslim aspects of power to consolidate legitimation, representing and guiding the interests of Sunni Islam. With the centralization of the administration, a parallel bureaucratic system had been created for the legal and educational fields. This brought in a principle of equality while limiting the Sultan’s freedom in these areas; the plurality of the legal system was brought into line with the conservative Sunni Hanbali school at the expense of the other religious schools. In the relations between the Near East and the West, a series of crusades continued until the seventeenth century with the aim of halting Muslim expansion in the Balkans (Angeliki & Mottahedeh, 2001). The

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Ottomans had not embarked on a determined policy of mass conversion, but they did make a point of setting up Sharia courts and levying the jizya (the tax reserved for non-Muslims) to gain the maximum economic profit. Another aim was to find their way into the trade in raw materials and slaves with their own merchants along the rivers of Eastern Europe. They also took advantage of the practice of Devshirme, which entailed the kidnapping and conversion of young men to recruit in the Turkish infantry, the jannissaries, the first regular Ottoman army instituted as from the early stages of expansion into the Balkans. In both the army and the administration, Christians, often converted to Islam, held positions of power. For example, Stephen, a son of the King of Herzegovina, became Ahmed and, with his successful career Grand Vizier, he married one of the daughters of the conqueror of Constantinople, Mehmet II, and remained influential in the court up to the times of Selim I (Pinson, 1993:10–16, 23–27, 33). Particularly significant among the factors that led to diversified lines of development were the problem of piracy, slavery, forced conversions and the fortunes of women, as well as technological innovation and, in particular, the printing press. Between 1500 and 1650, the Mediterranean was dominated by conflicts between the corsairs—representatives of states, both Christian and Muslim, bound by rules and pacts in their predatory exploits—and pirates, breaking the law for their own advantage and even ready to attack the ships of friendly states (Bono, 1993: 9). Throughout the Ottoman period, the corsair war was considered a matter of state, in particular in Algeria where, in the early years of the nineteenth century, Hamid¯u (1773–1815) was seen as a national hero in conflict with the Christians, a conflict justified by the spirit that inspired the holy war fighters. In nearby Tunisia, too, while promoting trade with the states to the North, the local governors failed to put a stop to piracy, seen to express the values of the jihad (Abun Nasr, 1987: 177). It should be noted that responsibility for the dreadful deeds associated with kidnapping and raids falls equally on the Maghrebi and the Knights of Malta, as well as the Knights of Saint Stephen, who were stationed in Pisa (Bono, 1999 114–115). According to Islam, human beings are born free and spiritually remain so, but non-believers may be reduced to slavery (Brunschvig, 1960); redemption is only possible through conversion, as in the case of Devshirme. The situation gets rather worse when it comes to women,

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for the master acquires not only the soul, but also the body. If, however, the woman is able to give her master male offspring, Islam recognizes her right no longer to be sold, and her freedom to receive part of the inheritance when the master dies. This was not the case in Christian territory, where the Muslim woman, or in any case the foreign slave woman, was seen not only as a stranger but also as a hostile figure, not to be trusted, and not to be spared physical violence and all sorts of abuse (Fiume, 2009: 46–57). It is not easy to find documentation on the private life of slave women, but the literary sources often cast light on the mentality of the time. An example of hostility and diffidence towards black slave women was recounted by Giambattista Basile (1566–1632) in Lu cunto de li cunti, ovvero lo trattenemiento de’ peccerille (The tale of tales, or children’s entertainment); a princess is betrothed to a prince, but a crafty black slave woman slips him a magic potion and gets him to marry her. Starting from the frame tale, reflecting the model of ‘The Thousand and One Nights’ (or The Arabian Nights), which was also taken up by Boccaccio in the Decameron, the princess resorts to tales; for five days, stories of love and betrayal are recounted, eventually coming to the last tale exposing the treachery of the slave woman, who was condemned and put to death (Corrao, 2001; Basile, 2006). Another tale—true this time, however—is the story of Alessandro de’ Medici, called the Moor because of his dark skin, son of Lorenzo II (although more probably of Cardinal Giulio de’ Medici, who was to become Pope Clement VII) and a mulatta serving woman in the Medici household. Subsequent to an agreement between the Pope and Charles V and the capitulation of the Florentine Republic, he became Duke of Florence (1532). In those centuries of wars and forced movements of populations, a decisive factor was the expulsion of Jews and Muslims from Spain. It has been estimated that over five million people were compelled to live in isolation or conditions of slavery (Bono, 1999: 100). The better-off Jews and Muslims could avoid conversion in the court of the Holy Inquisition fleeing to North Africa or the Middle East, and if the persons captured had sufficient means, like the writer Miguel de Cervantes, they could hope to be held prisoners and not reduced to slavery while awaiting the ransom procured by the families and delivered by ambassadors or religious authorities. The slaves who were not sold were confined in prisons or special places like the Bagni di Livorno, where the population of ‘Turks’ came to 2000 in the seventeenth century. Return to Christian territory entailed

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abjuration and reconversion to Islam; for Christian converts, a trial was held by the Holy Inquisition for verification.4 From certain documents regarding the negotiations and the literary evidence, it emerges not only that conflict between the parties could become violent and deadly, but also that diplomatic and cultural exchanges continued despite the objective difficulties. For example, when the ambassador of the Sultan of Morocco visited Palermo and Naples with a view to the liberation of some slaves, according to his report he was received in a spirit of generous and respectful hospitality (De Simone, 1986).5 Subsequent to Islamization in North Africa, Spain and the Middle East, the Arabic language prevailed over Latin and Greek; in Sicily, Arabic remained in use for a long time thanks to the transcription in Hebrew characters. Interesting evidence of the continuity of cultural exchanges is to be seen in the diffusion of the lingua franca. In order to facilitate trade in the ports, a Ligurian dialect mixed with Venetian began to be used among the seafaring people and the merchants; this evolved into a basic form of Italian that was used to draw up contracts and capitulations, to be replaced by French and English in the following centuries (Ostler, 2005). A crucial element in the cultural transformations of the fifteenth century was the invention of the printing press, thanks to which the imprecise copies of the amanuenses gave way to more exact printed reproduction and as the techniques developed circulation increased and learning became more widespread. The Islamic world had, through tenth-century Fatimid Palermo, passed on to Europe the use of paper, contributing to the transition from oral to written culture, but now, in the Ottoman age, it rejected this Western ‘innovation’ on account of the rigorously literal approach of the religious institutions.6 Although Ottoman culture responded positively to the findings of scientific research, study of history and geography and indeed the production of the minor arts with the development of miniatures and calligraphy, innovation in research methods raised suspicions rather than arousing real interest. Moreover, while circulation of the printed word led to development and perfection in national languages, on other shores of the Mediterranean imposition of the Turkish language in the administration widened the gap between popular culture (in the various local dialects) and the classical Arabic of the religious hierarchies. The isolation of the local cultures from the central culture and from European scientific development would

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come to weigh heavily on the evolution of the educational system and limit the scope of research. In the sixteenth century, Italy, from North to South, went through a period of great cultural richness, with an extraordinary flourishing of artists including Michelangelo, Raphael and Palladio. The cities of Rome and Naples, thanks to Sansovino (1570) and Vignola (1573) for the former and De Ribera and Domenichino in the case of the latter, were enhanced with masterpieces of Baroque art. Artists active in Italy also circulated in Spain, Holland and France, and indeed even in the Ottoman capital. Some sultans were patrons of the arts, like Suleiman, who provided support to the brilliant architect Mimar Sinan. This great contemporary of Michelangelo created over three hundred buildings including the celebrated Suleymaniyye Mosque, for the dome of which he took inspiration from the dome of Hagia Sofia, but taking the model even further. Suleiman also loved poetry and the minor arts, and promoted the sculptural arts and the sciences, as well as taking an interest in Western arts, following in the footsteps of his great-grandfather Mehmet II, whose portrait was painted by both Bellini and Costanzo da Ferrara. Of Suleiman there remain a portrait by the workshop of Titian and an etching by Hieronimus Hopfer (1526). According to the philosopher Norberto Bobbio in Western collective imaginings from Aristotle onwards, the East has long remained associated with despotism, suffice to recall Machiavelli, Hobbes and Montesquieu; but it is also the place where Christianity began, and in the European iconography, as in music, it was identified with biblical narratives and the story of Jesus and the holy family. We carry some peculiar aspects of the two cultures within us even if we are not aware of it (Bobbio, 2020: 72). As from the eleventh century, the literary sources, and in particular the Chanson de geste, evoked relations with the countries to the East of the Mediterranean with accounts of interminable successions of clashes, robbery and revolts (Galmès de Fuentes, 2002). We find stories of conflict and kidnapping, and since the ancient world the fighting is not always over matters of religion alone; suffice it to recall the story of Cleopatra, celebrated by Dante, Boccaccio, Chaucer and Shakespeare, without forgetting his memorable Otello. The figure of the Muslim enemy was reflected in the celebrated Italian epic poem Orlando Furioso (Raging Roland, 1516) by Ludovico Ariosto and Tasso’s Gerusalemme liberata (Jerusalem Delivered, 1581). Some centuries later, the world of the industrial revolution and Western rule

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over the waves would look back to the East in ‘primitive’ terms, conjured up in collective imaginings with the exotic fascination of the Thousand and One Nights, the monumental Arabic work translated by the French ambassador to Istanbul, Antoine Galland (1646–1715). In the course of time, dwindling territorial acquisitions meant a drain on the coffers of the Ottoman state; lack of close control over the fiscal system and the prolonged military effort contributed to the crisis of the Empire. The agricultural system failed to move on from the old, traditional techniques, crushed by the demands of the government and aristocracy without being able to promote innovation and productivity, while trade was also in the doldrums and the industrial revolution had yet to take off. Furthermore, the Ottomans failed to stand up to the commercial competition of the Dutch East Indies Company (1602), and subsequently the challenge represented by Great Britain, and then France, in development of the economy, and in technology and culture. Gradually, European trade privileges and capital found their way into the Empire, squeezing the scope for any belated local initiatives, thanks also to the protection of the capitulations. In the Age of Enlightenment, the Sultan Mustafa III (1717–1774) had imported architectural innovations from Versailles and tulips for the gardens of Istanbul, but the spirit of modernity did not impinge upon him, nor the need to promote the production system. While new forms of wealth, no longer dependent on landed property, were growing in the West and autonomous bourgeois institutions were sprouting in the cities, science stopped short at the mere collection and description of data in the Ottoman Empire, while teaching, institutionalized on local bases, remained traditional. At the political level, the Sultan was aware of the fact that the power of the Empire depended upon the military capacities of the army, reform of which was essential to maintain control over the European and Arab dominions. Defeats suffered at the hands of the European powers showed up the weakness of the Empire, even if the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774), recognizing the caliphal authority over the Muslim people, provided the opportunity for political revival of a title which was essential to maintain control over the Arab dominions. According to the Turkish historian Kemal Karpat, the capitulations (1699, 1718, 1774), signed with the treaties subsequent to military defeat, lay behind the more recent changes on the southern shores. While the treaty of Küçük Kaynarca confirmed the Sultan’s role as Caliph, it

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granted Russia, considerable economic privileges for the foreign traders, as well as protection of the orthodox Christians (Karpat, 1973); the privileges granted to Russia were later extended to other European powers. While revolution inspired by the principles of the Enlightenment raged in Paris, the splendours of the Caliphate were dimming to a sunset glow. The seeds of discontent were also at work in the Ottoman Empire, eventually inspiring the religious revolt of the reformist ‘Abd al-Wahhab (‘Abd al-Wahh¯ab) in Arabia and the military revolt of the Mameluk Aly Bey al-Kabir (Aly Bey al-Kab¯ır) in Egypt (Corrao, 2017). Against this background, Ottoman military reorganization was launched, first entrusted to a French convert, and subsequently to the Prussians, leading to suppression of the jannissaries and the formation of a modern army (Corrao, 1985). On the whole, apart from the ceaseless military attacks, the commercial privileges granted to foreigners and minorities led to a rift in relations between the Ottoman Muslims and the minorities within the Empire. The reorganization of the Empire was planned with a set of reforms (Tanzimat, 1839–1876) and introduction of the concept of citizenship, and thus of nominal equality between all the Caliph’s subjects, recognition went to the subjectivity of the individual, no longer seen simply as a member of a religious community. With attribution of the role of modern legislator to the state, the role of the religious communities would eventually have secondary importance. Moreover, thanks to the aforementioned capitulations, commercial disputes saw the interests of foreign citizens and minorities protected by the Consulate and no longer by Sharia as they had been hitherto. This state of affairs prompted the resistance of the Ulam¯a , who held that the state could not exercise this legislative power since the Law was revealed by God to the Prophet, and there can be no law but that of the Sharia; this, however, applied mainly to private and family law, and so the sovereign had a certain degree of autonomy in legislating in the field of administration. Thus, the Sultan could devise reforms, but could not introduce norms that would in practice change the conception of the status of the person, as was the case with definition of the citizen’s rights. Western culture and modernity found a place within the horizons of the city-dwelling élites, and many young people began to travel to France and study French. In the nineteenth century, with the introduction of printing, journals and translations disseminated Europe’s cultural models—innovations that separated intellectual élite from the vast

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majority of population who, besides being illiterate, were mostly attached to an archaic, patriarchal conception of religion.

3

Reform and Culture in Contemporary Islam

Usually, historians and political analysts move on fairly quickly from an overview of the past to the current situation. In the preceding sections, however, I have considered some events of crucial importance in three particular periods of Mediterranean history (the expansion of the Arab west-wards, the Ottomans and the piracy, and the effects of modernization), stressing the fruitful interchange of trade that thrived despite frequent wars and conflicts as well as epidemics that widened the gap between the opposite sides of the Mediterranean. The need to do without the Ottoman intermediary opened the way for the fortunes of the Indian Companies to take off. Continuing my rapid review of events in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, I will dwell on only certain crucial phases of transformation brought about thanks to cultural contacts and trade relations, which in turn led to modernization on the South and East shores of the Mediterranean. I take this approach since, as recent events like the Arab revolts have also demonstrated (uprisings or the so-called “Arab springs”), no aspect of civil life can be analysed in isolation from the other events; a mutual dependence correlates the events, and with them the various factors and levels of a culture and society (Ikeda, 2011). The conquest of Egypt (1798), and the arrival of French scientists and scholars together with the French army, brought the Ottomans up against the rise in Western technological and economic power—hence the need to launch economic alongside military reform. The Empire’s agricultural system had failed to move on from the old, traditional techniques, crushed by the demands of the government and aristocracy without being able to promote innovation and productivity, while trade was also in the doldrums and the industrial revolution had yet to take off. In short, the West had stepped up the needs of raw materials and markets. Gradually, European trade privileges and capital found their way into the Empire, squeezing the scope for any belated local initiatives, thanks also to the protection of the capitulations. While new forms of wealth, no longer dependent on landed property, were growing in the West and autonomous bourgeois institutions were sprouting in the cities, science stopped short at the mere collection and description of data in the Ottoman Empire, while teaching, institutionalized on local bases,

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remained traditional. At the political level, the Sultan was aware of the fact that the power of the Empire depended upon the military capacities of the army, reform of which was essential to maintain control over the European and Arab dominions (Corrao, 2017). For the sake of improved control over the immense territory, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Ottomans introduced the real estate registry and reorganized real estate, despite the hostility of the local notables who felt their economic power threatened by reinforcement of the central government. There was also the need to reform finances in order to acquire the resources necessary to modernize viability and promote trade with the West. The Empire had never had a strong mercantile vocation, in part due to a culture more interested in favouring the well-being of the community than that of the individual, nor had it promoted alliance between the Ottoman economic forces, landowners and local merchants with the European capitalists (Davison, 1973: 150–160, Conte, 2018: 51–57). Launching reforms and modernization entailed extremely high costs and encouraged an inflow of European capital, setting a mechanism of dependence into motion: with growing debt and loans backed by customs and fiscal revenue, representatives of the creditor countries eventually found their way into the Ottoman administration (Donini, 2003: 257). To guarantee the flow of money and payments, the capitalists compelled the Sultan to abolish the state monopoly on purchases (1838); this also favoured the interests of the landowners who, freed from the monopoly, could have access to the foreign markets and to the markets of the minorities which were mostly local intermediaries for foreign businesses. Their gains came at the expense of the central government, which lost control over economic sectors of key importance for the Empire. As trade intensified, the non-Muslim communities played a growing role in the field of transactions (Corrao, 2014). With expansion overseas, the European powers secured access to raw materials and new markets, but also reinforced their own positions in Europe, where political and even military conflict continued among the nations. Various reasons contributed to the drive for European expansion: nationalist ideology, more power to the social groups that supported the government and matters of foreign policy connected with internal politics as in the case of France, where expansion was needed to overcome the shame of the defeat dealt at Sedan by the Germanic Empire. There were also strategic reasons, like control of the routes to India (Suez) in

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the case of France and Great Britain, and access to the Mediterranean (Dardanelles) for Russia (Miege, 1976: 42–46; Calchi Novati, 1979: 34; Collotti, 1979: 66; Ardia, 1979: 286). In this scenario, Orientalism contributed to providing ideological support for expansionist policies, which came to be conducted in the spirit of a civilizing mission (Said 1987). Pamphlets, paintings and novels contributed to the oriental imaginings of the Europeans, fascinated by the exotic translation of the Thousand and One Night. In turn, Western pressure stimulated the urge for the East to reach the same degree of modernization as that of the colonizers. In Egypt, Muhammad Aly (Muh.ammad Al¯ı, 1769–1849), having driven out the French (1805), reorganized the army and administration, but maintained the monopoly on production of cotton (Hershlag, 1964: 86). His reorganization of the army was achieved so rapidly that he was able to support the Sultan in the war in Greece and Arabia, and to go on to threaten him when he wanted to deny the promised autonomy (Turco-Egyptian war of 1831–1839). The costs borne for the wars and economic development, coming on top of foreign interference, undermined the country’s economic fortunes. While establishing hereditary sovereignty and internal independence, the Sovereign (Khedivè) found himself obliged to grant commercial privileges, such as the monopolies on purchases, previously granted by the Sultan to Great Britain, and to look on as Egypt’s emerging industry went into decline. Here, we will not go into the manifold complex economic and social changes that led to the decline of the Turkish Empire and the birth of the Arab nations, referring readers to the ample literature on the subject (Issawi 1966; Holt, 1968: 303; Karpat, 1973; Mardin, 1973a; Corrao, 1985). With a view to reform in the field of education, Muhammad ‘Aly sent a mission of students to Paris to learn about the colonizers’ scientific advance. On returning, the delegation leader Shaykh al-Tahtawi (Shaykh al-T.aht.¯aw¯ı, 1801–1873) set up a translation school in support of commercial transactions and to bring out the first journal in Arabic and Ottoman Turkish. While economic agreements were being drawn up that favoured the British in optimizing the production of rice and cotton for export, in the space of twenty years the country grew into a hotbed of cultural initiatives and ideas. Exchanges intensified at both the commercial-technological and the cultural level with a proliferation of translations of European works and study missions. The cultural ferment was also fed by the arrival

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with the tradesmen of young Italian and French revolutionaries fleeing to Greece and Egypt to escape the repression following on the defeats of the Risorgimento movement and exercised in the nineteenth-century political clashes.7 The ideals of the French Revolution were spreading among the officers trained by British, French and Prussian military experts, and thanks also to certain professional figures like doctors, experts in accountancy and jurists invited to the court, they lived side-by-side with the new administrative élite of the renewed Ottoman institutions. The construction of the Suez Canal (1859–1869) set Egypt at the centre of the international trade and economic interests of the colonial powers. The enormous costs borne to construct the canal and modernize the country, including the creation of Alexandria-Cairo railroad and industries, as well as regulation of the Nile, led to massive debt with the foreign banks. The Egyptian capital had become a magnet for trade, and with its rapidly enriched elite, it had attracted artists and intellectuals. The city centre was rebuilt by Italian and French architects, including the engineer Eiffel who designed a bridge over the Nile. In 1870, the National Library opened up to the public and liberal newspapers were printed, such as al-Ahram (al-Ahr¯am, 1875), which promoted the circulation of translations of foreign literary works. The attitudes of these young generations were influenced by the classical texts on liberalism and socialism. Ottoman intellectuals like Namik Kemal (1840–1888) and the Egyptian politician Mustafa Kamel (Mus.t.af¯a K¯amil, 1874–1908), founder-to-be of the national party, were received in the French salons where they denounced Ottoman despotism and British political interference, receiving sympathy and help. In all this flourishing of artistic activities, Verdi composed Aida, and the theatre companies of Europe enjoyed great success, providing promising conditions for the birth of Arab theatre. The Egyptian Parliament was inaugurated in 1866, followed ten years later by the Ottoman in Constantinople (1876). The Sultan introduced a commercial code, and subsequently a penal code, which narrowed down the scope for application of Sharia, favouring development of an embryonic conception of the modern state. With the reform of the 1876, following the pattern of European codification, compromise was sought between religious law and secular legislation with the idea, among others, of promoting primary education outside the religious environment. In Egypt, liabilities plunged the country into bankruptcy. The young military class and the exponents of the emerging bourgeoisie felt that it was time to put an end to the corrupt regime of the Khedive, responsible

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for the financial troubles and the growing interference of the European powers. Under the leadership of Urabi Pasha (Urab¯ı P¯ash¯a, 1841– 1911), the revolutionaries seized power (1876–1879), but the short-lived liberal venture ended with the intervention of Great Britain (Cleveland, 2000). Thus, an Anglo-French economic dual control system was established (1876) to guarantee the foreign creditors (Lutsky, 2002).

4

Reformism Between Innovation and Tradition-Imitation

The rapid modernization also prompted some new thinking by the religious figures, who sought to identify and eliminate the causes of the spiritual decadence of the Islamic world. After an initial period of support for the Caliph Sultan, the first great religious reformer, al-Afghani (Jam¯al al-D¯ın al-Afgh¯an¯ı, 1838–1897), condemned his autocracy and sought refuge first in Egypt and then in France (see below Hashas, chapter 5). He collaborated with Muhammad Abdu (Muh.ammad Abd¯u 1849–1905) and Rashid Rida (Rash¯ıd Rid.¯a, 1865–1935) to renew the spirit of pure faith, free from the trammels of the time, thereby prompting awareness of the self, its role and its value. Maintaining that Islam was compatible with the modernity of the West, these reformers formulated positive responses meeting the needs of the times (Sedgwik, 2009). Tunis saw the arrival of some leaders of the Italian Risorgimento including Giuseppe Garibaldi. Europeans offered their own contribution by creating journals and renovating the architecture of the North African capital, a major destination for the sub-Saharan routes. In Beirut and Damascus, too, Christian religious schools were inaugurated to educate the new generations, teaching Western scientific subjects and disseminating modern ideas, and with them awareness of the need for updating not only in scientific learning but also in the juridical context. With the signing of the ‘Entente cordiale’ (1904), friction between France and Great Britain over their respective areas of influence was eased, and this also reduced tension in the colonies. The Iranian Revolution (1906) and then the coup d’état of the Young Turks (1908) led to approval of the constitution, inspiring hope and confidence in the Islamic world (Mardin, 2006). In Egypt, the first political journals were published, and shortly after the constitution of parties was authorized. The success of the National Party stimulated political debate, opening the

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way to the birth of the ‘Umma’ (community) party of the liberal Lutfi alSayyid (Lut.f¯ı al-Sayyid, 1872–1963), one of the founders of the Egyptian National Bank (Ahmed, 1960). The literary salons opened their doors to intellectuals and politicians; in Cairo, the salon of the poet Mayy Ziadeh (Ma¯ı Ziy¯ada, 1886–1941) was well attended, as was that of Mari Ajami (M¯ari Ajam¯ı, 1888–1965) in Damascus. It is worth recalling that the poets Giuseppe Ungaretti (1888–1970), Filippo Tommaso Marinetti (1876–1944) and Constantine Kavafis (1863–1933) were born in Alexandria, where they contributed to the city’s intellectual life. European novelists, too, like Lawrence Durrell and Pierre Loti contributed to drawing fascinated attention to the cosmopolitan life of the Ottoman capitals. Ziadeh published in French and Arabic and corresponded with men and women of letters at the international level, including the naturalized American Lebanese Khalil Jubran (Jubr¯an Khal¯ıl Jubr¯an, 1883–1931). The press gave circulation to debates throughout the Arab world, drawing attention to distant authors like the Tunisian al-Shabbi (Ab¯ u al-Q¯asim al-Sh¯abb¯ı, 1909–1934) and Jubran. The cultural ferment and climate of intellectual exchange contributed to revival of Arabic literature and language, the latter having for centuries been replaced by Ottoman Turkish in the bureaucracy and relegated to the juridical and religious spheres. Public schools were founded, like the al-Sadiqi College in Tunis and the University of Cairo. The Egyptian Athenaeum included foreign professors on its staff as the Italian Orientalists Carlo Alfonso Nallino and Guido Rossi. Among their pupils, it is worth remembering the future Dean and writer Taha Husayn (T.aha H . usayn, 1889–1973)—the author of works that revolutionized the academic sphere including, for example, a critical study of pre-Islamic poetry (1927) and a study on the ‘Future of Egyptian culture’ (1938). In the latter text, he stressed that the destiny of Egypt lay in the direction of Europe since, deriving from one of the most ancient Mediterranean civilizations, it shared both the Greek rational cultural tradition and the Roman pragmatic tradition. It was in this environment that the first ideas of emancipation of women found circulation, promoted by Hoda Sha‘arawi (Hud¯a Shaar¯aw¯ı, 1879–1947), the first Egyptian woman to take off her veil in public on returning from the feminist convention of Rome in 1922. To understand the reactions of the more conservative part of the population to the bold critical and formal experimentation of the Arabic men and women of letters, we should look back to the mentality that was

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widespread in the early twentieth century. Predominant then, and often even now, was the view of the Arabic classics established by al-Ghazali (Ab¯u H¯amid al-Ghazz¯al¯ı, c. 1058–1111). According to this expert in Islamic Law, the actions of men belong to God, and men can only acquire them; consequently, for the traditionalists, imitation is an absolute value (Adonis, 1993: 26; Gardet, 1981). He also held that the actions of men are determined by God, the only creator beyond the appearance of things. The classical, traditional interpretation of Islamic Law—according to which man does not act but is acted upon—was reflected in poetry and the need to create solely along the lines of the tradition, thereby remaining in the sphere of imitation. Thus, a culture of ‘tradition–imitation’ was consolidated in the field of intellectual creation (Corrao, 2017). This approach has prevailed in the conservative intellectual circles, with a rigid respect of the aesthetic elements and their formal criteria, while innovatory creation has continued to be viewed with suspicion. This is why, as from the beginning of the twentieth century, querelles between modernists and conservatives in politics have been reflected in the world of literature and the arts. After the First World War, with defeat of the Ottoman Empire and the end of the Caliphate, came the secular republic founded by Atatürk (1923). If the young modernists rejoiced, the majority of the population suffered a twofold trauma: the end of an epoch and the bewildering disappearance of a cultural and religious reference model. It was a choice that kindled keen debate among the various intellectual currents of the vast territory of Islam. In Egypt, from the ashes of the National Party arose the Wafd of Sad Zaghlul (Sad Zaghl¯ul, 1859–1927), together with other political groupings more influenced by developments in the West, like the Socialist group inspired by Salama Musa (Sal¯ama M¯us¯a, 1887–1958), and the Green Shirts party of fascist inspiration. Egypt’s rich cosmopolitan society, unconcerned by the unequal distribution of wealth, forgot the need for solidarity called for by the poorest marginalized components of Westernized society, who found the desired response, based on the principles of the Koran, in the words of Hasan al-Banna (H . asan al-Bann¯a, 1906–1949) founder of the Muslim Brothers (Jam¯aat al-Ikhw¯an al-Muslim¯ın, 1928). The French in Lebanon set up a Parliamentary assembly consisting of political representatives of the various religious groups, reviving the old system of community administration of the Turkish millet in political terms. In Syria, collaboration between Christian and Muslim forces

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led to the creation of the Arabic Socialist party of Bath (H . izb al-Bath al-Arab¯ı al-Ishtir¯ak¯ı) in 1947, founded by the Christian Michel Aflaq (M¯ısh¯ıl Aflaq, 1910–1989) and the Muslim Salah al-Din al-Bitar (S.al¯ah. al-D¯ın al-B¯ıt.¯ar, 1912–1980). In Algeria, opposition to French colonialism clustered around the religious leader Ibn Badis (‘Abd al-H . am¯ıd Ibn B¯ad¯ıs, 1887–1940), promoter of Muslim schools and journals like al-Muntaqid. Besides contributing to cultural advance, he also created centres for assistance to the poor and to remedy the shortcomings of the French segregationist regime which penalized the Muslim population (Corrao, 2017). Islamic reformers formulated a religious and political response to foreign despotism, and at the same time fought the local fatalism. The liberal intellectuals fell into line with the Western philosophers with the aim of bringing the rights proclaimed with the revolution of the Enlightenment to the Arab world. For example, Lutfi al-Sayyid declared that defining Islamic territory as the homeland for every Muslim was an imperialist principle, and called ‘Pan-Islamism a doomed ideology because the very existence of states is based on common interests, not common sentiments’ (Lutfi, 1947: 99). Before the movement for Arab socialism emerged, the 1940s had already witnessed the birth of nationalist political parties in many countries, from the Young Algeria of Ferhat Abbas (Firh.¯at Abb¯as, 1899– 1985), promoter of open democracy, to the popular party of the Syrian Antoun Saadeh (Ant.u ¯ n Sa¯ada, 1904–1949). Nasser’s (N¯as.ir) rise to power, with liberation of the Suez Canal (1956) and construction of the Aswan Dam (1962), stirred the spirits of many young people who hoped to leave the region’s economic and cultural backwardness behind in the near future. Propaganda of the ideals of Arab socialism, circulated through radio and television, fuelled hopes of emancipation, combining the sense of belonging to an Arab community with concern for the future of the downtrodden by means of an inclusive policy. Intellectuals and artists, not to mention singers like the Egyptian Umm Kulthum (Umm Kalth¯um, 1904–1975) and musicians like Abd al-Wahh¯ab (Abd al-Wahh¯ab, 1902–1991), played their part in boosting hopes after years of humiliation. Inspired by the ambition to achieve the power of the ex-colonial empires Nasser, and then Hafiz al-Asad (H . ¯afiz. al-Asad, 1930–2000) and the other socialist national leaders created the one-party system, eliminating other political groupings and repressing the opposition. With the

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persuasive propaganda of Radio Cairo the encouraging voice of the Egyptian leader resounded everywhere, but news of the arrest of Islamists and progressives was suppressed. The journals attacked the liberal intellectuals, accusing them of being insensitive to the suffering endured by the Egyptian people through colonialism, whose values and culture they accepted as accomplices. With the creation of schools, hospitals and ministries that gave work to the newly graduated, a climate of consensus and cohesion grew around the leader, even to the extent of passing over the humiliation of defeat in the Six-Day War (1967). In the Arab countries, the crisis resulting from the defeat of’67 gave a new lease of life to Pan-Arab ideology along anti-imperialist lines, with a rift between the political class and the intellectuals. Appalled by the shameful military performance, the Syrian poet Nizar Qabbani (Niz¯ar Qabb¯an¯ı, 1923–1998) accused the Arab leadership of having repressed the very freedom that was necessary for the cultural growth and emancipation of the people (Corrao, 2017). An emblematic example of this rift ¯ ab published was the case of the Lebanese literary journals: while al-Ad¯  articles by the intellectuals siding with Nasser, Shi r (Poetry) distanced itself from the Arab governments and political alignments. The ostracism of the intellectuals opposed to this journal was prompted by the intention to support the Arab governments threatened by imperialism, and the call to combine forces was considered imperative. On the other hand, the opposition expressed by Adonis in Shi r was based on the conviction of the need, rather, to change society through education and free speech. According to the poet Adonis, only individual change, profound revolution in people’s attitudes towards life and the world, can lead to true and lasting transformation (Adonis, 2009). The Arab countries had never accepted Israeli occupation of Palestinian territory, the Nakba (catastrophe) of 1948, subsequent to which it remained a burning issue in all relations with the West. The difficulty of dialogue with the Western countries also emerged on the occasion and approval of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights; among the signatories were only the six states that had by then achieved at least partial independence (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and Egypt). In 1990, through the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), Saudi Arabia promoted a Declaration of the Rights of Man in Islam which limited many freedoms, prohibiting change of faith and ignoring the emancipation of women and the right to join forces in unions. In 1994, the League of Arab States issued the ‘Arab Charter of

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Human Rights’, which ensured these rights, but on condition that they did not disrupt the safety of the country, in which case they could be suspended (Al-Jabri, 2015; Mousalli, 2001). The rural population remained excluded from the well-being acquired by the urban middle class, which led to increasing malaise. The fatalist, misogynist patriarchy continued to dominate social relations, despite a stream of protests by writers as from the beginning of the twentieth century. The new governments had tried to close the gap between centre and periphery, but forgoing defence of freedom and equality for women. According to the Syrian critic Khalida Said (Kh¯alida Sa¯ıd), the women of the Islamic countries have remained eternally subordinate, and any abuse is justified if it is to defend honour. According to a study by the Lebanese sociologist Fahmiyya Sharafeddin (Fahmiyya Sharaf alD¯ın), violence against women is widespread among the various different cultures in the Middle East, seeing both Christian and Muslim women as victims (Corrao, 2017). The aspirations of women are grossly betrayed; they gained at least juridical equality only in Turkey and Tunisia, elsewhere even formally subject to the misogynist culture of a conservative religious class whose support was sought to avoid any questioning of the legitimacy of the political powers (see below Francesca, chapter 6). Military setbacks and the economic shortcomings of five-year planning showed up the first cracks in the Arab system of socialism. Some governments, as in Egypt and Tunisia, then got down to some rethinking and changed strategy, launching liberal economic policies (Heydarian, 2014: 62–72). Thus, the 1970s saw a wave of privatizations starting and an opening up to foreign capital. Enterprises invested in the specially created tax-free areas (Tunisia, 1972; Egypt, 1977), offering jobs and development (see below Triulzi, chapter 3). Sadat decided to put an end to hostilities with Israel and set about concluding a separate peace agreement, which earned him the vehement censure of the OIC (Organization of Islamic Cooperation) and temporary expulsion from the Arab League, which was transferred to Tunis. On the other hand, however, President Sadat won over the support of the al-Azhar Mosque leaders for the Camp David Agreements (1979), and in return granted prime-time space to a religious programme on television. In the 1980s, Sadat handed back some of the lands that Nasser had expropriated from the old established landowners and made room for political dialogue. The victory of the Iranian Revolution (1979) had rekindled hopes of realizing an Islamic political system responsive to modern society. Arab Governments,

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following Western pressure, opened to the opposition, and in Amman, Tunis and Cairo religious political parties gained some limited representation in Parliament (1984). So, while Westernized people felt increasingly attracted to the dream of Mediterranean integration, the less fortunate sought to create a radical alternative to a model that excluded them. These reforms took place in a broader context of economic policies (Global Mediterranean Politics 1973–1992) designed to promote trade and improve production. A number of events cropped up to limit their effectiveness—the Palestinian terrorist attacks, including Munich (1972) and Fiumicino (1973), the 1979 oil crisis and the entry of Greece into the European Union (1981), followed by Spain and Portugal (1986), leading to approval of protectionist policies in agriculture and textiles. Moreover, with the fall of the wall of Berlin (1989), the EU opened up to the countries of the East, detracting from its commitment to the countries on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. The aim of the Renewed Mediterranean Partnership (1992–1995) to create a free trade area and construct a thoroughgoing regional entity through economic, political and social progress was only partly fulfilled (see below Triulzi, chapter 3). The EU, in fact, was intent on investing in the East while the reforms implemented in the countries to the South and East of the Mediterranean pursued development models that lacked inclusiveness and were flawed by cronyism and corruption (see below Redaelli, chapter 2). Moreover, with discontent over the failure to address the Palestinian issue merging with more general denunciation of the corrupt governments conniving with Western imperialism, consensus grew around the most conservative religious figures who took a softer line on terrorism. The proliferation of attacks aiming to overthrow the established powers led to brutal control of the population combined with fierce repression of civil society, which kept the ruthless and authoritarian governments in power (Francesca, 2012). At the economic level, neo-laissez-faire policies neither stimulated growth nor transformed the countries of the MENA area (Middle East and North Africa) into dynamic elements in the world economy, and they certainly had no effect on the problems of poverty and social injustice. Persisting clientelism together with the involvement of governmental hierarchies in the privatizations blocked the process of economic liberalization (Beau & Graciet, 2009). These dynamics, together with the effects of recurrent international crises, stood in the way of a broad project for reform involving both Islam and the population. The lack of democratic support on the one hand drove the

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governments to accept the conditions imposed by the religious establishment to legitimize their exercise of power, and on the other hand held the countries hostage to international political and economic aid (Francesca, 2012: 114). Some changes did come about, but the enrichment of a limited group of people close to the corridors of power made the unequal distribution of wealth even more evident. Moreover, as tourism developed the advantages went to the major cities and seaside resorts at the expense of the outlying and rural areas, which remained visibly excluded from the circulation of well-being. At the same time, alongside Westernization of part of society, those who were left out emigrated to the oil-producing countries which were enjoying vigorous economic growth. The development model of the states more respectful of Islamic charity revived the dream of creating a community based on solidarity as envisaged in Koranic teaching in their own countries (Heydarian, 2014: 97). The liberalizing policies of some governments opened the way to organization of non-governmental associations giving representation to civil society (Harik, 1997). Areas for aggregation, albeit limited, emerged through these organizations, favoured also by the diffusion of Internet. Dire alliances between illiberal governments and religious conservatives had already cost lives in the past; we may recall the pacifist Mahmud Taha (Mah.m¯ud T.aha, 1909–1985) in Sudan, killed because he wanted to distinguish and separate the universal teachings of the Koran revealed at Mecca from those more closely connected with the historical times of the prophecy, revealed at Medina. Repression of the intellectuals continued to take its grim toll, with the rigged trials of the Syrian philosopher Jalal al-Azm (S.¯adiq Jal¯al al-Azm, 1934–2017) in Lebanon (1969), of the writer al-Saadawi (Naw¯al al-Saad¯aw¯ı, n. 1931–2021) in 1991 and the scholar Abu Zaid (Nas.r H . ¯amid Ab¯u Zayd, 1943–2010) in Egypt (1995); and the activist Al-Hathloul (Lujayn al-Hadhl¯ ul, born in 1989) in Saudi Arabia (2018); all too often, and practically everywhere on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean, opponents have been unjustly arrested and tortured, like the young Italian scholar Giulio Regeni. The following pages contain analysis of various aspects—geopolitical (Redaelli, chapter 2), economic (Triulzi, chapter 3) social advance (Giordano, chapter 4) and gender issues (Francesca, chapter 6)—and the evolution of some countries over the last thirty years. Here, therefore, I will confine myself to a brief overview of some of the main causes that

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led to the Arab revolts and the transformation of them into even more authoritarian regimes or civil wars. Let us take a look at some of the critical points, focusing on seven significant aspects emerging in the countries on the South and East shores of the Mediterranean: 1. lack of alternation in political power, 2. economic investments that are inadequate for development and disregard welfare, 3. corruption, 4. economic crisis, 5. demographic growth, 6. Europe’s closure of access for economic emigrants, 7. failure of Western countries to support democratic movements. Let us begin with the first point, the lack of alternation in political power (El-Affendi, 2017: 124–125), linking this point to two other crucial elements: the history of the country and institutional arrangements. Reference is often made to failed states, but without attempting to understand the historical, political and cultural causes of failure while disregarding the stability of others. These causes affect the ability to manage the economy, but above all the capacity to keep alive the rapport with the people and the legitimacy that ensures stability in power (see below Redaelli and Triulzi, chapters 2–3). The military who had freed Egypt from British colonialism had guaranteed order and economic growth for many more years than the Iraqis and Syrians were able to. On the other hand, the strong religious component that contributed to the Algerian resistance up to final liberation never gave much ground to military secularism, compelled to reckon with it through years of grim civil war in the 1990s. The Kingdoms of Jordan and Morocco have many points in common: the two sovereigns are descendants of the Prophet and succeeded in guiding their countries towards a system of constitutional monarchy with an elected Parliament, leaving the government relatively independent of the Monarchy. Here history played a part in the cohesion of the social parts, and this made the difference: Jordan was born after the end of the mandate system in the Middle East and was conditioned to unite around its identity against the regional instability.

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Morocco, on the other hand, has centuries of history behind it. It was not colonized by the Ottomans (unlike the other Arab countries) and the French protectorate was relatively short-lived (1912–1956, if compared with the case of Algeria, 1830–1962). Moreover, besides being the political head of the country, the King has command over the believers, including Christians and Jews (the most numerous minority in the Arab countries). The Sovereign and the Makhzen (power system of the court and its allies) control much of the country’s production, but thanks to Hassan II and his son Muhammad VI economic reforms have been launched, with some liberalization in the political field (Laroui, 2011). A Moroccan socialist Prime Minister was appointed at the end of the 1990s, but after the Arab revolts of 2011 the King handed power over to the party that gained a majority in the election, and today an exponent of the Islamic party of justice and progress is still at the head of government. The second point concerns economic investments to promote development that are inadequate for development and disregard welfare. As we have seen, in the 1980s many governments created free tax zones offering considerable concessions to the foreign enterprises making investments (see below Triulzi, chapter 3). At the outset, it seemed to be a win– win project, because it created new jobs at zero cost and the enterprises engaged in production without paying taxes or social security contributions for the workers. Unfortunately, the lack of fiscal revenue drained resources for public spending, impoverishing the middle class (El Mikawy et al., 2017: 142–146), damaging the educational and health systems. With the end of the welfare promoted by Arab socialism, investments grew in the private education and health sectors, both rich and poor benefiting from the resources of the Islamic charitable foundations. Helping the poor is obligatory for Muslims, but those who do so tend also to make sure that the beneficiaries behave accordingly. The third point concerns corruption. The new jobs, created thanks to foreign investments, did not produce primary goods and so brought no improvement to the overall income of the middle class; privatization schemes favoured elite clients and significant proportion of revenues was allocated to army and security forces (Heydarian, 2014: 69). Clerks and manual workers were no longer able to pay for the private services unless they turned to the Islamic charitable associations for assistance with all the constraints involved. Thus, corruption increased, and to get a permit or any document in the public sector the need was, and still is, to pay extra on the side. The kickback system helps many to get to the end

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of the month; otherwise, members of the middle class have to do two jobs to survive, one of which in the informal economy (Amaney, 2007). Obviously the poorest, lacking the means to get the corruption system working for them, have scant chances of improving their standards of living (El Mikawy et al., 2017: 149–151). The fourth point, the economic crisis of 2008, aggravated already precarious conditions exponentially, with the concomitant demographic growth (see below Giordano, chapter 4) and closure of fortress Europe to immigrants making things even worse (see below Triulzi, chapter 3). These latter two factors have paralysed revitalization of enterprises and mobility. The governments have failed to give adequate response to the needs of the underprivileged classes, reacting to protests by clamping down on control and repression (Shehata, 2011). Given the lack of freedom, aid from Europe and the International Monetary Fund has been blocked, but at this point other actors enter the scene (Amendola & Ferragina, 2014). The economic crisis that had triggered the Arab revolts was further aggravated by civil wars, tougher control and repression of all protests, due also to the terrorist emergency (Roy, 2012). The conflicts kept the patronage system running and pushed up military spending, thereby draining yet more resources from welfare and the development of private and public enterprise (Corrao, 2011; Dabashi, 2012). Demographic growth saw the number of unemployed young soaring in the face of a ruling class and an old system lacking flexibility (see below Giordano, chapter 4). The response of the governments has proved insufficient and/or incapable of creating new job opportunities (Safadi & Neaime, 2017: 202–204). The sixth point, the closure of countries to migrants. Wars and terrorism have blocked the flourishing industry of the tourist sector while the more general European economic crisis, coming on top of growing fears of Islamic radicalism, has led to closure of the frontiers of the developed countries on the northern shores of the Mediterranean (see below Redaelli, chapter 2). Why are the rich Gulf countries no longer attracting immigrants from the Arab countries? After the boom of Egyptian intellectuals and young graduates emigrating to the rich oil-producing countries—from Iraq to the Emirates and Saudi Arabia—lacking expertise in the times of Sadat, things came to a halt after the Gulf crisis of the 1990s for political reasons (Corrao 2017, see below Pizzingrilli, Giorgi chapter 14). Iraq

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sent the Egyptian immigrant workers who failed to get away in time to the front against Kuwait. The Gulf monarchies preferred the poorer, milder Muslims of the Far East to their more problematic neighbours. An important point to bear in mind is the politicization of the emigrants; while it was largely liberals and communists who left the Arab countries for Europe in the 1970s, as from the 1980s it was in particular the supporters of the most intransigent Islamic movements that sought refuge in the Middle East. In Europe, on the other hand, immigration policies became increasingly restrictive subsequent to the 2008 crisis (Amendola, 2014: 81–91). The seventh point, failure to support democratic movements. Improvements in education and increasing cultural exchange in the Mediterranean area kindled great expectations among the young people. Subsequent to the Barcelona agreements, there was a huge increase in artistic activities: films and theatre festivals from Carthage to Cairo, exhibitions and international literary prizes from Asila in Morocco to Dubai, but also showings of Arab artists like the Egyptian painter Adil al-Siwi ¯ al-Siw¯ı) at the Venice Biennale, and the architectural works of Iraqi (Adil Zaha Hadid (Zah¯a H . ad¯ıd) in Europe’s capital cities. All this offered a more realistic to the dream that it was possible to launch a process of liberal, democratic development in the Arab countries as in the West (Corrao, 2011). Inspiring hope was the speech by President Obama at the University of Cairo (2009), which revived the courage and determination of the students. Freedom, however, remained limited, communication and information still under the strict control of the secret services. So it was until, thanks to Internet and cell phones, liaisons among the various activists multiplied, as had happened on the occasion of the strike of the Mahalla al-Kubra workers in Egypt (2008), whose protests had reached the students at Cairo. The student revolt in Iran (2009) demonstrated to young people in the Muslim world the need for courageous actions to assert their rights (see below Teti, Gervasio, chapter 8). The revolts of 2011 (known as the Springs) occurred above all in the countries where the dictatorships had been most corrupt and illiberal, and in most cases, they were either crushed with bloodshed (Egypt, Bahrein) or led to civil wars (Syria, Yemen and Libya, see below Plebani and Melcangi, chapters 10–11). The governments responded to demands for dignity and freedom with further political clamping down and tightening against free speech. In Tunisia, on the other hand, the associations of industrialists, lawyers and unions together with the staunch activism

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of the women’s associations put a stop to the obscurantist line proposed by the Islamic party Ennahda (H . arakat al-Nahd.a, see below Francesca and Pepicelli, chapters 6 and 12). After months of struggling, the country succeeded in keeping the most liberal constitution in the Arab world alive, and with it the democratic system, despite severe economic crisis. What, on the whole, has been lacking is serious sustained support by the Western world for the active albeit often minority democratic movements. At the same time, the Gulf monarchies stepped up their investments in the Arab countries facing difficulties, in practice consolidating the repressive regimes. This economic support awakened hopes of development but, alas, it never succeeded in properly taking off (see below Giorgi, chapter 14). Even today on the South and East shores of the Mediterranean, the clash between modernists and conservatives is still in a phase of increasing violence, and again the regimes respond with repression, the weakest part of the population remaining crushed by corruption and misrule. Anger grows, and with it discontent which is systematically exploited by the radical extremists set on destabilizing the regimes ‘in collusion with the West’ (Kepel, 2004, 2005; Khosrokhavar, 2016). Wars destroy the social fabric, laying waste the land and above all preventing education of the young people, blighting these countries’ prospects of social and economic development; our problem is that damage to their prospects is also damage to ours, since they leave scorched earth on our borders. Let us now consider what various Arab writers see as the causes of radicalization. According to Abu Zayd, it has always existed, but has been aggravated subsequent to encounter with the West, which, on the one hand, has contributed to the development of modern society including the foundation of NGOs in defence of human rights and the rights of women, while on the other hand it has led to epistemological closure setting in around the radical thought of Sayyid Qutb (Sayyd Qut.b), the ideologist of the Muslim Brothers (see below Hashas, chapter 5). As Abu Zaid sees it, the political and economic crises have fomented the urge to get back to the origins and purge the faith of ‘western’ contaminations. The primary objective of the neo-Salafist religious reformers has been to control the educational system and ensure rigid re-education in the principles of Islam (Zaid, 2006). According to the Tunisian sociologist Tahir Labib (al-T.¯ahir Lab¯ıb), the reciprocal prejudices between the opposite sides of the Mediterranean

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date back to the time of the Crusades and the fight for Jerusalem, and have been refuelled through failure to settle the Palestinian issue (see below Marzano, chapter 13). Since then, as the East has gone through decline the indifference of the Islamic religious towards the West has turned into increasing hostility with growth of the political and economic power of the West. The general feeling is that, having benefited from the scientific and cultural learning of East over the past centuries, the West has cancelled all memory of it (Labib, 2007). Labib observes that on both sides of the Mediterranean, the images of the ‘Other’ have taken on wild or wicked forms, as demonstrated by the studies of Edward Said (1935– 2003) and Hasan Hanafi (H . asan H . anaf¯ı, n. 1935) (Said, 1987; Hanafi, 1995); and even today, we still continue to cultivate negative, conflictive imaginings rather than seeking an honest meeting of minds. The brief season of hope that began with the Barcelona agreements led to positive reforms and a decree of economic growth, but with the benefit of improved education and cultural exchange, faced with economic crisis, the young woke up to the realities and lack of freedom, and revolts ensued (Ibrahim, 1997). In the light of these events, I believe we need to change our evaluation criteria; there can be no denying that the Arab revolts emerged from a movement of peaceful protest, as indeed has more recently been the case of the demonstrations in Beirut, Khartoum and Algiers (2019). The governments’ repressive response has always been disproportionate. On the other hand, where they have shown openness, as in Tunisia and, at the moment, Khartoum, progress has been made in the direction of dialogue between the parties involved to settle differences. Ignorance and fake news feed prejudices and racism in the media (Said, 1997). In the textbooks for Western schools, little has been done to change the negative image of Islam, while it would help greatly to dedicate some room to the positive contributions to our humanism and Renaissance originating, for example, in mediaeval Sicily and Andalusia (Makdisi, 1989). And it would also be beneficial to attribute the just value to the pluralist culture of rights for modernization and social and economic revival, for it is thanks also to this that the West was able to overtake the East, hamstrung by religious conservatism and the militarism of the Ottomans. Today, the southern side of the Mediterranean is seeing contention between the aggressive expansion of the most radical religious groups and governments allied with the West but wavering between semblances of political openness and suffocation of all liberal and democratic aspirations

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(El-Affendi, 2017: 83–87). The military regimes defend their institutional fragility with an iron fist, which they justify with the real need to fight terrorism (see below Redaelli, chapter 2). Nowhere has the issue been settled while economic crisis is endemic, aggravated by lack of welfare. Poverty swells the ranks of terrorists and drives the populations to migrate to the Middle East and North Africa far more than to Europe: a million refugees in Jordan and indeed in Lebanon, four million in Turkey and half a million Libyans in Tunisia, without counting the immigrants from subSaharan Africa in Morocco (see below Pepicelli and Pizzingrilli, Giorgi chapters 12 and 14). There have been some changes in relations between East and West: the Arab revolts have reawakened attention to the great sufferings of the populations, but real or specious raisons d’état continue to predominate over humanitarian considerations. The demonstrations have shown that the people are tired of attributing the course of economic crisis—resulting from misrule and corruption—to external enemies, or ethnic or religious groups. Repression—with continual outbreaks of violence—makes it hard for the opposition to enter into any constructive dialogue. Although the media on both sides of the Mediterranean continue to fuel diffidence and prejudices (Sakr, 2011), a growing number of citizens would gladly get to know the Other and work together. Despite the difficulties, the universities of some countries including Tunisia and Morocco are implementing projects with the EU, while some European universities, together with the UNHCR, have organized university links to help students living in the refugee camps to complete their studies. It may not be very much, and much remains to be done to reverse the present perilous trend, but what is certain is that only knowledge and education can foster respect of fundamental rights and the dignity and life, necessary for the Mediterranean to become a laboratory developing a new humanism.

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Notes 1. Jared Diamond speech on the occasion of a Master MISLAM lecture at the School of Government of the LUISS University April 2019. 2. The letter by the wife of the Marquis Adalbert II the Rich is conserved in the opposite altar in the Cathedral of Lucca, cf. Renzi Rizzo, 2003: 121– 125; Renzi Rizzo 2001/1: 3–47; Renzi Rizzo, 2002 http://www.storia. unifi.it/_RM/rivista/saggi/Renzi.htm. 3. Examples of the production of green and yellow glazed ceramics in western Sicily and specimens from the Arab workshops are to be seen in the ‘Museo delle Trame Mediterranee’ of the Fondazione Orestiadi at Gibellina (Trapani); for an essay on the subject, see Bagnera 2012: 2. On paper documents, see Johns 2018 file:///Users/francesca/Downloads/ Documenting_Multiculturalism_Document_of%20(1).pdf. 4. Here the slaves lived; they had their own cells and a mosque; by day they would go out to work in the port and could even set up small craft and trade businesses for their keep; work in households or life in these institutions brought them into contact with the local population who thus became acquainted with their culture, albeit to a limited degree and with persisting prejudices (Fiume 2009: 78–80, 101–108). 5. The Ambassador visited Palermo in 1782 and left a manuscript as a gift; the story inspired the Sicilian writer Leonardo Sciascia’s novel The Council of Egypt. 6. Jeremy Johns attests that the first use of paper in Sicily dated back to the tenth century, the subsequent diffusion being evidenced in Norman documents (Johns, 2018). On the Ottoman rejection, see Saraçgil 2001. 7. A collection of testimonies of revolutionaries and revolutionary entrepreneurs of the nineteenth century is available in Pellegrino 2014: 79–89 and Donini 2003: 212.

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Ahmed, J. M. (1960). The intellectual origins of Egyptian Nationalism. Oxford University Press. Akarli, E. D. (1976). The problem of external pressures power struggles and budgetary deficits in Ottoman Politics under Abdulhamid II, 1876–1918. Harvard University Press. Al-Jabri, M. ‘A. (2015). Democracy, human rights and law in Islamic thought. I.B. Tauris. Amaney, I. (2007). Barriers to democracy. The other side of social capital in Palestine and the Arab World. Princeton University Press. Amendola, A. (2014). Processi di integrazione e partenariato euro-mediterraneo. In Economia e Istituzioni dei paesi del Mediterraneo. Il Mulino. Amendola, A., & Ferragina, A. M. (2011). Bridging the gap: Free trade and integration processes in the Mediterranean. Rubettino. Angeliki Laiou, E., & Mottahedeh Roy, P. (2001). The crusades from the perspective of Byzantium and the Muslim World. Dumbarton Oaks. Ardia, D. (1979). Questione d’Oriente. In Politica Internazionale, La Nuova Italia. Bagnera, A. (2012). La bottega del vasaio di Mazara. In A. Bagnera (Ed.), Islam in Sicilia. Un giardino tra due civiltà. Archeologia dell’Islam in Sicilia. Fondazione Orestiadi. Basile, G. B. (2006). The tales of tales or the entertainment for the little one. Transl. N. Canepa. Wayne University. Beau, N., & Graciet, C. (2009). La régente de Carthage. Main basse sur la Tunisie. La Découvert. Bobbio, N. (forthcoming, 2021). Alcune riflessioni sul tema del convegno. In F. M. Corrao (Ed.), L’Approdo di Ulisse. Fondazione Orestiadi. Bono, S. (1993). Corsari nel Mediterraneo. Cristiani e Musulmani fra guerra schiavitù e commercio. Mondadori. Bono, S. (1999). Il Mediterraneo da Lepanto a Barcellona. Morlacchi editore. Bono, S. (2016). Schiavi. Una storia mediterranea (XVI–XIX). Il Mulino. Braudel, F. (1972). The mediterranean and the mediterranean world in the age of Philip II , 1/2 vols. Trans. S. Reynolds. Harper and Row. Braudel, F. (1982). On history. Transl. S. Matthews. University of Chicago Press. (1986) Una lezione di Storia. Einaudi. Braudel, F. (1986). Civiltà e Imperi nell’età di Filippo II . Einaudi. Braudel, F. (1995). A history of civilizations. Transl. R. Mayne. Penguin (Vol. I, 5th ed.) (1966) Il Mondo attuale. Le civiltà extraeuropee. Einaudi. Brunschvig, R. (1960). ‘Abd. In Encyclopédie de l’Islam. N. E., Brill. Calchi Novati. G. P. (1979). Colonialismo: la questione. In Politica Internazionale. La Nuova Italia. Campanini, M. (2019). Ibn Khaldun e la Muqaddima. Passato e futuro del mondo arabo. La Vela.

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Elbadawi, I., & Makdisi, S. (Eds.). (2017). Democratic transition in the Arab World. Cambridge University Press. El Mikawy, N., Mohieddin, M., & El Ashmaouy, S. (2017). Egypt: The protracted transition from authoritarianism to democracy and social justice. In I. Elbadawi & S. Makdisi (Eds.), Democratic Transition in the Arab World (pp. 133–183). Cambridge University Press. Fine, J. V. A., Jr. (1983). The Early Medieval Balkans. University of Michigan. Fiume, G. (2009). Schiavitù mediterranee. Corsari, rinnegati e santi in età moderna. Mondadori. Francesca, E. (2012). Liberalizzazioni economiche, disoccupazione e malessere sociale: i risvolti economici della primavera araba. In A. M. Di Tolla, & E. Francesca, (Eds.), La rivoluzione ai tempi di internet. Il futuro della democrazia nel Magreb e nel mondo arabo. Università degli Studi di Napoli l’Orientale. Gabrieli, F. (2009). Arab historians of the crusades. Revivals (1st ed, 1957). Galmès de Fuentes, A. (2002). La Épica Románica y la Tradición Árabe. Gredos. Gjuzelev, V. (1988). Medieval Bulgaria. Verlag Baier. Goitein, S. D. (1967–1973). A mediterranean society. The Jewish Communities of the world as portrayed in the documents of the Cairo Geniza. Berkeley: University of California Press. Hanafi, H. (1995). Islam in the modern World. Anglo-Egyptian Book- Shop. Harik, I. (1997). Pluralism in the Arab World. In N. S. Hopkins, & S. E. Ibrahim (Eds.), Arab society. Class, gender, power, and development. The American University in Cairo Press. Heydarian, R. J. (2014). How capitalism failed the Arab World. Zed Books. Hershlag, Z. Y. (1964). Introduction to the modern economic history of the Middle East. Brill. Holt, P. M. (1968). Political and social change in modern Egypt. Oxford University Press. Hrair Dekmejan, R., & Thabit, F. A. (2000). Machiavelli’s Arab Precursor: Ibn Zafar al-Siqilli. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 27 , 125–137. Ibrahim. S. E. (1997). Arab society. Class, gender, power, and development. The American University in Cairo Press. Ikeda, D. (2011). Toward a World of Dignity for All: The Triumph of Creative Life. https://www.daisakuikeda.org/sub/resources/works/props/ 2011-peace-proposal.html. Issawi, C. (2010). Economic History of the Middle East, 1800–1914. Routledge. Johns, J. (2018). Paper versus parchment: Countess Adelaide’s Bilingual Mandate of 1109. In Documenting multiculturalism project. Document of the Month: November 2018. Academia http://www.file:///Users/francesca/Downlo ads/Documenting_Multiculturalism_Document_of%20(1).pdf. Karpat, K. (1973). The Ottoman State and its place in world history. Brill.

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Kepel, G. (2005). The Roots of Radical Islam. Saqi Books. Kepel, J. (2004). The war for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West. Cambridge Massachusetts. Khosrokhavar, F. (2016). Inside Jihadism – Understanding Jihadi Movements Worldwide. Routledge. Lapidus, I. M. (1967). Muslim cities in the later middle age. Harvard University Press. Laroui, A. (2011). L’Histoire du Maghreb. Un essai de synthèse. Centre Culturel Arabe. Le Goff, J. (2005). The Birth of Europe. Blackwell. Lewis, B. (2003). What went wrong. The clash between Islam and modernity in the Middle East. Harper Collins. Lewis, B. (2004). The crises of Islam: Holy war and unholy terror. Random House. Lo Jacono, C. (2018). Interazioni mediterranee nelle testimonianze della Gheniza del Cairo. In F. M. Corrao & L. Violante (Eds.), L’islam non è terrorismo (pp. 123–135). Il Mulino. Lutsky, V. (2002). Storia Moderna dei Paesi Arabi. Teti. Makdisi, G. (1989). Scholasticism and humanism in classical Islam and the Christian West. Journal of the American Oriental Society, 109(2), 175–182. Mardin, S. (1973a). Turkey, the Middle East. A political economic survey. Oxford University Press. Mardin, S. (1973b). Center-periphery relation: A key to Turkish politics? Dedalus 102/1. Mardin, S. (2006). Religion, society and modernity in Turkey. Syracuse University Press. Menocal, M. R. (1990). The Arabic role in Mediterranean literary history. A forgotten Heritage. University of Pennsylvania Press. Metcalfe, A. (2003). Muslims and Christians in Norman Sicily. Arabic speakers and the end of Islam. Routledge-Curzon. Miege, J. L. (1976). Imperialismo coloniale italiano. Biblioteca Universale Rizzoli. Moussalli, A. (2001). The Islamic quest for democracy, pluralism and human rights. University of Florida. Ostler, N. (2005). The last Lingua Franca. Walker. Pellegrino, B. (2014). Il filantropo. Prospero Mosè Loria e la società umanitaria. Minerva. Pinson, M. (1993). The Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Their Historic development from the Middle Ages to the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Harvard University Press. Pirenne, H. (1992). Mohammed and Charlemagne. Barnes & Noble Books.

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Renzi Rizzo, C. (2001). Riflessioni sulla lettera di Berta di Toscana al califfo al Muktafì: l’apporto congiunto di dati archeologici e delle fonti scritte. Archivio Storico Italiano, CLIX, 2001(1), 3–47. Renzi Rizzo, C. (2002). I rapporti diplomatici tra il re Ugo di Provenza e il califfo”, ‘Abd al-Rahmàn III: fonti cristiane e fonti arabe a confronto. In Reti medievali online magazine III, 2. http://www.storia.unifi.it/_RM/riv ista/saggi/Renzi.htm. Renzi Rizzo, C. (2003). Pisa e il mare nell’alto medio evo. In M. Tangheroni (Ed.), Pisa e il Mediterraneo. Uomini, merci, idee dagli Etruschi ai Medici (pp. 121–125). Pisa, Skira. Roy, O. (Ed.) (2012). Arab society in revolt: The west’s mediterranean challenge. Brookings Institution Press. Said, E. (1987). Orientalism. Random House. Said, E. (1997). Covering Islam. How the media and the experts determine how we see the rest of the World. Vintage Books revised edition. Sakr, N. (1999). Satellite televisions and development in the Middle East. In Middle East Report. Sakr, N. (2011). Seismic shift. Understanding change in the Middle East. Stimson Center. Salvadori, M. L. (Ed.) (2004a). La Storia. Dalla Crisi del Trecento all’Espansione europea. UTET. Salvadori, M. L. (2004b). Il Cinquecento: la Nascita del Mondo Moderno. UTET. Saraçgil, A. (2001). Il maschio camaleonte. Strutture patriarcali nell’Impero ottomano e nella Turchia moderna. Mondadori. Sciascia, L. (2018). The council of Egypt. Transl. A. Foulke. Carcanet. Sedlar, J. W. (1994). East Central Europe in the Middle Ages, 1000–1500. University of Washington. Sedgwik, M. (2009). Muhammad ‘Abduh. One World Oxford. Shehata, D. (2011). The fall of the Pharaoh. Foreign Affairs, 90, 26–32. Stasolla, M. G. (1999). Frédéric II et le monde musulman. Islamochristiana, 25, 67–88. Teti, A., Abbott, A., & Cavatorta, F. (2018). The Arab Uprisings in Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia: Social, political and economic transformations. Palgrave.

A Geo-Historical Compass for the ‘New Mediterranean’ Riccardo Redaelli

Contents 1 The Geo-Historical Compass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Mediterranean Sea: A Limes or a Liminal Space? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Adapting to the Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

45 50 59 66

The Geo-Historical Compass

It is often said that the ‘expected never happens; it is the unexpected always’. More prosaically, others ironically point out that ‘it is difficult to make predictions, especially concerning the future’. But, it is very often hazardous even to correctly frame present trends and dynamics. Especially if we have to deal with one of the most complex, intricate regions of the word, such as the Mediterranean Sea. Indeed, this basin is not a natural place, but a geopolitical one, shaped over the centuries by the peoples and civilizations gravitating around it. An area so intertwined and wrapped around its long, glorious, tragic history that any perspective, any

R. Redaelli (B) Catholic University of the S. Heart, Milan, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 F. M. Corrao and R. Redaelli (eds.), States, Actors and Geopolitical Drivers in the Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69000-7_2

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analysis, any methodology adopted always seems as inadequate or too schematic. For this reason, we have summoned experts from different scientific fields, to analyze the current situation of the Basin. Not simply a multidisciplinary work team; instead, we organized a truly interdisciplinary one, benefiting from the contributions of specific disciplines, and profiting from the cross-fertilization effect produced. First of all, the analyses in this volume start from acknowledgment of the increased complexity of world politics following the end of the bipolar period. An evident and profound spatial reconfiguration of the international system is underway, which sees the growth of internal conflicts within and among its regional security complexes1,2 and especially along its diverse shatterbelts3 adopting the term introduced to geopolitical language by Samuel Cohen (Cohen, 1973) that represents its political, religious, social, and economic fault lines. A perception of a geopolitical chaos further enhanced by long-term trends, which are altering the previous precarious balances at the demographic, ecological, and technological levels. Migrations, climate changes, cultural, and technological transformations interweave and mix with the traditional political, economic, and diplomatic forces at work within the international system. The result is a reality very difficult to encompass, which requires a more holistic approach, mobilizing all our cognitive realms. Researchers are no longer living in the comfortable bipolar world, where most of the analyses were essentially part of a dichotomous narrative, based on binary vision, and generally characterized by a cognitive matrix connected to the zero-sum game theory, based on the amicus/hostis mechanism. At that time, the dominant macro-modelling of the neo-realist approach suggested achieving greater stability in the international system by means of a balance of power between two more or less equally powerful geopolitical blocs. Within that vision, the Mediterranean basin maintained a marked strategic stillness: it was basically perceived as the southern flank of the Atlantic Alliance, a well-defined and easily identifiable geographical space, where NATO had a dominant military role. The Alliance, however, remained above the local intra-Arab political tensions, the Israel-Palestinian dispute as well as the multiple African crises. The most relevant consequence of that situation was that the predominant regional military role of the West did not have any unifying effect. On the contrary, NATO adapted itself to the strategically and politically fragmented scenario. At the same time, however, the polarizing oppositions of the Cold War did not affect Mediterranean unity;

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on the contrary, they created some special conditions for preserving it, to the point that it has been considered a sort of ‘natural status’, not understanding that history is transformation. And that the recent historical changes are closely interconnected with global trends, often external to regional dynamics. Indeed, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the passage to the post-bipolar phase deeply affected the strategic and political perception of the region. A significant change, which should not surprise anyone: power transformations influence geographical perceptions. As stated by Gearóid Ó Tuathail, ‘geography is about power. Although often assumed to be innocent, the geography of the world is not a product of nature but a product of histories of struggle between competing authorities over the power to organize, occupy and administer space’ (Ó Tuathail, 1996: 1). Western perceptions of the Mediterranean changed accordingly. For the US, it ceased to be the ‘Southern Flank’ of the Alliance to become an important hub for the strategic shift toward the Gulf, Southwest Asia: it was in this period that Washington began to consider China as its only ‘peer competitor’ and wanted to refocus (although in a confused and erratic way) the pivot of attention from Europe to the Asia Pacific region. This means that is impossible to understand the geopolitical change experienced by this Sea without connecting it to the larger modification which affected the international system globally, and more specifically to the relation between the global and the regional dimensions. If during the Cold War, regional scenarios were always subordinated to the general bipolar competition, during the Nineties, the two traditionally opposed strategic paradigms—the Mediterranean as a ‘defensive barrier’ or as a ‘bridge’ for the West—were challenged, and both the EU and NATO attempted some poorly coordinated outreach programs, to increase the level of mutual confidence between the two shores of the Basin. As Tayfur pointed out: ‘The differences between the American and European perceptions of the Mediterranean, which developed steadily from the mid-1970s, became clear. The most important reason for this diversity over the definition of Mediterranean security in the post-Cold War period was the disappearance of the unidimensional Soviet threat. A Soviet-free world emancipated Europe from the strategic protection of the Americans and the EU, which now emerged as an important political and economic seat of power, developed its own policy and promoted its own interests in the Mediterranean’ (Tayfur, 2012).

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In this period, it became evident that the Mediterranean basin had to deal both with traditionally hard security challenges (military threats, proliferation, and so on) and with soft security ones, connected with political instability, economic insecurity, illicit trafficking, aggressive migrations trends, religious and identity-related tensions. In other words, the regional political and security scenario was characterized by a plurality of heterogeneous problems, which could not be addressed with the matrix of the Cold War. Europe, therefore, re-enforced its programs of cooperation and assistance, through the so-called ‘Barcelona Process’, later on re-labeled the ‘Union for the Mediterranean’, both of which were clearly ineffective and subordinated to the greater interest in the integration of Eastern Europe, as we will discuss in the following section (see also for a detailed economic analysis Triulzi’s essay in this volume). Those programs tried to give the Mediterranean basin an internal coherence, but they essentially failed. On the contrary, the most evident result has been its geopolitical fragmentation between a western portion (al-Maghrib), less strategically relevant and the eastern Mediterranean (al-Mashriq), attracted by the security dynamics of the enlarged Middle East and the Gulf which hampered any attempts to organize a coherent process of regionalizing security (Colombo et al., 2002: 18–19). One of the reasons lies in the divarication of interests between Europe and the US. If the EU relied more on cooperative economic tools and on soft power toward the central and western Mediterranean, for Washington the eastern part of the Basin was the pivotal one. Not per se, but in connection with the power competition and alliances of the enlarged Middle East, in particular after the 9/11 events and the attempt by George W. Bush’s Administration to promote a radical change in the area with the Greater Middle East program and with the ill-planned invasion of Iraq in 2003. Quercia (Quercia, 2019) correctly pointed out how the globalization process of the Euro-Mediterranean space involves not only a greater geopolitical entropy, but also a marked acceleration of the deconstructing processes of balances, perhaps precarious, which existed in the various Mediterranean sub-regions. In overall terms, the Mediterranean has ceased to be the ‘American lake’ that it had been since the Sixties to become again ‘challengeable’, due to the perceived decline of US power (or at least of its interest) and the already mentioned current redistribution of power at a global level, favoring bolder initiatives by regional or external actors. From a geopolitical perspective, the most important

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consequence has been that the region is gaining a new centrality, because of wars, riots, internal clashes within the Islamic world, migrations, and the Chinese attempt to connect this Sea to its Belt and Road Initiative (described in detail in the essay by Cavalieri and Ghezzi). However, the most peculiar aspect of this rediscovered centrality lies in the fact that it appears to be not a sought-after centrality but, instead, a sort of unexpected and unintended one. A consequence of the multiple crises that cross the Basin, rather than the specific will of its regional actors. This return to strategic centrality, however, is connected with a perceived economic decline of importance of the Basin in favor of the Asia Pacific region (despite the fact that the Mediterranean with one per cent of the world Oceans generate around 15 per cent of global maritime traffic and 20 per cent of its related economic value) and, above all, with an increase in its internal conflicts. There are at play multiple centrifugal forces that undermine its state structures, in particular (but not exclusively) along the southern bank. The explosion of particularly violent civil wars in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Libya, the increase in tensions following the disappointing results of the so-called ‘Arab Springs’ (an overly simplistic label which identifies much more complex political and social phenomena), the rise in the role and visibility of competing nonstate jihadist movements, the return of Russian activism and the growth of a violent induced polarization between Shiites and Sunnis are all signs of a marked destabilization of the security matrix of the Middle Eastern region. Particularly worrying is the explosion of infra-Islamic conflicts within the different denominations of the Muslim world, and the growing inability to imagine a common public space among different ethnoreligious-cultural communities, having different identities but rooted in the same territory. This situation of profound crisis of the political and security structures in the Mediterranean basin is increased by the lack of strategic coherence among Western actors and by an evident lack of common perception of risks and threats at both the regional and the international level. The first element, in particular, plays an extremely negative and dangerous role, and it is provoking an evident risk for both shores of the Basin. Looking at Europe, the divergence in political priorities and in the perception of challenges within the enlarged borders of the Union has weakened any attempt to consistently articulate an European regional security project, giving space to purely national logics that have exposed the Union to diverging policies, unilateral initiatives or open

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intra-European rivalries (such as the one between France and Italy over Libya’s future). Looking at the Arab states, the results are even more discouraging. Not only have they failed to elaborate any shared vision at the sub-regional level (Maghreb, the Levant, and so on), but infra-Arab rivalry and hostility broke out into open conflicts or proxy wars, in particular after the ill-planned invasion of Iraq by the Anglo-American coalition in 2003. An event that—even more than the 9/11 attacks on Washington and New York—unbalanced all regional relations in the enlarged Middle East, fueling the current ruinous mix of growing sectarian polarization, geopolitical competition, and domestic political instability. The result, as the essays of this volume will demonstrate, is that the region appears today to be more divided and fragmented than ever before, with a multitude of flashpoints and geopolitical shatterbelts that threaten the architecture of the state and favor the disintegration of the post-colonial political order.

2

Mediterranean Sea: A Limes or a Liminal Space?

