The Horn of Africa: From War to Peace 9781349214587, 9781349214563

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THE HORN OF AFRICA

Also by Paul B. Henze

ETHIOPIA: CRISIS OF A MARXIST ECONOMY ETHIOPIAN JOURNEYS REBELS AND SEPARATISTS IN ETHIOPIA *SOVIET STRATEGY AND ISLAM (with Alexandre Bennigsen. George K. Tanham and S. Enders Wimbush) THE PLOT TO KILL THE POPE

*Also published by Macmillan

The Horn of Africa From War to Peace Paul B. Henze Resident Consultant, The Rand Corporation, Washington

M

MACMILLAN

© Paul B. Henze 1991

Softcover reprint of the hardcover I st edition 1991 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London WI P 9HE. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. First published 1991 by THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire R021 2XS and London Companies and representatives throughout the world ISBN 978-1-349-21458-7 ISBN 978-1-349-21456-3 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-21456-3 A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Reprinted 1994

Contents List of Plates

VI

viii

List of Maps

ix

Preface Introduction

1

PART I

9

LONG ROAD TO THE PRESENT

1

Geography and History

12

2

Americans in the Horn

39

3

Russians in the Horn

65

PART II

4 5

MILITARIZATION, CRISIS AND DEGENERATION

Arms and their Social and Economic Effect

95 133

Crisis and Degenaration

PART III

93

RESTORING PEACE AND PROGRESS

6

A New Approach to Government in the Horn

7

How the West Can Help

171

172 187

202 214 240 242

Appendix Notes

Supplementary Bibliography Index

V

List of Plates 1.

2. 3.

4.

5.

6. 7. 8. 9.

10. 11. 12.

Haile Selassie and Mao Tse-Tung at conclusion of Chinese-Ethiopian talks in Peking, October 1971. The ladies are members of the Ethiopian royal family. Behind the Emperor and the Chairman are senior Chinese and Ethiopian officials. President Carter receives Somali Ambassador Ahmad Addou in the White House Oval Office, 16 June 1977. Zbigniew Brzezinski looks on. U.S. solidifies relationship with Sudan - President Nimeiry and his delegation meeting with President Carter in the Cabinet Room of the White House, 21 September 1978. On Nimeiry's left is Francis Deng, then Permanent Undersecretary in the Sudanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs; on President Carter's left is Zbigniew Brzezinski. The author is at far end of the table taking notes. Mogadishu -Posters and Graffiti condemning 'Russian Intervention' in the Hom of Africa - March 1978. Mission to Mengistu - The Author and David Aaron, Deputy National Security Advisor, at the Kennedy Library at Addis Ababa University following meeting with Mengistu, February 1978. The man on the right is Berhane Deressa, then Head of the American Section of the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry. President Carter and President Nimeiry in the White House Oval Office, 2 July 1980. Addis Ababa - Arch at Entrance to Revolution Square, January 1981. Ethiopia - Castles at the Old Imperial Capital of Gondar. Built during the 16th and 17th centuries. Sudan - The Tomb of the Mahdi in Omdurman. A view of the Ethiopian High Simien, 'The Roof of Africa', from the highway between Enda Selassie and Gondar. Lenin in Addis Ababa. Huge Statue facing the Airport Road erected in 1982, not yet tom down as of the end of 1990. A Tigrean woman gazes at the amba atop which Debra Damo, one of Ethiopia's oldest monasteries, is located. Much of the landscape of the province of Tigre is severely eroded and denuded of vegetation. vi

List of Plates 13.

14a. 14b. 14c. 14d.

15a.

ISb. 15c. 16.

Vll

Burgeoning population is a challenge for all governments in the Horn and will become even more serious during the 21st century. These are young Ethiopians of Gurage and Hadiya nationality. The photograph was taken in 1987 at Kabul in SW Shoa. Mengistu Haile Mariam, driving force of the Ethiopian Marxist revolution. He became chairman of the Derg in February 1977 and had himself made President in 1987. Camera Press. Isaias Afewerki, an Eritrean Evangelical Christian by origin, head of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front, one of the most successful of the Ethiopian separatist movements. Camera Press. General Mohammed Siad Barre, who took power in a coup in October 1969 and kept Somalia under a tight military socialist dictatorship for more than 20 years. Popperfoto, London. General Aman Andom, an Eritrean who became first head of state of Ethiopia on deposition of Haile Selassie on 12 September 1974. Killed by orders of Mengistu Haile Mariam on 23 November 1974. Associated Press. General Teferi Banti (on right) with the Ugandan tyrant, Idi Amin, in Nairobi in January 1976. Gen. Teferi became head of state of Ethiopia when General Aman Andom was killed on 23 November 1974 and served until he himself fell foul of Mengistu Haile Mariam in early February 1977 and was killed in a Derg shoot-out. Associated Press. Sudanese Statesmen Sadiq al-Mahdi, grandson of the leader of the rebellion which raged at the end of the 19th century. Popperfoto, London. John Garang, leader of the southern Sudanese rebellion since the early 1980s. Popperfolo, London. A traditional Ethiopian painting showing Haile Selassie as a relatively young man slaying a lion - the reactionary forces in Ethiopia against which he fought? From A. E. Jensen: 1m Lande des Gada, 1936.

List of Maps l. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Horn of Africa and surrounding region The Horn in the scramble for Africa Ethiopia Somalia Sudan Eritrea and Tigre

viii

Preface This book has two basic purposes: (1) to demonstrate how and why the Hom of Africa became one of the world's prime disaster areas, and (2) to attempt to point the way to a better future for the people who live in the region. To recover from the political and economic deterioration they have experienced during the past two decades - simply to survive as viable states - the countries of the Hom need new leaders with the courage to adopt new principles of governing. Nothing else can keep the region from falling into deeper disarray. The Hom also needs help from the outside. By help I do not mean primarily emergency relief or development aid, though both are required. The region needs more fundamental kinds of help and guidance: internationally coordinated protection, pressure and continuing strong doses of both carrot and stick. Chapter 7 goes into this in detail. The book is subdivided into three sections: Part I - The Long Road to the Present; Part II - Militarization, Crisis and Degeneration; and Part III - Restoring Peace and Progress. Each Part is preceded by an introduction which explains the aims and principal themes of the following chapters. I have attempted to cover a great deal of ground in each Part, but inevitably much has had to be left out. A few topics which did not fit easily into the main narrative are dealt with in the Appendix. The book is not intended for specialists on individual countries and historical periods, though I hope they will find it worth their time and not be too upset by the many generalizations I have made to be able to include the information pertinent to the purpose of the book. The book is directed at three audiences: (1) officials and journalists who find themselves involved in the affairs of the region and need background and basic information; (2) people who have lived and worked in the region in the past and continue to be concerned about it; and, last but most important of all, (3) people in and from the region who long to see their countries set back on the road to peace and progress. I want to stimulate them to think constructively and honestly about their problems and encourage them to work energetically to create a better future for their peoples. Of course, I also hope to attract the interest of "the general reader" and everyone else who now or in the future wants to gain some understanding of the region's history, current situation, and future prospects: students, businessmen, politicians, and philanthropists. The Hom merits the attention of all of them. ix

x

Preface

The numerous footnotes are not included to show erudition. Some provide exact sourcing and add detail that does not fit into the text. Their main purpose is to direct the reader to books and articles which cover history in greater depth, recount personal experiences, and offer more information and analysis, including at times arguments and judgments at variance with those I make. I first set foot in the Hom of Africa in 1962, visiting Kenya, Ethiopia and Sudan at the end of a long journey across Africa which began in Morocco and Senegal. The depth of its history and the vigor of its current life made the Horn even more fascinating to me than the rest of that vast and varied continent. I left determined to come back. I returned to spend a few weeks in Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia (including Eritrea) in 1968. I was appointed first secretary and political counsellor at the American Embassy in Addis Ababa in July 1969. During the following three years, official duties brought me into contact with Haile Selassie's government at many levels and with life in Addis Ababa and Asmara in all its variety. My family and I made many friends who - if they have survived - are friends still. When duty did not require my presence in Addis Ababa we explored the countryside, travelling by air, Land Rover, horse and on foot. This was not a good time for Americans to travel in either Somalia or Sudan, so my experience of them as they joined the Soviet camp was limited, but my responsibilities in Addis Ababa included reporting about them. I spent much of my spare time my first year back in Washington writing Ethiopian Journeys, 1969-72 which was delivered to the publisher just as the Ethiopian Revolution began to unfold and, as a consequence, did not appear until 1977. I was never far from Ethiopia even during the time I served in Turkey in the mid-1970s, for shortly after I arrived at the American Embassy in Ankara in the summer of 1974, the Ethiopian ambassador was called back to Addis Ababa to serve the Derg as Minister of the Interior. His family wisely remained in Ankara. He returned to collect them the next year and defected in Belgrade while his deputy, a native of Keren, also defected a few months later as Mengistu was preparing his genocidal march against Eritrean insurgents in the summer of 1976. These were the first of several dozen painful Ethiopian defections I experienced firsthand in subsequent years. In January 1977, Zbigniew Brzezinski invited me to join his NSC Stafr and I returned from Ankara to Washington. I had many responsibilities during the Carter Administration, but at least a third of my time was always taken up by the Horn of Africa. I participated in

Preface

xi

official missions to all Hom countries and dealt with all the leaders of the time as well as with their ambassadors and emissaries to Washington. Some of my experience is reflected directly in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. When I left government service at the end of the Carter Administration, I spent six weeks in Kenya and Ethiopia and began several writing projects relating to the Horn. I accepted a Wilson fellowship at the Smithsonian Institution and at the end of 1982 joined the RAND Corporation as a Resident Consultant in Washington, where I have remained since. At RAND I have undertaken several research projects on the Hom of Africa and maintained contact with most U.S. and foreign research organizations concerned with Horn affairs. I wrote on the Hom for the Christian Science Monitor in the early 1980s and have contributed to many periodicals. I have attended more conferences on the Hom than I can count, including four of the six most recent International Ethiopian Studies Conferences. I have made six different visits to the Hom since 1981 and, in addition, two to the Yemens and Oman. During the past two years, the U.S. Institute of Peace has supported much of the research that has gone into preparation of this book as well as several preliminary studies, some of which have been published by RAND and are referred to in footnotes. Many other organizations and individuals, including Hom government agencies and citizens of these countries both in their countries and abroad, have helped me gain greater understanding of their problems and prospects. I should also like to acknowledge the hospitality and many services I have received during travels in the Hom from American embassies as well as those of other friendly governments. Last but not least I wish to thank my wife, Martha, a hardy traveller and dedicated student of the Hom in her own right, for the critical judgment and enthusiastic support she has always shown in connection with my Hom endeavors. The Hom of Africa is by no means the only part of the world I have studied and in which I have lived and traveled. During the entire time I have been concerned with the Hom, I have also pursued several other basic and even older professional interests: Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the Middle East, especially Turkey, and Central Asia. Knowledge and experience of these areas has been useful in many ways in research on the countries of the Hom. In particular, the opportunity during the era of glasnost and perestroika to travel extensively in the Soviet Union as well as in China and Mongolia has provided comparisons which have influenced my judgments on matters relating to communism in the Hom.

xii

Preface

I remain entirely responsible for the judgments and propositions I advance. They represent no institutional or governmental position. I set them forth, however, in the hope that they will be considered seriously by governments and other organizations concerned with the region. PAULB. HENZE

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4. Mogadishu: Posters and graffiti condemning 'Russian Intervention' in the Horn of Africa, March 1978.

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5. (above) Mission to Mengistu - the author and David Aaron, Deputy National Security Advisor, at the Kennedy Library, Addis Ababa University, following meeting with Mengistu, February 1978.

6. (be/ow) President Carter and President Nimeiry in the Oval Office, the White House, 2 July 1980.

7. (above) Addis Ababa - arch entrance to Revolution Square, January 1981.

8. (below) Ethiopia: Castles at the old Imperial capital of Gondar built during the 16th and 17th centuries.

9. (above) Sudan: The Tomb of the Mahdi in Omdurman. 10. (below) A view of the Ethiopian High Simien, 'The Roof of Africa' from the highway between Enda Selassie and Gondar.

11. Lenin in Addis Ababa. still standing in 1990.

12. (above) A Tigrean woman gazes at the amba atop which Debra Damo, one of Ethiopia's oldest monasteries, is located. 13. (be/ow) Burgeoning population is a challenge for all governments during the 21st century. Ethiopians of Gurage and Hadiya nationalities.

14a. Mengistu Haile Mariam, became Chairman of the Derg in February 1977 and had himself elected President in 1987.

14c. General Mohammed Siad Barre, strongman of Somalia from 1969 onward.

14b. Isias Afewerki, head of the Eritrean People's Front.

14d. General Aman Andom, briefly head of state of Ethiopia, 1974.

15a. General Teferi Banti (on right) with Ugandan tyrant, Idi Amin, in Nairobi in January 1976.

15b. Sudanese statesman Sadiq al-Mahdi. grandson of the leader of the rebellion which raged at the end of the 19th century.

15c. John Garang. leader of the Southern Sudanese rebellion since the early 1980s.

16. Traditional Ethiopian painting showing Haile Selassie as a young man, slaying a lion the reactionary forces of Ethiopia against which he fought? from A. E. Jensen: 1m Lande des Gada, 1936

Arms and their Social and Economic Effect

127

to lower. The mid-decade famine caused a sharp rise in infant mortality in Ethiopia. Mid-1980s Horn infant mortality rates were exceeded by only a few West African countries. Only in Sudan did infant mortality rates decline, though slowly, during the seven years covered in Table 4.44. Given the unsettled conditions that have existed in all Horn countries, infant mortality must be underreported. During the latter half of the 1980s, increasingly large areas in all Horn countries fell out of central government control and most people living in them had even less access to medical services than previously. It would be surprising if infant mortality rates have not again risen sharply. Modern methods of contraception are inaccessible to all but a tiny fraction of the people in the Horn, so high infant mortality has surprisingly little effect on population growth. Table 4.45 shows that the ratio of medical doctors to population has long been much higher in Kenya than in any Horn country. It was almost eight time higher than in Ethiopia in 1984. This helps explain Kenya's substantially higher life expectancy and lower infant mortality figures. Statistics indicate that Sudan attained the Kenyan level at the beginning of the 1980s. Empirical evidence calls these statistics into question, however. Elementary improvement in health care in Hom countries is less directly dependent on availability of doctors than on medical technicians. Even with a slight improvement in the early 1980s, Table 4.46 shows that Ethiopia lagged far behind the other Hom countries in this respect. It had over five times fewer such personnel than Kenya. Somalia, in statistics at least, achieved a striking increase between 1981 and 1984 in contrast to the other three countries. As of 1985, a year of serious and widespread famine, Ethiopia ranked lowest in the region in ability to grow food for its population. The drop between 1983 and 1985 was probably less sharp than Table 4.47 indicates, however, in view of the fact that the 1984 census made calories-per-person calculations for previous years too high. Without both emergency relief and increases in development assistance, the quality of life in Horn countries would have declined even further than it did during the 1980s. Table 4.48 summarizes net disbursements of official development assistance (not including emergency relief) to the four countries of the region. ·Almost all this assistance came from international lending institutions and Western countries' foreign assistance programs, including those of the European Economic Community. The U.S. contribution was smaller than that of several West European countries. Somalia and Sudan also received assistance from oil-wealthy Arab governments. The contribution of Soviet Bloc countries, even to Ethiopia, was small. Development assistance does not playas large a role in Kenya's

128

Part II - Militarization. Crisis and Degeneration

economic growth as in Horn countries, though it has developed more successfully than any of them. Kenyan patterns of receipt of development assistance have been relatively steady, reflecting its political stability, its low level of militarization, and the priority it has given to realistic economic development programs. Ratios of development assistance to GNP in Horn countries and per capita ratios of aid received vary widely. Table 4.48 shows that Ethiopia, the poorest of Horn countries, received the lowest per capita development assistance, just as before the 1974 Revolution (see Table 4.9). Somalia, with the least to show in economic development, continued to receive the highest per capita assistance. SOVIET ECONOMIC AID Soviet economic aid, in contrast to military aid, has been extremely limited, though from 1959 onward, when the Soviets announced a $100 million credit for Ethiopia, it was often publicized far beyond its significance and raised high expectations. Ethiopia had drawn less than one-third of its 1959 $100 million credit by the time of the 1974 revolution. Early Derg expectations of large-scale Soviet economic aid were in vain. Moscow's eagerness to supply arms was not matched by economic largesse. In 1979 Moscow added new credits to the unused portion of the 1959 credit to a total of $149 million. Subsequent credits were granted to build a cement works, a tractor assembly plant, a few smaller construction projects, and the Melka Wakena dam on the Wabe Shebelle River. The 1964 Soviet aid agreement with Kenya resulted several years later in construction of a hospital in Kisumu, home of Kenyan radical politician Odinga, who was then favorably inclined toward Moscow. Kenya neither sought nor received further Soviet assistance. Soviet aid arrangements with Sudan, begun in 1961, and with Somalia, dating from 1962, came to an end in 1978. Of the four countries surveyed, only Ethiopia received Soviet economic aid after 1978. Data covering the entire period during which Soviet economic aid was provided to any of the four countries through 1983 are summarized in Table 4.49. 13 Table 4.49 shows how limited Soviet economic aid has been. No significant new commitments were made in Ethiopia after 1983. In response to the Great Famine in 1984-86, 10 000 tons of rice and a few medical supplies were donated. Ground and air transport was provided to move famine victims from camps in the north to resettlement sites. In 1988 the Soviet Union donated 250 000 tons of wheat valued at $50 million to Ethiopia. The Soviet Union did not contribute to

129

Arms and their Social and Economic Effect 4.49 Soviet economic aid, Horn region, to 1983 (converted to millions of constant 1987 US $)14

TABLE

Country

Initial Agreement

Offered

Disbursed

Ethiopia Kenya Somalia Sudan

1959 1964 1962 1961

468 44.3 150 40

247 12.3 93 38

702.3 2106.9

390.3 1 170.9

Total Total in 1987 US $

TABLE

1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987

4.50 Central government expenditures, 1981-87 (in millions of constant 1987 US $) All Africa * Ethiopia

Kenya

Somalia

Sudan

1246 1 391 1929 1 580 1 808 1 690 1 845

1932 1990 1 779 1 792 1 931 1920 2270

226 273 218 144 1272 149

1943 2043 1 747 1 768

95.5 98.8 102.2 100.6 103.0 104.7 109.5

2 191

Note: All Africa is in billions of US $.

famine relief operations in Somalia or Sudan and does not contribute to international organizations, including specialized UN agencies, that have over a period of many years, with large-scale support from the West, cared for and fed refugees from and in Horn countries, including Djibouti. RECENT PATTERNS IN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE The trend in development assistance for the Third World during the past decade has been toward increased conditionality by donors, whether

130

Part II - Militarization. Crisis and Degeneration

individual countries or international organizations. Thus, even where development aid has risen, recipient governments have had to meet stricter standards for use of it. Large-scale projects involving direct investment in operation of educational systems and public health services have not been particularly attractive to lenders and donors. More basic infrastructure projects and projects which aim at rapid increases in agricultural production have been favored. The capacity of these countries to expand educational and social services to their populations cannot depend indefinitely on external resources. Internal revenues must eventually meet a major portion of such needs. Nevertheless total domestic financial resources available to Horn governments, already appallingly inadequate to 'meet their goals, have been contracting, even though a continually larger proportion of GNP has been absorbed by government. Since GNP has grown only slightly, if at all, and per capita GNP has steadily fallen, resource constraints have become severe. Large receipts of foreign military aid, as in Ethiopia and Somalia, do not relieve the government from heavy expenditures out of its own funds to be able to utilize the military assistance. Education, health and other basic services have been increasingly starved for funds during the 1980s. 15 Table 4.50 shows changes in the size of government budgets during the 1980s converted into constant dollars to eliminate inflationary distortion. RETROSPECT AND SUMMARY The 1980s brought acceleration of trends that were discernible in the 1960s and intensified in the 1970s. Military priorities in all three Horn countries had an increasingly negative impact on economic development. During the mid-1980s it became dramatically apparent that diversion of resources to military purposes and continual involvement in military operations directed against internal discontent had undermined the capacity of these countries to feed their populations, and large-scale famine occurred. Drought was not the basic cause of famine. The ability of Kenya to act to alleviate the effects of drought (which did not lead to famine) and avoid dislocation of its population was, of course, the result of a cumulative process. So was its ability to recover rapidly from the crisis. The same is true of the contrary situation that developed in Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan, for the governments of each of these countries over a period of many years adopted policies and took actions that reduced their capacity to meet the basic needs

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of their people. Above all, these policies reduced the productivity of agriculture. Conventional "wisdom" in much scholarly writing about the Horn of Africa during the past two decades has attributed the deterioration of the region to environmental degradation and superpower competition. All the statistics analyzed in this chapter demonstrate that both notions are misleading. Environmental degradation has continued in the Horn, but it is the result, not the cause, of war and economic decline. It has had only limited impact on food production. The concept of superpower competition is excessively charitable to the Soviet Union. Though U.S. and Soviet arms deliveries to the region as a whole were equal during the 1960s, the Soviet Union outstripped the United States in the early 1970s. The U.S. refused to supply Ethiopia with arms to match the Soviet build-up of Somalia, nor did the U.S. take any action to compensate for the effect of the large-scale Soviet deliveries that were made to Sudan as soon as laafar Nimeiry's initially pro-Soviet regime seized power in 1969. These included sufficient weaponry to energize the insurgency in Eritrea to the point where it became a serious military problem for Ethiopia. The most concrete Soviet response to the Ethiopian Revolution was to sign a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Somalia and begin delivering larger quantities of arms than ever - more than $300 million was supplied to Siad Barre during the next three years, more than the U.S. provided to Ethiopia in the entire 25-year period of the 1953 military aid agreement. From late 1977 onward, the Soviet Union reversed course and shifted to supplying Ethiopia with weapons and Cuban manpower to defend itself against attack by Somalia. This series of actions by one superpower was not in response to actions by the other, but in response to its own actions. The United States ceased to be a significant arms supplier in the Horn after 1977. A few simple statistics sum it all up: During the years 1967-76, 54 percent of all arms going into the Horn of Africa were supplied by the Soviet Union. During the next seven years, the Soviet Union supplied almost two-thirds of all arms used in the Horn, while the U.S. supplied barely 7 percent. During the most recent period for which we have firm statistics, the years 1983-87, the Soviet Union delivered 86 percent of all arms going into the Horn, all to Ethiopia, while the U.S. proportion - consisting of small-scale deliveries of defensive weapons to Sudan and Somalia, fell to 4 percent. The crux of the problem of militarization of the Horn revolves around the USSR and Ethiopia. If the Russians had not been willing to provide Mengistu Haile Mariam with enormous quantities of military assistance, he could have found no other source for his insatiable appetite for weaponry.

