Feminist Encounters with Confucius [1 ed.] 9789004332119, 9789004332102

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Feminist Encounters with Confucius

Modern Chinese Philosophy Edited by John Makeham (La Trobe University)

VOLUME 12

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/mcp

Feminist Encounters with Confucius Edited by

Mathew A. Foust and Sor-hoon Tan

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Foust, Mathew A., editor. Title: Feminist encounters with Confucius / edited by Mathew A. Foust and  Sor-hoon Tan. Description: Leiden ; Boston : Brill, 2016. | Series: Modern Chinese  philosophy, ISSN 1875-9386 ; VOLUME 12 | Includes index. Identifiers: LCCN 2016035049 (print) | LCCN 2016038397 (ebook) | ISBN  9789004332102 (hardback : alk. paper) | ISBN 9789004332119 (E-book) Subjects: LCSH: Confucianism. | Feminism. Classification: LCC B127.C65 F46 2016 (print) | LCC B127.C65 (ebook) | DDC  181/.112082—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016035049

issn 1875-9386 isbn 978-90-04-33210-2 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-33211-9 (e-book) Copyright 2016 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi and Hotei Publishing. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Contents Introduction 1 Mathew A. Foust and Sor-hoon Tan

Part 1 Confucius’ Teachings in East Asian Women’s Practice and Learning 1 Confucius and the Four Books for Women (Nü Sishu «女四書») 17 Ann A. Pang-White 2 Confucian Mothering: The Origin of Tiger Mothering? 40 Ranjoo Seodu Herr 3 Beyond Sexism: The Need for an Intersectional Approach to Confucianism 69 George Wrisley and Samantha Wrisley

Part 2 The Situated Self: Knowing and Being 4 Confucian Reliability and Epistemic Agency: Engagements with Feminist Epistemology 101 Karyn Lai 5 Role Epistemology: Confucian Resources for Feminist Standpoint Theory 127 Kevin DeLapp 6 How Relational Selfhood Rearranges the Debate between Feminists and Confucians 147 Andrew Komasinski and Stephanie Midori Komashin

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Part 3 Feminist Confucian Ethics: Its Relevance in the 21st Century 7 Confucian Ethics and Care: An Amicable Split? 173 Andrew Lambert 8 Confucian Role Ethics in the 21st Century: Domestic Violence, Same-sex Marriage, and Christian Family Values 198 Sarah A. Mattice 9 Contemporary Ecofeminism and Confucian Cosmology 226 Taine Duncan and Nicholas S. Brasovan Index 253

Introduction Mathew A. Foust and Sor-hoon Tan In the midst of the socio-economic, political, and military crises that beset China during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Confucian encounters with feminist ideas promoting equality between men and women, and women’s liberation from the oppressions of traditional society, were mostly hostile. He-Yin Zhen’s 1907 “Feminist Manifesto” (Nüzi xuanbushu 女子宣布书), published in the short-lived anarcho-feminist journal, Natural Justice (Tianyi 天义), urged fellow Chinese women to free themselves from “the power of social customs and pedantic scholars” to strive for goals— ranging from monogamous marriage, valuing sons and daughters equally and raising them without discrimination, and abolishing all brothels—which she justified with the belief that “Heaven endows natural rights equally to men and women.”1 Her longer work, “On the Revenge of Women (Nüzi fuchouji 女子复仇记),” detailed the inequalities that enabled men to oppress and subjugate women throughout China’s long history, and placed the blame squarely on the School of Ru, “the key concept of which is none other than elevating men and deprecating women,” from its classical learning to the social and political institutions that had come to be identified with the Confucian tradition by the Ming and Qing dynasties: Consider Confucius, the founder of Confucianism, who was known for discarding his wife. . . . Consider Mencius, the great Confucian Master. Just because his wife failed to greet him when he came into the room, he plotted to get rid of her. What tyrannical control this is!2 Beyond hasty condemnation on purely anecdotal evidence, the essay, written in the style employed by erudite Confucian scholars of that time, referred to a wealth of textual evidence from the Confucian classics and other well-known works of the New Text school, popularized and spread through the revived Han Learning of nineteenth century China.

1  Lydia H. Liu, Rebecca E. Karl, and Dorothy Ko, eds., The Birth of Chinese Feminism: Essential Texts in Transnational Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013), 182–83. 2  Ibid., 123.

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He-Yin Zhen’s radical feminism viewed men as women’s archenemy, although she acknowledged that there were a few Chinese men who championed equality between husbands and wives, and maintained that her objective was “universal justice for all” and the title of her work notwithstanding, the goal of women’s liberation was “not to take revenge on men . . . nor is it to subjugate men and make them obey women’s rule.”3 Still, she rejected her contemporary male feminists’ championing of gender equality, women’s education and suffrage, as “men’s pursuit of self-distinction in the name of women’s liberation.”4 Women’s lot in traditional Chinese society was a topic of lively debates among male Chinese intellectuals during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, from Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, to the May Fourth thinkers such as Chen Duxiu and Hu Shih. The improvement of women’s situation was very much part of the larger project of strengthening and saving China through enlightenment and modernization from perspectives that remained patriarchal or at least androcentric. A Chinese historian remarked, “as the most profound movement of intellectual liberation in contemporary Chinese history, the May Fourth movement disseminated new concepts about women, marriage, and the family, and created a climate of public opinion and social atmosphere conducive to women’s emancipation.”5 This was also an era pervaded with iconoclasm that attempted to “demolish the Confucian shop.” May Fourth intellectuals linked the pursuit of equality and freedom for women to their attack on Confucianism, especially its “three tyrannies” of ruler over subject, fathers over sons, and husbands over wives, as well as its innerouter division that strictly separates men from women and confines women to the “inner quarters,” thereby denying them participation in public life, from school education to political office. Chen Duxiu emphasized the oppression of women in traditional Chinese society in his condemnation of “the way of Confucius” as incompatible with modern life.6 He later acknowledged that the actual teachings of Confucius may not be at fault, although one should .

3  Ibid., 108, 43. 4  “On the Question of Women’s Liberation (Furen jiefang wenti 妇人解放问题),” ibid., 60. 5  Meiyi Lu, “The Awakening of Chinese Women and the Women’s Movement in the Early Twentieth Century,” in Holding up Half the Sky: Chinese Women Past, Present and Future, ed. Tao Jie et al. (New York: CUNY Feminist Press, 2004), 67–68. 6  Chen Duxiu 陈独秀, “The Way of Confucius and Modern Life 孔子之道与现代生活,” The New Youth 新青年 (1916). Translated in Wm. Theodore de Bary and Richard Lufrano, eds., Sources of Chinese Tradition: From 1600 through the Twentieth Century, 2nd ed., 2 vols., vol. 2 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 353–56.

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also asked whether there is something in those teachings that lend itself to appropriation by oppressors. Lin Yü-t’ang was much more explicit on this point in his 1935 article on “Feminist Thought in Ancient China,” which put the blame for injustices against women on the Confucian “scholars of reason” (lixue 理学) of the tenth century onwards, who “had drifted a long way away from the sane and healthy humanism of Confucius and turned it into a killjoy doctrine.”7 Some questioned the view that Chinese women’s lives had been totally dominated by the “three obediences,” to their fathers before marriage, to their husbands, and to their sons when widowed.8 Despite the oppressions they suffered in traditional Chinese society, Chinese women had made significant direct contributions not only in the family, but also in education, in literature, and even to a certain extent, in government. Hu Shih was among those who recognized this, in a paper he presented to the American Association of University Women in Tianjin in 1931.9 Since then, many important works, often written from women’s perspectives, have been published on the history of Chinese women that seek to overturn the cliché of the weak and talentless Chinese woman oppressed by Confucian teachings and customs in traditional China.10 Recently, scholars have started to rethink Confucianism in East Asia by using gender as a category of analysis.11 7  L in Yü-t’ang, “Feminist Thought in Ancient China,” in Chinese Women through Chinese Eyes, ed. Yu-ning Li (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), 36. 8  Yang Lien-sheng, “Female Rulers in Ancient China,” ibid. 9  Hu Shih, “Women’s Place in Chinese History,” ibid. 10  The most well-known among the English publications include Richard W. Guisso and Stanley Johannesen, ed., Women in China: Current Directions in Historical Scholarship (Youngstown, NY: Philo Books, 1981); Patricia Ebrey, The Inner Quarters: Marriage and the Lives of Chinese Women in the Sung Period (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Dorothy Ko, Teachers of the Inner Quarter: Women and Culture in Seventeenth Century China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994); Susan Mann, Precious Records: Women in China’s Long Eighteenth Century (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997); Wang Zheng, Women in the Chinese Enlightenment: Oral and Textual Histories (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); Bret Hinsch, Women in Early Imperial China. Second Edition. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2011). Also see Lisa A. Raphals, “A Woman Who Understood the Rites,” in Confucius and the Analects: New Essays, ed. Bryan W. Van Norden (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 275–302. 11  These works include Margery Wolf, “Beyond the Patrilineal Self: Constructing Gender in China,” in Roger T. Ames, Wimal Dissanayake and Thomas P. Kasulis, ed., Self as Person in Asian Theory and Practice (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994); Lisa Raphals, Sharing the Light: Representations of Women and Virtue in Early China (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998); Chenyang Li, “Confucianism and Feminist Concerns: Overcoming the Confucian ‘Gender Complex,’ ” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 27, no. 2

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May Fourth iconoclasm did not destroy Confucianism, but led to a century of re-evaluation and re-interpretation of Confucius’ teachings in new encounters with modern philosophies, including feminism, producing new understandings of Confucian philosophy, its possibilities and relevance to the contemporary world. The year 2000 was a watershed moment in feminist encounters with Confucian thought.12 Sandra A. Wawrytko’s “Kongzi as Feminist: Confucian Self-Cultivation in a Contemporary Context” takes care to delineate clearly among responses to the following questions: What did Confucius say about women? What did Confucius intend to say about women? What could Confucius have meant to say about women? What should Confucius have said about women? What must Confucius (and Confucians) say about women in the present context?13 Chenyang Li’s edited volume, The Sage and the Second Sex, includes several engagements with Confucian texts, ranging from the Analects to the work of Li Zhi (李贽 1527–1602). Contributors show that throughout history, Chinese women were much more than mere victims of oppression, that any oppression that occurred had little to do with Confucius’ philosophy, and that Confucian ethics is compatible with feminism.14 Earlier, Chenyang Li’s comparison of Confucian ethics with feminist care ethics sparked debate that continues to the present.15 More recently, (2000); Susan Mann and Yu-ying Cheng, ed., Under Confucian Eyes: Writings on Gender in Chinese History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Dorothy Ko, JaHyun Kim Haboush, and Joan R. Piggott, ed., Women and Confucian Cultures in Pre-Modern China, Korea, and Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Sin Yee Chan, “Gender and Relationship Roles in the Analects and the Mencius,” in Confucian Political Ethics, ed. Daniel A. Bell (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 147–74. 12  This is not to suggest that important contributions were not made prior to 2000. Notable examples include Henry Rosemont, Jr. “Classical Confucian and Contemporary Feminist Perspectives on the Self: Some Parallels and Their Implications,” in Culture and Self: Philosophical and Religious Perspectives, East and West, ed. Douglass Allen (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 63–82; Terry Woo, “Confucianism and Feminism,” in Feminism and World Religions, ed. Arvind Sharma and Katherine K. Young (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 110–47. 13  Sandra A. Wawrytko, “Kongzi as Feminist: Confucian Self-Cultivation in a Contemporary Context,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 27, no. 2 (2000): 171–86. 14  Chenyang Li, ed., The Sage and the Second Sex (La Salle: Open Court, 2000). 15  Chenyang Li, “The Confucian Concept of Jen and the Feminist Ethics of Care,” Hypatia 9, no. 1 (1994): 70–89. For direct replies to Li, see Daniel Star, “Do Confucians Really Care? A Defense of the Distinctiveness of Care Ethics: A Reply to Chenyang Li,” Hypatia 17, no. 1 (2002): 77–106; Lijun Yuan, “Ethics of Care and Concept of Jen: A Reply to Chenyang Li,” Hypatia 17, no. 1 (2002): 107–29. For Li’s response to these critics, see Chenyang Li, “Revisiting Confucian Jen Ethics and Feminist Care Ethics: A Reply to Daniel Star and

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Lisa Rosenlee’s Confucianism and Women: A Philosophical Interpretation offers a re-interpretation of the traditional Confucian conception of the husbandwife relationship into one closer to friendship, within a more general feminist reading of Confucian philosophy.16 Subsequent scholars have developed interpretations and reconstructions of family life, conceptually grounded in both Confucianism and feminism.17 Research exploring the encounter between feminism and Confucianism—from philosophy and religion to cultural studies and bioethics—continues to grow.18 The time is right for a new anthology that will showcase recent work exemplifying the progress made in this area over the past decade, challenging us to consider and fill some significant gaps, and suggesting new directions that stimulate further research. 1

Overview of the Chapters

1.1 Confucius’ Teachings in East Asian Women’s Practice and Learning We begin this volume with studies of how East Asian women of different historical periods, social classes, and locations have creatively and assertively responded to Confucius’ teachings that pervaded their societies, not as mere victims, but as active contributors to Confucian education, to social continuity and transformation. Pang-White examines the Nü Sishu (The Four Books for Women)—Lessons for Women, The Analects for Women, Teachings for the Lijun Yuan,” Hypatia 17, no. 1 (2002): 130–40. Besides Andrew Lambert’s chapter in this volume, recent discussions include Ranjoo Seodu Herr, “Is Confucianism Compatible with Care Ethics? A Critique,” Philosophy East and West 53, no. 4 (2003): 471–89; Kelly M. Epley, “Care Ethics and Confucianism: Caring through Li,” Hypatia 30, no. 4 (2015): 881– 96; chapters by Chenyang Li and Lisa Rosenlee in The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Chinese Philosophy and Gender, ed. Ann A. Pang-White (New York: Bloomsbury, 2016). 16  Lisa Rosenlee, Confucianism and Women: A Philosophical Interpretation (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006). 17  Recent works include Mathew A. Foust, “Perplexities of Filiality: Confucius and Jane Addams on the Private/Public Distinction,” Asian Philosophy 18, no. 2 (2008): 149–66; Ranjoo Seodu Herr, “Confucian Family for a Feminist Future,” Asian Philosophy 22, no. 4 (2012): 327–46; Erin M. Cline, Families of Virtue (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015). 18  Recent works related to bioethics include Philip J. Ivanhoe, “A Confucian Perspective on Abortion,” Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 9, no. 1 (2010): 37–51; Erin M. Cline, “Confucian Ethics, Public Policy, and the Nurse-Family Partnership.” Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 11, no. 3 (2012): 337–56; Amy Olberding, “A Sensible Confucian Perspective on Abortion,” Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 14, no. 2 (2015): 235–53.

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Inner Court, and Short Records of Models for Women—written by women for women’s education in China, from the first century to the sixteenth century. Their authors found inspiration from Confucius’ teachings in articulating their own understanding of women’s identity and in formulating arguments to negotiate and defend women’s rights, and to empower women as much as each author saw fit even under tremendous constraints of an extremely conservative feudal society in imperial China. Acknowledging the differences in context that render such a classification provocative, she argues that this set of texts should be interpreted as a feminist response to Confucius’ teachings, and sketches a number of ways in which the feminism found in these texts can be brought to bear on issues addressed by contemporary feminists. Like much feminist scholarship, the Four Books for Women were rooted in the lived experience of real women, of the authors themselves and of those before them; in being adopted to educate Chinese women, many of whom have found strengths and encouragement in these lived stories, they in turn influence women’s practice, and thereby help to shape the societies in which women play active parts. Confucius’ teachings affect women’s lives not only in China but in many parts of East Asia. Ranjoo Herr broadens the scope of our inquiry and make more explicit and specific connection between women’s practice in traditional Confucian societies and contemporary feminist concerns through a study of exemplary mothers in Korean Chosôn dynasty measured against Confucius’ teachings, to provide the basis for a critique of the model of mothering popularized by Amy Chua’s ‘tiger mother’ who produced ‘stereotypically successful children’. Though a common phenomenon in East Asia, tiger mothers are not truly Confucian models of mothering; in its place, Herr offers a conception of Confucian mothering reinterpreted as part of Confucianism understood as a universal philosophical system, that has invaluable lessons even for parents in the 21st century. Herr’s appropriation of Confucian resources for a contemporary feminist perspective on an important role and experience shared by women is accompanied by a critical perspective on Confucianism, and highly aware of the need to reinterpret Confucius’ teachings for the contemporary world. Specifically, she criticizes the traditional conception of Confucian mothering that had resulted in historical practices which contributed greatly to their children’s flourishing and success in Confucian terms, but in retrospect are undesirable in preventing these mothers themselves from achieving the Confucian ideal. Both Pang-White’s and Herr’s chapters reveal the complex relationship between theory and practice in assessing feminist encounters with Confucius’ teachings and effecting change through philosophical reflection. It is too simplistic to simply blame Confucius’ philosophy for sexist practice; but it is

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equally mistaken to think that reconciling the philosophy with feminism by eliminating and reconstructing apparently sexist Confucian concepts or theories, or showing that Confucius shares certain core values with feminists, will absolve Confucius and Confucianism of all complicity in sexist practice. This theory-practice complexity also supports Wrisley and Wrisley’s call for an intersectional approach to Confucianism for better understandings of oppression in Confucian societies, since ‘sexist’ oppression cannot be fully understood as an ‘isolatable and discrete’ form of oppression. By analyzing the experience of a modern Chinese woman writer together with discussions of Confucius teachings found in key Confucian texts and traditionally practiced, this chapter shows how Confucian ethics centered in family relations, with their hierarchical roles and ritual demands of deference, contributed in practice to women’s oppression, not simply qua woman, but as younger sister for example, and in other lived roles and identities at the intersection of a variety of biological and socially constructed categories that structure social relations in Confucian societies, some explicitly endorsed, others simply taken for granted or had its significance overlooked by Confucian philosophy. The intersectional approach raises important questions for the recent advocacy of Confucian role ethics. While highlighting the challenge posed by traditional hierarchical roles’ having intersectional effects that contribute to oppression, especially oppression of women, it also suggests new possibilities in addressing those challenges, and hopefully would contribute to new feminist perspectives on Confucian role ethics. 1.2 The Situated Self: Knowing and Being The emphasis on real experience of women in feminist encounters with Confucius explored in the chapters of Part I might seem to reconfirm the impression that Confucian philosophy is strong on practical philosophy, but has much less to do with areas of theoretical philosophy such as metaphysics and epistemology. As feminists have shown that sexism extends to the very ways in which knowledge is produced and the way people view and interact with the world, contemporary encounters with Confucius would prove limited if they do not venture into these areas. Epistemological encounters between feminists and Confucius teachings are likely to be fruitful, given affinities in their views about theory and practice. Karyn Lai proposes a Confucian epistemology centered in the concept of reliability (xin, also translated as trustworthiness), usually taken to be an ethical categorical, by engaging feminist epistemology. Reliability (xin 信) is a major attribute of a Confucian exemplary person (junzi 君子). An important aspect of reliability is consistency in word and deed. Such consistency

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is important in how the self is perceived by others and therefore constitutive of one’s trustworthiness: a person whose deeds frequently did not match his words would not be deemed trustworthy. In her essay, Lai draws out three implications of xin. First, Confucian discussions are predicated on the primacy of practice over theoretical knowledge. The key epistemological question in Confucianism is not “What do I know?” but “How might I do my best in each situation?” Confucian philosophy does not prioritise theoretical knowledge but instead focuses on practice. Second, effective or excellent action is determined not simply by the ‘experts’ but, in part, by the communities within which the exemplary person lives and interacts. In this way, the exemplary person’s knowledge is not authoritarian but authoritative, as authority is derived from trust. Third, reliability is built, over time, in a person’s concrete actions in specific situations. This picture of actions as constitutive of reliability is concomitant with a situated account of personhood. Together, these three strands suggest an embedded picture of knowledge: to be reliable is to embody knowledge, to realise it in interaction with others in specific and concrete situations. Lai proposes that this model of reliability qua embodied knowledge may be a viable alternative to the particular model of rationality deemed so problematic in the feminist philosophical literature. Kevin DeLapp brings about an encounter between feminist epistemology and Confucius’ teachings from a different angle. Proponents of feminist standpoint theory argue that knowledge claims are inexorably comingled with particular features about the knower’s identity, and that identities which are characterized by social marginalization might therefore, in virtue of that same marginalization, furnish privileged epistemic positions. Despite potential political attractions in terms of giving voice to historically silenced perspectives, standpoint theory has run up against a variety of difficulties including articulating what precisely a “standpoint” is and how grounding epistemic justification in such a standpoint does not thereby lead to an undesired relativity. DeLapp attempts to requisition a certain reading of classical Confucian philosophy as a way of helping standpoint theory respond to both these objections. According to the interpretation of Confucianism that he defends, dubbed role epistemology, knowledge claims are justified by reference to the specific socialpolitical roles that the knower occupies, where the knower herself, in turn, is understood as being constituted through her negotiation of such roles. Like traditional standpoint theory, role epistemology affirms the epistemic advantages that can be granted to a knower on the basis of her socially-situated identity: to know is to believe the truth because of a specific social-political role that is occupied. But by shifting the justificatory mechanism to an embodied

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relationship which obtains between real flesh-and-blood persons, role epistemology dodges worries about feminist standpoints being essentialist or arbitrary. DeLapp concludes by considering the objection that certain social roles (perhaps especially classical Confucian ones) can be riddled with inequality and sexism, and explores the feasibility of Confucian strategies of remonstration and rectification in an effort to reclaim or redefine such roles. Lai’s and Kevin DeLapp’s epistemological explorations reveal that the affinities in views about theory and practice find resonance also in resemblances in feminist and Confucian conceptions of the person and self as situated. Komasinski and Komashin take the feminist-Confucius encounter on the latter theme further by arguing that the closeness in their understandings of selfhood and relationality reduces the distance between feminism and Confucianism approached categorically. They hold that Confucianism and feminism share a common objection to a modern notion of selfhood defined as independently rational, autonomous, and atomistic. Building on their common objection, they argue that both Confucians and feminists respond to this by emphasizing the situated and relational nature of selfhood. They then suggest that the disagreements between feminists and Confucians are better understood as disagreements about whether what remains is an ontological autonomous self with relationality, a relational self with autonomy, or a replacement of the concept of selves with moments in non-ontological relationality, each of which occur within both camps. Finally, they address two objections to any alliance between Confucians and feminists based on the role-based nature of these relationships and their expression in 禮 (li). 1.3 Feminist Confucian Ethics: Its Relevance in the 21st Century We conclude with encounters in the most popular area of both feminist and Confucian studies. The essays of this section focus on ethical issues, including critical analysis of the compatibility of Confucianism and care ethics, the prospects of Confucian-feminist ethics within evolving familial contexts of the 21st century, and the viability of a Confucian-feminist approach to environmental ethics. Andrew Lambert argues that despite some similarities, early Confucian ethics is not best understood as a form of care ethics. Rather, the relationship between Confucian ethics and care ethics is best understood not as a direct mapping of one to the other, but as two distinct-yet-related species of relationship-based ethics. Both take the practices and features of personal relationships to be fundamental to the directing and redirecting of action. Confucian ethics is still relevant to care ethics, however. Confucian discussions

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of how to conduct relationships yield novel conceptions of care useful to ongoing debate about how best to conceptualise it. For instance, setting an example for another for the sake of that person’s well-being (e.g., the fatherson relationship) is a form of care, but one distinct from the familiar motherchild paradigm of caring. Developing such alternative accounts of care help to overcome a number of objections raised against care ethics: for example, how to justify withdrawal from [unhealthy] personal relationships when commitment to them is morally basic, and how to avoid the domination of the caredfor by the carer. Sarah Mattice explores possible engagements between Confucian role ethics (CRE) and certain broadly feminist commitments on issues concerning families: domestic violence, same-sex marriage, and conservative, familybased ethical systems like those found in Christian Family Values. Mattice sees this as a conversation that cuts both ways; there are certain feminist challenges to CRE that need to be considered very carefully, but there are also resources from CRE that might enrich contemporary discussions of these issues. In responding to these contemporary issues, she draws on ideas such as yin-yang theory, Confucian accounts of moral exemplars, li 禮 (ritual, ritual propriety), intergenerationality, and Chinese cosmology to suggest that not only can CRE provide a response to feminist challenges of Confucianism’s complicity in the oppression of women, but that some of these ideas and practices from CRE could benefit primarily Western feminist responses on these topics. Taine Duncan and Nick Brasovan hold that critical feminist philosophy calls for a reevaluation and deconstruction of traditional Confucian patriarchal chauvinism. The ecofeminist critique is based on the insight that anthropocentrism shares fundamental assumptions and a theoretical structure with patriarchal chauvinism. The logic of human chauvinism can be expressed in a simple analogy: females are to males as the non-human natural world is to mankind. Although Confucius expresses a primary concern for persons as intrinsically valuable, and though he suggests a chauvinistic attitude, they maintain that deeper Confucian metaphysics of yin 陰 and yang 陽, harmony (he 和), vital energy (qi 氣) and continuity of nature and persons (tianrenheyi 天人合一) offer a means of reflexively critiquing the classical Confucian position and advancing a model of contemporary ecological/ecopractical feminism. Confucian natural cosmology can contribute a vocabulary and theoretical structure that advance contemporary posthumanism and new materialism, pushing ecofeminism beyond the limitations of modernity.

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2 Conclusion Chenyang Li ends his introduction to The Sage and the Second Sex by expressing hope that the essays comprising that volume “will open to more engaging, more meaningful, and more fruitful discussions and dialogues among interested scholars.”19 The present volume is a testament to enduring interest among scholars, representing a variety of methodological approaches and topical foci. Demonstrating more than the prospects for Confucianism and feminism to “come to terms with each other,”20 the chapters herein imagine how these traditions can respond to each other, and in many cases, fortify one another when joined and deployed to address contemporary philosophical problems. In turn, it is our hope that these feminist encounters with Confucius will inspire further engagements. With the renewal of attention to Confucianism in the twentyfirst century, and the ubiquity of gender disparities globally, such engagements will be as relevant as ever. Bibliography Chan, Sin Yee. “Gender and Relationship Roles in the Analects and the Mencius.” In Confucian Political Ethics, edited by Daniel A. Bell, 147–74. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008. Chen Duxiu. “The Way of Confucius and Modern Life 孔子之道与现代生活.” In The New Youth 新青年 (1916). Cline, Erin M. “Confucian Ethics, Public Policy, and the Nurse-Family Partnership.” Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 11, no. 3 (2012): 337–356. ———. Families of Virtue: Confucian and Western Views on Childhood Development. New York: Columbia University Press, 2015. de Bary, Wm. Theodore, and Richard Lufrano, eds. Sources of Chinese Tradition: From 1600 through the Twentieth Century. 2nd ed. 2 vols. Vol. 2. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. Ebrey, Patricia. The Inner Quarters: Marriage and the Lives of Chinese Women in the Sung Period. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993. Epley, Kelly M. “Care Ethics and Confucianism: Caring through Li.” Hypatia 30, no. 4 (2015): 881–96. 19  Li, The Sage and the Second Sex, 19. 20  Ibid.

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Foust, Mathew A. “Perplexities of Filiality: Confucius and Jane Addams on the Private/ Public Distinction.” Asian Philosophy 18, no. 2 (2008): 149–66. Guisso, Richard W. and Stanley Johannesen, ed. Women in China: Current Directions in Historical Scholarship (Youngstown, NY: Philo Books, 1981). Herr, Ranjoo Seodu. “Is Confucianism Compatible with Care Ethics? A Critique.” Philosophy East and West 53, no. 4 (2003): 471–89. ———. “Confucian Family for a Feminist Future.” Asian Philosophy 22, no. 4 (2012): 327–46. Hinsch, Bret. Women in Early Imperial China. Second Edition. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2011. Hu Shih. “Women’s Place in Chinese History.” In Chinese Women through Chinese Eyes, edited by Yu-ning Li, 3–15. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1992. Ivanhoe, Philip J. “A Confucian Perspective on Abortion.” Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 9, no. 1 (2010): 37–51. Ko, Dorothy. Teachers of the Inner Quarter: Women and Culture in Seventeenth Century China. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Li, Chenyang. “The Confucian Concept of Jen and the Feminist Ethics of Care.” Hypatia 9, no. 1 (1994): 70–89. ———. “Confucianism and Feminist Concerns: Overcoming the Confucian ‘Gender Complex.’ ” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 27, no. 2 (2000): 187–99. ———, ed. The Sage and the Second Sex: Confucianism, Ethics, and Gender. La Salle: Open Court, 2000. ———. “Revisiting Confucian Jen Ethics and Feminist Care Ethics: A Reply to Daniel Star and Lijun Yuan,” Hypatia 17, no. 1 (2002): 130–40. Lin, Yü-t’ang. “Feminist Thought in Ancient China.” In Chinese Women through Chinese Eyes, edited by Yu-ning Li, 34–58. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1992. Liu, Lydia H., Rebecca E. Karl, and Dorothy Ko, eds. The Birth of Chinese Feminism: Essential Texts in Transnational Theory. New York: Columbia University Press, 2013. Lu, Meiyi. “The Awakening of Chinese Women and the Women’s Movement in the Early Twentieth Century.” In Holding up Half the Sky: Chinese Women Past, Present and Future, edited by Tao Jie; Zheng Bijun; Shirley L. Mow, 55–70. New York: CUNY Feminist Press, 2004. Mann, Susan. Precious Records: Women in China’s Long Eighteenth Century. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997. Mann, Susan and Yu-ying Cheng, ed., Under Confucian Eyes: Writings on Gender in Chinese History. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001. Olberding, Amy. “A Sensible Confucian Perspective on Abortion.” Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 14, no. 2 (2015): 235–53. Pang-White, Ann A., ed. The Bloomsbury Research Handbook of Chinese Philosophy and Gender. New York: Bloomsbury, 2016.

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Piggott, Dorothy Ko; JaHyun Kim Haboush; Joan R., ed. Women and Confucian Cultures in Pre-Modern China, Korea, and Japan. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003. Raphals, Lisa A. Sharing the Light: Representations of Women and Virtue in Early China. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998. ———. “A Woman Who Understood the Rites.” In Confucius and the Analects: New Essays, edited by Bryan W. Van Norden, 275–302. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Rosemont Jr., Henry. “Classical Confucian and Contemporary Feminist Perspectives on the Self: Some Parallels and Their Implications.” In Culture and Self: Philosophical and Religious Perspectives, East and West, edited by Douglass Allen, 63–82. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997. Rosenlee, Lisa. Confucianism and Women: A Philosophical Interpretation. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006. Star, Daniel. “Do Confucians Really Care? A Defense of the Distinctiveness of Care Ethics,” Hypatia 17, no. 1 (2002): 77–106. Wawrytko, Sandra A. “Kongzi as Feminist: Confucian Self-Cultivation in a Contemporary Context,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 27, no. 2 (2000): 171–86. Wolf, Mergery. “Beyond the Patrilineal Self: Construting Gender in China.” In Roger T. Ames, Wimal Dissanayake and Thomas P. Kasulis, eds., Self as Person in Asian Theory and Practice, 251–67. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994. Woo, Terry. “Confucianism and Feminism.” In Arvind Sharma and Katherine K. Young, eds., Feminism and World Religions, 110–47. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999. Yang Lien-sheng. “Female Rulers in Ancient China.” In Chinese Women through Chinese Eyes, edited by Yu-ning Li, 16–33. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1992. Yuan, Lijun. “Ethics of Care and Concept of Jen: A Reply to Chenyang Li,” Hypatia 17, no. 1 (2002): 107–29. Zheng, Wang. Women in the Chinese Enlightenment: Oral and Textual Histories. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999.