As we have seen in the previous section, the perception of the Mediterranean as a political space has undergone a deep transformation in recent decades. In her introductory chapter, Francesca Corrao underlined the historical, social, and cultural ties of this Basin. But what is the situation from a security and geopolitical point of view? Scholars of International Relations often refer to the famous theory created by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver on the Regional Security Complex (RSC, Buzan & Wæver, 20034 ), or to specifically adapted formulations for the MENA countries, to underline the interdependence of regional security challenges and mechanisms. This approach theoretically divides the world into regions based on the degree of ‘enmity’ and ‘amity’ existing among states, with a plurality of patterns of amity and enmity (Buzan, 1991: 190). Thus, a security complex is defined as ‘a group of states whose primary security concerns linking together closely enough that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another’ (Buzan, 1991: 190). Thus, the term ‘security complex’ indicates both the character of the attribute that defines the set (security), and the notion of intense interdependence that distinguishes any particular set from its neighbors. Security complexes emphasize the interdependence of rivalry, as well as that of shared interests. In particular, the RSC theory often refers to the presence of three sub-complexes: North Africa, the Levant, and the Gulf,

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where the root causes of conflict and instability have different origins and motivations, with strong interdependence and vulnerability to external interferences, as we have already stressed in the previous section. These sub-regional security complexes, as correctly pointed out by Carl Brown, are part of a ‘penetrated system, one subject to an exceptional level of external intervention and yet, by virtue of its cultural distinctiveness, stubbornly resistant to subordination’ (Brown, 1984, 3–5), either extra-regional or regional. A place ‘characterized by frequent shifts in alliances, heavy penetration of the system by outside powers, a zero-sum logic and an overall trend towards “homeostasis”, featuring the inability of any regional player to substantially modify the existing balance of power’ (Hanau Santini, 2017: 97). Recently, Kamrava correctly underlined that: ‘in addition to its own inherent instability, the Middle East’s regional hierarchy further contributes to the region’s tensions because of the complex set of relationships that underlie the interactions of its members with one another and between them and external powers’ (Kamrava, 2018). However, most of the attempts to describe and conceptualize the regional space and its power projections often focus either on the MENA region or on the northern shore of the Basin, with few attempts to look at the Mediterranean as a whole. Visions of this Sea through history were always wobbling between the extreme perceptions of the Mediterranean either as a limes or as a cultural entity, while probably the best concept to define it is that of limen. For the Romans, the limen, threshold, was a transitional area, a marginal place, where marginal did not mean being irrelevant, but was more along the sense that Owen Lattimore gave, in his fundamental work on the role played by frontiers in Inner Asia across history (Lattimore, 1940, 1962). Indeed, this region, with its kaleidoscopic mosaic of wars, trade, cultural exchanges, religious encounters, and so on, represented a fluid crossover, a porous, liminal place of interaction, and even ‘cultural, religious and identity transgression’ with the unknown, with the Other. A place of blurred lines and shades, which in certain periods turned toward an inclusive perspective, while in others it emphasized the perceived borders along its waters. In any case, during recent decades, a plurality of different historical pivotal events and turning points affected the Mediterranean, and perception of the region, especially in Europe, changed accordingly, first moving toward inclusion and later on toward separation.

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In the 1990s, as already mentioned, the end of the bipolar confrontation paved the way for the EU to play a more active role, as analyzed in detail by Umberto Triulzi on the EU-MENA economic landscape. And indeed, for more than two decades, the EU—although it never wielded the hard power of the United States—tried to enhance its deep social, political, and economic ties with the countries of the southern and eastern Mediterranean. With the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, launched in 1995, the EU formally ‘promoted the vision of an open and integrated Mediterranean region that was organically tied to and politically oriented towards the EU’ (Behr, 2012: 76). The aspiration was to establish, relying mostly on economic support and soft power, closer relations and to promote political, economic, and cultural liberalizations. At the same time, European countries considered the autocratic, yet Western-oriented Arab regimes, as a way to contrast the rise of radical Islamist movements, and were ready to exchange ‘freedom for stability’, as it has been often said. The result was a fluid, often confused, ‘stability partnership’, serving ‘both the EU’s interests in a stable and Western-oriented Mediterranean and the need of Arab regimes to garner external rents and legitimacy’ (Behr, 2012: 76). The weakness of this strategy has been demonstrated by Gervasio and Teti, with their essay in this volume (see below, “Ferocious and Fragile: Egypt and the Myth of ‘Authoritarian Stability’”) which harshly criticizes the ‘double myth of stability’ associated with authoritarianism created by MENA regimes and their European counterparts, with a particular focus on Egypt. De facto, aspirations to promote political pluralism and human rights clashed with bilateral interests, intra-European rivalries and economic motivations, were often maintained as a rhetorical and formal official narrative of the EU policy toward the basin. The political reality, however, was a far cry from that vision: instead of promoting a liberalization of those regimes, EU programs offered support and legitimacy to them, with few exceptions. Furthermore, the EU progressively lost interest in engaging with southern and eastern Mediterranean countries, in particular after the economic crisis of 2008 and the rise of the socalled souverainist movements—marked by a distinct Islamophobia and anti-immigration obsession. A depressing reversal if one compares the previous EU ambitions toward the southern shores of the Basin: in 2003–2004, the EU launched the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), renewed in 2011, whose main goal was promotion of the EU’s normative agenda: the spread of

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democracy, human rights, and good governance in the MENA region (Del Sarto, 2015: 218). It was the natural follow-up to a plethora of European initiatives: from the Euro-Arab Dialogue (1973–1989) to the Global Mediterranean Policy (1972–1992), to the ambitious EuroMediterranean Partnership (EMP, 1995–2008), and it was connected by the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM, 2008–2012). In addition, European countries joined one other multilateral agreements and Fora promoted by NATO or other institutions. All these expensive initiatives got partial and often formal results (Colombo—Soler i Lecha, 2019). Programs of regional integration launched by southern Mediterranean states produced even worse results. Despite the rhetoric and the formal emphasis on the pan-Islamic, anti-Imperialism, and pan-Arab ideas, adopted by post-colonial political elites, the MENA region nonetheless remains not only extremely heterogeneous, but plagued by numerous territorial disputes, ethnic and religious polarization, open rivalries, and lack of cooperation. Cummings and Hinnebusch demonstrated how the clash between regional pan-Islamic or pan-Arabic supranational structures and the forced adoption of the European nation state poses a fundamental challenge to the legitimacy of the political elite in post-colonial Arab states (Cummings & Hinnebusch, 2013: 125) and has hampered all processes of integration. The Arab League is deeply polarized and often paralyzed in its initiatives; the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and even regional alliances (such as the Gulf Cooperation Council) can hardly find a common position except on formalistic, irrelevant issues. Even those in the economic realms, which mirrored the European ones, such as the Arab Maghreb Union, resulted in a flagrant failure, to the point that the ‘Middle East is one of the least integrated areas in the world’ (Lins de Albuquerque, 2016: 17). However, divisions, conflicts, and ethnic-religious-identity plurality have always been a characteristic of this Sea throughout its history. Differences which nevertheless did not prevent the Mediterranean from being an osmotic liminal space, as already said. It was only in the last decades that the perception of the Mediterranean basin as a barrier, as an identityrelated frontier became stronger, as a result of a plurality of factors and events, which triggered traumatic transformation in the region. The most important elements are represented by the rise of movements connected to the ideology of global jihad (first al-Q¯ a ida and then IS); the 9/11 attacks; the catastrophic effects of the disastrous AngloAmerican invasion of Iraq in 2003; the growing sectarian polarization

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between Sunnis and Shiites also as a result of the struggle for regional political supremacy between Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran5 ; the protests and political changes in 2011–2012 (which were identified with the rhetorical and misleading definition of ‘Arab Spring’); the outbreak of civil wars in Yemen, Syria, and Libya which have turned into proxy wars among competing external powers; the creation of a jihadist ‘caliphate’ in 2014 and the perception of a decline (at least in terms of interest) of the United States; the tumultuous rise of migration trends from the MENA and sub-Saharan regions toward Europe and the rise in Europe of the already mentioned ‘souverainist’ movements, which spread Islamophobia among public opinions and anti-Mediterranean political narratives, generally based on a vision of Muslim societies as a monolithic, static, backward reality. In this introductory chapter, it is impossible to analyze in detail all these complex trends and events, already addressed by a huge literature; what should be underlined here is their malignant synergy in amplifying the perception of a fixed, ontological alterity between the two shores. An idea that suggested to the European countries a dangerous withdrawal from their programs of outreach. A declining Europe, marginalized at the global level and harshly divided within, which basically gave up on its ambitions to support and in some way to shape processes of political liberalization and integration along the southern shore. Focusing too much on Eastern European integration in the past decades, and nowadays placing too many hopes on its economic links with China, the EU seems unable to understand that Chinese activism in the MENA region and in sub-Saharan Africa is reducing our grip on those areas and our capacity to outreach their elites, with dangerous consequences in the medium-long terms. Some of those triggering factors deserve, however, to be underlined. The first one is the rise of the so-called ‘global jihad’ ideology, which in particular played a crucial role in this process. Indeed, very few words in contemporary history have become as popular as the polysemous word jih¯ ad: probably the most controversial and debated concept associated nowadays with Islam. A verbal noun, both inspiring and frightening, which seems to overwhelm political debates about radical Islam. However, as always happens when technical terms become popular labels, jihad has become an overstretched word, an ideological banner, with an imprecise and broad significance, often disconnected from the classical doctrine which the contemporary jihadist ideologists nonetheless refer to.

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In other words, the current debate has transformed this term into a sort of a ‘meta-concept’, which, however, offers totally divergent narratives according to those who use, either in the West or within the D¯ ar al-Isl¯ am (Redaelli, 2017). As we know, the failure of ideologies based on alien patterns of Western modernization, on liberalism or Marxist theories, combined with the delusion of all hopes following the end of the colonial period, offered this politicized narrative of Islamic mobilization room for maneuvering. Islamic activism was the answer to the failure of decolonization and the instrument for fighting against economic and political inequality, in the name of human freedom and social justice. As has been said, a new ‘theology of discontent’, for mobilizing the millions who lived in degraded conditions under repressive, corrupted, and illiberal governments. And jihad was one of the pillars of this activism. The abysmal failures in modernizing and in offering responses to the needs of their populations, as well as their military humiliation by Israel, put Middle Eastern regimes in an increasingly difficult position. They were unable to cope with the fast demographic growth of their populations, large-scale urbanization, demands for basic needs (especially housing, health care, and education), political representation, and economic growth. A growing portion of the population within the Muslim countries—frustrated by the turns of events—felt the attractiveness of radical Islamist narratives on what ‘went wrong’, that is, the perceived betrayal of ‘real Islam’. However, despite the mobilization, determination, and popular support for the movements of so-called ‘political Islam’ (the Ikhw¯ an alMuslim¯ un among all), most of the contested regimes have been able to deal with the Islamist challenge, thanks to a plurality of different policies, often mixed together, ranging from brutal repression, social and religious concessions, political cooptation, and patron-client networks (supported by external financing). During the second half of the 1990s, most of those Islamist movements appeared to be trapped between governments’ successful repressions and a further radicalization of their agendas, which often led to their fragmentation and to political marginalization, as always happens when opposition narratives become too radical and violent (Kepel, 2002). The so-called ‘failure of political Islam’ (to use a contested terminology) created large cadres of dissatisfied Islamists who could not

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see a way to take power in their countries of origin, either through a cooperative approach with the existing regimes or by violent confrontation and paved the way for the rise of the global jihad. The champion of this new phase, based on this new concept, is obviously the movement created by Osama bin Laden (Us¯ama bin L¯adin) and other militant Islamists, al-Q¯ a ‘ida. The message of this organization, while simple and direct, maximized its impact on the Muslim community, shaping new modes of militant mobilization: a successful mix of quest for martyrdom and religious indoctrination with post-modern adaptability and the use of information technology. Qa’edist and post-Qa’edist movements, such as the successful organization of al-Dawla al-Isl¯ amiyya (IS—the evolution of the previous al-Dawla al-Isl¯ amiyya f¯ı al- Ir¯ aq wa al-Sh¯ am—a product of the disastrous Anglo-American invasion of Iraq in 2003) created deep fractures, active at all levels, either between the two shores of the Mediterranean or within the Islamic world itself. Andrea Plebani, in his essay, points out the effects of Daesh and how its actions reverberate all along our Basin (see below, “Periphery No More: The Jazira Between Local, Regional and International Dynamics”). Indeed, the 9/11 attacks by al-Qa eda and the subsequent decision by Washington to invade Iraq in 2003 as the starting phase for a transformation of the whole Middle East (with the idea of inoculating the Middle East with the ‘positive virus’ of democracy) represented a second negative turning point (Galbraith, 2009). The whole architecture of the postcolonial Middle East was shaken and lost its equilibrium. The multiple internal fractures within the Middle East were exacerbated by the collapse of the Iraqi state structure and by the disintegration of its social fabric, especially of its delicate ethno-religious nuances. The failure of the Bush Administration’s project in Iraq as well as the difficulties of the ‘War on Terror’ in Afghanistan against the Taliban and the jihadist organization there rooted, exacerbated the situation of great confusion and regional fragmentation (Bacevich, 2017). The most poisoning consequence, in any case, has been an artificial polarization and sectarian politicization within the Dar al-Isl¯ am, with the worsening of relations between the two main denominations of Islam (Gause III, 2014). The civil and proxy war in Iraq of the last two decades triggered sectarian narratives and feuds between Shia and Sunni communities, where religious disputes were simply a mask to cover the geopolitical clash in the Levant and in the Gulf between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (supported by several other Arab oil emirates).

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The uprising along the southern shore of the Mediterranean in 2011– 2012, with the so-called ‘Arab Springs’ (to use a contested definition) further amplified this sectarian violence and the diffusion of dichotomist narratives. Indeed: ‘the ‘exceptional power of identity in the Middle East and the permeability of regional state to trans-state identity’ is what emerged as a consequence of these dynamics: the long struggle of the nation state seems to be overthrown by the victory of identity and the belonging to another entity. The collapse of the authoritarian state brought about by the “Arab Springs”, intensifying the emergence of the pre-existing permeability of the states, accelerated this process leading to the use of sectarianism as a political tool or to the politicization of sectarianism’ (Melcangi & Redaelli, 2019: 127). The consequent civil wars in Libya and Syria, and the rise of the meteoric jihadist caliphate of IS in the Levant—described in detail by Melcangi and Plebani in their essays—worsened the problems of the whole region. In addition to the traditional political rivalries between states and the socio-economic pressures destabilizing many MENA countries, the tensions and upheavals of recent years are undermining consolidated state structures. The Syrian civil war has threatened countries like Iraq and Lebanon, which were already fragile and torn apart internally, further contributing to the crisis of what remained of the Middle East security complex. The continuing clash between opposing militias, the spread of jihadist movements, the explosive rise of illicit trafficking, and the impact in Europe of the rising migration trends all add to the security crisis permeating the entire Basin. The fragmentation of Libya is potentially even more dangerous for the stability of the Mediterranean, especially after Turkey entered directly into the conflict supporting the internationally recognized government of Fayez al-Sarraj (F¯ayaz al-Sarr¯aj) radicalizing its hostility toward Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, which support general Khalifa Haftar (Khal¯ıfa H . aftar). As pointed out by Melcangi in her essay: ‘Turkey’s strategy increasingly globalized the conflict, opening a new phase of the Libyan war, with regional and global powers committed to maneuvering for influence and supremacy, weaponizing their interests in the Country in order to augment their political and military meddling at the expense of other international powers, including EU countries’. The international community—and Europe in particular—responded slowly and in a fragmentary manner to this self-sustaining spiral of violence and instability. It was only with the outbreak of the IS

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phenomenon in the summer of 2014—and its use of media-amplified terror—that the international community tried to coordinate a political and military reaction, encouraging the setting up of an informal coalition intended to fight jihadist movements and to reinforce macroregional stability. However, as in the past, internal divisions, boycotts, and preventive exclusions continue to reign over this improbable coalition, exacerbated by weak European cohesion, tensions between Shi ‘a and Sunni blocs, the ambiguous ambitions of Erdogan’s Turkey, and the renewed activism of Putin’s Russia. Thus, regional rivalries and Western short-sightedness prevented the adoption of a coherent strategy and provided bold regional actors (Iran and Turkey in particular) with room to maneuver and to push their agendas. All these crises, conflicts, spectacular terroristic attacks on both shores of the Basin, and humanitarian catastrophes disseminated the perception that this region, throughout its history, has only been a mosaic of different communities, defined by clear-cut fault lines constrained in a regional framework dominated by ‘artificial states’. A place where sectarian conflicts represent the epitome of clear-cut, opposed identities, with communities separated by walls of mistrust and hate. In Europe, too many analyses insist on this stereotyped vision, obsessively focused on sectarianism and on the need to protect the ‘old continent’ from the diseases which Islam and the Middle East were spreading all around. De facto, the EU and the single European member state withdrew from an active policy toward the South, paralyzed by the terror of the Terror (which IS amplified with a series of bloody terroristic attacks), and by the refusal to set up a comprehensive common strategy to deal with illegal immigration flows and with the security crisis of the Basin. A by-product has been the growth of Islamophobic movements and the demonization of Muslim communities, perceived as an inner threat and not as a pivotal element for defeating violent radical Islamists narratives. An extremely negative role has been played by the inflated fear of the so-called ‘lone wolves’; that is, individuals who become quickly radicalized do not participate in active cells and are difficult to identify in time. Although their attacks lack the sophisticated organization of coordinated jihadist cells, from the point of view of public opinion, they have an even worse effect because they encourage the demonization of every Muslim, seen as a potential threat. This is a self-fueling process, since it is clear that certain types of media attention are facilitating their spread. In particular, emphasizing the ‘Islamist danger’ triggers a

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copycat effect, pushing borderline subjects into action. In addition, the shameful campaigns against Muslim communities by certain groups and media create an extremely dangerous climate of alienation and marginalization. Despite the presence of thousands of scholars and researchers studying Islam and the Muslim world, and despite centuries of contacts and relations, the lack of mutual knowledge is astonishing, as is the inability of European public opinion to adopt a more balanced approach toward this civilization and its nuances, described in detail by Mohammad Hashas in this volume (see below, “Arab Mediterranean Islam: Intellectual and Political Trends”). The presence of different denominations and an extremely diversified orthopraxis along the shore of the Mediterranean is often ignored, as is easily misunderstood the role played by religion. Indeed, religion itself is multidimensional, and dimensions of religious and spiritual experience can be combined in many ways across individual lives. Plurality in religion, in fact, begins with the daily life of common people, beyond religious authorities and rituals. Europe’s gradual relinquishment of actively dealing with Mediterranean instability, and possibly leading to the creation of a holistic political strategy to reduce it, represents a depressing failure, well beyond the political sphere, threating our capacity to adapt ourselves to the seismic changes and redistribution of power that is affecting the whole international system. The US too, at the end of the George W. Bush Administration, tried to disentangle itself from the chaos and the failure of the Middle East. Kenneth Pollack gave voice to this political aspiration with a famous book, with an extremely evocative title: A path Out of the Desert (Pollack, 2008). However, the American super-power is still inextricably involved in the Middle Eastern crises. For Europe, disentangling itself from the Mediterranean basin would be even more hazardous, lying in the realm of a simple childish and unrealistic attitude.

3

Adapting to the Change

As already underlined in the previous sections—and as the essays in this volume will demonstrate, too—the Mediterranean has acquired a renewed centrality. Paradoxically, however, states on the two shores risk being left on the edge, having partially lost their historical relationship with their Sea, which is being transformed into a ‘global sea’, despite its geography. A world dimension that marginalizes the Euro-Mediterranean dimension to favor a global but more fragmented reality, where regional single state

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Actors interact with non-state ones, proxies, and external powers, without any effective multilateral framework. From a theoretical perspective, it is clearly difficult to map and to organize the global transformation. Gordeeva regrouped approaches to the security dilemma in international relations into two main categories: the first is ‘towards the federalist and neo-functionalist schools of thought and bases its arguments on the idea of global integration suggesting for an abolition of the state-system in favor of a supranational geo-political entity’ (Gordeeva, 2016: 1). The second includes the rationalist schools of liberals, who believe in the collaborative power of international regimes, and neo-realists, who stress the importance of power projection and balances of power within an anarchic system. Whatever the theoretical frame adopted, this increased fragmentation of the Basin cannot be denied. Indeed, this amplified entropy and fragmentation derive also from the fact that the status quo tends to be a value in itself for the Actors that are part of the Mediterranean geopolitical region, since they share risks and opportunities. Instead, external Actors normally tend to have a functionalist approach, emphasizing their specific contingent interests, hardly paying attention to the collateral destabilizing effects in the medium-long term. A sort of self-sustaining process that is weakening any perspective of Mediterranean regionalism, worsened by the lack of political willingness (or capacity) of the European Union to react with stabilizing policies. A fragility which especially exposes the Mediterranean countries, Italy, Greece, and Spain in particular to the risk of an unregulated, fragmented, and polarized geopolitical space. Therefore, European, North African, and Levantine countries are facing a regional architecture which is undergoing a significant transformation and which requires the capacity to understand those changes, and to adapt their geo-strategies accordingly. Indeed, the greater security risk for a state is represented by its inability to understand the evolving geopolitical reality: ‘when the strategy diverges from that reality or when the reality changes without a corresponding change in strategy, the state loses its influence in international relations’ (Grygiel, 2006: 52). Nothing new from a historical perspective: at the global level, we may recall the progressive decline of the maritime empire of Spain, after its rise with the start of the inter-oceanic Columbian era; in the Mediterranean basin, Venice is probably one of the most paradigmatic examples: after the creation of a large mercantile empire at the beginning of the fourteenth century, Venice controlled the maritime routes between Asia and Europe.

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However, it was unable to cope with military threats (mainly posed by the Ottoman Empire) and with the changes in maritime technology, prompted by the new intercontinental maritime shipping lanes across the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic. The result of this hiatus between the traditional Venetian strategy and the new international contest provoked the decline and marginalization of its commercial empire.6 Therefore, fragmentation, military, political, economic, and humanitarian crises are not marginalized and the region—as already stressed—is again a pivot of interest within an international system under seismic transformations. The reasons for this persistent interest in the Mediterranean area are quite evident and the present volume, although not exhaustive, tries to summarize the main ones. It is clear that the Basin performs the function of political and anthropological mediation between different lands and cultures and it plays an important balancing role in the global space, interconnecting different geostrategic regions, too. This role of pivotal hub is, however, threatened by crises and conflicts of interest and it reveals a need that becomes increasingly urgent: to protect and guarantee the security of the area, developing a strategy not based on the zero-sum game theory among the competing interests of the Actors involved; on the contrary, it is vital to adapt our vision to the changing paradigm to envisage a policy which engages them, offering a common perspective based on shared values. The lack of European determination and weakness in its foreign policy actions has created new geopolitical spaces for emerging or returning powers, either from the region or outside it. However, those actors—such as Turkey, Russia, and several Arab countries—lack a coherent vision to imagine a new geo-political project encompassing a comprehensive vision of the Basin as a security system and not just a simple chessboard for their activities. Turkish activism during recent years is a clear demonstration of the limits of the so-called ‘neo-Ottoman’ vision formulated during the Erdogan’s period, as demonstrated in Nocera’s essay on Turkey in the Mediterranean. In any case, the balance of the Mediterranean basin is shacked also by a plurality of other trends and phenomena that go beyond the traditional geopolitical dynamics analyzed. One of the most evident is the demographic alteration between the two shores of the Sea, and the role played by the so-called ‘bulge generation’ for the MENA countries. Giordano, in his essay (Youth Bulge Dynamics in the Mediterranean Region: The Geopolitical Implications of Human Capital on Security and Stability),

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shows the multifarious consequences and implications connected with demographic changes between the two shores of the Basin and those in the sub-Saharan Africa, with the latter appearing particularly worrying. As Giordano correctly points out in his essay: ‘What has happened over recent years in the Mediterranean in terms of migration, conflict and disorder, could happen in even more virulent terms in Sub-Saharan Africa’, with the bulge generation particularly vulnerable to geopolitical instability and civil conflict. Indeed, the combined effect of large numbers of young people, rapid growth in the working-age population, and lack of employment opportunities within the job market produce a potentially explosive situation. Several essays analyze the economic transformations affecting the region, in particular the ones written by Triulzi (see below, “An Overview of the Changed Eu-Mena Economic Landscape: From Cooperation to Migration”) and by Cavalieri-Ghezzi (see below, “Is the Mediterranean Sea Still the Mare Nostrum? The Belt and Road Initiative and Chinese Investments in the Region”). The latter essay demonstrates the leading role that China can play from a geoeconomic point of view, analyzing in detail the huge and most ambitious project of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which clearly aims at repositioning China within the global community, and not only in the fields of economics and commerce. China is already and undoubtedly an economic giant in the Mediterranean, representing the second largest trading partner after the European Union; it benefits by the fact that the countries of North Africa and the Middle East lie logistically along one of the busiest maritime sea lanes in the world, the one that connects China to Europe. With the BRI project, Beijing is combining both the commercial element with the energy-related and infrastructural. A distinct peculiarity of the Chinese presence in the Mediterranean basin is that China is pushing its economic and commercial interests, trying to remain as much as possible neutral vis-à-vis the plurality of conflicts, political, and sectarian crises. A policy enforcing the image of China as a more neutral actor than the Western countries. As the two authors of the essay on China wrote: ‘China has pushed the concept of ‘developmental peace’—in contrast to the Western concept of ‘democratic peace’, arguing that the root cause of regional insecurity is economic stagnation, high unemployment, poor infrastructure, rapid population growth, and brain drain rather than a democracy deficit’.

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However, this prudent—or more probably, cynical, political line—has extremely negative implications both for the perception of the Mediterranean basin as a single region and for the elaboration of long-term visions which try to address the problems of the Basin with a win–win strategy. Instead, China, like Turkey, Russia, and other players active in this Sea, lacks the willingness—let alone the ability—to build a geopolitical project that embraces the whole Mediterranean. Another reason to regret the EU and NATO’s weakness and passivity. Because with the geopolitical vacuum created by their withdrawal, the very idea of the Mediterranean as a region that unites the two shores is fading away. The wider Mediterranean basin is therefore experiencing the controversial unfolding of a complex matrix of political, economic and security crises that are shaking the bases of our socio-political and institutional systems, and which are often translated into conflicts based on religious, ethnic or tribal identities. A rising number of political actors are exploiting and manipulating ethnic identities and religious values, practices and traditions to advance specific agendas, drastically limiting the room for coexistence in today’s societies. It is interesting to note how, after years of growing sectarian conflicts, in several MENA countries growing portions of the local population are realizing the artificial, fake nature of those sectarian discourses. For instance, in Iraq, since 2019, popular protests have rejected polarizing ethnic or religious politics, contesting all parties, accused of being corrupt and unable to provide basic daily needs. Lebanon, Sudan and other states have been shaken by similar dynamics. So, to counter the negative self-fueling spirals of polarizing, sectarian identities, it is crucial to relaunch political, social and cultural initiatives based on an idea of security, which should go beyond the traditional perception of state or national security to encompass that of collective security and, moreover, that of human security. As is well known, human security is a concept envisaged by Dr. Mahbub ul-Haq in 1994, described in the UNDP Human Report of that year (UNDP, 1994) and discussed for many years; only in 2012 did the UN officially adopt Human Security as a pillar of its action. While many politicians and analysts remain skeptical about the possibility to really implement this idea within the international system, it cannot be denied that Human Security clearly shows the need to move from a state-centered security to a peoplecentered one. In other words, security means addressing the basic needs of the population of a state, not just guaranteeing its borders. Looking

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from this perspective, the multiple emergencies of the Mediterranean basin appear to be not only political-military crises, but human security ones: inevitably, political violence, civil wars, terrorism emerge from states ‘that do not have adequate resources to provide proper material benefits or opportunities for their populations. Thus, human security also depends on the level of equality in a state’ (Koch & Stivachtis, 2019). When people see violated their basic needs, in terms of food, health, education securities, when they are not free from fear and need, when their civil rights, their freedom of political or religious expression are violated, then we have a threat to security which can easily overflow from its area of origin to neighboring regions. The recent history of the enlarged Mediterranean basin demonstrates it: the nexus among underdevelopment, lack of opportunities, social-economic inequalities and violence has been illustrated in several chapters of this book, in particular the ones devoted to the analysis of the situation in the single states of the southern shore of this Sea. As stated at the beginning of this introduction, the new centrality of the Mediterranean descends also—although not exclusively—from its being the center of a giant maelstrom of instability, and geopolitical rivalry which is arousing the worries and the nationalistic interests of local, regional and international actors. An unpleasant, reactive centrality, according to this perspective. At the same time, this Sea might become, once again—like before the so-called ‘Colombian epoch’ started in 1492—the leading terminal of a giant new Euro-Asian commercial corridor; a potential structural transformation of its economic role, which further emphasizes its current relevance within the global maritime commercial sea lanes. In both cases, the negative and the positive centrality, what is extremely needed is the launch of a new long-term strategy to address the imbalances and the elements of instability present in the region. A vision based not only on the interests of some single actor, but a holistic vision that might promote a collective human security for all the Mediterranean peoples and for the areas gravitating around this Sea. The only rational answer to seismic, epochal changes, is trying to govern and to adapt to them. Not to ignore them, under the childish illusion they will fade away as an undesired nightmare.

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Notes 1. For an analysis of the concept of Security regional complex, envisaged by Buzan and Weaver, see following section. 2. Kelly wrote an interesting analysis of Cohen’s shatterbelt concept (Kelly, 1986), trying to test it on empirical cases. 3. The famous Regional Security Complex theory was first elaborated by Buzan and Wæver in 1983 and immediately became one of the most popular and debated theory of International Relations. Substantially modified in 1998 and 2003, this approach paved the way for a theoretical debate, still going on, on the possibility to use it for describing Middle Eastern security dynamics, or to amend and adapt it to this specific part of the world. 4. The enmity between Iran and Saudi Arabia is a persistent feature of the modern Middle East, in particular after the Iranian Revolution of 1979, it encompasses religious, cultural, identity-related, and, obviously, geopolitical rivalries. Their relations further worsened after the ill-planned AngloAmerican invasion of Iraq in 2003, since it triggered Saudi Arabian fears that Iran could become the hegemonic power of the Gulf and the Levant. As a consequence, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia increased its political efforts and religious propaganda, accompanied by an almost inexhaustible stream of money, to combat those whom it considers to be its two deadliest enemies: Persian Shiite Iran, on the one hand, and the political Islam of the Muslim Brotherhood on the other. In order to oppose expanding Iranian regional geopolitical influence, Riyadh has not hesitated to finance extremist Sunni movements which are profoundly anti-Shiite and to incite rebellion among Sunni communities in Iraq and Syria, contributing to the polarization and fragmentation of the Levant. Its attempt to ‘export’ its own interpretation of Islam (the most dogmatic and rigid of all, linked to Wahhabism and the Hanbali school of religious law) has encouraged the rise of Salafi movements, deeply intolerant of any deviation from their own interpretation of Islam, which they consider to be the purest but which is only a mixture of extremist Islamic practices and tribal traditions, accompanied by a distorted interpretation of shariatic principles (see: Gause III, 2014; al-Rasheed, 2013). 5. According to Grygel, Venice declined for two main reasons, one outside of its influence, that is the emergence of alternative maritime trade routes, and the other the result of a hazardous strategy, that is to enlarge its domains on the Italian mainland, getting involved in expensive local wars with other Italian cities. The Serenissima was aware of the danger posed by the Vasco de Gama’s discoveries, to the point that—in 1586—she proposed to dig a Suez channel to connect the Mediterranean to the Red sea. But Venice mainland expansion created more problems than solutions to the

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decline, worsened also by Venetian inability to modernize and adapt its naval technologies to the new trade reality.

Bibliography Al-Rasheed, M. (2013). Saudi Arabia: Local and regional challenges. Contemporary Arab Affairs, 6(1), 28–40. Bacevich, A. J. (2017). America’s war for the greater Middle East: A military history. Random House Trade Paperbacks. Behr, T. (2012). The European union’s mediterranean policies after the Arab spring: Can the leopard change its spots? Amsterdam Law Forum, 4(2), 76– 88. Brown, C. (1984). International politics and the Middle East: Old rules, dangerous game. I.B. Tauris. Buzan, B. (1991). People, states and fear. An agenda for international security studies in the post-cold war era. Hemel Hempstead. Buzan, B., & Wæver, O. (2003). Regions and powers: The structure of international security. Cambridge University Press. Cohen, S. (1973). Geography and politics in a world divided (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press. Colombo, A., et al. (2002). Il grande Medio Oriente. Il nuovo arco dell’instabilità. EGEA. Colombo, S., & Soler i Lecha, E. (2019) A half-empty glass: Limits and dilemmas of the EU’s relations to the MENA countries. MENARA Working Papers 39, 1–31. Cummings, S., & Hinnebusch, R. (2014). Empire and after: Toward a framework for comparing empires and their consequences in the post-imperial Middle East and Central Asia. Journal of Historical Sociology, 27 (1), 103–131. Del Sarto, R. (2015). Normative empire Europe: The European union, its borderlands, and the ‘Arab spring.’ Journal of Common Market Studies, 54(2), 215–232. Galbraith, P. W. (2009). Unintended consequences: How war in Iraq strengthened America’s enemies. Simon & Schuster. Gordeeva, E. (2016). A transforming international system and the three approaches to the security dilemma. European Journal of Future Research, 4(6), 1–15. Gregory Gause III, F. (2014). Beyond sectarianism: The new Middle East cold war. Brookings Doha Center Analysis Paper 11: 1–33. Grygiel, J. J. (2006). Great powers and geopolitical change. John Hopkins University Press.

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Hanau Santini, R. (2017). A new regional cold war in the Middle East and North Africa: Regional security complex theory revisited. The International Spectator, 52(4), 93–111. Kamrava, M. (2018). Hierarchy and instability in the Middle East regional order. International Studies Journal, 14(4), 1–35. Kelly, P. L. (1986). Escalation of regional conflict: Testing the shatterbelt concept. Political Geography Quarterly, 5(2), 161–180. Kepel, G. (2002). Jihad: The trail of political Islam. Harvard University Press. Original edition: (2000) Jihad: expansion et déclin de l’islamisme. Paris: Gallimard. Koch, B., & Stivachtis, Y. A. (Eds.). (2019). Regional security in the Middle East sectors, variables and issues. E-International Relations Publishing. Lattimore, O. (1940). Inner Asian frontiers of China. American Geographical Society. Lattimore, O. (1962). Studies in frontier history: Collected papers, 1928–1958. Oxford University Press. Lins de Albuquerque, A. (2016). Analyzing security in the Middle East from a regional perspective. In E. Holmquist & J. Rydqvist (Eds.), The future of regional security in the Middle East: Expert perspectives on coming developments (pp. 14–25). Melcangi, A., & Redaelli, R. (2019). The re-sectarization of the Middle East: Minorities, communities and identity politics within the current geopolitical confrontation. In I. Caracciolo & U. Montuoro (Eds.), Protection of cultural and religious minorities. Leadership for international peace and security (pp. 117–134). Giappichelli Editore. Pollack, K. (2008). A path out of the desert. A grand strategy for America in the Middle East. Ramdom House. Quercia, P. (2019). Mediterraneo. Specchio del disordine globale. Ce.Mi.S.S.— Osservatorio Strategico, pp. 86–92. Redaelli, R. (2017). The broken mirror: How the contemporary Jihadist. Narrative is re-shaping the classical doctrine of Jihad. In P. Maggiolini & M. Demichelis (Eds.), The struggle to define a nation: Rethinking nationalism in the contemporary Islamic world (pp. 413–441). Gorgias Press. Tayfur, F. (2012). Securitity and co-operation in the mediterranean, Paper. Center for strategic research, Turkish ministry of foreign affairs. http://www. sam.gov.tr/pdf/perceptions/Volume-V/september-november-2000/FatihT ayfur.pdf. Tuathail, G. Ó. (1996). Critical geopolitics. The politics of writing global space. Routledge. UNDP. (1994). Human development report 1994: New dimensions of human security. Oxford University Press.

An Overview of the Changed EU-MENA Economic Landscape: From Cooperation to Migration Umberto Triulzi

Contents 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The Economies of the MENA Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 EU Policies for Cooperation with the MENA Countries . . . . . . . . 4 Migratory Policies in the MENA Countries and the EU . . . . . . . . 5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Introduction

The relations among the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries as well as between MENA countries and the European Union (EU) show a geopolitical and economic scenario marked by the concurrence of several factors: ambitious and unfulfilled projects of integration and cooperation, the political self-promotion of influential leaders in this vast geographical area (Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia and, more recently, Turkey) and the increasing involvement of actors outside the area pursuing new

U. Triulzi (B) Department of Political Science, Sapienza University, Rome, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 F. M. Corrao and R. Redaelli (eds.), States, Actors and Geopolitical Drivers in the Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69000-7_3

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regional political and energy equilibria (China and Russia). Together with the economic difficulties experienced in the past several years, these elements have contributed to exacerbating this area’s political instability, leading to dramatic conflicts, revolts, genocides, and migratory flows without precedent in the history of the region. In this chapter, we will be highlighting three closely interrelated issues: the critical economic issues and the potentialities of the MENA countries; the cooperation models put in place by the European Union and the reasons for their limited success; and, finally, the flight of millions of migrants to Europe, further evidence of the failure of the MENA countries’ policies but also of EU policies. As pointed out in the Resolution of the European Parliament of 27 March 2019,1 despite the considerable European investments made in the area, ‘the EU has not been able to gain real, substantive political and economic leverage. […] the impact of EU policies remains limited, and the EU is not perceived as a game changer by the countries in the region’ (PE, 2019: 7). In the conclusions, also in light of the changes in the social and economic situation brought on by COVID-19 in the last few months, we will advance some proposals for the construction of a renewed EU-MENA dialogue, more aligned and closer to the interests and aspirations of the populations in the two regions. We hope these proposals will help the Mediterranean area to regain its central position in diplomatic, political, and economic relations. To safeguard the strategic role and independence from outside influences that the Great Sea has enjoyed its thousands of years of history, EU and MENA countries have to move in the same direction, promote stability and new development opportunities for all the countries on the two shores.

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The Economies of the MENA Countries

The countries belonging to this area, extending from Morocco to Iran, reach a total population of over 450 million, about 50% of which is accounted for by children and young people in the age range of 0–24 (UNICEF, 2019). The MENA demographic forecasts place the region with the highest population growth: by 2050, the increase is estimated + 50% from the 2015 figure. Countries like Egypt, Iraq, and Sudan, despite fertility contraction rates, will see their populations increase, respectively, by 26, 17, and 16 million by 2030. In other countries like Turkey, Iran, and Morocco, the demographic transition resulting from higher education levels and closer attention paid to family planning and urbanization

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will have led to a demographic picture with lower mortality rates and a more significant reduction in the birth rates. The MENA countries’ economic situation differs significantly, depending on the availability of oil resources together with relatively greater or lesser availability of workforce.2 The oil-exporting countries of the Persian Gulf register GDP growth rates higher than the countries in North Africa; they are also able to make up for the insufficient internal supply of workforce by attracting labor forces from other countries in the region and Asia, thanks to higher wages, which allow immigrants to send remittances to their countries of origin. The comparison of per capita incomes levels in the MENA countries (2018) reveals wide gaps ranging from 70 thousand dollars in Qatar to 2.5 thousand dollars in Egypt, with other countries in between these two extremes (41 thousand in Israel, 23 thousand dollars in Saudi Arabia, 4 thousand dollars in Algeria, the 3.2 thousand dollars in Morocco). Considering the participation of young people in the labor market (in the 15–24 age group), we see that it comes lower in 17 of the 20 MENA countries than the global average of 45%. In over half of the region’s countries, only one out of three is found to be employed, in Jordan one out of four, and in Saudi Arabia one out of five. The employment level of the young people, and the women, in particular, is less than half as high as that of the men—a sure sign that, despite the higher levels of education reached in almost all MENA countries, most of the economies in the region are unable to satisfy the demand for jobs from a rapidly increasing population or offer qualified employment opportunities to a highly educated youth (World Bank, 2019c). Other adverse events have affected and profoundly changed as from the 2000s the political and social situation in the MENA countries, such as the failure of every attempt at peace between Israel and Palestine (the Camp David Accords), the beginning of the Second Intifada (2000– 2005), the American-led invasion of Iraq (2003), the growing rivalry between Iran and the moderate Arab states, the great financial crisis of 2007–2008 (although it had less effect on the economies in the area than on the more advanced economies), and later on, the Arab revolts for 2011 and 2019.

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2.1

The Main Criticalities

From an economic point of view, thanks to the reforms launched to reduce public spending and liberalize foreign trade and economy in general, the twenty-first century sees the MENA countries enjoying an average annual growth of over 3%, with even higher rates for Tunisia (4.8%), Morocco (4.9%), Jordan (6.7%), Libya (5.4%), Turkey (4.7%), and Iran (5.4%). However, economic growth and, with it, higher levels of consumption and well-being benefited only part of the area’s population, opening the way for economic, political, and social imbalances to emerge and eventually, with different impact, lead to the Arab revolts of 2011. It is in this context, with the people raising their voices to demand civil and political rights together with a fairer distribution of the benefits resulting from growth, that the limitations of the governance model applied by most of the countries in the area emerge, together with policies implemented by the governmental authorities to curb protests, often suppressed with violence and coercive measures. It is a model of social contract based on guarantees of jobs for the people in the public sector, subsidies for basic needs, and free education and health services. However, at the same time, it has seen the consolidation of the power in the hands of a narrow circle of political and military leaders, high public officials, and entrepreneurs close to the regimes (ISMed-CNR, 2016). Even the reforms launched in the 2000s for the privatization of businesses, enhancement of competitiveness, and the support of new and more dynamic entrepreneurship failed to produce the expected results, favoring only the interests of the sectors considered close to the power élites. Widespread corruption, lack of transparency, and a long-term strategy for the modernization of the economy and productive development in the area led to a reduced capacity to attract foreign direct investments (FDIs). Most of the FDIs, with the exclusion of Israel and Egypt, receiving over 40% of all the direct investments flowing to MENA, end up in the major oil-exporting countries (Oman, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates). Moreover, after the financial crisis and the 2014– 2016 lower economic growth, the already polarized FDI has also been shrinking (IMF, 2019). The consequences of the production slowing down in the sectors most affected by the crisis, including tourism, textiles, constructions, and trade, have led to more significant problems for the labor market. In particular, increasing unemployment for the higher educated young

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people, generating insecure, underpaid, and low skilled jobs, induced many workers—due also to the conflicts that broke out in the Middle East—to emigrate. In the years following on the Arab Springs, the region saw a new series of dramatic events that led to conflict in countries like Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, together with repressive policies and reduction of civil rights, in particular for journalists, activists, and exponents of the opposition. On top of all this came other forms of radicalization and violence (following on the birth of the Islamic State), with protests breaking out in countries not previously involved in the Arab revolts (Algeria, Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon) and non-Arab countries (Iran), and an overall deterioration in economic and social conditions, in particular for the more vulnerable populations of the non-oil-exporting countries. Poverty and inequality have been the main features that mark millions of citizens living in marginalization conditions and deprivation of essential goods. The data reported by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA, 2017) on indicators of multidimensional poverty reveal that in ten countries in MENA, 41% of the total population, about 116 million people, are classified as poor and 25% as at risk of poverty (a further reduction in income or increasing costs would suffice to plunge the population in poverty). The region also shows marked degrees of inequality: 10% of the population owns 61% of the wealth (in Europe the percentage stands at 37%, in the USA 4%). We witness gender, income, and ethnic inequality affecting every Arab society sector, both urban and rural (Khouri, 2019). The reasons for such high levels of inequality depend on specific structural factors. Some Arab economies, such as Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, and Sudan, depending almost entirely on incomes from energy sources (oil and gas), remittances of migrants, and foreign aid—resources over which the country’s political leadership has decisive control—lack policies to redistribute income, with the consequence of generating cronyism and advantages for the élites while encouraging the growth of opaque relations between public and private capital (Assoud, 2020). In the Gulf countries, the revenues from oil exports are primarily taken over by the élites in power and put into sovereign funds and offshore accounts. A clear sign of the scant interest these countries have in developing efficient public administrations able to meet the needs of the population in terms of well-being is given by the paltry contribution of fiscal

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measures (through tax systems, social security contributions, and redistribution policies) to the formation of the GDP. Taxes account for only 2% of the GDP in Iraq, 12.5% in Egypt, 15% in Lebanon, while in many Arab countries, more than 60% of the population lacks adequate forms of social security. The plunging oil prices seen over the last few years have come to constitute a further factor in the burgeoning of inequalities caused by the austerity measures brought in by the national authorities due to lower revenues and higher annual deficits. For instance, the decision to reduce food subsidies (mainly imported from abroad) hit the most vulnerable population hardest, worsening their living conditions, fueling conflict, and political and social instability. Further factors exacerbating the MENA countries’ economic lag and structural fragility are to be seen in the poor results of policies to diversify productive activities and the policies to promote exports. The special economic zones (SEZs) for attracting foreign businesses and boosting competitiveness for the national enterprises, with more business-friendly regulations than the regulatory systems in force in the rest of the country, have not produced changes in enterprises’ management, whether in private or public hands. Firms in the area continue to be the least regionally integrated, loath to give up privileges and protectionist practices to favor competition, promote investments in new technologies, and abandon bureaucratic and legislative barriers that distort the markets (World Bank, 2019c). Two other particularly worrying factors in the region, especially looking to the medium- and long-term prospects, are connected to the environmental stress caused by climate change, which has led to a 1.5 °C increase in temperature over the last two decades, and the limited availability of renewable water resources. The MENA countries are among the hardest hit by extreme meteorological phenomena such as exceptional heat waves, drought, desertification, severe water shortages, rising sea level, and land degradation. Over 60% of the population lacks the water resources to maintain the present levels of consumption and development of productive activities, particularly in the field of agriculture, which accounts for between 70 and 80% of the world’s water consumption (World Bank, 2018). The high population growth rate, concentrated in the urban areas, represents a further stress factor in water resources use. Few governments in the region have installed desalinization plants and implemented the necessary operations on the infrastructures to reduce the worsening of the impact due to water shortage. In most countries, the

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price policies applied do not bear the costs of infrastructures for irrigation, transport, and distribution of water, which are managed inefficiently with high levels of waste (Baconi, 2018). A further element that discourages the modernization of enterprises and reallocation of the MENA countries’ internal resources depends on the difficulties they face, particularly by the oil-importing countries, in accessing the financial resources necessary to develop investments and innovation processes in the economy. Opening up well-qualified lines of credit and introducing insolvency resolution schemes for the more efficient and accountable firms could promote the growth of investments in the private sector, boosting productivity through better allocation of the internal resources and development of businesses—especially small and medium-sized—in the direction of more competitive management systems and entrepreneurial activity. 2.2

The Potential of the MENA Countries

The economic and social picture prevailing in most countries in the region highlights the imbalances and significant differences in the living conditions of the population. Despite the reforms introduced and the progress made over the last few decades, these imbalances will still take a long time to be remedied or at least significantly reduced, calling for farsighted economic policies on the part of the governmental authorities. The geopolitical and armed conflicts underway, the tensions in the commercial relations between the major international players, the volatility of oil prices and high levels of unemployment among the younger generations, and women in particular, together with political instability and divergence between the interests of the countries in the area evoke obstacles that it will be hard to overcome, even over a more extended period. Coming on top of an already seriously destabilized macroeconomic and political situation, the costs that have more recently arisen with the COVID-19 health crisis, the drop in GDP experienced by the MENA countries for the fourth year running, 2017–2020, and the fall in global demand which will impact negatively on the economies of the area, an outlook for the future rife with uncertainties emerges (IMF, 2020). So, is the picture hopelessly gloomy? As we will see more clearly in the following two sections, analysis of the situation in the region should not underestimate the presence of positive elements which, if further developed through national governmental policies and at the same time incentivized

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by an innovative EU economic cooperation and integration policy, could set the region on a new path to growth. First, a population consisting mainly of young men and women with high levels of education and training is undoubtedly an asset. About half of the population is under the age of 24 and 2/3 under 30, representing well-qualified human capital, highly productive for the MENA economy development, but finding insufficient openings in the labor market. It is an outcome we might call ‘perverse’ insofar as many young people, highly qualified with academic degrees and diplomas, are more likely to remain unemployed. In contrast, the young people with lower education and training levels have easier access to the labor market, albeit working in the informal economy, with low salary and without social security (World Bank, 2019c). The MENA countries’ future will belong to the young insofar as their contribution is perceived as a potential resource for growth. The changes brought about by the new technologies, not only at the global level but also in all MENA countries, require radical changes in the labor demand of public and private enterprises that can only be met by an appropriately skilled supply, which in turn requires investment in the field of training and education of children, adolescents, and young people. The MENA countries, particularly those with large populations and relatively high levels of unemployment and underemployment, including Algeria, Egypt, Iran, and Turkey, have to develop a broader ability to adapt to technological innovations such as digitalization, automation, and artificial intelligence. They must create new jobs entailing higher skills and better pay, particularly more job opportunities for women. They will have to diversify their economies, encouraging the growth of private enterprises, and ensure forms of governance that cut down on the protection of the public enterprises, rewarding competitiveness and the culture of competition. Without these changes in economic policy, which hopefully accompany success in curbing the numerous conflicts within the region, many MENA countries will find themselves facing social and economic instability in the coming years, with even worse cases of civil conflict compared to those that broke out, and remain unresolved, with the Arab Springs. Another element pointing to the potential for the region’s economic development lies in some reforms recently brought in by MENA countries, which are going in the right direction. Groups of countries led by Tunisia, Jordan, and Kuwait, also with the support of international

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institutions, are introducing significant improvements in their government structures to answer more effectively to the citizens’ needs. In many Gulf countries, improvements made in the administration of the financial systems and the conditions for financing, together with more expansionary monetary policies, have created a more favorable climate for investments. However, access to credit, especially for small firms, remains a challenging obstacle in most lower-income MENA countries. In the oil-importing countries popular among tourists—Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia—the governments have launched promotion projects and plan to enhance security in this area. In Egypt, the macroeconomic reforms introduced in 2016 to liberalize the exchange rate, reduce subsidies to the energy sector, and introduce more business-friendly systems have had a positive impact in terms of investments and increasing exports (Youssuf et al., 2019). Enhancement of governance in the management of public services, introducing a new legal framework in public procurement, and new tariff policies for trade can help boost productivity, extending the range of goods produced and underpinning their position in the global value chains. Nevertheless, many reforms have not started, while others have only been initiated in part, or have been postponed due to the staunch opposition of the government authorities and privileged classes. As emerges from several reports of international institutions (IMF, 2018; UNECA, 2016, 2018; World Bank, 2018, 2019a, 2019b) and the many studies carried out in the area, the right path has been signposted, and the political authorities responsible in the MENA countries must continue in that direction, expediting the implementation of reforms in the interests of the populations they govern. The demands for change, as witnessed in 2019 with the protests breaking out in Algeria, Tunisia, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, and Egypt, can no longer be ignored or met only with violent reactions. The end of long-lasting shaky democratic regimes—Mubarak in Egypt, Ben Ali in Tunisia, Gaddafi in Libya, and, recently, Bouteflika in Algeria—not to mention many other Arab leaders who have failed to promote reforms as they promised—are a clear sign of social malaise, scant transparency, and corrupt management of political power coming in for increasing contestation. Finally, we come to the sector that is fundamental for both the countries rich in energy sources and the energy-importing countries, whose development may prove a factor catalyzing the process of internal change and a key element in the future energy scenario, and indeed in the growth

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of the economies in the region. The reference here is to the production and consumption of renewable energy. There are two significant aspects to bear in mind. First, the fluctuations in oil prices depend ever less on the decisions taken by the OPEC countries and increasingly on external events, mainly the USA’s oil autonomy, thanks to the exploitation of the shale reserves, and the geopolitical vicissitudes related to Saudi Arabia and Russia’s disagreement over crude oil production, with Riyadh is favoring exports even at minimal prices to crowd out the competing producers and Moscow more interested in guiding the barrel price toward its own ‘breakeven’ (around 40–50 dollars, as compared with the 80–85 of Riyadh). What is evident from a region holding half the world’s reserves of oil and gas is that the global energy scenario is changing and that the economies of the MENA countries most dependent on oil cannot rely solely on the fossil energy sources available in the area for their future growth. The interests of the countries in the region and the more vulnerable Mediterranean economies are heading in the opposite direction (Quagliarotti, 2019). Climate change, demographic growth, and urbanization have significantly increased electrical energy consumption from these sources, with a consequent increase in air pollution due to greenhouse gas emissions. In contrast, little has been done to develop the energy produced from renewable sources amply available thanks to the high concentrations of solar radiation characterizing these territories, although only a small fraction of it currently satisfies present consumption. Renewable energy accounts for less than 5% of the MENA region’s electrical energy production, and over 80% comes from the hydroelectric sector (Baconi, 2018). The second aspect relates to the development of renewable sources, thanks to the new technologies and reduction of the production costs, which will not only enhance energy security for the countries in the region most dependent on oil and gas imports and create new skilled jobs. The increased production of renewable energy will also make it possible for the hydrocarbon-producing countries to satisfy the growing energy demand, reducing the environmental impact, while export of crude and gas not consumed internally will yield the resources necessary to finance the energy transition (MENARA, 2019: n. 2). Of the oil-importing countries, Morocco has launched ambitious projects for the renewable source sector (solar and wind) to reach a level of electricity production over 50% by 2030. Algeria, Tunisia, Jordan, and

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Egypt have begun working on programs to reduce their hydrocarbon dependence with the creation of plants for the production of solar energy and desalinated water. In contrast, the Gulf countries, from Qatar to the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, have plans to invest in renewable energy projects to produce over 40% of their energy needs. According to the MENA Power Industry Outlook (APICORP, 2019), the investments estimated to be needed for the renewable energy sector for the five years 2019–2023 amount to 142 billion dollars for energy generation and 68 billion for transmission and distribution. These are huge investments that call for public financing and private capital, technical expertise to manage the entire sector value chain, agreements between countries in the region for the exploitation of resources and activities connected with renewable sources (hydroelectric, wind, and photovoltaic, agriculture and irrigated areas).

3

EU Policies for Cooperation with the MENA Countries

The dynamics affecting relations between the European Union and the countries of North Africa and the Middle East are the result of policies within and outside the area and of geopolitical equilibria which have changed radically over time, leading to a reduction of European influence in the area and almost a total failure in reaching the cooperation and integration objectives entered upon with MENA countries. The origins of these relations are to be seen in the founding treaties, beginning with the Treaties of Rome in 1957, which made provision for creating a European Development Fund (EDF) granting aid to the colonies and overseas territories with which the member states could claim historical connections. The legal framework at the basis of the European development cooperation policy in the region has considerably changed as a result of the shifting geopolitical scenarios affecting the area and subsequent changes in the policies pursued by the EU to ensure economic progress and political stability in the countries of the Mediterranean and the Middle East (Abbot, 2018; Colombo et al., 2019; Stivachtis, 2018). 3.1

The European Cooperation Models

In the 1970s, Europe pursued a twofold objective in the form of the European Economic Community (EEC). First, it sought to launch a

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global Mediterranean policy with the countries on two sides of the Mediterranean—the western «Maghreb» and eastern «Mashreq»—plus Turkey, Cyprus, and Malta, as favored interlocutors for the time-honored historical connections and the cultural closeness between the area and the countries of the old continent. Second, it aims at developing an Arab-European dialogue built upon cooperation agreements after the tensions unleashed by the Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur War in 1973 and the oil embargo that quadrupled the price of a barrel with the consequent drop in production and increase in inflation (stagflation) in the European and world economy. However, this first phase of Euro-Mediterranean policy was disappointing, particularly considering the ambitious goals proclaimed. To begin with, the rebalancing of trade between the EEC and the extended group of Mediterranean countries, so eagerly awaited, failed to come about and the growth rate of the third countries slackened to the point of stagnation precisely in the first half of the 1980s, a period that saw the full application of the new agreements. Secondly, the objective of promoting the exports of the Mediterranean countries clashed with the traditional protectionism of the European Community in the sectors of food farming and textiles-clothing, while the resources earmarked in the financial protocols fell short of the stated objectives (between 1979 and 1987 EC financial aid accounted for a mere 3% of total net public contributions to the countries in the region). Finally, the social chapter contained in the agreements with the countries of the Maghreb and Turkey saw practically no implementation. Moreover, even the global approach of the EuroMediterranean policy, in its twofold aim of ‘extended cooperation’ (not only commercial but also economic, technical, financial, and social) and of a global view of EC-Mediterranean relations (as an alternative to the prevalent bilateral view) remained a broken promise. Indeed, the choice to proceed with management of the global policy based on a series of bilateral cooperation agreements instead of a multilateral agreement for the entire area contributed to depriving the Mediterranean policy of much of its original significance (Triulzi, 2016). In the 1990s, cooperation with the MENA countries found some consolidation after a change in European expectations for the development of more solid relations with the area’s countries. This led to the Barcelona statement of 1995, this led to a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) that aimed at implementing ambitious objectives based on

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three pillars—regional political stability and security; economic integration and cooperation; and development of social and cultural relations. At the outset, the EMP included the 15 EU member states and 14 Mediterranean countries (Algeria, Croatia, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Mauritania, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and the Palestinian Territories). Libya was subsequently invited as an observer, given the critical role the country played in the area. In particular, the economic pillar, conceived to achieve balanced and sustainable economic development in the Mediterranean area, entailed the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (FTA) to be accomplished by 2010, the support for economic transition with the promotion of reforms involving economic liberalization and privatization, together with the increased foreign direct investments encouraged by the economic and trade liberalization (Colombo, Soler i Lecha & Otte, 2019). This second cooperation model also came up against some obstacles in the implementation. On the one hand, these were due to political considerations and mainly to the joint pursuit by the EMP, representing EU foreign policy, of two objectives, the promotion of democracy and political stability, and economic growth. These objectives were hard to achieve in a group of countries showing marked inequalities and not belonging to an economic and political entity characterized by common interests and aims. On the other hand, there were more strictly economic reasons arising from the pursuit of goals, such as the launch of a free trade area and liberal economic reforms that were too ambitious given the conditions prevalent in the region’s countries. The implementation of these policies, albeit partial, has led to aggravating the imbalances already characterizing the region due to limited integration, lower economic growth, growing public debt, and increasing inequalities (MENARA, 2019: n. 32). Both these factors stood in the way of implementing the EU agenda, which aimed to bring peace, security, and economic prosperity to the region. At the same time, however, they brought out the contradictions of a European plan for cooperation and partnership based on political and economic objectives that were far from the realities of MENA countries and the élites in power, who should have guaranteed their implementation. A straightforward example regarding the project of an EU-MENA Free Trade Area—which never came to fruition—suffices to highlight the European cooperation policy’s contradictions. At the end of the 1990s, intraregional trade accounted for only 5% of the total trade with 12 of the 14 states in the MENA region, and the European investments coming to

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the area amounted to just over 2% of the total FDIs (European Commission, 2000). Moreover, during the years of the EuroMed partnership, commercial interchange saw a considerable worsening in countries’ position in the region, registering growing deficits in the balance of trade with the EU member states—deficits that reached record levels net of the interchange of oil products and derivatives. A third cooperation model emerged during the early years of the new millennium based on new emergencies arising within and outside the MENA region and factors related to the extension of the European Union toward the countries of Central-Eastern Europe. In the MENA region, the failure of the peace process, the Second Intifada and deterioration of relations between Israel and Palestine, together with the US military interventions in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) after 9/11 eventually highlighted the situation of emergency and threat to security due to the rise of fervid Islamic fundamentalism in the area. In 2004, the EU responded to this latter phenomenon by launching a new European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) to make Europe’s outer borders safer and control the increasing illegal migratory flows from this area. In 2008, a new project, Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), was launched following the wishes of France to revive cooperation between the two shores of the Mediterranean through economic integration, the infrastructural interconnection between the countries and projects to free the seas from pollution, develop alternative energy sources, and create a Euro-Mediterranean University (in Slovenia). Although they involved the transfer of resources of more than 12 billion euros in the 2007–2013 period, these projects had relatively little impact on the area in terms of political dialogue, trade reforms, justice, good governance, the rights of the minorities, and sustainable development. Essentially, ENP remained a political project conducted at the bilateral level with each of the MENA countries through the Association Agreements (AAs) and Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs), which defined the goals to aim at and whose financing was guaranteed by the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Regarding the MENA countries, the ENP also recommended the development of regional integration and cooperation in the commercial field, promoting infrastructural works to facilitate connections within the area and participation in the EU programs to carry out the reforms and improve their administrative capacity.

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Of the criticisms leveled at the cooperation model pursued by the ENP concerning the MENA countries, besides the clash noted above between the political objectives and the economic ones, we must add a further element of inconsistency resulting from EU involvement in the Arab– Israeli conflict, viewed as hesitant by the countries in the region, while on the issue of censuring the Israeli policy to occupy Palestinian territories, the EU has tried to maintain friendly relations with Israel, putting Palestinians, Arabs, and Israelis on the same plane. The Arab world has interpreted this behavior as a political sign of a partner with limited credibility, interested solely in exporting their institutions and values (Abbot, 2018; Stivachtis, 2018). The Arab Springs of 2011 and the fall of long-lasting regimes in Tunisia and Egypt led the EU to revise the cooperation strategies and policies adopted in the region, the results of which had appeared modest in terms of opening up to democracy, defense of human rights, and stability. The new ENP approach, aiming at democratic transformation, institutional building, and more extensive partnership with the local populations, called for a more rigorous application of the EU principles. For the countries that carried out the reforms most promptly (the ‘more for more’ condition), a reward in terms of more generous financial aid, commercial exchanges, and advanced political relations with the Union was offered (European Commission, 2011). Again, this cooperation model came in for criticism for having continued to propose to the MENA countries an economic approach based on the principles of neoliberalism and privatization, with no opening of dialogue with the most important stakeholders in the area and limiting its role to exchanging greater economic rewards for progress achieved in terms of ‘a deeper and more sustainable democracy.’ Other projects launched by the EU to enhance the dialogue with civil society organizations, monitor enactment of the reforms, and improve implementation of the EU programs, including the European Endowment for Democracy and a Civil Society Facility (CSF), were met with frustration. The selection of organizations was often made inappropriately and arbitrarily without due consideration of the various needs of civil society emerging from the grassroots level (Khader, 2013). The unenthusiastic response given to the EU programs was due to a legislative alignment required of the MENA countries based on principles, values, and reforms that the European Union considered universal and unquestionable, but which the MENA political leadership greeted

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with criticism on account of the conflicting objectives often leading to the adoption of inconsistent policies. Moreover, the markedly heterogeneous economic conditions prevailing in the Arab countries constituted a further factor of pressure on the internal tensions and, consequently, the pursuit of agreements in the form of bilateral preferential relations between the European institutions and the MENA, but also with individual EU member states (Del Sarto, 2016; Gstöhl, 2015). The latest phase sees a new area of cooperation with the Mediterranean countries after the increase registered, as from 2013, in the number of migrants and refugees who, as a result of conflicts, wars, dictatorships, violence, natural disasters, and extreme poverty in the region and the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, flee from their countries of origin to seek refuge in Europe. This phenomenon is not limited to Europe. On the worldwide scale, in 2015, 244 million migrants abandoned their countries, and over 65 million asylum-seekers and refugees have been forced to take to the road, or the seas (UN, 2019). The Middle East and North Africa are the major regions dealing with migratory flows toward Europe, and this is the issue we will be addressing in the next section. Here, we want just to recall the escalation of the conflict between Israel and Palestine—driving millions of Palestinians to seek refuge in the neighboring Arab countries (in particular Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan), with the Israeli occupation of part of the Palestinian territories, the reprisals of the Israeli military, above all in the Gaza Strip, also after the launch of rockets by the Gaza Islamic Jihad. Moreover, there are religious clashes between (Shiite) Iran and (Sunni) Saudi Arabia, the wars in Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen and the arrival on the scene of the so-called Islamic State (Dawla al-Isl¯amiyya, IS). The concurrence of these factors has contributed to making this area the place of most pressing opposition to Israeli policies and more extended conflicts between the countries in the region and their allies. The European cooperation policy has been dramatically affected by the tensions and civil conflict breaking out in the MENA countries and the new central role taken on by the Gulf countries and Turkey in the geopolitical dynamics of the region. The launch of the EU Global Strategy in 2015, with the announcement of support for cooperation in an extended geographic context including countries of the Mediterranean, the Middle East and Africa (EU, 2016), highlights Europe’s interest in enlarging the area of its external intervention to guarantee security, prevent terrorist attacks, and promote policies for development. Nevertheless, partly due

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to the different positions taken by the most influential members of the Union (UK, France, and Germany) on the conflicts within the region, EU action has proved unable to come up with the right response in terms of crisis management and conflict prevention to ease tensions between the countries in the region. Furthermore, the EU has made use of a variety of financial instruments to promote economic reforms and underpin relations between the two shores of the Mediterranean, including programs like MEDA (MEDA 1, 1995–1999; MEDA II, 2000-2006), the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (2007–2013, ENPI) up to the more recent European Neighborhood Instrument (2014–2020, ENI), but the objectives pursued have been achieved only in part. Due to the lack of measures to offset the effects of the opening up of markets in the European programs, the reforms launched within MENA countries have not led to the desired improvements in the economic conditions of the populations. However, they have only brought advantages for the privileged classes and aggravated the internal inequalities (MENARA, 2019: n. 32). 3.2

The Critical Elements

From this brief analysis of the approaches of the development cooperation models promoted by the EU in the MENA region, elements of continuity emerge—albeit in different ways and to different degrees as geopolitical factors have led to changes in the internal political equilibria. The same continuity also represents the most critical element in accounting for the limited influence of the EU in the MENA countries’ political and social context. A first point concerns the relationship between the proposals for cooperation advanced over time by the EU and the economic measures implemented. What emerges from the analysis of the cooperation models promoted in the region is, in fact, the sharp contrast between the objectives pursued by the EU in the region in political terms—stability and promotion of democracy—and in economic terms—commercial integration, economic growth, and sustainable development. The clash between these objectives has remained a constant feature of European cooperation policies. It has stood in the way of, and (in many cases) even worsened, the chances of achieving greater well-being levels in the area, particularly for the low-income countries that depend on oil and gas imports.

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It is hardly surprising that the cooperation policies proposed by the EU have had very scant success. They were not shared by the political and government authorities that should have implemented them, too ambitious for the economic and social realities prevalent in the MENA countries, and based on Eurocentric policies that have not changed much (Cebeci, 2019). The unsuccessful pursuit of the economic objectives— reduction of trade deficits, economic diversification, creation of new jobs, and raising the level of income—lies behind the failure to emerge of a middle class favoring not only economic reforms but also the introduction of political reforms ranging from the rule of law and free speech to improved security conditions in the region. These reforms failed to get off the ground because they clashed with the interests of the dominant élites. It is worth noting that reference to the contradiction between the objectives proposed by the EU and the limited results achieved, noted above, does not appear only in the publications by Arab authors that have addressed these issues. The European Parliament itself made a similar observation in the Resolution of 27 March 2019: ‘EP.. takes the view, however, that, despite a fifteen-year policy focus on Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries, renewed policy efforts and increased budgetary resources in the wake of the Arab Spring (or Arab Springs), the EU’s goals and policies have not yet been achieved to the extent needed (and in some instances the situation has become worse), and that a real process of socio-economic inclusion has yet to begin; stresses that the external action of the EU vis-à-vis post-Arab Spring countries should factor in the realities on the ground and adapt policy strategies and their implementation accordingly.’ This fairly scathing criticism is followed through, in paragraph 8, with the observation ‘that for far too long the policy stance towards Maghreb and Mashreq countries was marred by an approach which was based to too great an extent on the EU’s expectations and objectives, which did not fully take into account the interests and realities of the EU’s partner countries ’ (European Parliament, 2019). A further criticism is to be made to the choice made in the mid1990s by the EU and still in place—not only in cooperation policies—to link implementation of democratic reforms, generally backed by a topdown approach on the part of the political élites, to reward systems with the conviction that the promise of financial incentives could catalyze the reform process. The failure of ‘more for more’ conditional line is a clear sign of the neo-laissez-faire approach implemented through the policies pursued in the 1990s by IFIs organizations. The financial support given

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to the developing countries in economic crisis and heavily burdened with debt was conditioned upon adopting a package of macroeconomic and institutional reforms aiming at economic stabilization, privatization, and liberalization. As many economists (e.g., Lavigne, 1999; Stiglitz, 1998) maintain, it is an approach that could be proposed to advanced countries with stable economies, but certainly not to countries lacking democratic political and economic institutions. The failure of the system of conditions applied to the MENA countries also depends on other critical factors in the region: the extension of the areas of conflict among the countries in the region and thus the implementation of divergent policies in adapting to the EU requirements, the proposal of democratic reforms advanced by the EU with no prospects of membership, the limited dimension of foreign aid as compared with the economic burdens the governments had to bear to reduce conflicts, develop more efficient economic systems, and implement social reforms. In a report by the UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), it is estimated that the actions undertaken between 2011 and 2015 to curb the conflicts and tensions characterizing the MENA region entailed a net loss of assets and a fiscal deficit amounting, respectively, to 613 and 243 billion dollars (ESCWA, 2016). The EU cooperation and development resources could certainly not have to cover even a fraction of the costs required to stabilize the region. However, the analysis of the influence of European policies in the region reveals results far short of expectations, which takes us to our third criticism. Besides the projects discussed above, the EU-MENA cooperation agenda also includes other types of interventions—for example, to reduce rural poverty, youth unemployment, and energy dependence and enhance agricultural productivity, mobility, and relations of partnership with professional organizations and civil society. In these areas of intervention, cooperation has played a more active role, especially with North Africa (Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco) which have long had closer commercial relations with the EU. In the oil-exporting countries, on the contrary, there has been relatively less interest in accepting the political conditions laid down by the EU, heavily dependent on hydrocarbon imports from the Gulf countries, than the interest shown by the dominant élites in defending the economic rents offered by oil and gas exports. More recently (after 2015), as the instability affecting the entire MENA area has increased, EU policy has changed direction, concentrating more on the objectives of stability and security than on the economic aims,

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from prevention of conflict to policies to fight Islamic radicalization and manage the migratory flows but, as many observers have noted, perception of the EU presence shows no improvement. EU projects for cooperation with Eastern Europe, supplying aid and assistance in the transition toward democracy and the free market, have shown decidedly more favorable outcomes, fully qualifying them to join the EU. The development cooperation with the MENA countries, precisely because of the almost unbridgeable gaps among them and on account of differences in the interests and policies shown by the EU countries, has failed to come up with the expected results. The EU cooperation models did not have the flexibility necessary to diversify programs and interventions, take better account of the local population’s needs, or suggest bottom-up solutions to the region’s problems and bring more effective coordination to bear on issues like the migratory emergency and mobility. The cooperation policies pursued in specific sectors by industry, agriculture, and energy have achieved scant visibility, while far more often operators in these sectors looked to projects promoted by individual EU countries rather than the often little-known projects promoted by the Union (Aboushady et al., 2019; Hamade et al., 2018). To the many EU projects that risk going unnoticed is to be added lastly the initiative regarding youth and the labor market. Discussing the MENA countries’ real potential, we noted the predominance of young men and women making up the population, with high levels of education and training, and high levels of unemployment. The delay of the cooperation policy in recognizing the necessity for planning with far more financial backing, and diversification in phasing and by sectors of mutual interest, proved even more significant. Between 2014 and 2017, the aid supplied by the European Commission and five member states (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Great Britain) for assistance in the development and humanitarian aid reached an average annual level of 8.2 billion dollars, falling a little short of the amount paid out by the USA ($10.9 billion) in the same period (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2019b). It was a considerable amount, but it had minimal effect on the youth; in fact, the European programs for university education accounted for a little more than 3% of the total sum. With the supply of university scholarships (Erasmus Mundus) and exchanges with EU universities or programs to modernize higher education (Tempus) in the countries of the extended Mediterranean area, European policies should

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have channeled more funding into education and mobility for the youth, enabling the more qualified students to complete their studies in European universities and schools of specialization. They should also have offered them the opportunity to become better acquainted with the EU countries’ economic, social, and productive realities by promoting onthe-job training in European enterprises. With the useful professional and relational skills thus acquired, on returning to their countries of origin, these young people could launch new initiatives in the key sectors and, thanks also to foreign direct investments, contribute to the diversification of their economies. The familiarity young people have with the new means of communication and information, together with the use of smartphones and social media to mobilize the population and the call for greater political participation in the face of the inertia of institutions, constituted additional elements in favor of developing cultural and education programs. More investment in this area could have helped the young people to play active roles in the economic and social changes that the MENA countries needed, and indeed still need. However, persisting high levels of unemployment and the lack of job prospects to absorb the new generations’ demand for work, on top of the increasing civil revolts and social and political conflicts breaking out in the region, are among the major push factors that have driven many young people to emigrate.

4 Migratory Policies in the MENA Countries and the EU Immigration is a permanent feature of human history. There have been periods with a massive transfer of populations or shifts of small communities from one region to another for a great variety of reasons, and periods that saw migratory flows dwindling into a trickle or stopping altogether when conflict raged. Migration routes from origin to destination countries have changed according to the policies followed by the authorities to promote expansion, as in the case of the forced emigration from the seventeenth century on, or to stem the inflows have witnessed in Europe in the last two decades. However, it is not possible to stop migration and international labor mobility; together with trade, investments, and technological development, they are founding elements in the processes of globalization that have characterized economies worldwide from the mid-nineteenth century.