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His attempts to suppress insurgency in Eritrea bolstered it to the point where the EPLF is closer to supremacy in 1990 than ever before. An originally less developed insurgency in Tigre developed in 1989 into a even more direct threat to Mengistu's control of the country. During the 1980s the two large north Ethiopian insurgencies shed dependence on outside largely Arab - help to maintain their momentum. They acquired a major share of their weaponry and supplies from the Ethiopian military as a result of capture, abandonment or sale. Thus the massive shipments of Soviet military aid which continued to arrive at Ethiopian ports through the first weeks of 1990 continued to fuel internal conflict on both sides. In any open society the massive and futile military investment which the Soviet Union has made in Ethiopia would long since have provoked journalistic criticism, legislative investigation and public outcry, generating pressure for corrective action. Signs of Soviet unhappiness about the Ethiopian misadventure have been accumulating for some time. During the Great Famine GOSPLAN advisers in Addis Ababa produced a highly critical report on the Ethiopian regime's economic performance. 16 Critical reporting about Ethiopian economic failures and military setbacks became more frequent in Soviet media during 1989. In early 1989 a group of Soviet officials inspired publication of a critical review of the entire experience of "building socialism" in Ethiopia. l ? Meanwhile Mengistu Haile Mariam's regime developed more serious cracks - most apparent in the coup attempt of May 1989 - and came under continually heavier pressure toward the turn of the year 1989-90 from insurgent advances toward the center of the country which his armies showed little taste for stemming.

5 Crisis and Degeneration CREATIVE STATESMANSHIP The pace of history in the Horn accelerated in the early 1970s. Sudan changed course sharply after its communist party tried to overthrow Nimeiry in July 1971. He survived by the skin of his teeth. Complicity has never been proven, but he concluded the Soviets had abetted the communists' COUp.l July 1971 was a watershed for Ethiopia too, though the reason was not immediately obvious. Vice President Spiro Agnew arrived in Addis Ababa early in the month on a mission that appeared puzzlingly routine at the time. His purpose - not revealed even to senior officers of the American Embassy - was to tell Haile Selassie that the U.S. was changing its policy toward China. He encouraged the emperor to do what he wished to advance Ethiopia's interests. Subsequent events are a measure of the energy and statesmanship of which the Lion of Judah was still capable as he neared 80. In October he took a delegation including his most trusted advisers and several senior aristocrats to China, met with Mao and Chou En-Iai and came back with agreements that both countries immediately began implementing. In return for establishing diplomatic relations, Mao promised to stop supporting Eritrean insurgents and inaugurate an economic aid program, including construction of an east-west highway across the center of the country. About the same time Nimeiry asked Haile Selassie to mediate a settlement with Sudanese southerners. The Khartoum leader was prepared to give the south autonomy and integrate the rebel fighters into the Sudanese armed forces. Nimeiry was also ready to restrict Eritrean insurgent use of Sudanese supply lines. Haile Selassie promised Nimeiry that he would no longer permit Ethiopian territory to be used to support movements challenging his government. 2 The southern Sudanese rebellion formally came to an end in March 1972 with the signing of a set of agreements in Addis Ababa. Nimeiry and Haile Selassic were able to settle these problems speedily and without outside help because they accepted each other's assurances of good faith, calculating that the links each country had with outside powers would not take priority over its own interests.3 Ethiopian-Sudanese strains, then as later, were a function of external factors. Neither country had serious economic, political or territorial claims against the other.

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The United States welcomed Ethiopian-Sudanese reconciliation and reduction in the intensity of the insurgency in Eritrea. The decision to curtail activity at Kagnew Station in anticipation of complete withdrawal by 1978 was taken at this time but Ethiopia was not officially informed. 4 Leftist harassment of the U.S. Peace Corps in 1969-70. and the abrupt withdrawal of most Peace Corps volunteers from provincial secondary schools, added impetus to an effort to reduce the official American role in development activity and shift more responsibility to international organizations. The U.S. military assistance group was gradually reduced from approximately 125 officers and men to 75. Though American advisers were assigned to Ethiopian military units at training bases, the U.S. avoided direct involvement in counterinsurgency operations in Eritrea, leaving this task to Israelis. Overall, U.S.-Ethiopian relations remained close and friendly, as the Nixon Administration's advance notice on the shift in China policy demonstrates. American investment and tourism were expanding. The U.S. played a leading role in higher education and American foundations were an increasingly important source of funding for programs in Ethiopia and for Ethiopians studying abroad. The Soviets were left in an awkward position in Khartoum by Nimeiry's shift but did not abruptly cut off military support. They showed no overt displeasure at Haile Selassie's establishing relations with Peking and made no obvious effort to compensate for the setback to Eritrean insurgency caused by loss of Chinese support. As has already been noted in Chapter 3, they appear at this time to have downgraded their estimate of Eritrean insurgents' chances of early success and shifted their priority to the Marxists. There must have been differences in the judgments of various Soviet power elements about Hom prospects and tactics, but the Soviets faced what appeared to them to be so many opportunities for forward movement in the Third World at this time that no single setback could provoke revision of basic policy. The Yemens, Dhofar and other opportunities in the Arab world looked promising, as did many countries in Africa. In the Hom itself Somalia loomed large in Soviet expectations. Having defeated the Somali-backed Bale-Ogaden insurgency and established a good working relationship with Somalia's elected leaders, Ethiopia was alarmed after Siad's coup to find itself facing the prospect of a systematic Soviet-backed build-up of Somali military power during the 1970s a more direct threat than insurgency. Haile Selassie went to Washington in May 1973 with a request for $450 million in military aid to modernize his anned forces to meet the Somali threat. 5 It was not a good time for a Washington visit, but he came back with a promise of $200 million over the next several years to include M-60 tanks, FS-E fighter-bombers, and

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Swift patrol boats useful for intercepting clandestine infiltrators along the Eritrean coast. The advanced aircraft would probably not have been promised without the emperor's personal appeal. Though they were not delivered until 1976, they proved crucial in enabling the Ethiopian Air Force to cripple Somalia's Soviet-supplied air force in 1977. PRELUDE TO REVOLUTION IN ETHIOPIA 1973 was a disquieting year for Ethiopia. Crown Prince Asfa Wossen was felled by a stroke in January and flown to London for treatment. At Easter, Haile Selassie proclaimed the Crown Prince's eldest son, 20-year-old Zara Yakob, next in succession after his father, but it was too late to dampen widespread skepticism about the viability of the monarchy. Famine developed in Wollo. The government first tried to ignore it, then to minimize its extent and discourage reporting on it. Eventually foreign reporters dramatized it. Intellectuals and officials were embarrassed by government prevarication. Ethiopia's break in relations with Tel Aviv under Arab and African pressure after the Yom Kippur War in October raised doubts about the emperor's ability to manipulate an increasingly complex international situation. Even more psychologically subtle in its impact but profoundly unsettling was the spreading fear among the Ethiopian elite that the U.S. was falling into internal disarray and might no longer be a reliable source of support. 6 Petroleum price increases were the immediate cause of the government crisis of early 1974. Soldiers in the south and in Eritrea demanded more pay. Suddenly a lethargic government was confronted with civilian and military demands from all sides. On 28 February the emperor dismissed Aklilu Habte-Wold, who had been prime minister for 16 years, and appointed a progressive aristocrat, Endalkachew Makonnen, in his place. The population rejoiced in the expectation that the long expected transition to a more open political system would go smoothly and a liberalized government could be in place before Haile Selassie departed from the scene. Labor unions became active, students debated and demonstrated.? Journalists started writing freely and political groupings began to form. There was no violence. Prospects for peaceful change in Ethiopia looked good. Abiy Gobegna, the country's most popular novelist, had come to America in the fall of 1973 for a year at the Iowa writers' seminar and spent the Christmas holidays with me in Washington. He was uneasy about Ethiopia, for he had been close to the Crown Prince and had high expectations that

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he would lead the way to a liberalized constitutional monarchy. He went back to Iowa depressed about Asfa Wossen's slow recovery in London. As the revolution got under way, Abiy began telephoning three or four times a week from Iowa, often late at night, for news from home. He found it more and more encouraging. One night at the end of May I picked up the phone and heard Abiy's voice: "I can stand it no longer. I can do no work here. I have decided to fly back home tomorrow. How proud I am of my country! All that change and no blood! I must be part of it!"8 A majority of Ethiopians, had they been polled in the early summer of 1974, would probably have said that they desired a more open society, a democratic political system, broadened educational opportunity, and faster economic progress. They expected that the changes under way would bring all these things. Almost no one advocated total replacement of the existing political and economic system. Most Ethiopians thought in terms of personalities, not ideology, and out of long habit still looked to the emperor as the initiator of change, the source of status and privilege, and the arbiter of demands for resources and attention among competing groups. ACCELERATION OF THE REVOLUTION Seen in retrospect, in spite of the apparent confusion of events, the undermining of imperial authority in Ethiopia was systematic and efficient. Was there a guiding hand behind it? None has been revealed. In April 1974 a group of lower-level officers organized an armed forces coordinating committee. The committee, which was soon called the Derg (a hitherto unused word derived from the ancient church language, Ge'ez) went through several transformations before its consolidation in June, when it appealed to military units in all parts of the country to send delegates to the capital. Lower grade officers or enlisted men were usually chosen. Major Mengistu Haile Mariam came from Harar and, along with Major Atnafu Abate who had preceded him, quickly became a dominant Derg figure. From the beginning the Derg was secretive about both its membership and method of operation. It aimed to exercise power without taking over the government. Clandestinity served the Derg well, for no one knew how much high-level support it had or what factions existed within it. No competing civilian leadership emerged and senior military officers stood by. Popular attitudes toward the Derg were equivocal: fear, doubt, expectation, and trust all mingled together. At Derg request many prominent figures in the imperial regime delivered

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themselves voluntarily into detention in June and July on the promise that their alleged misdemeanors and financial irregularities would be systematically investigated and fairly judged. Others were arrested, including Prime Minister Endalkachew, who was replaced on 22 July by Mikael Imru, son of Ras Imru, a liberal aristocrat and cousin of the emperor. By this time Haile Selassie seems to have been numbed by the rapidity of changes that were taking place. The country's traditional leadership - both the established aristocracy and the young technocrats whom the emperor had raised to positions of responsibility and influence - offered the Derg little challenge as it grew bolder and prepared to push the old emperor off his throne. This was no casual, improvised process; it was carefully orchestrated. Potential opposition was neutralized, co-opted, or circumvented. The Derg acted under a simple slogan Ityopya Tikdem, which meant "Ethiopia United" and carried no specific political implications. A comprehensive analysis of events during Ethiopia's summer ofrevolution remains to be written. 9 No outside influences on revolutionary actions were apparent. In spite of the past close relationship, the United States stood aside as Haile Selassie's authority eroded. None of the Ethiopian military men who joined the Derg seems to have been known to officers of the American military mission. USAID went about its business as usual. During the weeks when the Watergate crisis reached its culmination and President Nixon resigned, Henry Kissinger had no time for Ethiopia. There was no U.S. effort to influence the course of events in Addis Ababa and no other Western country seems to have tried to do so. Where were the Russians? Less diverted by crises at home than the Americans, they were present, as usual, in Ethiopia, but very much in the background. If some of the junior military men who played a role in the formation of the Derg had been recruited by KGB or GRU officers in preceding years and were under Soviet guidance as they forged this secretive military junta into an instrument of power and took charge of the revolution, the undertaking was accomplished with extreme care and discretion. 10 On 9 July, the Derg announced that a revised constitution was being drafted and would soon be presented to parliament for approval. It was published on 10 August but was never adopted and played no further role in the revolutionary process, which aimed at destruction - rather than reform - of imperial authority and neutralization of all elements supporting it. (Ethiopia remained without a constitution until 1987.) Step by step the emperor became the target of a vilification campaign. He was accused in August of devising a cover-up of the famine in Wollo. When Abuna Tewoflos, Patriarch of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, endorsed

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the revolution at the end of August, it was apparent that the emperor's fate was sealed. He was arrested and taken from his palace in a Volkswagen on 12 September, Ethiopian New Year's Day.11 THE DERG AND ERITREA Eritrea was bound to test the political skill of any new Ethiopian government. It was the most important political challenge the Derg faced on taking full power. The manner in which it tried to deal with it determined the subsequent course of events in the Hom. Armed insurgency in Eritrea was ten years old in the summer of 1974. Prospects for solution were better than at any time in the preceding decade. The imperial government's failure to take advantage of the favorable set of circumstances it had helped bring about from the fall of 1971 onward contributed to its downfall. The Derg, despite favorable prospects, was to fail far more catastrophically than the imperial regime. It let its approach be guided by the fatal illusion that Eritrean grievances could be dealt with militarily. During 1972 and 1973, Ethiopian military forces had extended their control over all major Eritrean towns and highways. The Eritrean economy improved. The provincial government organized an impressive exposition that ran for several weeks in Asmara in the spring and summer of 1972. Politically the situation remained stalemated. Chinese assistance for the Eritreans ceased and Sudanese supply lines contracted, but Qaddafy was now supporting the insurgency and Syria and South Yemen funneled in supplies from Soviet-connected sources. Cuba continued to train Eritrean fighters and conduct anti-Ethiopian propaganda. The Marxist Eritrean Popular Liberation Front (EPLF) was formally proclaimed in February 1972 as a "unified" competitor to the Revolutionary Command of the older Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF-RC).12 Like all Eritrean movements, it lacked cohesive leadership and was susceptible to fragmentation, for it was a coalition of disparate elements. Its most dynamic leaders were young men from Evangelical Christian families. Competitive politicking among Eritrean exile leaders and the propaganda they broadcast from various Arab capitals magnified the impression of the size of the insurgency. The best estimates of separatist fighters of all factions place their number at no more than 2000 in the early 1970s. In effect, the situation in early 1974 boiled down to a stubborn but unimaginative Addis Ababa government trying to subdue fractious coalitions of insurgents sustained by foreign money and supplies. Neither side was doing well. Neither side had leaders with the breadth of vision to attempt to escape from a vicious cycle

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of violence. The population felt victimized by both sides, but most Eritrean highland Christians remained committed to the Ethiopian state. When the Derg deposed Haile Selassie, it needed an acting head of state. No Derg member was strong enough to step into this role. A reputable general of Eritrean origin, Aman Andom, was chosen. In fighting against Somali-backed insurgents in the 1960s, Aman had made a name for himself as both a good commander and a champion of the common soldier. On Derg recommendation, Haile Selassie appointed him Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces in early July 1974. Before the end of the month he became Minister of Defense. He was a logical choice for head of state when the Derg deposed the emperor. During the spring and summer of 1974 expectations of a negotiated settlement had grown in Eritrea, for the population was eager for peace and stability. They wanted to take advantage of the economic opportunities made possible by reopening of the Suez Canal. The situation looked propitious. Unfortunately, factional rivalry among Eritreans in exile had spread into Eritrea, where Christian Tigreans, newly recruited to the Marxist EPLF, began an assassination campaign against people regarded as collaborators with Addis Ababa. Several prominent Muslims were killed. MuslimChristian political relations are always sensitive in Eritrea. This violence worked against compromise among the insurgents. During his weeks as Minister of Defense, Aman devoted much of his time to his home province. He returned from a trip there on 9 September to present a 19-point plan for settling the insurgency calling, inter alia, for: general reform of the administrative system, removal of all obstacles which had impeded social progress ... amnesty of political prisoners in Eritrea, return of exiles and their resettlement, promotion of foreign investments ... lifting the state of emergency, punishing officials guilty of misconduct in Eritrea ... [and] safeguarding Ethiopian unity,13 Aman hoped to persuade Christians in the EPLF to cooperate with the government against the predominantly Muslim ELF.14 He had a broad concept of Eritrean-Ethiopian reconciliation and had Christian Eritreans appointed as both governor-general of the province and chief of police. The popUlation of Asmara showed strong support for Aman's program. This aroused Major Mengistu to mobilize the Derg against him. Eritrean exile politicians rejected Aman' s proposals. Thus Mengistu and exiles collaborated, in effect, to block progress toward an Eritrean settlement. The Derg appointed General Teferi Banti, an Oromo hard-liner, military

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commander in Eritrea. Mengistu encouraged Teferi to pursue all the rebels vigorously. ELF-RC leader Osman Salih Sabbe issued a call from Beirut for intensified offensive rebel action. EPLF forces on the ground could not afford to be less militant. All major actors in the Eritrean tragedy succumbed to the fatal illusion that they could impose their will by force. So the tragedy was doomed to continue for the better part of the next two decades. On 23 November 1974 Mengistu sent troops to Aman's house in Addis Ababa to arrest him. In the ensuing firefight, Aman was killed. That night 59 former imperial officials were summarily shot. They had surrendered or been arrested during the previous summer and were being held for investigation. In a single day the Ethiopian revolution turned bloody. Mengistu's uncompromising policy not only hardened the Eritrean insurgents' will to resist. It drove the Eritrean populace into a more negative position toward Ethiopia than had ever occurred under Haile Selassie. Shocked by Aman's violent death and no longer obligated by his 1971 agreement with Haile Selassie, Sudanese President Nimeiry let increased aid flow to the Erilrean insurgents through Sudanese territory.IS As the Ethiopian revolution took a pro-Soviet tum, Nimeiry permitted several Ethiopian resistance groups to build up military forces in Sudan. By 1976, he was convinced that Mengistu and Qaddafy were collaborating in an effort to oust him and became more supportive of the Eritreans. ETHIOPIAN SOCIALISM Mengistu proclaimed "Ethiopian Socialism" on 20 December 1974. The nationalization of all banks and insurance companies was announced on 1 January 1975. On 3 February 1975, 79 industrial and commercial companies (many foreign-owned) were nationalized and the state took a controlling interest in 29 others. On 4 March 1975 all rural land was nationalized. Addis Ababa University and high schools were closed and 50 000 students were dispatched to the countryside to implement land reform. Men who formed the traditional structure of authority in the countryside fled or revolted. In less than four months, the Derg had shattered most of the lines of authority that had held imperial Ethiopia together. The bloodshed unleashed in Eritrea and Addis Ababa soon engulfed the entire country. Like the violent thunderstorms that pursue each other across the Ethiopian highlands during the annual great rains, the revolutionary process, once begun, gathered inexorable momentum. After four months

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the great rains come to an end. It took four years for the revolutionary storms to begin to abate. Each new "reform" brought others in its wake and generated controversy and resistance not only among the "broad masses," in whose name the Derg claimed to rule, but within the Derg itself. The workings of the Derg remained obscure. Its exact size was always a subject of speculation. During 1975-77, it was periodically wracked by violent shoot-outs that usually ended with bodies being carried out of the meeting room. Eritrea was the cause of some of this controversy. Repeated offensives led to steady loss of ground during 1975 and 1976. General Teferi Banti, who was made acting head of state after Aman was killed ill November 1974, survived until February 1977 when he perished in Derg violence that took the lives of seven others, including one Mengistu loyalist. After this episode Mengistu came into the open as Derg chairman. Soviet Ambassador Ratanov came to congratulate him personally and Fidel Castro sent a warm message. Dispatch of students generated acute political ferment in the countryside l6 and anti-Derg resistance movements mushroomed. The Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) advocated replacement of the Derg with a liberal democratic government. It gained adherents in Gondar and Tigre but had few overt followers in the capital.J7 The Tigre People's Liberation Front (TPLF), originally a Marxist group patterned after the EPLF, was led by former students. The Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Party (EPRP) came into the open in Addis Ababa in August 1975. 18 It was Marxist but anti-military and rapidly attracted a large following of ill-disciplined intellectuals, students and junior government officials. The eagerness of EPRP activists to claim the right to lead the revolution soon put them at odds with dominant Derg elements. Meanwhile the Derg had moved to organize a political party of its own. It set up a Politburo which organized an "All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement," abbreviated MElSON. Ideologues of EPRP and MElSON, both espousing Marxism, quickly became rivals, though both for a while seemed to enjoy the favor of the Provisional Office of Mass Organization Affairs, set up by the Derg in early 1976. Divisions within the Derg came to a head in July 1976 when the head of its Political Affairs Committee, Capt. Sisay Habte, was arrested and executed. His deputy and successor, Senay Likie, set up another organization, Wez Ader (Proletarian League) and about the same time other elements in the Derg created Abyot Seded (Revolutionary Flame), which aimed at controlling the kebeles, neighborhood associations established to mobilize the urban population in support of revolutionary objectives.