Part 1 Confucius’ Teachings in East Asian Women’s Practice and Learning

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CHAPTER 1

Confucius and the Four Books for Women (Nü Sishu《女四書》) Ann A. Pang-White 1 Introduction Traditional China’s gender-oppressive social practices in the past such as footbinding, forced widowhood, female infanticide, and exclusion of women from the public realm, coupled with its denial of women’s equal access to social advancement in the present, continue to generate the public perception that Chinese philosophy undermines liberal feminist causes. Confucianism, in particular, is often regarded as the main instigator that legitimizes all of this oppression. Not surprisingly, much Eastern and Western feminist critique in modern times tends to be anti-Confucian. Nonetheless, trans-cultural feminists (whether in the West or in the East) who uncritically endorse the values of liberalism have been heavily criticized in more recent feminist discourse as being neo-colonial and one-sided in their exclusive use of the liberal definition of equality as the universal, and only, measuring stick to judge cultural practices outside the West. This neo-colonial mentality may possibly be a result of ignorance of women’s traditions in other civilizations. Philosophically, we need to evaluate whether the term “feminism” (which is of the Western origin) needs to be broadened and redefined if we are to treat non-Western cultures as true equals, true conversation partners, on this important subject. It should be noted that this chapter is not intended to conceal Confucianism’s anti-feminist motif. Rather, it is to call attention to essential textual, cultural, and historical elements in the Confucian tradition, in particular the Nü Sishu《女四書》   (Four Books for Women), that modern readers may have bypassed due to their cultural blinders. Uncovering these hidden elements is a critical step toward our fair assessment, as well as creative reconstruction, of Confucian philosophy and the real identity of Chinese women. One thing to be sure is that Confucius (c. 551–479 BC) never directly wrote any treatise on women nor did he formally teach any female students. Remarks about women historically attributed to him are found in the Lunyu《論語》   (the Analects) and in some other classic texts only a few times. Nonetheless, the infamous Analects 17.23 (in some versions, 17.25) has been a major target © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi ��.��63/9789004332119_003

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of the gender critique of Confucianism since the beginning of the 20th century. Contemporary scholarship has demonstrated that the troubled history of Confucianism has much to do with the symbolic female subordination in the husband-wife relation and how it became entangled with the political symbolism of the ruler-minister relation by means of a politicized reading of the yin-yang metaphysics.1 Recent scholarship has been careful in separating original Confucianism from politicized Confucianism. Thus, if one is willing to re-imagine the functions that ritual plays in the Confucian tradition when they are exercised authentically rather than abusively, the feminist potential of a de-politicized Confucianism is not totally out of bounds. We will explore this possibility by examining a controversial set of four books for women, the Nü Sishu, compiled by Wang Xiang 王相.2 For some readers, the Nü Sishu has perpetuated androcentric Confucian patriarchy, while for others these four books contribute significantly to women’s literary tradition. The Nü Sishu was regarded as a counterpart to the famous Sishu《四書》   (Four Books) grouped by Zhu Xi 朱熹, a Song Neo-Confucian. In the Confucian tradition, the four books for men included: (1) the Analects, (2) the Mencius, (3) the Great Learning, and (4) the Doctrine of the Mean. The Sishu exerted immense influence on Chinese society, thought, and culture, particularly the time period from 1313 to 1905 during which these four texts were used as standard textbooks for the imperial civil service examination. So too, the Nü Sishu was considered a very important collection of four didactic texts for the education of women. Unlike the Sishu, however, the Nü Sishu (Four Books for Women) were written by women and included: (1) Nüjie《女誡》(Lessons for Women): by a Han Dynasty woman historian Ban Zhao 班昭 (a.k.a. Cao Dajia 曹大家, 45–117) (2) Nü Lunyu《女論語》(Analects for Women): by two sisters of the Tang Dynasty, Song Ruoxi 宋若莘 and Song Ruozhao 宋若昭 (c. 770?–824?) 1  See Julia Ching, “Sung Philosophers on Women,” Monumenta Serica 42 (1994), 259–74; Weiming Tu, “Probing the ‘Three Bonds’ and ‘Five Relationships’ in Confucian Humanism,” in Confucianism and the Family, ed. Walter H. Slote and George A. DeVos (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 121–36; Sin Yee Chan, “The Confucian Conception of Gender in the Twenty-First Century,” in Confucianism for the Modern World, ed. Daniel A. Bell and Chaibong Hahm (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 312–33; Ann A. Pang-White, “Zhu Xi on Family and Women: Challenges and Potentials,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 40, no. 3–4 (2013): 436–455. 2  Wang Xiang is a Ming scholar and the son of one of the authors of the Nü Sishu.

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(3) Neixun《內訓》(Teachings for the Inner Court): by Empress Renxiao Wen 仁孝文皇后 (1361/2–1407) of the Ming Dynasty (4) Nüfan Jielu《女範捷錄》(Short Records of Models for Women): by Chaste Widow Wang 王節婦 of the Ming Dynasty, also known by her maiden name Madame Liu 劉氏 (1480?–1570?) This collection spanned approximately 1,600 years from the first century to the sixteenth century. It provides readers with an invaluable look into the long-standing Chinese tradition of women’s writings, lives, education, history, and philosophy. The Nü Sishu demonstrates that not only women could think but also they could think well. The collection provides real life examples that debunk the traditional bias that women are more connected to their body and emotions and that, consequently, they are more easily swayed by fear and passion, thus less capable of rational thinking. Considering recent criticism directed toward the uni-directional discourse of trans-cultural feminism, this chapter aims to investigate the development of the narrative and to what extent the Nü Sishu may be argued to be a Chinese feminist response to traditional Confucian teachings from within. Some passages from the Teachings for the Inner Court and the Short Records of Models for Women will be translated into English for the first time. Further, to enrich our understanding and to contrast the gender perspectives of the two sexes, we will first take a look at what Confucian men have to say about the opposite sex before we turn our attention to what Confucian women have said about women. 2

“The Master Says . . .”: What Did Confucius and Other Confucian Men Say About Women?

2.1 Confucius’ Encounters with Women Even though Confucius never directly wrote a treatise on women nor did he formally teach any female students, his encounters with women can still shed light on his view of women. For example, according to historical records such as the volume Kongzi Shijia《孔子世家》(The Family Genealogy of Confucius) in the Shiji《史記》(The Historical Records) by Sima Qian 司馬遷 (145/ 139 BC–87/86 BC?) and the Kongzi Jiayu《孔子家語》(The Family Discourse of Confucius) by Wang Shu 王肅 (195–256), we know that Confucius was born of an aging father Shu Liang He 叔梁紇, known for his great physical strength, and Yan Zhengzai 顏徵在, a young lady from a noble family. After Shu Liang He’s first wife passed away and his second wife did not beget a healthy son to

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carry on the family name,3 he married Ms. Yan. A selection from the Kongzi Jiayu is translated below: The ancestors of Confucius were the descendents of Song. . . . . [After many generations,] Fangsu begot Boxia. Boxia begot Shu Liang He. The record said, “Although Shu Liang He had nine daughters, he had no son.” . . . Shu Liang He therefore made a request of a marriage to the Yan family. The Yan family has three daughters. The youngest is Zhengzai. [After receiving the marriage request,] Mr. Yan, the father, spoke with his three daughters: “Although Sir Shu Liang He’s father and grandfather were only low-ranking governmental officials, he is a descendent of former sage kings. . . . I am fond of him. Even though he is old and his temperament strict, this is not something to be concerned. Which one of you would be willing to marry him?” Two older daughters were silent. Zhengzai [, the youngest of the three,] stepped forward and said: “I will be willing to go. Is there any need to inquire further?” Mr. Yan replied: “Only you are able to do it” and married Zhengzai to Shu Liang He. . . . Zhengzai then gave birth to Confucius and named him Qiu and also gave him another given name Zhong Ni. When Confucius was three years old, his father . . . passed away . . . Later, when Confucius was at the age nineteen, he married Miss Shangguan. They had a son Bo Yu.4

3  Even though the authenticity of the Kongzi Jiayu《孔子家語》and its authorship is widely debated among scholars, several newly unearthed archaeological texts from China (e.g., the 1973 Hebei province Western Han tomb bamboo slips, the 1977 Anhui province Western Han tomb wood blocks), and the Shanghai Museum’s Chu bamboo book of the Warring States Period, demonstrate that the work is authentic. According to one account, the Kongzi Jiayu was probably composed by students of the Confucian school. The earliest twenty-sevenvolume version was lost during the imperially sanctioned book burning disaster of the Qin Dynasty. During the Western Han Dynasty, Confucius’ descendants compared extant versions and edited the ten-volume version. Wang Shu of the Three Kingdoms Period received this version, wrote an introduction, and provided notes and commentaries. This is the version that is in circulation now. For more information, see the introduction of the Kongzi Jiayu《孔子家語》, ed. Pan Shuren 潘樹仁 (Hong Kong: Chung Hwa Book Co., 2013), 1–3. See also the Xinyi Kongzi Jiayu《新譯孔子家語》(New Translation of Kongzi Jiayu), 2nd ed., trans. Yang Cunqiu 羊春秋 (Taipei: San Min Book Co., Ltd., 2008), 1–4. 4  All English translations used in this paper are mine, unless otherwise noted. This passage is from the Kongzi Jiayu, Volume 9, Section 39, Ben Xing Jie《本姓解》(Explanation of the Origin of the Family Name). See also the Shiji《史記》, Volume 47, Section 17, Kongzi Shijia 《孔子世家》(The   Family Genealogy of Confucius).

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One learns from this anecdote that Confucius’ mother Zhengzai was the youngest of the three Yan daughters. While her two older sisters hesitated, she alone looked past her future husband’s old age and married him for his virtue. She became a widow when Confucius was only three years old and single-handedly raised Confucius. It seems unlikely that Confucius, a strong advocate of filial piety with such a close relation to his widowed mother who raised him, would non-discriminately hold a misogynist view against all women. Even though we do not know much about Confucius’ wife, we do know that together they had a son Bo Yu, who was known for his love of learning.5 When Confucius travelled to various feudal states to promote the Way, he also encountered other women. Analects 6.28 mentions Lady Nanzi 南子, who is known for her exceptional beauty: “When Confucius went to see Nanzi, Zilu 子路 [Confucius’ student] was unpleased.” Shi Ji’s Kongzi Shijia provides us with further details about Lady Nanzi as well as the background of the actual event: Duke Ling [of Wei 衛靈公] had a concubine Nanzi. She sent a messenger to Confucius with the message that “No known gentlemen will insult [their hosts]: if a gentleman desires to become like a brother with my king, he must first come to see me, the little king. I, the little king, am willing to receive you.” Confucius declined Nanzi’s request at first, but he later went to see her reluctantly. When the meeting took place, Nanzi stayed behind the curtain. Confucius entered the door, facing north, and bowed. Nanzi returned a bow behind the curtain—her jade jewelries and accessories made many sounds. When Confucius returned to his residence after the meeting, he said: “I wished that I did not have to meet with Lady Nanzi. But since the meeting had to take place, I have followed all ritual propriety during our meeting.” Thereupon, Zilu was still displeased. Confucius sighed: “If I did anything contrary to rituals, may Heaven despise me! May Heaven despise me!” After Confucius stayed in the State of Wei for about one month, one day Duke Ling and Lady Nanzi rode in the same carriage in an outing. They made official Yong Ju participated in the ride and made Confucius followed in the next carriage. All the royal carriages drove passed the city and the market ostentatiously. Confucius commented afterwards: “I have not yet met anyone who would desire virtues as much as he desires the physical beauty of a woman.” Feeling ashamed, he left the State of Wei. . . .6 5  See Analects 16.13. 6  English translation is based on the Chinese text from the Chinese Text Project (http://ctext .org); accessed on July 12, 2014.

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Clearly, Nanzi was eager to exercise her influence on state affairs—calling herself the “little king (xiao jun 小君)” and demanding Confucius to pay honor to her. Having heard that she engaged in inappropriate sexual relations with multiple men including Duke Ling’s son (a clear violation of proper rituals), Confucius declined the meeting at first. But with a thin hope to meet with Duke Ling, Confucius reluctantly agreed to meet with Nanzi. Confucius eventually left the State of Wei after he realized that the Duke was too corrupted to consider humane government. Confucius’ outcry that “I have not yet met anyone who desires virtues as much as he desires a woman’s physical beauty” would provide the authors of the Nü Sishu an important foundation in upholding that the real beauty of a woman (fu rong 婦容) rests on her inner virtue, not outward appearance. 2.2 Confucius and Liu Xiang’s Biographies of Women Another important book that informs us about Confucius’ view of women in real life is the Lienü Zhuan《列女傳》(Biographies of Women). The Lienü Zhuan was composed by Liu Xiang 劉向 (c. 77–6 BCE), a court historian and Confucian scholar of Western Han Dynasty. The Lienü Zhuan was the first of its genre, providing quasi-historical records of one-hundred-andnine women, of which ninety-four are virtuous persons and fifteen are licentious characters.7 The Lienü Zhuan contains seven volumes: (1) Muyi (母儀 Motherly Deportment), (2) Xianming (賢明 Wise Intelligence), (3) Renzhi (仁智 Humaneness and Wisdom), (4) Zenshun (貞順 Women’s Integrity and Filial Obedience), (5) Jieyi (節義 Chastity and Righteousness), (6) Biantong (辯通 Penetrating Rhetorical Skills), and (7) Niebi (孽嬖 Vicious Spoiled Women). In later times, other scholars added another twenty biographies as volume eight, called Xu Lienü Zhuan (續列女傳 Supplement to the Biographies of Women). While gender-oppressive practices often derived from ritual traditions, many women in these biographies exercised ritual propriety (li 禮) in innovative manners as powerful means to protect their autonomy and to counter the societal and familial pressure of marriage or remarriage. One reads, for example, that a woman of the State of Shen in the Shaonan region was about to marry a man of Feng. But her future matrimonial family planned to bring her to the new household without preparing six ritual gifts (i.e., without following

7  Most of the chapters contain biographies devoted to one individual. Occasionally, some chapters present two to three women. See, for example, Volume 1, chapters 1 and 6; Volume 4, chapter 12; Volume 5, chapter 13.

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the proper marital ritual).8 She refused the marriage unyieldingly, arguing that the husband-wife relationship is the most fundamental of all human relations. If the root is incorrectly planted, the harm that is done will be insurmountable. Therefore, the marital ritual must be carried out completely and properly. Her future husband’s family sued her in court. She firmly stated in response: “If one thing is incomplete or one rite is unprepared, my integrity shall not be compromised because of it. Even if death comes, I shall not marry.”9 In a similar vein, one reads that Woman Cai, Lady Boying, Widow Taoying, Duke Weixuen’s wife, among others, exercised personal integrity and ritual propriety to resist their male suitors’ requests as well as family pressure to remarry.10 We also learn in the Lienü Zhuan that many women from different walks of life (whether they are young girls or elderly women) outsmarted men and emperors in political affairs as well as military strategy. Some of them (e.g., Zhong Lichun, Woman “Large Tumor”) were extremely unattractive by conventional norms.11 By exercising impressive rhetorical skills, these women not only confronted their husbands, sons, and emperors about their misdeeds and short-sightedness but also provided them with wise counsel on how to remedy these problems.12 Even though Liu Xiang’s real intention may have been to use the Lienü Zhuan as metaphors to critique the political corruption of his time by means of citing historical examples of virtuous and licentious women, the value of Lienü Zhuan in our study of the history and the philosophy of women in the Chinese tradition remains considerable. Furthermore, considering that the Lienü Zhuan was composed more than two thousand years ago, it is worthnoting that even though Liu was bound by the ultra-conservative values of sancong side (三從四德 three womanly obediences and four womanly virtues), he was independent enough to author biographies for women and to acknowledge their exemplary wisdom, integrity, intelligence, and talents in the social and political realms. 8  See the Liji Ji Shuo《禮記集說》(The Book of Rites and Collected Commentaries) (Taipei: Shijie Shuju, 2009), Volume 10, chapter 44, Huen Yi (Marriage Rites), 324. 9  Lienü Zhuan, Volume 4 (Woman’s Integrity and Filial Obedience), chapter 1, Zhaonan Shen Nü《召南申女》(Woman of Shen in the Shaonan Region). Here, cited from the Xinyi Lienü Zhuan《新譯列女傳》(New Translations of Biographies of Women), 2nd edition, trans. Huang Qingquan 黃清泉 with notes (Taipei: San Min Book Co., Ltd., 2008), 186. 10   Lienü Zhuan, Volume 4, chapters 3, 4, 9, 11, 13, and 15. 11  Ibid., Volume 6, chapters 10, 11, and 12. 12  Ibid. See, for example, Lady Fan of King Zhuang of Chu, Queen Jiang of King Xuan of Zhou, and Madame Liu Xiahui in Volume 2 (Wise Intelligence); Lady Jingjiang of Lu in Volume 1 (Motherly Deportment).

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The Lienü Zhuan often cites Confucius. Volume one Muyi (Motherly Deportment), Chapter Nine (Lu Ji Jingjiang 魯季敬姜), for example, recorded that Confucius held Lady Jingjiang of the Ji clan in the State of Lu in high regard. She was the wife of court official Kongfu Mubo and the mother of Prime Minister Wenbo. Commenting on her frugality and diligence even after her son became the prime minister, Confucius said: “My students: remember this. This lady of Ji does not indulge in extravagance.”13 Lady Jingjiang’s husband died early. Later when her son passed away, she strongly admonished her daughters-in-law that they should not starve themselves to death and that the funeral must be simple according to proper rituals. Upon hearing this, Confucius commented: “The wisdom of a young girl is not as great as that of an adult woman, and the wisdom of a young boy is not as good as that of an adult man. Kongfu’s wife is wise. She wants to illuminate her son’s virtue.”14 Lady Jingjiang mourned her husband in the morning and her son in the evening. Confucius heard about this and again praised her for knowing ritual, expressing affection without bias, and handling affairs with proper order.15 Volume 6 Biantong (Penetrating Rhetorical Skills), Chapter Six (A Gu Chu Nü 阿谷處女), recorded that Confucius and his students encountered a young girl who was washing clothes at a mountain valley. Confucius sent his student, Zigong, to initiate a conversation. This young girl handled their questions calmly and wisely. According to the record, Confucius praised her: “. . . This woman understands human feelings and proper ritual.”16 In both accounts, these women were praised for their wisdom and virtue, not because of their domestic skills. In addition, Confucius advised his students (all male) to take note and learn from these women. Contrary to the received opinion, these episodes support an alternative reading of Confucian philosophy of women—namely that women’s intelligence was not frowned upon in early Confucianism. Rather, strong character, argumentative talent, and reasoning ability in a woman were valued just as highly as her skills in household management. Nonetheless, one may still find issues with certain statements that were historically attributed to Confucius. There is, for example, the much debated Analects 8.20:

13   Xinyi Lienü Zhuan, 42: “仲尼聞之曰： 「弟子記之，季氏之婦不淫矣！」” 14  Ibid., 46. 15  Ibid., 47. 16  Ibid., 304: “孔子曰：「...斯婦人達於人情而知禮。」”

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[Sage King] Shun had five ministers and all under Heaven was well governed, and King Wu [of Zhou] said: ‘I have ten ministers who are skilled in government.’ Master Kong commented: ‘Is it not true that talent is hard to find? At the time of Shun’s accession things are thought to have flourished, and with a woman among King Wu’s ministers, there were in fact only nine men [alternatively, ministers].’17 And, the infamous Analects 17.23: Only women (nüzi 女子, alternatively concubines or young girls,) and morally inferior men (xiaoren 小人, or servants,) seem difficult to care for. If you keep them close, they become insubordinate; but if you keep them at a distance, they become resentful.18 In my view, it is easier to defend Analects 8.20 than to do so with Analects 17.23. One could argue that 8.20 is not necessarily a sexist statement. What Confucius meant was to point out that out of the ten ministers employed by King Wu, one was a woman or that a woman does not amount to a minister in the traditional sense whose role is essentially to administer “external” affairs while a woman’s role is to manage “internal” affairs. This is a restatement of the codified division of labor. Thus, King Wu of Zhou only had nine ministers. Analects 17.23, however, is much more difficult to be explained away. Even if one interprets this passage more charitably (taking nüzi as referring to concubines or young girls, not women in general), it is still puzzling why Confucius did not make similar comments about men or young boys.19 Because so far we lack sufficient 17  Confucius, Analects, trans. Raymond Dawson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 30. Some scholars argue that this passage clearly denigrates women. See Xinyan Jiang, “Confucianism, Women, and Social Contexts,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 36, no. 2 (2009): 228–42. Others have argued otherwise. See Paul Rakita Goldin, “The View of Women in Early Confucianism,” in The Sage and the Second Sex: Confucianism, Ethics, and Gender, ed. Chenyang Li (Chicago and La Salle: Open Court, 2000), 140; Lisa Raphals, “Gendered Virtue Reconsidered,” in The Sage and the Second Sex: Confucianism, Ethics, and Gender, ed. Chenyang Li (Chicago and La Salle: Open Court, 2000), 225. 18  Dawson, 73 (with modification). Attempts to resolve the tension created by this text are many, including Chenyang Li’s introduction to The Sage and the Second Sex: Confucianism, Ethics, and Gender, ed. Chenyang Li (Chicago and La Salle: Open Court, 2000), 3–4; Arthur Wiley, trans., The Analects of Confucius (New York: Random House, 1938), 217; Goldin, “The View of Women in Early Confucianism,” 139. 19  Here I agree with Jiang’s assessment regarding the difficulty of Analects 17.23. See Jiang, “Confucianism, Women, and Social Contexts,” 230–231.

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information to fully understand why Confucius made these statements which are clearly at odds with his positive assessments of women found in other works, we are not in a final position to conclusively determine whether or not Confucius was a thorough-going sexist. A more constructive approach to our creative task of rereading the canons is to temporarily bracket these puzzling statements and turn our attention to the core teachings of Confucian philosophy. In other words, if we are to regard the authors of the Nü Sishu as forerunners of Chinese feminism, what could have inspired these woman authors and those who came before or after them? Since much comparative work has already been done on Confucian ren (humaneness) vis-à-vis the feminist ethics of care,20 in what follows I will instead turn to the highly contentious notion of li (ritual) in my appropriation of the feminist potential of Confucianism. 2.3 Li (禮 Ritual) and the Image of the Feminine Because of his belief that “human beings are by nature similar to one another; it is due to habits that they become far apart,”21 Confucius was a strong advocate for the accessibility of education and learning. Analects 15.39 reads: “In education, there should be no class distinction.”22 A Confucian curriculum stresses moral education and the six arts (liuyi 六藝) and ritual is one of them. Among the principal virtues discussed in the Analects, li (ritual propriety, ritual, rites) is regarded as important as humaneness (ren 仁), righteousness (yi 義), wisdom (zhi 智), and filial piety (xiao 孝). Li is mentioned more than one hundred times in the Analects. One reads, for example, “if one is forthright but does without ritual, then one becomes rude”;23 “to [control] oneself and return to ritual is to practice humaneness”;24 “righteousness the 20  See, for example, Chenyang Li, “The Confucian Concept of Jen and the Feminist Ethics of Care: A Comparative Study,” Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy 9, no. 1 (1994): 70–89; Lijun Yuan, “Ethics of Care and Concept of Jen: A Reply to Chenyang Li,” Hypatia 17, no. 1 (2002): 107–29; Ranjoo Seodu Herr, “Is Confucianism Compatible with Care Ethics? A Critique,” Philosophy East and West 53, no. 4 (2003): 471–89; Karyn L. Lai, Learning From Chinese Philosophies: Ethics of Interdependent and Contextualised Self (Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate, 2006); Shirong Luo, “Relation, Virtue, and Relational Virtue: Three Concepts of Caring,” Hypatia 22, no. 3 (2007): 92–110; Ann A. Pang-White, “Reconstructing Modern Ethics: Confucian Care Ethics,” The Journal of Chinese Philosophy 36, no. 2 (2009): 210–27; Ann A. Pang-White, “Caring in Confucian Philosophy,” Philosophy Compass 6, no. 6 (2011): 374–84. 21   Analects 17.2. 22  See also Analects 7.7. 23   Analects 8.2. Dawson, 28. 24   Analects 12.1. Dawson, 44 (with modification).

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gentleman regards as the essential stuff and the rites are his means of putting it into effect”;25 “One is roused by poetry, established by ritual, and perfected by music”;26 “If [one does] not study the rites, [one] will have no way of taking [one’s] stand”;27 “when parents are alive, serve them according to proper rituals; when dead, bury them according to ritual propriety.”28 Moreover, li is regarded as a superior way to govern as opposed to legal sanction or punishment. The latter is often regarded as having a masculine and militant undertone: If one leads the people by means of government and keeps order among them by means of punishments, the people will try to avoid the punishments but without shame. If one leads the people by means of virtue and keeps order among them by means of ritual, they will have a sense of conscience and moreover they will arrive at the good that one tries to lead them to.29 Furthermore, If rituals and music do not flourish, then laws and punishment will not hit the mean. If laws and punishments do not hit the mean, then the people will not know where to put their hands and feet.30 The importance of li to Confucian ethics and social-political philosophy is evident. One further point about li in the Analects warrants attention. Analects 3.8 clearly associates li with the image of the feminine: Zixia asked: what is the meaning of this passage [from the Book of Songs]? “Fine looking smile is lovely. Beautiful eyes have an attractive gaze. Plain silk is to be adorned to become finery.” Confucius said: “The work of painting comes after the plain silk.” Zixia further asked: “Does ritual comes after?” Confucius replied, “Shang [Zixia’s other name] is the one who can penetrate my teaching. Now I can talk about the Book of Songs with him.”

25   Analects 15.18. Dawson, 62 (with modification). 26   Analects 8.8. Dawson, 29 (with modification). 27   Analects 16.13. Dawson, 68. See also Analects 20.3. 28   Analects 2.5. 29   Analects 2.3. A similar point is made in Analects 4.23. 30   Analects 13.3.

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The image of the feminine, the perfecting function of li, and the teaching on the continuity of the personal, the social, and the political as three concentric circles are repeated in the Da Xue《大學》(The Great Learning). Note how the images of the feminine (a mother, a wife, and a young girl) are explicitly deployed as symbols of virtuous rulers in the following passage. Moreover, in line with Analects 2.21, the normative priority of the nei (內 the internal) over the wai (外 the external)—thus the primacy of self-cultivation and the household preceding the social and the political—is also explicitly made.31 What is meant by “In order to rightly govern the state, it is necessary first to regulate the family” is this: It is not possible for one to teach others, while he cannot teach his own family. Therefore, the ruler, without going beyond his family, completes the lessons for the state. . . . In the Announcement to Kang, it is said, “Act as if you were watching over an infant.” If a mother is really anxious about it, even though she may not know exactly the wants of her infant, she will not be far from doing so. There never has been a girl who learned how to bring up a child so that she might afterwards marry. From the loving example of one family a whole state becomes loving, and from its courtesies the whole state becomes courteous; while, from the ambition and perverseness of the one man, the whole state may be led to rebellious disorder. Such is the nature of the influence. . . . Thus we see how the government of the state depends on the regulation of the family. In the Book of Poetry [the Shijing (The Book of Songs)], it is said, “That peach tree, so delicate and elegant! How luxuriant is its foliage! This girl is going to her husband’s house. She will rightly order her household.” Let the household be rightly ordered, and then the people of the state may be taught.32 These passages provide notable evidence that classical Confucian canons contain latent materials amenable to feminist concerns.

31   Analects 2.21: Someone said to Master Kong: ‘Why do you not take part in government?’ The Master said: ‘The Book of Documents mentions filial piety, doesn’t it? “Only be dutiful towards your parents and friendly towards your brothers, and you will be contributing to the existence of government.” These virtues surely constitute taking part in government, so why should only that particular activity be regarded as taking part in government?’ (Dawson, 8). 32   The Great Learning, chapter 11, trans. James Legge (Emphasis added), with modification. The Chinese Text Project http://ctext.org, accessed on July 12, 2014.

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3 The Nü Sishu: What did Confucian Women Say About Women? How do Confucian women perceive their own identity and how do these women teach other women about women’s roles in the household and the social and political realms in a Confucian society? It is true that the innerouter distinction, three obediences and four womanly virtues (sancong side) first appeared in the Liji (禮記 The Book of Rituals).33 Nonetheless, the Liji also made it clear that childhood education for both genders was essential. In addition, women played an important role in early childhood education as children’s first teachers before these children reached the age of ten.34 Unlike other Confucian canonical texts, the Nü Sishu (Four Books for Women) are unique in that these texts were written by women authors for women’s education. Who were these women and why did they write? 3.1 The Authors of the Nü Sishu《女四書》 The author of Nüjie (Lessons for Women) was Ban Zhao (班昭, 45–117), born of a family of scholars and officials. Ban was the first woman historian in Chinese history. She was quite knowledgeable in astronomy and geography as well as poetry. Her father and older brother were both famous historians. They were commissioned by the emperor to compile the Han Shu《漢書》(Book of Han). But both passed away before this monumental work could have been completed. Ban Zhao was summoned by Emperor He of Eastern Han Dynasty to complete this unfinished work. She travelled extensively in China to collect data, eventually bringing the work to fruition. In addition to the Han Shu and Nüjie, Ban Zhao also authored many other works. She married her husband (surname, Cao) at the age of fourteen, and became a widow at a very young age. Due to her broad learning and moral integrity, she was again called upon by the Emperor to serve at the imperial court as the teacher of the empress, imperial concubines, princes, and princesses. Ban Zhao was often referred to by her honorary title “Cao Dajia,” which means “a great teacher from the Cao family.”35 33  See the Liji, Books 11, 12, and 44. 34  See the Liji, Book 12. It is a misconception to think that ancient Chinese women were completely trapped in the inner quarters of the household, denied of any access to education. See Dorothy Ko, Teachers of the Inner Chambers: Women and Culture in SeventeenthCentury China (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1994). 35   Nü Sishu Ji Zhu Yi Zheng《女四書集注義證》(Four Books for Women with Selections from Traditional Commentaries), ed. Huang Yanli 黃嫣梨 with notes and an interpretative essay (Hong Kong: the Commercial Press, 2008), 3–4.

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Song Ruoxin and Song Ruozhao (c. 773?–824?) were the authors of the Nu Lunyu (Analects for Women). They were two of the five daughters of a famous Tang-Dynasty Confucian scholar, Song Tingfen. Both sisters were regarded as the most talented of the five sisters. Emperor De of Tang often summoned the two to give lectures to the emperor, the ministers, and the imperial inner court on the classics and historical records. The two sisters were also charged with the tasks of managing the imperial library and documents. Over their lifetimes, they served five emperors and were given high-ranking official titles in the inner court including Xue Shi 學士 and Shang Gong 尚宮. People also addressed them as Xian Sheng 先生 (“sir,” “teacher”). Both sisters chose the untraditional path of remaining single and devoted their lives to teaching and their work in the imperial court.36 Empress Renxiao Wen of Ming (maiden name Xu, 1361–1407) authored the Neixun (Teachings for the Inner Court). She was well learned and known for her filial piety and for her courage in protecting the imperial city which was under attack by the enemy force when the emperor and the military were engaged in a battle in areas distant from the imperial city. She often advised Emperor Cheng, known for his quick temperament in using force, to practice humane governance. Empress Renxiao Wen was not only a Confucian but also a devout Buddhist. The Neixun was regarded by some scholars as the most comprehensive and well-reasoned work among the Nü Sishu. In addition to the Neixun, she also authored several other Confucian texts and Buddhist texts. When she passed away, Emperor Cheng bestowed on her the honorary title of “Humaneness (ren)” and “Filial Piety (xiao),” in addition to her literary achievements (wen), thus the name Ren-xiao Wen Empress.37 Madame Liu (also known as Chaste Widow Wang, c. 1480?–1570?), the author of the last of the Four Books for Women, the Nüfan Jielu (Short Records of Models for Women), was also from the Ming Dynasty. Liu was the mother of the Ming scholar-official Wang Xiang, the compiler and annotator of the Nü Sishu. From her son’s introduction, one learns that Madame Liu’s husband passed away early in their marriage when she was only thirty years old. She went through considerable hardship as a widow, raised the young Wang Xiang, and remained chaste for the rest of her life for sixty years. To commemorate her virtue of chastity, some famous high-ranking officials honored her in public as a role model of exemplary virtue.38 Although not coming from an elite family, Madame Liu was nonetheless well immersed in the classics as evidenced by

36  Ibid., 33–34. 37  Ibid., 67–68. 38  Ibid., 167–168.

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her writings and her citation of more than one-hundred-thirty examples of women from the Biographies of Women and other texts in her work Nüfan Jielu. 3.2 The Contents of the Nü Sishu《女四書》 Ban Zhao mentioned in her introduction to the Nüjie (Lessons for Women) that it had now been over forty years since she married her husband at the age fourteen. Therefore, Ban Zhao was probably in her fifties when she composed this work. Since Ban Zhao was born in 45 AD, the Nüjie can be dated probably around the late first century or the early second century, approximately one hundred years after Liu Xiang’s Biographies of Women. The Nüjie is the most conservative of the Nü Sishu. This is somewhat surprising when one takes into account of Ban Zhao’s quite unconventional life journey and career path as a woman in first century feudal China. Ban Zhao explained that her motivation for writing the Nüjie is to provide marriage advice to her daughters. Thus, the contents of the work are limited to three areas: (a) how one should serve one’s parents-in-law, (b) how to serve one’s husband, and (c) how to get along with one’s sisters-and-brothers-in-law. She endorsed strict adherence to the four womanly virtues (side, woman’s virtue, woman’s speech, woman’s appearance, and woman’s work). She even cited an extremely conservative ancient text, A Pattern for Women (Nü Xian《女憲》), stating that “To obtain the love of one man is the crown of a woman’s life; to lose the love of one man is to miss the aim in a woman’s life.”39 More progressive topics included in Liu Xiang’s Biographies of Women that affirm women’s independence, intelligence, and rhetorical skills—such as “Motherly Deportment,” “Wise Intelligence,” “Humaneness and Wisdom,” and “Penetrating Rhetorical Skills”—were dropped in the Nüjie. This is clearly a big step backwards in advancing women’s causes. Still, one finds some insights in the Nüjie that could support feminist causes. For example, on the basis of the Confucian emphasis on equal access to education and the importance of respecting proper rituals, Ban Zhao made a strong argument for woman’s education: Yet only to teach men and not to teach women—is that not ignoring the essential relation between men and women? According to the Record of Rites, it is the rule to begin to teach children to read at the age of eight years, and by the age of fifteen years they ought then to be ready for cultural training. Only why should it not be (that girls’ education as well as boys’) done according to this principle?40 39  Robin R. Wang, ed., Images of Women in Chinese Thought and Culture: Writings from the Pre-Qin Period through the Song Dynasty (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003), 185. 40  Ibid., 181 with modification.