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What seems harder to justify from the issues we have addressed so far and from the extensive literature and rigorous scientific studies is the impact of migration on the economies and societies of destination countries (Andersson et al., 2019; Clemens & Hunt, 2017). There are European and MENA countries’ resistance to seeing migration as an opportunity for development, a necessary condition to ensure more efficient workforce allocation, and stimulate productive growth. For the destination countries, these flows aroused concerns about the risk of migrants’ lower wages bringing down the wages of the less qualified native workers and the costs entailed by social policies to promote their integration.3 Today, the concern of European countries is directed by various factors, mainly regarding security and the ideological radicalization of young people born in the EU, leading to violent extremism, terrorism, and crime. In the countries of the origins of the migratory flows, apart from conflict situations that can drive millions of people from their homes and cities (as in the recent case of Syria), emigration is seen as an inevitable necessity given the impossibility local economy to absorb the excess labor supply. It is not seen as a resource capable of offering considerable benefits in terms of higher incomes and levels of well-being for both the origin countries (the immigrants’ remittances, less stress for the labor market) and the destination countries (increased production, income tax payment), much like the mobility of goods obtained by eliminating the tariff and commercial transaction barriers (Muzi & Triulzi, 2006). Immigration is a complicated matter affecting issues central to the political, economic, and social life of the countries of departure and destination alike, and it can only be solved at the international level. No single country can face the challenges posed by immigration, and yet no country is willing to forego its autonomy when deciding on immigration policies. In the following analysis, we will address the issue of migration policies in the MENA and EU countries in order to demonstrate how migration, often seen as an element of friction and clash of divergent interests between the two sides of the Mediterranean, can become a unifying force and a basis to optimize the benefits that better management of migratory flows, closer to the needs of enterprises and the job markets in the respective countries, could bring.

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The Migratory Flows

North Africa and the Middle East constitute the two major areas from which migratory flows move toward the oil-producing countries in the region and Europe. Taking a historical perspective, the migratory flows—particularly from countries in North Africa (Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria)—moved in the direction of Europe, given the geographical proximity, agreements to hire workers, and the postcolonial connections. In contrast, the flows from the north-east of Africa (e.g., Egypt and Sudan) went mainly toward the Gulf countries. In the last 20 years, due to economic-institutional crises, the growing political instability in the region, and various conflicts, the number of migrants coming from this area has more than doubled. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2020), 12 million North Africans in 2019 lived in countries other than those of origin, 6 million in Europe, and over 3 million in the Gulf countries. The MENA region is affected by various types of migratory flows (MENARA, 2016: n. 3). The first is forced migration due to crises and conflicts within the region, particularly in Libya, Syria, and Iraq. The situation in Syria is particularly dramatic, being the country with the highest number of refugees. Six million Syrian refugees are living outside their country, mainly in Turkey (over 3 million), Lebanon (1 million), and Jordan (600 thousand), together with another 6 million displaced, for a total of 12 million, half the Syrian population (UNHCR, 2019). Syrian refugees have also reached Europe, crossing Turkey and Greece and following the Balkan route. There are over 500 thousand migrants in Egypt from the Palestinian territories, Syria, and other countries to the Sahara (Somalia and Sudan). There is also a significant number of refugees in Sudan (over 1 million), Egypt (240 thousand), Algeria (94 thousand), and Libya (over 56 thousand between refugees and asylum-seekers). The second type is economic migration, leaving the region mainly for the Gulf countries and Europe. In the Gulf countries, with their relatively small populations and great need of workforce to satisfy the internal labor demand, immigrants account for a large proportion of the total population—80% in the United Arab Emirates, 79% in Qatar, 72% in Kuwait, and 33% in Saudi Arabia (UN, 2019). Most of the workforce imported by the Gulf countries is channeled into oil, construction, trade, and service sectors. Some countries in the region have seen changes in their migratory

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flows, as in Morocco and Tunisia, having moved from countries traditionally exporting the workforce to countries importing migrants from other Africa regions, waiting to find ways to reach Europe. Thirdly, there are flows of migrants both within and outside the MENA region originally coming from other geographical areas—sub-Saharan Africa and eastern and southern Asia and migrants from the former Soviet Union—seeking jobs in the GCC countries, but also in the countries of North Africa. In particular, focusing on the flows from sub-Saharan Africa alone, there were about 27 million emigrants in 2017 (ISPI, 2019). Most migrants seek to settle in another neighboring African country, while only 30% aim to reach the Middle East, Europe, or other continents (North America). The number of migrants in Europe reached 82 million by 2019, about half of them born in Europe but subsequently having moved to other countries in the continent, while the population of non-European migrants amounts to 38 million. Most of the irregular flow from African and Asian countries—mainly Tunisia, Eritrea, Iraq, Sudan, and Pakistan— reached Europe along the central Mediterranean route, mainly from Libya. The irregular flows from the Western Mediterranean area found their way to Europe through Morocco. There are various reasons for the shifting of flows of irregular migrants from one boarding point on the Mediterranean to another, depending on the EU cooperation agreements with the origin and transit countries and on the maritime safety measures brought in to control the flows from the Libyan coasts (IOM, 2020). In the coming years, Europe will continue to be a particularly attractive area for migratory flows starting from the MENA countries both for purely economic reasons—the 27 member states constitute the world’s largest market of goods and services—and for humanitarian reasons. Nevertheless, in the last five years, European policy on managing migratory flows has had to cope with emergencies resulting from conflicts affecting the MENA countries. In the two years 2015–2016, over 2 million migrants landed on the coasts of Mediterranean countries. In the following years, these levels were brought down because of restrictive policies implemented at the Europe level and the level of the individual member states, although they have not succeeded in regulating the flows in a more orderly way. On the contrary, they have led to increased use of illegal immigration, fueled the undeclared labor market, and heightened the sense of insecurity with which European citizens react to the migrants.

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The Converging Interests of the EU and MENA Countries

Several reasons lie behind the interest the EU and MENA countries have in formulating migration policies more in line with demographic development and the growth objectives the two areas set themselves, above all, economic migrants. At first, there is the issue of demographic transition, i.e., the transition from a situation characterized by high birth and mortality rates—the first stage of the demographic transition now prevailing in most of the MENA countries—to one increasingly characterized by low levels of births and deaths—the second stage of the transition—characteristic of the European countries, where the trend is toward a shrinking population and with it a reduced labor supply. The MENA countries show vigorous demographic growth, albeit with some differentiation. Some countries register higher birth rates (Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Palestine, and Iraq) while others exhibit relatively lower levels (Tunisia, Lebanon, Iran, and Morocco). However, progress in terms of hygiene and health care, higher standards of education, in particular for women, and reduction of the mortality rates suggest that the differences now observed between the populations of the Mediterranean and the European countries will tend to reduce in the course of time (ISMed-CNR, 2019). The present situation of MENA countries shows a demographic growth trend that continues to feed more young people (between the ages of 15 and 24) into the labor market than exit from it due to death and accidents. It is precisely the contrary of what is happening in the EU countries, which means that the labor supply that exceeds the economic systems’ capacity to produce new jobs will give a further boost to emigration to Europe or toward economies registering higher income levels. For complementary reasons—low birth rates and shrinking of the working-age population in the member countries—the EU will be increasingly dependent on a system of managing intra-Mediterranean migratory flows that shows respect for the entry rules and the reception principles defined by the European regulations.4 Answering the needs of the EU and MENA countries means addressing migration issues with a somewhat different viewpoint to the approach taken so far to the departure of migrants from the MENA area and entry into the EU area. The failure of European migration policies over the last two decades emerges when we consider the many examples of efforts to find solutions outside the EU, given the impossibility of arriving at agreements and

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shared strategies to cope with the migration emergency. The 2016 agreement with Turkey to stem migration flows to Europe through the Balkan route shows the contradictions and limits of an EU decision now being questioned by the countries most affected (Greece and Turkey). President Erdogan is threatening not to respect of the agreement due to the problems of surveillance over the land frontiers with Greece, where fleeing migrants are converging not only from Syria but also from Afghanistan and Pakistan, while Greece is complaining about the lack of decisive action by the EU to compel Erdogan to respect the commitments he has taken on. Another example is the EU’s effort to stop migrants from leaving the coasts of Libya by drawing up agreements with the one Libyan authority recognized by the United Nations, namely the Tripoli government headed by Fayez al-Sarraj (F¯ayaz al-Sarr¯aj). The agreement has led to the construction of detention centers managed by those who organize the migrants’ crossings, where thousands of people waiting to cross the Mediterranean are kept in inhumane conditions, subjected to all sorts of violence, torture, and even killings. Difficulties in managing the migratory flows are also present in the countries of North Africa and the Middle East where, in the last few years, problems have arisen over the entry of migrants—in particular illegal immigrants and refugees—coming from other geographical areas in search of asylum and work. Thanks to the improved economic conditions in the countries of the region, they attempt to settle there, arousing ill feelings and hostility in the host communities. Such is the case of Morocco and Tunisia, which have changed from countries of migratory flow origin and transit to countries of destination. This is also the case for Algeria and Lebanon, where, because of the increased illegal immigration from western Africa and the number of Syrian refugees, their populations show decidedly hostile attitudes toward the migrants. Directly connected with the factors discussed above, this mobility issue shows once again how important it is to ensure for migrants bound for MENA and EU countries conditions of safety between the countries of origin and destinations. Recognizing the importance of migratory flows for both the economies of the EU and MENA countries, it should be in the common interest to safeguard transport security by land and sea and to guarantee the respect of human rights throughout all the stages up to arrival in the destination countries. In reality, however, we find the exact opposite. Neither the EU nor the MENA countries have been able to devise joint projects to transfer the migrants and implement operations for

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cooperation at the financial, organizational, and infrastructural levels to ensure management of migrant mobility following the objectives of integration and internal security. In the case of the EU, the Mediterranean policy in the various forms it has taken, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP 1995), European Neighborhood Policy (ENP 2004), Union for the Mediterranean (UfM 2008), the revamped ENP of 2011, and launch of the EU Global Strategy in 2015, has never addressed the issue of migration with the right tools. On the contrary, it has continued to pursue its aim of influencing the neighboring countries with policies continually adjusted to take into account changes occurring in the geopolitical scenarios of the region, and indeed in the migratory policies of the member countries, without making any significant difference to them (Matt et al., 2017; Stivachtis, 2018). With conflicts waxing keener, the exit of the USA from the scene, new tensions arising with the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and, finally, increasing pressures brought on Europe by migration after the wars in Syria and Iraq, the EU adopted a migratory flows approach based mainly on security and control of the external frontiers reliant both on the countries of the origin of the flows and also on the introduction of strict European regulations in the areas of flow limitation, asylum, admission, and residence of citizens from third countries, protection of refugees, and involvement of the military forces of the member countries in combating illegal migration and trafficking in human beings. In the case of the MENA countries, internal political instability and lack of a common approach to addressing unemployment, especially of young people and women, and to tackling the problems of economic and social growth in contexts showing significant differences in income levels and availability of human and financial resources in North Africa and the south-eastern shore of the Mediterranean, have constituted further difficulties in devising projects to make the best of the migratory flows. As a result of the lack of a joint strategic approach in defense of mobility and security of migrants, management of the illegal flows from the countries of origin, which involves the transversing many countries in sub-Saharan Africa to reach the boarding coasts to embark for EU countries, has been left almost entirely in the hands of criminal organizations with the result of making travel more hazardous, more costly,5 more exposed to violence, and with heavy losses of human lives.6 The issue of migrants flows crossing the Mediterranean to arrive in Europe, whether for economic reasons or seeking asylum, cannot be

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addressed with emergency solutions and actions decided upon unilaterally without considering the interests and expectations of the populations living on the two shores of the Mediterranean. Because of all the complexities we have seen, the migration issue must be addressed with new approaches in terms of EU-MENA cooperation and partnership, including a broad range of economic and humanitarian policies, making provision for work, safe passage, family reunification, and the protection of minors. The aim is to ensure benefits for all the countries involved and require compliance to the commitments undertaken. A third reason for considering migration a priority area in which the interests of EU and MENA countries converge is the issue of young people and their education and training. There are many good reasons for pursuing common objectives and actions to facilitate the mobility of labor both within the economies of the region, now showing high levels of unemployment, and toward the EU countries, where many businesses, especially in the sectors of small and medium enterprises and services with low or medium technological content, risk shutting down for lack of labor supply. Education and training, especially for young people and women in the 15–25 age range, is an area where the EU can contribute to building up a win–win relationship since both trade between private and public enterprises in the two regions and the direct investments of European enterprises in the MENA economies have increased over time (IMF, 2019). Managing innovative migration policies represents a real test for the European Union if it wants to be considered a credible actor not concerned solely with exporting its values and model of democracy. The EU should show interest in promoting cooperation programs helping the younger and more highly qualified workforces of the MENA countries to find a safe place in the European labor market. The education and training programs referred to, in which the EU and member countries should invest more resources than they have done in education and training programs. From those more directly connected with the traditional economic activities in the region (agriculture, commerce, tourism, and construction), to those related to services in the medical-health sector (doctors, nurses, physiotherapists, and social-health workers), calling for higher skills. The progress achieved in the MENA countries in many of the professions mentioned here reveals an increasingly widespread perception, not only among the youngest, that training is a winning tool for the development of their economies and a valuable resource of professional

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figures to satisfy the labor demand of the most innovative and competitive enterprises. The introduction of joint education and training routines, recognition of qualifications, refresher training, specialization courses, and internships in European firms are all elements paving the road to the development of various levels of training. The results, with a system of agreed entries and re-entries, and thus active participation in the economic, political, and social life of the countries of origin—but insofar as the qualified young people find not only work in the EU but also fuller integration in EU society—add up to much more than benefiting from higher skills for employment prospects (Patay, 2017). EU is the major donor for the MENA countries, supplying financial and humanitarian aid to the populations in difficulties (to the Palestinian Authorities, Syria, and Lebanon) and entering into agreements (with Tripoli and Turkey) to pass some responsibility for curbing migratory pressure to the local authorities. However, the EU lacks the resources to compete with the big international players in the area, particularly with what China is accomplishing with the Belt and Road initiatives to consolidate its presence in Asia and the MENA region (European Council on Foreign Relations, 2019a). The strength of the EU, not always perceived as such by the political leaders and European population, lies not only in the model of democracy implemented within it but also in having contributed to bringing European countries that are different in many respects, much like the MENA countries, to live together peacefully and advance economically. It is the openness to dialogue, innovation, and confrontation between different institutions and traditions—even when it finds scant consensus— that constitutes the positive wealth of experiences and ideas that the EU has been able to assemble in 62 years of life, and that can become the reference ground for future cooperation and immigration policies to be promoted upon with the countries of the enlarged Mediterranean.

5

Conclusions

The analysis presented in this chapter has brought to light the critical aspects and the potentialities existing between the MENA and EU countries for three interrelated sectors: economic dynamics, development cooperation, and migration policies. It has not been possible to enlarge

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our analysis of the COVID-19 effects on the living conditions of the populations and migrants on the two shores of the Mediterranean. The leading international organizations (IMO, 2020; World Bank, 2020) offer a glimpse of a scenario that can only aggravate, due to recession and lockdown of many economic activities in both the EU and the MENA countries, the vulnerable points shown by the two regions: increasing inequalities, insufficient health services (where many immigrants are employed), contraction of growth, and closing of borders. With the dramatic economic and health crisis underway in the countries we have been considering it is indeed hard to imagine short-term solutions; much will also depend on the political will and influence of the main competitors within and outside the region in envisaging geopolitical scenarios that can lead to a gradual reduction of conflicts and revive stability and economic growth. It is in the interests of Europe and the MENA countries to work to reinforce the reciprocal economic and commercial relations, but also to preserve the independence and centrality of the Mediterranean from outside influences seeking to modify the complex but vital equilibria that have always characterized political and diplomatic relations between the countries on the two shores. On the evidence of this study, bearing in mind that the MENA countries do not represent a homogeneous area and that the challenges facing us will take time to meet, there appears to be a real and indeed urgent need to set about reviewing the cooperation and migration policies between the two regions on the following issues. The first issue is the need for the EU countries to encourage and support the MENA countries in their social and economic reform programs with new cooperation initiatives and financial aid to catalyze economic transition and commercial integration. These goals are still very far from being achieved in the region, due to governance that has favored the interests of the élites and defense of inefficient public sectors. The MENA countries need to rebuild their governance model, open up to new economic actors, and introduce new systems to incentivize development of enterprises, fight corruption, and restore confidence between the public institutions and the citizens. The second issue concerns the development of the young workforce, an area of intervention that has seen relatively limited investment on the part of the EU and MENA countries. To create millions of new jobs and promote growth in the region requires not only well-qualified male and

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female workers with CVs showing a healthy scientific bias (science, technology, engineering, mathematics, STEM), but also to set to work on the transition of the systems of production and services open to innovation, to be able to rely on technical connection infrastructures facilitating the acquisition of advanced services in the commercial, education, finance, and health sectors. For the population of the region, access to advanced services is still limited. The experience acquired in the countries of Latin America and East and Central Asia—where, for example, liberalization of the telecommunications sector has been faster—shows not only that they have overtaken the MENA countries, but also that they compete with more advanced economies (World Bank, 2018). With its education programs (Erasmus+, Tempus), the EU can contribute with more advanced levels of specialization both for young people, providing them with scholarships, on-the-job training and internships in Europe’s universities, research centers and enterprises, and for immigrants and refugees with the introduction of ad hoc programs for language learning, enhancement of across-the-board skills, and inclusion in the host communities. The third issue concerns the effects of the development of renewable resources in the MENA area. The scenario we have discussed suggests the possibility of promoting a different economic and social model, able to reduce conflict over control of crucial resources like oil and gas, redefine new relations of energy interdependence among the states of the region, expedite the process of economic diversification of activities of production, and contribute to environmental hazard response, with positive repercussions on employment and in terms of political and social stability. It is in the new geopolitical and geo-economic context which highlights the more traditional activities intersecting with innovative actions in support of the energy transition that new scope opens up for dialogue and exchange of ideas in forging a more effective EU policy for economic integration and cooperation with the MENA countries.

Notes 1. European Parliament, Post-Arab Spring: the way forward for the Middle East and North Africa, Resolution 208/2160 of 27 March 2019. 2. The World Bank classifies the MENA countries into three groups:

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• the resource-rich labor-abundant countries of the Persian Gulf, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UEA); • resource-poor labor-abundant countries like Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, and Turkey; • resource-rich labor abundant countries like Algeria, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syrian Arab Republic, and the Republic of Yemen. The recent conflicts that have broken out in Yemen, Libya, Iraq, and Syria have led to considerable changes in their economic conditions due to halted and lesser exploitation of these countries’ hydrocarbon resources. Israel is not included in this classification since, while having limited natural resources, it is a highly diversified economy that needs to import workers from abroad to keep growing (World Bank, 2012). 3. About the impact of migrants in the destination countries, most of the studies carried out in the advanced countries arrive at a common conclusion: we receive from them, in terms of business and the taxes they pay, more than we give them in terms of services (housing, jobs, education, and health services). The security issue that has arisen more recently, namely Islamic terrorists infiltrating among the irregular immigrants to launch attacks at the heart of Europe, as witnessed in Paris, Brussels, Berlin, Nice, and Barcelona, has complicated the societal perception of immigration but makes no real change to the findings of the economic studies so far carried out. The benefits resulting from immigration, making up for the structural shortcomings of the labor market in the destination countries and, with their incomes, contributing to the pension system, are higher than the costs (Triulzi, 2017). 4. One of the most critical aspects emerging in a recent study financed by the EC to assess migration’s economic impact in 12 member countries concerns the differences in migration practices and policies implemented at the national level. The findings of this study offer a differentiated picture on the labor policies implemented by these countries showing heterogeneous results in terms of participation rates in the labor market, unemployment rates, migrant entrepreneurship, women’s working conditions, and employment rights. Most of these differences come from the autonomy that member countries have in the management of integration policy, but also from other issues linked to past migration experiences, labor market models, government and institutional structures (MAX, Maximizing Migrants’ Contribution to Society, Report On the Sphere of Economy, EU’s AMIF Action Grant AMIF-2017-AG-INTE 821,672). 5. There are no official figures on the business of transporting migrants since it is by criminal organizations. From the accounts of the migrants themselves, we can form an estimate of transportation costs that range from 1000 to

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6000 euros per migrant, depending on the departure point and costs borne during the journey and sea crossing. 6. The United Nations Agency for Refugees estimates that in the last 15 years, the number of migrants dying in Mediterranean crossings has reached over 30,000 (UNHCR, 2019).

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Youth Bulge Dynamics in the Mediterranean Region: The Geopolitical Implications of Human Capital on Security and Stability Alfonso Giordano

Contents 1

Introduction: The Youth Bulge Theory and the Geopolitical Vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The Youth Bulge in History: Some Empirical Evidence with Particular Reference to MENA Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 A Demographic Explanation of Youth Turmoil on the South-Eastern Shores of the Mediterranean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Conclusion: The Geo-Demographic Challenges of the Future . . . . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Introduction: The Youth Bulge Theory and the Geopolitical Vulnerability

The term ‘youth bulge’ is used to define the quantitative and proportional increase in the share of a country’s youth population, conventionally in the 16–25 age bracket or the 16–30 age bracket (Castree et al., 2013).

A. Giordano (B) Niccolò Cusano University, Rome, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 F. M. Corrao and R. Redaelli (eds.), States, Actors and Geopolitical Drivers in the Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69000-7_4

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According to Gunnar Heinsohn (2003)—who attempted a general interpretative formulation of the theme coined by Gaston Bouthoul (1970), and developed and applied it to around seventy countries—this condition comes about when at least 30% of the population belongs to the 15–29 age bracket, or when at least 20% is in the 15–25 age bracket. Technically, what happens is a swelling in the youth cohorts of a country’s population pyramid (Newbold, 2017). The theory asserts that societies characterized by high numbers of young people, scarcity of resources and, in particular, a lack of social positions of prestige for the youth surplus—third, fourth, fifth children—are more likely to experience social disorder and act in a warlike manner in comparison to those societies in which factors of demographic stress are absent. However, the idea that a large percentage of young people in a society, particularly males, can be the cause of violent conflict is not new. Various scholars (Choucri, 1974; Feuer, 1969; Moller, 1968) have already examined the question of how and to what extent the two phenomena are connected, yet scientific discussion about this possible correlation and the public debate that ensued only became widespread in the 1990s. The term ‘youth bulge’ was used by Gary Fuller (1995) in his article, ‘The Demographic Backdrop to Ethnic Conflict: A Geographic Overview’, presented during a conference organized by the CIA—Central Intelligence Agency—the foreign intelligence service of the United States. As well as the publications by Fuller (1995, 2004) and the aforementioned Heinsohn, the work of Jack Goldstone (1999, 2002, 2012), Richard Cincotta (2009, 2013, 2015a, 2017) and Henrik Urdal (2004, 2006, 2008) should also be cited as having contributed to the creation of a convincing theoretical framework. These authors argue that developing countries undergoing a phase of demographic transition, specifically those moving from high to low fertility and mortality rates, are particularly vulnerable to geopolitical instability and civil conflict. The combined effect of large numbers of young people, rapid growth in the working-age population and lack of employment opportunities within the job market produce a potentially explosive situation. As underlined, ‘a large proportion of young adults and a rapid rate of growth in the working-age population tend to exacerbate unemployment, prolong dependency on parents, diminish self-esteem’ (Cincotta & Mesquida, 2007: 3). Although this kind of frustration and competition for jobs does not directly fuel violence, it increases the probability that young unemployed

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people will seek social and economic advancement through alternative, extra-legal means (Lam, 2014). ‘If you have no other options and not much else going on, the opportunity cost of joining an armed movement may be low’ affirms Michelle Gavin, expert in African affairs and member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations under the Obama administration (Blanton & Kegley, 2020: 399). Not by chance, between 1970 and 1999, eighty percent of civil conflicts took place in countries in which at least sixty percent of the population was below the age of thirty, as ascertained in a report by the PAI, Population Action International (Leahy et al., 2007). Currently, most countries with an abundance of young people are likewise undergoing social unrest, instability, violence and migration. Scholars tend to argue that these conditions alone do not explain civil conflicts, ethno-religious tension and poverty. Poor political and economic institutions also play a role (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). Others exclude the youth bulge as a determining factor in the eruption of ethnic conflict, whose origins should be looked for in ethnic differences rather than in age brackets (Yar & Miodownik, 2016). However, a certain predisposition towards unstable and conflictual geopolitical situations cannot be excluded in and between States with large youth populations, as argued by Goldstone (2002). Furthermore, youth are often attracted by new ideas and heterodox relations that lead them to challenge older forms of authority. In the Muslim world large populations of idle youth are attracted by Islam as an alternative force for social mobility, proof of which can be found in the ease with which ISIS has been able to recruit young people in these geographical areas (Gouda & Marktanner, 2018; Sommers, 2019). Contributing factors to the development of a youth bulge include rapid urbanization, heightened expectations among job seekers and environmental stress. The migration model that leads to rapid growth in urbanization plays an important role since cities in the developing world lack the infrastructure, resources and jobs to accommodate a large influx of rural workers. This creates the conditions for black market activities, often led by gangs and paramilitary groups. In terms of employment, an abundance of both low and highly-skilled workers without job opportunities can foment social unrest. The environmental issue, on the other hand, is less immediately evident: rapid population growth often leads

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to the degradation of forests and water supplies. This can generate antigovernmental sympathies and create conflicts due to scarcity of resources (Finaz, 2016; Le Billon, 2001, 2005). It is evident that over and beyond turbulent situations of various intensity and more or less violent conflicts, a youth bulge almost always leads to youth mobility: within country in the case of rapid urbanization, between neighbouring States or, more and more frequently, migration towards countries with better living standards and more developed welfare systems (Kararach, 2014). Lastly, the question of whether the youth bulge phenomenon is always a negative issue should be addressed. The answer is, not necessarily. In time, with the progression of demographic transition and, above all, given the right investments, large youth populations will potentially become economically productive adults who can ensure the wellbeing of their society. This phenomenon is known as the ‘demographic dividend’ and arises out of the ‘demographic window of opportunity’: the period of time in which the age structure of a country sees a large share of the population enter the potential working age, in comparison to the number of children and old people who are not economically productive. For example, the East Asian economies in rapid growth underwent a youth bulgethat only later led to the good economic performance of those countries (Fong, 2016). Earlier still, the economies of Western countries underwent the same transition.

2 The Youth Bulge in History: Some Empirical Evidence with Particular Reference to MENA Region As Heinsohn explained the Holocaust (2000) and the practice of human sacrifice in ancient Mesopotamia (1992) through demographic change, other authors, as we will see later, have tried to demonstrate the connection between the youth bulge and terrorism (Schomaker, 2013), revealing how the Arab Spring has been triggered by a youth surplus, particularly in males, who, not coincidentally, were won over by the radical Salafi ideologies which supplanted the liberal democratic reformism that had once existed in the area. However, the youth bulge phenomenon and its dangerous effects are evidently not exclusive to the North African and Middle Eastern shores of the Mediterranean.

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When a youth bulge reaches significant levels, it becomes the cause of major instability that, in its most extreme forms, can mine democratic equilibriums. Bouthoul (1970) argued that in practice, from a sociological-demographic perspective, all major conflicts have contributed to the elimination of male surplus. The author underlines how every time the demographic pyramid leans notably in favour of the male section of the population—as is the case in many pre-war periods of history—the level of violence increases. According to the originator of this theory, many events in the history of humanity can be attributed to the youth bulge model, among which: the sixteenth century European colonialist expansion that began after nearly a century of progressive demographic growth following the decimation of the European population caused by the Black Death; the rise of Nazism that exploited the 1900–1914 German youth bulge during the crisis of the Weimar Republic; the Marxist revolutions in South America in the 1960s–1980s; and not least, the acts of terrorism that occurred in Europe in the 1970s. In the latter case, the endurance of the democratic institutions on the one hand and the economic recovery that the entire continent was experiencing on the other, prevented the phenomenon from degenerating. With regards to the youth bulge in North Africa and the Middle East, over the last 100 years the population in these areas has increased tenfold, reaching approximately 1.5 billion people today. This can be explained in the light of demographic data: in 1950 women from these geographical areas on average conceived between 6–8 children, of whom 3–4 were males (Giordano, 2011a). In 1970 those born in 1950 would have been exactly 20-years old, not by chance therefore the first episodes of unrest and resulting violence were recorded in the 20 years between 1970 and 1990. Lebanon provides us with a classic example of the youth bulge. Between 1975 and 1990 the civil war caused around 150,000 deaths in a population of approximately three million inhabitants. There is little doubt that a consistent share of this social unrest was provoked by the presence of various religious groups who fuelled the disquietude of young males. Despite this, the violence perpetrated in Lebanese territories came to a halt in 1990. The reasons behind this sudden change can be identified also in a drastic demographic drop in the number of male sons: on average, Lebanese women went from having 6 children to only 2; the ‘raw material’ that had given rise to belligerent conflict was no longer readily available (Harb, 2016). However, a sizeable youth population is

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still present in Lebanon and provided the basis for the ongoing protests in the country nationwide. Demonstrations, however intergenerational, that began on 17 October 2019 in response to the government’s inability to find solutions to an economic crisis that has loomed over the past year (Wimmen, 2019). The protests would have been triggered by the new taxes expected on petrol, tobacco and online calls through operators such as WhatsApp. Another example is provided by the Iranian youth cohort that has been politically active since the ousting of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1953. The death of three students during the protests against the visit of Vice President Nixon, who was in Iran in the same year to support the Shah after a CIA operation against the chosen government, is still commemorated nationally today. Youth were key players in the 1979 revolution. In the 1980s, they made up the majority of fighters in the eight-year Iran-Iraq war. In the 1990s, they recompensed the post-war debt by entering into politics and influencing the economic and social life of the country. In 1997, their numbers contributed to choosing the reformist president Mohammad Khatami. Their contribution to the 2009 elections saw the so-called ‘green revolution’ or ‘twitter revolution’, seriously alter the political debate in Iran. Today, their strength is in their numbers. A ‘baby boom’ after the revolution that lasted until the 1980s nearly doubled the country’s population, which increased from 34 to 63 million in a single decade. Iran is now one of the youngest societies in the world and its demographic progression is surely one of the greatest threats to the status quo (Giordano, 2011b). Just as interesting in terms of the actual extent of the phenomenon is the Palestinian youth bulge, whose relevance is due to the civil conflict currently in course with Israel (Laborce et al., 2018). It must be said that during conventional wars a drastic drop in the birth rate is the norm— this is due to both the very negative expectations of bringing a child into the world during these periods and the separation of parents, whose male members are at the front—while in conflicts involving civilians the population of the weaker side in the conflict often has higher fertility rates. This is also the case for example between Turks and Kurds, whose fertility rates vary significantly. Today’s fertility rates see Turkish-speaking women give birth to an average of 1.8 children per head, while Kurdishspeaking women give birth to an average of four children per head, double the number of Turkish children. This is one of the most extreme

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discrepancies in the overall decline in the Islamic population. On the other hand, Ocalan, former leader of the PKK (Partîya Karkerén Kurdîstan, separatist Kurdish party), was clearly aware of the strategic importance of the demographic factor when he is said to have suggested that ‘every Kurd must either grab his gun every morning…or grab his wife every night’ (Sizemore, 2010). Indeed, it is the presence of the Kurdish ethnicity in the South East of Turkey that has helped increase women’s fertility rates in comparison to all other areas. Naturally, the difference in fertility rates is also due to differing socio-economic conditions, reflected in lower salaries and lower levels of education in the same Kurdish population (Giordano, 2014).1

3 A Demographic Explanation of Youth Turmoil on the South-Eastern Shores of the Mediterranean While it can be said that environmental geography and economic relations in the Mediterranean world-system—particularly in ancient times–tended to uniform the Mediterranean landscape, the same cannot be said of historical and political events in the various countries that look onto the Mediterranean basin. Events of this kind have, on the contrary, delineated very different trajectories of development on the two shores of the Mediterranean. Despite sharing the same sea and many other common factors, the geographical Euro-Mediterranean2 area presents four distinct fractures of different kinds (Bonavero et al., 2006): – Demographic: The demographic process on the two shores of the Mediterranean shows two quite different trends, revealing a decisive decline on the northern shores and a higher growth rate in the south-east. According to the most reliable estimations,3 however, the trend in the south-east shows a long-term evolution that converges with that of the northern shore of the Basin. – Geo-economical: The countries in the north belong to one of the wealthiest areas of the planet and are securely integrated within the international economic system; conversely, the countries in the south-east have low economic and employment growth rates, and many of them remain in the margins of the world economic scenario.

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– Cultural: While in the past the cultural differences between the two shores of the Mediterranean were perceived as bringing wellbeing and positive reciprocal influence, today they are mostly perceived as conflictual, particularly in terms of religious identification. – Political: In the North, the European Union prevails, a group of countries that are more or less integrated as a coalition of stable, democratic states; while on the south-eastern side countries continue to be in conflict with each other (the Israeli-Palestinian issue is a perfect example here) and fail to support rights that are reconcilable with the fundamental rights of Europe. For the purposes of this contribution, the fracture that most interests us is the demographic one. The spatial distribution of the population in the Mediterranean area is of fundamental importance if we consider that the relations between the two shores have changed radically in terms of numbers and structure over the last 50 years. The northern shores of the Mediterranean have an ageing, static population, while the southern shores have a young population that will continue to grow over coming years, despite the diminishing fertility rate in the south-eastern Mediterranean that will be examined later on. First, let’s take a step backwards and place the Euro-Mediterranean question within the global system. We know that ageing is one of the factors at the basis of the geo-demographic revolution (Giordano, 2017) that has taken place throughout the world over recent years, alongside an increase in population and a reduction in birth rates. The world population is gradually ageing: the transition from 2015 to 2050 show that the percentage of over 65-year olds will continue to grow. For example, in most European countries over 65-year olds will increase from 20–25% of the population, to over 30%. Overall, the world population has developed very unevenly, yet the ageing trend has been confirmed despite a difference in times, speed and intensity. In fact, while some countries are currently ageing, others are in full growth and others will be the protagonists of the next demographic boom, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. The times and speed of geo-demographic processes are of crucial importance as they change the strategic, political and economic equilibriums in various geographical areas. Wallerstein’s world-system, conceived above all as a Marxist critique of capitalism, will continue to be reconfigured by the long-term driving forces that determine the evolution of the world population as

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it takes place within and between the various territories on the planet. As demographic transition (the process at the basis of the evolution of the population) develops in a spatially and temporally diversified manner, further imbalance will be added to a planet that is already politically and economically unequal. The order and spatial organization of human activity will be more and more disrupted. It is true that the world is ageing, but it has also never been as diversified as it is in this specific historical period. In the 1980s, the world was more uniform. Today, some parts of the world have populations that are structurally old, others are ageing, while others are still very young (United Nations Population Fund, 2014). The fact is that the world has never been so full of young people as it is today. The increase in the population over recent decades and the actual percentage of young people today, provides us with this scenario. Currently, the average age in the world is 30-years-old. In some countries, under 30-year-olds represent more than 30% of the total population. Looking at Fig. 1, it may occur to us to match these very young countries to territories of considerable turbulence. So, is such a young population a problem? Indeed, if we consult the Global Conflict Risk Index (Smidt et al., 2016) created by a European Commission study group, we can see that ‘demographics’ and the ‘youth bulge’ are both listed as political, social and economic risk factors in the ‘Geography and environment’ section. Figure 2 represents the youth bulge (and children bulge) in percentages for the various countries and geographical areas of the world. The darker colours show the countries in which more than 70% of the population is under 30-years-old. This is the case in many of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, where, however, there is also a children-bulge currently in course, with an average age of just 15. This explains why many of the wars in this part of the world are also fought by children and why—considering the other difficulties—this area of the world has yet to experience economic development: there are too many young people. In regional terms, the Middle East and Africa have the highest percentage of young people under 30. However, North Africa and the Middle East also have the highest percentage of real young adults: those between the ages of 20 and 30. If we now observe Fig. 3,4 we can see that the average age in almost all the countries in the MENA region is below the world average of 29. Only three countries have a higher average age, and yet it is still just a

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Fig. 1 Under 30 percentages in the world (Source Population Reference Bureau by New York Times [Sengupta, 2016])

little over 30. Yemen, Palestine and Iraq take up positions at the bottom of the chart with average ages at Sub-Saharan levels, 17/18-years-old. At the same time, we can see that young people correspond to a considerable percentage of the population in the working age. Yemen 42%, Palestine 39 and Jordan 37. Not only do these countries have a lot of young people, potentially these young people could be available as a significant part of the workforce. As said, these conditions alone do not necessarily produce the negative effects of the youth bulge. Another fundamental factor is represented by limited or no access to the job market. MENA region has shown the highest unemployment rates: between 2008 and 2010, the unemployment rate in the Middle East was at 25.5%, while in North Africa it was at 23. The MENA region does not just have the highest unemployment

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Fig. 2 The youth bulge and children bulge in the world (Source Euromonitor International, 2013)

rates, but also the lowest participation of young people in the job market. There are many young people in other parts of the world, but evidently the MENA region offers less job opportunities to young people. It should not surprise us then that the 2008 crisis contributed to aggravating youth unemployment, thus providing further motivation for the explosion of the Arab Spring (Fig. 4). Therefore, 5% of the world population has produced 45% of the terrorist attacks in the world, 57.5 of refugees in the world, 68.5 of deaths as a result of conflict in the world and 47 of internally displaced people (Ortiz & Cummins, 2012). In Jordan the youth bulge is reaching its height, although Algeria’s youth bulge is expected to last even longer because its fertility rate began to diminish later. Youth unemployment is still a huge problem in the country as there are very few possibilities for young people, including those with higher qualifications. In Egypt, the youth population is reaching its peak (LaGraffe, 2012), which adds to the difficulties

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Fig. 3 Median age in the MENA countries (left); Youth percentage of the total working-age population (right) (Source Roudi, F. (2011). Youth population & employment in the Middle East & North Africa: Opportunity or challenge. Population Reference Bureau)

of high unemployment rates (Ghafar, 2016). A democratic Egypt could use this population to its advantage, as long as it managed to insert more young people into the job market. It is also interesting to consider the two countries Algeria and Tunisia, both of which are going through a phase of advanced demographic transition in the area (Haghighat, 2018). The youth population in Algeria is reaching its peak and fertility rates are diminishing. Youth unemployment is still high, although oil revenue has contributed to creating more stable job opportunities in the field (Cincotta, 2015c). The youth bulge in Tunisia is less dramatic because fertility rates began to diminish earlier than in the rest of the region. A democratic Tunisia could represent a favourable moment for development, if the majority of people of working age are able to find work. The terrorist attacks, for

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Fig. 4 Youth unemployment in some MENA countries (Source Paasonen, K., & Urdal, H. (2016). Youth bulges, exclusion and instability: The role of youth in the Arab Spring . Peace Research Institute Oslo)

which the Islamic State (al-Dawla al-Isl¯amiyya) claimed responsibility, on the beaches and at the National Bard Museum, were aimed not so much at Western tourists as at creating insecurity in the Tunisian population and above all, weakening the tourist industry in order to provoke potentially unemployed youths into enlisting in the terrorist organization, also thanks to religious callings. What can we foresee for the future? The projections of the United Nations tell us that the population of the south-eastern Mediterranean has grown more than that of the European Union and that it will continue to do so for several years. The trend in the female Arab population— especially those who are urbanized and educated—is to have less children. If in the 1950s a woman’s average fertility rate was around 6–7 children, today it is only slightly above 2, with a strong tendency to converge with the European reproductive model (Kronfol, 2011). Life expectancy on the south-eastern coast of the Mediterranean is more and more similar to European life expectancy, and has improved dramatically since the 1950s, when expectancy was at just 45-years-old, to reach over 70-years-old today (Matthijs et al., 2015; Cincotta, 2015b).

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Fig. 5 Percentage of over-65 in MENA region, 1950–2100 (Source United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (2017). World population prospects: The 2017 revision. UNDESA)

This helps us understand two aspects: the percentage of over 65-yearolds in the MENA region will increase (Fig. 5), with differences between countries but with the same impact as in Europe; the youth bulge will gradually diminish (Fig. 6) due to both the ageing of the population and the new generations who, as we have seen, no longer have the same high fertility rates as before. The two trends characterize ageing as an irreversible phenomenon— an aspect that we find harder to accept—because the total growth and the percentage of elderly people in many contemporary societies is a direct consequence of the fact that people, on average, live longer and have less children than in previous eras. This means an induced reduction in the number of fertile people and therefore the obvious incapacity of the system to reproduce itself. Change in reproductive behaviour, even if radical, would not lead to changes in the structure of the population, except on a very long-term basis. What is happening in the MENA region—following the route taken by developed countries and that currently being taken by developing countries—is a period of demographic transition from an ‘ancient’ regime characterized by high birth and death rates to a ‘modern’ regime with low birth and death rates. The same cannot be said of Sub-Saharan Africa, which is still in the early phases of demographic transition and provides us with different challenges for the future.

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Fig. 6 Youth bulge in some countries of the MENA region, 1950–2050 (Source Paasonen [2016])

4

Conclusion: The Geo-Demographic Challenges of the Future

If the beginning of the century presented us with a demographic curve of prevailing instability in the MENA region, we should soon be worried about the situation represented in Sub-Saharan Africa. What has happened over recent years in the Mediterranean in terms of migration, conflict and disorder, could happen in even more virulent terms in Sub-Saharan Africa. These potential threats should be dealt with well in advance, because the geographic obstacles represented by the Sahara and the Mediterranean might well not be enough. Demography, however, provides us with favourable conditions as well as potentially dangerous ones, such as the demographic window of opportunity. Demographic transition is decisive: it is the moment in which the number of children begins to diminish but the population still hasn’t begun to age. For this reason, the active population extends to more than 65% of the total. This is a happy period that lasts roughly 30 years. It offers undoubted advantages, for example: a larger work force, a smaller number of children thus freeing women from the role of the carer,

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allowing them to be available for work; this means more savings for investment and improved human capital due to investments in training and education. In fact, the period known as the ‘glorious thirties’—between 1945 and 1975—was Europe’s demographic window of opportunity and economic development (the ‘economic miracle’ in Italy in the 1950s and 1960s is a good example), just as China is experiencing its window of opportunity today. The window of opportunity in Sub-Saharan Africa will not occur until around 2050, when all today’s children will be the adults of tomorrow. However, in this case it is important not to be determinist. Demography offers moments of crisis and opportunity. It provides a necessary context, but it is not enough on its own. It is important not to forget other factors such as the growing education of the population, the widespread use of new technologies, the unemployment issue, endemic corruption and the continuing violation of human rights. As in the case of the youth bulge, specific contextual conditions are necessary for these demographic events to manifest themselves positively or negatively through the window of opportunity. Good policies in health, education, economics and governance are all needed to be able to take advantage of the demographic dividend. The future wellbeing of the world population will depend on this. Not to foresee and provide for this would expose the world to the dangers inherent in the new demographic tsunami that is redrawing the planet. Our planet will have to contemplate the equilibrium between those countries in demographic growth and those in demographic depression, as well as the relationship between young countries and old countries or ageing countries, thus redefining centres and suburbs on a geo-demographic basis. Much will depend on the way in which and the speed with which we react. The reaction will require multi-scale governance with an internationally coordinated response and policies suitable to specific territories that take into consideration past histories, as well as demonstrating far-sightedness for the future.

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Notes 1. Turning to Europe, the same considerations can be made for the civil conflict between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland. It is well known that Northern Ireland is divided into two culturally diverse communities, the Unionists (pro United Kingdom) and the Republicans (pro Republic of Ireland). Both are often described on the basis of religious identification: The Unionists are mainly Christian-Protestant (predominantly Presbyterian), while the Republicans are mainly Christian-Roman Catholic. Contrary to popular belief, however, not all Catholics are Republican and not all Protestants are Unionist. Indeed, the high fertility rates in the area during the period of conflict—and therefore the high levels of young people—were not so much due to religious beliefs, but to a sense of belonging and the will to prevail. These contending motivations evidently flattened out with the 1998 Peace Agreement and since then Northern Irish fertility rates, although still some of the highest in Europe, have begun to ‘normalize’ (Goldstone et al., 2012). 2. The evident semantic fracture provides an initial indication of the gap between the European and the North African, Middle Eastern shores. 3. UN Population Division: https://population.un.org/wpp/; US Census Bureau International Database: https://www.census.gov/programs-sur veys/international-programs/about/idb.html; OECD Population Data: https://data.oecd.org/pop/population.htm 4. A methodological note: some of the figures here take into consideration the period from 2008 to 2011. This is intentional in order to understand what the demographic and economic conditions were before the outbreak of the Arab Spring and other geopolitical or conflicting events.

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Arab Mediterranean Islam: Intellectual and Political Trends Mohammed Hashas

Contents 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Ultra-Conservative (Salafi) Islam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Conservative (Orthodox) Islam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Progressive (Critical) Islam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Reflective Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

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Introduction

The socio-cultural, political, and economic dimensions of societies around the Mediterranean move like its waters, without losing their substance, their ‘spirits,’ though change touches the substance as well, at least minimally. The French historian Ferdinand Braudel (d. 1985) considers the Mediterranean the basin of influential world religions and civilizations, three in the lead: the Greek, the Roman, and the Islamic civilizations,

M. Hashas (B) Department of Political Science, Luiss University, Rome, Italy e-mail: [email protected] Leibniz-Zentrum, Orient, Berlin, Germany © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 F. M. Corrao and R. Redaelli (eds.), States, Actors and Geopolitical Drivers in the Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69000-7_5

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while the Iberian and the Jewish lived shorter and had less influence. The great Mediterranean civilizations have moved beyond what he calls the ‘“physical unit” of the Mediterranean’ to the ‘human unit’, the ‘Greater Mediterranean’, beyond the geographic basin that is influenced by these ancient civilizations (Braudel, 1972, 1998). For some historians, the arrival of Islam in the Mediterranean from the seventh century AD is but a continuity of and a step into the historical making of ‘late antiquity’ (Hourani, 1980, 1991; Hodgson, 1993; al-Azmeh, 2014). Other historians, however, give different periodization of the history of the Basin and emphasize the division of its North from South with the expansion of Islam, a view that would later develop into a ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis (Huntington, [1996] 2011; Pirenne, [1937] 1959). These two major views live on in the intellectual history disciplines of scholarship, besides their presence in politics, political science, and international relations views, as well as popular imaginaries. Overall, the interaction between the European worlds of Christianity and the Arab worlds of Islam for at least the last fifteen centuries are a mixture of fear and respect, friendship and enmity, war and peace, migrations, economic exchange, socio-cultural, and scientific confluences (Bulliet, 2004; Burger, 2015; Campanini, 2016; Hashas, 2019; Hitti, [1937] 1970; Lewis, 1993; Rogan, 2009; Tolan, 2019). Is ‘Mediterranean Islam’ possible, as an idea and/or as a reality? As a reality, yes, it is already there, present for centuries, in multiple forms, but as an idea, it is difficult to harmonize and systematize simply because it is very diverse, plural, and heterogeneous. This chapter reflects on the Arab world as a representation of ‘Mediterranean Islam’ and outlines the intertwining territories between theoretical and practical Islam of mostly the vital period of the twentieth century, with references to pre-and-post this era. This chapter describes how Arab Mediterranean Islam aspires for change based primarily on its own tradition, while taking into account modern socio-cultural and political challenges that impact revisiting this tradition and its re-appropriation. It ultimately shows how it is internally plural and diverse, and also conflictual. To facilitate this task of presenting a complex mosaic of Arab Mediterranean Islam in limited space, I will adopt a typology of Islam that is as comprehensive as possible: (1) Ultraconservative or Salafi Islam, (2) conservative or orthodox Islam, and (3) progressive or critical Islam. Within each of these types other subtypes emerge, where needed, for ease of picturing the plurality of the

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phenomenon under study. The chapter ends with a brief reflective closure on ‘Mediterranean thinking’.

2

Ultra-Conservative (Salafi) Islam

Al-salaf in Arabic in this context means the ancestors; the modern Salafis claim to be heirs of the early pious salaf (al-salaf al-s.¯ alih.). Salafi Islam in current lexicon means the literalist Islam as found in the Quran and Sunna; it sticks to the way this religion was lived and practiced by the Prophet Muhammad and his Companions and the succeeding Followers (i.e. three generations of Companions) as much as possible, from his attire to rituals practice and theological interpretations. Salafis reject all that came after the seventh century of Islam as ‘deviant’ (bid a) from the ‘authentic’ Islam. When the word salafiyya was common a century and a half ago among reformist scholars, during the so-called Arab first Renaissance (Nahd.a), it meant reforming according to the tradition of the ancestors, and the major reformists like Muhammad bin Ali al-Shawkani (Muh.ammad bin Ali al-Shawk¯an¯ı, d. 1834) in Yemen, Muhammad Abduh (Muh.ammad Abduh, d. 1905) in Egypt, Jamal alDin al-Qasimi (d. 1914) in Syria, Rashid Rida (Rash¯ıd Rid.¯a, d. 1935) in Lebanon, Abdelhamid Bin Badis (Abd al-H . am¯ıd Bin B¯ad¯ıs, d. 1949) in Algeria, Muhammad bin al-Arabi al-Alaoui (Muh.ammad bin al-Arab¯ı alAlaw¯ı, d. 1964) and Allal al-Fassi (All¯al al-F¯ass¯ı, d. 1984) in Morocco, Muhammad al-Amin al-Shinqiti (Muh.ammad al-Am¯ın al-Shinq¯ıt.¯ı, d. 1976) in Mauritania were considered Salafis, progressive Salafis in their time (Saeed, 2013); they aimed to change society for the better, based on the tradition as a reference. While its reference is in the past, salafiyya’s vision is for the future. For the last decades or so, since the 1970s, however, the concept has become strictly applied to the most conservative, the ultra-conservative, led by the Wahhabi movement of Saudi Arabia, founded by the earliest reformist Muhammad Bin Abdelwahhab (Muh.ammad Abd al-Wahh¯ab, d. 1792). Though reformist during the first period of its founder, Wahhabi Salafism did not change as society changes, and thus remained rigid, literalist, following the classical Hanbali school without ijtihad. Unlike progressive Salafism, this form of Salafism is regressive; its aims to change society backwards, by returning to the past and to the ancestors as the idea society; both its reference and its vision are in the past; its future is in

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the past; its future is then regressive, not progressive (Lauzière, 2016; Meijer, 2009, 2018). Otherwise said, this ultra-conservative Islam is literalist, antihermeneutic, and anti-speculative theology. For the Salafis, the founding sources of Islam are clear and do not need further interpretation; what is right/halal is clear, and so is what is wrong/haram. The task of the Muslim is to purify Islam from the accidentals and additions that have been added during the centuries of speculative theology and canonized jurisprudence, as well as the centuries of decadence. The Salafis deride the madhhabiyya in jurisprudence, since it is a tradition that was built intellectually, after the first three generations succeeding the Prophet. The Wahhabi Salafis destroyed most of the shrines and saints mausoleums that used to be visited by ordinary believers for benediction when the movement emerged; the idea behind this erasure was to purify the idea of Oneness of God, tawhid, from any innovations (bid a). The Salafis are also strong adherents to the Hadith tradition, which they take also literally. The ideal individual is the one who sticks to the tradition literally, and the ideal society is that which respects especially the Prophetic model of Medina. Women have to stay at home, or work in sectors where they do not interact with men when need be; women who travel have to be with a family member who they cannot marry (mah.ram). The Salafis believe in the saved sect, and they consider their path the safest and the surest, and the others are wrong, and the Shia are the most on the wrong side among Muslims; they excommunicate the non-Salafis from belief (takf¯ır). Sufism is considered a deviation, too, a gnostic tradition that believes in the internal approach of the divine, which is opposed to the literalist approach of the Salafis. Salafism does not believe in democratic systems but can live with them and keep calling for a shura-based system; the Muslim rulers who do not follow their interpretation of the tradition are advised often in forms of indirect public sermons and letters (Algar, 2002; Meijer, 2009; Lauzière, 2016). Salafism is of various types, often categorized into three: quietist, activist, and jihadi Salafism. They have become more widespread since the rise of Satellite TVs, private religious TV channels, and afterwards since the emergence of the Internet. For long, the Salafis have been considered quietist, apolitical; they emphasize non-violent methods on preaching their path, though they work for changing individuals and society as a step towards changing the political system to their puritan model. Prominent scholars of this type in Saudi Arabia include the earlier figure

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of Muhammad bin Abdelwahab (Abd al-Wahh¯ab, d. 1792), and the contemporary Nasir al-Din al-Albani (N¯as.ir al-D¯ın al-Alb¯an¯ı, d. 1999), the most authoritative scholar of hadith in modern times, Abd al-Aziz Bin Baz (Abd al-Aziz B¯ın B¯az, d. 1999), once the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, and Rabi’ ibn Hadi al-Madkhali (Rab¯ı Ibn H¯ad¯ı al-Madkhal¯ı, b. 1939), founder of the Madkhaliyya ultra-orthodox Salafi movement. They claim obedience to the political rulers, and often extreme obedience, and concentrate on personal piety and ritual observance. They have followers worldwide, and there are their equivalents in the rest of the Arab world, though they were hardly visible in military and authoritarian secular regimes of Saddam Hussein (S.add¯am H . usayn, d. 2006) in Iraq, Hafiz al-Assad (H . ¯afiz. al-Asad, d. 2000) in Syria, Muammar al-Qadhafi (Muammar al-Qadhdh¯af¯ı, d. 2011) in Libya, al-Habib Bourguiba (al¯ ın H . ab¯ıb B¯urq¯ıba, d. 2000) and Zin el-Abidine Ben Ali (Zayn al-Abid¯  bin Al¯ı, d. 2019) in Tunisia. Saudi Salafism expanded from the 1960s when King Faisal opened and funded new Islamic universities, institutions, and mosques in the country and worldwide as a form of state diplomacy and centralization in the Arab and Islamic world; this would further succeed after the failure of Arab nationalism, and the military crackdown on the Muslim Brothers in many Arab states (Al-Sarhan, 2020; Lauzière, 2016). By the late 1980s and early 1990s emerged a more moderate Salafi-Wahhabi group of scholars in Saudi Arabia and became known as the Sahwa movement, i.e. awakening/reformist movement, like Safar al-Hawali (Safar al-H . aw¯al¯ı, b. 1950) and Salman al-Auda (Salm¯an  al- Awda, b. 1956) (Al-Rasheed, 2010, 2015). As to activist or political Salafism, it works to apply its worldview in politics, often national politics, for justice, based on God’s law alone. This is a form of nationalist Salafism that works within nation-state borders. It emerged by the 1980s. In Egypt, post the Arab Spring, the Da wa al-Salafiyya (Salafi Call), formed in 1984, created al-Nur Party (H . izb al-N¯ur) in 2011 and won the second highest number of seats in the parliamentary elections of 2011–2012. In Morocco, the Salafis moved from a radical orientation in the 1970s and 1980s to a more pacifist and quietist participation in politics and public debate since 2011; a number of them changed radically, from refusing the political monarchic system, the democratic process and social change to a more open and liberal view, after what is known as ‘intellectual revisions,’ or mur¯ aja ¯ at, of their ultra-orthodox ideas mostly after long prison experience (Halverson & Greenberg, 2018; Masbah, 2019).

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As for jihadist Salafism, it takes a step further and calls for restoring the early Islamic ideal society by violence not only at the national level but at the international level as well; jihadi Salafism permits jihad against both Muslims and Muslims to change the status quo, which is described by Sayyid Qutb (Sayyd Qut.b, d. 1964), one of the early influencers of the trend, as a j¯ ahil¯ı-pagan society, poisoned by Western modernity, capitalism, and excessive consumerism and nihilism. Sovereignty is to God alone and his laws, and not to man-made laws. For example, Excommunication and Migration (al-Takf¯ır wa al-Hijra) radical movement, influenced by Qutb, started violent acts against some state officials in the 1960s in Egypt. In 1979, a Salafi radical group attempted to take over Mecca Grand Mosque, led by Mohammed Abdullah al-Qahtani (Muh.ammad Abd All¯ah al-Qah.t.¯an¯ı) and Juhayman al-Otaybi (Juhaym¯an al-Utayb¯ı); the former died in the siege and the latter was condemned to death by the Saudi authorities for this terrorist siege the same year. The salafiyya of Bin Baz was indirectly implicated in this siege, since al-Otaybi had earlier joined the local Salafi branch The Salafi Group That Commands Right and Forbids Wrong (Al-Jam¯ a a al-Salafiyya alMuh.tasiba) in Medina, which was directed by Sheikh Bin Baz at the time. Abdullah ‘Azzam (Abd All¯ah Azz¯am, d. 1989), a Salafi theologian and political activist in Palestine, is the founding member of al-Qaeda and mentor of Usama bin Laden (Us¯ama bin L¯adin, d. 2011); he is the major icon of violent Salafism; he aspired to free Palestine as well as Islamic lands from the ‘enemies’, the ‘Crusaders’, the ‘West’. He organized the ‘Arab-Afghans’ in their fight against the USSR. After his death, Bin Laden became the Emir/Head of al-Qaeda, who in turn is now succeeded by Ayman a-Zawahiri (Ayman al-Z.aw¯ahir¯ı; b. 1951), head of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (al-Jih¯ ad al-Isl¯ am¯ı al-Mis.r¯ı), founded in the late 1970s; the killer(s) of the Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat (Anwar al-S¯ad¯at) in 1981 belonged to the latter movement. As to the assassination of the ‘secular’ public intellectual Farag Fouda (Faraj F¯ udah) in 1992, it was carried out by another Islamist movement called The Islamic Group (AlJam¯ a aal-Isl¯ amiyya). After the ‘Arab Spring’ the Egyptian Islamic Jihad formed a party called Islamic Party and stood against the military coup of al-Sisi in 2013. In 2012, in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra (Jabhat al-Nus.ra) was formed to fight against al-Asad regime to form an Islamic State. The bloody Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (al-Dawla al-Isl¯ amiyya f¯ı al- Ir¯ aq wa S¯ ury¯ a, ISIS) since

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2014 is another jihadi-Salafi movement, considered more radical than alQaeda and Jabhat al-Nusra announced the formation of the Caliphate under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (Ab¯u Bakr al-Baghd¯ad¯ı, d. 2019). Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has been vocal in Algeria since 2007 and is considered an offshoot of the 1990s civil war, and often lead campaigns anti the state (Burke, 2013; Halverson & Greenberg, 2018). Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (Ab¯u Muh.ammad al-Maqdis¯ı, b. 1959) remains one of the most authoritative figures of jihadi Salafism so far; he is the mentor of Abu Musaab al-Zarkawi (Ab¯u Mus.ab alZarq¯aw¯ı, d. 2006) who founded al-Qaeda in Iraq and led its atrocities there after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Wagemakers, 2012). In front of these jihadi Salafi movements and their visible activism stand nearly invisible Liberation Party (H . izb al-Tah.r¯ır), which was created in Palestine in 1953 by Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani (Taq¯ı al-D¯ın al-Nabh¯an¯ı, d. 1977) to re-establish the Caliphate; the party has headquarters in Beirut, and is still active also in the London office. Broadly, the party overall does not call for violence, but works through publications and associations to recruit follows to its Salafi religious views, as a preparation for the reestablishment of the Caliphate for all Muslims, considered a must-do act to revive genuine Islamic identity, and without which the identity is influenced by the ‘rotten’ Western dominance and culture (H . izb al-Tah.r¯ır, [1953] 2000).

3

Conservative (Orthodox) Islam

The mainstream Muslim societies and communities worldwide, and the Arab world in focus, are conservative, or orthodox. Being conservative does not mean being extremist or violent; it means holding more to the traditional view on certain issues related to social organization, family, including business or the economic sector. By conservative Islam here is meant the mainstream Sunni Islam that is Ashari in creed, which is neither a literalist nor a pure rationalist school, but one that stands in-between; it gives reason high place in understanding revelation, but it sticks to revelation as the highest source of revelation. The Quran, the Prophetic Sunna, Ashari and Maturidi rationalist theology (‘ilm alkal¯ am), along with six canonical hadith collections (al-kutub al-sitta), and the four major juridical schools (madh¯ ahib), which developed sophisticated legal theories and jurisprudential methods of evaluation human acts, are what make the mainstream Sunni tradition, followed by some 80–85%

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of Muslims in the world; the rest follow the Shi ‘a tradition, which has its own hadith collections and juridical canonical texts. Both traditions developed over the political-theological issue of who should succeed the Prophet Muhammad as a successor (Caliph for the Sunnis or Imam for Shia) after his death. Five major ‘sectors’ represent conservative Islam: (1) state institutions, like the ministries of religious affairs and the nationalized established religious institutions, which promulgate state Islam, (2) established classical religious authorities, universities, and seminaries, which maintain orthodox Islam, (3) Sufi or mystical Islam, which some scholars consider a different category of Islam and not only a category of conservative Islam as this chapter has categorized it, (4) moderate/non-violent political Islam, and (5) popular Islam, lived Islam or Islam of the masses. First, conservative Islam is preserved and promulgated through nation state institutions, be they secular, religious or ‘secular-religious’ institutions. In the lead of these institutions is the political system in some Arab monarchies where the king is proclaimed as protector and servant of the two most holy sanctuaries/mosques of Islam (Mecca and Medina), as is the case with the King of Saudi Arabia, or as is the case with the King of Morocco as commander of believers, and the King of Jordan as custodian of the sacred places of worship for Muslims and Christians. At the executive level, it is ministries of religious affairs and endowments that govern the sector in terms of organization, funding, and promulgation of the faith in education and research, in classical religious schools, colleges, and universities, and in their modern secular equivalents, besides the presenting and representing in public TV, the media, and various visual and written forms. The nationalization of the classical established mosques/universities and the whole religious sector took place on different stages, for political reasons, gradually since 1835 in Egypt, and the 1920–1940s in Iraq and Syria, since the 1950s in the Maghreb, and since the 1960s–1970s in the Gulf. Modern state institutions, or pre-modern institutions that are now monopolized by the modern nation state, form state Islam. With this nationalization, each nation state has not only co-opted the religious establishment and turned its faculty and administration into its dependent salaried professors and civil servants, but has most importantly turned the flexible and adaptive Islamic jurisprudence and legal tradition into a rigid law, now sometimes commonly and erroneously called ‘Sharia’ instead of specifying it as ‘Sharia law’; correctly, Sharia is the

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broad Islamic worldview, which includes the creed as well as its various aspects in jurisprudence, ethics, and Sufism, and also the other fields that have its mark, like literature and the arts. However, the modern nation states in the Arab world have ‘rigidified’ Sharia legal practice and turned it into a law of the land, thus each nation state now has adopted a particular madhhab/legal school, though sometimes they borrow from each other, evoking the talf¯ıq method, or the eclectic method, where needed. More interestingly, Sharia law now binds mostly only family affairs related to marriage, divorce, guardianship of kids, inheritance division, and the issue of gender equality before the law; the rest of socio-political and economic issues are mostly administered by secular administration according to public interest, which is justified and legitimized by the Islamic legal theories of public good and objectives of Sharia (maq¯ a.sid al-Shar¯ı ‘a) that aim at serving human beings in this life. Added to this, Arab states are signatories of international conventions of human rights, women’s rights, child rights, besides other treaties and conventions that make them bound by international law. That is why one has to be cautious in calling Arab states as well as Arab societies as ‘Islamic’, since what is ‘Islamic’ keeps changing, and does not correspond to some essentialized and orientalized image of ‘Islam’ and Muslims of pre-modern or classical times. For a more adequate description, some scholars speak of ‘post-Islamist’ societies, or simply societies with geographical markers (e.g. North Africa, Maghreb, Arab), and not religious markers (e.g. Islamic, Muslim), markers a lot of heritage of which is ‘European-made’, ‘European-Orientalist’ since it helps in identifying what ‘Europe’ and the ‘West’ are. What is Europe or the West without Islam and the Arab world? What is the world without Islam? Graham Fuller attempted a reply (Fuller, 2010). Arab states monopoly of ‘established classical Islam’ has been used in recent feuds between geostrategic players and their interests either in the religion or beyond it, including in Europe. For instance, though Wahhabi Islam dominates both Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the latter’s version is more open and friendly to the Muslim Brotherhood, while its Saudi version is more rigid, and enemy-like to the Muslim Brotherhood and democratizing political Islam; this has been noticed over the last decades since the appearance of alJazeera channel in Qatar, and most importantly since the so-called Arab Spring of 2010–2011 (Bilgin, 2018). Similar rivalry on the religious and political spheres transpires in the Maghreb between Morocco and Algeria; in the religious sphere, both train imams and export them to especially

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Europe where they both have an important diaspora; in France in particular, they compete over the administration of mosques which they fund and provide with imams and religious guides (Bruce, 2019; Laurence, 2012). Second, conservative Islam in the Arab world is especially preserved through established religious institutions that have played the role of memory transmission of the Islamic tradition from generation to generation; these centuries-old institutions are considered the most legitimate presenters and representors of Islam for most Muslims, though at times they are silenced, weakened or/and influenced by (modern) state institutions (Kolig, 2012); they maintain orthodox Sunni Islam in the Arab world, and their equivalents in Iran in particular maintain the dominant Twelver Shia orthodoxy. Past esteemed scholars of Islam studied and taught in these institutions, which were, before the rise of the nation state, independent or semi-independent institutions, since they were part of endowments, given for the service of society by ordinary (rich) Muslims or men of power. The historian Philip K. Hitti (d. 1993) speaks of six city capitals of classical Arab Islam: Mecca, the religious capital; Medina, the caliphal capital; Damascus, the imperial capital; Baghdad, the intellectual capital; Cairo, the dissident capital; and Cordova, the European capital (Hitti, 1973). Here is a reference to some of the most influential in modern times. The most important of these, besides Mecca and Medina as cities of sacral importance as well as a hub of scholarly ‘sheikships’ over the centuries, is al-Azhar Mosque and University in Cairo, founded in 971 AD, which still plays a vital role in teaching Arabic language and Islamic sciences for religious graduates worldwide. However, since its early nationalization under Muhammad Ali Pasha who created the ministry of religious affairs (awq¯ af ) in 1835, King Fuad I (Fu¯ad al-Awwal), and later on Gamal Abd al-Nasser in 1952, its independence decreased; its board of scholars, for instance, is no longer international, representative of Muslims worldwide, as it used to be before. Moreover, currently, under the military regime of al-Sisi, the Grand Mufti Ahmed al-Tayyib (Ah.mad al-T.ayyib) is not happy with the toughness shown towards religious movements and institutions, which express a critique of the regime often not in a confrontational way. In Tunisia, there is al-Zaytuna University and Mosque, founded in 737 AD, which played a major intellectual and cultural role in the past centuries, but lost its heritage especially during the top-down secularization process under Habib Bourguiba and police-surveillance of Zine

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al-Abidine Ben Ali. And in Morocco stands the oldest functioning university in the world, since 859 AD, according to the UNESCO, preceding the oldest functioning university in Europe, i.e. Bologna University in Italy since 1088. In Greater Syria, or the Sham, which includes current Syria, Lebanon, Palestine-Israel, and Jordan, there have also been regional important centres of religious learning, and its prominent scholars find their ways to teach and preach in the Umayyad Mosque or the Great Mosque of Damascus, one of the oldest and largest mosques in the Islamic world, built between 708 and 715 AD. Overall, these religious institutions have been the representatives of Islamic mainstream orthodoxy since their establishment. During the colonial period, a lot of their powers started to diminish, and in the post-colonial period more of this heritage eclipsed. Still, since there are no real competing alternatives, they remain the official representatives of classical Islamic scholarship and religious education, despite all their current problems and shortcomings, especially since they became nationalized institutions in the postcolonial period (Bunt, 2018; Hallaq, 2009; Maussen et al., 2012; Qasim Zaman, 2012; Zeghal, 1996). These institutions do not directly intervene in national and international politics, though it will be seen how they are politicized in the next point; they condemn violence committed in the name of Islam or change through radical means; and the international icons of religious terrorist movements, like Osama Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri of al-Qaeda or al-Baghdadi of ISIS, are not graduates from, let alone being established scholars in, these institutions. Third, as to Sufi Islam, or mystical Islam, it is another branch of faith expression that few words cannot describe here. Only a classic in the field, Mystical Dimensions of Islam (1975) written by Annemarie Schimmel (d. 2003), an influential German scholar, an ‘Orientalist’, gives an accessible introduction to this type of profound and intimate religiosity and search for closeness to the divine and the Creator. Mysticism contains something that is not reachable by reason alone or by heart alone; it is a reality that only personal experience, through strenuous physical and intellectual efforts, can taste; once on this path, a light guides the seeker, the Sufi, enlightens his/her heart, and elevates him/her gradually to upper, mysterious, levels of closeness to the Ultimate Reality or Light of the Divine. Joy and suffering are parts of this path of purification and divine love (Schimmel, [1975] 2011). This path can be rightly taken by following the Prophetic teachings, his family members (ahl al-bayt ), and his most pious Companions and Sufi masters or ‘saints’ (awliy¯ a ) that came after them.