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But which revolutionary objectives? All these groups claimed to be Marxist, like the EPLF and the TPLF whose control of the countryside in the north steadily expanded, but shared Marxism did not promote harmony. There is good reason to believe that the Soviets (and perhaps some of their East European proxies) during the entire period from mid-I97S to mid-I978 were encouraging rival radical groups to see which might best qualify to serve as a true Marxist-Leninist Vanguard Party (MLVP) - an organizational device which Soviet ideologues during this period believed applicable to all Third World situations. As much as Mengistu desired a close Soviet relationship, the Russians seem to have been far from convinced that he represented the kind of leader they preferred in Ethiopia. 19 THE SOVIETS AND SOMALIA The priority which Moscow gave to consolidation of its posItion in Somalia was undoubtedly a major cause of uncertainty in its approach to revolutionary Ethiopia. The USSR signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in July 1974 with Somalia and increased arms aid to Siad Barre. $300 million in military assistance was delivered during the next three years. In October 1970, on the first anniversary of his taking power, Siad had proclaimed Somali socialism and proceeded rapidly to build a society and economy modeled on Marxism-Leninism and Soviet experience. 2o It had its distinctly Somali characteristics, however, including emphasis on development of the national language and culture which were welcomed by many segments of the population. Governing through a Supreme Revolutionary Council (a body with some similarity to the Ethiopian Derg), Siad proclaimed idealistic objectives: reduction of tribalism and more effective integration of the north and south, equality of women, moderation of the influence of Muslim clerics and efforts to develop agriculture, settle nomads and spread education. Great exertions were made to increase agricultural production and establish food and textile industries. Soviet generosity with arms was not matched by economic aid. By the mid-1970s, Somalia's efforts to generate momentum toward modernization and economic development were bringing the country into the same kind of stagnation that set in in Ethiopia a few years later. As difficulties mounted, Siad shifted his priorities from economic and social development to territorial expansion. Here both Soviet and Arab backing - Somalia also joined the Arab League in 1974 - nurtured the fatal illusion that all

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Somali-inhabited territories could be united by military means. In 1976, the Somali president, watching the mounting political turmoil in Ethiopia and noting that the Derg's military forces were hopelessly bogged down in Eritrea, began planning invasion. The Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), which had continued a shadowy existence since the late 1960s, was newly "founded" in 1975.21 In 1976 the Somali Abo Liberation Front (SALF) announced its formation. It purportedly represented Oromo aspirations for separation from Ethiopia and incorporation into Greater Somalia. Agents of these two fronts were active in the Ogaden and Bale by the end 1976. By this time southern Ethiopia, though free of the kind of major insurgencies that had taken hold in the north, had also been engulfed in the political ferment generated by political movements in Addis Ababa, some of which with the encouragement of Derg backers were trying to build strength in the provinces. The two Somali fronts began to infiltrate arms into SE Ethiopia during the winter of 1976-77. Supplies were being stockpiled in Somalia to support a major offensive. Strong pro-Somali feelings among Oromo were rare, but grievances of many kinds had accumulated against the Derg. Though the Mogadishu regime was in both theory and practice at least as socialist as the Derg, the two Somali fronts stressed nationalism and exploited local grievances without bothering about detailed economic and social programs for the future. As political ferment increased in Ethiopia and confidence in the Derg's ability to maintain its hold on power in outlying regions waned, some Oromo in the SE highlands were ready to hedge bets on the future by cooperating with Somali-supported infiltrators. Siad's original plan may have been to build up insurg~ncy gradually through the two fronts. As the political situation in Ethiopia deteriorated and worldwide concern about killings and oppression mounted, Siad sensed an opportunity to strike a decisive blow. By the time the Soviets brought Fidel Castro onto the scene in March 1977, they must have had a very good idea of Siad's plans; they may even have encouraged them. There were over 4000 Soviet advisers in Somalia by this time, serving with the armed forces down to the battalion level and engaged in every aspect of the operations of the greatly expanded National Security Service. Castro's efforts to bring all the contending elements in the Horn and South Arabia together into a federation in which the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Djibouti (about to be launched into independence by France), Eritrea and the Ogaden would have separate status along with Somalia and a truncated Ethiopia appealed to no one. Castro returned home with the Great Star of Somalia, which Siad pinned on him, and the

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complaint that all the leaders in the Horn were more nationalist than socialist. In June 1977, Somali guerrillas cut the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway, both actually and symbolically one of Ethiopia's lifelines. In July, full-scale Somali invasion began with regular Somali troops thinly disguised as WSLF fighters in the vanguard. Lightly held Ethiopian positions in the Ogaden fell in quick succession. Soviet aid had enabled Siad to expand Somalia's armed forces, based on a population no more than an eighth that of Ethiopia, to the point where in manpower alone they were half the size of Ethiopia's. In quantity of aircraft, tanks, and several other types of equipment, Somalia had gained equality with Ethiopia. Ethiopia's forces were armed with American equipment. THE UNITED STATES AND THE DERG The Ethiopian Revolution produced many myths. Among the most pervasive are two: (1) that the Derg was driven into the arms of the Russians by American hostility and refusal to supply arms and (2) that President Carter encouraged Somalia to attack Ethiopia. Neither has any validity. In spite of the long, friendly relationship with Haile Selassie, the United States accepted his deposition without disruption of relations. There was regret but no rancor. The same was true of the killing of 59 former high officials in November 1974, most of whom had been pro-American. A distinct coolness toward Americans and American values and principles was obvious on the part of the Derg from the beginning. By the end of 1974, Ethiopian media were hostile toward the U.S. In early 1975 a Derg group which included three of Mengistu's closest associates - Fikre Selassie Wogderes, Addis Tedla and Legesse Asfaw - went to the Soviet Union for political training. Though the U.S. military aid program continued into 1977, no regular contact between the Derg and the U.S. Embassy developed. No Derg member even suggested visiting the United States. Large numbers of Ethiopians, including military officers, were sent to the USSR and Eastern Europe for training, though most Ethiopians still preferred to go to the U.S. or Europe for training and higher education and pre-revolutionary exchange programs continued. Elite Ethiopian Air Force pilots went to the U.S. to learn to fly F5-Es. Despite misgivings about Derg offensives in Eritrea, U.S. military assistance was increased and Ethiopia was permitted to buy an additional $100 million worth of military supplies from the well supplied treasury the Derg inherited from Haile Selassie.22

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While Ethiopian media praised the Soviets and vilified the U.S., Ethiopians officials argued continually for increased American support to meet the growing Somali threat - the result of a steady and massive inflow of Soviet arms. Considering the aunosphere of the time, the U.S. was remarkably responsive. One third. in current dollar value. of all u.s. military assistance given to Ethiopia over the 25-year period 1953-77 was supplied during the first three years after the 1974 revolution. Mengistu, however, was playing for high stakes. He wanted a full military relationship with Moscow and made this clear on several occasions during 1976. The Russians exploited his eagerness skillfully. Their highest immediate priority was to get the United States out of Ethiopia, but they had not forgotten the lesson they learned from the Korean War: an apparently passive U.S. can shift suddenly and put decisive effort into defending interests for which, a short time before, it displayed little concern. Dalliance with the Derg and encouragement of official Ethiopian anti-Americanism reassured Moscow that the U.S. would have difficulty reestablishing a strong position in Ethiopia, but Kremlin leaders were cautious. They watched Angola become a contentious issue in U.S. politics in 1976. They could not be sure about Ethiopia. It was best to wait for the outcome of the U.S. presidential election of 1976. When the Democrats, who had been conciliatory on Angola, won, Moscow lost little time moving. Mengistu was invited secretly to Moscow and a military aid agreement was signed on 14 December 1976. It became apparent a few months later that full implementation was conditioned on the Derg's severing its U.S. military link. No one in Moscow could have expected at this time, of course, that the eventual cost of military support of Mengistu would be as astronomical as it became a decade later. Brezhnev nursed the fatal illusion that Ethiopia, and with it hegemony over the whole Horn, could be bought cheap. The F5-E fighter-bombers promised to Haile Selassie in 1973 were due for delivery in the spring of 1976 - the question arose in Washington: should they be turned over to Ethiopia as promised? After considerable debate, Henry Kissinger led the U.S. Government in deciding they should. Shortly afterward, word of a Derg plan for a shocking "final solution" in Eritrea reached Washington. The genocidal scheme involved a march by peasant militia recruited in the south who would kill or drive out all Eritreans and be offered the opportunity to settle the region themselves. Henry Kissinger sent an ultimatum to the Derg: stop the Eritrean march or the F5-Es will not be delivered. Mengistu denied the existence of the plan and the march did not materialize. A squadron of F5-Es arrived in Ethiopia in July. Rising concern about violence in Ethiopia led to Senate hearings in

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August during which a wide range of Americans knowledgeable of Ethiopia agonized over developments there but reluctantly recommended continuation of a U.S. military relationship with restrictions. A huge shipment of ammunition was held up to keep it from being used in Eritrea. During the final weeks of the Ford Administration, the draft of the annual worldwide human rights report was completed in the State Department. It was reviewed and released shortly after the Carter Administration took office. It condemned Derg-sanctioned violence in Ethiopia. But the time had passed when withholding of U.S. military or economic aid could be used as a lever for pressuring Mengistu into more rational and moderate behavior. With the Moscow agreement of December under his belt, Mengistu siezed upon the human rights report as the pretext to terminate the American military relationship. When the U.S. officially informed Ethiopia of the decision to close Kagnew Station by the end of the year,23 he feigned outrage and in April and May 1977 in two ultimata designed to inflict maximum humiliation ordered the immediate closing of all U.S. military facilities, research activities and USIS libraries, leaving only a severely reduced embassy staff and AID staff.24 Nearly three months before this sequence of events Mengistu had used another occasion to give vent to his obsessive animus against the United States. Following the Derg shoot-out from which he emerged as full chairman, he gave an interview to a Cuban journalist, Miguel Roa. Roa gave him a lead: "The Ethiopian government has accused the USA and the CIA in regard to what happened on 3 February ... " to which Mengistu replied: I confirm it. I cite in this regard the so-called Spencer report presented by the CIA to the American Congress after the fall of the Emperor in which it is recommended that the U.S. should maintain with Ethiopia the same close ties that existed with the earlier fascist and feudal regime. All in order to control the situation and neutralize the revolutionary trend that was making progress. To put this plan into operation, the Americans chose two courses. On the one hand, they encourage foreign support for the Eritrean separatists fighting against us. At the same time they support the counterrevolutionary forces, either in the capital to create an atmosphere propitious for a coup, or in the northern provinces where the old aristocracy sends armed bands to shoot soldier and peasant. The wave of political assassinations which has recently developed is also part of this strategy.25 When Mengistu and senior Derg members arrived in Moscow in the first week of May 1977. they were welcomed at the airport by General Sokolov,

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First Deputy Minister of Defense, and General Yepishev, Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Armed Forces. A glittering array of senior Brezhnev-era officials participated in the talks which followed and resulted in an agreement for full Soviet military support. At a formal dinner, President Podgorny praised Mengistu warmly but avoided clear political endorsement of the Derg and made no negative comments about the United States. Mengistu, flushed with satisfaction at his reception in the' Kremlin, replied in fulsome Marxist-Leninist jargon and denounced all groups opposing him: "The guardian, coordinator and leader of these groups," he concluded, "is the sworn enemy of oppressed peoples imperialism, especially American imperialism."26 It is difficult to find evidence in declarations such as these to support the notion that Mengistu had any desire to maintain a close relationship with the U.S. The contention deserves to be given the same weight in history as the allegation that Stalin imposed communism on Eastern Europe because he feared American aggressive intentions. THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION AND SOMALIA During the first months of 1977, messages kept arriving in Washington from President Siad, sometimes delivered by Somali visitors, at other times by Americans and Arabs. Details varied but the core theme was always the same: Siad could be lured away from his close relationship with Moscow for a price. Saudi Arabia was reported ready to underwrite a break and invest in a huge economic development program. The idea of detaching Somalia from its Soviet embrace appealed to some of the more liberal elements in the Carter team, including Vice President Mondale, though they had no firsthand knowledge of Somalia. By taking over a Soviet client such as Somalia, they calculated, they could placate conservative Senate opposition to a new SALT agreement with Moscow, the highest strategic priority of some members of the Carter team. By June it was apparent that Siad's price had nothing to do with economic development. He wanted backing for an attack on Ethiopia. After repeated requests from Siad's Ambassador in Washington, Ahmad Addou, President Carter received him in the Oval Office on 17 June 1977. Addou brought Carter an urgent message from Siad who claimed that Ethiopia, with Soviet backing, was preparing to invade Somalia. Would the United State provide immediate military aid? U.S. intelligence indicated that reality was exactly the opposite of what Siad alleged. Fully briefed on this intelligence, Carter replied that

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if Somalia were actually attacked the U.S. would be sympathetic and would consider defensive aid but stressed that his information did not substantiate the Somali president's fears. It is likely that Addou reported this meeting to Siad in much more positive terms than Carter's response justified. In any event, Siad was eager to believe that he had inveigled a naive American president into a commitment.27 Meanwhile a self-appointed private emissary, Dr. Kevin Cahill, who had been urging military support for Siad through the White House Domestic Staff (always avoiding the National Security Council), was encouraging Siad to expect U.S. military backing. Nothing Cahill did or said represented official American policy. By early July 1977, U.S. intelligence was providing daily evidence that Somalia had undertaken a full-scale invasion of Ethiopia. Since Ethiopia had ruptured its military assistance relationship with the U.S. a few weeks before and had asked for no assistance in repelling the Somali invasion, Carter adopted a policy of aiding neither combatant. Dozens of commentators have seized on this simple sequence of events to prove, variously, that Carter was duped, that he was playing power politics in amateurish fashion, or that he crassly encouraged Somalia to invade Ethiopia. I stressed the nature of the dilemmas Carter and his team faced in the Horn in the summer of 1977 in the Introduction to this book. Carter was trying to thread his way through a situation more complex than he realized at the time, but he was honest and well-intentioned. At most, his mistake was meeting personally with the Somali ambassador. There is no basis for the myth of Carter's encouragement of Somali attack. At this time the Soviets had over 4000 advisers in Somalia.28 What did they tell their Somali counterparts? What did they report to Moscow? What were they reporting from Mogadishu to the Soviet Embassy in Addis Ababa? And what were the Soviets in Addis Ababa reporting to Moscow? These, rather than anything that happened in Washington, are the key unanswered questions about the decisive developments in the summer of 1977. THE ETHIO-SOMALI WAR AND SOVIET INTERVENTION

By August 1977 the Somalis were in control of large parts of SE and southern Ethiopia. The distinction between guerrillas and Somali regulars blurred and disappeared. 29 In the south, the Somalis advanced beyond Somali-populated territories into Oromo-populated highlands. Here the SALF was expected to draw the Oromo into supporting Mogadishu. Some Oromo wavered briefly, but most rallied to Ethiopia. In the east,

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on the third anniversary of the Ethiopian Revolution, 12 September 1977, Mengistu suffered his most serious defeat. Jijiga, key to the route to the eastern plateau, fell. With it the Ethiopians lost vast amounts of equipment, including a new American-supplied battle-management radar that had only recently gone into operation. But the American F5-Es had already come close to obliterating the Soviet-supplied Somali air force and the Somalis were held short of Harar. A South Yemeni regiment was flown over to bolster Mengistu' s forces. During September both Soviet and U.S. official missions came to Addis Ababa to size up the situation. The U.S. mission reported that Ethiopia was rallying, rather than disintegrating, but recommended no reversal of what had become a U.S. arms embargo against both belligerents. 3o Nevertheless anti-American rhetoric was briefly dampened as Ethiopian officers and officials made personal appeals for delivery of spare parts and equipment that had been in the pipeline when Mengistu abruptly terminated the American military aid relationship in the spring. Mengistu made no formal request for such action, let alone for resumption of the military aid program. He was betting on a Soviet rescue effort. By this time there were perhaps 100 Cubans in Ethiopia training hastily recruited militia, but very few Russians. Moscow delayed making a commitment. Hesitation may have been provoked in part by Derg political infighting which aroused doubts about Mengistu's ability to maintain his position. The EPRP was openly challenging him. They were allied to a group of Marxist intellectuals led by Haile Fida, who had helped organize MElSON. Haile may have been regarded by some Soviets as an alternative civilian leader to Mengislu. He fell out with the Derg, fled to Wollega and was captured. Soviet military shipments continued to arrive in Somalia through August 1977. Siad flew to Moscow at the end of August to try to persuade the Russians to avoid supporting Ethiopia, which he pictured as being on the verge of collapse. The Russians equivocated. Siad could not. He had to follow up on his initial successes or risk a fatal loss of momentum. He was bolstered by shipments of arms from Egypt and Iran. He pressed on into Oromo territories in the highlands of Bale, Arussi and Sidamo, laid siege to Harar and came close to surrounding Diredawa. This was all that was needed to consolidate the great upwelling of national feeling that gripped Ethiopians throughout the country. The Derg was seen defending Mother Ethiopia. Ityopya Tikdem took on meaning. Like Stalin after the Nazi invasion in June 1941, Mengistu suspended revolutionary reforms, dampened

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Marxist rhetoric and made speeches full of traditional historical references. Religious dignitaries were brought out to participate in public rallies. Several divisions of newly recruited militia swelled Ethiopia's forces while Somalia's manpower was stretched as far as it could reach. Mengistu flew to Cuba and Moscow at the end of October. Raul Castro flew to Moscow in early November, accompanied by the same Cuban generals who later figured prominently in the campaign in Ethiopia. Somewhere in this sequence of visits, the Soviet decision to commit massive numbers of Cubans, a greatly expanded Russian advisory group and unprecedented quantities of Soviet arms and equipment to Ethiopia was made. Moscow made no move to break relations with Somillia even when Siad permitted mobs to attack departing Russians and Cubans. Finally Siad expelled all remaining Soviet advisers on 13 November, but retained diplomatic relations. General Petrov, who became the senior Soviet commander in Ethiopia, arrived in Addis Ababa on 17 November. All this did not occur without serious strain in the Derg itself. On 13 November 1977 Mengistu announced that "a revolutionary step had been taken" against his deputy, Lt.Col. Atnafu Abate, the previous day. He denounced him for having placed the interests of Ethiopia above the interests of socialism. A more detailed bill of particulars accused Atnafu of "providing solace" to counterrevolutionaries, of fear of politicization and arming the masses, of failure to believe in "the ideology of the working class" and of "making constant contacts with internal and external enemies of the Revolution, including CIA agents." Just what Atnafu's real crimes were remains a mystery. Was he opposed to the massive influx of Soviets and Cubans? Had he plotted against Mengistu? The next day the assassination of another Derg member "by counterrevolutionaries while returning to his home" was publicized. Since the killing of General Teferi and seven other Derg members the previous February, nothing so drastic had happened. Other high level violence that was occurring at the time was only admitted later. In June 1978, Ethiopian media revealed that there had been nine assassination attempts against Mengistu during the preceding year, four of them in September 1977. In the last week of November the massive airlift of Cuban troops and supplies from the USSR began. The aim was to expel the Somalis from all Ethiopian territory. Airlifts and sea deliveries that followed during December and continued into early 1978 brought in enormous quantities of equipment and 18 000 Cuban troops who took the lead in driving the Somalis back in the Ogaden. Soviet and Cuban generals directed operations. By the end of January 1978, the Somalis were everywhere on the run. Cubans and Ethiopians relieved the siege of Harar and Diredawa on 12 February and declared the eastern highlands wholly liberated on 5 March. On 9 March, Siad announced the withdrawal of all Somali regular

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forces from Ethiopian territory, but pledged moral support to the struggle of his two liberation fronts. All the main roads and population centers of the Ogaden were quickly reoccupied by Ethiopian forces with close Cuban support. Meanwhile a U.S. presidential mission, headed by David Aaron, Brzezinski's deputy, had come to Addis Ababa in mid-February and secured a pledge from Mengistu that Ethiopian forces would not cross the border into Somalia. This was not difficult, for Mengistu had no incentive to pursue a punitive offensive against Somalia. His highest priority remained Eritrea. The Soviets were ready to support him there. They preferred to regain influence in Somalia by political means. Aaron assured Mengistu on behalf of President Carter that the U.S. would never provide Somalia with anything but defensive military aid and that only if Somalia refrained from further operations against Ethiopia. Turning to Eritrea, he stressed that the U.S had no intention of wavering from its traditional position on Ethiopia's territorial integrity, reminding Mengistu that the insurgency he faced in Eritrea had been brought to a serious level by the very countries who were now his closest political friends. 31 A large portion of the Ogaden Somali population fled to Somalia with the retreating Somali army. WSLF guerrilla operations continued for the next two years, at times reaching a high level of intensity. They were hampered by lack of a popular base, so Siad again infiltrated disguised Somali regulars. Continued SALF operations were confined primarily to hit-and-run tactics. The majority of Dromo remained loyal to Ethiopia. Siad's continued guerrilla operations cost him heavily, for they prevented the conclusion of a U.S. military aid agreement with Somalia until August

1980.

THE STRUGGLE IN ERITREA Eritrean rebels gained ground steadily during 1976, though rivalry among factions grew and new splinter groups appeared. There were three axes of tension: (1) between exiles and guerrillas in the field; (2) between fighters in various regions of Eritrea along ethnic and religious lines; (3) \ and between exile leaders abroad. It is difficult to summarize the situation because at any given time there were uncertainties about the true strength of subfactions and individual leaders' hold over their followers. 32 The Derg had announced a 9-point program for settlement in Eritrea in May 1976, at the very time the peasant march was being planned. The program may have been a ruse, or it could have reflected divisions in

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the Derg over Eritrean strategy. Rivalry among Eritrean factions deterred all of them from considering compromise with the Derg. The EPLF's "National Democratic Program" proclaimed in January 1977 contained more hard-line Marxism than the Derg's. Both the Soviet relationship and Eritrea may have been among the contentious issues that provoked the Derg shoot-out in February 1977. As the Somali offensive began in the summer of 1977, Eritrean insurgents captured the important towns of Keren and Decamere. But military success heightened factional coinpetition. Two hundred ELF-RC fighters were killed in factional fighting in July and the EPLF arrested hundreds of its members for opposing its "National Democratic Program." The fact that Eritrean insurgents were able during the remainder of 1977 to expand the area under their control while internecine warfare intensified must be ascribed to diversion of Ethiopian military resources to the Ogaden war. By the end of 1977 , the Derg had lost all but 5 percent of the province. Massawa was under siege, Asmara was preparing for assault, and the Ethiopian lifeline to the south was under attack. But the competing and mutually hostile insurgent organizations could not agree on a plan for consolidating victory: On the threshold of victory ... young leaders had lost their chance to implement their goals. They had pushed aside older leaders in exile, but their radicalism had prevented them from benefiting from what was fundamentally a pro-Eritrean process in the region ... The neighboring Red Sea Arab states [now) conceived an independent, radical Eritrea as a great threat to their interests. Thus the stronger the EPLF became, the more isolated it became. 33 Nimeiry encouraged the Eritreans to unify at a meeting in Khartoum in March 1978, but the effort proved abortive. Meanwhile, with the aid of Soviet air and naval bombardment which inflicted heavy damage, Derg forces relieved the siege of Massawa. Transferring manpower from the south and benefiting from vast amounts of Soviet weaponry, Soviet advice and air support, Mengistu was able to regain control of major Eritrean cities and communications routes by the end of the summer of 1978 as the result of a massive, slow-moving Russian-style offensive. CONSOLIDATION OF THE SOVIET RELATIONSHIP The Soviets gave Mengistu full support in Eritrea but the Cubans stayed in the background. Their doing so was sometimes attributed to moral