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Ban Zhao also argued against domestic violence, verbal abuse, and physical beating of a wife on the basis of ritual respect (li) between the spouses and the importance of conjugal love.41 Furthermore, she insisted that beauty must come from within (not based on physical attraction that in part depends on luck and can easily disappear at an old age). She articulated firmly that “[w]omanly appearance requires neither a pretty nor a perfect face and form. . . . To wash and scrub filth away; to keep clothes and ornaments fresh and clean . . . may be called the characteristics of womanly bearing.”42 The Song sisters’ Nü Lunyu (Analects for Women) was composed approximately in the beginning of the 9th century, several hundred years after Ban Zhao’s Lessons for Women. Even though Nü Lunyu did not break new ground, its contributions were threefold. (1) The work was written in a simpler style. Therefore, it was more accessible to the common people. (2) The scope of its subjects was broader than the Lessons for Women, covering instructions for women’s self-cultivation and education in both the natal family and the married life. (3) It argued that in serving one’s husband, “a wife has the responsibility to remonstrate with him repeatedly should he have some evil ways”;43 in addition, “the authority to instruct children belongs primarily to the mother.” The latter included selecting good teachers, preparing honorariums, etc. Both (2) and (3) are welcome affirmations of women’s relative autonomy as well as authority in the household and a rebuttal of blind obedience to one’s husband or son.44 The Neixun (Teachings for the Inner Court) was composed in the advent of the 15th century, more than one millennium after Ban Zhao’s Nüjie and several hundred years after Song sisters’ Nü Lunyu. In her preface to the Neixun, Empress Renxiao Wen explained that education for both men and women are important. But proper education requires good methods.45 And yet, a complete work that contains suitable teaching materials for girls and women was lacking. She wrote that Ban Zhao’s Nüjie was too simple and some other ancient texts were no longer in existence. She lamented that even though Zhu Xi compiled a work called Xiao Xue (Elementary Learning), it was not suitable for women’s education. This is because women in the feudal China were educated separately from men and the two genders had different realms of operation based

41  Ibid., 184. 42  Ibid., 184–185. 43   Analects for Women, chapter 7, in Huang, Nü Sishu, 52: “夫有惡事，勸諫諄諄。” 44  Ibid., Chapter 8, in Huang, Nü Sishu, 55: “訓誨之權，實專於母。” 45   Neixun, preface and chapter 11, in Huang, Nü Sishu, 71 and 118.

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on the division of labor.46 These concerns motivated her to write the Teachings for the Inner Court, aiming at educating women of the imperial court. Later, this work was made available to the public by the emperor’s decree. In comparison with the Lessons for Women and the Analects for Women, the Teachings for the Inner Court, broke new ground. In addition to being a much lengthier work, the topics ranged from personal cultivation, management of the household, to the social and the political. It explicitly cited Confucius and the Analects several times.47 It also referenced the Book of Ritual and the Biographies of Women. For example, in chapter 3, even though Empress Renxiao Wen also affirmed the conservative “four womanly virtues (side),” she (like Ban Zhao) argues that: The beauty of a woman’s appearance is not measured by her physical attractions but by her virtue. Even though Wu Yan 無鹽 [i.e., Zhong Li Chun] was physically unattractive, her words when used to govern the State of Qi 齊 brought peace and stability to the country. Confucius said: “One who has virtue will have words. One who has words may not have virtue.”48 In this passage, the Empress cited Zhong Lichun from Liu Xiang’s Biographies of Women, a commoner who was physically unattractive but known for her intelligence and rhetorical skills. Zhong Lichun dared to request an audience with King Xuan of Qi in person. She criticized the King’s mistakes in government during their meeting. Her words shamed the King and inspired him to correct his ways. Zhong later became the King’s wife. Empress Renxiao Wen also cited Confucius and Analects 14.5 in her praise of Zhong’s forthrightness and integrity. Several chapters in the Teachings for the Inner Court praised the importance of women’s domestic work and how they contributed to the stability of the nation, linking the personal and the familial with the social and the

46  Zhu Xi too was concerned that Ban Zhao’s Nüjie was insufficient and has planned to commission his friend to edit a book for women’s education. His friend unexpectedly passed away. The project therefore never came to fruition. See Zhuwengong Wenji 《朱文公文集》Collected ( Works of Zhu Xi), Book 35; Zhuzi Yulei 《朱子語類》 (   Classified Conversations of Zhu Xi), Volume 1, Book 7; and Pang-White, “Zhu Xi on Family and Women,” 443. 47  See Neixun, Chapters 3, 7, 12, and 16. 48   Neixun, chapter 3, in Huang, Nü Sishu, 89.

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political. One reads: “women assist the nation from the inside”;49 “the founding of a country always relies on the virtue of the inner helpmate”;50 “regarding the flourishing and the decline of a nation, there had never been a case that it is not due to whether or not a woman is virtuous.”51 Therefore, “one can infer from this, inner harmony brings outer harmony. The harmony of a family brings the harmony of a country. The harmony of a country brings the harmony of the world. How can one not weigh it heavily?”52 Thus, the teaching on the continuity of the inner and the outer and the normative priority of the household found in the Analects and the Great Learning discussed earlier in this chapter provided strong textual authority for Empress Renxiao Wen to not only teach women the importance of self-cultivation and household management but also to acknowledge their contribution to the state by virtue of their domestic work. Madame Liu’s Nüfan Jielu (Short Records of Models for Women) was composed in the 16th Century, approximately one hundred years after Empress Renxiao Wen’s Neixun. The Short Records of Models for Women cited more than one hundred cases of model women (far surpassing the number of cases quoted in the other three books) and was the most outspoken book of the Nü Sishu. The opening chapter immediately argued for a bold thesis that women’s education was more important than men’s: If children are not educated when they are young, they will be disrespectful and neglect rituals when they become adults. Males can still benefit from their teachers and friends [from outside] to complete their virtue. Where can females select good role models to correct their mistakes? Therefore, the way of women’s education is even more important than man’s. The correct model of the inner realm is prior to that of the external realm.53 Chapter two (“Queenly Virtue”) affirms the duty and the importance of an empress in wisely assisting the king (echoing Empress Renxiao Wen’s Neixun), “From the ancient times, great emperors who founded a nation must have had

49   Neixun, chapter 8, in Huang, Nü Sishu, 109: “婦人內助於國家.” 50   Neixun, chapter 10, in Huang, Nü Sishu, 116: “國家肇基，皆有內助之德。 ” 51   Neixun, chapter 13, in Huang, Nü Sishu, 128: “國家廢興，未有不由於婦之賢否也。 ” 52   Neixun, chapter 17, in Huang, Nü Sishu, 146: “由是推之，內和而外和。一家和而一國 和。一國和而天下和矣。可不重哉。 ” 53   Nüfan Jielu, chapter 1, in Huang, Nü Sishu, 168.

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wise empresses.”54 Chapter three (“Motherly Deportment”) illustrates the temporal priority of the maternal influence on the education of a child before a father’s teaching: “From ancient times, when virtuous wise women are pregnant, they are prudent in prenatal education. Thus, model motherhood is prior to the teaching of a father.”55 The chapter on “Loyalty and Righteousness” made a strong case in regard to women’s courage. The chapter cited twenty-four examples of model women, including the following: The old saying says: all under heaven are the ministers of the emperor. How could it be that in the inner quarters of home [i.e., for women], there is no loyalty and righteousness? . . . When Jiang You 江油 [a general] surrendered to the [enemy] State of Wei 魏, his wife was not willing to survive in shame like him . . . Lady Zhu 朱夫人 helped build the city wall to defend the City of Xiangyang 襄陽 and defeated Qin 秦 soldiers. Madame Liang 梁夫人 climbed the Jin Mountain 金山 to beat the martial drums and thus drove away the invading Jin soldiers. . . . Lady Xie 謝夫人 was willing to be captured by the enemies in order to save her people.56 Furthermore, in citing multiple examples from the Biographies of Women, Madame Liu argued that ritual priority should apply to both men and women equally. At times a woman must use ritual propriety (li) as a means to defend her rights and to awaken her male counterparts.57 Due to women’s sensitivity to context, Liu also asserted that in handling affairs, “a wise woman is better than a man.”58 The book concluded with a chapter on women’s talents and virtues where Liu skillfully debunked a commonly held sexist belief—“without talent is a woman’s virtue (女子無才便是德),”—often used by societies to deprive women’s access to learning and opportunities. By a reductio ad absurdum, Liu adeptly exposed the absurdity of her opponents’ position. She wrote that if “without talent is a women’s virtue” were true, then it would imply that (1) all women without talent are all virtuous, (2) all virtuous women must all lack talent, (3) all women without virtue must all be talented, and (4) all women with talent must all lack virtue. But surely, none of the above is true. To drive 54  Ibid., chapter 2, in Huang, Nü Sishu, 172. 55  Ibid., chapter 3, in Huang, Nü Sishu, 186. 56  Ibid., chapter 6, in Huang, Nü Sishu, 214. 57  Ibid., chapter 8, in Huang, Nü Sishu, 231. 58  Ibid., chapter 9, in Huang, Nü Sishu, 238.

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her point home, Liu argued that anyone who is familiar with history would see that Ban Zhao, Empress Renxiao Wen, the Song sisters, and Madame Cheng (author of the Book of Filial Piety for Women) among others were examples of real-life women who were not only talented but also exemplary in their virtue.59 4 Conclusion This chapter has examined Confucius’ encounters with women, the Analects, the Lienü Zhuan, and the Nü Sishu. We find that Confucius’ teaching, particularly on education and ritual respect laid an important foundation for later normative didactic writings by later authors, intended specifically for women’s education. These later works acknowledge women’s contributions to the wellbeing of society and the state. The contents, purposes, and emphases of the Nü Sishu vary, at times quite considerably. Nonetheless, these women writers found inspiration from the Confucian canons in developing their own understanding of women’s identity. These women authors formulated arguments therein to defend women’s rights and to empower women as much as each author saw fit, even under the constraints of an extremely conservative feudal society in imperial China. One observes a progression from the earliest book of the Nü Sishu to the latest of the four. The topics were broadened, the tones became firmer, and the arguments were sharpened. These works built on the lived experience of real women. Many others after them have found strengths and encouragement in these lived narratives. Some of the views in the Nü Sishu may seem antiquated by today’s standards. And yet, in finding our own ways amidst the structural constraints even in the modern times, we owe much to the pioneering work of these inspiring women thinkers. How should a modern woman recognize that her true worth and beauty lies in strong character, not in physical attractiveness? How does one negotiate sexual and gender equality that does not necessarily work out in a 50/50 division of everything? How does one effect a structural change in a deeply-seated patriarchal ideology from within? How does one persuade one’s opponents in their own terms? The Nü Sishu provides us with compelling thought that can inform our own creative strategy. This is not to suggest that Confucius is a feminist or “Confucianism as is” is a feminist philosophy. We need to constantly re-read, re-appropriate, and reimagine canonical texts in order to enrich the dynamic growth of traditions. This is, however, quite different from suggesting its total eradication. In other 59  Ibid., chapter 11, in Huang, Nü Sishu, 255.

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words, we need to be careful in our critique of Confucian ideology, to separate politicized Confucianism from the essential teachings of classic Confucianism as a philosophy. The argument presented in this chapter is that a rereading of the canons in consideration of contemporary feminist concerns does not do violence to these texts. Rather, there are hidden threads of thought in need of contextualized re-appropriation in order to reveal their relevance to the audience of different times and ages. The women authors of the Nü Sishu did exactly this in their own historically situated consciousness. It is therefore essential for modern readers to see these women (and their appropriation of Confucian values)—not as helpless passive victims—but as independent thinkers who can articulate their aspirations in their own terms, even under strenuous social constraints. To perceive these women writers simply as products of a patriarchal structure, who can only perpetuate patriarchal values, is to rob these women of their voice, their struggle, and their triumph in their respective cultural and historical contexts. Such an attitude is self-defeating. It is selfdefeating because it not only disrespects these women pioneers but also undermines the true spirit of sisterhood in feminist movement. This is why historical and cultural study is much needed in comparative philosophy in order to nourish a nuanced discussion of gender dynamics in an intercultural setting. So far, little contemporary scholarship has been devoted to the Nü Sishu. Hopefully this chapter will pique and excite a greater interest in this subject.60 Bibliography Chan, Sin Yee. “The Confucian Conception of Gender in the Twenty-First Century.” In Confucianism for the Modern World, edited by Daniel A. Bell and Chaibong Hahm, 312–33. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Chen, Hao 陳澔. Liji Ji Shuo《禮記集說》(The Book of Rites and Collected Commentaries). Taipei: Shijie Shuju, 2009. Ching, Julia. “Sung Philosophers on Women.” Monumenta Serica 42 (1994), 259–74. Dawson, Raymond, trans. The Analects. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.

60  So far only Robin R. Wang and Li-Hsiang Lisa Rosenlee have made brief references in their work to the Nü Sishu. The only article-length research devoted to this subject is Terry TakLing Woo’s “Emotions and Self-Cultivation in Nü Lunyu《女論語》(Women’s Analects),” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 36, no. 2 (2009): 334–47. However, Woo’s article focuses exclusively on the Nü Lunyu, not on all four books of the Nü Sishu.

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Goldin, Paul Rakita. “The View of Women in Early Confucianism.” In The Sage and the Second Sex: Confucianism, Ethics, and Gender, edited by Chenyang Li, 133–62. Chicago and La Salle: Open Court, 2000. Herr, Ranjoo Seodu. “Is Confucianism Compatible with Care Ethics? A Critique.” Philosophy East and West 53, no. 4 (2003): 471–89. Huang, Qingquan 黃清泉, trans. with notes. Xinyi Leinu Zhuan《新譯列女傳》(New Translations of Biographies of Women), 2nd edition. Taipei: San Min Book Co., Ltd., 2008. Huang, Yanli 黃嫣梨, ed. with notes and an interpretative essay. Nü Sishu Ji Zhu Yi Zheng《女四書集注義證》(Four Books for Women with Selections from Traditional Commentaries). Hong Kong: The Commercial Press, 2008. Jiang, Xinyan. “Confucianism, Women, and Social Contexts.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 36, no. 2 (2009): 228–42. Ko, Dorothy. Teachers of the Inner Chambers: Women and Culture in SeventeenthCentury China. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1994. Lai, Karyn L. Learning From Chinese Philosophies: Ethics of Interdependent and Contextualised Self. Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate, 2006. Legge, James, trans. Shiji《史記》. Kongzi Shijia《孔子世家》(The Family Genealogy of Confucius). Accessed July 12, 2014. The Chinese Text Project. http://ctext.org. Legge, James, trans. The Great Learning. Accessed on July 12, 2014. The Chinese Text Project. http://ctext.org. Li, Chenyang. “The Confucian Concept of Jen and the Feminist Ethics of Care: A Comparative Study.” Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy 9, no. 1 (1994): 70–89. ———. Introduction to The Sage and the Second Sex: Confucianism, Ethics, and Gender, edited by Chenyang Li, 1–21. Chicago and La Salle: Open Court, 2000. Luo, Shirong. “Relation, Virtue, and Relational Virtue: Three Concepts of Caring.” Hypatia 22, no. 3 (2007): 92–110. Pan, Shuren 潘樹仁, ed. Kongzi Jiayu《孔子家語》. Hong Kong: Chung Hwa Book Co., 2013. Pang-White, Ann A. “Reconstructing Modern Ethics: Confucian Care Ethics.” The Journal of Chinese Philosophy 36, no. 2 (2009): 210–27. ———. “Caring in Confucian Philosophy.” Philosophy Compass 6, no. 6 (2011): 374–84. ———. “Zhu Xi on Family and Women: Challenges and Potentials.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 40, no. 3–4 (2013): 436–55. Raphals, Lisa. “Gendered Virtue Reconsidered.” In The Sage and the Second Sex: Confucianism, Ethics, and Gender, edited by Chenyang Li, 223–48. Chicago and La Salle: Open Court, 2000. Tu, Wei-ming. “Probing the ‘Three Bonds’ and ‘Five Relationships’ in Confucian Humanism.” In Confucianism and the Family, edited by Walter H. Slote and George A. DeVos, 121–36. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998.

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Wang, Robin R., ed. Images of Women in Chinese Thought and Cultures: Writings from the Pre-Qin Period through the Song Dynasty. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003. Wiley, Arthur, trans. The Analects of Confucius. New York: Random House, 1938. Woo, Terry Tak-Ling, “Emotions and Self-Cultivation in Nü Lunyu《女論語》   (Women’s Analects).” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 36, no. 2 (2009): 334–47. Yang, Chunqiu 羊春秋, trans. Xinyi Kongzi Jiayu《新譯孔子家語》(New Translation of Kongzi Jiayu), 2nd edition. Taipei: San Min Book Co., Ltd., 2008. Yuan, Lijun. “Ethics of Care and Concept of Jen: A Reply to Chenyang Li.” Hypatia 17, no. 1 (2002): 107–29.

CHAPTER 2

Confucian Mothering: The Origin of Tiger Mothering? Ranjoo Seodu Herr 1 Introduction Amy Chua uses her neologism1 “tiger mother” to refer to a certain mode of parenting attributed to mothers in or from East Asia—“Chinese” mothers.2 Key characteristics of the tiger mother for Chua seem to involve not only pushing the children to excel academically but also a tight control of children’s daily activities, choosing their extracurricular activities—such as learning either piano or violin (but no other musical instrument)—and pressuring them to practice the musical instrument regularly. Such mothers allow their children to engage only in activities in which they “can eventually win a medal,” which “must be gold.”3 The tiger mother demands “perfect grades” from her children because she believes not only that her children “can get them,” but also that she is entitled to make such demands on the children; the mother knows “what is best for [the] children” and they “owe [her] everything.”4 Chua claims that tiger mothering is not an ethnic way of parenting—the term “Chinese” mother notwithstanding—but rather a strict and disciplinarian style of parenting that is effective in producing “stereotypically successful kids.”5 Whether Chua recognizes it or not, tiger mothering has its origin in Confucian mothering that was widely extolled and emulated in Confucian East Asia. In the wake of Chua’s publication of her memoir, Battle Hymn of the Tiger Mother, there was uproar among American parents, many of whom were shocked at the seemingly abusive manner in which Chua treated her daughters, especially as young children. The idea of the tiger mother, while 1   See Nadine DeNinno, “Amy Chua, Tiger Mom, Talks Strict Parenting Success,” International Business Times January 04 2012, http://www.ibtimes.com/amy-chua-tigermom-talks-strict-parenting-success-390612. I thank the editors for suggesting this web article. 2  Amy Chua, Battle Hymn of the Tiger Mother (New York: Penguin Press, 2011). 3  Ibid., 3–5. 4  Ibid., 53. 5  Ibid., 3.

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unfamiliar and offensive to many American parents, is in fact quite familiar and prevalent in contemporary East Asia. There is also a widespread notion in many East Asian countries that tiger mothers have played a positive role in raising not only the general education level but also economic standards of their countries. Let me take my native country of South Korea as an example. South Korea has ranked at the top in the 2014 global ranking of student academic performance called “The Learning Curve,”6 up from the second in 2012.7 This is undoubtedly the outcome of Korean tiger mothers pushing their children to score ever higher in the annual college entrance examination,8 now called the College Scholastic Ability Test (CSAT). Further, many Koreans credit Korean tiger mothers for having made the “economic miracle” of South Korea possible. South Korea, which has the 14th highest GDP in the world as of 2013,9 was the poorest country in the world right after the end of the Korean War (1950–1953). It may therefore seem that Chua is justified in her claim that tiger mothering produces “stereotypically successful” kids. Or is she? To answer this and other relevant questions, this chapter closely examines the idea of Confucian mothering, from which tiger mothering originates. Confucianism is famous for its emphasis on the family and the father-son relationship. Some Confucian classics also extensively discuss the public education of the youth, both elementary and advanced.10 Unfortunately, however, Confucians and contemporary East Asian feminists have both neglected the subject of motherhood occurring within the household, especially relating to young children. This chapter attempts to start a conversation on this very important topic and explores the idea of Confucian mothering as follows. In sections II and III, I examine exemplary mothers in Confucian East Asia of the past in order to derive a preliminary idea of Confucian mothering. In order to consider whether Confucian mothering is conducive to promoting 6  Pearson, “The Learning Curve 2014 Report: Education and Skills for Life,” http://the learningcurve.pearson.com/index/index-comparison. Incidentally, according to this 2014 study, the first four top countries, South Korea, Japan, Singapore, Hong Kong, have all been influenced by Confucianism in the past. China and Taiwan are not included in the study. Finland, which surprised the world by ranking first in the same study in 2012, ranked fifth in 2014. See http://thelearningcurve.pearson.com/index/index-ranking, accessed 11/8/15. 7  “Best Education in the World: Finland, South Korea Top Country Rankings, U.S. Rated Average,” Huffington post 2012. 8  Seung-Suk Jo, “Korean Family and Children’s Education,” in Today and Tomorrow of Korean Family Culture, ed. Institute for Korean Women and Society (Seoul, Korea: Society and Culture Research Institute Publishing, 1995). 9  http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf, accessed 2/27/15. 10  E.g., Xiaoxue jizhu (小學集注); Dà xué (大學).

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the Confucian ideal, I first identify the Confucian ideal in section IV by providing a plausible conception of Confucianism as a universal philosophical system. In section V, I elaborate on how Confucian mothering in its goal and style has been conducive to enabling male children to realize the Confucian ideal. Yet these historical instances of Confucian mothering cannot be incorporated into the universal Confucian philosophical system because Confucian mothers themselves were prevented from realizing the Confucian ideal. I therefore argue in section VI for a reconceptualization of Confucian mothering consistent with Confucianism as a universal philosophical system. Reconceptualized in this way, I show in section VII the ways in which Confucian mothering is distinct from tiger mothering and argue that tiger mothering is morally unjustifiable. Finally, I conclude by examining why Confucian mothering is relevant even for contemporary American parents in the 21st century. 2

Classical Confucian Texts and the Confucian Mother

Confucius and Mencius, whose combined work arguably offers the true spirit of Confucian philosophy, did not make direct references to the Confucian motherhood. Indeed, it is difficult to construct any consistent viewpoint about women, let alone mothers, from the Analects and the Mencius. What little one finds about women in the Analects (6.28; 8.20; 9.18; 16.7; 16.14; 17.25) is unfavorable. In one case, women are viewed as in need of men’s management, just like servants (17.25); at other times women as possessors of “great beauty” are seen as sources of temptation for men aiming at moral perfection (9.18; 16.7). The Mencius, equally sparse regarding women (3A4; 3B2; 3B3; 4A5; 4B33; 5A1; 5A2; 6B1; 6B6; 7B9), fares somewhat better, perhaps due to Mencius’ admiration for his wise mother. Many references are related to women’s Confucian obligation to stay in the inner or domestic sphere (3A4) or to obey the husband (3B2). The ancient Confucian sages’ lack of interest in women, however, did not stop later Confucians from publishing handbooks and booklets that contain rules and precepts directed at women regarding their various roles in the family, as the Confucian transformation of China became more entrenched.11 The most important lesson for women, repeated in many such publications, however, pertains to the proper relation between husband and wife as “distinction (bie 別),” first proposed by Mencius (4A26). In the Mencian context, bie refers to the separation of inner and outer (neiwai 內外) spheres “based on 11  See, Robin Wang, Images of Women in Chinese Thought and Culture: Writings from the Pre-Qin Period through the Song Dynasty (Hackett Publishing Co., 2003).

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functions.”12 Accordingly, adherence to bie implies that men who occupy the public world ought to focus on affairs pertaining to the outside and women who occupy the private/domestic world ought to focus on affairs pertaining to the household. The interpretation of bie, however, goes through a radical transformation when the Han Confucian Dong Zhongshu (董仲舒 179–104 BC), influenced by the Book of Changes, made a fateful connection between sex differences and the yinyang (陰陽) principle (Dong, section 53). Consequently, bie was rein­ terpreted by later Confucians as implying a metaphysical difference between the sexes that renders women’s status inferior to men’s in accordance with the cosmological order in which “heaven (yang) dominates earth (yin).” Hence, in the Analects for Women published in the Tang dynasty (唐 618–907), women are told to treat their husband as their “master” (Song and Song, 333). In Precepts for Family Life published in the Song dynasty (宋 960–1279), the husband is likened to “heaven” and the wife to “earth.” Women’s “highest virtue” is defined as “being gentle and submissive.”13 The influential neo-Confucian Zhu Xi (朱熹 1130–1200) of the Song dynasty also argues in his Further Reflections on Things at Hand that women’s major precept is obedience.14 In short, as ontologically inferior inhabitants of the subordinate sphere, women’s sole virtue is “submissiveness” (shun 順) and their primary obligation is “obey[ing] [their] superiors” who are male.15 Even in these later Confucian publications that discuss women, references to women’s role as mothers are scarce. Liu’s Exemplary Women of Early China (2014), originally published in the Former Han dynasty (206 BC–8AD), is perhaps the most extensive collection of exemplary mothers from the Confucian perspective. It contains fourteen brief biographies of such mothers, most of which describe their relation to grown sons, with few stories about mothers of small children thrown in. Most of these narratives are too brief to be informative; while a consistent theme is that general qualities of exemplary mothers are moral qualities, such as devotion, reverence, and unfailing 12  Sin Yee Chan, “Gender and Relationship Roles in the Analects and the Mencius,” in Confucian Political Ethics, ed. Daniel A. Bell (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 150. 13  Guang Sima, “Precepts for Family Life,” in Images of Women in Chinese Thought and Culture: Writings from the Pre-Qin Period through the Song Dynasty, ed. Robin Wang (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 2003), 418. 14  Zhu Xi, “Further Reflections on Things at Hand,” ibid., 324. 15  Martina Deuchler, The Confucian Transformation of Korea: A Study of Society and Ideology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), 231.

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virtuousness in conduct,16 specific contexts or exemplary acts are rarely discussed. I would consider the story of the Mother Meng to be one of the few—if not the only—narratives that provide any clue regarding the ideal Confucian motherhood for young children. The only other relatively lengthy narrative about an exemplary Confucian mother of young children is found in Zhu Xi’s Reflections on Things at Hand; it is actually a story by another renowned Confucian scholar of the Song dynasty, Cheng Yi, about his mother. Mother Meng is none other than the mother of Mencius. Mother Meng was widowed when Mencius was very young and raised Mencius by herself in poverty by weaving. She valued her son’s education greatly and is famous for having moved three times in order to find the right educational environment for her son. She kept urging Mencius to apply himself to studying the Chinese Classics. One day when Mencius was still young, he told his mother that he was not progressing much in his studies. The mother was very alarmed and said, “Your abandoning your study is like my cutting this weaving,” as she cut up in front of him the cloth she had been weaving for days. She believed that a man must become knowledgeable and make a name for himself in order to “maintain tranquility” when at rest and to “keep trouble at a distance” when active. If, on the other hand, “a man is careless about cultivating his virtue,” then he will end up as a slave or a servant, if not a brigand or a thief. Mother’s stern admonition prompted Mencius to take his studies more seriously.17 When Mencius grew up and married, he was distraught over the fact that his new wife was not properly dressed when he entered their bed-chamber. Instead of taking her son’s side, the mother admonished Mencius that it was he who broke the rules of propriety for having entered the room without warning. Finally, when the mother learned that Mencius was reluctant to leave home and seek a fitting employment in the larger world because of his concerns about his aging mother, she urged him to leave her behind, arguing that a woman has to follow the “way of the three obediences”: a woman has to obey her father before marrying, her husband when married, and her son when the husband dies. If the son’s duty is to perfect his self-cultivation by serving a wise ruler, then the mother must assist the son to fulfill his duty.18

16  Liu Xiang, Exemplary Women of Early China: The Lienü Zhuan of Liu Xiang, trans. Anne Behnke Kinney (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 7. 17  Ibid., 18. 18  Ibid., 19–20.

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Cheng Yi’s mother19 was an exemplary daughter-in-law and served her husband’s parents with filial piety and reverence. She also treated her husband with reverence as well, as if he were a “guest.” Her husband apparently reciprocated by paying her the same kind of respect, although he had “concubines.” She was humble and obedient toward her husband. Before making any decision, she would always ask for her husband’s opinion, even regarding trivial matters. She was altruistic and humane, and never jealous. She treated the children of concubines, the orphaned nephews on her husband’s side, and even servant children with the same affection and care as her own. She would always tell the children to treat those in lower stations in life, such as servants, “just the same” as those in their own class. While her love and affection for her children were great, she was stern when it came to teaching them the right values. When children committed wrongful acts or made mistakes, she would “always scold [them] with a loud voice” and admonish them not to repeat the same offense. She would never cover for the children’s wrongs or mistakes but rather inform the father so that he would administer punishment if necessary. As the children grew up, the mother advised them to “keep company with good teachers and friends.” She was obedient and followed the conventional precepts for women not to go outside the gate of her inner quarters after dark. Although she loved literature, she did not engage in creative writing of her own, for she considered it to be “wrong.” Cheng Yi credits his mother for his and his brother’s virtues.20 3

Exemplary Chosôn Confucian Mothers

To these two biographical narratives of exemplary Chinese Confucian mothers, I will now add biographical narratives of exemplary Confucian mothers of the Korean Chosôn dynasty (朝鮮 1392–1910). The Chosôn dynasty was founded 19  The social milieus in which the Mother Meng and Cheng’s mother lived were rather different. Patriarchy in Confucian societies became more severe and entrenched in the post-Han dynasties due to the influence of the aforementioned Dong’s interpretation of the yin-yang principle as implying women’s ontological inferiority. Erin Cline argues that the Mother Meng and other mothers in Ancient China were “confident and effective” agents. See Erin M. Cline, Families of Virtue: Confucian and Western Views on Family Development (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 76. Whether or not this was the case, I am skeptical that this can be said of other mothers discussed here who had to contend with extremely patriarchal social conditions. 20  Zhu Xi, “Further Reflections on Things at Hand,” 319–20.