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While it is a personal journey, it requires company, a master and a disciple. Many paths or orders (turuq) have emerged over the centuries; during the later decadent centuries in the Arab-Islamic civilization, more popular practices of Sufis emerged as well, like visiting shrines of Sufi masters or awliy¯ a  for benediction, and the use of music and dance during the dhikr rituals, practices that are fully refused by modern Salafi movements and also important fractions of Sunni orthodox Islam. In the ‘West’, Sufism is often easily defined by ‘Westerners’ as private Islam, interior Islam, and thus the beautiful and liberal side of Islam, against the rigidity of Sharia law and public religiosity and practice. It is also not unusual to hear that Sufis are addicted to two forbidden fruits: wine (intoxication) and young boys (homosexuality). Mark J. Sedgwick, a contemporary scholar of Sufism, refutes these depictions as Europeanist and racist, developed especially during the last two centuries of modern encounter with Islam and Muslims, and especially during the colonial period when the Semites–the Jews and Arabs–were considered retarded races and focused only on legalism, while the Aryans–the Indo-Europeans, including the Persians–were considered superior and more innovative; a Semite mind cannot produce a creative interpretation of the universe, and express it in great Sufi literature and poetry, in an open/liberal and pluralist spirit, as did the legendary mystics like Muhammad Ibn Arabi (d. 1240), and Jalal al-Din al-Rumi (Jal¯al al-D¯ın al-R¯um¯ı d. 1273), among others; this way goes the biased Orientalist and racist view of Sufi Islam (Sedgwick, 2000). Contrary to these shallow and erroneous depictions, Sufi Islam, as said earlier, is part of classical ‘conservative Islam’; broadly, a genuine Sufi is supposed to esteem the mainstream Orthodox Islam and shari ‘a prescriptions, however different they are the details and practices different Sufi orders approach the divine and seek its love, closeness and ‘friendship’ or ‘union’. Sufi orders or paths are present worldwide, including in the ‘West’, and they are often well organized, since they have an internal hierarchy they respect. Besides focus on internal morality and piety of the individual through private and communal dhikr (remembers of God rituals), they also invest in public services for the poor in Islamic majority societies as well as dialogue in non-Muslim majority societies (Ernst, 2011; Spencer, 1971). That Sufi Islam is apolitical is a frequent idea or statement one comes across, since it is interior-focused and rejectionist of attraction to worldly affairs. However, Sufis, because of their involvement in providing services

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in society through their brotherhoods and their influence, can also be political, or turn political. This phenomenon is not new; a look at the recent past proves also the claim that Sufis have not always been apolitical. During the fight for liberation against European colonialism, Sufi brotherhoods contributed substantially in the struggle for independence, and some major religious scholars who were leaders of established religious institutions were themselves Sufi members or Sufi oriented, as was the case with the renowned figures, like Muhammad ibn Ali al-Sannusi (al-San¯us¯ı, d. 1859) in Libya, Emir Abdelkader (Am¯ır Abd al-Q¯adir, d. 1883) in Algeria, and Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905) in Egypt. Similarly, during the Arab Spring revolts, some Sufi orders took sides, either with the masses and the revolts or against them and thus with the old regime. In Morocco, for instance, on the one hand, the influential Boutchichiyya Sufi order (al-Budsh¯ıshiyya), which is close to the ruling circles in the country, went to the streets during the Referendum that was initiative by the monarch and encouraged people to vote ‘yes’ for the Constitutional reforms as the Referendum proposed; on the other hand, the Justice and Spirituality Movement (al- Adl wa al-Ih.s¯ an), which is also substantially a Sufi movement, an offshoot of the Boutchichi order, besides being a non-declared political movement, refused the new Constitution and considered it less democratic, and in which the King still enjoys substantial executive and non-accountable powers (Bouasria, 2017). Similarly in Egypt, influential Sufi orders, like al-Rifaiyya and al-Azmiyya, took the side of the military in 2013 and the election of General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi (Abd al-Fatt¯ah. al-S¯ıs¯ı) in 2014, against the elected President Muhammad Morsi (M¯urs¯ı) and the Muslim Brotherhood; earlier in 2011, they founded the Sufi Egyptian Liberation Party and joined the liberal Egyptian Bloc against the Muslim Brothers and the Salafis; some scholars justify this political attitude of the Sufis by their poor political awareness and long isolationism from political/world issues, as well as their long habit of seeking protection from rulers (Deasy, 2012; Ladjal & Bensaid, 2015). Fourth, as to political Islam, it is simply the use of the religious reference in politics and political competition for the sake of restoring a partial or full classical political system that was substantially–though not fully– religious in worldview and praxis. Some use political Islam, Islamism, and fundamentalism interchangeably, which is not accurate. Political Islam is a broader umbrella, and includes the democratic and democratizing religious movements, while the latter, Islamism and fundamentalism, are anti-modern, ultra-conservative, and a fraction of them is violent. Political

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Islam is the offspring of the Islamic socio-cultural, political, and religious revival, which started by the late eighteenth century in the Arabian Peninsula (in current Saudi Arabia, officially founded as state in 1932) by Muhammad ibn Abdelwahab, referred to earlier as the father of Salafi Wahhabism, and the Muslim Brotherhood movement, founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna (H . assan al-Bann¯a, d. 1949), a charismatic young man of Sufi tendencies, who was influenced by the influential reformists Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida. While Wahhabi Salafism started to internationalize only since the 1960s and 1970s, thanks to the petrodollar richness of the country and its state institutions that adopt the religious interpretation of Wahhabism, the Brotherhood received more appeal in the Arab world and beyond. The Brotherhood (for short) emerged in the period when the Ottoman Caliphate had just ended and left the Arab world disunited and under the European colonial machine, when Egypt was under the British Mandate, and when the secular nationalist movement was fighting for independence and gaining more sympathy among the masses; it emerged also when the Christian missionaries in the country were very active, and when the European Jewish migration to Palestine was in progress. All these factors contributed to the formation of the Brotherhood as a socio-political movement to organize society and Islamize it as the way out of these problems (Al-Anani, 2016; Wickham, 2015). The Brotherhood aimed at restoring Sharia and its prescriptions for individual and social affairs as the law of the land, thus the motto that Islam is both religion and state (al-isl¯ am d¯ın wa dawla). Al-Banna set a broad aim for the movement, to dominate the world according to the teachings of Islam, by outlining six major objectives: building the Muslim individual, the Muslim family, an Islamic society, an Islamic government, an Islamic state, and an Islamic umma (al-khil¯ afa). The movement saw in Sharia socio-political system a superior rival to the modern socio-political systems of Europe that were being introduced in the country by both the British, the King, and the secular nationalist movement. Consequently, disagreements between the Brotherhood and the ruling elite, with which it entered into a circle of assassinations, led in turn to the assassination of the founder of the Brotherhood, al-Banna, in 1949 (Al-Anani, 2016). During the period of leadership void within the Brotherhood, and the Free Officer’s rise to power under Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1952, a literary critic would emerge as an indirect supreme guide within the Brotherhood, i.e. Sayyid Qutb; some of his writings would become part

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of the reading literature of the movement. Disagreements between the Brotherhood, Qutb in particular, with the secular and socialist Nasser on politics in which religion should play a more important role, according to the Brotherhood, would lead to a feud, especially after an assassination attempt of Nasser in 1954, and to the imprisonment and later on the hanging of Qutb in 1964; this would make him the martyr of the Brotherhood and its radical wing. The movement is banned whenever more tension or violence arises with the state, as in 1948, 1954, and 2013. The Brotherhood keeps a non-violent agenda, but from its inception some radical wings emerged from its ex-members, like the radical Muhammad’s Youth in 1939, which wished to use violence against the British, and the Special Apparatus (al-Tanz.im al-Kh¯ a.s), which opposed the close ties of al-Hudaybi (al-Hud.ayb¯ı), the first supreme guide after al-Banna, with the regime of Nasser. During the 1970s–1980s and early 1990s emerged the reformist camp within the Brotherhood, which aimed at organizing and being involved politically, while the conservative camp insisted on focalizing da wa, education and social services away from direct involvement in politics. In 1984 the reformists pushed the whole movement to declare for the first time democracy the only viable political system. In the mid-1990s, the reformists founded al-Wasat Party (H . izb al-Wasat.), which the conservatives disagreed with, and which Mubarak regime cracked, thus gave more weight and legitimacy to the conservative camp, which was cracked too afterwards, until the Arab Spring (Al-Anani, 2016: 144–149). The Brotherhood, the dominant mainstream camp, would establish its first political party after the Egyptian revolts of 2011, Freedom and Justice Party, through which it would win, in the name of its candidate Muhammad Morsi, the first democratic elections in the country in 2012. However, because of internal dynamics, the army, led by General al-Sisi would overthrow the elected president Morsi (r. 30 June 2012–03 July 2013), violently crack down the movement and imprison its leaders, including Morsi, who died in prison in 2019; the movement is declared a terrorist movement by the military regime since 2013. Outside Egypt, which has enjoyed a strategic place in the Arab world for the last two hundred years, the Brotherhood, too, has enjoyed such a place (and it has affiliates, branches, and adherents all over the world). The movement has branches nearly in all the Arab world, with the exception of the Gulf where its influence has been minor since the region has been broadly Wahhabi before the rise of the Brotherhood, and because

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the two movements reflect different ideologies of political or active Islam. Nonetheless, a lot of members of the Brothers escaped to Saudi Arabi during the pression period under Nasser in the 1950s and 1060s and became influential in the Saudi society, which was still building its new modern schools and universities at the time, and needed teachers and skilled workers from Egypt, some of whom happen to be affiliates of the Brothers, thus emerged the Brothers’ presence in the country. During the US army’s landing in Saudi Arabia, against the invasion of Iraq in 1990, al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya movement (al-S.ah.wa al-Isl¯amiyya) in Saudi Arabia, along with the Brothers, denounced this permission of US army’s presence; the Sahwa, mentioned earlier is influenced by both the Wahhabi and Brothers’ lines of thought, and are considered reformist ‘Wahhabis’ (al-Rasheed, 2015). When Morsi was overthrown and imprisoned, the Sahwa leaders in Saudi Arabia condemned the act. When the Egyptian regime shortlisted the Brothers as a terrorist movement, it was shortlisted as such in Saudi Arabia as well. Similarly, the Brothers influence is present in the United Arab Emirates as al-Islah Group (Jam¯ a at al-Is.l¯ ah.) since the 1970s, but the movement at large is listed as a terrorist movement there as well since 2014; the ruling systems in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are fully against the rise of the Brotherhood, while Qatar is supportive of it, and condemned the coup d’état in Egypt in 2013. Moreover, the ‘global mufti’ Yusuf al-Qaradawi (al-Qarad.¯aw¯ı, b. 1926), resident in Qatar since the 1960s, is held of high esteem as an intellectual reference by the movement and its members, though he is not officially a member of the Brotherhood. Along with other figures like his compatriot and friend the influential Mohammed al-Ghazali (alGhaz¯al¯ı, d. 1996), al-Qaradawi belongs to what came to be known as the Wasatiyya (moderation) school of contemporary Islamic religious thought, i.e. a conservative and moderate trend that seeks cultural and social change without transforming the core message of Sharia teachings, especially in what concerns individual and family rights and duties (Al-Qaradawi, 2006; Moussa, 2016). Palestine is an important religious reference for the Brotherhood to which it sent its first military battalions in the war of 1948, the year when Israel was born as a state. However, with the creation of the secular Palestinian Liberation Organization–and its major party Fatah (H . arakat Fath.), formerly the Palestinian National Liberation Movement–as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, the Brotherhood remained invisible, and focused on social work. It was with the first Intifada of 1987 that

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Hamas, the Islamic Resistance Movement, was formed, and is considered the offspring of various charities and social institutions inspired by the Brotherhood. The movement won elections in Gaza 2006, and had to enter into a five-days violence in June 2007 to take hold of power which Fatah did not wish to let go; Gaza is under the control of Hamas since then, 2007, while the West Bank is under the control of the Palestinian National Authority, dominated by Fatah members, established in 1994 post-Oslo Accords. The Brotherhood has been influential in Jordan as well, since the 1960s, and stood beside King Hussein during the rise of Pan-Arab forces that were a threat to the Monarchy. Since 1989, it has become vocal in politics, more supportive of the Palestinian cause and Hamas, and developed a more critical attitude towards the state system; it calls for a constitutional Monarchy. In the 2011 Arab revolts, the Brothers won more seats and were invited to join the government, which they refused; they are now, in 2020, dissolved by law as a party, since they are accused of not having respected the reformed laws of 2014 about the organization of political parties (H . izb al-Tah.r¯ır, ([1953] 2000). In Lebanon, the Brothers’ affiliates established the Islamic Group (al-Jam¯aa al-Isl¯amiyya) in 1964, and it represents mostly parts of the Sunni Muslims in the country; its influence in the country at large is minor compared to the activism of other denominations, Muslim and Christina, the Shiite Hizbullah (H . izb All¯ah) in the lead (Pall, 2018: 8–11). It should be clear by now that the Islamist movements that function within certain state borders, like Hamas in Palestine and Hizbullah in Lebanon (and in Syrian since 2011 revolts), consider themselves resistance and liberation movements against colonialism (i.e. Israel), and do not aim at changing the world order at large, as is the case with the transnational claims and aims of al-Qaeda and ISIS. In Syria, the Brotherhood has been present since 1945; its Syrian founder, Mustafa al-Sibai, had close ties with al-Banna in Egypt, where he was studying in the 1930s; when the Bath Party came to power in 1963, it opposed it and entered into armed conflict with it, and it was crushed after the Hama protests of 1982, Hama being the stronghold of the Brotherhood; membership of the movement is considered a capital crime since 1980. During the first decade of 2000s, the Brotherhood came in close contact with the regime, especially that the latter was supportive of Hamas’ resistance, but since the Syrian revolts of 2011, which turned into

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a devastating civil and proxy war, the Brotherhood took the side of the revolts. On the South and West side of Egypt, the Brotherhood influenced the birth of the Unified Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood Organization in 1954, and the more influential Islamic Charter Front, led by Hasan alTurabi, in 1954, which shared power and influenced politics along with the military Omar al-Bashir (al-Bash¯ır) from 1989 until the Sudanese revolts, with interruptions in relations with the military. In Algeria, its branch the Movement of Society for Peace since the 1950s has been weaker, but in different ways it influenced the more prominent Front Islamique du Salut (FIS), which reached power in 1989 local elections, but it was soon banned in 1992 by the military, when it was clear they were going to win the legislative elections. This led to a bloody civil war during the decade of the 1990s, for which the military and the Islamists keep accusing each other. In Tunisia, Rached al-Ghannouchi (Rash¯ıd alGhann¯ush¯ı, b. 1941) formed the Ennahda (Renaissance) movement in 1981, for which he went into exile for some 20 years, to return home only after the Jasmine revolution of 2010–2011. The movement entered politics and has been democratically in power since 2011, in coalitions with other parties; Ennahda’s model of Islamic democracy is considered the most successful in the Arab world so far, along with the Moroccan version of the Islamic Brothers, i.e. the Justice and Development Party (H . izb al-Ad¯ala wa al-Tanmiya, PJD), officially created only since 1997, though it has been active in society in different forms since the 1970s, during the rise of political Islam. The Moroccan PJD does not have direct influence from the Brothers in Egypt; the PJD has been heading the electoral results, thus has been heading the government since 2011 revolts. In Libya, the Brothers have been banned by the military of al-Gaddafi, and they could organize themselves into Justice and Construction Party only after the revolts in 2011. Finally, fifth, regarding popular Islam, it is the Islam that is lived and practiced by the masses without much theological, juridical, and political thinking. It is fused with local cultures and customs, away from sophisticated religious thinking or political involvement. It is the Islam of daily life, invoked in mosques, at homes, in the markets, in weddings, birth celebrations and funerals, and various folklore customs and festivities. This makes ‘Moroccan popular Islam’, for example, different in some practices from ‘Saudi popular Islam’ or ‘Indonesian popular Islam’, or ‘Sub-Saharan popular Islam’. A lot of socio-anthropological work by

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local scholars as well as ‘Orientalists’ for the last century has accumulated a massive literature on these popular appropriations and adaptations of Islam to different geographies, languages, races, and customs and customary laws; lived Islam does not correspond fully to the ‘imagined’ or ‘essentialized’ Islam of Sharia strict law that is read about in books or in certain media outlets in the ‘West’. Such diversity and plurality in living the faith problematizes the ‘Islamic question’, i.e. what is truly Islamic and what is not, and what is the place of the customs and practices that may appear in contradiction with clear Islamic legal prescriptions but which are still practiced by various Muslim communities worldwide, and throughout the centuries. Some recent major works underline the importance of sociological details in the definition of Islam and Muslims, i.e. John R. Bowen’s A New Anthropology of Islam (2012), Thomas Bauer’s The Culture of Ambiguity (2009), Shahab Ahmed’s What Is Islam? (2015), and Armando Salvatore’s The Sociology of Islam (2016), among others (Ahmed, 2015; Bauer, 2017; Bowen, 2012; Esposito & Mogahed, 2007; Salvatore, 2016).

4

Progressive (Critical) Islam

By progressive Islam here is meant the interpretation of Islam so as to meet the modern socio-cultural, political, and economic challenges of individuals and societies; this religious reference varies according to the discipline or area of interpretation, which makes the religious presence minimal or maximal, accordingly. Overall, this view of Islam tries to distinguish itself from radical separatist secularism of the French style (laïcité) or atheist secularism of the past Soviet style; it is ‘secular-religious’. It is reformist, and aims to be pluralist, democratic, and a defender of modern human rights, fair distribution of wealth, and social justice; it is antiviolence, anti-jihadis, and anti-Salafis; it is also critical of certain aspects of modernity, and is anti-Western hegemony, and anti-imperialist. That is, it practices double critique against stagnant traditionalism and against Eurocentrism and Western-centrism. Anthologies and works on modern and contemporary Arab and Islamic intellectual history give different divisions and names to this version of Islam. Some call it progressive, and others call it critical, rational, leftist, and liberal Islam (Abu Rabi‘, 2004; Corm, 2019; Duderija, 2017; Hourani, [1962] 1983; Kassab, 2009; Kurzman, 1998, 2002; Safi, 2003). In this section, I propose bearing in mind this chronological framework, before I adopt the relevant division of

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the Egyptian philosopher Hassan Hanafi (b. 1935) of the new directions of Islamic thought, which he considers represent a ‘third way’ between Islamic conservativism and Western secularism (Hanafi, 2010), and which I take here to reflect plural ‘progressive Islam’. This chronology is as follows: modern Islamic thought (1840s–1940s), contemporary Islamic thought (1960s–2000s), and post-Arab Spring Islamic thought (2010– present). Because of space limitations, this division will not be further developed here, but speaking of the types of progressive Islam will make it clear enough. Importantly, I note that some fractions of the previous types of Islam (especially the non-violent Salafi Islam and the moderate conservative Islam) can make part of this progressive Islam, since they are critical and progressive within their own camp and interpretation of Islam. Hassan Hanafi speaks of three types of the ‘new directions’ in Islamic thought, with a focus on the Arab world: liberal Islam, socialist Islam, and nationalist Islam. First, liberal Islam, according to Hanafi, is the outcome of what has been referred to earlier as progressive Salafism, i.e. the early reformist movement, led by established religious and secular scholars all over the Arab world, like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d. 1897), Muhammad Abduh, Qasim Amin (Q¯asim Am¯ın, d. 1908), Abbas Mahmoud al-Aqqad (al-Aqq¯ad, d. 1964), Mohammed Hussein Haykal (d. 1965), Taha Hussein (T.aha Husayn, d. 1973), among many others, some mentioned in the opening section of Ultra-Conservative (Salafi) Islam. This liberal Islam emerged during the colonial period to free the lands as well as individuals from colonialism and foreign hegemony, and to free the culture from mimetic traditionalism by using the faculty of reason and cultural development; it defends individual freedom in religion, and freedom from socio-political enslavement, always based on Quranic and traditional sources, and modern democratic political systems and human rights achievements. Hanafi calls liberal Islam Rational Islam and Cultural Islam (capital letters are my own additions to emphasize the nomenclature). Most importantly he calls it pluralist Islam as well, since Islamic intellectual history reflects immense richness and diversity. In theology, there are different schools: Sunnis, Shia, Maturidis, Asharis, Mutazilites, Kharijites, Zahiris, etc. In philosophy, there are the naturalists (al-Razi, d. 932), the humanists (al-Tawhidi, d. 1023), the theosophists (Ibn Sina, d. 1037), the rationalists (Ibn Rushd, d. 1198), and in jurisprudence there are at least five major legal theories: Malikite, Jafarite, Hanafite, Shafiite, and Hanbalite.

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Second, as to socialist Islam, its first source of inspiration is Revelation itself as a progressive field of energy in history, by requiring equality, welfare, and social justice in society. Hanafi’s hermeneutics are hermeneutics for change and progress, for the poor against the rich, for the lower class against the upper class. Revelation, Text, is rooted in praxis. In Islamic formative period, Socialist Islam is epitomized in the struggle for social justice by figures like the Companion Abu Dhar al-Ghiffari (Ab¯u Dharr al-Ghif¯ar¯ı, d. 652 AD), and in scholarship of us.¯ ul al-fiqh from the Malikite jurisprudence to the Sharia objectives and public good (mas.lah.a) of the medieval jurists like Najd al-Din al-Tufi (al-T.uf¯ı, d. 1316) and Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi (Ish¯aq al-Sh¯atib¯ı, d. 1388), and in modern times is championed by figures like Mustafa al-Sibai (Mus.taf¯a al-Siba¯ı, d. 1964), Sayyid Qutb (the earlier socialist side of Qutb, and not the later radical one), Abdel Rahman al-Sharqawy (Abd al-Rah.m¯an al-Sharq¯aw¯ı, d. 1987), Ali Shariati (d. 1977), and Hassan Hanafi himself, considered the pioneer of what has become known as ‘Islamic Left’ and ‘Liberation Theology’ in contemporary Islamic thought. Socialist Islam is for property ownership, differently from the Soviet Socialism, industrialization, agricultural development, labour as a source of income, banks without interests, and most importantly redistribution of wealth, also through nationalization and confiscation of exploiting capital, to avoid monopoly and a huge gap between the classes. As Hanafi describes it, ‘socialist Islam is group solidarity, spiritual brotherhood, and a universal link between all Muslims all over the world’ (Hanafi, 2010: 6). Third, nationalist Islam, always according Hanafi’s typology, is that which emerged during the liberation movements against European colonialism. Here, the language, customs, manners, and culture of the land become the direct reference in defining the local or national Islam; it is the result also of the concept of the nation state, which did not exist before; nationalist Islam works within clear geographical and thus legal borders, unlike transnational Islam or the classical umma concept, which still lives as a concept but with the meaning of umma of the same faith. At the same time, this nationalist Islam is also an old fact, since there always existed Arab, Ottoman, Persian, Chinese, Indian, Malay, and now also European and American versions of Islam (Hanafi, 2010: 6–7). What should be added here, and this is implied from what has been presented so far in earlier sections, is that nationalist Islam is of at least three subtypes: (1) the nationalist Islam that modern nation states adopt and refer to as state Islam, e.g. Moroccan Islam, Egyptian Islam, Saudi Islam, etc.,

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since it is governed by state institutions, like the ministries of religious affairs; (2) the established religious institutions that are bound by national laws and customs but do not theoretically represent a nation or a nation state, like al-Azhar in Egypt, or al-Qarawiyin in Fez; while they have been influenced by the local norms and state interference, they still remain a reference for Islam and Muslims at large and not only for the nationals of the land; (3) free or ‘non-governmental’ Islamic movements, political parties of Islamic background, and Sufi orders are also part of the mosaic of this nationalist Islam. In the age of migrations especially postWorld War II, a lot of nationalist Islams migrated to Europe with the early ‘labourers’ and ‘guest-works’ and are now part of the European religious and cultural mosaic; they have become national Islams in Europe, French Islam, Italian Islam, German Islam, etc., the way their equivalents are national outside Europe; but some of them still retain the national aspect of their countries of origin, and others refuse to adopt a European national aura, and here again we enter into what type of Islam it is: when it is progressive, it generally seeks to adopt to the new land in Europe, and when it is ultra-conservative, it rejects any integration to Europe, and when it is conservative it gradually integrates while still keeping relations with the sources or mother-institutions in Arab-Muslim majority countries (Allievi & Nielsen, 2003; Bruce, 2019; Cesari, 2004; Hashas, 2019; Kepel, 1987; Laurence, 2012; Mandaville, 2010; Peter & Ortega, 2014).

5

Reflective Conclusion

What does this overview of intellectual and political Islam in the Arab South of the Mediterranean teach? Two major lessons may be drawn from the above, which cannot be further developed here, but important to ponder over for a better understanding of this part of the world, once called ‘the center of the earth’ (medi-terra). First, the identity of Arab Mediterranean Islam is as dynamic as the waters of the Mediterranean. To borrow the expression of Miriam Cook, it has an ‘aquatic identity’ (Cook, 1999). That is, it is plural, diverse, and also conflicting amidst the Arab-Islamic worldview of how to think and do politics. It is not a world that one movement or one intellectual trend can fully grasp or represent. Second, can such a plurality in the intellectual and political Islam hinder thinking ‘Arably’ and/or ‘Islamically’ about the Mediterranean? That is, and to borrow the concept from Cook again,

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is ‘Mediterranean thinking’ possible from the Arab-Islamic side? Apparently, though the Mediterranean as such has not been theorized, neither by the Arabs and Muslims nor by some other nordic European and Christian neighbours, to name these, it has been lived and engaged with for centuries as a physical entity first, though this does not eclipse the fact that the Mediterranean has impacted the other vital aspects of life of its various peoples. Despite this scarce theorizing of the Mediterranean as such, as may appear, there are some important intellectual attempts that go into this direction from the Arab-Islamic side, and this is manifest in one of the various types of ‘Islams’ described above; one example is the so-called critical Islam, championed by scholars and thinkers of different trends. For example, the great modern Egyptian writer and intellectual Taha Hussein, known as ‘dean of Arabic literature’, wrote The Future of Culture in Egypt (1938), in which he positioned Egypt, an Arab-Islamic important state and land, as an heir of a plural past, and he put the Mediterranean at the heart of his vision. He aimed to put the modernization of Egypt on the track of the great Mediterranean civilizations, and mostly the classical Egyptian civilization, the Greco-Roman civilization, the Arab-Islamic civilization, and the European civilization in modern times (Hossein [1938], 2014). It is one of the early modernist Arab texts that emphasized civilizational links around the Mediterranean and closeness to the modern Europe. He was, however, criticized for having forced this link to Europe, which he emphasized in his vision for the future of Egypt. His contemporary the renowned writer and public intellectual Abbas Mahmoud al-Aqqad (Abb¯as Mah.m¯ud al-Aqq¯ad, d. 1964) took a different view in a short book entitled Arabic Culture: Precedent of Greek and Hebraic Cultures (1960), in which he outlined the very ancient roots of Arabic culture, i.e. the Phoenician and Aramaic, and its influence on other cultures in the Mediterranean, including the Greek and Hebraic, and he also underlined the Egyptian influence on Greek culture and philosophy. Al-Aqqad’s thesis is that the oldest cultures in the world are the following, in this order: the [ancient] Arab, Greek, and Hebraic cultures, thus valourizing the origins of modern civilization, origins found in the Near East, the current Arab world (al-Aqqad [1960] 2018). In between these two different positions, one Europeanist and the other Arabist, to call them so, stands the position of the Algerian thinker Mohammed Arkoun (Muh.ammad Ark¯un, d. 2010). Arkoun dedicated some of his thought to critiquing rigidities both in the three Abrahamic

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religions, and not only in Islam, and in the modern rationalist and hegemonic Eurocentrism. His critique aimed at reinvigorating the idea of a more pluralist Mediterranean through what he called ‘emerging reason’ or ‘emergent reason’ (Abu-‘Uksa 2011; Arkoun, 2002). ‘Mediterranean thinking’ requires this emergent reason that is perpetually critical.

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Gender and Economics in Mediterranean: Looking for New Opportunities for North African Women Ersilia Francesca

Contents 1 2 3

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . North African Women and the Labor Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Role of Microcredit in Creating New Opportunities for North African Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Introduction

Since the 1950s and the 1960s, the MENA region has made important progress toward the improvement of women’s rights. The rates of maternal mortality and fertility have decreased dramatically, meeting the objectives set by the UN Millennium Goals with regard to improving maternal health and reducing child mortality.1 Women’s education, access to the labor market and political and social participation have improved as well. Although these positive trends slowed down at the end of the

E. Francesca (B) University of Naples “L’Orientale”, Naples, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 F. M. Corrao and R. Redaelli (eds.), States, Actors and Geopolitical Drivers in the Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69000-7_6

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1980s, socio-economic indicators concerning women’s empowerment have continued to improve, and the rate of female schooling has been rising very fast. In the 2000s, the MENA region succeeded in bringing the ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education up to 0.96, and in significantly increasing the ratio of young women attending university. Nonetheless, women still constitute the least educated segment of the population in several of the region’s countries. According to the World Bank collection of development indicators, in Morocco, for instance, 35% of women above 15 years of age are still illiterate, with the majority of them concentrated in the country’s rural areas.2 The advancements in terms of women’s literacy and in reducing the fertility rate have not been translated into a more effective inclusion of women in the economic and political spheres across the MENA region. In particular, the effects of education on the female labor market participation are not straightforward: basic education has a moderate positive effect, while tertiary education has no effects at all. This phenomenon, which is often referred to as the ‘gender paradox’ (World Bank 2004, 2012), is due to the patriarchal culture that dominates the region. Moreover, a discriminatory legal and fiscal framework, and the lack of public structures for the care of children and the elderly, both reinforce the gender-based division of labor and perpetuate the dominance of a family structure centered around the male breadwinner. Finally, the early mandatory retirement age set at 50–55 years excludes a significant share of women from the labor market (Chamlou & Karshenas, 2016: 8–10, 15). In both the Arab states and in North Africa, the female-to-male employment ratio is lower than the average ratio in all other emerging countries. In particular, women’s employment in the non-agricultural sector is weak compared to other regions in the world. Moreover, the proportion of women employed in the industrial sector dropped significantly between 2000 and 2011 (ILO 2018: 8; UNECA, 2014: 10). Women, particularly young women, are more exposed than their male counterparts to unemployment, underemployment, or informal employment (Moghadam, 2005, 2013, chap. 2) (Fig. 1 and Table 1). In North Africa, about 55.1% of working women are employed in vulnerable job positions, leading to the impact of poverty being much higher among women and children, especially in rural areas (UNECA, 2014: 9). The considerable socio-economic disparities and gender inequalities between urban and rural areas are not likely to diminish despite the implementation of numerous policies addressing the

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Fig. 1 Women’s participation in the labor force in North Africa (Source ILO database)

matter, which failed to effectively counter the discriminatory practices and the division of labor according to gender that characterizes the patriarchal organization of the peasantry. In Morocco, for instance, the most common status for women in rural areas is that of ‘family workers’. In 2012, the percentage of women and girls working as unpaid laborers reached 47.8%. In rural areas, the rate was 73.8%, compared to 23.9% for men (UNECA, 2014: 36–38). Gender disparities are crucial to understanding North African labor market dynamics. One main problem in the region is the state’s incapacity to ensure a healthy, dynamic labor market capable of creating more productive jobs and progressively reducing the number of less productive ones. Public sector jobs still remain the most sought-after form of employment, as they are much better compensated than equivalent private sector positions, particularly for the highly educated. However, as the creation of new positions in the public sector has decreased and has been unable

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Table 1 Levels and trends in rates of labor force participation and unemployment by sex, 2009–2021

Source ILO (2018)

to keep up with the growing number of young people looking for qualified jobs, a new pattern has developed in the labor market, the so-called ‘wait unemployment’, whereby young people remain unemployed in the hope of eventually finding a job in the public sector (Francesca, 2017: 64). The MENA region displays the highest youth unemployment rate compared to any other global region, impacting young people at every level of education. The lack of job opportunities and growing frustration are especially pressing for young women (ILO, 2015: 6). The Arab uprisings have highlighted the precarious and marginalized situation of women and young people across the region. To date, on the socio-economic front, governments have responded to protests by increasing spending on subsidies and public sector wages and expenditures. However, addressing the aspirations and needs of these countries’ populations will require more comprehensive reforms focusing on job creation strategies, without further affecting the budget deficit (World Bank, 2013: 115, 121).

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North African Women and the Labor Market

The North Africa region remains a traditional society which generally prioritizes women’s role within the household. Such patriarchal elements are not unique to the region but are perhaps more pronounced here than elsewhere. However, these elements are being affected by ongoing transformations: as education spreads and the demographic balance shifts, younger and more educated women are less accepting of the housewife stereotype. The same applies to women’s participation in the political sphere: younger and better-educated women in the North Africa region express greater confidence in women’s ability to contribute to the public sphere (World Bank, 2013: 63–64). Nonetheless, the North Africa region is still experiencing several forms of discrimination against women, which are exacerbated by the current political and economic situation. First of all, women experience inequality in the workplace. Most North African countries have laws against discrimination in the workplace and legislation mandating equal pay for equal work. In practice, however, enforcing non-discrimination laws is difficult. Equal pay provisions are undermined by inequalities in non-wage benefits which are usually allocated to the husband. Many women cannot benefit from proper labor legislation as they are employed in the informal sector–mainly in domestic or agricultural labor–which offers less protection than normal employment contracts. This lack of protection leaves such women vulnerable to exploitation and unfair employment practices. Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia all have legislation penalizing sexual harassment in the workplace. They encourage victims of sexual harassment to report instances of illegal conduct. However, as in many other countries, there are significant barriers against the effective enforcement of such laws. Legal claims against the harasser are difficult to pursue and are rarely an option for women who are afraid of being blamed and marginalized by their communities (World Bank, 2013: 80). The expansion of the public sector that occurred mainly in the 1960s and 1970s created many jobs, especially for the well-educated. Women have benefited directly from these jobs, which they often perceived as socially acceptable and compatible with family care and housework. But the high level of public sector employment has distorted the labor market by attracting the brightest workers at rates of pay that the private sector cannot match. Additionally, generous subsidies and family benefits certainly have helped to reduce economic vulnerability and poverty,

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but have worked also to reinforce a vision of women as homemakers and discouraged them from entering the labor market (World Bank, 2013: 93). Finally, a central tenet of the social contract has been heavy state investment in education. But, despite the high level of educational attainment in the region, there is a disconnect between what students learn and what productive jobs require. This problem is more pronounced for women. Following gender norms, women are inclined to study education, healthcare and welfare, humanities and the arts. These educational specializations in turn limit the job opportunities available to educated women: predominantly public sector positions in education, health and administration. Unfortunately, given the cuts to the public sector, the number of new positions in these fields has been decreasing. Women also are less likely than men to acquire job-relevant skills outside formal education. As a result, women have relatively less diversified and fewer marketable skills than men do. These limitations restrict women’s ability to adjust their skills to suit private sector employers (World Bank, 2013: 106). According to the analysis provided by the ILO, the main problems relating to gender in the North African labor market are represented by low-quality employment, high levels of informal employment, depressed wages and very long study-to-work transition paths, resulting in high rates of unemployment and inactivity. There is little consensus in the literature on how to stimulate job creation. Approaches span from emphasis on skill specialization and division of labor to promoting investment in infrastructure and human capital, and enhancing macroeconomic stability and good governance. Mainstream policies focus on cooperation between the public and private sectors, and between state and civil society organizations to improve employment outcomes (Barsoum et al., 2014). The considerable difference between young women and young men in terms of overall participation in the labor force is partially due to social norms according to which women (and especially married women) are not expected to work outside the family circle. Women’s primary role as housewives and caretakers for children and elders within the family is due not only to the norms of a conservative patriarchal society, but also to the difficult nature of accessing childcare and other social services. Married women have fewer chances of being employed in both the formal and informal sectors than their male counterparts. The private sector in particular seems to be a hostile environment for women, where women both face discrimination against female applicants on the part of employers,

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and also often themselves refrain from engaging in long-term training and long working hours in the private sector, having internalized the prevailing social norms that place women primarily within the household. The gender gap is exacerbated in rural areas where almost half of the young female population does not enter the labor market at all. For both women and men, being a new entrant into the labor market increases the probability of unemployment (by 21% for women and 17% for men). The level of education does not influence women’s inclusion in the labor force, but women with a tertiary education often do not renounce the hope of finding a job, even when not actively seeking one. According to the ILO, a way out of the high unemployment rate which has deteriorated the socio-economic stability of most Arab countries could lie in rethinking the recruitment system and innovating the whole educational system in order to provide young people with qualifications and skills necessary to meet the profound changes in the labor market. In its reports, the ILO gave resonance to young people’s widespread demands to be provided with better job opportunities, and to be allowed to participate in political decision-making processes related to education and labor, by inviting the Arab countries to put emphasis on an innovation-based schooling and training system and to foster the creation of new companies or entrepreneurial activities by providing counseling services and specific training in business management (Mansuy & Werquin, 2015: 6–8, 17–23). Self-employment is rare among young men and almost non-existent among young women. The latter continue to be underrepresented as business owners. Across the MENA region, only 13% of firms are owned by women; those that are, are mainly micro- or small enterprises, often not formalized, operating in the services sector (UNECA, 2017: 16; World Bank, 2015: 43). In Egypt, for instance, women own an estimated 10% of MSEs, which are, on average, smaller and less efficient than those owned by men. This gap is seemingly due to the fact that women entrepreneurs start their businesses from a relatively modest base, having more limited educational backgrounds, training and experience than their male counterparts. Women’s modest beginnings, coupled with the heavier burden borne by women with regard to family and social responsibilities, affect their performance, the size of their enterprises, markets, and economic activities (El Mahdi, 2016). A number of social, economic and cultural obstacles discourage women from becoming entrepreneurs, chief among these the regulatory and

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legal environment of most MENA countries, as well as issues of public order. Lack of access to financing is a further major obstacle hampering women’s business activities (UNIDO, 2017: 16). Therefore, the ILO invites policymakers, companies, employers’ organizations, and business associations to support women’s advancement in the private sector in the Middle East and North Africa (ILO, 2016: 5, 11, 17). Boosting women’s entrepreneurship and providing training in SME management should constitute a policy priority aimed not only at empowering women economically, but also toward ensuring inclusive economic growth and sustainable development (UNECA, 2017: 2).

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The Role of Microcredit in Creating New Opportunities for North African Women

Given the features that characterize North African labor markets, and the fact that the majority of women in the region are in vulnerable employment, either as self-employed workers or contributing their labor within the family, access to microfinance services proves crucial for their economic empowerment (World Bank, 2015: 50–51). Poor women and in particular those living in rural areas face many obstacles that hamper their access to education, employment opportunities, land ownership, and other productive resources, including all forms of financing. These major constraints not only prevent them from securing a decent and productive job but impact negatively on their families and communities as well. It is increasingly recognized that reducing gender inequalities regarding access to employment, resources, and services may help to reduce the number of people suffering from hunger worldwide by 100 to 150 million (ILO& IFAD, 2017a, 2017b). Most rural women work mainly in the informal sector or in unstable and low-income activities. They generally work harder than men as they must also carry out the majority of housekeeping tasks, including care for children and elderly parents, and also participate in additional unpaid productive work (such as agricultural work and tending to livestock). This accumulation of tasks, resulting from dominant gender paradigms as well as from the lack of basic social infrastructures–in particular access to water, childcare centers, schools, and hospitals–limit women’s opportunities to access paid work and expose them to poverty and marginalization more than their male counterparts (UNECA, 2014: i, 1, 8–9).

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The spread of microfinance programs in rural areas has improved women’s access to funding resources. Several initiatives managed by NGOs or specialized institutions have begun to offer loans and formal funding to prospective women entrepreneurs. Traditionally, moneylending institutions, such as banks, regard the poor as credit risks. Over the past few decades, however, the idea of banking for the poor has become a reality through microcredit and microfinance programs. In such programs, loans are small and often paid back in daily, weekly or monthly installments. Loans from microfinance institutions are frequently provided to groups of people rather than to individuals as a means of ensuring greater security to the microfinance institution. Although many microfinance institutions continue to mostly lend to groups, lending to individuals has become increasingly widespread. Today, microfinance institutions offer diversified loan products, including personal savings options, housing loans, insurance packages and social services, including health education and care. Policymakers and non-governmental organizations have long seen microcredit as a potential solution to the most pressing challenges affecting developing countries. In Morocco, for example, such challenges include ‘poverty eradication and promoting sustainable development’. Policies and programs aimed at fighting poverty and marginalization in rural areas are principally part of the NIHD (National Initiative for Human Development), and the Green Morocco Plan sponsored by the Ministry of Agriculture. In 2012, the Moroccan microfinance sector developed a national microfinance strategy aimed mainly at reducing poverty through the creation of jobs and other income-generating activities. Currently, Morocco is a leading country in North Africa with respect to the microfinance sector, with 13 microfinance associations (MCA) operating in the country: four of these operate at the national level (Al Amana, Foundation Banque Populaire Micro-Crédit, Foundation for Local Development and Partnership, ARDI), three at the regional level (Moroccan Solidarity without Borders Association Micro-credit, INMAA, Al Karama), and five are focused at the local level (Foundation du Nord, ATIL, Ismailia, Tawada, AMOS). These organizations provide 60% of their loans in urban areas and 40% in rural areas; 55.3% of the targeted population are women (UNECA, 2014: 46–47). Marginalized women, especially rural women, are mostly excluded from access to formal funding resources. Hence, women are the primary recipients of microfinance loans. Microfinance has some positive impact

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on women and their families in the short term, mainly in cases in which there is an already established business. Financial support to promote enterprise development has led to a small but significant positive impact on women’s income and assets availability in Egypt, as well as to an increase in the levels of schooling attained by the children of women involved in microfinance programs. In Morocco, positive effects are clearly discernible with regard to existing household-based self-employment activities (in terms of both sales and profits), and for agricultural and livestock rearing activities, while there has been no clear effect on women’s probabilities of establishing new businesses. This finding is contrary to evidence from other regions, where enterprise support programs instead frequently succeed in stimulating the establishment of new ventures, rather than solely the growth of existing ones (UNIDO, 2017). There is now considerable consensus that providing loans to the poor can lead to a successful outcome, provided the loan is accompanied by other services. A study by the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) emphasizes that credit needs to be supplemented with access to land, appropriate training, technology and information. But such activities require strong support from the public sector. In some of the lowest-income countries of the world, lack of access to land is the most critical single cause of rural poverty, which in turn is the dominant context of deprivation in those countries. But very few countries have undertaken substantial land reform programs. Moreover, non-governmental organizations and foreign donors have played an increasing role in the proliferation of micro-lending institutions. Non-governmental organizations vary in quality and strength. Research shows that the best results are produced when the governments of developing countries and non-governmental organizations work hand in hand (Bordat & Kouzzi, 2018: 22). Several microfinance institutions have succeeded in reaching the poorest of the poor by devising innovative strategies. These include the provision of small loans to poor people, especially in rural areas, at full-cost interest rates, without collateral, that are repayable in frequent installments. Borrowers are organized into groups, which reduce the risk of default. These are also effective mechanisms through which to disseminate valuable information on ways to improve the health, legal rights, sanitation and other relevant concerns of the poor. Above all, many microcredit programs have targeted one of the most vulnerable groups

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in society, women who live in households that own very few assets, or none at all. By providing opportunities for self-employment, many studies have concluded that these programs have significantly increased women’s security, autonomy, self-confidence and status within the household. There exists a general tendency to presume that women are more trustworthy than men and invest more in the welfare of the family than men do. Women are thus an appropriate target group for mitigating poverty and maximizing the social impact of development strategies. Most micro-financing research provides theoretical arguments to explain the preference for lending to women, but very few of these are based on actual data. One key guiding rationale has been that women are perceived as less inclined toward corruption than men. In fact, since 1996 the Zakoura Foundation–the first organization to offer microcredit in Morocco–reported a repayment rate of nearly 100% due both to its intensive coaching and supervision of borrowers as well as to women’s better repayment practices compared to men’s. The general belief in Morocco that women are less corrupt than men, along with the greater tendency of Moroccan women to repay loans, has led not only to women being targeted more often by microfinance programs, but more broadly to positive developments for the country’s economy. Recent findings have confirmed this relationship between microcredit loans to women and improved economic growth. Empirical research in Morocco and elsewhere suggests that the reason why women beneficiaries are better able to repay their loans is because they are generally involved in activities with shorter life cycles and take loans that are within their repayment capacities (Hamelin et al., 2018: 91–94). Further to this, within Morocco’s male-dominated society, microcredit loans to women give them greater control of household resources and consequently more resources to dedicate to children, food, health and education. As women in Morocco are at the center of extended family structures and bear the weight of a deficient social system, they play a crucial role in development (Hamelin et al., 2018: 107–109). In Tunisia, poverty eradication policies and programs in rural areas are mainly part of national or sectoral programs such as the economic and social development strategy for 2012–2016, integrated development projects, outreach programs for rural women, many of which are supported by international donors. Rural women access microcredit primarily through MFIs, including the MCAs, ENDA, banks (mainly the

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TSB-Tunisian Solidarity Bank–which in turn funds a number of MCAs), and the Post Office (UNECA, 2014: 21, 36). The possibility of accessing microcredit contributes to the improvement of the standard of living of the targeted population by increasing their stock of goods by 83%, their education and nutrition by 52% and their health by 39% (UNECA, 2014: 30). In particular, microcredit impacts on women’s capacity to achieve their ‘dream’ without having to borrow money from family or friends, and instead retaining control over their own resources. Though the impact on household income and on the standard of living is positive, microcredit nonetheless has its shortcomings; in particular it does not allow for the build-up of savings or investment that might enable women to pay off expensive loans. Moreover, access to microcredit does not significantly impact power relations within the family: men continue to have absolute control, while women’s workload increases and men’s financial participation in the family decreases. However, success in the projects they pursue, and the attainment of financial autonomy, are generally positive results for women with regards to their relationships with their male relatives and neighbors, who often show more consideration and respect toward them (UNECA, 2014: 31, 33). Though microcredit is the main formal economic resource in rural areas (except for Algeria where financial mechanisms are provided by the government), women’s access to such programs varies from one country to another. In rural areas in Tunisia for example, very few rural women benefit from MCA microcredit, while 65% of the total benefit from ENDA loans. In Morocco and in Egypt, access is unequal between men and women, and between urban and rural women, despite the considerable development of the microfinance sector in rural areas. In Egypt, indicators show that women have less access than men to banking services in general, and in particular rural women do not make extensive use of banking services but instead only access rural finance within specific projects dedicated specifically to them. Women’s participation in a microfinance program does not necessarily lead directly to their social and political empowerment. Nonetheless, facilitating access for poor women to productive and funding resources, along with policies for the reduction of gender inequalities and the improvement of women’s legal, economic and social status, has a strong positive effect on development (UNECA, 2014: 73–74; 79–81).

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Conclusion

Women in the MENA region have considerably improved their professional capabilities and are gradually increasing their participation in economic activities and asserting their presence in the world of business. However, they still face a number of challenges. In particular, women continue to be for the most part stuck in vulnerable and unpaid jobs with large wage and income gaps compared to their male counterparts. Moreover, they experience sectoral and occupational segregation, and face legal barriers to economic opportunities, such as access to credit and productive assets. Entrepreneurship has the potential to expand employment for women in all economic strata, but women are mostly relegated to the micro-enterprise sector and lack appropriate training, credit and other forms of support needed to make their enterprises more profitable (Chamlou & Karshenas, 2016: 17–18). How can the economic participation of women in the North African labor market be enhanced? Researchers have suggested that North African countries ought to implement policies more conducive to women’s participation in the labor market and to gender equality. Such policies should support women’s entrepreneurship, promote access to infrastructure for the care of children and the elderly; implement fiscal policies promoting two-earner families; reduce discrimination with respect to wages and career opportunities (Chamlou & Karshenas, 2016: 22). MSE (Micro and Small Enterprises) have proven crucial for the economic development of North African countries. Specific policies ought further to foster the enterprises run by women and encourage more women to enter the sector by reducing uncertainty and corruption, facilitating access to credit, and promoting investment in infrastructure (El Mahdi, 2016: 159). Over the past few decades, international organizations have promoted several initiatives to increase women’s participation in the economic and social spheres. Much of their research and operational effort have concentrated on women’s participation in microcredit and microfinance initiatives, suggesting that the latter have a strong positive impact on women’s financial independence, capabilities and responsibility, though they do not necessarily lead directly to women’s economic and sociopolitical empowerment. Microfinance and microcredit initiatives bring women together, providing them with a support group and an expansion

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of their responsibilities beyond traditional household duties. They have the unique capability to reach marginalized female populations who have little to no access to health care, health insurance and health information. Survey findings suggest that microcredit and microfinance institutions are ideal for launching health-related services. This connection has a strong positive impact on both women’s empowerment and sexual and reproductive health. Moreover, promoting poor women’s access to productive resources has a positive effect within the household and local communities and results in strong dividends for development. Implementation of gender-sensitive policies proves to be crucial in reducing gender inequalities in the labor market. Access to decent jobs contributes to expand women’s agency and possibilities; it increases their ability to influence society, and challenges the traditional norms that hamper their participation in the political and socio-economic arena. In order to reduce unemployment and to draw on the full potential of their human resources, North African countries should invest in a ‘better quality’, educated labor force that meets the skill requirements of the modern labor market. Governments should implement effective policies to contrast persistent gender divides without further liberalization. The remedy to the current state of affairs can only be found in domestic political reforms aimed at producing a credible juridical structure to enforce equality and to eliminate unjust labor market segregation (FEMISE, 2009: 119, 121; UNECA, 2017). The lack of gender-specific analysis, of awareness regarding socio-economic issues and the political situation, will result in policies and programs that only replicate existing systemic obstacles and hamper women’s empowerment and their involvement in society as fully-fledged economic players. This situation calls for a review of current policies and laws to ensure that all women, including those living and working in rural areas, enjoy equal access to productive resources, basic services, employment opportunities and labor-saving technologies.

Notes 1. http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/. 2. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR.FE.ZS?locations= MA&view=chart.

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ILO & IFAD (International Labour Organization & International Fund for Agricultural Development). (2017b). Empowering young women through business and vocational training: Evidence from rural Upper Egypt (Impact Brief Series 10), online publication https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_ emp/documents/publication/wcms_575931.pdf ILO (International Labour Organization). (2015). Synthesis review of ILO experience in youth and women’s employment in the Mena region: Summary version, online publication. https://www.ilo.org/beirut/publicati ons/WCMS_432593/lang--en/index.htm ILO (International Labour Organization). (2016). Women in business & management. Gaining momentum in the Middle East and North Africa, online publication. https://www.ilo.org/global/publications/books/ WCMS_316450/lang--en/index.htm ILO (International Labour Organization). (2018). World employment social outlook. Trends for women 2018, online publication. https://www.ilo.org/ global/research/global-reports/weso/trends-for-women2018/WCMS_6 19577/lang--en/index.htm Karshenas, M. (2001). Economic liberalization, competitiveness, and women’s employment in the Middle East and North Africa. In D. Salehi-Isfahani (Ed.), Labour and human capital in the Middle East (pp. 92–147). Reading: Ithaca Press. Mansuy, M., & Werquin, P. (2015). Labour market entry in Tunisia: The gender gap (W4Y Publication Series No 31). ILO, online publication. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/documents/ publication/wcms_440855.pdf Moghadam, V. (2005). Women’s economic participation in the Middle East: What difference has the neoliberal policy turn made? Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies, 1(1), 110–146. Moghadam, V. (2013). Modernizing Women: Gender and social change in the Middle East (3rd ed.). Rienner. In part. chap. 2 ‘Economic Development, State Policy and Women’s Employment’. UNECA (United Nation Economic Commission for Africa). (2014). Improving access to finance for the empowerment of rural women in North Africa: Good practices and lessons learned. Publication based on case studies of Tunisia Morocco, Algeria and Egypt, online publication. https://www.uneca.org/ sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/rural_women_en.pdf UNECA (United Nation Economic Commission for Africa). (2017). Women’s economic empowerment: Boosting women’s entrepreneurship in Africa, online publication. https://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/uploaded-docume nts/Gender/EGM-WEE-AR-2017/aide_memoire_wee_egm_addis_ababa_ eng.pdf

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UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development Organization). (2017). Promoting Women empowerment for inclusive and sustainable industrial development in the Middle East and North Africa region: A study on women entrepreneurship development in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine and Tunisia, online publication. https://www.euneighbours.eu/sites/def ault/files/publications/2017-11/UNIDO%20Study.pdf World Bank. (2004). Gender and development in the Middle East and North Africa: Women in the public sphere (MENA Development Report), online publication. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/15036 World Bank. (2012). World Development Report 2012: Gender equality and development. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/4391 World Bank. (2013). Opening doors, MENA Development Report 2013, online publication. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/338381 468279877854/pdf/751810PUB0EPI002060130Opening0doors.pdf World Bank. (2015). Morocco. Mind the gap. Empowering women for a more open, inclusive and prosperous society. http://documents.worldbank.org/ curated/en/818541468179084318/Morocco-mind-the-gap-empoweringwomen-for-a-more-open-inclusive-and-prosperous-society

Is the Mediterranean Sea Still the Mare Nostrum? The Belt and Road Initiative and Chinese Investments in the Region Cecilia Attanasio Ghezzi and Renzo Cavalieri

Contents 1 The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 China and the Mediterranean Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Chinese Investments in Mediterranean Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Dealing with China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

The Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road, also known as The Belt and Road, is a development strategy and framework, proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping, that focuses on connectivity and cooperation among countries, primarily between China and the rest of Eurasia, which consists of two main components, the

C. Attanasio Ghezzi (B) · R. Cavalieri Ca’ Foscari University, Venice, Italy R. Cavalieri e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 F. M. Corrao and R. Redaelli (eds.), States, Actors and Geopolitical Drivers in the Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69000-7_7

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land-based ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ and oceangoing ‘Maritime Silk Road’.1

This definition, as vague as it seems, is actually the shortest and more comprehensive official description of the Chinese一带一路 yidai yilu (literally, ‘one belt one road’) provided by the main governmental website.2 In 2015, the English name was changed from One Belt One Road (or OBOR) to the now widely accepted Belt and Road Initiative (or BRI).3 In fact, as Hillmann (2018) pointed out, ‘there is no official definition for what qualifies as a BRI project’, which renders the Initiative ‘breathtakingly ambiguous’. It is easier to think about it as a brand name (or a propaganda tag) launched by President Xi between September and October 2013 and formalized over the following years by a few political documents.4 It encompasses a wide variety of actions and can therefore be examined in a broad range of dimensions. In very general terms, it operates over three main concentric levels or layers: as a connectivity strategy in and of itself (1), as a major instrument of the internationalization of China’s economy (2), and as part of a larger project for a new, China-centered, global governance (3). (1) ‘Countries should work in concert and move toward the objectives of mutual benefit and common security. To be specific, they need to improve the region’s infrastructure, and put in place a secure and efficient network of land, sea, and air passages, lifting their connectivity to a higher level ’.5

In its more basic, specific, and technical dimension, the BRI is a connectivity project aimed at securing an efficient and stable exchange and transit of goods (in particular, the export of Chinese manufactured products and the import of raw materials, energy, and food) and capitals on the terrestrial and maritime roads from China to the Mediterranean and viceversa. It is realized through huge investments (accompanied by a very assertive, economic, and political activism of Chinese governmental and non-governmental organizations abroad) in maritime and terrestrial transports, logistics, communications, energy, constructions, and all related industries along both tracks. The infrastructural part of the initiative is the most explicit and best organized, as well as the most significant in financial terms, and is designed to provide the infrastructural backbone of the complex process of Chinese expansion west- (and south-) ward. Yet,

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this dimension cannot be properly framed without understanding its close link and systemic coordination with the next two. In fact, the BRI is one of the clearest examples of the coherent, far-sighted, systemic, and ‘holistic’ approach used by the Chinese government (and probably by Chinese political culture in general) to govern any economic, political and social issue, particularly of such outstanding importance. (2) ‘Investment and trade cooperation is a major task in building the Belt and Road. We should strive to improve investment and trade facilitation, and remove investment and trade barriers for the creation of a sound business environment within the region and in all related countries. We will discuss with countries and regions along the Belt and Road on opening free trade areas so as to unleash the potential for expanded cooperation’.6

In a broader meaning, the BRI brand is connected and intermingled with the go-global strategy (走出去战略 Zˇouch¯ uq¯ u Zhànlüè, literally ‘exit strategy’) launched by the Chinese government in 1999 toward Asia/Europe/Africa, and aimed at increasing and facilitating outward foreign direct investment, with the expectation that host countries would welcome Chinese investors in hopes of benefitting from the country’s growth. To this view, not only has the brand been constantly used in connection with Chinese investments in infrastructures in the countries along ‘the Belt and the Road’ but is also commonly applied to investment projects unrelated to such fields, and not always only as a merely formal tag. In this sense, two more aspects of this specific meaning shall be taken in consideration. The first is that freedom of cross-border investment is both a precondition for the functioning of the BRI and also a basic need of Chinese companies when entering the global market.7 The second is that, as we will see below, regardless of the public or private nature of the players involved, all Chinese investment projects directed to BRI participating countries are considered parts of the BRI itself and are therefore closely controlled by the government with a very strict top-down approach. After 2017, the Chinese outbound investment flow decreased, also due to the introduction of new restrictive rules on ODI, yet China keeps playing and will continue to play a major role in the global cross-border investments arena. (3) ‘Jointly building the Belt and Road is in the interests of the world community. Reflecting the common ideals and pursuit of human societies,

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it is a positive endeavor to seek new models of international cooperation and global governance and will inject new positive energy into world peace and development ’.8

In the broadest and most visionary meaning, the BRI corresponds to the ambitious geopolitical project aimed at repositioning China within the global community that started under Hu Jintao and continues to be energetically pursued by Xi Jinping. In this perspective, the BRI is the most significant strategic guideline for Chinese geopolitical action in general and not only toward Asia, Europe, and Africa. The BRI is a vision of the future of the world and of the role that China is going to play in it. It covers all areas of human interaction, from the economy to the military, from technology to education, and is echoed by posters in building sites in Pakistan as well as in trendy art exhibitions in Venice. It simultaneously and synergistically makes use of all available political, economic, technological, cultural, and military tools in all viable areas and is based on extremely wide-ranging and vague principles like harmony, inclusiveness, mutual benefit, and common prosperity. In keeping with this framework, the BRI is essentially free of legal regulations. The project is actually based only on a couple of central political documents and a few more sectorial or local sources, always characterized by a very vague and rhetorical language, and it is headed up by a surprisingly slim working group (领导小组l˘ıngd˘ao xi˘aozu) ˘ made up of just a handful of top national officials. So far, a similar informal and flexible methodology has also been used in the implementation of the BRI abroad: while a multitude of bilateral and multilateral legally non-binding memoranda and letters of intent have been signed over the last five years by governments, enterprise groups, and all kinds of organizations of participating countries under the BRI brand, there are few real treaties and agreements that are legally binding upon the parties. The Chinese approach to international relations is much less legalistic/contractual than the Western Bretton Wood’s-made one and the BRI is somehow a symbol of this difference (Carrai, 2018). China is grounding its new role on a whole bundle of relations (economic, political, technological, cultural, military), and less so on law, treaties or other formal documents. It is true that cross-border contracts play a major role in the BRI, but Chinese business players, as well as Chinese officials and judges, usually demonstrate a kind of holistic approach to contracts: forms

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are of course important, the political and relational framework of any transaction is more important than its form, and therefore it is expected to play a more crucial role if any dispute arise. As an Italian top manager said once: ‘Parties to a Chinese-related contract are always more than two, the Party – whatever it would mean in the specific case - necessarily being among them’ (Simonelli, 2015). Furthermore, from a geographical point of view, the borders of the BRI and the number of ‘participating’ countries are quite vague and flexible, being basically uncertain what ‘participation’ in the initiative means and which formalities should theoretically be followed to finalize it. By the way, there are also references to a Polar BRI,9 a Space BRI,10 and even to a brand new post-Covid-19 Health BRI11 that seem to transcend all the usual categories. In any event, and in almost every possible projection, the Mediterranean Sea is the real ultimate destination of both the belt and the road.12

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China and the Mediterranean Region

The Mediterranean is the crossroads of three continents and is the major maritime gateway between East and West. Whoever controls the Mediterranean has a direct access to the oil resources of the Persian Gulf, the rapidly growing economies of Africa, the military power of NATO, the economic engine of the European Union, and the often unstable regions of the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa. But while in southern Europe, the Near East, and northern Africa there is a clear and somehow unitary concept of what the Mediterranean is in terms of economic, political, historical and cultural reasons, the Mare Nostrum for the Chinese is a truly complex animal and is mentioned only occasionally as a subject per se. That is why it is difficult to identify a Chinese strategy that might apply to the whole Mediterranean region. The Chinese actors involved in the decision-making process (party officials and ministries, think tanks or university researchers) continue to approach the region by sub-areas, and rarely use the term Mediterranean. They tend to speak of ‘southern Europe’ or ‘northern Africa’, and consider the sub-regions depending on the geographical division of their institution. Li (2013) noted that political terms such as southern and eastern Mediterranean are rarely used in China. Geographically, China regards the region as West Asia and North Africa (WANA)13 or adopt the European geopolitical term, calling it the Middle

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East (ME and, therefore MENA).14 In addition to that, China still faces difficulties related to its regional expertise in North Africa. While some officials view the region primarily in relation to the Middle East, others perceive it as being more like ‘southern Europe’, and thus as separate from sub-Saharan Africa (Ghafar & Jacobs, 2019). As Ekman (2018) pointed out, ‘the distinct administrative and bureaucratic compartmentalization suggests that Chinese diplomacy does not consider the Mediterranean region in its entirety’. No cross-departmental or cross-ministerial task force has been set up to consider a Chinese strategy which would apply to the entire Mediterranean area. So far, it has envisaged informal cooperation mechanisms involving six southern European countries: Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Cyprus and Malta) (Ekman, 2016).15 Cooperation with the rest of the Mediterranean countries—mainly the Maghreb countries—is included as part of other sub-regional cooperation mechanisms previously created by China: the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation and the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum. North African countries’ presence in both African and Arab forums reflects the region’s unique and strategic position in terms of BRI economic connectivity and regional diplomacy (Ghafar & Jacobs, 2019). Generally, Chinese foreign policy follows the ‘top-level design’.16 It means it integrates key concepts and priorities issued by the central government, and then adapts and applies them to as many regions and situations as possible. This approach, reinforced under Xi Jinping’s presidency, should be fully taken into account when analyzing Chinese activism in the Mediterranean. For China, it is less about developing a specific strategy for the region, than using this region to internationalize and develop its centrally defined priorities. The aim is to contribute to the restructuring of global governance by increasing all-out initiatives, allowing it to strengthen its influence at different levels. That being said, it is easier to understand how regional cooperation mechanisms emphasize the importance that Beijing attaches to the Mediterranean, but without proving the deployment of any specific Chinese strategy for the area (Ekman, 2018). Since the early 2000s, China has been developing multilateral cooperation mechanisms with various regions,17 complementing existing bilateral partnerships.18 But in recent years, regional forums and sectoral cooperation have become tools for the purpose of consolidating a more comprehensive type of cooperation (both economic and political) with

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a sub-region. Chinese authorities are developing multilateral cooperation platforms in southern Europe, and MENA countries by focusing on certain sectors that Beijing considers priorities (such as telecommunications, e-commerce, maritime or the ‘green economy’ in general terms) or certain types of actors in particular (businesses, port representatives, research centers, etc.). The main reason could be related to the idea of establishing a ‘new model of major power relations’,19 a key concept of Xi’s foreign policy (Dian & Menegazzi, 2018). Ekman (2018) argues that engaging with smaller countries once they have been grouped into major regional forums is a way to balance the powers, but it is also a core component of China’s vision for a pragmatic and productive global order that will serve its own interests. In addition to this, China’s ‘group cooperation diplomacy’ ensures efficiency: it enables Chinese diplomacy to save time during Xi Jinping’s visits to the areas involved, through joint summits and joint statements, instead of many bilateral ones (Dawei, 2015). In fact, the multilateral cooperation mechanisms are also a way to bypass the foregoing existing balances of powers. For instance, the Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries, widely known as 16 + 1, was launched in 2012 to enhance cooperation in the fields of infrastructure, transportation and logistics, trade and investment. Of the 16 participating EEC states, 11 are EU member states, three are EU candidate countries, and two are potential candidate states.20 In 2019, Greece officially joined the initiative (since then 17 + 1) suggesting that China is very keen to connect the port of Piraeus via Macedonia to its proposed high-speed rail link between Belgrade and Budapest and maybe onwards to the western markets of Eurasia. In any case, the development of the 17 + 1 initiative seems to be framing a new regional context in the European continent. Indeed, in recent years, EU officials have lambasted China for allegedly undermining the European integration process by turning CEE countries into ‘Trojan horses’ and sowing division in the continent. Some of them have even demanded that China adopt a ‘One Europe’ policy just as the EU supports the ‘One China’ policy. Of course, they didn’t move from words to deeds. Another recent example of China pushing its own strategy in a vast region is ‘China’s Arab Policy Paper’,21 released in 2016 to coincide with Xi Jinping’s first presidential trip to the Middle East. The paper does not lay out specific policies for specific countries (in fact, there is not a single

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country named in the paper, besides China), but traces the history of China-Arab relations, from exchanges via the ancient Silk Road to the founding of the China-Arab State Cooperation Forum in 2004, before outlining China’s plan for expanding cooperation in the future: China’s ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative will serve as the framework for the ‘1 + 2 + 3 cooperation pattern’, an economic cooperation platform that is built on energy as a ‘core’, on infrastructure and on trade as ‘two wings’ and, finally, on new technologies such as nuclear energy, aerospace, and new energies as ‘three breakthroughs’. It is worth underlining that China has never before issued a paper outlining its approach to the Arab world. By doing so, Beijing lends growing strategic importance to the region, and helps distinguish China from the United States. In fact, for many years, China perceived the Middle East and North Africa as a ‘chaotic and dangerous graveyard burying empires’ as Li Shaoxian (2016) put it. Yet, since 2013, China has regarded MENA as a crucial asset for promoting its status as a world power.22 Indeed it is careful to avoid replicating what it sees as Western intervention, and puts forward a narrative of neutral engagement with all countries on the basis of mutually beneficial agreements. When engaging in the region Beijing should adhere to Xi Jiping’s ‘three no’s’23 : ‘Not seeking agents, but advising and mediating; not establishing spheres of influence, but inviting everyone to join the BRI; not seeking to fill a power ‘vacuum’, but expanding a mutually beneficial win–win cooperation network’ (Li, 2016). China has pushed the concept of ‘developmental peace’—in contrast to the Western concept of ‘democratic peace’, arguing that the root cause of regional insecurity is economic stagnation, high unemployment, poor infrastructure, rapid population growth, and brain drain rather than a democracy deficit. That’s why governments in MENA, and in the developing countries generally welcome partnerships with Beijing. They claim it treats them as equals rather than junior partners or colonial proxies.

3 Chinese Investments in Mediterranean Countries Beside BRI regional forums, strategic partnerships, and the regional policy paper, a way to understand the Chinese strategy abroad is to analyze its Foreign Direct Investments (FDI). As we can see from the data

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collected by the ChinaMed think tank,24 FDI in Mediterranean countries has grown exponentially from almost 675 million dollars in 2003 to more than 41 billion in 2018. In the MENA area, big moneys are spent mostly in the energy sector and, just for Israel, in technology. While China’s investment strategy in southern Europe has involved significant purchases of technology, large firms, and well-known brands (Hellström, 2016). Ports, infrastructures, and transport acquisitions are common in all the areas, underlining the importance given to the Mediterranean Sea in Beijing’s strategic vision. In fact, Chinese firms have recently been active throughout Mediterranean countries, often focusing on projects that lend themselves to achieving the BRI goal of connectivity. Ports and industrial parks have been central to such cooperation, as they create an economic chain that links China to the Gulf, the Arabian Sea, the Red sea, and the Mediterranean. Beijing first described this—which it calls the ‘industrial park – port interconnection, two-wheel and two-wing approach’25 —in the summer of 2018, predicting that it would be a major feature of China’s economic presence in the MENA region. In fact, since 2015, the Suez Canal expansion, the emerging naval gigantism, and the acceleration of global alliances made by shipping companies progressively reinforced the competitive advantage of the Europe–Far East route, restoring to the Mediterranean Sea a forgotten ‘centrality’ (Prodi & Fardella, 2018). Moreover ‘Building China into a strong maritime country’ is one of the points underlined by the 13th Five-year plan (2016–2020),26 hence port investment is part of the wider goal of developing China’s blue economy to a global leadership position.27 Roughly three-fifths of Chinese exports travel by sea and, as we have said before, the Mediterranean route is the most direct to Europe. In recent years, Chinese state-owned companies have built a global network of shipping and port assets all over the world. They provide the capital to build or upgrade commercial terminals; then they direct container traffic to those ports through shipping lines that are controlled directly by the port’s parent company or indirectly through companies associated with China’s strategic port owners through formal shipping alliances. As we will see, the Chinese are also using these ports as beachheads (or Dragon Heads, as the Piraeus port is sometimes called) for accessing the hinterland (Bekkers et al., 2019). Chinese SOEs nowadays are commercial enterprises that operate globally with the full financial and political backing of their home state.28 In

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this view, the vessels that connect these ports into an integrated network of commercial power are ‘ships of state’ (O’Dea, 2019), functioning as instruments of Chinese national strategy while they sail as commercial carriers of manufactured goods and commodities. Chinese state firms, which once kept close to their home market, now control about one-tenth of all European port capacity, and about twenty terminals all around the Mediterranean Sea (see the map below). The Greek port of Piraeus has always been at the center of the Mare Nostrum maritime network. Chinese investments there began in 2008 and were completed in 2016 when, with no counteroffers, Greece ceded the total control of the Piraeus Port Authority to COSCO.29 Increases in traffic followed, boosting the port to the seventh place in Europe by 2017, when the port also showed a 92% increase in profit. The expansion of Piraeus as COSCO’s main shipping hub helped the port to attract and absorb greater volumes not only from other ports in the Mediterranean but also from the ports in northern Europe, boosting competition in this sector. This is indeed an important building block in China’s ‘Maritime Silk Road’ vision. With the full development of the port and its related railway network30 that Chinese SOEs are helping to build31 and that will connect it to Budapest,32 the most dynamic shipping companies will likely prefer to use this area as a distribution network not only for the Balkans and eastern Europe but also for North African and Western European countries. Key global players like Huawei, ZTE, and Samsung are already moving in this direction. It is worth noting that the Piraeus port is just the most important piece of the complex jigsaw of Chinese-controlled terminals and infrastructural hubs in the Mediterranean area.

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COSCO, the Chinese state-owned shipping giant, also owns 51% of Noatum, the Spanish port management firm. It therefore controls (and rebranded) Bilbao on the Atlantic and Valencia on the Mediterranean, not to mention the ‘dry ports’ of Madrid, the largest in Spain and fifth largest in Europe, and the Zaragoza rail terminal. Also in Spain, the Hong Kong-based Hutchinson Ports own Barcelona Europe South Terminal, a new fully automated container terminal with the capacity to handle more large vessels than any other port in the Mediterranean. In 2019, the same company signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Egyptian Naval Forces to build a container terminal in Abu Qir port, just 30 km North East of Alexandria. Instead, the China Harbor Engineering company was involved in the construction of a new wharf in the Port of al Adabiya (Egypt) and in expanding the Port of Tripoli in Lebanon. In Algeria, China’s State Construction Corporation (CSCEC) has agreed to build and exploit the new central transshipment port of Cherchell. In Italy,33 COSCO and Qingdao Port International own together the 49% of the Italian port of Vado Ligure (Savona), which operates the largest refrigerated facility in the Mediterranean. Chinese companies also control Kumport,34 Turkey’s third largest port (and the one closest to Istanbul), and are building (or will control35 )

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Israel’s two newest ports: Ashdod Southport, and Haifa Bayport. In addition to this, the state-owned CCCC was provisionally chosen to build the so-called Red-Med rail that could serve as an alternative to the Suez Canal, allowing countries in Asia to pass goods to Europe through Israel.36 Another strategic deal was the purchasing of the 49% equity stake of Terminal Link by China Merchant Ports. With this operation, the conglomerate based in Hong Kong acquired stakes in ports in France, Greece, Malta, and Morocco,37 where it controls the Gibraltar Strait, hence one of the two entrances to the Sea that was called Mare Nostrum. To better understand how China is using maritime commercial investments to advance its geostrategic priorities38 is worth mentioning that COSCO is also present in the other entry points to the Mediterranean sea. It is in Port Said and Ein el-Sokhna Port, respectively, the northern and southern exit of the Suez Canal. China is also the single largest investor in Egypt’s Suez Canal Economic Zone and has also been seeking a port in Lajes on the island of Terceira, in the Azores, in the middle of the North Atlantic Ocean. Beijing is also seeking to develop trade with Libya39 and Tunisia. In 2018, it signed BRI MoUs with these two countries. The deals include projects to develop Tunisia’s southern port of Zarzis into an economic and trade hub, construct a bridge linking Djerba, Tunisia’s main tourism island, to Djorf in the mineral-rich Medenine region and build a 140 km railway linking the coastal region of Gabes, a hub for petrochemical and phosphate transformation industries, to Zarzis. In addition to this, many Chinese companies expressed the intention of carrying out infrastructural projects in Tunisia, including the bridge of Bizerte, and a port in Enfidha. Is not an exaggeration to state that China has been active all across the Mediterranean? According to a study by the Financial Times,40 Chinese investments in the ports of North Africa and the Middle East have grown at a pace exceeded only by that in Europe.41 But it is not all about infrastructures. In fact, the majority of investments made by Chinese groups within the BRI are made in developing countries through greenfield operations,42 and in the most advanced regions of the area—i.e., the Mediterranean European countries, Turkey, and Israel—through the acquisition of existing companies, often owners of proprietary technology or global brands in the most innovative industrial sectors, like hi-tech, pharma, or advanced manufacturing.

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Dealing with China

Subjectively speaking, it is quite difficult to distinguish the Chinese players that are specifically active in the infrastructural or non-infrastructural sectors. A good example of this is the Silk Road Fund,43 a Chinese public investment fund (the majority shareholder being the China State Administration for Foreign Exchange) specifically engaged in funding BRI projects, that nevertheless not only possesses (minority) shares in companies operating in infrastructures in industrialized countries like Italy, where it owns a 5% share of Autostrade per l’Italia, but has also a significant indirect stake in Pirelli, the Italian tires group operating in a sector with a very limited connection with infrastructures. Another feature that makes the distinction between the two areas of business difficult is financing (Liu et al., 2020). Almost all kinds of Chinese investment operations abroad, regardless of the economic field to which they belong, are financed by the sovereign fund China Investment Corporation or controlled/related companies (e.g., the Silk Road Fund itself) and by Chinese state-owned banks and their investment funds (e.g., the China Development Bank and its China-Africa Development Fund),44 but also by private and semi-private funds that—however—are expected to act within a coordinated national strategy. Access by Chinese companies to financial means is therefore obtained at favorable conditions that may be easily qualified as forms of dumping (Amighini, 2018). A characteristic common to all Chinese investments abroad that reveals how much the whole phenomenon is centrally planned and top-down controlled is that all FDI projects abroad, regardless of their nature, must be approved by the PRC administrative authorities and, in particular, by the MOFCOM, the NDRC, and the SAFE(Hanemann & Rosen, 2020).45 As Meunier (2019) summarizes: ‘a feature making Chinese investment different from historical precedent is the uniqueness of China’s political system and of capitalism with Chinese characteristics, which potentially pose several political problems for the host country’. That is why even in the case of transactions conducted by private investors, there are many doubts about the influence of the Chinese government and Communist Party. In fact, when a national interest is at stake, there is no distinction between private and public enterprises. Having a big friend like China has a lot of material pros that differ according to the degree of economic and social development of the countries involved, but can, in general, be identified as a massive flow of

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money and/or technology accompanied by the perspective of a longterm friendly cooperation with the new global political and economic superpower, as well as the world’s largest market. But it has also a number of cons. For many developing countries, there is the risk of falling into what has been called the Chinese ‘debttrap’,46 while for the more developed ones the risk is ‘only’ to lose pieces of economic and political sovereignty through the sale of industrial strategic national assets to Chinese investors, with the result of entering into China’s sphere of influence under unfavorable conditions, while compromising long-standing international relations. A more subtle potential risk is political leverage. China could use its ownership of foreign assets to pressure and even coerce host governments into falling in line on the political issues that the Chinese government cares deeply about, such as the question of Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and human rights. On Mediterranean shores, there are examples of all possible situations, from a proud France to a Greece under duress, from an Arab world in strong need of financial support to two local superpowers like Turkey and Israel, and the debate on Chinese investments shines light on nuances that change according to the single specificity: The range runs from a country like Montenegro—the only Mediterranean country that may actually be in condition to fall into the Chinese debt-trap—to Italy, the only G7 country that formally signed a BRI-related Memorandum of Understanding with China and probably the most outstanding example of the harsh political debate surrounding the risks that Chinese investments may imply for national economic and political interests (Innocenzi & Cavalieri, 2019). However, based on the Pew Research Center survey, in 2019, the number of people who evaluate China positively in Greece, Israel, and Italy has increased compared to 2018.47 Everywhere there is a dynamic tension between the desire (and/or the need) to deal with China and take advantage of such relations and the one to protect local citizens and enterprises from the asymmetric competition of Chinese state-backed investors and the possible plunder of national champions. This tension is also visible in the evolution of national regulation of foreign investments, that on one hand adopt legal, financial and tax tools to attract them, but on the other, even in countries that used to be characterized by an open and liberal market, are introducing regulations for the control and limitation of FDI in strategic sectors.