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considerations, for they had originally trained and supported many of the insurgent leaders. But there were pragmatic advantages for the Soviets in Cuban inaction, for by refraining from engagement in Eritrea, Cuba extended Soviet options for a shift in tactics vis-a-vis the Eritrean insurgency. Moscow still hoped to persuade the Marxist EPLF and the Marxist Derg to compose their differences and collaborate in laying the groundwork for a Marxist Horn federation. In Addis Ababa, Cubans and Soviets collaborated in an attempt to coerce Mengistu into broadening his political base and setting about the business of building a Marxist-Leninist Vanguard Party (MLVP). Though they had rescued him from disaster, some Soviets, at least, remained unenthusiastic about Mengistu as a chosen instrument in Ethiopia. A narrow and stubborn military man dependent on a narrowing military junta, Mengistu's credentials as an ideological communist were weak. Soviet-favored leaders who came out of the military in Sudan and Somalia - Nimeiry and Siad Barre - had turned out to be hard to control, just as Nasser had. There was a strong case for seeking a civilian leader with a good grasp of ideology who could lead an effective party. In May 1978 Negede Gobeze, a fiery Marxist intellectual who had been a close associate of Haile Fida, was brought back from exile in Europe by the Cubans and smuggled into Ethiopia on a South Yemeni passport. While this maneuver was getting under way, Mengistu was making a visit to Havana to thank Castro for the help he had provided in defeating Somalia. Castro tried to persuade him that Negede was the ideal choice to "help organize a proletarian party." Mengistu was unconvinced. When he returned he was confronted with a fait accompli. He insisted Negede leave. He expelled the Cuban charge and most of his embassy in June and sent the South Yemeni charge back to Aden. A few weeks later the Soviet ambassador also departed. Mengistu had demonstrated who was in charge and Moscow acquiesced. Castro came to Addis Ababa to celebrate the fourth anniversary of the revolution in September. Mengistu was invited to Moscow for the anniversary of the October Revolution in early November and signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Ethiopia was firmly in the Soviet bloc, and on Mengistu's terms. Mengistu promised Moscow he would set up a ML VP, but he was in no hurry. He had just brought the Red Terror to an end through mass slaughters of suspected EPRP supporters. But he did not want to share power with any of the factions that competed with the Derg. He was not confident Moscow might not use a party to build up alternate leadership. Finally on 18 December 1979 he announced formation of the Commission for Organizing the Party of the Workers of Ethiopia (COPWE). It was

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given the former British colonial-style parliament building in the center of Addis Ababa as a headquarters. The clock tower was painted deep red and the iron gates were ornamented with the hammer-and-sickle, but the symbolism was no measure of COPWE's importance. It had little to do. The Russians displayed outward official enthusiasm for COPWE, all the time pressing for its rapid transformation into a full-fledged MLVP. That process took almost five years. Meanwhile all political processes had continued to flow from the top down. The same pattern persisted in the Workers' Party of Ethiopia (WPE), little more than a continuation of the Derg itself with the addition of more military officers, civil servants and a few opportunist intellectuals and technicians. It was launched with great pomp on 11 September 1984 in the presence of a glittering array of guests from Moscow and the entire socialist world. Andropov had died the previous spring and Chernenko was too iII to come, so Politburo hardliner Grigory Romanov shared top billing with East German leader Erich Honecker. 34 In the months preceding the proclamation of the party all other governmental activity gave way to construction of a great congress hall, quarters for dignitaries, statues of Marx and Lenin and a huge monument, topped with a lighted red star, to the revolution itself. To demonstrate to his guests his antipathy to private enterprise, Mengistu had all commercial signs removed in the capital's business districts. Every intersection and square was adorned with garish arches, obelisks and contraptions featuring giant red stars and other communist symbolism. Government buildings were all topped, Soviet-style, with slogans in huge red letters. Slum areas were blocked from view by miles of painted tin fences. The party-launching project was reported to have cost more than $100 million. Immediately afterward Western media broke news of the Great Famine which had been ravaging the entire northern half of the country for months and which Mengistu had done his utmost to cover up and ignore. 35 THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEFEAT IN SOMALIA Normally a leader who had led his country into the kind of humiliating defeat Siad had to acknowledge in March 1978 would have resigned, fled, or have been ousted. Promises of support by the Saudis, Kuwait and other Gulf Arabs, Sadat, and the Shah of Iran combined with hope that the U.S. could eventually be inveigled into giving Somalia significant military support reinforced Siad's natural inclination to tough the situation out. If his daring gamble had succeeded in detaching the Ogaden from

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Ethiopia, rival Somali clans would have had little reason to oppose him, even though his early - and in part honest and commendable - efforts to reduce tribalism in Somali life had long since given way to favoritism toward his own Marehan-Ogaden-Dolbahanta (MOD) coalition. 36 It was not surprising, therefore, that a group of Mijertein officers attempted to oust him in a coup in April 1978. It failed and dozens of dissidents lost their lives, but one of its leaders, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmad, fled to Ethiopia and established the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). This was the first of several exile organizations that attracted opponents of Siad during the 1980s. Issaq emigres in London formed the Somali National Movement (SNM) in 1980. By the end of the decade it had become more important than any of the others. The Issaq are the dominant clan of the former British north. They drew financial support from prosperous exiles in Arab countries took advantage of Ethiopian readiness to permit them to work against Somalia from neighboring Ethiopian territory and collaborate with the SSDF. Though denounced as tools of Ethiopia and the ·Soviets, these Somali exile movements based their positions on a much more realistic appraisal of political possibilities in the region in the wake of Somali defeat than Siad and many other Somalis were able to do. Siad's situation was complicated by the fact that in the final period before his break with Moscow he had displayed his zeal for socialism with initiatives that would please the Russians. These included joining the Arab League in 1974, public execution of ten Muslim religious leaders in January 1975, and the launching with great fanfare of a classic ML VP, the Somali Socialist Revolutionary Party (SSRP) in 1976. Both the party and the security system the Soviets had helped create were retained after the 1977 break. The new constitution drafted by the SSRP was not ready until the summer of 1979 when it was submitted to referendum and announced as approved by over 99.8 percent of 3.6 million voters - a higher number than any realistic calculation of the Somali population at that time could justify. Simultaneously a People's Assembly chosen entirely by the SSRP was "elected." Siad's willingness to mount such a parody of democracy at a time when he was trying to present Somalia as an outpost of the Free World in a communist-dominated region can be considered either political stupidity or daring. The fact that consolidation of an American relationship was delayed only by continued Somali support of guerrilla operations in Ethiopia - and was concluded in the final months of the Carter Administration in 1980 - justified Siad's brazenness. In spite of its profession of high democratic principles, the Carter Administration, in order to claim to be making strategic gains as it faced elections in 1980, was ready to tum a blind eye on internal conditions in Somalia.

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The People's Assembly was overshadowed by the SRC, Siad's original military junta, which was restored at the same time the People's Assembly convened in January 1980. Its chairman, Vice President Ismail Ali Abokor, was arrested and charged with treason in June 1982. By this time tribalism had become a more pernicious factor in Somali politics than ever before in the country's history and corruption permeated every sector of the economy. While Siad was unwilling to dismantle state enterprises, Arab aid and trade fed an increasingly dominant unofficial economic sector. Somalia suffered steady brain drain as educated and talented people emigrated. The scandalous refugee situation provided a major share of the country's income during the 1980s. The government claimed a refugee population approaching 2 million. Foreign relief officials estimated refugees in camps at around 650 000. Even this figure represented, proportionately, the largest refugee burden in Africa. Areas around refugee camps suffered acute environmental degradation. Siad prevented dispersal or settlement of refugees to be able to use them to argue for future territorial rectification to be effected by international pressure on Ethiopia, but his primary interest soon became to exploit the steady influx of food, supplies and money the refugees attracted from UN agencies and the international philanthropic community. Upwards of $150 million annually - 40 percent of the country's official GNP - was coming into Somalia by the early 1980s for emergency relief operations which attracted hundreds of volunteers who worked in the dismal camps. But half of the incoming aid probably never reached the camps at all. Truckloads of food and medicine disappeared into the local economy as soon as they left the docks - trucks and all. After strong protests, U.S. and UN officials estimated in 1982 that what were euphemistically termed "supply losses" had been reduced to one-third of port deliveries. Even when refugees began returning to Ethiopia in response to appeals from Addis Ababa, reinforced by efforts of the Somali exile organizations, Siad refused to adjust inflated claims of camp populations. Though for periods in the early 1980s Saudi Arabia satisfied Somalia's oil requirements free, debts piled up and currency steadily lost value. Fishing declined sharply and agriculture, stagnant because of government price controls, did not satisfy internal needs. Periodic droughts, to which Somalia is especially prone, intensified the predicament of both settled farmers and the nomadic herders who still accounted for the majority of the population. There was little to export except livestock, for which Saudi Arabia and other nearby Arab countries were the major but not always dependable market. Degeneration continued through the 1980s. Siad's exploitation of the

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tribalism he once condemned became blatant as he distributed appointments solely on the basis of clan affiliation or personal loyalty, reserving key positions and opportunities for gains from corruption for his own relatives. The pressure of exile dissidents operating from Ethiopia increased with the capture of border towns. In the wake of the defeat of his armies at Afabet in Eritrea in February 1988, Mengistu met with the even more beleaguered Siad in Djibouti and the two political cripples concluded a non-aggression pact. Siad expected the arrangement to relieve him of pressure from the SNM, based in Eastern Ethiopia among sympathetic Issaq fellow tribesmen. Ethiopia lacked the strength (if it actually had the will, which was open to question) to prevent the SNM from moving into northern Somalia and taking over Burao and Hargeisa with the aid of the local population. Siad unleashed a military offensive against them. The destruction of both life and property was extensive. Siad eventually regained control of ruined towns and main roads, while the SNM retained its hold on the countryside,31 RECOVERY AND DECLINE IN SUDAN For Sudan the 1970s became the most hopeful period the country had experienced since independence. With both conservative and communist opposition defeated by 1971, Nimeiry moved toward moderation in the framework of a single-party system. He set up the Sudan Socialist Union in 1971, held elections for a People's Assembly the next year, and promulgated a constitution creating a presidential system in 1973, thus regularizing his leadership. A High Executive Council was established to implement autonomy for the south. Autonomy worked reasonably well with rival southern leaders Lagu and Alier cooperating. After 1973, Nimeiry encouraged a larger role for private capital in the economy. Relations with the U.S. and other Western countries wanned and oil-rich Arab states offered funds for projects aimed at exploiting Sudan's untapped potential for large-scale food production. Ansar leader Sadiq al-Mahdi and Muslim Brotherhood head Hasan al-Turabi returned from exile in 1977 and encouraged participation of their followers in Nimeiry's SSU. The U.S. resumed economic and military aid to Sudan in 1978. Over $150 million in economic aid was supplied during the next three years, but military aid did not reach significant levels until 1980. Sudan had agreed to an IMP stabilization program as early as 1972. IMP influence was a determining factor in Sudanese economic development policies over the next decade, which included efforts to reduce the role of the public sector,

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eliminate subsidies and liberalize trade, measures to contain state expenditure on social services and adoption of realistic exchange-rates. Sudanese efforts to attract private investment, though pursued vigorously, did not produce impressive results. Arab promises of support for development schemes and military purchases were also slow to materialize. Government expenditure on development projects more than tripled in the five years 1972-77, financed largely by bilateral and multilateral borrowing. Several large irrigation schemes were inaugurated for production of sugar, wheat, millet, cotton and vegetables. Mechanized dry farming was expanded. Funds were put into infrastructure development too: railway modernization, expansion of Port Sudan, construction of power plants and highways. The single most ambitious project was the Jonglei Canal intended to divert 20 million cubic meters of water daily from the Sudd swamps into the White Nile for use in irrigation both in Sudan and Egypt. In the wake of the 1973 petroleum crisis, oil companies were looking for new areas to explore. Sudan had promising concessions to offer. By 1980 the Chevron Corporation had found significant deposits in Bahr el Ghazal province, but a lOOO-mile pipeline was needed to carry the oil to the Red Sea - a typical problem for all Horn countries if and when dreams of exploitable oil are realized. By the early 1980s, in spite of all this encouraging activity, Sudan found itself in a cycle of increasing debt and declining production. There was too little successful small-scale development to offset the fact that completion of most big projects took longer than expected and few met optimistic production targets. The output of older agricultural schemes tended to decline and the balance of payments gap widened. Debt servicing became difficult. Between 1978 and 1982 external debt almost doubled. By 1985 it tripled to $9 billion. Sudan still had to import all its fuel. One of its worst problems became brain drain. Frustrated technicians and administrators, faced with government austerity measures, left in large numbers for better pay in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. Sudan's Arab friends were, in effect, undermining the very development efforts they encouraged. Migrant remittances were spent on imported cars, houses, and land and fed inflation. The government increasingly lost control over the economy while the IMP and creditors insisted on tight government budgets and limitations on new investment. Both to remedy some of the country's economic problems and divert political grievances and energies to the regional level, Nimeiry announced a decentralization program in 1980. Five regional governments were set up in the north. Tribal rivalries caused dissolution of the southern regional assembly in 1980 and intense controversy arose over extension

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of regionalization to the south, where the effects of the economic crisis were most severe. Eventually Nimeiry divided the south into three regions. His proclamation of Islamic law in May 1983 exacerbated the southern situation. Violence had already broken out early in the year. The Sudanese Popular Liberation Movement (SPLM) was formed in August 1983 and in less than a year gained control of much of the territory between the Nile and the Ethiopian border. Economic and political deterioration fed on each other. The French company working on the Jonglei Canal ceased operations in December 1983. Attacks on oil workers brought Chevron operations to a halt two months later. Drought affected much of the north during 1984-85 and the government was unable to respond effectively. Nirneiry's adoption of Islamic law did not improve relations with Islamic political opponents. Sadiq al-Mahdi was arrested in the fall of 1983. Hasan al-Turabi, who had served as attorney general, resigned and the Muslim Brotherhood was suppressed shortly before Nimeiry left for the United States in March 1985. Riots broke out in protest of austerity measures urged by the U.S. and the IMP. I remember how sad, strained, and lonely Nimeiry looked the last time I talked to him during this Washington visit. He got no farther than Cairo on his return flight to Khartoum. The general he had named minister of defense a few days before his departure, Siwar al-Dhahab, announced on 6 April 1985 that the armed forces had formed a Transitional Military Council (TMC) and taken control of the government. The SSU was dissolved and elections promised. The SPLM's leader, John Garang, was unimpressed. He termed the TMC "Nimeiryism without Nimeiry." With three changes of leadership, Sudan has fallen deeper into political and economic crisis ever since. One of the most sympathetic American scholar-specialists on the country concluded an evaluation of its situation as of the beginning of 1990 with these observations: The danger ... is that the problems are now not solvable[:] the debt, the destruction of housmg and farmland in recent years as a result of natural and human-made catastrophes, and the high proportion of the population that have become refugees ... are the surrealist dimensions of a society near collapse ... Without effective leadership or a national sense of identity, the people of the different regions have little concern for the high loss of life or social destruction outside of their own locality ... Civilian and military government have failed ... Rather than being a productive "breadbasket," Sudan will probably continue to be a "basket case" in political and economic terms.38

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THE GREAT FAMINE IN ETHIOPIA The famine that afflicted most of northern and north-central Ethiopia during the years 1984-86 produced an enormous literature which chronicles the suffering of more than 10 million people and the exertions of the nonCommunist world to alleviate it. 39 Certain basic truths need to be stressed, for this catastrophe was not simply the consequence of unavoidable natural misfortunes. Of the four factors contributing to famine, in fact, drought ranks fourth in importance. Though severe in certain regions, drought did not then, and has never, affected all of Ethiopia at the same time. Many parts of this large country had, and continue to have, adequate rainfall and good crop conditions during famine years. Parts of northern Ethiopia had been disrupted by insurgency and civil war for more than a decade when famine became severe. In Eritrea, the EPLF had capitalized on the setbacks of 1978 to consolidate its position and in Tigre, the TPLF steadily gained ground. Against these and other northern rebel movements, Mengistu mounted repeated military offensives. A steady inflow of Soviet arms (as demonstrated in Chapter 4), enabled Mengistu to sustain these operations. Mengistu regarded food, too, as a weapon - by withholding it, he hoped to force alienated populations to stop supporting insurgents. There is little evidence that famine upset Mengistu. He deliberately ignored warnings of his own officials through the spring and summer of 1984. Even when the fact of famine could no longer be hidden, the Derg made minimal efforts to move grain from surplus regions to those in dire need. In December 1984 I visited state and collective farms in Arussi where mountains of grain were being threshed. The grain was going to a nearby malt plant. WPE leaders, now calling themselves communists, looked on famine relief as a task to be left to tender-hearted foreigners. 4o The Derg's Soviet-style approach to agriculture lies at the root of Ethiopia's food problem. The land reform of 1975, which was really land nationalization, was designed to facilitate collectivized farming. State farms received the bulk of agricultural investment all through the 1980s - seeds, tools, fertilizer - while individual peasants got less support than they had before the revolution. Peasants were paid less than the cost of production for grain they were forced to deliver to the government's Agricultural Marketing Corporation. Several Western-supported agricultural development projects, all aimed at raising the efficiency of small farmers and creating incentives for them to increase production, atrophied and collapsed during the early 1980s. Ethiopia's population kept growing but food production declined from 194.7 kilograms per capita in 1979

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to 125.3 kilograms per capita in 1987. Production of agricultural export commodities declined even more precipitously, so the country lost its capacity to make up for declining food production by imports.41 Nevertheless Mengistu's response to famine in 1984-85 was identical to Siad Barre's ten years before, when he exploited a famine to launch a massive nomad resettlement program. Mengistu took advantage of peasant helplessness to transfer hundreds of thousands of famine victims from Tigre and Wollo to hastily prepared resettlement sites in the western and SW lowlands. The Soviets endorsed the program and provided air and truck transport. The sites were set up as state farms. Without massive Western emergency relief, mortality would have been far higher than the 30 percent it reached in some resettlement areas. None has proved self-sustaining. The cost in Ethiopian government funds alone had exceeded $300 million by 1988, though the transfer of new settlers stopped in 1986. All of the resettlement sites were disintegrating by the end of the 1980s. Parallel to the resettlement scheme, Mengistu unleashed a massive villagization program - concentration of peasants into huge grid-style camps designed to serve as the initial stage of collective or state farms. Food production fell further as a result and the country experienced new food crises in 1987-88 and 1989-90. Fifteen million peasants were said to have been villagized by 1989. But as the WPE began to disintegrate and the government lost control of more and more of the countryside, villages began to dissolve. Mengistu announced concessions in respect to land ownership and peasant initiative in March 1990, but the damage done by villagization will require years to be made good. Back to 1984 - the US AID mission in Addis Ababa was reestablished at the end of the year to oversee famine relief operations and rapidly became a focal point for coordination of the efforts of private voluntary organizations who carried out (as they have since) most of the actual distribution of food and supplies. Journalists, welfare workers, singers, U.S. Congressmen, European parliamentarians and churchmen all streamed into Ethiopia to help, observe, report. AMERICANS IN ETHIOPIA IN THE 1980s Thus the Great Famine had its positive side. It brought an end to the Derg's efforts to isolate the country, cut off links with the West and compel the population to believe that there was no alternative to accommodating to Marxism-Leninism. During the famine years Ethiopians experienced a sense of release. They could talk with some degree of freedom again.

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They could envision a different future. They could associate with foreigners whom they respected and who asked nothing of them but to be able to help. Americans played a major role and, among the population at large, may have received even more of the credit than they deserved. Americans in Ethiopia emerged from a long, dark period during the Great Famine. Try as he might, Mengistu was never able to push Americans into the shadows again. With a combination of stubbornness and patience, the U.S. had maintained a foothold in Ethiopia during the preceding decade and concentrated on activities that became important in 1984 and the years that followed. In response to Mengistu's assurances to David Aaron in February 1978 that he desired improved relations, President Carter appointed a professional diplomat, Frederick Chapin, as ambassador. Chapin arrived in Ethiopia in July 1978 determined to do everything possible to resolve contentious issues. Mengistu's government frustrated all his efforts. The USAID mission in Addis Ababa, which had kept a few small development projects going, had to be closed down in July 1979 to comply with laws prohibiting aid to countries that nationalize American investments without compensation. Chapin left Addis Ababa in 1980 disillusioned and convinced that Mengistu wanted a hostile relationship with the U.S. to help draw the Soviets more fully into backing him. The American Embassy in Addis Ababa experienced four lean years, 1980-84. The U.S. continued to contribute several million dollars' worth of food each year to support relief agencies' operations in parts of northern Ethiopia chronically affected by shortages. The Voice of America began broadcasting in Amharic in September 1982 and soon attracted an even larger audience than Deutsche Welle, the only other Western broadcaster in Amharic, or the BBC, the most prestigious source of news in English for Ethiopians. Thanks to the sustained efforts of Roberta Cohen, wife of David Korn (who as U.S. charge d' affaires, 1982-85, oversaw the restoration of a vigorous American diplomatic presence in Addis Ababa), the American cultural exchange and information program was revived. When an International Ethiopian Studies Conference was held at AAU in November 1984, Americans formed the largest foreign group in attendance, a measure of the extent to which U.S. scholarly interest in Ethiopia persisted in spite of Derg efforts to discourage contacts. The seeds Roberta Cohen planted grew to a major program under John Bums, one of the U.S. Information Agency's most capable Africa specialists, who arrived in 1985 and stayed until 1989. He distributed hundreds of thousands of books and periodicals to higher educational institutions

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and libraries throughout Ethiopia. He revived the Fulbright program, bringing American scholars and researchers to Ethiopia in increasing numbers. Relations between Ethiopian institutions and many American universities and research institutions were revived. Dozens of Ethiopians were helped each year to go to the United States for study, conferences, and professional training. By the end of the 1980s, American cultural and intellectual influence in Ethiopia was on its way back to a level comparable to the prerevolutionary period. The Derg's efforts to reorient the country toward the East had been utterly frustrated. 42 Though the American embassy in Addis Ababa continued to be headed by a charge d'affaires, experienced officers were selected for this position who combined patience, energy, and dedication to serving fundamental American and Ethiopian interests: David Korn, James Cheek and Robert Houdek. The U.S. was a major supplier of famine relief in 1987-88 and again in 1989-90, but no U.S. assistance was used to support resettlement or villagization. Mengistu 's refusal to moderate economic policies deterred the U.S. government from considering resumption of development aid through 1989. While official relations remained cool at the top, many Ethiopian government officials sought closer contacts and private contacts expanded steadily. After the severe defeats his armies suffered in the north in 1988 and 1989, and in face of continued economic failure, an increasingly beleaguered Mengistu began to seek closer relations with the U.S. He appointed an Ethiopian ambassador to Washington, for the first time since 1977, in the spring of 1989. The fact that the State Department cold-shouldered the appointment, leading an angry Mengistu to withdraw it a few weeks later, underscored the continuity between the Reagan and Bush Administrations in coolness of policy toward the Marxist-Leninist regime, in contrast to wholehearted concern for the Ethiopian people. With the anti-communist revolution gaining momentum through the entire Soviet-oriented world, the U.S. was disinclined to accept accommodation with Mengistu except on the basis of comprehensive reform. The U.S. expressed displeasure to Israel at establishment of relations with Mengistu's government at the end of 1989 and cautioned against military assistance. THE UNITED STATES AND SOMALIA IN THE 1980s As Mengistu's Marxist-Leninist regime degenerated during the 1980s, the American position in Ethiopia gradually improved. In Somalia during the

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1980s, both Siad's situation and the American position in the country eroded. The Carter Administration's belated embrace of Somalia - the August 1980 agreement for use of Somali ports and airfields in return for which Somalia received $40 million in defensive military aid over the next two years - disappointed Siad. His hopes for better treatment from the Reagan Administration rose in the first week of January 1981 when Henry Kissinger, in response to urging from Anwar Sadat, called for full U.S. backing of Somalia against Ethiopia. But when Siad arrived in Washington in May 1981, he discovered Kissinger, who held no office in the Reagan Administration, had been speaking for no one but himself. Reagan had not focussed on Somalia at all. An admiral was sent to Mogadishu in October to attend the celebration of the twelfth anniversary of Siad's coup, but there was no increase of aid. 250 U.S. troops landed in Berbera for a military exercise in November 1981, and then departed. The Pentagon had difficulty finding money to build much in Berbera. The tripartite pact signed in August 1981 between Libya, Ethiopia and South Yemen looked ominous enough to provoke proposals in the U.S. National Security Council staff in early 1982 for U.S. aid to rebels in Ethiopia and a major build-up of Somalia, Sudan and Kenya. Congress remained cool about Somalia. Kenya and Sudan got more aid, but a U.S. policy review in the spring of 1982 rejected support for rebels in Ethiopia and dampened plans for increased military aid for Somalia. Siad had not yet given up hopes for Western backing for renewal of his war against Ethiopia. He infiltrated a military force into Ethiopia in June and attacked a town 100 km. inside the Ethiopian border. The Ethiopians retaliated by sending SSDF Somalis into Somalia with military backing. There were several border skirmishes. In August, the SSDF took the town of Goldogob and held it. Siad appealed frantically to Washington, claiming an invading Ethiopian column was on its way to Mogadishu. The Reagan Administration responded by rushing eight planeloads of arms to Mogadishu, allocating an extra $10 million for armored personnel carriers and authorizing Italy to transfer a group of Korean War period tanks to Somalia, while Egypt and Saudi Arabia also sent Siad equipment. In a few weeks the excitement died down as all parties realized the futility of trying to build up Somali forces to match the massively armed Ethiopians. The more weaponry Siad possessed, the more likely he was to provoke new hostilities. The specter of Qaddafy moving into the Horn receded. Ethiopian expectations of large-scale Libyan economic aid were not realized. U.S. attention was diverted to problems in the Middle East. Continued deterioration of internal conditions in Somalia provoked hard questions from congressional committees.

