Food Trade and Foreign Policy: India, the Soviet Union, and the United States 9781501742835

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Food Trade and Foreign Policy India, the Soviet Union, and the United States Robert L. Paarlberg

Cornell University Press

Ithaca and London

NO LONGER THE PROPERTY OF THE

Food Trade and Foreign Policy

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https://archive.org/details/foodtradeforeignOOOOpaar

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This book was written under the auspices of the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. Copyright © 1985 by Cornell University All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, 124 Roberts Place, Ithaca, New York 14850. First published 1985 by Cornell University Press. International Standard Book Number 0-8014-1772-4 (cloth) International Standard Book Number 0-8014-9345-5 (paper) Fibrary of Congress Catalog Card Number 84-29335 Printed in the United States of America Fibrarians: Fibrary of Congress cataloging information appears on the last page of the book. The paper in this book is acid-free and meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Fongevity of the Council on Fibrary Resources.

Contents (

Preface vii Introduction 1

11

The Food Power Presumption

15

Origins of the Food Power Presumption The Food Power Debate 21 2

India: Domestic Sources of Grain Trade Policy The Domestic Food Balance Rice Trade Policy 37 Wheat Trade Policy 46 Summary 62

3

28

29

The Soviet Union: Retreat from Food Power Grain Trade Policy Grain Trade Policy Grain Trade Policy Grain Trade Policy Summary 98

4

16

63

under Stalin 64 under Khrushchev 68 under Brezhnev 73 since Brezhnev 97

The United States: Food Power Forgone

100

Grain Exports, Farm Prices, and Foreign Policy before 1933 The Great Depression 103 World War II and the Marshall Plan 105 The Eisenhower Years 107 The Kennedy—Johnson Years 111 The Nixon—Ford Years 117 The Carter Years 131 The Reagan Years: Food Power in Eclipse 133 Summary 140

101

6

Contents

5

Testing Food Power: U.S. Food Aid to India, 1965—1967 U.S. Food Power Potential Objectives and Tactics

144

146

Domestic Objections in the United States

151

Response of the International Food Aid Community Impact on India

6

143

157

159

Testing Food Power: Embargo on U.S. Grain to the Soviet Union, 1980-1981 170 U.S. Food Power Potential Objectives and Tactics

171

173

Domestic Objections in the United States

178

Response of the International Food-Trading System Impact on the Soviet Union Summary

213

219

Bibliography Index

199

211

Conclusion Notes

184

251

258

Tables 1. Indian net rice trade, 1961—1984

38

2. Indian net wheat trade, 1951—1984

48

66 3. Soviet grain exports, 1904—1937 4. Soviet grain trade, 1956—1964 71 5. Soviet response to poor grain harvests, 1963-1972

6. Soviet grain trade, 1965-1983

88

7. U.S. grain exports, 1935—1950

106

8. U.S. exports of wheat and coarse grains, 1961—1984

82

122

9. Total Soviet grain imports by country of origin, 1979—1981

10. U.S. grain exports and Soviet grain imports, 1979—1980 11. U.S. share (%) of world grain exports, 1978—1981 198 12. Soviet total grain imports, 1979-1981 201

195

197

13. Soviet grain imports and feed use, 1979—1980 202 14. Soviet cattle, hog, and poultry inventories on state and collective farms, 1978-1982

203

15. Soviet average liveweights at slaughter of cattle and hogs, 1978— 1981 204 16. Soviet meat and milk production, 1978—1980

205

Preface (

“Food,” it has been said, “is a weapon.” This book challenges that sensational assertion through an examination of past and present grain trade policies in India, the Soviet Union, and the United States. In none of these countries, as it turns out, is food trade used consistently as an instrument of foreign policy. Moreover, when such use has been at¬ tempted, the presumed advantage to those wielding the “food weap¬ on” has failed to materialize. I trace the scant use and frequent failure of food power in the first instance to domestic food and farm policy constraints. I argue that such domestic constraints are, considering the alternatives, a healthy inhibition. I began this extended inquiry into the use and nonuse of food power soon after the controversial decision of President Jimmy Carter, in January 1980, to impose a partial U.S. grain embargo as one means to punish the Soviet Union for its 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. The difficult implementation of that embargo and its dubious impact upon the Soviet Union are examined at length in the concluding chapter. For balance, a parallel chapter examines President Lyndon Johnson’s 1965—67 “short-tether” policy on food aid to India. But the larger burden is to explain the surprising rarity of such food power episodes. An increasing disconnection between food trade and foreign policy in each of the countries under review emerges as a major finding, and as the major analytic challenge, of this book. I have received invaluable support and advice from many quarters. Much information was gained through private interviews with officials of the government of India, the U.S. government, the Food and Agri¬ culture Organization of the United Nations, the World Food Council,

8

Preface

and the International Wheat Council. Generous support from the Ford Foundation and assistance from the Institute for the Study of World Politics made much of this research possible. An attractive supplement to this essential support was an invitation from the Rockefeller Foun¬ dation to prepare initial portions of the manuscript while I was a guest at the Conference and Study Center in Bellagio. I owe even larger debts to the Flarvard Center for International Affairs, and especially to Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Stanley Hoffmann, Ray¬ mond Vernon, Samuel P. Huntington, Eric Nordlinger, and John Odell for their assistance and advice. Others who have provided helpful reactions include Martin Abel, J. P. Bhattacharjee, James Cole, I. M. Destler, Arturo Goetz, Merilee Grindle, Dale Hathaway, Raymond Hopkins, Robbin Johnson, R. P. Kapoor, Robert Keohane, Rip Land¬ es, Clifford Lewis, Anton Malish, Zhores Medvedev, J. S. Mehta, William Pearce, Fred Sanderson, Samar Sen, Lawrence Sullivan, Peter Timmer, Alberto Valdes, and Mitchel Wallerstein. Don Paarlberg, my father, shared his valuable experience and his reasoned reactions at every stage. My thanks also to Wellesley College for granting a year’s leave to begin the study and later for supporting the final preparation of the manuscript. The intelligence and enthusiasm of my students at Welles¬ ley, together with the support of colleagues such as Alan Schechter, helped me over many a hurdle. Marianne Perlak, my wife and my partner in every enterprise, did more than her share, as usual. In this case, she has even designed my book. To Don and Eva Paarlberg, with their son’s love and admiration, this book is dedicated. Robert L. Paarlberg Cambridge, Massachusetts

Food Trade and Foreign Policy

Introduction