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In European countries, in particular, the debate is concentrated on two risks: (1) the risk of losing national control of strategic or critical sectors of the economy and (2) the risk of giving away—often under their value, due to financial distress—the most established and historical ‘national champions’ (i.e., companies, assets, technologies and brands that are not necessarily strategic per se, but have an irreplaceable role and a strong goodwill in their markets). While any restriction on sales of non-strategic assets would imply a restriction of the freedom of enterprise that is unacceptable for any liberal system and therefore has been so far excluded in all European countries, efforts have been concentrated on the protection of strategic industries. As regards EU countries, one of the main problems that has been met in managing Chinese direct investments is the lack of coordination in national policies and laws of individual member states that were and still are quite uneven. Not only is there no common legal framework regulating non-European direct investments in the EU—the material differences in national legislations potentially allowing foreign investors to enter Europe through its ‘weakest’ door—but until 2019, there was also no exchange of information at all. To fill such a loophole, on March 19, 2019, the EU enacted a highly innovative regulation on the screening of Foreign Direct Investments (2019/452), which will apply to all member states. While it does not allocate to the European institutions any capacity of issuing binding decisions on single investment projects, the new regulation creates, for the first time, a common legal framework of information sharing and cooperation between member states and the European Commission with the aim of preserving European strategic assets in critical infrastructures, technologies, inputs essential for the security or the maintenance of public order, and access to sensitive information.48 The Mercator Institute for Chinese Studies has listed the amendments made on the European legislations on FDI control from 2017 to 2019 (Hanemann et al., 2019): in this lapse of time, all major European economies have introduced more severe forms of control and more efficient legal tools to stop or condition investment transactions, like the special power (called Golden Power) given to the national government to require specific conditionalities for the acquisition of significant shares, to veto some corporate resolutions, or even to forbid the transaction.49 As noted above, Chinese investments in Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa have different reasons, targets, and methodologies and also

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the local sentiment toward China-related businesses vary and will vary widely, depending on several factors. But since the announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative, the Chinese government has indeed maintained a more proactive attitude toward all Mediterranean countries. It has certainly understood the geostrategic importance of the Sea that gives access to three continents. But as François Godement et al. (2017) pointed out, partnering with China is often like looking at the sky from the bottom of a well.50 Each country is at the bottom of their own well, looking up. Each of them is addressed in terms of the wonderful opportunity China presents, in the form of investment, lending, or an improvement to their relationship in general, in what is essentially a bilateral silo. But, just as the sky stands immense above every well, the BRI and long-term Chinese strategies loom over the economic and political condition of each country to draw a broader picture that could challenge the geopolitical status quo.

Notes 1. ‘What is Belt and Road initiative?’ in Belt and Road Portal, Chinese Central Government’s Official Website: https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/ ghsl/cjwd/2757.htm. The answer to the same question in the Chinese version of the website is completely different, and much less informative. https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/info/iList.jsp?tm_id=540. 2. In the English version only, as the Chinese one is totally different. 3. As Yuan Li in Amighini (2017) recalls, during his visit to Kazakhstan in September 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping put forward the proposal for an innovative model of regional economic cooperation in order to foster collaboration across the historic Silk Road and named it the ‘New’ Silk Road. One month later in the same year, Xi Jinping proposed the Maritime New Silk Road during his speech to the Indonesian Parliament, which was an extension of the continental New Silk Road and echoed the historic Maritime Silk Road. But the Chinese government did not simply name the initiative the ‘New Silk Road(s)’, which might be the most straightforward and suitable title. Instead, the official Chinese official name of the initiative is ‘一带一路’ (literally translated as ‘One Belt, One Road’). As Huang (2016) reconstructs, Chinese and foreign politicians suggested using different English translations for the name of the initiative, noting that the term One Belt, One Road is awkward in English. Moreover, since its introduction in 2013, the initiative has progressed very fast. The initiative has expanded from including just ‘one’ belt and

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5. 6. 7.

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‘one’ road, into including many ‘belts’ and many ‘roads’. Therefore— from September 2015 on—the official English name of this initiative was changed from One Belt, One Road to The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The most important aspect of this documents is an action plan named ‘Vision And Actions On Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt And 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road’, issued by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) of the People’s Republic of China, with State Council authorization in March 2015. In Chinese: http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/i/dxfw/jlyd/201 601/20160101243342.shtml. In English: https://en.ndrc.gov.cn/new srelease_8232/201503/t20150330_1193900.html. Vision and actions, cit. III. Vision and actions, cit. IV. ‘We should integrate investment and trade, and promote trade through investment. We should speed up investment facilitation, eliminate investment barriers, and push forward negotiations on bilateral investment protection agreements and double taxation avoidance agreements to protect the lawful rights and interests of investors ’. http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201 503/t20150330_669367.html. Vision and Actions, cit. I. See Tillman, H., Yang, J., & Nielsson, E. T. (2018). The Polar Silk Road: China’s New Frontier of International Cooperation. China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies. https://doi.org/10.1142/S23777 40018500215. The Belt and Road spatial information corridor program was proposed by NDTIC (National Defence Technology & Industry Committee), and implemented by the China National Space Administration (CNSA) http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-04/24/c_138005579.htm. State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi (2020) said in a signed article published on March 1 by Qiushi Journal, flagship magazine of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, that public health issues should be moved up on the international agenda, and major international health projects should be implemented, and a health Silk Road taken up. The Belt and Road runs through the continents of Asia, Europe, and Africa, connecting the vibrant East Asia economic circle at one end and developed European economic circle at the other, endowing countries with huge potential for economic development. The Silk Road Economic Belt focuses on bringing together China, Central Asia, Russia, and Europe (the Baltic); linking China with the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea through Central Asia and West Asia; and connecting China with Southeast Asia, South Asia, and the Indian Ocean. The 21stCentury Maritime Silk Road is designed to go from China’s coast to

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16. 17.

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Europe through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean in one route, and from China’s coast through the South China Sea to the South Pacific in the other. http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/publicati ons/2015/03/30/content_281475080249035.htm, at point III. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/; https://www.idcpc.org.cn/english/Profile/lineup/index.html. The term MENA refers to the 22 member states of the Arab League (including Palestine) and three non-Arab countries, namely Israel, Iran, and Turkey. Since most of the countries are Arab states, Chinese scholars sometimes call the area the ‘Arab world’. In contrast to this, the term WANA does not necessarily include the (Persian) Gulf region, or the six member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Iran, and Iraq, and so is closer to the geographical term southern and eastern Mediterranean. Since 2013, China has indeed launched several sub-regional initiatives involving countries of the Mediterranean region. In Rome, in February 2013, Beijing organized a conference bringing together representatives from the Ministries of Agriculture (including several ministers) of six southern European countries (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Cyprus, Malta) and China for the first time with the aim of strengthening agricultural cooperation between the participants. In November 2015, at Xiamen (in south-east China), the State Oceanic Administration and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs organized another meeting with these same six southern European countries, this time focusing on maritime cooperation. This meeting—the first of its kind, known as ‘Forum of Marine Cooperation between China and South European Countries’—brought high-level officials and experts on maritime issues together. Since the end of this forum, and gradually over the last three years, China has developed ‘Comprehensive Maritime Cooperation’ partnerships with Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Cyprus and Malta including the construction or development of ports, industrial parks in the surrounding areas, transport networks, tourism, and fishing. 顶层设计 dˇıngcéng shèjì. These mechanisms most often take the form of high-level forums, created at China’s initiative and meeting on an annual basis: Forum on ChinaAfrica Cooperation (created in 2000), China-Arab States Cooperation Forum (2004), China-Central and Eastern European Countries Cooperation—known as ‘16 + 1’ (2012), China-Community of Latin American and Caribbean States Forum—CELAC (2015). According to Strüver (2017), relations between partner countries under ‘strategic partnerships’ have the following four characteristics: (1) They go beyond typical diplomatic relations, involving consistent meetings between government officials and agencies to develop communication and trust;

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(2) They do not fall within the confines of treaty-based alliances or coalitions; (3) They are more ‘goal-driven’ than ‘threat-driven’, typically focusing on areas of mutual cooperation in economics, culture, security, and technology; (4) They are characterized by an emphasis on behavior and institutional processes. In comparison, ‘comprehensive strategic partnerships’ involve a higher level of institutional communication, including regular high-level meetings between top leadership members of both partner countries. ‘Three conditions have to be met before an agreement on a comprehensive strategic partnership can be achieved: political trust, dense economic ties, cultural exchanges, and good relations in other sectors’. 新型大国关系 x¯ınxíng dàguó gu¯anxì. The EEC states are: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The official candidate countries to become member states of the European Union are: Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia. The countries to become potential candidates are: Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina. For the English version of the policy paper, see: http://english.www. gov.cn/archive/publications/2016/01/13/content_281475271412746. htm. The complement of this policy is the so-called strategic partnership diplomacy, where States relationships fall into four broad categories in keeping with their importance: comprehensive strategic partnerships (as with Algeria, and Egypt); comprehensive innovation partnership (as with Israel) and a strategic cooperative relationship (as with Turkey); strategic partnerships with several midsized countries (as with Morocco); strategic partnerships with the smaller states (Lons et al., 2019). Worthy of note, almost all the strategic partnership agreements that China has signed with countries in the Middle East and North Africa came about in the past decade (the one with Egypt, signed in 1999, is the sole exception). 三不原则, s¯an bù yuánzé. https://www.chinamed.it/chinamed-data/mediterranean-region State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi described the operation of ‘two wheels’ as combining cooperation in conventional oil and gas and low-carbon energy to establish the China-Arab states strategic cooperative relations in the energy field, connecting all industry chains and covering all areas, and the cooperation in science and technology and finance as ‘two wings’, which required cooperation in the fields of artificial intelligence, mobile communications, Internet of Things, space launch, satellite navigation and others, and innovate investment and financing methods, mobilizing various funds to participate in the joint building of the Belt and Road between China and Arab states.

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26. https://en.ndrc.gov.cn/policyrelease_8233/201612/P02019110148 2242850325.pdf. 27. In 2014, the State Oceanic Administration—a governmental agency that was incorporated into the Ministry of Natural Resources in 2018 and since then no longer exists as an independent, institutional entity—calculates China’s blue GDP at 10% of the country’s total GDP. The notion includes fisheries, shipbuilding, offshore oil and gas exploitation, maritime engineering, maritime biology pharmacy, renewable energies, the services industry with coastal and sea tourism and public transportation, and maritime finance (Chang & Li, 2019). 28. Investments in infrastructures—at least in the Asian part of the Mediterranean or those directly connected to Asia – are also funded by the brand new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the China-led multilateral financial institution established in 2014. 29. A recent analysis of COSCO’s situation in Piraeus concludes that it constitutes a new ‘Greek prototype’ of port governance that ‘implies the losing of any public sector power to intervene in what is the institution responsible for the oversight of strategy and the development of modern ports’—that is, a port authority (cfr. Athanasios & Vaggelas, 2017). 30. An important project under BRI and ‘16 + 1’ is the Adriatic-BalticBlack Sea seaport cooperation, announced at the Suzhou Summit in 2015, which aims to integrate the development of ports, including those in the hinterland, as well as logistic hubs, economic zones and transport corridors in the related regions. Still in the planning stage, it is regarded as complementary to the land transport developed under the Belt and Road Initiative. 31. In fact, in 2013, China, Serbia and Hungary signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for the construction of the Hungaro-Serbian High-Speed Railway (HSR), connecting Belgrade and Budapest by rail to facilitate transporting Chinese exports from Greek ports to European markets. 32. In 2015, during the China-CEE Summit in Suzhou, the Chinese premier, Li Keqiang, set out the concept of the ‘Adriatic- Baltic-Black Sea Seaport Cooperation’ (also referred to as the ‘Three Seas Port Cooperation’), in which he envisioned ‘establishing industrial cluster areas around ports with the right conditions’. He specified that the approach should combine ‘China’s equipment, European technology and central and eastern European markets on the way to achieving productive cooperation projects’. This idea is thus an embodiment of Li’s signature concept of ‘industrial capacity cooperation’. The Three Seas initiative has since become an important part of the discussions taking place in the 16 + 1 framework. 33. Within the framework of the MoU signed in Rome in 2019, the China Communications Construction Company (CCCC) signed a cooperation

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36.

37.

38.

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agreement for the reconstruction and redevelopment of the Port of Genoa, and a MoU with the port of Trieste for the development of logistics platforms in China and new warehouses in Italy. In addition to this, in 2016, a consortium led by a Chinese company won the tender to design a docking bay off the coast of Venice that—should the project be eventually undertaken—would be capable of handling large container ships and would, if built, more than double Venice’s cargo handling capacity. 65% owned by China Merchants Port (26%), COSCO (26%), and CIC International (13%). In 2014, Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG) won a tender to run Haifa Bayport for 25 years beginning in 2021, when the construction of Bayport is expected to be completed by an Israeli consortium. The project is a 300-km high-speed railway linking the port city of Ashkelon, just 25 km south of port Ashdod, to the Red Sea. Its main objective has been to find a way to avoid the Suez corridor. With its traditional emphasis on finding alternatives and concerns about instability in the Middle East, the Chinese administration explored how it could benefit from Israeli stability and reliability to secure trade. In France: Marseille Eurofos on the Mediterranean sea; and Terminal des Flandres at Dunkirk, Terminal de France and Terminal Nord at Le Havre, Terminal du Grand Ouest at Montoir on the Atlantic. In Greece, the port of Thessaloniki, in Malta, the Freeport Terminal at Marsaxlokk, and in Morocco Somaport in Casablanca, and Eurogate Tanger in Tangiers. Just as an example: under Chinese law, all commercial ports are obliged to provide logistical support to that country’s military should it be requested (Thorne & Spevack, 2017). After the outbreak of the civil war in Libya in 2011, Beijing had to evacuate its citizens and abandon important projects and investments. However, its Libyan oil purchases have more than doubled since 2017. Chinese firms have ceased operations due to ongoing instability, though the Prime Minister of the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA), Fayez Serraj, has said that they are welcome to return. The Chinese government has repeatedly stated that it is willing to participate in the reconstruction effort once peace is restored. https://ig.ft.com/sites/china-ports/. After ambitious spending by several domestic conglomerates in 2016, when outbound FDI reached US$170.1 billion, a 44.1 percent increase over 2015, the Chinese government instituted several new capital controls and cracked down on ‘irrational’ acquisitions by domestic firms abroad. In a statement published August 4, 2017, the State Council laid out the new measures that categorize outbound investment into three categories, as follows: Banned (Investments that threaten national security or interests; Investments in unauthorized core military technology and products;

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Investments in gambling and sex industries); Restricted (Investments in countries with which China has no formal diplomatic relationship, is at war, or has agreements with restricting investments; Investments into real estate, hotel, entertainment, and sport industries); Encouraged (Investment in One Belt, One Road (OBOR) related projects and infrastructures; Investments that advance Chinese manufacturing technology; Investments that improve Chinese high-tech and R&D centers abroad; Investments that secure supply chains in raw materials and energy sources, such as oil, gas, and minerals; Investments in trade, culture, logistic services are encouraged, as well as in finance). If we check the last available version of the American Enterprise Institute database on Chinese investments (Fall 2019), we immediately notice that greenfield account for more of 21 billion dollars in the MENA region, 17.6 in Europe; while amounting to almost 50 billion dollars in subSaharan region and almost 56 in West Asia https://www.aei.org/chinaglobal-investment-tracker/. Silk Road Fund is a limited liability company created in 2014. Its four shareholders are: State Administration of Foreign Exchange (65%), China Investment Corporation (15%), Export–Import Bank of China (15%), and China Development Bank (5%). The Fund has a total capital of 40 billion, and the first round of capital instalment is US$10 billion, contributed by the shareholders accordingly. http://www.silkroadfund.com.cn/. http://en.cadfund.com/. On the legal framework of Chinese overseas investments, see also Chen Jianfu (2015) China’s Outbound Direct Investment, Chinese Law: Context and Transformation, Leiden-Boston, Brill-Nijhoff, pp. 861–889. In a 2018 report on BRI debt, researchers from the Center for Global Development warned that eight countries were at risk for ‘above-average debt’, including Djibouti, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, the Maldives, Mongolia, Pakistan, and Montenegro. High levels of debt with obscure terms undermine, rather than advance, developing economies. Countries like Morocco, Egypt, and Tunisia are already struggling to reduce their external debt. According to the SAIS China-Africa research initiative, Chinese loans to North African governments from 2000 to 2017 totaled $4,607 million. Of the North African countries on the list, Egypt ranked the highest for total amount borrowed from China from 2000 to 2017 ($3,421.60 million), followed by Morocco ($1,030.55 million), Tunisia ($145.39 million), Algeria ($9 million), and Libya ($0). https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/12/05/people-aroundthe-globe-are-divided-in-their-opinions-of-china/. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/IT/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX: 32019R0452&from=EN.

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49. As a matter of fact, in order to safeguard the sectors deemed strategic and of national interest, since 2012 the legislator has organically rewritten, with the Decree Law no. 21 of March 15, 2012 (converted into law on 11 May 2012), the procedures for the exercise by the Government of special powers of control and veto, exercisable in the sectors of defense and national security and in certain areas of defined activities of strategic importance in the sectors of energy, transport and communications. These sectors were subsequently specified by Law no. 172 of 4 December 2017 and finally integrated by Decree-law no. 64 of 11 July 2019, which extended the scope to the sector of telecommunication s networks, including 5G ones, and to semiconductors, but which has not been converted into law because of the government crisis that occurred a few weeks after its enactment. 50. A Chinese proverb: 井底之蛙 jˇıngdˇızh¯ıw¯a, ‘the frog at the bottom of the well’.

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Ekman, A. (2018). China in the mediterranean: An emerging presence. Notes de l’Ifri, Ifri. Ghafar, A. A., & Jacobs, A. L. (2019). Beijing calling: Assessing China’s growing footprint in North Africa. Policy Briefing, Brooking Doha Center. Godement, F., Pavli´cevi´c, D., Kratz, A., Vasselier, A., Rudolf, M., & Doyon, J. (2017). China and the mediterranean: Open for business? China Analysis. European Council of Foreign Relations, 21. Hanemann, T., Huotari, M., & Kratz, A. (2019). Chinese FDI in Europe: 2018 trends and impact of new screening policies. Rhodium Group (RHG) and the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS). Hanemann, T., & Rosen, D. (2020). Buying the dip? China’s outbound investment in 2020. Rhodium Group Research. Hellström, J. (2016). China’s acquisitions in Europe: European perceptions of Chinese investments and their strategic implications (Swedish Ministry of Defence. Report No: FOI-R–4384—SE). Hillmann, J. E. (2018). China’s belt and road is full of holes. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Huang, Y. (2016). Understanding China’s belt & road initiative: Motivation, framework and assessment. China Economic Review, 40, 314–321. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2016.07.007 Innocenzi, P., & Cavalieri, R. (2019). È tutta seta ciò che luccica? L’Italia e Xi: bilancio e prospettive della Via della Seta, Mondo Cinese n.165/166. Li, G. (2013). China: An emerging power in the mediterranean, the Mediterranean Region in a multipolar world (pp. 11–20). The German Marshall Fund of the United States. Li, S. (2016). China’s response to the chaos in the Middle East and the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (中东大乱局及“一带一路”背景下中国的应对, zhongdong daluan ju ji “yidai yilu” beijing xia zhongguo de yingdui), Lingdao kexue luntan da jiangtang 9. Liu, W., Zhang, Y., & Xiong, W. (2020). Financing the belt and road initiative. Eurasian Geography and Economics, 61(2), 137–145. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/15387216.2020.1716822 Lons, C. Fulton, J., Sun, D., & Al-Tamimi N. (2019). China great game in the Middle East, European Council on foreign relations. Meunier, S. (2019). Beware of Chinese bearing gifts: Why China’s direct investment poses political challenges in Europe and the United States. In J. Chaisse (Ed.), China’s international investment strategy: Bilateral, regional, and global law and policy. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/978 0198827450.001.0001 O’Dea, C. R. (2019). Asia rising: Ships of state? Naval War College Review, 72(5), 1.

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Hotspots of Crisis and Regional Interferences in the Mediterranean

Ferocious and Fragile: Egypt and the Myth of ‘Authoritarian Stability’ Gennaro Gervasio and Andrea Teti

Contents 1 2 3 4

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Historical Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Theoretical Lessons: The Myth of Authoritarian Stability . . . . . . . . Multidimensional Instability: Domestic Failures and Regional Impasses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Conclusion: Egypt–Fierce, Fragile, and a Sinkhole of Insecurity . . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Introduction

One of the watersheds the Arab Uprisings (or ‘Arab Spring’) represented was a renewed attention by European policymakers to their ‘Southern Partners’. During the Uprisings, the EU recognized that populations in

G. Gervasio (B) Department of Humanities, Roma Tre University, Rome, Italy e-mail: [email protected] A. Teti The School of Social Science, University of Aberdeen, Aberdeen, Scotland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 F. M. Corrao and R. Redaelli (eds.), States, Actors and Geopolitical Drivers in the Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69000-7_8

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‘Southern Neighbourhood’ countries had been marginalized both politically and economically by their governments, that this produced instability in the political, economic, and security spheres. They also recognized that EU policy would have to correct its previous mistake of equating authoritarian repression with stability. Unfortunately, the wrong lessons have been learned from the Uprisings: Europe’s Union and its most powerful states have concluded that their principal objective in the region should be ‘stability’ understood as a mere lack of change, and that supporting violently authoritarian regimes such as Egypt’s is an acceptable ‘cost of doing business’ to keep migration in check and to counter terrorism at home (for an overview, see Teti et al., 2020). After a brief review of the historical context within which the current regime emerged, this contribution considers orthodox analytical and policy views on the ‘stability’ which authoritarian regimes are claimed to provide, outlining an alternative analysis which highlights the inevitable instability of post-populist authoritarian regimes in their ‘neoliberal’ incarnations. It then illustrates this instability by outlining Egypt’s post-2013 track record on issues of domestic, regional and international stability. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the concept of ‘national interest’ invoked by Western governments in supporting al-Sisi’s (al-S¯ıs¯ı) regime and those like it, noting that invoking such a narrow definition of that interest reflects a failure to confront the evidence of the failure of authoritarian regimes to stabilize either internally or externally as well as impasses in the domestic politics of Western—particularly European—states themselves.

2

Historical Context

The 2011 ‘January Revolution’ was a surprise even to those who called for demonstrations on January 25th, but it was not without context or long-term causes. On the contrary, the combined political and economic marginalization which had increased since the mid-1990s had produced protest movements at least over the previous decade (ElMahdi & Marfleet, 2009). In Egypt, protests supporting the Second Intifada (2000) first and then against the invasion of Iraq (2003) also mobilized those who could not protest the Egyptian regime overtly, and this experience would be crucial in the establishment of later anti-regime protest initiatives and movements such as Kif¯ aya (Enough), Shayfeenkum (Sh¯ ayfiynkum, ‘we see you’), the April 6th Movement (Harakat Sitta

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Abr¯ıl ), the National Association for Change, and perhaps more significantly increasingly organized and militant labor groups all the way up to the well-known Mahalla al-Kubra week-long labor protests (e.g., Beinin & Duboc‚ 2013) and the establishment and resonance of the We Are All Khaled Said (Kullun¯ a Kh¯ alid Sa ¯ıd) group, which harnessed public anger at the police torture and assassination of a young activist who intended to expose instances of the police’s notorious corruption (Gervasio & Teti, 2014; Khalili & Schwedler, 2010). In response to increasing disaffection and increasingly impoverished middle and working classes, the regime found itself simultaneously unable to manage conflict in its midst—the tawr¯ıth or ‘inheritance’ of the Presidency which Mubarak planned for his businessman son Gamal and which was strenuously resisted by the regime party ‘old guard’—but also unable to make any significant concessions to the population, since its kleptocratic program of economic ‘reforms’ required political repression and produced economic hardship for the vast majority of the population (Abdelrahman, 2014; Achcar, 2013; Hanieh, 2013; Teti et al., 2018). Between December 2010 and January 2011, the revolution in Tunisia—equally unexpected, but with similar causes—jolted public opinion across the Arab Middle East, and some opposition groups, believing it might be possible to achieve the same in Egypt, called for a protest in Cairo on January 25th, an ironic and deeply significant way of ‘marking’ National Police Day. The crowds turning out were beyond organizers’ wildest imagination and were themselves dwarfed by the nationwide outpouring of anger on January 28th, when it became clear that the Ministry of Interior’s police forces were having trouble dealing with protesters. Over the ‘Eighteen Days’, masses of protesters exhausted the police and drove them from public spaces, even assaulting occasionally police stations and burning them down as they had the headquarters of the regime’s National Democratic Party (Alexander & Bassiouny, 2014; Ketchley‚ 2017). Finally, the Military decided to remove Mubarak, to the stunned elation of crowds across Egypt and the entire region. Counterrevolutionary reactions, however, were already evident, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood’s willingness to compromise with the Army in negotiations even on the first weekend of protests (‘Abd al-Rah.m¯an 2019; Ketchley, 2017; Ryzova, 2020). The Military had taken control via the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), and was clearly unwilling

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to renounce power: it first called for a referendum on ‘constitutional principles’ which it rapidly tried to turn into a new constitution, then it so delayed any transitional process that by the end of the summer, massive crowds protested against the Army—all the more remarkable given the Military’s much-vaunted reputation as a ‘national institution’. By early autumn, the military decided to try where the police had failed to crush protests. But, as evidenced by the so-called Maspero Incident (October 2011) in which protesters were run over by a military vehicle killing 29, this clampdown sparked even more intense protests, in the form of the socalled Battle of Muh.ammad Mah.m¯ud Street, in which government forces and protesters clashed for several days (Ryzova, 2020). Only after these clashes, did SCAF agree to a timetable to parliamentary and presidential elections. Parliamentary elections were not a closely fought affair, with the Muslim Brotherhood (Jam¯ a at al-Ikhw¯ an al-Muslim¯ın) and Salafi Nour (H ur) alliance winning about 67% of seats. The weakness of . izb al-N¯ the democratic opposition in both numbers and nationwide organization showed. The June 2012 Presidential elections, however, were a better test of public opinion, and were a very close call—not just the run-off between regime hangover Ahmad Shafiq (Ah.mad Shaf¯ıq) (48.27%) and the Brotherhood candidate Muhammad Morsi (Muh.ammad Murs¯ı) (51.73%), but, especially the first round, in which the first two were very closely followed by former Brotherhood member and maverick social-democratic Islamist Abd al-Munim Aboul-Futouh (Ab¯ u al-Fut¯uh.) and leftist nationalist Hamdeen Sabbahi (Hamd¯ın S.ab¯ah.¯ı). In that first round, Morsi polled 25%, Shafiq 24%, Sabbahi 21%, and Aboul-Futouh 17%. Public opinion was split nearly evenly across the Brotherhood, the former regime, and progressive Islamist and leftist forces. Very small swings would have seen a very different second round. The Brotherhood, however, failed to recognize the depth of division in Egypt or the precariousness of its own nationwide support, and while attempting to negotiate with the Army, shunned and isolated itself from centrist and leftist forces. The latter would prove a fatal mistake: as Brotherhood and Salafist ran roughshod over the concerns of these groups in Parliament, in government and in the committee tasked with writing a new constitution, they increasingly alienated key portions of public opinion and ‘revolutionary actors’. These soon began mobilizing against the MB, and by early 2013, the Tamarrud protest movement had formed. Some eventually began calling for the Army to intervene against

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the Brotherhood-led government and Presidency, and after nationwide anti-Brotherhood demonstrations on June 30, the Army issued an ultimatum against Morsi to step down. On July 3rd, they removed him and took direct power, as they had aimed to do in 2011, but this time with considerable—though not overwhelming—public backing. This left public opinion badly split, and when the Brotherhood and some other groups attempted to protest the removal of the only freely elected President in Egypt’s history at Rabaa al-Adawiya (R¯abi al-Adawiyya) Square, on August 14th government forces violently attacked protesters, killing nearly 1,000 (Human Rights Watch, 2014).

3 Theoretical Lessons: The Myth of Authoritarian Stability 3.1

A Failed Orthodoxy

The orthodox account found in political science and, especially among policymakers of how to achieve democracy—which has survived the Arab Uprisings surprisingly intact—relies on two main types of factors: liberalizing collective decision-making in politics and liberalizing the economy. The first has focused on a polyarchic and procedural conception of democracy, to be achieved by prioritizing civil-political over socioeconomic rights, civil society over unions, a balance between state and civil society, and ‘free and fair’ elections as a mechanism of collective choice of governments. In parallel, economic liberalization has been portrayed as the best—and only—way of achieving ‘inclusive development’, i.e., delivering on a measure of equality and decent life which populations in 2011 demanded. This involved prioritizing ‘free markets’—i.e., deregulation, including in labor markets—as tools to deliver inclusive growth betray the policymakers’ and certain scholars’ attachment to the orthodoxies of ‘market-led development’, while eliding in both rhetoric and in practice socioeconomic issues and actors (e.g., unions) from ‘civil society’ specifically and thus from democratization and development generally (for a critical review of this literature, see Stacher, 2020). But this orthodoxy produced disastrous effects in practice: rising inequality in the economy, increasing marginalization and repression in politics, and the ever-harsher oligopolistic grip of a kleptocratic elite alliance on both spheres (Hanieh, 2013).

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At a political level, the liberalization of the political sphere—including nominally competitive elections—and the growing presence of Civil Society Actors and Organisations (CSAs/CSOs) is often claimed, particularly in policy circles, as a sign of democratization. However, scholarship has long shown that the existence of opposition is not necessarily a sign of incipient democratization, as its presence may support autocracy—which neutralizes this opposition through co-option, thereby helping the regime ‘perform’ liberalization (Albrecht, 2005, 2013). Indeed, this combination of co-optation and repression has been an important part of regime strategy in neutralizing protest both before and after (Sika, 2019) the January revolution. As for elections, the manner in which they have effectively been emptied of political significance is well-documented (Schedler, 2002a, 2002b). By the same token, the much-vaunted reliance of Western policymakers on ‘civil society’ to bring about democracy is unwarranted: both in the run-up to 2011 and since then, while democratic opposition groups have taken the form of civil society because unionization and becoming parties were precluded to them (Gervasio & Teti, 2014), the regime in turn coopted CSOs and ‘flooded’ civil society with government-friendly groups (Abdelrahman, 2004, 2014) which allow the regime to ‘perform’ democratization while deflecting its radical implications, so much so that it was not ‘civil society’ per se which helped bring about the January revolution (Beinin, 2014) but rather those specific democratic actors for which the form of unions and parties was precluded (Gervasio & Teti, 2014). Indeed, it has long been pointed out that the combination of a liberalizing performance combined with deliberalization in practice—by corruption, co-optation, or repression—is much more than a reactionary response to a contingent threat such as Islamism (Kienle, 1998) or indeed to mass mobilization in the wake of the January revolution: it is part and parcel of a way of governing, a form of power. Nor are MENA populations somehow taken in by their governments’ or Western powers’ rhetorical emphasis on market democracy: they understand perfectly well the political and economic inequalities which this discourse masks, and Western powers’ popular reputation in the region suffers as a consequence (Teti et al., forthcoming). The logical and empirical flaws in orthodox accounts must be taken seriously: now more than ever, it is crucial to understand the actual dynamics of authoritarianism in the South Mediterranean.

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3.2

209

Egypt’s Brittle Authoritarianism

One of the first, spectacular lessons of the Uprisings was that authoritarianism is can be fragile—much more than it might appear (Teti & Gervasio, 2011). An academic and policy orthodoxy disappointed at the absence of a ‘third wave’ of democratization in the Middle East nonetheless noted the ‘authoritarian resilience’ of MENA regimes—Egypt above all—which increasingly frequently ‘performed’ liberal democracy while avoiding serious challenges to their autocracy (Malmvig, 2012). Explanations for this newfound authoritarian resilience offered by ‘mainstream’ scholarship often reached for reasons ranging from culturalist claims about Islam and Arab culture (Fish, 2011; Inglehart, 2017; Norris, 2014) to the tools of coercion (Bellin, 2004, 2012) and patronage (Haber & Menaldo, 2011; Oskarsson & Ottosen, 2010; Ross, 2011) that keep regional autocrats in power. Others emphasized the fact that this form of governance paradoxically dressed up repression and citizens’ socioeconomic and political marginalization in the language of democracy: while granting rights in principle, they passed ‘security’ and ‘anti-terrorism’ legislation which increasingly radically curtailed the independence of the press, of civil society, of unions, and the political neutralization of parliaments. Supposedly consolidated ‘Western’ liberal democracies were reluctant to push back against their MENA counterparts, having increasingly securitized dissent in after the ‘9/11’, 2001 attacks in the USA, having progressively curtailed the role of independent unions domestically, and which believed that supporting MENA dictators were necessary for regional ‘stability’, ‘security’, and migration control. And yet, scholars and policymakers conflate stability and lack of change at their peril. A lack of substantive change that comes from ever-fiercer repression produces an illusory stability and blinds observers to the extent of dissent and to the significance of opposition. Moreover, while it is true of policymakers and scholarly orthodoxy that ‘[q]uite a lot of analytical attention has been devoted to the instruments of state authoritarianism, but not enough has been paid to the strength and durability of the protest movements’ (Hudson, 2011), other scholars have focused on this— they’ve just been ignored by their field’s orthodoxies and by policymakers (Beinin, 2012; Bush, 2010; El-Mahdi & Marfleet, 2009). Indeed, analytical tools focusing on something other than the equation of lack of change with stability did exist and were well-known. As Ayubi (1996) famously noted, for example, a regime’s coercive capacity does not

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necessarily translate into resilience. Drawing on Gramsci, he distinguished between ‘hegemonic’ states, which enjoy popular support, and ‘fierce’ states, which need to rely far more on naked coercion to remain in power: while the former are stable and solid, the latter are brittle, as a wide variety of sociopolitically diverse cases—from Tunisia to Yemen, Bahrain to Libya, Egypt to Morocco, and more recently Sudan and Algeria—have dramatically confirmed. Conversely, although most regional observers were well aware of the lack of legitimacy MENA regimes suffered from, this did not translate into skepticism about their ‘stability’. In this sense, the events of the Uprisings are an indictment of the profession not because they were not predicted, but because only by conflating ferocity and strength could it have been so easy to miss the region’s instability and the risks of Western governments’ policies for so long. The hallmark of post-Uprisings MENA states—of which al-Sisi’s Egypt is the epitome—is precisely this brittle ferocity Ayubi identified: the more regimes rely on repression, the ‘fiercer’ they are, the weaker they are. And al-Sisi’s Egypt—with tens of thousands of political prisoners and increasingly paranoid repression (Human Rights Watch, 2017, 2020)—is strikingly fierce. By contrast, the regime and its European counterparts have constructed a double myth of stability, in which the Sisi regime supposedly stabilizes both Egypt’s domestic politics and regional international politics.

4 Multidimensional Instability: Domestic Failures and Regional Impasses Italian public opinion was shaken by the kidnap, torture, and assassination by Egyptian government forces of Giulio Regeni, a doctoral researcher working on Egypt’s informal trade unions, in January–February 2016. Italy withdrew a trade delegation in Cairo at the time, and eventually also its Ambassador, after a significant public outcry. Barely a year later, Italy’s then-Foreign Minister Angelino Alfano announced the return of an Ambassador to Cairo, claiming that ‘Egypt is an unavoidable partner’ (Alfano in ANSA, 2017). Indeed, by then major European governments—particularly Italy, France, Germany, and the UK—seemed convinced that managing immigration and terrorist groups required supporting dictatorships like Egypt’s, which jailed tens of thousands of prisoners of conscience.

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Despite considerable evidence to the contrary, the regime has represented itself domestically, regionally, and internationally as a ‘stable island in an area of instability’. Key ‘Western’ actors, including the EU, Germany, the US—and European powers with Mediterranean interests such as France, Italy, and the UK—have bought into the al-Sisi regime’s narrative that it represents those power’s best, last hope against the twin dangers of Islamist radicalization and mass migration. Sadly, these countries’ media has largely followed suit or not challenged policymakers strongly enough, while experts in regional relations who have been pointing out the dangers of such policies are often ignored by both policymakers and the media. It ought to be a sobering thought that this was precisely Qaddafi’s rhetoric in the decade before his fall—as it is now Erdogan’s in Turkey. This claim that authoritarian regimes are stable and that this stability, is instrumental to Western countries’ national interests, is highly problematic, not just ethically, but also factually. Mubarak’s Egypt, especially during the 2000s, might conceivably still claim a semblance of stability (Rutherford, 2013)—although as noted above, mobilization against the regime was significant—making the destabilizing effects of his regime less immediately evident at the time. However, al-Sisi’s track record and strategy which essentially intensify Mubarak’s, particularly since 2015, provides very little evidence of domestic or regional ‘stabilization’. A brief review of Egypt’s domestic situation and regional role illustrates the point. The signs of Egypt’s domestic instability make for a long list. Among the most notable are, first, the instability internal to the regime itself. Egypt’s ‘New Military Regime’ still does not have a new elite to support it. Several elements of the elite formerly surrounding Gamal Mubarak have happily realigned themselves to work with the Army, but the ‘Republic of Generals’—with its corruption (Adly, 2020) and everincreasing grip over the economy (Marshall & Joshua, 2012)—continues to make it very difficult for a ‘new economic elite’ willing to accept the hegemony of the ‘military economy’ to emerge (Abul-Magd et al., 2020). Second, as in the past, the ‘state of emergency’ declared in the aftermath of the July 3, 2013 coup in order to—supposedly—counter an Islamist insurrection, had the effect of reducing freedoms to levels never seen before in contemporary Egypt, as apparent from the ballooning numbers of prisoners of conscience and of opinion (Human Rights Watch, 2017, 2020), a flood of legislation aimed at stymying political parties and CSOs, and the exponential growth of grave issues such as the use of

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military tribunals against civilians and of torture (Matthies-Boon, 2017; Stacher, 2015). A regime which represents itself in hyper-masculinist terms as ‘strong’ and as an anchor of ‘stability’ is in fact profoundly fearful of even the possibility of another ‘January 25th ’, to the point that any sign of dissent—however minuscule—is met with grossly disproportionate repression. The protests of September 2019, which were ultimately rather small, provide a case in point. Indeed, the post-coup regime has portrayed any form of dissent as a conspiracy against the country’s ‘stability’, and the limited but significant protests which took place in September 2019 are an example of its unwillingness and inability to respond to the deteriorating conditions the population must endure. Third, as for the ‘real’ war on terrorism, the al-Sisi regime has proven capable of coming to grips with the dissent—including armed—in North Sinai, much of which still escapes its control (Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, 2015). Fourth, the al-Sisi regime’s weakness is evident from its handling of the economic crisis which beset the country even before the January Uprising. The new Egyptian regime has thus far survived through a combination of subsidies from regional and international sponsors, debt, and worsening economic conditions for the population. But neither it nor its international sponsors have been able to provide answers to the structural impasse of the Egyptian economy, dominated by civilian and military elites who are willing to do little else but continue extracting wealth from the country. This impasse is evident in the extremely poor levels of satisfaction with government performance—on everything from basic services to fighting corruption—revealed by survey data (Teti et al., 2018, 2021). Finally, the causes which most drove Egyptians to protest in 2011 remain unchanged if not worsened. Corruption (Sapsford et al., 2019) was the single most significant factor which led people to passively or actively support the January Uprising (Abbott & Teti, 2017a) alongside economic inequality (unemployment, poverty, inflation, etc.). The perception of corruption is nothing short of dramatic: barely 11.6% think state agencies are not corrupt; 32% think private sector business are not corrupt; a mere 14% think the government is making a concerted effort to crack down on corruption; and a huge 82% think it is difficult to get a job without ‘connections’ (Teti et al., 2020: 229–230). The perception of the economic situation is no less dire: only 29.9% of people thought the economic situation was good or very good; barely 31.8% thought the government’s performance managing the economy was good

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or very good; 14.5% felt its performance reducing economic inequalities good/very good; only 31.2% felt their household income covered expenses; and less than 1 in 10 (9.3%) felt that the government’s performance keeping prices down was good or very good (Teti et al., 2020: 229–230). All of this illustrates the point—which ought to be uncontroversial, but is systematically ignored in policy circles—that the Egyptian government has extremely low levels of popular support, and that seven years since taking power directly, it has yet to show any hint that it is willing or able to address the country’s structural problems. All evidence, in fact, points in precisely the opposite direction. The new Egyptian regime’s regional role is not more flattering than its domestic one. In Libya, Egypt pursued its own regional interests but also presented its backing of Gen. Haftar (H . aftar) as in the interests of the EU and of specific European powers, particularly Italy. Haftar, however, has been all but utterly routed, and Egypt’s Libya policy lies in tatters. On Palestine-Israel, Egypt has not acted to encourage Israel and Palestinians to reach a negotiated settlement, but has, on the contrary, increasingly isolated Palestinians, especially in Gaza, by never challenging—and indeed mirroring—Israeli policy, with the excuse of ‘securing’ the Sinai. In relation to Yemen and Iran, Cairo has done little but echo Saudi interests and objectives, drawing Egypt into the Yemeni conflict, and even ceding two strategically located islands to Saudis very much against Egyptian public opinion and strategic interests. On migration, a particularly important topic for European countries, Egypt has presented itself as a vital force stemming migration toward Europe. It is certainly true that the economic situation in Egypt is so dire that an estimated 40% of its population are prepared to consider emigrating temporarily or permanently (Abbott & Teti, 2017b). Repression, however, cannot provide a solution, and indeed in the long term, it simply amplifies the effects of an inevitable eventual rupture.

5 Conclusion: Egypt–Fierce, Fragile, and a Sinkhole of Insecurity One of Gramsci’s intuitions was that authoritarian regimes could remain in place and gain a measure of consensus from the groups they exploited as a result of a machinery of politics and culture which made certain ideas appear ‘normal’ and uncontested/uncontestable. Ayubi pointed out that

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while such a ‘hegemonic’ position might allow regimes to use violence extensively and intensively, regimes lacking such consensus might also deploy similar violence in order to mask their lack of popular support. If one takes as token of ‘security’ or ‘stability’ such a use of violence, then regimes like Egypt’s might appear strong while in fact suffering from significant weakness. What Ayubi called ‘fierce’ states—as opposed to their hegemonic, ‘strong’ counterparts—are in this sense not strong at all, but rather weak: they not fragile in the sense that their fall is necessary or imminent, but in the sense that, lacking popular consensus, they thus lack room to maneuver, and are in this sense precarious and brittle. While appearing strong, this can be progressively eroded over time until a combination of trigger events and a lack of resilience which derives from a lack of popular consensus reveals just how precarious that regime is. In this sense, regimes such as Egypt’s are probably best thought of as ‘sinkholes of insecurity’ (Teti & Gervasio, 2011; Teti et al., 2017, 2018). After all, this is what the Arab Uprisings demonstrated: the inability of ‘neoliberalized’ post-populist autocracies to either withstand or absorb the ‘sudden shock’ of mass protest which literally embodied the widespread distrust and dissatisfaction regimes such as Mubarak’s had earned. Supporters of European governments’ decision to accept and support al-Sisi claim that, although morally unpleasant, the pursuit of national interests trumps ethics. But the interests of nations and of their populations—whether Egypt’s or Europe’s—are not served by supporting brittle authoritarian ‘sinkholes’, rather they are further damaged. However, as the 2010–2011 Uprisings have shown, security without social and political justice—particularly when maintained without consent and with bloodthirsty and paranoid repression—is precarious and unstable, and is likely to create even greater dangers, particularly in the long run. Even the conviction that, in the wake of the ‘Regeni Affair’, the Italian ambassador’s return to Cairo could consolidate business relations with Egypt and Libya seems to be dictated more by optimism than reality. This diplomatic normalization is actually counterproductive in its attempts to please the Egyptian regime on the basis of an erroneous assessment of our national interests. Under these circumstances, with Egypt’s inability and unwillingness to address the structural causes of its instability, it would be profoundly incautious—at best—for Western policymakers to uncritically support the regime.

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Unfortunately, Italy, Germany, and France in particular as well as the UK have for a long time been ‘hypnotized’ by internal problems—their dismantling of social democracy, increasing economic inequalities, and the ‘rise of the right’ which has come with that—and have lacked the political will to address any of the structural causes of their own problems. Allowing themselves to blame ‘immigration’ in particular has made them particularly susceptible to MENA governments ‘playing’ this card— as Erdogan does, as Mubarak did and Sisi does, and it should be a sobering thought that this was precisely also one of the main levers used by Gaddafi. Conversely, with a precariously perched regime facing such significant domestic dissatisfaction, one might ask whether the revolutionary moment which began in early 2011 is indeed over. It is certainly true that the regime’s paranoid repression of even the mildest dissent in Egypt has made it impossible for a nationwide organization to effectively confront the government. However, as both survey and field research remind us, the causes that in the past lead Egyptians to call in their millions for isq¯ a.t al-niz.¯ am, the downfall of the system—or indeed to chant yasqut. yasqut. h.ukm al- askar (down, down with the military government) in late 2011 and early 2012—has not disappeared and cannot be arrested, harassed, tortured, or co-opted into non-existence. From corruption to basic services, from jobs to inequality, from police abuse to the denied freedom to speak and protest, Egyptians remain deeply disillusioned and dissatisfied with their government—and their government has even fewer answers than it did in December 2010 when it had just elected the most regime-dominated Parliament since the advent of multi-party elections.

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Rutherford, B. K. (2013). Egypt after Mubarak: Liberalism, Islam, and democracy in the Arab World. Princeton University Press. Ryzova, L. (2020). The battle of Muhammad Mahmoud street in Cairo: The politics and poetics of urban violence in revolutionary Time*. Past & Present, 247 (1), 273–317. Sapsford, R., Tsourapas, G., Abbott, P., & Teti, A. (2019). Corruption, trust, inclusion and cohesion in North Africa and the Middle East. Applied Research in Quality of Life, 14(1), 1–21. Schedler, A. (2002). Elections without democracy: The menu of manipulation. Journal of Democracy, 13(2), 36–50. Schedler, A. (2002). The nested game of democratization by elections. International Political Science Review, 23(1), 103–122. Sika, N. (2019). Repression, cooptation, and movement fragmentation in authoritarian regimes: Evidence from the youth movement in Egypt. Political Studies, 67 (3), 676–692. Stacher, J. (2015). Fragmenting states, new regimes: Militarized state violence and transition in the Middle East. Democratization, 22(2), 259–275. Stacher, J. (2020). Watermelon democracy: Egypt’s turbulent transition. Syracuse University Press. Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (TIMEP). (2015). Egypt’s rising security threat. Washington, DC. Teti, A., Abbott, P., & Cavatorta, F. (2018). The Arab uprisings in Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia: Social, political and economic transformations. Palgrave. Teti, A., Abbott, P., & Deane, S. (2017). Sinkholes of insecurity: Structural causes of weakness in Six Arab countries. Arab transformations policy briefs. University of Aberdeen. Teti, A., Abbott, P., Talbot, V., & Maggiolini, P. (2020). Democratisation against democracy: How EU foreign policy fails the Middle East. Palgrave Macmillan. Teti, A., & Gervasio, G. (2011). The unbearable lightness of authoritarianism: Lessons from the Arab uprisings. Mediterranean Politics, 16(2), 321–327. Teti, A., Gervasio, G., & Abbott, P. (forthcoming). Perceptions of the EU: Activists and public opinion in the Middle East. In D. Bouris, D. Huber & M. Pace (Eds.), Handbook of EU-Middle East relations. Routledge.

Perspectives on the New Centrality of the Mediterranean States: The Role of Turkey in a Changing Region Lea Nocera

Contents 1 2 3 4 5 6

Turkey, a Regional Power in the Mediterranean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Turkey and the Mediterranean in the Interwar Period . . . . . . . . . . The Cold War Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Post-Cold War Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Turkey and the Mediterranean under the AKP governments . . . . . From ‘Zero Problems with Neighbors’ to an ‘Enterprising and Humanitarian Foreign Policy’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 East Mediterranean, Sea of Rivalries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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1 Turkey, a Regional Power in the Mediterranean New geopolitical equilibriums are recently being established and redefined in the Mediterranean waters, with matches played both within the basin and elsewhere to the extent that one must reflect on its new centrality. It has already been obvious for years that the Mediterranean has become Europe’s border and, de facto, ‘its horizon, the place, both real and imaginary, where the question of war and peace has come to forefront yet again’ (Fabre, 2010: XII). It is in Mediterranean waters rather than in the often idealized echoes of the past that the explosions of tension that in recent years have crossed the regions of the Middle East and North Africa can be heard and reverberate, causing the regional system to experience a serious crisis (Del Sarto, 2017). Hence it is no coincidence that it is above all a specific area, the eastern Mediterranean, which in more recent times has become the battlefield on which old and new regional powers go to war; a ‘Regional Subsystem’ (Tziampiris, 2019) that should cause ‘substantial concern’ (Aydınta¸sba¸s et al., 2020). There is a great deal at stake in this area, at least as much as the many fields of action. This is proved by the role played by Turkey within this scenario, a country engaged on several fronts, de facto in all the sensitive sectors involving the waters of the Mediterranean: energy, migration, ongoing conflicts in Libya and Syria, the dispute over Cyprus. Turkey, which as of the second half of the Nineties and then more significantly in the years 2000s has changed the course of its own foreign policy, without any doubt plays an important role as a geopolitical pivot and has on various occasions proved to be a regional power. Although as it is often claimed that Turkey is the country with the longest continental coastline in the Mediterranean,1 as Altunı¸sık (2011: 11) argued ‘[it] has failed to develop a comprehensive Mediterranean vision and thus a strategy towards this region’ and its policies and interventions in the Basin appear instead to be linked to a broader and more complex framework in which various international political trajectories and domestic issues merge. This article contains an outline of Turkish foreign policy’s historical framework, attempting to emphasize when and in what manner various interests resulted in the Mediterranean being considered a geostrategic area; how interest in the Mediterranean was accompanied by Turkey’s rise as a regional power and then an analysis of the most recent challenges faced.

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Turkey and the Mediterranean in the Interwar Period

Although both for security reasons as well as economic, commercial and political ones, the Mediterranean has been a very important area for the Turkish Republic ever since the first years of its foundation, it was only during the Nineties and then the years 2000 that one began to observe the region as a whole. This happened above all in reaction to European Union strategies, which in 1995 embarked on the Barcelona Process and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), and towards the end of 1994 with NATO launching the Mediterranean Initiative.2 Turkey’s interests, however, as well as its foreign policy, never went as far as a broad and overall consideration of the Mediterranean and remained concentrated on the eastern region. This had effectively been the more sensitive and unstable area ever since the early years of the republic. Initially, between the 1920s and the 1930s, foreign policy was concentrated on consolidating the nation’s position on the international stage, firmly defending the principle of national sovereignty and safeguarding stable conditions. This meant above all redefining equilibriums with European powers, navigating rivalries between great powers and in particular addressing the greatest concern, which consisted in Mussolini’s Italian foreign policy in the eastern Mediterranean. In 1928, a non-aggression pact was signed with Italy, followed in 1930, by a treaty ratifying reconciliation with Greece. A few years later, in 1934, the Balkan Entente was signed, a pact involving mutual assistance and non-belligerence with Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia. But it was above all thanks to the Montreux Convention (1936) that Turkey regained control over the Straits, the strategic link between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, preventing Italy from taking any eventual action. During the years that preceded World War II, relations with Western powers improved significantly; not only was Turkey accepted as a member of the League of Nations, but thanks to policies aimed at maintaining the status quo, the so-called buffer state policy, it also established closer relations with France and Great Britain.

3

The Cold War Period

After World War II, Turkey’s foreign policy was outlined on the basis of the status of new world order. The polarisation caused by the Cold War paradoxically contributed to opening Turkey to the exterior world

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(Vaner, 2005: 52). At the same time, the country’s central position was reassessed as it maintained an essential role in the equilibrium of the Middle Eastern region. It was a country bordering with the Soviet Union, fearful of its territorial expansion and one that had decided to side with the Western bloc. Therefore, during those years, foreign policy was dictated by a search for security and integration between Western countries, through membership of the main international bodies. In just a few years, Turkey joined the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (now OEEC and in 1948 OECD), the Council of Europe (1949), NATO (1952), as well as taking part in the economic development programmes of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. By joining NATO, of which Turkey would become the most important outpost in the Mediterranean, the country’s strategic position and regional importance assumed new significance, even though ‘the Mediterranean would have never attracted the attention of Turkish foreign policy-makers other than in the context of NATO’s military strategies’ (Kiri¸sci, 2009: 250). It was in order to follow the West’s efforts to contain the advancement of Communism and to isolate the Soviet bloc that, during this period, Turkish diplomacy established a series of regional alliances in the Balkans and in the Middle East, often under the aegis of the United States. A series of attempts were aimed at slowing down the spreading of pan-Arabism and the rise of socialist-inspired Arab nationalism led by the Egyptian president Gamal Abd al-Nasser (Jam¯al Abd al-N¯as.ir) and it is in this context that one should assess the efforts made in the early Fifties to establish an alliance with Egypt, efforts that did, however, fail. It was during the years of the Cold War and in particular between the Sixties and the Seventies that the issues that led Turkey to look to the Mediterranean began to emerge. These included the Cyprus problem that caused a serious deterioration in relations between Greece and Turkey. While in the immediate post-war period relations between the two countries were quite stable, also thanks to a shared orientation on foreign policy since in 1954, encouraged by the Greek nationalist movement, demands had been presented to unite the island with Greece, relations then experienced rifts and quickly deteriorated. The independence and territorial integrity, of Cyprus ratified in 1960, did not last long and violence between the island’s two communities resulted in the Turkish government organizing military intervention, avoided thanks to intercession from the United States. Such violence did in fact occur in 1974, leading to the occupation of the northern

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part of the island that in 1983 was unilaterally proclaimed the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. The Cyprus issue brought about important changes in Turkish foreign policy. Lack of support from the United States ‘forced Turkish leaders to recognize that their strict adherence to Western alignment while the international system changed had left Turkey isolated in the world’ (Aydın, 2019: 370). This resulted in a rapprochement with the Soviet Union and aperture to non-aligned countries; more generally speaking there was ‘a new drive towards the Middle East’ while little changed regards to the perspective from which Turkey observed the Mediterranean. The eastern dimension remained the predominant one, although, in the course of the 1973–1974 oil crises, economic relations with Libya started to intensify. It was interesting how Turkey’s relationship with Libya was to return over time to become relevant in the context of the Cypriot crisis, as has also recently happened again.

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The Post-Cold War Period

These were just signs of the real change in Turkish foreign policy, firstly after the 1980 coup and the ensuing Turgut Özal government, and then in later years after the establishment of new conditions, after the end of the Cold War. Critical regards to the traditional approach adopted until then, entirely based on national security and of a reactionary kind, Özal, to whom the introduction of liberal market policies is also owed, decided to use foreign policy so as to exploit real and potential opportunities Turkey enjoyed thanks to its strategic position. The emergence of a de facto trading state changed the definition of priorities, abandoning a military and security-based approach in favour of one aimed at resolving conflicts and peace building, strategies that allowed Turkey to open up to new markets and attract investments. (Kiri¸sçi, 2009) Economic considerations therefore resulted in greater and more versatile commitment that was developed in various directions. With the end of the Cold War and the bipolar system, identity politics started to appear within the context of foreign policy; during the Nineties, Turkey started to emphasize the centrality of its own position, which allowed the country to move in a multi-directional manner towards the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Once again great attention was paid to the Middle East. The functionalist liberal approach allowed more opportunities and threats to appear in Middle Eastern countries, and the Arab world appeared as a promising

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market for expanding Turkish industries. Furthermore, intensifying relations with countries in the Middle East helped relations with the U.S. and EU, as proved by the role Turkey played in the 1990–1991 Gulf crisis in which it confirmed it was still a ‘strategic asset to the West’ (Altunı¸sık, 2009). As far as the Mediterranean was concerned, Cyprus remained the issue that dominated the stage. After Turkey and Greece had signed—not coincidently at the World Economic Forum—the 1988 Declaration of Davos thanks to which war was avoided between the two NATO countries, relations remained tense during the Nineties at least until the end of the decade. A series of attempts undertaken by the United Nations and the European Union to resolve the Cyprus issue failed and in 1993, the EU decided to start the membership process for Cyprus in view of a peaceful, lasting and stable solution of the Cypriot problem (Hale, 2000: 254). Relations with Greece, however, deteriorated during those same years due to a number of controversies concerning the Aegean area, firstly linked to the exploration of the seabed in search of oil which involved both countries and then for defining limitations to air space. During the Nineties the Cyprus issue, which also started to be reframed in terms of national security, underlined the emphasis on the Mediterranean region— in reality still mainly the oriental Mediterranean area—which had started to be defined as a separate geostrategic and cultural space with extended boundaries beyond its geographical reference points (Altunı¸sık, 2011: 11). Turkey actually considered the Mediterranean as an extended region that included the Balkans, the Caspian, the Black Sea, the Middle East and the Gulf, an area in which it obviously played an important connecting role. One of the reasons for this bond was the building of oil and gas pipelines linking the Caspian Sea with the Mediterranean. In 1999, an agreement was signed between Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan for the building of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, which was then started in 2002. The match over safe access to the Mediterranean Sea and the Middle East, as well as the protection of oil coming from the Caspian, was played around Cyprus. After years of crisis, relations between Greece and Turkey improved so much at the end of the Nineties, that Greek Minister George Papandreou started rapprochement policies with the Turkish government and also supported its candidacy as an EU member. Evidence of the about-turn in Greek-Turkish relations was the instant and consistent aid that Turkey offered following the Marmara earthquake. Again at the end of the Nineties, relations with Syria also appeared to improve

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after seeing Turkey greatly involved on the Middle Eastern stage. The reasons for which the two countries clashed were instead different ones, such as the conflict concerning the water resources of the Tigris and Euphrates; territorial claims regarding the province of Hatay (formerly Ottoman Alexandretta); support for the PKK’s Kurdish guerrilla warfare that was mainly based in Syria. The 1998 Adana Agreement resulted in a détente between the two countries, which also improved relations with Arab countries that were very critical of the country’s alliance with Israel. This was considered a serious problem since it was based mainly on military cooperation agreements signed as of 1996 and greatly supported by the United States. Thanks to this series of agreements and evidence provided also in the Balkans concerning multidirectional ways of taking action, and finally thanks to its EU candidature, in 1999, in Helsinki, Turkey ended the decade asserting itself as a real regional power, assuming assertive but cooperative tones also in line with what appeared to be community policies started with the Barcelona process.

5

Turkey and the Mediterranean under the AKP governments

With the arrival to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002, foreign policy showed great élan starting with the exploitation of the country’s geostrategic position. This new approach, according to which Turkey assumed a proactive role on various fronts, had its premises in an essay by Ahmet Davuto˘glu entitled Strategic Depth published in 2001. Davuto˘glu—Foreign Minister from 2009 to 2014—attributed great importance to geopolitics and in particular proposed a dynamic reinterpretation of Turkish geopolitics so as to increase the country’s global influence and its international aperture. As Baskin Oran (2012: xv–xvi) tried to summarize, this change in foreign policy was generally interpreted on the basis of three subjects: (1) Turkey had changed alliances by replacing a transatlantic axis with an Islamic orientation; (2) The Turkish government had pursued a policy of Neo-Ottomanism to then pursue an imperial policy similar to that of the Ottoman Empire. (3) Turkey should serve as a model for the democratization of Muslim majority societies. In reality, the history of foreign relations provides evidence of far more continuities and that even in the past, there had been times in which Turkey tried to redefine its own position also independently of Western powers (see the change of axis in the rapprochement with non-aligned

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countries during the Seventies) or to emphasize identity characteristics to strengthen its own regional role. What happened after 2002 was that Turkey did everything it could to assert itself as a ‘strategic medium power’ and, for the first time, with Davuto˘glu, had wide-ranging foreign policy strategies. This new approach was based on the creation of its own dynamic axis of civilization, a vast area of political, economic and cultural influence on which relations with bordering nations as well as others could be re-established. In order to re-launch this foreign policy, it was therefore necessary to lower the level of tension with neighbouring countries, privileging economic and cultural factors rather than institutional or regime rivalries. It was policy inspired by soft power, that so as to take Turkey to succeed in a positive and dynamic sense on the international stage, envisaged a significant passage from unilateral and static diplomacy to a multilateral approach (Davuto˘glu, 2001). The context within which all this took place was a favourable one; at a domestic level, Turkey was experiencing a positive conjuncture due to the political rift resulting from the AKP’s victory over a system that until then had been rather suffocating and authoritarian, economic revival, and the implementation of democratic reforms linked to the European integration process. At an international level, the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the American global War on Terror that followed, made Turkey’s role as a democratic and Muslim country all the more important. In addition to the peculiarity of its geostrategic position, the specificity of its cultural identity and historical experience of modernity also constituted important elements in this new foreign policy approach. The so-called Turkish model started to become a success; the country became a significant case that proved the possible coexistence between Islam and democracy. In fact, with a mainly Muslim population, Turkey managed to establish itself as a modern nation with a solid secular state organization, transforming its own political system into a multi-party democracy and creating a liberist economy (Keyman, 2012). This seemed particularly relevant within the scenario outlined following the attack on the Twin Towers, which caused a decisive change of direction in international relations and above all in the perception of Islam as a terrorist threat. In a post-9/11 context, Turkey presented itself as the go-between in the required mediation between Islamic nations and Western governments. Fuat Keyman (2009) suggests the idea according to which in observing current Turkish foreign policy, it is possible to notice that a perception

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of this country based on identity peculiarity has resulted in Turkey’s growing presence and increasingly active role in some areas of world politics. These areas are listed as follows: the occupation of Iraq and the Kurdish problem in relation to northern Iraq; the Iranian issue and the future of the Middle Eastern region; Russia’s position and Eurasia’s future; finally, as far as Europe is concerned, the crisis of multiculturalism and the Islamic issue. In this perspective, Turkey appeared to be a model nation for the creation of conditions of peace, stability and democracy in the Middle East but also in the Islamic world in general. During the first decade, the implementation of soft power policies—a combination of humanitarianism and international cooperation, export, cultural and religious diplomacy—also thanks to wide-ranging use of ‘non-conventional foreign policy instruments’ among them religious and educational networks, made the country a major hub of attraction for a region stretching from Southeast Europe to the Black Sea, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East (Öktem, 2012). In this new process involving international relations in which specific interconnected areas were outlined, the Mediterranean was revaluated in view of the creation of sea and waterway strategies. The policy of basins discussed in Strategic Depth lists among the three most important geopolitical areas of influence to so-called near maritime basins represented by the eastern Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Adriatic, the Red Sea, the Gulf and the Caspian Sea.3 The Mediterranean Sea is at the centre of a broader area of interest, as one of interaction and connection between various countries bordering with Turkey. Mediating, becoming a reference nation, acting with the ability to connect different geographies also resolving old issues or controversies between other countries became the Turkish government’s objective during those years. It is in this sense that one should also understand policies in favour of resolving the Cyprus controversy, which according to Davuto˘glu seemed essential for establishing positive relations with a network of countries such as Greece, Egypt, Syria and Israel. In 2004, the Turkish government supported the Annan plan as wished by the United Nations, a plan that did not, however, find consensus and this failure then had consequences on the country’s more rigid stance against Cyprus joining the European Union, the reason for which the integration process was halted and is still today one of the most critical issues in relations with the EU.

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Diplomatic initiatives, trade cooperation, strategies involving cultural hegemony became the base for consolidating relations with many Mediterranean countries and Turkey’s presence penetrated the Balkans and in particular Bosnia and Serbia, as well as being persistent in many North African countries (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia). Turkey’s mediating role was revived when Davuto˘glu was appointed foreign minister in 2009. There was, therefore, a clear improvement in relations with a number of countries, among them Syria, always considered a rival, with whom the Turkish government established a strategic partnership that included economic, cultural and military elements. In 2008, Turkey worked on setting up mediation in the conflict between Israel and Syria, but Israel’s attack on Gaza not only caused negotiations to fail but also had a negative effect on Turkish-Israeli relations. And it was with Israel that there was the most significant rift, summarized in Erdogan’s treatment of Shimon Peres at the World Economic Forum in Davos. The deterioration of relations with Israel followed a parallel course to Turkey’s commitment to the Israeli-Palestinian problem and was often seen as the result of the AKP’s new policy in the Middle East, which contemplated greater cooperation with Muslim countries. In this sense, the attack in international waters against a Turkish vessel carrying aid to the Gaza Strip that resulted in the death of nine Turkish citizens made things even worse. To this, one must add rapprochement with Iran, a country with which the Turkish government signed important agreements on electric and nuclear energy that did not improve relations with Israel. Difficult relations with Israel tarnished Turkey’s image as a peacemaking country but above all rocked strategies in the eastern Mediterranean. Relations between Israel and Greece strengthened with an alliance that in the years that followed, as well as more recently, became problematic for Turkey increasing the country’s isolation.

6 From ‘Zero Problems with Neighbors’ to an ‘Enterprising and Humanitarian Foreign Policy’ After almost ten years of policies based on soft power and on active globalization, on Davuto˘glu’s civilizational realist thinking of regional and global relations summarized in the expression ‘zero problems with neighbors’, in 2010, following the Arab uprisings in Tunisia and in Egypt, a

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period of great instability began during which new crises and challenges emerged (Aras & Keynam, 2019; Ayata, 2015; Del Sarto et al., 2019). There was a powerful crisis experienced by the authorities and by territorial integrity in many countries in the MENA region (Del Sarto, 2017). ISIS’ rising power in Syria and in Iraq starting in 2014 was an unprecedented reason for concern for the region’s security. Furthermore, within this context, other regional players such as Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States intervened in an increasingly significant manner, while the war in Syria provided Russia and Iran with new margins for manoeuvres in the area. Regional and global turmoil, to which one must add the 2008 serious global economic crisis, also affected Turkey. According to the periodization proposed by Keyman (2017: 58–60), there was a second stage of AKP foreign policy between 2010 and 2014–2015, in which proactivism had to be downsized. These were years during which Erdo˘gan’s power started to be seriously questioned with the Gezi Park protests of 2013, the corruption scandal and the rift with the Fethullah Gülen movement that would be later recognised as the organizer of the July 2016 coup. The authoritarian shift that had deteriorated in the course of the years also weakened the country’s until then greatly acclaimed international image of success as a democratic and Muslim nation in that region. Finally, a series of terrorist attacks, the attempted coup and the intensification of the Kurdish issue with the worsening of the conflict against the PKK contributed to destabilize Turkey even more, to the extent that it had to reset its foreign policy commitment and involvement in the MENA area. ˙ It was while protests were taking place in Turkey that Ibrahim Kalın, a top foreign policy adviser to the Turkish prime minister, resorted to the expression ‘precious loneliness’ to define the Turkish government’s new foreign policy attitude. Kalın at the time used this definition, as himself explained, as a way of expressing Turkey’s ‘honourable stance’ against coups and slaughters, as opposed to the world’s ignorance of the conflicts in Egypt and Syria. In just a few years, Turkey found itself moving from a status that envisaged ‘zero problems with neighbours’ to a situation involving uncertain borders, serious instability, great risks as far as national security was concerned and a state of tension with many countries. The new principle introduced at the end of 2015 was ‘the policy of regaining friends’ (Keyman, 2017: 64), mending relations, experiencing a crisis (e.g. with Russia) as well as creating new alliances, but this time based on selective priorities. In fact, while during the first decade foreign policy

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was more ‘multi-layered, multi-actor and multi-dimensional, as well as more regionally and globally engaging’ it now involved a more focused, selective and globally limited proactivity. (Keyman, 2019: 387) Choosing priorities were dictated by security issues and realist strategic thinking in which humanitarian rules played an important role. Humanitarianism, which, however, in this phase was accompanied by a return of hard power, remained one of the policies in continuity with the previous period. It was hence no longer based on a commitment using economic and cultural instruments, but rather a moral dictate that simultaneously motivated and legitimized strong, assertive and even aggressive action. Humanitarian work that characterized the AKP’s foreign policy at the beginning of the 2000s involved economic aid for Somalia and Sudan, civil aid for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, operations in Pakistan, Afghanistan as well as Syria.4 More recent aid provided to Syria was instead destined to the population in the North East affected by a military offensive called ‘Operation Peace Spring’ which from a Turkish perspective was aimed at creating a safe area at the border without the presence of Kurds from the People’s Protection Units (YPG), but sparked a serious humanitarian situation. This was an operation that gave rise to international condemnation and in particular threats of sanctions and weapons embargos from the EU. According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey Mevlüt Çavu¸so˘glu, an ‘Enterprising and Humanitarian Foreign Policy’ is the country’s new policy for international relations. It is a policy that ‘does not hesitate to take initiatives and at the same time take peace and development plans into account’.5 Humanitarianism, developmentalism, economic cooperation, but also the desire for greater independence are implemented in the context of Turkish foreign policy in order to consolidate the role of a pivotal state entrusting itself to hard power and overseas military interventions to do so.

7

East Mediterranean, Sea of Rivalries

The Mediterranean is one of the areas in which this policy is implemented and there have been various aggressive initiatives that have resulted in diplomatic controversies or international clashes. Many of these are linked to issues concerning the exploitation of underwater energy resources. In asserting Turkey’s role as a pivotal state, a country that does not produce

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oil or natural gas and that is basically dependent in the energy sector— the objective was to assert it as an energy hub and in particular, for the transporting of natural gas between the Middle East, the Caucasus and Europe. Interest in global energy politics, increasingly having a bearing also on globalization, has continued to increase in the course of the years 2000 and has begun to have a serious impact on foreign policy. In this sense, it fostered the construction of the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), the European leg of the Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), an immense project that will connect the giant Shah Deniz gas field in Azerbaijan to Europe. The pipeline is of strategic importance both for Azerbaijan and Turkey. It will allow the first Azerbaijani gas exports to Europe, beyond Turkey. It plays a significant role in regional energy supply security and bolsters Turkey’s strategic position as a key player in the Mediterranean region. The energy issue, however, contributes to a rise in strong rivalries in the Basin due above all to the discovery of underwater oil and gas fields (Sartori & Bianchi, 2019). These discoveries have resulted in huge controversy regarding maritime waters and have intensified the Cypriot issue as well as the clash between Turkey and Greece and more in general with Europe. There have been a number of exemplifying events such as Eni’s SAIPEM 12000 exploration ship being blocked by Turkish naval intervention in February 2018, the expulsion of the Israeli research vessel Bat Galim in December 2019; the exploration activities commenced by the Turkish drilling vessel Fatih, which in May 2019 launched offshore operations in waters claimed by the Republic of Cyprus as being under its sovereignty. Drilling operations by Turkish ships in the area off the coast of Cyprus, which Turkey describes as its own ‘continental shelf’ do not appear to have stopped in spite of the European Union inflicting sanctions on illegal exploration drilling undertaken in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the Republic of Cyprus (Seufert, 2020: 3). Turkey considers this drilling legal because it takes place in the territorial waters of Northern Cyprus—which are not recognized by any country other than Ankara. The Republic of Cyprus EEZ is instead recognized on the basis of maritime law also by other nations in the basin such as Israel, Egypt and Lebanon and similar agreements are being negotiated between Egypt and Greece. Furthermore, Turkey has not even signed the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and therefore considers null and void treaties referring to it. In recent years, therefore, a strategic alliance had been forming between Greece, Cyprus, Israel and Egypt, based not only on military cooperation

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but also on energy cooperation as proved by the creation of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) launched in Cairo in 2019 and later formalized as an international body of which Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan and Palestine are members, with support provided by the United States. The EMGF emphasizes Turkey’s isolation in opposition to what has been formed as an anti-Turkey front. Conditions created in the eastern Mediterranean involves external players, in particular the UAE, which already oppose Turkey in other fields amidst bitter regional rivalry. This situation has driven Turkey to sign an important maritime agreement with the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA), which also envisages strategic military cooperation. This is an agreement that according to many political analysts is part of Turkey’s brinkmanship and since it was announced has contributed to unsettling the waters of the Mediterranean. This maritime deal, useful as far as the Turkish government is concerned in providing legal coverage for oil and gas exploration, is part of a strategy to create new alliances in the current Middle Eastern turmoil. In the meantime, it is set in the context of growing rivalry between Turkey and the Gulf countries, with the exception of Qatar, and hence rebalances isolation from the Arab world to which the multilayered regional rivalry between Turkey, Egypt and the UAE contributes greatly. The deployment of armed forces is furthermore evidence of the military power of a NATO member that supports the legitimate government and one recognized by the United Nations, as well as the will to address terrorism at a regional level and beyond Syria. Finally, another interesting aspect is that by maintaining control over Libya, Turkey could play a more important role regards to a subject that is very delicate as far as the EU is concerned, that of refugees.6 In recent years, Turkey has experienced the importance of foreign policy in the management of the refugee crisis. A country that hosts the highest number of refugees, with about 4 million people of which 3.6 million are Syrians (Turkey hosts almost 4 million externally displaced people, approximately 3.6 million of whom are Syrians under temporary protection), Turkey has turned this welcoming policy into evidence of respect for the country’s humanitarian inclinations, but also an explicit negotiating card with the European Union. The recent crisis at the border with Greece, when the government declared the Turkish-Greek border open in retaliation for an attack against the Turkish army in northern Syria, was simply evidence that the often made threats to ‘open the gates’

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to Europe for refugees can happen quickly if so decided by Ankara. The issue involving refugees adds an element of complexity to relations between Ankara and the European Union, which due to the war in Syria, the situation in Cyprus as well as conflict with individual EU nations (e.g. France) have become increasingly difficult and constantly marked by reciprocal mistrust.

8

Conclusions

The race for energy resources, disputes over maritime waters and the refugee issue are subjects that overlap and that set the Mediterranean region in a crucial position for defining international relations both at a regional and global level. Although it has never had a general Mediterranean policy, Turkey recently rediscovered a geopolitical arena in the eastern Mediterranean in which it could exercise its influence and power, as well as redefine its position in relations with the Arab world in addition to the EU, the U.S. and NATO. While until recently Turkey proved that it could dynamically adapt its foreign policy to external conditions and develop strategies capable in some way of confirming its role as a geopolitical pivot in the Mediterranean basin, challenges to be faced nowadays have multiplied on various fronts. Turkey’s involvement in what are the most important challenges also concerning European and American interests in the Mediterranean—as well as those of new players such as the Gulf nations—makes it necessary to hope for greater cooperation, openness to dialogue and cooperation policies that will allow the overcoming of assertive policies that are leading to isolation. The country’s domestic instability leaves a margin of unpredictability regards to future developments and Turkeys ability to negotiate its own policies not only at a European level. The economic crisis and serious political situation caused by conditions that are very critical of democracy and the rule of law are factors that affect the definition of foreign policy and the country’s proactiveness as it attempts to gain not only visibility but also greater levels of legitimacy and negotiations at an international level. There are, however, still also important conditions that could imply a decisive redefinition of foreign policy. What is certain, however, is that Turkey plays a role that is not remotely negligible in recently established Mediterranean scenarios.