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Siad kept dropping hints of reviving a Soviet relationship. In November 1986 he sent a large delegation to Moscow for talks. The Soviets were polite, but unforthcoming. Contacts continued. In August 1989 he sent his son to Moscow where he was received by Defense Minister Yazov. Yazov may have found the visit useful to cause Mengistu discomfort. Meanwhile U.S. development aid for Somalia was frozen following the brutal oppression in the north in the summer of 1988 and the Reagan Administration found itself acutely embarrassed by the fact that Siad had used U.S.-supplied arms and ammunition in massive killings of his own citizens. During the same period, the UN refugee agency (UNHCR) suspended aid for refugee camps because of misappropriation of food and arming of Ogadeni refugees. Personnel of the U.S. mission in Mogadishu were cut in half during 1989 as U.S. relations with Somalia fell into a state of paralysis which only a complete replacement of leadership with a new governing philosophy is likely to change. RUSSIANS IN THE HORN IN THE 1980s The concluding paragraphs of Chapter 4 have already underscored the dominant feature of Soviet involvement with the Horn during the decade: massive deliveries of military supplies to Mengistu. After Gorbachev came to power, muted criticism of Mengistu's Stalinist economic policies was occasionally heard from Soviet diplomats - but it was never followed by any known threat to withhold military aid. More than a thousand Soviet advisers remained in Ethiopia during the 1980s, augmented by an East German group perhaps equally large. Cuba gradually drew down its troops to the point where there were no more than 2500 left when it was announced they would all be leaving in 1989. On the personal level, Russians isolated themselves from Ethiopian life, cultivating no personal friendships, making surprisingly little effort to develop contacts in academic and intellectual circles. Ethiopians despised them for their materialism, racism and uncivilized habits. By the late 1980s stories circulated in Addis Ababa - widely believed whether true or not - of drunken brawls between young Ethiopians and Russians, beatings and even assassinations. Russian wives went shopping oniy in escorted groups. Compared to the easy friendliness always characteristic of Ethiopian associations with Americans and Europeans, the predicament of the Russians was pathetic, part of the larger tragedy of the degeneration of life under communism in the Soviet Union itself. I recall going to a

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service at the Church of St. Stephen overlooking Revolution Square in Addis Ababa at dawn one Sunday and encountering a young Russian. He could not have known my nationality, but when I spoke to him in his own language, he drew back in horror and fled, fearful no doubt of being identified and reported. Of Easterners in Ethiopia, only the Poles became popular. They brought in a squadron of helicopters during the Great Famine to fly food to remote regions in the mountainous north and set up a headquarters in the isolated district of Merhabete in northern Shoa. They bec1\me famous for the bravado of their flying and their friendliness with Ethiopians, with whom they were frank in sharing their disdain for Russians. The pilots departed in early 1987 amid tears and toasts. When I visited Alem Ketema, principal town of Merhabete in 1989, young men in the market place were still greeting visitors in Polish and recalling the Poles who had worked among them. Only in the face ofrepeated failures of northern offensives and territorial gains of insurgent movements from the end of 1987 onward, did Moscow begin to press Mengistu to compromise and encourage Soviet media to make occasional criticism of Ethiopian policies and failures. Several Russians were killed and three, including a colonel, were captured by the EPLF at Afabet in February 1988. 43 But the Soviets remained surprisingly supportive of Mengistu. Shipments of arms, ammunition and other military gear kept arriving at Massawa and Assab into early 1990. Reduced to its essentials, Gorbachev's approach to Ethiopia appeared to be identical to his approach to Afghanistan and Angola: keep sending in arms and hope that something positive will happen. But what sense did it make when he had accepted the collapse of communism throughout Eastern Europe and the necessity of radical economic and political reform in the Soviet Union itself? No coherent vision for the future of Ethiopia and the Horn could be discerned in Moscow at the beginning of 1990. Gorbachev may well have been too preoccupied with the deterioration of the Soviet Union itself to have time to focus in the absence of Western pressure - on problems of the "outer empire." The subject will be discussed further in Chapter 7.

ECONOMIC DETERIORATION AND INSURGENCY No Horn leader was distinguished by foresight, realism or skill in statesmanship during the 1980s. They all found it impossible to escape from fatal illusions. Nimeiry set in motion the chain of events that led to his

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fall in the middle of the decade. After his ouster, the situation deteriorated to the point where it was difficult for any government to maintain itself in power in Khartoum long enough to develop a workable plan for national resuscitation. To the end of the decade Mengistu clung to the fatal illusion that he could impose a Soviet-style system on his country and subdue resistance by military means, conscripting teenagers to fill out the ranks of his disintegrating armies. His speech of 5 March 1990 was an admission of failure of everything he had tried to do during the previous decade and a half - but without recognition of the consequences. He was half-apologetic, half-accusatory. Like Siad Barre in 1978, he seemed determined to try to survive disaster, hoping perhaps that Israeli advice and arms could save him. Meanwhile there were encouraging signs of evolution toward moderation and political sophistication in EPLF leadership. The TPLF, following its stunning defeat of Mengistu's armies at Enda Selassie in February 1989, took control of the entire province of Tigre. Its leaders abandoned their Marxist rhetoric and moved toward pragmatic economic and social policies. Together with the EPDM, a predominantly Amhara movement headquartered at Sekota in northern Wollo, they formed the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Its forces, dominated by the TPLF, moved south through Wollo, Gondar and Gojjam into the old Amhara-populated regions of northern Shoa during the winter of 1990 and by spring had approached to within 60 miles of Addis Ababa. In Somalia the SNM was articulating a far more coherent program for the future of the country than Siad Barre. Whatever sincerity underlay Siad's original goals for his country, he had already turned it into a ruin at the beginning of the 1980s and compounded all its problems in the course of the decade. Somalis are fortunate that an opposition movement is prepared to accept the challenge of rebuilding the country. The survivability of all three major Horn states as governable entities was in question at the beginning of 1990. 44 Three decades of Soviet adventurism in the Hom - fueled by the fatal illusion that the entire region could be turned into part of the extended Soviet Empire - ended up producing utter bankruptcy. The task for the people of the Horn is to take matters into their own hands, without illusions, and shape a better future. The task for the rest of the world is to offer them encouragement, advice and support. Part III of this book discusses those tasks.

Part III Restoring Peace and Progress

Part III Restoring Peace and Progress There is no reason why we should regard the peoples of the countries of the Hom as less capable or less entitled than any others in the world to govern themselves. The purpose of Chapters 6 and 7 is to suggest principles and procedures by which the people of these countries can be helped to rescue themselves from the vicious downward spiral of insurgency, economic crisis, famine and oppressive government in which they have become ever more deeply entangled over the past two decades. I have tried to combine realism in reviewing the recent history of the Hom countries and relations between them with both realism and idealism about the future. Endless chewing over of the past is pointless, but analyzing past misjudgments and errors makes it easier to avoid repeating them. StUdying missed opportunities may prepare people for seizing them when a second chance comes. To extricate themselves from the worsening economic and political impasses in which they now find themselves, the peoples of the Hom need both a realistic understanding of the past and a clear vision of the future. By offering a vision of how humane leaders could establish constructive governments, I aim to encourage constructive thinking about the future. That is the primary purpose of Chapter 6. The peoples of the Hom also need outside help, for they have been so severely set against each other that they keep thwarting their own efforts at settling their differences. A review of the historical record leaves no doubt that the United States has done much less to exacerbate conflict in the Hom than the Soviet Union has done. It is unrealistic to expect Moscow to do much to help the Hom now, even if it had the will, which is open to doubt. The survival of the Soviet Empire is in doubt and communism as a political philosophy and set of guidelines for operating a political system thoroughly discredited. The United States and its allies, on the other hand, can do a good deal to help the Hom. I devote Chapter 7 to suggestions for policy and action by the West.

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THE FAILURE OF AUTHORITARIAN MAXIMALIST GOVERNMENT While, as I argue in the conclusion of the Chapter 7, there is a case to be made for a genuine federation of the entire Horn area, pursuit of federation as an early goal would be unrealistic. The immediate task for the peoples and leaders of these countries, and one for which they need the support of the international community, is to keep their countries united within their present boundaries and to establish political systems within which sustained economic development and modernization can take place, cultural values can be protected, and human rights can be defended and extended. Considering the political, economic and social deterioration which has afflicted much of this region for more than two decades, these tasks alone are a formidable challenge requiring patience, perseverance and open-minded, steady and realistic new leaders who recognize the mistakes of their predecessors and are determined to avoid repeating them. All three countries have had bitter experience with dogmatic, ideologically motivated leaders. Recent Horn leaders have invariably attempted to govern maximally. They have intruded into and aspired to manage every aspect of their people's lives. They have applied identical rules and techniques to all peoples in their countries in spite of different traditions and styles of life. They have blocked channels through which alternate opinions on political, economic or social issues can be legitimately expressed. They have all been stubborn and slow to admit mistakes. They have all invested large resources in oppressive security services and have vastly expanded their military services. Their armies, allegedly defending the state from foreign enemies, have come to be used almost exclusively against domestic political opposition. l None of these authoritarian systems has worked for long. It is apparent from the experience of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe that authoritarian socialism has an inherent tendency to degenerate. The electronic revolution which has swept the world during the 1980s has made it impossible to keep populations ignorant of the outer world and from 172

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communication with it. Political opposition grows. It takes both passive and violent foons. Insurgencies and famine have dislocated millions of people within all three Horn countries. Millions have fled across boundaries and become refugees dependent on international charity. A significant portion of the educated and technically trained and experienced people in each Horn country has fled or emigrated abroad. Authoritarian methods of economic management have not only led to mistaken decisions and actions; they have driven a major portion of economic activity underground. While underground economies serve the urgent needs of some sectors of the population, the net effect is negative. Corruption has spread into most sectors of the governmental bureaucracy concerned with economic affairs. The quality of life for the majority of citizens of Hom countries has steadily deteriorated. It has rarely worsened to the point where people's reproductive capacity has been impaired, however, so populations continue to grow at high rates. If these societies are not restored to a condition where they can develop and modernize, they will confront insurmountable demands for education and social services early in the twenty-first century. The 1990 famine in Ethiopia demonstrates that provision of food, the most elementary of human needs, is an increasingly serious problem. The capacity of all Hom countries to feed themselves has been severely impaired by their governments' economic policies. They are driven to depend on international charity.2 A NEW PHILOSOPHY OF GOVERNMENT A whole new philosophy of governing is needed and a new style of leadership. The Horn states have no need of more central government. Above all

they need less intrusive government. They need government more directly

responsive to the peoples' needs. They need leaders who understand the limitations of government. They need leaders who understand how to help

people help themselves. Future central governments in the Hom will have to operate with severe resource constraints. They will have no choice but to confine their activity to those essential basic services which can best be performed by central governments. Everything else will have to take second place. Leaders need to recognize and encourage regional diversity. They need to understand the advantages of pluralism in all aspects of political and social life and above all in economic endeavor. In economics, pluralism means free markets and in politics, pluralism means a multi-party system.

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Future Hom leaders will have no practical alternative to federalism. Politically, the federalist principle can be applied with many variations. Hom countries have their own traditions to draw on. They also have the experience of federal systems in many other parts of the world to study. They can combine their countries' traditions with others' experience. In regions alienated from central government, autonomous local governments will have to be recognized and considered legitimate. They should be encouraged and assisted to establish institutions that suit their own inclinations and meet their requirements. Central governments should confine their activity to provision of services that will demonstrate to disaffected regions the value of continued links to the country as a whole. Repairing the damage that has been done during the 1970s and 1980s will not be easy, but it will occur faster if individuals and families, tribal and ethnic groups and various subdivisions of Hom societies are all allOWed to benefit directly and immediately from their own exertions to improve their lot and if governments confine their efforts to supporting and assisting them and encouraging cooperation for broader goals. FEDERALISM IS UNA VOIDABLE What are the minimal objectives reformed central governments in Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan can realistically aim to achieve? They must begin by restoring respectability to their countries in the international community. They can reassert sovereignty over their internationally recognized national territory only if they assert it lightly. It is clear from the history of the past decade that no government in Khartoum can impose its will on the southern Sudan; no government in Addis Ababa can subdue Eritrea or Tigre by force; no government in Mogadishu can compel the inhabitants of northern Somalia to follow its dictates. The $12 billion worth of Soviet military aid Mengistu received from the Soviet Union in little over a decade served only to mire him deeper in futile efforts to bring northern Ethiopia to heel. A Soviet Union entangled in a revolution against communism and gripped by a worsening economic crisis must soon be compelled by its own people to recognize the futility of pouring more arms into Ethiopia. Leaders who replace Mengistu's failed clique will find no country ready to ship them weapons. Ethiopia long ago lost the ability to pay for arms by its own export earnings. The same is equally true of Sudan and Somalia. New Horn leaders must face the challenge of persuading alienated regions and ethnic groups that they will improve their own position by remaining part of the larger country, sharing in its government, and

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gaining from its economic development. To do so new leaders may have to concede de facto autonomy to disaffected regions, while retaining the concept of national sovereignty as a temporary fiction. Federalism is the only principle on which any of these states can hope to survive. CONCESSIONS TO DISAFFECTED REGIONS A decade and a half of Mengistu' s bloody campaigns to bend Eritrea to his will has generated so much resentment and distrust that the only basis on which a new Addis Ababa leadership can hope to retain this historic part of Ethiopia within the nation is not only to agree to return to the federation that was established under UN sponsorship in 1952, but to go beyond it and provide additional guarantees and incentives. The 1972 Addis Ababa agreements provided a basis for settlement of the problem of the Southern Sudan. They worked until the early 1980s. Nimeiry's tampering and then abrogation of them led to a renewal of the rebellion. Southern Sudanese remain committed to a united country. At the end of the 1980s their commitment appeared deeper than that of the northern Muslims. Renewal of the 1971 commitments, with provisions to ensure that they cannot again be violated (which may require some degree of international supervision) could provide a basis for resolution of Sudan's most fundamental problem. The marriage of British-ruled northern Somalia with the much larger former Italian colony in the south was never fully amicable. Northern Somalis' dissatisfaction intensified under Siad Barre's oppressive regime. As in Eritrea and the Sudanese south, repeated attempts at SUbjugation by military force have left a population so alienated that it is impossible to go back to a clean slate and restore confidence. Clan rivalries in the south have also been exacerbated by Siad Barre. To remain a single country, Somalia may have to be reconstituted as a cantonal federation. The Somali dream of uniting Somali-inhabited portions of Kenya, the Ethiopian Ogaden and Djibouti with the independent republic was shattered by the failed gamble of Siad Barre's attack on Ethiopia in 1977. It could be realized, if at all, only within a genuine federation of all the countries of the Horn. THE HIGHEST PRIORITY - ECONOMIC REFORM The most urgent objective of all new Hom governments must be to open up and free their economies. Rapid benefits can be realized from

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permitting farmers to plant, harvest and sell as they please, from permitting agricultural labor to move freely from one region to another, from privatization of state farms and agricultural processing enterprises and from creation of conditions that will make investment of indigenous and foreign capital in modern agriculture attractive. The substantial aid that international organizations and European countries have continued to provide to Horn governments for agricultural development will produce permanent positive results in a free market where farmers at all levels in society can calculate the return they will get for their work, their investment and their ingenuity. Both central and regional governments will continue to have a role to play in agriculture by providing support and services ranging from facilitating delivery of basic inputs such as seeds, fertilizer and tools, through provision of extension services and training programs to support of agricultural colleges and research institutes. Access to support and services must be open to all elements of the population engaged in agriculture. While governments may have a role to play in marketing of agricultural produce. their approach should be facilitative, not restrictive. They should confine regulatory functions to measures that ensure fair distribution to all elements of the population and ensure quality of commodities for local consumers, for agro-industry and for export. They should devise incentives for protecting the environment and renewing natural resources. Wherever possible. implementation of such programs should be decentralized so they can be adjusted to local conditions and the people immediately affected can gain maximum benefit from them. Out of necessity - i.e. for lack of capacity to do otherwise - future Horn governments will have to devise methods for self-regulation of major sectors of their economies. Some measures and arrangements affecting agriCUlture have been so misguided and oppressive and require such large subsidies to be maintained that new governments will be well advised to abandon them as rapidly as possible, taking care only to avoid causing further acute hardship. This is particularly true of coercive resettlement projects, forced villagization and forced nomad settlement projects. If people wish to remain in villages or new settlements to which they have been moved and can do so without being heavily subsidized by the state or charitable organizations, well and good. If nomads wish to remain settled, they should be encouraged to become self-sufficient; if not, they should be allowed to resume their previous mode of life. Modernization and improvement of conditions of rural life throughout the Horn - including provision of education, health and other social services - must receive higher priority for both central and regional governments. But decentralization and encouragement of local

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initiative is likely to produce the best results and ensure that resources are not wasted. Federalism entails freedom to experiment at all levels of society. limited only by avoidance of actions that do injury to others. New leaders' economic challenges will be eased if they lift all controls over agricultural and industrial prices immediately and free rates of exchange and restrictions on currency transactions. Most existing controls have already become meaningless. In every Hom country a large proportion of productive economic activity has gone underground. Removal of prohibitions will bring it to the surface. a necessary first step to restoring economic health. Elimination of the underground economy will be most painful for the sizable class of illicit opemtors (including government officials) who profiteer from smuggling and bribery. unofficial currency exchange and other forms of unproductive endeavor. Since many of these people have shown great ingenuity and enterprise under difficult conditions. they stand a better than even chance of becoming successful entrepreneurs if they apply their talents in a framework of relaxed but rational legality. RESTORING INDUSTRIAL GROWTH Both manufacturing and service industries in Horn countries will of necessity continue to involve a mix of state and private ownership and management. Dogma should not be the guiding principle for decision-making in this sector. though the fact that direct government management of manufacturing industry seldom works well over time must be recognized. Most recently nationalized industries and services are likely to operate more efficiently and profitably if returned to private or autonomous control. with the state sometimes involved as a partner but not a direct participant in operations. Recently established state enterprises should be systematically evaluated to determine their viability in an open economy. then continued. reorganized. privatized or abandoned. For the foreseeable future no Horn country is going to be able to raise its level of domestic savings or export earnings sufficiently to satisfy even minimal capital investment needs. To attract aid and credit from multilateral and bilateral donors and lenders. new leaders must adopt credible development policies. To attract foreign private investment. they must establish conditions that appeal to investors who can choose among a wide mnge of alternate possibilities worldwide. Hom countries will be competing not only with the rest of Africa and the Third World to attract aid and investment. Changes that have taken place in Eastern Europe and the

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Soviet Empire make these countries major and attractive competitors for Western investment too. Restoring nationalized foreign investments to their original owners will create a favorable climate for attracting new foreign investment. PLANS AND PLANNERS In all Horn countries generously funded and pampered central planning organizations housed in new buildings filled with Western-style office furniture and equipment have been far more impressive in appearance than in performance. They have too much authority and too little practical experience. Seeing themselves as economic gods, central planners have discouraged (and often restricted or prohibited) local and regional initiative. The very nature of their function, as they have defined it, prejudices them against private enterprise. Planners have flattered their authoritarian masters by drawing up grandiose multi-year schemes based on best-case estimates of both foreign and local resources and local performance. Visions of a radiant future camouflage dismal day-to-day reality. Almost without exception, multi-year development plans of all Horn countries stand as monuments to naive and unrealistic expectations, none more than the Ethiopian Ten-Year Plan of 1984. Some planning functions will still be desirable with a new philosophy of government but the role of central planners should be limited to research; dissemination of information on management techniques, technical procedures, and innovations; collection and rapid dissemination of statistics on economic activity; provision of services to foreign investors; and coordination of infrastructure development. They should make recommendations, not issue instructions, and provide assistance to autonomous regional and functional development groups, including the private sector, not attempt to direct their activity. They should be required to justify their performance (and their budget) to legislators and be open to media scrutiny.3 Infrastructure development is an important priority for any government dedicated to improving the life of its people. Highway systems, railways, river and sea transport, air service, provision of power, and construction and management of water systems for private consumption and industrial and agricultural use are functions that require initiative and oversight at a national level. Even under highly developed federal systems, a considerable degree of central coordination of these functions and planning for their expansion is usually desirable. If they provide such services and constructive advice efficiently, Horn governments can demonstrate their value and

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make themselves indispensible to disaffected regions and groups. There must also be room for private and regional initiative as well as foreign investment in all these fields. Regional and local authorities are best able to oversee secondary and tertiary road development. Medium-scale water projects should be undertaken by regional and local governments. Many service functions are best performed privately or, if governments are involved, by ensuring that private competitors have the opportunity to compete with state enterprises on an equal basis. Long-distance bus services, road hauling and river, lake and maritime transport services will be much more efficient if they operate with competition. In some fields entities that are legally state-owned corporations can operate according to sound private-enterprise principles if they can preserve management autonomy, as the example of Ethiopian Airlines demonstrates. But in the field of air transport, too, there is no reason why private competition should not be permitted. NECESSARY CENTRAL GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS There are other areas where broad central government initiative and oversight are unavoidable if modernization and economic development are to proceed effectively and international obligations are to be met. These include (a) managing the monetary system, (b) operating the central revenue and budgetary system, (c) providing postal, telephone and radio communications services, (d) ensuring maintenance of standards in the educational system and (e) setting standards for performance in health

and social services.