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through a military overthrow of the Buddhist Koryo dynasty (高麗 918–1392) by a group of Confucian Scholars in collaboration with a military general. It was one of the most ideologically Confucian dynasties in East Asia. Chosôn Confucians, including Jeong Do-Jeon (鄭道傳 1342–1398), the “master architect of the Chosôn dynasty” (Han), were faced with the urgent task of organizing a new society according to Confucian values and principles. They enthusiastically adopted the Neo-Confucian vision offered not only by Zhu Xi’s influential interpretations of the Confucian classics but also his Zhuzijiali (朱子家禮), a comprehensive handbook on the rituals (li) of family relations.21 Some of the basic tenets of the Confucian Chosôn society relevant for our purposes are as follows: All Chosôn government officials and bureaucrats came from the class of Confucian scholars (literati) familiar with the Confucian Classics. The literati class is not exactly equivalent to the European aristocracy; although the literati class status was in general maintained through family lines, it was in principle meritorious. What made persons members of the literati was Confucian education, and a family maintained its elite status through its sons’ academic success. In other words, a family retained its literati class status only if its sons scored highly in the Confucian state examination on the Confucian Classics, which selects government officials and bureaucrats of varying ranks. If there were no sons, or sons failed to become high-ranking government officials by scoring low in the state exam, then the family lost its literati status and fell into disrepute. The goal of the literati class was therefore to have their sons pass the state examination and become high-ranking government officials. It was therefore a son’s filial duty to apply himself daily to the study of the Confucian Classics and do well on the examination. Very little, if any, reference is made to Confucian mothering in Chosôn Confucian publications, even those that were aimed at promoting Confucian customs. As far as women were concerned, the focus was mostly on the husband-wife relationship and the wifely virtues of obedience and chastity. The narratives of exemplary Chosôn Confucian mothers used in this chapter are from Eun-Sig Yi’s contemporary compilation of the Chosôn dynasty’s exemplary mothers, largely based on anecdotes and their sons’ writings.22 I consider stories of five such mothers: Ms. Yun (early 17th century?–1689), the mother of Kim Man-jung; Ms. An (1401–1469), the mother of the Seong brothers; Ms. Yu (16th century?–?), the mother of Yang Sa-eon; Ms. Yi (1539–?), the

21  Deuchler, The Confucian Transformation of Korea: A Study of Society and Ideology, 112. 22  Eun-Sig Yi, Korean History of Motherly Love (Seoul, Korea: Taoreum Press, 2009).

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mother of Seo Seong; and Ms. Shin (1480–1524), the mother of Yi Jun-keong.23 The book, despite its title Korean History of Motherly Love, gives only general qualifiers regarding the exemplary mothers’ parenting style, such as “stern,” “strict,” “devoted,” etcetera, and does not provide any detailed description. The book, in line with the general writing format of Korean Confucian writers, is mostly devoted to elaborating on their family tree, the achievements as well as the fate of their sons, the location of graves and monuments, and other related historical background. In order to identify key elements of exemplary Confucian mothering exhibited by these mothers, I therefore focus on some commonalities among such mothers. First, the sons were all exceptionally accomplished literary figures who had reached the apex of the government hierarchy as highest-ranking Confucian government officials at least once in their lives. This means that they had passed the Confucian state examination with flying colors. Many of them were later deposed and exiled, although some were reinstated later. This is not because they were incompetent or corrupt. As a monarchical system, the governing of the Chosôn dynasty was at the mercy of hereditary monarchs. If the ruling monarch was wise or at least decent, then it was by and large orderly and even prosperous; if the ruling monarch was arbitrary, intemperate, and/or tyrannical, then it was unjust and corrupt to varying degrees. There were always multiple factions and divisions within the Chosôn government attempting to curry favor from or influence the monarch. If the monarch was wise, he was able to keep such attempts under control. If the monarch was not, factions often engaged in fatal political struggles for power. Serving in the Chosôn court was therefore a dangerous business, especially for those who spoke truth to power. One of the few stable state institutions throughout the dynasty, however, was the Confucian state examination system by which government officials were selected. Whatever their later fate, the sons of the exemplary mothers in the book were without exception those who had outperformed others in the exam. Secondly, these mothers came from the literati class background themselves, many of whose fathers and grandfathers were high ranking governmentofficials. Most were taught to read and write Chinese characters—the language of the elite at the time—and a fortiori the Confucian Classics. This was unusual at a time when most women, even from the elite class, were not allowed to 23  In Korea, women did not take up their husband’s family name upon marriage. The last names of these mothers are their own family names. Regarding the dates, the book does not provide specific dates of all the mothers. This is probably because such dates are not available in the family records, due to the fact that daughters or daughters-in-law were not considered family proper.

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attend schools or taught how to read or write, as being educated was regarded as detrimental to being an obedient wife and daughter-in-law. Ms. Yun, Ms. An, and Ms. Shin who were taught the Confucian Classics at home were able to teach their sons when they became too poor to send them to proper schools or tutors.24 Thirdly, these mothers faced extreme adversity of one kind or another. Ms. Yun, Ms. Yi, and Ms. Shin all became widows early in their marriages and had to raise young children by themselves. Ms. Yun’s husband, a high official in the Chosôn court, committed suicide to protest against the Qing dynasty’s invasion of Chosôn in 1636. After the husband died, Ms. Yun made a living by weaving and embroidering. She was impoverished but never begrudged expensive books for her son.25 Ms. Shin’s husband and his brothers, all high officials of the courts, were beheaded for treason by a notorious tyrant, and she herself was enslaved for a brief time. After she reunited with her sons, she lived in severe poverty but never neglected the education of her sons, teaching Confucian Classics to her sons herself.26 Ms. Yi was blind from birth and her husband died of natural causes at the age of 22. It is hard to imagine how a blind widow could have survived without a husband at a time when there were no opportunities for gainful employment for elite women with no business skills. Ms. Yi, however, made good money by making and selling delicacies and wine to elites and was able to support her son’s education.27 Ms. An was not a young widow; still she had to raise her children by herself because her ambitious husband was never around, either preoccupied with work or busy partying and drinking.28 Fourthly, all the mothers were singularly committed to their son’s education to the extent that they were willing to sacrifice their lives; at least one actually did. Their unparalleled commitment is obvious from their persistence in educating their sons against all odds. Ms. Yu, however, sacrificed her life for it. She became a second wife of a widowed small town governor who was forty years her senior.29 In Chosôn it was legally decided in 1413 that a man must have only one legal wife, who is the primary wife, and all other wives were relegated to the status of secondary or minor wives.30 Due to the strict distinction

24  Yi, Korean History of Motherly Love, 12–13; 93; 335. 25  Ibid., 12, 39. 26  Ibid., 331–36. 27  Ibid., 286–92. 28  Ibid., 92–96. 29  Ibid., 228–38. 30  Deuchler, The Confucian Transformation of Korea: A Study of Society and Ideology, 132.

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between primary and secondary wives, sons of minor wives were of secondary status and were prohibited from taking the state examination. This means that they were forbidden to enter the government bureaucracy and climb the social ladder. After her husband died, Ms. Yu inquired her late husband’s family elders about how her sons could avoid this fate. She concluded that the only way her sons could avoid the fate of second-class citizens was for her to disappear. Consequently, she committed suicide in front of the relatives gathered at the funeral of the late husband, and her sons were subsequently adopted as children of the primary wife.31 Fifthly, and most importantly for the purpose of this chapter, all the mothers exhibited a certain style of parenting. They were strict with their sons and emphasized discipline and self-cultivation. The style, however, went hand in hand with a two-fold goal: It was effective not only in prodding the sons to excel in the study of the Confucian Classics that were the subject matter of the state exam, but also in urging them to become morally excellent or self-cultivated persons. In fact the primary theme of the Confucian Classics is none other than the importance of achieving moral excellence or selfcultivation (xiushen 修身). The Confucian idea of self-cultivation comes directly from the Analects, and it refers to a very strenuous life-long process of self-education to reach the highest stage of moral perfection (Analects 8.7). The strict and disciplinarian style of traditional Confucian education that emphasizes persistence, perseverance, and self-discipline is consistent with the idea of “self-cultivation.” Confucians believe that the development of such virtues is necessary to achieve the Confucian ideal of junzi (君子 noble person) who succeeds in self-cultivation (cf. Mencius 6A15; 4B19). Given the arduousness of self-cultivation, it is widely recognized that only a small number of persons would persist in it throughout their lives. Consequently, those who were considered to have achieved the status of junzi were widely revered. Many of these mothers themselves exemplified virtues of persistence, perseverance, and selfdiscipline. These mothers were not merely preaching to their sons to cultivate themselves and develop Confucian virtues. They themselves had ample selfdiscipline, perseverance, and grit, and taught their sons by example as well as by instruction. Sixthly, they all subscribed and were well-adapted to the Confucian ideology regarding the place of women in society. All Confucian mothers examined here, including Mother Meng and Cheng’s mother, accepted women’s subordination and exhibited qualities that contemporary feminists would find submissive. These mothers all took for granted that a woman’s sole duty was to be a good wife and mother. Although many of these mothers were well versed in 31  Yi, Korean History of Motherly Love, 239–42.

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the Confucian Classics, they did not have any ambition of their own. Cheng’s mother, in particular, refrained from developing her considerable talent for literature. They were ambitious, however, for their sons, which was an important reason that they devoted themselves to their sons’ education. I will later return to the topic of the exemplary Confucian mothers’ willing acceptance of subordination. 4

Confucian Ideal in Morality and Politics

How does Confucian mothering relate to Confucianism in general and the Confucian ideal in particular? Is Confucian mothering practised by the exemplary Confucian mothers consistent with Confucian education aimed at promoting the Confucian ideal? In order to answer this question, we must identify the idea of Confucian ideal predicated on the concept of the Confucian person. In order to do so, I suggest that we go back to the Ancient Confucianism of Confucius and Mencius before Dong’s interpretation of the yinyang principle was incorporated into the Confucian philosophical system, which propelled Confucianism’s excessively patriarchal turn. The Confucian person is essentially a moral being with the “moral mind” (xin 心) (6A15).32 The moral mind consists of four kinds of feelings: commiseration (ceyin 惻隱), shame and dislike (xiuwu 羞惡), modesty and yielding (cirang 辭讓), and the sense of right and wrong (shifei 是非) (Mencius 2A6). These four feelings, if preserved, provide the “beginnings” of the four “constant” Confucian virtues of ren (human heartedness 仁), yi (righteousness 義), li (propriety 禮), and zhi (wisdom 智), respectively (Mencius 2A6). The moral mind is common to all humanity, sages and ordinary humans alike (cf. Mencius 3A1, 6A7, 6A10; Analects 17.2): “[A]ll human beings are endowed with the authentic possibility to develop themselves as moral persons through the cognitive and affective functions of the mind.”33 The Confucian ideal is the embodiment of the four virtues by preserving and developing the four beginnings, which is essentially a moral ideal. 32  “Mind” (xin) in Confucianism, unlike the Western notion, which is primarily epistemic, deliberative, and therefore passive, encompasses emotions, desires, and actions and is therefore inherently active and moral. In fact, in Confucianism, distinguishing moral mind from epistemic mind is inconceivable. See Xinzhong Yao, “Self-Construction and Identity: The Confucian Self in Relation to Some Western Perceptions,” Asian Philosophy 6, no. 3 (1996): 183–184. 33  Wei-ming Tu, “Pain and Suffering in Confucian Self-Cultivation,” in Way, Learning, and Politics: Essays on the Confucian Intellectual (Singapore: Institute of East Asian Philosophies, 1989), 46.

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Although all four Confucian virtues are important in actualizing the Confucian ideal, the most significant Confucian virtue is ren, and, therefore, Confucians must strive to embody ren—what I call the precept34 of ren. Ren is not merely a “particular virtue” of human relations, but a “general virtue” in its “inclusiveness” of other Confucian virtues.35 Some even attribute to it a special status as “a principle of inwardness” that guides the Confucian person toward moral perfection.36 Construed thus, the process of actualizing ren is “practically identical” to the process of self-cultivation (xiushen 修身),37 a life-long process of arduous “self-education” aiming at moral perfection, which often involves pain and suffering (Analects 8.7). The burden of selfcultivation, however, is not imposed from without but is in fact “an internally motivated sense of duty,”38 as “the uniqueness of being human is as much a responsibility as a privilege.”39 The Confucian self, however, is “irreducibly interpersonal”40 in that it emerges only in a net of human relations41 in which the self is expected to play definite roles. It is in the process of performing these roles and performing them well that the Confucian self acquires a unique identity. Therefore, Confucian self-cultivation must occur within the confines of human relations and maintaining harmonious human relations is an integral component of the Confucian ideal.42 In concrete relational contexts, ren manifests as “love” (ai 愛) for others43 and cultivating oneself in human relations requires expanding one’s love to those involved in relations with oneself. The family relation, among others, is crucially important, because it is where Confucian persons experience and practice love for the first time. This is why ren, especially in its Mencian

34  I use “precept” instead of “principle,” because I take Confucianism to be a branch of virtue ethics, distinct from rule based ethics such as utilitarianism or deontology. 35  Wing-tsit Chan, “The Evolution of the Confucian Concept Jen,” Philosophy East and West 4, no. 4 (1955): 298; Analects 13.27. 36  Wei-ming Tu, “The Creative Tension between Jen and Li,” in Humanity and Self-Cultivation: Essays in Confucian Thought (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1979), 9. 37  Ibid., 6; cf. Analects 14.25. 38  “Pain and Suffering in Confucian Self-Cultivation,” 48. 39  Ibid., 45. 40  Roger T. Ames, “Reflections on the Confucian Self: A Response to Fingarette,” in Rules, Rituals and Responsibility, ed. Mary Bockover (LaSalle: Open Court, 1991), 105. 41  Typically, “five human relations” (wulun 五倫) are considered fundamental for the Confucian society. The other three relations are between ruler-minister, old-young, and friend-friend. 42  Tu, “Li as Process of Humanization,” 20, 22, 25. 43  Chan, “The Evolution of the Confucian Concept Jen,” 299; Analects 12.22.

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interpretation, is often translated as “love with distinction” (chadengai 差等愛).44 Yet the Confucian ren as love, even interpreted in the Mencian way, does not imply egoism centered on one’s family. Despite the Confucian emphasis on the parent-child relation (Analects 1.2; Mencius 4A27, 6B3, 7A15), the Confucian person must embrace all in his or her love (Mencius 7A46).45 The concept of love with distinction is concerned primarily with “the application of love” and implies that there is “an order, a gradation, or distinction, starting with filial piety” when exercising the virtue of ren.46 In other words, we must apply the lessons about love learned within the family to non-familial relations, albeit in a diluted fashion. As implied in Mencius’ statement that “All the myriad things are there in me” (7A4), the true Confucian self is “an open system”47 at the center of “a series of concentric circles, . . . the outer rim of [which] never closes.” The precept of ren, then, requires “the broadening and deepening ‘embodiment’ of an ever-expanding web of human relationships.”48 It is therefore stated in the Da Xue (大學) that the stages of this process are fourfold: first, self-cultivation (xiushen 修身); second, regulating one’s family (qijia 齊家); third, governing the state (zhiguo 治國); and fourth, bringing peace to the world (pingtianxia 平天下) (Da Xue 大學 1). This interpretation of the Confucian precept of ren clearly shows that Confucian politics and Confucian morality are intimately connected. The circle of human relations involved in politics is by far the widest, involving the last two stages of self-cultivation mentioned in the Da Xue; governing the state and bringing peace to the world. A classical statement about the Confucian way to govern a state can be found in the Mencius, where it is stated that “the people (min 民) are the most important [element in a state]” (Mencius 7B14). Therefore, “the ruler must love the people wholeheartedly” and all state policies must aim at promoting their well-being.49 Some Confucians call this “people-centeredness (min-bon/minben 民本)” and take it as the most

44  Ibid. 45  Ibid., 303. 46  Ibid., 301. 47  Wei-ming Tu, “An Inquiry in the Five Relationships in Confucian Humanism,” in The Psycho-Cultural Dynamics of the Confucian Family: Past and Present, ed. Walter H. Slote (Seoul, Korea: International Cultural Society of Korea, 1986), 183. 48  Ibid., 188. 49  Do-Jeon Jeong, Sambong Jeong Do-Jeon Mun-Jip, trans. Association of Minjok-MunhwaChujin, 1–14 vols. (Seoul, Korea: Hanguk-haksul-jeongbo co., 2006), Bk 13, 236; Analects 12.2, 14.45.

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central political value of Confucianism.50 Since “To govern (zheng 政) is to rectify (zheng 正)” (Analects 12.17 see also, 13.6, 13.13), governing the people and promoting their well-being also means cultivating/rectifying them (zhengren 正人 or zhiren 治人), which means enabling them to engage in self-cultivation and strive toward moral excellence. This is the politics of ren (renzheng 仁政, cf. Mencius 2A3), considered the best form of government in Confucianism. We might call this the Confucian political ideal, which is distinct from what I have identified as the Confucian (moral) ideal. Only junzis who have attained the Confucian (moral) ideal can practice the politics of ren, as it is the ultimate realization of ren. This explains why Confucius himself never gave up his dream to serve a wise king and rectify the world (Analects 13.10, 14.41, 17.1, 17.5, 18.7). 5

The Parenting Goal and Style of Confucian Mothering

The exemplary Confucian mothers’ parenting goal and style were in general conducive to their sons’ approximating the Confucian ideal. The twofold educational goal of Confucian mothers was, first, to enable their sons to master the Confucian Classics and excel in the Confucian state examination in order to become high-ranking government officials, and, second, to enable their sons to approximate the Confucian ideal. These goals were intimately related because the Confucian education is essentially moral education and the main theme of the Confucian Classics is the importance of attaining the Confucian ideal through self-cultivation. Given the intimate connection between excelling in the state exam and obtaining/maintaining the socio-political privilege, one may argue that these mothers were more motivated by social success than Confucian morality. Perhaps. Yet real human motives are always complex; it cannot be denied that, as moral beings well socialized in Confucian morality, they would also have been committed to the Confucian ideal and the value of self-cultivation. Taking as the starting point the presumption that at least one of the Confucian mothers’ motives was to enable their sons to realize the Confucian ideal, this section examines further the style of Confucian mothering in order to determine whether it would be conducive to enabling children to realize the Confucian ideal.

50  Young-Woo Han, The Architect of the Chosôn Dynasty: Jeong Do-Jeon (in Korean) (Seoul, Korea: Ji-shik-san-eop co, 1999), 139.

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The Confucian mothers’ parenting style involved stern exhortations to develop the virtues of self-discipline, perseverance, and persistence. One notable aspect of this parenting style was that it did not endorse frequent and liberal expressions of affection, love, and compliments considered necessary for raising children among contemporary American parents.51 This does not mean that Confucian mothers did not feel affection toward their children, nor does it mean that emotion is unimportant in Confucianism. Emotion, as we have seen, is fundamental as the “beginning” of Confucian virtues. However, following the precept of ren actually requires distancing oneself from unreflective and visceral emotion, even in the case of the parent-child relation. The reason is that ren must be expressed through proper li, which represents “enlightened” and “refined” norms of comportment expected of one’s role in human relations.52 In other words, it is not enough for Confucians that one adopts ren as inner morality, but ren must be externally expressed in accordance with certain public expectations pertaining to one’s role in human relations, li. The intimate connection between ren and li is evident in Analects 12.1, which defines ren as “to subdue oneself (keji 克己) and return to li ( fuli 復禮).” Li, however, involves jing (respect or reverence, 敬) toward others. Indeed, various sources in the Mencius (Mencius 2A6; 4B28; 6A6) suggest that “jing is the central element of li just as love is to ren.”53 Jing, whatever else it may imply, implies at the very least “seriousness toward a person,” which involves “taking to heart a person’s claims on us and dutifully expressing our responsibility toward that person.”54 As such, jing entails some deferential distance between the one expressing jing and the object of jing.55 Consequently, spontaneous and unprincipled expressions of emotion are in general prohibited. Therefore, in the Confucian parent-child relation children are required to show the requisite li of affection, and the consistent theme in the Confucian classics regarding children’s obligation toward parents is to be respectful (jing) toward them (2.7; Xiaojing 孝經, bk. 2). In the Liji (禮記), in which how to comport oneself in front of parents is extensively discussed, the unifying theme is again to serve one’s parents sincerely and to maintain a deferential and respectful 51  In this sense, Confucian mothering contrasts with the ideal mothering endorsed by care ethicists. For an example, see Nel Noddings, Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (Univ of California Press, 2013). 52   A.S. Cua, “The Conceptual Framework of Confucian Ethical Thought,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 23, no. 2 (1996), 162; cf. Analects 9.3 Analects 3.3, Analects 15.17; Mencius 4B6. 53  Sin Yee Chan, “The Confucian Notion of Jing (Respect),” Philosophy East and West 56, no. 2 (2006), 237. 54  Ibid., 233; cf. Mencius 6A5. 55  Chan 2006, 235.

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manner and attitude. This means that there must be some emotional distance when children act in their parents’ presence. How about parents’ treatment of children? Strangely, there is in Confucianism an eerie silence concerning the li of affection required of parents toward children.56 It is not entirely clear why Confucianism has been silent on this issue57 and has instead placed such disproportionate burden to fulfill the li of affection on children and not on parents. Most Confucian relations, however, presuppose reciprocity58 and if one party to the relation does not act in accordance with ren and express appropriate li, then the other party need not reciprocate (cf. Mencius 1B8; 4B30). Therefore, it is possible to interpret the li of parent-child relation to include duties of parents to express proper affection toward children.59 If so, then might it not be possible to interpret the proper li of affection that parents ought to express toward children as involving emotional intimacy? I would like to argue that, even in the case of parents’ treatment of their children, deferential distance is required of their li of affection. Evidence for this can be found in Analects 16.13, in which Ziqin asks Confucius’s son Boyu about his father’s way of instructing him as a child. Boyu recounts that, when he was passing his father in the courtyard, Confucius, rather than expressing affection or compliments, urged him to apply himself to studying the Chinese Classics. Upon hearing this, Ziqin extolls Confucius for maintaining “a certain distance in relations with his son.”60 The Song commentator Sima Guang interprets such a distance as expressing “ritual propriety” and claims that father and son ought not to “consort with one another day and night in an indecently familiar manner”;61 the distance that a father ought to maintain “from his son” is due to “his role as teacher, guide, and disciplinarian.”62 This supports my view that the primary responsibility of parents toward children 56  This is consistent with the fact that the early Confucians “say little on [the broader] topic” of the “education of the youth” (Van Norden, cited in Cline, Families of Virtue, 41). 57   Joel Kupperman has ventured three possible reasons for such an “omission” in Confucianism (Cline, Families of Virtue, 41–42). 58  Tu, “An Inquiry in the Five Relationships in Confucian Humanism,” 180. 59  Ibid., 181. 60  Cline, Families of Virtue, 47. 61  Cited in Cline, Families of Virtue, 48. 62  Ibid., 48. Mencius also emphasized the importance of disciplining children and the “importance of children learning to take criticism from others, which is essential for selfcultivation.” As Cline points out, however, Mencius recognized the possibility that such a disciplinarian attitude toward one’s own children could “hurt” their feelings and recommended letting others taking on the role of the teacher (Mencius 4A18). See Cline, Families of Virtue, 53.

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in Confucianism is to enable them to realize the Confucian ideal of junzi committed to the life-long process of self-cultivation. The best way to instill in children requisite li of human relations and enable them to be virtuous Confucian citizens is for parents to take on the role of moral educators by becoming moral exemplars themselves. This means that parents themselves have to maintain deferential and respectful manner and attitude toward their children, so that children can learn by following parents’ example. The emphasis on exemplary mothers’ moral qualities, such as devotion, reverence, and unfailing virtuousness in conduct63 discussed previously is consistent with this conclusion. The Confucian mothers’ parenting style, involving stern exhortations to embody self-discipline, perseverance, and persistence, was conducive to enabling the children to engage in self-cultivation and develop Confucian virtues, especially because the mothers themselves exemplified such qualities and habits. This is not to say that Confucian mothering style should be devoid of affection or caring. Confucian mothers ought to express proper affection and approval toward children when called for, complimenting them when they exemplify requisite virtues and encouraging them to continue to behave properly, so that the children form good habits and eventually develop virtuous character fit for a junzi. When children misbehave, on the other hand, Confucian mothers ought to chasten and discipline them. Punishment may be involved in this process, as long as it is proportionately, unemotionally, and fairly administered, making sure that children themselves understand why it is appropriate. Whether showing affection or disapproval, Confucian mothers ought never to be overly emotional or indulgent, but moderate, controlled, and respectful, based on self-disciplined emotional restraint. 6

Is Confucian Mothering a Worthy Parenting Ideal in the 21st century?

We have seen that Confucian mothering as was exemplified in history has contributed to raising sons to approximate the Confucian ideal. Might historical Confucian mothering, then, be considered a worthy model of parenting, if not by everyone than at least by parents in traditionally Confucian East Asia? I do not think so. The most problematic aspect of historical Confucian mothering from the contemporary perspective is that these mothers themselves were prevented from achieving the Confucian ideal and they seem to have willingly accepted their subjugated status as women in their society. If a hallmark of 63  Liu Xiang, Exemplary Women of Early China: The Lienü Zhuan of Liu Xiang, 7.

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a plausible philosophical system is that it promotes universal moral values, then there is something off-kilter about the fact that Confucian mothers were mere tools to facilitate the realization of the Confucian ideal by their male children, while they themselves were excluded from realizing the ideal. One might conclude, therefore, that Confucian mothering as was practiced in the past is not fully integrated into the Confucian philosophical system but is rather a mere instance of patriarchal manipulation of women to perpetuate male dominance. If this is the case, then our initial question whether Confucian mothering is a relevant parenting ideal in the twenty first century would lose its significance. I fully recognize that historical Confucian mothers were unduly restricted in their agency as they tried to survive in a severely patriarchal socio-political system to which Confucianism was historically reduced. And who could blame them? There is no doubt that they tried their best under the circumstances and deserve our utmost admiration and respect for their achievements, however meager they may seem from the contemporary feminist perspective. The important question for our purposes, then is whether Confucian mothering can be reinterpreted to be fully integrated into the universal Confucian philosophical system, which also had to be resuscitated from the ideological distortions of Confucianism since the Han dynasty. My answer to this question is a “Yes.” Making my case, however, requires answering two further questions in the negative: First, is women’s subjugation entailed by the Confucian philosophical system? Second, is women’s subjugation constitutive of Confucian mothering? Let us begin with the first question. Women’s subjugation is contradictory to the spirit of Confucianism because it is inconsistent with the Confucian moral precept to embody the virtue of ren. There is simply no justifiable reason why women should not be considered moral persons capable of self-cultivation. If they are capable of self-cultivation, then the universal moral precept of ren ought to apply to women as well. As we have seen, the true Confucian self is “an open system” and the completion of one’s self-cultivation, while starting with the family, must include “the universe as a whole.”64 Not extending oneself outward, whether due to one’s refusal or others’ interference, “restricts us to a closed circle”65 and stunts one’s moral growth. Circumscribing women’s domain of self-cultivation to the domestic sphere therefore constitutes a morally unjustifiable restriction of women’s moral growth, which goes against the core Confucian precept.

64  Tu, “Li as Process of Humanization,” 29. 65  Tu, “An Inquiry in the Five Relationships in Confucian Humanism,” 188.

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What about the second question, is women’s subjugation constitutive of Confucian mothering? The answer is again, no. In Confucianism, taking “care of family affairs is itself active participation in politics,”66 since the family itself is intimately connected to the public realm as “the training ground for moral cultivation.”67 The pivotal importance placed on the family in Confucianism entails that “taking care of family affairs” should be an important Confucian responsibility for all members of the family, whether men or women, directly related to the precept of ren. If so, then Confucian mothering should be understood as “Confucian parenting” required of parents of both sexes68 and the responsibility of Confucian mothering should fall equally on parents of both sexes. In order to raise and educate the next generation to become moral persons and active participants of the public sphere, the parent must understand the crucial connection between the domestic sphere and the public sphere, which is in turn predicated on her being an active participant in the public sphere as well as in the private sphere. Therefore, it is incumbent on parents of both sexes to actively engage in both domestic and public spheres, in order to be informed about the connection between the two. Variations may exist in the extent to which each parent engages in either sphere, depending on his/her disposition and preferences. This variation, however, should not pose a problem for Confucianism, provided that a reasonable balance between the two spheres is maintained. The degree to which each parent cultivates him or herself in different spheres should be a matter of negotiation and mutual agreement between the two parents who both care deeply about raising children to be moral and politically active Confucian persons. Understood in this way, women’s subjugation is by no means constitutive of Confucian mothering. Indeed, it obstructs the attainment of Confucian mothering’s main goal, which is to enable children to approximate the Confucian ideal. 7

Relation between Confucian Mothering and Tiger Mothering

I have shown that the idea of Confucian mothering can be made consistent with the universal Confucian philosophical system and argued that the reinterpreted Confucian mothering can provide a worthy model of parenting in the contemporary world, especially for parents in East Asia, which still retains 66  Ibid., 189; cf. Analects 2.21. 67  Chan, “Gender and Relationship Roles in the Analects and the Mencius,” 150. 68  I will continue to use “mothering,” however, for the sake of consistency.

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much of its Confucian tradition. In this section, I examine the relation between Confucian mothering and tiger mothering discussed at the outset. Recall that the goal (moral education) and the style (disciplinarian) go hand in hand in Confucian mothering. The similarities between Confucian mothering and tiger mothering mainly pertain to their parenting style, which involves instilling in children self-discipline, perseverance and persistence. Tiger mothering also shares one of the goals of Confucian mothering, which is academic excellence of the children. Yet this is where similarities end. Academic excellence in Chosôn, as I have argued, was subordinate to the more fundamental goal of moral education. If academic excellence is disassociated from moral education, then it can no longer count as Confucian education. In tiger mothering, academic excellence is a mere instrument for winning in social competition and advancing oneself toward a higher social status. Recall Chua’s emphasis on winning “the gold medal”? Tiger mothering is all about advancing one’s own children at the expense of other children. Moral or civic education is irrelevant to Chua’s tiger mothering. As in any brand of egoism, the logic of tiger mothering works only if a small minority practices it. If the majority of parents were to become tiger mothers, then this would lead to a brutal zero-sum game in which only the fittest or the strongest or the luckiest will survive after much wasted money, time, and energy, not only at the individual level but also at the social level. This scary scenario is being played out in contemporary South Korea where the majority of mothers in upper and middle classes are tiger mothers. Traditionally, Confucian mothering was the mothering style among the literati class in Chosôn (1392–1910). The Confucian socio-political system of Chosôn that had lasted for over 500 years, however, was violently dismantled when the Japanese Empire colonized Chosôn in 1905. After Korea’s independence from Japan in 1945, the Korean War (1950–53) and the influx of American capitalism in its aftermath completely disintegrated the Confucian socio-political hierarchy. The lacuna that resulted from a succession of devastating social and political upheavals for 50 years opened up new opportunities for ambitious individuals who were no longer constrained by traditional socio-political hierarchy, and social competition spread to the masses. Remarkably, however, the college entrance examination—a secular successor to the state examination of Chosôn—has survived the test of time and is still the most significant way to decide the winners of social competition. The subjects of the college entrance examination, however, are not the Confucian Classics, but rather an assortment of subjects that define modern education, including math and English. The ingrained cultural belief that education is the key to success is proven true time and again, however, as income statistics show that the more educated end

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up with much higher income.69 As recently imported capitalism that identifies success with financial gains has become more entrenched in South Korea, competition for higher education has become increasingly severe among Koreans. This is the background for the emergence of Korean tiger mothers. Recall that South Korea has ranked first in the most current global ranking of student academic performance. Undoubtedly, Korean tiger mothers have played a significant role in this. Similar to the tiger mother described in Chua’s memoir, Korean tiger mothers typically exhibit strict parenting style toward their children: They tightly control their children’s daily activities, choose their extracurricular activities and pressure children to not only practice for their extracurricular activities, but also excel academically. It is unclear whether these mothers share Chua’s level of confidence in the mother’s authority or feel the sense of entitlement to coerce her children, but at least they believe that they know “what is best for [the] children”70 in order to ensure their survival in severe social competition. Chua had to risk being seen as a ruthless and uncaring mother by her own children, because other American mothers are not tiger mothers. Korean tiger mothers, however, do not have to worry about being singled out, because most other Korean mothers of similar class backgrounds, against whom they are competing, are tiger mothers too. Given that tiger mothers have contributed to South Korea’s ranking at the top in student academic performance, the phenomenon of tiger mothers may seem positive. The fact of the matter is that it is not. South Korea is infamous for the severe competition for the yearly College Scholastic Ability Test (CSAT). In 2011, like countless preceding years, about 700,000 students, which is over 80% of high school students, took the CSAT.71 The aim of these students is the same: to do as well as possible in the test, so that they can enter the three best universities in South Korea—Seoul National University (SNU), Korea University and Yonsei University, collectively nicknamed “SKY.” To be able to enter any of these three universities, one must get a near perfect score on the CSAT, in addition to having top grades in high school. Although entering these universities may not guarantee success in life, it will certainly make life easier for the alumni and make their success more likely; not only will prospective employers consider them elites from the “best” universities, but strong and thriving alumni

69  Jo, “Korean Family and Children’s Education,” 170. 70  Chua, Battle Hymn of the Tiger Mother, 53. 71  Jiyeon Lee, “South Korean Students’ ‘Year of Hell’ Culminates with Exams Day,” CNN, November 13 2011.