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Notes 1. This statement has often been reiterated by Turkey’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Çavu¸so˘glu. See for instance Çavu¸so˘glu (2019). The assertion according to which Turkey has the longest coastline in the Eastern Mediterranean as reiterated by the country’s Foreign Ministry is also frequently the object of a public debate. In fact, this assertion, in particular when not specifying that the length of the coast is referred to the continental line, reveals one of the founding elements of the so-called Aegean dispute linked to a different interpretation of maritime law: Turkey has not signed the Convention on the Continental Shelf nor the superseding United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, both of which have been signed by Greece. Hence, Turkey does not recognize the legal continental shelf and the EEZ around the Greek islands. 2. On Mediterranean Initiative and its perspectives see Lesser et al. (2000). 3. Then there are the ‘near land basins’ (the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caspian) and ‘near continents’ (Europe, North Africa, South Asia, Central Asia and East Asia) (Altunı¸sık). The Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus represented three areas of interaction and the Eastern Mediterranean as the fundamental geopolitical and geostrategic area. However, it remains only one of the regions overlooked by Turkey. 4. On the role played by humanitarian diplomacy in the AKP’s foreign policy and as the instrument for the reconstruction of Turkey’s global identity see Altunı¸sık (2019). 5. A synopsis of the Turkish foreign policy is available at Ministry of Foreign Affairs website: http://www.mfa.gov.tr/synopsis-of-the-turkish-foreign-pol icy.en.mfa [last access: 29 June 2020]. 6. This is what Güney Yildiz (2020) emphazises explaining the reasons for which ‘Libya for Turkey is a significant subcategory of several crucial foreign policy objectives’.

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Ayata, B. (2015). Turkish foreign policy in a changing Arab World: Rise and fall of a regional actor? Journal of European Integration, 37 (1), 95–112. Aydın, M. (2019). Foreign policy. 1923–2018. In A. Özerdem & M. Whiting (Eds.), The Routledge handbook of Turkish politics (pp. 367–377). Routledge. Aydınta¸sba¸s, A., Barnes-Dacey, J., Bianco, C., Lovatt, H., & Megerisi, T. (2020). Deep sea rivals: Europe, Turkey and new eastern Mediterranean conflict line. ECFR/322. https://www.ecfr.eu/specials/eastern_med [last access: 29 June 2020]. Çavu¸so˘glu, M. (2019, July 14). Comply with the proposal or we will continue. Kıbrıs Postası. http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-sayin-mev lut-cavusoglu_nun-kibris-postasi-gazetesinde-yayinlanan-makalesi.en.mfa [last access: 29 June 2020]. Davuto˘glu, A. (2001). Stratejik derinlik: Türkiye’nin uluslararası konumu. [Strategic depth: Turkey’s international location]. Küre Yayınları. Del Sarto, R. (2017). Contentious borders in the Middle East and North Africa: Context and concepts. International Affairs, 93(4), 767–787. Del Sarto, R., Malmvig, H., & Soler i Lecha, E. (2019). Interregnum: The regional order in the Middle East and North Africa after 2011 (MENARA Reports. Final Report 1), IAI. Fabre, T. (2010). Preface: At the frontiers of the Mediterranean. In D. Bechev & K. Nicolaidis (Eds.), Mediterranean frontiers: Borders, conflict and memory in a transnational world (pp. XI-XII). I.B. Tauris. Groc, G. (2000). Le paramètre turc dans l’espace public méditerranéen. In J. Henry & G. Groc (Eds.), Politiques méditerranéennes entre logiques étatiques et espace civil: Une réflexion franco-allemande (pp.191–209). Institut de recherches et d’études sur les mondes arabes et musulmans. Hale, W. (2000). Turkish foreign policy. 1774–2000. Frank Cass. Keyman, F. (2009). Globalization, modernity and democracy: In search for a viable domestic polity for a sustainable Turkish foreign policy. New Perspectives on Turkey, 40(1), 7–27. Keyman, F. (2012). Proactivism in Turkish foreign policy: The global-local Nexus. In A. Kadıo˘glu, K. Öktem, & M. Karlı (Eds.), Another empire: A decade of Turkey’s foreign policy under the justice and development party (pp. 19–33). Istanbul Bilgi University Press. Keyman, F. (2016). Turkish foreign policy in the Post-Arab spring era: From proactive to buffer state. Third World Quarterly, 12(37), 2274–2287. Keyman, F. (2017). A new Turkish foreign policy: Towards proactive “moral realism.” Insight Turkey, 19(1), 55–69. Keyman, F. (2019). Resetting Turkish foreign policy in a time of global turmoil. In A. Özerdem & M. Whiting (Eds.), The Routledge handbook of Turkish politics (pp. 378–390). Routledge.

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Kirisçi, K. (1999). Turkey and the Mediterranean. In S. Stavridis, T. Couloumbis, T. Veremis, & N. Waites (Eds.), The foreign policies of the European union’s Mediterranean states and applicant countries in the 1990s (pp. 250–294). Palgrave Macmillan. Kirisçi, K. (2009). The transformation of Turkish foreign policy: The rise of the trading state. New Perspectives on Turkey, 40(1), 29–57. Kiri¸sci, K., Tocci, N., & Walker, J. W. (2010). A neighborhood rediscovered. Turkey’s transatlantic value in the Middle East (Brussels Forum Paper Series), The German Marshall Fund of the United States. Lesser, I. O., Green, J. D., Larrabee, F. S., & Zanini, M. (2000). The future of NATO’s Mediterranean initiative: Evolution and next steps. RAND Corporation. Ögütçü, M. (2012). Rivalry in the eastern Mediterranean: The Turkish dimension. The German Marshall Fund of the United States. Öktem, K. (2010). The ambivalent sea: Regionalizing the Mediterranean differently. In D. Bechev & K. Nicolaidis (Eds.), Mediterranean frontiers: Borders, conflict and memory in a transnational World (pp. 13–34). I.B. Tauris. Öktem, K. (2012). Projecting power: Non-conventional policy actors in Turkey’s international relations. In A. Kadıo˘glu, K. Öktem, & M. Karlı (Eds.), Another empire: A decade of Turkey’s Foreign policy under the justice and development party (pp. 77–108). Istanbul Bilgi University Press. Öni¸s, Z. (2019). Turkey under the challenge of state capitalism: The political economy of the late AKP era. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 19, 1–25. Oran, B. (2012). Preface: A proactive policy with many hunches on the back. In A. Kadıo˘glu, K. Öktem, & M. Karlı (Eds.), Another empire: A decade of Turkey’s Foreign policy under the justice and development party (pp. XV– XXIII). Istanbul Bilgi University Press. Seufert, G. (2020, February 6). Turkey shifts the focus of its foreign policy. From Syria to the eastern Mediterranean and Libya. SWP Comment 2020/C. https://www.swp-berlin.org/https://doi.org/10.18449/2020C06 [last access: 29 June 2020]. Tziampiris, A. (2019). The new eastern Mediterranean as a regional subsystem. In S. Litsas, & A. Tziampiris (Eds.), The new eastern Mediterranean: Theory, politics and states in a volatile era (pp. 1–30). Springer. Vaner, S. (2005). L’obsession territoriale ou la douleur des membres fantômes. In S. Vaner (Ed.), La Turquie (pp. 39–60). Fayard-Ceri. Yildiz, G. (2020, June 1). How (and why) Turkey strengthened its grip on Libya despite Covid-19. ISPI Commentary. https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubbli cazione/how-and-why-turkey-strengthened-its-grip-libya-despite-covid-1926381 [last access: 30 June 2020].

Periphery No More: The Jazira Between Local, Regional and International Dynamics Andrea Plebani

Contents 1 2

Jazira as a Gateway for Syraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Al-Ahd’s Attempt to Link Syria and Iraq Through the Jazira: 1919–1920 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Jazira as the Heartland of the ‘Islamic State’ Project . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The Jaziran Shatterbelt/Buffer Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 The Many Fault-Lines Traversing Jazira . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Jazira as a Gateway for Syraq

The emergence of the self-proclaimed Islamic State (al-Dawla alIsl¯ amiyya, IS) in the liminal space between Syria and Iraq and its bid to overcome the so-called Sykes-Picot order (Kamel, 2016; Nehme Hamdan, 2016) have represented some of the most striking features of the sociopolitical agenda espoused by the movement. Raqqa and Mosul rose to the status of twin capitals of the organization, becoming two of

A. Plebani (B) Catholic University of the S. Heart, Milan, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 F. M. Corrao and R. Redaelli (eds.), States, Actors and Geopolitical Drivers in the Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69000-7_10

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the most recognizable symbols of IS’ power. Yet, despite their association with IS, the two cities have for centuries been an integral part of a broader sociopolitical, cultural and economic fabric: the Jazira. Defined by the mid-upper sections of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers (hence the name Jazira, ‘island’), the region represented the core of IS’ bid for Syraq. Despite being divided by the Syrian-Iraqi border and often being identified with its vast desert stretches, the region is home to an extremely diversified geoeconomic system comprising not only key Syrian and Iraqi cities but also important agricultural assets and significant hydrocarbon resources. The area has also maintained significant internal coherence based on extensive cultural and blood linkages, a distinct local identity and a cross-border economy built over licit commerce and illicit trafficking (Denselow, 2007). This coherence was further strengthened by an ethno-religious environment that, despite important exceptions, especially along its northern edges, has largely been dominated by Arab Sunni communities, by the resilience of important tribal dynamics as well as by the porosity of the Syria-Iraq border: factors that favoured an identification of the area with the bordering zones of Pakistan and Afghanistan (‘AfPak’): hence the term ‘Syraq’ which has often been used to indicate it (al-Marashi, 2013). As we will see, the Jazira was central for IS’ ascendance and survival. Yet, IS was not the only actor willing to exploit the above-mentioned features and the strategic role Jazira plays as a junction between the Levantine and the Mesopotamian systems. A century before, another movement focused on the region to give birth to another ‘Syraq’ ante litteram.1 In 1919–1920 the al-Ahd group tried to transform the areas of Deir el-Zor and Mosul into a launching pad for an offensive aimed at strengthening the bonds of the territories lying between the Mediterranean and the Gulf.

2 Al-Ahd’s Attempt to Link Syria and Iraq Through the Jazira: 1919–1920 Founded in 1913, al-Ahd aimed at countering the alleged decay of the Ottoman Empire. While at first, the group championed a reform of the Ottoman system, it later shifted its positions. During the First World War, the group developed a more Arab-centric vision centred around Syria, Mesopotamia and Hijaz: several of its members joined the Arab revolt and

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participated in the Sharifian administration of Syria (1918–1920) (Tauber, 1993). By the end of 1919, and after a split that divided the group along ‘Syrian’ and ‘Iraqi’ lines, the al-Ahd Iraqi branch stepped up its efforts aimed at transforming the Jazira into a launching pad for a campaign aimed at securing Iraq independence and at strengthening the bonds between Syrian and Iraqi provinces. While mainly controlled by British forces, the status of the areas lying between Deir el-Zor, Mayadin and Albu Kamal (now part of the Syrian state) was undefined since previous British-French agreements did not clearly delineate it (Rutledge, 2014). Exploiting this situation, the relative weakness of local British garrisons and their distance from the bulk of the forces on which London could count, on 11 December 1919, alAhd forces backed by local tribes occupied Deir el-Zor and spread further south towards Mayadin and Albu Kamal on the Euphrates.2 But al-Ahd was not interested in infiltrating the Euphrates riverine cities only. The organization aimed at a much bigger prize: Mosul, the most important city of the upper Tigris and of the whole Jazira. The group began the second phase of its offensive in June 1920, moving its forces eastward and occupying the town of Tal Afar.3 Despite this initial success, the coordinated assault that should have led al-Ahd to occupy Mosul with the support of its local chapter was thwarted by the intervention of British forces. The defeat, followed a few weeks later by the fall of the Arab Kingdom of Syria (July 1920), brought an end to the al-Ahd project to transform the Jazira into the essential junction of the Syria-Iraq-Hijaz triangle, setting the stage for the division of the region between Damascus and Baghdad (Tauber, 1991).4

3 Jazira as the Heartland of the ‘Islamic State’ Project A century later, even if on a bigger scale and with a deeper impact, IS also chose the Jazira as the core of its state-in-the-making. After the fall of the Saddam Hussein (S.add¯am H . usayn) regime (2003), the Tigris and the Euphrates had become extraordinary vectors for the insurgent forces challenging the new Iraqi order. al-Qaeda in Iraq (Al-Q¯aida f¯ı al-Ir¯aq, AQI), in particular, considered the areas located between the twin rivers as key logistic and military assets and devoted important resources to keeping the Tigris and Euphrates lines of communication between Syria and Iraq

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open. Yet, the group focused its strategy mainly on the so-called Sunni triangle: a largely Arab-Sunni inhabited area roughly delimited by Tikrit, Ramadi and Baqubah-Baghdad, with the latter representing the epicentre of its strategy. The elimination of al-Zarqawi (al-Zarq¯aw¯ı) in 2006, the defeats the group incurred while fighting against Shiite militias, Iraqi security forces and the US-led International Coalition, and the heightening opposition of many of its former allies (many of whom joined US-backed .sah.wa councils) (Benraad, 2011; McCary, 2009) obliged the organization (renamed Islamic State in Iraq in 2006) to abandon its strongholds in central Iraq and to relocate to the Nineveh governorate (Plebani, 2010). It is in this context that within its ranks emerged Abu Bakr alBaghdadi (Ab¯u Bakr al-Baghd¯ad¯ı). Appointed to the helm of the group in late 2010, al-Baghdadi launched a reform process that involved even the strategic domain: instead of focusing on Baghdad, the new leadership defined the Jazira as the ‘centre of gravity’ of the ‘Islamic State’ it wanted to establish. Unlike his predecessors, al-Baghdadi succeeded in fully exploiting the importance of the two rivers not only in military and logistic terms but also at the sociopolitical, identity and geopolitical levels (Plebani, 2017). Focusing on the Jaziran human, strategic and geopolitical linkages, the group presented itself as an alternative to the governments that pushed Syrian and Iraqi Sunni communities to the margins of their sociopolitical spaces, thus making partial inroads into the composite local social fabric (Benraad, 2017; Marr & al-Marashi, 2017). Obviously, this did not mean that the whole Jaziran population welcomed IS or adhered to its vision. Far from it: whole communities were obliterated and forced to flee their ancestral homes (Clapperton et al., 2017) as it happened to the Yazidi populations inhabiting the areas of Mount Sinjar or the Christian communities scattered over the Nineveh Plains (Sevdeen & Schmidinger, 2019). Yet, the group did not refrain from targeting members of the Islamic Sunni community too: tens of thousands were killed or forced to abandon their homes, in several cases well before the fall of Mosul in June 2014. In this sense, consciously or not, from a strategic viewpoint the group partially followed in al-Ahd footsteps: building on the strong linkages uniting Jazira, it chose it as its core. The battle for Mosul that led to the proclamation of the ‘Islamic State’ (June 2014) also bears interesting similarities with the plans elaborated by al-Ahd to seize the city: not only

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did both groups choose Tal Afar as their forward base, but both counted on the presence of fifth columns within Mosul to defeat their enemies. Yet, historical antecedents apart, IS’ bid for Jazira appears particularly significant in geopolitical terms: the ‘island’ broadly delimited by the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers was de facto equalled by al-Baghdadi to Sir Halford John Mackinder’s concept of heartland: a pivotal area, rich in resources, well connected, controlled by a single authority, relatively invulnerable to external attacks and ‘naturally’ destined to expand (Mackinder, 1904). All features fitting perfectly into an IS Weltanschauung considering the Jazira as the epicentre of a polity able to face any opponent whatsoever and destined to expand its reach well beyond the boundaries of Syria and Iraq. But IS’ identification with (parts of) the Arab Sunni heartland of Syria and Iraq also proved to be one of the group’s main limitations. It was not by mere chance that its offensive started to lose momentum once it moved beyond this ‘comfort zone’: at Samarra and in Diyala where it faced forces who swore to protect what they considered core Arab Shia territories lying further south, on the edge of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) where it had to face peshmerga units, as well as at Kobane where it had to cope with the stiff opposition mounted by local Kurdish forces destined to become the bulk of the Syrian Defence Forces (SDF).

4

The Jaziran Shatterbelt/Buffer Zone

Another geopolitical concept is particularly useful when looking at IS’ presence in the Jazira: the shatterbelt. Saul B. Cohen defines shatterbelts as deeply fragmented areas caught up in the competition between great powers yet not resulting in military confrontations between them. (Cohen, 2003). In this framework, Washington, Teheran, Moscow and Ankara (only to cite some of the most important players in the Syrian and in the Iraqi fields) developed a complex web of relations with local forces, paramilitary groups and militias that, while officially justified by the strength of the ‘Islamic State’, served also to preserve their positions in the Jazira and to balance the presence in the area of their main competitors. For the Islamic Republic of Iran, in particular, the battle for Syria and Iraq was crucial not only to protect two of its most important regional partners but also to keep open what Fabrice Balanche defined as the ‘Iranian land-bridge to the Levant’: a string of territories stretching from

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the Gulf to the Mediterranean where the regime could count on the support of a network of local allies and proxies able to expand its influence well beyond its borders (Balanche, 2018). In so doing, Iran aimed at compacting the space comprised between the Levantine, Mesopotamian and Gulf subsystems, de facto replicating one of the strategies Mackinder associated with land powers. On the contrary, despite varying notably over time and being characterized by multiple and often competing strategic goals, Washington followed a two-fold approach aimed at defeating IS and at breaking the continuity of the ‘Iranian land-bridge’. On the one hand, it strengthened its collaboration with old (Iraqi security forces and KRI peshmerga units) and new (Syrian Democratic Forces) allies deemed fundamental to counter IS and to avoid the deployment of too many ‘boots on the ground’. On the other, it stepped up its presence within the Jazira through a string of outposts located in north-eastern Deir el-Zor, along the southern edge of the Syrian-Iraqi border (al-Tanf base) and in the al-Anbar province (Ayn al-Asad base): a triangle that, while increasing American options in the battle against IS, at the same time was a thorn in the side of Tehran’s strategy. While adopting a strategic stance less centred on the Jazira, Russia and Turkey too increased their presence in the area. The former played a pivotal role in restoring Damascus’ hold over much of Syria and has added to its bases along the Mediterranean coast a significant presence in northern Syria on both sides of the Euphrates River, thus reaffirming its role as a crucial stakeholder in the whole wider Mediterranean region (Kofman & Rojanski, 2018; Lovotti et al., 2020). Albeit widely perceived as less coherent and more controversial than the strategy adopted by its Russian counterpart, Turkey’s strategy was also marked by a strong dynamism. After being accused of maintaining an opaque stance towards IS, Ankara launched a series of major offensives in northern Syria aimed at severing the group’s lines of communication with the outer world and at consolidating its positions in the area. At the same time, Ankara mobilized its web of local proxies to weaken SDF strongholds in order to avoid the formation of an autonomous administration on its southern borders (Rojava) accused of maintaining strong ties to the outlawed Kurdistan’s Workers Party (PKK). In so doing, Turkey further distanced itself from most of its NATO partners, de facto exposing a series of major fissures that emerged in all their depth, especially after Ankara’s rapprochement with Moscow.

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In such a complex ‘game of shadows’, patron-client relations were often blurred, with local proxies demonstrating to be not just mere puppets in the hands of external backers, but actors able to exploit the terms of the relations for their own interests. Particularly significant, in this sense, was the strategic alignment developed by Washington with the Kurdish forces operating in Syria and in Iraq as well as the partnership Ankara developed with parts of the Syrian opposition. Albeit marked by different equilibriums and raisons d’être, the multitude of Iranian-backed militias operating in Syria and Iraq also acted according to similar logics. The situation changed dramatically when IS’ hold over Syraq began to crumble. In a certain sense, and albeit rarely acknowledged, ISheld territories represented for years a sort of buffer zone dividing key players operating in the area. Especially in Syria (albeit, as we will see, the reasoning holds partially true also for Iraq when considering the difficult relations between the Kurdistan Regional Government and the government of Iraq over the status of the disputed areas) (Meier, 2020), the very presence of IS over an arch bisecting the country from north to east resulted in the formation of a buffer zone that avoided direct confrontation between local and international opponents mustering almost irreconcilable positions.

5

The Many Fault-Lines Traversing Jazira

With the liberation of Mosul (June 2017) and Raqqa (October 2017), IS’ territorial base began to crumble and with it the ‘barrier’ separating the group of local, regional and international actors operating in the area. A new era of open competition having Jazira as its epicentre began. The first sign of major developments in this sense came from northern Iraq. In September 2017, sensing that the war against IS was nearing an end, the leadership of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) organized a referendum calling for independence. Building on the strong ties it had forged with Washington and Ankara as well as on the moral and political capital it acquired during the war against al-Baghdadi’s forces, the KRI tried to secure its aspirations despite the pleas for moderation coming from its key partners. Yet, no regional or international player was ready to risk antagonizing Baghdad while the battle against IS was still raging for a bid that, while rooted in historical Kurdish aspirations, was also directly linked to intra-KRI political calculus. When the crisis escalated, Baghdad, backed by Iran and counting on US and Turkish

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non-intervention, got the upper hand: Kirkuk and most of the disputed areas returned under Baghdad’s formal control, while Iran-aligned militias consolidated their presence further, increasing Tehran’s influence in the region (International Crisis Group, 2017; Palani et al., 2019). Northern Syria also represented a critical flashpoint. The important role played by the SDF in countering IS allowed them to craft a solid partnership with Washington, thus limiting Turkey’s ability to cope with a movement considered a major threat both for its alleged ties to the PKK and for the support it gave to the Rojava autonomist project. After a first operation launched in 2016, in the framework of the war against the ‘Islamic State’, from 2018 onwards, Ankara stepped up its pressure on SDF-held areas along the Syrian-Turkish borders. In late 2019, despite important reservations expressed by US military and political circles, Washington finally agreed to withdraw most of its forces, de facto creating the conditions for a new major offensive. While succeeding in extending Ankara’s influence over northern Syria, Operation Peace Spring fell short of eradicating the SDF presence from the area, resulting in a fragile entente based on an uneasy compresence of a wide array of actors along the Syrian side of the border. Amongst them: Turkish and Turkishbacked Syrian forces, Russian military police, Syrian border guards and US-backed SDF units (Aydınta¸sba¸s, 2020). While forced to relinquish control over several Kurdish-inhabited areas, the SDF managed to maintain their hold over much of the territories they seized east of the Euphrates, remaining a critical player in the region. Equally important, they kept their ties with Washington intact as attested to by the presence of a small US contingent in the area of Rmelan—de facto a deterrent aimed at countering further Turkish moves against a partner Washington deems crucial to keep IS’ resurgence at bay. KRI and Rojava aspirations apart, the most important fault-line passing through the Jazira remains that of Washington’s opposition to Tehran and to a wide array of Iranian-backed forces operating both in Syria and Iraq. Largely composed of Iraqi militants operating under the insignia of the Popular Mobilization Units (H . ashd al-Sha b¯ı—PMU) (Alaldin, 2017; Plebani, 2019), these groups are widely perceived as an essential part of the Iranian grand scheme aimed at keeping the Levant and the Mesopotamian subsystems open. Their presence in Syria was extremely important in protecting key Shiite holy sites as well as to expanding Damascus’ reach over territories previously under IS or opposition control. While less visible than before, their presence in Albu

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Kamal and in the surrounding areas also proved fundamental to keeping open the Iranian land-bridge to the Levant (Hasan & Khaddour, 2020; Knights, 2019). Yet, it is in Iraq that these units play a much more significant role. Building on the critical role they played in halting and then repelling IS, they entrenched themselves within the Iraqi political, economic and security sectors. It is also for this reason that, despite having been formally integrated into the Iraqi security forces, Hashd units with strong ties to Teheran succeeded in preserving much of their autonomy and in consolidating their presence in a string of Jaziran territories stretching from al-Anbar to Diyala. These factors, coupled with their alleged involvement in attacks and demonstrations targeting US personnel in Iraq, favoured a military escalation that reached its apex with the January 2020 military strike that killed Major General Qasem Soleimani (Q¯ass¯ım Sula¯ım¯an¯ı) at the Baghdad airport.5 The death of Soleimani represented a terrible blow for the Islamic Republic: not only he was considered the mastermind behind the web of Iran-aligned paramilitary units spread all over the region but also he was a crucial actor in multiple theatres, Iraq and Syria above all. His elimination, together with that of Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis (Ab¯u Mahd¯ı al-Muhandis), deprived pro-Iran PMUs of their top references and risked drawing the whole region into a major military escalation. Tehran’s limited reprisal, coupled with the outrage aroused in multiple strata of Iraqi society and the partial withdrawal of US forces stationed in the country, avoided the explosion of an all-out war. Yet, tension remains extremely high and the risk of a major confrontation is far from being eliminated. Finally, despite being a pale shadow of the group that succeeded in extending its grip over much of the Iraqi and Syrian states, the ‘Islamic State’ is far from having been completely vanquished. Existing evidence suggests that well before being expelled from its last strongholds, the organization planned a ‘post-territorial’ phase aimed at preserving its remaining resources and at creating the conditions to wage prolonged guerrilla warfare (Hassan, 2017). In this framework, instead of infiltrating and controlling key urban areas in the provinces located along the SyrianIraqi border, the group seems to have partially switched its focus to more peripheral areas in Deir el-Zor, Kirkuk and Diyala, deemed ideal to wage a campaign of attrition having significant similarities with the strategy, its predecessor, the Islamic State in Iraq, was forced to implement in 2008. Even if devoid of stable territorial bases, then, the huge resources the organization accumulated, the influence it exerted over the region for

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more than five years, the protracted volatility of the Jazira and the surge of IS-related activities registered in the past few months (Knights & Almeida, 2020) all attest to the group’s resilience.

6

Conclusion

Neglected for decades and considered no more than a liminal area, the Jazira was ‘rediscovered’ after IS extended its grip over much of the Iraqi and Syrian territories lying between the Tigris and the Euphrates rivers. Building on its sociopolitical and cultural coherence as well as on its geopolitical and economic potential, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi succeeded in transforming largely peripherical areas into the heartland of a state-inthe-making destined, according to its supporters, to alter the equilibriums of the whole Middle Eastern system. Such a situation impacted dramatically on local populations as well as on a wide array of local, regional and international actors: while under IS’ control, the Jazira became one of the major shatterbelts of the MENA region, at the same time acting as a sort of buffer zone able to separate multiple actors mustering conflicting interests and agendas. In this context, while being hailed as the dawn of a new era, IS’ alleged demise did not coincide with a return to the status quo ante. Kept at bay by the presence of a common enemy, the tensions that remained latent for years exploded with renewed intensity, throwing the Jazira into a new spiral of violence that risks transforming the whole area into a major flashpoint for years to come.

Notes 1. Another interesting antecedent is represented by the Mosul-centred Zengid emirate which in the twelfth and thirtieth centuries succeeded into extending its authority over large swaths of the Jazira and beyond (ElAzhari, 2016). Yet, for the purpose of this analysis, the author considered it more proper to focus on al al-Ahd’s experience only. Allegedly, the Zengid emirate represented a point of reference for Ab¯ u Mus.‘ab al-Zarq¯aw¯ı, widely considered one of the founding fathers of the ‘Islamic State’ (Weiss & Hassan, 2015). 2. Foreign Office, The National Archives, FO 371/5128, Report on the Events at Dair ez-Zor during November and December 1919, A. Chamier, January 2nd, 1920, F. 93–107.

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3. Cabinet Papers, The National Archives, CAB 24/111/1, Report on the Recent Attack at Tel Afar, L. F. Nalder, June 25th, 1920, F. 8–9. 4. Cabinet Papers, The National Archives, CAB 24/111/1, Report on the recent attack at Tel Afar, L. F. Nalder, June 25th, 1920, F. 8–9. 5. The strike also resulted in the death of another nine people, including the deputy chief of the Popular Mobilization Committee, Ab¯ u Mahd¯ı alMuhandis.

Bibliography Alaldin, R. (2017). The origins and ascendancy of Iraq’s Shiite militias. Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, 22, 143–158. Al-Marashi, I. (2013, September). Iraq’s security outlook for 2013. Italian Institute for International Political Studies (pp. 1–10). Aydınta¸sba¸s, A. (2020, May). A new gaza: Turkey’s border policy in northern Syria. European Council on Foreign Relations (pp. 1–31). Balanche, F. (2018, August 17). From the Iranian Corridor to the Shia crescentdemography and geopolitics. Hoover Institution (pp. 1–12). Benraad, M. (2011). Iraq’s tribal “Sahwa”: Its rise and fall. Middle East Policy, 13(1), 121–131. Benraad, M. (2017). Mosul, Sunni Arabs and the day after. In A. Plebani (Ed.), After Mosul: Re-inventing Iraq (pp. 91–108). Ledizioni LediPublishing. Clapperton, M., Jones, D., & Smith, M. (2017). Iconoclasm and strategic thought: Islamic state and cultural heritage in Iraq and Syria. International Affairs, 93(5), 1205–1231. Cohen, S. B. (2003). Geopolitics of the world system. Rowman & Littlefield. Denselow, J. (2007). Mosul, the Jazira region and the Syrian-Iraqi borderlands. In R. Visser & G. Stansfield (Eds.), An Iraq of its regions. Cornerstones of a federal democracy? (pp. 99–122). Hurst Publishers LTD. El-Azhari, T. (2016). Zengi and the Muslim response to the Crusades: The politics of Jihad. Routledge. Hasan, H., & Khaddour, K. (2020, March). The transformation of the IraqiSyrian border: From a national to a regional frontier (pp. 1–36). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Hassan, H. (2017). Insurgents again: The Islamic state’s calculated reversion to attrition in the Syria-Iraq border region and beyond. CTC Sentinel, 10(11), 1–8. International Crisis Group. (2017, October 17). Oil and borders: How to fix Iraq’s Kurdish crisis, crisis group (pp. 1–16). International Crisis Group Middle East Briefing 55.

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Kamel, L. (2016). Artificial nations? The Sykes-Picot and the Islamic state’s narratives in a historical perspective. Diacronie. Studi Di Storia Contemporanea, 25(1), 1–19. Knights, M. (2019). Iran’s expanding militia army in Iraq: The new special groups. CTC Sentinel, 12(7), 1–12. Knights, M., & Almeida, A. (2020). Remaining and expanding: The recovery of Islamic state operations in Iraq in 2019–2020. CTC Sentinel, 13(5), 12–27. Kofman, M., & Rojansky, M. (2018). What kind of victory for Russia in Syria? (pp. 6–23). Military Review. Lovotti, C., Tafuro Ambrosetti, E., Hartwell, C., & Chmielewska, A. (2020). Russia in the Middle East and North Africa: Continuity and change. Routledge. Mackinder, H. J. (1904). The geographical pivot of history. The Geographical Journal, 23(4), 421–437. Mackinder, H. J. (1919). Democratic ideals and reality: A study in the politics of reconstruction. Constable and Co., Ltd. Mackinder, H. J. (1943). The round world and the winning of the peace. Foreign Affairs, 21(4), 595–605. Marr, P., & al-Marashi, I. (2017). The modern history of Iraq. Westview Press. McCary, J. (2009). The Anbar awakening: An alliance of incentives. The Washington Quarterly, 31(1), 43–59. Meier, D. (2020). ‘Disputed territories’ in northern Iraq: The frontiering of in-between Spaces. Mediterranean Politics, 25(3), 351–371. Nehme Hamdan, A. (2016). Breaker of barriers? Notes on the geopolitics of the Islamic state in Iraq and Sham. Geopolitics, 21(3), 605–627. Palani, K., Khidir, J., Dechesne, M., & Bakker, E. (2019). The development of Kurdistan’s de facto statehood: Kurdistan’s September 2017 referendum for independence. Third World Quarterly, 40(12), 2270–2288. Plebani, A. (2010). Ninawa province: Al-Qa‘ida’s remaining stronghold. Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel, 3(1), 19–21. Plebani, A. (2017). After Mosul: What fate for IS in Iraq? In A. Plebani (Ed.). After Mosul: Re-inventing Iraq (pp. 127–157). Ledizioni LediPublishing. Plebani, A. (2019). Janus in the land of the two rivers: What role for militias in Iraq? In R. Alaaldin et al. (Eds.), The rise and the future of militias in the MENA region (pp. 32–41). Ledizioni LediPublishing. Rutledge, I. (2014). Enemy on the Euphrates. The Battle for Iraq 1914–1921. Saqi Books. Sevdeen, B., & Schmidinger, T. (2019). Beyond ISIS: History and future of religious minorities in Iraq. Transnational Press London. Tauber, E. (1991). The struggle for Dair al-Zur: The determination of borders between Syria and Iraq. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 23(3), 361–385.

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Chaos in the Heart of The Mediterranean: The Libyan Crisis After the Fall of Al-Qadhafi’s Jam¯ah¯ıriyya (2011–2021) Alessia Melcangi

Contents 1 2

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ‘We Win or We Die’: The 2011 Revolt Against Al-Qadhafi and the Collapse of the United Libya Ideal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 One Libya, Two Powers, One Thousand Militias: From the Second Civil War (2014–2015), Through the Skhirat Agreement (2015) Until the Defeat of the Islamic State (2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The Globalization of the Conflict: Libya in the Eastern Mediterranean’s Geopolitical Great Game Between Turkey’s Ambitions and the Risk of a New War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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A. Melcangi (B) Department of Social Science and Economics, La Sapienza University, Rome, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 F. M. Corrao and R. Redaelli (eds.), States, Actors and Geopolitical Drivers in the Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69000-7_11

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1

Introduction

The outbreak of the so-called Arab Spring in Libya in 2011 caused the toppling of the long-standing authoritarian regime of Muammar alQadhafi (Muammar al-Qadhdh¯af¯ı): however, unlike many other states affected by the uprisings that saw the beginning of a transitional period often followed by delusive results, the Libyan revolt soon turned into a dramatic civil war torn by the continuous meddling of regional players. The shattering of the political system, the dissolution of the central authority and military force with a monopoly over the use of weapons, the re-emergence of tribal legacies together with an open struggle between warring factions, fuelled by the agendas of regional and international powers, clearly shows the collapse of the post-revolutionary institutional frame. After the ouster and murder of al-Qadhafi, the country passed through different stages in which various actors moved by conflicting interests, tried to solve or inflamed the conflict with disastrous results for the country and, above all, for all Libyan citizens. Today the country appears ready to open a new chapter of its recent history following the ceasefire agreement signed in October 2020 by the warring parties and the election of a three-person Presidency Council, headed by Muhammad Mnefi (Muh.ammad Y¯unis al-Manf¯ı), and the creation of a Government of National Unity (GNU), headed by the Prime Minister, Abdul Hamid Dbaiba (Abd al-H . am¯ıd al-Dubayba), in the framework of the UN-mediated political talks. Nevertheless, the general picture is anything but changed: Libya continues to be at the mercy of a dangerous fragmentation and violent clashes, divided among different local actors who claim legitimacy to exercise political and economic control over the country. Although the two sides’ foreign patrons officially declared their support for the new government, regional and international actors such as Turkey—which backed Tripoli-based militias and the military coalition allied with the former Government of National Accord (GNA)—on one side, and Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Russia—which all covertly supported General Khalifa Haftar (Khal¯ıfa H . aftar)-led forces—on the other, continue to interfere, as in the past, on the Libyan theatre. In the middle there are hundreds of non-state actors, militias, movements and paramilitary armed groups connected to the two factions as well as a difficult process of national reconciliation that

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started as many times as it was frozen. Thus, the Libyan conflict can still degenerate into a critical military escalation that will spread to the entire Middle Eastern region involving, inevitably, the Mediterranean area. Libya, in fact, due to its history, is at the core of the Mare Nostrum: in past decades it was involved in exchanges of goods and people between the two shores and, more dramatically, in recent days, in human smuggling and the illegal trafficking of migrants. The contemporary history of the country seems to have catapulted Libya to the centre of the political agendas of many countries such as the European one, in particular Italy, which has always considered the North African state its ‘backyard’. Current internal events closely connect Libya with the new geopolitics and geoeconomics of the eastern Mediterranean and all the regional and international interests that are developing within it. Thus, the country’s dangerous instability could potentially involve, with serious effects, the northern shore of the Mediterranean basin and all the Middle East. How we got to this point and which were the phases leading to such a conundrum with still unpredictable results is what we will analyze in the following paragraphs, starting from the political, economic, social and cultural failures of four decades of al-Qadhafi’s rule that led to the 2011 uprising until the present possible outcomes.

2 ‘We Win or We Die’: The 2011 Revolt Against Al-Qadhafi and the Collapse of the United Libya Ideal A large amount of studies can be found on the beginning of the Libyan uprising and the subsequent fall of the al-Qadhafi regime (Aghayev, 2013; Cole & McQuinn, 2015; Erda˘g, 2017; Pack, 2013; Prashad, 2012; Smits et al., 2013): many of them focus, in particular, on the spontaneity of the popular protests that began in February 2011. Although they raged on in the wake of the Arab Spring, they soon distinguished themselves from the Tunisian and Egyptian revolts: the riots in Libya not only led to the end of al-Qadhafi’s Jam¯ ah¯ıriyya or ‘state of the masses’, but ushered in an unstoppable process of political, economic and social fragmentation of the country, as well as a civil war between rival groups with conflicting interests linked to a system of transversal and variable loyalties. The roots of these revolts can be traced to the 40 years of the Libyan ra’¯ıs ’ management of power: al-Qadhafi, in his extraordinarily

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lengthy regime, thanks to oil revenues was able to transform Libya into a modern oil economy and maintain social contracts with his subjects, providing, however, more a distributive largesse than a successful employment policy and economic modernization (Erda˘g, 2017: 29; Pargeter, 2012). Thus, the political structure that supported this economy was strictly connected to a power system based on severe control over politics and security, strengthened by the systematic suppression of all opposition, an unequal redistribution of wealth in the country and a vicious alliance between nepotism and money which annihilated any sense of political community (Joffé, 2013). Moreover, under the regime the eastern part of Libya, Cyrenaica, was politically and economically marginalized from the centre, so much so that it had represented the heart of the opposition to al-Qadhafi’s rule since his rise to power in 1969. A policy of statelessness, as Dirk Vandewall states (2012: 211), where all institutions were used as a channel for the spread of nepotistic practices, while the central authority and the military forces were collapsing under the emergence of a combination of different levels of loyalties: to family, kinship, tribe, Islam, Arab nationalism, African unity. As soon as socio-economic contradictions emerged, the ethnic, tribal, geographic and ideological fissures present started to come to the surface of an imminent revolution. On February 15, 2011, the protests against the regime began in Benghazi where a group organized a ‘Day of Rage’ to demand political and economic reforms (Sawani, 2014). The regime’s brutal repression and the lethal use of force on protesters resulted in the UN’s decision to enforce the arms embargo and impose a no-fly zone with UN-security Council Resolution 1970, approved on February, 26, 2011 and the subsequent Resolution 1973 on March 17, 2011. The protests began to spread around the country and in the same month the opposing forces came together under the Benghazi-based first Libyan independent government, the National Transitional Council (NTC), declaring itself the representative of the Libyan people (Pack, 2013). With the intervention of France and Great Britain in support of the anti-government rebels, the Libyan crisis opened a second stage characterized by internalization: ‘The concept of “the responsibility to protect” constituted the grounds for legitimacy for the humanitarian intervention in Libya in terms of international law’ (Bellamy, 2011; Erda˘g, 2017: 30). Thanks to the NATO operation begun on March 25, 2011, when airstrikes damaged al-Qadhafi’s defences by targeting key infrastructure including military compounds, airports and government

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buildings, and the advance of the loyalist forces was stopped in favour of the opposition forces. Eventually, the latter began to get the upper hand against the regime’s forces in Benghazi, Ajdabiya, Misrata, and in the summer, Tripoli was besieged (Cole & Khan, 2015). In October the rebels, who were composed of a mix of civilians, former soldiers and religious organizations, conquered Sirte, the last stronghold of the regime and the hometown of al-Qadhafi, where, irony of fate, the ra’¯ıs was finally killed. Al-Qadhafi left a country deeply fragmented in a political scenario marked by violent struggle: in the first moment, it seemed possible to revive the state’s institutions, providing them with the legitimacy they never had through creation of the NTC and leading the country to the 2012 election. But in reality, the post al-Qadhafi transition period opened the door for a non-state order characterized by split sovereignty, with rebels taking over major cities and regions, contesting the al-Qadhafi regime’s claim to legitimacy, and establishing their own leadership of local military councils (Lacher, 2020: 19). If, on the one hand, the centrifugal forces of the subnational or supranational loyalties of the groups organized on the basis of individual cities, neighbourhoods or tribes, soon appeared to be disintegrative of the social fabric and extremely divisive,1 on the other, the historical dualism between Cyrenaica and Tripolitania became overbearing as the consequence of a polarization of interests that soon led to a de facto division of the country. Meanwhile, the army and security apparatus had largely collapsed along with the regime. In August 2011 the NTC adopted an Interim Constitutional Declaration, which was supposed to set the road map for and the guiding principles of, the post-al-Qadhafi transition based on the need to initiate a national reconciliation process for the creation of new institutions, for the revitalization of a national identity and for a renewed balance among the various components of power in Libya. This body would have six months to organize the general elections of an interim parliament, the General National Congress (GNC), which in turn would nominate a government and appoint a constituent assembly tasked with drafting the country’s constitution (both within thirty days of the GNC being sworn in). This period inaugurated a difficult phase of ‘nation building’ and ‘state building’: it was characterized by the limits soon shown by the NTC, caused by a fragmented coalition clearly dominated by eastern Libyan personalities with no effective political leverage over the revolutionary forces as they emerged on the ground and no monopoly of coercive military force.2

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Indeed, the first problem of this transitional stage was related to the role played by the th¯ uww¯ ar, or revolutionaries, who actively participated in the ouster of al-Qadhafi and refused to disarm, fearing they would be marginalized in the future state organization. At the same time, this revolutionary camp started to split into sub-groups with their own agendas and goals, a situation that complicated the possibility of reintegrating them into the new political institution. ‘The executive branch was thus reduced to convincing different militias and opposition groups to incorporate under the aegis of national institutions (such as the army, police force, different bureaucracies and ministries)’ (Vandewalle, 2015: 24). The militias, which initially were an instrument of liberation, became very swiftly a source of concern to the NTC, especially because most of the brigades were not willing to hand over their weapons or to leave Tripoli but instead claimed control over the controlled areas’ energy resources. For a long time, the formation of a new Libyan national army remained the principle security weak point that a political organization like the NTC was unable to face. The transitional government tried to marginalize old regime supporters and initiated a programme of ‘disarmament, demobilization and reintegration’ (DDR) of militias but, due to the lack of an official coercive force, none of these goals could be achieved: in turn, during the transitional period, these groups became the principal effective security actor (Kadlec, 2012; Laessing, 2020; Ziad, 2017). Renewed fighting between militias in the first week of January 2012, especially between that of Misrata and Zintan on the periphery of Tripoli, led NTC leader Mustapha ‘Abd al-Jalil (Mus.t.af¯a Abd al-Jal¯ıl) to warn of the risks of another civil war. Abd al-Rahim al-Kib (Abd al-Rah.¯ım al-K¯ıb), head of the NTC’s executive board, appointed after the resignation of Mustafa Abd al-Jalil on October 23, 2011, attempted a series of options, such as the establishment of the Libyan Shield and the Supreme Security Committee, to unify many unaffiliated militia groups under a central command, aiming at exerting control over them. The former was created with special security tasks related to the government and the latter with a role similar to a revolutionary National Guard. The Libyan Shield was under the Ministry of Defence while the Supreme Security Committee was under the Ministry of the Interior. However, despite the initial intentions, both were steeped in the problem of ‘dual affiliation’ and ‘double loyalty’ of militias: on the one hand, loyalty to the central authority, on the other hand to local memberships or tribal ties. A dangerous bipolar attitude that—during

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periods of political crises—could reactivate sectarianism and lead to the disintegration of the newly formed national security forces (Pack et al., 2014). In July 2012 Libya held its first free and democratic elections, with unexpected results: a new political entity emerged, the Justice and Construction Party (H ala wa al-Bin¯ a ), founded as the polit. izb al- ‘Ad¯ ical wing of the Muslim Brotherhood organization (Jam¯ a at al-Ikhw¯ an al-Muslim¯ın) (Fitzgerald, 2015), which won fewer seats than Mahmud Jibril (Mah.m¯ud Jibr¯ıl)’s National Forces Alliance (Tah.¯ aluf al-Quww¯ a al-Wat.aniyya—NFA), a broad-based coalition of many political organizations and associations that won the elections. The newly elected body had to deal with some of the principal challenges since the end of the revolts: ‘establishing the legitimacy of interim-governing institutions; rebuilding state institutions and the economy while integrating the militias in a unified police and military force; securing borders and collecting weapons to avoid arms proliferation’ (Mezran, 2014). Of course, these goals could not be reached due to the GNC’s extreme fragmentation. In this complex political scenario, the September 11, 2012 attack on the US embassy in Benghazi, in which Christopher Stevens, the US ambassador to Libya, and three other American officials lost their lives, made clear a phenomenon that has progressively grown in the country: the presence of terrorist groups linked to radical Islamism, the most important of which was Ansar al-Sharia (Ans.¯ ar al-Shar¯ıa bi-L¯ıb¯ıy¯ a )3 (Pargeter, 2013). The fall of al-Qadhafi opened new public spaces for Libya’s Islamist groups whose members had been in exile or imprisoned for years. In the twenty months following al-Qadhafi’s ouster, their increasing influence in the political sphere came as a surprise to many, especially to those who believed that Libya’s transitional roadmap would ensure the success of the more liberal, western-friendly forces (Wehrey, 2018). The reasons that led to the gradual political pre-eminence of Islamist forces are multiple, but it is clear that evolving strategies among the various Islamist groups, and reactions to their perceived growing strength within the GNC at the expense of the more liberal political forces, played an important role in influencing the political process and the constitutional path, including their delays. Trapped between the political impasse, the presence of different militias and Islamist organizations, ‘instead of establishing an inclusive reconciliation and transitional justice process, on April 11, 2013 the GNC issued the Political Isolation Law with the aim

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of removing former al-Qadhafi personnel from the country’s political, economic, educational and security institutions4 : this law represented a purely punitive instrument, without any of the conciliatory measures that have proved instrumental in reconstructing several other states after civil wars’ (International Crisis Group, 2013). In 2013, clashes among militias and tribes, targeted political assassinations, kidnappings and energy supply blockades took place all over the country, especially in the South and in the East. All these events soon led to the beginning of the second Libyan civil war.

3 One Libya, Two Powers, One Thousand Militias: From the Second Civil War (2014–2015), Through the Skhirat Agreement (2015) Until the Defeat of the Islamic State (2017) In 2014 the Libyan crisis reached its peak with the formation of two governments and two Parliaments and with the definitive interference of international and regional powers that contributed to nurturing the country’s divisions. Moreover, in the same year General Khalifa Haftar, a former army officer and al-Qadhafi protégé who returned from exile in 2011, entered the scene, worsening the pre-existent fight between the Islamist groups and liberals. In fact, the 2013 military coup in Egypt increased tensions within the GNC: many in the NFA saw this body as incapable of maintaining control of Libya’s post-revolutionary institutions and avoiding clashes between militias, and accused the Muslim Brotherhood faction of being guided by the fear of counter-revolutionary plots and, as a consequence, of hijacking government institutions (according to the Egyptian, Saudi Arabian and the UAE media discourses). This struggle escalated, paralyzing the institutions, while the political climate began to be polarized, violence between the eastern and western militias increased (Lacher & Al-Idrissi, 2018: 5) and the GNC was locked in an internal struggle over appointment of the new Prime Minister, following the ouster of ‘Ali Zaidan (‘Al¯ı Zaid¯an) on 4 May. It was in that convulsive context that on May 16, 2014, General Haftar, commanding the self-titled Libyan National Army (al-Jaysh alWat.an¯ı al-L¯ıb¯ı, LNA), launched airstrikes called ‘Operation Dignity’ against Islamic extremists, conflating Ansar al-Sharia with political Islamists who nominally embrace the democratic process, like the

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Muslim Brotherhood, and increasing the polarization in Libya along Islamist/non-Islamist lines.5 This operation dealt a blow to the transitional process that would prove fatal. ‘Across the country, military officers, army units and tribes began expressing their support for Haftar, as did Jibril’s NFA. Meanwhile, the self-described revolutionaries saw themselves confirmed in their fear of counter-revolutionary plots’ (Lacher, 2020: 36). The clash was not simply about East versus West, as is often portrayed, but more for political and ideological reasons. ‘For instance, the Tripolibased government viewed Haftar’s LNA military campaign in Benghazi as a coup attempt to disrupt Libya’s democratic transition. Nationalists in the East defended the General for ridding Benghazi of extremist groups that terrorized citizens and were involved in the killing of US Ambassador Christopher Stevens in 2012’ (Badi et al., 2019: 27). In his struggle against Islamist groups, Haftar gained the political and military support of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and UAE, already long engaged in a fight against political Islam, which they considered a dangerous political threat. Libya held its second parliamentary elections on June 25, 2014 and the newly elected parliament, the House of Representatives (HoR), dominated by non-Islamist groups, took office in the capital in early August. According to international observers, the election was a failure due to low voter participation (about 18%) that was only a third of that seen in the 2012 elections, data that underlines how these elections contributed neither to a real path to the country’s democratization nor to giving institutions the legitimacy they needed. Contested parliamentary elections led to the formation of two rival administrations: one in the western capital, Tripoli, and another in the east. The split came after an Islamist bloc, backed by armed groups united in the Libya Dawn (Fajr L¯ıb¯ıy¯ a ) group,6 refused to end the 18-month transitional mandate of the now-defunct GNC, also as a reaction to their defeat in the election. In a state of civil war, the confrontation in Tripoli between Islamist factions and forces loyal to strongman Khalifa Haftar ultimately led the newly elected HoR to move to the eastern city of Tobruk. The country now had two rival parliaments: the democratically elected HoR in Tobruk, comprising a majority of nationalists and federalists backed by Haftar’s LNA, and a resurrected GNC in Tripoli, an entity dominated by Islamists and with a long-expired mandate. But, besides the dual political governmental structure, two armies were shaped by militias, the Libyan Dawn and the group led by Haftar, the LNA.

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Libya’s political transition appeared definitely disintegrated amid the violence of armed groups, their influence over government institutions and policy and the serious absence of a legitimate central government and security apparatus. The nation- and state-building processes had been wrongly based only on the electoral process rather than on the attempt—accompanied by the international community—to build institutions and strengthen the rule of law promoting an open discussion about the premises needed to rebuild the new Libyan nation. As expected, this failure, worsening the fractures within society, ratified the definitive collapse of the country into two rival camps. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE were on one side, becoming the political and security backers of General Haftar’s LNA, and Qatar and Turkey on the other, supporting Islamists; this fuelled the conflict and played a substantial role in the ultimate splitting of the country into two opposing governments. In September 2014, the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) brokered what became an institutional dialogue between rival factions which led to the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) signed in Skhirat (Morocco) in December 2015. It stemmed from the idea of creating a Presidency Council (PC) tasked with forming a unity government accommodating the Tobruk-based HoR and the Tripoli-based GNC, and reintegrating militias, but unfortunately resulted in failure.7 In fact, all the governing bodies involved in the agreement, such as the HoR, the High Council of State, the PC and the GNA (Government of National Accord) based in Tripoli and headed by the Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj (F¯ayaz al-Sarr¯aj)—he was appointed PC President and also Prime Minister of the GNA—soon began to be locked in a power struggle, triggered also by external actors. Although the GNA become Libya’s internationally recognized government, it was never endorsed by the HoR, as envisioned by the UN-backed deal. The result was the formation of competing security command structures between the administrations in the East and West, parallel central banks and competing national oil corporations. This situation soon became one of the reasons for the inefficiency of al-Sarraj’s government, leading to growing discontent that rapidly eroded consensus for the GNA. While the US, UK, France (although in an extremely ambiguous way, since it was supporting Haftar’s ambitions, too), Germany, Italy, Spain, the European Union (EU) and of course, the UN, continued to strongly support the council, recognizing the unity government it nominated, Egypt, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey persisted in fuelling

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the division among the two Libyan factions: the Skhirat deal was not able to eradicate Egypt and the UAE’s conviction that the Qataris and the Turks were providing arms to the Islamists and the Muslim Brotherhood, nor Qatar and Turkey’s equal conviction that Egypt and the UAE were providing them to Haftar (Mezran & Varvelli, 2017). In this chaotic context the radical jihadist movement known as ‘Islamic State’ (IS–al-Dawla al-Isl¯ amiyya) found a safe haven for transforming Libya into a hub for coordinating broader regional violence, further complicating the political and security scenario. IS took root in Libya (Wehrey & Al-Rababa’h, 2015; Schmitt, 2015), especially in Derna and Sirte, to supplement the largely domestic al-Qaeda (al-Q¯ a ida) entities and their affiliates with foreign fighters from Syria and Iraq. Immediately, the group found in Libya a breeding ground for spreading mayhem due to easy access to weapons, the presence of weak institutions and easily crossed borders: between 2014 and 2016 it was able to reposition the country on the global jihadist circuit, transforming it from a transport hub to a final arrival destination (Melcangi, 2019). Between 2015 and 2016, at the height of its diffusion, the organization grouped around 4,000 to 7,000 members and controlled about 200 km of coastal territory from Derna, the historical stronghold of Libyan Islamism, to Benghazi and Sirte, thus threatening the Libyan ‘oil crescent’. Haftar’s ‘Operation Dignity’ succeeded in removing the jihadists from Derna, forcing them to move and strengthen their presence in the Sirte and Sabratha area, a fundamental hotspot for smuggling from sub-Saharan Africa to the Libyan coast through the Fezzan region. However, IS’s final decline began in 2016 with the intervention of pro-government forces, mainly Misrata militias under the formal direction of the GNA, helped by US bombardments, that released Sirte in December 2016. In mid-January 2017 the US bombing of terrorist training camps together with the pressure exerted by Haftar’s LNA with the aforementioned ‘Operation Dignity’ against the East’s jihadist groups pushed Daesh to regroup in south-western Libya. In the meanwhile, equipment provided earlier through the UAE and continuing support from Egypt played a key role in enabling General Haftar to seize much of the Gulf of Sirte’s ‘oil crescent’, with its oil and gas production, refining and export facilities, confirming his position as Libya’s strongest military force. So, between 2014 and 2018 Libya became a theatre of violent clashes between rival forces and opposing external players in the midst of a political and economic collapse: the UN-brokered LPA did not lead to the

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desired stabilization, and the effectiveness and power of the GNA were always frustrated by competition with the HoR. The protracted conflict took a heavy toll on the economy8 and, above all, on the Libyan people: at the end of 2017 the UN Refugee Agency estimated that more than 217,000 people had been internally displaced and approximately 1.3 million people needed humanitarian assistance in Libya.9 A disastrous humanitarian crisis that worsened the political chaos: after a series of failed international meetings (Cairo, Dubai and Paris in 2017; Paris again in 2018 followed by a meeting in Palermo in the same year; Abu Dhabi in 2019), organized with the aim of discussing an end to the conflict, and with new elections approaching–scheduled under the auspices of the UN representative Ghassan Salamé (Ghass¯an Sal¯ama) for April 2019—the situation in the country returned to a critical point. Thanks to the military support of his regional sponsors and the international community’s lack of willingness to intervene, on April 4, 2019, Haftar, after taking control of the south-western region of Fezzan, began a military campaign to conquer Tripoli and the entire country. The General’s intention was to capture the capital in a short time, freeing the whole country from the Islamist groups. However, the reality on the ground immediately proved arduous and the siege soon turned into a 14-month war of attrition. This is how the situation on the ground welcomed the year 2019.

4 The Globalization of the Conflict: Libya in the Eastern Mediterranean’s Geopolitical Great Game Between Turkey’s Ambitions and the Risk of a New War Since April 2019 Libya has fallen back into the downward spiral of a new civil war: in the face of the Western countries’ reticence to intervene, the regional powers made their triumphant entry, increasingly boots on the ground, dragging the country into a sort of ‘proxy war’ whose reflections intertwine with the current eastern Mediterranean’s geopolitical Great Game. In the last decade, this sector of the Sea has grown in importance thanks to the natural gas discoveries in the Levantine Basin that could potentially offer considerable economic and political opportunities for

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regional development and cooperation among coastal countries. Considering all of the gas fields present in the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of Israel, Cyprus, Egypt, Lebanon and Palestine, it was estimated that this area contains more or less 122.4 trillion cubic feet of recoverable gas (Schenk et al., 2012). As a consequence, in recent years the eastern Mediterranean region became a hotspot for the global natural gas industry, attracting increasing attention from multiple stakeholders also as a result of its high geopolitical and geoeconomic stakes. It is enough to imagine how these gas-field discoveries are shaping the region, elevating it to a potential geostrategic game-changer for international politics. Indeed, besides the emergence of sub-regional bilateral and multilateral cooperation between the coastal countries for the extraction and marketing of gas, on a geopolitical level, a real scramble for access to gasfield resources is underway: it is shaping a new balance of power between Egypt, Israel, Cyprus and Greece and a new competition for hydrocarbon resources between them and Turkey (Aydınta¸sba¸s et al., 2020). One of Ankara’s main foreign policy goals is to avoid being excluded from the exploitation of these deposits: in fact, while at the centre of the oil and gas exports bound for Europe from Russia and the Caspian Sea countries, Ankara needs to import about 75% of its energy needs. Thus, Turkey wishes to participate in this scramble for eastern Mediterranean gas resources, but this strategic projection is fiercely opposed by Israel, Greece and Cyprus—since 2017 tensions have been incrementally rising over competing claims about the island’s EEZ—and their geopolitically rival Arab axis led by the UAE, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In particular, this regional fight can be read in light of the long-standing conflict within the Sunni world that opposes Turkey and Qatar, fierce supporters of political Islam, to the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which from the ousting of President Muhammad Morsi (Muh.ammad Murs¯ı) in 2013 have waged a battle against the now banned Muslim Brotherhood. The creation of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) in 2019, a sort of ‘gas cartel’, strongly supported by Cairo together with Tel Aviv, Nicosia and Athens, not only risks reducing the importance of Turkey’s Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) and Turkish Stream gas pipelines (TurkStream), but also marginalizing Ankara from gas exploitation investment projects in the eastern Mediterranean (Melcangi, 2020b). Added to this there is a gas pipeline project which should link eastern Mediterranean fields—including Egypt’s Zohr, and Israel’s Leviathan and Tamar—with European markets bypassing Turkey

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altogether. Conflicting legal claims to the fields have led to the creation of a new geopolitical front in the eastern Mediterranean that closely overlaps with the Libyan issue. The game was afoot: these tensions spilled over to the Libyan crisis, when Turkey turned the tide of the civil war by joining the side of the GNA in December 2019, signing a memorandum of understanding with Tripoli along with a maritime demarcation agreement that would allow Ankara to drill for energy resources in Cypriot and Greek Mediterranean areas.10 This agreement on the borders of EEZs, violating international rules on the delimitation of national waters, can also be read as a Turkish reaction to the strategy of Egypt, Cyprus, Greece and Israel and a way to reshape its position in the Mediterranean energy dispute (Sönmez & Ya¸sar, 2020). Supporting the UN-backed Tripoli government of Prime Minister al-Sarraj, Muslim Brotherhood-linked factions and other Islamist actors who belong to the GNA, with shiploads of weapons, military equipment, intelligence officials for military training and militias deployed from Syria, Ankara was able to turn the tables, ensuring that Tripoli would not fall. A presence on the ground that, moreover, could assure further benefits for Turkish consumer goods and its construction companies on the Libyan market (International Crisis Group, 2020) and be a guarantee for its ideological ambition of re-boosting Islamic political activism, obsessively feared by Haftar’s backers in the Gulf and by Egypt. Turkey’s strategy increasingly globalized the conflict, opening a new phase of the Libyan war, with regional and global powers committed to manoeuvring for influence and supremacy, weaponizing their interests in the country in order to augment their political and military meddling at the expense of other international powers, including EU countries. The regional powers’ moves in Libya led to a rapid rearmament of the competing coalitions with the consequent escalation of tensions. After a long stalemate in Haftar’s attacks on Tripoli on April 4, 2019, the arrival in September of Sudanese, Chadian and Russian mercenaries of the Wagner Group—provided respectively by the UAE, Egypt and Russia in support of the LNA–and the ingress of Syrian militias alongside the Turkish troops allied with the GNA in January, provoked a profound change in the balance of forces on the ground (Mackinnon, 2020). The January 2020 Berlin Conference on Libya, although immediately hailed as a victory for international diplomacy, in reality was unable to achieve a ceasefire or enforce the largely ignored arms embargo on Libya—which was imposed by the United Nations Security Council

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through UN Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011) and UN Security Council Resolution 2292 (2016). Only a few days after the ceasefire agreement, the fragile truce was violated by the rival factions, thereby showing the inability of international institutions to decipher the reality on the ground and to act accordingly. The stance taken by Turkey and Russia in the Libyan context clearly filled the gap left by the disarticulated and hesitant Euro-Atlantic and US response to the crisis; two months later the head of UNSMIL, Ghassan Salamé, resigned from his post: there hasn’t been a single day when weapons, ammunition and men haven’t arrived in Libya. The two Libyan camps have never stopped fighting, especially Haftar’s forces which, despite the numerous previous promises, on January 19 imposed an oil blockade that, according to the National Oil Corporation (NOC), caused a cumulative loss of about $5 billion,11 enough to prevent the country from covering even 10% of salaries, taking it to its knees. On March 25, 2020, the GNA, in response to continuous attacks by the LNA, launched the ‘Peace Storm’ counteroffensive which in a short time was able to roll back Haftar’s forces from the western coast while Turkish air defence systems and drones, targeting his bases and supply lines, fatally wounded his project to conquer Tripoli. Soon the GNA’s forces gained the upper hand after retaking Tripoli’s airport, all the city’s main entrances and exits, and a string of key points, such as the al-Watiya airbase, the last major stronghold of the LNA in Tarhuna, forcing the General’s fighters to retreat to pre-April 2019 lines. In order to prevent Haftar’s collapse, the already strained regional allies, fearing losing their grip on Libya’s East and their interests in the country, tried to resume the diplomatic path by demanding a ceasefire. On June 6, Egyptian President Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi (Abd al-Fatt¯ah. alS¯ıs¯ı) announced a new political endeavour aimed at finding a diplomatic resolution for the conflict. The so-called ‘Cairo Declaration’, backed by Haftar and Libya’s parliamentary speaker, Aguila Saleh (Aq¯ıla S.¯alih. ¯Is¯a), proposed an intra-Libyan resolution based on a presidential council election, the drafting of a constitutional declaration to regulate elections for a later stage and the resumption of the 5+5 Libyan Joint Military Commission under the auspices of the UN12 . The declaration was quickly welcomed by Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan, and Bahrain, which each voiced their support for an end to the ongoing disputes in Libya. But, unsurprisingly, asking for the disbandment of militias and the handover of their weapons to the LNA—presented as Libya’s

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only security provider—together with the demand to expel foreign mercenaries from the country (referring, however, only to those supporting the GNA), provoked the strong refusal of Ankara and Tripoli. The following events are part of recent history. During the summer of 2020, Libya dangerously danced on the edge of the abyss of an enlarged war. Surprisingly, in October 2020 the different local and regional actors on the ground opted to return at the negotiating table converging on a ceasefire agreement (UNSMIL, 2020) that was signed between the two sides’ military commanders, under UN auspices. A historic milestone in the fragile Libyan context, which paved the way for a new phase characterized by the return to UN-brokered political negotiations. In early February 2021, after a series of UN-mediated political talks, the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF)—which brought together 75 participants as representatives of the country’s multiple constituencies—nominated a three-person Presidency Council headed by Muhammad Mnefi and a Prime Minister, Abdul Hamid Dbaiba, with the task of forming a government of National Unity (GNU). In March, the new interim executive obtained a confidence vote and the agreement of the two parallel governments to the transfer of powers as well as a general consent of the respective military coalitions to collaborate with it. The final goal of the GNU is to prepare the country for the parliamentary and presidential elections planned on December 24, 2021: not a simple task considering the deep-rooted political division and the societal rifts caused by years of war. In addition, there is the perception of a weak government of national unity, not fully representing the interests of all the Libyan groups and a still fragmented military landscaper that hampers any credible reform of the security sector (Lacher, 2021). Indeed, despite the GNU and the international community’s request for a withdrawal of foreign military forces and private military contractors, different foreign troops—mercenaries, foreign fighters and official state troops—remain in the country. Turkey and Russia continue to maintain a significant military presence in Libya, facing each other in the SirteAl Jufra region, considered to be a “red line” that no one should cross. While Ankara strengthened its control on the Wutiya air military base, a few hundred miles south of Tripoli (Badi, 2021), for its part, Moscow enhanced its military presence at the Al Jufra base, in central Libya, a few hundred miles south of the city of Sirte (Harchaoui, 2021). Instead, Egypt has bet on relaunching the diplomatic path, appearing since fall 2020 as the most compromise-seeking actor among the Libyan general’s backers (Melcangi, 2021), actively supporting the new Libyan executive.

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In this new contest, the UAE still maintains an ambiguous position: from the one hand, Abu Dhabi apparently started to recalibrating its foreign policy priorities, taking a sort of “strategical pause” in the Libyan crisis and officially confirming its support for the new government; on the other hand, it is rumored that it continues its disruptive policies on the ground (Fattah et al., 2021). It is undoubted that the persistent presence of these meddling powers risks to exposes Libya to renewed violence and political fragmentation, making a sustainable and lasting pacification hardly likely at the moment.

5

Conclusion

As we have seen, Libya, due to its geographical position, is at the centre of the dynamics of the Mediterranean, a basin that, following the recent energy discoveries, has once again become a fundamental geopolitical pivot of regional and international interests. And Libya is paying dearly for its geostrategic position at the centre of the Mare Nostrum: soon after the 2011 uprising, all the negative trends that would afflict the country in the following years began to emerge. That is, the lack of national leadership, political localism and fragmentation that resulted in the proliferation of militias and warlords, could be read as the inevitable outcome of the previous structural socio-political conditions. However, all these domestic factors have been aggravated by the weight of external interventions, led by regional and international powers that have projected their national interests onto this country. A geopolitical confrontation soon translated into military, economic and political support for rival factions which heightened the internal fragmentation. A negative spiral exacerbated by NATO’s withdrawal after the fall of al-Qadhafi and by the UN Security Council’s limited interest. It is hardly possible to foresee future scenarios, as there are too many variables in play, pressing challenges that the GNU has to deal with in order to create a viable political transition and carry out the UN-backed roadmap leading to the presidential and legislative elections scheduled for December 24, 2021. First of all, there is a lack of consensus on the constitutional framework for elections, since the country has neither a constitution nor an electoral law. A factor that risks to derail the fragile political process, together with the well-known political, military and socio-economic problems affecting Libya since the fall of al-Qadhafi regime (Mezran and Al-Ghwell, 2021). Since 2014, the political and

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geographical division of the country had made any attempts at reunification ineffective. Although the new interim government has recently taken some steps in the direction of reunifying the country and its divided institutions, persisting controversy on the resources’ allocation and the institutional frame, together with the harsh economic crisis, could put the political situation into a dramatic deadlock (International Crisis Group, 2021: 8). After the oil blockade was lifted in September 2020, oil production has almost returned to pre-blockade levels, which could guarantee a general improvement of the country’s economic and social conditions (Mezran and Melcangi, 2020: 1–2). Nevertheless, there are multiple difficulties in dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic, improving the delivery of basic services and rebooting the economy. In the security field, the reality on the ground is that militias continue to fortify and protect their positions in western Libya—sometimes representing part of the state apparatus without any accountability—while the east continues to be in the hands of various groups and militias only apparently unified under the name of Haftar’s LNA. Even more crucial is the presence of foreign troops which represents a fundamental backbone for the military coalitions that support the two rival Libyan factions: Russian-backed mercenaries alongside the Haftar forces, Turkey-backed Syrian fighters on Tripoli’s side and a vast range of African armed groups that have been operating in Libya since the start of the conflict. The withdrawal of foreign fighters is a fundamental pre-condition for the political stabilization, without which the risk of renewed hostilities at a later stage remains, triggered by their antagonistic interests in the country. In this general picture, there is a concrete possibility that the country might slip again into the abyss of war. Nevertheless, there is also room for improvement, especially considering the ongoing de-escalation between the war’s main external protagonists—Turkey and Qatar, on one side, and Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, on the other—which could pave the way for a credible international convergence behind a political path forward and for a constructive approach to a peaceful settlement in Libya. The recent reengagement of the US and the EU in the Libyan dossier may play a crucial positive role, further testified by the new Operation EUNAVFOR MED IRINI (launched in March 2020 by the European Council ): indeed, a new failure of the political processes in Libya is a scenario that many, Italy in primis, but also the US, cannot easily accept. Italy thinks that a fragmented Libya would only increase its own security problems, and the US does not want a thorny Russia consolidation in the Mediterranean.

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Considering what the country represents for its energy resources, the regional competition for oil and gas control could represent the next pivotal element of the confrontation. Libya’s stabilization will depend on the balance of powers that will be set up in the near future and on the capacity to create viable national security forces and to implement much-needed economic reforms. While the success of these conditions is uncertain, on the contrary it is evident that the price of Libya’s instability will have an impact on the whole Mediterranean basin.

Notes 1. Al-Feitouri, A. H. (2011). Al-mashr¯ u al-L¯ıb¯ıy¯awakhuturat inzilaqehi il¯adawlat al-qabiliyya [The Libyan project and the danger of a tribal state], al-Hewar Mutamaden, 3 June. https://www.ahewar.org/debat/show.art. asp?aid=261647. 2. Rakik, A. A. (2011). Limaslahati man tata’kharu al-mus.¯alah.¯at alwat.aniyya? [Who benefits from delaying national reconciliation], al-Watan Libya, 19 November. https://www.alwatan-libya.com/more.asp?ThisID= 18,108&ThisCat=22. 3. The group emerged after the collapse of the al-Qadhafi regime and was able to gather together most of the existing Islamist militias. It spread mainly to Derna and Benghazi, which were the main centres of Islamist mobilization. To secure the support of the population, the movement focused on charitable activities, always pursuing the goal of creating a constitution that would guarantee the application of shar¯ı‘a. There is also good reason to believe that Ansar al-Sharia planned and organized the attack on the US diplomatic compound in Benghazi on September 11, 2012. ¯ 4. General National Congress. (2013). Al-Mutamar al-Watan¯ı al-Amm  yaqirr q¯an¯ un al- azl al-siy¯as¯ı [The GNC approves the Political Isolation Law], 5 May. http://www.gnc.gov.ly/legislation_files/635131800 553722968.pdf. 5. Ahram Online. (2014). I want to cleanse Libya of muslim brotherhood: Haftar. 20 May. http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/8/101 760/World/Region/I-want-to-cleanse-Libya-of-Muslim-BrotherhoodHaft.aspx. 6. Al-Monitor. (2014). Dawn of Libya Forces impose control on Tripoli. 25 August. https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/08/libya-tri poli-control-hifter-tribal-forces.html#. 7. Temehu. (2015). Al-ittif¯aq al-siy¯as¯ı al-L¯ıb¯ı [The Libyan political agreement]. 17 December. https://www.temehu.com/GNA/Libyan-PoliticalAgreement-17-December-2015-arabic.pdf.

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8. World Bank. (2018). Libya’s economic outlook—April 2018. http://doc uments1.worldbank.org/curated/en/209171523638294449/pdf/125 257-MEM-April2018-Libya-EN.pdf 9. UNHCR. (2017). Libya. 23 October. https://www.unhcr.org/libya. html. 10. Butler, D. and Gumrukcu, T. (2019). Turkey signs maritime boundaries deal with Libya amid exploration row. Reuters, 28 November. https:// www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-libya/turkey-signs-maritime-bounda ries-deal-with-libya-amid-exploration-row-idUSKBN1Y213I. 11. Reuters. (2020). Libya’s losses from oil blockade almost $5 billion: NOC statement. 28 May. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-oil-res ults/libyas-losses-from-oil-blockade-almost-5-billion-noc-statement-idU SKBN2333DT. 12. Al-Youm al-Sabaa. (2020). Il¯an al-Qh¯aira kh¯arit.at t.ariq liwaqf naz¯ıf al-h.arb wa ila al-mas.lah.at al-wat.aniyya fi L¯ıbiy¯a [The Cairo Declaration. A road map for stopping the war bleeding and boosting the national interest in Libya]. 8 June. https://www.youm7.com/story/2020/6/ 8/%D8%A5%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9% 82%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%B1%D8% B7%D8%A9-%D8%B7%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%82-%D9%84%D9%88%D9% 82%D9%81-%D9%86%D8%B2%D9%8A%D9%81-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8% AD%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%88%D8%A5%D8%B9%D9%84%D8%A7%D8% A1-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B5%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%A9-% D8%A7%D9%84%D9%88%D8%B7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9/4813115.