Each of these functions can combine a mix of central direction with regional initiative and contractual relationships with private entrepreneurs. Hom countries can draw on past experience in all these areas not all of which, even under authoritarian regimes, has been negative. Some services have continued to be well performed in the Hom even under conditions of political and economic deterioration. Though Somali and Sudanese currencies had lost most of their value by the end of the 1980s, the Ethiopian Birr retained greater strength than the Soviet Ruble or the currencies of Eastern Europe. EDUCATION AND HEALTH Central governments will have to continue to play a significant role in expansion of educational opportunities if they are to meet to an even modest

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degree the desires of their people in these fields. There is nothing the people of Hom countries desire more than greater educational opportunities for their children and access to health services. Better health conditions are the key to family planning success. Programs initiated by central governments should be designed, however, to encourage and reward regional and local initiative, including private efforts to expand education and social services. The same principles should apply to expansion of health services and to provision of family planning assistance. Throughout the Horn elaborately designed national plans for expanding education and health services have resulted in creation of centralized bureaucracies imposing programs on local people. Local initiative and responsibility have been discouraged and sometimes stifled. Budgetary stringency has usually meant that money for textbooks and elementary medicines is cut out while funds for officials' salaries and offices and attendance at international conferences are the last to be reduced. The health station with no bandaids or aspirin became as common in the Horn in the 1980s as the primitive, grossly overcrowded school where a dozen students share a single tattered, out-of-date textbook and teachers lack maps, charts, chalk and blackboards. Overly centralized education ministries discourage local initiative and dampen feelings of local responsibility. Local governments need authority to levy taxes. In many poor regions, however, taxes will not suffice. A system for allocating funds raised by or made available by the central government to regions is needed. In the 1960s Horn governments were able to devote a comparatively large share of their revenue to education because they were spending less on military establishments. In the future, as military expenditures are curtailed, there should be more money for education, health and other social services. THE NEED FOR MONEY One of the most urgent problems new Horn leaders will face will be budgetary stringency and a limited revenue base. Many services and functions have been systematically starved for resources as military forces have absorbed ever higher portions of budgets. Taxes have ceased to flow in from regions no longer under central government administration. Underground economic activity feeds no taxes to treasuries. Subsidies to unprofitable state farms and nationalized industries and declining export earnings have placed all Hom governments under continually mounting budgetary pressure. New leaders will have to govern less intrusively

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and dictatorially, but demands on them for services will be no less than on the failed totalitarian governments they replace. Federalism and decentralization require devolution of significant revenue-raising authority to regional and local administrations. New leaders will have to exert themselves to find additional sources of revenue. How can they manage? Where can the money come from? They will have to cut military forces quickly. Security services will also have to be sharply reduced. Allocations for state-sponsored political parties and propaganda can be abolished. New, free political parties will have to finance themselves. State farms and nationalized industries will have to absorb their losses until they are reorganized or privatized and become self-supporting. Bringing the underground economy above ground will generate a resurgence of economic activity at all levels and greatly increase the potential for tax returns from trade, private incomes and customs. Remittances from workers and exiles abroad who now send their money home through underground channels will have a direct and favorable impact on economies and foreign exchange balances as currency controls and other restrictions on economic activity are liberalized and abolished. Exports which have been leaving these countries via smuggling routes will begin to produce a return in revenue for governments at several levels as they are legalized. As economies recover and generate an export potential, adjustment of exchange rates will have a favorable impact on exports. Foreign investment and more effectively utilized foreign aid grants and loans will improve payment balances. LEARNING FROM THE EXPERIENCE OF OTHERS Economic recovery will not be a simple matter. It will require bold initiative, decisiveness, persistence and support from abroad. There is a good deal of recent experience which people in the Horn can study for both positive and negative lessons. Turkey, Pakistan and North Yemen are countries whose recent experience is relevant for the Horn. 4 There are many examples from Africa of both what should and should not be done. China's economic liberalization since the death of Mao offers both positive and negative lessons, especially in comparison with the experience of the USSR under Gorbachev. China's economic liberalization was rapid and far-reaching. Collective agriculture was abandoned and food production increased quickly. Liberalization of trade, crafts and small-scale industry and decentralization of control of large-scale industry combined with encouragement of joint ventures with foreign investors brought striking

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improvements in living standards and economic growth. But China failed to liberalize politically. Political ferment in the spring of 1989 caused China's autocratically minded leaders to revert to repression and centralization which are having negative economic consequences. Gorbachev, on the other had, gave higher priority to glasnost and political reform and until early 1990 took only half-measures toward genuine economic liberalization. His partial reforms caused confusion and degeneration in the Soviet economy. Political and social tension mounted to dangerous levels and ethnic unrest became impossible to contain. The Soviet system is caught up an interlocking systemic crisis that threatens the viability of the Soviet Russian Empire. The outcome is uncertain. In Eastern Europe pressure for change rapidly mounted at the end of the 1980s and burst out into anti-socialist revolution. New leaders have responded by implementing fundamental political and economic reforms simultaneously and many groups in the population are taking matters into their own hands. Repair of the damage Soviet-style political and economic leadership has done to Eastern Europe will require substantial help from democratic capitalist countries. The help is coming, but it is conditioned on effective performance. The outcome is not yet certain, but prospects for success are brighter than in either the USSR or China. What are the lessons of these dramatic developments for the countries of the Horn? These are the most important ones: Daunting as the task may be, political and economic liberalization are best undertaken in tandem so that they can reinforce each other. Half-measures are riskier and more likely to generate adverse consequences than far-reaching, basic changes. Foreign help in many forms is essential and chances of securing it are improved if economies are liberated, past mistakes admitted and diagnosed and dictatorial political systems abandoned. DIFFERING PROSPECTS IN THE THREE COUNTRIES I have been generalizing, quite deliberately, by lumping all three Horn countries together. There are, of course, substantial differences between them. If it does not fragment and fall victim to political turmoil, economic recovery should proceed fastest in Ethiopia and is likely to facilitate political stabilization. Political fragmentation in Sudan has caused economic stalemate, but the potential for economic recovery is nevertheless substantial. Even with political recovery in Somalia, economic recovery will be difficult because the country is less well endowed with basic resources and has developed profligate habits for use of the relatively generous foreign

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assistance it has received. The challenge will be to exploit the talents of an ingenious people. Ethiopia and Sudan have enormous potential agricultural wealth. Farmers need security to expand production. Wars and insurgencies must be brought to an end by compromise. Merely by letting its farmers live where they wish and permitting them to produce and sell according to their own calculations of their best interests, Ethiopia can quickly begin to profit from its agriculture. Further increases of productivity will follow. Sudan's small farmers have been less affected by authoritarian meddling than Ethiopia's, but the south has been severely affected by chronic warfare. Realization of the agricultural potential of remote and underpopulated regions will require great effort in infrastructure development and outside capital investment. As Sudan's experience of the 1980s has shown, this can occur only under reasonably predictable political and security conditions. Feasibility studies and surveys carried out by indigenous talent and foreign advisers have already charted enough potential development projects in Ethiopia and Sudan to last several decades. These are on the shelf, so to speak, for intelligent leaders to take down and help put into practice. Somalia is not in as fortunate a position and will need more help not only from distant countries but from its neighbors as well. s APPROACHES TO THE MANPOWER PROBLEM In spite of various fonns of brain drain - death, imprisonment, exile, departure of experienced technicians and educated people for work abroad - all Horn countries still possess talent to meet expanded and rationalized technical, administrative and managerial requirements. Available talent needs to be redistributed. Authoritarian socialist governments make irrational use of man- and woman- power. Too many people are employed in unproductive administrative tasks, in political and propaganda operations and in supporting the military. Security services waste talent. Top-heavy bureaucracies have been imposed on agriculture, trade and industry. Many of the people who staff them know how sterile and unproductive their work is and will welcome the opportunity to shift to more productive and satisfying employment. Military forces absorb skilled manpower that can be better used in other ways. Disillusioned and disaffected officers and civil servants have been retiring early, defecting or deserting and going into hiding. They are kept from making a positive contribution to society. Though large numbers of highly educated people have left Horn countries during the past decade

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and a half, most retain ties; many remit money to support relatives. Under improved political and economic conditions many will return, bringing with them new skills, experience, capital and valuable foreign links. New leaders in Hom countries will be wise to give high priority to attracting back as many skilled and experienced departees as possible. They will need to return confiscated property to some, cancel punitive legal judgments against others, restore academic and professional status and find ways to compensate people for injustices done to them. Returnees, like all citizens, will want unrestricted access to news and information and will insist on freedom to travel abroad and retum. New leaders must ensure observance of these and other basic human rights. They must restore press freedom, freedom of communication, academic freedom, freedom for citizens to form associations and freedom for non-governmental (including religious-sponsored) educational, social-service and charitable activities. FOREIGN RELATIONS Central Governments must retain responsibility for conduct of foreign relations. All Hom countries have been fortunate in developing high quality professional diplomatic services. A great deal of attrition has occurred as diplomats have defected. Authoritarian leaders have appointed individuals lacking professional qualifications to diplomatic posts. New governments will have to shake up their foreign ministries and sort out their diplomatic establishments, but this task should be easier than most of the other high priorities they will face. In some cases, diplomats in exile or forced retirement can probably be attracted back to active service. There will be plenty for them to do and their experience will be valuable, for all Hom countries have relationships and responsibilities, many fixed by treaty, in international and regional bodies that will continue to require attention, all the more so under governments dedicated to more productive and cooperative relations with each other and with the outer world. Even with a high degree of economic and administrative decentralization, central governments will have to retain primary responsibility for many aspects of foreign economic relations, both bilaterally and with international lending and aid granting organizations as well as with international advisory and regulatory bodies in fields such as communications, air traffic, shipping and the expanding field of environmental protection. Future governments in the Hom will need help from friendly foreign powers and international organizations to accomplish the difficult job of setting their countries back on the road to internal peace, economic and

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social progress and constructive relations with their neighbors. Chapter 7 will consider how and under what conditions this help can best be provided and expanded. MILITARY SERVICES By the 1980s the military establishments of all Hom countries were devoted almost exclusively to suppressing domestic unrest and protecting increasingly unpopular governments against their own people. By the end of the 1980s no Hom government faced any significant threat from a neighbor or a more distant power likely to use military force against it. The primary task in assessing probable military needs of future Hom governments is to determine what, realistically, such forces would be used for and what resources governments responsive to the will and needs of their peoples will be able to collect to support them. Calculations can no longer be based on the assumption of large-scale foreign assistance. There are no territorial disputes between Sudan and Ethiopia and neither country has ever used military force against central government forces of the other. It would be encouraging to assume that Somalis have fully learned the sad lesson of the 1970s: that they cannot be unified by military force. In the immediate future, whatever the desires of a few Somalis might be, the primary challenge they face is to retain a facade of unity over their present deeply divided country. Unless it is armed from the outside, Somalia has no resources to support a military establishment that can be a threat to Ethiopia. An Ethiopian state reconstituted on a federal basis will have no need of military forces to defend itself either against Sudan or Somalia. It faces no danger across its borders from Kenya or Djibouti. Sudan, it could be argued, has a greater need for military forces to counter threats arising from instability in several of the countries on which it borders, extending from Libya to Uganda, but these dangers can be limited by Pan-African and international arrangements. Large standing armies, navies or air forces have contributed little to preserving the territorial integrity of Hom countries. The internal threat of insurgency can be made unattractive if other channels for expression of dissatisfaction are kept open. External threats are best dealt with by collective security arrangements that ensure a multilateral response. Thus new governments in the Hom will have little need of large military establishments. They will be more secure without them. The participation of military officers may be unavoidable for the formation of new governments in the Hom. Budgetary pressure and reduction

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of foreign military assistance will combine to force sharp reductions in military forces. The role of military forces will then have to be redefined and the extent to which they are needed for - or can perform - internal security functions and be used for development tasks - can be determined. The solution to the problems the existence of large military forces pose for each of these countries can be found only in the framework of international arrangements that effect reconciliation among them and enforce a moratorium on arms shipments to the region.

7 How the West Can Help WESTERN AND SOVIET IMPACT COMPARED Chapters 4 and 5 have demonstrated that during the past quarter century the major impact of the Soviet Union on the Horn of Africa has been twofold: (1) as an arms supplier and (2) as a Marxist-Leninist political and economic model. The weapons it has delivered to the Hom have set countries against each other and encouraged governments to oppress their people by force. In comparison with what the West has provided, Soviet development aid has been meager and its development advice negative in its consequences. Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology as espoused by intellectuals and students blighted creative social and economic thinking and inhibited or prevented constructive debate about policies and results. As applied by Hom leaders, Marxism-Leninism has been disastrous in its effect on both the political processes and the economies of Horn countries. Development aid and, to a more limited extent, investment, from a wide variety of Western (and occasionally Arab) countries as well as international organizations supported by the West has been essential for the very modest progress toward modernization Horn countries have been able to continue to make. Emergency relief to care for refugees and alleviate famine has also come almost exclusively from the West. Even in the absence of Western pressure, some degree of Soviet withdrawal from the Horn must be anticipated. Is it too much to hope that the Soviet Union could actually be persuaded to join the West in an effort to help the peoples of the Horn overcome the deterioration which afflicts them and embark on a path to peace and prosperity? Some Ethiopians talk of demanding reparations from Moscow for the damage which Soviet support of Mengistu has done to the country. Efforts to obtain reparations from a Soviet Union which is itself threatened with economic collapse are unlikely to be rewarding. The most that can be hoped for is that the Soviet Union might make amends for past adventurism in the Horn by refraining from further destructive intervention in Horn affairs and by giving political and moral support to international efforts to rehabilitate the region.

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A KEY ROLE FOR THE UNITED STATES The countries of the Hom appear to lack the capacity to extricate themselves from the vicious downward spirals into which they have been drawn. They need outside help of many kinds. They are getting some. The record of the United States during the 1980s is spotty - generous with emergency relief, unforthcoming on development aid, passive on political initiative. The United States continued to serve as a model and hope for the Hom. A sizable proportion of educated people who fled or emigrated from the Hom during the late 1970s and 1980s came to the United States. Europeans and international organizations continued to give development assistance to all Hom countries. They were also generous with famine relief but took no significant political initiative. Development aid given to Hom countries could have been more effective if donors had coordinated "their efforts and held recipient countries to higher standards of performance. How can coordination not only of economic aid but of political efforts be achieved? The United States has been passive about taking initiative, but it is better suited to take the lead than any other country. This concluding chapter is based on four important assumptions: (1) that the Hom merits international attention; (2) that there is very little hope that the region can surmount its current difficulties without outside assistance; (3) that little can be accomplished until the Soviet Union modifies its policies or is excluded from involvement in the region; and (4) if the West is going to continue to help, the help is likely to be more effective if it is given as part of a coordinated, comprehensive approach both to the individual countries and to the region as a whole.'

IS THE HORN STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT? Strategic importance is a relative concept which depends on power relationships at a particular time. The Hom was strategically important in the early phase of World War II because Italy dominated it. Italy had brutally invaded Ethiopia and allied itself with Hitler. After British and Commonwealth forces conquered Italian East Africa, the region served as a support base for the campaigns in North Africa and the Middle East and for the American lend-lease lifeline through Iran to Russia. After the war the Hom retained high value as a link in the chain of

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Western defenses against Soviet expansionism and radical Arab disruptive activities. Its location astride shipping routes from the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean through the Red Sea to Europe gives it continued strategic importance. Strategic value is a flexible concept. A geographically insignificant territory may increase greatly in strategic value as soon as it falls under chauvinistic or irresponsible control. Small islands can suddenly become "strategic" under such circumstances. Likewise, a small territory with no resources may, under responsible leadership, playa positive role as a stabilizing influence in a much larger area - the Republic of Djibouti is an example in the Hom. Most Middle Eastern countries regard the Hom as strategically significant from the viewpoint of their own security and commercial interests. As a result, every country in the region, on both sides of the Red Sea, has experienced meddling by radical Arab leaders from Nasser to Qadaffy. Israel's relationship with Ethiopia reflects ancient legends but is based on modem political considerations. Soviet-Chinese competition affected the entire Hom/South Arabian region until the early 1970s. Becoming arbiters of Hom politics by the mid-1970s, the Soviets introduced another alien element into the region to assist them - Cuba. In terms of world power relationships at the time, these developments gave the Hom unusual strategic importance. We have seen that Soviet leaders harbored fatal illusions about their ability to manipulate Hom politics. These provoked American reactions. The U.S. response to the crisis that culminated in the Ethio-Somali War of 1977-78 led to military involvements in Somalia and Sudan based on illusions about the capabilities and intentions of the authoritarian leaders of those countries. In contrast to those of Moscow, American miscalculations about Somalia and Sudan did not arise from an urge to exercise hegemony over the Hom. American illusions and miscalculations in the Hom were not fatal to anyone. They pale in significance in comparison to the misjudgments that have governed the Soviet approach to Ethiopia and the damage Soviet involvement in the country has inflicted on it. In absolute terms, the Soviets expended far greater resources and invested much more of their prestige in both Siad's Somalia and Mengistu's Ethiopia than the United States (or its allies) did in Somalia or Sudan, or than the United States invested in Haile Selassie's Ethiopia. Comparatively, the material cost of Soviet involvement - given Moscow's own constrained resources - was much greater than the investment which the United States and its allies made in the region. The highest price, of course, was - and is still being - paid by the inhabitants of these countries.

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THE BROADER SIGNIFICANCE OF THE HORN Statistics on military and economic assistance demonstrate that all Western governments, including the United States, have always considered economic and social development a higher priority in the Hom than military interests. American economic aid always exceeded military aid in value, as Chapter 4 demonstrated. But what governments say and do does not represent a full measure of Western interest. Pluralistic Western societies and economies project themselves into other parts of the world through private educational, philanthropic, religious, commercial and industrial channels. From the 1840s onward European missionaries from many countries were active in educational and medical work in Ethiopia. American and Canadian missionaries joined the Europeans in the 20th century in both Ethiopia and Sudan. Chapters 2 and 3 have demonstrated that the predominant interest drawing Russians to the Horn in the nineteenth century was strategic, but when the United States opened diplomatic relations with Ethiopia in 1903 its purpose was to expand trade. When trade did not expand significantly, the small American Legation in Addis Ababa was closed, to be reopened only because Haile Selassie desired representation of a major country with no record of strategic designs on his country. Russia was compelled by its internal deterioration to withdraw from the Horn in the early twentieth century, but its political interest was such that it returned to the area during World War II in spite of severely limited resources. During the 1950s and 1960s, as economic development and modernization of the Third World became an international preoccupation, private Western activity expanded rapidly in the Hom, with the U.S taking the lead. Foundations gave grants for development of universities and specialized training institutions. Large numbers of people from these countries were placed in universities and training programs in America and Europe under both government and privately funded arrangements. American, Canadian and European universities supported numerous training and development projects. Groups concerned with economic and social development sent specialists and advisers. Research in many fields expanded rapidly. In Ethiopia, Transworld and Boeing had set up Ethiopian Airlines as early as 1946 and in the 1950s Dutch interests developed a modern sugar industry. Italians made extensive investments in industrial and agricultural development in both Ethiopia and Somalia. Western companies began the search for oil in all three countries. The programs of Western governments, international organizations and private interests usually complemented each other.