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networks will support them in employment and promotion. The chances of marrying up also increase for the alumni of the three universities.72 Under these circumstances, tiger mothers start their children’s education early and enroll them in diverse pre-school programs with the hope that the early development of their malleable brains would turn their children into “gifted” children.73 In elementary schools, tiger mothers sign their children up in private academic institutions known as “hagwon” for after school extracurricular activities. According to the Korean Ministry of Education statistics, almost 75% of the student population took up private education through different hagwons (Lee 2011). Once students enter junior high, tiger mothers prepare their children for the CSAT coming up six years later by enrolling them in more hagwons primarily aimed at increasing the CSAT scores. Hagwons have proliferated because there is a widespread distrust of school education. These hagwons cost an average of US $700–$1,000 a month, which is quite burdensome on most middle-class families.74 By high school, it is common for students to spend most of their waking hours in schools and after-school hagwons and come home past midnight.75 According to a 2011 survey, high school seniors slept just 5.5 hours a night on average and typically study more than 10 hours each day.76 Tiger mothers—mostly full-time housewives—are on call to transport their children to different hagwons, so that as little time would be wasted on non-study related matters. Children suffer in an environment of such intense social competition. Korean teenagers don’t have any spare time to play or develop hobbies or reflect about who they are and what they want to be in their future. It is therefore not surprising that the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child announced in 2003 that South Korea violated the children’s “rights to play.” Perhaps predictably, the suicide rate of Korean teenagers is one of the highest among OECD countries. Numbers differ depending on the statistics, but according to one, more than 1,000 students between the ages of 10 and 19 killed themselves from 2000 to 2003. In addition to the psychological and financial cost to individual students and their families, the cumulative cost of private 72  James Card, “Life and Death Exams in South Korea,” Asia Times, Nov 30 2005. See also Jo, “Korean Family and Children’s Education,” 170–72. 73  “Korean Family and Children’s Education,” 195. 74  Teachers there earn handsome salaries, some of whom become millionaires, but they often go unreported. 75  Card, “Life and Death Exams in South Korea.” 76  Samuel Lee, “South Korea’s Dreaded College-Entrance Exam Is the Stuff of High School Nightmares, but Is It Producing ‘Robots’?,” CBS NEWS, November 7 2013.

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education is astronomical. According to the Korean Educational Development Institute, the total private education costs have risen from 7.12 trillion won (US $6.9 billion) in 2000 and 10.66 trillion won in 2001 to 13.65 trillion won in 2004, which is the highest of all OECD counties in private education tuition.77 The financial burden on individual families and society as a whole that results from this over-heated educational competition is not the only social cost. Having been dissociated from the goal of Confucian education as moral education, the Confucian style of parenting is misapplied. As getting the highest grade possible in the exams becomes the most important goal for their children, parents push and prod their children to spend as much time as possible studying. Time to engage in moral or civic education is considered time wasted. In the constant drumbeat for academic excellence, the other equally important areas of childhood development—emotional, psychological, and moral—are drowned out. Feeling sorry for their constantly stressed and tired children, parents refrain from disciplining their children’s daily behavior unrelated to studying.78 When the idea of self-esteem is divorced from moral maturation, it gets wrongly associated with feeling powerful and dominant vis-à-vis others. Hence many Korean parents try to instill self-esteem in their children by praising them indiscriminately and refraining from chastising or disciplining them when they misbehave. Therefore, one can often witness loud and disruptive children in public spaces such as restaurants, while parents look on unperturbed and ready to jump in to protect their children should anyone else chastise them.79 Children who are socialized to outcompete others and are positively rewarded for doing so without checks on their socially disruptive behavior are turning into egoistic individuals concerned only with their own success at the expense of others.80 77  Card, “Life and Death Exams in South Korea.” 78  Jo, “Korean Family and Children’s Education,” 178. 79  Ibid., 180. 80  Ibid., 202. In exposing the details of the South Korean educational conundrum partly caused by tiger mothers, I by no means intend to blame individual Korean tiger mothers. In many ways, they are the victims of a structural problem from which there seems to be no way out. In an environment of intense competition to just stay afloat, not following the crowd may seem to ensure failure for one’s child. This sentiment is expressed by one tiger mother who argues that she would stop sending her child to private hagwons if others would do the same: “I send my kid to private hagwons because I’m afraid that my child will lag behind if I don’t” (ibid., 201).This perfectly exemplifies the mentality of a prisoner in the prisoner’s dilemma. For more on the prisoner’s dilemma, see Steven Kuhn, “Prisoner’s Dilemma,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (2014).

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Contemporary Relevance of Confucian Mothering

The original aim of Chua’s book to show “how Chinese [tiger] parents are better at raising kids than Western ones” (jacket cover, added emphasis) calls for a critical interrogation: Depending on how one specifies the goal at which one is “better,” it is either incoherent (if the goal is raising ethical and politically engaged kids) or morally repugnant (if the goal is raising kids who are egocentric and obsessed with winning). As has been argued in the paper, Confucian mothering is distinct from tiger mothering, although related in some superficial ways. The most important aim of Confucian mothering and Confucian education is to raise children to become moral and politically engaged citizens of a polity. To promote this aim, the Confucian mothering style emphasizes instilling in children self-discipline, persistence, and perseverance. I have argued that Confucian mothering understood in this way is still a live and relevant ideal for contemporary parents in East Asia, whose tradition is still largely Confucian. As East Asia and the West have distinct cultural and moral traditions, Confucian mothering with its concrete goal to realize the Confucian moral ideal may not be replicable in the West. In concluding this chapter, however, I would like to argue that Confucian mothering as essentially moral and civic education may be instructive for American parents in the 21st century. Let me start with a brief overview of the prevalent parenting style in the upper and middle class America.81 Even in earlier times in its relatively short history, American families have been by and large nuclear, consisting of parents and their biological children, unlike families of the Old World. Due to its Puritan origin, focus on (religious) morality has been a cornerstone of children’s education in America until the end of the 19th century; 19th century parents emphasized the “internalization of moral prohibitions” through obedience and self-control.82 As capitalism, industrialization, and the immigration of different ethnic groups became more entrenched in America, education increasingly came to be seen as a tool for upward social mobility for urban middle-class families. Although American upper and middle class parents have been quite involved in children’s education,83 their parenting style took a distinct turn 81  Although confining the focus on the upper and middle class America may sound too narrow, it is suitable for the purpose of this paper, which is to identify what is considered to be an ideal parenting style among Americans manifested most frequently in the upper and middle class families. 82  Maris Vinovskis, and Stephen Frank, “Parenting in American Society,” in Contemporary Parenting: Challenges and Issues, ed. Terry Arendell (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1997), 54. 83  Ibid., 59.

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toward boosting children’s positive self-esteem in the 1970s. Po Bronson argues that this has to do with the 1969 publication of Nathaniel Branden’s influential The Psychology of Self-Esteem, in which self-esteem was singled out as the “single most important facet of a person.” In the broad “self-esteem movement” set in motion as a result, one of its “key tenets” is that “praise, self-esteem, and performance rise and fall together.” Reflecting this broad social trend, 85% of contemporary American parents think that it’s important to tell their children that they’re smart.84 In line with this parental mindset, “Anything potentially damaging to kids’ self-esteem was axed. Competitions were frowned upon. Soccer coaches stopped counting goals and handed out trophies to everyone. Teachers threw out their red pencils. Criticism was replaced with ubiquitous, even undeserved, praise.”85 Consequently, “over-parenting,” “over-protecting”, or “over-praising” has become the main feature of upper and middle-class American parents’ parenting style.86 There is, however, increasing evidence that over-praising, undeserved praising, or even praising children for their intelligence can backfire.87 Most notably, the Stanford psychologist Carol Dweck’s research has repeatedly shown that praising children for their smarts can induce children to become riskaverse, unmotivated to take on challenging tasks, and unwilling or unable to persist or persevere in overcoming difficulties. This is not to say that all praise is bad for children. Praise that is sincere, focused on their effort, and specific to the concrete task with which the child is engaged can motivate children to perform better and be effective at it.88 Over-praising, however, induces children to be more focused on the praise itself rather than the intrinsic enjoyment of the task at hand. When such children enter school, they tend to be narrowly focused on the grade they get than the learning experience in taking a class. As college students, they lack persistence or perseverance and “commonly

84  A Columbia University survey, cited in Po Bronson, Nurtureshock (New York: Twelve, 2009), 12. 85  Ibid., 18. 86  Catherine Pearson, “The Over-Praise Dilemma: When Complimenting Kids Actually Holds Them Back,” Huffington Post, 1/06 2014. 87  See Carol Dweck, “Caution-Praise Can Be Dangerous,” American Educator 23, no. 1 (1999); “The Perils and Promise of Praise,” Educational Leadership 65, no. 2 (2007); R.F. Baumeister, J.D. Cambpell, J.I. Krueger, and K.D. Vohs, “Exploding the Self-Esteem Myth,” Scientific American 292 (2005); Eddie Brummelman, Sander Thomaes, Orobio de Castro, Geertjan Overbeek, and Brad Busman, “That’s Not Just Beautiful—That’s Incredibly Beautiful!: The Adverse Impact of Inflated Praise on Children with Low Self-Esteem,” Psychological Science 25, no. 3 (2014). 88  Bronson, Nurtureshock, 20.

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drop out of classes rather than suffer a mediocre grade.” They have difficulty choosing a major, as they are scared of committing to something that they are uncertain about succeeding.89 They are also more willing to cheat, rather than try harder to perform better; the fact of the matter is they have not “developed a strategy for handling failure.”90 If this is true, then the answer to the much hyped question, “Can American education compete globally?” seems to be a no. The evidence seems to be in the aforementioned global rankings of student academic performance, “The Learning Curve,” in which America has consistently ranked one of the lowest among developed nations, 14th in 2014 and 17th in 2012. In order to improve American students’ performance in this ranking, the cultivation of selfdiscipline, persistence and perseverance in children may be a necessary first step. Perhaps this is the reason why Chua’s prescriptions for tiger mothering touched a nerve with American parents. Yet, surely, the right question to ask is not “Can American education compete globally?” Rather, the right question is “Can American education be a worthy model to be emulated globally?” If the answer to this question is to be a yes, then simply instilling self-discipline, persistence and perseverance in children only regarding intellectual or other academic endeavors is clearly not sufficient. In doing this, American parents would be approximating tiger mothers. America full of tiger mothers may overtake South Korea, currently number one, in the global education ranking. However, South Korea is saddled with social problems caused by its over-heated educational competition fueled by its tiger mothers. Instilling in American children self-discipline, persistence and perseverance must accompany proper moral and civic education that teaches them to embody moral and civic virtues necessary for promoting the common good, as is required of Confucian mothering. Since the content of moral and civic virtues in America is obviously different from the Confucian counterpart, I am not arguing that Confucian mothering can be transplanted onto American soil without modification. Yet the need for moral and civic education is extremely urgent in 21st century America, where income inequality is the widest among industrialized countries,91 the voter participation in national elections is dismally low, between 30% and 55%,92 and the political process is dysfunctional 89  Ibid., 21. 90  Ibid., 22. 91  Robert Reich, Aftershock: The Next Economy and America’s Future (New York: Vintage Books, 2013). 92  Thomas E. Patterson, The Vanishing Voter (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002). The much touted 61.6% turn out for the 2008 presidential election was an exception rather than the rule. It went down to 58.2% in the 2012 presidential election.

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due to extreme partisan division as well as voter apathy and ignorance.93 To overcome such debilitating social and political problems, Americans must rally around their own moral and civic ideals and reform their parenting approach and educational system to center on moral education, teaching their children not only self-discipline, persistence and perseverance, but also, more importantly, worthy moral and civic goals necessary for a meaningful human life for every member of society.94 Bibliography Ames, Roger T. “Reflections on the Confucian Self: A Response to Fingarette.” In Rules, Rituals and Responsibility, 103–14, edited by Mary Bockover. LaSalle: Open Court, 1991. Baumeister, R.F., J.D. Campbell, J.I. Krueger, and K.D. Vohs, “Exploding the Self-Esteem Myth.” Scientific American 292 (2005): 84–92. “Best Education in the World: Finland, South Korea Top Country Rankings, U.S. Rated Average.” Huffington Post, 2012. Bronson, Po. Nurtureshock. New York: Twelve, 2009. Brummelman, Eddie, Sander Thomaes, Orobio de Castro, Geertjan Overbeek, and Brad Bushman. “That’s Not Just Beautiful-That’s Incredibly Beautiful!: The Adverse Impact of Inflated Praise on Children with Low Self-Esteem.” Psychological Science 25 no. 3 (2014): 728–35. Card, James. “Life and Death Exams in South Korea.” Asia Times, Nov 30 2005. Chan, Sin Yee. “The Confucian Notion of Jing (Respect).” Philosophy East and West 56, no. 2 (2006): 229–52. ———. “Gender and Relationship Roles in the Analects and the Mencius.” In Confucian Political Ethics, edited by Daniel A. Bell. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008. Chan, Wing-tsit. “The Evolution of the Confucian Concept Jen.” Philosophy East and West 4, no. 4 (1955): 295–319. Chua, Amy. Battle Hymn of the Tiger Mother. New York: Penguin Press, 2011. Cline, Erin M. Families of Virtue: Confucian and Western View on Childhood Development. Columbia University Press, 2015. Cua, A.S. “The Conceptual Framework of Confucian Ethical Thought.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 23, no. 2 (1996): 153–74. 93  Alan Wolfe, Does American Democracy Still Work? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006). 94  To my mind, two among such goals are (1) the fair and moral treatment of co-citizens— not only at the individual level but also at the collective level—and (2) active civic participation in democracy to realize this moral ideal in a common polity.

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DeNinno, Nadine. “Amy Chua, Tiger Mom, Talks Strict Parenting Success.” International Business Times, January 04 2012, http://www.ibtimes.com/amychua-tiger-mom-talks-strict-parenting-success-390612. Deuchler, Martina. The Confucian Transformation of Korea: A Study of Society and Ideology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992. Dweck, Carol. “Caution-Praise Can Be Dangerous.” American Educator 23, no. 1 (1999): 4–9. ———. “The Perils and Promise of Praise.” Educational Leadership 65, no. 2 (2007): 34–39. Han, Young-Woo. The Architect of the Chosôn Dynasty: Jeong Do-Jeon (in Korean). Seoul, Korea: Ji-shik-san-eop co, 1999. Jeong, Do-Jeon. Sambong Jeong Do-Jeon Mun-Jip [in Korean]. Translated by Association of Minjok-Munhwa-Chujin. 1–14 vols. Seoul, Korea: Hanguk-haksul-jeongbo co., 2006. Jo, Seung-Suk. “Korean Family and Children’s Education.” In Today and Tomorrow of Korean Family Culture, 165–215, edited by Institute for Korean Women and Society. Seoul, Korea: Society and Culture Research Institute Publishing, 1995. Kuhn, Steven. “Prisoner’s Dilemma.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, 2014. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/ prisoner-dilemma/. Lee, Jiyeon. “South Korean Students’ ‘Year of Hell’ Culminates with Exams Day.” CNN, November 13 2011. Lee, Samuel. “South Korea’s Dreaded College-Entrance Exam Is the Stuff of High School Nightmares, but Is It Producing ‘Robots’?” CBS NEWS, November 7, 2013. Noddings, Nel. Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics and Moral Education. Univ of California Press, 2013. Patterson, Thomas E. The Vanishing Voter. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002. Pearson. “The Learning Curve 2014 Report: Education and Skills for Life.” http:// thelearningcurve.pearson.com/index/index-comparison. Pearson, Catherine. “The Over-Praise Dilemma: When Complimenting Kids Actually Holds Them Back.” Huffington Post, 1/06 2014. Reich, Robert. Aftershock: The Next Economy and America’s Future. New York: Vintage Books, 2013. Sima, Guang. “Precepts for Family Life.” In Images of Women in Chinese Thought and Culture: Writings from the Pre-Qin Period through the Song Dynasty, 414–18, edited by Robin Wang. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 2003. Tu, Wei-ming. “The Creative Tension between Jen and Li.” In Humanity and SelfCultivation: Essays in Confucian Thought, 5–16. Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1979. ———. “Li as Process of Humanization.” In Humanity and Self-Cultivation: Essays in Confucian Thought, 17–34. Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1979.

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———. “An Inquiry in the Five Relationships in Confucian Humanism.” In The PsychoCultural Dynamics of the Confucian Family: Past and Present, edited by Walter H. Slote. Seoul, Korea: International Cultural Society of Korea, 1986. ———. “Pain and Suffering in Confucian Self-Cultivation.” In Way, Learning, and Politics: Essays on the Confucian Intellectual, 45–56. Singapore: Institute of East Asian Philosophies, 1989. Vinovskis, Maris, and Stephen Frank. “Parenting in American Society.” In Contemporary Parenting: Challenges and Issues, 45–67, edited by Terry Arendell. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1997. Wang, Robin. Images of Women in Chinese Thought and Culture: Writings from the PreQin Period through the Song Dynasty. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 2003. Wolfe, Alan. Does American Democracy Still Work? New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006. Xiang, Liu. Exemplary Women of Early China: The Lienü Zhuan of Liu Xiang. Anne Behnke Kinney, trans. New York: Columbia University Press, 2014. Yao, Xinzhong. “Self-Construction and Identity: The Confucian Self in Relation to Some Western Perceptions.” Asian Philosophy 6, no. 3 (1996). Yi, Eun-Sig. Korean History of Motherly Love [in Korean]. Seoul, Korea: Taoreum Press, 2009. Zhu Xi. “Further Reflections on Things at Hand.” In Images of Women in Chinese Thought and Culture: Writings from the Pre-Qin Period through the Song Dynasty, 316–26, edited by Robin Wang. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 2003.

CHAPTER 3

Beyond Sexism: The Need for an Intersectional Approach to Confucianism George Wrisley and Samantha Wrisley 1 Introduction Confucianism has been associated with sexist practices such as footbinding, child-brides, and female infanticide, among others.1 Because of such associations, Li-Hsiang Lisa Rosenlee, for example, is concerned to address the extent to which those forms of sexism are intrinsic to Confucianism and not “merely” a product of its historical background. She rightly asks, “. . . how does one identify the ‘sexist’ components in Confucianism as a whole? . . . is there an inevitable causal link between ‘Confucianism’ and ‘sexism’? In short, is ‘Confucianism’ sexist through and through?”2 It is our impression that the sexism/oppression that is at issue in such discussions of Confucianism is sexism/oppression against women qua women. The purpose of this paper is to show that, in light of intersectional approaches to oppression, looking at Confucianism from the singular angle of sexism, so understood, is insufficient if our concern is to address to what extent Confucianism entails (women’s) oppression. 2 Preliminaries Our goal is to take part in advocating for the (continued) value of Confucius’ philosophy. We agree with Roger Ames when he writes, “. . . Confucianism offers us philosophical assets that can be resourced and applied to serve not only the 1  Li-Hsiang Lisa Rosenlee, Confucianism and Women: A Philosophical Interpretation (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), 15. 2  Rosenlee Confucianism and Women, 15. Similarly, Chenyang Li addresses the issue of Confucianism and feminist concerns by addressing three questions, namely: Has Confucianism oppressed women? If yes, then how much? And what can be done about it? See Chenyang Li, “Confucianism and Feminist Concerns: Overcoming the Confucian ‘Gender Complex,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 27, no. 2 (2000), 187.

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renaissance of a revitalized Chinese culture, but also the interests of the world culture more broadly.”3 The body of recent work that takes feminist concerns seriously in the Confucian context4 has been vital for Confucian philosophy’s continued relevance and appeal.5 Nevertheless, a kind of course correction needs to be made, one that recognizes more fully the complex, intersectional nature of oppression and the ways that it can manifest in a Confucian context.6 The key aspect of the intersectional approach that we are recommending is its claim that the idea of a “pure” form of oppression such as sexism, i.e., an isolatable and discrete form of oppression along gender lines, is problematic. Just as in Confucianism a person is neither a preformed, discrete human “substance,” nor simply a parent, child, sibling, friend, or subject, but rather a process that is the intersection of her relationships, the nature of a person’s lived experience of oppression is what it is only at the intersecting lines of various modes of oppression such as racism, classism, sexism, ageism, etc. One of our concerns is that attempts to defend Confucianism against charges of sexism in the recent literature have focused on showing that much that is at the heart of Confucianism is also at the heart of feminism. And thus we find a general type of response, namely: Confucianism actually advocates x and x is also what feminism advocates; therefore, Confucianism is not actually

3  Roger T. Ames, Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2011), 2. 4  We use “Confucian context” to refer to that state of affairs that is a group of people who are followers of Confucius such that the society can be characterized as Confucian and the people can be said to be generally committed to the goals of Confucius’ philosophy. This, of course, leaves open whether it is a context in which people are “good Confucians,” i.e., skillful in achieving, for example, consummate conduct (ren 仁). This latter point will be important later on. 5  For example, see Li-Hsiang Lisa Rosenlee, Confucianism and Women; A.T. Nuyen, “Love and Respect in the Confucian Family,” in The Moral Circle and the Self, ed. Kim-chong Chong, Sor-hoon Tan, and C.L. Ten (Chicago: Open Court, 2003); Chenyang Li, The Sage and the Second Sex: Confucianism, Ethics, and Gender (Chicago: Open Court, 2000); Susan Mann and Yu-ying Cheng, ed., Under Confucian Eyes: Writings on Gender in Chinese History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). 6  Rosenlee goes someway in this direction, discussing the problems with essentializing the category of “woman,” as if there were one thing that is to be a woman across time and culture. And she acknowledges that in Western feminism there is a good deal of attention paid to race and class. See Rosenlee, Confucianism and Women, 152. However, her concern in these areas has to do with what she sees as the inadequate attention paid to the details of Chinese/ Confucian culture in cross-cultural gender comparisons. She does not bring in or mention the methodology of an intersectional approach.

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sexist at its core.7 It may well be true that Confucianism shares certain core values with feminism,8 but, as we will argue, the basic goal of ending oppression will be unachievable if we fail to recognize the number of ways that oppression can manifest intersectionally in, and because of, the Confucian context. One of those ways, as we will discuss in detail, is due to the centrality of both the kinds of relationships at the heart of Confucianism and their hierarchical nature, and the fact that it is unlikely that everyone in a Confucian context will be a good Confucian. Therefore, if our interest is to in some way rehabilitate Confucianism to avoid oppression, we cannot simply expunge the obviously sexist elements from, for example, ritual propriety (li 禮), while playing up the elements that are in common with feminist concerns, for example, the virtue of consummate conduct (ren 仁). 3

The Need for an Intersectional Approach to Oppression in the Confucian Context

When considering the relationships between sexism, Confucianism, and the idea of a female ethic, Hall and Ames acknowledge the importance of two points made by Jean Grimshaw, who is skeptical of a sex- or gender-based ethic. The first is that regardless of the cultural or biological origin of male and female “voices,” we find that we cannot describe them in any neat and clear way; and this is because neither all males nor all females have an essence that marks them or their voices as male or female.9 This observation about the problematic nature of articulating a male and female voice due to the variety of possible male and female voices leads us nicely into intersectionality. One reason that there is no such thing as the female voice is that a woman’s experience is never simply that of a woman, but that of a Black woman, a poor woman, a lesbian, a transgender woman, a poor Latina lesbian, etc.10 Oppression is lived at the intersections of its multiple modes; oppressed voices speak from these 7  This is one way to view the strategy, or part of the strategy, of writers such as Rosenlee, Nuyen, Li, and Xinyan Jiang. For the latter, see Xinyan Jiang, “Confucianism, Women, and Social Contexts,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 36, no. 2 (2009): 228–42. 8  And we should acknowledge, too, though that there is not a single movement which is feminism, but a diverse range of movements, authors, and goals that fall under “Feminism.” 9  Hall, David L. and Roger T. Ames. Thinking from the Han: Self, Truth, and Transcendence in Chinese and Western Culture (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 86. 10  Similarly, we should keep in mind the differences between, for example, a Black woman living in rural Louisiana and a Black woman living in Chicago, and an American Black woman and a Nigerian Black woman, etc.

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intersections. It is here that a central value of the intersectional approach that we are recommending can be seen: it can reveal what would otherwise be hidden and/or subtle forms of oppression not easily discerned either at all or in their proper light in its absence.11 “Intersectionality” can refer to either intersectional theory or intersectional oppression manifesting in life; importantly much work that happens on intersectionality does not go by that name.12 As a feminist theory, Kimberlé Crenshaw put a name to intersectionality in 1989, though it had been floating in the feminist consciousness for much longer.13 It seeks to understand how a variety of biological and socially constructed categories (age, race, sex, gender, class, ability, etc.) come together, or intersect, to create unique circumstances by which individuals are oppressed—unique circumstances in which “. . . hierarchies of differential access to a variety of resources—economic, political, and cultural” manifest.14 Within the feminist context, the need for an intersectional approach to oppression stemmed from the fact that white feminism did not accurately represent the struggles faced by women of color. There was the recognition that feminism—as a movement for and by women—should not limit the scope of its activism and theory to liberating white, middle-class women. It became clearer and clearer that in order to capture an accurate 11  And thus since we are not focusing on Confucianism merely as an historical “object,” but as a viable contemporary standpoint, our project is a contribution to Rosenlee’s goal of providing “. . . a point from which to begin to conceive Confucianism as a viable resource to deploy in a move toward liberation for Chinese women by indicating what might be the steps necessary to construct Confucian feminism,” since one of the goals of a Confucian feminism is a Confucianism that does not embody or produce oppression.” (Rosenlee, Confucianism and Women, 4). 12  Patrick R. Grzanka, Introduction to Intersectionality: A Foundations and Frontiers Reader, edited by Patrick R. Grzanka (Boulder: Westview Press, 2014), xviii. 13  While there is debate about its exact nature and usefulness, the importance of considering an intersectional approach is generally taken to be a given by feminist scholars: “. . . it is not an exaggeration to suggest that wherever one looks in women’s and gender studies and across much of the academy, intersectionality is being theorized, applied, or debated. . . .” See Michele Tracy Berger and Kathleen Guidroz, The Intersectional Approach: Transforming the Academy Through Race, Class, & Gender (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 1. We will lay out some of its key tenets in a general way, one that will allow us to show its value in the Confucian context; however, we will not be entering into the depths of detail that those interested in theorizing the nature of intersectionality would be concerned to enter into. 14  Nira Yuval-Davis, “Intersectionality and Feminist Politics,” in The Intersectional Approach: Transforming the Academy Through Race, Class, & Gender, edited by Michele Tracy and Kathleen Guidroz, 44–60 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 51.

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understanding of people’s oppressed experience, we cannot focus one at a time on their race or gender or class or sexual orientation, etc. We must view individuals as they are: completely social beings. An oppressed person is never simply her gender, or race, or class, or . . . She is these things intersecting to create a unique social identity or experience of oppression. As Yuval-Davis notes, different modalities of oppression clearly interlock: “When people are excluded from specific jobs, like teaching or becoming a bishop, as recently happened in the Anglican church, because of their sexualities, this concerns not only their social and cultural recognition but also their economic position.”15 A useful example of intersectional oppression can be found in the case of “DeGraffenried v. General Motors,” in which five Black women levied suit against GM, stating that they were unfairly fired due to their status as Black women. In their defense, GM produced evidence that showed that they indeed employed both women (white and who worked in the offices) and men (Black and who worked in the plants). Due to the fact that the court would not recognize the plaintiffs’ “Black women” status as one that should be protected, apart from their separate identity as “women” and “Black,” the case was dismissed. The Black women working for GM failed to find justice in the legal system because they inhabited an unacknowledged intersection of race and gender. In other words, the problem was not one of discrimination by addition—adding oppression from being Black to oppression from being a woman—the discrimination was of a unique, intersectional variety. We thus see that simply knowing that a woman operates within a patriarchal society is not sufficient for describing her lived experience as an oppressed person. For one to fully understand the extent to which she is oppressed, one must also consider her race, age, sexual orientation, gender, class, ability and other social factors that are viewed by society in various degrees of acceptance and marginalization. Without this broadened insight informing our analysis, we will likely miss individualized instances of subjugation (as in the GM case). Another harmful outcome of ignoring intersectionality is that we may fail to provide an adequate and just rectification of oppression. Crenshaw provides us with an important example of this. United States Immigration law once required that a person—usually a woman—who has immigrated to the United States in order to marry a U.S. citizen must have remained “properly” married for two years before she could apply for permanent status. The lawmakers that wrote this particular provision failed to anticipate that the rigid time minimum enacted by this law discouraged many immigrant women from separating and divorcing abusive spouses. Crenshaw writes, “When faced 15  Ibid., 52.

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with the choice between protection from their batterers and protection from deportation, many immigrant women chose the latter.”16 Faced with the grievous ramifications of this “double subordination,” Congress included in the 1990 Immigration Act a decree amending the marriage fraud regulations that allowed for women to obtain an “explicit waiver for hardship” caused by spousal abuse. Unfortunately, to obtain such a waiver, women had to provide evidence in the form of (but not limited to) police reports, medical records, and affidavits from social service agents. But as Crenshaw notes: . . . cultural barriers often further discourage immigrant women from reporting or escaping battering situations. Tina Shum, a family counselor at a social service agency, points out that “[t]his law sounds so easy to apply, but there are cultural complications in the Asian community that make even these requirements difficult. . . . Just to find the opportunity and courage to call us is an accomplishment for many.”17 Requiring bureaucratic documentation of abuse, thus, put immigrant women, many of whom had limited financial and cultural resources at their disposal, in a difficult position and, thus, they were often further discouraged from escaping their violent marriages. While the legislation was meant to provide women with a safer path to citizenship rather than staying married to their abusive partner, requiring immigrant women to provide documentation that contained explicit evidence of their violent marriages created a new oppressive situation that was, by nature of the intended subject, inherently classed and raced. Our analysis of possible oppression in the Confucian context relies on two key aspects of the intersectional approach. The first we have already illustrated, namely, the claim that there are unique forms of oppression that occur only at the intersections of modes of oppression—the GM case is a paradigmatic example. The second we have mentioned and that is that a person’s daily lived experience of oppression cannot be understood properly if the modalities of oppression are considered individually in isolation. This follows in part from the first aspect above, but can be further seen in Cressida Heyes’s description of the problematic nature of second wave feminism:

16  Crenshaw, Kimberlé. “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color,” Stanford Law Review 43 (1991): 1247. 17  Ibid., 1248.

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Friedan’s famous proposition [in the Feminine Mystique] that women needed to get out of the household and into the professional workplace was, bell hooks pointed out, predicated on the experience of a post-war generation of white, middle-class married women confined to housekeeping and child-rearing by their professional husbands (Friedan 1963; hooks 1981). Many women of color and working-class women had worked outside their homes (sometimes in other women’s homes) for decades; some lesbians had a history of working in traditionally male occupations or living alternative domestic lives without a man’s “family wage.” Similarly, some women from the less developed world have been critical of Northern feminist theory for globalizing its claims.18 A Mexican woman working in a white, middle-class person’s home, who experiences racial discrimination from her employer—she overhears the employer refer to her as a “wetback,” say—does not have an isolated, abstracted experience of racism. She experiences that racism as a lower class Mexican woman working in another person’s home. Her experience of being called a “wetback” would (almost certainly) be different than that of a Mexican man who owns a business.19 This aspect of intersectionality, namely, that each person’s experience of oppression is unique, lines up well with the fact that in the Confucian context, a person is literally constituted by his unique set of relationships—he is their intersection—and his experience is that of a person at that unique intersection.20

18  Heyes, Cressida, “Identity Politics”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/identity-politics/, 2012. We should note that Heyes’s description may only be applicable to dominant trends within second wave feminism, and not second wave feminism as a whole. Thanks to Matt Drabek for this point. 19  The inseparability of the different modes of oppression is intended primarily at the level of lived experience, not from the standpoint of ontology. That is, it is not claimed that gender and its concomitant sexism are conceptually dependent upon other social divisions and their concomitant forms of oppression. One way in which they are ontologically distinct is that they are not reducible to each other, i.e., classism does not reduce to sexism. For more on this distinction between lived experience and ontology, see YuvalDavis, “Intersectionality and Feminist Politics.” 20  We purposely use the masculine pronoun here because of what will come up later regarding the idea that in the Confucian context, women are ultimately denied full personhood.