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Schenk, C. J., Brownfield, M. E., Charpentier, R. R., Cook, T. A., Klett, T. R., Kirschbaum, M. A., Pitman, J. K., Pollastro, R. M., & Tennyson, M. E., (2012). Assessment of undiscovered oil and gas resources of the Levant Basin Province, Eastern Mediterranean (pp. 1–4). U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet 2012–3046. Schmitt, J. (2015). ISIS in Libya—Exploitation and governance of areas of limited statehood (pp. 1–28). International Institute for Counter-Terrorism. https:// www.ict.org.il/Article/1471/ISIS-in-Libya#gsc.tab=0. Smits, R., Janssen, F., Briscoe, I., & Beswick, T. (2013). Revolution and its discontents: State, factions and violence in the new Libya (pp. 1–75). Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’. Sönmez, G., & Ya¸sar, N. T. (2020). Making sense of the crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean and Turkish involvement in Libya. The Georgetown Journal of International Affairs (GJIA), 15 June. https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2020/ 06/15/making-sense-of-the-crisis-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-and-turkishinvolvement-in-libya/. UNSMIL. (2020). Unsmil welcomes agreement between Libyan parties on permanent country-wide ceasefire agreement with immediate effect, 23 October. https://unsmil.unmissions.org/unsmil-welcomes-agreement-bet ween-libyan-parties-permanent-country-wide-ceasefire-agreement. Vandewalle, D. (2012). A history of modern Libya (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press. Vandewalle, D. (2015). Libya’s uncertain revolution. In P. Cole, & B. McQuinn (Eds.), The Libyan revolution and its aftermath (pp. 17–30). Oxford University Press. Wehrey, F. (2018). The burning shores: Inside the battle for the New Libya. Farrar, Straus, and Giroux. Wehrey, F. & al-Rababa’h, A. (2015). Rising out of chaos: The Islamic State in Libya. Carnegie Middle East Center, 5 March. http://carnegie-mec.org/ diwan/59268. Ziad, A. A. (2017). Militia institutionalisation and security sector reform in Libya (pp. 1–43). IEMed, EuroMeSCo. https://www.iemed.org/publicaci ons-en/historic-de-publicacions/papersiemed-euromesco/35.-militia-instituti onalisation-and-security-sector-reform-in-libya.

The Unfinished Transition. The Post-revolutionary Path of Tunisia and the Test of Covid19. A Historical and Socio-Economic Perspective Renata Pepicelli

Contents 1 2 3

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . An Historical Overview: The Building of Contemporary Tunisia . From Revolution to Present days (2010–2020) Between Successful Results and Betrayed Promises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The Effects of Covid19 in Tunisia: Magnifying Lenses on Fragility and Regional Inequalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 The Social Victims of Pandemic Between Economic Crisis and Gender Inequalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Social Conflict and Protests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Conclusions. Beyond the Myth of the Tunisian Exception . . . . . . . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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R. Pepicelli (B) Department of Civilization and Forms of Knowledge, University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 F. M. Corrao and R. Redaelli (eds.), States, Actors and Geopolitical Drivers in the Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69000-7_12

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1

Introduction

This contribution aims to analyze the post-revolutionary path of Tunisia by placing it, on the one hand, within the historical, political and economic processes that led to the formation of contemporary Tunisia and, on the other hand, within the challenges that the country has been facing since the end of Ben Ali’s regime in January 2011. Lights and shadows of the so-called democratic transition are critically examined, taking into account social, economic and political elements. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic is used here as magnifying glass to understand the path of Tunisia from the revolution to the present. The government policies implemented to counter the contagion and people’s response to them show fragility and inequalities of the Tunisian context that are rooted in the time of the French occupation and of the governments of ¯ ın bin Al¯ı). Bourguiba (al-H . ab¯ıb B¯urq¯ıba) and Ben Ali (Zayn al-Abid¯ Finally, this chapter dwells on the weight of the social conflict in the current socio-political pattern of Tunisia.

2 An Historical Overview: The Building of Contemporary Tunisia Tunisia, the smallest country in North Africa, has always been open to the encounter with different Mediterranean cultures (Phoenicians, Romans, Arabs, Ottomans, Italians, French…) that have shaped its history. An incredible transculturality that is the result of an historical multi-layered past marks its identity and makes contemporary Tunisia (El Houssi, 2013). Conquered in the eighth century by the Arabs who were proceeding in their expansion in the territories of North Africa, Tunisia has been ruled by Aghlabids, Fatimids, Almohads, Hafsids until the sixteenth century, and it was under the Hafsid reign (1207–1574) that modern Tunisia was born (Guazzone, 2016: 149). In 1574 it became part of the Ottoman Empire, from which it partially autonomized with the birth of the ‘beylical’ dynasty of the Husainids (1705–1956). Under them a strong modernization of the country was promoted as response to the economic and military decline and the rise of the power of European countries in the Mediterranean. In particular, between 1837 and

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1881 a series of reforms aimed at modernizing and strengthening the Tunisian state were implemented. Under Ahmed Bey (Ah.mad B¯a¯ı, 1837– 1855) important reforms took place in the army, administration, and social structure. In 1846 slavery was abolished. In 1861 Muhammad al-Sadiq (Muh.ammad al-S.¯adiq, 1859–1882) approved the first constitution of the Arab world. Nevertheless, the realization of the reforms was accompanied by an increase in taxes and a growing indebtedness, which represented the end of Tunisia’s independence. In 1867, Tunisia failed to heal its financial situation and was in fact subjected to the protection of an international commission for the settlement of debts contracted with European banks in order to implement the modernization of the country. Thus, the Tunisian state was deprived of large part of its sovereignty, and eleven years later, in 1878, the Congress of Berlin accepted that the country would pass under direct French colonial control, despite the formal persistence of the Bey. On May 12, 1881 the ‘Treaty of Bardo’ authorized the French military presence, and the protectorate of Tunisia formally began, shattering Italy’s dream of colonizing this country where lived a big Italian community (Finzi & Kazdaghli, 2000). The French occupation of Tunisia was welcomed differently by the inhabitants of the various regions of the country. The colonial government could in fact substantially count on the support of the city’s elite, while it had to deal with the resistance from the mountaineers of the North-East and the Bedouins of the South (Guazzone, 2016: 152). Under the protectorate, the country was ruled differently according to the areas. The diverse management of the territory and its resources produced inequalities between coastal and inland areas that were perpetuated in the post-independence era by the governments of Bourguiba and Ben Ali, and still persist to this day as will be explained further in the following paragraphs. The French colonial policy based on the expropriation of tribal and public lands led to the rapid impoverishment of many peasants, who were deprived of their lands and pushed to cities. Urbanization and redefinition of the country’s economy were the main results of this choice (Ayeb & Bush, 2019). In this phase of transformations caused by the colonial experience, education grew and a new city bourgeoisie, which demanded reforms rather than independence was formed. However, it was necessary to wait until the end of World War I–in which 60,000 Tunisians had participated supporting France–in order to have the first important nationalist claims. Only at the end of the conflict, the first nationalist demands emerged.

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In less than two decades they became demands for independence. A fundamental step in this path was the foundation of the Destour party (from Arabic dust¯ ur: constitution) in 1920, which demanded the respect of the already mentioned Constitution of 1861, the recognition of the Arab-Islamic identity and a representation in Parliament. As the party was considered too elitist, conservative and far from the problems of the people, in 1934 it experienced a split that marked its decline. A group of dissenters led by Habib Bourguiba founded the Neo-Destour party. Relying on a mixed social base, composed of workers, exponents of the new city’s middle-class and people of the Sahel, the Neo-Destour asked France for full independence (Torelli, 2015: 27–32). In 1938, intense demonstrations for independence took place in Tunisia and led to the arrest of Bourguiba and other independent leaders who were in France. With the Second World War the path towards the independence of Tunisia took a further step. Bourguiba, who was under arrest in France ordered to support the movement ‘France libre’ of De Gaulle against the Germans who had occupied Tunisia since 1942. At the same time, however, Germans encouraged Tunisian nationalism in an anti-French key and therefore released Bourguiba and other leaders in the hope of being supported by them. With the Anglo-American liberation of Tunisia in 1943 and the re-establishment of the French protectorate, Bourguiba, who had returned to Tunis, was accused of collaboration with Germans and forced to flee to Cairo in 1945. In Bourguiba’s absence, Neo-Destour was led by Salah Ben Yousef (S.¯alih. bin Y¯usuf), expression of the Pan-Arab, Islamic and conservative soul of the party that was silenced and repressed in the following years. In 1946, while the struggle for independence was intensifying, the UGTT (Tunisian General Labour Union) was founded. In 1951–1952, the Neo-Destour and the UGTT organized a series of large strikes, and from 1953 the guerrilla warfare of the fellagha (fighters, partisans; from the Arabic fall¯ aqa: bandit) hit the symbols of colonialism (Guazzone, 2016: 115). Faced with an increasingly difficult situation, in 1954 negotiations for independence began leading to a first ‘internal autonomy’. The full recognition of independence was only in 1956 and in 1957 Bourguiba became the President of independent Tunisia, a country that was marked by a deep economic crisis and political divisions. In open contrast to Salah Ben Yousef vision, Bourguiba’s policy was characterized by a modernist, centralist, secular and ‘pro-Western’ project. Considered an ‘enlightened despot’ for his authoritarian and progressive policies at the same time, Bourguiba built

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his power on a modern, non-militarized, bilingual (Arabic and French) centralized state in which the Arab-Islamic identity was characterized by a distance from the ideals of Pan-Arabism and the centrality of Islam in the public sphere. He proposed a modernist interpretation of Islam that was reflected in the marginalization of traditional religious authorities. In 1975, Bourguiba became President for life and ruled Tunisia for 30 years. It is possible to summarize his Presidency in at least three phases (Guazzone, 2016: 157). The first one (1956–1969) was marked by the consolidation of the regime through administrative and legal reforms, and the elimination of the opposition (‘yousefists’, military, trade unionists, communists etc.). In this period presidential authority was strengthened and political representation was channelled into the President’s party, namely the Neo-Destour. Between 1964 and 1969 Bourguiba attempted a socialist experiment, and the party’s name changed from Neo-Destour to the Socialist Desturian Party (PSD). Under the leadership of the then Minister of Economy Ahmed Ben Salah (Ah.mad bin S.¯alih.), a series of socialist reforms were implemented. Industrialization of the country and development of a collectivist agriculture, based on cooperatives and nationalization of foreign owned lands, were the objects of these reforms. Nonetheless, following important protests in the country, the project failed and in 1969 the end of socialist policies was decreed. Ben Salah was considered the only one responsible for the failure. During Bourghiba’s second term (1970–1980) the economy was oriented in a capitalist way and an economic growth based on the exploitation of raw materials took place. The initial relative liberalization of the political debate, started at the beginning of the 1970s, was soon supplanted by the return of authoritarianism. Strong repression of the opponents was the government answer to the growth of left-wing movements in universities and among workers, as well as to the spread of the Islamist movement.1 The peak of the social and political conflict was reached on January 26, 1978 (also known as Black Thursday) when the first general strike since independence took place and the government harshly repressed the protestors. The third phase of Bourguiba’s Presidency (1980–1987) was opened by the so-called ‘controlled liberalization’, which produced a return to multipartyism as foreseen by the 1956 constitution. As a result, several parties, with the exception of the MTI, were admitted to the 1981 elections, which were however won by the PSD allied with the UGTT. The year 1983 marked the beginning of the final crisis of Bourguiba’s regime. In 1983–1984 the so-called ‘bread riots’ broke out in response to the

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suspension of subsidies for basic necessities. In that same year, General Ben Ali was appointed Secretary General of National Security (i.e. Head of the secret services) and began his political rise. In 1987 he became Minister of the Interior, then Prime Minister and finally President of the Republic, following the medical coup that in the night between 6 and 7 November dismissed Bourguiba (Torelli, 2015: 64–67). Fundamentally, Ben Ali’s government (1987–2011) continued along Bourghiba’s path in the management of the political and economic system (Chaouika & Gobe, 2015: 54). The country was ruled through the hegemonic role of the dominant party, namely the PSD that in 1988 changed its name to Rassemblement Constitutionel Démocratique (RCD); and the process of economic liberalization, which had begun in 1986 with the structural adjustment plans, was intensified. Considered by Western countries as the bon élève of the neo-liberal globalization and the bulwark against the advance of Islamists in Tunisia and the region (Hibou, 1999), Ben Ali transformed Tunisia into a dictatorship in a few years, betraying the initial premises regarding political openness. Indeed, the initial democratic opening was soon replaced by a harsh authoritarianism, marked by the consolidation of the family clan Trabelsi and the repression of opponents, Islamists as well as secularists. The 90s and early 2000s were characterized by the suppression of all internal dissent. Nevertheless, in the second half of 2000s, as consequence of the effects of the global financial crisis and the worsening of the socio-economic conditions in the country, the opposition re-emerged. In January 2008 the revolts of the Gafsa mining basin (Chouika & Geisser, 2010) marked the beginning of a new phase in the history of Tunisia. However, it was necessary to wait until December 2010 to see the emergency of a large opposition movement in response to the growing unemployment and lack of freedom. On December 17, the death of Mohammed Bouazizi (Muh.ammad alB¯uaz¯ız¯ı), a street vendor from Sidi Bouzid (a city in the interior), who had set himself on fire to protest against police abuses gave birth to a vast protest movement that soon turned into a revolution. The demonstrations, which started in the inland regions and spread from there to the whole country and Arab region, led to the fall of Ben Ali’s regime on January 14, 2011.

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3 From Revolution to Present days (2010–2020) Between Successful Results and Betrayed Promises Ten years after the 2010/11 revolution, Tunisia continues to be seen as the only success story of the Arab Spring. Undoubtedly, a number of important objectives in terms of democratic transition have been achieved: recognition of free speech and association, approval of a new constitution in 2014, free elections in 2011, 2014 and 2019 (Walles, 2020), greater involvement of women in political life and enhancement of gender equality legislation.2 The list of successes achieved could go on, to the point that many analysts say that at least two of the objectives of the revolution, namely that of freedom and democracy–forcefully demanded in the protests that led to the fall of Ben Ali–have been achieved. However, on closer scrutiny this entirely successful narrative of the Tunisian transition falters. In a collective volume edited by Amin Allal and Vincent Geisser the authors ask with the title and then with a series of specific examples: ‘Tunisia, a democratization above suspicion?’ (2018). Although, from a formal point of view several rights have been assured to citizens and the democratic game is formally guaranteed, in practice many of the rights written in the new constitution (right to work, right to a clean environment, right to access to water, right to health…) are not applied. Moreover, in answer to the terrorist challenge that has seriously afflicted the country several times between 2012 and 2015, and that continues to undermine national stability,3 a growing security clampdown risks jeopardizing the acquired freedoms, paving the way to the return of the authoritarian practices of the pre-revolutionary regimes. On the other hand, the political forces in power, both secular and Islamist, have chosen not to seriously settle accounts with the authoritarian past, despite the incredible work carried out by the Truth and Dignity Commission (IVD) in charge of shedding light on the crimes and attacks on human rights that occurred from 1955 until 2013, the date of promulgation of the Tunisian law on transitional justice.4 Although the 2014 Constitution itself recognizes this process of reconstruction of the memory of human rights violations and the state’s responsibility for such violations since independence, the path of the IVD has been hindered by several political forces. The political parties, including Ennahda (H . arakat al-Nahd.a), which had been among the main supporters of this path–considering itself the main victim of post-independence regimes–preferred to settle for an unfinished trial of the dictatorship in exchange for token awards

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and compensation, facade discourses on memory and national reconciliation, while trial hearings concerning judicial proceedings transmitted by the Truth and Dignity Commission (IVD) are constantly postponed (Brésillon, 2020a), blocking the process of transitional justice that had raised so many national and international hopes in recent years. But the shortcomings in satisfying the demands of the revolution emerge above all on the economic level. On this front, Tunisia’s postrevolutionary path has led nowhere, failing to secure new jobs and to ensure the dignity and social justice called for in the street demonstrations in 2010–11 and then repeatedly re-claimed by citizens who continue demonstrating for fulfilment of the promises of the revolution. GDP growth has remained well below expectations of 3%, and this year because of Covid19 it is expected to stop around 1%. Moreover, as reported by Stefano Torelli in an article on the political-economic situation in the country, the public debt almost doubled from 2011 to 2018, rising from just over 35% of GDP to 70% (Torelli, 2018: 64), and this percentage is expected to rise yet further. In fact, in order to tackle the challenges of the transition and to cope with the pandemic, Tunisian governments have repeatedly requested (the last time was at the end of March 2020) help from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which have granted loans totalling more than 5 billion dollars. However, this aid goes hand in hand with a programme to review national spending, which has an impact on household incomes with significant cuts in basic necessities, while for years Tunisians have been witnessing devaluation of the Tunisian dinar and loss of purchasing power. It has been calculated that unemployment in the country stands at 15%, representing the highest rate of unemployment in the entire area of North Africa and, turning the focus on youth unemployment, it reaches 35%, with high percentages among graduate students (Torelli, 2018: 64), who not surprisingly are among the forces most present in the ongoing protests. The social contract at the basis of the governmental choices of post-independence that were supposed to guarantee jobs in exchange for education and political consensus has been ignored for years and nowadays young people in the country are facing formidable difficulties. If during and soon after the revolution the young were considered ‘heroes’, agents of change, today they are increasingly depicted as a threat to the fragile Tunisian political system, characterized by limited statehood and recurring crises in the relationship between the state and societal forces (Hanau Santini, 2018). In a few years, the heroic narrative about young people changed

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dramatically and a securitarian and paternalistic approach has taken its place. Blocked in an unachieved transition to adulthood that moulds their daily life, the young people are showing increasing disenchantment with a political elite, considered corrupt and incapable of responding to the demands for justice, dignity and employment (Pepicelli, 2018). And it is precisely the economic question, as mentioned above, that is the main and most problematic issue unanswered by the post-revolutionary government elites, who have failed to produce an economic strategy or respond to the shortage of jobs. In continuity with the previous governments, the post-revolutionary ones accepted the neo-liberalist path traced out by Bourguiba in 1986 with adoption of the structural adjustment plans, and later confirmed by Ben Ali (Paciello, 2013). Ennahda party, although initially described as the champion of socio-economic reform, has also fully embraced the liberalist path as Maryam Ben Salem demonstrates in her article ‘God loves the rich. The Economic Policy of Ennahda: Liberalism in the Service of Social Solidarity’ (2020). On closer examination, ‘Ennahda failed to enact substantive land or fiscal reforms because it proved unable or unwilling to antagonize well-entrenched interest groups and economic elites or draw public attention to towering economic and regional inequalities. Instead, the party downplayed confrontation and tried to have it both ways. While this approach secured Ennahda’s inclusion and protected the fledgling democracy in the most rudimentary sense, transactional politics between Islamists represented by Ennahda and elites from the former regime represented by the secularist Nidaa Tounes party came with a cost: a political settlement that neutralized tangible and substantive socioeconomic reforms. […] By overvaluing political expediency for the sake of access, Ennahda allowed old regime hands to continue to pillage the state and enrich themselves’ (Meddeb, 2020). Meanwhile, corruption, having permeated the entire system, represents another serious obstacle that paralyzes the development and real democratization of Tunisia, which is increasingly dependent on the outside world in terms not only of financial aid but also of its economy and its ability to meet its internal needs. Although it is an agricultural country, Tunisia depends largely on external sources to satisfy its food needs. ‘Tunisia is not self-sufficient in terms of food production: more than 50 percent of the food the country consumes is imported. In 2008, agri-food products worth TND3 679.9 million (USD 4 400 million) were imported. In 2017, that figure was TND6 340.6 million (USD 15 500 million). While the imports allow Tunisia to meet food demand, and although the

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state subsidises certain basic foodstuffs to ensure that the population has access, affordability increasingly becomes an issue’ (Amayed, 2020).

4

The Effects of Covid19 in Tunisia: Magnifying Lenses on Fragility and Regional Inequalities

Faced with this situation, the arrival of the Covid19 pandemic in late winter/early spring 2020 showed the real situation of the country, its fragility and the challenges it faces. Thus, analysis of the impact of Covid19 on Tunisia offers a useful magnifying glass to understand the path of Tunisia from the 2011 revolution to the present. When the epidemic turned into a pandemic and the first cases of Covid19 also emerged in Tunisia, the government tried to shelter the country from the worst of the pandemic, also because the health system would not have been able to cope with the spread of the virus. On March 18, president Kais Saied (Qays Sayd) proclaimed a night-time curfew (closing restaurants, cafes, etc. in the afternoon) and two days later a lockdown for non-essential purposes. To impose respect of mandatory confinement at home he also chose to use military and police forces, although civil society was showing serious concerns about the tightening of the security clampdown (Yerkes, 2020). Throughout the country all travel was interdicted, the workforce partially demobilized, mosques were closed and schools, universities and businesses shut down. The measures taken have borne fruit from the health point of view. On June 21, at the time of the reopening of the borders, there were 1159 declared cases, 89 active cases, 1020 recoveries, 50 deaths, 67,233 tests performed. Tunisia has fared relatively well during the Covid19 pandemic, compared to other Maghreb countries. In Morocco, on the same date there were 9801 cases and 213 deaths; in Algeria 11,631 cases and 837, in Libya–but the data are certainly unreliable–520 cases and 10 deaths (Inkyfada, 2020). However, despite the capacity to contain the contagion, in Tunisia, as elsewhere in the world the pandemic has shown up the insufficiencies and fragility of the system from the point of view of health, economy, politics and society (Cimini, 2020). Covid19 exposed deep social inequality in the country, but, alas, the history shows that there is nothing new about economic and social exclusion in Tunisia (Sadiki, 2020). The social and regional inequalities, which appeared in all their gravity during the pandemic, have characterized the Tunisian history since the time of French colonialism and were structured and crystallized through

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the governments of Bourguiba (1957–1987) and Ben Ali (1987–2011) (Ayeb & Bush, 2019). Despite proclamations and electoral promises, post-revolution governments have failed to reduce the gap between the centre and periphery, and the inland regions still remain seriously disadvantaged compared to the coastal regions in terms of services (including access to water) and employment and poverty. ‘In 2015, some communities, particularly in central western Tunisia, had poverty rates twice as high as the country as a whole on average: in 2015, the average national poverty rate was 15.2 percent whereas Kef (North West), Kasserine (Center West), and Beja (North West) had poverty rates of 34.2 percent, 32.8 percent, and 32.0 percent, respectively. Meanwhile in places like Tataouine, Jendouba, and Kasserine, unemployment was two times the national average’ (Meddeb, 2020). The inequality and disadvantages of inland regions are the result of a logic of ‘internal colonization’, (al-isti m¯ ar al-d¯ akhiliyya, Al Salihi, 2017), which has been going on since independence in 1956 and is based on exploitation of the resources of peripheral/inland regions to support the development of coastal areas. As Hamza Meddeb recalls, ‘today, inland provinces hold 50 percent of the country’s oil, gas, and water resources; 70 percent of wheat production; and 50 percent of olive oil and fruit production. Yet these regions are disadvantaged’ (Meddeb, 2020). During the confinement imposed with the measures to contain Covid19 contagion, regional inequalities emerged mainly in terms of income, possibility of access to basic resources and, in particular, to health services, unevenly distributed throughout the territory. Under Ben Ali the public health system was severely undermined: there was a progressive reduction in public funding by the state and opening up to private investments, including foreign investments, which have been directed in particular towards the coastal areas at the expense of the inland areas and the working-class districts of large cities. This policy has continued even after the fall of the dictator. As Olfa Lamloum writes: ‘the budget percentage allocated to health care in 2018, under Youssef Chahed’s government, was lower than in 2006, under Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali (5.2% in 2018 compared with 7.4% in 2006) […] In 2016 (latest data available) the governorate of Tataouine (150,000 inhabitants) had only three gynaecologists and obstetricians. Even today, the hospitals in Tataouine and Kasserine do not have resuscitator doctors. […] There are no laboratories for the analysis of samples of potential patients [of Covid] in any of the governorates of the North-West and

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South, including those where the number of patients infected with corona virus is high, such as the governorates of Kebili and Mednine in the South-East. Similarly, most of these regions, such as Kasserine and Sidi Bouzid, where the revolution started, had no beds for resuscitation until March’ (Lamloum, 2020). On top of this critical situation of extreme shortage of health infrastructure has been added the serious shortage of doctors in hospitals, resulting from the considerable migration of many doctors going abroad in recent years in search of better employment opportunities and higher salaries.

5

The Social Victims of Pandemic Between Economic Crisis and Gender Inequalities

Although the number of health victims of the pandemic has been relatively small, the social victims have been countless and their number is destined to grow since, as the IMF writes, Tunisia is now expected to go through the worst recession since independence (IMF, 2020). However, if the health crisis has had a heavy impact on the middle class, the impact has been devastating for poor families, who live in precarious conditions, depending on day-to-day jobs, without sufficient savings and financial resources to cope with long periods without work. To have an accurate picture of the impact of Covid19 on Tunisian households, the Institut national de la statistique (INS), in collaboration with the World Bank, launched an investigation with the intention of casting light on the way Tunisian households reacted to the pandemic. Meanwhile, a study by the Tunisian Forum for Economic and Social Rights (FTDES) entitled ‘Pandémie Covid-19 in Tunisie: les inégalités, les vulnérabilités à la pauvreté et au chômage’ (Mahjoub, 2020), carried out by Azzam Mahjoub, has already shown a number of social implications of the pandemic in terms of inequalities and vulnerability of the population. The main inequalities that emerge from the report are in terms of poverty exacerbation, housing inequalities, educational inequalities and gender inequalities. The obligation to be confined at home has shown that several families, especially in suburban areas, do not have access to ‘decent housing’, and are forced into small households, unhealthy environments, and often into situations of overcrowding. At the same time, Mahjoub’s study pointed out that with the impossibility of implementing distance education during the lockdown of schools, children had different access to forms of pedagogical support depending on the families they

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came from. Finally, the report highlighted the increase in Tunisia, as in the rest of the world, of violence against women during the phase of confinement at home. In an article for ‘New Arab’, later taken up by Carnegie, Sarah Yerkes and MaroYoussef analyze the situation in depth, describing the increase in gender-based violence cases in the country. ‘The Covid-19 pandemic saw a five-fold increase in reported incidents of GBV in three months [...] According to UN Women, there were 40 reported acts of violence in the span of one week in March 2020, compared to seven during the same period the previous year. Between March and May, government GBV hotlines received over 7,000 complaints, 1,425 of which occurred during the first month of the lockdown. ATFD’s Tunis domestic violence shelter received 350 women weekly during the lockdown, a four-fold increase compared to before the lockdown’ (Yerkes & Youssef, 2020). On closer inspection, in Tunisia, as elsewhere in the world, the drastic confinement measures taken by the government to stop the spread of the virus have had a serious effect on many women who found themselves more exposed to male violence.

6

Social Conflict and Protests

While, as already said, the measures restricting freedom of movement and assembly adopted by the Tunisian government have succeeded in limiting the contagion, they have not, however, stopped the protests that have been erupting in the country since the 2010/2011 revolution, creating a climate of constant tension that calls into question the successful narrative with which Tunisia is described, discussed at the beginning of this contribution. The monthly report of the FTDES on the protests in the country in March showed that, despite the exceptional epidemiological situation and the choices made by the government to confine the population, the social charter of the protest has not changed, but has been confirmed, with peaks of protest, as in previous months, in the regions of Kairouan, Sidi Bouzid, Jendouba (FTDES, 2020). The end of March 2020 saw demonstrations by workers in the informal sector on a large scale: overwhelmed by the economic crisis, they took to the streets to call for state aid. It was only on March 30 that the government began to distribute financial aid (Wirtz, 2020). With the end of confinement, the demonstrations increased significantly throughout the country. The claims of the protesters are various: for water in rural areas, for the payment of wages for tourism workers in Gerba and workers in the industrial area

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of Zaghouan and the Gafsa mining basin (Brésillon, 2020b). Particularly significant in June were the protests in the Tatouine area, where unemployment reaches 30%, one of the highest percentages in the country. The protests broke out for implementation of the 2017 deal to create jobs in oil companies and infrastructure projects (at Jazeera, 2020)–an agreement that was the result of major protests of the population led by the El Kamour movement (I tis.¯ am al-K¯ am¯ ur, Blaise, 2017).5 But as said above, these protests are not isolated but come from afar and are part of a complex national dynamic. If we extend our view to the first 100 days of government of Elyès Fakhfakh (Iliy¯as al-Fakhf¯akh)–from February 27 to June 5, 2020–we can see the extent of the protest movements in Tunisia. According to data from the FTDES, 1138 protest movements were active during this period. The majority of the protests (47.6%) took place in the central western region: in particular, Sidi Bouzid and Kairouan. More than half were organized and not spontaneous, and took place, in particular, in relation to health, safety, employment/work and access to water. These continuous widespread protest movements expressed disillusionment with and anger towards the government elites who failed to respond to demands for employment, services, security, education, and were not committed to reducing inequalities and the gap between the centre-periphery, coastal and inland areas. However, despite the spread of protest movements, as researcher Jihed Haj Salem points out, ‘none of these dynamics is echoed in political life or in parliamentary debates…The paradox of these movements is that they are radical in form: road or rail blocks, administrative or factory blocks. In short, they block the system, but demanding to be integrated into it. They are not articulated in any political or social alternative’ (Brésillon, 2020b).

7

Conclusions. Beyond the Myth of the Tunisian Exception

The economic crisis and the growing and consequent political crisis, in the absence of a credible political and social alternative, are seriously destabilizing Tunisia and the positive results achieved as from 2011. The democratization achieved is weak because it has failed to settle the economic inequalities and imbalances between the coast and the interior regions. The President of the Republic, Kaies Saied (Qays Saiyyd), who was elected with a broad popular consensus in the autumn of 2019, has so far failed to fulfil his electoral promises, nor has he managed to

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ferry the country towards a new future of discontinuity with previous policies. On the contrary, although the country has chosen not to fully come to terms with its authoritarian past, depowering the work of the IVD, it seems to be stuck in a past dimension where the main political actors, whether ‘Bourguibist’, ‘Benalist’ or Islamist, are stuck in diatribes of the past, without being able to make new proposals for the present and the future. The myth of the Tunisian exception, to use a concept by Michel Camau (2018), is no longer enough to hide the problems of the country. The explosion of the Covid19 pandemic has brutally exposed all the fragility of a process of democratic, but above all economic, transition which is unfinished. A widespread sense of betrayal of revolutionary promises has pervaded the country and produced different responses: a departure from formal politics, which translates into a significant drop in participation in the elections, with the exception of the 2019 presidential elections6 ; a state of permanent unrest in the country with constant protests and demonstrations; new migrations; and violent extremism. It has been estimated that Tunisia supplied organizations such as the socalled Islamic State (al-Dawla al-Isl¯ amiyya, also known with the acronym Daesh) with the highest per capita rate of foreign fighters in the world: between 6000 and 7000 people, mostly young, left the country for Syria, Iraq and Libya.7 To free itself from this morass, as Hamza Meddeb writes, ‘the country requires genuine compromises to facilitate wealth sharing. New ruling elites need to make hard economic choices and promote deep structural changes, like levying more taxes on privileged social groups, implementing a genuine land reform that could unleash developmental forces in the hinterlands, and curbing rent-seeking to ensure financial and economic resources are deployed to develop the country’s interior regions. Furthermore, new elites should build a larger and more inclusive social coalition, an indispensable ingredient for establishing a more legitimate political and economic order’ (Meddeb, 2020).

Notes 1. After a decade of growth of the so-called political Islam, the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI) was founded in 1981, under the leadership of Rached Ghannouchi (R¯ashid al-Ghann¯ ush¯ı) and Abdel Fattah Mourou (Abd al-Fatt¯ah. M¯ ur¯ u).

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2. For example, in 2017 a remarkable law combating Gender Based Violence was passed. It is well known that Tunisia stands out in the region for women’s rights. However, although many important laws on gender equality have been approved since 1956 they still need to be fully implemented. 3. The last attack was on March 6, 2020 when suicide bombers targeted the US embassy. 4. Cf. Loi organique 2013–53 du 24 décembre 2013, relative à l’instauration de la justice transitionnelle et à son organisation, Journal Officiel de la République Tunisienne 105 (201), available at: http://www.legisl ation.tn/sites/default/files/journal-officiel/2013/2013F/Jo1052013.pdf, (Accessed on 11 March 2020). For an analysis of the transitional justice in Tunisia cfr Andrieu (2016), Belhassine (2019), Gobe (ed.) (2019). 5. To better understand the June 2020 Tatouine protests we should go back to the 2017 Al Kamour protest and even before to 2008, when the strongest social protest under Ben Ali erupted for the first time in the Gafsa region. “The Kamour protests did not explode in a vacuum. They must be situated within the context of more than fifteen years of revolutionary action in the phosphate basin” https://www.opendemocracy.net/ en/north-africa-west-asia/tunisian-protesters-democracy-not-enough/. 6. Cf. the special issue of the Revue Tunisienne de Science Politique, v. 1, no 01, 2020 dedicated to the 2019 elections. 7. Cf. http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_For eignFightersUpdate3.pdf.

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2OcyHkdGTw5QLJ9pM_aeFdplS2cs_h1_43DGX8iYNC8. Accessed 20 May 2020. Andrieu, K. (2016). Confronting the dictatorial past in Tunisia: Human rights and the politics of victimhood in transitional justice discourses since 2011. Human Rights Quarterly, 38(2), 261–293. Ayeb, H., & Bush, R. (2019). Food insecurity and revolution in the Middle East and North Africa. Agrarian questions in Egypt and Tunisia. Anthem press. Belhassine, O. (2019, July 6). Tunisie: Un An De Procès Sous Pression. Justiceinfo.net. https://www.justiceinfo.net/fr/tribunaux/tribunauxnationaux/41610-tunisie-un-an-de-proces-sous-pression.html. Accessed 29 October 2019. Ben Salem, M. (2020, May). God loves the rich. The economic policy of Ennahda: Liberalism in the service of social solidarity in politics and religion. Politics and religion. pp. 1–24. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/politicsand-religion/article/god-loves-the-rich-the-economic-policy-of-ennahda-lib eralism-in-the-service-of-social-solidarity/2DF08A6647AC7D7F3B083012 CBAF56ED/share/9c636a821ce3cfabcb1fb4fd757faedcd75499ff. Accessed 13 June 2020. Blaise, L. (2017, May 28). À El Kamour, la résistance continuera pendant le Ramadan. Middle East Eye. https://www.middleeasteye.net/reportages/ el-kamour-la-r-sistance-continuera-pendant-le-ramadan-322384578. Accessed 22 June 2020. Brésillion, T. (2020a, May 29). Les procès de la dictature en Tunisie: une si longue impatience. Middle East Eye. https://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/ decryptages/tunisie-justice-transitionnelle-ivd-verite-dignite-torture-dictature. Accessed 1 June 2020. Brésillion, T. (2020b, June 25). Jihed Haj Salem: En Tunisie, les formes de mobilisation des jeunes restent totalement invisibles aux yeux des partis. Middle East Eye. https://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/entretiens/tunisie-tat aouine-revolution-justice-sociale?fbclid=IwAR08U1p74OxBjTIjI954G9mA4 5v4ji8BW1L4g_cgzVCvIDsE-Z9J_PYLnyY. Accessed 1 July 2020. Camau, M. (2018). L’exception tunisienne. Variations sur un mythe. KarthalaIrmc Tunisi. Chouikha, L., & Gobe, É. (2015). Histoire de la Tunisie depuis l’indépendance. La Découverte. Chouika, L., & Geisser, V. (2010). A reading of the revolt in the Gafsa Mining. L’Année du Maghreb, VI , 415–426. Cimini, G. (2020, April 29). COVID-19 and Tunisian democracy: High risks ahead. IAI commentaries. https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/covid-19and-tunisian-democracy-high-risks-ahead?fbclid=IwAR3t3TfHT3ecqbQlDPj njyPLa4fXWIq0miJLEeUZDGhje_zdHObZ9yVtcZ4. Accessed 16 June 2020.

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Finzi, S., & Kazdaghli, H. (2000). Mémoires italiennes de Tunisie. Finzi. FTDES (Forum tunisien des droits économiques et sociaux). (2020). Rapport du mois de march 2020 des mouvements sociaux, suicides et violence, Avril. https://ftdes.net/ost-rapport-mars-2020-des-mouvements-sociaux-sui cides-et-violences/. Accessed 2 May 2020. Gobe, E. (Ed.). (2019). Justice et réconciliation dans le Maghreb post-révoltes arabes. Karthala-IRMC. Guazzone, L. (2016). Storia contemporanea del mondo arabo. I paesi arabi dall’impero ottomano ad oggi (pp. 149–170). Mondadori. Hibou, B. (1999). Les marges de manoeuvre d’un ‘bon élève’ économique : La Tunisie de Ben Ali (pp. 1–33). CERI, Centre de recherches internationales de Sciences Po. el Houssi, L. (2013). Dalla transculturalità all’islamicità? Il caso della Tunisia. Memoria e Ricerca, XXI (43). International Monetary Fund. (2020, April 10). IMF executive board approves a US$745 million disbursement to Tunisia to address the COVID-19 Pandemic. Press Release No. 20/144. https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/ 04/10/pr20144-tunisia-imf-executive-board-approves-a-us-745m-disbursem ent-address-covid19-pandemic. Accessed 12 June 2020. Inkyfada. (2020, June 14). The COVID-19 epidemic in Tunisia, in numbers. https://inkyfada.com/en/2020/06/14/dashboard-covid-19/. Accessed 28 June 2020. Lamloum, O. (2020, April 29). Tunisie. Une gestion sécuritaire du Covid-19 au détriment du droit à la santé. Orient XXI. https://orientxxi.info/magazine/ en-tunisie-les-fragilites-sociales-et-sanitaires-assombrissent-l-horizon,3839? fbclid=IwAR0Eg9qtzU-xmWojlDlPte3H60gbTh_fQNnX5VTlE8xF7BD6cr HQ1rcO1NU. Accessed 15 May 2020. Mahjoub, A. (2020). Pandémie Covid 19 en Tunisie: les inégalités, les vulnérabilités à la pauvreté et au chômage. Forum Tunisien pour les Droits Economiques et Sociaux. https://ftdes.net/pandemie-covid-19-en-tunisie-les-inegalites-lesvulnerabilites-a-la-pauvrete-et-au-chomage/. Accessed 25 May 2020. Meddeb, H. (2020). Tunisia’s geography of anger: Regional inequalities and the rise of populism. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegie-mec.org/2020/02/19/tunisia-s-geographyof-anger-regional-inequalities-and-rise-of-populism-pub-81086. Accessed 7 April 2020. Paciello, M. C. (2013). Delivering the revolution? Post-uprising socio-economics in Tunisia and Egypt. The International Spectator Italian Journal of International Affairs, 48(4), 7–29. Pepicelli, R. (2018). From «hero» to «zero»: Re-thinking youth in postrevolutionary Tunisia. A focus on family, state and public discourse. In L.

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Queirolo Palmas & L. Stagi (Eds.), Winou el shabab. Images of transformations between the two shores of the Mediterranean (pp. 56–80). GUP. Sadiki, L. (2020, July 8). For Tunisian protesters, democracy is not enough. Open Democracy. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/north-africa-west-asia/tun isian-protesters-democracy-not-enough/. Accessed: 2 July 2020. Santini Hanau, R. (2018). Limited statehood in post-revolutionary Tunisia. Citizenship, economy and security. Palgrave. Torelli, S. (2018). Focus paese: Tunisia. Mediterraneo Allargato. Osservatorio di politica internazionale, n°8—settembre (pp. 62–62). ISPI Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale. Torelli, S. (2015). La Tunisia contemporanea. il Mulino. Yerkes, S. (Ed.) (2020). Coronavirus threatens freedom in North Africa. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/ 2020/04/24/coronavirus-threatens-freedom-in-north-africa-pub-81625?fbc lid=IwAR3YDW_TZf__tf3CEBq08cenvP9PwoOe7ZaEzIq_zPAcw37G1YjY BC7kKAQ. Accessed 15 June 2020. Yerkes, S., & Youssef, M. (2020, June 22). Coronavirus reveals Tunisia’s revolutionary gains for women only exist on paper. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/06/22/cor onavirus-reveals-tunisia-s-revolutionary-gains-for-women-only-exist-on-paperpub-82151?fbclid=IwAR0gRhByWKbnWf6gNipLd9osJ-OxKq-ZCH3FwYSQ cm0FyiVBgMv4s3csOYc. Accessed 2 July 2020. Walles, J. (2020, February 3). The risk to democracy. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/80942?fbclid=IwA R1Ghmxt-yzFI7XKFJrd2us4Znli0bSw3YpiDNo6A4MEimM9adqFHdva1wg. Accessed 11 June 2020. Wirtz, M. (2020, May 13). Il était une fois... Tunis confinée. Le point Afrique. https://www.lepoint.fr/afrique/il-etait-une-fois-tunis-confinee-1305-2020-2375407_3826.php. Accessed: 31 May 2020.

The Israeli–Palestinian Impasse Arturo Marzano

Contents 1 The Oslo Accords: Twenty Years Later: A Brief Overview . . . . . . . 2 Israeli Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Palestinian Politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 American Politics and the Peace Deal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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In December 2019, when the Seminar was held whose proceedings are collected in this volume, the Israeli–Palestinian peace process was at an impasse. After two rounds of elections, there was still no government in Israel, and the country was set to return to the polls for the third time in a year the following spring. The two leading Palestinian political parties, Fatah (H as ), had failed . arakat Fath.) and Hamas (H . arakat H . am¯ to form a government of national unity despite several rounds of negotiation, and the divide between them increasingly weakened Palestinian attempts at ending the 52-year-long Israeli occupation of Gaza and the

A. Marzano (B) University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 F. M. Corrao and R. Redaelli (eds.), States, Actors and Geopolitical Drivers in the Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69000-7_13

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West Bank. The Trump administration’s peace plan, which according to the US President’s pretentious rhetoric would solve the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, had not been fully revealed yet. The economic framework had been presented the previous June in Bahrain, but the White House had yet to unveil the plan’s political framework. At the time of submitting this article in June 2020, a few changes have occurred. A peculiar government led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was sworn in on May 17, thus ending a 17-month political crisis—the longest in Israeli history. On January 28, Trump disclosed the full text of his peace plan, triumphally referred to as ‘the deal of the century’. Even though Fatah and Hamas are still divided, both have harshly opposed the peace plan and seem to have found a common ground at least on this issue. Yet, despite these changes, the Israeli–Palestinian peace process has not emerged from its impasse. First of all, any political change needs to address the evolution and impact (not only health-wise) of the Covid19 pandemic. In fact, the new Israeli government was born as an emergency cabinet to deal with the coronavirus crisis, and the emergency may be over, but its economic consequences continue to unfold. Secondly, both Israelis and Palestinians are fully aware that things might change in Washington this November. While it is to be expected that the Palestinians will keep rejecting the peace plan without further negotiations—taking a wait-and-see stance and hoping for a new administration in the White House—it is difficult to gauge what the Israeli government’s plans are. Will the government take advantage of such pro-Israel moves by the current US administration to change the status of (parts of) the West Bank, or will it wait for the next elections to avoid a possible crisis down the road? Arguments can be made for both scenarios, and it is not possible to predict which of the two will prevail. The current stalemate may continue for some time. It is worth highlighting, though, that this impasse does not mean inactivity; Israel’s policy of creating ‘facts on the ground’ allows it to gain ever-increasing control over the West Bank, as settlements continue to grow in size and population. As these changes threaten the viability of a future Palestinian state, the current impasse serves Israeli interests while jeopardizing Palestinian prospects.

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1 The Oslo Accords: Twenty Years Later: A Brief Overview As is widely known, the beginning of the second intifada, or Al-Aqsa intifada, in September 2000 marked the failure of the Oslo peace process, which had begun seven years earlier with the signing of the Declaration of Principles by the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and the PLO President Yasser Arafat (Y¯asir Araf¯at). An in-depth discussion of the reasons for such failure would fall outside the scope of these pages1 —suffice to say that the hopes harboured by both peoples at the beginning of the peace process had all vanished by the end of the decade. The Palestinians had been hoping for the full withdrawal of Israeli forces from their territory. What they got instead were IDF-staffed checkpoints outside the main Palestinian cities and an increase in the number of settlements in the occupied territories. The Israelis were looking for an end to the acts of violence committed by Palestinians. Not only did that not happen, but things soon took a turn for the worse with the first suicide bombings carried out by Hamas and the Islamic Jihad (H ad al-Isl¯ am¯ı f¯ı . arakat al-Jih¯ Filast.¯ın, Andoni, 1997). The most important consequence of the second intifada, which lasted around four years, was the impact it had on both Israeli and Palestinian politics. The failure of the Oslo process led to a series of defeats for the Labour Party, the driving political force behind the peace agreement with the PLO (Shilon, 2020), and Israeli elections have since been virtually dominated by right-wing coalitions. Something analogous has occurred in Palestinian politics. Similar to Israel’s Labour Party, the leading political group Fatah, which had supported the Oslo peace process, lost the only Palestinian parliamentary elections to the rival Islamist party Hamas in early 2006. Relations between the two factions have been tense since 2007, when Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip and Fatah started ruling over the West Bank, thus splitting the Palestinian territory into two divided lands. Despite a few attempts at relaunching the peace process, such as the Annapolis Conference in 2007, no constructive negotiations have since been held between Israel and the Palestinians (Cohen-Almagor, 2012).

2

Israeli Politics

On March 2, 2020, elections for the Knesset (the Israeli Parliament) were held for the third time in a year. The April 9, 2019 elections

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had failed to produce a coalition to replace the government that had ruled the country since May 2015. Netanyahu was not able to form a government despite centre-right, right, and far-right parties together holding a clear majority in the Knesset with 65 seats—35 of which were won by the Likud party (Likud, lit. Consolidation), the heir to the Revisionist movement founded in the 1920s by Ze’ev Jabotinsky. Established in 1973 by former Prime Ministers Menachem Begin and Ariel Sharon, the nationalist party Likud espouses neoliberal economics and a clear security-oriented agenda opposing Palestinian statehood and in support of Israeli settlements. Shas (an acronym for Shomrei Sfaradim, i.e. Sephardic Guardians) and United Torah Judaism (UTJ; Yahdut haTorah)—the two parties representing the ultra-Orthodox constituency, and the Sephardi and Ashkenazi communities in particular—each won 8 seats. Despite their differences—UTJ, which was formed in the early 1990s, is a non-Zionist party, while Shas, founded in the mid-1980s, defines itself as Zionist—both parties actively seek to expand the influence of Halakhah (Jewish religious law), as well as supporting religious education systems within communities. Yisrael Beitenu (Israel Our Home), a secular nationalist party established in the late 1990s that represents the interests of immigrants from the former Soviet Union, gained 5 seats. Union of Right-wing Parties (URWP; Ikhud miflagot ha-Yamin)—an electoral alliance formed by right-wing and far-right religious Zionist parties in early 2019 to support Israeli settlements in what they refer to as Judea and Samaria (i.e., the West Bank), and prevent Israel’s withdrawal from those territories—also won 5 seats. Finally, the centrist party Kulanu (All of Us), founded in 2014 with a focus more on economic issues and reducing social inequalities than on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, gained 4 seats. The main reason behind Netanyahu’s failure was the challenge of mediating between competing interests. Yisrael Beitenu’s leader, Avigdor Lieberman, demanded reassurances that the government would pass a bill to gradually increase the quota of ultra-Orthodox Jews drafted in the army. Shas and UTJ were opposed to the bill and forced Netanyahu to resist Lieberman’s demands.2 As a result of irreconcilable differences between the two parties, Netanyahu was not able to form a governing coalition: Yisrael Beitenu withdrew its support, and the number of Knesset members backing a new Netanyahu-led government fell to 60, one vote short of the 61-seat majority. Thus, Israel’s politics came to an impasse that has lasted for well over a year. And indeed the elections of September 17, 2019 did not lead

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to a clear majority either. On that occasion, the centre-right, right, and far-right parties fared worse: Likud won 32 seats despite running with Kulanu; Shas won 9, UTJ 7, and Yamina(Rightwards, a newly formed alliance of right and far-right parties that basically replaced URWP) 7. Interestingly enough, it was Lieberman’s party that increased its seats from 5 to 8, thus demonstrating that at least a part of Israeli public opinion was in favour of higher quotas for the draft of ultra-Orthodox Jews, and that the rift between secular and religious Jews is one of the main cleavages within Israeli society.3 As to the other parties, the main opponent to Likud was Kakhol Lavan (Blue White), a coalition of three parties formed to take part in the April 2019 elections: Yesh Atid (There is a Future), Hosen l-Israel (Israel Resilience), and Telem (an acronym for Tnu a leumit mamlakhtit, the National Statesman-like Movement). In September 2019, Kakhol Lavan won 33 seats, emerging as the largest party in the Knesset. Yet it failed to reach the required 61-seat majority, despite 65 Knesset members (MKs) opposing a new Netanyahu-led government. Kakhol Lavan has positioned itself as a moderate party in the centre of the Israeli political spectrum—although it has been rightly argued that it ‘falls under the right-wing Revisionist Zionist camp, a camp whose main party has always been the Likud’ (Shalev, 2019)—and aims at representing all Israeli citizens. In fact, the main bonding factor between the three parties and, more specifically, between Kakhol Lavan’s leading figures Benny Gantz and Gabi Ashkenazi (Hosen l-Israel), Yair Lapid (Yesh Atid), and Moshe Yaalon (Telem), is their opposition to Netanyahu rather than a common ideology or a shared political platform. For this reason, it was almost impossible for Benny Gantz, who emerged as a candidate for prime minister, to form a cohesive coalition with a shared programme including anti-corruption and social justice measures as well as a revival of the peace process. Notwithstanding the victory speech that Netanyahu delivered soon after the close of polling stations (Ynet News, 2000), the third round held on March 2, 2020 failed to produce a clear majority. Likud made a stronger showing than in the previous elections, rising from 32 seats to 36. However, the coalition supporting Netanyahu only won 58 seats in Parliament, three short of a ruling majority: Shas and UTJ won the same number of seats as in September (9 and 7 respectively), while Yemina lost one, dropping to 6 seats. Once again, even though a majority of MKs were opposed to a Netanyahu-led government, they were not able to unite around Benny Gantz, the leader of the second-largest party Kakhol

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Lavan, which won 32 seats. The main obstacle to an agreement among ‘anti-Netanyahu’ parties was the participation of Arab Knesset members in the Israeli government, or alternatively their external support to a minority coalition. More specifically, the point of contention was the role that the third-largest party in the Knesset, the so-called Joint List (alq¯ a ima al-mushtaraka in Arabic; ha-reshima ha-meshutefet in Hebrew) should play. The Joint List is a coalition of four parties, originally formed in January 2015, later dissolved, and then re-established in July 2019. It won 13 seats in September 2019 and increased its share to 15 in March 2020. Out of the four parties, three are entirely Arab. Balad (the acronym for its Hebrew name Brit leumit democratit, National Democratic Alliance, but also an Arabic word that means ‘nation’) was founded in 1995 with the stated purpose of transforming Israel from a Jewish state to a state for all its citizens. Ta‘al (the acronym for its Hebrew name Tnu a aravit le-hitkhadshut, Arab Movement for Renewal), also an Arab nationalist party, was established in the mid-1990s with the aim of representing the interests of the Palestinian citizens of Israel. Ra‘am(the acronym for its Hebrew name Ha-reshima ha- aravit ha-meukhedet, United Arab List), a nationalist and Islamic party, was founded in the early 1990s. Lastly, Hadash (the acronym for its Hebrew name khazit democratit le-shalom u-le-shivion, the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality) is a joint Jewish–Arab party and the heir to the Communist party. Yet, four out of five members of the coalition in the Knesset are Arab, and only one is Jewish. This has led to the Joint List being perceived as an Arab party in Israeli politics, and it was its support for a Gantz-led government that was met with opposition from two Kakhol Lavan MKs (Verter, 2020). This was not at all unexpected. Apart from the already mentioned cleavage between secular and religious Jews, there is another, more important, rift in Israeli society, namely between Jews and Arabs (Peleg & Waxman, 2011). Had Benny Gantz succeeded in forming a government based on the external support of an Arab party, it would have been a historic change in Israeli politics. Only between 1995 and 1996 did an Israeli government rely on external backing from Arab MKs, namely when after Rabin’s assassination, Shimon Peres’ new cabinet could count on 58 seats only in the Knesset, and therefore depended on the support of two Arab parties. Yet Peres’ government, which would only last for a few months, was a response to the dramatic events surrounding Rabin’s death. Further, the number of votes from Arab parties was quite limited. The current political situation is not as dramatic as in 1995, and a quarter of the votes

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needed for a majority would come from the Arab parties. By opposing Arab support, the two members of Kakhol Lavan voiced the belief shared by many Israeli Jews that Israel is a Jewish state, and for this reason its government should be supported by a largely Jewish majority rather than a Jewish–Arab one, as would be the case should Israel become a binational state. Their opposition doomed all hopes for a Gantz-led government that would include the Joint List. Having failed to secure their votes, Gantz only garnered 60 MKs: 30 of which came from Kakhol Lavan, 15 from the Joint List, and 7 from Yisrael Beitenu. Six votes came from a threeparty coalition of Labor (Ha- avodah), the heir of the once glorious Zionist-Socialist party led by David Ben Gurion; Meretz (lit. Vigor), Israel’s most left-wing Zionist party, founded in 1992, and whose secular leftist agenda includes supporting a two-state solution and protecting the rights of religious, ethnic and sexual minorities; and Gesher (lit. Bridge), a centrist party not too distant from the positions of Likud on many issues. It is worth mentioning that it would have been very difficult—to say the least—for Gantz to keep together such a heterogeneous and contradictory alliance. The only way to avoid a fourth election in a row was to create a national unity government based on an agreement between Netanyahu and Gantz. And that is what happened, despite Gantz repeating for more than a year that he would never sit in a government with Netanyahu. Even though Kakhol Lavan split (only Gantz’s faction, Osen l’Yisrael, has entered the government), and even though the right-wing coalition also split (Yemina has decided not to join the new government), Netanyahu and Gantz were able to reach an agreement. On May 17, the new government was sworn in, backed by a majority of 73 MKs: 36 from Likud; 17 from Kakhol Lavan; 9 from Shas; 7 from UTJ; and 4 from Labor-Gesher. Netanyahu will serve as Prime Minister for the first 18 months before being replaced by Gantz (Lis, 2020). Several questions remain unanswered. What is the new government’s agenda? What issues will it address? While responding to the COVID19 emergency is the top priority at the moment—the ‘national emergency government’ is set to devote the next six months to deal with the health and economic crisis—it is too early to make any prediction. Certainly, no decision will be made about the drafting of ultra-Orthodox Jews, despite its urgency. At the same time, it is very unlikely that further steps might be taken concerning the peace process with Palestinians. A lot—as

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detailed in the third section of this article—will depend on the actions of the US administration and the outcome of the November 2020 presidential elections, and even more so, on Netanyahu’s bribery trial, which started on May 24 (Kaplan Sommer, 2020). Under the circumstances, it is quite likely that the government will not make a final decision on crucial matters, and the political impasse will continue for the near future.

3

Palestinian Politics

As stated previously, since June 2007 a deep rift has grown within Palestinian politics between Fatah, the largest, more nationalist and secular faction within the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and Hamas, the Islamist nationalist organization. As a consequence of the clashes that broke out in June 2007 (Baconi, 2018: 131–132), the Gaza Strip is still under the control of Hamas, while parts of the West Bank—specifically areas A and B, the divisions established by the Oslo Accords (Anziska, 2018: 285–287)—are under the control of Fatah, which runs the Palestinian Authority (PA), a self-government entity also set up by the Oslo Accords. There have been several reconciliation attempts since then, brokered by regional and international actors, notably Saudi Arabia and Egypt (Abu Toameh, 2018). The talks, however, have led nowhere and a national unity government is yet to be created. The main points of contention between Fatah and Hamas are: responsibility for the payment of salaries to civil servants in the West Bank and Gaza; the possibility of running national elections all over the Occupied Palestinian Territories (Abu Amer, ); reform of the PLO and Hamas’ interest in joining the organization (Khoury, 2018); security in the Gaza Strip and the demilitarization of Hamas. Their lack of agreement is due to the wish of both parties to maintain their current prerogatives and power: Hamas, in particular, is not willing to cede control over security in the Gaza Strip to the PA and dismantle its militias, while Fatah refuses to compromise on the issue (Abu Amer, 2018). Apart from these aspects, regional events have also contributed to deepening the Hamas–Fatah rift: the Arab revolts of 2010–2011 and their consequences all over the Middle East, from the coup d’état against the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhw¯ an al-Muslim¯ un) in July 2013 that led to the ascent of al-Sisi (al-S¯ıs¯ı), to the wars taking place in Yemen, Libya and Syria; the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and its repercussions on

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the struggles of Sunnis and Shias, such as in Lebanon and Iraq; and the competition between Turkey and Qatar on the one side, and Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates on the other. Both Fatah and Hamas have been backed by Middle Eastern countries using their support to increase their regional status. Until 2011, Hamas was increasingly linked to—and depending on—Iran and Syria; however, since the beginning of the war in Syria, the Palestinian faction has broken its relations with Damascus and loosened its ties to Teheran while moving closer to Turkey and Qatar. As to Fatah, its connections to Saudi Arabia have grown stronger, as the worsening of relations between Riyad and Doha has led the Saudis to increase their support for Fatah while reducing their assistance to Hamas. At the same time, the end of the Muslim Brotherhood’s rule in Egypt has led Cairo to jeopardize its relationship with Hamas while increasing its backing of Fatah (Natil, 2015: 147–152). As a result of the Fatah–Hamas split, Palestinians’ bargaining power with Israel has weakened. The Israeli government has clearly taken advantage of this division and tried—successfully so far—to widen the rift between the two Palestinian factions. Since 2009, Hamas has received much harsher treatment from Netanyahu-led governments than Fatah, and this has fuelled its resentment towards the latter; in this way, Israel has made it much harder for Palestinians to reach a compromise (Khalidi, 2015). At the same time, Israel has used Hamas’ control of the Gaza Strip and its hard-line policy to reinforce the rhetoric that ‘there is no partner for peace’ (Ziv, 2019) among the Palestinians; in fact, no negotiations have been set up with the PA President, Abu Mazen (Ab¯u M¯azin), since Netanyahu’s return to government in 2009. As a result, Palestinians have not been able to carry out any policy that might contribute to the advancement of their cause, that is, the creation of an independent and viable Palestinian state alongside Israel. The Fatah–Hamas split is not the only division affecting Palestinian politics. Internal disagreement within each faction has also contributed to preventing a reconciliation agreement between Fatah and Hamas. The divisions within Fatah are not a recent development. Well before the death of Yasser Arafat in November 2004, what the Palestinian political scientist Khalil Shikaki has referred to as a rivalry between the ‘Old Guard’ and the ‘Young Guard’ (Shikaki, 2002) was already evident. Since then, the younger members of Fatah have not been able to oust the ‘Old Guard’ and rise to power. The most visible example of this is the split between Abu Mazen and Mohammed Dahlan (Muh.ammad Dah.l¯an).

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The former, a typical representative of the ‘Old Guard’, joined the PLO while living abroad and returned to Palestine after the signing of the Oslo Accords. The latter is a typical member of the ‘Young Guard’ who spent his childhood and adolescence in the Gaza Strip, emerging as a young leader during the First Intifada and moving on to become the head of the Preventive Security forces in the Strip at the time of the Oslo Accords. Dahlan, who had very good relations with Israel, the EU and the United States,4 hoped to take Abu Mazen’s place as leader of Fatah and head of the PA but did not succeed and, on the contrary, was expelled from Fatah on accusations of corruption and has left Palestine to move to the United Arab Emirates. The rift between the two politicians and signs of internal tensions between factions were evident at Fatah’s General Conference in November–December 2016 (Khoury, 2016). As a result of these divisions, there is no successor to Abu Mazen and there might not be one for a while. Marwan Barghuthi (Marw¯an al-Bargh¯uth¯ı), head of the Fatah Supreme Council in the West Bank before the Second Intifada, and often referred to as the Palestinian Mandela, is the only person who may be able to unite Fatah and replace Abu Mazen. However, he has been convicted on terrorism charges by an Israeli tribunal and is now serving his sentence in an Israeli prison. Therefore, it is unclear whether Israel would allow him to run in presidential elections, when/if they are held (Weitz & Khoury, 2016). Finally, there are divisions within Hamas, as well. First, there is a political rift. In recent years, there has been fierce competition between the political leadership in Gaza and the Diaspora leaders. Specifically, a political feud is playing out between Ismail Haniyeh (Ism¯a¯ıl Haniya), the first Hamas Prime Minister of the PA after his victory in the 2006 parliamentary elections, who at the time was living in the Gaza Strip, and Doha-based Khaled Mashal (Kh¯alid Mashal), chair of the Hamas political bureau, who lived in Damascus between 2001 and 2012. However, since June 2007, ‘the political leadership in Gaza has become stronger, serving as a real counterweight to the influence of the bureau’ (Berti, 2015: 30). Divisions have eased since May 2017, when Mashal retired and Haniyeh succeeded him as Hamas’ political leader. The change in leadership took place soon after a new charter was unveiled by Hamas softening its stance on Israel by accepting the idea that a Palestinian state might be based on the 1967 borders (Hamas, 2017). Yet not all members of the bureau have been pleased with the political shift. Mahmud alZahar (Mah.m¯ud al-Zah¯ar), in particular, the Minister of Foreign Affairs

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in the first Hamas PA government and a member of the political leadership in the Strip, expressed his dissatisfaction with the new charter, thus challenging Haniyeh’s leadership (Eldar, 2017). Currently, Hamas leaders have different positions on the possibility of signing some sort of longterm ‘arrangement’ with Israel. Second, there is a rift between the political and military branches of Hamas. On the one side there is the military wing of Hamas, which has seen its role expand since 2007, thanks to its control of the underground smuggling tunnels between Gaza and Egypt. It is not by chance that, for fear of being dismantled, the military wing has played a key role in trying to prevent reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah (Lewitt & Weinstein, 2017). On the other side, the political wing’s increased control over the military arm of Hamas in very recent years has fuelled dissent, giving way to defections into the ranks of competing groups such as the Islamic Jihad. Some sort of compromise between the two branches is represented by Yahya Sinwar (Yah.y¯a al-Sinw¯ar), head of the Hamas political bureau in Gaza since 2017, who ‘grew out of the armed Palestinian wing […]; yet he also understands the importance of maintaining civilian social stability in order to preserve long-term Hamas control in Gaza’ (Milstein, 2020). It should be clear from what has been stated so far that the divisions within Palestinians make it very difficult—not to say impossible—for them to develop a united and strong position vis-à-vis the Israeli government concerning the peace process. And this means that there is an impasse that is not likely to be resolved anytime soon.

4

American Politics and the Peace Deal

Even though Donald Trump declared he would deal with the Israeli– Palestinian peace process during the first months of his Presidency–he held meetings with Netanyahu on February 15,5 and with Abu Mazen on May 3 (Wilner & Rasgon, 2017)—it took his administration three years to unveil a detailed peace plan, triumphally presented as ‘the deal of the century’. Only on January 28, 2020 was the full text of the Peace to Prosperity plan (White House, 2020) released. Has the plan succeeded in getting the Israeli–Palestinian peace process back on track, or are negotiations still at an impasse? While this article does not focus specifically on the peace plan, highlighting its most relevant aspects can help address this question.

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The document consists of two main parts: a 53-page long ‘Political framework’ and the 125-page long ‘Economic framework’ that was first put forward in June 2019, during a US-led meeting in Bahrain (MizrachiArnaud, 2019). It is quite clear from the space devoted to each part that the US administration considers the economic development of Palestine to be much more relevant than the political agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. Moreover, the second part is much more detailed than the first, with lots of specifics concerning the construction of ‘essential infrastructure’, the promotion of ‘private-sector growth’, ‘regional development and integration, ‘workforce development’, and the enhancement of ‘Palestinian governance’. There are even charts showing the estimated costs and timeline for implementation associated with ‘empowering’ the Palestinian people and the development of Palestine. The main reason for such discrepancy between the two parts is the vision behind the peace plan—i.e., the belief that Palestinian economic development is the key to achieving a stable peace between Israelis and Palestinians. The idea is not at all new (Alpher, 2016): on the contrary, it is as old as political Zionism, since already Theodor Herzl believed that the development of Palestine by the Jews would persuade the Arabs living there to accept Zionism, thus avoiding a conflict. The Israeli Ministry of Defence Moshe Dayan also shared this view after the 1967 occupation of Gaza and the West Bank, and Netanyahu is of the same opinion (Marzano, 2017). Obviously, Trump and the members of his administration who have worked on the plan—notably his son-in-law, Jared Kushner—share the same conviction and have therefore developed a plan that focuses more on economic development than a political agreement establishing a viable Palestinian state. What emerges from the peace plan is instead a proposal for the creation of a Palestinian state—in four years, provided that the Palestinians agree to several conditions—without territorial contiguity except through tunnels and skyways; without control over its borders, airspace, and territorial waters; and without sovereignty over East Jerusalem, including the area of the Temple Mount/al-H . aram al-Quds¯ı al-Shar¯ıf (that is, the Al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock). The peace plan presented by the US administration is entirely in line with the requests made by Likud as regards not only the ‘characteristics’ of a Palestinian state but also the conditions for its creation. In this regard, it is worth quoting what the Israeli historian and intellectual Benzion Netanyahu (Benjamin Netanyahu’s father) said about the Prime Minister’s opinion on a Palestinian State: ‘[he] doesn’t support [a

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Palestinian state]. He supports conditions that they [the Palestinians] will never accept’ (Pfeffer, 2020: 498). A remarkably pro-Israeli stance is apparent in the section titled ‘The Approach’, which lists a series of principles and conditions that should govern the Israeli–Palestinian agreement. Five of them are worth mentioning. First of all, in the paragraph titled ‘Legitimate aspirations of the parties’, ‘the Palestinians’ legitimate desire for self-determination’ is mentioned alongside the State of Israel’s ‘legitimate desire to be the nation state of the Jewish people’ (White House, 2020: 7). The latter is a recent request by the Israeli government. For example, such recognition was not included in the peace agreements with Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994. It was Netanyahu who made it a fundamental element of negotiations with the Palestinians, after openly demanding recognition during a speech he delivered at Bar-Ilan University on June 14, 2009, in which he stated: ‘if the Palestinians recognize Israel as the State of the Jewish people, then we will be ready in a future peace agreement to reach a solution where a demilitarized Palestinian state exists alongside the Jewish state’ (Netanyahu, 2009). While the PLO had already recognized the right of Israel to exist under the Oslo Accords, it has always refused to recognize Israel as the State of the Jewish people (Kershner, 2009), and Abu Mazen has openly said that he does not intend to (The Times of Israel, 2014), because doing that would jeopardize the national rights of the Palestinian citizens of Israel. Actually, many within (Yadgar, 2020: 78–111) and outside Israel (Beaumont, 2018) criticized the Israeli government for discriminating against non-Jewish citizens when, in July 2018, the Knesset passed the new Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People (Basic Law, 2018). The Trump administration, however, was not among the critics of the 2018 law (Shalev, 2018) and has repeated its position in the peace plan. Secondly, the plan explicitly recognizes the ‘primacy of security’, stating that Israel cannot ‘compromise the safety and security of its citizens’ (White House, 2020: 7). This is a major issue, because Israel has always maintained that its politics in the OPT have been driven by the need to protect its citizens’ security (Hass, 2019). Stating that security has a primacy means nothing less than siding with Israeli rhetoric. A third principle concerns the territory, about which three aspects should be highlighted. The peace plan states that ‘Israel has already withdrawn from at least 88% of territory it captured in 1967’ (White House, 2020: 8). Clearly, the peace plan refers to the Sinai Peninsula, from where

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Israel withdrew in 1982 as a consequence of the Camp David Accords. However, that territory has nothing to do with the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, since what is at stake here is the occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Including Sinai among the territories ‘captured in 1967’ suggests that Israel has already fulfilled its obligations and, therefore, it is up to the Palestinians to compromise, backing down from their demand for a full Israeli withdrawal. At the same time, the plan states that ‘peace should not demand the uprooting of people (Arab or Jew) from their homes’ (White House, 2020: 8), thereby implying that Israeli settlements on occupied territory—which, as is widely known (United Nations, 2016), are illegal under international law—are a legitimate part of Israel from which settlers are not to be ‘uprooted’. This is a direct consequence of the first aspect: Israel will not need to withdraw entirely from the West Bank, because Israeli settlements will not be dismantled. Finally, as a result of that, the plan envisions the creation of a ‘transportation contiguity’ that will ‘enhance the mobility’ of the Palestinian people (White House, 2020: 8)—seemingly a direct reply to criticisms of the role played by settlements in preventing territorial contiguity of the Palestinian state. Guaranteeing ‘transportation contiguity’ through ‘transportation corridors’ is the best way to remove a crucial obstacle to the viability of a future Palestinian state, effectively taking the issue off the table. A fourth principle deals with refugees. The plan acknowledges the need for a ‘just’ and ‘fair solution to the Palestinian refugee issue’, but it also adds that it should be ‘realistic’ (White House, 2020: 9), meaning that the right of return—which was recognized for the first time by UN General Assembly Resolution n. 194, approved on December 11, 1948, and has been central to the Palestinian cause—is too impractical to be implemented. At the same time, the plan highlights that ‘the Arab–Israeli conflict created both a Palestinian and a Jewish refugee problem’ (White House, 2020: 9). By tying the two issues together, the plan incorporates the contents of a campaign launched in 2000 by Bobby Brown, Netanyahu’s advisor on Diaspora affairs, according to whom identifying the Jews coming from Arab countries as refugees would prevent the successful implementation of the Palestinian right of return and, at the same time, reduce the amount of compensation that Israel would pay in case of a peace agreement (Fischbach, 2008). This is exactly what the peace plan aims at by suggesting that, as much as Israel accepted and integrated Jewish refugees following the events of 1948, each Arab country should do the same with the Palestinian refugees, absorbing ad integrating

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them. At the same time, if mechanisms to compensate the Palestinian refugees are envisaged, similar tools should be foreseen for the Jewish refugees. Finally, the fifth principle pertains to Jerusalem, and more specifically to the holy sites, since this is how the plan refers to the city: ‘Jerusalem is holy to multiple faiths and has religious significance for much of humanity’. By addressing the religious character of the city, ‘particularly the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif’, the peace plan intentionally hides the political one. Thus, without even mentioning Palestinian requests to consider East Jerusalem as the capital of the Palestinian state, the plan states that ‘Israel has been a good custodian of Jerusalem’, since it ‘has kept [it] open and secure’ (White House, 2020: 9). The main consequence of this reasoning is that Israel deserves to have sovereignty over the entire city because, in this way, the holy sites will ‘always remain open to worshippers of all religions’. There is no need to provide more details about the peace plan, as it is already clear that the US administration has met all Israeli requests while ignoring requests from the Palestinians. It should not come as a surprise, then, that Abu Mazen strongly condemned the proposal on January 28, the same day it was released: ‘Palestine is not for sale’ (Ibrahim, 2020), he said. On May 19, 2020 he even declared that the PLO and the PA ‘are absolved […] of all the agreements and understandings with the American and Israeli governments’ (WAFA, 2020). Even more important was the reaction of several Arab countries, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, that are among the most pro-American in the region. Neither country sent representatives to attend the unveiling of the plan in Washington, nor did they comment on its contents despite saying they appreciated Trump’s efforts. On February 1, the Arab League rejected the plan stating that ‘it would not lead to a just peace deal’ (Arab League, 2020). Such attitude is not only politically disturbing for Washington—in fact, it may further undermine its influence in the Middle East, which has witnessed the progressive disengagement of the U.S. It is also, and more importantly, economically worrisome, since Saudi Arabia is one of the Middle Eastern countries that is expected to contribute the most to the economic component of the peace plan. The result is that, despite the release of the peace plan, the impasse in the Israeli–Palestinian peace process is far from being overcome. As evident from the brief analysis of its underlying principles presented above, the vision behind the plan is clearly biased, and that explains why

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opposition to the plan has come from both Palestinians and the Arab countries, even the most pro-American. It is therefore unlikely that the plan will be implemented in the near future, and negotiations are not expected to resume any time soon.

5

Conclusion

The Israeli–Palestinian peace process is still in a state of impasse. The US peace plan led to further deadlock, and nothing has changed since its release. As to Palestinian politics, the creation of a Hamas–Fatah unity government that might overcome the split between the two factions is far from being envisaged. Israeli politics have witnessed the birth of a new government, bringing an end to a stalemate that lasted for more than a year. But it is not clear where this new government is heading as far as the Palestinian issue is concerned. The annexation of parts of the West Bank, which the peace plan allows for and that (in the case of the Jordan Valley) is provided for in the Netanyahu-Gantz deal (Lazaroff, 2020), is something that this government might consider implementing after July 1. However, it is impossible to know whether this will happen or whether the US administration will push for a postponement. That notwithstanding, the most important aspect to consider is that it is not clear what the consequences of that decision might be, since a ‘de facto’ annexation has already taken place (Landau, 2020). Most likely, not much will change should the annexation take place. The impasse I have described does not mean that nothing is happening. On the contrary, as said at the opening of this article, a policy based on ‘facts on the ground’ is allowing Israel to increasingly exert control over the West Bank. According to the Peace Now Settlement Watch, the number of settlers is growing year by year: construction started on 1,917 new housing units in 2019, and 11 new outposts were established. In particular, the Israeli NGO highlights that ‘the takeover of the Jordan Valley is almost complete’ (Peace Now, 2019: 11). While a stalemate has been reached at the political and diplomatic level, on the practical side there have been changes allowing Israel to seize more and more land on a daily basis. The main consequence is that the chances of creating a viable Palestinian state, with territorial contiguity and reasonable borders, are decreasing by the day. And this means that the two-state solution that has been at the core of negotiations for the past 25 years risks being no

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longer viable, thus clearing the way for the one-state solution—with all the consequences that would entail.

Notes 1. On this topic, see Elderlin (2002) and Roy (2002). 2. On the long-standing issue of the drafting of ultra-Orthodox Jews, see Ellenson (2018). On those events, see Lis (2019). 3. On the existing cleavages, see the still relevant article by Raffaella Del Sarto (2007). On the relationship between secular and religious Jews, see BenPorat (2013) as well as Peled and Herman Peled (2019). 4. On the contacts between the George W. Bush administration and Dahlan in 2007 with the aim of removing the Hamas-led government from power, see Rose (2008). 5. For a video of the press conference, see ABC News (2017).