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No complete tallying of the value of unofficial aid to Horn countries has ever been made. Incomplete annual surveys carried out by the U.S. Embassy in Addis Ababa in the years immediately before the 1974 revolution indicated that American private aid to Ethiopia alone totalled several million dollars each year.2 The significance of such assistance is much more than financial. It underscores a permanent commitment of Western nations to economic and social development. FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR AID AND INVESTMENT All Western nations, including Japan, have declared support of Third World economic and social development a high policy priority for the remainder of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first. All have set up government departments to implement their policies. Many also have programs encouraging and coordinating private aid and investment by their citizens. Since most such programs enjoy legislative and public support, it is unlikely that the commitment to them will diminish during the 1990s and beyond. On the other hand, the Soviet Union, the countries of Eastern Europe, China and other communist or ex-communist countries are no longer even theoretically in the competition as providers of development assistance. Instead they are recipients of it and thus in competition with the Third World. Only democratic capitalist countries and international institutions created and supported by them are credible for the foreseeable future as sources of economic aid and investment. They are also the primary traders of the world. Aid, trade and investment will all take place in a much more competitive atmosphere during the 1990s than was true in the past. The once popular slogan "Aid Without Strings Attached" has been thoroughly discredited. Aid-providers have learned that aid without strings attached too often turns out to be aid wasted or misdirected. The countries of the Horn will have a combined population of more than 100 million people by the end of the century, 17 percent of the population of Subsaharan Africa. 3 There is widespread agreement among development specialists that the region is well endowed with the prerequisites for successful economic development, including populations that have proved resilient and resourceful in face of extreme adversity. Even in competition with Eastern Europe, the countries of the Hom have every reason to expect to continue to benefit from international and unilateral Western aid and development programs. Aid will come more readily if these countries can

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overcome the strife and divisiveness which have come close to crippling them during the 1980s. It will be better utilized if leaders enunciate realistic development policies, encourage flexibility and experimentation in application of them and give responsibility to officials who display creativity and initiative. If Western countries coordinate their operations more effectively, they can make a major contribution to this process. AMERICAN AND EUROPEAN APPROACHES TO RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT

The West must come to grips with basic .policy problems. With the United States supplying a major share of the funding and often in the lead organizationally, Western countries displayed energy and ingenuity during the 1980s in creating an infrastructure to deal with the millions of people suffering from (and threatened by) famine in the Horn. The system can go on operating indefinitely and, if further natural or man-made disaster causes a sharp rise in the need for emergency relief, the U.S. Congress will in all likelihood appropriate more money. But is this enough? Admirable as this reaction is, it is superficial and partial. Millions of people are being kept alive who would otherwise have died. But their prospects for a decent life have not improved. The long-range outlook has actually worsened. All these people remain victims of circumstances over which they have no control. Merely rescued temporarily, they have no insurance against falling into the same miserable condition again - as some of the Horn's chronic refugees have indeed done, crossing borders two or three times in a decade. Does not providing aid to ease the lot of the dispossessed and keep people from dying of famine carry with it some obligation to help them effect a permanent improvement in their lives? The answer seems obvious. Many of America's friends and allies say "Yes, we mUst help them improve their lives. Therefore we provide development aid." A few, such as Italy, have even given massive aid to resettlement sites to which Mengistu arbitrarily transported several hundred thousand famine victims, many of whom were rounded up at gunpoint from refugee camps. The EEC and the World Bank support projects for improving agriculture in regions where Mengistu's Marxists herded the rural population into villages designed to become collective farms. In Somalia both the EEC and Italian government have supported projects only for the sake of maintaining a presence while Siad Barre's refusal to abandon his own peculiar combination of socialism and clan favoritism has prevented effective management of them. The United States, caught

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in a self-deceptive policy of meeting Somalia's alleged need to defend itself against aggression, stretched criteria for judging the effectiveness of economic assistance to the breaking point. In Ethiopia, on the other hand, the United States has been firm on principle and refused to consider giving development aid for projects motivated by Marxist-Leninist dogma, deemed inhumane or unlikely to produce sustainable results. Some U.S. restrictions have been mandated by congressional action. Several other Western governments take positions similar to those of the U.S.: e.g. Britain, France, Germany and the Netherlands. Canada has been more indulgent, like Italy. Sweden, traditionally a major source of development assistance in Ethiopia, grew steadily more stringent during the 1980s in its conditions for aid and withdrew completely from support of its originally highly successful large-scale agricultural development project in Arussi. THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND THE HORN The Reagan Administration did no better than the Carter Administration in developing a long-range policy for the Horn of Africa. During the early Reagan years there were repeated and largely unsuccessful efforts to reverse negative trends in Sudan and Somalia. Initially justifiable, this policy was maintained in face of failure. The Reagan Administration wasted time devising compromises with Congress to permit continuation of military aid programs. The bureaucratic energy could have been more productively devoted to reexamination of the real value of military assistance. It is hard to see what useful purpose it served. It was not handled in a way that brought broader policy leverage. Neither Sudan nor Somalia made a significant contribution to U.S. defense requirements during the 1980s, while both deteriorated politically. Incompetent leaders were nevertheless bolstered by American military assistance, even though it was relatively meager. Congress was generally well ahead of the Executive Branch in questioning the usefulness of both military and economic aid for these two countries and in raising concerns about human rights. The fact that the Horn will not be able to regain political and economic health until the most populous and important country of the region Ethiopia - can be set on a path to political and economic recovery is now more clearly recognized in the U.S. government than ever before. The Reagan Administration's initial attitude of sullen hostility toward Ethiopia - stemming from failure to distinguish between Mengistu's vicious and incompetent leadership and the pro-American attitudes of

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the overwhelming majority of the Ethiopian people - did not last long and was completely reversed during the Great Famine. Nevertheless, once the famine was over, little effort was expended to devise pressures on Mengistu's regime for fundamental reform or - more important - on the Soviets to stop delivering weapons for his increasingly unsuccessful armies. The United States shrank from the challenge of working out a coordinated approach to the development aid issue with European allies and international organizations. Pressures on the Soviets may well have produced an initial sullen response, but we now know that they would have been welcomed by some officials in the Soviet party and government hierarchy who were doing "New Thinking" about the dead end to which Soviet policy has come in Ethiopia as well as in the Third World as whole. The U.S. could in this way have accelerated the policy changes that Gorbachev (or his successors) cannot escape. The Reagan Administration ended up moving neither backward nor forward in Sudan and Somalia, though both countries slipped backward in spite of American and other Western help. In effect, it invited concerned Congressmen to make up for its passivity and lack of initiative in policy thinking. The Congress is usually more effective in prescribing negative measures - such as suspension of military aid for Somalia and Sudan or attempting to legislate a trade embargo against Ethiopia - than in launching new initiatives. The primary responsibility for policy formulation is with the Executive Branch. The Bush Administration inherited a policy stalemate in the Horn of Africa. After a year and a half of marking time, it has the opportunity to chart a new course not only for the United States but for the Western World as a whole. PEACEFUL ENGAGEMENT IN THE HORN The deterioration of Mengistu's Marxist-Leninist government and the recurrence of widespread famine in northern Ethiopia in 1990 - with another international effort being mounted to alleviate it - gives the U.S. a new opportunity to take the lead in enunciating a comprehensive program for restoring peace and progress to the area. Continued insurgency, economic deterioration and resultant dislocation of populations in northern Somalia and southern Sudan are additional compelling incentives for action. Allies and friends of the United States must be invited to join in refining and expanding programs. Establishment of a multi-national coordinating group would be a good way of ensuring

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more efficient exchange of information and collaboration in diplomatic and operational initiatives. The program should have short-, medium- and long-range objectives.

SHORT-RANGE OBJECTIVES The short-range objectives include but should not be confined to saving as many lives as possible. In this the lesson of previous famine relief and refugee support operations should be taken to heart. The groundwork must be laid - or at least defined - for addressing the causes of the famine and disruption of lives so that the victims can be rehabilitated and provided with the opportunity to regain control of their lives. Short-range objectives must therefore include intensified efforts (a) to bring about cessation of hostilities and (b) to explore avenues of political and economic reform that will make it possible for Horn countries to feed themselves.

MEDIUM-RANGE OBJECTIVES Medium-range objectives should be centered around measures to stimulate, encourage and press for rapid movement toward fundamental political and economic change in all Horn countries. There should be no doubt about the direction of change: toward more open pluralistic societies and freer economies with governments that recognize the need for autonomy and diversity in dealing with different parts of their countries. In return, all concerned powers should make clear that they will avoid supporting territorial fragmentation or separatism as a matter of principle, whatever temporary arrangements must be made in practice to secure peace in areas affected by insurgency and civic disorder. The situation in each country needs to be assessed in its own terms, but the basic approach should involve a steady build-up of pressures and incentives for change and encouragement of constructive reform forces in these countries, with assurance that they will not be left helpless by the international community when abrupt political change occurs - i.e. when oppressive regimes are overthrown or collapse. The understanding and cooperation of regional organizations (such as the Organization of African Unity) should be sought. An early objective to be enunciated strongly by the U.S. should be declaration of a permanent moratorium on all arms shipments into the area. The organization of international peace- keeping

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forces to reestablish security in regions where order has collapsed should also be explored and, if feasible, implemented. The absence of a clear vision of the future is a prime factor inhibiting coalescence of constructive opposition forces to oppressive Horn regimes. It will be important in carrying out the program proposed above to define a set of long-range principles and objectives for the Horn which the international community can pledge to support. They have already been discussed in Chapter 6. Before considering them further, let us review the role which the Soviet Union could play in this process, as well as measures the international community can take if the Moscow refuses to cooperate. THE SOVIET FACTOR The revolution which the Soviet Empire is undergoing, and which appears likely to accelerate in intensity and complexity during the next few years, has impaired Moscow's ability to manage its Third World relationships. A Soviet leadership which has not intervened in the face of abandonment of communism in Eastern Europe ought to have difficulty justifying to the international community or to its own people any form of forceful intervention to preserve the shaky Ethiopian People's Republic. 4 Some Soviet officials may still wish to try to manipulate a more cooperative pro-Soviet leader into power as a replacement for Mengistu. Recent East European developments reduce the probability that such a maneuver could succeed. A move by Moscow to compensate for loss of Ethiopia by reestablishing a position of strength in Somalia also seems less probable with each month that passes. Nevertheless, as some strategic analysts argue, the Soviet General Staff may give high priority to retaining control of a sea route from the Mediterranean through the Indian Ocean to the Pacific and therefore want to retain leverage in the Hom. As of mid-1990 the Soviet Union had still failed to adjust its behavior in Ethiopia to correspond to the new realism it applied in face of revolutions against communist authoritarianism in Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania and even distant Mongolia. Soviet military shipments were still arriving at Assab in early 1990. First Deputy Foreign Minister Yuli Vorontsov reiterated a declaration of continued support for Mengistu on 27 October 1989 during a visit to Addis Ababa. s Subsequent statements in early 1990 confirmed Moscow's intention to stand by Mengistu. It seemed likely that Gorbachev, in the absence of a compelling reason to do so, was avoiding basic decisions on Ethiopia. Several years of genteel diplomatic exchanges about Ethiopia in bilateral

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talks between the U.S. and the USSR have produced a minimal response from Moscow. Fear of embarrassing Gorbachev should no longer deter the U.S. Government from speaking up strongly on this and other stalemated or deteriorating Third World situations. Moscow should be challenged to demonstrate a commitment to peace and reform in Ethiopia by:

1. 2.

3.

Halting immediately all military assistance and resupply shipments; Joining in an international declaration calling for: (a) a general cease-fire among all warring factions; and (b) establishment of an international peace-keeping mechanism while negotiations for resolution of armed conflicts continue or (in instances where they are not already under way) are initiated. Actively pressing Ethiopia to commit itself to fundamental economic and social reforms parallel in scope to those being implemented in Eastern Europe.

There are precedents for these propositions in the stance the U.S. has taken in respect to many other countries that have formed part of the Soviet Empire or stand in close relationship to Moscow. In addition, the international community should openly appeal to Arab governments to refrain from further assistance to insurgent movements in Ethiopia. Israel should be warned against paying a price in military assistance to Mengistu for restored diplomatic relations. A LONG-RANGE PLAN FOR THE HORN Zbigniew Brzezinski urges the West in its own interest to develop a positive vision for the future of the Soviet Union: A politically appealing vision inevitably must challenge existing reality. But a vision is necessary to impose order on dynamic change that otherwise might become chaos. It is, therefore, not utopian but actually realistic to try to define new formulas for the increasingly crisis-ridden Soviet Disunion. Moreover, given the intense admiration of all things American now so fashionable among the politically articulate Soviets, it behooves Americans to proffer concrete suggestions for how to alleviate the intensifying Soviet inter-national conflicts through deliberate adoption of con federational arrangements. 6

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The same arguments and principles apply equally well to Ethiopia and the other nations of the Horn. What does the U.S. have to risk or lose by declaring a vision for the future of the Horn that corresponds to our own ideals? Our friends and allies may choose to endorse it or issue similar declarations on their own. The declaration would advocate the principles already discussed in the preceding chapter, welcome and support governments committed to observing them:

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

A democratic, multi-party political system; An open, pluralistic society; A free-market economy; Rule of law, with an independent judiciary; Unrestricted flow of information, both internally and from abroad; Freedom of religion.

Other freedoms of particular concern to groups in Horn countries derive from, and can be defined in relation to, these basic principles. Freedoms can only be secured in a context where people accept responsibilities. The freedom of ethnic groups, labor unions, political parties, trade and professional associations, and cultural groups cannot be exercised in monopolistic fashion. Individuals must recognize that the enjoyment of their own basic rights requires that the same rights of others be respected and protected. The essential characteristic of open, pluralistic societies and democratic systems is that they provide mechanisms whereby conflicting demands and desires can be debated and decided (adjudicated, if necessary) and rules and prQCedures for enjoyment of freedoms can be worked out and periodically revised. The process is never-ending. New governments and leaders in the Horn will need encouragement and assistance in implementing the freedoms their people desire. There are bound to be frustrations. All Horn societies have traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution that reflect elementary democratic principles. Most of them still w(lrk to some degree. They can be adapted to more open societies and federal systems. Countries and international organizations assisting Hom governments must be patient about practice, but insistent about commitment to principles. Provision of economic assistance, operation of education and training programs and promotion of investment should all be conditioned on minimal observance of the six principles stated above. Implementation of these principles should be judged in terms of sincerity and consistency of effort and the direction of movement. A higher degree of active coordination than has prevailed to date between countries involved in supporting

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development in the Horn is essential. Techniques and mechanisms being developed to coordinate assistance to the newly reformed governments of Eastern Europe and monitor performance on reforms represent models that can be adapted to the Hom. A HORN FEDERATION AS ULTIMATE GOAL? The hastily contrived Soviet scheme for federation of Ethiopia, Somalia and South Yemen which Moscow had Fidel Castro advocate unsuccessfully in the spring of 1977 proved utterly impractical under the tense political circumstances of the time. In light of the Soviet record in the region, subsequent Soviet advocacy of federalist principles in the Horn was dismissed as a thinly disguised attempt to camouflage a Soviet desire for hegemony. There is nevertheless a good deal to be said for objective examination of ideas of federalism. With the exception of South Africa, where the Union of South Africa established after the Boer War has endured as a republic in which component elements retained identity, federations of states have not worked well in Africa. The best example in colonial Black Africa, the British-initiated East African Community which linked Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika in what appeared to be a mutually beneficial economic federation, did not long survive independence. The subsequent federation of Tanganyika with Zanzibar which created Tanzania has been successful but it is an anomaly, not an example applicable elsewhere. Developing economic relationships in West Africa may eventually lead to economic unions and even political federations, but the process will take time. The conclusion seems to be clear: African federations must evolve to meet requirements which are widely shared and understood in the societies entering into them. The idea of federation is essentially democratic. A federation is a form of pluralism in practice. Successful, enduring federations demonstrate a high degree of flexibility and evolve procedures and institutional arrangements that enable them to adjust to change. Modern history provides many examples of federal states. Those which have operated democratically and have had a clear economic rationale have ensured greater progress for their people and proved better able to cope with strain than those which have operated on an authoritarian basis. Contrast Switzerland, Canada, the United States and India with the Soviet Union or, perhaps more directly relevant to discussion of a Horn federation, the European Economic Community with COMECON. Movement toward federation in the Horn must be a gradual process.

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The basis for increased economic cooperation has developed to a remarkable degree during the period of authoritarian political deterioration. For the better part of a decade eastern Ethiopia, northern Somalia and the Republic of Djibouti have constituted an informal "free trade area" in which goods of all kinds move across borders in all directions outsid~ of government control. Political hostility, military confrontations and ethnic and religious antipathies do not prevent traders from moving goods in both directions across all Horn borders. A significant portion of Ethiopia's coffee and livestock exports leave the country via southern Somalia from where they are exported to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. All three Horn countries interrelate economically with Kenya over loosely patrolled borders where officials on both sides have developed a vested interested in "free trade." All this extra-legal trade that takes place across Horn borders in a period when all countries are in a condition of economic depression rests on something more fundamental than the desires of smugglers and underpaid officials to make money. There is widespread demand for the items and products that are traded. This fact demonstrates that there is a basis for economic cooperation on a much broader scale once these countries have more flexible and realistic governments. It means that the best basis for movement toward federation in the Horn is economic. Developed countries and international organizations providing economic assistance and investment capital can encourage these trends by favoring arrangements that lead to increased economic cooperation and, on occasion, by making economic cooperation a condition of support for assistance. In the longer term it is difficult to envision settlement of ethnic issues in the Horn without a higher degree of political cooperation between the countries of the immediate region and, perhaps, with some of their other neighbors. There are many strains of underlying cultural continuity throughout the area. If all the Horn states are reconstituted on the basis of federative principles, closer relations between regions of one state and another are likely to develop. In most instances there is already a solid historical basis for such relationships: between northern Somalia and contiguous regions of Ethiopia and Djibouti, e.g. between the Ogaden and Somalia; between the Afars and Djibouti; between southwestern Ethiopia and Sudan; between Eritrea and neighboring Sudanese regions. Nevertheless, political federation of the Horn is a very distant prospect. It is conceivable only when these societies have matured and modernized and developed a broad network of interrelationships and shared interests. The process must begin with Horn states reconstituting themselves as functioning federal polities. This in itself may take a good deal of time.

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Is the prospect too idealistic to be taken seriously? Perhaps, but what are the alternatives? Fragmentation into mini-states? Continued tension and civil war, erupting periodically into cross-border confrontations? Endless international famine-relief operations to save lives not worth living? Chaos?

Appendix Certain topics which did not fit into the narrative but which are important for their bearing on the major themes of the book are dealt with in the brief sections which follow. ERITREA - GEOGRAPHY Eritrea is not a natural geographic region but a transitional zone. Its terrain is extremely varied: a long, barren seacoast; a narrow, hot coastal desert; a rugged escarpment; a high plateau with temperate climate but uncertain rainfall; and northern and western lowlands that drain into the Nile basin. Linguistic and ethnic unity are lacking. The EPLF recognizes nine nationalities, each with its own language. Four non-indigenous languages are in use: Amharic, English, Italian and Arabic. Religious distinctions include several Muslims sects and Orthodox, Evangelical and Catholic Christians. Religious affiliations do not always correspond to ethnic divisions. There is no ethnic or religious majority. Compared to neighboring areas, Eritrea has highly developed infrastructure: roads, power lines, dams, ports and a long unused railroad. Italy made substantial investment in Eritrea during its 50 years of colonial rule. Infrastructure was extended during the period of British occupation and following federation with Ethiopia in 1952. There are great variations in patterns of life, ranging from pastoral nomadism in arid areas to village-centered agriCUlture in the highlands where cultivation has been practiced for thousands of years and complex societies based on farming and trade had already reached a high level of evolution in the pre-Christian era. Massawa is heir to a coastal tradition of urban life based on sea-borne trade that goes back to ancient times. Asmara, an attractive Afro-Mediterranean city barely a hundred years old, is a focal point for government, industry, commerce and education. With a population now approaching half a million, it is home to almost 20 percent of Eritrea's people. Several subprovincial capitals - Keren, Adi Ugri, Tessenei, Barentu - serve as trade and communications centers.

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ERITREA - ORIGIN OF THE IT ALlAN COLONY A private Italian company set up a trading station at Assab in 1869. The Italian government, belatedly joining in the scramble for Africa, took it over in 1882 and three years later moved into Massawa. Italian ambitions grew rapidly. In early 1887 they dispatched an expeditionary force to the highlands. It was almost annihilated by Ras Alula, the ruler of Hamasien (the region around Asmara), at Dogali, in the coastal plain.l This setback was only temporary. By 1890 through a combination of force, diplomacy and intrigue Italy succeeded in gaining control of the entire territory between the coast and the Mareb River and proclaimed it Colonia Eritrea - the Red Sea Colony. Thus the name first came onto the map. ERITREA - BRITISH ADMINISTRATION Italian colonial policy had not envisioned Eritrean independence or selfrule. Eritrea was regarded as part of Ethiopia and Mussolini saw it as a base from which the conquest of all of Ethiopia would be effected. 2 Eritrea and Tigre were united as one of the six districts of Africa Orientale Africana between 1936 and 1941. When British Commonwealth forces conquered the colony in 1941, they set up a military administration, treating Eritrea as conquered enemy territory as defined by international law. British military rule was mild. Eritreans enjoyed both prosperity and relative personal freedom. The British, though military occupiers, were more liberal in treatment of the population than the Italians had been. British military administrators, in fact, encouraged politicization of Eritrean society, though no single British plan for the future of the colony developed. Some Britons favored amalgamating all or part of Eritrea with Sudan; others envisioned a close association between Eritrea and Tigre. No independence movement developed during the period of British military administration. Instead political opinion became polarized for and against unification with Ethiopia. Tigrinya-speaking, Orthodox Christian highlanders strongly favored unification. Some lowland Muslims wanted their areas joined to Sudan. Other Muslims, some Christians and a large portion of the Italian colonial population preferred some form of restored association with Italy. ERITREA - INSURGENCY, EARLY PHASE A few Eritreans who strongly opposed federation with Ethiopia fled abroad during the 1950s. When Nasser took power in Egypt and sought influence

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throughout Africa and the Middle East, some found a welcome in Cairo and one, an Evangelical trade union leader, Wolde-Ab Wolde-Mariam, began broadcasting over Radio Cairo. Nasser stopped these broadcasts when Haile Selassie came to his support during the Suez crisis of 1956. Wolde-Ab and others persisted in opposition and established the Eritrean Liberation Movement (ELM) in 1959. Christians in Eritrea did not respond to its summons to rebellion. A broader group which aimed to unite Christians and Muslims, the Eritrean Liberation Front, superseded it in 1961. It was dominated by Muslims of the interior Beni Amer tribe. One of them, a native of Tessenei, mounted an attack on an Ethiopian military position on I September 1961. This episode has subsequently been glorified as the beginning of armed struggle in Eritrea. During the next six years the ELF, with exile leaders in Beirut, Damascus, Cairo and Baghdad, profited off the rising tide of Arab nationalism and gained material support from several Arab governments. Exile leaders formed a Supreme Council in Khartoum and divided Eritrea into five regional commands patterned after those of the Algerians. These had considerable autonomy which reduced the effect of the factionalism that divided Muslims even more than Christians. Efforts to accommodate Christian rebels were complicated by pressures from the ELF's Arab backers, who saw Eritrea as Arab territory. Muslim fighters were trained in Syria, while young Christians were trained separately in camps in Sudan. Both were expected to speak Arabic, which became a source of contention. Periodic hit-and-run operations were carried out in various parts of Eritrea but their military effect was negligible. Fighters totalled no more than a few hundred at this time. Until the latter half of the 1960s the rebellion had no significant EastWest dimension. The ELF was predominantly conservative, traditional and by no means irrevocably separatist in orientation. Socialism was of little interest to anyone. Muslims felt little affinity with African anti-colonialist liberation movements who showed little interest in them.