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An Intersectional Approach to Confucianism

There are a number of possible ways in which intersectional oppression is a concern for Confucianism. We have already made the general point that oppression is not experienced along the lines of a single modality. Thus, if we are concerned with the relationship between Confucianism and sexism, we need to be aware of the ways in which sexism intersects with other modes of oppression, for example, racism. Beyond that general point, we now want to argue that there are two central ways in which intersectional oppression could manifest in a Confucian context. First, it is possible to have unique forms of intersectional oppression that occur at the intersection of the hierarchical Confucian relationships (with what we would refer to as the not always equitable demands of ritual propriety [li 禮] that govern them) and our contemporary (western) society’s institutionalized racism, sexism, classism, etc. The intersectional oppression would come from the hierarchical specifics of ritual propriety in combination with current cultural institutionalized oppression. That is, the specifics of ritual propriety may simply delineate lines of deference, i.e., lines of power inequality, and then, along those lines of power inequality, institutionalized racism, sexism, classism, etc., manifest. For our purposes, let us call this type mixed intersectional oppression. Second, it is possible that the demands of ritual propriety that govern individual roles give rise to intersectional oppression because of their specific content and their normative claims regarding deference and power inequality.21 An example would be where ritual propriety was such that sexism and ageism intersected, as it might for the youngest daughter in a family. For our purposes, let us call this type intrinsic intersectional oppression. Let us look at these two types of Confucian intersectional oppression in more detail.

21  There are, of course, various forms of what could be called inequalities of power. We are concerned with those that are power over another person such that the one in power can exert some sort of force against the other. This could be in the form of physical or symbolic violence, for example. The former would be where one who is physically stronger than another exerted physical force against the weaker. The latter would be where, for example, an obstetrician told a birthing mother that she must have a C-section when the reason for it is so that he may be done in time to have drinks with friends.

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Mixed Confucian Intersectional Oppression

What we are calling mixed intersectional oppression is that form of intersectional oppression that could occur at the intersection of Confucianism and non-Confucian forms of oppressions, such as racism, classism, and sexism. We learn very early in the Analects that the concepts of filial conduct/responsibility (xiao 孝), ritual propriety (li 禮),22 and consummate conduct (ren 仁) are tightly entwined. Family/filial responsibility (xiaodi 孝弟) is the root of consummate conduct (ren 仁): Exemplary persons (junzi 君子) concentrate their efforts on the root, for the root having taken hold, the way (dao 道) will grow therefrom. As for filial and fraternal responsibility [xiaodi 孝弟], it is, I suspect the root of authoritative conduct (ren 仁)23 And serving one’s parents by observing ritual propriety (li 禮) is a central way to manifest filial conduct/responsibility (xiao 孝): Meng Yizi asked about filial conduct (xiao 孝). The Master replied: “Do not act contrary.” Fan Chi was driving the Master’s chariot, and the Master informed him further: “Meng Yizi asked me about filial conduct, and I replied: ‘Do not act contrary.’ ” Fan Chi asked, “What did you mean by that?” The Master replied: “while they are living, serve them according to the observances of ritual propriety (li 禮); when they are dead, bury them and sacrifice to them according to the observances of ritual propriety”24 Moreover, being deferential and accommodating is central to ritual propriety: Master You said: “. . . That being deferential gets one close to observing ritual propriety (li 禮) is because it keeps disgrace and insult at a distance. Those who are accommodating and do not lose those with whom they are close are deserving of esteem.”25 22  We want to make explicit that in what follows we are not operating with a view of ritual propriety such that it is merely a matter of internalizing rules/rites. It is well taken that, among other things, it is also a matter of countenance and internalizing the appropriate shame response (Analects 2.3; 2.8). 23   Analects 1.2. 24   Analects 2.5. 25   Analects 1.13.

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And consider the deference called for in such passages from the Book of Rites: The bridegroom himself stands by (the carriage of the bride), and hands to her the strap (to assist her in mounting),—showing his affection. Having that affection, he seeks to bring her near to him. It was by such reverence and affection for their wives that the ancient kings obtained the kingdom. In passing out from the great gate (of her father’s house), he precedes, and she follows, and with this the right relation between husband and wife commences. The woman follows (and obeys) the man:—in her youth, she follows her father and elder brother; when married, she follows her husband; when her husband is dead, she follows her son. ‘Man’ denotes supporter. A man by his wisdom should (be able to) lead others.26 While the passage esteems reverence and affection for wives, it is all too easy for the wife/woman to be abused given how she is required to defer to the men in her life. Filial conduct, deference, and accommodation all play out in the field of hierarchical relationships that constitute a person.27 Of the five central relationships—ruler and subject, husband and wife, father and son, older brother and younger brother, and friend and friend—three are centered on the family.28 It is at home that one learns that being a good Confucian means endeavoring, within the family, to make ritual propriety and consummate conduct one’s own and second nature. And in so doing one learns how to maneuver skillfully within the boundaries of the various roles—oldest sister, youngest brother, 26  James Legge, trans. Li Chi: Book of Rites, edited by Ch’u Chai and Winberg Chai. Vol. I (New York: University Books, 1967), 440–41. In personal correspondence on the question of deference, Nick Hudson makes the point that deference seems to be stressed more for women than men; and that this may be due to the paucity of specific prescriptions (li 禮) guiding the husband/wife relationship—which, again, sets her up for abuse. But as we can see in the quote from Master You, deference is of general importance in the Confucian relationships. 27  Except, perhaps, for the relationship between friend and friend, as it is not, strictly speaking, hierarchal. However, note that the Book of Rites says of a son, “He should serve one twice as old as himself as he serves his father, one ten years older than himself as an elder brother; with one five years older he should walk shoulder to shoulder, but (a little) behind him. When five are sitting together, the eldest must have a different mat (by himself).” Qu Li I, 17. Thus, one would imagine the younger of two friends being called upon to defer to the older. 28  Perhaps ruler/subject is, as well, since the state is viewed as the family “writ large.” Thanks to Nicholas Hudson for this point.

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wife, husband—as determined by ritual propriety. And from there one maps virtuous behavior from family to the broader society: “There is a common expression, ‘The Empire, the state, the family’. The Empire has its basis in the state, the state in the family, and the family in one’s own self.’ ”29 But whether one endeavors to be a good Confucian or not, in a Confucian familial context, one learns to be accommodating and deferential. For those who have not grown up in such a context, it may be difficult to fully appreciate what this means, its possible depths and implications. Yen Mah, a Chinese woman (doctor and author), writes: I never cared for my sister Lydia. As the oldest of seven children in our family, she was known to us as Da Jie 大姐 (Big Sister). She was often put in charge and would flaunt her authority. When I was little, she hectored me mercilessly and often beat me. After a long separation we met each other again. By then, a reversal of fortune had taken place. I was no longer the despised little sister whom she could bully at will, but a successful physician practicing in America. She, meanwhile, had been stuck in a loveless marriage in Communist China for thirty years. Although I was shocked by her downtrodden appearance and humble demeanor, all the familiar emotions of respect and fear re-emerged as soon as she uttered my childhood name, Wu Mei 五妹 (Fifth Younger Sister). Suddenly, I reverted to my former status. Respectfully, I called her Da Jie and dutifully agreed to do everything she asked. I do not trust her but was eager to please and felt compelled to help her although I could not understand why. I knew my sister was ruthless but not once did I consider refusing her. Perhaps my mind was so conditioned by Confucian concepts of min fen [sic] [“duty accorded by name”] that I could no longer think for myself.30 While we must be careful about what we conclude from the experience of one person, this quote is important in a number of ways.31 First, it illustrates the way in which the hierarchical relationships in Confucianism constitute 29   Mencius 4A5. 30  Adeline Yen Mah, Watching the Tree: A Chinese Daughter Reflects on Happiness, Tradition, and Spiritual Wisdom (New York: Broadway Books, 2001), 53–54. 31  For examples of other women’s negative experiences in a Confucian context, see Nuyen, “Love and Respect in the Confucian Family.” It is important to emphasize that while this is but one example, it illustrates the points highlighted even if it is not representative of all or even a majority of women’s experiences. Thus, we have not sought to catalogue further examples.

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habituated and potentially unconscious power inequalities. Second, it shows how a Confucian context can exist with its hierarchical relationships and deference in place, without that meaning that all parties are embodying Confucian virtues such as ren 仁 or shu 恕, “putting oneself in the other’s place.”32 This latter point leads to a third, namely, that those who are in the lower position of power in a relationship are in a position of having to act, trusting that the other party will reciprocate—i.e., they make themselves further vulnerable. When one acts according to ritual propriety, one might be motivated by a sense of doing the right thing because it is the right thing or out of fear of remonstration or punishment. Virtue would presumably require the former motivation, though it is probably too simplistic to think that we can so clearly delineate our motivations. If one acts according to ritual propriety because it is ritual propriety, then one would presumably act accordingly even when knowing the other person would not. And if one acts according to ritual propriety because of fear of remonstration or punishment, only one of the two in the relationship has an immediate motivation because of the unequal power. This is the case even if, for example, the older sister can be reproached by a parent for being cruel to the younger sister. Let us keep two points in mind. First, the various rites and observances of ritual propriety are rooted in and constitute the deferential nature of the Confucian relationships. Second, as we noted above, it is possible (if not likely) to have a Confucian context in which not everyone is a good Confucian. In such a context, the hierarchical Confucian relationships, characterized by their power inequality, are ripe for occurrences of intersectional oppression. The mixed variety of intersectional oppression that we are here concerned to clarify would come about from either a) the deference, accommodation, and power inequality in the Confucian context intersecting with other, not specifically Confucian, forms of oppression, or b) that context of deference, etc., together with specific norms of ritual propriety (li 禮) that embody oppression, intersecting with not specifically Confucian forms of oppression such as racism, classism, etc. To be as clear as possible, the concern is this: in the quote from Yen Mah, her older sister was cruel to her. This cruelty was made possible, in part, by the hierarchical nature of their relationship. Whence the sister’s cruelty? We do not know. But replace the sister with either a person who is, or a system that is, 32  See Ames, Confucian Role Ethics, 194ff. for a helpful discussion of shu. Here is one example of its mention: “Zigong asked, ‘Is there one expression that can be acted upon until the end of one’s days?’ The Master replied, ‘There is shu 恕: do not impose on others what you yourself do not want.’ ” (Analects 15.24)

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racist and sexist and that racism and sexism may easily manifest intersectionally through the Confucian power inequality that characterizes the hierarchical relationships. Take, for example, the case of the Black women and GM. If we modify it so that it is a Confucian context, we can imagine a form of intersectional oppression that makes use of the power inequality of the Confucian understanding of the relationships. Imagine that Patricia, who is an accountant, is given tasks at work that fall outside of her job description, e.g., picking up her boss’s children from kindergarten and taking them to a sitter every afternoon. Moreover, he gives these tasks to her because he thinks women are the ones who should deal with children and that picking them up is a servant’s task, and Blacks, not whites, should be servants. In other words, she is given those tasks not because she is Black or because she is a woman, but because she is a Black woman. In a non-Confucian context, he would have power over her because he is her boss. Perhaps he has the power to fire her or deny her promotion. But in the Confucian context this is not the only power that he has. In the Confucian context Patricia’s boss is in a ruler/minister type position and she is required to show the appropriate deference to and accommodation of his wishes, for if she does not, then she is being a bad Confucian. However, we should note that in the Xiaojing (The Chinese Classic of Family Reverence) we find: . . . if confronted by reprehensible behavior on his father’s part, a son has no choice but to remonstrate with his father, and if confronted by reprehensible behavior on his ruler’s part, a minister has no choice but to remonstrate with his ruler. Hence, remonstrance is the only response to immorality. How could simply obeying the commands of one’s father be deemed filial?33 We thus find explicit instruction that one is not being filial if one blindly obeys one’s father or ruler when they are doing something reprehensible/questionable. To be filial requires remonstrating with them. Thus, Patricia would seem to have recourse to object to her treatment. However, we also find a similar passage in the Analects, but with an important addition:

33  Henry Rosemont, Jr. and Roger T. Ames, trans. The Chinese Classic of Family Reverence: A Philosophical Translation of the Xiaojing (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2009), 114.

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The Master said, “In serving your father and mother, remonstrate with them gently. On seeing that they do not heed your suggestions, remain respectful and do not act contrary. Although concerned, voice no resentment.”34 While this passage refers to the father and mother relationships, it is presumably safe to say that as the family is the locus of learning consummate, virtuous behavior, the same sort of procedure would apply outside the family. Thus, assuming she overcomes fear of retribution and speaks up (not necessarily a minor assumption), remonstrating with her boss, there is nothing that requires him to listen. However, in the end, she is required to defer to his judgment on the matter if she is to be a good Confucian, all while not exhibiting resentment. One would hope that in a Confucian society characterized by harmony and virtue there would not be racism, sexism, classism, heterosexism, etc.35 However, as we have seen, it is possible to have the hierarchical Confucian context with all of its power inequalities and insistence on deference while those in the positions of power abuse that power.36 And that power is easily abused along (intersecting) lines of existing institutionalized oppression such as racism, sexism, classism, and sexual orientation, as well as the institutionalized oppression that can result from religious hegemony.37 To be clear, the claim here is not that a Confucian context will necessarily give rise to such abuses. Rather, the claim is that the hierarchical nature of Confucian relationships creates institutionalized privilege on behalf of those in power. And that privilege can either be accompanied by reciprocity or by abuse. One form of abuse is intersectional oppression. 34   Analects 4.18. 35   Assuming that sexism would be expunged from a contemporary formulation of Confucianism. 36  It cannot be stressed enough that we acknowledge that “those in power” needs to be understood carefully. Since a person’s position of power will depend on who the other is in the relationship, one cannot be said to be in a position of absolute power. The older brother has power over the younger siblings, but must accommodate and defer to the wishes of his father, uncle, and authorities outside the family, whether officials or older friends. 37  Think for example of the treatment of women and homosexuals in the history of Christianity, and its contemporary manifestations. We are grateful to Masato Ishida for reminding us of the importance of bringing into consideration oppression resulting from religion. We are grateful for his feedback and the general enthusiasm and feedback we received when presenting the core ideas of this paper at the 2014 University of TokyoUniversity of Hawaii Summer Residential Institute in Comparative Philosophy.

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Given the above, we believe we avoid the mistake that Rosenlee warns about: . . . Confucianism should not be reduced to a set of hierarchical kinship and rigid gender roles, since in this reductionism one overlooks the dynamic aspect of Confucianism, whose ethical theory of ren 仁 as well as its emphasis on the lifelong project of self-cultivation and maintaining proper relations, at least at the theoretical level, are akin to the feminist ethic of care and its socially constructed self as a web of relations.38 We fully appreciate the ethical implications of ren 仁, and the other Confucian virtues, but that does not change, as we have tried to show, the potential for oppression that is inherent in the hierarchical nature of the Confucian understanding of relationships and persons. In this context we should note Ames’s point that: Confucius himself during his lifetime despaired at having yet to meet “anyone who is truly fond of consummate conduct” (ren 仁) or “anyone who is truly steadfast” (gang 剛), and it is unlikely that many consummate and steadfast persons who have reached Confucius’s high expectations have lived in the interim.39 We are not suggesting that Confucianism is necessarily oppressive; however, while ren 仁 and the junzi 君子 (exemplary person), for example, may be ideals or goals in Confucianism, they presuppose the hierarchical relationships with their power inequalities. The possibility of a harmonious Confucian society, thus, presupposes the risk of those hierarchies being abused; and there is nothing in Confucianism that ensures they will not be abused. In a similar vein, the threat of mixed intersectional oppression in the Confucian context does not require us to construe the hierarchies constituting the Confucian relationships as authoritarian. Regarding authoritarian worries, Nuyen notes that, “Conceptually, the Confucian notion of li seems to be the main source of the trouble.”40 In trying to defend Confucianism, and against the idea that li is the main culprit, Nuyen notes that the idea of the Three Bonds—“The minister serves the king, the son serves the father, and the wife

38  Rosenlee, Confucianism and Women, 16. 39  Ames, Confucian Role Ethics, 19. 40  Nuyen, “Love and Respect in the Confucian Family,” 97.

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serves the husband”41—which might seem to embody authoritarian inequality in favor of men, is actually from the Legalist text the Hanfeizi, and was only later incorporated into Confucianism, “. . . through the politicization of Confucianism during the Han dynasty and subsequently.”42 Moreover, the Confucian text of the Mencius in specifying the five central Confucian relationships, says: “. . . between father and son, there should be affection; between sovereign and minister, righteousness; between husband and wife, attention to their separate functions; between old and young, a proper order; and between friends, fidelity.”43 Regarding this, Nuyen writes: It is interesting to note that righteousness governs only the relationship between the sovereign and the minister. The family relationships of father and son and husband and wife are governed respectively by affection, or love, and separateness, or distinction. For Mencius, then, “the proper relationship between [father and son] is mutual affection rather than one-way obedience.” There is also mutuality in the husbandwife relationship. The “underlying spirit” in the governing principle of attention to separate functions “is not dominance but division of labor.” It is no wonder that critics ignore the Mencius when it comes to textual support for the charges of authoritarianism, totalitarianism, and domination.44 As a defense of the Confucian texts such as the Analects and Mencius to charges of one-sided authoritarianism, Nuyen’s points are well-taken. However, the Confucian relationships, and the li and ren that govern/constitute them, need not be authoritarian or totalitarian in order for them to be conducive to various forms of oppression. As it is found in the Analects and the Book of Rites, for example, the separate functions of the husband and wife are delineated in such a way that there is a hierarchical power inequality. That inequality is sufficient, given human nature45 and the fact that being a good Confucian

41  Quoted in ibid., 96. 42  Ibid., 98. 43  Quoted in ibid., 98. 44  Ibid., 98. 45  We do not mean to lean too heavily on any claims about “human nature,” as those are notoriously problematic. The point is simply an empirical one, namely, that humans seem to us to have a propensity for greed, particularly greed for power and control. The extent to which this is human nature and not learned nature resulting from our living in a capitalist economy is a good question.

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is not so easily achieved, for abuses of power and intersectional oppression. As Nuyen helpfully points out: . . . it may be insisted that despite what Confucius, Mencius, and other key Confucianists actually said, Confucianism has to be taken as a blend of what was said and the interpretations of what was said, not to mention the applications in daily life of the actual teachings and their interpretations.46 Thus, again, while consummate conduct (ren 仁) and the five relationships are centered around self-cultivation, mutual love, and support, in practice the nature of the hierarchical relationships and the traditional understanding of what li 禮 calls for, provide a context for mixed intersectional oppression. In light of this consider the following: The Master said, ‘To cultivate harmony with all the kindred of parents may be pronounced filial! It is said in the Book of Poetry (II, vii, ode 9, 3), “Brethren whose virtue stands the test, By bad example still unchanged, Their generous feelings manifest, Nor grow among themselves estranged. But if their virtue weakly fails, The evil influence to withstand, Then selfishness o’er love prevails, And troubles rise on every hand.” ’47 Those who are virtuous manifest generous feelings, but for those who are weak in virtue, their love is overcome by selfishness. That selfishness in the context of power inequality is a central worry in spite of the ideals found in the Confucian texts. We hope that it is clear in our line of argument that we are not claiming, explicitly or implicitly, that Confucianism is a “patriarchal ideology through and through,”48 one necessarily characterized by male hegemony. The problem is that it need not be any of those things in order for mixed intersectional oppression to be a potential issue. 46  Ibid., 99. 47  Legge, Vol. II, 290. Emphasis ours. According to Legge, we cannot suppose that this section of the Liji is derived from actual sayings of Confucius: “They are not in his style, and the reasonings are occasionally unworthy of him” (Legge 1967, Vol. I, 42). Nevertheless, the ideas contained in this passage seem to us to be representative of Confucianism. 48  Rosenlee, Confucianism and Women, 16.

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And, again, the mixed variety of intersectional oppression that we are here concerned to clarify would come about from either a) the deference, accommodation, and power inequality in the Confucian context intersecting with other, not specifically Confucian, forms of oppression, or b) that context of deference, etc., together with specific norms of ritual propriety (li 禮) that embody oppression, intersecting with not specifically Confucian forms of oppression such as racism, classism, etc. We have primarily focused on examples of a) because of the importance of the concept of deference to Confucian thought, but b) is another clear form of it. 6

Intrinsic Confucian Intersectional Oppression

The second main way in which intersectional oppression may manifest in the Confucian context is that it is possible that the demands of ritual propriety (li 禮), which govern/constitute the individual roles—ruler, older brother, friend, for example—give rise to intersectional oppression because of their specific, Confucian content. We take this sort of intrinsic oppression to be in the sense that people are usually concerned that sexism is a part of Confucianism. That is, the central way that Confucianism is taken to embody patriarchy and sexism is through the inequitable ways it specifies the roles, their duties, and what is appropriate to them. However, in light of intersectionality, we need to consider the possibility that ritual propriety, together with the hierarchical nature of the Confucian relationships that they specify, may produce intersecting modes of oppression beyond sexism in isolation. For example, in Confucianism we find sexism institutionalized in the demands of ritual propriety, this much is usually acknowledged. However, we also find embodied the requirement that the younger defer to the older. Just as there can be requirements for women that are not sexist and those that are sexist, there can be requirements for the younger to defer to the older that are just and those that are unjust, i.e., ones that amount to ageism. Thus, there could arise a case in which the youngest daughter experiences oppression along the intersecting lines of sexism and ageism. This would happen, for example, if she was unjustly denied something or unjustly punished, not because of being a woman or being young, but being a young woman.49

49  It is, of course, an important question when discrimination based on age is unjust. We might, in fact, be less sure of our intuitions regarding it than those regarding when discrimination based on gender is unjust.

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With what sounds as though it is an acknowledgement of intersectional concerns, Hall and Ames write about what they call the Chinese correlative model of sexism, which we will address in detail below: Another feature of the correlative model is that the male/female complementarity cannot be divorced from other significant correlations. As Guisso observes: If the Five Classics fostered the subordination of woman to man, they fostered even more the subordination of youth to age. Thus, in every age of Chinese history where Confucianism was exalted, the woman who survived, the woman who had age and the wisdom and experience which accompanied it, was revered, obeyed and respected . . . even if her son were an emperor. It is perhaps this fact more than any other, which enabled the woman of traditional China to accept for so long the status imposed upon her. If we begin from the assumption that humanity is an achievement, age becomes a significant factor. Woman achieves status by growing old. However, a simple-minded reverence for the aged is not to be encouraged. Confucius himself says repeatedly that age in the absence of achievement should be a source of embarrassment. . . .50 The point made by Hall and Ames that the male/female cannot be divorced from the old/young is very much an intersectional one. While an older woman without achievement would be an embarrassment, a young woman would be in an unfortunate place as well, since she is at the intersection of age and gender. Our point here is to illustrate that when thinking about the ways in which sexism manifests in Confucianism, we need to have an eye open to unique forms that cannot be seen when looking at sexism independently of other modes of oppression. From a feminist perspective, part of the importance of the intersectional approach is to become more aware of the ways in which oppression against women can manifest. Aside from the usually mentioned sexism, there are also racism, classism, ageism, heterosexism, cissexism,51 ableism, and discrimination based on religion, nationality, or perceived ethnicity.52 By intersectional lights, sexism can manifest in forms that are unidentifiable as pure forms of sexism; moreover, the lived experience of an oppressed woman is never that 50  Hall and Ames, Thinking from the Han, 97–98. 51  Discrimination against persons whose gender does not match their biological sex. 52  And this list is not intended to be exhaustive.

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of simply being a woman. Given all of the modes of oppression that have been identified, there are a great many possibilities. That is, of course, not to say that we will find or are even likely to find them all in Confucianism. The importance of taking an intersectional approach to Confucianism is that we can be blind to intersectional forms of oppression unless we are aware of their very possibility and the ways in which they may manifest. As Chenyang Li notes, not enough attention has been paid to Confucianism in regard to feminist concerns.53 While this situation seems to be improving, it appears to us that attention is paid to concerns of sexism as a singular, independent mode of oppression. But in light of Black Feminist thought, and what we have seen so far, it is clear that that approach is inadequate if we are concerned with the status and rights of women, and oppression more generally. A further aspect of the importance of oppression in the Confucian context, particularly in relation to intrinsic intersectional oppression, is that persons are constituted by their relations. And, thus, oppression that is rooted in the nature of those relationships strikes at the heart of the person’s existence. For example, a Black lesbian who experiences oppression at the intersection of being Black and being a lesbian experiences oppression at the core of her being. This is not to essentialize race or sexual orientation. It is simply to point out that those aspects of her lived life are central to her daily lived experience.54 This is in contrast to someone, say, a white heterosexual male who is made fun of by his friends for regularly wearing black and blue together. While his wardrobe may be central to his lived identity, it is difficult to imagine it being central in the way that being Black or being a lesbian would be. This is in large part because of the level of choice that is involved in picking one’s wardrobe. Its being a matter of choice is, of course, not the only, or even the main, difference between the Black lesbian and white heterosexual male with the black and blue wardrobe. The former but not the latter’s oppression is institutionalized and systemic in a way that the making fun of the black and blue wardrobe is not. Analogously, being the youngest daughter is a central aspect of a woman’s personhood in the Confucian context, and in the Confucian context we have a potentially analogous form of institutionalized oppression. That is, given the “institutional” nature of the Confucian relationships, her oppression along those lines can be considered institutionalized, particularly if it is a result of

53  For example, in Li, The Sage and the Second Sex. 54  The extent to which they must be is an important question. In a society in which there is no racial or sexual orientation oppression, those aspects may be less central to her lived existence.

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the normative prescriptions of ritual propriety. And, thus, oppression that is rooted in those relational aspects of her being is particularly pernicious. 7

A Further Complication: Women and the Question of Personhood

We need to take seriously the uniquely Chinese Confucian form of sexism that ultimately denies full personhood to women. Personhood in the Confucian context is not an automatically given status that a member of homo sapiens receives in virtue of being homo sapiens. As Rosenlee nicely summarizes, “The virtue of ren is the defining characteristic of Confucian personhood; the category of ‘person’ is an achieved, ethical category, instead of an a priori ontological category.”55 This aspect of Confucianism, however, opens up a new avenue of oppression. In contrast to the West where a woman must embody masculine character traits to be considered fully human, in China: . . . the realized person has been broadly defined as an achieved harmony of the full range of human traits and dispositions. Male dominance is a consequence of sexual differentiation into male and female that has tended to exclude the female from the achievement of becoming human. Thus, the male has been free to pursue the task of realizing his personhood though [sic] the creation of an androgynous personality. The distinctive feature of the Chinese conception of gender is that were, per impossibile, the female to be allowed freedom to pursue realized personhood, she could do this by seeking a harmony of the same range of human traits that the male employs as standard. Chinese sexism, which denies to the female the possibility of becoming a human being, is brutal in the extreme. However, the model available to avoid continued brutality might be more humane than is the Western model. The status of women in Western cultures might be deemed less humbling, but the means of becoming truly human advertise a more subtle kind of dominance. To be human you must be male.56 Hall and Ames’s analysis of Chinese vs. Western sexism makes for an extraordinarily interesting, and troubling, complication. We do not want to take it as obviously correct or uncontentious; however, there is not space here to

55  Rosenlee, Confucianism and Women, 35. 56  Hall and Ames, Thinking from the Han, 81–82.

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adequately discuss its correctness.57 Assuming that Hall and Ames are broadly correct in their analysis regarding a woman’s inability to achieve full personhood in the Chinese Confucian context, we find that there are still further intersectional concerns—ones that cut across our mixed and intrinsic forms of intersectional oppression. In the context of mixed intersectional oppression, this further intersectional concern is the result of combining the denial of full personhood with other forms of oppression such as racism. With the denial of full personhood, a Black woman is not just black and a woman, she is a Black woman who lacks full personhood and who is thus in the position of being judged less deserving of respect, office, achievements, etc.58 And while our understanding of what it is to advocate a contemporary, non-oppressive Confucianism might imply the dissolution of Western racism, there is presumably still the possibility of other forms of racism that could take root. There was, after all, discrimination in 57  For a similar approach to women and persons, see Watson, Rubie S., “The Name and the Nameless: Gender and Person in Chinese Society,” American Ethnologist 13 (1986): 619–31. Rosenlee grounds the inability of women to achieve full personhood in the “. . . structural limitation derived from the concept of nei-wai as a gender based division of labor . . .” (Rosenlee, Confucianism and Women, 35). In the Book of Filial Piety for Women, it is made clear that while a woman may influence the world outside the home positively or negatively through her relationship with her husband and family (“She sets an example of rectitude and virtue, and her husband enthusiastically copies it”), it also makes clear that her place is in the home and her duty is to her husband and family. In addition to extolling the virtues of purity, obedience, absence of jealousy, it also counts as a virtue “absence of contact with the outside” and we are told that while, “. . . the husband has a hundred actions, the wife has a single purpose” (Mann and Cheng, Under Confucian Eyes: Writings on Gender in Chinese History, 59–60). Thus, when being filial, a woman’s role and duties do limit the full range of her activities and the possibility of her fully cultivating the same range of relationships that a male would be able to cultivate. This would seem to lend support to the claim that women, by and large, are denied the possibility of achieving the same sort of personhood (ren 仁) that a man can achieve. 58  The situation is potentially even worse, since even without the Confucian issues regarding women and personhood, Blacks in the United States, for example, may feel less than human. Describing her early college experience, bell hooks writes: “We need more autobiographical accounts of the first generation of black students to enter predominantly white schools, colleges, and universities. Imagine what it is like to be taught by a teacher who does not believe you are fully human. Imagine what it is like to be taught by teachers who do believe that they are racially superior, and who feel that they should not have to lower themselves by teaching students whom they really believe are incapable of learning.” bell hooks, Teaching Critical Thinking: Practical Wisdom (New York: Routledge, 2010), 2.

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traditional China along ethnic lines, e.g., the Han discriminating against the non-Han minorities. Writing about the dangers of the Chinese, correlative model of sexism vs. the dualistic Western model, Hall and Ames note: In the absence of some essential nature that guarantees the sanctity of all human life, there is justification for worshipping some human beings while abusing others as chattel. In the dualistic model, one may argue that a woman has not been permitted to be a man. In the correlative scheme, females have historically not been allowed to be persons.59 A question that is similar to ones we raised earlier raises its head at this point: to what extent must Confucianism bring with it the Chinese form of sexism identified by Hall and Ames? Our goal is not to answer this question, but to raise it in the context of clarifying the complex nature of oppression in the Confucian context. It is our belief, though we shall not argue it here, that Confucianism need not bring with it the particularly Chinese version of sexism identified by Hall and Ames. Nevertheless, as hopeful as we might be about the possibilities to be found in Confucian thought, we must not forget that the hierarchical nature of relationships grounds and exacerbates the Chinese form of sexism in a way that is not so easily dealt with: . . . there is a persistent worry in the project of woman’s liberation in a Chinese society. Unlike the dualistic model in which some equality can be sought by recourse to a woman assuming the gender traits of a man, there is no such basis for essential equality in the correlative structure. Hierarchy would seem to be inevitable. The only possibility that might seem acceptable would be a qualitative hierarchy where status is a

59  Hall and Ames, Thinking from the Han, 97. As de Beauvoir notes: “The categories masculine and feminine appear as symmetrical in a formal way on town hall records or identification papers. The relation of the two sexes is not that of two electrical poles: the man represents both the positive and the neuter to such an extent that in French hommes designates human beings, the particular meaning of the word vir being assimilated into the general meaning of the word ‘homo.’ Woman is the negative, to such a point that any determination is imputed to her as a limitation, without reciprocity. . . . In fact, just as for the ancients there was an absolute vertical that defined the oblique, there is an absolute human type that is masculine.” Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex. Trans. Constance Borde and Sheila Malovany-Chevallier (New York: Vintage Books, 2009), 5.

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function of nongendered personal achievement rather than biological sex or cultural gender.60 This passage suggests an important line of inquiry: What aspects of Confucianism are essential to it? Does it require a particular way of understanding hierarchical relationships? Is it possible to have Confucianism without the hierarchies? Let us turn now to a brief consideration of these issues. 8

Confucianism without Hierarchies and Deference?

A large portion of our argument has been based on the fact that Confucianism centers around hierarchical relationships, ones characterized by power inequalities. However, as Joel Kupperman does,61 we might question whether or not Confucius’ ethics really requires hierarchies of the kind we find, for example, in the five main relationships. That is, might we not make sense of both deference and ritual without true power inequality? After all, we have ways of deferring to others in contemporary societies that do not require power inequalities, e.g., right of way laws for cars, trucks, buses, bicycles, etc. Moreover, we could even welcome some power inequalities of the form of parents over children without that requiring or implying that all other relations are hierarchical. Lastly, regarding deference, we might note, following Ames’s discussion of shu 恕, that deference may be understood not merely as giving way to another’s higher authority (power) but a matter of both, “. . . deferring action until we overcome uncertainty in our moral inquiry, and . . . taking under consideration the interests of others in that process.”62 Taking consideration of others’ interests can be a matter of knowing their personal details and interests, but it can also be a matter of interests tied to roles and to general aspects of being human. Thus, as a student, we might defer to a teacher qua her role as teacher because she is an authority on something that we have an 60  Hall and Ames, Thinking from the Han, 99. 61  Two questions he asks are, 1) Are “the classical Confucian philosophers . . . right in holding that an effective system of ritual requires differentiated social roles”? and, 2) “would whatever is valuable in the Confucian approach be preserved if we inserted the assumption that women and men are in general equally important and equally deserving of respect and deference?” Joel Kupperman “Feminism as Radical Confucianism: Self and Tradition.” In The Sage and the Second Sex, edited by Chenyang Li, 43–56 (Chicago: Open Court, 2000), 49. 62  Ames, Confucian Role Ethics, 196.

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interest in learning and because she has an interest in teaching. It is not that she is more powerful or above us, but given our interests and hers, we are deferential. Further, as a student defers to the interests of the teacher (and, in a sense, her interest in learning), so, too, the teacher defers to the interests of the students (i.e., learning) and her interests in teaching. She defers to their interests by doing her utmost to teach well, i.e., she does her utmost to be prepared, not show favorites, not unjustly punish students, etc. What is key would be to have neither party’s interests rank as more important than the others. The interests of the teacher and the interests of the students are equally important; in this way we allow for deference without power inequality. Further, in this way, we might be able to have a Confucianism that defines all roles by the interests that those roles entail pursuing for both members of the relationship. Regarding the interests rooted in basic humanity, we might defer to a person’s need to eat, or her family’s need, by not taking more than our share. Similar deferential duties would follow naturally from other basic human interests, for example, clothing, shelter, and preservation of life. We already find a concept/virtue in Confucius’s ethics that pertains to a more egalitarian understanding of roles and deference. That is, central to the Analects is an emphasis on shu 恕 or “putting oneself in the other’s place.” In Analects 4.15 we find Master Zeng saying, “ ‘The way of the Master is doing one’s utmost and putting oneself in the other’s place, nothing more.” This calls for the imagination to come into play as we try to put ourselves in another’s place. Using the above student/teacher example, the student defers to the teacher, in part, through attempting to imagine what it is like to be what she is not: “If I were interested in teaching, what would I want from my students?” Such a task would surely require “doing one’s utmost” (zhong 忠) and would take some time to refine. But given that ritual propriety (and, by implication, consummate conduct) requires more than merely applying a set of rules to a given situation, it is not surprising that shu 恕 is such an important concept.63 Applying these considerations to our concern for intersectional oppression in the Confucian context, the idea would be to make clear and equitable the interests assigned to the different roles one might inhabit so that, for example, it is not the case that we define the interests of the wife as running the household and the interests of the husband as making money and having a good time. Doing this in a way that does not require a rigid specification of 63  In Analects 2.8, for example, Confucius makes clear the importance of countenance and not simply doing one’s duty. Another example would be Analects 2.3, where Confucius emphasizes the importance of shame and achieving order through instilling a sense of shame over a fear of punishment.

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either taking care of the household or going off to work for either husband or wife would be important if we want to avoid making it such that all women, as wives, do the same thing, namely, stay at home or go to work or. . . . With this example alone we begin to see the difficulties faced by trying to respect contemporary feminist concerns while respecting the central Confucian insight of achieving a harmonious society through (in part) roles defined by ritual propriety. That is not to say that it cannot be done. However, it is not our purpose to attempt any further progress on the issue here. Our purpose has been to emphasize the importance of calling into question the hierarchies and power inequalities of Confucius’ ethics, while suggesting a possible route to another way of making sense of deference without power inequality and essentializing along gender lines. We can further see the importance of doing so by taking note of recent empirical work done regarding empathy and power. In “Social Class, Contextualism, and Empathic Accuracy,” researchers tested the hypothesis that “individuals of a lower social class are more empathically accurate in judging the emotions of other people.”64 The studies seem to confirm the hypothesis, suggesting that people in positions of greater (upper class) power are less capable of empathy. This might suggest that those who are in positions of power over others would have more difficulty truly enacting shu 恕. Another study concerned the role of mirror neurons in our interactions. Among other things, mirror neurons are supposed to help ground our attunement with the behavior of others and may be particularly important for empathy.65 What researchers have found is that those who have been primed in the experiments to be in a position of power had much less mirror neuron activity when observing others in lesser positions of power. Two of the authors summarize their findings by saying: Does this mean that the powerful are heartless beings incapable of empathy? Hardly. Recall that we induced power in our participants randomly. This sort of manipulation cannot fundamentally change empathic capability. So the bad news is that the powerful are, by default and at a neurological level, simply not motivated to care. But the good news is that they are, in theory, redeemable.66 64  Kraus, Michael W., Stéphane Côté, and Dacher Keltner, “Social Class, Contextualism, and Empathic Accuracy,” Psychological Science 21 (2010): abstract. 65  Inzlicht, Michael and Sukhvinder S. Obhi, “Powerful and Coldhearted.” The New York Times Sunday Review. July 25th (2014): Accessed online on July 28th, 2014: http://www .nytimes.com/2014/07/27/opinion/sunday/powerful-andcoldhearted.html?_r=0. 66  Ibid.

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We, of course, have to be extremely careful with such findings and their interpretation; however, if the above findings were to bear out, then they could have important implications for Confucian thought—in particular the issue we’ve been addressing regarding the necessity of power inequality in Confucius’ ethics. As a cautionary note regarding the above findings, it might well be that in a Confucian context in which children are raised from the beginning to be deferential and considerate of others, people’s basic “empathetic capability” would be much higher than the presumably non-Confucian test subjects. Again, it has not been our aim to answer the questions we’ve posed about the necessity of power inequalities. We take them, instead, to be points of departure for further work on Confucianism in relation to oppression. Nevertheless, as we have tried to indicate above, we are optimistic regarding the ability of Confucianism to adjust to the evolving concerns of feminists, philosophers, and feminist philosophers. As Ames writes, “. . . Confucianism has been appropriated, commented upon, reinterpreted, and reauthorized by each of some eighty generations of Chinese scholars and intellectuals that across the ages have contributed their own best thoughts to this ‘literati learning’ as a continuous, living tradition.”67 May it continue to evolve in positive directions. Bibliography Ames, Roger T. “What is Confucianism?” In Confucianism in Context: Classic Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, East Asia and Beyond, edited by Wonsuk Chang and Leah Kalmanson, 67–86. Albany: State University of New York Series in Chinese Philosophy and Culture, 2010. ———. Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2011. Ames, Roger T. and David L. Hall, trans. Focusing the Familiar: A Translation and Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2001. Ames, Roger T. and Henry Rosemont Jr., trans. The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation. New York: Ballantine Books, 1998. Berger, Michele Tracy and Kathleen Guidroz. The Intersectional Approach: Transforming the Academy Through Race, Class, & Gender. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009. Collins, Patricia Hill. “Learning from the Outsider Within: The Sociological Significance of Black Feminist Thought.” Social Problems 33, no. 6 (1996): 14–32. 67  Ames, Confucian Role Ethics, 1.

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Crenshaw, Kimberlé. “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color.” Stanford Law Review 43 (1991): 1241–99. De Beauvoir, Simone. The Second Sex. Constance Borde and Sheila MalovanyChevallier, trans. New York: Vintage Books, 2009. Grzanka, Patrick R. Introduction to Intersectionality: A Foundations and Frontiers Reader, edited by Patrick R. Grzanka. Boulder: Westview Press, 2014. Hall, David L. and Roger T. Ames. Thinking from the Han: Self, Truth, and Transcendence in Chinese and Western Culture. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998. Heyes, Cressida. “Identity Politics”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/entries/identitypolitics/, 2012. Hogeveen, Jeremy, Michael Inzlicht, and Sukhvinder S. Obhi. “Power Changes How the Brain Responds to Others.” Journal of Experimental Psychology 143, no. 2 (2014): 755–62. hooks, bell. Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center. 2nd Ed. New York: South End Press Classics, 1984. ———. Teaching Critical Thinking: Practical Wisdom. New York: Routledge, 2010. Inzlicht, Michael and Sukhvinder S. Obhi. “Powerful and Coldhearted.” The New York Times Sunday Review. July 25th (2014): Accessed online on July 28th, 2014: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/27/opinion/sunday/powerful-andcoldhearted. html?_r=0. Jiang, Xinyan. “Confucianism, Women, and Social Contexts.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 36, no. 2 (2009): 228–42. Kraus, Michael W., Stéphane Côté, and Dacher Keltner. “Social Class, Contextualism, and Empathic Accuracy.” Psychological Science 21 (2010): 1716–23. Kupperman, Joel. “Feminism as Radical Confucianism: Self and Tradition.” In The Sage and the Second Sex, edited by Chenyang Li, 43–56, Chicago: Open Court, 2000. Legge, James, trans. Li Chi: Book of Rites. Eds. Ch’u Chai and Winberg Chai. Vols. I & II. New York: University Books, 1967. Li, Chenyang. “Confucianism and Feminist Concerns: Overcoming the Confucian ‘Gender Complex.’ ” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 27, no. 2 (2000): 187–199. ———, ed. The Sage and the Second Sex: Confucianism, Ethics, and Gender. Chicago: Open Court, 2000. Mah, Adeline Yen. Watching the Tree: A Chinese Daughter Reflects on Happiness, Tradition, and Spiritual Wisdom. New York: Broadway Books, 2001. Mann, Susan and Yu-ying Cheng, ed. Under Confucian Eyes: Writings on Gender in Chinese History. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001. Nuyen, A.T. “Love and Respect in the Confucian Family.” In The Moral Circle and the Self, edited by Kim-chong Chong, Sor-hoon Tan, and C.L. Ten. Chicago: Open Court, 2003.

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Rosemont, Jr. Henry and Roger T. Ames, trans. The Chinese Classic of Family Reverence: A Philosophical Translation of the Xiaojing. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2009. Rosenlee, Li-Hsiang Lisa. Confucianism and Women: A Philosophical Interpretation. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006. Watson, Rubie S. “The Name and the Nameless: Gender and Person in Chinese Society.” American Ethnologist 13 (1986): 619–31. Yuval-Davis, Nira. “Intersectionality and Feminist Politics.” In The Intersectional Approach: Transforming the Academy Through Race, Class, & Gender, edited by Michele Tracy Berger and Kathleen Guidroz, 44–60. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009.

Part 2 The Situated Self: Knowing and Being

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CHAPTER 4

Confucian Reliability and Epistemic Agency: Engagements with Feminist Epistemology Karyn Lai 1

Knowledge and the Knower: Some Feminist Concerns

Discussions in feminist epistemology have articulated a number of concerns relating to conceptions of knowledge, its production and applications and its place in epistemic life, including accounts of epistemic agency. As feminist evaluations of epistemology arise from diverse considerations,1 the discussion here does not intend to exhaustively or representatively recapture those debates. Instead, I articulate three interrelated angles from which we may explore the notion of epistemic agency, in particular, to see how a Confucian account of reliability might make some contribution to these debates. The three angles are as follows: conceptions of knowledge, the production of knowledge, and knowers and epistemic agency. 1.1 Conceptions of Knowledge A fundamental concern of feminist epistemology is that some conceptions of truth and epistemic norms are not sufficiently agent-sensitive. There is a trend in Anglo-analytic philosophy that prioritises a conception of knowledge qua propositions or pieces of information, as for instance, in terms of the belief that p or the knowledge that p. It follows, then, that knowers are observers or beholders, engaging with these pieces of information “at a distance.”2 Recent debates in Anglo-analytic epistemology have seen significant support for the intellectualist argument in the knowing-how/knowing-that distinction first

1  E.g. Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter, “Introduction” to Feminist Epistemologies, eds. Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter (New York: Routledge 1993), 1–14. Alessandra Tanesini, “Feminist Epistemology,” in Gender: The Key Concepts, ed. Mary Evans and Carolyn Williams (New York and London: Routledge, 2013), 81–87. 2  Lorraine Code, What Can She Know? Feminist Theory and the Construction of Knowledge (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 141.

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raised by Gilbert Ryle in 1946.3 There, discussions often focus on the “S-knowsthat-p” construction, with more attention given to p, the object of knowledge, than S, the knower.4 According to Code, in “S-knows-that-p epistemology (“Sue knows that the box is full”), S is a place-holder for anyone at all, and p an empty container into which anything whatsoever could be inserted”.5 Traditional epistemology may not necessarily agree that “anything whatsoever” may be inserted in the position of placeholder p. Nevertheless, this conception of knowledge holds two problematic assumptions, namely, that knowledge is value-neutral and the correct way to embrace it is to adopt a “view from nowhere” or a “God’s-eye view.” The discussion of Confucian epistemology here focuses on its orientation to practice. Confucian philosophy prioritises knowledge in action, one that is not simply a matter of what is known but how it is realised in concrete situations. 1.2 The Production of Knowledge: Situated Knowledge The assumption that knowledge is value-free begs the question about the need for justification of agent-independent conceptions of knowledge. The view from nowhere suggests agent- or perspective-irrelevance as far as knowledge is concerned, while the God’s eye view implicitly upholds an unwavering, ‘infinite’ conception of knowledge.6 Both these views ignore how knowledge might be shaped by the situation or the social, political, relational and epistemic location of subjects. In response, feminist situated epistemology proposes that knowledge is at least partly dependent on knowers in their respective locations.7 The situated knowledge project complicates what it means to know; it takes into account “the structural intricacies of place and its inhabitants, the genealogies, power relations, and commitments that shape the knowledge and subjectivi3  Stanley and Williamson argue that knowing-how is reducible to knowing-that. There is significant interest in and support for their thesis. See Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson, “Knowing How,” The Journal of Philosophy 98, no. 8 (2001): 411–44. See the discussion in Jeremy Fantl, “Knowing-How and Knowing-That,” Philosophy Compass 3, no. 3 (2008): 451–70. 4  Lorraine Code, “Feminist Epistemologies and Women’s Lives,” in The Blackwell Guide to Feminist Philosophy, ed. Linda Alcoff and Eva Kittay (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2007), 211–34. 5  Code, “Feminist Epistemologies,” 211–34. 6  Donna Haraway, “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective” in Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature, ed. Donna Haraway (New York and London: Routledge, 1991), 183–201. 7  E.g. Haraway writes, “Feminist objectivity is about limited location and situated knowledge, not about transcendence and splitting of subject and object. In this way we might become answerable for what we learn how to see.” Haraway, “Situated Knowledges,” 190.

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ties enacted there, the locational specificities that resist homogenization [and] the positionings available or closed to would-be knowing subjects.”8 Here, situation or location is not merely a physical place but a positioning which is neither value- nor agent-neutral as it involves status, hierarchies and power. To say that knowledge is agent-dependent entails that assessment of epistemic practice, subject to relevant norms, is an important part of epistemological investigation. In her discussion of epistemic practices in science, Longino argues for the recognition that in this field, as in any other, norms shape the production of knowledge.9 Longino writes: This way of thinking about knowledge and inquiry involves a shift in attention away from the outcomes or products of inquiry, whether these are theories or beliefs, to the processes or dynamics of knowledge production. The ideal state is not the having of a single best account, but the existence of a plurality of theoretical orientations that both make possible the elaboration of particular models of the phenomenal world and serve as resources for criticism of each other.10 We may extend these reflections to knowledge production in other domains of inquiry. As we will see later, the Confucian model I propose upholds the view that knowledge must be realised in action. Given that this is the case, epistemological issues in Confucian philosophy centre on the processes of cultivation in order to ensure that individuals are equipped to realise their knowledge optimally in their actions. 1.3 Knowers and Epistemic Agency Some scholars in feminist epistemology also note with concern that conceptions of knowledge as fundamentally conceptual and universally-applicable give credence to the view that agents are disembodied subjects of knowledge.11 In feminist epistemology, the concrete, contextualised nature of women’s experiences contribute to how knowledge is grasped and produced. Location may shape the knower, and hence the knower’s knowledge, in the following 8  Code, “Feminist Epistemologies,” 218. 9  Helen Longino, “Feminist Epistemology as a Local Epistemology,” in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 71 (1997): 19–35. 10  Longino, “Feminist Epistemology,” 29. 11  E.g. Sandra Harding, “Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What is ‘Strong Objectivity’?” in Feminist Epistemologies, ed. Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter (New York: Routledge, 1993), 63.

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way: “social location systematically shapes and limits what we know, including tacit, experiential knowledge as well as explicit understanding, what we take knowledge to be as well as specific epistemic content.”12 One way to highlight the experiential dimension of knowledge is to suggest there are many perspectives; this extends the view in feminist philosophy that the ‘voices’ of women are plural. On this view, there is not simply one, or one type of, privileged knower; rather, there are plural subjects. According to a proposal, from standpoint epistemology: “the subjects/agents of knowledge for feminist standpoint theory are multiple, heterogeneous, and contradictory or incoherent, not unitary, homogeneous, and coherent as they are for empiricist epistemology.”13 An alternative approach to the issue of epistemic agency is to suggest that communities, rather than individuals, are the basic epistemic agents. According to this view, knowledge (in science, as in any other field) “is not isolatable from a larger system of theories, practices, and standards of evidence, a system that includes other aspects of scientific knowledge and practices as well as those of common sense.”14 This view, perhaps one of the earliest account of communities as epistemic agents, holds that knowledge arises within contexts whereby new discoveries are possible only because they build on existing knowledge. It follows, then, that the communities within which individuals learn and operate in, provide standards for knowledge: “communities construct and acquire knowledge” and are therefore the primary epistemic agents.15 Drawing together these three angles—knowledge is not necessarily valueneutral, knowledge is situated, and knowledge is bound up with issues of epistemic agency—we arrive at a major concern that arises in feminist epistemology, that is, the issue of epistemic validity. If feminist epistemology attends to the concrete, specific and situational aspects of knowledge and its production, what are its relevant epistemic norms? In traditional Anglo-analytic philosophy, the objectivity of knowledge is considered one of its defining features. However, objectivity is often associated with knower-independence which, as we have seen, clashes with feminist epistemology’s emphasis on concrete, contextual and localised knowledge. Feminist epistemology so conceived would 12  Alison Wylie, “Why Standpoint Matters,” in The Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader: Intellectual and Political Controversies, ed. Sandra Harding (New York and London: Routledge, 2004), 343. 13  Harding, “Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology,” 65. 14  Lynn Nelson, “Epistemological Communities,” in Feminist Epistemologies, ed. Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter (New York: Routledge, 1993), 137. 15  Nelson uses the example of the discovery of proton structure to make this case. (Nelson, “Epistemological Communities,” 141).

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hold a notion of epistemic legitimacy quite different from that in traditional epistemology: “Knowledge claims would thus gain or fail to achieve acknowledgement situationally, according to the patterns of incredulity, authority and expertise constitutive of the social order and the “institutions of knowledge production” in which they circulate and in whose praxes they are embedded: situations neither so alike as to permit interchangeable, universal, analyses nor so idiosyncratic as to require radically separate and distinct analyses.”16 But how might feminist notions of epistemic agency avoid epistemic subjectivism or solipsism? Because standpoint epistemology asserts that some standpoints are epistemically privileged, debates on epistemic agency have been a central concern in its discussions. Earlier versions of this thesis asserted one standpoint shared by women,17 although such assertions of singularity might be committed to essentialism.18 On the other hand, upholding the voices of women in the margins may express resignation to marginality.19 Subsequently-developed versions of standpoint epistemology suggested that some knowers, by virtue of the position they occupy in society, have epistemic privilege at least with regard to some areas of enquiry.20 The view that there is a variety of epistemicallyprivileged standpoints was proposed by Hill Collins21 and is widely-held. These discussions within standpoint epistemology demonstrate that the question of epistemic privilege—what its criteria are and who holds these perspectives— can be fraught. 16  Code, “Feminist Epistemologies,” 218. 17  E.g. Nancy Hartsock, “The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism,” in Discovering Reality, ed. Sandra Harding and Merrill Hintikka (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1983), 283–310. 18  Elizabeth V. Spelman, Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought (London: Women’s Press, 1990). 19  See, for example, Harding’s comment that “Standpoint theories argue for ‘Starting off thought’ from the lives of marginalized peoples; beginning in those determinate, objective locations in any social order will generate illuminating critical questions that do not arise in thought that begins from dominant group lives.” (Harding, “Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology,” 56). See also Gayatri Spivak and Ellen Rooney, “In a Word (Interview),” in The Essential Difference, ed. Naomi Schor and Elizabeth Weed (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 151–84. 20  E.g. Sandra Harding, The Science Question in Feminism, (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 1986). 21  Patricia Hill Collins, “Black Feminist Epistemology,” in Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment, 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2000), 251–71.

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When epistemic justification is sought, consideration often reverts to the notion of objectivity. Even if many feminist epistemologists have suspicions about objectivity as a criterion for knowledge, epistemological theories built upon subjectivity are not plausible and some of these might actually result in marginalising some women. In light of these discussions, Janack has convincingly argued that disagreements about objectivity—both within the feminist literature and more widely—are often based on insufficient clarity about what it actually means.22 According to Janack, a reason for this variance rests in part on what we require objectivity to “do.” For instance, there are at least two broad ways in which we appeal to objectivity, one being that of procedural objectivity (fairness) and the other of a more metaphysically-based objectivity, aiming to “get the facts right.”23 Fine also uses these two senses of objectivity (procedural objectivity and objectivity relating to the products of inquiry) to reflect on what might be at their core. He suggests that procedural objectivity is the fundamental issue, and that trust is at its core: Procedural objectivity does not guarantee objectivity for the products of inquiry. It does not guarantee that the contents of those products are nonperspectival nor that the products themselves are really real . . . So what good is it? My suggestion is that procedural objectivity speaks to our attitude toward the products of inquiry rather than to traits of those products themselves. The operative attitude is that of trust.24 Where the process of inquiry has certain built-in procedural features (“safeguards,” we sometimes call them), we are inclined to trust it more than we would a procedure that fails to have those features . . . suppose that the virtue of objectivity is that it promotes trust in the process. What about the product? Does trust in the process make for trust in the product? Curiously, in this instance, it does . . . the proper sort of inquiry is the best way to get things right.25 This analysis may be applied to the notion of epistemic agency: agents are deemed reliable when they consistently demonstrate that their actions and 22  Marianne Janack, “Dilemmas of Objectivity,” Social Epistemology 16, no. 3 (2002): 273–274. 23  Janack, “Dilemmas of Objectivity,” 268, 278. 24  I discuss the notion of trust as an attitude and its relation to reliability in the final section of the chapter. 25  Arthur Fine, “The Viewpoint of No One in Particular,” in The Pragmatic Turn in Philosophy, ed. William Egginton and Mike Sandbothe (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004), 125–126.

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behaviours are procedurally appropriate. Who deems them reliable? People in the communities within which they undertake tasks, relate to others and pursue their goals. The reason for bringing in a Confucian perspective on this debate is to draw on Confucian philosophy’s emphasis on reliability as a characteristic feature of the exemplary person (junzi 君子). I use the notion of reliability to extend some of the discussions in feminist epistemology on situated knowledge, epistemic practices and the production of knowledge, and the relation between the epistemic agent and the epistemic community. Noting Fine’s comments on objectivity and trust, I suggest that reliability in Confucian philosophy pertains to procedural rather than substantive issues. Hence, instead of focusing on Confucian values, I explore Confucian philosophy’s backgrounding epistemic assumptions and their justification. 2

The Primacy of Practice in the Analects: Situated Knowledge

The conversations in the Analects assume that the aim of learning is to inform choices, decisions and practice. Inquiry into the epistemological assumptions of the text must focus on key terms such as zhi (知) and its cognate zhi (智 knowledge, wisdom, understanding),26 as well as a cluster of terms associated with learning and practice, including xing (行 proceed, permissible), wen (溫 revise) and xin (信 reliability). On the whole, the text focuses more on practice and the development of understanding than it does on definitions of knowledge or truth. This means that a fuller picture of its epistemology may only be gained if we move beyond its axiology27 or its picture of knowledge to investigate the processes associated with learning. 26  In the Warring States (Zhanguo 战国; 475–221 BCE) texts, two characters, zhi 智 and zhi 知 overlapped in meaning and were used interchangeably. See Lisa Raphals, Knowing Words: Wisdom and Cunning in the Classical Traditions of China and Greece (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1992), 7, 16. The first typically refers to wisdom, skill, or intelligence while the second, to know, understand, be aware of, be acquainted with, or to appreciate. 27  There are a number of important studies of Confucian ethics, including Wei-ming Tu, Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985); Kim-Chong Chong, “Confucius’s Virtue Ethics: Li, Yi, Wen and Chih in the Analects,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 25, no. 1 (1998): 101–30; Kwong-loi Shun and David Wong, ed., Confucian Ethics: A Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy, and Community (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Kim-Chong Chong, Early Confucian Ethics (Chicago: Open Court, 2007); and Alexus McLeod, “Ren as a Communal Property in the Analects,” Philosophy East and West 62, no. 4 (2012): 505–28.

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To begin with the term zhi, it has a range of meanings that correspond roughly to knowledge-that (knowledge as pieces of information) and knowledge-how (procedural knowledge) as well as particular insights and competencies. It may also refer to agents who possess either type of knowledge.28 In the Analects, zhi is often coupled with a subject, to “zhi-X,” which signifies that a person knows to act in a manner that manifests X. For example, to say that a person zhili (knows behavioural propriety) is to say that, in a range of different situations they know to act in such a way as to realise propriety in their actions.29 Likewise, to zhiren (lit.: know men) is to (know how to) optimise the fit between the abilities of particular officials and the tasks of the state.30 These uses of zhi in a procedural sense are aptly captured in Hall and Ames’ translation of zhi as ‘realization;’31 to act knowingly is to manifest, successfully, an act or task in a concrete situation. There is more in the Analects that supports the assertion that knowledge is conceived of predominantly in this way. Another important epistemological term in the text is xing (行): to put into practice. The character refers in its broadest sense to movement or action. In the Analects, its meanings range from the act of walking or departing (Analects 7.22) to normative action, including what is permissible (Analects 1.12), as well as appropriate conduct (Analects 2.18; 5.10). Xing may also refer to the possibility of putting something into practice (Analects 2.13; 5.20; 15.18), to the (lack of) obstacles to or constraints on getting something done (Analects 5.7; 5.14) and even to success (Analects 15.6). Because knowledge is articulated in concrete performances, practice is a primary way to learn. Revision is important (wen 溫; Analects 2.11), as is repeated performance (xi 習; Analects 1.1; 1.4; 17.2).32 The rationale for 28   Zhi as pieces of information: Analects 1.23; 7.28; 9.23; 9.28; 13.15; 17.6.  Zhi as procedural knowledge: Analects 1.12; 1.15; 1.16; 2.4; 2.11; 2.15; 2.22; 7.31; 9.23; 11.12; 12.22; 15.4; 16.8; 20.3. Zhi as particular insights: Analects 2.11; 2.17; 2.23; 5.9; 5.22; 6.22; 6.23; 8.9; 14.1; 16.8; 18.5. Agents who ‘know’: Analects 4.1; 4.2; 9.29; 15.8. 29  Passages that refer to zhili include Analects 2.15; 2.22 and 7.31. 30  Relevant passages include Analects 1.16; 12.22 and 20.3. 31  I draw on Hall and Ames’ translation of zhi as “realization” to emphasise the performative aspect of knowing (e.g. in Analects 15.3; 15.4) and to highlight a person’s attitudinal commitment to enact what is learnt (Analects 6.20). See David Hall and Roger Ames, Thinking Through Confucius (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), 50–56. 32  Interestingly, the term xi may also refer to performance. The meaning of xi incorporates the meaning of performance, as in the phrase xiliyue 習禮樂 (to perform ritual and music) in the Liji 《禮記·射義》. The phrase xili 習禮 (to perform ritual) also occurs in many later texts such as the Da Dai Li Ji 《大戴禮記》and the Han Shu 《漢書》. In

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learning, performance and revision is that it is important to attend to contextual details which influence the situation and shape its meaning. Therefore, it is important to listen (wen 聞; 2.18),33 read (dushu 讀書; 11.25), inquire (wen 問; 6.5; 10.14), observe (guan 觀; 2.10; 4.17)34 and familiarise oneself with this light, the opening passage of the Analects which mentions xi states that: “Is it not pleasant to learn in and through practice, at appropriate moments? Is it not delightful to have friends coming from afar? Is it not an exemplary person, who feels no dismay when others do not know him?” (1.1; translated by author). I have translated ‘er’ to mean ‘alike’ (ru 如) (See Edwin G. Pulleyblank, Outline of Classical Chinese Grammar (Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press, 1995), 148; and Axel Schuessler, ABC Etymological Dictionary of Old Chinese, (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 2007), 224), with the implication that the phrase means “to learn, as it is with the case in practice” to denote the type of learning. I interpret the phrase 學而時習之 as: “To learn in and through practice, at appropriate moments.” This involves translating shi as timeliness to denote practicing at appropriate moments (see 17.1), rather than in terms of frequency (shishi 時時) which follows the interpretation of Zhu Xi, 《 ( 四書章句集注》卷一~卷六, 學而第一). 33  The Analects emphasises the importance of listening widely (多聞: 2.18; 7.27; 16.3) in order to develop one’s awareness. The terms ting (聽) and wen (聞) are both used in a general sense to refer to what one hears. Ting is used infrequently in the Analects, and in a non-specific sense, to denote what one has heard (5.9; 12.13; 17.14). Wen occurs much more frequently in the Analects and its scope seems to overlap in a number of cases with ting, to mean hearing in general (e.g. 1.10; 5.12; 11.21; 17.4). However, wen is at times used more specifically to refer to what Confucius himself has heard (e.g. 3:15; 5:19; 14:19) or what his disciples have heard him say (5.6, 5.25; 17.7, 19.18). Wen is also used in association with content that the Confucians value; to hear about dao (聞道, wendao; 4.8), to hear about rightness (聞義 wenyi: 7.3), to hear the Odes, li and the exemplary person (聞詩, wenshi; 聞禮 wenli; 聞君 wenjun: 16.13). In its more specific uses, wen seems to involve hearing about issues that reflect the value orientation of the Confucians. In these cases, there is intimation of more thoughtful or considered listening, as opposed to what one merely hears, without further reflection. 34  The character jian, xian (見) is the root of the term guan. Jian may be understood most generally as ‘to see’. However, in the Analects, it is most often used to denote a meeting or consultation, as in “X met with Y” (e.g. 3.24; 15.41; 16.1). Another related character, shi (視), refers to a more specific sense of ‘seeing’ that more closely approximates careful consideration of a particular subject (e.g. 2.10; 12.1). In later discussions of wen and ting, and of shi and jian, a distinction is made between more reflective and less reflective activities of listening and observing. In the case of listening, one is to avoid perfunctory listening (聽而不聞: ting er bu wen; Da Xue 7.2; Zhongyong 16.2) which approximates the phrase in English “hearing but not listening”. This phrase parallels that which is applied to perfunctory observations (視而不見: shi er bu jian; Da Xue 7.2; Zhongyong 16.2). These phrases indicate the centrality of reflection in cultivation, an especially important subject in both the Da Xue and Zhongyong. In the Analects, guan is frequently used to refer to observation of a person’s conduct (e.g. Analects 1.1; 5.9) although one may also observe

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cultural norms (wen 文; 5.15) and behavioural propriety (li 禮; 6.27; 12.15).35 This approach to learning reveals aspects of Confucian epistemology, whose emphasis is on practical learning. The thesis that Confucian philosophy prioritises practical knowledge is buttressed by its empirically-grounded methods of acquiring knowledge; knowledge is acquired through seeing, observing, familiarising, listening and practising.36 Practice is important so that one can attune oneself to a wide range of contexts within which one may realise one’s knowledge. For example, practising behavioural propriety is central to a person’s learning to behave appropriately according to li. One speaks in hushed tones when visiting a cathedral in Melbourne where others are engaged in worship. A woman knows not to wear shorts when visiting a temple in Yogyakarta. These are instantiations of knowing behavioural propriety; through practice in concrete situations, a person becomes a better ‘knower’ of behavioural propriety. The concrete manifestations of knowledge in particular situations— which I have called ‘knowing to act in the moment’—are not simply expressions of conceptual or propositional knowledge.37 There are a few reasons why focusing on the moment of action is important and I outline two of them here. First, it highlights the episodic nature of the action; it stresses that knowledge is articulated at a specific point in time. Reference to time also helps to draw our attention to timely action that can be critical in some cases.38 Secondly, reference to the ‘moment’ points to the specificity, rather than the generality, of what it means to know. When we say that Confucius knows li (Analects 3.15), we do not simply mean that he knows how to act according to propriety. We mean that he knew that to ask questions was to act according

his motives (2.10) or countenance (12.20). Furthermore, there are cautious remarks made in relation to unacceptable conduct such as that of a person who is arrogant (8.11) or one who performs rituals without accompanying sentiment (3.26). One is advised not to follow such ways. 35  These learning processes are discussed in detail in Karyn Lai, “Knowing to Act in the Moment: Examples from Confucius’ Analects,” Asian Philosophy 22, no. 4 (2012): 347–64. 36  Amy Olberding proposes a persuasive account of Confucian learning that involves the physical body as well. Such learning involves muscular movement that mirrors those of exemplary persons so that a person acquires graceful movements associated with particular activities. See Amy Olberding, Moral Exemplars in the Analects: The Good Person is That (New York: Routledge Publishing, 2012), 116–117. 37  Karyn Lai, “Knowing to Act.” 38  Ibid., 354, 358.

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to propriety and, at that moment, that was what he did. Each successful concrete action is a case of what it means to know, not just an expression of knowledge-that, and not reducible to it.39 Over time, such successful actions build up a picture of the reliability of the agent in undertaking actions or tasks of a particular type; I discuss that in the final section of the chapter. What I have tried to present in this brief sketch is an understanding of knowledge that does not see agent- or context-independence as one of its essential characteristics. Taking a very different route from feminist debates, the Confucian Analects simply takes it for granted that knowledge is enacted in concrete situations. In its own way, the Analects resists a monolithic, abstractlydetermined conception of knowledge. 3

Communities of Practice

In Confucian philosophy, knowledge is situated at another level, that of the community. There is a conceptual difference between the situatedness of knowledge in particular instances and the situatedness of knowledge within the context of the community. The first attends to the specificities of each situation that shape an event. As we have seen in the previous section, because Confucian philosophy holds that the concrete practicalities are not reducible in the assessment of outcomes, actions and agency, it is important to develop knowledge that enables a person to deal with relevant particularities appropriately. The second layer, situatedness of knowledge in communal contexts, focuses on the shared norms and practices which provide a frame of reference for understanding and evaluating outcomes, actions and agency. The distinction between the two layers is only theoretical; in practice, considerations across these two layers are intimately intertwined and it is not always possible to disentangle them. How do contextual considerations shape knowledge in Confucian philosophy? This is expressed in a number of ways, in different conversations in the Analects. The ethical characteristics of a particular social environment are deemed especially important in a person’s development. In Analects 4.1, it is stated that “Concerning one’s dwelling place, it is ren (benevolence) which constitutes the excellence of a neighbourhood. If a person selects a dwelling 39  Refer to the discussion of a theory of practical knowledge, dubbed “practicalism,” in Stephen Hetherington and Karyn Lai, “Practising to Know: Practicalism and Confucian Philosophy,” Philosophy, 87, no. 3 (2012): 375–93.

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place where ren does not prevail, how can he be (considered) wise?”40 The discussions of this chapter, captured in its title, focus on “Li Ren” (里仁), which may be understood as “dwelling in an environment where people are committed to ren (benevolence)” or “dwelling in an environment where there are benevolent people”.41 These concerns are reflected in another conversation where there was concern about Confucius’ wish to live among people deemed uncouth: The Master wanted to go and live amongst the nine clans of the Eastern Yi Barbarism. Someone said to him, “What would you do about their crudeness?” The Master replied, “Were an exemplary person (junzi 君子) to live among them, what crudeness could there be?”42 The assumption made by Confucius’ interlocutor is that association with people whose moral characters are wanting may adversely affect one’s commitments, although Confucius idealistically reassures them that the reverse will be the case, with the exemplary person influencing the uncouth positively. There are two ways in which the social environment may affect a person’s own moral beliefs. First, the people a person associates with may influence how she understands and values things.43 Those who are moral equals will weigh up things in a similar way (9.30;44 1.8; 9.25). Friendships are especially important because friends who are moral equals may help in reproach and edification (5.26; 12.23; 12.24). Analects 12.24 states explicitly that “The gentleman acquires 40  Adapted from the translation by James Legge, trans., The Chinese Classics: with a Translation, Critical and Exegetical Notes, Prolegomena, and Copious Indexes, Vol. I: Confucian Analects, The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean, (Taipei: Southern Materials Center Publishing Inc. 1985), 165. 41  I thank Wai Wai Chiu for the suggestion of ‘dwelling’ as an apt translation for 里. 42   Analects 9.14. Roger Ames and Henry Rosemont Jr., trans., The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation, (USA: Ballantine Publishing, 1998), 129. 43   Analects 5.3 states, “The Master remarked about Zijian, ‘He is truly an exemplary person (junzi 君子). If Lu had no other exemplary persons, where could he have gotten his character from?’ ” (Ames and Rosemont Jr., Analects, 95). 44  He Yan’s (何晏; ?–249 CE) commentary on Analects 9.30 states “even though one may be able to share your stance, he may not necessarily be able to weigh the light and heavy to their utmost limits” (sui neng you suo li wei bi neng quan liang qi qing zhong zhi ji ye 雖能有所立未必能權量其輕重之極也) (Yan He, Collected Explanations of the Analects,《論語集解》, 2 vols. (四部叢刊經部 Si bu cong kan series), (上海: 商務印 書館, Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1922), vol. 1, 163.

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friends by means of cultural refinement, and then relies upon his friends for support in becoming good.”45 Confucius expresses delight in the opportunities he had to engage in edifying discussions with his followers Zigong (子貢; 1.15), Yan Yuan (顏淵; 2.9) and Zixia (子夏; 3.8. See also 16.5). Secondly, the broader social context within which norms and practices are negotiated, established and challenged is the locus within which a person learns. It is also where a person interacts with others and expresses herself. Therefore, it is against this background that her actions and decisions are considered, understood and evaluated. This is the sense of environment evoked in Analects 4.1 on dwelling in an environment where benevolence prevails. We have seen how Confucius emphasises empirical methods of learning—listening, observing, practising propriety, asking, discussing and reading. All these activities are lodged within traditions. The social environment is the locus within which an individual learns, expresses herself, responds to others and realises her achievements. The emphasis on how prevailing norms and practices (wen 文: 6.18; 12.8) shape the self is a significant feature of Confucian philosophy. Wen, broadly conceived, includes the cultural, historical, social, ethical and political ways of life in the community. If we agree that cultural and social factors play a significant role in the production of knowledge, we face one significant problem: how might individuals express dissent? If everything a person knows is fully supplied within and constrained by her social environment (in terms of what most people believe or what the dominant group holds to be true), how might an individual learn to establish a stance? The Analects maintains the independence of individuals from social mores. In his response to the question about living among the uncouth, Confucius notes, optimistically, that the morally-cultivated will influence those who are not, and not vice-versa. Indeed, it is a distinguishing characteristic of the morally-cultivated person that she stands apart from prevailing norms. The exemplary person is harmonious but he does not seek to be like all others: The Master said, “Exemplary persons seek harmony not sameness; petty persons, then, are the opposite.”46 The village worthy (xiang yuan 鄉愿), a petty person, only shallowly reflects the values of his environment (17.13). His actions are difficult to fault because 45   Edward Slingerland, trans., Confucius Analects: With Selections from Traditional Commentaries, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2003), 137. 46   Analects 13.23, Ames and Rosemont Jr. trans., Analects, 168–169. See also Analects 13.24.

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he carries out the right actions and has correct behaviours. However, his case is one of “excellence (de 德) under false pretenses.”47 Examination of the term li, behavioural propriety and its meanings in different conversations in the Analects also helps to reveal how a person develops the kind of independence befitting an exemplary person. In the early stages of learning, behavioural propriety is primarily normative: these tradition-based norms are a fundamental source of the learner’s knowledge (2.5). Running parallel with this sense of li is the Confucian emphasis on filial piety, which seems to demand unquestioning compliance (4.18) but which is perhaps necessarily so because the learner at this stage does not have the cognitive, affective or ethical resources independently to assess what is presented to him. This stage of familiarisation is critical at the early stages because it is the process in which one becomes acquainted with existing norms, beliefs and expectations before one can attain critical distance in thinking about their appropriateness and applications in particular circumstances.48 By contrast, the exemplary person’s actions are not restricted by behavioural propriety.49 He has acquired fluency in acting according to these norms through much practice, and is not perplexed by situational contingencies: “The wise (zhi 知) are not in a quandary; the authoritative (ren 仁) are not anxious; the courageous are not timid.”50 Perplexity (huo 惑) in the face of alternatives at the moment of action is an important concern in the Analects (2.4; 12.10; 14.28). Not only is the exemplary person not perplexed by situational contingencies, he is also able to depart from standard practice where necessary (9.3). His detachment from simply following tradition is developed through reflection (si 思) on existing norms and practices. Analects 2.15 stresses the interdependence of learning and reflection: The Master said: “Learning [xue 學] without due reflection [si 思] leads to perplexity; reflection without learning leads to perilous circumstances.”51 47  Ames and Rosemont Jr., trans., Analects, 207. Refer to the discussion of the village worthy in Hall and Ames, Thinking Through Confucius, 49–50. 48   Analects 20.3 presents a terse summary of this view, noting that “. . . someone who does not understand the observance of ritual propriety (li: 禮) has no way of knowing where to stand . . .” (Ames and Rosemont Jr., trans., Analects), 229. 49  A more detailed account of the developmental stages during which li play different roles is described in Karyn Lai, “Li in the Analects: Training in Moral Competence and the Question of Flexibility,” Philosophy East and West 56, no. 1 (2006): 69–83. 50   Analects 9.29. Ames and Rosemont Jr., trans., Analects, 132. 51  Ames and Rosemont Jr., trans., Analects, 79.

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Si refers to reflection and xue to knowledge acquired in a range of different ways. Merely to absorb prevailing norms without reflection leads to bewilderment while thinking on issues without familiarity with prevailing norms is risky as one does not have adequate or proper grounds for reflection. The passage affirms the importance of striking a fine balance between familiarisation with conventional norms and reflection on their appropriateness. The exemplary person’s encounters with the world stand in stark contrast to that of the village worthy. The exemplary person is not just reinforcing received wisdom by performing by rote or mimicking the behaviour of others.52 He must be thoughtful about these customs and practices in his applications of them in context. This account articulates the importance of tradition in Confucian philosophy but also emphasises the need for people—paradigmatic thinkers—to build on the tradition, and to adapt and modify when necessary: “Reviewing the old as a means of realizing the new—such a person can be considered a teacher.”53 The discussion here has dwelt on the Confucian emphasis on tradition as a starting point for individuals. Communities are the locus of knowledge. However, it would be naïve simply to make this assertion without also examining how individuals may express different points of view. The Analects presents a picture of exemplary persons as people who have cultivated critical abilities to stand apart from customary norms and practices in order to respond thoughtfully and appropriately in each situation. An individual’s actions and decisions may affirm and entrench, modify or extend existing ideals and values. This view of epistemic agency emphasises that knowledge is manifest in an individual’s actions but also understands that actions are interpreted within a wider context of the community’s epistemic norms. In this way, epistemic agency does not lie either with the individual or the community, but in the engagement of the individual with others in the community. The next section discusses the authority of exemplary persons in Confucian philosophy through an examination of the notion of reliability. 4

Reliability and Epistemic Authority

The Confucian exemplary person is reliable (xin 信). Passages 1.4 to 1.8 of the Analects discuss xin as an essential quality of such a person. The legitimacy of 52  I consider these questions in Karyn Lai, “Tradition, Change and Adaptation,” in Learning from Chinese Philosophies: Ethics of Interdependent and Contextualised Self (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2006), 139–56. 53   Analects 2.11. Ames and Rosemont Jr., trans., Analects, 78.

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the exemplary person’s attempts to stand apart from custom is based in part on his authority, which in turn is grounded in his reliability. What is reliability in Confucian philosophy? I have translated xin as “reliable” or “reliability” here to reflect the relational nature of xin in Confucian philosophy. When we say that a person is reliable, we may refer to third-party ascriptions of reliability, that is, that the person is deemed dependable by others. In Confucian philosophy, this aspect of reliability is important: a person is reliable only insofar as others can count on him. Typically, observations of a person’s conduct and interactions with her over time provide the bases upon which we come to rely on a person. Confucius himself was a keen observer of people’s conduct (2.10) and Zai Wo’s (宰我 or Zai Yu 宰予) actions did not give Confucius any confidence in him: Zai Yu was sleeping during the day. The Master said, “Rotten wood cannot be carved; dung walls cannot be troweled. What is the use of scolding him?” The Master said, “There was a time when I used to listen to what people said and trusted that they would act accordingly, but now I listen to what they say and watch what they do. It is Zai Yu who made me change.”54 Confucius remarks on the futility of trying to alter Zai Yu’s conduct.55 Here, two important dimensions of the Confucian notion of reliability emerge. The character xin and its use in the Analects, as shown in this passage, express these dimensions. The first captures what I call ‘episodic reliability,’ which refers to the alignment of a person’s commitments with his actions, manifest in his handling of situations. The second refers to the ‘longitudinal reliability’ of a person’s actions over time. I discuss each of these dimensions in turn. The character xin is comprised of two components, the first meaning ‘human’ (ren 亻) and the second, ‘word’ (yan 言). Interpretation of xin’s meaning often draws from its compositional ideographical characteristics, to mean a person standing by his word. Although xin is frequently translated as ‘trustworthiness’ or ‘sincerity,’ its meaning in this case is more fully captured 54  Simon Leys, trans., The Analects of Confucius (London and New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), 20. See also 4.22; 4.24. 55  In Analects 17.21, Zai Wo similarly attempts to rationalise away his lack of compliance with observing the three-year mourning practices following a parent’s death. Confucius asks if Zai Wo is comfortable not complying with this practice. When Zai Wo says that he is, Confucius does not attempt to persuade him to comply—just as, in this case, he does not try to talk him out of his indolence.

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in the phrase ‘coherence between words and deeds’. When Zizhang (子張) asked how he could get by in the world (xing 行),56 Confucius’ advice was: when speaking, be steadfast and dependable (yan zhong xin 言忠信) and when undertaking tasks, be sincere and respectful (xing du jing 行篤敬) (15.6; see also 2.13; 14.27).57 In Analects 2.22, Confucius comments that it is not possible for a person without xin to get on in the world. Here, an analogy is drawn between this person and a large ox-cart without a linchpin to secure the cart to the ox. Ames and Rosemont Jr. comment on the significance of this analogy: “like the carriage pins, making good on one’s word (xin 信) is the link between saying and doing.”58 This view is expressed in D.C. Lau’s analysis of the term: To be [xin] is to be reliable in word. An important part of this has, of course, to do with promise-keeping. But when Confucius talks of being [xin] in word (1.7; 13.20; 15.6), he means more than that. To be [xin] in word applies to all one’s words. It concerns, besides promises, resolutions concerning future conduct, or even plain statements of fact. Not to carry out a resolution is to fail to be [xin]; to have made a statement not borne out by facts—whether they be present or future facts—is equally to fail to be [xin] . . . Confucius often opposes the terms [yan] (word) and [xing] (deed) For one’s deed to fail to match one’s word is to fail to be [xin].59 For Lau, xin is understood as one of “the moral qualities of the gentleman.”60 To fail to be xin is a failure of moral agency. We may extend the notion of failure in moral agency to one of agency more generally: failure to match deeds with words is a failure reliably to realise one’s comments and beliefs in action. In this light, one reason for naming this aspect of xin “episodic reliability” is to highlight that it stands at the nexus of agency and the situation. The analysis of xin by Ames and Rosemont Jr. makes explicit the episodic nature of xin and its impact on a person’s relationships: 56  I follow Slingerland’s translation of xing (Slingerland, Confucius Analects, 176). 57   Analects 4.22 states, “The Master said, “The ancients were loath to speak because they would be ashamed if they personally did not live up to what they said.” (Ames and Rosemont Jr., trans., Analects, 93). See also Analects 12.3. 58  Ames and Rosemont Jr., Analects, 234n40. 59  Dim-Cheuk Lau, trans. Confucius: The Analects (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, 1979), 25. 60  Lau, Confucius, 31.

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. . . every reader of the Analects confronts visually “person” standing by “words” or “speech.” Xin is often translated as “trustworthy”. However, being simply well intended in what one says and does is not good enough; one must have the resources to follow through and make good on what one proposes to do. Interestingly, as with most classical Chinese terms, in understanding xin we must appreciate the priority of situation over agency. That is, xin in describing the situation of persons making good on their word goes in both directions, meaning both the commitment of the benefactor and the confidence of the beneficiary. Xin, then, is the consummation of fiduciary relationships.61 Contrary to what Ames and Rosemont Jr. suggest, it may be unnecessary to make a determination on whether the notion of individual agency or its separate instantiations are more fundamental in Confucian philosophy. After all, if the carriage pin joins the ox to the cart, it is the alignment of the two, rather than the agent’s commitments or her deeds, which is prior.62 The second dimension of xin relates to the consistency of a person’s actions and conduct over time; this is an important way in which we might confidently count on a person. In the Analects, this notion of reliability is especially important as Confucius’ followers contemplated how officials could nurture the peoples’ confidence in them. Famously, Analects 12.7 sets out three fundamental criteria for good government: in order of importance, the first is the confidence of the people (min 民) in the government, the second sufficient food and the third sufficient arms for defence. The passage makes clear that it is crucial for the people to have confidence in the government: “if the common people do

61  Ames and Rosemont Jr., Analects, 53. 62  Slingerland’s analysis emphasises the other strand, that of individual agency. Slingerland considers Analects 13.20 (and 13.18, 14.17, 15.37, and 17.8) problematic as they show that xin can be carried too far. According to Slingerland, when this happens, xin becomes a “vice” (Slingerland, Confucius Analects, 148; in relation to 13.18). Here, I mention two problems with Slingerland’s analysis. First, he assumes that the text’s conversations are to be read as a coherent whole such that all the passages within which xin occurs must be brought within a single explanation. Secondly, in relation to the discussion here, he prioritises a virtues-based account of agency where failure appropriately to instantiate xin is couched in terms of “vice.”  There are other ways to explain 13.20 on excessive xin. One way is to examine the phrase “necessarily making good on their word” (yan bi xin 言必信). The problem is not with xin in itself but with those who see it as necessary (bi 必). For these people, adherence to xin is not a negotiable matter, irrespective of circumstances. It is their doggedness and inflexibility that is problematic rather than xin itself.

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not have confidence in their leaders, community will not endure.”63 In their translation of the Analects, Brooks and Brooks point out that this definition of government “locates it in the confidence of the people, not in the government’s ability to feed or protect them or the credibility of its threat of punishment.”64 In a conversation with Zizhang on ren (benevolence), Confucius makes the connection between an official’s reliability and others’ reliance in him: Zizhang asked Confucius about authoritative conduct (ren 仁). Confucius replied, “A person who is able to carry into practice five attitudes in the world can be considered authoritative.” “What are these five attitudes?” asked Zizhang. Confucius replied, “Deference, tolerance, making good on one’s word (xin 信), diligence and generosity. If you are deferential, you will not suffer insult; if tolerant, you will win over the many; if you make good on your word [xin], others will rely upon you; if diligent, you will get results; if generous, you will have the status to employ others effectively.”65 “If you make good on your word, others will rely upon you”: the character for rely on, ren (任), can mean both the act of reliance as well as the act of bearing a responsibility.66 It is important to understand the transitive meaning of xin: that a person bears a responsibility also indicates that someone else relies on the person to carry through that responsibility. This dual nature of responsibility and reliance is also implicit in xin in relation to friendship. It is important not to have friends not alike oneself—that is, not to have friends who are not moral equals—because friends have mutual responsibility for each other, insomuch as they rely on each other (1.8; 9.25). Analects 12.23 sketches the fine line a person treads in taking up this responsibility: Zigong inquired about how to treat friends, and the Master replied, “Do your utmost (zhong 忠) to exhort them, and lead them adeptly (shan 善) along the way (dao 道). But if they are unwilling then desist—don’t disgrace yourself in the process.”67 63  Ames and Rosemont Jr., trans., Analects, 154–155. 64  E. Bruce Brooks and A. Taeko Brooks, The Original Analects: Sayings of Confucius and His Successors (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 91. 65  Ames and Rosemont Jr., trans., Analects 17.6, 204. 66  Editorial Committee of Guwenzi Gu Lin, eds., The Explanatory Dictionary of Ancient Chinese Characters《古文字詁林》, (Shanghai: Shanghai jiao yu chu ban she, 上海: 上海敎育出版社, 1999–2004), vol. 7, 362. 67  Ames and Rosemont Jr., trans., Analects, 160.

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This brief examination of xin—reliability—in those who undertake official duties and in friendship highlights that reliability is not simply a characteristic of an individual. It signifies a relationship, typically over the longer term, where one’s handling of particular matters inspires trust: the people will only have confidence in officials who have over time shown that they are reliable in undertaking specific tasks; one trusts a friend because one has observed how the friend handles situations and interacts with oneself and others in a range of situations, over time. Reliability is a constituent of trust, and, in trusting someone, we might also believe that they have a “competence and willingness to look after, rather than harm, things one cares about which are entrusted to their care.”68 Yet, the focus on the other’s goodwill as a distinguishing feature of trust does not fully capture the nature of trusting relationships. One way of explaining the nature of trusting relationships is to emphasise the attitude toward the other’s action or conduct, such that one feels “betrayal should [trust] be disappointed, and gratitude should it be upheld.”69 This analysis does not propose trust in all of a person’s actions and undertakings, but in specific ones. In this way, it is consistent with episodic reliability in Confucian philosophy. In both episodic and longitudinal reliability, Confucian philosophy upholds an inter-subjective conception of agency. A reliable agent is so, not simply because she possesses various attributes, nor just because she occasionally demonstrates that her words and deeds are aligned. Rather, she is so because she demonstrates that her commitments (word) and actions are integrated, she consistently does so over time, and others have come to rely on her. Reliability therefore focuses on the nexus of situation and agency, as well as the place of the agent within her community. I have proposed an account of agency that focuses on procedural rather than substantive issues. I have not discussed the nature of projects and pursuits or the axiological commitments upheld by the Confucian tradition. Instead, I have focused on one aspect of what it takes to be an exemplary person, one that others can rely on. From this perspective, the relevant assessment of a person’s conduct is whether, in any one situation, he has taken appropriate 68  Annette Baier, “Trust and Antitrust,” Ethics 96, no. 2 (1986): 259. 69  Richard Holton, “Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72, no. 1 (1994), 67. Holton draws from Strawson’s discussion of participant attitudes in trust but re-shapes his discussion to focus on a “participant stance.” On this account, trusting someone involves “relying on them to do something, and investing that reliance with a certain attitude” (Holton, “Deciding to Trust,” 67).

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action (yi 義)—to do the fitting thing. This notion of right action is situationsensitive but not entirely dictated by the situation. Although there are situational factors that will constrain possible actions and influence outcomes, agency cannot be neglected. In Confucian philosophy, agency is manifest in situations: “In dealing with matters in the world, the exemplary person is not for or against anything. He follows what is appropriate.”70 It is the agent who knows to be flexible in this way: not having predetermined conclusions but acting in a fitting manner as the situation calls for it. At the heart of Confucian agency is epistemic acumen to deal with each scenario. A situation may throw up only a small number of relevantly dissimilar variations on a person’s previous experiences or it may involve new, quite different, considerations from what he is familiar with. But the epistemically reliable agent is not thrown (9.29); through extensive practice, he has acquired knowledge of a range of possibilities for realising his commitments, the aptitude to work with patterns of conduct, and relevant competencies to realise them, aptly, in particular situations. In each situation, he “[reviews] the old as a means of realizing the new” (2.11).71 Agency is expressed each time a person undertakes a particular type of activity. Through time, a person’s successes in the activity build up a picture of his longitudinal reliability, which may also be reflected in terms of his reputation for doing the activity well. Isolated and occasional cases of failure or botched performances may not necessarily cost a person his reputation for being skilled in a particular activity although, depending on the nature of the activity, there will be a limit beyond which the person’s expertise will not be left unchallenged. Agency is that which persists, bridging the gap between episodic and longitudinal reliability.72 In turn, longitudinal reliability allows 70  4.10; trans. by author. 71  Ames and Rosemont Jr., trans., Analects, 78. 72  The continuity between commitment and behaviour is a captured in Analects 16:10; the passage expresses the thoughtfulness (si) of the exemplary person that stems from his commitment:  “Confucius said, The gentleman [junzi] has Nine Thoughts [九思: jiusi]. In seeing he thinks of being clear, in hearing he thinks of being perceptive, in expressing he thinks of being warm, in appearance he thinks of being respectful, in word he thinks of being loyal, in deed he thinks of being assiduous, in doubt he thinks of inquiring, in anger he thinks of consequences, and seeing a chance of gain he thinks whether it is right.” (trans. Brooks and Brooks, Original Analects, 156). Brooks and Brooks also note that “For several of these “think of” phrases we could more idiomatically say “is concerned to, takes care to.” . . . Seeing and hearing are the basic learning methods; one tries to use them effectively. Expression and demeanor are basic behavior, and a balance of affability and courtesy

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us to be confident that this person may be relied on in his present and future undertakings of that activity. The model of an accomplished musician is helpful in illustrating the connections between (reliable) agency, epistemic norms and the standing of such agency within an epistemic community. The accomplished oboist performs different pieces, and with different groups (orchestras or smaller ensembles). She frequently—perhaps almost all the time—receives accolades for her performances. Even if there are imperfections in some performances, she reliably demonstrates a high level of skill in playing the oboe, both technically and musically, in different performances. Both her general audience and the community of musicians appreciate and are in a position to evaluate her performances, to different degrees. The general audience is the wider, epistemic community while other accomplished musicians occupy a position of epistemic privilege by virtue of their deeper understanding of musicianship and musicality. Each evaluation is an epistemic exercise which draws on a set of norms appropriate to the context of the performance, as for example, how she has interpreted the composer’s intention and the genre of the work, how she may have introduced new elements into the performance, how her performance is attuned to the performances of the other musicians she plays with, and whether her performance takes into account the audience she plays for. Evaluation does not focus on whether she has followed instructions to play a piece like another musician has, or like an ideal musician does. Confucian philosophy helps us to appreciate the relational nature of epistemic assessment. As in the case of the musical performer and her audience, most of our actions and tasks undertaken are subject to evaluation by our ‘audience’ according to relevant epistemic norms. The lack of a fixed set of norms that apply standardly to actions of a particular type does not indicate the end of objectivity. Rather, norms may be affirmed or challenged as situations arise; some norms are more or less entrenched, as they should be (e.g. Confucius speaks against glib speech, an obsequious countenance and excessive solicitude in Analects 5.25);73 while others are debatable (e.g. whether to wear a hemp or silk cap in Analects 9.3). One important point to make about this treatment of norms is that it does not hold that there are no norms, but cover the ground. Then come the old pair of word and deed, with fidelity and duty uppermost. The next pair are relatively new, and seem to give counsel for bureaucratic position: if you don’t know, ask, and if you are angry, forbear. Finally, the set ends with an unpaired and thus somewhat emphasized saying.” (Brooks and Brooks, trans., Original Analects, 156). This passage, together with others, may be cited in support of a Confucianist account of intellectual virtue. 73  Ames and Rosemont Jr., trans., Analects, 101.

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that there are clusters of norms that are relevant to specific activities and not all of them may apply—and, indeed, some may be challenged—in any one specific case. This way of thinking about epistemic norms may contribute to discussions about the legitimacy of situated knowledge, preventing it from collapsing into perspectival subjectivism. The relational nature of epistemic assessment also informs our thinking about where the lines of responsibility fall in accounting for epistemic agency. Confucian philosophy avoids the attribution of basic epistemic agency solely to individuals. It also avoids the attribution of basic epistemic agency only to communities74 as that may downplay the independence and responsibility of individuals. Because neither the agent nor his epistemic community is the basic epistemic agent, the question of epistemic authority is more complex. It is intertwined with the recognition of authority within the epistemic community. In some cases, this may be a simple matter while in others it may be drawnout, complicated and sometimes unresolved (as, for example, in the cases of Galileo, Aung San Suu Kyi and Confucius himself). In these cases, epistemic authority is entangled with existing power struggles. Here, Confucian philosophy shares the firm conviction with feminist philosophy that the concrete particularities of individual, social and political contexts must be attended to. There is a presupposition in Confucian philosophy that people are susceptible to changes in their surrounding environments.75 Although it is not stated explicitly in these terms, the Confucians believed both in the force of the environment to shape individuals, as well as the potential of individuals to effect changes in their societies. These two polarities of the self-community nexus are closely connected. Independence is possible only if the conditions not only allow but seek to engender critically-thinking, reflective individuals. If we uphold the ideal of the Confucian exemplary person as one who can challenge existing norms where appropriate, we must also be committed to a socio-political environment that nurtures individuals in these skills. According to the argument in this chapter, a contribution of Confucian philosophy to contemporary debates is its emphasis on the importance of an environment— epistemic contexts—conducive to the cultivation of reflective individuals who know how appropriately to respond in different situations (Analects 14.30). This picture of epistemic agency makes an intellectualist account of knowledge look inadequate and perhaps too modest in its expectations of human capability.

74  See Nelson, “Epistemological Communities.” 75  This would account in part for a cautious reliance on universally-applicable norms and an emphasis instead on assessing circumstantial elements in particular situations.

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Bibliography Alcoff, Linda Martín and Potter, Elizabeth. Introduction to Feminist Epistemologies, edited by Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter, 1–14. New York: Routledge, 1993. Ames, Roger T. and Rosemont Jr., Henry, trans. The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation. USA: Ballantine Publishing, 1998. Baier, Annette. “Trust and Antitrust.” Ethics 96, no. 2 (1986): 231–60. Brooks, E. Bruce and Brooks, A. Taeko, trans. The Original Analects: Sayings of Confucius and His Successors. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998. Chong, Kim-Chong. “Confucius’s Virtue Ethics: Li, Yi, Wen and Chih in the Analects.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 25, no. 1 (1998): 101–30. ———. Early Confucian Ethics. Chicago: Open Court, 2007. Code, Lorraine. What Can She Know? Feminist Theory and the Construction of Knowledge. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991. ———. “Feminist Epistemologies and Women’s Lives.” In The Blackwell Guide to Feminist Philosophy, edited by Linda Alcoff and Eva Kittay, 211–34. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2007. Editorial Committee of Guwenzi Gu Lin, eds. The Explanatory Dictionary of Ancient Chinese Characters《古文字詁林》Gu wen zi gu lin, 12 vols. Shanghai: Shanghai jiao yu chu ban she, 上海:上海敎育出版社, 1999–2004. Fantl, Jeremy. “Knowing-How and Knowing-That.” Philosophy Compass 3, no. 3 (2008): 451–70. Fine, Arthur. “The Viewpoint of No One in Particular.” In The Pragmatic Turn in Philosophy, edited by William Egginton and Mike Sandbothe, 115–29. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004. First published (1998) as the “Presidential Address of the Central Division of the American Philosophical Association.” Proceedings and Addresses of the APA, 72 (1998): 9–20. Hall, David and Ames, