From Ally to Enemy: The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa, A Failed Intervention [First ed.] 9781569027523, 1569027528

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Copyright © 2021 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the prior written permission of the publisher. Book design: Dawid Kahts Cover design: Ashraful Haque Cataloging-in-Publication Data may be obtained from the Library of Congress.

Acknowledgements Dr David Styan read an earlier draft of the manuscript and his comments were helpful. Martin Plaut was always available to help whenever necessary. I am grateful to their support. I owe a particular debt of gratitude to my publisher, Mr Kassahun Checole at Africa World/Red Sea Press who tirelessly worked with me throughout the later stage of the preparation and publication of the book. Timnit Abraha has read some of the chapters of the first draft. A debt of gratitude is due to her. The manuscript has benefited tremendously from Ms Fiona Leney’s professional editing skills. I am greatly indebted to her. Roma Thomas’ support has been instrumental throughout the time I researched and wrote the book. Dr Mebrahtu Atewebrham has drawn and prepared the two maps and a deep sense of gratitude is due to him. In spite of all of the help and encouragement, I remain entirely responsible for all the shortcomings as well as the views expressed. Gaim Kibreab London, 12 March 2021

v

Contents Legend

xi

Abbreviations

xiii

Introduction Data Sources The Cold War Outline of the Structure of the Book

1 8 11 13

Chapter One Moscow and the Horn of Africa in the Cold War Moscow’s Foreign Policy Toward Africa Ethio-Soviet Relationship in a Historical Perspective Soviet Strategic Interests in the Horn of Africa The Socialist Countries and the New Regime The Soviet Union and Mengistu’s Rise to Power

17 17 18 20 28 30

Chapter Two A New Era in Ethiopian-Soviet Relations Soviet relations with Mengistu The Ethio-Somali Conflict; Moscow sits on the Fence Soviet and Cuban Attempts to Head Off War in the Ogaden As Pressure Grows, Mengistu seeks Help Ratanov and Ochoa; Architects of the Derg’s Military, Foreign and Economic Policies Prelude to the Ogaden Invasion Invasion of the Ogaden Lies and Denials The Defeat of the Somali Armed Forces vii

37 38 40 44 46 52 52 58 61

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa

The Lessons of the Ogaden Conflict Chapter Three A Moving Target – Moscow’s Regional Treaties Somalia Expels Soviet Advisers Ethiopia and the Soviet Union Sign Friendship and Co-operation Treaty Chapter Four Crossing the Rubicon: why Moscow chose Ethiopia over Somalia Mistrust of Somalia’s Muslim sympathies Chapter Five Why Moscow chose Ethiopia over Eritrean Liberation Movements The Importance of the Red Sea Coastline Fears of Muslim and Imperialist Manipulation Moscow’s Preferred Outcome Chapter Six Soviet and East German Attempts at Peacemaking Soviet Union’s Dual Strategy on Eritrea Soviet Leadership Sympathetic to Mengistu Socialist Countries endorse Mengistu’s Nationalist Position The Meeting between the Derg and the EPLF The Soviet Committee for Solidarity Meets Ahmed Nasser Chapter Seven Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The EPLF’s Dilemma Weaponising Semantics: Advocates of Greater Ethiopia attack Fissures within the EPLF over Soviet Intervention Independence: a Non-Negotiable Prize The Split Between EPLF and the Eritrean Diaspora Becomes a Chasm viii

64 71 76 77 83 83 85

91 94 96 103 113 113 119 120 121 134 143 147 150 157 162 7

Table of Contents

Chapter Eight A Hopeless Task: Why Peace Talks Failed Mengistu’s pathological hatred No Costs for Mengistu’s failure to heed the Soviet Union Flawed Assumptions New Developments Chapter Nine A Turning Point in Soviet Foreign Policy Gorbachev’s New Thinking on Ethiopia and The Eritrean Liberation Struggle Chapter Ten The Tide Turns: The Battle of Afabet The Repercussions of Defeat at Afabet The Liberation of Massawa: a Harbinger of Eritrean Independence

171 171 179 182 186 193 196 203 211 222

Chapter Eleven Conclusion

233

References

247

Index

265

ix

Legend 1. Arabian/Persian Gulf (CTF 152) 2. Gulf of Oman (CTF 150, India)

3. Southern Red Sea (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, CTF 151)

4. Bab-al-Mandeb (CTF 151)

5. Gulf of Aden (CTF 151, China, Iran, Russia, Anti-piracy operations) 6. Somali Coast (India, EUNVFOR) 7. Mayotte, Reunion (France)

8. India (off the coast of the Seychelles, off the coast of Oman, Off the coast of Somalia)

9. Arabian Sea, Red Sea, Indian Ocean (CTF 150), CTF combined Task Force (Modified from A. H. Nordpil 2018).

xi

Abbreviations AESNA Eritrean Students in North America AEWNA Association of Eritrean Women in North America CIA Central Intelligence Agency (USA) Central Committee of the Communist Party of the CPSU CC Soviet Union DERG Military junta that ruled Ethiopia from 1974 to 1987. EDU Ethiopian Democratic Union EFLNA Eritreans for Liberation in North America ELF (RC) Eritrean Liberation Front (Revolutionary Council) EPLA Eritrean People’s Liberation Army EPLF Eritrean People’s Liberation Front EPRDF Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front ESUNA Ethiopian Students Union in North America GDR German Democratic Republic Military Assistance Advisory Group MAAG MPLA People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola PDRE Democratic Republic of Ethiopia PMAC Provisional Military Administrative Council SED The Socialist Unity Party of  Germany (German: Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands) Shengo National Assembly (Amharic) SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute TPLF Tigraen People’s Liberation Front UAE United Arab Emirates National Union for the Total Independence of UNITA Angola USSR Soviet Socialist Republics WSLF Western Somalia Liberation Front xiii

Introduction

T

his book aims to explain how the Soviet Union, which was once looked upon by Eritrean revolutionaries as an important potential ally, came to be one of their most deadly enemies. Drawing on a treasure-trove of hitherto unused Soviet documents with regard to the Eritrean war of independence, it provides the first detailed insight into a conflict that was not only a seminal moment in the history of the Horn of Africa, but a key element in the Cold War itself. The question of why the Soviet Union and its allies chose to back the Mengistu regime against the democratic movement in Ethiopia and the Eritrean liberation struggle had been latent in my mind for a number of decades. I was awakened to the idea of looking into the question in depth when I discovered declassified Soviet and East German archives. The sudden surge of interest in the Red Sea and in the littoral states in the region since 2015 aroused my curiosity and hence I wanted to understand their historic strategic significance. In view of the fact that each year hundreds of billions of dollars worth of international trade passes through the southern part of the Red Sea connecting Europe, Asia and the Middle East, I was aware of the strategic significance of the area in general and its southern end in particular, the Bab elMandeb1 (see Map 1.1 and Map 1.2). The “Gate of Tears,” as it is known in Arabic is a crucial choke point at the entrance to the Red Sea, only 25 kilometres wide at its narrowest point. It commands access to the Suez Canal shipping route that connects Asia, Europe and the Middle East.

1

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa

2

Introduction

Although scholars of the Cold War, such as Radoslav R. Yordanov (2016) have made extensive use of Soviet archives to document the role of the Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa, especially during the Ogaden war, neither Yordanov nor other analysts have tapped on to Soviet and East German archives to examine the role they played in the Eritrean liberation struggle. From Ally to Enemy heavily draws on these archives to document and analyse the key roles the Soviet Union and East German states played: on the one hand, they enabled the Derg to weaken the Eritrean liberation movements and on the other, they attempted to bring the warring parties to the negotiating table. No other analyst has hitherto addressed these critical issues. Without tapping onto Soviet and East German archives, this volume would

3

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa

have not seen the light of the day. The references contained in these primary data sources regarding the role the Soviet Union and East Germany played in the Eritrean War of Independence remained largely untapped, until I drew on them for this book Soviet intervention in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa during the Cold War was one of the most significant episodes in the region’s history. Moscow’s involvement in the Horn of Africa since the Ogaden crisis of 1977-1978 remains a talking point among foreign policy analysts trying to discern the Soviet Union’s wider intentions, not only in Africa but also throughout the developing world. Jiri Valenta, Non Resident Senior Research Associate at BESA [Begin-Sadat] Center for Strategic Studies, who has published widely on Soviet intervention abroad, observed in an article titled “Soviet-Cuban Intervention in the Horn of Africa: Impact and Lessons” published in the Journal of International Affairs (1980/1981) that ‘concern has been growing among US policymakers that the Soviet ventures in Angola, Ethiopia, and lately in Afghanistan may be setting a pattern for future involvements in other strategic areas of the Third World such as the Persian Gulf, and the Caribbean’ (1980/81: 353). The Soviet Union’s prompt and uncritical support for Mengistu Haile Mariam and his extreme nationalist group (mantra: “Ethiopia First”) caught progressive forces throughout the region by surprise, particularly because, from the beginning, Mengistu and his inner circle viciously suppressed dissent, including Marxist-Leninist movements. This new and repressive alliance between the Soviet Union and Mengistu Haile Mariam’s regime represented a dilemma for the Eritrean liberation movements and their supporters, who had considered the Soviet Union and other socialist countries as their strategic allies. Until the second half of the 1970s, those of us who supported the Eritrean liberation struggle perceived these socialist countries as being an integral part of the worldwide anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist movement. We also considered the Soviet Union as being at the helm of this movement, and as such, the strategic ally of the Eritrean liberation struggle. Loyalty to the Soviet Union and its allies was a core belief among Eritreans within the liberation movement. I was then an active member of the University Students Union of Addis Ababa (USUAA). Our political outlook was coloured by 4

Introduction

a fundamentally bi-polar view of a world divided between East and West. A country, a movement or even an individual belonged either to the socialist (East) camp, led by the Soviet Union, or the imperialist (West) led by the US. In those days among progressive forces it was considered taboo to be associated with US imperialism and regional forces of reaction. The progressive wings of the Eritrean liberation movement, namely, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Eritrean Liberation Front-Revolutionary Council (ELF-RC) did all they could to distance themselves from imperialism and link themselves with anti-imperialist forces worldwide under Soviet leadership. This made it almost impossible for the Eritrean liberation movement to condemn the Soviet Union when it supported Mengistu and his regime during its large-scale counter-offensives in Eritrea in 1978-1979 and after. Thus the Eritrean forces found themselves in the absurd situation where, while confronting the Derg and their socialist allies in the battlefield, they could not bring themselves to condemn them openly. Yet this critical issue has never been examined up to now. From Ally to Enemy is the first work to remedy this omission. Until the mid-1970s, the only meaningful opposition to Emperor Haile Selassie’s autocratic rule was the nascent labour union movement and the student movement under the leadership of the University Students Union of Addis Ababa (USUAA) (on the Ethiopian student movement in a historical perspective see Balsvik 1985, 1994, 2009; Bahru Zewde 2014; Fantahun Tiruneh 1990). When the military seized power in the 1974 coup, the student movement resisted fiercely in an attempt to block the fledgling military dictatorship from taking over (on the Ethiopian revolution see Clapham 1990, 1995, 1996, 2001, 2003; Gebru Tareke 1998; Andargachew Tiruneh 1993; Fantahun Tiruneh 1990; Fantahun Ayele 2014; Halliday and Malyneux 1981). The Soviet Union, however, wasted no time in expressing unreserved support for Mengistu and the Derg, his “socialist” military junta, in spite of early evidence of brutality and repression. Hopes of the progressive forces throughout Ethiopia that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries would support democracy were dashed. The disillusionment of student activists, including this author, was

5

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa

only to grow as collaboration between the Soviet Union and the Derg deepened.. The military junta was aware of the embryonic resistance and at the end of 1974 decided to disperse university and senior secondary school students throughout the country in order to make it harder for them to organise opposition. Under the pretext of what was known as the Development through Cooperation Campaign (zemecha), allegedly intended to teach and politicise the peasants in the countryside, students were sent out across the land (see Paulos Milkias 1980a, 1980b; Balsvik 1985, 1994, 2009; Bahru Zewde 2014). Many Eritrean students decided to boycott the zemecha, leaving them with the question of what to do next. This period coincided with the escalation of the Eritrean War of Independence in which the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) liberated large parts of the rural areas, as well as many small towns in different parts of the country (Korn 1990; Connell 1997; Pateman 1998). Many students argued in favour of returning to Eritrea to join the liberation struggle, and most of those who did return joined the ELF and the EPLF. As a result the nature of the resistence fronts, especially the EPLF, changed dramatically as educated, urban students joined their ranks (see Kibreab 1987, 2008). Others fled the country, including this author, as failure to participate in the zemecha campaign was considered treason by the military junta, making it unsafe to return to the cities, where continuous house-to-house searches were taking place. In my case, my older brother arranged to help my friend and I to leave Asmara. In November 1976, we fled to Sudan. Towards the end of the year, I left for Sweden and soon after, my friend migrated to Germany. In Sweden, I joined the Eritrean student movement Eritreans for Liberation in Europe (Sweden branch). By 1977 not only was the Soviet Union’s unconditional support for the Derg obvious, but it was also clear that it was backing the Derg’s counter-offensive campaign in Eritrea with the aim of wiping out the liberation struggle once and for all. Indeed, it had become clear that the Ethiopian troops were incapable of doing this alone. By late 1977, independence fighters had inflicted catastrophic defeats on the Ethiopian military, driving them back across vast swathes of Eritrea.

6

Introduction

The collapse of the Ethiopian military’s hold on Eritrea was too much for Moscow to contemplate, given its strategic interest in the Red Sea, Indian Ocean and the Horn of Africa. With the Somali offensive in the Ogaden defeated, Soviet planners threw their weight behind Ethiopian efforts to retain its wayward northern province. As The New York Times reported, West European and US intelligence analysts and military planners considered the Soviet-Cuban movement on Eritrea as the biggest strategic challenge facing NATO. ‘The establishment of Soviet air power at Massawa, Eritrea, on the Red Sea, would create a direct threat to Saudi Arabia, whose capital, Riyadh, is 800 miles from Massawa, and to tanker traffic passing out of the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz,’ the newspaper reported.2 Given what I had learned about the Soviet Union from my experience in the Ethiopian student movement, I was not surprised by the Soviet Union’s unprincipled approach to the struggle in Eritrea. What I found more perplexing, however, was the EPLF and the ELF leaderships’ reluctance to openly condemn the Soviet Union and its socialist allies for betrayal of a cause that they had indirectly supported previously. However, given the fronts’ silence on the question, it was not possible to speak out about it It was clear that not only was the Soviet Union arming and training the Derg to eliminate the Eritrean liberation forces, but that Soviet generals were directing the Ethiopian counter-offensive in Eritrea. The EPLF did not want to admit this openly. Until its second organisational congress held in March 1987 at Orota in the Sahel region of  Eritrea, the EPLF denied that the Soviet Union was involved in the largescale counter-offensive in Eritrea. This was despite the fact that it was common knowledge that there were a total of 1,100 Soviet military personnel in Ethiopia. This ideological dilemma constitutes one of the central Issues of the book, a critical question that has been overlooked until now. Available evidence shows that there were two Soviet generals who directed the large-scale 1978-1979 Ethiopian counter-offensives in Eritrea.3According to a key informant who was a high-ranking EPLF military commander during the war of liberation, these facts were well known to the EPLF leadership. Moreover, according to James Phillips, of the Heritage Foundation, ‘The Soviets furnished leadership and 7

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa

logistical support and bombarded the insurgents from ships off the Eritrean coast.’4 Not only was such information in the public domain, but Dan Connell, an authority on the Eritrean liberation movement and especially on the EPLF, witnessed Soviet ships bombarding the port city of Massawa in 1977. The EPLF leadership for a long time attempted to persuade the Soviet Union and its socialist allies from behind the scenes and through friendly mediators not to suppress a liberation movement that was socialist-oriented and a part of the global anti-imperialist and anticolonialist movement persisting with this approach, officially at least, right up until March 1987. From 1987 onwards, attacks on the US became more muted and criticism of the Soviet Union’s position on Eritrea became more pronounced.

Data Sources This study is mainly based on original declassified Soviet documents, as well as East German and other primary sources from the socialist countries. The Russian documents are extensive, and include numerous files on a series of conversations between the Soviet Ambassador in Addis Ababa, A.P. Ratanov and Ethiopian officials, on Mengistu’s visits to Moscow and Soviet officials’ visits to Ethiopia. The records also include minutes of conversations between Soviet, East German, Ethiopian, Somali and Cuban diplomats and military officials. Of particular significance were the reports from A.P. Ratanov of extensive conversations he held with, among others, Cuba’s highest military official in the Horn of Africa, General Arnaldo Ochoa. At the time of these conversations Mengistu’s regime was in a state of paralysis and Ratanov and Ochoa rapidly became the key architects of the Derg’s Military, Foreign and Economic Policies.5 The accounts helped me to understand the key strategic thinking underlying Soviet and Cuban intervention in the Ogaden conflict, but more importantly that against the Eritrean liberation struggle. There are documents on conversations between Soviet Embassy staff and the political counsellor of the US Embassy in Ethiopia, as well as memoranda of conversations between the Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia and Mengistu. There are also very useful records of transcripts of CPSU CC Politburo Meetings, etc. The data obtained 8

Introduction

from the declassified Soviet archives on Ethiopia, Somalia and Eritrea besides being extensive and detailed are highly reliable. The East German documents were originally obtained from the East Berlin archive of the former ruling party of the German Democratic Republic, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) and translated from German into English by Christian F. Ostermann, a researcher based at the National Security Archive. These diverse East German Documents include reports of communications with Cuban and Soviet officials, conversation between Soviet and East German officials concerning the Horn of Africa, particularly Ethiopia, Somalia and Eritrea. The East German documents also include a lengthy conversation between the East German leader, Erich Honecker and Fidel Castro after his return from his extended tour of Africa, including Ethiopia, Somalia and Aden. The documents give extensive accounts of the four or more meetings that took place in East Berlin between representatives of the Derg and the EPLF under the auspices of SED. These sources are extensively used and referred to throughout the book. More importantly, the East German data contain interesting and useful accounts of the conversations between the EPLF’s deputy leader, Isaias Afwerki, and the East German leader Erich Honecker. I found nearly all of the detailed studies of Soviet and Cuban intervention in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia and Eritrea highly useful and reliable. This study has benefited from these sources considerably. Among the important secondary sources I have used in writing this volume is Yordanov’s useful volume—The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa During the Cold War: Between Ideology and Pragmatism (Lexington Books, 2016). Although there are some similarities in the questions the two volumes address, there are many areas that Soviet Intervention in the Eritrean Liberation Struggle: From Ally to Enemy in Cold War Africa addresses which are not covered by Yordanov or any other analyst. One of them is the inability of the USSR to exert anything approaching the level of leverage over its Ethiopian ally that might have been expected. None of the primary and secondary sources I sifted through in researching my book addressed this critical question. Notwithstanding the fact that Mengistu and his regime depended for their survival on the Soviet Union and its allies, he seldom heeded 9

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa

their advice with regard to Eritrea. Until the second half of the 1980s, he suffered no consequences for this - a unique experience in other patron-client relationships. The reason for this was the Soviet allies’ compelling strategic interest in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. Moscow and its allies feared that if successful the Eritreans, in collaboration with reactionary Arab states, might turn the Red Sea into an “Arab lake.” This would mean, in their view, a triumph for imperialism and regional reaction. As this volume shows, the concern was groundless. The Eritrean liberation movements, especially the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Eritrean Liberation Front—Revolutionary Council (ELF-RC) were strongly opposed to imperialism and regional reaction because they perceived the Eritrean liberation struggle as an integral part of the global anti-imperialist camp led by the Soviet Union. Another important and hitherto neglected focus of From Ally to Enemy is the dilemma faced by the major Eritrean liberation movements, especially the EPLF, over their relations with the Soviet Union, given its attitude to the independence struggle. When the Eritrean liberation fronts defied the Soviet bloc’s call to join the Ethiopian revolution by abandoning the liberation struggle in Eritrea, Moscow and its socialist allies labelled them as serving the interests of imperialism and regional reaction. After the Soviet Union and its socialist allies condemned the Eritrean liberation struggle and backed the Derg unconditionally, the question which preoccupied analysts and observers was whether – and how—the Eritrean liberation struggle would change its own attitude to the Soviet Union and its allies. Some, including among Eritrean organisations wanted the EPLF to denounce and label the Soviet Union as social imperialist. Other analysts expected the EPLF to abandon their previous position of perceiving the Soviet Union as being the strategic ally of the Eritrean revolution. Heavy pressure was brought to bear on the EPLF leadership to condemn the Soviet Union for its betrayal of the legitimate liberation struggle in Eritrea. Notwithstanding the fact that the Soviet Union supplied Mengistu and his regime with enormous amounts of materiel and manpower, including senior military officers to direct the government’s counteroffensive in Eritrea, the leadership of the EPLF refused to change 10

Introduction

its position. Many Eritreans condemned this stance, especially the US-based associations of Eritrean students and women’s associations which were until then the backbone of the liberation struggle. The fissure caused within the ranks of the Eritrean liberation struggle was so severe that it resulted in severance of links with the Front’s major backers. The EPLF leadership, however, stood its ground. Whilst fighting the Soviet Union and the Derg on the battlefield, in the political sphere the leadership continued to regard the socialist block countries under the leadership of the Soviet Union as the Eritrean liberation struggle’s strategic allies. Such a political position was unprecedented in international relations and national liberation struggles. Although the subject has received some attention from scholars concerned with the Cold War, there has not, until now, been enough analysis by scholars from the region itself. Although I recognise the regional and international dimensions of the issues, the absence of Eritrean scholars has meant that Eritrean perspectives have been absent. At the heart of this volume lies Eritrean scholarship, partially filling that lacuna. The volume is also a major contribution to area studies based on hitherto untapped primary sources. It is worth noting that most of the sources Yordanov uses are different from the sources the author of this volume has used. In that sense, in the limited areas where they coincide, Yordanov’s and this volume supplement, rather than compete with, each other.

The Cold War This study is about the role of the Soviet Union in Ethiopia and Eritrea during the Cold War.6 In view of the fact that many of the book’s readers may be young men and women whose knowledge of the Cold War is limited, a succinct definition may be helpful. The term Cold War refers to a declared state of hostility between the West and the East under the leaderships of the USA and the Soviet Union, respectively. The question of when the Cold War began and ended is contested. According to some historians, it began in 1917 when the Bolsheviks achieved political power in Russia whilst others trace its beginning to 1947. Its end is equally disputed. For Hugh Huggins (1974), the Cold 11

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa

War began in 1917 and ended in 1960. The Soviet State was received with extreme hostility by the rest of the world from the outset. The Cold War was marked by an intense period of ideological conflict that resulted in the division of the world between the East and West, symbolically led by the Soviet Union and the United States of America respectively. In view of the hostility with which it was met, the Soviet state became obsessively preoccupied with security and survival. Security became Moscow’s defining characteristic of its relations not only with its neighbouring states, but also with the Third World countries (Payne 1988: 6). Since WWII, one of the corner stones of US foreign policy has focussed on limiting the Soviet Union’s influence and expansion (see Lacey ed. 2016; Heller 2016; Nincic 1989). The perceived threat felt by Soviet leadership was real. The Western world’s hostility to the birth of the Soviet Union is characterised by Winston Churchill’s condemnation. In January 1920, he declared: ‘The theories of Lenin and Trotsky have driven man from the civilisation of the 20th century into a condition of barbarism worse than the Stone Age, and left him the most awful and pitiable spectacle in human experience, devoured by vermin, racked by pestilence, and deprived of hope.’7 Churchill further said, ‘I think the day will come when it will be recognized without doubt, not only on one side of the House, but throughout the civilized world, that the strangling of Bolshevism at its birth would have been an untold blessing to the human race.’8 Nevertheless, the rise of a common enemy, Hitler in Germany, and the imminent threat he posed to the Western Powers and the Soviet Union prompted the two natural enemies to forge a tactical alliance to defeat him. In 1956, there was a split in Sino-Soviet relations and from then onwards, the division was no longer marked by bi-polarity but rather by tri-polarity. The ideological and political divisions were further exacerbated by the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 which brought the two superpowers close to war (see Detzer 1979). Ironically, however, the Cuban missile crisis was a harbinger of rapprochement between the two superpowers, which led in the following year to the partial nuclear test ban treaty agreed by the Soviet Union, USA, and Britain. Delving into in-depth discussion of the Cold War is beyond the scope of this volume (those who want to acquaint themselves with the history of the

12

Introduction

Cold War should read among others Higgins 1974; Barker 1972; Bisley 2004; Betts 1994).

Outline of the Structure of the Book Chapter 1 explains the evolution of the relationship between Russia/ the Soviet Union and Ethiopia from a historical perspective. It gives an account of Mengistu Haile Mariam’s ascent to power and the immediate response of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. It also discusses briefly the initial stance of the Soviet Union on the tension between Ethiopia and Somalia over the Ogaden. It explores the key role played by Anatoli Ratanov, the Soviet Ambassador in Addis Ababa, in the emergence and consolidation of Mengistu’s dictatorship. Chapter 2 focuses on the Soviet Union’s involvement in the Horn of Africa during the Cold War. It discusses the aims and objectives of Soviet policy in Africa. It also examines the intensification of the Soviet bloc’s involvement in Ethiopia and the Soviet Union’s strategic interests in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa region. Chapter 3 deals with the treaty the Soviet Union signed with the government of Egypt in the early 1970s and discusses its aims and objectives. It discusses why the Egyptian government revoked it and what this meant to the Soviet Union’s strategic interest in the region. It also examines the Treaty of Friendship the Soviet Union signed with the Government of Somalia in July 1974, and the importance of the port of Berbera. It discusses the Soviet Union’s efforts to resolve the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia and its failure to convince the Somali government to abandon its claims to the Ogaden. Chapter 4 concentrates on the reasons why the Soviet Union, abandoned its long-standing political and military relationship with Somalia in favour of Ethiopia. Chapter 5 examines why the Soviet Union sided with the Derg against the Eritrean liberation struggle in apparent contradiction of its strategic interests. Chapter 6 discusses the dual strategy the Soviet Union and East Germany pursued vis-à-vis the Eritrean conflict. The chapter examines the different attempts made by the East German government to bring the leaderships of the EPLF and the Derg to the negotiating table, the 13

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa

meetings that took place under the auspices of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) and presents their results. Chapter 7 highlights the dilemmas that confronted the leaderships of the ELF and the EPLF as a result of the Soviet Union’s support for the Derg. It looks at the EPLF leadership’s failure to condemn the Soviet allies and the ambiguity of a position which caused severe splits in the liberation movement. The prolonged discussions that took place between the leaderships of the EPLF and the Association of Eritrean Students in North America (AESNA) and Association of Eritrean Women in North America (AEWNA) that culminated in cutting of ties between the Front’s leadership and student’s and women’s association in North America are discussed extensively. Chapter 8 examines in detail the reasons for the failure of the Soviet bloc’s attempts to solve the Eritrean problem peacefully. The chapter also discusses the developments that took place in Eritrea and Ethiopia in the second half of the 1980s which affected both the Eritrean war of independence and the political and military situation in Ethiopia. Chapter 9 examines the consequences of the changes that took place in the Soviet Union’s foreign policy toward the Third World in general and Africa in particular in the aftermath of Leonid Brezhnev’s death and Yuri Andropov’s rise to power. It scrutinises the extent to which Andropov continued or reversed Brezhnev’s Third World policy, including in Ethiopia and Eritrea. It also discusses the impact of Mikhail Gorbachev’s new thinking on Ethiopia and the Eritrean Liberation Struggle. Chapter 10 assesses the impact of the defeat the EPLA inflicted on the Ethiopian armed forces at the battle of Afabet. The chapter examines the extent to which the defeat changed the Soviet Union’s view of the Derg’s future in Eritrea. It also assesses the impact of this on Ethiopia’s military. The last part of the chapter presents the EPLF’s victory at the battle of Massawa and argues that the comprehensive defeat suffered by Mengistu and his regime marked a turning point in the Eritrean liberation struggle and sounded the death knell of the regime in Ethiopia. The chapter also discusses the routing of huge Ethiopian defence forces by the EPLF and the EPLA which resulted in the de facto independence of Eritrea on 24 May 1991. 14

Introduction

The conclusions of the book are presented in Chapter 11.

Notes 1

The Bab el Mandeb Strait, about 19 kilometers wide lies between Djibouti and Yemen where about 4.8 million barrels per day of crude and refined petroleum products are shipped through. The tiny but strategically located state of Djibouti bordered by Eritrea to the north, Ethiopia in the west and south and Somalia to the south east hosts the highest concentration of foreign military bases than any other country. Djibouti is seen as an open access resource to foreign powers reflected in its readiness to host diverse military bases. Among others, the country hosts the US Africa Command’s (AFRICOM) Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa. The US base in the country—Camp Lemonnier—is the only permanent US military base in Africa. Every African country approached by the US government refused to house AFRICOM except Djibouti. The Bab el-Mandeb is the shortest trade route between the Mediterranean region and the Indian Ocean and the rest of East Asia. 2 New York Times, 5 July 1978, https://www.nytimes.com/1978/07/05/ archives/eritrean-situation-has-nato-worried-a-soviet-air-base-on-thered.html 3 Ibid. 4 James Phillips, Ethiopia’s Kremlin Connection, the Heritage Foundation, January 17, 1985. Available at https://www.heritage.org/ node/22356/print-display “Memorandum of conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Ethi5 opia A.N. Ratanov and Cuban military official Arnaldo Ochoa,” July 17, 1977, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1637, ll. 141-146; translated by S. Savranskaya http:// digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111849 The term Cold War was for the first time used in 1947 by Bernard 6 Baruch, advisor of the then American President. Bolshevism: “Foul baboonery…Strangle at Birth” Available at https:// 7 winstonchurchill.hillsdale.edu/bolshevism/ 8 In Ibid.

15

Chapter One

Moscow and the Horn of Africa in the Cold War Moscow’s Foreign Policy Toward Africa

A

nalysts give many reasons to explain the Soviet Union’s compulsion to expand its influence globally. These include the assumption that contemporary Russia is essentially the continuation of pre-revolutionary Russia and consequently those currently in power are essentially inheritors of this expansionist and imperialist legacy. Richard Payne (1988: 6) argues that ‘the Soviet empire today, just as (in) the Czarist period, provides not only prestige but also security. This view holds that in order to maintain control over what it has, the internal dynamics of imperialism compel the Soviets to control more’. Secondly, he says, Soviet expansion is perceived as a ‘defensive reaction of insecure state’ that feels permanently threatened by external enemies. The third explanation for Soviet expansionism is the Marxist-Leninist ideology which entrusts the Soviet Union with the mission to make the world communist (Payne 1988: 7). In a similar vein, referring to Colin Legum (1978), Albright (1987), Daniel Papp of the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College (1978) identifies four fundamental objectives underlying the Soviet Union’s policy toward Africa. The first of these is the yearning for a voice in African affairs in order to spread the Kremlin’s political and economic influence in the continent. The second driver is assumed to be promotion of the Soviet Union’s international security interests by way of gaining access to African support facilities, such as ports, in order to make maintaining Soviet naval units in African waters easier. 17

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa

The third driver of Soviet African policy was predicated by the fact that the division of the world into Communist and Capitalist spheres of influence was underlined by fierce competition between East and West. Therefore Moscow aimed to counteract, and if possible to undermine, Western influence and its grip on the continent. Lastly, the Soviet Union was keen to prevent Chinese influence in Africa from growing (1978: 114).

Ethio-Soviet Relationship in a Historical Perspective According to the Soviet Foreign Ministry on Soviet-Ethiopian Relations diplomatic ties between the two countries date from the days of World War II. A background report dated 3rd April 1978 1 stated that diplomatic ties were established on 21 April 1943, and that ‘SovietEthiopian political cooperation before the Ethiopian revolution in 1974 developed on the basis of the historical ties between the peoples of the USSR and Ethiopia, [and] both countries’ participation in the struggle against Fascism during World War II’. It continues that the relationship also reflects ‘the positive position that Ethiopia held in the struggle against colonialism and racism, in the questions of strengthening global peace and international security’.2 However, Russian interest in the region goes back much earlier. Contact between Ethiopian monks and Armenians was established in Jerusalem in the fourteenth century (Patman 1993: 111). And in the pre-Soviet era, both countries followed the teachings of the Eastern Christian Orthodox church (see Porter 1984: 191). Russian interest in the strategic importance of the Red Sea goes as far back as the early tsars. In 1674, the second Romanov Tsar, Alexis, considered the possibility of establishing a joint EthiopianRussian alliance to counter the threat of the Ottoman Empire. This interest in protecting its southern sea route was also evidenced in its efforts to cultivate ties with Christian Ethiopia ‘…in the hope of planting a Russian flag along the shores of the Red Sea, then the object of British, French and Italian colonial expansion’ (Remnek 1990: 2). Stalin resurrected hopes of controlling these territories, including Eritrea, in the aftermath of WWII, when the disposal of the former Italian colonies came up. As Fred Halliday wrote: ‘After the Second World War, the USSR tried to have Italian colonies in the Horn 18

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transferred to Russian jurisdiction’ (1984: 130). Richard Payne (1988: 34) referring to Rothenberg (1980: 138) observes: During UN debates on the future of Eritrea, the Soviet Union actually opposed Ethiopian attempts to annex that territory and clearly indicated its interest in playing a role in government [of] the former Italian possessions until they obtained their independence. Failing to persuade the UN to establish a trusteeship council for Eritrea and Somaliland, Moscow advocated immediate independence for Eritrea and voted against the General Assembly resolution approving Eritrean incorporation in Ethiopia as an autonomous unit,

According to Edward Wilson (1980: 73), during the Adwa war of March 1896, Russian arms and military advice contributed to Emperor Menelik’s victory over the Italians. The Russian diplomatic mission had been opened in Addis Ababa in 1903 and in July 1943, full diplomatic relations were established between the two countries. Khrushchev acknowledged that the relations between Ethiopia and Russia during the Emperor’s rule were excellent (Khrushchev 1970: 336). This is demonstrated by the fact that between 1954 and 1967, the Soviet Union provided Ethiopia with US$ 15 million aid - the third largest sum in Africa at the time (Nielsen, 1969: 207). Robert Patman states that in 1959, the USSR extended a US$100 million trade credit to Haile Selassie’s government. On top of that Russia also built the polytechnic school at Bahr Dar, as well as an oil refinery in the port of Assab in the 1960s (p. 111). The Emperor made repeated visits to the Soviet Union, going there in 1959, 1967, 1970, and 1973, where he was received warmly.3 According to Robert Hess, the Emperor was said to have received assurance from the Soviet Union that the latter would support Ethiopia’s territorial integrity in 1967 (Hess, 1970: 187), which suggests that the Soviet Union no longer recognized the right of the Eritrean people to self-determination, if it had ever done so. The cordial relations between Russia and Ethiopia lasted until towards the end of the Emperor’s rule, and he himself acknowledged this.4 No evidence exists to show that the Soviets supported the Eritrean liberation struggle for independence. What was true, however, was that the USSR was not actively hostile to the Eritrean liberation struggle, as became the case after the Derg’s seizure of power. 19

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa

Soviet Strategic Interests in the Horn of Africa The importance of this region is determined by its geographical situation at the juncture of two continents—Asia and Africa, by the presence of first-class ports in the Gulf of Aden and in the Indian Ocean, and, most importantly, by the fact that important sea lanes, linking the oil producing countries with America and Europe, pass through the region.5

Jiri Valenta’s (1980/81: 355) observation that ‘ideological interests did not comprise one of the main reasons for Soviet involvement in the Horn in the 1960s and 1970s’ is spot on. Valenta further notes that ideology did not play a vital role in the realignment of forces in the Horn of Africa either. The Soviet Union’s choice of one leader or country over the other was not determined by the ideological inclination of the leaders. Given their difficult experiences in other African countries, such as Ghana, Mali, Sudan and Egypt (all failed experiments), the Soviet viewed neither the Somalis nor the Ethiopians as truly socialist or Marxist-Leninist (Valenta 1980/81: 355). Socialism failed in Ghana, Mali, Sudan and Egypt partly because of reluctance to espouse communist ideology and partly the material conditions were lacking for socialist transformation. Instead, more important in motivating Soviet involvement in the area were, as we have seen, strategic and political interests. Soviet policies in the African continent, including the Horn, are part of Moscow’s global strategy of securing assured access to modern air and naval facitilites on worldwide so as to more effectively project power and hence influence, while at the same time undermining the power and influence of the West—particularly the U.S. and her allies—and the People’s Republic of China (Ibid.).

Valenta further states, ‘The main significance of the Horn for the USSR lies in its having a geographic position strategic to both Africa and the Middle East’ (Ibid). As seen earlier, Papp (1978: 114) identified four factors that motivated the Soviet Union to engage itself in Africa. The pursuit of strategic interests lay at the heart of the Soviet Union and its allies’ interventions in the Horn of Africa in general, and in Ethiopia 20

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and Eritrea in particular. Fred Halliday identifies Soviet interests in the Red Sea area as being military, economic and political (1984). As Augustine Nurthen (1980: 86) insightfully observes: A substantial Soviet presence in Ethiopia would enhance significantly the USSR’s capability to pursue its strategic incentives in the Red Sea basin. Ethiopia represents the heartland of the Horn of Africa. Its acquisition to the Soviet family along with Somalia and South Yemen would constitute a strategic bonanza for Moscow. Naval forces (Soviet, local or both) operating out of the Ethiopian port of Assab combined with those from Berbera and the South Yemeni Island of Perim could exert undisputed control over the 12 kilometers wide Bab el-Mandeb shipping channel.

As we shall see later, Soviet commitment to the buildup of Ethiopia’s defense and fighting capability, reflected in the transfer of massive amounts of materiel, such as tanks, artilleries, mortars, armored vehicles, air defense guns, helicopters, combat aircrafts, missiles, attack boats, military advisors, trainers, and others (see Table 1.1) was unprecedented outside of the Warsaw Pact. There are analysts who argue that the real motive of the Soviet Union and their allies’ investment in Ethiopia’s military power was not to maintain Ethiopia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, but to promote Soviet strategic interest in the region. As Robert Patman (1990a: 263-4) observes: But did the Soviets invest so much just to consolidate the Mengistu government and maintain Ethiopia’s sovereignty? The answer of course, is an unequivocal no. It should be recalled that the original objective of Soviet policy was to establish a Pax Sovietica in which all states in the Horn would be linked through a confederation under Soviet political tutelage. That objective, however, foundered on the stony ground of Somali nationalism in 1977. Thus, while Soviet intervention on the side of Ethiopia was a successful demonstration of power, it was also an illustration of the limitations of Soviet influence in the area.

Samuel Makinda (1987: 180) also states: One of Moscow’s primary interests in the Horn and Red Sea region has been to secure and maintain naval and air facilities so as to project more effectively its power in the Indian Ocean region as a whole. An 21

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa American military build-up in the region is seen by Soviet strategic planners as a threat to their country’s foreign policy goals. So as the US increased its military presence in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf region in the late 1970s, the USSR was also determined to maintain access to some military facilities in the region.

Donald Donham perceptively unravels the strategic interests of the Soviet Union in the Red Sea as follows: ‘To the Cold War imagination, both North American and Soviet, the Horn of Africa was a critical strategic point—a fulcrum from which to exert world power at the meeting point of continents’ (1999: 136). A Soviet publication of 1978 claimed: The area has been allotted an exceptionally important place in the imperialist strategic plans because of its geographical location at the junction of two continents Asia and Africa, its first-class ports in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean and, above all, its proximity to key sea lanes linking oil-producing countries with America and Europe. Some 70 per cent of the oil and other raw materials imported by Western Europe is carried over these sea routes (Sofinsky and Khazanov 1978 quoted in Donham Ibid.).

The Red Sea adjoins the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, and herein lay its strategic significance not only to the Russians and later to the Soviet Union, but also to the Western world, as well as other countries within and outside the region (see Map 1.1). Not only did the Soviet Union recognise the geopolitical significance of the Red Sea earlier on, but also jealously guarded its strategic interests in the region. As stated in Izvestiya (16th April 1977): There is no need to discuss the geographical and strategic position of the Red Sea. The maritime communications lines linking Asia and Europe pass through it from the Indian Ocean … there are 10 states and many important ports on the shores of the Red Sea. The ships of many countries and practically all the ships which pass through the Suez Canal sail its waters (cited in Nurthen 1980: 80).

The Soviet Union perceived both offensive and defensive strategic interests in the Red Sea basin. ‘Defensively, Moscow must protect its maritime fleet which is the second largest in the world numbering more than 2,400 ships. 18% of this fleet, whose average age is less 22

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than 12 years, plies the Indian Ocean trade routes. The Soviet fishing fleet, the largest in the world, nets 20% of its catch from the Indian Ocean’ (Nurthen 1980: 80). The strategic significance of the Red Sea basin is, for example, underscored by Colonel Hussein Al-Yadoomi of the Yemen armed forces in which he states: ‘Due to the increasing attention given to the Red Sea, as if rediscovered, …[it] appears to the viewer as if it were a delicious meal that suddenly emerged from underground causing the powers to swarm around it and gain access to advantageous ground, where, if they reach over, they can get hold of everything’ (1990:1). This, among other things, is because 40 per cent of the total world oil traffic tankers pass through the Bab al-Mandeb and the Red Sea (Fitzgibbon 1984: 108). Louis Fitzgibbon further writes: ‘The passage is so narrow that the sinking of even one large ship could make it impassable. The significance of oil needs no elaboration: suffice it to say that in an ever-more mechanical world, it is upon oil that so much depends— be it for machines of peace, or be it for engines of war’ (Ibid.: 109). Fitzgibbon further writes: ‘Strategically, therefore, Bab al-Mandab must be one of the world’s most sensitive bottle-necks, and this fact should be constantly in the minds of those to whom entrust our future’ (Ibid.). Since the Soviet Union was an ally of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) and Ethiopia [Eritrea], located to the west and east of the Bab al-Mandab respectively, the Soviet Union’s strategic leverage in the area cannot therefore be underestimated (see Map 1.1 and Map 1.2). According to Jiri Valenta, ‘The Horn’s real strategic value for the Soviet both then and now, has been as a staging area for reconnaissance, a facility for repairs and storage of tactical surface-surface missiles and fuel, and as a long-range communications receiving station’ (p. 356). The Red Sea is quite simply the shortest and fastest waterway between the East and the West, making it of enormous strategic importance. Richard Remnek (1990: 2) states: ‘The region lies astride the USSR’s southern sea route, the shortest sea lines of communication open year round between its European and Pacific ports. The next fastest route runs around the Cape of Good Hope, which takes approximately an extra 18 days.’ It is estimated that more than half of the Soviet Union’s transcontinental freight is carried over this route 23

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa

(Westwood 1985: 47). Soviet interest in the Red Sea peaked during the Cold War because of the time and fuel savings to be made by using the route. Soviet vessels sailing through the Suez Canal route for transit from the Black Sea to the Arabian Sea could reduce the journey by 9,000 miles in distance and about 24 days in sailing time. In addition, Soviet warships sailing from the Baltic and Northern fleets to the Horn of Africa could also save about 3,900 miles by using the Suez Canal (1978: 167; Alvin and Burrell 1974: 30). The total amount of Soviet cargo transferred through the Suez Canal in 1977 was estimated to be 11 million tons (Cottrell and Barrell 1974: 31). On top of shielding its maritime fleet, the Soviet Union’s defensive interests also included the monitoring of US ballistic missile submarines, including allied naval forces operating in the waters surrounding the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. According to Fred Halliday: The prime Russian military interest …is the denial of the Red Sea to the fleets of hostile powers in the event of nuclear war. The Soviet Union does not need to deploy nuclear weapons in the Red Sea for striking targets in North America or Western Europe. But NATO states can use the Red Sea for deploying aircraft-carriers with planes carrying nuclear weapons and can deploy missile-firing submarines capable of launching rockets against the territory of the USSR (1984: 124).

He continues: ‘Since 1964, when the Polaris A3 submarines went into service with the US navy, the Red Sea has therefore been a potential launching-pad for nuclear attack on the USSR, and the deployment of the newer generation of submarines, Poseidon and now Trident, has confirmed this’ (Ibid.). In pursuit of its strategic interest, and to counteract enemy initiatives, the Soviet Union dispatched oceanographic vessels to carry out wide-ranging surveys in the Indian Ocean. The Red Sea basin provided the Soviet Union access to potential precious resources, such as minerals, fishing, and petroleum, including those available in the Persian Gulf and the African continent. The determination to obtain bases for logistic support, communications and intelligence gathering facilities in the Red Sea basin could all be traced back to Moscow’s strategic concerns (Remneck 1980; 1990; Nurthen 1980). In 1973, Admiral Nikolai Sergeev, chief of the Soviet Naval Staff, stated that the 24

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quest for bases had been the single most important issue for the Soviet navy since the shift to forward deployment (US Congress referred in Nurthen 1980). The quest for a base was partially fulfilled with access to the Somali port city of Berbera. As already stated, Somalia was the second country after Egypt to grant the Soviet Union access to ‘extensive facilities ashore’. ‘Soviet access privileges included the exclusive use of a long-range communications station and the rights to stage periodic maritime reconnaissance flights from Somali airfields’ (Renmeck 1980: 5). Moscow’s attraction to Africa’s untapped mineral resources is acknowledged by the Soviet writer, Evgenii Tarabrin (1974: 151)6 in which he stated: Africa currently contains over 80 per cent of the capitalist world’s known resources of cobalt and tantalum, 72 per cent of its chromite, 60 per cent of titanium, 40 per cent of copper and manganese, 30 per cent of bauxites, 27 per cent of uranium, 20 per cent of niobium and antimony, and 13-15 per cent of lithium, beryllium, tin, graphite and asbestos.

Before the USSR developed its Siberian oil reserves, not only did it have an incentive to compete for Gulf oil exports, but it was also keen to deny the industrialised West access to such resources. It is estimated that about 30 per cent of all Indian Ocean maritime trade with Western Europe passed through the Red Sea basin. The most important sealanes linking the oil producing countries with the US and Europe pass through this region. It is also worth noting that 70 per cent of the raw materials imported by Western European countries pass through the same sea lane. Darius and Schroeder (1981: 7) state: The strait of Bab el Mandeb, one of the two connecting links between the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea, has become more significant since the widening of the other link (the Suez Canal) and since the substantial rise of trade in 1973 between the oil-rich Gulf states, the US and Western Europe. The strait of Bab el Mandeb and the Suez canal will remain critical chock points for all major maritime powers.

Richard Remneck writes: ‘The strategic importance of the Bab alMandab and the Horn of Africa lies in its location astride two major 25

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa

international waterways, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, and adjacent to the Arabian peninsula’ (1990: 1) (see Map 2.1). In addition, the region is in close proximity to other areas of great strategic significance, such as the Persian Gulf, and the vital sea-lanes from it. Superpower rivalry for regional domination lay at the heart of the Soviet Union’s determination to ensure its presence in the region in response to the allegedly increased presence of the US under the Carter administration (see David 1979; Remneck 1984; Patman 1990; Morison 1980). The area was hugely strategically important to many countries. Those with the greatest interests included the Soviet Union, the United States, France, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Egypt (Renmek 1990). Although not to the same extent, European, Middle Eastern and Asian states also had interests in the Horn of Africa. And then there were those whose goals were to deny other states from gaining access to the strategic region of the Horn, including the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. Remneck states, ‘…while China may have earlier had a strategic interest in denying Soviet access through the Bab al-Mandab, and Libya may today have interest in denying Israeli access to the Red Sea, neither of these states has appreciable positive interests in the region worth protecting’ (1990:1). It was only direct acquisitive and denial of access interests that motivated different states in the region. Nevertheless, there were also some states, such as the US, which supported Israel’s right to “free and unimpeded passage” through and over the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab, according to the terms of the 1975 memorandum of understanding between the two governments (Remnek 1990: 2). Although the number of states with strategic interests in the region were numerous in the 1970s and 1980s, those of the Soviet Union were arguably paramount. These interests were multiple, and some were essential to Soviet national security. The region lies astride the USSR’s southern sea route, the shortest sea lines of communication open year round between its European and Pacific ports.

Further Remnek observes: Reliance on the southern sea route is not likely to be reduced appreciably by the introduction into service of the Baikal-Amur (BAM) railroad line, which should eventually open up Siberia’s natural resources to commercial exploitation and foreign export... 26

Chapter 1 In fact, since the BAM line was opened in 1984, Soviet maritime traffic has gradually increased. Whereas 1,823 Soviet-flagged vessels transited the Suez Canal in 1981, by 1987 the number had risen to 2,281, accounting for 6.8 per cent of the net tonnage of ships using the Canal … A significant part of Soviet shipping through the Suez Canal is bound for India, Vietnam, and other Asian and African states with which the USSR maintains trade and aid ties (Ibid.).

The Soviet Union was exceedingly preoccupied with the security of its maritime commerce through the Bab al-Mandeb. It was also haunted by fears, which had first surfaced in the 1970s, that US-backed Arab policy was to turn the waterway into an ‘Arab lake’. These dated from a meeting of Arab leaders in March 1977 at Ta’izz, Yemen Arab Republic, where Sudanese delegates held discussions with counterparts from the Yemen Arab Republic and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen. A month earlier, representatives of Sudan, Egypt and Syria had held a meeting in Khartoum. The Soviet Union perceived this as being a Saudi-inspired initiative designed to ‘forge a pro-imperialist military bloc in the area, with the aims of obstructing both Israeli and Soviet shipping through the Red Sea, and eventually of eliminating Soviet influence in the area as well’ (Remneck 1980: 9). The First Deputy Chairman of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, Aleksander Dzasokhov stated, ‘The main objective of US-backed Saudi Arabian policy was to turn the Red Sea into a ‘closed Arab lake.’7 Mengistu Haile Mariam visited the Soviet Union at the beginning of May 1977 and at a Kremlin dinner condemned the Eritrean liberation movements as being sponsored by imperialism and reactionary Arab states whose aim was to ‘tear Eritrea away from Ethiopia and establish full strategic control over the Red Sea.’8 In the joint Soviet-Ethiopian communiqué issued at the end of Mengistu’s visit, both parties affirmed that the Red Sea should remain ‘an open and international body of water.’9 Although no direct mention of Eritrea was made in the joint Soviet-Ethiopian communiqué, the Soviet media increasingly spoke of the threat of the Red Sea becoming an “Arab lake”. Throughout the spring and early summer of 1977 they accused the West and certain Arab states of fomenting separatist sentiments in Ethiopia without directly referring to Eritrea. Referring to the latter by name would have been inconsistent with the Soviet Union’s policy of saying little about 27

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa

Eritrea and encouraging a peaceful solution of the problem. This was in spite of Mengistu Haile Mariam’s desire to put the question of Eritrea at the heart of Soviet-Ethiopian relations.

The Socialist Countries and the New Regime After the fall of Emperor Haile Selassie, especially from 1976 onwards, the socialist countries attempted to make their presence felt in Ethiopia. A dispatch from the Yugoslav Embassy, for example, stated: The activity of the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European countries in Ethiopia has been felt greatly as of late. A number of economic, trade, technical, social and sports delegations, including the exchange of football and other sports teams, have taken place. The signing of contracts on technical and cultural cooperation and exchange of goods are continuing on a permanent basis. At present, there is an Ethiopian military delegation in the USSR. These days, the East German foreign minister and trade delegations from Romania, East Germany and Czechoslovakia visited Ethiopia.10

There is evidence to suggest that from the outset Moscow worked from behind the scenes to strengthen the radical elements within the Derg. Robert Patman (1993: 113) states that from early on, before Mengistu Haile Mariam had consolidated his power, ‘the Brezhnev leadership decided he was the main horse to back in the Provisional Military Administrative Council.’ The Soviet media was supposed to have championed the cause of Mengistu Haile Mariam two months after the Emperor’s demise (Gerasimov in Patman, 1993: 113). Réne Lefort (1983: 206) suggests that Mengistu had probably received help from the Soviet intelligence services in his fight against rivals within the junta. Writing in the Washington Post, Don Oberdorfer stated: The Soviet decision to accept the Ethiopian offer of alliance dates from 1976, according to U.S. accounts. The most definitive sign was a Soviet-Ethiopian military aid pact signed secretly that December. There is a consensus among Kremlin-watchers that this decision was made at the top level of the Soviet government, and there is clear evidence that Moscow’s African specialists were less enthusiastic than high-ranking politicians and military-ranking politicians and military strategists.11 28

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In the beginning both the Chinese and the Soviets vied for influence in the country. The same dispatch stated: ‘The very energetic competition between China and the Soviet Union in the exchange of delegations and sports teams to Ethiopia is most interesting. Both countries sent delegations almost at the same time, striving to maintain a mutual balance.’12 It is further stated: ‘In an effort to expand and consolidate its presence, the Chinese appear modest and unobtrusive. Russians are rougher and intrusive, with careful placement conditions.’13 According to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘In midOctober 1976, Mengistu and the deputy head of the military government held talks with the heads of socialist states’ representations. Referring to the difficult situation, and that they want to give up the supplies of US weapons, he asked the socialist states to provide adequate quantities of arms to Ethiopia.’14 In October 1976, at least formally, Mengistu was still an ordinary member of the Derg although he had addressed the armed forces as early as the 16th November 1974. The fact that he addressed the armed forces and later also held such an important meeting with the heads of the socialist states indicated his prominence within the junta. It is further stated: ‘In parallel with Mengistu’s request, the head of the Commission for reconstruction and aid, Adugna, sought civilian aid. Initially, he asked for the provision of means of transport, tractors, agricultural machinery, irrigation equipment and experts.’15 The most significant shift in relations between Ethiopia and the Soviet Union took place in December 1976, ‘when a Derg delegation headed by Mengistu visited Moscow and concluded an arms agreement with the Soviet Union valued at US$385 million that was designed to end Washington’s virtual monopoly on arms supplies to Ethiopia.’16 This represented a turning point not only for the relationship between the Soviet Union and Ethiopia, but also equally between Ethiopia and the US. In 1976, after receiving Moscow’s assurance of military assistance, Lieutenant Colonel Atnafu Abate, vice-chairman of the Derg, announced that Ethiopia would restrict its future purchases to “socialist countries”. Although there was an increased exchange of economic, political and cultural exchanges between Addis Ababa, Moscow, Berlin, Belgrade, Sofia and Prague, the latter countries were not in a hurry to engage in supply of arms to Addis Ababa. The 29

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa

Soviet Union and its socialist allies wanted first to see progress in other fields, such as economic, political and cultural. US arms supplies were dwindling, making finding an alternative source of arms from the socialist countries a question of life and death to the embryonic regime. However, despite the pleas from Mengistu and the regime, Moscow was unmoved, for the time being at least.

The Soviet Union and Mengistu’s Rise to Power This state of affairs changed dramatically after 3rd February 1977. On that day, seen by many as one of the most significant dates in modern Ethiopian history, the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) Chairman, General Teferi Bante, and five other members were killed in a “shoot-out” at PMAC headquarters in the Grand Palace in Addis Ababa. According to Milene Charles (1980: 136): ‘On February 3, 1977 Mengistu, the third ranking member of the Derg, personally killed Teferi Bante, the chairman, and six other Derg leaders at a confrontation at the Grand Palace headquarters’ (emphasis added). Although there is little doubt that Mengistu ordered the execution of the head of state, Teferi Bante, not all analysts agreed that Mengistu shot him personally. In a firefight at government headquarters in early February 1977 Teferi Bante, the head of state, was killed with five of his key supporters.17 Thereafter, Mengistu unleashed what he unabashedly called the “Red Terror”—an attempt to kill as many as possible of the regime’s real or imagined enemies and thereby to force the population in the areas held by the Derg to obedience (Westad 2005: 259).

The day after the Grand Palace killings, hundreds of thousands of Addis Ababa residents staged a demonstration to express their support for the regime and to condemn the so-called “traitors” and “defeatists.”18 Soon after, Mengistu announced that in the future he would seek military aid from the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries rather than relying on the US. Moscow immediately hailed the putsch as the foundation of a socialist revolution under the leadership of a true revolutionary group. It said the Soviet Union, Cuba and the other socialist countries could 30

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work with this group in pursuit of the common goal of advancing socialism by defeating imperialism and regional reaction. Radio Moscow declared that the changes in Ethiopia were ‘not just an ordinary military coup’ (Patman, 1990: 151). Martina Ottaway who was a lecturer and researcher at the Woodrow Wilson Centre in Washington, D.C. (1982: 107)19 stated: How the shootout started is not known, but the outcome was extremely clear. The Soviet Union lost no time. Within 24 hours of his victory Mengistu met with the Soviet ambassador in Ethiopia who assured him of Soviet backing and received a personal message of congratulations from Fidel Castro. In the following days all Eastern European countries sent messages of support to Mengistu. An East German delegation arrived in mid-February and was received with great cordiality and enormous publicity. By this time Mengistu had officially become the Derg’s chairman, following the announcement of yet another international reorganisation of the Council on February 11.

Ottaway further stated: ‘The speed of the Soviet reaction to the takeover by Mengistu, all the more notable after years of great caution, strongly suggests that either the Soviet knew of Mengistu’s intentions before February 3 or at least they had already decided that Mengistu was the man they could trust within the Derg’ (1982: 107). In retrospect, there is every reason to believe that the Soviet Union either engineered the palace coup that led to the execution of General Teferi Bante and his six colleagues on the 3rd of February, or they knew in advance that Mengistu was going to take power. There is now ample evidence to show that the Soviet Bloc representatives were closely monitoring the tension permeating the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) throughout 1976. Radoslav Yordanov argues that the Soviet Union and their socialist allies were aware of the tensions between the two trends in the Derg, which represented two opposed worldviews and interests. Mengistu’s faction was considered to represent the revolutionary orientation, indeed Mengistu himself is widely believed to have been behind the death of Lt. General Aman Andom in November 1974. General Aman Andom was an Eritrean and the first acting head of state of Ethiopia 31

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after Emperor Haile Selassie’s removal from power. Dr Andargachew Tiruneh, an Ethiopian academic wrote; ‘On 23 November General Andom died in an exchange of fire with agents of the Derg’s security men who had come to his residence to arrest him, according to some, on order of the Derg’s first vice-chairman [Mengistu Haile Mariam].’ (p. 78) Colin Legum and Bill Lee (1979: 36) state that from the outset the Derg’s civilian politburo, the Provisional Office for Mass Organisational Affairs (POMOA), had been torn asunder by internal rivalry. There ‘was a split between “militants” who saw pragmatic reasons for functioning in the shadow of the Derg, and “moderates” who demanded immediate civilian rule’, they concluded. The moderates, led by the chairman of the Committee of Political and Foreign Affairs, Sisay Habte, were said to be influenced by the CIA and Western powers’ intelligence services. According to Yordanov (2016: 154): Toward the end of 1976, the Soviet Bloc representatives, briefed by Mengistu, relayed his pleas to the Central Committees of the parties, thus, paving the way to the long-awaited military support. Mengistu’s pre-emptive coup against his allegedly pro-Western opponents was the pivotal moment that prompted Moscow to increase its material support for Addis Ababa in defense of the revolution.

On 11th February 1977, a week after he staged the coup, Mengistu was “elected” chairman of the PMAC and soon assumed unlimited power. Mengistu consolidated his power within the Derg by ‘murdering, one by one his rivals, both real and imagined’ (Lefort (1983: 257). The gradual declassification of top-secret Soviet files in the aftermath of the collapse of the communist regimes provides a rare opportunity to revisit and shed light on the situation. At the time of the executions of General Teferi Bante and the other Derg members, Captain Meles Maru, a member of the Derg, was visiting West Africa with an official delegation. He had previously been ADS to General Teferi Bante. When he heard about the execution of the general and the six other Derg members, he decided to defect rather than return to Ethiopia.20 Captain Meles headed for West Germany, where the authorities interviewed him at length about the Derg. The British Embassy in Addis Ababa wrote: ‘… the [German] Ambassador here 32

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has passed to us in confidence a copy of the resultant de-briefing report.’21 The confidential document of the British Embassy states: ‘From what he has told us of it, it is a most interesting document. As you will see from the enclosed copy, it is in German; and I should be grateful if you could arrange for a translation to be prepared and sent to us – if possible by the next confidential bag (leaving London on 21 May [1977]).’22 The reason this disclosure was significant was because it was the first of its kind to provide a detailed account of the jealously guarded secrets of Mengistu and his inner circle from an insider. More importantly, the information provided by Captain Meles provides key insights into the role the Soviet Union played in the Mengistu regime from the outset through its Ambassador in Addis Ababa, Anatoni Ratanov. According to Captain Meles; ‘Ever since the formation of the Military Council in the summer of 1974 [Ratanov] has systematically, intensively and repeatedly endeavoured to gain direct influence over individual members of this body’ [Derg].23 This may suggest that the Soviet Ambassador was intimately involved in the grooming and shaping of Mengistu. Captain Meles stated: ‘It is in MENGISTU that RATANOV has finally found a man whom he has been able to corrupt on account of his uncontrolled striving for power precisely with the prospect of one day being able to seize power himself. In recent months RATANOV has been calling on the PMAC almost daily and making his “recommendations” to them.’24 What Captain Meles said with regards to the role the Soviet Ambassador played in the execution of General Teferi Bante and the other six members of the Derg was remarkable. He stated: Thus, in particular, the policy of Marxism-Leninism announced by the PMAC in December 1976 and pursued by it recently must be attributable to RATANOV’s burrowing activities, just as RATANOV is also the man who is said to have persuaded MENGISTU ruthlessly to rid himself of all his personal enemies. These include the former Head of the Political Committee, Maj, SISSAY, as well as latterly the group around General TAPERI [Teferi] BANTE25 (emphasis added).

It was not only Ratanov who seemed to be in command behind the 33

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa

scenes in Ethiopia. The second man in the Soviet Embassy, S.J. Sinistin, also played a key role in shaping developments from the outset. Captain Meles described him as ‘…being just as active as Ambassador RATANOV in the efforts to gain influence. SINITSIN has had on the one hand to conduct and/or interpret at difficult negotiations for his ambassador whose English is described as not very good. On the other hand he has also played an active and independent part in shaping the whole development.’26 Captain Meles stated that Mengistu was ‘clearly favoured, influenced and supported by the Soviets. In particular, corrupted by the Soviet Ambassador at ADDIS ABABA, Anatoli RATANOV, by means of the prospect of power. For that reason markedly pro-Soviet, yet without any precise party-political ideas. Harsh and (?) trigger-happy, a fanatic for power’.27 Not only is there evidence to show that the Soviet Ambassador set Mengistu’s agenda for action, but also that whoever failed to toe the Soviet line was either sidelined or eliminated. Captain Meles told the German authorities that the Derg’s Vice-Chairman, Col. Atnafu Abate, was disliked by the Soviet Ambassador. ‘The Soviet Ambassador has spoken against ATNAFU several times.’28 Captain Meles prophetically predicted that Atnafu ‘May be one of MENGISTU’s next victims’.29 During his tour in Eritrea in late 1977, Col. Atnafu became convinced that the Eritrean problem could only be solved through political settlement. Upon his return to Addis Ababa, he called for such a policy to be initiated with the insurgents. He was immediately executed after being labelled a CIA agent Moscow celebrated the bloodbath and Pravda declared that with the intensification of the deepening class struggle in the country, the revolutionary government was successfully ‘liquidating counterrevolutionary bands’ (in Patman, 1990: 195). Yordanov (2016: 156) states that ‘the Minister-Counsellor of the Soviet embassy, Sinitsyn, interpreted the events of February 3 as an apogee of the crisis in the Derg strengthening the revolutionary core within the military, headed by Mengistu.’ Andrew and Mitrokhim state that in a speech on 17th April 1977, Mengistu Haile Mariam ‘launched a frenzied attack on the “enemies of the revolution,” and in an extraordinary piece of paranoid theatrical symbolism, broke three glass flagons containing what appeared to be blood. The broken flagons and the blood that 34

Chapter 1

spilled from them symbolised, he declared, the three enemies which the revolution must exterminate: imperialism, feudalism and capitalism’ (2006: 457).

Endnotes 1

“Soviet Foreign Ministry Background Report on SovietEthiopian Relations,” April 03, 1978, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 75, d. 1175, ll. 24-32; translation by Svetlana Savranskaya. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110977 (20 Nov 2019). 2 Ibid. 3 “Joint Soviet-Ethiopian Communiqué,” Pravda, March 3, 1967, p.1. 4 Radio Moscow, 1 April 1974 referred in Papp (1978, p. 5). 5 “The Horn of Africa in the Strategy of Imperialism,” Moscow (Tass), 8 February 1978; V. Sofinsky and A. Khazanov, “The Imperialist Design for the Horn of Africa,” New Times, 1980, No. 7, pp. 2-7 6 Tarabrin, E.A. (1974) The New Scramble for Africa.Translated from the Russian by Kenneth Russell Hardcover. Moscow: Progress Publishers. 7 Interview in New Times, No. 9, Feb. 1978: 10-11. 8 Pravda, “In a Friendly Atmosphere,” 5 May 1977, p.4. 9 “Joint Soviet-Ethiopian Communiqué,” in Pravda, 9 May 1977, p.4. 10 “Message from Yugoslav Embassy in Beijing, ‘From Our People in Addis Ababa – For Your Information’,” December 23, 1976, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Diplomatski Arhiv Ministarstva Spoljnih Poslova Republike Srbije [Belgrade], Fond: PA, Etiopija 1976, fasc. 34, dos. 17, sig. 467630. Obtained and translated by Radoslav Yordanov. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/ document/134774 (accessed 30/12/17). 11 Don Oberdorfer, The Superpowers and the Ogaden War, Washington Post, 5 March 1978 Ibid. 12 13 Ibid. 14 “Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Urgent note on Aid to Ethiopia from the Countries of the Socialist Community, Including Poland’s’,” January 29, 1977. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/ document/134776 (accessed 25 April 2017). Ibid. 15 16 Foreign Military Assistance, (n.d). http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/etsave/ et_05_03.html ((accessed 25 April 2017). 35

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa 17 18 19 20

21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

36

The figure of five dead quoted by Westad is at variance with the earlier referred of six persons who were killed with General Teferi Bante. Such demonstrations reflect the docility or fear of the public more than anything else. Marina Ottaway is a Middle East Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center and a long-time analyst of political transformations in Africa, the Balkans, and the Middle East. “Letter from Roger Barltrop of British Embassy in Addis Ababa, ‘The Derg’,” May 10, 1977, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, The National Archives [Kew, London], FCO 31/2094, fo. 94. Obtained by Radoslav Yordanov. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter. org/document/134775 Ibid. Ibid. Enclosure in Letter from Roger Barltrop of British Embassy in Addis Ababa, … Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. I have adhered to the contents of the document without attempting to correct the grammar. Ibid. Ibid.

Chapter Two

A New Era in Ethiopian-Soviet Relations

W

hen the future of Eritrea was debated at the UN headquarters, New York, in the end of the 1940s, ‘the Soviet Union actually opposed attempts to annex that territory’ (see Payne 1988: 34). According to resolution 289 A (IV), adopted at the fourth session on 17 November 1950, the General Assembly, inter alia, established the United Nations Commission for Eritrea to ascertain more fully the wishes of the inhabitants of Eritrea and the means of allegedly promoting their future welfare (Bereket Habte Selassie 1989).1 The Commission was mandated to prepare a report and to submit proposals, so that the matter might be considered by the General Assembly at its fifth session. The Interim Committee of the General Assembly was asked to consider the Commission’s report and to submit its conclusions to the fifth session of the Assembly.2 As Awet Weldemichael stated, ‘In its inchoate responses to American early Cold War initiatives, the Soviet Union first supported Eritrean self-determination. During an Eritrea-related debate at the un in the late 1940s, for example, the Soviet representative thus rejected USsupported Ethiopian claim (Awet Welemchael 2013).’3 Even after prolonged debates and negotiations motivated by diverse interests the members of the Commission could not reach a common agreement. Three different proposals were therefore submitted. The findings of the members of the Commission are succinctly summarised by the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951 as follows: The report of the UN Commission established by the fourth session of the General Assembly of its investigation of Eritrea did not submit any agreed recommendation but, rather, presented 37

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa three different proposals espoused by different members of the Commission. One member (Norway) favored the annexation of all of Eritrea by Ethiopia. Two members (South Africa and Burma) favored the federation of all of Eritrea with Ethiopia. Two other members (Guatemala and Pakistan) favored UN trusteeship for 10 years leading to independence. Under the circumstances … the Department of State decided to give strong support to the proposal for the federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia. It was felt that this was in line with our basic policy and our security interests in Eritrea, and that it stood the best chance of meeting the views of the various interested parties and of obtaining the approval of two-thirds of the members of the UN.4

In fact, the Soviet Union was only one of three nations interested in Eritrea. The United States was already in possession of a communication facility in Asmara, the Kagnew Station. As Payne states, ‘American ties with Ethiopia under Selassie stemmed mostly from US interest in using the Kagnew military base at Asmara in Eritrea, a major communication facility’ (1988: 30). Britain also had an ambition to administer the country. In view of the conflicting interests of the three powers, the United Kingdom, United States and Soviet Union agreed to delay a decision on Eritrea’s future. The Soviet Union, however, remained keenly interested, with Stalin repeatedly proposing at meetings in Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam to administer Eritrea under a post-war trusteeship (Rivlin 1950: 11-13).

Soviet relations with Mengistu The assassination of Ethiopia’s chief of state, Brigadier General Teferi Bante, in the murky palace shooting of 3rd February 1977 was both a turning point in Ethiopian-Soviet relations and the opportunity for the hitherto little-known Lieutenant-Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam, to seize power (see Ottaway 1982:107). Within 24 hours of the putsch, the Soviet Ambassador in Ethiopia, A.P. Ratanov, had met Mengistu and assured him of Soviet backing (Ibid. 107). Mengistu had also received a personal message of congratulations from the Cuban leader, Fidel Castro. Soon after, all Eastern European countries sent messages of solidarity to the new leader. An East German delegation visited Ethiopia in mid-February 1977 and was ‘received with great cordiality 38

Chapter 2

and enormous publicity’ (Ottoway 1982: 107). Nevertheless, although the announcement was positively received by the Soviet Union, it did not result in any immediate concrete economic or military project, despite the signing of a military agreement between Moscow and Addis Ababa as far back as December 1976 (see Halliday 1982: 98) when an Ethiopian delegation led by Mengistu had visited Moscow seeking arms. It took a series of dramatic measures by the PMAC, demonstrating their commitment to socialism, to encourage the Soviet Union to embrace the regime. It was slow progress. One year after the palace coup, the Soviet Foreign Affairs Ministry stated: The Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) announced its course for a Socialist orientation and its intention to develop comprehensive co-operation with the USSR after it came to power on 12 September 1974. The Ethiopian leadership emphasized the fact that it saw the Soviet Union as the main source of its support internationally. The positions of the PMAC on the majority of major international problems coincide with or are close to those of the USSR.5

The Soviet Foreign Affairs Ministry further stated: In January 1975 the PMAC leadership raised in principle the question of developing Soviet-Ethiopian relations. It was announced by our side that the Soviet Union regarded sympathetically the measures taken by the PMAC for building a new society on progressive principles, and that we shared their opinion about the need to develop comprehensive contacts between Ethiopia and the Soviet Union.6

But despite these pronouncements, the Soviet Union still did nothing concrete to support the PMAC. As Aryeh Yodfad (1980: 32-33) writes: Ethiopian appeals to Moscow for arms supplies met, for the time being, with no success. Soviet media praised Ethiopia’s revolutionary regime, but the government sent no arms. The PMAC, however, continued to seek Soviet friendship and good will, hoping that the Kremlin would deter Somalia from attacking during Ethiopia’s time of great weakness. Ethiopian-Soviet contacts, however, were few and mostly relatively low and unofficial. Interest grew with 39

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa Ethiopia’s increasing socialisation, but the Soviets were careful not to harm their relations with Somalia. Moscow hoped to improve Somali-Ethiopian relations, so that ties with Addis Ababa could be widened without a worsening of relations with Somalia.

The Ethio-Somali Conflict; Moscow sits on the Fence On 2 February 1977, the Third African Department, Soviet Foreign Ministry, stated: The position of the Soviet Union on the question of the EthiopiaSomalia territorial dispute, which many times has been brought to the attention of the governments of both countries, is that Ethiopia and the [Somali Democratic Republic] SDR must take all possible measures to settle their disagreements by means of negotiations and to find a way to lessen the tension in Ethiopia-Somalia relations.7

It was further stated: The friendly advice of the USSR government, aimed at a settlement of Ethiopia-Somalia relations, has been favourably accepted by the governments of both countries. In responses to our appeals both Ethiopia and Somalia have announced their readiness to resolve all disputed issues by means of negotiations and not to allow the unleashing of a new armed conflict.8

The reason the Soviet Union did its utmost to encourage the two governments to solve their differences through peaceful means was because its geopolitical strategic interest transcended Ethiopia’s or Somalia’s national interests. The Soviet Union wished to broaden its sphere of influence by reconciling the two Soviet-friendly countries— Ethiopia and Somalia—instead of siding with either of them. A record of Soviet-Somali talks, for example, states: It goes without saying that the Soviet side is aware of the difficulties which have arisen and understands the approach of each of the delegations in their consideration of the current issues. But it would obviously be hasty to come to conclusions of any sort which would “slam the door.” On the contrary, the door is open to the search for a rational solution to the questions which stand between the two 40

Chapter 2 countries [Ethiopia and Somalia], with both of whom the Soviet Union has friendly relations.9

Siding with one country against the other was considered counterproductive as it could weaken the anti-imperialist struggle in this strategic region. The Soviet side told the Minister of Mineral and Water Resources of Somalia, Head of Delegation of Experts, Hussein Abdulkadir Kasim, that ‘the situation which has developed in the relations between Somalia and Ethiopia, in the view of the Soviet side, is favorable to the realization of the goals of imperialism and reactionism.’10 The Soviet Union was therefore determined to try to reconcile Somalia and Ethiopia to ensure its dominance in the region. In view of the fact that ‘The Soviet Union had invested 15 years of building a loyal client state in Somalia and poured more than US $285 million in military assistance into the country,’ (Henze 1983; 20) it could not walk away from it easily. In Moscow’s eyes, the interests of Somalia and Ethiopia, and those of the Soviet Union and socialist countries worldwide, lay in a strong anti-imperialist partnership among the countries under the tutelage of the Soviet Union. The PMAC tried to convince the Soviets that they could be a trustworthier ally of the socialist bloc than Somalia, a country which could easily be seduced by reactionary forces in the Middle East such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The latter countries were viewed by the Soviet Union as the lackeys of imperialism. The nascent Derg capitalised on that view. To underline this, on the 6-11th July 1976 an Ethiopian state delegation led by the former Chairman Mogus Wolde Michael of the PMAC went to the Soviet Union on an official visit where they were met by a Soviet delegation led by A.A. Gromyko.11 A.N. Kosygin also received the Ethiopian delegation during their visit.12 The visit by the Ethiopian delegation made little difference to the Soviet Union’s attitude toward the Derg. The PMAC’s plea for Soviet weapons produced no results. Nevertheless, that October a team of Soviet specialists visited Ethiopia, although they still balked at taking decisions that would represent a turning point in Ethio-Soviet relations. Ethiopia’s invitation to the Soviet Foreign Minister, A. Gromyko, was politely turned down. Ethiopia was at this point still reliant on the US for supplies, but in Washington, too, the response to Addis Ababa’s request for arms and closer relations were lacklustre. The US government was reluctant 41

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa

to be involved in ‘…a place of potential major crisis, in a country in conflict with Arab states, with whom the State Department wanted to have good relations. When American military supplies stopped, Soviet media accused Washington of an attempt to overthrow the existing regime and to replace it with one more suitable to the US.’ (Pravda cited in Yodfad 1980: 32).

Soviet and Cuban Attempts to Head Off War in the Ogaden During Mengistu’s visit to Moscow in 1977, Brezhnev ‘expressed concern about the continuing deterioration of relations between the two progressive states that are friendly to us [the Soviet Union]— Ethiopia and Somalia, and pointed to the urgent need to take measures for the improvement of these relations.’13 The declassified data release indisputably shows the Soviet Union and its socialist allies’ preference for a peaceful resolution of the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia, as well as between Ethiopia and Eritrea. During his visit, Mengistu was told by the Soviets unequivocally that they considered the peaceful resolution of the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia as key to the establishment of peace and tranquility in the Horn of Africa. They reported: ‘On our part, we emphasized the importance of seeking ways to accelerate the re-establishment of peace in the Horn of Africa and the settlement of the Somali-Ethiopian conflict - on principled foundations, of course.’14 The Soviet Union maintained this stance until the Somali government expelled the Soviet advisors and annulled its rights to access the naval facilities it built in Berbera on 13th November 1977.15 Initially, the reconciliation of the two countries topped the Soviet Union’s agenda for the Horn of Africa. In its view, not only would reconciliation be in the interest of the whole socialist bloc, but also in that of Ethiopia and Somalia’s inhabitants. Somalia’s President, Siad Barre, realised this and feigned willingness to dance to the Soviet Union’s tune. According to Russian and East German documents, 1977-1978:

42

Chapter 2 [I]n January 1976, Siad Barre informed the Soviet government of [Somalia’s] intention to enter into negotiations with the Ethiopian leadership about the creation of a Federation of Somalia and Ethiopia. In this regard the President requested the Soviet side to join the negotiations as a mediator. Insofar as the goal and character of a federation, as well as the possible position of Ethiopia, were not clear, it was decided to avoid defining our attitude to this initiative and mediation on this issue. In November 1976 Siad Barre expressed the wish that the Soviet side would report to the Ethiopian leadership about the wish of the SDR [Somali Democratic Republic] to begin a peaceful dialogue with Ethiopia on the disputed issues which they have. This wish was brought to the attention of the chairman of the Committee of the PMAC for political and foreign affairs through the Soviet Embassy in Addis Ababa.16

Mengistu was told ‘that it is necessary to struggle not against Somalia, but in support of Somalia. Mengistu said that he agreed with this.’17 To emphasize his acceptance, Mengistu said that the Derg had not provided any assistance to anti-Barre Somali dissident groups when there had been an opportunity to do so.18 In August 1976, Berhanu Bayih, a prominent member of the PMAC, in an article published in World Marxist Review, described the Ethiopian regime as moving in the direction the Soviets would approve of. He wrote: ‘Our irreversible aim is socialism, and when we speak of socialism, we mean scientific socialism based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and the doctrine of proletarian dictatorship, which, I need hardly to say, will take into account the concrete conditions of Ethiopia’ (cited in Yodfad 1980: 32). There was a notable irony in the fact that despite his ostensible conversion to socialism, Mengistu displayed an unmistakable desire to emulate the deposed Emperor Haile Selassie. Legum and Lee stated, for example, ‘Mengistu himself had increasingly assumed the trappings of autocratic personal power. Even in faintly imperial style: he lived in one of the Haile Selassie’s palaces, sat on his throne and rode in his limousines; in receiving the Vice-President of Tanzania in February [the same month he ascended to power] he put on a white suit, rolled out the old royal red carpets and turned on the palace fountains.’ On various public occasions, Mengistu sat alone on an elevated platform in the gold and red velvet eighteenth-century armchair favoured 43

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa

by the Emperor (The Guardian in Patman 1990: 271). In the streets of Addis Ababa ‘Mengistu’s coloured portrait, far bigger than life, became a permanent feature’ (Patman 1990: 271). Not only were these proclivities early signs of obsessive megalomania, they were also traits incompatible with socialism.

As Pressure Grows, Mengistu seeks Help Just two months after Mengistu had seized power in Addis Ababa, Siad Barre made a diplomatic move, ostensibly to seek a resolution of the crisis between the two countries. N.V. Podgorny, the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, was on a visit to Somalia to seek, inter alia, a solution to the Ethio-Somali tensions in the Ogaden. During the visit, President Barre expressed his government’s readiness to search for a mutually acceptable agreement to resolve the conflict and requested the Soviet Union to organise a meeting between the two heads of state. As we saw earlier, Siad Barre was not fundamentally interested in finding a solution to the conflict in the Ogaden unless it was on his own terms. No solution would be acceptable to him short of Ethiopia ceding the Ogaden to Somalia as part of his aspiration of unifying all Somalis under one regime—Greater Somalia. His call for a meeting with Mengistu was solely intended to mislead the Soviets and buy time to strengthen the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF) in the Ogaden with Somali troops. President Barre’s request was presented to the Ethiopian delegation to Moscow headed by Mengistu during the Soviet-Ethiopian talks on the 4th-8th of May 1977. The Soviet Union proposed, in accordance with Siad Barre’s request, to ‘organise and conduct in the Soviet Union a summit meeting for the establishment of good neighbourly relations between Somalia and Ethiopia.’19 A declassified former secret document of the Soviet Foreign Ministry stated; Mengistu Haile Mariam was received by Comrade Brezhnev. SovietEthiopian negotiations in which the sides considered the status and the prospects for further development of Soviet-Ethiopian relations, the situation in Africa, and other international problems of mutual interest were held.



44

Chapter 2 The sides adopted a Declaration of the Basis for Friendly Relations and Cooperation between the USSR and Ethiopia in the name of further strengthening of Soviet-Ethiopian relations. A joint SovietEthiopian communiqué was published on the results of the visit of the state delegation of Ethiopia to the USSR. During the visit the sides signed an Agreement on Cultural and Scientific Cooperation, a Consular Convention, and the Protocol on Economic and Technological Cooperation of 6 May 1977.20

It is stated that Mengistu accepted the idea of a summit happily. Bizarrely, even though it was his own idea, President Barre; ‘…in a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador on 17 May of this year [1977] …[he] declared that he is not ready at the present time to sit at the negotiating table with Mengistu. […]21. Tensions between the Ethiopians and the Americans had been rising for some time. The Carter administration informed the Derg of its decision to reduce the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) mission, which was already down to 46 men, by half, and said that it would close down the Kagnew Station by September (see Ottaway 1982: 108). The Carter administration also withheld financial and military assistance to Ethiopia, hitting the latter’s defence capability. Mengistu lost patience and took drastic action, partly to retaliate against the US government and more importantly to show the Soviet Union and its allies his commitment to join the socialist bloc. In the second half of April 1977, the US Information Service office in Addis Ababa, the Military Assistance Advisory Group, the Navy Medical Research Unit, the consulate general in Asmara and the communications station at Kagnew Station in Eritrea were closed down. Soon after Mengistu’s visit to Moscow, the US government announced that the delivery of about US$ 100 million worth weapons and equipment, which was already earmarked, would be cancelled (Weiss, 1980). Given the severe tensions permeating Ethiopia and the regional landscape, the question of security and access to Soviet weapons were on the top of Mengistu’s agenda. He cast his net wide, seeking military assistance not just from the Soviets, but also from the Cubans, East Germans, Libyans and South Yemenis. Since the Soviet Union’s priority at the time of Mengistu’s visit was the need to reconcile the Somali and Ethiopian governments, there was nothing to suggest that Moscow 45

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa

made any promise to supply weapons. In the course of the May meeting, Mengistu was promised Soviet aid (Yodfad, 1980: 39), but not necessarily military aid. Nonetheless, it was a high-profile visit, with Mengistu meeting Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and the Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny (Ottaway, 1982: 149). And in response to Mengistu’s appeals, the Soviet Union expressed its full support for the Ethiopian government (Minkov 2016). The warm reception accorded to Mengistu worried and angered Siad Barre and his government.

Ratanov and Ochoa; Architects of the Derg’s Military, Foreign and Economic Policies Fidel Castro played a key role in accelerating the collapse of EthioSomali relations subsequent to his visit to the region and after the failure of his peace initiative in the Horn of Africa during the second half of the 1970s. He castigated the Somali president as being untrustworthy and pompous, and shifted the alignment of Soviet bloc forces in the Horn of Africa. Equally, if not more importantly, the Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia, A.P. Ratanov, and the head of the Cuban military mission in Ethiopia, Arnaldo Ochoa, became the architects of Ethiopia’s military strategies, its foreign and economic policies. Before the Soviets and Cubans took charge of the country’s defence, the Ethiopian military was in disarray, and the Derg had no idea of the military capability of its adversaries, the WSLF, the Somali defence forces and the Eritrean insurgents. This is clearly stated in the Memorandum of Conversation between Ratanov and Ochoa, who stated that the Ethiopian government had no clue about the scale of the challenges facing the country. During their meeting in the Soviet Embassy in Addis Ababa, the Soviet Ambassador stated that the loss of several strategically important locations in Eritrea and in the eastern regions of Ethiopia to ‘the separatists and [to]… the Somalis has showed that the PMAC: 1.

46

Underestimated the military capabilities of the Eritrean separatists, and thus did not take serious measures to strengthen the group of troops in Eritrea. At the same time the PMAC was hoping that it would be able to persuade the leadership of the Eritrean organizations to take part in negotiations on the

Chapter 2

2.

3.

political settlement of the Eritrean problem.22 Did not expect that the units of the Somali regular army in Ogaden would participate directly in the military actions. It is significant that the Ethiopian command did not take measures for building a defensive barrier in the regions adjacent to Somalia. Apparently, the PMAC was concerned that such measures could be perceived by Somalia as an Ethiopian refusal to settle their disagreements with Somalia peacefully. Overestimated its own military capabilities. It did not take into account the fact that the old army did not go through the school of revolutionary struggle even though it took part in the revolution, since the main demands of the rank and file soldiers were for a raise in pay and for improvement of the retirement pensions, and a certain part of the officer corps was against the Revolution altogether.’23

The Soviet Ambassador and the Cuban military official further pointed out that during the three years since the Ethiopian revolution, the Ethiopian command had never attempted to launch any offensive military operations ‘against the Eritrean armed forces, and that the troops of the Ethiopian regular army were practically dwelling in their quarters.’24 It is worth noting that the reason the Ethiopian military was unable to launch military offensives and recapture the territories taken by the Eritrean insurgents, as well as by the WSLF, was because it was on the verge of collapse. A Memorandum of Conversation between the GDR Embassy in the USSR and S.J. Sintsin, for example, stated; Large parts of the cadres, in particular the officer corps, were taken over from the imperial government. Sabotage, insubordination, even withdrawal without fighting are serious occurrences. … The biggest problem here is once again the cadres and their training. One should also not underestimate the problems caused by the change-over in the army from Western to Socialist weapons systems which have to be managed and deployed efficiently.25

Ratanov and Ochoa further pointed out that it was only two or three months after the Derg received weapons from the socialist countries that it ‘hastily began to organize new units of the regular army, and the people’s militia’.26They stated that the Ethiopian military comprised 47

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa

of six divisions of regular army consisting of 55,000 men, eight divisions of people’s militia, i.e. about 100,000 men and a police force of 40,000—in total 195,000 men.27. They went on to say: ‘However: 1. The Ethiopian army is inferior to the Somali army in the quality of armaments. 2. The members of the people’s militia have not had a sufficient military training yet.’28 They stated that the WSLF had up to 5,000 fighters ‘introduced mainly from Somalia.’29 The Somalis in Somalia proper and in the Ogaden are indistinguishable in terms of appearance, language and dress. Therefore Ratanov and Ochoa had no means of ascertaining whether the insurgents in the WSLF originated from the Ogaden or were brought into the region from Somalia. Most probably, the majority were from the Ogaden. However, what tipped the balance in favour of the Somalis was the heavy involvement of members of the regular Somali army. Ratanov and Ochoa stated that those who were ‘introduced from Somalia’ and members of the WSLF together ‘…established control over the most part of the territory. The front is engaged in combat near the cities of Harar, Jijiga, Gode, Dire Dawa’. They went on to say that ‘the PMAC has up to 10,000 people in the Ogaden. Currently detachments of the people’s militia are being transferred there. The Ethiopian command considers the situation in the Ogaden most dangerous since Somalia continues to transfer its military personnel and heavy weaponry to that region’.30 Although they painted a bleak picture of the state the Ethiopian military was in, both in Eritrea and the Ogaden, Ratanov and Ochoa still thought that there was a glimmer of hope for reversing the setbacks, provided the following three problems were addressed. Firstly, the armed forces had to be provided ‘with the means of transportation (helicopters, trucks, etc.) for a quick transfer of the reserves when and where they are needed’. Secondly, fuel reserves should be created and the means of transporting them should be made available. Thirdly, food and medicine reserves should be provided.31 The problem was that if the Derg had been able to provide these critical facilities in the first place, the country would not have been in the dangerous state it was in at the time. By undertaking a forensic scrutiny of the causes of the appalling performance of the Ethiopian armed forces, Ratanov and Ochoa were able to identify the major deficiencies that accounted for the catastrophic defeats suffered both in the Ogaden and Eritrea. 48

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By doing so they were able to see where the gaps in defense and fighting capabilities were and what kind of assistance they should provide to the Ethiopian armed forces. Another major weakness they observed permeating the Ethiopian armed forces was a lack of political consciousness, which in their view needed to be addressed. However, this would require ‘…cadres of political workers,’ which were said to be in short supply.32 Ratanov and Ochoa stated that in socio-political terms the forces of revolution seemed to ‘predominate over the forces of the counter-revolution,’ and they also recognized that the PMAC had done some work to organize the peasantry and the urban population into different associations. However, in their view; ‘…the level of political consciousness of the broad masses of the population (mostly illiterate) remains very low.’ They further observed ‘elements of confusion’ in the Defense Council. Although in their view Mengistu still remained the leader of the revolution, they said that the PMAC needed to address the following three political tasks: firstly, it should take additional measures to broaden and strengthen its social base by making its socioeconomic policy clearer in order to reassure the peasants that the land would remain in their possession. It should stress to the peasantry that the regime would not rush into collectivization of production and land ownership. They also thought that it was necessary to take measures that would assuage the concern of the national bourgeoisie by reassuring them that the regime had no intention of expropriating their property. This suggests that the extreme sloganeering of the regime was actually striking terror into the hearts of the peasantry and owners of the means of production throughout the country. Ratanov and Ochoa were admonishing the regime to moderate their rhetoric and actions in order to build the necessary broad mass base. Secondly, they said that a policy on regional identities should be developed and made concrete in order to establish autonomous regions based on ethnicity. Nevertheless, they realized that this task would not be easy under the existing circumstances because of the absence of cadres from the non-Amhara nationalities who ‘were discriminated against before the revolution’ and no measures had been taken to remedy the situation.

49

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa

Thirdly, they said, a political party and a broad-based people’s front not only of workers and peasants, but also of the national bourgeoisie should be established. It is interesting to note that even representatives of the two socialist countries, the Soviet Union and Cuba, thought that the Derg was moving too fast towards “socialism” and disregarding the reality on the ground. They urged the PMAC not only to broaden its social base, but also to move slowly. Fourthly, Ratanov and Ochoa called for a more active foreign policy toward African states. They recommended that Mengistu reemphasise the message he had delivered to the OAU summit in Gabon that Ethiopia had no intention of exporting its revolution. They also suggested that the PMAC needed to reassure and provide the African states with a political program for the settlement of the EthiopianSomali disagreements.33 Ratanov and Ochoa continued: In the course of further discussion, we came to common conclusions that the difficult situation dictated the necessity of creating in some form a state defense committee, which would be authorized to mobilize all forces of the country for the defense of the revolution; of organizing the highest military command, and at a minimum, of two fronts (Northern and Eastern) with corresponding command and headquarters structures.34

It seems that the Derg had relinquished its sovereign power of framing the country’s economic, political and defense policies. Ratanov and Ochoa were effectively exercising such power on behalf of their states to promote socialism in the country and to defeat what were allegedly forces of domestic, regional and international reaction. They were effectively laying the foundation of Ethiopia’s national policy because the government was in a state of paralysis. Ratanov and Ochoa continued their prescription by observing that the existing structure of the Ethiopian armed forces was not fit for purpose and had to be reorganized in a manner that was consistent with ‘modern military concepts applicable’ to the realities in the country. They pointed out that conservatism of the officer corps constituted a major obstacle to restructuring. ‘For example, the General Staff currently nurtures ideas of creating tank divisions and an anti-aircraft defense system of the country by removing those kinds of weapons (tanks, anti-aircraft launchers) from existing infantry divisions.’35 Both 50

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men were very critical of the Derg’s approach to such complex and serious matters. They stated, for example, that the Cubans had learned that moments before a mission headed by the PMAC General Secretary, Fikere Selassie Wogderes, left for Moscow, it was decided to ask the Soviet Union for tanks, armored cars, and the like when the Ethiopians had still not trained their cadres to operate technology already received. ‘Arnaldo Ochoa told Mengistu that such a light-headed approach to serious business might undermine the prestige of the Military Council.’36 This clearly reflects the low opinion the Soviets and the Cubans had of the Derg. The fact that a Cuban military officer could tell Mengistu, a head of state, that his approach was light-headed (shallow) and for the latter to acquiesce indicates the extent to which he was humbled by the desperate situation his regime and the country were in. The two men observed; ‘Arnaldo Ochoa had the feeling that Mengistu understood what he meant.’ The Soviets and the Cubans were clearly in the driving seat and Mengistu was a passive and muted passenger. They further said: Another example of such a light-headed, even irresponsible, approach to the military questions is the idea that somebody is suggesting to Mengistu about the necessity of preparation of an offensive on Hargeisa (Somalia), which would give Somalia a reason to start a more massive offensive in the Ogaden with tanks and aircraft, not to mention the catastrophic political consequences of such a step for Ethiopia.37

All this may further indicate that the Derg was manned by incompetent individuals who took hasty decisions without weighing the short, medium and long-term consequences on national security and societal safety. No wonder the country was on the verge of collapse. To avoid this potential disaster, Mengistu seems to have given the Cuban military officer and the Soviet Ambassador free rein to choose whatever course of action they deemed fit to salvage his regime.

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The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa

Prelude to the Ogaden Invasion Mengistu’s May 1977 visit to Moscow took place against the backdrop of almost total victory for the Eritrean liberation movements, who had managed to evict the Ethiopian military from the whole country except the besieged cities of Massawa, Assab and Asmara. There was also the looming danger of invasion of the Ogaden by the Somali regular forces. In view of Somalia’s strategic position and the Soviet Union’s massive investment in the construction of a military base in the port of Berbera, Moscow left no stone unturned to avert the threat of war between the two governments. However, their reconciliation attempts produced no results. The close relationship developing between Ethiopia and Moscow infuriated Siad Barre. He was unwilling to accept that the interests of the Soviet Union and Cuba transcended the national interests of Somalia and Ethiopia in favour of a greater geopolitical strategic interest based on mutual cooperation of the “two pro-Soviet” governments. The fatal weakness of the Somali authorities lay in their inability to conceive of the Soviet Union’s grand design in the region. This was incompatible with what Siad Barre and Mengistu hoped to achieve by separately enlisting Soviet and Cuban assistance in pursuit of their own nationalistic interests and to the detriment of the other. Both the Soviets and the Cubans tried to convince Siad Barre to abandon his irredentist ambitions and instead to collaborate with Mengistu. Together they were supposed to pursue a grand strategy whose raison d’être would be to counteract the perceived onslaught of the forces of imperialism and their regional lackeys, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Sudan.

Invasion of the Ogaden In mid-July 1977, the Somalis invaded the disputed Ogaden region, where there was already a well-established liberation movement, the WSLF, sponsored by the Somali government. The invasion took Ethiopia by surprise, and the Somali armed forces met no effective resistance. By the 26th of July 1977, Somali forces and the WSLF had captured about ten towns in the Ogaden region. 52

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Mengistu appealed to Cuba to intervene militarily in the Ogaden to salvage the Ethiopian armed forces from collapse. Castro was having none of it, and on the 16th of August 1977, ordered General Ochoa to reject Mengistu’s appeal for Cuban troops’ involvement in the Ogaden. We absolutely cannot agree to send Cuban military forces to fight in Ethiopia. You must convince Mengistu of this reality. We will honour our agreements about military advisers and military instructors. We will also continue to send medical aid … Despite our sympathy for the Ethiopian revolution and our profound indignation at the cowardly and criminal aggression to which it has fallen victim, it is frankly impossible for Cuba to do more in the present circumstances. You cannot imagine how hard it is for us constantly to rebuff these requests (quoted in Gleijeses 2006: 109).

In September 1977, at a meeting with Ochoa and the Cuban Ambassador in Ethiopia, Mengistu explained that the situation in the battlefield was dire. He said; ‘Our enemies are getting stronger, and we still don’t have the skilled personnel to use the weapons that the Soviet Union is sending us’ (quoted in Mitchell 2016: 349). He pleaded with the Cubans for more instructors and weapons to arm and train another 100,000 men. He presented the situation as being so severe that unless there was a decisive Cuban action, the whole eastern front may collapse and the revolution may be crushed. He told the two Cuban officials: ‘This is the decisive moment. Either we rally to save the Revolution, or we allow the imperialists to destroy it’ (quoted in Mitchell 2016: 349). The Cubans painted a bleak picture of the Ethiopian army which was characterised as being ‘broken.’ The Derg’s military position deteriorated rapidly. In less than two weeks, the Somali army and the WSLF captured 112 towns and 85 per cent of the region (LeoGrande 1980b: 39). By mid-September 1977, Ethiopia conceded that it had lost 90 per cent of the Ogaden to the invading Somali forces. The Somali forces suffered losses when their attempt to capture Diredawa and Jijiga was unsuccessful. However, this was reversed in their second attempt at Jijiga in mid-September 1977 in which the overwhelmed Ethiopian troops withdrew from the town in panic. According to Kenyan Brigadier Joseph K. Nkaisserry (1997: 15), 53

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa …at the start of the hostilities, the Somalis had excellent intelligence on Ethiopian order of battle and vulnerabilities in enemy defences. This enabled the Somali army to isolate Ethiopian units in the southern Ogaden and defeat them in detail. During this phase, Ethiopia proved unable to reinforce its forces, and WSLF took control of much of central Ogaden. The Ethiopian military was incapable of defending against WSLF interdiction and sabotage of logistic centres. The WSLF effectively distracted the Ethiopian military and partially masked the intentions of the Somali army.

Brigadier Nkaisserry further states, ‘The campaign plan devised by the Somali military was sound both in setting and conception. The attack executed by the regular military units of Somalia in July 1977 to seize control of the Ogaden province of Ethiopia was well conceived’ (Ibid.). The Soviet Union and Cuba tried in vain to persuade the Somali government to stop the attack. When this failed, the Soviets suspended arms shipments to Somalia on the 19th of October 1977. In the same month Mengistu travelled to Cuba, and from there to the Soviet Union to desperately plead for help. In his meeting with Fidel Castro on the 28th of October, he openly stated: ‘Not long ago, four of our divisions were wiped out by the Somalis… The Somalis, after taking control of the entire south, launched three attacks on Jijiga, and the third attack forced us to withdraw …’ (quoted in Mitchell, 2016: 349). Castro blamed the ‘chauvinist’ Barre, who had disregarded the former’s efforts and launched the offensive. But he also reassured Mengistu saying; ‘All is not lost. We can help with some things—we can provide more training, but we cannot provide weapons. We will think about what else Cuba would be able to do’ (quoted in Ibid.). Mitchell wrote, ‘The Cuban military mission reported recurring problems with its [Ethiopian] discipline, command structure, and morale. In November 1977, it noted three episodes of fragging, when soldiers had killed unpopular officers. On December 4 Ochoa cabled Havana stating that Ethiopian soldiers on the front lines were ‘engaging in self-mutilation so that they would be evacuated’ (2016: 368). Bruce Porter also wrote: ‘Morale in the Ethiopian ranks was so low that many soldiers mutinied, abandoning large stocks of American weapons as they retreated westward. Somalia pressed its offensive further in October, besieging the walled city of Harar and threatening Diredawa, respectively the fifth and third largest cities in Ethiopia’ 54

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(1984: 184). The Cuban armed forces in Ethiopia identified three problems confronting the Ethiopian army, namely, overstretching, a lack of reserves (especially artillery and tank units) and a lack of the technical skills required to use Soviet weapons because they had been trained with American weapons. The Cuban mission concluded: ‘The Ethiopian army is incapable of mounting offensive operations.’ The mission further stated: ‘Only the active participation of Cuban troops can change this’ (Mitchell 2016: 368 emphasis added). Siad Barre turned a deaf ear to the veiled threats of the Soviet Union and Cuba. Blinded by fury at what he considered to be the Soviet Union’s betrayal, Siad Barre expelled Soviet advisors on the 13th of November 1977. He also annulled the rights of the Soviet Union to access the naval base facilities it had built in Berbera. It was officially announced by Radio Mogadishu on November 13, 1977, that because of the Soviet Union’s “collaboration with Ethiopia in preparation for an invasion of Somalia” Soviet military and civilian advisors stationed in Somalia would have to leave the country within a week; that all military facilities granted to the USSR in Somalia were withdrawn with immediate effect; that the 1974 Treaty of Friendship between the two countries was abrogated; that the staff of the Soviet Embassy in Mogadishu would have to be reduced; and Somalia had severed its diplomatic relations with Cuba, with all Cubans being required to leave the country within 48 hours, because of “Cuba’s brazen decision to commit its troops on the side of the Ethiopian government and its propaganda against Somalia.”38

There is no evidence to show that the Cubans had made up their mind at this point to commit their combat troops to fight in the Ogaden on the Ethiopian side. At least on the surface, Cuba’s preferred option until the last minute was reconciliation between the two countries. As late as the 8th of November 1977, nearly a week after the announcement by Radio Mogadishu concerning the expulsion of Cubans from Somalia, Cuba’s Vice-President, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, met with Lyle Lane, a US diplomat in Havana. When asked about the country’s alleged plan to send troops to Ethiopia to engage in fighting against the Somalis in the Ogaden, he said that ‘Cuba had no intention of joining the fighting there… Ethiopia does not need foreign military manpower’ (quoted in Mitchell 2016: 347).39 55

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa

Cuba Deploys its Troops As seen earlier, on the 16th of August Castro had categorically rejected Mengistu’s request for deployment of Cuban troops in Ethiopia, but on the 25th of November 1977 he reversed his decision. A Soviet air bridge had already been established in September 1977 and was maintained for about eight months, in which the Soviets supplied Ethiopia with more than US$1billion worth of weapons and equipment (Westad 2007: 276). Another source stated: On 25 November 1977, the Soviet Air Force initiated a huge airbridge to Ethiopia, deploying no less than 225 Il-18, An-12B, An22, and Il-76 transports from Tashkent, via Baghdad, over Aden and Masawa to Addis Ababa to fly enough BM-21s, T-55 and T-62 MBTs, BMP-1 and BRDM APCs, 130mm, 155mm and 185mm artillery, ammunition and supplies for three small divisions.40

It was further stated, ‘For the next two weeks, in a unique development that stunned most Western observers, a Soviet transport aircraft was landing every 20 minutes at Addis Ababa—day and night.’41 The Soviet Union’s decision to abandon an ally it had had since the mid-1960s in favour of backing Ethiopia, Somalia’s sworn enemy, was characterised by observers as ‘one of the greatest pieces of political opportunism in post-war history’ (quoted in Minkov 2016). Brenner et al (1989:391) also states: The harshness of the Dergue’s internal policies (e.g., frequent executions of dissident Dergue members and the waging of a “red terror” against the EPRP) made the Ethiopian government unpopular internationally. In addition, the Soviet Union’s readiness to replace the United States as Ethiopia’s patron, even at the expense of its friendship with Somalia, struck many observers as crass geopolitical jockeying. Cuba’s willingness to cooperate closely with the USSR to preserve the Dergue, forsaking Somalia and the Eritreans in the process, gave credence to the argument that Cuban policy was being set in Moscow.

It is worth noting that although the supply of Soviet weapons to the Derg began in September 1977, the scale and intensity changed dramatically after the Somali government expelled the Soviet military advisors and 56

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closed down their military facilities in Berbera in November of the same year. Don Oberdorfer (1978; A10),42 for example, states that on the 28th of November 1977, two weeks after the Somali government’s decision, the Soviet Union engaged in a major military airlift of arms and weapons bound for the Horn of Africa. Captain Gary Payton also wrote, ‘In succeeding weeks the U.S.S.R. employed An-12 (NATO Cub) and An-22 (NATO Cock) transport aircraft along with seagoing cargo vessels to deliver an estimated $1 billion in fighter-bombers, tanks, artillery, and ammunition to the Ethiopian regime…’ (1978). This came as a relief to the beleaguered Ethiopian military. On top of the enormous supply of weapons, in late September two South Yemeni armoured battalions arrived to take part in the fighting. On the 22nd of December 1977, a massive airlift of Cuban troops from three countries, namely, Cuba, Angola and the People’s Republic of the Congo, began arriving in Ethiopia (Valdes 1980: 57). Owing to the secrecy surrounding the arrival of Cuban troops, the airport in Addis Ababa closed its regular traffic for 24 hours to prevent the landing being noticed. According to Westad, the total number of Cuban soldiers sent to Ethiopia by Fidel Castro included 11,600 soldiers and more than 6,000 advisors and technical experts, who played a key role not only in halting the advance of the WSLF and the Somali army, but also, over time, in defeating them (p. 276). Westad further states, ‘Most spectacular of all, almost 1,000 Soviet military personnel went to Ethiopia in 1977-1978 to help organise the counter-offensive’ (Ibid.). ‘At the height of the buildup, between mid-November 1977 and February 1978, Soviet transport aircraft, including giant An-22s, landed at twenty-five- minute intervals at Ethiopian airports. An estimated 225 transports--about 15 percent of the Soviet air fleet-- participated in the operation.’43 It is further stated in the report that Soviet aid included 80 aircrafts, 600 tanks, and 300 APCs and the total estimated value of the supply was US $1 billion, surpassing in a matter of months the total value of United States aid provided to Ethiopia between 1953 and 1977. A quarter of the Soviet assistance was a gift; reportedly the Libyan government financed a small portion.44 Somalia’s military success in the Ogaden had been brilliant, but it did not last long. Between October 1977 and January 1978, the WSLF’s guerrillas and Somali forces attempted to capture the strategic city of 57

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Harar, where there were about 50,000 Ethiopian troops reinforced by large amounts of Soviet-supplied weapons, and, in the final weeks of the battle, 11,000 Cuban soldiers45 and 1,500 Soviet advisors. For the Ethiopians, the timing of the Soviet Union’s intervention was miraculous. Without it the task of repulsing the Somali assault on the city would have been impossible or at least very difficult. Thanks to the Soviet Union’s assistance and the deployment of Cuban troops, the attack was quashed. The massive supplying of weapons carried on throughout January; according to different sources, the Derg received no less than 400 tanks and 50 jet fighters, and the value of the supplies reached the astounding total of US$1bn. Cuban troops, too, continued to pour into the country. In early January 1978, there were said to be about 2,000. Thousands more were transported from Aden a month later, bringing the total to 10,000-11,000. Nancy Mitchell (2016: 367-8) writes: The Western countries failed to imagine the scale of the Soviet and Cuban intervention in Ethiopia. There were still no reporters on the front lines of the war, and the information from official Ethiopian and Somali sources was almost comically unreliable. The Somalis still denied that any of their troops were in the Ogaden, and Siad Barre had cried wolf for so long about the Cubans that it was impossible to take his claims seriously. The Ethiopians denied that the Cubans and Soviets were arriving. As late as February 7, 1978, for example, when thousands of Cubans were fighting in the Ogaden, the spokesman for the Derg assured the press corps in Addis that “there were no Soviet or Cuban troops in Ethiopia—only technicians and medical personnel …Some Cubans and Soviets are training our soldiers, but they are not participating in the fighting, and they are not even near the front… The Soviets likewise lied, denying that they were airlifting weapons to Ethiopia.

Lies and Denials The “spin doctors” from the three countries of Cuba, the Soviet Union and Ethiopia engaged in a strenuous campaign of misinformation, denying the involvement of Cuban troops in frontline combat. It worked. The US and the other Western countries believed throughout January 1978 that the Ethiopian military would need at least four 58

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months before they could launch a counter-offensive using Soviet weapons and ‘backed by a Cuban mechanised battalion’ against the Somalis (Ibid.). Nothing could be further from the truth. When Fidel Castro was interviewed in Foreign Policy on September 15, 1977, the journalist asked him: ‘Are you sending military advisors to Ethiopia?’46 He denied it, stating: ‘We have sent diplomatic personnel to Ethiopia. All our personnel in Ethiopia are accredited as diplomatic personnel.’ He further said, ‘There are no military advisers as such in Ethiopia.’47 When she asked him, ‘What do diplomatic advisors do?’ he said, ‘They are diplomatic advisors that have good experience in revolutionary matters, and they even have some experience in military questions. But, as such, we do not have military advisers there.’48 Although the presence of Cuban military advisors in Ethiopia undoubtedly pre-dates Castro’s interview in mid-September 1977, the details of the first Cuban military intervention was probably worked out soon after, in early October 1977. That month, the Cuban armed forces’ Chief of Staff visited Ethiopia and this visit was followed by Mengistu’s first secret visit to Cuba and then to the Soviet Union in late October 1977.49 Soon after, the Cuban Minister of the Armed Forces, Raul Castro, accompanied by two Cuban generals who played a key role in the Ogaden campaign, travelled to the USSR.50 As seen before, the Somali authorities severed diplomatic relations with both the USSR and Cuba on the 13th of November 1977 and threw out the Soviet and Cuban military advisors in the country simultaneously. That same month, General V.I. Petrov, Deputy Commander in-Chief of the Soviet Ground Forces travelled to Ethiopia to plan the delivery of greater military aid and to organise the counter-offensive.51 At the peak of the Soviet Union’s intervention, there were a total of 1,100 Soviet military personnel in Ethiopia. Among them there were eight generals who ran the war together with members of their staff.52 General Petrov, the highest-ranked Soviet military officer in Ethiopia, was responsible for planning and passing the plan to Ethiopians and Cubans for execution. He was also responsible for directing the use of Cuban troops. He was the ‘final arbitrator of disagreements on conducting war’ and of any friction between the Soviets and Ethiopians.53 The responsibilities of the 1,100 Soviet military personnel included maintenance of Soviet-supplied weapons and equipment and 59

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa

providing technical services and instructions for the Ethiopian army and Ministry of Defence. Two Soviet generals also directed Ethiopia’s counter-offensive in Eritrea.54 Even after the defeat of the Somali army and the WSLF and their subsequent withdrawal to Somalia from the Ogaden, the Ethiopian government continued to deny the presence and participation of the Cubans and the Soviets. This seemed to puzzle even the East Germans and the Cubans. It was only when the Cubans requested Mengistu admit the presence of their troops in the country that he began to do so. This is clear from a Memorandum of Conversation between Socialist Unity Party of  Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands) SED official, Lamberz, and the Cuban Ambassador to Ethiopia, Pepe. It was stated: ‘At the request of the Cuban comrades, Mengistu spoke publicly about the presence of Soviet and Cuban advisers. Nevertheless, the press continually claims that Ethiopia is still fighting by itself. The reason for this [is] unclear.’55 In January 1978, Raúl Castro secretly visited Addis Ababa where Mengistu presented the inadequacies of the Ethiopian army in dramatic terms: The Ethiopian Armed Forces are non-existent. There are really only two functioning divisions—the “Flame” and the 7th division—plus a handful of men from the old army. That’s what we now call the army. The militia is a hundred thousand strong, but it is composed of peasants who have no revolutionary consciousness, and all they want to do is to go home (Quoted in Mitchell 2016: 368 emphasis added).

Although there was a considerable amount of truth in what he said - the Ethiopian armed forces were truly on the verge of collapse, Mengistu’s dramatic description of his ‘non-existent’ military should be understood in the context of the message he wanted to convey to his host, the Cuban Defence Minister. By painting a hopeless picture, he wanted to show him that unless Cuba deployed even more frontline combat troops to expel the Somali army and the WSLF from the Ogaden and wiped out what he referred to as “bandits” in Eritrea, not only might the revolution be defeated, but also the country’s future existence itself might be thrown into serious danger. Raúl Castro seemed to accept Mengistu’s account. The two men agreed there was a potential danger that countries which supplied weapons to the 60

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Somali government might send troops as well, posing an imminent threat to the fledgling socialist state of Ethiopia. ‘We have to accept the possibility,’ Raúl Castro said to Mengistu on 10th January 1978, ‘that Siad will receive additional help—troops from Iran and, after a while, from Egypt’ (in Ibid.). It is worth noting that there was no evidence to indicate that either Iran or Egypt was considering such a move. From Addis Ababa Raúl Castro flew to Moscow56 where he met his counterpart, the Soviet Defence Minister, Dimitrij Ustinov. After listening to his dismal account of the state of the Ethiopian military, Ustinov wondered: ‘How much longer can we continue to help them [the Ethiopians], when they still haven’t been able to create an army – even a small army, but at least one that is organised? No matter how much we help them, we can’t take their place. We’ll help –but it’s up to them to solve their own problems!’ (Quoted in Mitchell 2016: 369). Both Castro and Ustinov agreed that Harar should not fall into the hands of the Somali forces and to achieve that they had to move with the utmost speed and decisiveness. On the 19th of January 1978, both men sent a message to the heads of the Soviet and Cuban military missions in Ethiopia stating: ‘We understand the complexity of the situation in the Ethiopian army and the difficulties of mounting the offensive… But time is of the essence. Do not delay the counter offensive. In the last ten days of January, advance toward Harar. Then, in the first ten days of February, launch the major offensive toward Diredawa’ (quoted in Ibid.). This demonstrates that the power of decision concerning when, where and how to conduct the counteroffensive against the WSLF and the invading Somali army was exercised by the Soviet and Cuban defence ministers in Moscow and Havana and their military missions in Ethiopia.

The Defeat of the Somali Armed Forces According to different sources, including John Orme (1992: 117), thousands more Cubans were ‘…transported by sea from Aden in February, bringing their numbers to around 10-11,000. The combined forces, now under the command of General Petrov, then took the offensive, inflicting a devastating defeat on the Somalis near Genasene in late February and early March. Four days after the battle’s conclusion, Siad Barre announced that all of his forces would be withdrawn from 61

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the Ogaden (Napper 1983; Legum 1981). Orme continued: ‘The United States indicated its willingness to furnish defensive weapons to the Somalian armed forces’ (p. 71). Although the Carter Administration characterised Somalia’s invasion of the Ogaden as an act of aggression, it ‘…was unable to resist the lure of wooing Somalia from the Soviets, and it was reluctant to oppose Siad Barre, a friend of Saudi Arabia’ (Ibid.). The US government encouraged its friends to transfer nonUS weapons to Somalia whilst refusing to ‘open a pipeline of USsupplied arms’ (Ibid.). The latter observation, however, was inaccurate because the US government was opposed to Somalia’s irredentism (see Brenner, et al 1989: 390). According to a secret document heavily redacted (deleted) before its release in July 2011: ‘When the Soviets and Cubans got involved in the Ogaden, they doubted that the US would intervene on the Somali side claiming that they were defending a Third World country’s territorial integrity at the request of its government.’57 In early February 1978, Ethiopian and Cuban forces launched a twostage counter attack and moved into Jijiga. Not only were the counteroffensive operations executed by Cubans, South Yemenis and Russians, but General Petrov planned and directed the operations (Urban, 1983). According to Brigadier Joseph Nkaisserry, the counteroffensive, which began in February 1978, was planned according to a ‘classic model’ in which ‘Emergency assistance to blunt the immediate danger was the first order of business, with an estimated 400 tanks and 50 jet fighters provided to Ethiopia between December 1977 and early January 1978’ (1997: 18). The large-scale counter-offensive was accompanied by ‘… troops from the Soviet Union, Cuba and other East Block allies’ which included ‘…approximately about 1200 Cubans, 2,000 South Yemenis, 1,000 East Germans and 2,000 Soviets.’ (Nkaisserry 1997: 18). The Somali authorities had not anticipated the scale of the counteroffensive in terms of manpower, composition and armaments when they made the decision to invade the Ogaden. They miscalculated, moreover, the extent to which both superpowers would commit themselves to the opposing sides, believing that the Soviet Union would be less supportive of Ethiopia, and that the West would be more supportive of Somalia. Siad Barre’s assumption was that the West would come to his government’s rescue to counter Soviet hegemony in the region, but: 62

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The West never came to Somalia’s aid, and the United States even went so far as to block the transfer of US arms to Somalia from Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Western neutrality was based upon the fact that Somalia was the clear aggressor in its attempt to incorporate the Ogaden into a “Greater Somalia,” and thus was violating a cardinal principle of African politics: the permanence of existing borders (Brenner et al 1989: 388). In April 1977, President Jimmy Carter had been on the verge of embracing closer ties with Somalia as a way of enticing it out of the Soviet Union’s grip. However, when the national Somali forces invaded the Ogaden ‘…Washington backed off, unwilling to openly assist a war of aggression’ (Mitchell 2016: 340). Regarding the miscalculations that underlay Siad Barre’s decision to invade the Ogaden, the Kenyan Brigadier Nkaisserry wrote that the Somalis miscalculated how the changing alliance would affect the pre-existing power relations. Brigadier Nkaisserry describes the crushing of the Somali forces in the Ogaden as follows: The Ethiopian and Cuban forces recaptured Jijiga on 5 March 1978, in a major victory that was organised by the Soviet generals. The key element was surprise. The Somalis had expected the Soviet and Cuban led Ethiopian forces to spearhead their attack through the strategic Kara Marda mountains range. But instead, the Russian planners and advisors organised a massive airlift of troops and an armoured unit to positions behind the Somali forces. The Cubans on the other hand played the crucial role of skirting the mountains and attacking the Somali positions from the north and northeast. At the same time, heavy Soviet artillery pounded the Somali held positions at Kara Marda and thousands of Ethiopians militia were sent in successive waves, to draw fire to exhaust Somali ammunition supplies (1997: 19-20).