ERITREA - INSURGENCY AND MARXISM Marxism was not a causative factor in the Eritrean rebellion. An avowedly Marxist faction coalesced only when the initial phase of the insurgency produced new leaders drawn in large part from young men who had been exposed to Marxism as students or to whom Marxism appealed as a formula for taking and exercising power. The Marxist Eritrean People's Liberation Front, proclaimed in early 1972, steadily expanded its influence during

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the 1970s. Soviet-leaning Derg officers who found it necessary to present themselves as ultra-nationalists to justify and consolidate their hold on Ethiopia could find no common ground with separatist Marxist Eritreans. The fact that both were immature and insecure and had to operate in highly factionalized political contexts discouraged compromise. Both competed for Soviet favor until 1977. During this period the EPLF steadily gained strength against other insurgent factions. After 1977 conservative Arab states replaced most of the arms and money from communist and radical Arab sources that had previously sustained the Eritrean insurgency, but until the late 1980s, the EPLF continued to call itself Marxist. Eritrea thus offered the seemingly incongruous spectacle of a Marxist anti-Marxist insurgency. Both the Derg's Marxism and that of the EPLF had little bearing on the internal problems of Eritrea. These, ironically, are primarily economic and social, but Marxism, in spite of its pretensions to economic determinism, had no constructive solutions to offer.3 GE'EZ The ancient Semitic written language of Ethiopia is almost identical to ancient South Arabian. Both used the same ancient alphabet. Ge'ez stands in the same relationship to the modern Semitic languages of Ethiopia as Latin does to the Romance languages of Europe. Ge'ez remains in liturgical use in the Ethiopian Orthodox Church and among Ethiopian Jews. Ge'ez roots have long been a source for new words in Amharic and Tigrinya. HAILE SELASSIE - STYLE OF GOVERNMENT Until the Italian invasion Haile Selassie maintained intact most of the old kingdoms and principalities that had evolved since medieval times in northern and southwestern Ethiopia. After the 1941 liberation, he reorganized the country into twelve (later fourteen) governorates. 4 No two of them were administered in exactly the same manner and there were wide variations. Tigre was restored to its old princely family after World War II (see below). Hararge continued to be governed by Shoan Amharas but leaders of the Muslim population, including Somali clan chiefs, were adroitly co-opted into the ruling group. In the Afar sultanate of Aussa, the hereditary ruler remained in power until the end of Haile Selassie's reign. Governors, whether of regional origin or appointed from Addis Ababa,

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often enjoyed extensive autonomy and fell into disfavor only if they proved inept or plotted against the central government. In 1955, Haile Selassie proclaimed a revision of his 1931 constitution. Liberal in general principles, it was authoritarian in specific provisions but legitimized the more complex administrative system that was required as development and modernization gained momentum after World War II. Haile Selassie' s government, as well as Ethiopian society, evolved ever more rapidly toward modern pluralistic patterns during the last two decades of his reign. s Until his final years, when reluctance to replace familiar personalities and conservative habits reduced his effectiveness, Haile Selassie remained a paternalistic activist, pushing and prodding Ethiopia into the modern world. British Ethiopianist Edward Ullendorff made an apt observation in the introduction to his translation of Haile Selassie's autobiography: "For two thirds of his life, all the problems Haile Selassie had to face arose from the fact that he was in advance of his time."6 He encouraged modem education, technical and commercial enterprise, the growth of autonomous institutions - in short a more open, pluralistic society. It was Haile Selassie who had fostered the development of all the forces who contended for power as his government fell into disarray in 1974: students, teachers, technicians, businessmen, civil servants, labor leaders, police and professional military officers. The autonomy and freedom of action which all these groups had gained by 1974 was systematically circumscribed and suffocated as Mengistu Haile Mariam gained predominance in the Derg and forced Stalinist socialism onto the country. NAMES IN THE HORN Most peoples in the Horn of Africa use the same name system. The "first" name is the individual's proper name and the "second" name the father's name. Surnames are not used except by some southern Sudanese and occasional Europeanized families. The system is most methodically applied in Ethiopia, where all peoples follow it consistently. In Sudan and Somalia, clan designations and nicknames may form part of an individual's name. In these countries, "Mohammed" is frequently given as an initial honorific name, but not used for day-to-day purposes. Ethiopian Christian names often have two elements: e.g. Haile Selassie, "Power of the Trinity" or Gebre Kristos, "Slave of Christ." Thus a complete Ethiopian name can consist of four parts. Wives do not take their husband's name. Many titles were used in pre-revolutionary Ethiopia and have not entirely disappeared.

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The term Guad (Comrade) was introduced for both women and men when the WPE was formed in 1984, but is unlikely to outlast Mengistu's regime. SOMALIA - EVOLUTION OF THE STATE Menelik's conquest of Harar and the Ogaden resulted in destructive Ethiopian raids on Somali herdsmen in regions which had not yet come under British protection. Repeated Ethiopian capture of large herds of cattle and camels provoked Somali resistance. A roving holy man,leader of a Sufi sect, Said Mohammed Abdille Hasan, became leader of this resistance, first mobilizing Ogaden and Dolbahanta clansmen in the British protectorate and eventually drawing Somalis from the Italian colony into rebellion against Ethiopia, Britain and Italy. With the British in the lead, the three powers undertook their first campaign against "The Mad Mullah" and his "dervishes" in 1901. The Mullah's forces grew to 20000 guerrilla fighters, almost half mounted cavalry. They were fired as much by religious zeal as by ethnic solidarity, but resistance was inspired by a combination of both. The British brought in Indian and African troops but the tribesmen had the advantage of vast expanses of semi-desert. In a famous letter to the colonial powers, the Mullah declared: I have no forts, no houses. .. I have no cultivated fields, no silver or gold for you to take. You gained no benefit by killing my men and my country is no good to you . . . The country is a jungle . . . If you want wood and stone, you can get them in plenty. There are also many ant heaps. The sun is very hot. All you can get from me is war. If you wish peace, go away from my country to your own.7 The struggle went on until 1920 when the guerrilla warriors were finally defeated by a combination of air bombardment and the great influenza epidemic that followed World War I. Said Mohammed Abdille Hasan died of influenza in December of that year. 8 An impressive statue of him on his favorite horse was raised in Mogadishu after independence, honoring him as the founder of the Somali state. Said Mohammed Abdille Hassan created no government or state structure. The Somali Republic was built on the legacy of the Italian and British colonial governments. Well into the mid-twentieth century, for most Somalis clan and tribal loyalties and religion were far more meaningful than any sense of common nationality. A small class of educated men were deeply affected by political nationalism which developed after World War II when

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the former Italian colony, first occupied by Britain, was returned to Italy as a United Nations trusteeship to be prepared for independence, while the smaller northern British protectorate of Somaliland went through a separate process of orderly, British-style evolution toward self-government. The two regions were combined only in 1960 when the Somali Republic was launched into independence with a liberal democratic constitution. During the republic's first nine years, elections were held regularly and political life was lively, with panies forming primarily as coalitions of tribal and clan groups. SUDAN - EVOLUTION OF THE STATE The path by which both Sudan and Somalia were launched into evolution toward modernization was very different from Ethiopia's. Development of modem government was the result of external initiative instead of internal evolution. Sudan after 1898 was formally an Anglo-Egyptian condominium but Egypt's role in governing was minimal. Britain added vast, ethnically disparate regions that had never formed part of any Sudanese state to Sudanese territory in the early twentieth century. Administration of the country centered on the Arab/Muslim north but even here the population was deeply divided by religious sectarianism and tribalism. The British contribution to Sudanese development was fourfold: a high-quality civil service; small but efficient armed forces organized to serve internal security needs; an educational system limited in extent but high in quality; and some development of transport and other economic infrastructure. The British introduced no tradition of maximalist, intrusive government into Sudan. The process of nation-building remained incomplete. Britain governed the outlying parts of the country lightly and indirectly. Young officers of the Sudan Political Service, often fresh from Oxford or Cambridge, were sent out to establish a British presence, to regulate trade and restrain tribes from raiding rivals in territories of neighboring colonial powers, to advise traditional chiefs on administration of their territories, and to adjudicate disputes. They were often the only connecting links to the government in Khartoum which had no other presence as such in outlying areas. 9 TIGRE - HISTORICAL BACKGROUND The province of Tigre and the neighboring highland areas of Eritrea are a single historical and cultural entity whose inhabitants speak Tigrinya, the

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Ethiopian Semitic language closest LO Ge'ez. Over millennia Tigre suffered severe ecological degradation, though it remained thickly populated. And though the idea of an Ethiopian Empire persisted from ancient times, the state was more often than not a loose association of semi-autonomous kingdoms that paid tribute to the empire and gave military support in times of emergency. Tigre has played a prominent role in the competition for Ethiopian national leadership. Several Tigrean nobles were major figures in north Ethiopian politics in the first half of the nineteenth century. Following the defeat and suicide of Emperor Tewodros at Magdala in 1868, the ruler of Tigre, Dejazmach Kassa Abba Bezbez (born 1831), emerged among several contenders as the logical claimant to the imperial throne and was crowned Emperor Yohannes IV in 1872. He reunified northern Ethiopia in the face of Egyptian, Italian and Sudanese encroachments and died fighting Sudanese Mahdists at the Battle of Metemma in March 1889.10 After consolidating their hold on Eritrea in the 1890s, the Italians looked upon Tigre as the avenue through which they would eventually advance to take possession of all of Ethiopia. Thus they sought influence by cultivating dissident Tigrean leaders. This led to a pattern of politics well described by the Israeli historian, Haggai Erlich: Collaboration [with the Italians] ... did not stem from a separatist instinct . .. Rather it was always a means of obtaining promotion . . . within the traditional Ethiopian game. Taking money and arms from the Italians usually aimed at maintaining support and creating a nuisance in the eyes of Addis Ababa . .. Indeed the ultimate goal of the Tigrean chiefs cooperating with foreigners was to eliminate local rivals in order to be recognized as Tigre's negus by Ethiopia's emperors. The Shoans ... unable to force an Ethiopian centralist government on Tigre, chose to promote local jealousies and rivalries. l1 When the Italians invaded in 1935-36, several Tigrean aristocrats, as well as the entire Raya and Azebo Oromo population of the southeastern part of the province, supported them. After the defeat of Haile Selassie's forces, Tigre was incorporated into Eritrea. The Italians invested very little in developing the province. Some leaders eventually shifted allegiance and joined the Patriot resistance. Following the defeat of the Weyane rebellion (see below), the grandson of Yohannes IV, Ras Seyoum Menegesha, was appointed governor. On his death in 1960, he was succeeded by his son, Ras Menegesha Seyoum, married to Haile Selassie's granddaughter, Princess Aida Desta. Ras

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Menegesha established a reputation as an activist keenly interested in economic development, but the province remained one of Ethiopia's poorest and least modernized to the eve of the revolution. TIGRE - THE WEY ANE REBELLION After defeating the Italians in 1941, British forces occupied Tigre as well as Eritrea. Haile Selassie moved quickly to reassert his authority in the region. He set up a provincial administration and sent in troops. Traditional forms of tribute were abolished and a new tax system was introduced. Though it guaranteed land tenure, the new tax system was not welcomed by the majority of Tigrean peasants. Few had paid any taxes during Italian occupation, for much of the province had been out of the control of any effective administration. During those years bands of Patriots, locally recruited Italian auxiliaries, troops loyal to local leaders, and bandits had all operated in Tigre and compelled the peasants to support them when they had the power to do so. Though many Tigreans would rather have lived with the autonomy and near-anarchy to which they had become accustomed for nearly a decade than adjust to a stable and orderly administration, they could probably have been won over to Haile Selassie's new tax if it had been administered by a rational and efficient bureaucracy. The officials and military commanders appointed by Addis Ababa were more often than not inefficient and rapacious. A local poem of the time expressed prevailing Tigrean attitudes: Woe, woe, woe - death unto the officials of today who abuse their authority for a kilo of grain and destroy documents for the gift of a goat. The emperor is not aware of these scandals, but surely he has sent us hyenas to all places. 12 Some Tigrean nobles, wanting to retain as much regional autonomy as possible, opposed Haile Selassie' s consolidation of authority. In their eagerness to see security reestablished in Tigre, the British were unmindful of the complexity of local political relationships and attitudes toward the central government in Addis Ababa. Serious trouble first developed in the southeastern region of the province among the Raya and Azebu and the Wejerat, peoples with a long history of resistance to authority and complicated relations with Tigrean leaders. The Raya and Azebu are closely related predominantly Muslim Oromo subtribes; the Wejerat are Christian, but both were opposed to central authority.

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In a clash in January 1942 at Kobbo, three British officers and several Ethiopian soldiers were killed trying to force the Raya and Azebu to pay taxes. The British then bombed the area, but with little effect. The rebellious tribesmen were defeated only after a four-month campaign lasting from April to July 1942. Thirty thousand troops were used, including 5000 from Wollo and Shoa traditionally regarded as enemies by the Tigreans. Large tracts of country were devastated and severe fines in both livestock and money were imposed on the defeated Raya and Azebu. Nevertheless, the campaign had no deterrent effect on the rest of Tigre. Security conditions in the rest of the province deteriorated and tax arrears accumulated. Haile Selassie responded by sending in more Shoan troops. The next major clash was with the Wejerat who periodically raided the lowland Afar for cattle, adding to the general instability of the region. They, too, refused to pay taxes. A large military force led by a Tigrean subprovincial official acting in the name of the central government attacked the Wejerat in May 1943 and was defeated. The commander was taken prisoner and, in accord with Wejerat tradition, dressed like a woman and kept in detention until JUly. This defeat badly undermined the standing of Tigrean leaders cooperating with the Addis Ababa government. Open resistance now broke out all over Tigre and leadership of the rebellion crystallized around Haile Mariam Redda, a young man of peasant origin who had been coopted by the Italians and made governor of his native region, Dandiera in Enderta, in 1938. After the Italian defeat he was removed by Addis Ababa and became a Robin Hood type outlaw popular among the peasants because he protected them from bandits and corrupt officials. His political program was conservative: He accused the Shoan Amhara aristocracy of having impoverished Tigre and destroying its institutions by ranging the Tigrean nobility against each other. He attacked them for having ... accused the Tigreans as unpatriotic and less nationalistic than the Amharas while they sold the latter's lands to foreign powers - presumably a reference to [the loss of] Eritrea [to Italy]. He dismissed the emperor as a coward who had betrayed the country and was thus unfit to rule. He ... accused him of being an agent of the Catholic church .. , He vowed to liberate Tigre from Shoan Amhara hegemony if the central government failed to respond to the call of the rebels and reform itself.13 Many of Haile Mariam's commanders were Tigrean aristocrats. The rebels did not question the existing social structure, perhaps because traditional

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Tigrean patterns of land ownership and generational relationships provided for adjustment up and down the social scale. 14 Tigrean loyalties were to local communities, leading families and traditional leaders. Such loyalties gave the rebellion great strength as it gathered force but made the movement brittle when the rebels met sustained resistance and frustration. Spectacular victories were followed by quick and devastating defeat. The rebellion enjoyed the support of the Orthodox clergy. All elected officials were required to take an oath administered by a priest. Haile Mariam condemned Catholics, Protestants and officials who smoked and wore long pants as alien intruders and an outrage to tradition. Traditional tolerance of Muslims prevailed, however, and Muslim rebels participated with Christians. The rebellion was motivated by Tigrean regional pride and particularism. Separatism was not a factor. The Tigreans considered themselves as good Ethiopians as the Shoans, whose domination they resented. The rebels were well armed, for the Italians had distributed large quantities of weapons to presumably friendly Tigrean peasants during their occupation. Haile Mariam established his headquarters at Wokro, an old town on the main north-south highway famous for its ancient rock-cut church. He had a natural gift for delegating authority and inspiring cooperation. He used the rainy season of 1943 to organize his forces. After celebrating the Ethiopian New Year on 12 September, they went on the offensive. Their first victory was a hard-fought assault on the government garrison at Quiha, a key junction on the main highway south of Wokro. They then moved westward to Enda Yesus, a fort overlooking the provincial capital, Makelle. Central government officials fled. Haile Mariam issued a proclamation to the inhabitants of Makelle which stated: Our governor is Jesus Christ And our flag that of Ethiopia Our religion is that of Yohannes IV. People of Tigre: Follow the moUo of Weyane. 15 Haile Selassie ordered his minister of war, the Patriot guenilla leader, Ras Abebe Aregai, to take charge of the campaign against the Weyane. Ras Abebe's central government forces were bolstered by a small contingent of British officers and technicians. The Ras rushed northward and arrived at Korem, on the southern border of Tigre, on 17 September 1943. A rebel force which included large elements of Raya and Azebu blocked him. The battle which developed centered on the great natural fortress of Amba Alaji which had already seen two bloody encounters during the previous eight

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years: during the Italian invasion in 1935 when both aerial bombardment and poison gas were used against the poorly anned Ethiopians and again in 1941 when British forces and Ethiopian Patriots defeated the Italians. The Weyane forces outnumbered those of the central government, but this advantage was offset by artillery and British air power. Haile Mariam launched a three-pronged attack on government positions with perhaps 10 000 men on 6 October. Disagreements developed among some of the Tigrean leaders and the rebels were unable to maintain momentum. Ras Abebe moved north out of Korem on 9 October and proceeded systematically via Quiha to Makelle, reaching it on 14 October. He overran Haile Mariam's headquarters at Wokro on 17 October. Interviewed in 1974, Haile Mariam contended that his forces could have won by exhausting their opponents had it not been for the artillery and air attacks. This judgment is confirmed by the observations of a British officer at the time: The bombing was accurate and inflicted considerable casualties which had their effect in undermining rebel determination. Quite apart from the actual casualties inflicted, however, after one or two attacks the appearance of the aircraft alone was sufficient to cause concentrations of tribesmen to disperse. Ground troops were thus enabled to move forward and occupy key places without opposition. 16 Ras Abebe Aregai was appointed governor of Tigre and embarked on a brutal "pacification" of the province. The Raya and Azebu had all their lands and animals confiscated. Ten Weyane leaders who were caught were sent to Shoa and imprisoned at Debre Berhan. Haile Mariam Redda himself did not surrender until 1946. Haile Selassie exiled him to Illubabor and then to Gamu Gofa for 20 years. In 1975 the Derg appointed him head of militia in Tigre. Memory of the Weyane rebellion remains alive in Tigre. TPLF insurgents in the 1980s invoked Weyane traditions to inspire resistance to Mengistu's government in Addis Ababa and Mengistu used the term Weyane as an epithet to condemn them.

Notes Preface 1.

Published by Ernest Benn, London, and distributed by Westview Press, Boulder, CO, in the U.S. The book covers most of my travels except those in Shoa. I planned and began to write a second book on travel in Shoa but have not yet finished it.

Introduction 1.

2.

A common counterargument advanced by people with little grounding in history was the contention that it was asking too much of the Somalis to give up their aspiration to unify all Somali-speaking lands. But why should it have been so much more difficult for them, in face of defeat, to abandon their territorial ambitions than it was for the Greeks after 1922 or for the Germans after 1945 or for the Mexicans - half of whose country we seized in the mid-19th century? The VOA did no broadcasting to Ethiopia until the early 1980s. I secured the policy decision and laid the groundwork for broadcasts in Amharic during the final year of the Carter Administration.

Part I - The Long Road to the Present 1.

The second element in a name is ordinarily the father's name in Ethiopia and may include clan or tribal names and nicknames in Sudan and Somalia.

Chapter 1: Geography and History 1. 2.

3.

The Eritrean railway which extends from Massawa to beyond Agordat has been inoperable for more than two decades because of insurgent damage. The two Ethiopian provinces of Wollega and Gojjam, taken together, have more well-watered cultivable land than Kenya. Ethiopia as a whole has at least 30 times the cultivable area of Egypt. The populations of Egypt and Ethiopia are approximately the same size. The 1937 figures are official Italian estimates. The figure for Ethiopia includes Eritrea but is lower than most other estimates of the period; 1967 figures are from The Economist; 1987 and 2000 figures are World Bank estimates, drawing on and projecting figures of the respective

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Notes to pp. 15-18

4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

13. 14. 15. 16.

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governments. The original Kenya figure is an official projection of the census of 1931. Donald Johanson and Maitland Edey, Lucy, the Beginnings of Humankind, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1981. See Richard Leakey and Roger Lewin, People of the Lake, Doubleday, New York, 1978, and Richard Leakey, The Making of Mankind, Michael Joseph, London, 1981. Grover Hudson, "Language Classification and the Semitic Prehistory of Ethiopia," Folia Orientaiia, XVIII, 1977. J. Spencer Trimingham, Islam in the Sudan, Cass, London, 1965, p.39. The term Cushitic which has largely replaced the earlier term Hamitic for the non-Semitic languages and peoples of the Hom is derived from ancient Kush. P. L. Shinnie, Meroe, Thames & Hudson, London, 1967. J. W. McCrindle, The Topographia Christiana, Hakluyt Society, London, 1897, p. 120. Graham Connah, African Civilizations, Cambridge University Press, 1987. The great majority of Yemeni Jews migrated to Israel shortly after its founding, but a few Jewish settlements remain. The Ethiopian Jews Falashas - have been the subject of continual international concern in recent years, but there is no evidence that the Marxist-Leninist regime deliberately singled them out for persecution. They suffered from the same misfortunes as the rest of the Ethiopian population. More than half of them have now found their way to Israel and emigration continues. Stuart Mumo-Hay, Excavations at Aksum: Research at the Ancient Ethiopian Capital by the late Dr Neville Chittick, British Institute in Eastern Africa, Nairobi, 1989. G. W. B. Huntingford (ed.), The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea, Hakluyt Society, London, 1980. Sergew Hable Selassie; Ancient and Medieval Ethiopian History to 1270, Haile Selassie University Press, Addis Ababa, 1972, pp. 81-2. Maxime Rodinson, Mohammed, Penguin, 1971, pp. 113-16. Also J. Spencer Trimingham, Islam in Ethiopia, Cass, London, 1965. In the Mediterranean world the term "Ethiopia" during ancient times - derived from the Greek for "Land of Burnt Faces" - was usually applied to the whole region south of Egypt. It has the same basic meaning as "Sudan" which comes from Arabic "Bi/ad as-Sudan" - "Region of the Blacks." Abyssinia derives from the Arabic term for Ethiopia, Habesha. Its derivation is still a subject of controversy among scholars. It has pejorative connotations in modern Ethiopia like the term Coptic for Ethiopian Christianity. Coptic means Egyptian and, though Ethiopian Christianity had close connections with the Egyptian Coptic Church until the twentieth century, the term is not used by Ethiopians for their church, which is called Orthodox.

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17.

18. 19. 20. 2l. 22.

23. 24.

25. 26. 27. 28.

29.

30.

Notes to pp. 19-25

Donald Levine, Greater Ethiopia, the Evolution of a Multiethnic Society, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1974. An important recent work carries this history into the mid-twentieth century: Donald Donham and Wendy James (eds), The Southern Marches of Imperial Ethiopia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986. Sven Rubenson, The Survival of Ethiopian Independence, Heinemann, London, 1976,pp. 31-32. G. W. B. Huntingford (ed.), The Glorious Victories of Amda Seyon, King of Ethiopia, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1965, pp. 57-58. What is known of these was collected by the Hakluyt Society in London and published as Ethiopian Itineraries, circa 1400-1524, Cambridge University Press, 1958. The port has disappeared but the name survives in the Straits of Hormuz. The damage which Ahmad Gragn did has never been forgotten. Every Christian highlander still hears tales of him in his childhood. In the 1970s I often listened to villagers describe sites of towns, forts and churches destroyed by him as if these catastrophes had occurred only a few years before. At the Monastery of Mertule Maryam in Gojjam in early 1989 monks displayed an enoromous blue velvet robe said to have been taken from him when he was killed, brought to the monastery and preserved there ever since. The late Turkish historian