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Marzano, A. (2017). Storia dei sionismi. Lo Stato degli ebrei da Herzl a oggi. Carocci. Milstein, M. (2020, February 25). Yahya Sinwar and Hamas’ strategic crossroad. Tel Aviv Notes, 14(2). The Moshe Dayan Center. Available at https:// dayan.org/content/yahya-sinwar-and-hamas-strategic-crossroad. Accessed 14 June 2020. Mizrachi-Arnaud, Y. (2019, July 9). Neither peace nor prosperity: Jared Kushner’s Middle East peace plan falls flat in Bahrain. FPRI. Available at https://www.fpri.org/article/2019/07/neither-peace-nor-prosperityjared-kushners-middle-east-peace-plan-falls-flat-in-bahrain/. Accessed 14 June 2020. Natil, I. (2015). Hamas transformation: Opportunities and challenges. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Netanyahu, B. (2009, June 14). Address at Bar-Ilan University. Available at https://mfa.gov.il/mfa/pressroom/2009/pages/address_pm_netanyahu_ bar-ilan_university_14-jun-2009.aspx. Accessed 14 June 2020. Peace Now. (2019). Settlement Construction Report 2019. Available at http:// peacenow.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/2019-Construction-Report_ Peace-Now.pdf. Accessed 14 June 2020. Peled, Y., & Herman Peled, H. (2019). The religionization of Israeli society. Routledge. Peleg, I., & Waxman, D. (2011). Israel’s Palestinians: The conflict within. Cambridge University Press. Pfeffer, A. (2020). Bibi: The turbulent life and times of Benjamin Netanyahu. C. Hurst & Co. Rose, D. (2008, March 3). The Gaza Bombshell. Vanity Fair. Available at https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2008/04/gaza200804?currentPage=all& printable=true. Accessed 14 June 2020. Roy, S. (2002). Why peace failed: An Oslo autopsy. Current History, 651, 8–16. Shalev, S. (2018, August 5). Netanyahu’s hyper-nationalist Israel is now part of Trump’s legacy. Haaretz. Available at https://www.haaretz.com/israelnews/.premium-netanyahu-s-hyper-nationalist-israel-is-now-part-of-trump-slegacy-1.6342731. Accessed 14 June 2020. Shalev, S. (2019, February 11). Meet Benny Gantz’s Right-Wing Roster. Israel Policy Forum. Available at https://israelpolicyforum.org/2019/02/ 11/meet-benny-gantzs-right-wing-roster/. Accessed 14 June 2020. Shikaki, K. (2002). Palestinians divided. Foreign Affairs, 81(1), 89–105. Shilon, A. (2020). The decline of the left wing in Israel: Yossi Beilin and the politics of the peace process. I.B. Tauris. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2334. (2016, December 23). Available at https://www.un.org/webcast/pdfs/SRES2334-2016.pdf. Accessed 14 June 2020.

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The Times of Israel. (2014, November 29). Palestinians will never recognize Israel as Jewish state. Available at https://www.timesofisrael.com/abbas-pal estinians-will-never-recognize-israel-as-jewish-state/. Accessed 14 June 2020. Verter, J. (2020, March 10). Two refined racists from Gantz’s party foil his chance at replacing netanyahu. Haaretz. Available at https://www.haaretz. com/israel-news/elections/.premium-two-refined-racists-from-gantz-s-partyfoil-his-chance-at-replacing-netanyahu-1.8659435. Accessed 14 June 2020. WAFA. (2020, May 19). President Abbas declares end to agreements with Israel, US; turns over responsibility on occupied lands to Israel. Available at http:// english.wafa.ps/page.aspx?id=SHr6TEa117154132029aSHr6TE. Accessed 14 June 2020. Weitz, G., & Khoury, J. (2016, July 5). Will Marwan Barghouti be the Palestinian Nelson Mandela? Haaretz. Available at https://www.haaretz.com/isr ael-news/MAGAZINE-is-this-the-palestinian-mandela-1.5403803. Accessed 14 June 2020. White House. (2020). Peace to prosperity. A vision to improve the lives of the Palestinian and Israeli people. Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2020/01/Peace-to-Prosperity-0120.pdf. Accessed 14 June 2020. Wilner, M., & Rasgon, A. (2017, May 3). Trump says he will launch new Middle East peace process. The Jerusalem Post. Available at https://www.jpost.com/arab-israeli-conflict/trump-abbas-hold-his toric-white-house-meeting-489655. Accessed 14 June 2020. Yadgar, Y. (2020). Israel’s Jewish identity crisis: State and politics in the Middle East. Cambridge University Press. Ynet News. (2000, March 3). Netanyahu: This is a night of great victory. Available at https://www.ynetnews.com/article/YRG40H8FY. Accessed 14 June 2020. Ziv, G. (2019). Nobody to talk to: The persistence of the ‘no partner’ mantra in Israeli discourse. The Middle East Journal, 73(3), 355–375.

Mashreq Monarchies’ Role in the Mediterranean Sea Odetta Pizzingrilli and Luigi Giorgi

Contents 1

The Jordanian Neighbor, a Country Built on Migration Movements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The Evolution of the Role of Qatar in the Mediterranean Crises . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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The present chapter is co-authored, the first part, written by Odetta Pizzingrilli, focuses on the Jordanian case, pp. XX–XX; the second part, written by Luigi Giorgi, focuses on the Qatari case, pp. XX–XX. O. Pizzingrilli (B) · L. Giorgi Department of Political Science, LUISS University, Rome, Italy e-mail: [email protected] L. Giorgi e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 F. M. Corrao and R. Redaelli (eds.), States, Actors and Geopolitical Drivers in the Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69000-7_14

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1

The Jordanian Neighbor, a Country Built on Migration Movements

The migration management policies of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan changed over time alongside the government’s political narrative on the matter. The numerous waves of migrant workers and forced migrants1 (Palestinian, Iraqi and Syrian being the larger in number and the most significant) have shaped the Jordanian national identity and transformed the Kingdom’s socio-economic system in turn both affecting its relations with the neighboring countries and defining its role within the Mediterranean scene. Indeed, the domestic, regional and international levels are intertwined and need to be examined as a whole. Since 2004 Jordan has been part of the ‘European Neighborhood’, the new ENP-created geographical entity. When dealing with this acquired neighbor, the European Union (EU) and more generally the International Community need to take into account its peculiar state-building process, the hybrid nature of its sovereignty,2 and its multilayered, albeit strong national identity. Jordan is a long-standing migration hub within the eastern Mediterranean basin and the Mashreq region, and its economic system and domestic and foreign policy have changed over time alongside the inward and outward fluxes of people that crossed it in turn shaping the country’s social composition. In the words of Brand (1995) ‘examining the [Jordanian] regional shifts against the background of bilateral and multilateral economic relations demonstrates how economic agencies and structures […] can better explain foreign policy’ (Brand, 1995: 3). Among the most significant fluxes over time: • The highly skilled Jordanian (-Palestinian) nationals migrating to the Gulf whose remittances bumped the Kingdom’s economy in the Seventies while being counter-balanced by an intense inward migration of unskilled labor mainly from Egypt and South Asia (Hanieh, 2018); • The return of the so-called ‘Palestinians of Kuwait’, later expelled from the Gulf city-state because of the PLO alignment with Saddam Hussein (S.add¯am H . usayn) during the First Gulf War leading to a new peak of the unemployment rate and challenging once again the multilayered Jordanian national identity by adding a new social constituency alien both to the (Trans) Jordanians and to the Palestinians of Jordan. In fact, ‘these Palestinians largely viewed their

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Jordanian passports as a convenience not as a basis of identity or belonging’ (Brand, 1995: 49–50) and their different account of ‘Palestinianess’ (Brand recalls among other elements their hatred of Saddam Hussein) alienated them from the other Palestinian Jordanians. Moreover, this flux was so significant (around 200,000 units) as to be called ‘the Palestinians’ third exodus’ (Le Troquer & Hommery al-Oudat, 1999: 37–51), the first two being the one that followed the foundation of the state of Israel in 1948—that tripled Jordan’s population and gave a stronger diplomatic role to the country at the regional and international levels, as well as a demographic visibility (De Bel-Air, 2016)—and the one that followed the 1967 defeat when about 350,000 Palestinians fled to Jordan, making the East Bank the PLO ‘headquarters’ and thus threatening the state’s sovereignty. Indeed, Jordan is the Arab country that hosts the greatest number of Palestinian refugees,3 one of the largest and longest-lasting refugee populations in the world (Feldman, 2012b: 155), and the Jordanian society is still adjusting to the marked governmental nationalist narrative that constructs the nation through exclusion (Riad, 2004). Proof of that is the fact that the label ‘Jordanian-Jordanian’ or ‘pure/purely Jordanian’ as opposed to ‘Palestinian Jordanian’, even though widely criticized, is still very common in the country.4 • The so-called ‘Afghan Arabs’ that fought in the Soviet-Afghan War (1979–1989) and came back bringing with them an extremist account of Islam that denies the legitimacy of both the State’s borders and its ruler’s.5 The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ‘the quintessential moderate Muslim ally’ in Sowell’s definition (2017) paradoxically made a major contribution to radical groups such as al-Qaeda and IS, providing them both soldiers and leading figures, Abdallah Yusuf Azzam (Abd All¯ah Y¯usuf Azz¯am, 1941–1989), al-Zarqawi (alZarq¯aw¯ı, 1966–2006) and Abu Qatada (Ab¯ u Qat¯ada, b. 1960) to name a few (Sowell, 2017: 153). Islamism in Jordan has indeed a special status and its course is both affected by the peculiar hybrid nature of the state and affects its complex identity, which is in constant motion. For instance, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, established in 1945 by Abd al-Latif Abu Qura (Abd al-Lat.¯ıf Ab¯u Q¯ura, 1906–1967), enjoyed until recently a good relation

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with the leading family (Wagemakers, 2020: 35–50), while since the Fifties the Jordanian education system has become deeply Islamist (not Salafist): The standard Islamic text across Jordanian universities, Islamic Culture and Modern Issues (al-Thaq¯ afa al-Isl¯ amiyya wa Qad.¯ ay¯ a al- As.r, published by 20 members of the Sharia College faculty of the University of Jordan in Amman) never referred to the Kingdom of Jordan as a modern nation-state while calling forth ‘those capable to found a State of Islam’. The book was re-edited in 2015–2017 but it undoubtedly had an impact on the society’s understanding of citizenship, sovereignty and national identity (Sowell, 2017: 155–156). • The Iraqi refugees arrived in different waves after the first and the second Gulf wars, often using Jordan as a stopover of their journey toward other, usually European, destinations; • The Syrian refugees arrived after the 2011 crisis (746,723 as of April 15, 20206 ), to be added to the wealthy Syrian nationals residing in the Kingdom that did not register with UNHCR, such as the seasonal workers with no proper work permits that may have crossed the borders when the conflict begun7 and businessmen that shifted their assets from Lebanon to Jordan, worried by the political instability following President Hariri’s (al-H . ar¯ır¯ı) assassination in 2005 (De Bel-Air, 2016). Interestingly, the growing presence of Iraqi and especially Syrian refugees had changed both the self-perception of the ‘Palestinian-Jordanians’ and their image of the ‘JordanianJordanians’ as ‘in comparison with Syrians, Palestinians are now looked at differently cause now there’s a new enemy, a new other 8 ’. The Kingdom’s governmental narrative went from being Pan-Arab in the Fifties to stressing a (Trans)Jordanian, tribal, Islamic and Hashemite identity in the Seventies, when a ‘state within a state’—developed during the Black September crisis—started to challenge the Kingdom’s very existence (Gallets March 18, 2015). In the 1974 Rabat summit, the Arab League indicated the PLO as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinians in occupied lands and in the diaspora; in 1988 King Husayn (H . usayn, 1935–1999) announced the administrative disengagement of the West Bank (fakk al-irtib¯ a.t) and over a million Jordanian nationals residing on the West Bank lost their full Jordanian nationality. However, until 1984 the residency of Arab nationals was not subject to a permit while non-Arab worker visa

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regulation was under the strict kaf¯ ala (sponsorship) system. Later on, work permits—to be renewed yearly by paying an (always increasing) fee—became mandatory for both Arabs and non-Arabs. Since the death of Husayn in 1999 ‘the Hashemite regime had been transformed into a relatively well-functioning authoritarian state with reasonably good relations between the Monarchy and […] significant regional actors, as well as both the USA and the EU’ (Seeberg, 2016: 167).9 In the 2000s, King Abd Allah II (Abd All¯ah al-Th¯an¯ı), through national campaigns such as ‘Jordan First’ (al-Urdunn Awwalan), promoted an all-encompassing and essentially Arabic Jordanian identity, a probable reason of identity confusion for the younger generations of nonArab nationals, such as the Chechens and the Circassians. Lastly, the high numbers of Iraqi and especially Syrian refugees represent an ultimate challenge for the Hashemite rulers. Even though, as already mentioned, their presence contributed in lowering the ‘otherness’ of Palestinian Jordanians (Feldman, 2012a: 129–169), it exacerbates the country’s long-lasting criticalities—unemployment, scarceness of infrastructure and the water crisis, to name a few—because of the sudden and extraordinary population increase while at the same time providing the government with a convenient scapegoat to blame. Finally, the IC humanitarian and development funding received by the Kingdom replaced, alongside the US and the Gulf aid, the remittances of the Seventies-Nineties—contributing to the preservation of Jordan’s semi-rentier economic system and consequently its state’s legitimacy, since semi-rentierism can be configured as a form of legitimation in Schlumberger and Bank’s account.10 However, worsening economic conditions and the new national role assumed by the military during the Covid19 pandemic (the PSD being the primary enforcer of the Covid19 policies) may have transformative implications for Jordanian politics, as ‘neo-rightwing sympathizers may see this crisis as a validation exercise for their political platform […] driving more Jordanians into the populist camp and call for more military intervention in governance’ (Spencer Hartnett et al., 2020), and economy, as Jordan is facing a potential loss of foreign aid and ‘may thus have to contemplate a drastic change in its economic orientation’ (Singh, 2020). Having identified the many components of the Jordanian society and outlined the transformations of the country’s domestic and regional11 policies over time, both deeply affected by the migrant waves that crossed it, it is now possible to focus on the international dimension. The 2004

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Eastern enlargement of the European Union12 and its consequent need to ‘strengthen relations with those countries who, although not EU members nor candidates for accession, are of strategic relevance for the geopolitical and geoeconomic reconfiguration of ‘Europe as global actor’ (Celata & Coletti, 2015: 1)—profoundly affected the framework of cooperation of the EU with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. In order to secure the new external borders, the EU launched the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) in 2004 (and reviewed it in 2015), which includes ten Mediterranean countries (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria [suspended in 2011]) and six Eastern countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine), a wide and heterogeneous systematization that have been criticized by some (Celata & Coletti, 2015: 11).13 By doing so the ENP invented a new geographical entity, the ‘European Neighborhood14 ’ meant to ‘share everything with the Union but institutions’ in the words of Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission in 2002.15 As for Jordan, alongside the EU-Jordan ENP Action Plan signed in 2005, the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement came into force in May 2002 formed the legal basis of the Hashemite Kingdom’s relations with the EU by setting out the conditions for economic, cultural and social cooperation. Moreover, Jordan is a member of the EU’s strategic partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East (SPMME, approved by the European Council in June 2004) whose primary objective is promoting the development of a common zone of peace, prosperity and progress in the region. The Hashemite Kingdom is also part of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), founded in 2008 to reinforce the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership inaugurated at the 1995 Barcelona conference, and it is the Southern Co-President of the Union since June 2012, after Egypt. Finally, it is the third Arab Mediterranean country (after Tunisia and Morocco) to sign a Mobility Partnership agreement with the EU (2014) aimed at improving migration and mobility management (e.g. better preventing human trafficking and the smuggling of migrants while facilitating the procedures for the issuing of Schengen visas to citizens of Jordan).16 The relations between Jordan and the European Union date back 40 years (the year 2019 marks the 40th anniversary of the EU’s presence in Jordan17 ) and since at least two decades the Jordanian actor has been playing an active role in the Mediterranean scene. However, the Syrian crisis and the regional and international turmoil that followed

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alongside the rise of the so-called Islamic State (al-Dawla al-Isl¯ amiyya) in the neighboring countries increased the strategic importance of the Hashemite Kingdom, the last bastion of political stability and security in a challenging region (Seeberg, 2016: 163–180) and a potential ally of the EU in the fight against violent terrorism (in June 2018 the European Council authorized an exchange of data between Europol and the Jordanian authorities). Indeed, Jordan is the second biggest recipient of Syrian refugees in relation to the indigenous population after Lebanon (the Jordanian government estimates the number to be around 1.3 million). For the most part, they live in cities and villages in the northern governorates (especially Mafraq and Irbid) while only a small percentage reside in one of the three camps of the country, Zaatari (10 km east of Mafraq), the Emirati Jordanian Camp and Azraq Camp (both in the Zarqa governorate). Notably, Hüser (2016) discusses the governmental ‘refugees as a burden’ narrative arguing that although the refugee influx has placed growing pressure on Jordan’s infrastructure and resources, refugees have been used by the Hashemite rulers as a scapegoat for the worsening of the economic situation of the Kingdom and to attract further funding from the West, while the real causes of such crisis are to be found in the regime’s structural deficits derived from the country’s nation-state building process, only exacerbated by the population increase (Hüser, 2016: 79–82). Indeed, bilateral and multilateral European development aids are so significant18 as to be considered ‘rent equivalents’ thus contributing, alongside the USA and the Gulf States’ financial support, to making the Jordanian economic system semi-rentier (Peters & Moore, 2009: 256–285). For instance, in return for the Kingdom’s commitment to the Jordan Compact (for example, it undertook to allow up to 200,000 work permits for Syrian refugees over a three-year period), Jordan was allocated about 2 billion US dollars in grants and cheap loans and granted improved access to European trade markets for Jordanian products (Bel-Air, 2016).19 The latest approach when dealing with protracted displacement is the Jordan Compact, a deal signed at the Supporting Syria and the Region Conference in London in February 2016 between the Hashemite Kingdom and the International Community (IC20 ) amid a deepening EU migration crisis. The Jordan Compact must be contextualized within the new holistic policy model of the socalled ‘refugees’ compacts’ that brings together the humanitarian and the development sectors, meaning that the funding comes with reform

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agendas and development plans agreed upon by the partners with the aim of improving the refugees’ self-reliance (profoundly related to the right to work) while also ensuring the positive development of the host communities. Born with the ambition of turning ‘the Syrian refugee crisis into a development opportunity for Jordan by shifting the focus from shortterm humanitarian aid to education, growth, investment and job creation, both for Jordanians and for Syrian refugees’ (Barbelet et al., 2018), years later the Compact is under examination. Although considerable progress has been made—for example in the access to the national health care system and to education (a pillar of the Compact) as the levels of school enrolment for primary-age Syrian children have significantly increased21 — challenges remain. As stressed by Meral (2019): ‘the Jordan Compact provides a progressive and innovative means of international action to better realize [the right to work of the Syrian refugees], albeit with real shortcomings in its implementation’, in other words refugees are not yet treated on an equal basis as nationals, being still dependent on work permits (when and if refugees are able to overcome the administrative and bureaucratic barriers) to access legal work and limited to low-skilled sectors (the permit fee have been reduced from about 700 to 10 JD for most low-skilled work categories in sectors like agriculture, construction and manufacturing).22 Besides, gender issues in the workplace such as women’s fear of harassment and discrimination have not been dealt with. As for the way forward, it is due to stress that the donors’ humanitarian support will decline at some point in the future thus favoring the transition from humanitarian to development funding, quite a different understanding of transition when compared to the government of Jordan account that wishes to make of the private investment the primary driver of the economy and public revenue in the future.23 Jordan is indeed a country built on migration movements; a mindful actor of the Mediterranean scene kept afloat by the many opposite currents that have incessantly crossed it ever since its very foundation.

2 The Evolution of the Role of Qatar in the Mediterranean Crises Qatar is a small outcrop of the Arabian Peninsula between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Uninhabited for many years, in 2017 its population was 2,725 million.24 Thanks to the export of oil and natural gas, its annual GDP

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per capita at the time was one of the highest in the world.25 The country’s geographical position and the impossibility of forming its own army have always rendered it vulnerable. In order to protect the country, the ¯ Th¯an¯ı), had always designated control Qatari royal dynasty Al Thani (Al of its own security and foreign policy to various other countries (Baabood, 2017: 16–17). ¯ From 1995, Emir Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani (H . amad bin Khal¯ıfa Al Th¯an¯ı, b. 1952; r. 1995–2013) revolutionized that approach and established an independent international agenda for Qatar. The country started to get involved in many conflicts, with varying means and degrees of interference. This article will focus on the crises on the southern shores of the Mediterranean with an analysis of Qatar’s role and a critical review of its evolution between 1995 and 2017. In order to understand the ways and the extent of Qatar’s involvement, three main phases have been identified: 1. 1995–2010. The first phase began with the coming to power of Hamad Al Thani, which marked the rise of Qatar as a regional mediator. The Emirate assumed an impartial role in many of the crises in the Mediterranean region and was seen as a peaceful country; 2. 2010–2013. After the Tunisian Revolution and its spread throughout the region from January 2011, Qatar was no longer neutral and sided with the revolutionary Arabic populations. Doha went on to support the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhw¯an alMuslim¯un), and contributed to their rise in the Mediterranean territories; 3. 2013–2017. From 2013 onwards, the weakening influence of the factions supported by Doha and two crises within the Gulf Cooperation Council effectively left Qatar in a state of regional isolation and forced Emir Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani (Tam¯ım bin H . amad ¯ Th¯an¯ı, b. 1980; r. 2013–) to rethink his interference in the region Al and place his trust in the leadership of Turkey. It will be shown that these three phases reflect the approaches to national security policy adopted by the two Emirs, Hamad e Tamim Al Thani, which would not have been enough to overcome the royal dynasty’s traditional concerns regarding the State’s survival, but which

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would contribute to Doha’s desire for greater prestige and regional influence. 2.1

Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani’s Qatar. From Saudi Satellite to Independent Regional Mediator

Iraq invaded Kuwait on the 2nd of August 1990. The occupation, although short-lived and limited only to Kuwaiti territory, was a watershed moment for Qatari foreign policy. After the Iranian Revolution of 1979 had ousted their ally Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Saddam Hussein’s (S.addam Husayn) Iraq was no longer considered an ally and was indeed now considered a threat to Doha’s sovereignty. In addition to this, the conflict had revealed Saudi Arabia’s weakness, despite its role as the key regional power in terms of foreign policy and security, showing itself unable to handle the Iraqi invasion (Boyce, 1991; Fromherz, 2017: 105–106; Kamrava, 2017: 16–17; Ulrichsen, 2020: 28–30). The recent instability of the geopolitical balance which had underpinned Doha’s foreign policy since their declaration of independence from the United Kingdom in 1971, forced Qatar to rethink their survival strategy. In 1992, Qatar signed the Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) with the USA, independently from Riyadh, thus ensuring that Washington assumed responsibility for protecting the Emirate.26 The key players in this change of position were the Crown Prince Hamad Al Thani and the Minister for Foreign Affairs Hamad Bin Jassim (H . amad bin J¯asim ¯ Th¯an¯ı, b. 1959). bin Jabar Al The signing of an agreement which effectively sanctioned Qatar’s withdrawal from its sphere of influence provoked new tensions at the heart of Saudi Arabia, which were further exacerbated by a coup d’état Hamad ¯ Th¯an¯ı, 1932–2016; r. deposed his father Khalifa (Khal¯ıfa bin H . amad Al 1972–1995) and seized power. Saudi Arabia—like Bahrain, United Arab Emirates and Egypt—refused to legitimize the coup d’état and attempted to stage a violent—and ultimately unsuccessful—countercoup. The Emir still could not trust Riyadh and in 1996 managed to orchestrate the establishment in Qatar of American military bases, a deterrent against any possible aggression from Saudi Arabia (Fromherz, 2017: 65, 77–80; Gray, 2013: 46–47; Gulf States Newsletter, 1992: 2; 1994: 5; Kamrava, 2017: 69–71; Ulrichsen, 2020: 29–30). Having reduced the risk of invasion, Hamad shifted his focus to exploiting the ‘North Dome 27 ’ natural gas reserves. The Emir believed

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that exporting gas would provide an additional source of income which was longer-lasting than oil exports,28 while also increasing Doha’s presence in regional and international politics. In order to increase awareness of Qatar’s ‘brand’, in 1996 the Emir decided to back the establishment of the new television network ‘Al Jazeera’, which in a very short period of time, succeeded in improving Qatar’s image (Powers, 2012: 5–11). Thanks to this network, Hamad Al Thani did effectively make Qatar a key player in the region. For the first 20 years of the new Millennium, this emirate successfully mediated many crises in the Mediterranean territories.29 In this context, we should mention Doha’s negotiations between (a) Libya and USA on the issue of Libyan disarmament (2003); (b) Algeria and Morocco (2004); (c) Hamas (H awama . arakat al-Muq¯ al-Isl¯ amiyya) and Fatah (Fath.) in Palestine (2006); (d) the government of Yemen and the rebel Houthi movement(al-H uth¯ıyy¯ un); (e) .¯ pro-government factions and anti-government militias in the 2008 Libyan crisis; (f) Sudan and Chad during peace negotiations following the conflict in Darfur (Fromherz, 2017: 88–90; Kamrava, 2011: 534–544; 545–552). The unusual approach to foreign policy adopted by Hamad Al Thani was the result of ongoing concerns about the state’s survival, combined with Doha’s ambition for greater prestige. On one hand, Qatar showed its dedication to the resolution of many regional crises, giving the impression of being impartial, peace-loving and free of political interests. These characteristics allowed Doha to establish a strong network of diplomatic relationships, thereby increasing its allies and reducing its enemies, which, together with Al Jazeera, increased the country’s soft power. This in turn allowed Doha to expand its political and economic power in the Mediterranean and gain recognition and international prestige (Kamrava, 2011: 555–556; Miller, 2018: 92–93). 2.2

The Arab Uprisings and Qatar’s Hyper Activism in the Mediterranean Crises (2011–2013)

Although the uprisings that started in Tunisia in December and spread to almost all the Muslim-Arabic countries from January 2011 onwards (the so-called Arab Spring) did not directly involve Qatar, they triggered a new phase of foreign policy in the Emirate. Doha no longer acted as a mediator and began supporting the majority of protesting Arab populations. In fact, from December 2010, Al Jazeera dedicated large segments of their news coverage to the protests which in turn, fueled their spread

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through the region. Meanwhile, Qatar started showing support for the various offshoots of the Islamic movement known as the Muslim Brotherhood which were beginning to emerge in the area. In this respect, the main areas of intervention in the Mediterranean were Libya, Egypt and Tunisia. In particular, Doha provided political and economic support to emerging Islamic movements—Ennahda (H . arakat al-Nahd.a) in Tunisia and Freedom and Justice Party (H ala) in . izb al-H . urriyya wa al- Ad¯ Egypt. Thanks in part to this support, both movements won elections between 2011 and 2012.30 Doha’s support continued after the Muslim Brotherhood assumed power, through massive donations, loans and investment.31 In Libya, Qatar assumed an uncharacteristically aggressive approach to the crisis and immediately stepped in to support the protesting factions even before Muammar Qadhafi’s (Muammar alQadhdh¯af¯ı) regime fell. As the world’s media focused its attention on the ‘Libyan’ Spring, Qatar made efforts to discredit the politics of the Ra is around the world. These efforts resulted in the recognition and sponsorship of the authority of the National Transition Council (CNT), as Libya’s legitimate government. Meanwhile, Doha was making military moves by providing training and weapons (20,000 tons) and financing local Islamic factions, while contributing its jets to NATO’s military action in 2011. Immediately after the regime’s fall, Qatar donated and invested more than 400 million USD in Libyan infrastructures (Bianco, 2015; Chivvis & Martini, 2014: 8). Such an unusual level of interference in Mediterranean crises was founded on three key pillars. Firstly, it was made possible by the Qataris’ lack of a deep-rooted sense of the need to rebel, resulting from the population’s homogeneity and their general support of the royal dynasty. This nationwide sense of calm left room for greater zeal in foreign affairs which would otherwise have been impossible (Nuruzzaman, 2015: 227). The second fundamental factor was the lack of reaction to the protests from the main international players. The reluctance of global powers like USA and Russia to intervene in the region left a vacuum which Qatar was quick to fill, particularly in the context of Libya (Ehteshami & Mohammadi, 2017: 10). This activism was founded on the conviction that changes provoked by the protests were irreversible. Thus, Qatar considered that the Muslim Brotherhood would ultimately be the most powerful force—as a deep-rooted reality in Arabic society, characterized by a hatred of regimes while offering credible alternative policies. It is also

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of interest to note that Al Thani already had long-standing relationships with high-ranking members of the Muslim Brotherhood (Ehteshami & Ariabarzan Mohammadi, 2017: 4–6; Kamrava, 2017: 79). Doha’s modus operandi was largely stemmed from pragmatism and ambition rather than idealistic or religious motivation. Doha saw in these crises the opportunity to proactively protect its political and economic concerns. The goal was to engage with the players who would be building the regimes of the future, as this would be a useful way of establishing peaceful relationships, while increasing their regional sphere of influence. If the factions they supported were ultimately victorious. Qatar could then act as a bridge between them and the Western powers, given their reluctance of the West to interact with Islamist movements (Bianco, 2019; Nuruzzaman, 2015, 230–231).32 2.3

Lowering the Profile. The Collapse of the Muslim Brotherhood and the GCC Crises

By 2013, the stability that Doha had helped establish on the southern shores of the Mediterranean was slowly disintegrating. In Tunisia, the murder of the leader of the opposition party triggered weeks of demonstrations against the government and in particular against Ennahda, which resulted in the resignation of the Prime Minister. In Egypt, the government was facing resistance from more and more sectors of society. In Libya, the factions supported by Doha since 2011, were becoming stronger than the CNT political parties and were starting to take control of the country, using guerilla warfare and acts of terrorism to advance and claim territory. These strategies based on chaos and destabilization provoked increasing frustration among the Libyan population, who was angered by Qatari interference in their affairs (Nuruzzaman, 2015: 232; Reuters, 2011). The climate of international distrust that was growing around the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist movements was backfiring on Qatar (Blair & Spencer, 2014; Gulf News, 2017; Middle East Online, 2013). The Emirate was now surrounded by regional troubles of its own making, ruining its reputation as a peaceful and cooperative partner. Meanwhile, this situation was boosting support for the region’s more conservative axis, which was trying to curb the Islamic expansion in Libya, led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, who were concerned about the spread of pro-democracy rallies in the region. The Al Sauds were hostile to the political interpretation of Islam33 proposed by

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the Muslim Brotherhood (Aras & Yorulmazlar, 2018: 1–2; Nuruzzaman, 2015: 227–228). From 2013, pressure from the West and from within the region, mainly from the GCC, forced Doha to keep a low profile regarding Mediterranean policies. This new phase was sealed by the resignation of the Emir and the Foreign Minister on 25th June. The investiture of Tamim Al Thani, who was more interested in Doha’s politics and internal development than foreign policy, became a further weakening of Qatari control of the Arabic-Mediterranean region. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates decided to intensify their own regional activism. In Egypt, the two monarchies were to play a key role in providing economic and political support to the army general Abdel Fattah al-Sisi (Abd al-Fatt¯ah. al-S¯ıs¯ı, b. 1954), who later, on 3rd July, deposed President Morsi (Muh.ammad M¯urs¯ı). In Tunisia, the murder of another member of the opposition party resulted in the interruption of the Constitutional Assembly. Ennahda would have been forced to agree to mediation by the constitutional office of the secular union UGTT (Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail ), effectively losing the leadership role. From that moment on, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi increased their support for the secular movement Tunisia’s Call (H a  T¯ unis ), which defeated . arakat Nid¯ 34 the Islamists in elections the following year. After this upheaval which worked in their favor, Doha’s rival axis tried to chip away at Libya, with the arrival in 2014 of Khalifa Haftar (Khal¯ıfa H . aftar, b. 1943), former general in the Libyan army, selected by Riyadh and Abu Dhabi as the right person to overthrow Islamist militias (Barfi, 2014; BBC, 2019). This led to Tamim Al Thani’s decision to renew his efforts to take action in Libya, the last Mediterranean conflict where he could exert any influence. The reinvigorated flow of weapons and money to the allied Libyan factions effectively ensured that the conflict degenerated into civil war, for which Qatar was criticized by countries all over the world. On a regional level, it was the trigger for a diplomatic crisis lasting eight months with Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain, all of whom recalled their ambassadors from Doha.35 The 2014 crisis persuaded the Emir that, given the political climate, it was better to avoid the risks of his particular approach to foreign affairs. From then on, Doha decided to leave the leadership of the Mediterranean to Turkey, a country which had already fully prepared their geopolitical agenda and shared Doha’s interests and goals, including support for the Muslim Brotherhood (Aras & Akpınar, 2017: 4–5; Aras & Yorulmazlar,

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2018: 6–8; Küçüka¸scı, 2019: 11; Pala & Aras, 2015: 286–302; The Daily Sabah, 2014). Turkey also had one of the most powerful armies in the world—a fact which rendered this alliance even more important in terms of national security. In that same year, Doha and Ankara agreed to build a Turkish military base on Qatari territory. In June 2017, another GCC diplomatic crisis was triggered against Doha by Saudi Arabia and their allies, which served to strengthen the relationship between Doha and Ankara. Turkey was in fact the only country that supported Qatar through the embargo which was imposed upon it, as shown by the provision of 5000 Turkish soldiers 2 days after the crisis began (Al Jazeera, 2017; Vagneur-Jones & Kasapoglu, 2017). Ultimately, the embargo only strengthened the Doha Ankara alliance in the context of Mediterranean politics, as the Emirate needed to focus on its own internal organization (Al-Din, 2020: 182– 184; Aras & Akpınar, 2017: 6; Baabood, 2017: 10; Çetino˘glu, 2016: 4–6; Miller, 2018; Zafirov, 2017: 191–201). 2.4

Conclusions

Qatar’s small territory and population resulted in an inherent structural vulnerability which, together with its proximity to its two most powerful regional rivals, forced Doha to entrust its own protection to others. In the twentieth century, the Emirate’s sudden economic boom and the constant regional evolution increased the Al Thani family’s insecurity and enabled Qatar to develop its own international political agenda. Under the leadership of Hamad and Tamim Al Thani since 1995, the Emirate was involved in numerous national and international crises on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. In terms of means and degree of intervention between 1995 and 2017, there are three phases—one of mediation, one of hyper-activism and finally, a low-profile phase. It seems evident that the activity in the Mediterranean during this period was not considered by the Al Thani family as a threat to their county’s survival, but rather as an opportunity to increase their ambitions and prestige in the region. This was particularly apparent during the first phase when Qatar was keen to mediate between warring factions in order to expand their sphere of influence in the Mediterranean and their network of allies. The hyper-activism of the second phase continued in the same vein, albeit with a slightly different approach toward Doha’s security

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policy, as proposed by Hamad, whose focus was ensuring an advantageous political and economic position for Qatar in the Mediterranean by supporting those who would become the region’s next rulers. The Qatari acceptance of the country’s new stance from 2013, came after the unfortunate evolution of the region’s geopolitical balance. During this phase, the Emirate prioritized its own security rather than its political ambitions in the Mediterranean.

Notes 1. Jordan is not a party to the 1951 Geneva convention relating to the Status of Refugees. 2. A model that ‘accepts the coexistence of tribal networks and ethnoreligious loyalties and the modern state format’ and where ‘primordial identities and patterns coexist with citizenship within the Western-like borders’. Gökan, B. (2008). Hybrid sovereignty in the Arab Middle East. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 5. See also Kubow, K. et al. (2014). Citizenship in a hybrid state: Civic curriculum in Jordan’s education reform for knowledge economy era. Middle Eastern & African Journal of Educational Research, 13, 4–20. 3. According to the 2008 Minority Rights Group report, about 3 million people residing in Jordan have Palestinian origin and are overwhelmingly concentrated in northern and central Jordan, specifically in the Amman Governorate, Zarqa Governorate and Irbid Governorate. Witte, E. Middle East,” Minority Rights Group Report (2008), https://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/oldsite-downloads/download-470-Middle-East.pdf. 4. A conclusion drawn from the data analysis of a larger project on the identity criteria upon which is founded the legitimacy of the Arab-Muslim States, with a focus on the Jordanian and the Kuwaiti cases. The empirical part of the project consisted of over 80 open, semi-structured interviews. The Jordanian sample included both ‘pure Jordanians’ and Jordanians of Palestinian origin. 5. Many of the most influential ideologues of both the al-Qaeda leadership and local Salafi movements were refugees and former soldiers returned from Afghanistan in the Eighties/Nineties, such as al-Zarq¯aw¯ı (1966– 2006) leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq (the precursor of ISIS) and responsible of the 2005 Amman bombings, and ’Ab¯ u Qat¯ada (b. 1960), the spiritual father of al-Qaeda in Europe. See Wiktorowicz, Q. (2001). The management of Islamic activism: Salafis, the Muslim brotherhood, and state power in Jordan (pp. 111–146). New York: State University of New York Press.

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6. Registered Persons of Concern Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Jordan April 15, 2020 according to UNHCR. https://data2.unhcr.org/en/doc uments/download/75578. 7. Transit trade through Jordan has been a key source of revenue and trade for the country. 8. H . ak¯ım, semi-structured interview made in April, 2017 in Amman. Gender: male; age: 18/40; level of education: high (master’s degree); religion: Islam; language of the interview: Arabic (here in the English translation). 9. Notably, Freedom House rated Jordan as ‘not free’ since 2009 to 2016. Currently, it is rated as ‘partly free’. See https://freedomhouse.org/rep ort/freedom-world/2019/jordan. 10. (Semi-) rentierism lays its grounds on both the inward and outward movements upon which the country is build. Hence, political power and in turn domestic sovereignty and foreign policy are linked to a fragile and over-reliant socio-economic system International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) and United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT). City Migration Profile-Amman. Executive Summary, 2015. https://www.uclg.org/sites/default/files/amman_city_migration_ profile_executive_summary_en.pdf; Schlumberger, O., & Bank, A. (Fall 2001/Spring 2002). Succession, legitimacy, and regime stability in Jordan. The Arab Studies Journal, 9/10(2/1), 50–72. As for the codependence see Brand, L. (1995, Summer). Palestinians and Jordanians: A crisis of identity. Journal of Palestine Studies, 24(4), 49, 50. 11. Financially, Jordan is a partner of the Agadir Agreement (with Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, signed in 2004) for the establishment of a free trade zone between the Arab Mediterranean Nations and supported by the EU, and it founded alongside other 13 Arab countries the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA, 1997). 12. The largest single expansion of the European Union (EU) to date. 13. See also Lavenex, S. (2008). A governancse perspective on the European neighbourhood policy: integration beyond conditionality? Journal of European Public Policy, 15(6), 938–955 and Sieglinde, G., & Erwan, L. (2014). The neighbours of the European Union’s neighbours: Diplomatic and geopolitical dimensions beyond the European Neighborhood Policy. Farnham: Ashgate. 14. To be placed, in a logic of ‘concentric circles’, at the external one, the others being the Schengen area, the Euro zone, the European Union and the countries in pre-accession. Filippo Celata, Raffaella Coletti, op. cit., 3. 15. Romano Prodi President of the European Commission. A Wider Europe—A Proximity Policy as the key to stability Peace, Security and Stability International Dialogue and the Role of the EU.

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16.

17.

18.

19. 20.

21.

22.

23.

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Sixth ECSA-World Conference. Jean Monnet Project. Brussels, 5–6 December 2002, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/ en/SPEECH_02_619. See Press Release: EU-Jordan: a new partnership to better manage mobility and migration (Brussels, 9 October 2014) https://ec.europa. eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_14_1109. On September 26, 1978 the European Council adopted several cooperation agreements with Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon and additional financial protocols with Israel, Portugal and Malta. https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history/19701979/1978_en. See also Del Sarto, R., & Schumacher, T. (2011). From Brussels with love: Leverage, benchmarking, and the action plans with Jordan and Tunisia in the EU’s democratization policy. Democratization, 18(4), 932–995. For the period 2017–2020, the EU’s bilateral assistance to Jordan under the ENI (The European Neighborhood Instrument), will amount approximately to e335.5 million–e410.1 million. ‘European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations: Jordan’. https://ec.europa.eu/nei ghbourhood-enlargement/neighbourhood/countries/jordan_en. See also https://www.refugee-economies.org/innovative-practices/jor dan-compact. It includes international donor states such as the United Kingdom, United States, Canada, Japan and the European Commission, alongside technical international organizations, such as the World Bank and the IMF. Syrian children have been allowed to enroll in public schools even when they do not have identification; many new schools have been built in the refugees’ camps, there 35 in Zaatari, 4 in the Emirati camp and 15 in the Azraq camp. “City Migration Profile-Amman. Executive Summary”, 2015. Indeed, until 2016 obtaining a work permit was conditional on residency, the permit fees had to be paid by the employer, the profession had to be opened to non-Jordanians and the refugees living in camps and those who entered the country through unofficial borders were not entitled to the permits. ‘Independent Monitor’s Assessment Report Jordan Compact and Brussels meetings’. Report Number 1 (First quarter 2019), founded by the European Union. https://ec.europa.eu/trustfund-syria-region/sites/ tfsr/files/eutf_syria_action_document_10th_ob_higher_education.pdf. Of these, 300,000 were Qatari nationals. The country was almost uninhabited until the discovery of oil reserves. In 1940, were not more than 16,000 living there. Crystal (1990: 117) and Qatar Planning and Statistics Authority (2019).

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25. In 2017, this was 127,602.587 USD. See: International Monetary Fund (2019). 26. The wording of the agreement is classified. It governs the access and positioning of American military personnel in Qatar as well as the arms trade and other aspects of defense cooperation between the two countries. Congressional Research Service (2020: 15). 27. The North Dome/South Pars is the biggest natural gas deposit in the world. It is owned by Qatar and Iran. The Qatari-owned part contains around 910.5 trillion cubic feet of gas. Dargin (2007: 136). 28. Qatari gas reserves are expected to last for 200 years. Geological Survey (US) (2010: 53.2). 29. On Qatar’s mediation methods, see: Kamrava (2011: 543–544). 30. For Tunisian Constituency Elections, see: Bustos (2011); for Egyptian parliamentary elections, see: The Carter Center (2012a); for Egyptian presidential elections, see: The Carter Center (2012b). 31. For Qatari investment in Tunisia, see: Kausch (2013). For Qatari investment in Egypt, see: Ulrichsen (2014), Vignal (2018), and The New York Times (2013). 32. Interview by the author with Cinzia Bianco, Research Fellow on Europe and Gulf at the European Council on Foreign Relations (12/2019). 33. On this topic see: Darwich (2016: 469–488). 34. For the results of the legislative and presidential elections in Tunisia see: National Democratic Institute (2015). 35. On the 2014 crisis, see: Hassan (2015: 78–86.a).

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Index

A Abbas, Ferhat (Firh.¯at Abb¯as), 26 Abbasid Caliphate, 5, 9 Abd al-Jalil, Mustafa (Mus.t.af¯a Abd al-Jal¯ıl), 256 Abd Allah II (Abd All¯ah al-Th¯an¯ı bin al-H . usayn), 321 Abd al-Munim Aboul-Futouh (Ab¯ u al-Fut¯ uh.), 206 Abd al-Rahman III (Abd al-Rah.m¯an), 7 Abd al-Wahhab (Abd al-Wahh¯ab), 18, 26 Abdelkader, Emir (Am¯ır Abd al-Q¯adir), 141 Abdelwahhab, Muhammad Bin (Muh.ammad Abd al-Wahh¯ab), 131, 133 Abduh, Muhammad (Muh.ammad Abduh), 23, 131, 141, 142, 148 Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis (Ab¯ u Mahd¯ı al-Muhandis), 245, 247

Abu Qatada al-Filistini (Ab¯u Qat¯ada al-Filast.¯ın¯ı, born Umar ibn Mah.m¯ ud ibn Uthm¯an), 319 Abu Qura, Abd al-Latif (Abd al-Lat.¯ıf Ab¯ u Q¯ ura 1906–1967), 319 Abu Zaid (Nas.r H u Zayd), . ¯amid Ab¯ 30, 35 Adana Agreement, 225 Adonis, ix, 4, 5, 25, 27 Afghani, Jamal al-Din al- (Jam¯al al-D¯ın al-Afgh¯an¯ı), 23, 148 AfPak, 238 Aghlabid, 6, 276 Ahmad, Shafiq (Ah.mad Shaf¯ıq), 206 Al-Ahd group, 238 Al-Azmiyya, 141 Al-Ahram (al-Ahr¯ am), 22 Al Amana, 165 Alaoui, Muhammad bin al-Arabi al- (Muh.ammad bin al-Arab¯ı al-Alaw¯ı), 131 Al-Azhar, 6, 28, 138, 150 Albani, Nasir al-Din al- (N¯as.ir al-D¯ın al-Alb¯an¯ı), 133

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 F. M. Corrao and R. Redaelli (eds.), States, Actors and Geopolitical Drivers in the Mediterranean, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69000-7

343

344

INDEX

Al-Dawla al-Isl¯ amiyya f¯ı al- Ir¯ aq wa al-Sh¯ am. See Islamic State (al-Dawla al-Isl¯ amiyya, IS) Alfonso the Wise, King of Castile, 8 Al-Islah Group (Jam¯ a at al-Is.l¯ ah.), 144 Al Jazeera (al-Jaz¯ıra), 137, 327, 331 Al Kar¯ama, 165 Al-Qaeda (al-Q¯ a ida), 53, 134, 135, 139, 145, 261, 319 Al-Qaeda in Iraq (al-Q¯ a ida f¯ı  al- Ir¯ aq), 135, 239 Al-Qarawiyin University (J¯ ami‘at al-Qarawiyy¯ın), 150 Al-Sahwa al-Islamiyya (al-S.ah.wa al-Isl¯ amiyya), 133, 144 Al Thani, Hamad Bin Jassim (H . amad ¯ Th¯an¯ı), bin J¯asim bin Jabar Al 326 Al Thani, Hamad Bin Khalifa (H . amad ¯ Th¯an¯ı), 325, 326 bin Khal¯ıfa Al Al Thani, Tamim Bin Hamad (Tam¯ım ¯ Th¯an¯ı), 325 bin H . amad Al Al-Wasat Party (H . izb al-Wasat.), 143 Amin, Qasim (Q¯asim Am¯ın), 148 AMOS, 165 Ancient Mesopotamia, 110 Annan plan, 227 Annapolis Conference, 297 Ansar al-Sharia in Libya (Ans.¯ ar al-Shar¯ıa bi-L¯ıb¯ıy¯ a ), 257, 258, 269 April 6th Movement (H . arakat Sitta Abr¯ıl ), 204 Aqqad, Abbas Mahmoud al- (Abb¯as Mah.m¯ ud al-Aqq¯ad), 148, 151 Arab Charter of Human Rights, 28 Arabian Nights, 14 Arab League, 28, 53, 192, 309, 320 Arab Maghreb Union, 53 Arab Mediterranean Islam, vi, 130, 150

Arab nationalism, 133, 222, 254 Arab Spring, vi, 19, 31–33, 36, 37, 71, 49, 54, 57, 71–73, 76, 83, 86, 110, 117, 119, 123, 133, 134, 137, 141, 143, 145, 148, 160, 203, 207, 214, 228, 252, 253, 281, 302, 327 Arafat, Yasser (Y¯asir Araf¯at), 297, 303 ARDI, Fondation pour le microcrédit, 165 Asad, Hafiz al- (H . a¯fiz. al-Asad), 26, 133, 134 Ashari, 135 Ashkenazi, Gabi, 298, 299 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), 194 Association Agreements (AAs), 82 Aswan Dam, 26 ATIL Microcrédit, 165 Atlantic Alliance.. See NATO Azraq Camp, 323, 334 Azzam, Abdullah (Abd All¯ah Azz¯am), 134 Azzam, Abdallah Yusuf (Abd All¯ah Y¯ usuf Azz¯am, 1941-1989), 319 B Baby boom, 112 Baghdadi, Abu Bakr al- (Ab¯u Bakr al-Baghd¯ad¯ı), 135, 139, 240, 241, 243, 246 Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, 224 Balad, 300 Balkan Entente, 221 Balkans, 6, 8, 12, 13, 184, 222–225, 228, 234 Banna, Hasan al- (H . asan al-Bann¯a), 25, 142, 143, 145 Barcelona conference (1995), 322 Bardo, Treaty of, 277 Barghuthi, Marwan (Marw¯an al-Bargh¯uth¯ı), 304

INDEX

Baybars, Mamluke Sultan, 9 Begin, Menachem, 298 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), xiii, 49, 62, 97, 176–180, 182, 183, 186, 187, 190, 191, 194, 196 Ben Ali, Zin el-Abidine (Zayn ¯ ın bin Al¯ı), 77, 133, al-Abid¯ 280, 290 Ben Gurion, David, 301 Ben Salah, Ahmed (Ah.mad bin S.¯alih.), 279 Ben Yousef, Salah (S.¯alih. bin Y¯ usuf), 278 Berlin Conference, 264 Bey, Ahmed (Ah.mad B¯a¯ı), 277 Bin Badis, Abdelhamid (Abd al-H . am¯ıd Bin B¯ad¯ıs), 131 Bin Baz, Abd al-Aziz (Abd al-Aziz B¯ın B¯az), 133, 134 Bin Laden, Usama (Us¯ama bin L¯adin), 56, 134, 139 Bin Talal, Husayn (H . usayn ibn T.al¯al), 320 Black Death, 9, 111 Bouazizi, Mohammed (Muh.ammad al-B¯ uaz¯ız¯ı), 280 Bourguiba, al-Habib (al-H . ab¯ıb B¯ urq¯ıba), 133, 138, 277–280, 283, 285 Boutchichiyya, Sufi order (al-Budsh¯ıshiyya), 141 Braudel, Ferdinand, x, 3, 10, 11, 129, 130 Brown, Bobby, 308 Bush, George W., 48, 56, 59, 311 C Cairo Declaration, 265 Cairo Geniza, 8 Camp David Accords (1979), 71 Camp David Agreements (1979), 28 Çavu¸so˘glu, Mevlüt, 230, 234

345

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 108, 112 Charles V, Emperor of the Germanic Holy Roman Empire, 11, 14 Chechens, 321 China-Africa Development Fund, 187 China-Arab States Cooperation Forum, 180, 192 China Development Bank, 187, 196 China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO), 184–186, 194, 195 Civilizations, Greek, 129 Clash of civilizations, 130 Cold War, x, 46–48, 221–223 Council of Europe, 222 Covid-19 pandemic, viii, 284, 287, 296, 321 Crusaders, ix, 7, 134 D Daesh (Da ish). See Islamic State (al-Dawla al-Isl¯ amiyya, IS) Dahlan, Mohammed (Muh.ammad Dah.l¯an), 303, 304, 311 D¯ ar al-Isl¯ am, 55 D¯ar al-Isl¯am, x Davuto˘glu, Ahmet, 225–228 Da wa al-Salafiyya (Salafi Call), 133, 143 De Gaulle, Charles, 278 De Medici, Alessandro, 14 Demographic transition, vi, 70, 93, 108, 110, 115, 118, 120, 121 Demographic window of opportunity, 110, 121, 122 Destour party, 278 Devshirme, 13 Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), 256 Disarmament of Libya, 327 Dual control system, 23 Durrell, Lawrence, 24

346

INDEX

E Eastern enlargement of the European Union (2004), 322 Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF), 232, 263 Education, 21, 22, 27, 32, 34–37, 55, 64, 70–72, 76, 88, 89, 93, 96, 97, 99, 100, 113, 122, 136, 139, 143, 157, 158, 160–165, 167, 168, 178, 277, 282, 286, 288, 298, 320, 324, 333 Egyptian parliamentary elections (2012), 335 Egyptian presidential elections (2012), 335 Emirati Jordanian Camp, 323 Enda Tamweel (institution de microfinance – Tunisia, ENDA), 167, 168 Eni’s SAIPEM 12000 exploration ship, 231 Ennahda (H . arakat al-Nahd.a), 35, 146, 281, 283, 328–330 Entente cordiale (1904), 23 Erdo˘gan, Recep Tayyip, 229 EU’s strategic partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East (SPMME, 2004), 322 EU-Jordan ENP Action Plan (2005), 322 EU-MENA FTA (Free Trade Area), 81 Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement (2002), 322 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), 52, 53, 80, 81, 95, 221, 322 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), 82 European Commission (EC), 80, 82, 83, 88, 100, 115, 189, 322, 333, 334

European Council, 322, 323, 334 European development fund (EDF), 79 European Economic Community (EEC), 79, 80, 181, 193 European Endowment for Democracy and a Civil Society Facility (CSF), 83 European Investment Bank (EIB), 82 European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), 85 European Neighborhood Instrument (ENI), 85, 334 European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), 52, 82, 83, 95, 318, 322 European Parliament (EP), 70, 86, 99 European Union (EU), vii, viii, xii, 29, 37, 47, 48, 52, 54, 57, 58, 60, 62, 69, 70, 76, 79, 81–90, 92–100, 114, 119, 179, 181, 189, 193, 203, 211, 213, 221, 224, 227, 230–233, 260, 264, 304, 318, 321–323, 333, 334 Exclusive economic zone (EEZ), 231, 234, 263, 264 F Fakhfakh, Elyès (Iliy¯as al-Fakhf¯akh), 288 Fassi, Allal al- (All¯al al-F¯ass¯ı), 131 Fatah (H . arakat Fath.), 144, 145, 295–297, 302–305, 327 Fatimid, 6, 7, 276 Fellagha, 278 Fertility, vi, 70, 108, 112–114, 117–120, 123, 158 Fethullah Gülen movement, 229 55 Libyan Joint Military Commission, 265 First Arab-Israeli Yom Kippu War (1973), 80

INDEX

First Gulf War (1990–91), 318 First World War, 5, 25, 238 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, 180, 192 Fouda, Farag (Faraj F¯uda), 134 Foundation Banque Populaire Micro-Crédit, 165 Foundation du Nord, 165 Foundation for Local Development and Partnership, 165 Frederick II, Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, 8 Freedom and Justice Party (H . izb al-h.H ala), 143, . urriyya wa al- Ad¯ 328 Front Islamique du Salut (al-Jabha al-Isl¯ amiyya lil-Inq¯ adh, FIS), 146 G Gantz, Benjamin (Benny), 299–301, 310 General National Congress (GNC), 255, 257–260, 269 Gesher, 301 Gezi Park protests, 229 Ghannouchi, Rached al- (Rash¯ıd al-Ghann¯ ush¯ı), 146, 289 Ghazali, al- (Ab¯ u H¯amid al-Ghazz¯al¯ı), 25 Ghifari, Abu Dharr al- (Ab¯ u Dharr al-Ghif¯ar¯ı), 149 Global Mediterranean Policy, 53, 80 Government of National Accord (GNA), 195, 232, 260–262, 264–266 Gramsci, Antonio, 210, 213 Greater Mediterranean, 130 Great Game, 262 Greek civilization, 129 Green Morocco Plan, 165 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 53, 92, 192, 325, 330, 331

347

H Hadash, 300 Hadid, Zaha (Zah¯a H . ad¯ıd), 34 Haftar, Khalifa (KKhal¯ıfa H . aftar), 57, 213, 258–262, 264, 265, 330 Hamas (H awama . arakat al-Muq¯ al-Isl¯ amiyya), 145, 295–297, 302–305, 327 Hanafi, Hasan (H . asan H . anaf¯ı), 36, 148, 149 Hanafite, 148 Hanbalite, 148 Haniyeh, Ismail (Ism¯a¯ıl Haniya), 304, 305 Hariri, Rafic (Raf¯ıq al-H . ar¯ır¯ı), 320 Hassan II, King of Marocco (al-H . asan al-Th¯an¯ı), 32 Hathloul, Lujayn al- (Lujayn al-Hadhl¯ ul), 30 Haykal, Mohammed Hussein (Muh.ammad H . usayn Haykal), 148 Heartland, vii, 241, 246 High Council of State (Libya), 260 Hizbullah (H . izb All¯ah), 145 Holocaust, 110 Holy League, 11 Hosen L’Yisrael , 299 House of Representatives (HoR), 259, 260, 262 Houthi movement (al-H uthiyy¯ un), .¯ 327 Human security, 63, 64 Hussein, Saddam (S.add¯am H . usayn), 133, 239, 318, 319, 326 Hussein, Taha (T.aha Husayn), 24, 148 I Ibn Arabi, Muhammad (Muh.ammad ibn Arab¯ı), 140 Ibn Khaldun (Ibn Khald¯ un), 9

348

INDEX

Ibn Rushd, 148 Ibn Saba‘in (Ibn Sabyn), 8 Ibn Sina (Ibn S¯ın¯a), 148 Ijtihad, 131 Institution Marocaine d’Appui a la Microfinance (INMAA), 165 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), 222 International Labour Organization (ILO), 158–160, 162–164 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 33, 72, 75, 77, 96, 222, 282, 286, 334, 335 International Organization for Migration (IOM), 91, 92 Intifada, 71, 82, 144, 204, 297, 304 Iraq War (2003-2011), 112 IS. See Islamic State (al-Dawla al-Isl¯ amiyya, IS) ISIS. SeeIslamic State(al-Dawla al-Isl¯ amiyya, IS) Islam, xiii, 5–7, 9, 10, 12–15, 23, 25, 27, 29, 35, 36, 54, 56, 58, 59, 65, 109, 130–132, 135–142, 144, 146–152, 209, 226, 254, 259, 263, 279, 289, 319, 329, 333 Islamic Charter Front, 146 Islamic Jihad, 84, 134, 297, 305 Islamic State (al-Dawla al-Isl¯ amiyya, IS), vii, 5, 73, 84, 119, 142, 237, 240, 241, 244–246, 261, 289, 323 Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI), 279, 289 Ismailia (Ism¯ a ¯ıliyya), 165 J Jabotinsky, Ze’ev, 298 Jafarite, 148 Jalal al-Azm Sadiq (S.¯adiq Jal¯al al-Azm), 30

Jam¯ ah¯ıriyya, xiii, 253 Jannissaries, 13, 18 Jazira, vii, xiii, 238–244, 246 Jibril, Mahmud (Mah.m¯ ud Jibr¯ıl), 257 Jihad, x, 12, 13, 53–56, 134 Jihadi Salafism, 132, 134, 135 Jizya, 13 Joint List, 300, 301 Jordan Compact, 323, 324 Jubran, Khalil (Jubr¯an Khal¯ıl Jubr¯an), 24 Justice and Construction Party (H. izb 442 al-‘Ad¯ala wa al-Bin¯a[Pleaseinsert 443 ʾintopreamble]), 146, 257 Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), 225, 226, 228, 230, 234 Justice and Development Party (H . izb al- Ad¯ ala wa al-Tanmiya, PJD), 146 Justice and Spirituality Movement (al- Adl wa al-Ih.s¯ an), 141 K Kaf¯ ala (sponsorship), 321 Kakhol Lavan, 299–301 ˙ Kalın, Ibrahim, 229 Kamel, Mustafa (Mus.t.af¯a K¯amil), 22 Kavafis, Constantine, 24 Kemal, Namık, 22 Kharijites, 148 Khatami, Mohammad (Muh.ammad Kh¯atam¯ı), 112 Khayr al-Din Barbarossa (Khayr al-D¯ın Barbar¯us), 11 Khedive, 22 Kif¯ aya (Enough), 204 King Fuad I (Fu¯ad al-Awwal), 138 Knights of Malta, 13 Küçük Kaynarca, 17 Kulanu, 298, 299

INDEX

Kulthum, Umm (Umm Kalth¯ um), 26 Kushner, Jared, 306 L Labib, Tahir (al-T.¯ahir Lab¯ıb), 35, 36 Labor Party, 297 Lapid, Yair, 299 League of Nations, 221 Lepanto, battle of, ix, 12 Liberation Party (H . izb al-Tah.r¯ır), 135 Liberation Theology, 149 Libya Dawn (Fajr L¯ıb¯ıy¯ a ), 259 Libyan National Army (al-Jaysh al-Wat.an¯ı al-L¯ıb¯ı, LNA), 256 Libyan Political Agreement (LPA), 260, 261, 269 Lieberman, Avigdor, 298, 299 Life expectancy, 119 Likud, 298, 299, 301, 306 Limen, x, 51 Limes , x, 50, 51 Loti, Pierre, 24 M Madkhali, Rabi’ ibn Hadi al- (Rab¯ı Ibn H¯ad¯ı al-Madkhal¯ı), 133 Madkhaliyya, 133 Mahalla al-Kubra strike, 34, 205 Malikite, 148, 149 Mameluk, 18 Maqdisi, Abu Muhammad al- (Ab¯ u Muh.ammad al-Maqdis¯ı), 135 Mare Nostrum, 10, 179, 184, 186, 253, 267 Mare Nostrum, xiii, xiv Marxist Revolutions, 111 Mashal Khaled (Kh¯alid Mashal), 304 Maturidi (al-M¯ aturidiyya), 135, 148 Mazen, Abu (Ab¯ u M¯azin), 303–305, 307, 309

349

Mediterranean Initiative, 221, 234 Mediterranean thinking, xiv, 131, 151, 152 Mehmet II, Ottoman Sultan, 13, 16 Meretz, 301 Michelangelo, 16 Middle East and North Africa (MENA), v–viii, xi, xii, 6, 29, 37, 50–54, 57, 61, 63, 69–99, 115–117, 119–121, 157, 158, 160, 163, 164, 169, 180–183, 189, 192, 193, 196, 208–210, 215, 220, 229, 246 Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) (China), 187, 191 Mobility Partnership agreement, 322 Mogul Empire, 12 Mohammed Abdullah al-Qahtani (Muh.ammad Abd All¯ah al-Qah.t.¯an¯ı), 134 Montreux Convention, 221 Moroccan Solidarity without Borders Association Micro-credit, 165 Morsi, Muhammad (Muh.ammad Murs¯ı), 141, 143, 144, 206, 207, 263, 330 Mortality, vi, 71, 93, 108, 157 Mosaddegh, Mohammad (Muh.ammad Mos.addeq), 112 Mourou, Abdel Fattah (Abd al-Fatt¯ah. M¯ ur¯ u), 289 Mutazilites, 148 Mubarak, Husni (H . usn¯ı Mub¯arak), 77, 143, 205, 211, 214, 215 Muhammad VI, King of Marocco, 32 Musa, Salama (Sal¯ama M¯ us¯a), 25 Muslim Brotherhood (Jam¯ a at al-Ikhw¯ an al-Muslim¯ın), vii, 25, 65, 137, 141, 142, 205, 206, 257–259, 261, 263, 302, 325, 328–330, 332 Mustafa III, Ottoman Sultan, 17

350

INDEX

Mutanabbi (Ab¯ u al-T.ayyib al-Mutanabb¯ı), 6 N Nabhani, Taqi al-Din al- (Taq¯ı al-D¯ın al-Nabh¯an¯ı), 135 Nahd.a, 131 Nasser, Jamal ‘Abd al- (Jam¯al ‘Abd al-N¯as.ir), 26–28, 138, 142, 144, 222 National Association for Change (alHaraka al-wataniyya lil-tagh¯ır, NAC), 205 National Bard Museum, 119 National Democratic Party (NDP), 205 National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) (China), 187, 191 National Forces Alliance (Tah.¯ aluf al-Quww¯ a al-Wat.aniyya, NFA), 257–259 National Initiative for Human Development (NIHD), 165 National Oil Corporation, 260, 265 National Transition Council (CNT), 328, 329 NATO, x, 46, 47, 53, 63, 179, 221, 222, 224, 232, 233, 242, 254, 267, 328 Nazism, 111 Neo-Destour party, 278 Netanyahu, Benjamin, 296, 306 Netanyahu, Benzion, 306 9/11 terrorist attacks, 226 Nixon, Richard, 112 North Dome, 326, 335 Nour Party (al-) (H ur), 133 . izb al-N¯ O Obama, Barak, 34, 109

Objectives of Sharia (maq¯ a.sid al-Shar¯ı‘a), 137 Ocalan, Abdullah, 113 Operation Dignity, 258, 261 Operation Peace Spring, 230, 244 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 123, 166 Organization for European Economic Cooperation (now OEEC and in 1948 OECD), 222 Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), 27, 28, 53 Oslo Accords, 302, 304, 307 Otaybi, Juhayman al- (Juhaym¯an al-Utayb¯ı), 134 Özal, Turgut, 223 P Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza (Moh.ammad Rez.a Pahlav¯ı), 326 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 297, 302, 304, 307, 309, 318–320 Papandreou, George, 224 Partîya Karkerén Kurdîstan (PKK), 113, 225, 229, 242, 244 Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs), 82 Peace to Prosperity plan, 305 People’s Protection Units (YPG), 230 Peres, Shimon, 228, 300 Persian Gulf, 5, 71, 100, 179, 191 Philip II, King of Spain, 11 Piracy, 11, 13, 19 Poitiers, Battle of (732), 10 Political Isolation Law, 257 Popular Mobilization Units (H . ashd al-Sha b¯ı), 244 Presidency Council (PC), 260 Prodi, Romano, 322, 333

INDEX

Public good (mas.lah.a), 137, 149 Putin, Vladimir, 58

Q Qabbani, Nizar (Niz¯ar Qabb¯an¯ı), 27 Qadhafi, Muammar al- (Muammar al-Qadhdh¯af¯ı), 133, 252–258, 269, 328 Qaradawi, Yusuf al- (Y¯usuf al-Qarad.¯aw¯ı), 144 Qasimi, Jamal al-Din al- (Jam¯al al-D¯ın al-Q¯asim¯ı), 131 Qatar-USA Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA), 326 Qutb, Sayyid (Sayyd Qut.b), 35, 134, 142, 143, 149

R Ra‘am, 300 Ra’¯ıs , 253, 255 Rabaa al-Adawiya sit in (R¯ abi  al- Adawiyya), 207 Rabat summit (1974), 320 Rabin, Yitzhak, 297, 300 Rahim al-Kib, Abd al- (Abd al-Rah.¯ım al-K¯ıb), 256 Rassemblement Constitutionel Démocratique (RCD), 280 Razi, al- (Abu Bakr al-R¯az¯ı), 148 Reconquista, xii, 6, 10 Regional Security Complex (RSC), 46, 50, 65 Rida, Rashid (Rash¯ıd Rid.¯a), 23, 131, 142 Rifaiyya (al-Rif¯ a iyya), 141 Roger II, Norman King, xi, 8 Rome, Treaties of, 79 Rumi, Jalal al-Din al- (Jal¯al al-D¯ın al-R¯ um¯ı), 140

351

S Saadeh, Antoun (Ant.u¯ n Sa¯ada), 26 Sabbahi, Hamdeen (H . amd¯ın S.ab¯ah.¯ı), 206 Sadat, Anwar (Anwar al-S¯ad¯at), 28, 33, 134 Sadiq, Muhammad al- (Muh.ammad al-S.¯adiq), 277 S.ah.wa councils, 240 Said, Edward (Sa‘id ¯Idw¯ard), 21, 36 Said, Khalida (Kh¯alida Sa‘id), 28 Saied, Kais (Qays Sa¯ıd), 284, 288 Salafi Islam, vi, 130, 131, 148 Salamé, Ghassan (Ghass¯an Sal¯ama), 262, 265 Saleh, Aguila (Aq¯ıla S.¯alih. ¯Is¯a), 265 Sannusi, Muhammad ibn Ali al- (Muh.ammad ibn Ali al-al-San¯ us¯ı), 141 Sarraj, Fayez al- (F¯ayaz al-Sarr¯aj), 57, 94, 260, 264 Sayyid, Lutfi al- (Lut.f¯ı al-Sayyid), 24, 26 Schengen area, 333 Selim I, Ottoman Sultan, 13 Shaarawi, Hoda (Hud¯a Shaar¯aw¯ı), 24 Shabbi, Abu al-Qasim al- (Ab¯u al-Q¯asim al-Sh¯abb¯ı), 24 Shafiite, 148 Sharafeddin, Fahmiyya (Fahmiyya Sharaf al-D¯ın), 28 Sharia, 13, 136, 137, 140, 142, 144, 147, 149 Shariati, Ali (Al¯ı Shar¯ıat¯ı), 149 Sharon, Ariel, 298 Sharqawy, Abdel Rahman al- (Abd al-Rah.m¯an al-Sharq¯aw¯ı), 149 Shas, 298, 299, 301 Shatibi, Abu Ishaq al- (Ish¯aq al-Sh¯at.ib¯ı), 149 Shatterbelt, 46, 50, 65, 241, 246

352

INDEX

Shawkani, Muhammad bin Ali al- (Muh.ammad bin Al¯ı al-Shawk¯an¯ı), 131 Shayfeenkum (Sh¯ ayfiynkum), 204 Shaykh al-Tahtawi (Shaykh al-T.aht.¯aw¯ı), 21 Shia (Sh¯ı‘a), 56, 132, 136, 138, 148 Shinqiti, Muhammad al-Amin al(Muh.ammad al-[Pleaseinsert ʾintopreamble]Am¯ın al-Shinq¯ıt.¯ı), 131 Sibai, Mustafa al- (Mus.taf¯a al-Sib¯a¯ı), 145, 149 Silk Road Fund, 187, 196 Sinan, Mimar, 16 Sinwar, Yahya, 305 Sisi, ‘Abd al-Fattah al- (Abd al-Fatt¯ah. al-S¯ıs¯ı), 141, 204, 265, 302, 330 Siwi, Adil al- (al-S¯ıw¯ı ‘Adil), 34 Six-Day War (1967), 27 Socialist Desturian Party (PSD), 279, 280, 321 Soleimani, Qasem (Q¯ass¯ım Sula¯ım¯an¯ı), 245 Southern Gas Corridor (SGC), 231 Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989), 319 Special economic zones (SEZs), 74 State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) (China), 187, 196 Stevens, Christopher, 257, 259 Suez Canal, 22, 26, 183, 186 Sufi Islam, 132, 136, 137, 139–141, 150 Suleiman the Magnificent, Ottoman Sultan, 11, 12, 16 Sultan al-Kamil (al-K¯amil), 8 Sunni, 6, 12, 49, 54, 56, 58, 65, 84, 135, 136, 138, 140, 145, 148, 238, 240, 241, 263, 303 Sunni triangle, 240

Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), 205, 206 Supreme Security Committee (SSC), 256 Sykes-Picot agreement, 237 Syraq, vii, xiii, 237, 238, 243 Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), 241, 242, 244

T Ta‘al, 300 Taha, Mahmud (Mah.m¯ ud Muh.ammad T.aha), 30 Takf¯ır, 132 Tamarrud protest movement, 206 Tawada, 165 Tawhidi, Abu Hayyan al- (Ab¯ u H . ayy¯an al-Tawh.¯ıd¯ı), 148 Tawr¯ıth, 205 Tayyib, Ahmed al- (Ah.mad al-T.ayyib), 138 Telem, 299 The Libyan Shield, 256 Theology (‘ilm al-kal¯ am), 135 The Skhirat agreement, 258 Th¯ uww¯ ar, 256 Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), 231, 263 Trump, Donald, vii, 296, 305–307, 309 Truth and Dignity Commission (IVD), 281, 282, 289 Tufi, Najd al-Din al- (al-T.uf¯ı), 149 Tunisian Constituency Elections (2011), 335 Tunisian Revolution, 325 Tunisian Solidarity Bank (TSB), 168 Turabi, Hasan al- (al-Tur¯ab¯ı), 146 Turkish Stream gas pipelines (TurkStream), 263

INDEX

U Ulam¯a, 18 Ul Haq, Mahbub, 63 Umayyad Caliphate, 6, 7 Umma (community) party, 24, 142, 149 Unified Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood Organization, 146 Union for the Mediterranean (UfM, 2008), 48, 53, 82, 95, 322 Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT), 278, 279, 330 Union of Right-wing Parties (URWP), 298, 299 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 231, 234 United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), 73, 87 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 101 United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), 70 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 254, 264, 267 United Nations (UN), 63, 77, 84, 91, 94, 119, 224, 227, 232, 260–262, 265, 287, 308 United Torah Judaism (UTJ), 298, 299, 301 UN Millennium Goals, 157 UN Refugee Agency, 262 UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), 260, 265 Urabi Pasha (Urab¯ı P¯ash¯a), 23 Urban II, Pope, 7 Urbanisation, 55, 70, 78, 109, 110, 277

353

W Wafd party (H . izb al-Wafd), 25 Wagner Group, 264 Wahhabi Salafis, 131–133, 142 Wallerstein, Immanuel, 114 War on Terror, 56, 226 Wasatiyya, 144 We Are All Khaled Said (Kullun¯ a Kh¯ alid Sa ¯ıd), 205 Weimar Republic, 111 West Asia and North Africa (WANA), 179, 192 World Bank, 71, 74, 76, 77, 98–100, 158, 160–164, 282, 286, 334 World Economic Forum (WEF), 224, 228

X Xi Jinping, 175, 178, 180, 181, 190

Y Ya‘alon, Moshe, 299 Yamina, 299 Yesh ‘Atid, 299 Yisrael Beitenu, 298, 301 Young Algeria party, 26 Young Turks coup d’état (1908), 23 Youth bulge, xiii, 107–112, 115–118, 120–122 Youth unemployment, vi, 87, 117

Z Zaatari camp, 323, 334 Zaghlul, Sa‘d (Sad Zaghl¯ ul), 25 Zahar, Mahmud al- (Mah.m¯ ud al-Zah¯ar), 304 Zahir, 148 Zaidan, ‘Ali (Al¯ı Zayd¯an), 258 Zakoura Foundation, 167

354

INDEX

Zarqawi, Abu Musaab al- (Ab¯ u Mus.ab al-Zarq¯aw¯ı), 135, 240, 246, 319

Zawahiri, Ayman al- (Ayman a-Z.aw¯ahir¯ı), 134, 139 Zaytuna University, 138 Ziadeh, Mayy (Ma¯ı Ziy¯ada), 24