He summarises the five major features of the counter-offensive operation planned by Soviet generals as follows: (a) Make the Somalis believe that the main attack would come from the west through the Kara Marda pass. (b) Flank the Somali positions to the north of the mountains with a reinforced Cuban tank brigade. (c) Establish a staging point north east of the mountains for helicopter re-supply to the forces that would block the Somali withdrawal. (d) 63

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa Make a strong diversionary attack down the mountains pass with three infantry divisions supported by a Cuban mechanised brigade. (f) Launch a concentrated attack supported by about eight artillery battalions and three fighter ground attack squadrons of MIG 21 from both north and west to destroy the Somali forces (Ibid.).

He added that the Somalis fought bravely, but by that time they had no air cover and had run out of ammunition. This had been expected as their former supplier of weapons and ammunitions, the Soviet Union, had abandoned them and refused to replenish the depleted Somali weapons and ammunitions, indeed, why would they since they had by then become Somalia’s adversary? ‘When the Ethiopian airborne armoured and other units overran the rear of the Somali forces, they were caught in a trap, hence they lost the initiative and were hamstrung by lack of logistical support …’ (Nkaisserry 1997).

The Lessons of the Ogaden Conflict Soviet-Cuban intervention was the decisive determinant of the Ogaden war. According to The New York Times, Soviet-Cuban co-operation was so intimate that Soviet pilots were said to have replaced pilots in Cuba to ease the shortage caused by the deployment of Cuban pilots on combat missions in the Ogaden.58 The Cuban troops did the lion’s share of the fighting on behalf of Ethiopia, and Somalia was hung out to dry. As LeoGrande states: ‘The Somalis, short on supplies, proved to be no match for the Cubans’ (1980: 40). By 5 March 1978, the Somali forces were completely routed from the Ogaden and the Somali government announced its intention to withdraw. On 15 March 1978, all Somalia troops had crossed back into Somalia having left pockets of WSLF to harass the Ethiopians’ (Global Security, 1986). It is not far fetched to speculate that had it not been for the intervention of Cuban troops and high-ranking Soviet military officers, not only would the Ethiopian army have been unable to repulse the Somali invasion of the Ogaden, but the country’s very survival would have been put at risk. This is confirmed by the findings of Gebru Tareke. He stated: ‘That the Cuban-Soviet assistance was instrumental in both their [the Somalis’] defeat and their expulsion … is incontrovertible’ (quoted in Mitchell 2016: 368). The Ethiopians’ inability to use Soviet weapons was a major drawback, but at the heart 64

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of the problem lay ‘…the weakness of command and control’. This was because the Derg had ‘purged Emperor Haile Selassie’s officer corps, but it had not succeeded in replacing it with well-trained leaders who were reliably loyal to the revolution’ (Ibid.). The campaign in Ogaden was Cuba’s second military involvement in Africa, but it was substantially different from its intervention in Angola. There, Cuba had come to the aid of a movement it had supported a decade earlier in its fight against powerful external enemies; South Africa, Zaire and the US government. In Ethiopia, Cuba came to assist a new government with whom it did not have a pre-existing relationship. More importantly, ‘Cuban troops were entering into combat against troops of a nominally Marxist-Leninist Somalia which had itself been a recipient of Cuban military aid less than two months prior to Cuba’s intervention in support of Ethiopia’ (LeoGrande, 1980: 35). In Angola, Cuban and Soviet policies of intervention initially evolved independently and only developed mechanisms of cooperation gradually. It is important to state that unlike in Ethiopia, in Angola not only did Cuba have a pre-existing relationship, but Castro and the Cuban leadership had a deep sense of affection for, and trust of, the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) and its leader, Agostinho Neto. For example, during his visit to Angola, Castro stated: Everywhere we went in Africa, our delegation was given a fine welcome indeed. But when we arrived in Angola we were able to appreciate the solidarity and special affection of the Agolans. [N] Ever before have I seen such happy faces, such friendly and happy smiles, and I say on behalf of all my comrades that we, too are infinitely happy.59

Castro further stated: The freedom of all of you, your smiles, your happiness, your future were saved thaks to the bloodshed by the brave Agolan and Cuban fighters. The Angolan revolution was like a flower that the reactionaries wanted to destroy; and the image that I have before me today is that of a beautiful, fragrant, blooming flower. It is the image of a people whose future will be frustrated by nothing and nobody ever again, ever again.60 65

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa

In Ethiopia the Soviets and Cubans worked hand in glove with each other from the outset. As LeoGrande observes, the two countries ‘closely coordinated their military aid to Ethiopia from the outset, with the USSR playing a much more prominent role than it had in Angola’ (1980: 35). He further argues that unlike in Angola, ‘the ideological lines of the conflict were much less clearly drawn and the geopolitical dimension of the conflict loomed much larger. Cuba was thus much more vulnerable to the charge of acting as a Soviet proxy’ (Ibid., emphasis added). It is worth noting that the Soviets and the Cubans were in command roles in Ethiopia – not in auxiliary positions. In fact, by early 1978, General Petrov was in charge of all Ethiopian military planning. ‘All together, it was the most important Soviet-led military operation outside the area of the Warsaw pact and the Korean war’ (Westad 2007: 277). This may suggest the extent to which the Ethiopian military was in a wretched state. Had this not been the case, the regime would not have relinquished its sovereign exercise of power by handing over full control of the counter-offensive to the Soviets and Cubans. This was already clear during Mengistu’s third visit to the Soviet Union, ‘On 3031 October 1977 Chairman Mengistu Haile Mariam of the PMAC of Ethiopia came to the USSR on a closed visit. During the conversation that Comrades L.I. Brezhnev, A.N. Kosygin, and A.A. Gromyko had with him, it was emphasized that the USSR was going to continue to provide comprehensive assistance and support for the Ethiopian revolution in the future.’61 During this visit, Mengistu had to promise that the military strategy of the counter-offensive would be controlled fully by the Soviets and Cubans. ‘In no case would Soviet and Cuban soldiers be under the command of local officers, even when, as in the case of some Soviet tank crews and fighter pilots, they operated material that was technically Ethiopian’ (Westad 2007: 277). As we shall see throughout the following chapters, the defeat of the Somali military and WSLF had direct consequences for the conduct of the Eritrean War of Independence. In pursuit of its strategic interest, the Kremlin signed different treaties with the countries in the region. Some of these treaties are discussed in the following chapter. 66

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Endnotes 1 2

3 4

5 6 7

8 9

10 11

12

Bereket Habte Selassie (1989) Eritrea and the United Nations and other Essays. Trenton, N.J.: The Red Sea Press Summary of AG-048 United Nations Commission for Eritrea (1950), United Nations Archives and Management Section. https:// search.archives.un.org/downloads/united-nations-commissionfor-eritrea-1950.pdf (accessed 23/1/18); see also UN General Assembly,  Eritrea: Report of the United Nations Commission for Eritrea; Report of the Interim committee of the General Assembly of the Report of the United Nations Commission for Eritrea, 2 December 1950, A/RES/390, available at: https://www.refworld.org/ docid/3b00f08a3f.html [accessed 30 January 2020] Awet T. Wedemichael, African Diplomacy of Liberation. The Case of Eritrea’s Search for an “African India.” Diplomatie Africaine de la liberation. Le cas de l’Érythrée en quête d’une “Inde africaine,” 2013. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The Near East and Africa, Volume V, Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Webb) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay). Available at https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951v05/d701 (accessed 30/2/17). Ibid. Ibid. Third African Department, Soviet Foreign Ministry, Information Report on Somali-Ethiopian Territorial Disputes,” February 02, 1977, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1632, ll. 39-44. translated by Mark H. Doctoroff https:// digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111623 (12/4/2018). Ibid. “Record of Soviet-Somali Talks, Moscow (excerpts), with Somali aide-memoire, 10 August 1977,” August 26, 1977, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1620, ll, 3259; translated by Sally Kux http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/ document/111857 (accessed 12/4/2018). Ibid. Soviet Foreign Ministry, Background Report on Soviet-Ethiopian Relations, 
3 April 1978

Secret. Single copy
orig. No. 167/3, 3 April 1978. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110977 (accessed 9/1/2018). Ibid.

67

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa 13

See “CPSU CC to SED CC, Information on Visit of Mengistu Haile Mariam to Moscow,” May 13, 1977, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, SAPMO, J IV 2/202/583; obtained and translated from Russian by Vladislav M. Zubok http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/ document/111847 (accessed 28/8/2018). Ibid. 14 15 See also Ethiopian-Somali conflict—Somalia’s abrogation of Treaty of Friendship with Soviet Union, expulsion of Soviet experts and severance of diplomatic relations with Cuba… Keesing’s Record of World Events Vol. XXIV, Jan. 1978, Ethiopia, Somalia, page 28760. 16 Russian and East German Documents on Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa, 1977-1978. Third African Department, MFA USSR. Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1632, II. 39-44; translated by Mark H. Doctoroff; note revisions to this document added in late May-early June. Available at http://www.banadir.com/77/3.shtml (accessed 28/11/2017). 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 “Soviet Foreign Ministry Background Report on Soviet-Ethiopian Relations,” April 03, 1978, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 75, d. 1175, ll. 24-32; translation by Svetlana Savranskaya http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110977 (accessed 10/7/2018). Ibid. 21 22 In the light of the Derg’s refusal to address the Eritrean problem through negotiation and political settlement, it is not clear what “political settlement” it is Castro is referring to. 23 “Memorandum of conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia A.N. Ratanov and Cuban military official Arnaldo Ochoa,” July 17, 1977, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1637, ll. 141-146; translated by S. Savranskaya http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111849 (accessed 28/09/2017). Ibid. 24 25 “ Memorandum of Conversation with the Dep. Head of the MFA Third Department (Africa), Comrade S. J. Sinitsin,” February 16, 1978, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, SAPMOBArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/127; obtained and translated by Christian F. Ostermann. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110970 (accessed 28/8/2016). 68

Chapter 2 26

“Memorandum of conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia A.N. Ratanov and Cuban military official Arnaldo Ochoa,” July 17, 1977, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1637, ll. 141-146; translated by S. Savranskaya https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111849 (accessed 19/7/2017). Ibid. 27 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. (emphasis added). 30 Ibid. 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid. 38 Ethiopian-Somali conflict—Somalia’s abrogation of Treaty of Friendship with Soviet Union, expulsion of Soviet experts and severance of diplomatic relations with Cuba… Keesing’s Record of World Events Vol. XXIV, Jan. 1978, Ethiopia, Somalia, page 28760. 39 At the time the Somali government took such a dramatic action which amounted to signing Siad Barre’s and his government’s “suicide note” and over time lay at the heart of the demise of the Somali state, no decision was taken either by the Soviet Union or Cuba to abandon Somalia in favour of collaborating with Ethiopia. 40 Tom Cooper, with additional details from Gianfranco Lanini, Ogaden War, 1977-78, Central, Eastern & Southern Africa Database, ENTRAL, Sep 2, 2003. http://web.archive.org/web/20070107093450/ http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_188.shtml (accessed 19/2/2017). 41 42 Don Oberdorfer, “The Superpowers and Africa’s Horn,” Washington Post, 5 March 1978, A10 Ibid. 43 44 Ibid. 45 The acual number of Cuban troops in the country varies slightly depending on the particular sources. 46 Barbara Walters, An Interview with Fidel Castro. 15 September 1977. http://foreignpolicy.com/1977/09/15/an-interview-with-fidelcastro/ (accessed 12/12/2017). 69

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa Ibid. Ibid. Director of Central Intelligence, The Status of Cuban Military Forces in Ethiopia. Intelligence Memorandum, NI IIM81-10021, 2 September 1981. CIA-RDP97S00289R000200200014-1.pdf Ibid. 50 51 Ibid. 52 The Status of Cuban Military Forces in Ethiopia, Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, 2 September 1981. Ibid. 53 54 Ibid. 55 Memorandum of Conversation of SED Comrade Lamberz with Cuban Ambassador to Ethiopia, Comrade Pepe, Addis Ababa, 3 March 1978 (dated 4 March 1978) (Based on notes of Comrade General Major Jaenicke. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110973 (accessed 10/3/2017). 56 Director of Central Intelligence, The Status of Cuban Military Forces in Ethiopia (secret sanitized copy approved for release 2011/07/08 https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIARDP97S00289R000200200014-1.pdf (accessed 29/12/2017). Director of Central Intelligence, The Status of Cuban Military Forces 57 in Ethiopia (Secret). Interagency Intelligence Memorandum. CIARDP97S00289R000200200014-1 New York Times, 14 February 1978. 58 59 Speech given by Fidel Castro from the balcony of the Palace of Government in Luanda, 23 March 1977, Granma Weekly Review, 3 April 1977, p. 2. Ibid. 60 61 Soviet Foreign Ministry Background Report on Soviet Ethiopian Relations, 03 April 1978. Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 75, d. 1175, ll. 24-32; translation by Svetlana Savranskaya. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter. org/document/110977. Original Archive Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI) 47 48 49

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Chapter Three

A Moving Target – Moscow’s Regional Treaties

T

o ensure its influence and to protect its strategic interests in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean region, the Soviet Union signed different treaties of friendship and cooperation with client states in the region at different times. The first friendship and cooperation treaty was signed with Egypt in May 1971.1 This treaty was vital because of the Suez Canal’s strategic significance. The Canal is the shortest link between the East and the West due to its location linking the Mediterranean Sea at Port Said and the Red Sea at Suez. Article One of the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty states: The high contracting parties solemnly declare that unbreakable friendship will always exist between the two countries and their peoples. They will continue to develop and strengthen the existing relations of friendship and all-around cooperation between them in the political, economic, scientific, technological, cultural and other fields on the basis of the principles of respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, noninterference in the internal affairs of each other, equality and mutual benefit.2

A major part of the Soviet Union’s shipping through the Suez Canal was bound for India, Vietnam, and other Asian and African countries with which the USSR maintained trade ties. However, the friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Egypt did not last long. On 18th July 1972, the then-President of Egypt, Anwar Sadat, announced the expulsion of Soviet military advisors from the country. Consequently, many Soviet advisors and troops left Egypt. The reason for the hostility between the two countries was due to the following: 71

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa The crucial reason for the Egyptian-Soviet estrangement was the Russian refusal to provide Egypt with offensive weapons. The key to Egypt’s conflict with Israel is not ground forces, as huge as the Egyptians have made theirs with Soviet help, but air power. There, the balance is still overwhelmingly in Israel’s favor, and the Russians, in effect, refused to alter it for fear of an eventual confrontation with the United States.3

Sheehan argues that Anwar Sadat’s expulsion of the Russian military advisers represented ‘probably the most severe defeat the Soviet Union has suffered since it began to buy friends and influence nations in the non Communist Third World.’4 Less than a year after the banishment of Soviet advisors from Egypt, the Soviet Union signed another Treaty of Friendship with another strategically located country in the Horn of Africa, Somalia. In July 1974, the presidents of the two countries—Nikolai Podgorny and Mohammad Siad Barre ‘prompted by the desire to reinforce and consolidate the existing friendly relations between the USSR and the Somali Democratic Republic’ signed a treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. The treaty was said to have laid a ‘firm foundation for the further development of friendly relations’ serving as a ‘contribution to the joint struggle against imperialism and colonialism.’5 General Andrei Grechko, Marshall of the Soviet Union and Minister of Defense, visited Somalia and entered into an agreement intended to improve and modernise the strategic Somali port city of Berbera in return for a Soviet access facility. During the following eight years, the Somali-Soviet relationship deepened, benefiting both parties. The close relationship provided the Soviet Union access to facilities that enabled it to promote its strategic interests in the region whilst giving the Somali government access to Soviet weapons and expertise. After signing the 1974 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Moscow, Mogadishu started taking delivery of numerous sophisticated weapon systems, including MiG-21 jet fighters, T-54 tanks, a SAM-2 missile defense system for Mogadishu, and modern torpedo and missile-armed fast attack and landing craft for the navy. Soviet military advisers increased in number to about 1,500, supplemented by approximately 50 Cubans. The Soviet Union also trained and organized the Somali army’s intelligence apparatus and the NSS.6 72

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‘The Soviet Union eventually built Berbera into a base that included a missile storage facility for the Soviet navy, an airfield with runways nearly 5,000 meters long and capable of handling large bombers, and extensive radar and communications facilities.’7 Access to Berbera was of vital significance to the Soviet Union because the port made it possible to maintain a presence in the strategically important areas of the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf and the Horn of Africa area, allowing it to monitor and counter the United States’ military and naval activities in the region. The Treaty of Friendship between the Soviet Union and Somalia was signed at a highly critical time for Moscow. Between July 1972 and the signing of the Treaty of Friendship with Somalia in 1974, the Soviet Union’s standing and influence in the region had been in decline. With access to Berbera Soviet ships could be deployed uninterruptedly for longer periods because the port provided critical logistic support and maintenance opportunities. Repairs could be undertaken satisfactorily at sea. Richard Remnek (1990: 5) states: One indication of the value that the Soviets place on access to local ports is the degree to which they make use of them. Whereas, prior to 1972, Soviet warships had made occasional business calls to Indian Ocean ports, in that year they gained unrestricted access to Berbera; and after their arrival in the fall of that year of a barracks and repair ship, which significantly improved the Indian Ocean squadron’s ability to supply and repair its units and rest their crews on-station, the frequency of Soviet operational visits increased sharply8—a trend that coincided with the lengthening of deployments.

Remnek states that the value of shore-based support is not limited to port access. He states that in 1972 ‘Somalia became the second Third World country, after Egypt to grant the USSR access to extensive facilities ashore. Soviet access privileges included the exclusive use of a long-range communications station and the rights to stage periodic maritime reconnaissance flights from Somali airfields’ (Ibid.). The Soviet Union was acutely aware that the future of the arrangement depended on the resolution of the intractable dispute over the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. It saw both Somalia and Ethiopia as invaluable strategic allies whose progressive alliance and collaboration could advance revolutionary change and transformation under 73

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa

Moscow’s tutelage. Together they could “foil imperialist machinations” in the strategic regions of the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. The single most important constraint at this time to the grand design of establishing pax Sovietica in the Horn of Africa was Somalia’s ambition to incorporate the Ogaden region of Ethiopia into Greater Somalia. For the Somali authorities this was a sacrosanct political goal. And it was not negotiable. The Soviet Union and the Cuban leadership urged the two governments to put aside their differences in the interest of fighting imperialism and regional reaction. Fidel Castro during his visit to both countries in March 1977 made strenuous efforts to reconcile Siad Barre and Mengistu,9 but to no avail. In a meeting held in Moscow between Somali and Soviet officials on the 25th-29th July 1977, a few months after Castro’s return from the region and his subsequent marathon meeting with the East German leader, Erich Honecker, Soviet leaders urged the Somali leadership not to declare war against Ethiopia in the Ogaden. The Soviet representatives said: From our point of view, in order to resolve any sort of problem which has arisen between states, first and foremost it is necessary to have a favorable atmosphere. We, as the party which is offering its good services, consider that the central task should now comprise the cessation of military actions. This is the appeal we make to both the Somali and the Ethiopian sides. It is our opinion that the issue currently stands as follows: either the Horn of Africa will become an arena where imperialist and reactionary intrigues are carried out, or by our common efforts we will succeed in turning the Horn of Africa into a region of friendly relations and peace. We appeal to both delegations to take a seat at the negotiating table, to speak forth their own views and, correspondingly, to listen fully to each other’s point of view, having devoted their full attention to the search for a path to the normalization of the relations between the two countries.10

During Mengistu’s visit Brezhnev ‘expressed concern about the 74

Chapter 3

continuing deterioration of relations between the two progressive states that are friendly to us [the Soviet Union]—Ethiopia and Somalia, and pointed to the urgent need to take measures for the improvement of these relations.’11 The declassified data release indisputably shows the Soviet Union and its socialist allies’ preference for a peaceful resolution of the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia, as well as between Ethiopia and Eritrea. By then, however, tensions between the two governments had run so high that neither of them was willing to listen. During his visit to Moscow, Mengistu told the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Central Committee (CPSU CC) that his enemies: … unleashed a virtual civil war in some provinces of the country [Ethiopia]. These actions of domestic counter-revolution are linked to the activities of imperialism and other external reactionary forces directed against the new Ethiopia. Mengistu underlined that a special role in these co-ordinated activities belong to the anti-Communist regime of Numeiri, and behind its back lurk reactionary Arab countries, first of all Saudi Arabia and Egypt.12

The CPSU CC wrote to the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, Central Committee (SED CC) stating: ‘The head of the Ethiopian delegation said that Ethiopia will not overcome external and internal counterrevolution alone, and for that reason it relies on support on the part of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. He expressed a wish to develop all-faceted co-operation with the USSR.’13 As mentioned in the previous chapter, Mengistu visited Moscow between 30th and 31st October 1977 to plead for support. He held talks with Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Gromyko and was told ‘… that the USSR was going to continue to provide comprehensive assistance and support for the Ethiopian revolution in the future.’14 Soon after Mengistu’s visit to the Soviet Union, a delegation from the Soviet Union under the leadership of General Petrov arrived in Ethiopia. As stated in the Soviet Foreign Ministry Background Report on SovietEthiopian Relations: A state delegation led by Army General V.I. Petrov has been staying in Ethiopia since November 1977 on a closed visit. The tasks of the delegation include devising measures jointly with the Ethiopian 75

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa side to assist the PMAC in building the Ethiopian armed forces, for faster mastering of the Soviet military equipment by the Ethiopian army, and in the planning of military operations in the Ogaden and Eritrea (emphasis added).15

The Soviet Union and its socialist allies, including Cuba, had become convinced of Mengistu’s apparent revolutionary potential, and upon this they made the crucial decision to swap allies. Soon after this, the Soviet Union initiated the arms transfer program. Approximately 50 Soviet ships passed through the Suez Canal on the way to the port of Assab to unload crated fighter aircraft, tanks, artillery, and munitions - an estimated 60,000 tons of hardware - for delivery to the Ogaden front.16 In addition, the Soviet Union shipped equipment to Ethiopia from the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen).

Somalia Expels Soviet Advisers As a result of the Soviet move Somalia abrogated its Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union and threw the Russians out. John Darntonnov writing from Nairobi in The New York Times stated that on 13th November 1977, Somalia ordered all Soviet advisers to leave the country within seven days, ended Soviet use of strategic naval facilities in the Indian Ocean and broke diplomatic relations with Cuba.17 It was further stated that in addition to expelling all Soviet experts, who numbered in the thousands, and withdrawing the use of ‘all facilities enjoyed by the Soviet Union on land and sea’, the Mogadishu Government formally renounced the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation that was signed by Somalia and the Soviet Union in 1974.18 Thirteen days later the Soviet Union embarked on its massive military air and sea lift to Ethiopia. According to the US National Security Affairs: Soviet General Petrov is “almost entirely” in control of military planning for Ethiopian and Cuban forces in the Ogaden, according to a generally reliable clandestine [less than 1 line not declassified] source. Petrov reportedly controls a joint military planning group (Soviets, Cubans and Ethiopians) and does not have to coordinate his decisions with, or seek approval from, Addis Ababa. According 76

Chapter 3 to the source, Petrov personally gives orders to Ethiopian division and brigade commanders and decides when Cuban units should be committed to combat.19

After the Soviet Union lost its access and use rights to the facilities at the Somali port city of Berbera, the Eritrean ports of Assab and Massawa, which were under Ethiopian control, became indispensable. ‘Since the loss of access to Somalia, the amphibious contingent has visited Aden and the Ethiopian ports of Assab and Massawa more frequently but much of this activity has been associated with the sealift of arms to Ethiopia.’20According to a declassified research paper of the US National Foreign Assessment Centre, during the Ethiopian-Somali war, ‘…the Soviets augmented the Indian Ocean Squadron—particularly its amphibious and escort ship contingent—to support and protect seaborne deliveries of military equipment and to show full backing for Ethiopia.’21 The Eritrean ports of Assab and Massawa played a key role in the sealift. As stated in the report of the US National Foreign Assessment Centre: ‘One LST and one LSM transited to Suez Canal to join the one Soviet LST normally present in the area. These units helped South Yemeni and Ethiopia landing ships transport military supplies and Ethiopian troops from Assab to beleaguered Massawa. The ships also shuttled arms from Aden to Assab.’22 Given the size of the Soviet operation: Landing ships were needed for seaborne deliveries because they could load and offload supplies at the beach near Assab’s congested ports, and they were better suited for the wartime conditions at Massawa. While the amphibious ships shuttled supplies, a Soviet destroyer and four frigates were used to patrol the area in support of the sealift, and to protect Soviet passenger ships carrying Cuban troops.23

Ethiopia and the Soviet Union Sign Friendship and Co-operation Treaty During the same month that the Somali government abrogated the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev and Mengistu Haile Mariam signed the USSR-Ethiopia 77

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa

Friendship and Cooperation Treaty in Moscow. Subsequently, Ethiopia became the major ally of the USSR. In Article 1 of the Treaty it is stated: ‘The high contracting parties will develop and deepen relations of indestructible friendship and all-round cooperation in the political, economic, trade, scientific, technical, cultural and other fields on the basis of equality, non-interference in internal affairs, respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and the inviolability of borders.’24 Although the Treaty did not commit the two states to mutual military assistance, they agreed that: ‘In the interests of ensuring the defense capability of the high contracting parties, they will continue to cooperate in the military field.’25 The data in Table 3.1 shows equipment delivered in the Soviet airlift and sealift undertaken between November 1977 and May 1978. The CIA report further states that the value of Soviet deliveries to Ethiopia since 1975 was about US $2.6 billion and the ‘bulk of the equipment in a massive sealift and airlift’ was during the 1977-1978 Ogaden war, as can be seen in Table 3.1. This supply of equipment had enabled the Mengistu regime to equip and build sub-Saharan Africa’s largest army totaling between 200,000-220,000 men. Table 3.1 Soviet Military Deliveries of Major Equipment to Ethiopia Year

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982 Total (Jan-Nov)

Ground force Tanks

684

Artillery (76-mm, 85- mm, & 132-mm howitzers & rocket launchers)

905

Mortars (82-mm, 120mm)

886

Armored vehicles (BTR-60, BTR-152, BMP-1, BRDM-2)

865

Air defense guns (23-mm, 37-mm, 57mm, 100-mm)

767

78

Chapter 3 SAM launchers (SA-7) Helicopters (MI-8, MI-24)

125 51

Airforce Combat aircraft (MIG-15/17, MIG21, MIG-23)

148

Transports (AN-12, YAK-40)

13

Navy Missile attack boats (Osa-II-class)

4

Torpedo boats (MOL-class)

5

Landing craft (T-4s, Polnocy LSM)

4

Air Defense Command SA-2 launchers (four sites)

24

SA-3 launchers (three sites)

21

Source: US Directorate of Intelligence, E thiopia: The Impact of Soviet Military Assistance. A research paper, 1983 (CIA historical review program, Release as sanitized 1999).

In a heavily redacted research paper produced in January 1983 and released in 1999, the US Directorate of Intelligence states that in return for the supply of assistance worth US $4 billion and 1,700 military advisers, including equipping the Cuban combat brigades that formed a strategic reserve to assist Ethiopian forces, ‘Moscow has achieved substantial influence with the dominant state in the Horn of Africa [Ethiopia] and has gained access to air facilities in Eritrea Province and a small naval facility off the Eritrean coast [Dahlak Archipelago].’ It is further stated: ‘In our judgment, Soviet influence in Ethiopia also gives Moscow a basis from which to work against Western interests in the region.’26 Pamela S. Falk (1987: 1079) states, 79

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa

‘The Horn of Africa provides easy access via the Red Sea to the Middle East; the Ethiopian [Eritrean] ports of Assab and Massawa allow Cuba and the Soviet Union access to the Gulf of Aden and the ports of South Yemen. In addition, the Red Sea passage to the Suez Canal is of vital importance for transporting Soviet goods.’27Richard Remnek, who wrote extensively on the strategic significance of the Red Sea, Bab al Mandeb and the Horn of Africa, wrote that unlike in the 1970s, when the Soviet Union depended on Berbera for their Indian Ocean Squadron, in the 1980s, their access in the Red Sea region increased considerably after they entrenched themselves in Ethiopia and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen. This increased the Soviet Union’s bargaining power. Remnek stated: They [Soviets] have, therefore built “down” their naval support infrastructure in Ethiopia’s Dahlac islands, which replaced Berbera as the Soviet Navy’s principal Indian Ocean logistic and maintenance base. The Dahlac complex contains easily removable equipment, such as the same 8,500 ton floating dry dock they had previously stationed at Berbera, floating piers, water and fuel storage tanks (1990: 6).

This demonstrates the strategic significance of the Red Sea and the Dahlac Archipelago for the Soviet Union and its allies. Seth Singletone also states, ‘Naval presence in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean is a security matter…’ (1987: 88). 28 The following chapter outlines the reasons underlying the Soviet Union’s decision to abandon Somalia in favour of Ethiopia, in spite of the fact that there was no previous military cooperation between the two countries.

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Endnotes 1

See Text of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Signed by Soviet and Egypt. The New York Times, 28 May 1971. 2 Art. 1The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Signed by Soviet and Egypt, The New York Times, 28 May 1971. https://www.nytimes. com/1971/05/28/archives/text-of-the-treaty-of-friendship-andcooperation-signed-by-soviet.html (accessed 20/2/2017). 3 Edward R.F. Sheehan, “Why Sadat packed off the Russians,” The New York Times, 6 August 1972. 4 Ibid. 5 Pravda 13 July 1974 in Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 7 August 1974, 14. 6 Somalia Foreign Military Assistance. http://www.country-data.com/ cgi-bin/query/r-12055.html (accessed 30/1/19). 7 Ibid. 8 The data in Table 1 of Richard Remnek’s article shows that after the Soviet Union and Somalia signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in July 1974, the number of Soviet Naval Operational visits to the Indian Ocean increased considerably. In 1973, 1974, 1975 and 1976, the total of visits to the Indian Ocean were 42, 61, 54 and 75, respectively (1980: Table 1). 9 See Transcript of Meeting between East German leader Erich Honecker and Cuban leader Fidel Castro… 10 Record of Negotiations between Somali and Soviet Officials in Moscow, 25-29 July 1977 (excerpts) (From the journal of L.F. Ilichev 11 August 1977). “Record of negotiations between Somali and Soviet Officials in Moscow (excerpts),” August 11, 1977, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1620, ll. 3-31; translation by Sally Kux. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/ document/111850 (25/4/2019). 11 See “CPSU CC to SED CC, Information on Visit of Mengistu Haile Mariam to Moscow,” May 13, 1977… 12 “CPSU CC to SED CC, Information on Visit of Mengistu Haile Mariam to Moscow,” May 13, 1977, … Ibid. 13 14 “Soviet Foreign Ministry Background Report on Soviet-Ethiopian Relations,” April 03, 1978, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 75, d. 1175, ll. 24-32; translation by Svetlana Savranskaya http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110977 (10/4/2017). 81

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 John Darntonnov, “Somalia expelling all soviet advisers, halts use of bases,” The New York Times, 14 November 1977. 18 Ibid. 19 Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special Files, Box 2, Chron File: 2/78. Top Secret; Exdis; Codeword. Carter wrote at the top of the page, “We might go public on this. J.” 22 Feb. 1978 https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus197780v17p1/d59 (4/11/18). Ibid. 20 21 National Foreign Assessment Centre, Soviet Amphibious Forces: Tasks and Capabilities in General War and Peacetime. A research Paper, SR 79-10065JX, June 1979, p. 36. Ibid. 22 23 Ibid. 24 Friendship and Co-operation treaty between the USSR and Socialist Ethiopia, 20 November 1978. Article 10 in Ibid. 25 26 US Directorate of Intelligence, Ethiopia: The Impact of Soviet Military Assistance, A Research Paper, Secret, January 1983 (CIA Historical Review Program, Release as sanitized, 1999). Pamela Falk, “Cuba in Africa,” Foreign Affairs 65 (5): 1077-1096, 1987 27 Seth Singleton, The Future of Soviet Influence in Africa. Contractor, 28 Harvard University, 27 October 1987.

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Chapter Four

Crossing the Rubicon:

why Moscow chose Ethiopia over Somalia

A

s seen earlier, the Soviet Union carried out a spectacular volteface when it abandoned Siad Barre’s regime in Somalia and shifted its assistance to Mengistu and his regime in Ethiopia. The question that arises is why? The decision of the Soviet Union to abandon its long-term ally in favour of Ethiopia had nothing or little to do with ideology. Jiri Valeta, for example, argues that ideological interests were not a main factor in Soviet involvement in the Horn of Africa in the 1960s and 1970s. Valeta further observes: Nor did ideology play a crucial role in the recent realignment of forces there. True, the radical inclination of both regimes [Somalia and Ethiopia] could not have been ignored by the Soviets, who have always been willing (not without a prolonged period of deliberation) to exploit opportunities in the area. Yet there is no evidence that the Marxist-Leninist convictions of either Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam or President Mohamed Siad Barre significantly impressed the Soviet leadership or cause it to favour one country over the other (1980: 355).

More importantly, Valeta observes that it would be misleading to claim that Soviet intervention in the Horn of Africa, particularly in Somalia in the 1970s or in Ethiopia in 1977 was because ‘of proclaimed “selfless” and “revolutionary” support for their respective regimes. In the light of its bitter experience in other African countries, such as Ghana, Mali, Sudan and Egypt, the Soviet Union did not view the Somali and Ethiopian governments as socialist or Marxist-Leninist, but rather merely as “progressive” embarking on “noncapitalist development” (Ibid.). Valeta argues that the most important factors that motivated 83

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the involvement of the USSR in the area were strategic and political interests. Soviet policies in the African continent, including the Horn, fit into Moscow’s overall global strategy. Primary objectives of this strategy include securing assured access to modern air and naval facilities on a worldwide basis so as to more effectively project power and hence influence, while at the same time undermining the power and influence of the West –particularly the U.S. and her allies—and the People’s Republic of China (p. 355).

In what follows, an attempt is made to unravel the underlying factors that underpinned the Soviet Union’s decision. Although Mengistu’s radicalism and anti-imperialist, as well socialist rhetoric, impressed the Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern Europe and Cuba, it was probably the opportunities that Ethiopia, presented, rather than the excitable Mengistu and his clique that explain the USSR’s decision. If, for example, Mengistu had been head of a less significant state in the region, such as Djibouti rather than Ethiopia, ceteris paribus, it would have been unlikely that the Soviets would throw over Somalia for them. Like all counterfactual questions, this cannot be empirically scrutinized. Nevertheless, we can still safely assume that the Soviet Union would not have abandoned Somalia in support of tiny, resource-poor and politically insignificant Djibouti. Important strategic decisions such as this are seldom mono-causal, however. The decision was most probably taken for a multitude of reasons. When the superpowers were faced with the critical moment in mid-1978, each of them had to take a decision in support of or against Ethiopia or Somalia. Once such a decision was taken, a Rubicon would be crossed and a return to the status quo ante would be inconceivable. Given the significant strategic interests at stake, each of the superpowers would have to factor in different variables. What Paul Henze of the US National Security Council said regarding why the US should support Ethiopia rather than Somalia during the Ogaden crisis in mid-1978 was illuminating. He observed: ‘Ranked in order of intrinsic importance (population, resources, strategic significance), Ethiopia remains the most important country in the Horn, followed by Sudan, Kenya, Somalia and Djibouti. We should aim to reassert ourselves in the most important country, Ethiopia, maintain our increasingly strong position 84

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in Sudan and Kenya and look upon Somalia and Djibouti as essentially marginal.’1 He celebrated the fact that his government was not swayed by its regional allies, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which were intrinsically inclined to side with Somalia due to their common religion, Islam. He said: ‘During the past year, we have successfully avoided succumbing to pressures from the Saudis, Egyptians, and Iranians to become identified with Siad’s Somalia in ways which could preclude reasserting ourselves in Ethiopia.’2 As we shall see in what follows, the Soviet Union’s decision was underpinned by a multiplicity of considerations and therefore it is not possible to isolate a single factor. If one considers that the Soviet Union and Somalia had been close for more than a decade (evidenced by the Treaty of Friendship and Soviet supply of arms worth US $300 million), one could assume that on the surface the Soviet Union had incentive to side with Somalia rather than with the experimental Mengistu regime. However, as history is rarely made to order, this did not happen.

Mistrust of Somalia’s Muslim sympathies Among other things, at the heart of the decision to swap sides lay Ethiopia’s perceived vulnerability to encirclement by “hostile Muslim states.” This was also influenced by Somalia’s propensity to gravitate to the champions of regional reaction—Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Sudan. The Soviets could perceive Ethiopia’s insecurity as a golden opportunity for forging an alliance against the forces that it perceived represented an “existential threat”. Although the Soviets had had close relations with Somalia since the mid-1960s, there was little or no progress made towards either deepening the relationship or towards establishing a vanguard Marxist-Leninist political party in the country. This was noted by several Soviet analysts. N. Kosukhin and L. Obukhov, for example, lamented that ‘right-wing nationalist forces’ in the country impeded the ‘further deepening of the national democratic revolution’ (quoted in Patman 1993: 136). E.F. Chernenko concurred observing; ‘narrow nationalistic prejudices which have retarded [political] consciousness have been preserved by part of the population and are still hindering the movement forward’ in the country (in Ibid.). 85

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One of the factors that represented a major constraint on Somalia’s socialist transformation was Islam, which according to the perception of the Somali elite, including President Siad Barre, was inextricably interwoven with Somali identity. Although President Barre spoke of “scientific” rather than “Islamic socialism,” in his view, it had to be constructed along specifically national lines. Somali nationalism was the ultimate organizing principle of the social fabric of Somali society. Notwithstanding the government’s – and Siad Barre’s - socialist rhetoric, the right of private property was secured in the country. There was a general understanding that socialism did not mean Marxism and hence private ownership in industry and agriculture was not threatened (Bergman and Andersson, 1979). More importantly, for Siad Barre, socialism and Islam were intrinsically compatible (Socialism, 1972: 44). He argued that socialism expressed the essential communal spirit of Islam (Lewis referred in Westlund, 1982: 18). Siad Barre conceptualized Islamic values as integral to a scientific socialist orientation. His views were at odds with the Soviet bloc’s conception of socialism. He said, for example, that ‘Islam and socialism are compatible because the Muslim religion is not against progress, development and social equality and justice and to work for their betterment and defend their sovereignty and independence’ (quoted in Bakonyi 2018: 7). A prominent Somali politician who called for the adoption of the Arabic language as a national language in Somalia in the 1960s, for example, said: How can you differentiate between the Muslim identity from Somali identity? To me being a Somali and being Islamic are one and the same thing. The terms “Somali” and “Muslim” are synonymous in my mind. Islam provides our code of life. It is our state religion. Hence the question of a script for our language puts our basic cultural and spiritual values at stake (quoted in Baknyi 2018: 17).

Siad Barre is also reported to have said: ‘In our country religion is not just a matter of faith: it is inherent in our culture and has its own social structure. And because imperialism has always tried to use religion as an instrument against communist ideas, we decided that in our country there should be no struggle between religion and socialism.’3 Siad Barre’s view of Islam indicated to the Soviets the futility of their attempt to establish a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party. The notion of transforming Somali society along the lines of Marxism-Leninism 86

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was considered to be equally futile. Their efforts to entrench socialist values in the way Somalia was governed hit a brick wall. Not only did the Soviet Union consider Siad Barre’s idea of socialism fundamentally incorrect, but they also feared that, given his deeply entrenched Islamic convictions, it was only a question of time before he and his regime sought closer ties with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Sudan, North Yemen and the Gulf States, which were the traditional allies of US imperialism and perceived to be hostile to the USSR. This, the Soviet Union feared, could contribute to the transformation of the Red Sea into an “Arab lake”. Such fear, coupled with the newly-found interest in Ethiopia, was manifested in an editorial of Izvestiya which stated: First of all, certain circles in the Arab countries have coined the term “Arab lake” with respect to the Red Sea … which obviously reeks of nationalism, all the more so since not all the littoral countries are not Arab, to say nothing of the nationality of the ships passing through the Red Sea … But some people need this emphasis on the Red Sea being an “Arab lake” in order to play on nationalism and set the Arab countries on Ethiopia which has a 625-mile coastline on the Red Sea (in Nurthen, 1980: 26).

Since Ethiopia is landlocked, the 625-mile coast-line on the Red Sea is Eritrean, hence the importance of the latter both for Ethiopia and the Soviet Union. For example, when the Soviet Party-Government Delegation visited Ethiopia in September 1978, Mengistu sharply criticized the foreign policy of the Carter administration.  He characterized Sadat’s line on questions pertaining to the Near Eastern problem as treason and condemned the plans of reactionary Arab regimes to turn the Red Sea into an “Arab lake.”4 This was because Mengistu wanted to shore up Soviet support for his regime against the Eritrean liberation movements by exaggerating the risk of an “Arab lake” scenario if Addis Ababa were to lose control of Eritrea’s coastline. The Soviets had not yet taken a clear anti-Eritrean position, and were still pursuing a peaceful solution to the problem. In the joint communique issued at the end of Mengistu’s visit to Moscow in 1977, both sides affirmed that the Red Sea should remain ‘an open and international body of water.’5 As mentioned in the previous chapter, Fidel Castro had visited Somalia and then Ethiopia in March 1977. His conclusions on 87

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Siad Barre and Mengistu underpinned the position the socialist countries were to take. Castro was deeply impressed by the apparent transformations he saw unfolding in Ethiopia as he put it under ‘…a quiet, serious, and sincere leader [Mengistu] who is aware of the power of the masses. He is an intellectual personality…’6 Castro told Honecker, the East German leader:‘I developed the impression that there was a real revolution taking place in Ethiopia.’ 7 Aryeh Yodfat’s finding is consistent with this in which he stated Soviet observers were deeply impressed by the “genuine” nature of the Ethiopian revolution (1980: 70). Compare this weighty endorsement with what Castro concluded concerning Siad Barre. He summarized his impression: ‘I have made up my mind about Siad Barre, he is above all a chauvinist. Chauvinism is the most important factor in him. Socialism is just an outer shell that is supposed to make him more attractive. He has received weapons from the socialist countries and his socialist doctrine is [only] for the masses. The Party is there only to support his personal power.’8He further said: ‘His principal ideas are nationalism and chauvinism, not socialism.’9There is no doubt that Castro’s scathing account of Siad Barre and his flattering account of Mengistu were critical to the Soviet Union and Cuba’s decision to swap sides. Ultimately, the factors that underpinned the Soviet Union’s decision to abandon Somalia in support of Ethiopia were not radically different from the ones that promoted the US government’s policy in the region during that critical period (see Henze, 1978). These included: firstly, Ethiopia’s greater population size which was nine times more than Somalia’s (Patman, 1993; Kessler, 1990), secondly, Ethiopia’s gross domestic product which was eight times larger than the Somalia’s (Remnek, 1990; Kessler, 1990); thirdly, Ethiopia’s endowment of natural resources was greater than Somalia’s (Remnek, 1990; Patman, 1993); and fourthly, and more importantly, Ethiopia had greater influence over sub-Saharan African states (Patman, 1993). Richard Remnek summarises the ‘intrinsic benefits’ Ethiopia offered to the USSR as a “client state”: With the second largest population in Black Africa (ten times larger than that of Somalia), with resources sufficient to justify good prospects of long-run economic development, and with its capital 88

Chapter 4 the headquarters of the OAU (thanks largely to its independent historical tradition), Ethiopia is both an important African country and the key state in the African Horn. Clearly, involvement in Ethiopia offered the Soviets an opportunity to expand their influence in Africa (1990: 9) .

Robert Patman (1993b: 114) also stated, ‘Strategically, the Brezhnev leadership considered Ethiopia to be the greater prize by virtue of its access to the Red Sea. The Ethiopian ports, Assab and Massawa, as well as the permanent military base in the Dahlac Islands, offered the prospect of strategic leverage in the Middle East region.’ Melvin Goodman (1991: 14) also states that the Soviet Union, by supporting Ethiopia against Somalia, ‘… received facilities on Dahlak Island in the Red Sea off the coast of Ethiopia, which expanded capabilities in the Indian Ocean.’10 This was highly significant in light of the Soviet Union’s loss of access to facilities in Berbera. Changes that had taken place in Soviet internal power dynamics also facilitated the pro-Ethiopian stance, by weakening pro-Somali officials in the Soviet Union, paving the way for Brezhnev to adopt policies favourable to Ethiopia at the expense of Somalia. One of the most significant of these changes was the removal from power of President Nikolai Podgorny. The Soviets were also encouraged by the fact that their support of Ethiopia was unlikely to be opposed by Western governments given the culpability of Somalia on the question of the Ogaden. There was international consensus that the Ogaden was an integral part of sovereign Ethiopian territory and that its invasion by Somalia was unacceptable.

Endnotes 1 2 3

Memorandum From Paul B. Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1 Washington, July 27, 1978 (emphasis added). Ibid. In Why did the USSR and Cuba choose to support Ethiopia instead of Somalia in the Ogaden war of 1977? https://www.reddit.com/r/ AskHistorians/comments/3acahk/why_did_the_ussr_and_cuba_ choose_to_support/ (accessed 28 Seo, 1918).

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5 6 7 8 9 10

90

“Report on the Visit to Ethiopia by the Soviet Party-Government Delegation,” September, 1978, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Translated for CWIHP by Daniel Rozas. https:// digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121062 (accessed 17 Feb 2017). “Joint Soviet-Ethiopian Communique,” in Pravda, 9 May 1977, p. 4 Transcript of Meeting between East German leader Erich Honecker and Cuban leader Fidel Castro … Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Robert D. Kaplan, “The Loneliest War,” The Atlantic, July 1988

Chapter Five

Why Moscow chose Ethiopia over Eritrean Liberation Movements

A

fter the Somali army was pushed out from the Ogaden with massive Soviet and Cuban help, Mengistu and his regime were emboldened to pursue military victory against the Eritrean liberation movements, which had in the meantime liberated up to 90 per cent of Eritrea. Extensive military cooperation with the Soviet Union and massive arms deliveries received in the course of the Ogaden conflict had enabled the Ethiopian military machine to become the largest and best equipped in the whole of sub-Saharan Africa (Andargachew Tiruneh, 1993; Patman, 1993: 115). However, it was still unable to face the Eritrean liberation fronts on its own and therefore Mengistu urged the Soviet Union and Cuba to replicate their involvement in the Ogaden to defeat the Eritrean liberation movements. In return for the Soviet support in the Ogaden conflict, Mengistu and his regime had allowed the Soviet navy ‘to establish anchorage facilities in the Dahlac[k] Islands off Massawa in the Red Sea in 1978’ (Ibid.). ‘Ethiopia made the Dahlak Archipelago available to the Soviet navy, which subsequently installed naval support facilities, and soon after, Soviet planes began making surveillance flights over the Indian Ocean from the Asmara airfield’ (Phillips 1985:7). Although both Cuba and the Soviet Union shared Mengistu’s view that the Eritrean liberation movements had to be defeated for the sake of the Ethiopian revolution, according to William LeoGrande, ‘This posed political problems for Cuba and the Soviet Union, both of whom had provided aid to the Marxist EPLF in the early 1970s when it was 91

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fighting against Haile Selassie’ (1980: 28). Nonetheless, in July 1979, the Soviet Union also ‘underwrote Ethiopia’s fifth offensive against Eritrea by shipping military hardware to Ethiopian army garrisons at Mersa Teklay and Asmara. Moreover, Soviet officers reportedly commanded Ethiopian field units. However, like the four earlier ones between 1974 and 1978, this offensive failed to bring rebel areas under government control.’1 While the EPLF dug in, the Soviets helped build up the Ethiopian Army, from 65,000 men to nearly 300,000. More than 2,000 Soviet advisers arrived. The enormous military-assistance program allowed the Ethiopian government to launch the largest offensive ever against the Eritrean guerrillas, in February of 1982. Called Operation Red Star, it involved fifteen divisions whose troop strength was estimated at over 100,000 (Kaplan (1988).2

During the large-scale Ethiopian counter-offensive, ‘The Soviets furnished leadership and logistical support and bombarded the insurgents from ships off the Eritrean coast.’3 Regarding the Eritrean question, not only did the Soviet Union endorse Mengistu’s proposed idea of regional autonomy, but it went further; it declared that the proposal made unnecessary the notion of Eritrean independence as if the aim of the liberation struggle was merely regional autonomy. For the Soviet Union, the question of nationalities, including the Eritrean question, was an integral part of class struggle and Mengistu, in spite of his nationalist rhetoric, purported to present the Eritrean question as a class struggle rather than one of nationhood. For example, during his visit to the Soviet Union,‘Mengistu made it understood that with the current conditions it [the Eritrean question] must be regarded not as an ethnic but as a class problem.  The movement in Eritrea has transformed and is now increasingly becoming a weapon of reactionary and imperialist forces’.4  Mengistu’s claim conveniently coincided with the position the Soviets and the Cubans had adopted vis-à-vis the Eritrean question. For example, an article in Pravda stated, ‘In a situation where the imperialists and their accomplices … are attempting to utilize national and separatist sentiments, Ethiopia’s revolutionary forces view the national question in the context of the class struggle inside the coutnry and in the international arena. They advocate unity and state integrity 92

Chapter 5

of their homeland.’5 It was further stated: ‘Thus, in this matter, the Ethiopian leadership hopes for comprehensive support from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.’6 The then Foreign Minister of Ethiopia, Berhanu Bayeh, stated what was at stake in Ethiopia was ‘not the liberation of colonies but the development of nationalities within a revolutionary Ethiopia.’7 Although the Eritrean liberation struggle did not receive much attention in the Soviet media—positive or negative—during Emperor Haile Selassie’s rule, all this changed after the demise of his regime in 1974. The Soviet Union hailed the Derg’s notion of regional autonomy to solve the Eritrean problem peacefully in accordance with ‘… the principles of preserving national unity and territorial integrity of the state’ (Yag’ya quoted in Patman, 1990: 169). In mid-1976, about a month after the proclamation of the NDR [National Democratic Revolution] programme, Moscow signalled its strongest expression of support yet for the Dergue’s policy toward Eritrea. This was occasioned by the PMAC’s nine-point peace plan of May 1976. While the Eritreans, the Somalis and most Arab states swiftly rejected the new initiative, the Soviet Union warmly welcomed it (Patman 1990: 170).

In Moscow’s view, these proposals ‘answered the hopes and dreams of the province’s population’ because they satisfied the ‘basic right of the people of administrative region of Eritrea’ and ‘knocked the poisoned weapons from the hands of counter-revolution’ in the Country.8 The nine-point peace plan was issued on 16th May 1976. Christopher Clapham perceptively observes that the document refers throughout to: …the Administrative Region of Eritrea, making it clear that Eritrea was to be viewed simply as one of the fourteen regions, and does not refer at any point to “Eritrean,” speaking instead of Ethiopians who had, for example, lost property or gone into exile as a result of “the absence of peace in the Eritrean Administrative Region” (1988: 208).

This was consistent with Mengistu’s pathological loathing for the very notion of Eritrea. Clapham further observes that the document then calls upon “progressive groups and organisations in Eritrea” ‘…to 93

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participate in building an Ethiopian national revolution—a form of words signalling a readiness to make common cause with the EPLF, as the more explicitly “progressive” against the more Islamic and Arabsupported ELF’ (p. 208). As we shall see throughout this chapter, although Mengistu flagged up the notion of regional autonomy whenever he was under pressure from the military successes of the Eritrean liberation struggle, he was never committed to it. This was even acknowledged by East German and Soviet officials. For example, Paul Markovski of the SED and CPSU CC International Department head Boris N. Ponomarev stated: ‘Mengistu is, however, wavering according to the military situation. As the military pressure the rebels were exerting on Massawa and Asmara was increasing, he was ready for a compromise. Now that this situation has become a bit more stable, he is silent or makes pungent statements.’9 However, in spite of the socialist countries’ awareness of Mengistu’s lack of commitment to the notion of regional autonomy for Eritrea, it remained their most favoured solution throughout. This was despite the fact that both the warring parties - the Eritrean liberation movements and Mengistu and his regime - rejected it. Moscow agreed with the Derg’s token nationalities policy despite knowing full well that Mengistu was not committed to it.

The Importance of the Red Sea Coastline As has been said before, one of the major strategic attractions of Ethiopia to the Soviet Union was Eritrea’s 625-mile coastline on the Red Sea. Much of Eritrea’s importance is …evident to Moscow and Havana. Both capitals recognise that events in Eritrea may have widespread political, ideological, and particularly to the Kremlin, strategic ramifications. Politically, Moscow and Havana are obviously committed to Mengistu’s regime, and have a stake in its survival. Ideologically, Soviet and Cuban opposition to national movements they formerly supported must be credibly explained. Strategically, Soviet intimacy with Ethiopia has cost it its base rights at Berbera in Somalia, and either Massawa or Assab could prove acceptable substitutes (Papp 1978: 2).

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Daniel Papp of the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, underscores the strategic significance of Eritrea. In view of this, the central question that arises is: wouldn’t it have made more sense to the Soviet Union and its allies to side with Eritrea than with Ethiopia in pursuit of their strategic interests in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb? Soon after Fidel Castro’s 1977 attempt to establish a Red Sea alliance of progressive states, consisting of Ethiopia, Somalia, the would-be independent state of Djibouti, and an autonomous Eritrea within Ethiopia failed, Mengistu flew to Moscow. In a dinner held in his honour in the Kremlin, on 4th May 1977, the Eritrean question figured prominently. Mengistu condemned what he referred to as the ‘reactionary organisations’ who ‘ostensibly… call themselves Eritrean liberation fronts.’10 In his view, the Eritrean fronts were ‘lined with feudalism, imperialism, and bureaucratic capitalism’ and he alleged that they were sponsored by imperialist and reactionary Arab states whose aim was ‘to tear Eritrea away from Ethiopia and establish full strategic control of the Red Sea.’11 Mengistu’s condemnation of Eritrea before the Soviet officials was premature and received unenthusiastic reaction. Papp wrote: ‘While this was of course an understandable position for the Ethiopian leader to take, it nonetheless placed his host in a somewhat embarrassing position. In his dinner speech, soon-to-be dismissed Soviet President Podgorny merely noted that the Kremlin regarded ‘with understanding’ the Derg’s efforts to ‘achieve a peaceful settlement to Ethiopia’s nationalities problems.’12 The reality was completely different. Neither Mengistu nor his regime had any intention of seeking a peaceful solution to the Eritrean problem. In August 1977, Mengistu claimed to the Soviet Ambassador, A.P.Ratanov, that ‘The Sudan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, under the cover of Eritrean separatist organizations, are transferring their detachments and arms into Eritrea. Sudan is supplying the separatists with American arms as well as arms they have recently received from the People’s Republic of China’.13 There was no evidence to back such an allegation. Mengistu’s aim was to dramatize the situation in order to provoke a knee-jerk reaction from the Soviet Union and its socialist allies. During his secret visit to the Soviet Union in November 1977, ‘Mengistu spoke about the hostile activity of Sudan and other reactionary Arab states 95

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa

who plan in connection to the unification of the three separatist states [read fronts] in Eritrea to set up an Eritrean “government” and to proclaim an independent state.’14 It seems that Mengistu’s fictional allegation concerning the Eritrean liberation movements’ subservience to US imperialism, was accepted by the Soviet Union.

Fears of Muslim and Imperialist Manipulation

Over time, the Soviet Union adopted the same position on Eritrea as the Derg in Ethiopia. For example: ‘In an article in Pravda on March 15 [1978] it was made clear that the USSR would support the Ethiopian forces against the “rebels” in Eritrea because Western and Arab support for the secessionists was aimed at weakening Ethiopia and depriving it of its outlets to the Red Sea and because the secessionists were ‘objectively helping the realization of imperialist designs.’15 This flawed assumption is drawn from the principle that underpinned Cuban policy in Angola. There, although Cuban intervention was generally mobilized to thwart foreign aggression, the Cuban authorities interpreted that the guerrillas opposed to the MPLA or the government in Luanda were necessarily agents of outside forces, and therefore they extended the effect of the [Cuban-Angolan] treaty to internal counterinsurgency operations (Dominguez 1979: 64). At the heart of the Soviet Union’s decision to change its stance on the Eritrean liberation struggle also lay its flawed belief that a separate Eritrean state would be vulnerable to the manipulation of imperialism and Arab reaction. This, the Soviets thought, would threaten their and their socialist allies’ strategic interests. What the US Interagency Intelligence Memorandum observed on the question is relevant in this regard: Because of Eritrea’s location on the Red Sea and its large Muslim population, the province figures prominently in Ethiopia’s historical fear of “Arab encirclement,” a concern that has increased because of the military regime’s belief that conservative Arab states are supporting the Eritrean insurgency in an attempt to weaken or destroy Ethiopia’s socialist revolution.16

It was further stated: ‘While some of the rhetoric on this subject is deliberately exaggerated, the Ethiopian leaders genuinely believe 96

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that a guerrilla victory would allow Eritrea to be used as a base of operations by the government’s opponents.’17 If by “opponents” it meant Ethiopian democratic movements fighting for change in the country, the EPLF would have undoubtedly made Eritrean territory available and provided support in order to defeat the Derg; that was in fact how the regime was finally defeated. However, since the EPLF was, as Donham (1999: 136-7) observed, ‘…more genuinely Marxist movement than any in Ethiopia,’ it was highly unlikely that it would collaborate with imperialism and Arab reaction even against its sworn enemy, the Derg. The EPLF’s socialist and even communist orientations were beyond doubt. Paul Henze, who was a CIA operative and who had an intimate knowledge of Horn of Africa governments and movements, and who has published widely about the Horn of Africa, also wrote on the EPLF as follows: The EPLF’s own declarations and proclamations have until recently given a picture of a highly centralised, dogmatic Marxist-Leninist party aiming to embellish a classic communist-type state structure. EPLF leaders and spokesmen say they have modified their Marxist views of society and statist ideas of how an economy should function. Their official declarations put them well behind Poland, Hungary, and China on economic and social issues and raise serious misgivings about their commitment to individual freedoms and democratic political procedures, subjects that are increasingly debated in the USSR itself (1989: 17).

Notwithstanding this, however, the Soviet Union assessed the Eritrean liberation movements as being either knowing or unknowing pawns of foreign powers seeking to create a vassal Eritrean state under either Western or Arab tutelage.18 There were allegedly two reasons why the West and the Arab states would want to do this. The aim was firstly to undermine the on-going Ethiopian revolution19 and secondly, to turn the Red Sea into the afore-mentioned “Arab Lake” which could guarantee imperialist control over ‘vital raw material sea routes,’ (Sofinsky and Khazanov 1978: 4) such as the Bab el Mandeb. Many analysts claim that the Soviet Union supported the Eritrean liberation struggle during Emperor Haile Selassie’s rule (Yodfat, 1980; Donham, 1999: 136; Westad, 2005). Paul Saba, among many others, states: ‘Before the fall of Selassie in 1974, the USSR supported the 97

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Eritreans. Today it is slaughtering them. The reasons for the guerrilla war haven’t changed, but the Soviets can now gain more by backing the Ethiopians.’20 The Guardian (New York)21 and the Observer (London)22 also stated: ‘…throughout this hectic organisation-political history the Eritreans received the moral, political, and even material support of the Soviet Union …’23 Paul Henze mentions: ‘Gaddafi and the South Yemenis, as well as the Syrians …continued to support the Eritrean rebels, and served as channels for Soviet and East European assistance. Cuba continued its support as well, and of course was dependent upon the Russians for the weapons and funds that were required’ (1983: 157) Using Russian primary sources, Radoslav Yordanov stated: ‘During Haile Selassie’s regime, the Russians tacitly supported the Eritreans as a national liberation movement’ (2016: 194). Donald Donham writes: While the United States spoke of the importance of “democratic freedoms,” it increased sales of arms to military-led Ethiopia in 1975 and 1976. Two years later, the Soviet Union, upholding the values of “proletarian internationalism,” cut off aid to a secessionist group in the north, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF)— surely a more genuinely Marxist movement than any in Ethiopia, one that the USSR had previously supported. The USSR provided the Derg with the equipment and advisers to attack those (the Eritreans) whom they had so recently called comrades (Donham, 1999: 136-7) (emphasis added).

If the EPLF were more genuinely Marxist than any other movement in Ethiopia, including the Derg, it was wrong to believe that independent Eritrea would be a launching pad for imperialism and regional reaction. The Soviets Union’s change of position in favour of the Derg at the expense of the EPLF could not have been on ideological grounds. Similar views were also expressed by Odd Arne Westad in which he states: ‘Foremost among the many separatist movements that challenged the Ethiopian regime was the EPLF, a Marxist group that had received substantial support from South Yemen, the GDR, Cuba and the Soviet Union’ (2005: 259). Paul Henze also writes of the EPLF: ‘...An avowed Marxist group, [it] split off from the Eritrean Liberation Front in 1970, and since then various leftist currents have been an important aspect of the Eritrean separatist politics. The net result of being linked to an international leftist ideology has been to encourage factionalism in an 98

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always divided movement’ (1983: 157-8). Although both Cuba and the Soviet Union shared Mengistu’s view that the Eritrean liberation movements had to be defeated for the sake of the Ethiopian revolution, the challenges in Eritrea were far more complicated than in the Ogaden. This was because, inter alia, ‘With some 16 years of guerrilla experience and wide popular support, the Eritrean Liberation Forces promised to be a formidable military foe’ (LeGrande 1980: 28). Consequentially, the Soviets and the other socialist countries had to think twice before they could commit their ground troops to fight against the seasoned Eritrean fighters. This is consistent with Bruce Porter’s insightful generalisation regarding the Soviet Union’s involvement in local conflicts, which was often underpinned by a careful understanding and knowledge of the dynamics of the conflicts in question. Before the Soviet Union committed itself to local conflicts, he argued that it took the utmost care to understand not only the nature of the conflict but the alignment and balance of forces. His study showed that: ‘Moscow did not back a losing side in any of the cases studied. Indeed, throughout the postwar period, the USSR has only rarely been caught supporting a client who has been defeated (the most striking and catastrophic instance was the Arab defeat in June 1967)’ (1984: 217). This was by no means due to the ‘USSR’s military power or because of the Calusewitzian genius of its leadership. Rather, the USSR seems to have chosen which conflicts to become involved in with considerable care, deliberately avoiding those in which defeat—with its attendant implications for Soviet prestige and influence—was probable’ (Ibid). Porter suggests that Soviet involvement in local conflicts was often preceded by ‘… considerable research and intelligence gathering resources to studying and comprehending the dynamics [of] specific local disputes’ (Ibid.). There was no doubt that the Soviet Union had enough knowledge and understanding of the Eritrean liberation struggle to realize that it would be impossible to defeat the EPLF. Hence their reluctance to deploy a large number of ground troops. Three days after the Cuban-Ethiopian forces drove out the Somali army from the Ogaden and reached the Somali border on the 15th March 1978, the editorial of Pravda, the organ of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), published an article the EPLF referred to 99

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as false and slanderous, issuing a “Position Statement” replying to the unfounded allegations. The editorial stated that the Eritrean struggle was “objectively helping the realisation of imperialist designs” and claimed its ‘’ideological and political’’ discretion to support the Ethiopian junta against the onslaught (emphasis added.)24 The article was written by a certain Alexander Serbin, but in view of the fact that it was published as an editorial of the official organ of the CPSU, it can safely be assumed that it was a position paper of the CPSU. The editorial stated: a. The imperialist forces are interfering in Ethiopia’s internal affairs through the activities of the “secessionists” in the north-eastern “province” of Ethiopia. b. The aim of the “secessionist” war is to weaken Ethiopia and

c. To deprive Ethiopia of access to the sea.

d. The Eritreans are taking part in, and objectively working to safeguard imperialist designs.25

In its “Position Statement,” the EPLF stated; ‘Convinced of the justness and progressive nature of our anti-imperialist struggle and convinced that these false accusations by Pravda cannot in any manner affect our determination to persist in armed struggle until final victory, the EPLF wants to clarify its position vis-a-vis these false accusations.’26 The statement further pointed out that the Soviet Union seems to be excessively pre-occupied with the question of Ethiopia’s access to the sea, but when it supported Eritrean independence by rejecting the US government’s proposal for federation in the early 1950s, the issue of Ethiopia’s access to the sea existed then too. This did not deter the Soviet Union from supporting the demand of the Eritrean people for independence. The EPLF further stated: ‘In Africa alone, there exist 14 land-locked countries. Why then doesn’t Pravda justify and support the provocation of wars by these land-locked countries against neighboring countries to have access to the sea?’ More significantly, the EPLF’s “Position Statement” observed: The welfare and progress of the Ethiopian people interests the Ethiopian peoples as well as the Eritrean people, who have been and 100

Chapter 5 are still oppressed by the same enemy and against which they are fighting in common. But Ethiopia’s access to the sea is one that can and should be discussed and settled between two sovereign states and cannot be imposed by force or through foreign intervention. That the EPLF has incessantly strived and continues to strive to create strong ties of solidarity with the heroic Ethiopian masses is a fact to which the Ethiopian masses testify.27

The “Position Statement” concluded: ‘Pravda’s statement and its implications are clear. They are unfounded, false accusations to mask the true intention of the Soviet Union—that of safeguarding strategic (national) interests by sacrificing the liberation of the people [of Eritrea].’28As we shall see later, this is the first time the EPLF stated unambiguously that the Soviet Union’s policy vis-à-vis Eritrea was driven by strategic national interest. Nonetheless, it still refused to condemn Moscow (see Chapter Seven). The statement published in Pravda clearly shows, among other things, that the Soviet Union and East Germany were persuaded by Mengistu’s allegations. The East German leader, Honecker, for example, in a draft letter to Brezhnev stated: ‘The attitude of the representatives of the Eritrean Liberation Movement illustrated … under the pressure by the leadership of the Sudan and the Arab reaction, there has been a strengthening of nationalist, openly separatist forces within the Eritrean movements, especially by means of the coordination between the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front and the Eritrean Liberation Front (Revolutionary Council).’29 This allegation was based on a falsehood. There was never a time where the demand of the liberation movements in Eritrea had been non-nationalistic.30 During his visit to the Soviet Union, Mengistu informed the CPSU CC ‘… that the separatist movement in Eritrea, which receives massive support from the Arab countries, acquired a reactionary character after the victory of the national-democratic revolution in Ethiopia.’31 There was no evidence to suggest that either the Arabs or imperialists had a plan to intervene in the situation. This appears to have been said to exaggerate the danger in order to justify intervention against the Eritrean liberation struggle. Friedel Trappen (SED) and R. A. Ulyanovsky in the CC of the CPSU in a conversation stated that there were three fundamental 101

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reasons why the idea of Eritrean independence should be rejected. Firstly, they dismissed the demand of the Eritrean liberation movements for independence, which in the opinion of the East German and Soviet officials could split up Ethiopia. Secondly, they rejected any attempt made to deny Ethiopia access to the Red Sea ports in Eritrea. Thirdly, underscoring the strategic interests of the socialist countries in the region, they said that the question of whether to ‘… drive the Soviet Union and the other Socialist countries out of this [Red Sea] region, are not simply a national problem but a problem of international class warfare…’32 Implicit in this observation is that the strategic significance of the Red Sea and its environs is more significant than the demand of the Eritrean liberation movements for an independent state. More importantly, Trappen and Ulyanovsky explained the underlying reason of the socialist countries’ opposition to Eritrea’s independence. The reason was that they thought ‘…a separate [Eritrean] state would be manipulated by the Sudan and Saudi Arabia and their petrol dollars’33 (emphasis added). It is interesting to note that in spite of its fury and the imminent threat that the Soviet bloc represented to the Eritrean liberation struggle, the EPLF was reluctant to condemn the Soviet Union. In fact, if the Soviet Union had called for rapprochement with the EPLF, the latter would have seized the opportunity. The EPLF leadership would have happily served the strategic interest of the Soviet Union provided Moscow supported their quest for independence and desisted from supporting Mengistu and his regime against them. One of the reasons the Soviet bloc chose to side with Ethiopia on the Eritrean liberation struggle was because they strongly believed that a separate Eritrean state would be unable to resist the pressures exerted by reactionary Arab states and imperialism in the Red Sea region. Richard Remneck argues: Indeed, one of the reasons the Soviets have remained steadfast in their support of Ethiopia’s territorial integrity, even in the period of declining Soviet support for the Ethiopian war effort in the north, is the fear that an independent Eritrea would eventually cooperate with Arab influence, and might eventually cooperate with Arab plans to limit international navigation through the Red Sea. In view of these potential threats, it was not surprising that Israel and the 102

Chapter 5 Soviet Union have found common cause in supporting Ethiopia’s territorial integrity (1990: 3).

This recurring concern that the Red Sea might be turned into an area controlled by Arab states – the feared “Arab lake” - also preoccupied the Israeli government after it resumed diplomatic relations with Addis Ababa in 1990. The newly-appointed Israeli Ambassador to Ethiopia, Meir Joffe, warned against Eritrean independence citing these concerns. He said that Mengistu had to be supported against secessionist rebels in the coastal region of Eritrea.34 He said: ‘…it was strategically vital for Israel that the rebels not turn the “Red Sea into the Arab Sea.” ’ To underscore the strategic importance of the Eritrean coast to Israel, he said: ‘You just have to look at a map to see the importance to Israel … If the Eritrean rebels were able to win independence, the Red Sea would be under Arab influence. He claimed that the rebels get most of their supplies from radical Arab countries, including Libya and Syria.’35 However, Western diplomats disagreed and said: ‘…the vast majority of the Eritreans’ supplies are captured from the Addis Ababa Government.’36 Patman estimated that, during the was against the liberation fronts, about 125 military Israeli instructors were assisting the Ethiopian military establishment and that Israeli officials probably supplied about 100,000 recycled Kalashnikov rifles to the Ethiopians (Patman 1993:124-125).

Moscow’s Preferred Outcome Other things being equal, the USSR and its allies’ most preferred outcome in the Horn of Africa, including in Eritrea, was a progressive alliance of states under the tutelage of the Soviet Union, namely, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Yemen, Djibouti and an autonomous Eritrea within the state of Ethiopia, which it hoped would counteract US military build-up in the region. The wars between Ethiopia and Somalia, as well as between Eritrea and Ethiopia, were unpalatable realities for the Soviet bloc. They meant that Soviet policies in the Horn vis-àvis Ethiopia and Somalia, as well as Eritrea and Ethiopia, had to be developed in response to the unfolding of events on the ground. These was largely dictated by Mengistu’s intransigence and by Somalia’s irredentism. The Eritrean liberation movements’ refusal to 103

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relinquish their fight for independence was also important. Another major factor was Soviet Union’s strategic interests in the region, which had been damaged by the loss of its naval facilities in the Somali port city of Berbera in the north-western part of the Indian Ocean in November 1977. The Soviet Union’s base at Berbera was ‘equipped with a mooring, an important communication centre, … a tracker station, a tactical missile warehouse, as well as a big fuel storage and communication facilities for one thousand fifty people.’37 From the beginning of the early 1980s, ‘the Soviet Union has maintained between 20 and 30 vessels, including supply ships, in the Indian Ocean at any one time and some of them have been given anchorage privileges at the Dahlak Islands’ (Kingston in Makinda 1987: 181). As suggested by Philip Allen (in Ibid.), in 1981, ‘the Soviet fleet included far-ranging destroyers and amphibious landing craft … nuclear submarines, intelligence collecting merchant ships and trawlers, and, on occasion, the 38,000-ton aircraft carrier Minsk from the formidable Pacific fleet.’ The Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, visited Ethiopia in July 1980 in the aftermath of the dislodgement of the Eritrean liberation movements from all of the liberated areas except the town of Nakfa and its environs. During his visit to Ethiopia, Gorshkov is said to have sought greater use of military facilities in the country. He also ‘toured Eritrea, visited the naval base at Massawa, and was “briefed” on the political and military victories won in the area. His weeklong tour included what were described as “very fruitful” talks with Mengistu’ (Ibid.). Gorshkov expressed appreciation of the continued use of military facilities in the Dahlak archipelago and according to Makinda, some reports indicated that ‘…the USSR installed modern equipment on the Dahlak Islands for use by its Indian Ocean Naval Squadron and by ships of the Mediterranean fleet. It moved the dry dock from Aden to the Dahlak Islands where repairs on Soviet, as well as Ethiopian, ships could be carried out’ (Kinston in Ibid.). Given the significant Soviet strategic interest in Ethiopia, including Eritrea, the question of why the Soviets did not deploy large numbers of ground troops to crush the Eritrean liberation struggle is highly relevant. The Soviets and their allies, including Cuba, knew very well that in the long-term, Ethiopia was likely to lose the war. That may 104

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explain why the Soviet Union and Cuba rejected Mengistu and his regime’s plea to deploy their ground forces fully against the Eritrean and Tigrean freedom fighters. The Soviet Union and its allies were aware that EPLF and ELF fighters would resist any deployment of ground forces to the bitter end. The Soviet bloc’s fear of Saudi Arabia and imperialist manipulation of a future independent Eritrean state was unrealistic. Saudi Arabia had always been hostile to the EPLF because of the latter’s leftist orientation and independence. As an example, in 1984, the EPLF lashed out at Saudi criticism, issuing an ‘Important Declaration’ on the matter. The EPLF declared: The steady escalation of the injustices against the EPLF perpetrated by the Saudi Government during the past two years, in particular, has been one of the questions of grave concern. The EPLF has not refrained from making tireless efforts to tackle with patience and care the Saudi injustice against the Eritrean people and their struggle, in general, and the EPLF, in particular. So far, however, its efforts have not received the positive response of the Saudi Government; worse still, the attempts to harm the EPLF have been stepped up. 38

According to the EPLF’s statement, the Saudi government was so hostile to the front, and to the cause of the Eritrean people that it left no stone unturned to tarnish its image and destroy its credibility by conducting a campaign of slander and denigration.39 In November 1983 Saudi Arabia’s navy had intercepted an EPLF boat in international waters in the Red Sea and confiscated weapons. The statement observed that ‘The efforts made to secure the release of our property have fallen on deaf ears.’40 Worse still, the Saudi Government closed all the offices of the EPLF throughout the country.41 The Secretary General of the EPLF, Isaias Afwerki, was in 1987 interviewed by Adulis, a monthly magazine published by the EPLF:42 He was asked: ‘The EPLF issued a statement last January that revealed the growing interference of Saudi Arabia in the internal affairs of our struggle calling on the kingdom to change its stance. What have been the developments?’43 He replied, ‘None’ and continued: But to underline a very fundamental point, the EPLF did not issue the statement because it considered Saudi intervention a big obstacle 105

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa inflicting grave setbacks on our struggle. Nonetheless, the Eritrean people have to be wary of any meddling in their affairs, irrespective of its impact. Moreover, unlike previous enticements the latter scheme involved training and raising a mercenary group abroad, in a much more organised manner. In the event the EPLF strongly condemned the interference while simultaneously reminding the Saudis to desist from this path...’44

According to Isaias although the Saudis had always interfered in the Eritrean struggle their interference had reached new heights of late, such as conscripting mercenaries and sowing seeds of discord intended to destroy the liberation struggle. Thus, the Soviet Union’s allegation that a future independent Eritrean state would be manipulated by Sudan, Saudi Arabia and petro dollars was clearly deeply flawed. Mengistu, the Soviet Union and its allies, also alleged that a future Eritrean state would be vulnerable to imperialist blackmail and manipulation. Regarding US imperialism and the West in general, Isaias Afwerki said: Another reality that has become evident in the last decades is the fact that the rivalry between the superpowers is rooted on their competitive interests and does not otherwise have anything in common with the struggle of peoples for liberation and democracy. Indeed like its American counterpart, Soviet intervention has tended to harm Third World countries which adopt political systems that differ from those the superpowers think would best serve their own interests intensify against Third World countries which embark on political systems they deem appropriate or better serving their aspirations.45

In the immediate aftermath of the EPLF’s second congress, Isaias Afwerki, was asked by Adulis to elaborate on the EPLF’s decision to condemn the Soviet Union not only in terms of its intervention in the Horn of Africa, including Ethiopia, but also worldwide. He responded: Our operational philosophy has always been to remind regional or international forces hostile to our just cause to reconsider their actions. When the Soviet Union first begun to interfere against our cause, the EPLF, which then carried out its first congress [in January 1977], called upon the Soviet Union to recognise the legitimate cause of Eritrea and desist from its intervention.46 106

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Isaias was speaking of the time before the Soviet Union had fully committed to support the fledgling regime of the Derg, less than a month before the bloody palace coup of 3rd February 1977 that brought Mengistu to power. Isaias further said the call for recognition and noninterference was subsequently followed by ‘several memorandums and initiatives on our part to establish contact with the Soviets to dissuade them to change their stance. All these efforts however bore no fruit and Soviet intervention grew with time instead of decreasing. Under the circumstances, it is only natural to condemn Soviet crimes against the Eritrean people at this juncture when we appraise the event of the last ten years.’47 When Isaias was asked whether the EPLF congress’ condemnation indicated a shift toward the West in general and the US, he said the new position represented no shift either to the West or East. It reflected rather the EPLF’s independence: In contrast to those who perceive international relations in bipolar terms; those who lack their own independent line, and view the world in terms of the Eastern and Western camps, and those who cannot contemplate any organisation taking an independent stance outside this block allegiance, the EPLF is again asserting that it would challenge and confront any force, regional or global, that is hostile to the just cause of our people.48

He dismissed the allegation that the EPLF condemned the Soviet Union in order to cozy up to the West in general and the US in particular. He further said that such an allegation ‘does not affect the EPLF and only betrays misconceptions. The EPLF does not make cheap overtures to one power or bow to the other.’49 In an earlier interview, Isaias had said that in most situations, the two superpowers normally stood in opposition to each other. But on the question of Eritrea, both stood together determined to undermine the demand of the Eritrean people for independence. He further said: ‘In other areas where US imperialism has been involved, there has at least been the moral and material support of the Soviet Union and other forces. In the case of our struggle, however, these two superpowers have exerted considerable pressures to weaken and destroy the Eritrean revolution.’50 Although, as seen earlier in the chapter, it is true that most analysts generally agreed that the Soviet Union supported the Eritrean liberation 107

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struggle before Mengistu took power in February 1977, there are a few exceptions. Their views were apparently confirmed by the EPLF in this statement: In a span of 22 years, the U.S. alone provided Haile Selassie’s regime military support worth more than 600 million dollars to crush the Eritrean and Ethiopian people’s aspirations to independence and democracy… And in that situation the Soviet Union never provided any form of support to the Eritrean revolution—not even moral. On the contrary, the Soviet Union maintained good relations with the Haile Selassie regime and contributed to the consolidation of the economic infrastructure of the oppressive regime.51

Papp also states that before the Kremlin recognized the Derg as being “anti-colonialist” and “anti-imperialist,” ‘Moscow was rather reticent about the Eritrean situation. On the rare occasions when comments were made, the Soviets observed, for example, that “the feudal regime which held power in Ethiopia until recently… carried out a policy of internal colonization in Eritrea. This naturally led to increased separatist tendencies’52 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, despite this rare and exceptional sympathetic observation, Moscow always made it clear that it preferred the maintenance of the ‘integrity of the state’ and preservation of Ethiopia’s national unity.53 Since, as we saw in the preceding section, many of the advantages Ethiopia offered to the USSR as a “client state” were derived from the former’s control over Eritrea, why did the Soviet Union decide to support Ethiopia’s annexation of Eritrea, and reject the Eritrean demand for self-determination and national independence? The question, as we have seen, is a vexed one, and one that can only be partially answered by the factors mentioned above. Be that as it may, the EPLF leadership continued to consider Moscow as a strategic ally of the anti-imperialist armed struggle, despite its hostility to the notion of Eritrean independence. This stand engendered tensions and disagreements among Eritrean movements worldwide (see Chapter Seven).

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In the following chapter the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries’ apparent desire and their efforts to contribute toward resolving the Eritrean problem through peaceful means are discussed.

Endnotes 1

Foreign Military Assistance, (n.d). http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/etsave/ et_05_03.html 2 Robert D. Kaplan, “The Loneliest War,” The Atlantic, July 1988 Issue. 3 Christian Science Monitor, 5 December 1978. 4 “Report on Mengistu’s Visit to the Soviet Union to discuss SovietEthiopian Relations,” July 20, 1978, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Translated for CWIHP by Daniel Rozas http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121063. (Accessed 20/5/20). 5 A. Serbin, “In the Interests of Unity,” Pravda, 15 March 1979, p. 5. 6 “Report on Mengistu’s Visit to the Soviet Union ... 7 Berhanu Bayeh, ‘People’s Gains in the Ethiopian Revolution,’ The Africa Communist, 74, 1978. 8 Moscow Radio quoted in Patman (1990: 170). 9 “Memorandum of Conversation between East German official Paul Markovski and CPSU CC International Department head Boris N. Ponomarev … 10 “In a Friendly atmosphere,” Provda, 5 May 1977, p. 4 11 In Ibid. 12 TASS, 4 May 1977, as reported in in FBIS Soviet Union, 5 May 1977, p. H2 quoted in Papp, 1978, p. 11. 13 Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia a.p. Ratanov, Memorandum of Conversation with Mengistu, 7 August 1977 CPSU CC to SED CC, Information on 30-31 October 1977 Closed 14 Visit of Mengistu Haile Mariam to Moscow, 8 november 1977 … Keesing’s Record of World Events, Volume XXIV, May 1978 Ethiopia, 15 Ethiopian, page 28989 16 Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, Ethiopia: Likelihood and Implications of Possible Outcomes in Eritrea. Washington, May 22, 1978. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus197780v17p1/d84 Ibid. 17 18 TASS, 31 January 1978 referred in FBIS Soviet Union, 1 February 1978 109

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa A. Serbin, “In the Interests of Unity,” Pravda, 15 March 1979, p. 5. “Soviets back genocide in Eritrea” Encyclopedia of Anti-Revisionism on-line. Vol. 5, No 5, March 12-25, 1982. Guardian (New York) 19 April 1978, p15 21 22 The Observer (London), Feb. 27, 1978, p. 5 Guardian (New York) 19 April 1978, p15; The Observer (London), 23 Feb. 27, 1978, p. 5 24 “EPLF Replies to Pravda’s Slander of Eritrean Struggle,” Eritrea in Struggle. Newsletter of Association of Eritrean Students in North America Vol. II, no. 8, May 1978. Ibid. 25 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 “Draft Letter from Honecker to Brezhnev on Ethiopian-Eritrean Talks, 19 April 1978,” … 30 This is referring to the meeting between the EPLF and the ELF held on April 22-24, 1978 in the liberated areas of Eritrea to implement the “Document for the Implementation of the October 20th Agreement” the leaderships of the two fronts signed on 15 March 1978 in Khartoum. The document signed by both the leaderships of the two fronts on 15 March 1978 outlined the specific principiles ad procedures for implementing the general principles agreed upon by the two fronts in their 20th October meeting. The thrust of the agreement was to form a joint political leadership, joint committees in the military, economic, social affairs …(see Hail the EPLF-ELF Unity Agreement, Eritrea in Struggle, Vol. II, No. 8, May 1978 31 “CPSU CC to SED CC, Information on Visit of Mengistu Haile Mariam to Moscow,” May 13, 1977... 32 “Memorandum of Conversation between [SED] Comrade Friedel Trappen and Soviet Comrade R. A. Ulyanovsky in the CC of the CPSU,” May 11, 1978, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/127 http://digitalarchive. wilsoncenter.org/document/111899 (accessed 12/9/17). Ibid. 33 34 Jane Perlez, “Israelis Widening Role In Ethiopia,” The New York Times, 7 Feb. 1990 35 Ibid. 36 In Ibid. 19 20

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Soviet military base on Socotra—myth and reality. 16 Nov. 2008. http://socotra.info/soviet-military-base-on-socotra-the-myth-andreality.html#.WKnVERSp6T8 (accessed 30/5/18). EPLF, Important Declaration. Adulis Vol. 1, Nos. 4-5, October38 November 1984, p. 8 Ibid. 39 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 A magazine published monthly by the Foreign Relations Bureau of the EPLF 43 “Interview—EPLF Secretary Genereal on Key Congress Issues,” Adulis, 1987, Vol. IV, No. 2, p. 9 Ibid. 44 45 Ibid. 46 “Interview—EPLF Secretary Genereal on Key Congress Issues,” Adulis, 1987, Vol. IV, No. 2, p. 6 Ibid. 47 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid. 50 Special Interview with Issayas Afewerki. Adulis Vol. 1, No. 4-5, October-November 1984, p. 9. EPLF Replies to Pravda’s … 51 52 “The Eritrean Problem,” Izvestiia, 9 February 1975, p. 2 quoted in Daniel Papp (1978: 9). 53 in Ibid.

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Chapter Six

Soviet and East German Attempts at Peacemaking

T

here is ample evidence to show that the Soviet Union, East Germany and the other socialist countries tried to convince the leaders of Ethiopia and Somalia to overcome their differences peacefully. They attempted to focus their attention instead on the bigger picture—the anti-imperialist and anti-regional reaction in the Red Sea and the Arab peninsula. By the same token, they wanted to solve the Eritrean problem peacefully by granting the Eritreans regional autonomy within the framework of Ethiopian sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity.1 The Soviet authorities maintained this position even when the situation had tipped the balance in favour of the EPLF and there was clear evidence to show that the Derg was in its death throes.

Soviet Union’s Dual Strategy on Eritrea The following quotation from the conversation between two senior officials in the East German and Soviet Union’s communist parties summarises the dual strategy adopted by the Soviet Union and its allies vis-à-vis the Eritrean liberation struggle. Friedel Trappen of (SED), East Germany and R. A. Ulyanovsky in the CC of the CPSU stated: We completely agree with the estimate that military actions for the solution of the Eritrean question alone are pointless and, moreover, dangerous. They would widen the gap between the Eritrean people and the Ethiopian Revolution and create new, intensified hatred. This does not mean that the PMAC should completely abandon military activities. We think that it is necessary to exert military pressure on the Eritrean separatist forces. This especially since in regard to 113

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa military matters the current situation in Eritrea is not favourable for the PMAC. It is therefore necessary to talk but at the same time to act militarily on the part of the PMAC. This applies in particular to the safeguarding of important military strategic positions and especially of the communications with the ports of Massawa and Assab as well as the capital Asmara, the cities Akordat, Keren, and Barentu. These military actions have to serve political measures.2

This was very different from Angola, (see Dominguez 1984, 1989; Patman 1990; Erisman 1984; Yordanov 2016; LeoGrande 1980) where the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries had characterised the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) as a counter-revolutionary agent of imperialism and apartheid which had to be defeated militarily. The Soviet bloc saw the EPLF and the progressive wing of the ELF as potential allies that could be won over rather than defeated militarily. As Papp observes perceptively: It was also noteworthy that the Soviet Union never equated the Eritrean secessionists with reactionary forces in Ethiopia or codified them as counter-revolutionaries. During the Angolan Civil War, the Soviet Union had adopted exactly that terminology for both movements which opposed the Soviet-supported MPLA. Thus even though the Soviet Union supported both the MPLA in Angola and the PMAC in Ethiopia, it was evident that the Kremlin perceived differences between the anti-MPLA forces on the one hand and the Eritrean separatists on the other (1978: 10).

In Moscow’s view, the anti-MPLA forces were allied with imperialist forces directly, whilst the Eritrean liberation fronts were perceived as being used by imperialist states rather than being their allies (see Papp 1976-77). The underlying reason for the Soviet position was that Moscow did not want to alienate either the Eritrean liberation movements or their allies, namely, the Syrians and Iraqis. The Soviet Union’s ambiguous position more or less coincided with Castro’s stance (see Dominguez 1984: 698). However, in view of Mengistu Haile Mariam’s intransigence, the Soviets had to tread a tightrope and could not acknowledge the progressive character of the Eritrean movements. So the Soviet Union adopted a dual strategy based both on negotiation with, and fighting against, the Eritrean liberation fronts. Moscow’s aim was not necessarily 114

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to defeat the progressive forces in the Eritrean liberation fronts, but rather to weaken them and make them amenable to compromise on terms acceptable to and dictated by Mengistu and his regime. Therefore the Soviet Union’s position with regards to the Eritrean liberation struggle was equivocal. At the heart of Soviet foreign policy in the Horn of Africa was the establishment of pax Sovietica in which all states in the region would be linked through a confederation under Soviet tutelage. This confederation would comprise of Ethiopia, Somalia and an autonomous Eritrea and Ogaden within the framework of Ethiopian sovereignty. This grand Soviet design failed in its first aim since the Somali government refused to abandon its irredentist stance over the Ogaden, and it was unthinkable for Mengistu to cede part of Ethiopia’s sovereign territory. With regards to the Eritrean problem, the assumption underpinning Moscow’s approach was that the liberation fronts were unlikely to accept a solution based on regional autonomy rather than independence as long as they were winning battles. The dual aspect of this Soviet strategy is evidenced by the fact that whilst representatives of the Derg and the Eritrean liberation movements met for talks in East Germany, the Soviet Union and other places, assaults and counter-assaults continued to be launched throughout Eritrea. Notwithstanding the military and diplomatic pressure, the leaderships of the ELF and the EPLF refused to surrender their demand for independence in favour of regional autonomy. Ironically, Mengistu and his regime also rejected the idea of granting Eritrea regional autonomy within the framework of the colonial territories. Mengistu intended to wipe Eritrean separatism from the face of the earth. In order to achieve this goal, he and his regime were in favour of partitioning Eritrea into four parts to expunge the notion of Eritrean national identity. David Korn observed, ‘It might still have been possible to put a political solution in train, had Mengistu been willing to offer the Eritreans something more than simple integration into a unitary Ethiopian state. The thought never seems to have crossed his mind’ (1990: 19). As we shall see later, Mengistu’s proposed solution to the Eritrean problem was considered too radical by the Soviet Union and East Germany. Mengistu also dismayed the Soviet Union and 115

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its socialist allies by his prevarication with regards to the formation of a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party. As a result, the grand design of pax Sovietica, based on the confederation of Somalia, Ethiopia and autonomous Eritrea and Ogaden, was stillborn. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union persisted with its dual strategy regardless of the Ethiopian military’s poor performance and the regime’s intransigence. The Soviets and their allies had realised early that Siad Barre’s obsession with incorporating the Ogaden into “Greater Somalia” was unacceptable and could only be dealt with militarily. Their view coincided with Mengistu’s and that of his regime. That was the main reason, as we saw in Chapter Two, that they agreed to back the Ethiopian counter-offensive to eject Somali forces and the WSLF from the Ogaden. The massive supply of Soviet arms and the Sovietengineered defeat of Somalia boosted Mengistu’s self-confidence, and precipitated the Ethiopian army’s move against the Eritrean liberation movements. Analysts and observers had anticipated that in the aftermath of the Ogaden war that the next “culprits” Mengistu would want to deal with would be those whom he routinely referred to as “bandits”. As Anthony Cordesman (1984: 792) states, ‘The militarisation of Ethiopia has continued despite the de-escalation of the Ogaden war. Moscow has poured up to $4 billion of military aid into the country since 1977 and the Ethiopian armed forces have grown from 65,000 men to more than 250,000 today’ (Cordesman 1984: 792). Mengistu expected Cuban ground troops and the Soviet highranking military officers would direct, plan and execute the large-scale counter-offensive in Eritrea. The aim of the assault, for Mengistu and his regime at least, was not only to dislodge the Eritrean liberation movements from the liberated areas and towns, but to destroy them utterly, once and for all. In an attempt to bolster the confidence of the Ethiopian army and to dishearten the Eritrean liberation movements, Mengistu bragged, in a speech read in his name over Radio Ethiopia on 16 May 1978: In the friends’ camp we have the USSR, Cuba, the South Yemen, East Germany and other genuine socialist countries and progressives that have supported us through their actual deeds. 116

Chapter 6 The genuine progressive comrades whom we have mentioned above are living with us, dying with us, and fighting with us, standing by the side of the broad masses of Ethiopia and their revolution after having traveled several thousand miles . . . In the enemy camp, international imperialism and all its puppets have risen up against us.3

As we shall see throughout the following chapters, the reality was far more complex. Mengistu soon found out that the Eritrean conflict was not as straightforward as the Somali occupation of the Ogaden. Dealing with an external invasion is different from dealing with an internal rebellion. Differences of principles and approaches also emerged soon after. The Soviets and the East Germans preferred a negotiated solution to the Eritrean problem within the framework of Ethiopian unity and territorial integrity. This stance was unacceptable both to the Derg and to the Eritreans, though for very different reasons. As we have seen, weakening the Eritrean liberation movements lay at the heart of the Soviet dual strategy. At the same time, the Soviets and their allies were aware that the Ethiopian military was unable to make inroads against the liberation fronts on its own. They had to be prepared to support Ethiopian forces, in the hope that defeats on the field would force the liberation fighters to the negotiating table. However, this was by no means an easy task or costless to the socialist countries. The Eritrean liberation struggle had many supporters in Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere, and the majority were also allies of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. The option of a peaceful solution was to some extent intended to appease these forces. Given Mengistu’s hostility to the notion of autonomy, let alone independent Eritrea, the potential risk involved with this option was that it could antagonise Mengistu and his regime and jeopardise the Soviet bloc’s strategic interests. The problem was further complicated by the Soviet bloc’s assumption that the Eritrean liberation movements were not homogenous ideologically. They were convinced that among them were progressive groups, who could be won over to work with the Derg under the guidance of the Soviet Union. The Soviets and their socialist allies were convinced that these forces could be mobilised to join the Ethiopian revolution to defeat imperialism and regional 117

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reaction, and more importantly, to bolster Soviet strategic interests in the region, including in the Red Sea. They tried to split the EPLF and the ELF-RC from what Moscow referred to as the “agents of Arab reaction” in the Eritrean liberation movement. The attempt bore no fruit because, regardless their ideological inclinations, all groups were equally committed to the goal of national independence. The attempt to solve the Eritrean problem peacefully was pursued even when it was clear to the Soviet authorities that any solution within the framework of Ethiopian unity and territorial integrity would be stillborn. Mengistu and his regime were determined to dismember Eritrea. He decided to divide it into three zones, namely, one for the Tigrinya-speaking Christian highlanders in the central region of the country, another for the Kunama in the southwest of the country and one in the north for the Tigre-speaking Eritreans. The Afar of Eritrea were to be cut off from the rest of the country to form part of the new autonomous region of Assab, which was to have the same status as Eritrea.4 According to the plan, the five autonomous regions in Ethiopia would be Eritrea, Tigray, Assab, Diredawa and Ogaden. They were to have their own assemblies directly accountable to the national Shengo, to the Council of State and the president of the country.5 The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front rejected this as a ploy intended to destroy Eritrean national identity (in Ibid.). That the Eritrean problem was always foremost in Mengistu’s mind is borne out by the fact that, in his visit to the Soviet Union in May 1977, only three months after assuming absolute power, he lamented the internal and external difficulties his leadership was facing.6 During talks with Podgorny, Gromyko, and other Soviet officials, he underscored the critical phase his regime was in.7 He said: ‘Rightist, as well as ultra-leftist elements, are rising, de facto, in a united front against the revolution. … These actions of domestic counterrevolution are linked to the activities of imperialism and other external reactionary forces directed against the new Ethiopia.’8 The message underlying Mengistu’s assertions was that these forces were undermining the Ethiopian revolution, sovereignty and territorial integrity by supporting the “separatist forces” in the region of Eritrea.

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Soviet Leadership Sympathetic to Mengistu The Soviet leadership observed: ‘The Ethiopian side judges that the separatist movement in Eritrea, which receives massive support from the Arab countries, acquired a reactionary character after the victory of the national-democratic revolution in Ethiopia.’9 This amounted to the regurgitation of Mengistu’s slogans. The Soviet leadership expressed understanding of the difficulties the new Ethiopian leadership encountered inside the country and outside its frontiers. Not only did the Soviet side express sympathy, but they also briefed the Ethiopian mission on the activities undertaken by the Soviet Union in the international arena to counter ‘the anti-Ethiopian position of the ruling circles of Sudan and to the arms supplies to the Eritrean separatists from a number of Arab states’ and pledged ‘… to continue henceforth to give assistance to the new Ethiopia’.10 The focus here is on the Soviet Union and its allies’ stance in regards to the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict rather than on the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia.11 In the discussions that followed Mengistu’s visit to the Soviet Union in 1977, the Soviet side drew Mengistu’s attention to the importance of a political settlement of the Eritrean problem for which in their view, ‘…the Ethiopian leadership must draft a clear program for resolving the national question, including in Eritrea, in order to bring progressive elements to their side.’12 The Soviet-Cuban strategy in Eritrea as insightfully observed by the US Interagency Intelligence Memorandum: … is to split off the Marxists from the non-Marxists in the insurgent movement, to bring the Marxists—primarily the EPLF (Eritrean People’s Liberation Front), plus Marxist elements in the ELF (Eritrean Liberation Front)—to the negotiating table with the Ethiopian government, and eventually to set up a Marxist front or government in an autonomous Eritrea that will be prepared to work with Addis Ababa.13

One of the major reasons the Soviet Union called for the drafting of a clear program to resolve the Eritrean problem peacefully was to strengthen the anti-imperialist alliance by wedding the progressive groups in the Eritrean liberation movement to the Ethiopian side. The Soviet Union ‘pointed out the danger of employing only military 119

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methods in resolving this difficult [Eritrean] problem.’14 The second reason the Soviet Union wanted the Derg to draft a program for the peaceful resolution of the Eritrean problem was its realization that Eritrea had many supporters, especially among progressive Arab states. The Soviets stated: ‘One must not … fail to take into account that the situation in Eritrea worries many countries, including progressive Arab states.’15 The Soviet Union’s position in this regard is identical to that of Cuba.16 The Soviet leadership recommended Mengistu to seek a political solution to the problem and to grant autonomy to the Eritreans.17 Both Russians and East Germans advised a peaceful solution, as did the Cubans, but Mengistu ignored them. 18 Despite his intransigence, he faced no consequences in terms of supply of weapons, advisors and military trainers. The Soviet bloc’s mantra became: “We should continue to work on him.” Over time, Mengistu realized that no matter what he did and how he behaved towards the internal opposition groups and towards Eritrea, the Russians had no leverage they could use on him. He realised that the Soviet Union could not afford to antagonise him after its loss of the military facilities at the Somali port of Berbera. As we shall see, he was to become aggressive towards the Russians and the Cubans whenever he felt they had overstepped their role, despite the fact that his survival and that of his regime depended on their support.

Socialist Countries endorse Mengistu’s Nationalist Position To Mengistu’s delight, not only did the Soviets and East Germans and the Cubans characterize the Eritrean problem as Ethiopia’s domestic problem, but they also proposed that ‘Any solution has to be found within the framework of the Ethiopian state’ even though they were aware, ‘this is uncomfortable for the Eritrean movements’19(emphasis added). Both the characterization of the Eritrean question as Ethiopia’s internal problem and the proposition that a solution should come within the framework of the Ethiopian state (notwithstanding the fact that Eritreans were fighting for independence) was obviously a non-starter for the Eritrean side. That this proposition was unacceptable to Eritreans was even clear to the Derg’s socialist allies. That the Soviets and the East Germans were aware their proposal would make the 120

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Eritreans ‘uncomfortable’ but did not want to alter it shows the degree to which they were prepared to ride roughshod over Eritrean wishes. If the socialist countries knew the second party to the proposed solution would feel “uncomfortable”, the obvious and logical thing to do would have been to propose an alternative approach. They could not do so because they were aware Mengistu would reject it offhand. Despite Mengistu’s intransigence and the EPLF’s uncompromising position on the question of independence, the Socialist Union Party of East Germany brought the two sides together in an attempt to find a peaceful solution. The meetings and their outcomes are discussed below.

The Meeting between the Derg and the EPLF In January 1978, the East Germans facilitated a meeting between representatives of the Derg and the EPLF. Isaias, the General Secretary of the secret Revolutionary Party of Eritrea,20 represented the latter. In his conversation with the East German leader Erich Honecker, Isaias said: We are very proud and very happy about this meeting. It is a historical meeting. The first visit of our comrades in the GDR already brought very positive results. [...] We highly appreciate the good offices of your country and your party. What we have achieved so far is already a turning-point in our fight. The results of the meeting with the Ethiopians are still uncertain, but in any case it will be a historic meeting. In the past 17 years a fierce battle has been waged. Not one meeting has taken place between Eritreans and Ethiopians. If something developed from this first meeting, this will not only be good for our two countries but for the peoples of the entire world. The only pre-condition for it is goodwill on the Ethiopian and on our side.21

For the EPLF, meeting the East German leader, regardless of the outcome of the summit, gave them badly-needed exposure and publicity. That may be the reason Isaias called it ‘a historic meeting.’ Honecker lamented the fact that the two progressive forces instead of joining hands to defeat imperialism were fighting each other and praised Isaias for his willingness and determination to come to Berlin in search of a political settlement. He said: 121

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa For the first dialogue with the Ethiopians it will be decisive to consider in which direction one has to become active in the interest of the Revolution. We are deeply interested in the success of the Ethiopian Revolution and in the objectives of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Movement. Both sides have the goal to repel the imperialist intervention and build a new humane social order. It is very painful that comrades who are ideologically close are involved in such a conflict. We welcome the fact that Comrade Aforki [Afwerki] has the determination and mandate to come to Berlin to find out together with the representatives of the DERG how the problems can be solved. We have used our influence as much as possible to make sure that you will be heard. Now much depends on the dialogue which - after 17 years - can lead to a turning-point (emphasis added).22

It is easy to see Honecker’s view of the Eritrean liberation movement. He valued it not in terms of recognising the right of the Eritrean people for self-determination, but rather as a means of undermining the interests of imperialism in the region. Honecker’s statement is also insincere when he claims that “they” are ‘interested in the objectives of the EPLF.’ He gives away his true position when he states that ‘from my point of view, the full autonomy within the Ethiopian state is the correct solution in order to pursue together the common task of economic build-up and the creation of a progressive social order in Ethiopia and Eritrea.’23 The single most important objective of the Eritrean liberation movement was the establishment of an independent sovereign state, but Honecker rejected that in favour of ‘full autonomy.’ A state with such a point of view could not be interested in the objectives of the Eritrean liberation struggle. There is nothing wrong in being interested in both the Ethiopian revolution and the objectives of the Eritrean liberation struggle. It is totally different, however, to prescribe a “solution” to the struggle which is tantamount to forfeiting its declared raison d’être—independence. “Full autonomy” within the framework of Ethiopia’s territorial integrity was incompatible with the declared aims and objectives of the liberation movement. Honecker’s call for “full autonomy” was also unrealistic. In the Minutes of the Meeting of the CPSU CC Politburo, on 14th July 1978, Alexander Maltsev said: ‘the Ethiopians are behaving incorrectly in Eritrea. They are campaigning against providing autonomy to Eritrea. They have begun military actions there.’24 122

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Isaias pointed out: ‘The main problem is in how far Ethiopia is willing to meet our demands. It is clear from the start that if Ethiopia is not bringing along new proposals, a solution will not be possible. There is no point in discussing the possibility of unifying both revolutions.’25 This was at the heart of the problem. Nevertheless, as if the primary objective of the Eritrean liberation struggle were the fight against imperialism, Isaias said; ‘What we need are guarantees that the fight against imperialism and reaction will continue’26 (emphais added). What Eritrea actually needed was the assurance that the East Germans and the other socialist countries, including the Soviet Union, would recognize their right to self-determination and be willing to facilitate negotiation along such lines. However, both men seemed more interested in telling each other what they wanted to hear rather than the difficult truth. Although it is not clear what he meant, Isaias said: ‘We won’t be picky in minor questions.’27 Thus Honecker declared: ‘We are deeply interested in the objectives of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Movement,’ while knowing perfectly well that neither he, nor his allies in the socialist countries, nor Moscow supported the demands of the Eritrean people. Equally hypocritically, Isaias beat around the bush, claiming that the fight against imperialism was the primary interest of the Eritrean liberation struggle. Undoubtedly, the Eritrean liberation struggle was anti-imperialist, but at that historical juncture, it was the Soviet Union’s unconditional support for the Derg that represented a threat to the hopes and aspirations of the Eritrean people and the objectives of the EPLF. Honecker rightly pointed out that ‘besides you, there are two other movements in Eritrea. In case of an agreement one would have to carefully plan all steps’.28 It seems that Isaias wanted to keep the meeting in East Germany secret. He answered: ‘Eritrea has many enemies within and without. If they all find out about it, we will have many difficulties. But we are preparing for it.29 ‘It is true that we are not the only organization. That, however, does not worry us. Because of our great influence and military strength we can succeed,’ he added. Worse still, he went on to say that ‘the other two organizations in Eritrea have allied themselves with the imperialists and the reaction in the Arabic region.’30 123

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This, besides being a groundless allegation, is surprising in light of the fact that the representatives of the Joint Supreme Political Leadership of the EPLF and the ELF-RC which met in Beirut, Lebanon, on 21 April 1978 agreed on 20 May 1978 and issued a declaration which (among other things) stated: ‘The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front and the Eritrean Liberation Front-Revolutionary Council are the sole representatives of the Eritrean people and the only legal spokesmen on all issues concerning the Eritrean people’s struggle’31 (emphasis added). If the ELF-RC were allies of imperialism and Arab reaction, would the EPLF enter into such an agreement? This is an example of the unfortunate but typical propensity of the two leaderships (but especially of the EPLF) to villify the “Other.” There is no evidence that the People’s Liberation Front-Eritrean Liberation Front (PLF-ELF) or the Sabbe group were acting in the service of imperialism or Arab reaction to the detriment of the Eritrean liberation struggle. A report of the conversation between the East German Central Committee and the Cuban Vice-president, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, clearly demonstrates this. The Cuban Vice-president said: ‘The leadership of our party has for some time expected a declaration by Mengistu on the Eritrean problem. This had been agreed between him and comrade Valdez Vivo in the 5-point program at the end of last year [1977].’32 It was further stated: ‘Comrade Werner Lamberz had detailed this still more in his talk with Mengistu and there was, as you know, the affirmation that this declaration would still come in December. Obviously the Ethiopian comrades have not been sufficiently ready for it and still have numerous reservations against a decisive step towards the solution of the Eritrean problem.’33 The members of the Cuban delegation stated: We also completely agree with the view that the Ethiopian leadership apparently does not have a clear concept, either on a general solution of the national problem in Ethiopia nor on the specific problems in Eritrea. They have until now not really seriously believed in it and have not seriously concerned themselves with it but instead only considered the demand for a peaceful solution as [in itself] a kind of political solution… the Ethiopian comrades still do not have the deep recognition of the necessity of a political, i.e. peaceful solution of the Eritrean problem.34 124

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The second meeting between the EPLF delegation headed by Isaias and the delegation of Ethiopia’s PMAC, represented by Berhanu Bayeh, took place on 23rd March 1978. Hermann Axen, member of the CC Politburo and CC secretary, attended the meeting. Although the two representatives had returned with hardened attitudes, they disingenuously declared their ‘desire to terminate the bloodshed and to do everything to solve the Eritrean problem by peaceful means.’35 Nonetheless, ‘the political negotiations showed that the positions on both sides had become stiffer.’36 This was despite the fact that Mengistu had claimed in his conversation with Werner Lamberz that he was willing to ‘grant the people of Eritrea full autonomy within the Ethiopian state.’37 On the Ethiopian side Berhanu Bayeh ‘…was inclined to favor a predominantly military solution of the Eritrean problem. They did not make any concrete or constructive proposals for a peaceful and political solution…’38 The socialist countries’ call for a peaceful political settlement of the Eritrean question was hardly less disingenuous. On the one hand, they urged Mengistu and his regime to grant the Eritreans regional autonomy within the framework of Ethiopian sovereignty, and on the other, they supported the regime’s military campaign by supplying enormous amounts of materiel to weaken the liberation movements. Although the East German and Soviet officials questioned the usefulness of relying solely on military actions to solve the Eritrean question, they were convinced that the dual policy of force and peace talks was the proper way forward.39 But Mengistu and his regime were unwilling to grant even this. Although nothing had changed in the Eritrean side’s position, the Draft Letter stated that the attitude of the representatives of the Eritrean movement had hardened due to pressure from ‘… the leadership of the Sudan and the Arab reaction…’40 This was said to be reinforced by nationalism of ‘openly separatist forces within the Eritrean movements, especially by means of the co-ordination between the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front and the Eritrean Liberation Front (Revolutionary Council).’41  The strong sense of optimism exhibited by Isaias in the first meeting had been replaced by pessimism, reflected in the EPLF delegation’s reluctance to participate in the second meeting. They 125

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assumed that no benefit would come from it. Isaias made it clear that Eritrea’s demand for independence was not subject to compromise or negotiation. ‘Only after long sharp discussion was he willing to agree to this second meeting and to the further examination of the proposals made by the SED.’42 Both sides made their irreconcilable positions clear in the course of the meeting. Nonetheless, both parties accepted the SED proposal, which was agreed on by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to put the following four points before the Provisional Military Administrative Council and the Central Committee of the EPLF as recommendations for a settlement: 1. Both sides confirm their resolve to stop the bloodshed immediately and bring about a political solution.

2. The Provisional Military Administrative Council of Ethiopia will make a public declaration expressing its concrete proposals for the implementation of regional autonomy for Eritrea in the framework of the Ethiopian state and under inclusion of all willing positive forces in Eritrea. The Central Committee of the EPLF recognizes the achievements of the Ethiopian Revolution and declares itself ready for cooperation in the interest of implementation of regional autonomy. 3. Revolutionary Ethiopia’s secure access to the Red Sea must be guaranteed by its uninterrupted access lines and its control over Asmara and the ports of Massawa and Assab. 4. Both sides form a common commission for the purpose of implementing the above points and all other steps for the security of the Revolution in Ethiopia and regional autonomy in Eritrea.43 The third proposed agreement amounted to surrendering Eritrean sovereignty and territory. In the light of the fact that the proposed settlement disproportionately favoured the Ethiopian side at the expense of Eritrea, the question that should have sprang to the mind of Isaias and his comrades was “what is there for us in the proposed 126

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settlement?” There was no indication to show that they expressed such a concern. Isaias’ detractors may justifiably interpret this as an indication of his willingness to compromise the goal of Eritrean independence. Not only that, but when Isaias was interviewed in the official organ of the EPLF, Vanguard, in July 1978, his account of what was proposed by the SED (the East German Communist Party led by Honecker) and agreed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union did not correspond to what is stated above in the declassified East German documents. Isaias’ account is grossly inconsistent with the four points presented here. According to Isaias the ‘points presented by Democratic Germany during the third tour [meeting] were: 1. That the Derg accepts and declares the right of the Eritrean people to self-determination; 2. That a cease fire be declared in Eritrea;

3. That some roads be opened so as to ease the economic problems created in some places, especially around Asmara; 4. And that official negotiation starts after all these measures went in effect.44

I have thoroughly scrutinised the East German documents and nowhere did I come across these alleged proposals. In stark contrast to Isaias’ claim, Honecker made it crystal clear that the best solution to the Eritrean problem was the one proposed by the Derg—regional autonomy. Does this therefore mean Isaias misinformed the EPLF’s leadership by distorting the ‘four point proposal presented by East Germany? The question that arises is: why did the Eritrean delegation accept the draft settlement in view of the fact that it departed so clearly from the avowed aims of the EPLF and the Eritrean people? Neither party had ever agreed to regional autonomy or envisaged guaranteeing the Ethiopians uninterrupted access lines and control of Eritrea’s capital city, Asmara and the ports of Massawa and Assab. These demands 127

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amounted to surrendering important parts of Eritrea to Ethiopia, forfeiting or undermining the single most important goal of the Eritrean liberation struggle. However, both delegations agreed only to submit the proposed settlement to their leaderships without necessarily accepting the proposed solutions and to report back in a third meeting, planned to take place in the GDR in mid-May.45 According to Isaias, however, ‘as the authorities of Democratic Germany were busy with other things at the time of our next visit, the proposed meeting date was postponed to the beginning of June.’46 At the meeting, the EPLF delegation presented a memorandum and the delegation of the Derg also came with responses.47 A deadlock appeared as a result of the preconditions demanded by the Ethiopian side. The Derg’s representative said that in order for their side to start negotiating on the basis of the East German proposal, ‘the Eritrean revolution or the democratic forces in Eritrea—the EPLF included— must accept the “national democratic programme” of the Derg. It was made clear by the Derg’s representative that unless the EPLF accepts this condition the Derg will not enter into negotiations’.48The EPLF’s delegation rejected the Derg’s precondition as amounting to capitulation and the meeting came to an end. The EPLF concluded that the proposed precondition had exposed the Derg in the sense that it ‘unmasked [that]…the Derg’s erroneous slogan for peaceful solution is in the final analysis only a tactical maneuver used to serve its military preparations’.49 When both parties had accepted the four points proposed by East Germany in the March 1978 Berlin meeting, it was highly likely that neither the Ethiopian nor the Eritrean delegation full-heartedly accepted the terms of the proposed settlement. The Ethiopian side had made clear its intention to defeat the Eritrean liberation movement militarily and the Eritreans participated in the second meeting only reluctantly. The proposed settlement would have forfeited the foundation on which the liberation struggle rested, so the promise to submit it to the EPLF leadership for consideration was meaningless. Isaias, who represented the EPLF in the meeting, was in any case, more powerful than the whole EPLF leadership. It is likely that his promise to submit the proposal to the leadership was no more than a formality.

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It was stated that one of the achievements of the second meeting was that it encouraged the EPLF to change its mind about a previous decision to discontinue contacts with the PMAC.50 One of the reasons the East German government persisted in trying to achieve settlement of the Eritrean question seems to have been driven by the desire to secure Ethiopia’s territorial integrity and its continued access to and control of the Red Sea, Asmara, Assab and Massawa. The socialist countries were also anxious to prevent the internationalisation of the conflict, fearing the involvement of the reactionary Arab countries and imperialist powers on the Eritreans’ side. Honecker’s Draft Letter to Brezhnev on Ethiopian-Eritrean Talks warned: ‘… the situation involves the acute danger that the fighting over Eritrea will escalate and that the Arab reaction and the imperialists will intervene even further and attempt to internationalize the conflict. This would severely endanger the revolutionary developments in Ethiopia.’51 This clearly demonstrates that the socialist countries saw granting regional autonomy to the Eritreans as a means to an end. This end was to ensure Ethiopia’s territorial integrity, safeguard its access to the Red Sea and its control of Asmara and the ports of Massawa and Assab, and avert the potential threat of intervention by Arab reaction and imperialism. The Draft Letter further stated: ‘The Politburo of the CC of the SED is of the opinion that everything has to be done to achieve a political solution of the Eritrean question.’52 In the preceding 17 years, the Eritrean people and the liberation movements that represented their interests had made it clear that their aim was no less than the establishment of an independent Eritrean state. Even the proposed regional autonomy was only a means of serving Ethiopian interests: ‘The safeguarding of the revolutionary process in Ethiopia and its territorial as well as political integrity is a necessary precondition for this [Eritrean autonomy]. The Provisional Military Administrative Council must doubtless have reliable control over its free access to the Red Sea. This, however, must be safeguarded by political and military means.’53 It is worth noting that the recurring references to Ethiopia’s secure access to, and control of, Asmara, the Red Sea and the ports of Massawa and Assab, reflect the Soviet allies’ determination to reassure Mengistu that they were committed to protecting Ethiopia’s interest at 129

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the expense of Eritrea. This was consistent with what the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries perceived to be their own strategic interests, and to achieve it, they were willing to follow Mengistu’s hard line. The Draft Letter, for example, stated: ‘It is our impression following the recent meeting that the Provisional Military Administrative Council is only oriented towards the military tasks in this matter and, despite repeated verbal assurances, has not made any concrete political steps in winning over the Eritrean population for the implementation of regional autonomy’ (emphasis added).54 However, the Soviet bloc’s view was that for the proposed solution to succeed it had to be embraced by the Eritrean people. This, it was believed, should be the job of the PMAC. Moscow and Berlin maintained that the PMAC had the ability to win the hearts and minds of all Eritreans in favour of a peaceful political solution. We therefore think that the Provisional Military Administrative Council should without further delay address an appeal to all willing forces in Eritrea for the peaceful political solution of the Eritrean problem. It would have to render more precisely the proposals it has made so far by concrete suggestions on the implementation of the right for self-determination of the different nations within Ethiopia in order to speed up the process of differentiation within the Eritrean population and to isolate the reactionary, separatist forces in Eritrea (emphasis added).55

The second part of the quotation above clearly demonstrates the willingness of the East Germans and the Russians to pander to Mengistu by seeking to blot out the achievements of the Eritrean liberation struggle in the preceding 17 years. The call in the Draft Letter for ‘the implementation of the right for self-determination of the different nations within Ethiopia’ amounted to ignoring the Eritrean liberation movement. Not only did it deny the specificity of the Eritrean issue, but nullified the price paid by Eritreans in lost lives and opportunities through the years of the struggle. Readers of the Draft Letter to Brezhnev may discern a darker intention underlying the proposal – that of dividing and weakening the Eritrean liberation movements. This is clear from the declared intention of speeding ‘up the process of differentiation within the Eritrean population and to isolate the reactionary, separatist forces in Eritrea.’ Labelling the 130

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forces who stood for independence as reactionary contradicts the previous position held by the socialist countries, especially that of East Germany’s ruling party. As we saw earlier, Honecker had told Isaias:‘We are deeply interested in … the objectives of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Movement.’56 The reference to ‘proposals it has made so far …’ is to Mengistu’s Nine-Point Plan of 1976, whose futility were even acknowledged by the architect of Soviet-Ethiopian relations, the Soviet Ambassador, Ratanov. In a conversation with East German officials in 1977, he had noted: … the Ethiopian side is not willing to grant the Eritrean population autonomy within the bounds of its old territories. They assume that other peoples still reside in Eritrea (e.g. Tigre and Afars). This has to be taken into consideration. Therefore they want to trim Eritrean territory. The area of the Afars around the port of Assab as well as the Tigre are to be separated. This would be almost half of Eritrean territory.57

Ratanov continued: ‘Should the Ethiopian leadership stick with this point of view, it will be difficult to find a common ground for negotiations.’58 Despite this insightful observation, fourteen and a half months later Honecker called for the implementation of that very plan in his Draft Letter to Brezhnev. It not only failed to conceive a solution which would have kept the entirety of Eritrea as a political entity, but actually aimed at dismembering it. Mengistu’s Nine-Point Plan was stillborn; but the question that arises is: why did Honecker and his Soviet allies want to resurrect it? The reason is straightforward. Honecker’s Draft Letter was issued in the run-up to a major Soviet-backed Ethiopian counter-offensive, which aimed at dealing a deathblow to the liberation struggle. The Eritrean liberation movements were under enormous pressure on the eve of the counter-offensive’s launch, and Honecker and the Soviet Union hoped the threat of potential extinction would push the EPLF and the ELF-RC to the negotiating table. The Soviet bloc clearly expected the Eritrean liberation movements to accept conditions that had been unacceptable previously. The Draft letter concluded: ‘Based on the results of the last meeting, the Politburo of our Party proposes therefore that the Soviet comrades, 131

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in conjunction with representatives of our Party, work out internally possible solutions to the regional autonomy of Eritrea in the framework of the Ethiopian state in order to communicate them at the appropriate time to the Chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council, Mengistu Haile Mariam.’59 The Draft Letter also indicates that the Cuban, Soviet and East German communist parties had been happy with the outcome of the second meeting between the Eritrean and Ethiopian delegations. The Cuban Vice-president Rodriguez, for example, stated: The initiative and the efforts of the SED merit the highest recognition. The [Ethiopian-Eritrean] meeting in Berlin was of great historical importance. We fully agree with the strategy of the SED; this fully conforms with our common concept of efforts towards a peaceful solution of the Eritrean problem as agreed between us. I would like to emphasize that there is complete agreement among us and that the politburo of our party completely approves of the strategy, the estimate, the arguments and the conclusion in this matter.60

Ulyanovsky of the CPSU, who oversaw the follow up of the EritreanEthiopian second meeting, also observed that bilateral contacts with the Cuban and East German communist parties were excellent. But he stated: ‘There has been no exchange of opinion with the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen on the part of the CPSU. They have, as is well known, pulled their troops out of Ethiopia.’61 It was further pointed out that ‘one has to take into consideration that the situation in the PDR Yemen is difficult. The PDR Yemen has to be protected.’62 It was agreed to create a mechanism for consultation and co-ordination with regard to the Draft Letter from Honecker to Brezhnev before the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.63 It was also agreed that public pronouncements of the respective parties on the Eritrean question had to be synchronised with the results: ‘…of the Moscow talks with Ahmed Nasser [the ELF’s leader] and the planned third meeting of the Ethiopian and Eritrean sides with the SED.’64 The Eritrean side had called for guarantees during the second meeting, and in response, it was stated: ‘Concerning the guarantees called for by the Eritrean side, one can only get more precise on this point after concrete results have been achieved on the question of what, 132

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who, and to whom in some matter guarantees might be given.’65 It is worth noting that the PMAC would still not relinquish its predilection for a military solution. As Ulyanovsky pointed out: … the attempt to keep the Ethiopian leadership from its military advance through us was a very delicate matter. The PMAC was predominantly of the opinion that even a political solution of the Eritrean question was not possible without a strengthening of Ethiopia’s military positions in Eritrea and that the liberation of above-mentioned ports and cities can only be achieved by military means. The PMAC assumed that only then [would] actual and basic conditions exist for negotiations with the separatists.[...]66

In the PMAC’s view, if defeated, the Eritrean liberation movement would have no other choice but to surrender rather than face annihilation. Mengistu also believed that Eritrea’s alleged supporters, the Arab governments, would be disinclined to invest their scarce resources in a losing side. These conditions were expected to prompt the Eritrean movements to renounce their demand for independence. The PMAC’s socialist allies were walking a tightrope each time they proposed to resolve the Eritrean problem peacefully. Despite the fact that the survival of Mengistu and his regime was contingent on the support of the Soviet Union and its allies, they found it difficult to raise the question of a peaceful resolution because of Mengistu’s pathological hostility to the idea of negotiating with what he referred to as “bandits.” As Westad observes: ‘For Mengistu … no negotiations with the Eritreans …were possible until they had recognised the “leading role of the national government.” When the foreign affairs spokesman for the Derg, Sisay Habte, had the courage to suggest otherwise Mengistu had him purged and shot’ (2005: 259). Trappen and Ulyanovsky reflect that urging the Ethiopian leadership to desist from using military force was ‘very delicate’ 67 partly because of Mengistu’s violent and autocratic tendencies. The third meeting between the EPLF and Ethiopia was planned to take place in the GDR in mid-May 1978.68 Although there is evidence to show that it did happen, I am unable to find information about it in the declassified archives. According to Robert Patman, this third discussion was supposed to have taken place with the representatives of the EPLF in East Berlin (1990: 274). 133

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As seen earlier, the socialist states were aware that there was more than one liberation movement in Eritrea, and consequently, they understood that a meaningful solution could only be achieved if both fronts representing the Eritrean people were involved in the peace process. Notwithstanding this, however, senior Soviet officials were reluctant to be involved directly and openly for fear of antagonising Mengistu and his regime. It was for this reason that the meeting with the ELF was held with the Soviet Committee for Solidarity rather than with the Government of the Soviet Union or representatives of the party. Every move the Soviet Union took concerning Eritrea was carefully weighted against the risk of antagonising Mengistu and his regime. This was not only true regarding the meeting with the leader of the ELF-RC, Ahmed Nasser. There is also evidence to show that the Soviet Union turned down a suggestion by the head of the bureau of the Palestine Liberation Organisation in Baghdad, Abu Nidal. A record of conversation between the East German official Paul Markovski, and CPSU CC international department head, Boris Ponomarev, in Moscow stated that: ‘Abu Nidal was informed that Aforki was at a meeting in Berlin. He was willing to meet with representatives of the CPSU. Abu Nidal emphasizes that it would be necessary to quickly find a solution since Saudi Arabia and other reactionary forces were exerting strong pressure upon the Eritrean movements.’69 Unsurprisingly the suggestion was politely declined. ‘Ponomarev stated that the CPSU did not think a meeting with Aforki [Afwerki] was necessary after a meeting between him and the SED had just taken place. The SED was to continue its conversations with the Eritreans.’70 There follows a brief account of the meeting between the Soviet Committee for Solidarity and Ahmed Nasser, the leader of the ELF-RC.

The Soviet Committee for Solidarity Meets Ahmed Nasser On 7 June 1978, a meeting between the Soviet Committee for Solidarity and Ahmed Nasser, the leader of the ELF-RC, took place in which the former ‘…explained the USSR position which is based on the assumption that the solution of the Eritrean question has to be achieved within the framework of a unified Ethiopian state by means of 134

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negotiations.’71 It was reported that, in initial talks, Nasser indicated that the ELF-RC would consider federation with Ethiopia as a solution.72 It seems however that this was likely based on a misunderstanding because information from the talks include a statement that: ‘In the following talks it was not mentioned again, and by the time the third talk took place on 8 June, the position of the Eritrean friends had even hardened.’73 The results of the three consecutive talks held with Ahmed Nasser showed that the Eritrean side was not willing to surrender the ‘slogan of independence of Eritrea.’ The point of departure of the ELF-RC was that neither side should force the other and, in their view, a genuine solution could only result from ‘unconditional negotiations.’74 Earlier in 1978 the East German leader, Honecker, had reminded Isaias of the existence of the other two movements in Eritrea which needed to be considered in case of an agreement. Isaias had admitted reluctantly that the EPLF was not the only organisation in Eritrea, but had belittled the significance of the other organisations compared to the EPLF’s influence and military strength. He further claimed that the other two organisations had sold out to imperialism and Arab reaction in the region.75 The disparaging comments about the ELF-RC were disingenuous, and served little purpose. The representatives of the Joint Supreme Polical Leadership of the EPLF and the ELF-RC on 21 June 1978 issued a declaration which underlined the wording of their peace agreement between the ELF and the EPLF of 20 April 1978 and the Political principles of 20 May 1978, and which stated, ‘The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Eritrean Liberation FrontRevolutionary Council (ELF-RC) are the sole representatives of the Eritrean people and the only legal spokesmen on all issues concerning the Eritrean people’s struggle.’76 The ELF-RC, for their part, were at pains to prove that their party was the most Marxist-Leninist of the Eritrean movements. They pointed out advantages they claimed to offer the Socialist bloc over the EPLF and the ELF-PLF (Saleh Sabbe’s faction): 1.

The ELF recognizes the progressive character of the Ethiopian Revolution. 

2.

It acknowledges the importance of Soviet-Cuban support. 135

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3.

It does not demand preconditions.

4.

It is willing to negotiate.

5.

It favors the unification on a common democratic basis.77

The Solidarity Committee, Ahmed Nasser’s host, concluded: ‘The Soviet comrades estimate that the attitude of the ELF appears to be slightly more flexible as [than] those of the other Eritrean movements but this is, however, only an appearance.’78 Another negotiating session was also said to have taken place in Beirut on 24th August 1980 in which the leaders of the ELF, Soviet diplomats and representatives of the Derg were present.79 This meeting represented the last attempt at peaceful negotiation between the PMAC and the Eritrean insurgents. The ELF-RC’s declarations, besides being opportunistic, were to some extent bewildering. Critics may wonder how such a characterisation could square with Mengistu’s equating the Eritrean liberation movements with banditry and counter-revolution, when they seemed so ready to compromise.80 It is also worth noting that the ELFRC made this declaration during what its representative in Beirut called ‘“the largest offensive” ever launched by the central government in Addis Ababa…’81 The declared aim of the May-August 1978 counteroffensive was to eliminate the Eritrean liberation movement82 Even for a party that wanted to give the impression of magnanimity, it was extraordinary to characterize the Mengistu regime as progressive when it was engaged in an all-out conflict against the liberation movement. The ELF-RC’s acknowledgement of the importance of SovietCuban support to Mengistu was equally bizarre since it was the supply of weapons, provision of military training and advice by the Soviet bloc that enabled the regime to recapture most of the liberated cities, towns and the other areas. Given the weakness of the Ethiopian military before Soviet and Cuban intervention in 1977, it would have been inconceivable for Mengistu’s troops to dislodge the ELF and the EPLF unaided. Acknowledging the significance of the support provided by the Soviet Union and Cuba to Mengistu’s regime amounted to celebrating the builders of the ELF’s own “funeral pyre.” Indeed, the counter-offensive set in motion the demise of the ELF, including the ELF-RC. 136

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The last point in the communiqué is obscure. It is not clear what the ELF leadership meant by “It favors the unification on a common democratic basis”. Unification, with whom? With the Derg? The latter can’t be the case, because at a later stage of the negotiation, the ELFRC team made it clear that nothing less than independence would be acceptable to them. In the following chapter I examine the dilemmas that faced the Eritrean liberation movements in the most critical period of their conflict with the Soviet allies.

Endnotes 1

“Draft Letter from Honecker to Brezhnev on Ethiopian-Eritrean Talks, … 2 “Memorandum of Conversation between [SED] Comrade Friedel Trappen and Soviet Comrade R. A. Ulyanovsky in the CC of the CPSU,” May 11, 1978, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/127 https://digitalarchive. wilsoncenter.org/document/111899 (accessed 14 Dec 2017). 3 Quoted in Murrey Marder, “Ethiopia Launches Drive Against Eritrean Rebels,”
 Washington Post, 17 May 1978 4 EIU, CR 1987, no 4:22. 5 EIU, CR 1987, no 4:22; EIU, CR 1988, no 4:21. 6 See “CPSU CC to SED CC, Information on Visit of Mengistu Haile Mariam to Moscow… 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 For a brief discussion see Chapter 2 12 Report on Mengistu’s Visit to the Soviet Union … 13 Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Horn of Africa, Part 1 Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, Washington, May 22, 1978 Report on Mengistu’s Visit to the Soviet Union … 14 Ibid. 15 16 See “Memorandum of Conversation of SED Comrade Lamberz with Cuban Ambassador to Ethiopia, Comrade Pepe, Addis Ababa,” March 03, 1978, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, SAPMOBArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/127; document obtained and translated by Christian F. Ostermann. 137

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32

33 34 35 36 37

138

See “Memorandum of Conversation between East German official Paul Markovski and CPSU CC International Department head Boris N. Ponomarev in Moscow,” … Ibid. Ibid. It is interesting to note that only its carefully selected members knew of the existence of the clandestine party within the EPLF. Even the large majority of the EPLF combatants were not aware it existed. “Memorandum of a Conversation between East German leader Erich Honecker and Siassi Aforki, … Ibid. Ibid. “Minutes of Meeting of CPSU CC Politburo (excerpt),” July 14, 1978, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, APRF, f. 3, op. 120, d. 40, ll. 45, 10-12. Translated for CWIHP by Mark Doctoroff http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111906 (accessed 28/7/2017). “Memorandum of a Conversation between East German leader Erich Honecker and Siassi [Isaias] Aforki … Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. EPLF-ELF-RC Joint Press Release on Peaceful Solution, 21 June 1978, Beirut, Lebanon. Printed in EPLF, Vanguard Vol. 3, No. 3, July 1978. SED CC, Department of International Relations, 16 February 1978, Report on Conversation with [Vice-president] Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Member of the Politburo of the CP Cuba, in Havana,” February 13, 1978, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, SAPMOBArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/127; obtained and translated by Christian F. Ostermann. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110968 (accessed 3/9/19). Ibid. Ibid. “Draft Letter from Honecker to Brezhnev on Ethiopian-Eritrean Talks … Ibid. “Memorandum of a Conversation between East German leader Erich Honecker and Siassi Aforki …

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“Draft Letter from Honecker to Brezhnev on Ethiopian-Eritrean Talks, 19 April 1978 … 39 See for example, “Memorandum of Conversation between [SED] Comrade Friedel Trappen and Soviet Comrade R. A. Ulyanovsky … 40 “Draft Letter from Honecker to Brezhnev on Ethiopian-Eritrean Talks, 19 April 1978 … Ibid 41 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid. 44 Excerpts from Special Issue of Vanguard Vol. 3, No 7, July 1978 (The entire issue is an exclusive interview with the Vice-Secretary General of the EPLF, Isaias Afwerki). 45 “Draft Letter from Honecker to Brezhnev on Ethiopian-Eritrean Talks, 19 April 1978 … See Excerpts from Special Issue of Vanguard Vol. 3, No 7, July 1978 46 Ibid. 47 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid. 50 .”Draft Letter from Honecker to Brezhnev on Ethiopian-Eritrean Talks, 19 April 1978 … Ibid. 51 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid. “Memorandum of a Conversation between East German leader Erich 56 Honecker and Siassi Aforki… Memorandum of Conversation, East German official with Soviet 57 Ambassador to Ethiopia Ratanov, Addis Ababa, 6 December 1977 (dated 7 December).  [Source: SAPO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/126; document obtained and translated by Christian F. Ostermann.] http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110964 (accessed 17/10/17). Ibid. 58 59 “Draft Letter from Honecker to Brezhnev on Ethiopian-Eritrean Talks, 19 April 1978,” April 19, 1978 … 60 “SED CC, Department of International Relations, 16 February 1978, Report on Conversation with [Vice-president] Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Member of the Politburo of the CP Cuba, in Havana,” February 13, 1978, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, SAPMOBArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/127; obtained and translated by Christian F. 139

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa Ostermann. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110968 (accessed 7/7/18). 61 This suggests that the Yemeni troops in spite of the key role they played in warding off the liberation of the port city of Massawa by the EPLF, they did not participate in the major Ethiopian counteroffensive of 1978-1979. 62 “Memorandum of Conversation between [SED] Comrade Friedel Trappen and Soviet Comrade R. A. Ulyanovsky … Ibid. 63 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid. 68 “Draft Letter from Honecker to Brezhnev on Ethiopian-Eritrean Talks, 19 April 1978,” April 19, 1978… Memorandum Of Conversation Between East German Official Paul 69 Markovski And Cpsu Cc International Department Head Boris N. Ponomarev In Moscow, 10 February 1978 Ibid. 70 71 “Information on Talks of Ahmed Nasser (ELF-RC) in the USSR Solidarity Committee,” June 07, 1978, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/127 http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111900 (accessed 2/8/18). Ibid. 72 Ibid. 73 74 Ibid. 75 “Memorandum of a Conversation between East German leader Erich Honecker and Siassi Aforki… EPLF and ELF-RC Joint Press Release on Peaceful Solution, 21 June 76 1978, Beirut, Lebanon. Reprinted in EPLF’s Vanguard Vol 3, No. 2, July 1978. 77 “Information on Talks of Ahmed Nasser (ELF-RC) in the USSR Solidarity Committee,” June 07, 1978 .. Ibid. 78 79 Africa Confidential, 19, 14, 7 July 1984, pp. 3-4. 80 See “Embassy of the GDR in the USSR, Political Department, 17 February 1978 … see also Mengigistu Haile Mariam in The Ethiopian Herald, 26 Feb. 1982. Quoted in Murrey Marder, “Ethiopia Launches Drive Against Eritrean 81 Rebels.” 140

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Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, May 17, 1978. 82 See Mengistu Haile Mariam’s interview, ‘Considerable Progress Already,’ New Times, 48, 1985: 10-11

141

Chapter Seven

Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The EPLF’s Dilemma A political dilemma emerges when two valid norms point a polity in opposite directions Bernard Williams (1973: 86).

E

ven though the leaderships of the two independence fronts faced severe dilemmas as a result of the Soviet bloc’s intervention in the war of liberation, the focus here is on the EPLF. Since its inception, the EPLF had had a polarised view of the world divided into two antagonistic and irreconcilable camps— revolution and counter-revolution. This was consistent with the view prevailing worldwide. It was common for governments and national liberation movements in the developing world to belong either to the socialist and anti-imperialist camp or to the imperialist camp. According to the classic narrative, in the revolutionary camp belonged the socialist countries, peoples fighting for independence and liberation, and the working classes of developed countries fighting against the owners of the means of production to bring about change and transformation through socialist revolution. In the counter-revolutionary camp belonged imperialism, colonialism, regional and domestic reaction, which struggled constantly to defeat the socialist countries, national liberation movements and the working classes and their representatives. In the EPLF leadership’s view, at the helm of the two hegemonic and antagonistic camps were the Soviet Union and the United States of America. 143

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For any national liberation movement, such as the ELF and the EPLF, belonging to the revolutionary anti-imperialist anti-colonialist camp was critical. Not only was this important in terms of ensuring co-operation and solidarity with progressive forces worldwide, but also in terms of identity, credibility, legitimacy and more importantly recognition. The two liberation movements, namely the ELF and the EPLF tried constantly to present themselves as being more progressive and more anti-imperialist than the other. Not only did the EPLF try to appear more progressive than the ELF, but also it often distanced itself from the influence of reactionary Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and others. The progressive wing of the ELF faction, the Revolutionary Council also tried to adopt pro-Moscow stance. In the second half of the 20th century, whether a national liberation movement was progressive or reactionary was determined not only by the nature of the struggle such a movement waged, but also by the extent of its recognition in the anti-imperialist and progressive camp. Transnational alliances with progressive forces in the regional and international arenas were considered conditio sine qua non for belonging to the worldwide revolutionary movement. The leadership of the worldwide revolutionary movement was contested, especially after the ideological rupture that took place between the Soviet Union and People’ Republic of China (PRC) in the first half of the 1960s. Most liberation movements in Africa, regardless of their varied ideological inclinations, were reluctant to take a position either for or against Moscow or Beijing, and this included both the EPLF and the ELF. In spite of the differences between the Soviet Union and the PRC, most of the African national liberation movements considered both of them champions of the revolutionary camp. This was not because they did not understand the foundations of their differences, but because it was believed that division within the revolutionary camp could only benefit US imperialism and reaction. Since the Eritrean liberation struggle did not neatly fit into the typical anti-colonialist struggle fought against European masters or white supremacists as was the case in the former Portuguese colonies and South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe, respectively, the leaders of the EPLF and the ELF had to work hard to gain support. Given the influence and ties that Emperor Haile Selassie and his government 144

Chapter 7

had both in Africa and with the US and European states, the task of promoting the cause of Eritrean independence was not easy. The Eritrean liberation struggle was easily labelled a movement without a cause, or in the service of imperialism and regional reaction. Firstly, those who believed in what they called ‘Greater Ethiopia’ ridiculed the accusation that Ethiopia had “colonised” Eritrea. They argued that the Ethiopian state was at a pre-capitalist stage and therefore did not have the essential characteristics of a colonial state. Some offered the suggestion that Eritrea was more developed than Ethiopia and so could not possibly have been colonised by Addis Ababa. They were vehemently opposed to the idea of Eritrean independence and left no stone unturned to delegitimise the liberation struggle. We will return to this controversy later. Syria and Iraq were the first countries that warmed to the Eritrean liberation struggle. The reason for this is not clear but probably had to do with the Ethiopian government’s close relationship with the state of Israel and Christianity. In the 1960s, the ELF leadership was keen to present the liberation struggle as pro-Arab and pro-Islam. It is not clear whether this was for the purpose of gaining support from middleEastern countries or because the leadership genuinely believed that Eritrean Muslims were oppressed by “Christian” Ethiopia. Initially, the Syrian and Iraqi governments considered Eritrea to be part of the Arab world, and their support throughout the 30- year war was indispensable, especially for the various ELF factions. In 1963, 30 Eritrean students were sent to Syria from Cairo to receive military training. Among them was Ramedan Mohamed Nur who became the secretary-general of the EPLF until replaced by his deputy, Isaias, at the second organisational congress in 1987. At the end of the students’ military training, they were given weapons and returned to Eritrea to join a small band of ELF fighters in Barka province. A second group of about 70 were again sent to Syria to receive military training in 1965, and the flow continued for some years (see Markakis 1990: 112). In 1964, the Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai visited Eritrea, which was then formally part of Ethiopia. Seifudein Adem states, ‘On January 30, 1964, Emperor Haile Selassie welcomed the Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai to Ethiopia or, more accurately, to Asmara, 145

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa

Eritrea’ (2012: 40). He further stated, ‘This visit was unusual for, among other things, how it came about, how it was conducted, where it took place and who masterminded it… It is one of the curious features the visit that Haile Selassie decided to receive Zhou Enlai in Asmara rather than in Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia. One question that arises is: why Asmara, and not Addis Ababa? ’ (Ibid.). Although the Chinese Prime Minister’s visit took place almost four years before the Chinese government began supporting the Eritrean freedom fighters, there were already rumours indicating that China was supporting the Eritrean liberation movement. Seifudein Adem explained the oddity of the situation surrounding the Chinese Premier visit to Asmara rather than Addis Ababa as follows: ‘Coming as the visit does less than two years after Eritrea was absorbed into Ethiopia and became one of the 14 provinces in the country, it seemed, the Emperor sought to send a clear message to China that there was no place for its “subversive activities” in Eritrea’ (p. 41). The Emperor’s manoeuvrings had little effect. The PRC followed Syria and Iraq in establishing a relationship with the Eritrean liberation struggle. In 1966 two leaders of the ELF, Osman Saleh Sabbe and Idris Mohamed Adem visited China and returned with a small amount of cash, arms and the offer of scholarships for military and political training (Connell and Killion 2011: 145). The ELF received 500 Chinese automatic weapons and a group of 25 trainees were invited to attend at the Nanking Military Academy later in 1967. Many of those students went on to become senior leaders of the liberation movement—Isaias Afwerki, Ramedan M. Nur, Ahmed Adem Omer, Mohamed Ahmed Ibrahim and Mahmud Chekini (Connell and Killion 2011: 145). Among them were also Abdela Said Elaj, Ahmed Ibrahim, Hassen Saleh Ab Rajet (Hassinit), Osman Mohamed Gaber, unidentified fighter, Saleh Omer Shum, Salah Aldin Abdella, Mesfin Hagos, Mohamed Berhan Belata, Abdulrahman, Issa Musa, Fessehaye Commados and Arefaine.1 Their nine-month training during the height of the cultural revolution had a profound impact. Isaias and Ramedan returned with a commitment to implement Mao Zedong’s principles of guerrilla warfare and peasant-based social revolution under the leadership of a vanguard political party, which they played leading roles in forming in the early 1970s (Ibid.). 146

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This promising relationship between the ELF and the PRC was short-lived, however, ending suddenly after Ethiopia recognised the People’s Republic of China in 1970.

Weaponising Semantics: Advocates of Greater Ethiopia attack One of the most outspoken campaigners against the Eritrean liberation movements was the Ethiopian Students Union in North America (ESUNA). In August 1976, ESUNA published a highly polemical paper, titled The National Question in Ethiopia: Proletarian Internationalism or Bourgeois Nationalism?2 ESUNA argued, inter alia, that the Eritrean struggle was not a national liberation movement and did not serve the interests of Eritrean workers, peasants and other deprived masses. More importantly, it stated: ‘The Eritrean struggle is not anti-imperialist and anti-feudalist but, on the contrary, units [unites] with counter-revolutionary feudalists and pro-imperialist agents such as the EDU [Ethiopian Democratic Union] leaders.’3 This was not only unsupported by evidence, but also obviously improbable since the EDU was led by former members of the deposed regime, and therefore equally opposed to the Eritrean liberation struggle. ESUNA further stated, ‘The Eritrean struggle is not part of the worldwide proletarian revolutionary front but part of the camp of imperialism and reaction.’4 As seen in previous chapters, the Eritrean liberation movements were not homogenous, but as we saw earlier, Donald Donham, characterised the EPLF as being more Marxist than any other movement in the country (1999: 136). Most of the proponents of Greater Ethiopia rejected the characterisation of the Eritrean question as colonial. For example, according to Addis Fana, the Derg’s mouthpiece, ‘It is very easy to show the baselessness of the “arguments” of the Eritrean fronts that the Eritrean question is a colonial question. It is enough to give the scientific definition of colonialism, which is a product of capitalism. Since there is no capital exported from Ethiopia to Eritrea, the Eritrean question is not colonial’ (quoted in the Association of Eritrean Students in North America (AESNA) 1978: 59). In the same vein, ESUNA asserted that there was no colonialism before the rise of capitalism ‘In the MarxistLeninist politico-economic sense, old style colonialism is and can only 147

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be a product of the pre-monopoly stages of capitalism and new style colonialism is and can only be a product of monopoly capitalism.’5 Since both ESUNA and AESNA unquestioningly adhered to Marxism-Leninism, whatever Lenin said was deployed as incontestable evidence to prove or disprove an argument. Thus the AESNA quoted Lenin back to defeat ESUNA’s argument. It quoted him as writing: Colonial policy and imperialism existed before the latest of capitalism. Rome founded on slavery pursued a colonial policy and practised imperialism. But general “discussions” on imperialism, which ignore or put into the background, the fundamental difference between socio-economic systems, inevitably turn into the most vapid banality or bragging, like the comparison: “Greater Rome and Greater Britain.” Even the capitalist colonial policy of previous stages of capitalism is essentially different from the colonial policy of finance capital (Lenin 1964: 260 quoted in AESNA 1978: 62).

As AESNA showed with the above quotation, Lenin does not say that the term colonialism can only be used in relation to capitalism. AESNA pointed out that, according to these words of Lenin’s, Ethiopia could have certainly be accused of having a colony, in spite of being only semi-capitalist. ‘What he says is that, provided the fundamental difference between socio-economic systems (including between premonopoly and monopoly capitalism) is taken into account, one can talk about the colonial policy of a slave, feudal or capitalist society.’ (1978: 63). The Ethiopian government and its supporters, including the proponents of the notion of Greater Ethiopia, argued that there was no Eritrean nation prior to Italian colonialism, and that therefore the present Eritrean territory was an integral of part of the Ethiopian Empire. This argument was fiercely deployed notwithstanding the fact that ‘…neither Eritrea nor Ethiopia as presently constituted existed in the pre-colonial period’ (Haliday and Molyneux 1981: 175). Eritreans and other scholars who agreed with the proponents of ‘Greater Ethiopia’ argued that Eritrea was inhabited by nine disparate ethno-linguistic groups, namely, the Afar, Blin, Hedared, Kunama, Nara, Rashaida, Saho, Tigre and Tigrinya. In the pre-colonial period, as neighbouring and economically interdependent and competing communities, these disparate ethno-linguistic groups sometimes 148

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traded and co-operated with each other and sometimes fought against each other in pursuit of common and divergent interests, respectively (Kibreab 2000, 2005, 2008, 2009, 2017). Nevertheless, there are different views regarding Eritrean nationalism. There are scholars who argue that the birth of the Eritrean nation or the advent of Eritrean nationalism precedes Italian colonialism (1890-1941). The proponents of this view include Basil Davidson (1980), Yohannes Ogbazghi (1991) and Richard Reid (2011). They trace the origin of Eritrean nationalism to the pre-colonial period. They challenge the dominant narrative among Eritrean scholars who assume Eritrean history or identity was the result of Italian colonialism (Yordanos Gebre-Medhin 1989; Ruth Iyob 1995). Although the suffering and exploitation commonly experienced by the different ethno-linguistic groups and the struggles they waged together against colonial oppression and racism had laid the foundations for a common national Eritrean identity, the process of construction of an Eritrean nation and identity was incomplete (Kibreab 2017). The process that began during the colonial period, and in Davidson’s, Yohannes Ogbazghi’s and Reid’s views much earlier, was broadened and deepened during the 30-year war of liberation. Had it not been for the ability of the disparate ethno-linguistic groups to set aside their differences, they would have been unable to defeat subSaharan Africa’s strongest army (Kibreab 2008, 2009). In the process of fighting for a common cause, not only did Eritreans bond across differences of ethnicity, religion, gender, class and region, but they also developed shared values that led to the development and consolidation of sacrificial nationalism, dedication, and a sense of common purpose and commitment to independence (Bernal 2014; Kibreab 2009, 2000, 2005). The leadership of the ELF and EPLF viewed these core values as the factors that determined the successful outcome of the war of independence, as well as being indispensable to the process of nation building. Not only do the scholars who trace the birth of Eritrean nationalism to the pre-colonial period challenge the proponents of Greater Ethiopia, such as ESUNA (1976), Tekeste Negash (1997), but also Eritrean scholars who attribute the emergence of the Eritrean nation and Eritrean nationalism to the advent of Italian colonialism 149

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(see Jordan Gebre-Medhin 1989; Markakis 1990; Ruth Iyob 1995; Kibreab 2000, 2008, 2009, 2017; Uoldelul Chelati 2004). A third group of scholars trace the origin of Eritrean nationalism to the post-colonial period when Eritrea fell under the British Military Administration in April 1941 which led to the birth of the national liberation struggle (Mesfin Araya 1990; Abdulkader Saleh Mohammad 2013). As seen earlier, there are also scholars who trace the birth of the Eritrean nation or the advent of Eritrean nationalism to a period preceding Italian colonialism (Davidson 1980; Yohannes Ogbazghi 1991; Reid 2011).

Fissures within the EPLF over Soviet Intervention When the Soviet Union made it clear that it would back the Derg rather than the Eritrean liberation movement, EPLF and ELF leaders worked strenuously behind the scenes to endeavour to persuade Moscow to change its mind. The supporters’ organisations in the diaspora took a very different view, however, and friction grew between the liberation movement’s leadership in Eritrea and its supporters abroad. This was a serious rift, for many reasons. With few exceptions, the EPLF relied heavily on resources raised from diaspora Eritreans who lived in different parts of the world, especially in North America, Western Europe, the Gulf States and Africa. The most prominent organisation among them was the Association of Eritrean Students in Northern America (AESNA) and Association of Eritrean Women in North America (AEWNA) (see AESNA and AEWNA 1978a; Oberst 1980/81; Ogbazghi Yohannes 1987; Redeker Hepner 2011). There were similar organisations in northern Europe, the Middle East and Africa, but none of the latter was as significant and influential as the AESNA. The latter’s contribution was not limited to material assistance, but also some of its members were chief ideologues of the EPLF. Some prominent Eritrean students and professors abandoned comfortable lives and professions in prestigious universities and other institutions in North America in order to join the EPLF. The cadres of the AESNA and AEWNA had also played a key role in facing down the propaganda campaigns launched abroad by proponents of Greater Ethiopia, the 150

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Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ethiopian embassies worldwide. The leadership of the Eritreans for Liberation in North America (EFLNA) urged the Political Bureau of the EPLF to openly and unequivocally condemn the Soviet Union and its allies for their policies toward the Eritrean and Ethiopian revolutions. These negotiations, partly conducted face-to-face between EPLF and EFLNA leaders and partly through correspondence, were conducted secretly for a year and a half, but bore no fruit. The leaderships of the AEWNA and AEWNA also expected the EPLF leadership to publicly condemn the Soviet Union’s intervention against the democratic movements in Ethiopia and the liberation struggle in Eritrea. To their dismay and that of other organisations and movements in Eritrea and abroad, not only was the EPLF’s leadership mute about the Soviet Union’s support for the Derg, but it kept restating the misguided slogan that the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries were the Eritrean revolution’s strategic allies.6 When the internal discussions between the EPLF and the Central Committee of the EFLNA failed to produce results, the latter decided to take the unprecedented step of issuing a strongly worded letter to the EPLF’s Political Bureau.7 The Central Committee wrote: ‘Because the counter-revolutionary activities going on in the Horn of Africa affect us directly we ourselves ought to have a clear understanding of the situation and bring it to the attention of the progressive world. The EPLF as the vanguard of the Eritrean Revolution, has an obligation to illuminate the situation to its people and the people of the world.’8 The EFLNA’s leadership stated firstly, that the decision of the Soviet Union to arm the Derg, the involvement of Cuban advisers in Ethiopia and Mengistu Haile Mariam’s visit to Moscow were clear indications of the Soviet Union’s and Cuba’s determination to defeat the democratic forces in the region.9 Although the CC of the EFLNA did not refer to the EPLF leadership openly, it was clear who it considered to be to blame for the state of affairs. The CC stated that because the counter-revolutionary activities that were unfolding in the Horn of Africa had a direct impact on the Eritrean liberation struggle, not only was it imperative to have a clear understanding of the situation, but also this should be brought 151

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to the attention of progressive forces worldwide. This was a veiled but scathing criticism of the EPLF leadership’s muted position: The Soviet Union’s position to arm the fascist Derg, the involvement of Cuban advisers, and Mengistu’s visit to Moscow10 have made the relationship of the Soviet Union and Cuba with the Derg an open fact. The Soviet Union and Cuba, in collaboration with the fascist Derg are determined to crush the democratic forces in the region. 1. The argument that their collaboration with the Derg is not a move against the Eritrean revolution but the reactionary countries in the region are so refined a disguise that it is even strange to the ear. What is really shaking the Derg is the Eritrean revolution. The weapons and advisors being sent to prop up the tottering Derg are, therefore, first and foremost to liquidate the Eritrean revolution and also to crush the democratic forces in Ethiopia. 2. Such arguments such as that these countries have been deluded by the Derg or that they don’t know the situation are baseless. They very well know what is happening and who is who in the world. The Soviet and Cuban collaboration with the Derg cannot be for any other reason than to puruse their interest and secure a force that would capitulate to them. Their intention is to place such forces in all the corners of the world which they can manoeuvre from the Kremlin. For this purpose in the Horn of Africa, they are collaborating with the fascist Derg against the Ethiopian masses and the Eritrean revolution.11 The CC of the Eritrean Students in North America (ESNA) also rejected what it called the “conspiratorial proposal” of the socialist block to tie Eritrea into some sort of federal union with Ethiopia. According to the proposal the Soviet Union could support the EPLF and liquidate the ELF and the Sabbe group. The CC of ESNA rejected this scheme as being divisive and disregarding the fundamental question of Eritrean independence. ‘Nobody but our people and our revolution can lay down the strategy and tactics of our revolution and no foreign force has a right to interfere in the internal affairs of our revolution,’ it declared.12 The CC also underscored the importance of waging a people’s war to achieve Eritrea’s independence. In a veiled but 152

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unequivocal criticism of the EPLF leadership, it stated: ‘We must be ready to oppose any outside force that may attempt to exert pressure upon us to shut our mouth.’13 Frustration with the EPLF leadership’s muteness was clear when it concluded: ‘We have been unable to give any explanation about the present situation because the EPLF has not given us any guiding instructions. Therefore, comrades, we expect your views on the situation as soon as possible.’14 In a statement issued in October 1977 titled “Against the Ethiopian Military Junta and In Defence of the Eritrean Revolution (on the intervention of the Soviet Union and Cuba against the Eritrean revolution)” the AESNA stated, inter alia: The Soviet Union, Cuba and most Eastern European countries are giving all out military, political, economic and diplomatic support to the Ethiopian junta. The Soviet Union is providing the junta with US $385 million worth of arms (MIGs, tanks, armoured cars, artillery, light weapons, etc.) Cuba has sent over 400 military “advisors.” The Soviet Union and its allies are pouring a daily barrage of propaganda signing praises to the Ethiopian junta and vilifying the just and heroic struggle of the Eritrean people and the revolutionary forces in Ethiopia. They are putting tremendous pressure on numerous countries, liberation movements and organisations to support of the Ethiopian junta and denounce the Eritrean struggle.15

The statement continues, ‘The Soviet Union, Cuba and most Eastern European countries are playing a role that runs counter and is directly opposed to the revolutionary struggle of the oppressed masses of Eritrea, Ethiopia and the region.’16 The AESNA in its statement called on all revolutionary, progressive and democratic peoples to ‘vehemently condemn and expose the reactionary puppet and annexationist Ethiopian military junta’.17 It further called on supporters to ‘firmly oppose and condemn the US imperialist manoeuvres18 to subvert and crush the revolutionary struggles of the Eritrean and Ethiopian peoples’.19 More importantly, the AESNA called for the firm opposition and condemnation of the Soviet Union’s and Cuba’s ‘all out support to the Ethiopian junta, their arming and training of the junta’s troops and their campaign of vilification and slander against the Eritrean and Ethiopian peoples struggles.’20 The association also urged all progressive forces worldwide 153

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to support the revolutionary struggles of the Ethiopian and Eritrean people. On 26 January 1978, the CC of AESNA sent a letter with an attachment21 containing the summation of a four-month study that the organisation had undertaken on the ‘origins of revisionism and the ways to combat it.’ The CC stated, ‘So far this document has only been circulated among our members and EPLF offices abroad.’22 It urged the EPLF’s leadership: ‘On your part, we hope that you can send us the studies you are conducting on this important and timely question in our revolution, and we await with great anticipation your views on our document.’23 In a fierce attack on the Soviet Union and Cuba and on the EPLF leadership’s failure to openly condemn them, the Central Committee of the AESNA stated: …at a time when thousands of Soviet, Cuban as well as other mercenary troops are fighting on the side of the Derg, at a time when they have deployed their warships and are napalming liberated Eritrean towns and densely populated villages, killing innocent civilians in the most ruthless and barbaric fashion, the EPLF’s inability to put out an official statement opposing this aggression consistent with the practical opposition it is showing in the battlefield has created confusion and doubts among the entire membership of our mass organisation and among our supporters—and for some it has become difficult to explain. We ourselves have found it very difficult to openly defend the EPLF’s inability to put out such a statement of opposition in front of our fellow members and supporters.24

Reiterating its frustration, the CC goes on to say; “Therefore, we once again raise the point we had raised before in our correspondence, through the telephone and by sending a representative, reminding that such a statement of opposition be put out—for it is even more correct and legitimate to do so at this time than at any time before.’25 The CC did not say what explanation had been given by the EPLF for the failure to put out a statement condemning Soviet and Cuban intervention against the liberation struggle It said, however, that ‘although you have already given us some explanation why the EPLF did not officially state its opposition at this time when the hostility and fear that Russia and Cuba have over our revolution has become 154

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so obvious to the whole world and when they are expressing their “pride” of unleashing this fascistic and reactionary war in the name of “proletarian internationalism, we don’t believe such an explanation is enough.’26 At the end of the letter, the CC observed, ‘At the moment the only correct measure is to openly and officially state your opposition to all forces working feverishly to crush our revolution.’27 The EPLF Central Committee turned a deaf ear, however, to the Central Committee’s calls, and in its third regular meeting only declared, ‘We remind the socialist countries which are giving political and military support to the Derg to rectify their wrong stand.’28 The CC further pointed out that ‘because these activities emanate from the class nature of the revisionists, we don’t entertain the view that it is a mistake that can be rectified.’29 The CC stated that the EPLF had in its official monthly journal and in correspondence acknowledged that the Soviet Union was ‘… doing this not by mistake but because they want protect their interest in the Horn of Africa.30 This being the case, we believe that the correct stand is for our revolution to strongly condemn their counter-revolutionary and fascist activities (without going into their nature) against our revolution and call upon all the struggling and oppressed peoples of the world to condemn them.’31 There is evidence that although the EPLF leadership was against issuing a statement of condemnation, it did not shy away from criticising the Soviet Union in its own publications. For example, in December 1978, the EPLF wrote: For quite sometime and now in a bitter ironic reversal of history, the Soviet Union—once an ardent advocate of Eritrea’s independence32—has been vehemently pursuing a politico-military strategic objective of weakening and challenging the superiority of the EPLF in military and political fields. It has thus been slandering the Eritrean revolution and the EPLF as “secessionist” … “instigated by imperialism” … etc. In order to politically isolate it, while simultaneously, it has been supplying massive highly sophisticated weapons as well as other technical support. … The present all-out predatory offensive is planned and executed by Soviet war experts and generals … Hundreds of Soviet troops, pilots and marine are involved. The heavy guns and artilleries shelling our positions are fired and manned by Soviet troops. The MIGs which are strafing our liberated areas and civilian are flown by Soviet pilots.33 155

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As is clear from this statement, not only did the EPLF acknowledge the intervention of the Soviet Union, but it also condemned its determination to weaken and isolate the Eritrean liberation struggle. Nevertheless, in contrast to the declaration of the Central Committees of the AESNA and AEWNA, it did not characterise the Soviet Union as counter-revolutionary and revisionist. In its 1 April 1978 letter to the EPLF’s Political Bureau, the CC of the AESNA stated, In the past, the EPLF has considered the Soviet Union and other revisionist countries as socialists and has taught the masses they are friends of our revolution. But at a time when all the masses and fighters have questioned the socialism of the Soviet Union and other revisionist countries, at a time when they see them objectively opposing and crushing a struggle that they know is just and revolutionary at a time when our people see them arming the Derg whose fascistic nature they know very well from their own experience, and at a time when our preople see and hear them compare the out and out fascistic actions of the Derg with the great October Revolution of Russia, at a time when the mass organisations of the EPLF in North America based on the study they made have reached a common understanding that they see the Soviet Union and other revisionist countries are revisionists; we believe you made a tactical error by publicly presenting them as socialists in the name of the entire front. We believe the correct step would have been to pass without mentioning the nature of the Soviet Union and its lackeys because as far as we know no intensive study has been made on the subject and no summation of the different views within the front.34

The CC of the Association of Eritrean Women in North America (EWNA) in a letter written on 4 April 1978 stated that the support of Cuba and the Soviet Union for the Derg was not based on some kind of misapprehension, as the EPLF leadership had suggested, but rather because of their ‘…revisionist and counter-revolutionary nature.’35 In June 1978, the secretary-general of the EPLF delivered a speech at AESNA’s first congress. In it he criticised the Soviet Union for its contradictory stance and for its obstruction of a peaceful resolution of the Eritrean problem. He pointed out that on the one hand, Moscow called for a peaceful resolution of the problem and on the other, supplied the Derg with weapons.36 But this was not worth condemnation in the 156

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EPLF leadership’s view. It was a secondary issue affecting relations within the progressive and democratic camp. Romedan Mohamed Nur, the Secretary-general of the EPLF, summarised the situation as follows: As our revolution is an integral part of the world-wide revolutionary forces, all socialist and democratic systems and liberation forces are our strategic allies. Therefore, the contradiction between us and those socialist and democratic systems and organisations that have taken a wrong stand on the Eritrean question and have sided with the Derg is a contradiction within the world-wide revolutionary force. For this reason it occupies a secondary position. Hence, to make them understand the situation of the Eritrean revolution and to correct their wrong stand through opposition we shall continue our struggle within the world revolutionary force.37

This summarises succinctly the position of the EPLF. The leadership perceived Russian and Cuban support to the Derg to destroy the Eritrean liberation fronts as a problem between strategic allies belonging to the same progressive and anti-imperialist camp. The decision was wrong, argued the EPLF secretary-general, but nevertheless, the clashing interests could, according to the Marxist-Leninist rulebook, be resolved through dialogue rather than armed struggle. In view of the huge amount of arms and equipment, guidance and training the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries were providing to the Derg to defeat the Eritrean liberation struggle, the EPLF’s argument was a nonsense.

Independence: a Non-Negotiable Prize As we saw in the preceding chapters, whilst the Soviet Union and its socialist allies supplied the Derg with materiel, financial and other types of assistance, they also brought huge pressure to bear on the ELF and EPLF leaderships to accept the regional autonomy solution proposed by the Derg. The National Democratic Revolution (NDR) statement on 21 April 1976 affirmed that ‘the right of self-determination of nationalities can be guaranteed through regional autonomy which takes due account of objective realities prevailing in Ethiopia.’38 The Soviet bloc continually reiterated the need to unite the progressive wings of the Eritrean liberation struggle with the Derg under the terms of the 157

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NDR. The Provisional Military Government in a document titled— “P.M.G’s Decisions to Provide a Peaceful Solution to the Problem in the Administration Region of Eritrea” stated: Having realised the difficulties existing in the Administrative Region of Eritrea and the urgency of overcoming them, and in order to apply in practice the right of self-determination of nationalities on a priority basis, the Provisional Military Government is prepared to discuss and exchange views with the progressive groups and organisations in Eritrea which are not in collusion with feudalist reactionary forces in the neighbourhood and imperialists.39

The Derg’s policy on regional autonomy further stated that the Ethiopian government would give full backing to all progressive forces in Eritrea who would collaborate with the progressive forces throughout the country [Ethiopia] on the basis of the NDR and ‘endeavour to arouse, organise and lead the working masses of the region [Eritrea] in the struggle against the three enemies of the Ethiopian people - feudalism, bureaucratic capitalism and imperialism - and thereby promote the unity of the oppressed classes of Ethiopia.’40 It is interesting to note that Ethiopian government, the enemy of the Eritrean people as defined by the liberation movements and as demonstrated by the almost 100 per cent backing for independence in the 1993 UN-sponsored referendum (see Styan 1996), was not mentioned. Not surprisingly, the EPLF rejected the proposed solution out of hand. The party reacted with fury when Osman Saleh Sabbe, the official spokesman of the ELF-Ex Foreign Mission told an Egyptian newspaper: ‘Neither the Ethiopian military government nor us should present any precondition before we meet. Though our goal is for independence, we will not insist that independence be the starting point to our negotiation with Ethiopia.’41 The EPLF leadership was scathing about the very idea of negotiating with the Derg without pre-conditions. The EPLF’s response was: The statement given by the official spokesman that the Eritrean revolution should not insist on a pre-condition in negotiating with Ethiopia is an attempt to obliterate the 15-year struggle of the Eritrean people. We consider tailing after conditions presented by the enemy and retreat from the principled stand as a betrayal.42

The EPLF also rejected any form of unconditional negotiation with 158

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the Derg. In its first congress, the Front expressed its willingness to negotiate for a just, peaceful solution, but only when the Derg recognised the right of the Eritrean people to self-determination and independence. However, when the leaderships of both fronts met in Beirut to hammer out their strategy, this position was abandoned.43 Between 1978 and 1983, with the support of the Soviet Union, Ethiopia launched six large-scale major counter-offensives. Soon Ethiopia was able to regain the territories which had been controlled by the two fronts. The counter-offensives forced the EPLF to withdraw from all the liberated areas with the exception of its historical bases in the Sahel region and around the city of Nakfa. They had an even more devastating impact on the ELF. It was against this backdrop that the EPLF and the ELF leaderships abandoned their previous rejection of unconditional negotiation with the Derg.44 On 21 June 1978 representatives of the Joint Supreme Political Leadership of the Eritrean Liberation Front-Revolutionary Council (ELF-RC) and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) held a meeting in Beirut, Lebanon and issued a declaration which, inter alia, stated: The continuation and intensification of the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia does not serve the interests of the two peoples and their victories. It brings much suffering and destruction to the Eritrean people and the peoples of Ethiopia. Proceeding from this understanding, the Joint Supreme Political Leadership underscores the necessity of a peaceful solution and expresses its readiness to negotiate with the Ethiopian government for a just peaceful solution of the Eritrean case based on the right to self-determination and on just and democratic principles without preconditions. It reaffirms that the Joint Supreme Political Leadership is the sole legal spokesman in any negotiation with the Derg concerning the destiny of the Eritrean people.45

This position was diametrically opposed to the EPLF’s previous position, when it had condemned the Osman Saleh Sabbe group for proposing unconditional negotiation with the Derg. It also flew in the face of the resolutions decided at the first congress of the EPLF in January 1977. 159

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In July 1978 the vice-secretary general of the EPLF, Isaias, was interviewed by the front’s monthly official organ, Vanguard. The interview was published in a special issue—Vol. 3, No 7. One of the questions he was asked was: ‘To what extent have we succeeded in our political activities abroad to present the correct image of the Eritrean revolution to the world? What are the difficulties we have faced and are still facing?’46 After describing the international and regional factors that complicated the situation, bearing in mind the changed circumstances, he said: ‘[the]Eritrean revolution had to strive to get the support of its strategic allies’ in accordance with the foreign policy principles outlined in the EPLF’s first congress held in the liberated areas of Eritrea in January 1977. He further stated that the EPLF leadership’s primary goal was to win the support of the socialist countries by explaining the regional political situation, exposing the nature of the Derg, describing the depth of the Eritrean revolution and clarifying the EPLF’s view of the general situation in the region.47 Isaias further stated that while engaging with these issues, ‘we were also striving to secure the support of socialist countries, communist parties in different countries, and the liberation movements in the world.’48 That the front’s most powerful leader kept returning to the question of striving to ensure the support of the socialist states shows his belief that their support was the make or break question facing the Eritrean revolution. He also underscored that although the support of the regimes in the region was vital, they could not be allowed to exert political influence or interfere in the internal affairs of the Eritrean revolution. He added that these efforts had led to the realisation by socialist countries that the Eritrean revolution ‘is a social revolution dominated by a democratic force.’ He continued: When this question became clear to the socialist countries, the stand they have taken to resolve the complicated political situation is a peaceful solution to the question of the Eritrean revolution. They have started taking steps to peacefully resolve the contradiction between the Derg’s regime which they support and the democratic movement of the Eritrean people.49

This interview was conducted against the backdrop of negotiations that were taking place between representatives of the EPLF and the Derg under the auspices of the East German leader, Erich Honecker50 160

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(see the preceding chapter). In the course of researching Eritrea and the EPLF, I have read Isaias Afwerki’s many interviews and this is the first time I have seen him referring to the Eritrean revolution as the ‘democratic movement of the Eritrean people’ rather than the revolutionary movement of the Eritrean people. As seen in the preceding chapter, the East German leader, with the other socialist countries, including the Soviet Union and Cuba, was urging the EPLF to accept a solution on the basis of regional autonomy within the framework of Ethiopia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The EPLF’s deputy secretary-general’s critics may justifiably construe this as indicating his willingness to succumb to the pressure applied by the socialist states. His claim that the socialist countries had adopted a new position, i.e. a determination to solve the Eritrean problem peacefully, was not true. As we saw in the preceding chapters, the Soviet bloc had always used a double-pronged approach; both supplying the Derg with weapons and advisors to weaken the Eritrean liberation struggle so that they would accept terms dictated by the Derg and calling upon the Derg and the liberation movements to negotiate on the basis of regional autonomy. There was no time when the Soviet Union and its allies did not call for a peaceful settlement of the Eritrean question while still supplying the Derg with deadly armaments. It is not clear on what grounds the EPLF Vice Secretary-General claimed that they had started taking a new approach. Some of Isaias’ statements with regard to the Soviet bloc’s twopronged approach are unintelligible. He stated, ‘We, in all our might supported the initiative taken by the socialist countries and we are striving for it. In our opinion, for the socialist countries to take such a stand while providing support for the Derg, is positive’ (emphasis added).51 The kind of support the Soviet Union was providing the Derg was, to recap, billions of US dollars-worth of materiel that destroyed Eritrean lives and property. His observation was astonishing. Furthermore, he attributed what he referred to as the ‘positive stand … struggle waged on our part to make them understand and acquire their political support’,52 as if there was any time the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries had not called for the surrendering of the goals of the armed struggle in Eritrea. Since at the heart of the Soviet bloc’s policies toward Ethiopia and Eritrea, as in the rest of the region, lay only their own strategic 161

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considerations, the reason they preferred a peaceful settlement was because they deemed that approach the most cost-effective. All the more since their major ally in region, the Ethiopian regime was no match for the EPLF and Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Isaias shifted the focus: ‘intrigues and oppositions directed against our struggle by the regimes in this region such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and other well known reactionary regimes are crystal clear,’53 he said. He accused these countries of having denied transit to supplies for the Eritrean struggle through their airspaces and land. Isaias tied in himself in knots in an attempt to put a positive gloss on South Yemen’s deployment of troops to support the Derg. The EPLF’s relations with this government had been the closest of all the front’s foreign ties in the past. He claimed, somewhat obscurely, that South Yemen’s position had changed either as a result of its own studies regarding the Ethiopian situation, or as the result of the EPLF’s diplomatic campaign. According to Isaias, the South Yemenis had sent troops to support the Derg in their fight against imperialism generally. However, he said that South Yemen had withdrawn its troops from Ethiopia and that relations were improving not withstanding the fact that it still maintained diplomatic relations with the Derg. He said that although there had been opposition to this on the part of the Eritrean revolution, ‘…the EPLF’s view on South Yemen did not change from the basic strategic line.’ Nonetheless, he had to admit that its deployment of troops to the Derg had had a detrimental effect on relations with the EPLF. In the party’s view there was no justification for such a stand, no matter the context, he said.

The Split Between EPLF and the Eritrean Diaspora Becomes a Chasm The AESNA and AEWNA’s leaderships engaged in fierce debates with the EPLF leadership in the lead up to their congresses in Washington in August 1978. The discussions not only raged over the Soviet bloc’s intervention in the conflict between Ethiopia and the freedom fronts, but also on the very nature of the Soviet bloc itself. The two congresses were held under the slogans, “Death to the Soviet-Cuban revisionists,” “Our Homeland with Our Blood.” The discussions focussed on three major themes—Soviet revisionism, the nature of the Derg and the 162

Chapter 7

question of peaceful resolution of the Eritrean question.54After two days’ intensive discussion, it was stated that the congress ‘refuted and discredited that the U.S.S.R. and the other revisionist courtiers are “strategic friends” of oppressed peoples of the world and showed that the history of revisionism has been one of treachery, deception, and subversion of all genuine struggles for democracy independence and socialism.’55 On the third day of the conference, the message of the EPLF to the congress was deliberated. Foreign affairs were the main focus. It was stated that the Derg had kept up a relentless negative diplomatic campaign against Eritrea, and not only did the regime exaggerate its reforms but also packaged them in pseudo-revolutionary slogans resulting in political confusion in the Middle East, Africa and the rest of the world. The EPLF message stated: ‘The Soviet Union, other socialist countries and nationalist regimes support it [the Derg] in various ways,’56 And went on to say that ‘under such circumstances, especially after the convening of the second regular meeting of the central committee [of the EPLF], it was important on our part to work toward rectifying the wrong stand of the socialist countries and struggle to get their support and the support of progressive and democratic countries and organisations in the Middle East, Africa and Europe’.57 The EPLF leadership thought that the best way to counter the Derg’s two-pronged strategy of military and diplomatic offensives was to to defeat it both in the battlefield and by winning the hearts and minds of progressive actors internationally Unlike the AESNA’s and AEWNA’s outright condemnation of the Soviet Union and its allies, the EPLF leadership favoured a diplomatic campaign to make the case for the justice of the Eritrean revolution. While the EPLF leadership considered the Soviet Union bloc strategic friends of the Eritrean and other national liberation movements in spite of their backing of the Derg, the AESNA and AEWNA characterised the Soviet Union and its allies as revisionists, counter-revolutionaries and social imperialists. The EPLF leadership referred to the actions of the Soviet bloc against the Eritrean revolution as deeply flawed and misguided, but baulked at attributing them to a counter-revolutionary and revisionist character. The cause of such a misguided stance, argued the EPLF, was a lack of understanding and 163

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa

the gross disinformation fed to the bloc by the mendacious Derg. The Eritrean students and women’s organisations in North America dismissed this explanation. For the EFLNA and AEWNA leadership, the actions of the Soviet Union and its allies were explained by the fact that the Soviet bloc was no longer socialist. The countries were revisionists and social imperialists whose foreign policies and practices were driven by self-interest. The congress assessed what it called the ‘ideological and political danger the capitulation of the EPLF leadership to the Soviet revisionists posed to the Eritrean people’s strategic questions of national salvation, independence and democracy.’58 The meeting ‘unanimously resolved to condemn and expose the capitulationist line pursued by the EPLF leadership and sever all links with it and, accordingly change our name to Eritreans for Liberation in North America (EFLNA)’.59 It further condemned the EPLF leadership for perceiving the Soviet Union as being socialist and a strategic ally of the Eritrean revolution. The leadership of the EFLNA also rejected the EPLF leadership’s assertion that the conflict that existed between the Soviet Union and the Eritrean revolution was a secondary issue which could be resolved through peaceful means. EFLNA declared: ‘Applying this counter-revolutionary strategy into practice, the EPLF leadership has reversed the position of the enemies and friends of the Eritrean revolution, hence leading the struggle into a quagmire of reaction.’60 The EPLF leadership stressed that their cautious approach had brought some dividends; they were able to register the support of several countries and organisations in Africa, the Middle East and Europe and they had been able to lessen support for the Derg from other states and organisations that had previously supported it fully. More importantly, the EPLF leadership said that it was possible to make a stand against the Derg’s military aggression.61 The message to EFNLA was unequivocal: Regarding the policy the Soviet Union follows in the world and the errors that are reflected, we have time and again clarified our position to you. We have already made it clear that we don’t submissively accept the Soviet Union’s erroneous stand in regard to its support to governments that are installed through coup d’êtats in 164

Chapter 7 the Third World countries, to the so-called anti-imperialist regimes, to the limited support it gives to national liberation movements, to the policy it follows in its relationship with the different communist parties and the policy it ought to follow in connection with the peoples’ struggles in different parts of the world.62

The statement further pointed out: We have also explained that we have our own stand and opinion regarding political questions inside the Soviet Union and the controversial questions of political differences among the revolutionary forces of the world. We have our difference with the proletarian parties and national liberation movements of the world on the wrong position they have on various questions and we struggle against all wrong political stands and views.63

More importantly and in a manner that was diametrically opposed to the EFLNA and AEWNA leaderships’ position, the EPLF leadership defiantly declared: ‘We could have a wrong position and we will rectify it when we realise it. But we have never for any reason considered the Soviet Union as our enemy, as an imperialist force, as a capitalist system and as a counterrevolutionary force’ (emphasis added).64 This statement signalled the crossing of a Rubicon between the two irreconcilable lines of the two leaderships. The EPLF stated, ‘…we have never considered the parties and liberation movements whose wrong political positions we criticise, as forces of counter-revolution.’ In an uncharacteristically self-deprecating manner, they stated, ‘We cannot say that we alone have the correct view and line. We commit many mistakes as a result of our lack of experience and limited capacity to perceive and understand. Our policy of struggle is to oppose and correct mistakes manifested in the world revolutionary forces, correct our own mistakes and wage a resolute struggle against world counterrevolutionary forces.’65 In a scathing criticism of the EFLNA and the AEWNA, the EPLF leadership declared, ‘…to dump into the camp of counter-revolution all those who do not fit into your line and views is erroneous and adventurist, it means to fight against everybody.’66 The statement went on: ‘We have stated more than once our opposition to the support the Soviet Union is giving to the Derg. This, however, is not to mean that we consider the Soviet Union as an imperialist, 165

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa

counter-revolutionary force nor does it mean we should concentrate all our propaganda machinery for an attack on the Soviet Union.’67 The EPLF leadership further stated that it was after consideration of these situations that the Central Committee, in its second regular meeting held in November 1977, assessed the position of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and decided to issue a reminder, which underpinned EPLF policy.68 The crisis at the time was so severe that the EPLF leadership was even seeking support and recognition from nationalist and neo-colonial regimes. The statement concluded, ‘Therefore, if there is anything at all that we want to remind you,69 it is the rectification of the wrong handling of this question in your publication.’70 At a time when the EPLF leadership was trying to win international support, condemnation of the Soviet Union by the AESNA and AEWNA was considered damaging the cause of the Eritrean revolution. However, as the intensity of the large-scale Ethiopian and Russian counter-offensive deepened, the EPLF’s office in Khartoum, Sudan, issued a statement which unequivocally condemned the role played by the Soviet Union. The statement, issued on 5 December 1978, stated: ‘Ethiopian and Soviet aggression on Eritrea conducted by two Soviet generals - one of them Ogaden veteran - eleven high ranking officers over 1,000 commissioned and non-commissioned officers continues to escalate.’71 The statement further stated, ‘Soviet warships are heavily involved not only in providing supplies to the invading army in the eastern front, but also shelling EPLF positions from the sea and providing cover to the enemy forces fighting in the east.’72 The statement continues, ‘The Soviet Union is sparing no effort to crush the EPLF and destroy the 17 years old Eritrean struggle for national independence and freedom.’73 The EPLF’s Khartoum office said that not only was the Soviet Union shelling EPLF positions but also burning crops, killing animals, destroying villages and massacring civilians, including women, children and the aged. The statement further stated, ‘These barbaric acts of extermination which is [are] largely being conducted by the Soviet Union cannot extinguish the revolutionary struggle of our people.’ The statement concluded, ‘The EPLF calls again upon all freedom, peace and justice loving nations and people to voice their opposition and condemn this barbaric act 166

Chapter 7

of aggression against the Eritrean people and give their moral and material support.’74 It is intriguing that this condemnation of the Soviet Union’s actions against the Eritrean liberation struggle came from the EPLF’s Khartoum office rather than from the Political Bureau of the EPLF. Given the EPLF leadership’s obsession with control, it is unimaginable that the Khartoum Office would issue such a statement without the approval of the political office. It is still unclear why such an important statement did not come from the EPLF leadership or its foreign office. In the following chapter, the reasons for the failure of the Soviet Union’s half-hearted call for a peaceful resolution of the Eritrean problem is discussed.

Endnotes 1 Hedgait ‫تياقديه‬ : Picture: ELF group that was training in China 1967 and Isaias’s early views on ELF. https://hedgait.blogspot.com/2014/12/picture-elf-group-that-wastraining-in.html (accessed 26 December 2014). 2 Ethiopian Students Union in North America (ESUNA), Combat Vol. 5, No. 2, 1976, August. 3 Quoted in Association of Eritrean Students in North America (AESNA) and Association of Eritrean Women in North America (AEWNA), In Defence of the Eritrean Revolution. Second Edition, AESNA, New York, May 1978), p. 3. Quoted in Ibid. 4 5 ESUNA 1976: 27 quoted in AESNA 1978:62. 6 See Excerpts from the EPLF’s Message to the 9th Congress of EFLNA and the 2nd Congress of AEWNA, August 1978. See The Central Committee of EFLNA to the Political Bureau of 7 EPLF, 19 May 1977. The Central Committee of EFLNA to the Political Bureau of the 8 EPLF, 19 May 1977. Ibid. 9 10 On Mengistu Haile Mariam’s visit to Moscow see See “CPSU CC to SED CC, Information on Visit of Mengistu Haile Mariam to Moscow,” May 13, 1977, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, SAPMO, J IV 2/202/583; obtained and translated from Russian by Vladislav M. Zubok. 167

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa 11

See The Central Committee of EFLNA to the Political Bureau of EPLF, 19 May 1977. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. (emphasis added). 15 Against the Ethiopian Military Junta and In Defence of the Eritrean Revolution (AESNA’s statement on the intervention of the Soviet Union and Cuba against the Eritrean revolution), October 1977. Ibid. 16 17 Ibid. 18 At the time the statement was released, there was not US intervention against the Eritrean revolution. Ibid. 19 20 Ibid. 21 My attempt to find the attachment the CC of AESNA sent to the EPLF’s Political Bureau was unsuccessful. 22 The Central Committee of AESNA to the Political Bureau of EPLF, 26 January 1978. Ibid. 23 24 The Central Committee of AESNA to the Political Bureau of EPLF, 18 Feb. 1978. Ibid. 25 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. (emphasis in the original). 28 Quoted in The Central Committee of AESNA’s letter to The Political Bureau of the EPLF, 1 April 1978. Ibid. 29 30 Ibid 31 Ibid. (emphasis added). 32 Although the Soviet Union had sometimes supported Eritrean independence in pursuit of its own strategic interest in the Red Sea region rather than out of concern for the right of the Eritrean people for self-determination, the EPLF’s claim that it was an ardent advocate of Eritrean independence lacks empirical backing. EPLF, Statement on Soviet Aggression in Eritrea, Mekalih Sewrana 33 (The Voice of Our Revolution) Vol. 1, No. 2, December 1978, Roma, Italy. Mekalih Sewrana was a monthly newsletter of the EPLF. 34 Central Committee of AESNA’s letter to The Political Bureau of the EPLF, 1 April 1978. 35 Central Committee of AEWNA to the Political Bureau of the EPLF, 29 July 1978. 168

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Excerpts from the speech of the secretary general of EPLF to the first congress of the Association of Eritrean Students as printed in June 1978 issue of the official organ Vanguard Vol. 3, No 5. Ibid. (emphasis added). 37 38 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, P.M.G’s Decisions to Provide a Peaceful Solution to the Problem in the Administrative Region of Eritrea, 18 May 1978, Press and Information Department, Addis Ababa. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 In Vanguard Vol. 1, No 20, September 1976, quoted in EFLNA and AEWNA, Eritrea: Revolution or Capitulation, New York, October 1978. 42 Quoted in Ibid. 43 EPLF-ELF-RC Joint Press Release on Peaceful Solution, 21 June 1978, Beirut, Lebanon. Printed in EPLF, Vanguard Vol. 3, No. 3, July 1978. 44 See “Memorandum of a Conversation between East German leader Erich Honecker and Siassi Aforki… 45 EPLF-ELF-RC Joint Press Release on Peaceful Solution, 21 June 1978, Beirut, Lebanon. Printed in EPLF, Vanguard Vol. 3, No. 3, July 1978. 46 Excerpts from Special Issue of Vanguard Vol. 3, No. 7, July 1978. The entire issue is an exclusive interview with him. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid. 50 “Memorandum of a Conversation between East German leader Erich Honecker and Siassi Aforki … 51 Excepts from Special Issue of Vanguard Vol. 3, No. 7, July 1978. (The entire issue is an exclusive interview with the Vice-Secretary General of EPLF Isaias Afwerki) Ibid. 52 53 Ibid. 54 See “EFLNA’s Historic 9th Congress,” Eritrea in Struggle. Newsletter of Eritreans For Liberation in North America, Sep-Nov 1978. Ibid. 55 56 Excerpts from the EPLF’s Message to the 9th Congress of EFLNA and the 2nd Congress of AEWNA, August 1978. Ibid. (emphasis added). 57 58 “EFLNA’s Historic 9th Congress,” Eritrea in Struggle. Newsletter of Eritreans For Liberation in North America, Sep-Nov 1978. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid. 169

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa 61

Excerpts from the EPLF’s Message to the 9th Congress of EFLNA and the 2nd Congress of AEWNA, August 1978. 62 Ibid. Ibid. 63 64 Ibid. (Emphasis added). 65 Excerpts from the EPLF’s Message to the 9th Congress of EFLNA and the 2nd Congress of AEWNA, August 1978. Ibid. It is worth stating that admission of fallibility has become 66 anathema to the post-independence EPLF leadership, especially the personal ruler, Isaias Afwerki. Ibid. 67 68 See EPLF Central Committee Holds Second Regular Meeting, 16-20 November, 1977 in Eritrea in Struggle Vol. II, No. 4, January 1978. They are referring to the leaderships of the AESNA and AEWNA. 69 Ibid. 70 71 Statement No 6, EPLF Khartoum Office, December 5, 1978. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid.

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Chapter Eight

A Hopeless Task: Why Peace Talks Failed

W

hen looking for an explanation of why the socialist countries’ attempt to resolve the Eritrean problem peacefully failed, three reasons stand out. Firstly, Mengistu nurtured a pathological hatred of the very notion of an independent Eritrea; secondly, no costs were attached to Mengistu’s failure to heed the advice of the Soviet Union and its allies; and thirdly, the proposed solution of the Eritrean problem was based on flawed assumptions.

Mengistu’s pathological hatred The idea of a peaceful resolution of the Eritrean problem was anathema to Mengistu. His and his regime’s point of departure was that the Eritrean liberation movements should be defeated and destroyed. During the 1982 ‘Red Star Campaign,’ Mengistu called for action ‘to end once and for all the organised banditry perpetrated by the traitorous bandit groups [the EPLF and the ELF]’ in Eritrea.’1 He never considered the idea of a negotiated settlement of the Eritrean question. This was a logical consequence of his most important principles. One destroys rather than negotiates with the enemy. “We shall not rest until we annihilate the bandits from the face of the earth” was Mengistu’s motto. The Asmara Manifesto, which Mengistu had drawn up and which guided the Red Star Campaign declared: The anti-freedom, anti-unity and anti-peace bandit gangs who have been rejected by the society and who represent no one except the forces of imperialism and reaction should no longer be allowed to

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The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa continue creating destruction and must be therefore, reduced to smithereens by the united might of the broad masses. We moreover pledge to crush those who provided support to the bandits, including the fifth columnists, because they are enemies of the people.2

In Mengistu’s view, there was only one solution to the Eritrean problem—extermination. The following graphic and horrifying description of the brutality committed by Mengistu and his regime months after the bloody coup in which he seized power shows his appetite for violence against his opponents. Andargachew Tiruneh says: The May Day rallies of 1975 and 1978 had resulted in the arrest of many and the death of some EPRP supporters; the rallies of 1977 in Addis Ababa, on the other hand, led to the most horrifying carnage in the history of the country. An anti-government demonstration organised by EPRP to undermine the government’s May Day rallies was launched on the evening of 29 April; well over 500 of the demonstrators were gunned down during the same evening while marching, running for cover or in the houses they had fled to for refuge. The massacre continued in the following days; according to the Secretary General of the Swedish Save the Children Fund, over 1,000 youths had been executed by 16 May and their bodies were left in the street and ravaged by hyenas at night. School children of eleven years of age and above were at the forefront of EPRP demonstrations. It is widely reported that hospitals often refused to treat the wounded on the grounds that they were reactionaries and charged anything up to 100 US dollars and 25 US dollars for the release of students’ and workers’ bodies, respectively, to cover the cost of bullets wasted in killing them (1993: 211-2) .

Andargachew continues: What was done to those who were detained under suspicion of being members or sympathisers of EPRP was no less horrifying than the street massacres. The number of detainees was too great to be accommodated by the existing prisons and police stations; as a result, all the offices of the urban dwellers’ associations, the palaces and military garrisons in the towns up and down the country were turned into detention centres. The victims of the mass arrests and 172

Chapter 8 those picked up in the streets and their homes were taken to these centres and subjected to some of the most inhuman forms of torture of a cruelty unprecedented in the history of the country. One typical form of torture was soaking the feet of the detainees in boiling water for a time and then suspending them upside-down and beating the soles of their feet until the skin gave way to blood and the raw flesh and finally to the hare bones. Without doubt, many died during the ordeal, others many years later as a result of complications they developed afterwards, yet others became crippled for life, and the remaining became paranoid, unable to trust anyone (Ibid.).

If Mengistu treated Ethiopian nationals who demanded democratic changes so harshly, it is not difficult to imagine how he and his regime treated Eritreans who represented an imminent threat to Ethiopia’s perceived territorial integrity and unity. It is hard to believe that these gruesome spates of violence were committed with full knowledge and probably approval of the Soviet Union, East Germany and the other socialist countries that supported Mengistu despite his brutality. Soviet and East German authorities hardly dared to present their views on the desirability of peace talks to Mengistu. It was stated: ‘We would like to stress that we have to be extremely tactful in our relations with Mengistu Haile Mariam and the PMAC, in particular with respect to the Eritrean question.’3 Mengistu turned a deaf ear to his allies’ pleas that he finds a peaceful solution to the Eritrean problem because he had no interest in negotiating with liberation struggle leaders, whom he characterised as ‘outlaws’ and ‘terrorists.’4 As noted previously, Mengistu’s allies were well aware of his attitude. The East German official, Paul Markovski, said in 1978: With respect to the situation in Eritrea, … Ponomarev mentioned the conversations between the Soviet leadership and Mengistu Haile Mariam in the course of which it was recommended to Mengistu to seek a political solution to the problem and to grant autonomy to the Eritreans. Since then no new discussions between the Soviet side and the Ethiopians have taken place. Mengistu has been silent. Up to now he has not done anything to follow our advice. The Cuban comrades have unequivocally told the Ethiopian leadership that Cuba would not intervene in the Eritrean conflict, in a domestic Ethiopian conflict. The best thing would be a peaceful solution. Both sides need to take 173

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa the right attitude towards the problem. ... We have to continue to work on him. Any solution has to be found within the framework of the Ethiopian state although this is uncomfortable for the Eritrean movements (emphasis added).5

In the East German State Security’s view, Mengistu was preoccupied with the desire to defeat the Eritrean insurgents militarily rather than finding a political settlement6 His aversion to any political settlement of the Eritrean question was even acknowledged by the Cuban Vicepresident, Carlos Rodriguez.7 Rodriguez sarcastically noted: ‘They [Mengistu and his regime] probably still have the thought in the back of their minds that a peaceful solution of the Eritrean problem will mean a capitulation by the Eritrean movements, which means that the military solution would be the preparation for a further peaceful strategy.’8 A few months later, in June 1978, the Soviet bloc’s hopes were raised, then dashed, that Mengistu might be considering a fresh proposal to solve the Eritrean problem peacefully. ‘Mengistu’s speech, which contains the necessary elements for a peaceful solution of the problem, is the basis for the further work,’ reported Winkelmann,9 SED CC Department of International Relations.10 It was further stated: ‘Mengistu will travel in the next days to Asmara. It is planned to hold a meeting with the population in which Mengistu will explain his program for a peaceful solution. His recent speech is the prelude to this action.’11 It is not clear whether this is referring to Mengistu’s speech of 14th June 1978.12 If it is, the speech was later criticised by Grabowski and Sinitsin as offering nothing new except underlining the necessity of military force to solve the Eritrean problem.13 They stated: ‘Intentions for a complete military solution of the Eritrean problem shine through.’14 It is astonishing that Mengistu was going to Asmara to deliver a message of bloodshed and violence. It was even more extraordinary that Winkelmann had thought that the speech contained the ‘necessary elements for a peaceful solution’ of the Eritrean problem.’15. The gist of the speech, as described by Grabowski and Sinitsin, could ‘hardly be read without concern’.16 They stated:

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Chapter 8 One still has to assume that the military actions of the separatists have to be energetically opposed, that full and effective control by the PMAC and the Ethiopian armed forces over the cities in the north of the country and their access lines has to be assured. But obviously this was not everything that the speech meant to convey. Intentions for a complete military solution of the Eritrean problem shine through. One cannot recognize any new constructive or concrete suggestions on how to proceed politically.17

Grabowski and Sinitsin further observed, ‘Obviously those forces within the Ethiopian leadership which have always favored a one-sided military solution have gained ground.’18 Of course, Mengistu was at the helm of that group. He ‘… made it understood that with the current conditions it [the Eritrean problem] must be regarded not as an ethnic but as a class problem.  The movement in Eritrea has transformed and is now increasingly becoming a weapon of reactionary and imperialist forces.  Thus, in this matter, the Ethiopian leadership hopes for comprehensive support from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.’19 The rationale underlying his argument was that no deal could be made with such forces and the only reasonable course of action was that the Soviet bloc provide him and his regime ‘comprehensive support’ to defeat the Eritrean liberation struggle and their alleged masters—imperialism and Arab reaction once and for all. When Mengistu visited the Soviet Union in July 1988, the Soviet authorities stated: On our side, it was emphasized that the Ethiopian revolution, as before, can count on Soviet Union’s support and solidarity. We feel the fate of Ethiopia and the historical choice of its people is close to us, and we not only sympathize with the progressive course conducted by its leadership, but also strive to provide it with all possible assistance.20

However they did press Mengistu, once more, to offer peace talks: We thought persistently that in preserving the territorial integrity and unity of Ethiopia, it is important to demonstrate a proactive approach in finding a peaceful solution to the Eritrean problem [and] to turn to the Eritrean organizations with proposals to begin peace 175

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa talks. If they refused, they would expose themselves, and the central government, in any case, would show its strength, not weakness.21

All evidence shows however, that the PMAC consistently rejected peaceful means of solving the conflict in favour of military solution. This was the case even when the tide turned against it in the conflict. A lengthy CIA report on the issue posits four major reasons why this was so. ‘Emotional factors … have probably influenced the intensity of Ethiopia’s desire for a purely military solution to the conflict; to back down after so many years of fighting would be a blow to its pride. The military rulers would be compared unfavorably with Haile Selassie in terms of their ability to hold the Ethiopian empire together.’22 This critical observation is spot on. During the International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA II) held in July 1984 in Geneva, I met Major Dawit Wolde Giorgis, the then Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commissioner.23 Dawit introduced me to the Minister of Interior, General Taye Tilahum, and told him we were old acquaintances from the Law School in Addis Ababa and Asmara. He also told him that we discussed the situation in Eritrea.24 The Minister asked me my thoughts on the Eritrean situation. With his customary wit, Dawit interjected and said, “Getaye [Sir], Gaim thinks that the issue should be left to the discretion of the Eritrean people.” The General calmly but disapprovingly replied; “Leave it to which people? We have the sacrosanct duty to bequeath what we inherited from our forefathers to the next generation at any cost.” He further said, “We have the responsibility to fight for the last inch of our sovereign territory.” That is the standard line repeated by most nationalist Ethiopians regarding the Eritrean question, even now, nearly 30 years after independence. According to the Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, the third reason why Mengistu and his regime rejected the peaceful option of resolving the Eritrean problem was that: Ethiopian leaders probably have some doubts about how successful the military will be in Eritrea without direct Soviet and Cuban involvement, but they are confident they will gain ground against the guerrillas—and also confident that the Soviets and Cubans will come to their aid if the offensive runs into trouble. They believe that 176

Chapter 8 without Cuban troops they will face a difficult struggle, but they are willing to pay the price in men and resources.25

If Cuba did not fully deploy its ground forces in Eritrea during the major Ethiopian counter-offensive in 1978-1979 it was most probably because they saw no need to do so. The supply of Soviet weapons and the training and advice provided by East Germans, Cubans and Soviet officers were enough to enable the Ethiopian military to dislodge the Eritrean insurgents. A document titled Ethiopia: The Impact of Soviet Military Assistance, states: ‘Since their deployment to Ethiopia, Soviet advisors have provided two vital services: direct combat support for Ethiopian ground force operations against insurgents in the Ogaden, Tigray, and Eritrea: and rear services support’ (1983: 6). More importantly, the same document states, ‘Soviet advisors have heavily influenced Ethiopian ground force operations in Eritrea (Ibid.). Had the offensive failed, there is evidence to show that the Cubans and their Soviet allies were ready and willing to step in whenever the need arose. According to the US Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, another reason why Ethiopia rejected the call for a peaceful settlement was because: ‘After achieving initial military objectives, the Ethiopians might offer a fig leaf of autonomy to the Eritreans—a deal that the insurgents are most unlikely to accept under any circumstances. In any event, the fighting will continue—at a reduced level—but the situation will remain basically unchanged.’26 This was echoed by the two most prominent architects of the Soviet-Cuban policy in Ethiopia, the Soviet Ambassador in Ethiopia, Ratanov, and the Cuban highest military official in Ethiopia, General Arnaldo Ochoa, who stated: ‘If the military effort in Eritrea is successful, the PMAC hopes that the separatists and the Arab countries who support them would have to agree to a political settlement and accept internal autonomy for Eritrea.’27 The PMAC believed only military defeat would bring the Eritreans to the negotiating table. As General Ochoa observed: The majority of the Council [PMAC]… thinks that in the existing circumstances, when the separatists are on the offensive, they would not agree to negotiations, or they would present ultimata demanding the separation of Eritrea. Therefore, the majority of the Council believes a combination of military and political measures should be 177

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa undertaken, i.e. to propose negotiations to the Eritrean organizations only after having achieved some military successes.28

The explanations given by the US Interagency Intelligence are highly plausible. A report produced subsequent to A. N. Kosygin’s Official Visit to Ethiopia stated: ‘We gather the impression that the Ethiopian leaders, despite the fact that the national question in Ethiopia continues to be pointed in nature, are not putting forward any concrete programs for a political resolution, relying mostly on the use of force.’29  As pointed out by the East German official Paul Markovski and CPSU CC International Department head Boris N. Ponomarev in Moscow, much was said to depend on Mengistu’s attitude towards the Eritrean problem.30 Markovski and Ponomarev further stated: ‘It has to be expected that - as L. I. Brezhnev told Mengistu - the national question cannot be solved militarily.’31 Nonetheless, there was to be no softening of Mengistu’s position. He adamantly refused to recognise that the Eritrean liberation movements fought for a just cause, telling the Soviet New Times: ‘…to contend that the bandits of Eritrea are fighting for a righteous cause is to condone brigandage and terrorism…against the national unity of Ethiopia’.32 Robert Patman states (1993: 115): ‘Soviet military aid had the unintended effect of strengthening Ethiopian nationalism.’ In Eritrea, ‘Mengistu refused to consider anything but a military solution’ (Patman 1990: 273). Citing Lars Bondestam (1980), Patman stated: ‘Dismissing the Eritrean liberation movements as “bandits” and “terrorists,” he was resigned to the fact that “the Eritrean war may continue for generations”’ (Ibid.). Echoing his boss, the head of the Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Council, Berhanu Jembere, said that the idea of negotiating with ‘bandits and terrorists cannot be entertained.’33 Robert Patman states that ‘Officially, Moscow endorsed the Mengistu line on Eritrea. Since 1978, the Soviet media regularly pointed out that the victory of the Ethiopian revolution removed any political justification for Eritrean secessionism’ (1990: 274)

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No Costs for Mengistu’s failure to heed the Soviet Union The second fatal flaw in the Soviet bloc’s attempts to broker a peaceful end to the Eritrean issue was that it had very little leverage with Mengistu. It is interesting to note that how little his dependence on the Soviet bloc influenced Mengistu’s attitude to Eritrea. This was, quite simply, because the strategic stakes for the socialist countries in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa were so high that they could not risk alienating him or his regime. As seen in the Ponomarev quotation,34 the response was to persevere and continue to work on Mengistu no matter how intransigent he might have been. The US Interagency Intelligence Memorandum hits the nail on the head: The USSR sees considerable potential for gain from its involvement in Ethiopia, including important local opportunities in East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, as well as a chance to advance the USSR’s status as a great power with an expanding presence on the world scene. Moscow wants to replace air and naval facilities that were lost in Somalia—particularly in light of US-Soviet negotiations on forces in the Indian Ocean—and to intimidate Somalia’s Arab and potential Western backers with the warning that Moscow has permanent interest in the area of the Red Sea.35

As has been seen, the Eritrean ports of Massawa and Assab and the nearby islands such as the Dahlak were valuable substitutes for the Somali Port of Berbera after Somalia expelled the Soviet Union and their allies in 1977. Moscow’s determination to establish a high profile presence in the Red Sea region was reinforced by the absence of perceived ‘…external deterrents to their course of action, and they apparently judge[d] the political risks of US reaction as tolerable and the military risks as negligible.’36 Despite this, a full-fledged concession to establish a Soviet naval base on Eritrean shores seems to have been ostensibly rejected by the government. In December 1984, the then Ethiopian Foreign Minister, Goshu Wolde, stated: ‘We have no military bases here. We have a treaty of Friendship and Co-operation with the Soviet Union but that does not in any way mean we are subservient to Soviet foreign policy.’37 Marina Ottaway states that although the Ethiopian government stood 179

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on the Soviet side, e.g. it opposed the UN resolution that called for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, on issues ‘closer to home…the Ethiopian government proved much less compliant: in fact it gave remarkably little to the Soviet Union’ (1982: 149). She further wrote: ‘The initial Ethiopian concession to the Soviet Union was to allow it to anchor in the Dahlak Islands, off the port of Massawa in Eritrea, the dry dock originally stationed at Berbera’ (Ibid.). According to Patman, the Soviet’s plea for a naval base at Massawa was rejected on at least three occasions (1990: 273). However according to Madam Sauldie: By the time the Ethiopian leader Mengistu was paying his fourth visit to the Soviet Union in November 1980, these reports were already speculating that the Soviet Union was using the Dahlak Islands off Ethiopia’s Red Sea coast. The Dahlak Archipelago is only 50 km off Massawa and roughly 500 km from Assab at the southern outlet of the Red Sea at Babel Mandeb (Gate of Tears) Straits. As of October 1980, these reports estimate that about half of Soviet Indian Ocean Naval Squadron of 30 combat vessels, 16 support ships and several submarines were anchored off the Dahlak Islands. (1987:141).

Other reports indicate that the Ethiopian government had allowed the Soviet Union to use port and airfield facilities. For example, according to a report published in June 1987 by the US Defence Department: … there are about 1,700 Soviet military advisers in Ethiopia, a lower figure than usually estimated. The report says that Ethiopia allows the USSR to use its port and airfields to provide logistic support and reconnaissance facilities for Soviet operation in the Red Sea … The report also mentions that the USSR has a small naval support base in the Dahlak islands, off Massawa. There are also believed to be about 2,000 advisers from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany and Poland.38

According to Yuri Velidanov, a Soviet diplomat based in the Seychelles in the 1980s, while the Soviet Union did have a strategic interest in the Indian Ocean, Moscow was not interested in threatening the oil routes vital to Western economies (referred in Yordanov 2016: 207). Yordanov stated that the main reason the Soviet Union deployed large numbers of warships to the Indian Ocean ‘was to secure the Soviet 180

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Union’s maritime and fishing areas’ (p. 208). Referring to Kaufman, he further pointed out that ‘As the Soviet Union developed its maritime and fishing fleets, traffic between Vladivostok and the Black Sea ports increased and established one of the country’s most important naval highways’ (p. 208). Despite the importance of the Dahlak Islands to the Soviet Union, the latter invested cautiously in light of the heavy losses incurred at Berbera. Yordanov argues that whilst Dahlak was equipped with facilities and communications of the Soviet navy, it was not a full-fledged military base like the one built by Washington on Diego Garcia: ‘Its purpose was to offer technical support for the Soviet squadron in the Indian Ocean by providing spare parts and a large concrete floating dock for ship repair, engineering and technical personnel, and a small guard unit’ (p. 208). Beyond the fear of losing access to the Red Sea, Moscow was hampered in its efforts to bring Mengistu to the negotiating table by the very support it had given him. On the one hand, the socialist countries reiterated the need for a political settlement of the Eritrean problem, and on the other, their supply of weapons, technical experts, and other forms of assistance continued despite Mengistu’s defiance and his scorched earth policy in Eritrea. By providing so much military assistance the Soviet Union and its allies fostered the conditions for Mengistu’s administration to favour military, rather than political solutions. The Soviet Union, Cuba and East Germany actually undermined their own peace efforts by supplying Mengistu with weapons. As Yordanov rightly pointed out: ‘Although the Kremlin had been encouraging the Derg’s negotiation with the Eritrean nationalist factions, by the end of 1979, Moscow furnished Ethiopia with large quantities of arms. As a result, the unsuccessful attempt of the Ethiopian army of forty thousand man to take Nacfa in July 1979 was an embarrassment to the Soviet Union’ (2016: 241). Had the socialist countries’ approach been based on a combination of reward and punishment—carrot and stick—Mengistu’s response to their advice would most likely have been different. Not only did they keep on supplying him with weaponry, advisors and military trainers, but, they even warned each other to be easy on him regarding the Eritrean question. Their common phrase was “We 181

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should work on him” as if he was an unfinished good. For example, Andrei Kirilenko, member of the political bureau, CPS said: ‘Mengistu [Haile Mariam] is still not sufficiently experienced … therefore it is just necessary to teach him.’39 Paul Markovski and Boris N. Ponomarev also said: ‘We have to continue to work on him [Mengistu]. Any solution has to be found within the framework of the Ethiopian state.’40

Flawed Assumptions The third reason the socialist countries’ attempt to resolve the Eritrean problem peacefully failed was because the proposed solution was based on the flawed assumption that the Eritrean problem was an Ethiopian domestic problem which had to be solved within the framework of Ethiopia’s sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity. Any serious peacemaker would seek to identify a common ground between the warring parties, to be used as a launching pad for negotiation and compromise. However, since at the heart of war between Eritrea and Ethiopia lay the “framework of the Ethiopian state,” it should have been obvious from the outset that there could be no “solution” within that structure. Soviet and East German officials were aware that such a solution, without consideration for the demands of the Eritrean side, would be unacceptable. Yet the socialist countries were not willing to seek an alternative approach. Inevitably, therefore, they were doomed to fail. In the draft letter from Honecker to Brezhnev on EthiopianEritrean talks, it was stated: ‘The Politburo of the CC of the SED is of the opinion that everything has to be done to achieve a political solution of the Eritrean question. The safeguarding of the revolutionary process in Ethiopia and its territorial as well as political integrity is a necessary precondition for this.’41 This makes it clear that no solution to the Eritrean problem could be achieved. The draft letter also stated: ‘The Provisional Military Administrative Council must doubtless have reliable control over its free access to the Red Sea. This, however, must be safeguarded by political and military means.’42 Since the Eritrean liberation movements considered the Red Sea as being Eritrean, vesting its control in the Ethiopian government would also be unacceptable. 182

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Honecker had told Isaias at their meeting in Berlin: ‘From my point of view, the full autonomy within the Ethiopian state is the correct solution in order to pursue together the common task of economic build-up and the creation of a progressive social order in Ethiopia and Eritrea.’43 That Isaias did not dismiss Honecker’s point out of hand may seem strange, but at the time of the meeting the priority of the Eritrean liberation movements was to avert the Soviet-backed counteroffensive scheduled for the second half of 1978. Lamberz of SED and Pepe, the Cuban Ambassador in Ethiopia, also agreed that Ethiopia’s ‘Territorial integrity and central authority had to be guaranteed. Danger of an internationalization of the conflict existed in the North, in particular in Massawa.’’44 The SED official, Hermann Axen, in his note to E. Honecker stated: Based on the results of the last meeting, the Politburo of our Party proposes therefore that the Soviet comrades, in conjunction with representatives of our Party, work out internally possible solutions to the regional autonomy of Eritrea in the framework of the Ethiopian state in order to communicate them at the appropriate time to the Chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council, Mengistu Haile Mariam.45

In preparation for the ELF-RC’s planned meeting with the USSR Solidarity Committee, Trappen of the SED and Ulyanovsky of the CC of the CPSU emphasised: ‘The objective is to find an appropriate solution for Eritrea within the framework of the Ethiopian state. We do not have the intention to hide from Ahmed Nasser our policy toward a unified Ethiopia. The policy of the CPSU is aimed at the unity of Ethiopia.’46 It was further pointed out that: ‘We will try to convince Ahmed Nasser that the future development of the Eritrean people can only evolve in a unified Ethiopian state. In the discussions we will continue to pursue the line of emphasizing the unity between the Marxist-Leninist forces and national-democratic forces in Ethiopia and Eritrea.’47 The Soviet Union and its allies believed that the Ethiopian leadership stood a chance of winning ‘progressive elements’ in the liberation fronts to their side, and thus fracture the movement.48 It is interesting to note, however, that, as the US Interagency Intelligence Memorandum of states, the ‘EPLF leaders so far seem no more 183

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inclined than other insurgent leaders to negotiate or to abandon the Eritrean demand for complete independence’.49 The attempts to divide the Eritrean liberation movements along ideological lines failed not because the leaderships of the ELF and the EPLF liked each other. Nothing could be farther from the truth. But despite the fact that they loathed each other for many, diverse reasons, they were both singlemindedly committed to independence. In the absence of such a split, pressure exerted on the protagonists was destined to fail. ‘In effect, the three talks which were held with Ahmed Nasser proved that the Eritrean friends are not yet willing to approach the question by giving up the slogan of independence for Eritrea. Their argumentation is that neither side should coerce the other one into negotiations and a solution could only be a result of unconditional negotiations.’50 Trappen and Ulyanovsky made it clear that a solution to the Eritrean problem should be based on granting Eritrea regional autonomy, ‘but, however, no separate national independence’ (emphasis added).51 They also underscored the importance of ‘the unconditional use of Ethiopia’s communications with the ports on the Red Sea.’52 This was proposed regardless of whether it was acceptable to the Eritrean side, showing a decidedly cavalier attitude to their aspirations. Despite the fact that the East German and Soviet officials acknowledged that ‘… the USA, Italy, and France have officially opposed Eritrean separatism,’53 in the same document, Grabowski (SED) and Sinitsin (CPSU) made an outrageous claim that, ‘The imperialists aspire to take advantage of ethnic conflicts, exploit the social instability of the leadership, and encourage nationalist feelings in an effort to further stiffen the Ethiopian attitude in the Eritrean question and thereby aggravate the situation of the revolutionary regime.’54 If the imperialist powers, the USA, France and Italy were opposed to ‘Eritrean separatism,’ In view of the fact that the major imperialist powers, namely, the USA, France and Italy had officially declared their opposition to Eritrean separation, Gradowski’s and Sinitsin’s allegation that they would exploit it for their own advantage and to undermine the Ethiopian revolution didn’t make sense. The imperialists and the Soviet Union’s position on the Eritrean question were almost identical. According to David Shinn, ‘When Ethiopa 184

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was threatened by … Eritrean separatism, the United States strongly backed the Haile Selasie government.’55 The same policy applied during Mengistu’s rule. As Halliday points out: ‘Russian policy in the Horn is, in some respects, little different from that of the West. Both sides insist on the territorial integrity of Ethiopia - meaning no Eritrean secession, and no handing over of the Ogaden to Somalia’ (1984: 130). The socialist countries continued to insist on what they termed the ‘political settlement’ of the Eritrean problem; the plan for regional autonomy under which Eritrea would have been partitioned.56 However, if half a country’s territory is removed, what is there left to settle? This proposal was to some extent an heir of the Bevin-Sforza Plan of 1949.57 The Soviet allies kept on trying to sweeten the deal for Mengistu, making concessions to the extent of diluting the geographical, political and social identity of Eritrea. This was notwithstanding the fact that the Soviet Ambassador in Ethiopia, Ratanov, had, as early as 1976, pointed out the futility of this approach. He had said: ‘Should the Ethiopian leadership stick with this point of view, it will be difficult to find a common ground for negotiations.’ 58 Nonetheless, Ratanov went on, ‘the most important thing is to get both parties to the negotiating table’.59 He had further stated: ‘The first point of the 9-point program on Eritrea states autonomy with respect to tribes/peoples but not with respect to territories. Mengistu has stated in a previous speech that Ethiopia would be willing to grant more autonomy to Eritrea than it had before. But he has not yet stated what he meant by this.’60 Years later, the East German Ministry of State Security described the situation in which the USSR still found itself: ‘In order to avoid Ethiopia’s military defeat in the north, the Soviet Union responded to Mengistu’s request for immediate and extensive delivery of military provisions and the all-round support in the transfer of the troops of the 1st army.’61 In spite of ongoing aid, delivered over the years, the Ethiopian armed forces had been unable to defeat the Eritrean insurgents. The US Interagency Intelligence Memorandum of 1981 had predicted that even if the Eritrean guerrillas were dislodged from ‘Asmara, Massawa, and other urban areas,’ they ‘will probably again take to the hills and continue the insurgency…’62 And this was exactly what

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had happened after the Soviet-backed Ethiopian counter-offensive in 1978-1979. Moscow concluded that Ethiopia would be unable to resolve the problem militarily. To rescue Mengistu and his regime from defeat at the hands of the EPLF, the Soviet Union in 1985 expressed its willingness to broker peace between the two warring parties. Of course it would not have been as a neutral arbiter, but as an Ethiopian ally. Brutents, the Department head for Africa at the Soviet foreign ministry, said that in the light of the development and ‘…the proven inability of Ethiopian armed forces to find a military solution … in personal talk with Mengistu expressed the Soviet Union’s readiness to act as an intermediary between the Ethiopian leadership and the EPLF.’63 Even with the Ethiopian armed forces in Eritrea on the verge of collapse, Mengistu’s intransigence persisted. According to the East German Ministry of State Security, he urged the Soviet Union, East Germany and the other socialist countries to stop meddling in Ethiopia’s internal affairs.64

New Developments In 1987 the EPLF held its belated second organisational congress. Isaias, who had been running the organisation from behind the scenes, became more visible by taking on the position of Secretary General, replacing the highly-respected veteran combatant, Ramadan Mohamed Nur. Another significant change was that the Front finally abandoned its problematic position on the Soviet Union. After its congress, the EPLF leadership became openly critical of Soviet foreign policy, including its stance on Eritrea. The EPLF also modified its previously hostile position on the US. Before the congress the EPLF had characterised Washington as the enemy of the Eritrean liberation struggle. From 1987 onwards ‘…attacks on the US were more muted—suggesting that the EPLF may be trying to soften its socialist image.’65 There were also formal changes in Ethiopia. On 10th September 1987 the Derg was officially replaced by the so-called people’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE). The Derg held its last congress, and the newly elected National Assembly (Amharic—Shengo, an Amharic equivalent to “Soviet” (Clapham 1988: 94) was inaugurated. Despite the rhetoric, the Shengo was nothing more than a rubber- stamping 186

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body. As Gebru Tareke (2009: 139) states: ‘Despite the constitutional provisions that gave it sweeping powers (articles 62-63), the Shengo was little more than a decorative institution.’ As predicted, Mengistu was elected as the first civilian president. As Andargachew Tiruneh (1993: 278) states: ‘All Ethiopians, including the politically uninitiated as well as the foreign press had been predicting well before 10 September 1987 that this was going to be the outcome. Further, thousands of children had, for months, been practising how to write “president Mengistu” with cards to be displayed at the mass rallies on Revolution Day (13 September 1987). What came as a surprise to Eritreans and international observers alike was Mengistu and his regime’s decision to dismember Eritrea. The Ethiopian Institute of Nationalities, which was established in 1983, was said to have carried out research on re-districting the country along ethnic lines. Based on its findings, the Shengo (National Assembly) approved a plan for regional restructuring in September 1987. Under this plan, the 14 provisional administrations were to be divided into 24 administrative regions and five autonomous regions: Eritrea, Tigray, Assab, Dire Dawa and the Ogaden. In the autonomous regions, assemblies were directly accountable to the national Shengo, to the Council of State and to the President of Ethiopia.66 The new region of Eritrea was to be divided into three zones: one for the Kunama in south-west Eritrea, another inhabited largely by the Christian, Tigrinyaspeaking people in the centre, and the last in the North inhabited by the Tigre-speaking Eritreans. The Afar section of Eritrea was removed, to become part of the new autonomous region of Assab.67 This dismemberment of Eritrea was condemned by the EPLF ‘… as colonisation under a new guise. It argued that the removal of Assab, and the division of Eritrea into three administrative regions based on nationalities, was no more than an effort to dissipate Eritrean unity’ (in Ibid.). The notion of dismembering Eritrea into three parts, and the removal of Dankalia, fundamentally contradicted what Eritreans regarded as a principle of indivisibility. This was far worse than Mengistu’s Nine-Point Plan of 1976. Mengistu’s decision to dismember Eritrea sounded the death knell of the attempt to solve the Eritrean question peacefully.

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In the following chapter, the changes that took place in the postBrezhnev era and their consequences in the Horn of Africa, particularly in Ethiopia and Eritrea, are discussed.

Endnotes 1

Mengistu Haile Mariam quoted in, “For Unity and Victory of Socialism.” The Ethiopian Herald, Editorial, 26 January 1982. 2 The Asmara Manisfesto, The Ethiopian Herald, vol. xxvii, No. 12, 2 February 1982 3 “Information on Talks of Ahmed Nasser (ELF-RC) in the USSR Solidarity Committee,” June 07, 1978. http://digitalarchive. wilsoncenter.org/document/111900 (accessed 1/1/18). 4 See Mengistu’s interview in New Times, 48, 1985, pp. 10-11. 5 “Memorandum of Conversation between East German official and CPSU CC International Department head Boris N. Ponomarev in Moscow,” February 10, 1978. Document obtained and translated by Christian F. Ostermann. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/ document/110967 (accessed 1/1/18). 6 See “East German Ministry of State Security, ‘The Current Situation in PDRE [People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia] and the Region’,” June 06, 1988. Obtained and translated by Radoslav Yordanov. http:// digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/134784 (accessed 2/1/18). 7 See “SED CC, Department of International Relations, 16 February 1978, Report on Conversation with [Vice-president] Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Member of the Politburo of the CP Cuba, in Havana,” February 13, 1978. Obtained and translated by Christian F. Ostermann. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110968 (accesssed 1/1/18). 8 “SED CC, Department of International Relations, 16 February 1978, Report on Conversation with [Vice-president] Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Member of the Politburo of the CP Cuba, in Havana,” February 13, 1978. Obtained and translated by Christian F. Ostermann. http:// digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110968 (accessed 2/2/18) 9 “Winkelmann to Hermann Axen,” June 09, 1978, document obtained and translated by Christian F. Ostermann. http://digitalarchive. wilsoncenter.org/document/111902 (accessed 1/2/18). Hugo Winkelman (SED) was General Major der volksplizei according 10 to the Diretory of East German Officials. Ibid. 11 188

Chapter 8 12 13 14 15 16

17 18 19

20

21 22 23

24 25 26 27

28

This however seems unlikely unless Winkelmann had access to the speech in advance five days before its delivery. It was also unlikely that Mengistu would deliver two speeches within five days. See footnote 78 above Ibid. See Winkelmann to Hermann Axen, June 09, 1978 … “Memorandum of Conversation between Grabowski and Sinitsin in Moscow,” June 19, 1978; document obtained and translated by Christian F. Ostermann. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/ document/111903 (accessed 3/3/18). Ibid. Ibid. “Report on Mengistu’s Visit to the Soviet Union to discuss SovietEthiopian Relations,” July 20, 1978, Translated for CWIHP by Daniel Rozas http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/121063 (accessed 29/2/17). “’Information About the Highlights of a Brief Working Visit to the USSR (25-27 July This Year [1988]) of the General Secretary of the WPE CC, the President of the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Mengistu Haile Mariam’,” July, 1988,. Obtained and translated by Radoslav Yordanov. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter. org/document/134785 (25/3/18). Ibid. Ibid. Dawit and I were classmates at Law School in Addis Ababa. I used to meet him in Asmara during the summer holidays when he returned to serve in the Second Division of the Ethiopian ground forces. We were both surprised and excited to see each other in unexpected place In December 1987, he resigned his position as Ethiopia’s ambassador to the Scandinavian countries and defected. Ethiopia: Likelihood and Implications of Possible Outcomes in Eritrea: Foreign Relations, 1977–1980 … Ibid. “Memorandum of conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia A.N. Ratanov and Cuban military official Arnaldo Ochoa,” July 17, 1977; translated by S. Savranskaya http://digitalarchive. wilsoncenter.org/document/111849 (accessed 12/5/19). “Memorandum of conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia A.N. Ratanov and Cuban military official Arnaldo Ochoa…

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“Report on A. N. Kosygin’s Official Visit to Ethiopia,” September, 1979, Translated for CWIHP by Daniel Rozas. http://digitalarchive. wilsoncenter.org/document/121061 (5/5/19). “Memorandum of Conversation between East German official Paul Markovski and CPSU CC International Department head Boris N. in Moscow,” February 10, 1978 … Ibid. Mengistu Haile Mariam “Considerable Progress Already,” New Times, 48, 1985: 10-11 Cited in The Times, 3 December 1987. See “Memorandum of Conversation between East German official Paul Markovski and CPSU CC International Department head Boris N. Ponomarev in Moscow…

Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, Ethiopia: Likelihood and Implications of Possible Outcomes in Eritrea, Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Horn of Africa, Part 1,Washington, May 22, 1978. Ibid. 36 37 Interview, The Daily Telegraph, 7 December 1984 EIU, No. 3-1987: 23. 38 39 “Minutes of Meeting of CPSU CC Politburo (excerpt),” July 14, 1978, APRF, f. 3, op. 120, d. 40, ll. 45, 10-12. Translated for CWIHP by Mark Doctoroff http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111906 (accessed 1/2/20). See “Memorandum of Conversation between East German official 40 Paul Markovski and CPSU CC International Department head Boris N. in Moscow,” February 10, 1978 … 41 “Draft Letter from Honecker to Brezhnev on Ethiopian-Eritrean Talks, 19 April 1978,” April 19, 1978, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/127; document obtained and translated by Christian F. Ostermann. http:// digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110979. Ibid. 42 43 “Memorandum of a Conversation between East German leader Erich Honecker and Siassi Aforki, General Secretary of the Revolutionary Party of Eritrea, in Berlin,” January 31, 1978, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/127; document obtained and translated by Christian F. Ostermann. http:// digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110965(accessed (accessed 10/3/19). 35

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“Memorandum of Conversation of SED Comrade Lamberz with Cuban Ambassador to Ethiopia, Comrade Pepe, Addis Ababa,” March 03, 1978, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, SAPMOBArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/127; document obtained and translated by Christian F. Ostermann. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/ document/110973 (accessed 10/4/19) 45 “Draft Letter from Honecker to Brezhnev on Ethiopian-Eritrean Talks … 46 “Memorandum of Conversation between [SED] Comrade Friedel Trappen and Soviet Comrade R. A. Ulyanovsky in the CC of the CPSU,” May 11, 1978, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/127. Ibid. 47 48 Ethiopia: Likelihood and Implications of Possible Outcomes in Eritrea: Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Horn of Africa, Part 1 Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, Washington, May 22, 1978. ttps://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v17p1/ d84#fn:1.5.4.4.262.5.2 Ibid. 49 50 “Information on Talks of Ahmed Nasser (ELF-RC) in the USSR Solidarity Committee,” June 07, 1978, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/127 http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111900 51 “Memorandum of Conversation between [SED] Comrade Trappen and Soviet Comrade R. A. Ulyanovsky … Ibid. 52 53 “Memorandum of Conversation between Grabowski and Sinitsin … Ibid. 54 55 David Shinn, “U.S. Policy Towards the Horn of Africa,” International Policy Digest, 13 October 2011. Available at https://intpolicydigest. org/2011/10/13/u-s-policy-towards-the-horn-of-africa/ (accessed 13/8/18). 56 See the Soviet Union’s Ambassador in Ethiopia, Ratanov in “Memorandum of Conversation, East German Official with Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia Ratanov,” December 07, 1977, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/126; document obtained and translated by Christian F. Ostermann. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110964 (accessed 13/8/18). 57 The Plan was the result of a joint agreement of the British foreign secretary, Ernest Bevin, and the Italian foreign minister, Count Carlo 191

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58 59 60 61

62 63 64 65 66 67

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Sforza. According to the Plan, Eritrea was to be partitioned between Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and Ethiopia. The western lowlands of Eritrea were to be apportioned to Sudan and the rest of Eritrea to Ethiopia (see Kibreab 2005). “Memorandum of Conversation, East German Official with Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia Ratanov… Ibid. Ibid. “East German Ministry of State Security, ‘The Current Situation in PDRE [People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia] and the Region’,” June 06, 1988, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Die Behörde des Bundesbeauftragten für die Stasi-Unterlagen (BStU) [Berlin], MfS HA I 13935, ss. 79-93. Obtained and translated by Radoslav Yordanov. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/134784 (27/9/17). Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. EIU 1987, CR, no. 2: 22. EIU, CR 1987, no 4:22. EIU, CR 1987, no 4:22.

Chapter Nine

A Turning Point in Soviet Foreign Policy

A

fter the death of Brezhnev in November 1982, Yuri Andropov became the Secretary-General of the CPSU. Although he did not completely reverse Brezhnev’s approach to revolution in the developing world, in June 1983 he argued that it was wrong to impose socialism if the necessary socio-economic conditions were lacking. He is reported as saying: ‘It is one thing to proclaim socialism as one’s goal, and it is quite another to build it’ (quoted in Patman 1993: 119120). The corollary is that many countries have proclaimed socialism as their primary goal without having the necessary preconditions, and the outcome has been either a failure or considerable burden on the Soviet Union and its allies. Andropov further stated that the allies of the Soviet Union in the developing world should achieve socialism by relying on their own resources and capabilities (in Ibid.). The new approach questioned Brehznev’s Third World policy, leading to a profound impact on future relations between the Soviet Union and Ethiopia. Robert Patman states that Soviet analysts began identifying negative trends in Ethiopia, such as Mengistu’s reluctance to establish a vanguard Marxist-Leninist party to lead the revolution in the country: ‘The Soviets became increasingly critical toward Mengistu’s nationalist tendencies … Moreover, on the political front, Ethiopia showed little progress in the creation of the Marxist party, which was perceived as an important policy control instrument by the Kremlin’ (Yordanov 2016: 218). The importance of establishing a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party in Ethiopia had been highlighted as early as 1977 by the Soviet Union. 193

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It had been suggested to Mengistu during his closed visit to Moscow in October 1977 that it was critical to create a party which could lead the revolution, mobilize the masses and resolve the nationalities question in Ethiopia. A report on the meeting stated: As a comradely advice, [the Soviet side] shared with Mengistu ideas in favor of the accelerated creation in Ethiopia of a party based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism, which would further the mobilization of masses to defend revolutionary conquests and to promote the revolution. It was stressed to be important for the PMAC to adopt practical measures to resolve the nationalities question in Ethiopia in order to ensure the support of the progressive regime on the part of national minorities.1

Mengistu had done nothing. Frustrated by his resistance, the Soviet Union, in collaboration with Cuba, had decided on a radical plan. In May 1978 they smuggled Negede Goboze, the leader of the outlawed All Ethiopian Socialist Movement (Meison), from exile to plant a party organisation in the Derg. This move so enraged Mengistu that he expelled both the Soviet and Cuban ambassadors and Negede Gobeze from the country (Erlich 1983: 113). An account by Jorge Dominguez, an academic authority on Cuba, is slightly different from this. He states that unlike in Angola where Cuba intervened to support the government against a coup attempt, in Ethiopia Cuba was so concerned by the lack of a civilian political party that it was prepared to undermine Mengistu’s government. Meison had been formed in 1976 as a civilian political party, which provided critical support to the military leadership. The party’s leadership then fell out with Mengistu and the latter banned it in August 1977. Cuba conspired with the Embassy of South Yemen to smuggle Negede back into Ethiopia, but he was arrested immediately. The top leaders of the trade union organisation were also arrested for links to Meison. Mengistu also expelled the Cuban ambassador and the Cuban political counsellor.2 It was only seven years later that Mengistu finally allowed the establishment of a civilian party. Even when he established the party and introduced ostensible political reforms, some analysts considered these superficial and cosmetic. ‘Mengistu’s political reforms were more symbolic than real. Like Emperor Haile Selassie before him, he 194

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preserved the political tradition of firm, one-man rule in Ethiopia’ (Patman 1993: 116). The new party was warmly greeted, however, by the Soviet Union. Tass, for example, proclaimed ‘the creation of the WPE [Workers’ Party of Ethiopia] raised our [Soviet-Ethiopian] co-operation to a new level’ (quoted in Patman 1993: 116). Ironically, as will be seen later, the opposite was to be the case, especially after Soviet foreign policy began to be influenced by Gorbachev’s ‘New Thinking’ doctrine. A document which discusses the KGB’s opinion of Mengistu, the level of support for Ethiopian intelligence services, and the difficulties the Soviets experienced in dealing with their Ethiopian counterparts within state security observed: ‘… the role of the avantgarde party must also be properly assessed, and there are no illusions that Mengistu needs the importance of the constitution, the party, and the government to ensure the functioning of the state.’3 It goes on: ‘It remains an authoritarian state and Mengistu is not necessarily considered a democrat. … He is not burdened with intellectual complexes. If necessary, he is ready to use a weapon.’4 These bleak assessments of Mengistu’s questionable intellectual competence and violent proclivities were made three years after the establishment of the civilian vanguard party. And a year later, during Mengistu’s visit to Moscow in July 1988, Soviet officials observed: During the course of the talk, it was felt that he [Mengistu] still favours the military methods in solving the Eritrean problems, and does not exclude the possibility of returning to the policy of exerting pressure on Somalia and Sudan. In this context, we have tried to bring to Mengistu’s mind the idea about ​​the need to display restraint and flexibility and about the responsibility of the Ethiopian leadership to develop and adopt fundamentally important decisions for the fate of the revolution. Probably, there is still a lot of work to be done with Mengistu (emphasis added).5

The establishment of the party had had no effect on the power structure in the country. Since Mengistu filled the key positions in the party with hand-picked yes- men, the outcome was predictable. As Robert Patman states,

195

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa Predictably, when the WPE emerged in September 1984, it was a hand-picked group of Marxist cadres. Mengistu was “elected” the party’s General Secretary, while the Political Bureau—the WPE’s top decision-making body—was made up largely of the most prominent figures of the PMAC. Thus, the new ruling party in Ethiopia was a thinly disguised military one and a Mengistu dominated one at that (1993: 117).

The establishment of the WPE coincided with fundamental changes that were taking place in the Soviet Union. These changes were to have consequences not only on the relationship between the two countries, but on the future of Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Gorbachev’s New Thinking on Ethiopia and The Eritrean Liberation Struggle It is immoral to throw hundreds of millions of dollars into the development of [the means of] homicide when millions starve and are devoid of everyday necessities. Mikhail Gorbachev cited in Volkov, M. (1987: 9)

The rise of Mikhail Gorbachev to the position of the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union ushered in a profoundly new way of thinking, not only in terms of the Soviet Union’s foreign policy, but also in the allocation of the country’s scarce resources. The above quotation indicates where Gorbachev’s priorities lay. Rather than investing in the development of the means of destruction, the priority should be to combat poverty and to promote world peace. After the end of the superpower rivalry in the Middle East, the Soviet Union re-examined its track record in Africa. Gorbachev’s inner circle began voicing dissatisfaction with Brezhnev’s African policy, as well as with the Marxist dogma that had underpinned the Soviet Union’s approach toward its client states in Africa, such as Ethiopia. The organising principle underpinning Gorbachev’s approach was reduction of the Soviet presence and pursuance of peaceful solutions to regional conflicts (Goodman, 1999). In view of the cessation of hostilities between the superpowers, it was deemed inappropriate to pursue the same policy of confrontation as before. As summarised by 196

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Brutents: ‘…without the superpower claims and the Cold War global confrontation, Moscow’s Third World policy was “uneconomic” and self-destructive’ (cited in Yordanov 2016: 217). The cessation of superpower rivalry and hostilities precipitated a reappraisal of the nature of countries previously considered socialist, such as Ethiopia, Angola and Afghanistan. Gleb Starushenko of the Soviet Institute of African Studies even went as far as declaring ‘there are no socialist states in sub-Saharan Africa, only socialist-oriented states’ (in Yordanov 2016: 237). The reassessment of the African reality seemed to have led some Soviet analysts, such as Starushenko, to abandon the Soviet model of the non-capitalist path of development.6 This was because the countries concerned were said to lack the necessary socio-economic preconditions for socialist transformation. The motivating force of socialist revolution and consolidation— the proletariat or the working class—was said to be either weak or non-existent in the countries concerned. The corollary was that Africa might have to pass through the capitalist stage of development before embarking on the socialist path. Radoslav Yordanov perceptively argues: ‘This ideological volte-face further freed up Soviet foreign policy, giving it much needed flexibility vis-à-vis Africa’ (p. 237). The then Soviet Foreign Minister, Edward Shevardnadze, visited southern Africa for the first time in March 1990 and prior to his departure expressed his governments’ desire to end the rivalry with the West in the Third World countries. Instead, he called for the development of a more pragmatic approach to international relations regarding the Third World (in Yordanov 2016: 237). “Without disarmament, reduction of military expenditure, conversion of military industries, and release of resources for development needs,” it would be extremely difficult to tackle challenging global issues, he said (in Yordanov Ibid.). Gorbachev’s government did not immediately cut military and economic assistance to Ethiopia. The Soviet Union continued making use of the naval facilities in the Dahlak Islands in Eritrea. During the year he took power, 1985, Gorbachev provided Ethiopia with US $800 million in military aid (Katz 1989). However, in 1986, Ethiopia received only US $310 million from Moscow. However, this increased substantially in 1987 (Ibid.). Despite this, there were indications that the 197

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priorities set by Gorbachev’s ‘New Thinking’ were beginning to affect existing security arrangements. Provision of support to countries such as Ethiopia were downgraded. On 2nd March 1987, USSR Minister of Defence S.L. Sokolov met with Ethiopian defence minister Lt General Gebre-Kidan Tesfaye in Moscow. Although details of the discussions were not made public, the session was attended by a number of high-ranking Soviet military officials who clearly indicated the Soviet Union’s growing concern about the situation in Ethiopia.7 For the moment, and notwithstanding the Soviet worries about the deteriorating military situation in Ethiopia, particularly in the north, support was there. In November 1987, Soviet and Ethiopian officials concluded a new agreement worth US$ 2 billion. However, the deal was set to end in December 1990, with no provision for renewal (Patman 1993:122). There was evidence the Ethiopian military was tired of the endless conflict. From mid-1987, the Ethiopian military ‘had grown so war weary and grievances were so widespread that some units in the north were said to have demanded to see no less an official than the president himself. Even worse, some brigades were defecting from Eritrea to Sudan and others entrenching themselves in remote parts of Eritrea and the neighbouring provinces and refusing to fight’ (Endarkachew Tiruneh 1993: 354). During his working visit to the Soviet Union in July 1988, Mengistu expressed his deep indebtedness for the ‘Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries for their timely assistance, which allowed for the defence of Ethiopia’s unity and its territorial integrity.’8 Soviet officials remarked that the situation in the northern part of the country remained difficult, and as a result Mengistu ‘… did not rule out that a protracted war will have to be waged against the separatists, which will require the mobilization of all available resources in the country.’9 The Soviet officials who were hosting Mengistu further stated: On our side, it was emphasized that the Ethiopian revolution, as before, can count on Soviet Union’s support and solidarity. We feel the fate of Ethiopia and the historical choice of its people is close to us, and we not only sympathize with the progressive course conducted by its leadership, but also strive to provide it with all possible assistance. The difficult situation in which the Ethiopian leadership has to operate has been acknowledged, and it was noted 198

Chapter 9 that the reactionary forces apply similar subversive methods against such progressive African countries as Mozambique or Angola.10

Bearing in mind that this meeting was three years after Gorbachev had come to power, the sentiments are surprising in view of Gorbachev’s so-called ‘new thinking’. However, although Gorbachev did not immediately renounce his predecessor’s foreign policy of heavyhanded intervention in Africa, over time his government signalled to its clients in countries such as Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Ethiopia that the Soviet Union was no longer prepared to pursue the old antagonistic policy against the US government and its allies in the West. That policy was costly both in the provision of military and economic assistance, and in the way it fomented problems with the United States. Over time, such an approach was considered incompatible with Gorbachev’s principle of perestroika (openness) which underpinned the new Soviet foreign policy. One of the earliest tangible dividends of the Gorbachev era was improved relations between former adversaries Ethiopia and Somalia. During Mengistu’s visit to the Soviet Union, Gorbachev reminded Mengistu that the Ethiopian people ‘had broad opportunities to display their constructive potential.’11 Gorbachev considered peaceful resolution of conflicts in the country, including in Eritrea, a priority. Mengistu was as intransigent on the issue as ever, and still Gorbachev, like Soviet leaders before him, was willing to provide logistical help and support. Soviet officials during Mengistu’s visit observed: In connection with the development of the situation and the proven inability of Ethiopian armed forces to find a military solution, the Department head for Africa at the Soviet foreign ministry, Brutents, in personal talk with Mengistu expressed the Soviet Union’s readiness to act as an intermediary between the Ethiopian leadership and the EPLF. This readiness was abruptly rejected by Mengistu as “interference of the supervisors in the internal affairs of the PDRE”. Instead of such mediation, Mengistu asked for the USSR to intervene within the US and Arab states and to prevent the EPLF’s external support, and thus isolate the EPLF internationally. 12

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allegations that the Eritrean forces were receiving external support, either from Arab nations or the US. The Saudis and the Egyptians had never supported the EPLF, and by 1987, they had even stopped supporting other Eritrean factions that they helped previously. This was because: In late April [1987] Ethiopia received an official Saudi Arabian delegation in Addis Ababa, and in July the [Ethiopian] foreign minister, Berhanu Bayeh, made the first visit since 1974 to the country by any high ranking official when he went to hold talks with King Fahd as well as the foreign minister, the minister of defence and the minister of interior. This suggests that with the death of the veteran Eritrean nationalist and Muslim leader, Osman Saleh Sabbe, whom it had consistently supported, Saudi Arabia has decided to reconsider its policies towards the Eritrean question.13

Not only did this show that the Saudi government’s commitment was to Osman Saleh Sabbe rather than to the Eritrean liberation struggle, but also that Saudi Arabia had already reconsidered its stand on the Eritrean question when Mengistu urged the Soviet Union to intervene with the Arabs. Saudi Arabia in fact joined Egypt in trying to mediate in the longstanding feud between Mengistu and Jaafar Neimeri of Sudan. In April 1987, ‘Mengistu visited Egypt after Berhanu Bayeh had paved the way in January. One aspect of this visit was an offer of mediation with Sudan…’14 Mengistu made it clear that ‘Ethiopia would continue to fight the civil war against secessionist forces in Eritrea and Tigray provinces in the north, ‘’whatever the cost’’ and ‘’whatever the time.’’’15 He told Jane Perlez of The New York Times that ‘a resolution to the war, similar to the talks on Afghanistan, Angola and Cambodia was not possible because Ethiopia’s struggle was internal, not regional.’16 He also told The New York Times that a restructuring like the Soviet Union’s perestroika was not the answer for Ethiopia as a developing country. ‘We must devise our own solutions for these problems,’17 he said. As seen in the previous chapter, and as admitted by the Soviet Union, Cuba and East Germany, what Mengistu refers to as “our own solutions” was nothing more than carnage and bloodshed. On the Eritrean question and that of Ethiopia’s ‘territorial integrity’, Mengistu’s and the Soviet Union’s positions, including under 200

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Gorbachev’s leadership, were identical. The only difference was that Moscow understood that the war would be won by the EPLF and the TPLF, whilst Mengistu continued with the delusion that not only could he defeat the liberation movements but exterminate them, provided that the Soviet bloc stood by him. As we saw above, the Soviet Union committed to continuing supply of weapons even when there were clear signs indicating that the Ethiopian military was on the verge of collapse after the humiliating defeats it had suffered at the battles of Afabet (17th-19th March 1988) and Shire Enda Selassie (15th-19th February 1989). After this, Ethiopian forces were forced to withdraw from the whole of Tigray, even Mekelle, the capital city. After the liberation of Mekelle, Eritrea was cut-off from the rest of Ethiopia and could only be reached by air, or by the unreliable sea route from Assab. The Derg’s army never recovered. The routing of the Ethiopian armed forces in these two battles sounded the death knell of Mengistu and his regime.

Endnotes 1 “CPSU CC to SED CC, Information on 30-31 October 1977 Closed Visit of Mengistu …Haile Mariam to Moscow … 2 Said Yusuf Abdi, “Cuba’s Role in Africa: Revolutionary or Reactionary,” Horn of Africa , No 1(October-December 1978), 19,24. “East German Ministry for State Security, ‘Consultations with KGB 3 21-24 April 1987, About Ethiopian Consultation’,” April 30, 1987, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Die Behörde des Bundesbeauftragten für die Stasi-Unterlagen (BStU) [Berlin], MfS ZAIG 5115, ss. 89-93. Obtained and translated by Radoslav Yordanov. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/134782 (accessed 14 March 2018). 4 Ibid. 5 “’Information About the Highlights of a Brief Working Visit to the USSR (25-27 July This Year [1988]) of the General Secretary of the WPE CC, the President of the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Mengistu Haile Mariam’,” July, 1988,. Obtained and translated by Radoslav Yordanov. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter. org/document/134785 (2 Oct 2017).

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At the heart of the theory of non-capitalist path was the notion of skipping the capitalist stage of development to embark on the path of socialism. In addition to Sokolov, four important Deputy Ministers of Defence 7 also attended the meeting: the First Deputy, Army General P.G. Lushev; Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Ye. F. Ivanovskiy; Commander in Chief of the Air Force, A.N. Yefimov, and Commander of the Armed Forces Rear Services, S.K. Kurkotkin (BBC, SWB, 10 March 1987). “’Information About the Highlights of a Brief Working Visit to the 8 USSR (25-27 July … Ibid 9 10 “’Information About the Highlights of a Brief Working Visit to the USSR (25-27 July … Soviet Weekly, 9 November 1985 11 “East German Ministry of State Security, … 12 EIU 1987, CR, no. 3: 23. 13 14 EIU 1987, CR, no. 3: 23. 15 Jane Perlez, Ethiopia’s President Looks Toward Better U.S. Relations Ethiopia: At a Glance, New York Times, 28 November 1988. 16 In Ibid. 17 In Ibid.

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The Tide Turns: The Battle of Afabet

A

mong the battles that constituted the turning point in the long struggle for independence, the battle of Afabet on 17th-19th March 1988 stands out. Peter Worthingtone, the founding editor of the Toronto Sun and the only journalist present when the battle was fought between the EPLA and the Ethiopian Nadew Command, wrote: One battle in 1988 - the largest on the continent since the Second World War -was the turning point for victory: The Battle of Afabet (also known as Nadew). It was one of the rare decisive battles that changed the course of history. It is often compared with Dien Bien Phu that defeated the French in Indochina, and Kursk, the largest tank battle of WWII where the Russians beat the Germans.… [w]alking among dead bodies, witnessing the pillaged Ethiopian army headquarters where Canadian food aid for refugees had been diverted to army kitchens for soldiers. Coincidentally, Rob Roy (then of Stornoway Productions), and I were doing a TV documentary about the war in Eritrea. We were the only outside journalists at the front to document the Eritrean victory (2013 [1988]).

Worthingtone further wrote: ‘The EPLF was virtually a barefoot guerrilla army waging a war in which they should have had no chance against the tanks, guns and numbers of Ethiopia’s supposedly crack divisions—some 20,000-25,000 troops’ (Ibid.). According to Berhan Hagos: 203

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa The LION OF AFABET, Gen. Mesfin Hagos, commanded the biggest victory in Eritrean history in a battle that lasted 48 hours – ON TIME & ON TARGET. On March 18, 1988, Gen. Mesfin received a radio communication from EPLF’s Secretary General Isayas Afeworki to abandon the operation due to unexpected resistance from the Dergue army. But the Lion of Afabet, who has better understanding of military dynamics, pressed on ensuring Eritrea’s victory within the following 24 hours. As a result of the Lion of Afabet’s decisive actions, EPLF and Eritrea were able to: Seize the largest cache of military hardware, enough to arm EPLF and then EPRDF to ultimate victory; Encourage both EPLF and EPRDF to set aside their differences and work together, thus sealing our ultimate victories Gain world publicity and recognition for the Eritrean cause and EPLF for the first time. This victory was acknowledged as the biggest victory by a liberation movement since Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam in 1954; Stir discontent within the Derg army leading to the failed coup in May 1989 against Col. Mengistu Hailemariam, and weakening his regime (emphasis in original). Berhan Hagos1

David Korn emphasised the strategic importance of the victory: The defeat at Afabet appears to have brought to an end whatever hopes Mengistu may have had of regaining military superiority in Eritrea. David Korn (1990: 19).

According to the account of an Ethiopian soldier who survived the ordeal:

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Chapter 10 The fighting [at Afabet] was continuous, exhausting, merciless, and bloody. Brothers were locked in a bottomless pit of death. I saw enemy tanks rolling over my dead or wounded comrades. The slow march to Keren was full of thorns and hardship. It was most humiliating and aggravating. Here was the army’s strong arm, a force that had served with unrivaled dedication, determination, and distinction. Nevertheless, it just melted like butter in front of our unbelieving eyes. What a sad epitaph for the gallant warriors of Mother Ethiopia.2

After the battle, Mengistu himself angrily complained to the Politburo: ‘The leaders of Afabet could have at least saved the weaponry. They could have burned the ammunition. Without doing anything they fled to save their own lives. We are now being hammered with this arsenal.’3 The EPLF and TPLF forces went on to defeat Ethiopian government troops in further battles throughout March, and the humiliation of the Ethiopian army convinced the Soviet Union and its allies that the rebels would sooner or later win the war. In light of this, the Soviet Union began seriously to question the wisdom of continuing its military involvement in Ethiopia. Isaias, who was then secretary-general of the EPLF, also pointed out: The victory at the Nakfa Front is a culmination of a protracted war of liberation. Its significance is measured in terms of the developments in the military during the last ten years. Not only were the offensives in the Nakfa Front poignant and rapid but also have left indelible marks. The question of whether Ethiopian rule in Eritrea is likely to last has for the first time become a major preoccupation requiring an urgent answer in the minds of Ethiopian rulers. Isaias Afwerki, September 19884

Not only had the EPLF captured large quantities of Soviet weaponry,5 it had also taken three senior Soviet military officers. A fourth was killed. Ustinov claimed that 13 more Soviet advisors would have been taken prisoner had Soviet helicopter crews not rescued them. Ustinov maintained that he, like other Soviet citizens working in Ethiopia in 1988, had been aware of the facts but had not been allowed to disclose that the officers had been captured. (Ustinov in Anderson-Jaquest, T. C. 2002).6 The New York Times reported: 205

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front asserted this month that it had captured or killed 18,000 Ethiopian troops and captured three Soviet military advisers - a fourth adviser was said to have been killed - in fighting that resulted in the fall of the strategic town of Afabet, about 60 miles north of Asmara, Eritrea’s capital. Rebel reports have been virtually impossible to verify but Moscow has confirmed the capture of its military advisers.7

A week later, TPLF forces drove Ethiopian troops out of four important towns in Tigray, resulting in a further loss of Soviet arms and equipment. Tom Killion, who visited Afabet in the immediate aftermath, also wrote in the Los Angeles Times: In a four-day battle, the guerrillas of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) destroyed three Ethiopian divisions around this garrison town in northern Eritrea, killing or capturing 18,000 soldiers, four Soviet officers, 50 tanks, 80 heavy guns, 200 trucks and immense quantities of ammunition and supplies. It was the most decisive victory for the rebels since they were forced to retreat from the towns of central Eritrea in 1978,8 following massive Soviet military intervention on the side of the Marxist Ethiopian government of Mengistu Haile Mariam.9

Killion continued: ‘On the road to Afabet, the debris of war was everywhere: burned tanks and charred corpses; the smell of rotting flesh filled the air. At Ashirum pass we waited for hours while hundreds of young guerrillas cleared a path through the wreckage of an entire Ethiopian mechanized brigade, trapped and destroyed on the narrow road.’10 (Ibid.) Roy Pateman (1998: 145) wrote: ‘On March 17 began the most comprehensive defeat of a colonial army since the French failure at Diem Bien Phu in 1954’. He also said: ‘That the war was becoming a test of intelligence capability was shown by the fact that the EPLA destroyed the Ethiopian command and control centre before beginning its offensive.’ (Ibid.) He went on to say: ‘The 14th, 19th and 21st infantry Divisions and 29th mechanized brigade were destroyed. Lt. Colonel Afework Wassae, political commissar for the North and three Soviet officers were captured, along with 50 tanks, a number of Stalin Organs and a large quantity of heavy weapons.’ (p. 146) Sheila Rule writing 206

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in The New York Times stated: ‘Eritrean rebels fighting the Ethiopian authorities say they killed or captured 18,000 Government soldiers and seized three Soviet military advisers in an offensive that they said had ‘’broken the backbone of the Ethiopian Army’’ in Eritrea.’11 Gebru Tareke wrote: The EPLF won one of the most resounding victories in the annals of conventional warfare in the third world… It destroyed the most formidable garrison in northern Eritrea and set in motion a series of events that would lead to total victory three years later. ... The battle of Afabet was one of the three turning episodes of the war in Eritrea. Nakfa ensured the continuity of the national struggle. Afabet, though not terminal, severely degraded the military’s ability to wage war and heralded the demise of the dictatorship and concomitant Eritrean independence… (Gebru Tareke (2009: 248).

At Afabet, the Nadew, Ethiopia’s biggest and strongest command had been demolished. The Nadew (Ez) command comprised of ‘two mountain infantry divisions, one infantry division, one mechanized brigade, one artillery brigade, and a tank battalion. It had eighty-three tanks, ten BM-21 rockets, fifteen 130 mm and thirty-five 122 mm heavy field artillery, ninety-six 82 mm mortars, five BTR-60s, sixty-seven ZU23 antiaircraft, and forty B-10 antitank guns’ (Gebru Tareke, 2009: 248), and was well known for its toughness, speed of operation and extensive combat experience. It had been led by a man of unrivalled professional competence and reputation, General Tariku Ayene, whom Mengistu had executed after the debacle. The command he had led ‘was seen as the unassailable shield of the Nakfa front and had played a leading role in all the campaigns (albeit failed) to capture Nakfa, the hub and symbol of the Eritrean resistance’ (Ibid.). Despite its fearsome reputation, however, the Nadew command’s fighting capability had been severely undermined by infighting among rival cliques. This was something the troops could ill-afford when ‘fighting an enemy of surprising resilience, skill and adaptability, quick to exploit any vulnerability’ (Gebru Tareke 2009). The much-vaunted Nadew was virtually annihilated. On March 19, 0730 hours, the EPLA stormed the garrison. Af Abet [Afabet], symbol of the army’s power was lost for good. With it were gone fifty tanks, perhaps more than half of the them intact, long-range 207

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa Soviet-made heavy artillery, a large amount of light weapons, and millions of rounds of ammunition (Gebru Tareke 2009: 256).

Gebru continued: For the first time, the EPLA acquired 130 mm mortars and BM-21 rocket launchers. The EPLF’s losses were unknown but significantly less than the catastrophic Ethiopian tally. Barely a third of the troops were accounted for. The rest were dead, captured, or missing. Among the dead were Colonels Teshome Wode Senbet and Admassu Makonnen, respectively commanders of the refractory Fourteenth and Nineteenth divisions and sixty junior officers (Ibid.).

Just a few months after Afabet came the first signs that Moscow was preparing to abandon its erstwhile ally. Karen Brutents visited Mengistu in June and delivered Gorbachev and the Politburo’s message to the effect that ‘the solutions [to the nationalities issue] can only be on the political path’ (in Yordanov (2016: 242). However, Mengistu once again saw the call for a peaceful settlement as “superpower interference in Ethiopia’s internal affairs” and, once again, rejected it forthrightly (Ibid.). Nonetheless, even he had to admit that his forces had suffered a devastating defeat at the hands of the EPLF. During a visit to Moscow in July he admitted: ‘In March of this year, separatists managed to inflict a serious defeat on government troops, attempting to seize a number of strategically important cities in order to proclaim Eritrean independence.’12 The defeat of the Ethiopian military and the capture of the Soviet officers was also highly significant in terms of raising the profile of the Eritrean liberation struggle internationally, and in influencing international and regional opinion. Just as importantly, it rendered questionable the inviolability of Ethiopian unity and territorial integrity.13 Isaias, the secretary-general of the EPLF, commented mockingly that if this were not the case, ‘why would the Mengistu regime declare that government x, y, z, etc. have expressed support for Ethiopian unity and territorial integrity thirty years after?’14 This, he said, was a manifestation of a deep sense of fear, insecurity and uncertainty that had struck the government.15 208

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A few months after the victory at Afabet, Isaias gave a lengthy interview with the Front’s official periodical, Sagem, in which he said that after the Derg had established the so-called People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) and the National Shengo (National Assembly) in September 1987 it had set out to confuse the world on the Eritrean question. The Derg’s plan to dismember Eritrea along ethnic lines was described by the EPLF as an attempt to destroy the unitary entity of Eritrea. When asked which governments, parties and organizations were supporting Eritrea, he declined to give names but said: ‘the conversations we have been holding with government authorities, leaders of political parties and influential persons in the Middle East, Europe, Africa and in other regions clearly demonstrate that there is a growing support for and sympathy with the Eritrean revolution.’16 Isaias further said that even information coming from the superpower states which supported the Derg indicated that the Eritrean liberation struggle could no longer be ignored.17 Sagem’s interviewer pointed out that the Soviet Union had on the one hand called for a peaceful resolution of the Eritrean problem, and on the other, its supply of soldiers and weaponry continued to give support to Ethiopia.18 In response Isaias said: ‘We should not delude ourselves regarding the Soviet Union’s position. We also don’t want others to be confused by their stance. It is vital to understand the objective reality on the ground.’19 Taking the case of Afghanistan as an example, it was foolish, he said, to assume that the Soviets’ decision to withdraw their troops from that country was based on altruism. ‘They have been intervening everywhere to overthrow and establish governments and to destroy popular movements in pursuit of their strategic interests. However, they have been unsuccessful,’ he said.20 This, he added, was because had it been solely a function of might, with peoples and movements intimidated into silence. ‘Because the will and power of the people is immense [in Eritrea], the outcome has been different.’21 Regarding the Soviet Union’s call for a peaceful means of solving the Eritrean problem, Isaias commented that: ‘when failure occurs recurrently, it leaves an indelible impact on the perpetrator nation. Just because the Soviet Union changes its approach to avoid a recurrence of 209

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another catastrophe, we cannot assume that it has adopted a different strategic position.’22 He further said that change was likely, and it was important to view the Soviet Union’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in this light.23 Isaias acknowledged the devastation caused by Soviet weaponry in the conflict but added that failure to yield the expected results, such as wiping out the Eritrean liberation movements, had raised important questions for Moscow. Combined with the other similar problems facing the Soviet Union globally, these were bringing changes in the internal dynamics of the USSR and necessitating a gradual change in the status quo.24 He added that some of these changes were likely to be manifested in the Horn of Africa. ‘Nevertheless, we don’t take the unfolding changes for granted and expect to derive benefits from them. We are not going to be fooled by the ongoing conversations regarding the Soviet Union.’ he said. 25 Isaias emphasised that the independence fighters would give the captured Soviet soldiers no special treatment because of their nationality. ‘The fact that they are citizens of a superpower makes no difference to the EPLF. They are the same as the other thousands of prisoners of war under it.’26 He further pointed out that since the world didn’t care about the other thousands of prisoners of war under the EPLF, it was ridiculous of it to pay such attention to the three Soviet prisoners of war. He added that the latter were mercenaries “usubat.” This is because Ethiopia has colonised Eritrea by violating its national dignity and territorial integrity. Any foreigner who participates in this illegal occupation is a mercenary. What were these prisoners doing? It is our right to find out what role they played in the war. We cannot determine how to handle their case before we establish this. Additionally, whether they will be released or not is determined on the basis of our internal rules.27

Emphasising the EPLF’s defiance of Moscow, he further said: ‘The offer for mediation does not meet the procedural requirements and therefore cannot be considered ... the EPLF does not give the case of the three captured Soviet soldiers much attention.’28.

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The Repercussions of Defeat at Afabet As Ethiopian defeats multiplied in the wake of Afabet, so did signs that Gorbachev intended to disengage from Ethiopian military entanglements. In January 1989, the Soviet Union announced a decision to drastically cut the production of conventional weapons. This would have a direct impact on weaponry that had been earmarked for export to Ethiopia since the late 1970s (Anderson-Jaquest 2002). According to data from SIPRI, aeroplane output was scheduled to decline by 23 per cent, and the manufacturing of helicopters by 60 per cent (1991: 299). Tank and munitions production were projected to drop by 52 per cent and 20 per cent respectively (in Anderson-Jaquest 2002). Indeed, ‘In October Youli Vorostsov, the Soviet deputy minister of foreign affairs, delivered a message from President Gorbachev to President Mengistu. This is thought to have been a warning of what is now an open secret: Soviet arms shipments will cease by the beginning of 1991, and possibly in early 1990.’29 Not only that, but the security situation within Ethiopia itself was crumbling. Rumours about impending coups proliferated, and several clandestine pamphlets were printed calling for the overthrow of the tyrant Mengistu and his regime. Amidst all this, in May 1989 Mengistu left the country for an official visit to East Germany, aware that a coup was being prepared. ‘An informed independent account of the coup attempt on May 16 adopts the line that Mengistu flew to East Germany in the knowledge that an attempted takeover was planned [and] that the fighting in the capital resulted from the government’s pre-emptive strike.’30 On 16th May, soon after Mengistu had left the country, senior military officers led by the Chief of Staff, General Merid Negussie, attempted to stage a coup.31 Officers of the second division captured key positions, including the radio station, in the Eritrean capital Asmara, at the same time as their colleagues made their move in the capital. Calling themselves the Eritrean Revolutionary Forces and Popular Police Forces, and broadcasting as the Voice of Ethiopia, the rebels castigated Mengistu for his relentless prosecution of the war and pressganging of children to fight in the north. They called for the overthrow of the “tyrant” and for a government of national unity, including various 211

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa rebel groups, to be formed. Major General Seyoum Mekonnen, former head of military intelligence, was widely billed as the new leader (Ibid., p. 24).

The Northern Military Command in Asmara immediately declared its solidarity with those who staged the coup in Addis Ababa, and its intention to seek a negotiated solution to the Eritrean issue. One of the major drivers of the coup was the conviction among professional soldiers that the war in Eritrea and Tigray were lost causes, and one of the coup’s objectives was to reach a negotiated settlement.32 In response, the EPLF declared a two-week ceasefire and called upon the Ethiopian armed forces in the rest of the country to join the coup (Henze 1989). The EPLF backed the formation of a provisional government comprising of the armed forces and the rebel groups. They also expressed their willingness to provide support to those who staged the coup. The events that followed are unclear, but Paul Henze, a keen observer of Ethiopian politics of the time stated that ‘…heavy fighting in Asmara resulted in the death of six Ethiopian generals and the reimposition of control over the Northern Command - which may contain as many as 170,000 men, more than half of Ethiopia’s armed forces - by Mengistu loyalists’ (Ibid.: 6). The coup was quashed, prompting public disappointment. Mengistu transformed public disappointment into ‘…general resentment on the part of the civilian and military population by having his recently honoured plotters humiliated on television programmes and by interfering in their trial by military court. Mengistu had the judges abruptly close the court to the public and mete out death sentences … 12 generals were executed in this way’ (Adargachew Tiruneh 1993: 355-6). Although the regime’s foundations had been fundamentally shaken by the overwhelming defeat that the military had suffered in Afabet and Shire, ‘... poor planning, lack of co-ordination, and indecisiveness’ meant that the coup failed. (Gebru Tareke, 2009: 285). But by then the EPLA had transformed itself from a guerrilla movement into a conventional – and powerful - military organisation. On June 6th 1989, Mengistu told a press conference that the executed included 11 generals and 16 senior officers, including most 212

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of the headquarters staff of the second army in Eritrea, the Chief of Staff and the Commander of the Air Force. It was further stated: ‘In the days following the coup attempt another 24 generals and 152 senior officers suspected of being accomplices were rounded up under the direction of Legesse Asfaw, the architect of the “Red Terror.” By early June only three generals and 30 other officers had been exonerated and released.’33 The ruthless execution of the top echelons of the army ‘… greatly weakened the military command, depriving the army and air force of their most experienced officers. Moreover, those chosen to fill the vacant posts are more commendable for their loyalty to President Mengistu than their martial qualifications.’34 The government had clearly been shaken by the events on and off the battlefield. At the same time as the executions it declared its willingness to open negotiations with any party without preconditions.35 This was the first time that Mengistu had offered negotiations without strings attached. The proposal was unanimously endorsed by delegates and included the presence of international observers in future meetings. However, despite the fact that his government had been brought to its knees, Mengistu stuck to his old stance, ruling out an independent Eritrea at a press conference the day after offering negotiations (EIU, CR, 1989, no 3: 22-3). The EPLF rejected the proposal on 9th June, stating that this condition betrayed Mengistu’s reluctance to negotiate (Ibid.: 23). As perceptively stated by Andargachew Tiruneh: ‘From 1989, the regime had been living on borrowed time and had become as Mengistu once said of the last months of Haile Selassies’ government, a hut made of dried corn stocks which required only a little touch to collapse’ (Andargachew Tiruneh, 1993: 356). The Soviet Union had delayed its reaction to the May coup attempt, but now it issued a carefully worded statement. It endorsed the Shengo’s initiative of 5 June 1989 which called for a negotiated settlement of the Eritrean problem, and included the following: As is known, an extra-ordinary session of the National Assembly (Shengo) of the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia was held on 5 June of this year [1989] in Addis Ababa. It was called to examine one of the most acute issues facing this country, the Eritrean problem, the failure to find a settlement of which is one of the reasons for the war that has continued for many years in 213

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa the north of Ethiopia. The session has put forward an important and concrete initiative aimed at finding a political solution to the Eritrean question the essence of which is an appeal to opposition organisations with a proposal for talks to be begun officially and publicly and without preliminary conditions. 36

The Statement further said: The Soviet Union welcomes the decision of the highest legislative body of the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia as an act of state wisdom, and as a demonstration of great responsibility for the fate of Ethiopia. This is a serious step opening the way toward a ceasefire as soon as possible in Eritrea, toward opening a dialogue between the government and the opposition organisations at the negotiation table, and toward the democratic and just resolution to the Eritrean question.37

The statement also called for the Eritrean liberation movement to respond positively to Mengistu’s apparent call for a negotiated settlement of the Eritrean problem. The Italian and US governments approved the initiative. On 2 June Herman Cohen, the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Anatoly Adamishin, and Giulio Andreotti, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, met in Rome to agree on a common point of departure on the matter (Andargachew Tiruneh, 1993: 356). The three sides favoured an Italian proposal to hold an international conference on the Horn of Africa. ‘Although both Italy and the USA are thought to be sympathetic towards the EPLF they, together with most Western countries, continue[d] to oppose the proposed independence of Eritrea.’38 The two superpowers put pressure on Mengistu and his regime to enter negotiations with the EPLF. On July 13th, the USSR announced that Yuri Yukalov, Director of the African Department within the Soviet Foreign Affairs had held a meeting with Isaias, in the beginning of July. Anatoly Adamshin, the Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, ‘stated that this was the first “serious” meeting between the Soviet government and the EPLF, a sure signal that the USSR’s call for negotiations with the rebels is in earnest.’39 It is worth noting, however, that ‘Adamshin sought to reassure the government in Addis Ababa by asserting; “the only thing that cannot be negotiated is Ethiopia’s 214

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territorial indivisibility.”40 Despite the fact that the regime in Addis Ababa was in its death throes, the Soviet Union’s stance on Ethiopian unity and territorial integrity still remained very close to that of Mengistu and his regime. Even though Moscow consistently returned to the need to seek a political settlement to the Eritrean problem, its supply of weapons to the Ethiopian government continued unabated for the time being, indicating ‘…that it is [was] prepared to bolster the government until it can arrive at an “equitable” solution to the Eritrean problem’ (Ibid.). Washington’s position mirrored that of Moscow. Nevertheless, to mollify the Eritrean leadership, the Soviet Union ‘…rejected President Mengistu’s proposed division of Eritrea along religious lines by recognising its territorial integrity’ (Ibid.). This did represent a change. Even though Moscow rejected the notion of Eritrean independence, vetoing the dismemberment of Eritrea represented a major departure. One week later, after a meeting with Herman Cohen, the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in Washington, Adamshin stated that he was “very optimistic” about the prospect for peace in Ethiopia (Ibid). On 23rd July Cohen announced that both the EPLF and the Ethiopian government accepted the former US president, Jimmy Carter, as a mediator in the dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Although he was acting in a private capacity, Jimmy Carter was fully backed by the US government and was far from being a neutral arbiter. His position on the Eritrean question was, like his government’s, a commitment to Ethiopia’s unity and territorial integrity. In talks with Mengistu in Addis Ababa on August 4th-6th, ‘Carter sought to reassure the Ethiopian government about US intentions by expressing his support for “the preservation of Ethiopia’s unity.”’41 The reassurance provided by Carter encouraged Mengistu to take part in the talks. Ten days later Carter announced that the meeting of delegations of the two parties would take place at the Carter Centre in Atlanta, Georgia on 7th September 1989. This was the first time the two enemies had agreed to hold a face-to-face meeting since the failure of their secret negotiations in 1985. The reason the Soviet Union encouraged Mengistu to consider a peaceful political settlement was because preserving Ethiopia’s territorial integrity and unity had been conceived as sine qua non for 215

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safeguarding the Soviet Union’s strategic interest by Brezhnev. ‘We thought persistently that in preserving the territorial integrity and unity of Ethiopia, it is important to demonstrate a proactive approach in finding a peaceful solution to the Eritrean problem [and] to turn to the Eritrean organizations with proposals to begin peace talks.’42 Because the military balance of power had distinctly tilted in favour of the liberation movements, however, the only way to safeguard the country’s territorial integrity and unity, and thus Soviet strategic interest, was through negotiation and granting the Eritrean people regional autonomy. The situation on the ground, and the end of superpower rivalry, reinforced by Gorbachev’s “New Thinking”, led Moscow to understand that war could not defeat the liberation fronts. Yordanov states: Gorbachev’s initial stance on the Eritrean question was a clear demonstration of his unsettled views on Moscow’s role in local conflicts. In this context, a telling example of the CPSU leader’s position was the way he dealt with Mengistu’s pleas for military support. On 1 April 1988, Gorbachev was informed by his foreign policy adviser, Chernyaev that Mengistu was asking for help, as the Eritrean army was demolishing the Ethiopian forces. While Gorbachev was willing to respond positively to Mengistu’s plea, Chernyaev believed that by immediately delivering more weapons, the Kremlin would push Mengistu toward a desperate attempt to solve everything through military force (Yordanov 2016: 241).

At the same time Marshall Akhromeev depicted a “catastrophically hopeless” picture of Mengistu’s chances of winning the war in Eritrea and Tigray.43 ‘Consequently ... the Kremlin had to abandon its confrontational ideology’ (Yordanov, p. 241). This meant abandoning Mengistu and his regime, whose ideology was, in the context of Gorbachev’s “New Thinking”, obsolete. The Soviet Union concluded that participating in someone else’s failing civil war was pointless, and officially declared that Soviet military specialists would no longer participate in the internal conflicts of Ethiopia (in Ibid.: 242). The Soviet Union was in so much of a rush to “vote with its feet” from the deteriorating situation in the country that ‘in order to fulfil its commitments as soon as possible, [it] brought forward its deliveries. Throughout November and December the port of Assab was clogged 216

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with vessels unloading military hardware and munitions.’ (Ibid.) Consistent with their policy of “divide and rule,” Mengistu and his regime held a meeting in Addis Ababa on 30th December 1988 with five former members of the ELF. ‘These renegades, claiming to represent 750,000 Eritreans, called for the creation of an autonomous Eritrean region in the predominantly Muslim lowlands. They rejected the EPLF’s claim to represent all Eritreans …’ (Kibreab 2008).44 The proposal to establish a lowland autonomous region for Muslims in Eritrea was approved by an extraordinary meeting of the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE) Central Committee’s Politburo and was presented as ‘an expression of basic democratic rights.’ It was further decided to present the project for ratification to the national Shengo in June 1989.45 This proposal to dismember Eritrea was dismissed by the EPLF as ‘a fabrication’ (Ibid.). Mengistu also looked for support from old enemies. As seen before, after the death of the Eritrean nationalist O.S. Sabbe, conservative Arab states such as Saudi Arabia had lost interest in the Eritrean War of Independence as it was, in their view, dominated by the radical EPLF. As a continuation of the Derg’s diplomatic offensive in the Middle East, Mengistu Haile Mariam visited Syria for two days in early October 1989 where he discussed his proposed solution to the Eritrean question (Ibid. p. 23). However, given the long-standing ties between the Syrian government and the Eritrean liberation movement, there was no evidence that the visit swayed President Assad. This was followed by a further diplomatic offensive intended to restore normal diplomatic relations with the Sudan. On 26th October Sudan’s Defence Minister visited Ethiopia for talks. This was followed two weeks later by a meeting between Colonel John Garang, the leader of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) which was then operating from bases in Ethiopia, and representatives of Sudan’s Democratic Unionist Party, including Mohammed Uthman al-Mirghani. A visit to Khartoum by Ethiopia’s Prime Minister followed in December, and a Sudanese delegation headed by the Energy Minister arrived in Addis Ababa in January 1990 (Ibid. p. 24). These intensive diplomatic offensives made no difference, however, to the crumbling of security and stability in Ethiopia, particularly in Eritrea and Tigray. Not only were there signs of a breakdown in 217

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the cohesion and discipline of the country’s armed forces, but more importantly: ‘According to diplomatic sources the Soviet Union considers the situation so precarious that it has ordered the withdrawal of its nationals from the north.’46 By 1990, many of the Soviet military advisors in Ethiopia had been sent home, and those who remained ‘no longer take [took] an active role in directing operations and have been withdrawn from the war zone.’47 This was a deathblow to the government and its armed forces’ morale and fighting capability. In the end, Mengistu was forced to compromise, not just because of the pressure exerted by Gorbachev and his government, but rather, as admitted by Moscow, due to ‘serious reverses’ for the Ethiopian army on the battlefield.48 He had tried to deny reality for some time: ‘Mengistu repeatedly executed senior officers whose units suffered reverses in battle or who had the courage to tell him that the war in Eritrea could not be won by military means’ (Korn 1990: 21) and those implicated in the May 1989 coup had been dealt with ruthlessly. This, however, had crippled the army. The air force was most affected since many air force officers had been implicated in the coup. The consequence of this on the country’s defence and fighting capability was debilitating. The country’s air force ‘was the only sector in which the Ethiopian military retained superiority over the opponents, for neither the Eritreans nor the Tigreans have aircraft at their disposal’ (Korn 1990: 22). According to representatives of the EPLF, ‘Ethiopian air power is [was] the only thing that prevents [prevented] them from pushing the Ethiopian army out of Eritrea.’49 But after the coup that air force had been almost entirely grounded. Moscow urged Mengistu to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the Eritrean problem and consequently endorsed talks between his government and the EPLF in 1989, representing the first statement on any African issue other than South Africa.50 ‘The statement indicated willingness to press Mengistu on resolving rebellions in the northern provinces of Eritrea and Tigre[ray], where the regime has suffered serious setbacks. Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly Adamishin went further in meetings with the EPLF in London in the summer of 1989, when he stated that “both sides seem ready” to begin talks.51 Adamishin also approved of Carter’s efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Eritrean problem. The USSR was sticking to its insistence that it would 218

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no longer provide Mengistu with supply of weapons, and arguing in favour of a political solution to the Eritrean question (Goodman, 1991: 24). Melvin Goodman rightly states that Moscow was willing to abandon its customary stance of working behind the scenes in favour of getting out ‘in front to arrange a negotiated settlement on the Horn of Africa’ (1991: 24). Goodman further states: ‘If so, Gorbachev may be prepared to give up naval access to facilities on Dahlak Island, which supports the Soviet presence in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, and rely on facilities in Yemen’ (p. 24). This was to some extent a reflection of changes that permeated the political landscape of the Soviet Union as part of the perestroika movement under Mikhail Gorbachev. Melvin Goodman observes: In Africa the Soviets have access to facilities in Ethiopia, which expand capabilities in the Indian Ocean area. The Soviet presence in Ethiopia is modest because of reluctance to invest large sums in a nation that cannot subdue an insurgency in Eritrea as well as Moscow’s memory of being expelled from bases in Egypt and Somalia in the 1970s. As a result, Soviet assets in Ethiopia are for the most part movable or “removable,” including floating piers and dry-docks, tenders, and repair ships at Dahlak Island off the coast (1991: 130).

Goodman further states: Guided missile cruisers and nuclear powered submarines regularly call at Dahlak for repair and supplies and, due to the vulnerability of Dahlak, the Soviets maintain a naval infantry security detachment that is the primary Soviet unit for amphibious operations. The USSR formerly deployed two IL-38 antisubmarine and maritime reconnaissance aircraft to Asmara Airfield, until destroyed by Eritrea`s rebels in 1984. The decision not to replace these aircraft was consistent with Soviet caution in Third World countries, where forces have come under attack (Ibid.).

Consequently, the Soviet Union supported the meeting of the representatives of the Ethiopian government and the EPLF in Atlanta. Although the two sides had previously met in East Germany in 19771978, secretly followed by another 10 secret meetings that took place 219

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between 1982 and 1985 in different places in Europe, the Atlanta meeting was the first time they had met publicly to seek a solution to the conflict. 52 By then about 50,000 people had died as a result of war and famine.53 The significance of this meeting, besides the fact that it was held in public, was that it had no preconditions. Jimmy Carter underscored this, stating that ‘… the failed East Germany talks began with preconditions and that no third-party observers attended, both facts having diminished their chances for success.’ He further pointed out that the fact ‘…the Atlanta talks have been announced publicly will force both sides to put forth their most attractive and reasonable proposals and demonstrate a degree of good faith to prevent failure.’54 Jimmy Carter said that he had the strong backing of the US and Soviet governments to pursue ‘…this delicate diplomatic quest for peace in northern Ethiopia.’ He further said that ‘Soviet officials contacted him “at the last moment” to reaffirm their commitment to help him “in any way” they could.’55 The US Secretary of State, Herman Cohen, expressed his approval for Carter’s efforts saying: ‘It’s a very encouraging development and we support it.’56 Nevertheless the two sides disagreed fundamentally on the nature of the conflict. In his opening speech, the secretary of the EPLF ‘Alamin [Al-Amin Mohamed Saiyed head of the EPLF negotiating team] called it “the Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict” over Eritrea’s status, which had never been resolved after WWII, whilst Ashegre [Ashagre Yigletu, head of the Ethiopian government negotiating team] referred to it as a “fratricidal civil war” over what he called “the cradle of our ancient [Ethiopian] civilisation.” ’57 These diametrically opposed characterisations of the status of Eritrea and its relationship with Ethiopia have always been at the heart of the conflict between the Ethiopian government and the Eritrean liberation struggle. It is important to emphasise that without the rapprochement between the two superpowers, a unified position regarding the solution of the Eritrean question would have been inconceivable. This should not be misconstrued, however, to imply that the realisation of the solution was due to such a rapprochement. It is important to state that neither of the superpowers, or their allies, recognised the right of the Eritrean people to self-determination. The solution they sought was still based on the notion of regional autonomy within the framework 220

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of Ethiopia’s unity and territorial integrity. Nevertheless, one of the dividends of the rapprochement was that Soviet-US pressure led to an Ethiopian-Eritrean agreement in June 1990 to re-open the Red Sea port of Massawa for food deliveries to millions of people on the verge of starvation (see Goodman, 1991). Even now, notwithstanding the peace initiative, Mengistu’s intransigence and aggression continued, reflected in his aim to ‘proceed with the planned growth of the army in 1989-1990, raising [it] to six hundred thousand troops’ (Yordanov 2016: 243). In the Kremlin’s view, Mengistu’s determination to continue the war, despite the fact that his armed forces were in disarray, had led to an economic crisis, public resentment and unrest and plunging morale among the armed forces. Mengistu’s position was becoming increasingly untenable. Yordanov (2016: 244) states: …while moving forward with already scheduled deliveries of tanks and ammunition worth 18 million roubles, in September 1989 the Soviet leadership decided that sending additional weapons would be inappropriate. Crucially, the Soviet Defense Minister and deputy commander of the land forces, General Varennikov, attending the September 1989 talks in Atlanta informed Mengistu of the Soviet decision to gradually withdraw its military experts from Ethiopia. The withdrawal was intended to prevent Soviet troops from entering directly into the local conflict. General Varennikov also informed the Ethiopians of additional changes in the terms of military support announcing the shipment of education materials, instead of weapons.

Mengistu and his regime left no stone unturned to secure an alternative source of materiel. Given the fact that the Israeli government had supplied the Derg with weapons, and teams of advisors in military aviation and logistics during the Ethio-Somali war in the Ogaden in 1978 (see Patman 1993: 128), they approached the government of Israel, which responded positively. ‘In 1990, Israeli officials confirmed that a few military advisors and some small weapons like rifles had been sent to Ethiopia’ (AndersonJaquest 2002: 121). Although there were no detailed accounts of the roles the Israeli military played in Ethiopia, ‘…some of the operations reported included the repair and maintenance of sophisticated Soviet 221

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machinery such as the MiG-21 and MiG-23 fighter-ground attack planes and training Ethiopian armed forces personnel’ (Associated Press, 4 October 1990; Washington Post, 10 February 1990 referred in Ibid.). Elaine Sciolino wrote in the The New York Times: ‘Administration officials said today they strongly suspected that Israel has sent cluster bombs to Ethiopia. They said there were unconfirmed reports that the Soviet-backed Marxist Government in Addis Ababa has already used the weapons against rebels in the northern part of the country.’58 It was reported that: ‘A leaked memo to a congressman, Howard Wolpe, head of the house sub-committee on Africa, details extensive Israeli aid to Mengistu, including 100 cluster bombs, surveillance equipment and military spares … protests were made to the Israelis, both via their Washington ambassador and directly to the Israeli defence ministry.’59 Jane Perlez writing in The New York Times stated: ‘In an effort to support the last non-Arab presence on the Red Sea, Israel has increased its diplomatic and military links with the embattled Marxist-Leninist Government here, diplomats say.’60 The motive underlying the Israeli government’s decision was the assumption that the Eritrean insurgents were likely to turn the Red Sea into an ‘Arab lake’, which in their view would be detrimental to Israel’s national security. This was confirmed by the Israeli Ambassador, appointed in the immediate aftermath of the rapprochement of the two governments. He stated: ‘The Government of Lieut. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam needs to be supported against secessionist rebels in coastal region of Eritrea who would turn the “Red Sea into the Arab Sea…” ’61 The Israeli government’s decision to assist Mengistu’s regime was opposed by the US government. ‘Washington has taken a dim view of Israel’s assistance. Some officials say the Israeli help will serve only to prolong the Ethiopian civil war, now nearly three decades old.’62

The Liberation of Massawa: a Harbinger of Eritrean Independence Bolstered by its success on the Nakfa Front and elsewhere, the EPLA captured the port town of Massawa in February 1990. According to Dan Connell: 222

Chapter 10 The EPLF took Massawa in February 1990, using a flotilla of speedboats to mount a surprise attack on the offshore positions that had eluded them before. Eleven Ethiopian warships were sunk and three captured; nearly 100 tanks were also taken or destroyed. Though the battle went quickly and decisively in the EPLF’s favour this time, the aftermath was brutal. The Ethiopians bombed the city for ten straight days once their ground forces surrendered (1997: 234).

According to The New York Times, the offensive by the rebels occurred along a 120-mile front stretching from Keren in the central highlands of Eritrea to the coast. It followed a nine-month lull in fighting between Ethiopia’s Soviet-backed government and the secessionist front.63 Ethiopian officials in Nairobi acknowledged that the rebel offensive had taken the government by surprise.64 The loss of Massawa was a deathblow to the morale of the Ethiopian military and government. Many troops were killed, others were wounded and captured. Huge amounts of arms, tanks, heavy artillery, personnel carriers, and ammunitions fell into the hands of the EPLA, further bolstering their fighting capability. As stated in the EIU:65 The capture of Massawa by the EPLF on Feb 10 was the greatest humiliation and, strategically, the most devastating defeat the Ethiopian armed forces have suffered in the 28 years in the Eritrean conflict. Ethiopia’s fleet was caught in the harbour since it was naval graduation day, and nine of the 22 vessels were sunk. On land the EPLF claimed to have captured or destroyed 99 tanks and armed personnel carriers. Three attempts to recapture the port, launched from the stranded garrison in Asmara, failed and by the end of April the EPLF’s Voice of the Broad Masses claimed that nearly 40,000 government troops had been killed or wounded in battles on the Ginda front. In desperation the government resorted to bombing the port to deny the rebels its use.

Once again Mengistu had to admit defeat. He acknowledge that the loss of Massawa was likely to sound the death knell of Ethiopian sovereignty over Eritrea. In a broadcast to the Ethiopian armed forces on 17th February 1990, he said ‘capturing Massawa means capturing our Second Revolutionary Army … which is the backbone of our armed forces. Capturing our Second Revolutionary Army … means 223

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the secession of Eritrea.’66 Gebru Tareke described the significance of the loss of Massawa: ‘If Af Abet [Afabet] was the harbinger and Shire the accelerator, Massawa was the denouement of the destruction of the revolutionary army and the consummation of the civil wars. Between 1988 and 1990, conflicts large and small, each one presenting painful choices to the Ethiopian military leadership, led to the final, “terrible” resolution in 1991’ (2009: 201-02). Isaias described the EPLF’s victory in Massawa as ‘a victory of the greatest strategic value in the struggle’s history’ (quoted in Ibid.). According to an Ethiopian naval officer, ‘without exaggeration, of the battles fought against Shaabia (EPLF) none was as devastating and harrowing as that of Massawa’ (Abebe Haile quoted in Gebru Tareke, 2009: 297). After the fall of Massawa, Asmara, Eritrea’s capital, became isolated not only from the sea but also from the rest of Ethiopia. All supplies had to be brought in by air. This was unsustainable. The government had ‘only twelve Antonov transport planes at its disposal, hardly enough to carry the army’s food needs let alone those of the civilian population, most commentators agree that it is simply a matter of time before Asmara falls and government forces are thrown out of … Eritrea.’67 A demoralised Mengistu elaborated the far-reaching consequences of the loss of Massawa as follows: The defeat at Massawa was the major reason for the collapse of the army. Massawa shielded Asmara. Its occupation [by the enemy] was decisive. Even if we lost Asmara we could always recoup for as long as we controlled the seas and fed our forces. But to lose Massawa was effectively to lose Eritrea. After the capture of the port we could supply our forces by air only, but we do not manufacture planes, nor do we produce oil. All logistics and all foodstuffs for the army and the populace, from salt to sugar, had to be delivered by air. The air force could not do it alone and so we used Ethiopian Airlines. We even rented from abroad. It was not enough. That was when the war ended.68

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In vengeance for the loss of Massawa, Mengistu rained bombs on its civilian inhabitants. According to a report compiled by Human Rights Watch: Since February, the Eritrean port of Massawa, described by the Ethiopian Tourist Office as “The Pearl of the Red Sea”, has been a particular target for bombardment.  The raids started a few days after the capture of the port by the forces of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and continued intermittently until June.  Most of these attacks have not been aimed at targets of military significance, but instead at the installations of the port, the food relief stored there, and most appallingly, the civilian population (1990). 

The report further stated that the Ethiopian air force was ‘engaged in a bombing campaign which is largely targeting civilians, and which is resulting in the killing and maiming of thousands of non-combatants, including many women and children’ (Ibid.). It is further stated that Mengistu had, at his disposal, ‘over 100 bomber aircraft, including sophisticated MiG 23s, supplied by the Soviet Union.  He has a formidable array of weaponry including phosphorous and/or napalm, and cluster bombs… The cluster bombs used by the Ethiopians are almost certainly supplied by Israel’ (Ibid.).  After establishing control of Massawa and its environs, EPLF troops launched a new assault along the Keren front, to the northwest of the capital, Asmara.69 The EPLF radio Voice of the Masses stated: ‘The valiant people’s army launched this large-scale attack after it had crushed the enemy’s huge armies on the Asmara-Massawa line, and after imposing its control on Massawa town at midday Saturday.’70 Further victories followed, including along the Danakil littoral. The Front’s assault on the Derg’s forces was effectively coordinated with the EPRDF’s large-scale offensives in the central parts of Ethiopia. As the Derg’s forces were hammered from all corners, they were forced to retreat, and this enabled the EPLA’s forces to thrust southward, reaching within 30 km of the only remaining port city of Assab. Soon after, the EPLF took the port of Tio on February 27th and Beylul on 4th April, and entrenched themselves in the hills overlooking Assab (EIU, CR, 1991, no. 2: 28). 225

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The loss of Massawa was the final proof for the Soviet Union and its allies of the futility of continuing to invest in a dying regime. Consequently, ‘By the end of February the remaining Soviet military advisers, thought to number several thousand, had been pulled out of the war zone’ (EIU, CR, 1990, no. 2: 28). This decision finished off not only the fighting capability but also the morale of the Ethiopian military. In March Mengistu made a last effort to win support. Having previously demonised the private sector and capitalism as being Summum malum (the greatest evil), he renounced Marxism-Leninism, announcing that the private sector would henceforth play a leading role in the national economy, and that the workers’ party would be dissolved and replaced by a multi-party-political system. ‘Be that as it may, Mengistu’s announcement only enhanced the underlying process of disintegration of the fibre of the state’ (Andargachew Tiruneh, 1993: 356). After its crushing military victories the EPLF was not in a hurry to deal the final blow to Mengistu’s rule in Eritrea. As stated by the EIU: ‘Yes, although the noose has tightened, with the front claiming to have captured the neighbouring towns of Senafe on 24 April, Adi Kayeh on 25 April and Digsa on 29 April, the EPLF is clearly in no hurry to launch an all out assault on the remaining government strongholds. Instead it is prepared to bid its time as the beleaguered garrison weakens by the day’ (EIU, CR, 1990, no 2: 25). Talks scheduled to begin in Nairobi on April 8th under the joint chairmanship of Jimmy Carter and Julius Nyrere were cancelled. In mid-June Carter announced that the EPLF had withdrawn from the negotiating process, expressing their preference for the UN to sponsor future negotiations. The Soviet Union, through its officials in Addis Ababa, told Western counterparts that it would ‘cease all military aid to Ethiopia by the end of 1990, when the current four-year agreement terminates’ (EIU, CR, 1990, no. 2: 28). To add to Mengistu’s woes, ‘the USSR also refused to allow Soviet aircraft based in Ethiopia to participate in Asmara airlift’ (EIU, CR, 1990, no. 2: 28), and the besieged city, containing 100,000 Ethiopian armed forces, their families and an estimated 500,000 civilians, could only be supplied by air. The highway connecting Asmara to the rest of Ethiopia had fallen under the control 226

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of the liberation movements after the EPLA had taken Massawa and the Tigray region. What flights arrived were, in any case, inadequate: ‘Food and military equipment [could] arrive only irregularly because flights were restricted to hours of darkness due to an imminent danger of being downed by EPLF artillery’ (Ibid.). The regime’s problems were no longer limited to the supply of weapons, military trainers and advisors. Given the demand for the limited resources of the USSR, some Soviet analysts began asking critical questions. This included whether Ethiopia still represented good value for money, especially in the light of cessation of hostility between the Western and Eastern powers. Moscow’s warm tone towards the Mengistu regime had also cooled. In contrast to the usual fanfare that surrounded visits of high-ranking Ethiopian officials to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, observers noted: ‘Ethiopia has also been snubbed diplomatically’ (EIU, CR, 1990, no. 2: 28): When Dinka Tesfaye, the Foreign Minister, visited Moscow in March to brief his hosts on the reform programme, he was denied the usual blare of publicity and Pravda declined to run the traditional expressions of solidarity. An article in Isvestia, written by the paper’s Addis Ababa correspondent, reveals just how far Soviet attitudes to the Ethiopian government have changed in recent months. It argued that the Soviet assistance, worth US$ 2 billion over four years, was originally intended to support Ethiopia against foreign aggression but that it was now being used to finance a senseless civil war. In addition, the article continued, Ethiopia gives little in return for Soviet assistance, much of which has been wasted since huge arms dumps have fallen into the hands of the rebels (Ibid.) (emphasis added).

Finally Mengistu appeared to have realised the truth ‘In a comprehensive and candid statement to the fourth annual meeting of the national Shengo (parliament) on June 21, P.M. Haile Mariam admitted that Ethiopia is facing military and political fragmentation, and that the EPLF “has almost managed to cause Eritrea to secede”’ (EIU, CR, 1990, no. 3: 23). At the close of its fourth session, the Shengo ‘announced a general mobilisation of able-bodied citizens, recalling all retired military and police personnel under the age of 70, and instructing kebelles [neighbourhood associations] not to issue travel permits 227

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and passports in an attempt to stem the growing exodus of young people fleeing conscription. Emergency measures now also permit the commandeering of private vehicles for the war effort’ (Ibid). The regime was in its death throes. The Ethiopian government reversed its previous position and accepted both the presence of UN representatives in negotiations with the EPLF, and the use of Massawa for food aid. ‘Both concessions were evidently designed to curry international favour, particularly with the US administration’ (EIU, CR, 1990, no.3: 26). In 1991, Soviet disengagement from the military relationship with Ethiopia was completed. In January, concessional prices for Soviet arms supplies were eliminated because of Gorbachev’s decision to conduct all foreign trade, including arms deals, in hard currency (SIPRI 1991:213-214). In March the same year, the three Soviet military advisors captured by the EPLF in 1988 were handed over unharmed to the Soviet ambassador in Khartoum.71 In May 1991, Soviet officials disclosed the fact that 75 military advisors and specialists had been killed in Ethiopia.72 Soviet television newscasters at the time also reported that Mengistu had received about US $12 billion worth of Soviet military assistance over the years.73 Paul Henze, referring to data issued by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarrangement Agency, indicated that the Soviets had invested US$11 billion in Ethiopia’s armed forces during the past 12 years (1989: 11). On 21 May 1991 Mengistu fled the country in utter humiliation, bringing to an end 14 years of tyrannical rule. Not only was his departure celebrated throughout Ethiopia, but also in the rest of the world. His departure ushered in the complete disintegration of the country’s armed forces, the biggest in sub-Saharan Africa. Consequently, the EPLA quietly took control of Asmara and Assab, while the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Dembocratic Front (EPRDF) immediately moved to the edge of the capital, Addis Ababa, which it entered on 28th May (EIU, CR, 1991, no.2: 25). The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) promised to hold a constitutional conference within one month, and Isaias, speaking from London, made it clear that Eritrea was de facto independent and would only participate in the EPRDF’s proposed conference with observer status. 228

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Evidence suggests that the Ethiopian delegation to the London peace talks had realised that the victory of the liberation movements in Ethiopia and Eritrea was inevitable and that they would not be returning home. It seems that they had left Ethiopia with one-way air tickets, and their head suddenly became a refugee. ‘In fact Tesfaye Dinka, the recently appointed Prime Minister, was not quite as surprised or upset as he appeared at the time. Like several officials in the delegation, he had carefully cleared his property in Addis Ababa before leaving, and is now settled in the USA (EIU, CR, 1991, no. 3: 26). ‘President Mengistu’s flight to a secluded farm in Zimbabwe was also prepared well in advance. Lt. General Tesfaye Gebre-Kidan, the acting president, was left in the capital when the government delegation flew to London. Some leading figures fled to Israel, while others have been detained by the EPRDF pending trial’ (EIU, CR, 1991, no. 3: 26). General Tesfaye Gebre-Kidan74 was president of Ethiopia for one week before surrendering to rebel forces on 27th May 1991. He died in June 2004 after spending 13 years hiding at the Italian Embassy in Addis Ababa.  

Endnotes

1 Berhan Hagos, The Lion of Afabet, 31 March 2010. Available at https://asmarino.com/articles/619-the-lion-of-afabet- (emphasis in the original) (accessed 1/12/2018). Corporal Aschenek Akalemariam quoted in Gebru Tareke 2009, 2 Chapter 8, endnote 40 Quoted in Gebru Tareke 2009, Chapter 8, endnote 37. 3 “Interview with comrade Isaias Afwerki, secretary-general of the 4 EPLF,” Sagem, No. 14, September 1988, p. 18. (Author’s translation from Tigrinya into English). EIU, CR, 1988, no 2:15-16. 5 6 Ustinof in Anderson-Jaquest, T. C. (2002) “Restructuring the SovietEthiopian Relationship; A case study in Asymmetric Exchange.” A Thesis submitted to the University of London in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London School of Economics and Political Science. Sheila Rule, “Ethiopia’s President Admits the Rebels Are Forcing 7 ‘Grim Battles” The New York Times, Archives 1988. On the strategic withdrawal of the EPLF and the ELF from the 8 liberated areas of Eritrea, see Awet Weldemichael, “The Eritrean Long 229

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa March: The Strategic Withdrawal of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), 1978-1979,”The Journal of Military History, Vol. 73, No. 4 (October 2009), 1231-1271. Tom Kilion, In War-Torn Eritrea, Rebels Gain on an Ethiopian Regime 9 Sustained by U.S. Aid, Los Angeles Times, 1 May 1988. Available at https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1988-05-01-op-3277story.html (30 Feb 2019). Ibid. 10 11 Sheila Rule, “Eritrean Rebels Claim Big Victory Over Ethiopia,” The New York Time, 28 March 1988. 12 “’Information About the Highlights of a Brief Working Visit to the USSR… See “East German Ministry of State Security … 13 14 “Interview with comrade Isaias Afwerki, secretary-general of the EPLF,” Sagem, No. 14, September 1988, p. 18. (Author’s translation from Tigrinya into English). Ibid. 15 16 “Interview with comrade Isaias Afwerki, secretary-general of the EPLF,” Sagem, No. 14, September 1988, p. 18. Ibid. 17 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. Ibid. 23 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid. 29 EIU, CR, 1990, no 1: 29. 30 EIU, CR, 1989, no 2: 23. 31 EIU, CR, 1989, no 2: 23. 32 EIU, CR, 1989, no. 3: 22. 33 EIU, CR, 1989, no 3: 21. 34 EIU, CR, 1989, no. 3: 21. 35 EIU, CR, 1989, no. 2: 25. 36 Soviet Government Statement on Ethiopia, 13 June 1989, translated by FABIS, Prvada, Appendix in Paul B. Henze, Eritrean Options and Ethiopia’s Future, September 1989, A RAND NOTE 230

Chapter 10 37 Ibid. 38 EIU, CR, 1989, no. 3: 23. 39 EIU, CR, 1989, no. 4: 21. 40 . Ibid. 41 EIU, CR, 1989, no. 4: 22. Carter by taking pro-Ethiopian stance before he began his mediating role, discredited himself in the eyes of the EPLF. “’Information About the Highlights of a Brief Working Visit… 42 Ibid. 43 44 See also EIU, CR, 1989, no 1: 21. 45 EIU, CR, 1989, no 1: 22. 46 EIU, CR, 1989, no 2: 25. 47 EIU, CR, 1990, no. 1: 29. 48 See Moscow Radio, English language Africa broadcast, 9 June 1988. 49 Interview with Eritrean People’s Liberation Front’s, 26 October 1989 referred in David Korn, Ethiopia on the Verge of Disaster, 1989, p. 22. Izvestia, June 15, 1989, p. 1 in (Goodman 1991: 24) 50 Izvestia, June 14, 1989, p. 5 in Ibid. 51 52 David B. Ottaway, “Carter Opens Peace Talks between Ethiopia and Eritrean Rebels,” The Washington Post, 8 September 1989. 53 “Carter to Bring Together Ethiopian Foes.” New York Times, 18 August 1989. 54 In Ibid. 55 David B. Ottaway, “Carter Opens Peace Talks… Quoted in Ibid. 56 Quoted in Ibid. 57 58 Elaine Sciolino, “U.S. Officials Suspect Israelis Sent Ethiopia Cluster Bombs,” The New York Times, 21 Jan 1990. EIU, CR, 1990, no.3: 26. 59 60 Jane Perlez, “Israelis widening role in Ethiopia,” The New York Times, 7 February 1990 The New Israeli Ambassador to Ethiopia quoted in Ibid. 61 Ibid. 62 63 “Rebels in Ethiopia Claim Capture of Red Sea Port,” The New York Times, 11 February 1990. https://www.nytimes.com/1990/02/11/world/ rebels-in-ethiopia-claim-capture-of-red-sea-port.html 64 “Rebels in Ethiopia Claim Capture of Red Sea Port,” The New York Times, 11 February 1990. https://www.nytimes.com/1990/02/11/world/ rebels-in-ethiopia-claim-capture-of-red-sea-port.html EIU, CR, 1990, no 2: 25. 65 66 Quoted in EIU, CR, 1990, no 2: 25. 231

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa 67 Quoted in Ibid. 68 in Ibid. 69 In “Ethiopia Reports More Port Combat,” The New York Times, 12 February 1990. 70 In Ibid. 71 TASS, 27 March 1991. TASS, 21 May 1991. 72 73 BBC, SWB, 24 May 1991. Tesfaye Gebrekidan was a lieutenant general in the Ethiopian armed 74 forces. He was appointed vice president and minister of defence by President Mengistu Hailemariam on April 26, 1991. When Mengistu fled to Zimbabwe on May 21, 1991, Tesfaye succeeded him as acting president. The latter surrendered the government to the rebel forces after their entry to Addis Ababa on May 27, 1991 and sought refuge in the Italian Embassy in Addis Ababa..

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Conclusion

I

n Moscow’s ill-fated involvement with Mengistu’s regime, the strategic goals of a superpower were defeated by a list of interconnected factors. This book has shown how those factors caused the grand design for a Pax Sovietica in the region to founder on a combination of hubris and poor judgement. The attitude of the Soviet Union towards the Eritrean liberation movements, and indeed its twists and turns in support of the Derg regime, reflects the flawed thinking behind its rush to link states in the region into a confederation under Soviet tutelage. This grand design foundered not only on Somali and Ethiopian refusals to set aside nationalist rivalry for the cause, but on Mengistu’s intransigence and the Eritrean people’s fierce desire for independence. Russian interests in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa region are longstanding ones, and hang on the region’s strategic location. As far back as the 17th Century, the second Romanov Tsar, Alexis, endeavoured to seal an alliance with the Abyssinian Kingdom of the time to counteract the looming threat of the Ottoman Empire in the region. Although the endeavour bore no fruit, the Soviet Union’s interest in the region was again resurrected in the immediate aftermath of World War II in connection with the future disposal of the former Italian colonies, especially Eritrea (on the disposal of Eritrea see Kibreab 2005). Thwarted in its desire to play a role in the administration of Eritrea, Moscow called for the immediate independence of the territory. However its stance was more a reflection of superpower rivalry and its desire to be a dominant force in the Red Sea region than an expression of support for Eritrean self-determination. Had the call for independence been genuine, Moscow’s relationship with 233

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the Emperor’s government would have cooled considerably when Eritrea was annexed as the 14th province of Ethiopia. Instead, relations continued as warmly as before. For example, between 1954 and 1967, two years after Ethiopia annexed Eritrea, the Soviet Union provided Ethiopia with US$ 15 million in aid, the third largest given in Africa at the time by the Soviet Union. Between 1959 and 1973, i.e. including a year before his deposition, the Emperor visited the Soviet Union four times and received warm welcome. More importantly, he was also said to have received an assurance that the Soviet Union would support his country’s territorial integrity in 1967 as the Eritrean War of Independence intensified. In spite of this, a few analysts argue that throughout its involvement in the Horn of Africa, the Soviet Union did show some flexibility in its approach to Eritrea’s right to self-determination. Radoslav Yordanov, for example, states that before the change of regime in Addis Ababa in 1974, the Russians tacitly supported the Eritrean liberation movement. However, as seen throughout the preceding chapters, this view lacks evidential backing. What was true was that although the Russians perceived the Eritrean problem, unlike that of the Ogaden, to be internal, they supported the Derg, which they considered to be progressive and anti-imperialist as well as amenable to Soviet interest. After Mengistu’s rise to power, the Soviet Union expected the progressive sections of the Eritrean liberation movements to relinquish their fight for independence by joining the Ethiopian revolution. At that historical juncture, the Soviet Union argued that consolidation of the Ethiopian revolution and the task of stifling imperialism’s and regional reaction’s strategic interests and ambitions in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region were vital. In their view, once Emperor Haile Selassie’s regime was defeated, the goal of the Eritrean revolutionaries should have been to strengthen the Ethiopian revolution rather than weaken it. At the heart of this view was the flawed assumption that the flourishing of the Eritrean liberation struggle was detrimental to the anti-imperialist struggle and aligned with regional reaction. Even if there were any truth in the claim that the Soviets had some forbearance towards the Eritrean revolutionaries, it would not have been because they sympathised with, or supported the cause of, Eritrean independence. Any tolerance would rather have been due 234

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to their veiled respect for the liberation fighters’ fighting capability and perseverance in spite of the odds that stood on their way. Hence ceteris paribus, the Soviet Union would have preferred the Eritrean revolutionaries to stand with the Ethiopian regime and its Soviet allies. Mengistu relied heavily on Cuban and Ethiopian forces, both in the Ogaden conflict, and, later, against the liberation fronts in Eritrea. However, it is worth noting that the Ethiopian military was on the verge of collapse and could not face the fronts alone. In an attempt to avert the threat to his regime and the country’s territorial integrity, Mengistu pleaded for support against the Eritrean liberation fronts from the highest leadership of the Soviet Union. He used the term “internal counter-revolution” to describe the liberation movement in Eritrea. He told his hosts in Moscow that his aim was to establish a socialist Ethiopia, and to develop cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. To strengthen his argument, Mengistu also warned that unless drastic action was taken by the the Soviet Union and its allies, the Red Sea risked turning into an “Arab lake”. Moscow and its allies became convinced of Mengistu’s revolutionary potential, and in response, a delegation from the Soviet Union under the leadership of General V.I. Petrov arrived in Ethiopia immediately to support the Ethiopian armed forces and help them acquire the skills necessary to master Soviet-supplied military equipment. One of the major remits of the delegation was to assist in the planning of military operations in both the Ogaden and Eritrea. Soon after, the Soviet Union initiated a colossal arms transfer program. By the end of 1977, 17,000 Cubans were said to have arrived. They enabled the Ethiopian armed forces to defeat the Somali army and the WSLF. It is not clear how much of the Soviet-supplied massive weapons and equipment was used in the Ogaden war and how much in the Ethiopian counter-offensive in Eritrea. Given the far longer duration of Ethiopia’s counter-offensive in Eritrea, it is likely that a substantial proportion of the total of the Soviet-supplied equipment was used to dislodge the Eritrean liberation movements from liberated areas. However, despite the fact that the Soviet Union had backed the Derg’s large-scale counter-offensive in Eritrea, it allegedly saw the 235

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EPLF and the progressive wing of the ELF—i.e. the Revolutionary Council, as potential allies that could be won over rather than destroyed militarily. This view was premised on the assumption that the progressive groups in Eritrea would firstly relinquish their struggle for independence in favour of regional autonomy, and secondly, join the Ethiopian revolution. In light of Mengistu Haile Mariam’s hardline stance and his hatred of the very notion of Eritrea, the Soviet Union had to tread warily, not pronouncing the progressive character of the Eritrean movements lest they arouse Mengistu’s wrath. It was for this reason that the Soviet Union adopted a dual strategy, on the one hand based on negotiation, and on the other, on intensified fighting against the Eritrean liberation fronts. The aim of the latter approach was not necessarily to destroy the fronts, but rather to weaken them substantially in order to render them amenable to compromise and submission. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries’ dual strategy was therefore developed in response to the prevailing constraints on the ground. The Soviet and East German leaders urged Mengistu to seek a negotiated settlement to the Eritrean problem. They urged him to leave no stones unturned to win the hearts and minds of the Eritrean people, arguing that unless the Eritrean people were won over, it was very unlikely that his regime would be able to defeat the insurgents. The Soviets insisted repeatedly that it was important to show the Eritrean people that the Derg was different from Emperor Haile Selassie and that the interests of the Ethiopian Revolution were in harmony with those of the progressive forces in Eritrea. However, rhetoric notwithstanding, no concrete actions and measures were taken by the regime. Representatives of the Soviet Union and East Germany complained that Mengistu and the Derg did not do enough to reassure and to win the hearts and minds of the Eritrean people. Hand in hand with this went the Soviet allies’ strategy of strengthening the Ethiopian armed forces, in an attempt to improve the regime’s bargaining power in talks. The assumption underpinning the Soviet approach was that the Eritrean liberation fronts were unlikely to negotiate as long as they were winning the battles. They had to be weakened and threatened with defeat to accept a solution based on regional autonomy rather than independence. 236

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The duality of the Soviet Union and its allies’ strategy is evidenced by the fact that meetings on the peaceful settlement of the Eritrean problem were taking place in East Germany, the Soviet Union and elsewhere while assaults and counter-assaults directed by Soviet generals seethed throughout Eritrea. However, neither military action nor diplomacy changed the positions held by the EPLF and the ELF. Although Moscow supported the Derg in pursuit of its strategic interest in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, it came to consider Mengistu’s commitment to the socialist cause questionable at best, illustrated by his equivocation with regards to the formation of a Marxist-Leninist party. As a result, the grand design of pax Sovietica based on the confederation of Somalia, Ethiopia and autonomous Eritrea and Ogaden was stillborn. Having tasted success with the support of the Soviet allies in the Ogaden war, Mengistu thought the same formula would be replicated, with the same success, in Eritrea. He soon found out that the Eritrean problem was far more complicated. The approaches and modalities of dealing with external invasion and “internal” uprising are different. Matters were further complicated by the fact that the Soviets and the East Germans allegedly preferred a negotiated solution to the Eritrean problem within the framework of Ethiopia’s unity and territorial integrity. It is worth noting that their proposed peace deal was acceptable neither to the Derg nor the Eritreans for different reasons. Despite the Soviet Union’s call for a peaceful solution to the Eritrean problem, Mengistu refused to consider anything other than a military solution. He made it clear that his government would never consider negotiating with the Eritrean liberation movements unless it was on the basis of regional autonomy. At the same time, it appeared that the only way to induce the Eritrean fronts to accept Mengistu’s terms was to weaken them militarily. This was by no means easy or costless to the socialist countries. Firstly, there was the fighting capability of the Eritrean insurgents. Equally, if not more importantly, the Eritrean liberation struggle had many supporters in Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere. Not only were the majority of the latter anti-imperialist, but also they were important allies to the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. The option of a peaceful solution to

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the Eritrean problem was to some extent intended to appease Eritrea’s international and regional friends. The problem was further complicated by the Soviet allies’ assumption that the Eritrean liberation movements were not ideologically homogenous. They were convinced that among them were progressive groups, who could be won to work with the Derg under the guidance of the Soviet Union. They tried to divide what they termed the “progressive” groups - the EPLF and the ELF-RC - from what they referred to as the “agents of Arab reaction and imperialism” in the liberation movement. This tactic bore no fruit because all were equally committed to the goal of national independence. For a time, with the assistance of their Soviet and Cuban allies, Mengistu and his regime were able to reverse their setbacks in Eritrea. They dislodged the Eritrean liberation movements from nearly all the liberated areas. In early December 1978, the strategic city of Keren was recaptured prompting the flight of 100,000 civilians. The Ethiopian government prematurely considered the recapture of Keren as representing the death knell of the Eritrean liberation struggle. John Darnton writing in The New York Times observed that after Ethiopia secured the Eritrean Red Sea ports, the Russians expected ‘to acquire bases along a 1,000 mile coastline which would more than compensate for their expulsion from the Somali port of Berbera a year ago.’1 What Mengistu and his benefactors did not realise was that as long as the Eritrean fighters were in control of the tough, impenetrable and rugged Nakfa terrain, any talk of defeat was premature. The most intense Ethiopian offensives and counter-offensives took place after the EPLF forces vacated the liberated areas under what they referred to as strategic withdrawal. Between 1978 and 1983 alone six major Ethiopian offensives and counter-offensives were launched, directed by high-ranking Soviet generals. All these highly-publicised offensives, including the make or break Red Star Campaign, ended in failure leaving tens of thousands of Ethiopian soldiers, including high-ranking military commanders, dead, wounded and captured. The amount of manpower, materiel and financial resources invested in the launching of the Red Star Campaign and the others was gargantuan. Over 120,000 soldiers were brought from the eastern, southern and central commands on top of the Second Division, which was already 238

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there. Plans were made to obliterate the EPLF’s strongholds. Mengistu declared that the final hour had struck and called for the destruction of the “bandits”, lock, stock and barrel once and for all. However, the outcome was a disaster for the Ethiopian military. The EPLA smashed offensives and counter-offensives planned and directed by Soviet generals, leaving tens of thousands of Ethiopian soldiers dead and injured. The collapse was a deep embarrassment to the Soviet Union. Then the EPLA went on the offensive. One of these actions, considered the largest in the African continent, was the battle of Afabet, launched on 18 March 1988. It was a turning point for the Eritrean liberation struggle. The Ethiopian debacle at Afabet made it clear to the Russians that it was futile to continue being involved with the losing side. They thought that it was only a question of time before the Ethiopian armed forces suffered a final, devastating defeat both in Eritrea and Tigray. As a result, the Soviet Union officially declared that its military specialists would not participate in Ethiopia’s domestic conflicts anymore. President Gorbachev, who had been elected General Secretary in 1985 and had a far more ambivalent attitude to involvement in Ethiopia than his predecessors, counseled Mengistu to declare a ceasefire. In pursuit of this goal Gorbachev sent a high-level delegation to Ethiopia to tell Mengistu that the conflict had no military solution. Brezhnev’s death and Gorbachev’s rise to power were key contributors to the collapse of the Derg’s and Mengistu’s regime. Whilst Brezhnev seized every opportunity to increase the presence of Soviet influence throughout the developing world, including in the Horn of Africa, Gorbachev aimed at redirecting Soviet investments to address domestic economic and social problems, and more importantly to reduce Soviet involvement abroad by seeking peaceful solutions to regional and local conflicts. Given the dependence of the regime in Ethiopia on the Soviet Union, this radical shift of Soviet foreign policy rang the death knell of one of the most violent regimes in Africa. The regime’s survival had been inextricably linked to the Cold War. Once the tensions underpinning the Cold War ceased, and collaboration between the US government and the Soviet Union prevailed, Mengistu’s rhetoric became obsolete. Unlike Brezhnev, who had regarded Mengistu as a personal friend, Gorbachev perceived 239

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him as a liability to the Soviet Union and more importantly to the Ethiopian and Eritrean people and the rest of the population in the Horn of Africa. Mengistu was not even able to get a private audience with Gorbachev when he went to Moscow in February 1985 to attend Chernenko’s funeral (Korn 1990). By 1989, the Soviet Union began expressing displeasure with the Ethiopian government’s policies, including its intransigence in Eritrea. On 21 May 1991 Mengistu fled to Zimbabwe, leaving a caretaker in Addis Ababa and ending 14 years of tyrannical rule. His departure was celebrated throughout the country and in the rest of the world. His departure ushered in the complete disintegration of the country’s armed forces, the biggest in sub-Saharan Africa. Consequently, the EPLA quietly took control of Asmara and Assab, while the EPRDF immediately moved to the edge of the capital, Addis Ababa, which it entered on 28th May. The EPRDF promised to hold a constitutional conference within one month, and the leader of the EPLF, Isaias Afwerki, made it clear that Eritrea was de facto independent and would only participate in the proposed conference with observer status. The end of the Cold War was undoubtedly a harbinger of dramatic changes across the globe. Although it is difficult to establish the extent to which the demise of Mengistu and his regime and the victory of the Eritrean liberation struggle could be attributed to the end of the Cold War, it is important not to understate its significance. There is no doubt that both the changes within the Soviet Union itself, reflected in the rise to power of Gorbachev and the decision to limit interventions in the developing world, and the rapprochement between Moscow and Washington were critical to the changes that occurred in 1991 and after. It was because of the end of the Cold War that the United States began to facilitate peace talks between the EPLF and representatives of the Ethiopian government in the months leading up to the demise of Mengistu and his regime.. A high-level US delegation, for example, took part in the conference that established the transitional government in Ethiopia. EPLF leaders attended the same conference in an observer capacity and also held talks with the transitional government regarding the future relationship between the two countries. The result of those talks was, inter alia, that the transitional government in Ethiopia recognized the right of the Eritrean people to hold a referendum on 240

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the question of independence. The referendum was held between 23 and 25 April 1993, and 99.8 per cent voted in favour of independence. The process and the outcome of the referendum were confirmed by the United Nations Observer Mission to Verify the Referendum in Eritrea (UNOVER). Eritrea was formally admitted to the membership of the United Nations on 28 May 1993.

Ethiopia and Eritrea in the post-1993 period And what of Eritrea’s relationship with its erstwhile enemy, Ethiopia? Several developments are worth mentioning. When the 30-year struggle for independence ended in victory for the Eritrean freedom fighters, one of the most important factors was the simultaneous conquest of political power in Addis Ababa by the EPLF’s ostensible ally, the EPRDF. The EPRDF government was among the first governments that recognised the sovereignty of the Eritrean state unconditionally, leading to recognition by practically all governments worldwide. The loss of Eritrea, control of the Red Sea, the Eritrean ports of Assab and Massawa and access to marine resources was deeply lamented by some nationalist Ethiopians, especially among the old Amhara ruling class. At first this was of no importance—relations between the TPLF-dominated EPRDF government in Ethiopia and the EPLF-government in Eritrea were ostensibly excellent. Such an apparently warm and friendly post-conflict relationship between two countries that had fought a thirty-year war was almost unprecedented.2 This was greatly helped firstly, by the traditionally warm relations between the two populations, and secondly by the fact that the conflict had been between two armies, and had not involved civilians. Notwithstanding the fact that the war was devastating in terms of casualties and destruction of lives and properties in Eritrea, it did not greatly impact civil society. Thirdly, although the relationship between the EPLF and the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in the mid-1980s was acrimonious (see Young 1996), the leaderships of the two fronts had soon realised that their mutual goals would be unachievable without mutual cooperation. It was the joint onslaughts that had helped the two fronts to smash the Ethiopian military. Unfortunately the honeymoon was short-lived. In hindsight it was clear that, in the euphoria of victory and peace, the two governments 241

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had failed to tie up the loose ends of accords that would govern their future relations. But most importantly, there was a significant rump of disaffected nationalist Ethiopians who deeply lamented the loss of control of the Red Sea and the Eritrean ports. The forces that resented the apparent friendly relationship between the two governments accused Meles and his inner circle of prioritising Eritrean interests to the detriment of Ethiopia’s national interest. There were even groups that referred to the Ethiopian government as a ‘…masked Eritrean ruling group of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi…’ and consequently argued that the said group ‘… has no legal nor moral rights to continue to rule the country, and has to resign without leading the country to violence.’3 Most of these forces blamed Meles and the TPLF for having betrayed Ethiopia’s national interest by failing to fight to keep the Red Sea under Ethiopia’s control. When Eritrea had become independent, the government had granted Ethiopia duty-free access to the Eritrean ports. However, soon after, issues relating to management, payment of commissions and currency exchange rates brought the arrangement to a halt in 1997, a year before a border war broke out in May 1998 in the region of Tigray. On 7 May 1998, the two countries went to war, catching the world and the general population of the two countries unaware. The war displaced nearly one million people, left about 100,000 dead and probably an equal number of maimed soldiers (see Fessehatzion 1999; Mengisteab 1999; Negash and Tronvall 2000; Clapham 2003; JaquinBerdal and Plaut 2005). Tens of thousands Ethiopians of Eritrean ancestry and Eritrean immigrants with settled status in Ethiopia were expelled to Eritrea in appalling and inhumane conditions without due process (Kibreab 1999).4 This had serious economic and political ramifications for both countries. When the war broke out, Ethiopia switched imports and exports to Djibouti, despite ruinous costs for both sides; Eritrea suffered substantial loss of revenue and Ethiopia incurred huge haulage costs. According to The Economist, ‘That comes at a heavy price: it costs more to truck a container from Djibouti to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’s capital, than to ship the same container from China to Djibouti.’5 Meles and the leaders of the TPLF tried to win back the trust of the Ethiopian diehards in the course of the war by trying to inflict 242

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severe damage on the Eritrean economy and infrastructure. However, to Meles’ and his inner circle’s credit they turned a deaf ear to the call of diehard nationalists who called for the occupation of Assab. Meles unequivocally dismissed the idea of claiming Assab, as being against international law.6 He added that Ethiopia as a landlocked country should be ‘assured of having guarantees for port services. …Indeed this is an issue to be raised.’7 He further pointed out that this demand was consistent with the international law. The point is that this matter should be perceived in light of the interests of Ethiopia and Eritrea. Well, if we make use of the Port of Assab, it is inevitable that we make payments for the Port owners in proportion to our utilization of the port and as long as we do so according to international law.8

However, Meles did reveal a draconian project to inflict the heaviest damage possible to the Eritrean economy by refusing to use Assab for imports and exports, including for supply of emergency relief,9 even though this would have been to the benefit of both countries. Realizing Eritrea’s dependence on the monies paid by Ethiopia for the use of its port services, he went out of his way to make the point that if Ethiopia used the port of Assab, ‘the benefit is not only for us, but for Eritrea, too. On the other hand, if we decide against using Assab, then the fate of Assab would remain to be a mere source of drinking water for camels’10 (emphasis added). The two Eritrean ports and to a lesser extent Djibouti had always been the main outlets for Ethiopian trade. Available data suggest that in 1986, the ‘…total tonnage handled at the ports of Assab, Djibouti and Massawa was 2,869,844 tones, 297,314 tones, and 593,977 tones, representing 76.6, 7.9 and 15.5 per cent, respectively.’11 Since the border war, Ethiopia has ceased using Assab and Massawa. Given its geographical location, very little goods are imported through the port of Assab and it can be safely stated that the infrastructure of the port has fallen into a state of disrepair. However, since the recent rapprochement of the two governments, which culminated in the July 2018 peace agreement,12 both have agreed to build roads on each side of the border, and it is hoped that in the future Ethiopia may resume using the Eritrean ports. Although Eritrea lost a substantial amount of income after Ethiopia ceased to use Assab and Massawa, it has to some extent made 243

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up for this with the new security deal struck with Saudi Arabia and UAE after the outbreak of the war in Yemen in 2015. The amount Eritrea receives for leasing Assab to the UAE is unknown, but there is no doubt that it is substantial. Meles’ assertion that the Eritrean government would be unable to earn a penny after Ethiopia ceased using the Eritrean port cities is no longer true. But the question is: at what cost? Although there has been a surge of goodwill toward the Eritrean government after the peace agreement with Ethiopia, there is no evidence that Isaias Afwerki himself has improved his standing in the region or internationally. With few exceptions, Eritrea still remains politically, economically and socially isolated. One indication of this is the government’s refusal to re-join the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) regional body. The government’s human rights record remains as bleak as ever. The open-ended national service that has degenerated into a modern form of slavery, prompting tens of thousands to flee, remains in force (see Kibreab 2009, 2013, 2017). Thousands of political prisoners, including the founding mothers and fathers of the national liberation struggle detained before and in September 2001, as well as after, are still detained incommunicado and without charge, assuming they are still alive. Prominent religious leaders, including his Holiness, Abune Antonios, the Patriarch of the Eritrean Orthodox Church has been in detention for over 13 years without charge. Other historic issues remain. Although Eritrea’s sovereignty over the Red Sea ports of Assab and Massawa is settled, to some diehard Ethiopians the question remains vexatious, to say the least. At the heart of the problem lies, as Teame Tewoldebrahan, argues is the question of Eritrea providing ‘access to and from the sea through its ports to Ethiopia in accordance with the provisions of the International Law of the Sea and other relevant multi-lateral conventions.’13 These issues still remain unsettled. Drawing on the Principle V of the 1965 Convention and Article III (1925), Teame Tewelde-Berhan in a meticulously documented paper argues that as a transit state, ‘…Eritrea exercise[s] full sovereignty over its territory.’14 Nevertheless, he continues, ‘…Eritrea will have the responsibility to provide Ethiopia unrestricted transit, Ethiopia shall have the obligation to abide by the rules and 244

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regulations of Eritrea established by common agreement among both parties.’15 All things being equal, the recent rapprochement between the Eritrean and Ethiopian governments may pave the way for the development of mutually agreed institutional arrangements and mechanisms of enforcement regarding Ethiopia’s access and use of the Eritrean ports. However, for such arrangements to evolve, the attitude of the Eritrean leadership toward multilateral rules need to change fundamentally, and Ethiopian politicians need to accept the fact that their country is landlocked and Assab and Massawa are Eritrean ports. This is not to suggest in any way that Eritrea can deny Ethiopia access and transit rights. These are sine qua non requirements for a peaceful, harmonious and prosperous relationship between the two countries and their populations – populations that have been let down in the past by the lack of political maturity and diplomatic acumen of their rulers.

Endnotes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

John Darnton, “100,000 Refugees Reported to Have Fled Eritrea,” The New York Times, 17 December 1978. At least that was what most observers thought before seeing what was to come from the second half of the 1990s. “Meles Aborted World Support for Ethiopia to capture Assab Port,” April 22, 2003. Available at https://www.ethiomedia.com/news/ meles_foiled_assab_capture.html See Human Rights Watch World Report 1999: Events of December 1997-November 1998, New York. Shipping in East Africa: Ocean Ahoy! The Economist, 21 April 2012. Available at https://www.economist.com/business/2012/04/21/ ocean-ahoy Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Simon Denyer, Ethiopian refusal to use ports treat to aid: UN, 14 April 2000. https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopian-re fusal-useports-treat-aid-un “Meles Aborted World Support for Ethiopia to capture Assab Port,” April 22, 2003 245

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Teame Tewolde-Berhan, Access to and from the Sea and Transit Rights for land-locked States: A Review of International Law of the Sea and State Practice (with special reference to Ethiopia), Digest Topical Issues, No 4, December 1990, p. 72 12 Ethiopian, Eritrean leaders sign peace agreement in Jeddah, SEPTEMBER 16, 2018, Middle East https://uk.reuters.com/article/ uk-ethiopia-eritrea-saudi/ethiopian-eritrean-leaders-sign-peaceagreement-in-jeddah-idUKKCN1LW0KT 13 For a brilliant discourse on these and other issues relating to the Eritrean ports and Ethiopia’s privilege of access and use see Teame Tewolde-Berhan, Access to and From the Sea and Transit Rights for Land-locked States: A Review of International Law of the Sea and State Practice with Special Reference to Ethiopia, Eritrean Information Service, 1990. Ibid. p. 98. 14 15 Ibid.

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264

Index A Abate, Lieutenant Colonel Atnafu 29, 34 Abdella, Salah Aldin 146 Abdulrahman 146 Adamishin, Anatoly 214, 218 Adamshin, Anatoly 214, 215 Addis Ababa 4, 5, 8, 13, 19, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 39, 40, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46, 56, 57, 60, 61, 70, 76, 87, 103, 119, 136, 137, 139, 145, 146, 169, 172, 176, 189, 191, 200, 212, 213, 214, 215, 217, 222, 226, 227, 228, 229, 232, 234, 240, 241, 242, 248, 253, 260, 262 Adwa war 19 AESNA (Eritrean Students in North America) xi, 14, 147, 148, 150, 153, 154, 156, 162, 163, 166, 167, 168, 170 AEWNA (Association of Eritrean Women in North America) xi, 14, 150, 151, 156, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170 Afghanistan 4, 180, 197, 200, 209, 210, 247, 253, 257 Al-Yadoomi, Colonel Hussein 23, 247 Andom, General Aman 31, 32 Andreotti, Giulio 214 Andropov, Yuri 14, 193

Angola xi, 4, 57, 65, 66, 96, 114, 194, 197, 199, 200, 251, 262 Asmara 6, 38, 45, 52, 91, 92, 94, 114, 126, 127, 129, 145, 146, 171, 174, 176, 185, 188, 189, 206, 211, 212, 219, 223, 224, 225, 226, 228, 240 Asmara Manifesto 171 Axen, Hermann 125, 183, 188, 189 Ayene, General Tariku 207

B Bab al-Mandab 23, 25, 26 Bab el-Mandeb 15, 21, 26, 95, 260 Bante, General Teferi 30, 31, 32, 33, 36, 38 Barre, Siad 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 52, 54, 55, 58, 61, 62, 63, 69, 72, 74, 83, 86, 87, 88, 116 Bayih, Berhanu 43 Beirut 124, 136, 138, 140, 159, 169 Belata, Mohamed Berhan 146 Belgrade 29, 35 Berbera 13, 21, 25, 42, 52, 55, 57, 72, 73, 77, 80, 89, 94, 104, 120, 179, 180, 181, 238 Berlin 9, 29, 121, 122, 128, 130, 132, 133, 134, 183, 190, 192, 201 Bolsheviks 11 Brezhnev, Leonid 14, 28, 42, 44, 66, 74, 75, 77, 89, 101, 110, 129, 130, 131, 132, 137, 138, 139,

265

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa 140, 178, 182, 188, 190, 191, 193, 196, 216, 239 Britain 12, 38, 148 British Military Administration 150

C Cape of Good Hope 23 Caribbean 4, 250, 257, 262 Carter, President Jimmy 26, 45, 62, 63, 82, 87, 215, 218, 220, 226, 231, 254, 257 Castro, Fidel 9, 31, 38, 46, 53, 54, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61, 65, 68, 69, 70, 74, 81, 87, 88, 90, 95, 114 Charles, Milene 30, 257 Chekini, Mahmud 146 Chernenko, E.F. 85, 240 China ix, 20, 26, 29, 84, 95, 97, 144, 146, 147, 167, 242, 247, 260 Christianity 145 Churchill, Winston 12 CIA (Central Intelligence Agency (USA)) xi, 32, 34, 70, 78, 79, 82, 97, 176, 249 Cohen, Herman 214, 215, 220 Cold War v, 1, 3, 4, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 22, 24, 37, 197, 239, 240, 248, 249, 250, 252, 253, 254, 255, 257, 260, 263, 264 Commados, Fessehaye 146 Connell, Dan 6, 8, 146, 222, 250 CPSU CC (Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) xi, 8, 68, 75, 81, 94, 101, 109, 110, 122, 134, 137, 138, 167, 178, 188, 190, 201 CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) xi, 8, 68, 75, 81, 94, 99, 100, 101, 109, 110, 113, 122, 132, 134, 137, 138, 167, 266

178, 183, 184, 188, 190, 191, 193, 201, 216 Cuba 8, 30, 50, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 62, 64, 65, 66, 68, 69, 76, 80, 82, 84, 88, 89, 91, 98, 99, 104, 105, 116, 120, 136, 138, 139, 151, 152, 153, 154, 156, 161, 168, 173, 177, 181, 188, 194, 200, 201, 249, 251, 252, 256, 258, 262

D Dahlac Archipelago 80 Dahlak Island 89, 219 Dahlak Islands 104, 180, 181, 197 Darntonnov, John 76, 82 Davidson, Basil 149 DERG (Military junta that ruled Ethiopia from 1974 to 1987) xi, 122 Derg, the v, vi, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 19, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 41, 43, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 53, 56, 58, 65, 68, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 107, 108, 113, 115, 117, 120, 121, 123, 127, 128, 133, 136, 137, 147, 150, 151, 152, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 181, 186, 194, 201, 204, 209, 217, 221, 225, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 248, 253 Dire Dawa 48, 187 Djibouti 15, 84, 85, 95, 103, 242, 243 Dominguez, Jorge 96, 114, 194, 251 Donham, Donald 22, 97, 98, 147, 251 Dzasokhov, Aleksander 27

Index

E East Berlin 9, 133 Eastern Christian Orthodox church 18 Eastern Europe 84 East Germany 4, 13, 28, 101, 113, 115, 116, 121, 123, 127, 128, 131, 173, 180, 181, 186, 200, 211, 219, 220, 236, 237 EDU (Ethiopian Democratic Union) xi, 147 EFLNA (Eritreans for Liberation in North America) xi, 151, 164, 165, 167, 168, 169, 170 Egypt ix, 13, 20, 25, 26, 27, 41, 52, 61, 63, 71, 72, 73, 75, 81, 83, 85, 87, 95, 144, 200, 219, 251 Elaj, Abdela Said 146 ELF (Eritrean Liberation Front) xi, 5, 6, 7, 10, 14, 94, 105, 110, 114, 115, 118, 119, 124, 131, 132, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 140, 144, 145, 146, 147, 149, 150, 152, 157, 158, 159, 167, 169, 171, 183, 184, 188, 191, 217, 229, 236, 237, 238 ELF (RC) (Eritrean Liberation Front (Revolutionary Council)) xi Enlai, Zhou 145, 146 EPLA (Eritrean People’s Liberation Army) xi, 14, 203, 206, 207, 208, 212, 222, 223, 225, 227, 228, 239, 240 EPLF (Eritrean People’s Liberation Front) vi, xi, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 91, 92, 94, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 105, 106, 107, 108, 110, 111, 113, 114, 115, 118, 119, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 131,

133, 135, 136, 138, 139, 140, 143, 144, 145, 147, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 183, 184, 186, 187, 199, 200, 201, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 212, 213, 214, 215, 217, 218, 219, 220, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 248 EPRDF (Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front) xi, 204, 225, 228, 229, 240, 241 Eritrea vi, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 18, 19, 21, 23, 27, 28, 34, 37, 38, 42, 45, 46, 48, 60, 67, 75, 76, 79, 87, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 102, 103, 104, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 145, 146, 147, 148, 150, 151, 152, 153, 155, 158, 159, 160, 161, 163, 166, 168, 169, 170, 171, 173, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 209, 210, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 222, 223, 224, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 249, 250, 251, 253, 254, 255, 267

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 263, 264 Eritrean Liberation Front xi, 5, 6, 10, 98, 101, 119, 124, 125, 135, 159 Eritrean liberation struggle 1, 3, 4, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 19, 93, 94, 96, 97, 99, 101, 102, 104, 107, 113, 115, 117, 122, 123, 124, 128, 130, 144, 145, 146, 147, 151, 156, 157, 161, 167, 175, 186, 200, 208, 209, 220, 234, 237, 238, 239, 240 Eritrean Revolution 151, 153, 167, 168, 250, 253 Eritrean war of independence 1, 14 Eritrean War of Independence 4, 6, 66, 217, 234, 255 ESUNA (Ethiopian Students Union in North America) xi, 147, 148, 149, 167, 251 Ethiopia vi, vii, xi, 1, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 34, 35, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 68, 69, 70, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 83, 84, 85, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 106, 108, 109, 110, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 128, 129, 130, 132, 133, 135, 137, 139, 140, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 157, 158, 159, 161, 162, 173, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 268

198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 205, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 234, 235, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264 Ethiopian-Somali war 77 Ethio-Somali war 221

F Fitzgibbon,Louis 23, 252 France ix, 26, 184

G Gaber, Osman Mohamed 146 Gaddafi, M. 98 Garang, Colonel John 217 GDR (German Democratic Republic) xi, 47, 98, 121, 128, 133, 140 Gebre-Medhin, Yordanos 149, 150, 254 Genasene 61 Germany xi, 4, 6, 9, 12, 13, 14, 28, 32, 60, 75, 101, 113, 115, 116, 121, 123, 127, 128, 131, 173, 180, 181, 186, 200, 211, 219, 220, 236, 237 Ghana 20, 83 Gode 48 Goodman, Melvin 89, 196, 219, 221, 231, 252 Gorbachev, Mikhail vii, 14, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 201, 208,

Index 211, 216, 218, 219, 228, 239, 240, 252, 254 Gorshkov, Sergei 104 Grechko, General Andrei 72 Gromyko, A. 41, 46, 66, 75, 118

H Hagos, Berhan 146, 203, 204, 229 Hagos, Mesfin 146, 204 Halliday, Fred 18, 21, 24 Harar 48, 54, 58, 61 Henze, Paul 84, 97, 98, 212, 228 Hitler, Adolf 12 Honecker, Erich 9, 74, 81, 88, 90, 101, 110, 121, 122, 123, 127, 129, 131, 132, 135, 137, 138, 139, 140, 160, 169, 182, 183, 190, 191 Horn of Africa v, 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 15, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 35, 42, 46, 57, 68, 72, 73, 74, 79, 80, 83, 97, 103, 106, 115, 137, 151, 152, 155, 179, 188, 190, 191, 201, 210, 214, 219, 233, 234, 237, 239, 240, 249, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264 Huggins, Hugh 11

I Ibrahim, Ahmed 146 Ibrahim, Mohamed Ahmed 146 IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority for Development) 244 Indian Ocean ix, 7, 15, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 71, 73, 74, 76, 77, 80, 81, 89, 91, 104, 179, 180, 181, 219, 250 Isaias Afwerki 9, 105, 106, 107, 121, 122, 123, 125, 126, 127,

128, 131, 134, 135, 138, 139, 145,146, 160, 161, 162, 167, 169, 170, 183, 186, 205, 208, 109, 210, 214, 224, 228, 229, 230, 240, 244, 247, 269 Islam 85, 86, 145, 261, 263 Israel 26, 72, 102, 103, 145, 221, 222, 225, 229 Italian colonialism 148, 149, 150 Italy 168, 184, 214 Iyob, Ruth 149, 150, 254

J Jembere, Berhanu 178 Jerusalem 18 Jijiga 48, 53, 54, 62, 63

K Kagnew Station 38, 45 Kalashnikov rifles 103 Kasim, Hussein Abdulkadir 41 Kenya 84, 85 Khartoum 27, 110, 166, 167, 170, 217, 228, 250 Killion, Tom 146, 206, 250, 255 Korn, David 6, 115, 204, 218, 231, 240, 255 Kosukhin, N. 85 Kosygin, A.N. 41, 66, 75, 178, 190 Kremlin 15, 17, 27, 28, 39, 66, 94, 95, 108, 114, 152, 181, 193, 216, 221, 259, 261

L Lamberz, Werner 60, 70, 124, 125, 137, 183, 191 Lebanon 124, 138, 140, 159, 169 LeoGrande, William 91 Luanda 70, 96 269

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa

M MAAG (Military Assistance Advisory Group) xi, 45 Makinda, Samuel 21, 104, 256 Mali 20, 83 Maltsev, Alexander 122 Mariam, Haile 4, 13, 27, 28, 32, 34, 38, 44, 66, 68, 77, 81, 83, 109, 110, 114, 132, 137, 140, 141, 151, 167, 173, 182, 183, 188, 189, 190, 201, 206, 217, 222, 227, 236 Markovski, Paul 94, 109, 134, 138, 140, 173, 178, 182, 190 Marxism-Leninism 33, 43, 86, 148, 194, 226 Marxist-Leninist 4, 17, 20, 65, 83, 85, 86, 97, 116, 135, 147, 157, 183, 193, 222, 237 Menelik, Emperor 19 Mengistu Haile Mariam v, vi, vii, 1, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 21, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 38, 39, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 59, 60, 61, 66, 68, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 81, 83, 84, 85, 87, 88, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 99, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 124, 125, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 136, 137, 141, 151, 152, 167, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 193, 194, 195, 196, 198, 199, 200, 201, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 270

228, 229, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 253 Mengistu’s Nine-Point Plan of 1976 131, 187 Mersa Teklay 92 Michael, Mogus Wolde 41 Middle East 1, 20, 36, 41, 80, 89, 117, 150, 163, 164, 196, 209, 217, 237, 246, 251, 252, 255 Mitchell, Nancy 58 Mogadishu Government 76 Mohammad, Abdulkader Saleh 72, 150, 257 Moscow v, vi, 4, 7, 8, 10, 12, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 51, 52, 56, 61, 67, 68, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 78, 79, 81, 83, 84, 87, 91, 93, 94, 95, 99, 101, 102, 103, 108, 109, 110, 114, 115, 116, 118, 123, 130, 132, 134, 137, 138, 140, 144, 150, 151, 152, 156, 167, 178, 179, 180, 181, 186, 188, 189, 190, 194, 195, 197, 198, 201, 206, 208, 210, 215, 216, 218, 219, 227, 231, 233, 235, 237, 240, 252, 253, 258, 261 Mozambique 199 MPLA (People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola) xi, 65, 96, 114 Musa, Issa 146

N Nakfa Front 205, 222 Namibia 144, 199 Nasser, Ahmed vi, 132, 134, 135, 136, 140, 183, 184, 188, 191

Index NDR (National Democratic Revolution) 93, 157, 158 Negash, Tekeste 149, 242, 257, 261 Neto, Agostinho 65 New York Times 7, 15, 64, 70, 76, 81, 82, 110, 200, 202, 205, 207, 222, 223, 229, 231, 232, 238, 245, 256, 257, 260, 261 Nidal, Abu 134 Nkaisserry, Brigadier 54, 63 Nkaisserry, Joseph K. 53 North America xi, 14, 24, 110, 147, 150, 151, 152, 156, 164, 167, 169 Nur, Ramedan Mohamed 145, 146, 157, 186

O Oberdorfer, Don 28, 35, 57, 69, 258 Obukhov, L. 85 Ochoa, General Arnaldo v, 8, 15, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 53, 54, 68, 69, 177, 189 Ogaden v, vi, 3, 4, 7, 8, 13, 35, 42, 44, 47, 48, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64, 65, 69, 73, 74, 76, 78, 84, 89, 91, 99, 115, 116, 117, 118, 166, 177, 185, 187, 221, 234, 235, 237, 252, 254, 257, 259, 262, 263 Ogaden conflict 8, 91, 235 Ogaden war 3, 64, 78, 89, 116, 235, 237, 257 Ogbazghi, Yohannes 149, 150, 258 Omer, Ahmed Adem 146 Ostermann, Christian F. 9, 68, 137, 138, 139, 140, 188, 189, 190, 191

P Papp, Daniel 17, 20, 35, 94, 95, 108, 109, 111, 114, 258 Patman, Robert 18, 19, 21, 26, 28, 31, 34, 44, 85, 88, 89, 91, 93, 103, 109, 114, 133, 178, 180, 193, 195, 198, 221, 258 Payne, Richard 12, 17, 19, 37, 38, 259 PDRE (Democratic Republic of Ethiopia) xi, 186, 188, 192, 199, 209 People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen 23, 27, 76, 80, 132 Persian Gulf ix, 4, 7, 22, 24, 26, 73 Petrov, General 59, 61, 62, 66, 75, 76 Phu, Diem Bien 203, 204, 206 PMAC (Provisional Military Administrative Council) xi, 30, 31, 32, 33, 39, 41, 43, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 66, 76, 93, 113, 114, 125, 129, 130, 133, 136, 173, 175, 176, 177, 194, 196 Podgorny, N.V. 44 Podgorny, President Nikolai 46, 89 POMOA (Provisional Office for Mass Organisational Affairs) 32 Ponomarev, Boris N. 94, 109, 134, 138, 140, 173, 178, 179, 182, 188, 190 Porter, Bruce 18, 54, 99, 259 Port Said 71 Potsdam 38 Prague 29 PRC (People’ Republic of China) 144, 146, 147

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R Rajet, Hassen Saleh Ab 146 RATANOV 33, 34 Ratanov, A.P. v, 8, 13, 15, 33, 38, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 68, 69, 95, 109, 131, 139, 177, 185, 189, 191, 192 Red Sea vi, ix, 1, 4, 7, 10, 13, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 67, 71, 74, 80, 87, 89, 91, 94, 95, 96, 97, 102, 103, 105, 113, 118, 126, 129, 168, 179, 180, 181, 182, 184, 219, 221, 222, 225, 231, 233, 234, 235, 237, 238, 241, 242, 244, 249, 250, 252, 253, 254, 256, 257, 258, 261 Red Star Campaign 171, 238 Remneck, Richard 24, 25, 26, 27, 102 Remnek, Richard 18, 23, 26, 73, 80, 81, 88, 260 Rodriguez, Carlos Rafael 55, 124, 132, 138, 139, 174, 188 Russia ix, 11, 13, 17, 19, 154, 156, 263

S Saba, Paul 97 Sabbe, Osman Saleh 124, 135, 146, 152, 158, 159, 200, 217 Sadat, Anwar 71, 72 Saudi Arabia ix, 7, 26, 41, 52, 62, 63, 75, 85, 87, 95, 102, 105, 106, 134, 144, 162, 200, 217, 244 SED (The Socialist Unity Party of  Germany (German: Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands) xi, 9, 14, 60, 68, 70, 75, 81, 94, 101, 109, 110, 272

113, 126, 127, 129, 132, 134, 137, 138, 139, 140, 167, 174, 182, 183, 184, 188, 191, 201 Selassie, Haile 5, 19, 28, 32, 43, 65, 92, 93, 97, 98, 108, 144, 145, 146, 176, 194, 234, 236, 261 Shengo (National Assembly (Amharic)) xi, 118, 186, 187, 209, 213, 217, 227 Shevardnadze, Edward 197 Shinn, David 184, 191 Shum, Saleh Omer 146 SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) xi, 211, 228, 260, 261 socialism 31, 39, 43, 44, 50, 86, 87, 88, 156, 163, 193, 202 Sofia 29 Somalia vi, ix, xi, 9, 13, 15, 21, 25, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 47, 48, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 60, 62, 63, 64, 65, 68, 69, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 94, 95, 103, 113, 115, 116, 119, 179, 185, 195, 199, 219, 237, 248, 249, 252, 254, 264 South Africa 38, 65, 144, 218 South Yemen 21, 76, 80, 98, 103, 116, 162, 194 Soviet bloc 10, 13, 14, 46, 86, 102, 103, 105, 114, 117, 120, 130, 131, 136, 143, 157, 161, 162, 163, 164, 174, 175, 179, 201 Soviet Union v, vi, vii, xi, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 62, 63, 64, 66, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 87, 88,

Index 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 123, 126, 127, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 136, 137, 143, 144, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 159, 161, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 171, 173, 175, 179, 180, 181, 183, 184, 185, 186, 189, 191, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 205, 209, 210, 211, 213, 214, 215, 216, 218, 219, 225, 226, 227, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 249, 253, 257, 258, 263, 264 SPLA (Sudan People’s Liberation Army) 217 Starushenko, Gleb 197 Sudan 6, 20, 27, 52, 83, 84, 85, 87, 95, 101, 102, 106, 119, 125, 166, 192, 195, 198, 200, 217, 254, 255 Suez Canal 1, 22, 24, 25, 27, 71, 76, 77, 80 Sweden 6

T Tanzania 43 Tareke, Gebru 5, 64, 187, 207, 208, 212, 224, 229 Tehran 38 Tesfaye, Lt General Gebre-Kidan 198, 227, 229, 232 Tewoldebrahan, Teame 244 Third World 4, 12, 14, 62, 72, 73, 106, 165, 193, 197, 219, 247, 250, 251, 252, 254, 256, 257, 258, 259, 263

Tigray 118, 162, 177, 187, 200, 201, 206, 212, 216, 217, 227, 239, 242 Tiruneh, Andargachew 5, 32, 91, 172, 187, 198, 212, 213, 214, 226, 247, 262 TPLF (Tigraen People’s Liberation Front) xi, 162, 201, 205, 206, 241, 242 Trappen, Friedel 101, 110, 113, 137, 139, 140, 191 Tsar, Alexis 18, 233

U UAE (United Arab Emirates) xi, 244 Ulyanovsky, R. A. 101, 102, 110, 113, 132, 133, 137, 139, 140, 183, 184, 191 UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola xi, 114 United Kingdom 38 USA (United States of America) xi, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 12, 15, 17, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 37, 38, 41, 42, 45, 55, 56, 57, 58, 62, 63, 65, 67, 72, 73, 76, 77, 78, 79, 82, 84, 85, 87, 88, 95, 96, 98, 100, 103, 106, 107, 119, 143, 144, 145, 153, 161, 168, 172, 177, 178, 179, 180, 183, 184, 185, 186, 197, 199, 200, 214, 215, 220, 221, 222, 228, 229, 239, 240, 247, 250, 253, 257, 259, 262, 263 USSR xi, 9, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 39, 40, 44, 45, 47, 55, 56, 59, 66, 68, 71, 72, 73, 75, 77, 78, 82, 84, 87, 88, 89, 96, 97, 98, 99, 103, 104, 108, 116, 273

The Soviet Union and the Horn of Africa 134, 140, 179, 180, 183, 185, 188, 189, 191, 198, 199, 201, 202, 210, 214, 218, 219, 226, 227, 230, 253, 254, 259 USSR (Soviet Socialist Republics) xi, 9, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 39, 40, 44, 45, 47, 55, 56, 59, 66, 68, 71, 72, 73, 75, 77, 78, 82, 84, 87, 88, 89, 96, 97, 98, 99, 103, 104, 108, 116, 134, 140, 179, 180, 183, 185, 188, 189, 191, 198, 199, 201, 202, 210, 214, 218, 219, 226, 227, 230, 253, 254, 259 USUAA (University Students Union of Addis Ababa) 4, 5

V Valenta, Jiri 4, 20, 23, 262 Valeta, Jiri 83 Velidanov, Yuri 180 Vivo, Valdez 124 Vorostsov, Youli 211

W Warsaw Pact 21 Wassae, Lt. Colonel Afework 206 Weldemichael, Awet 37, 229 Westad, Arne 98 Western Europe 22, 24, 25, 150 Western European 25 Wilson, Edward 19, 31, 36, 257, 263, 264 Wogderes, Fikere Selassie 51 Wolde, Goshu 179 Worthingtone, Peter 203 WPE (Workers Party of Ethiopia) 189, 195, 196, 201, 217

274

WSLF (Western Somalia Liberation Front) xi, 44, 46, 47, 48, 52, 53, 54, 57, 60, 61, 64, 66, 116, 235 WWII (World War II) 12, 18, 203, 220, 233

Y Yalta 38 Yemen 15, 21, 23, 27, 76, 80, 87, 98, 103, 116, 132, 162, 194, 219, 244 Yemen Arab Republic 27 Yodfat, Aryeh 88 Yordanov, Radoslav R. 3, 9, 11, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 98, 114, 180, 181, 188, 189, 192, 193, 197, 201, 208, 216, 221, 234, 264 Yukalov, Yuri 214

Z Zaire 65 Zedong, Mao 146 Zenawi, Minister Meles 242 Zimbabwe 144, 199, 229, 232, 240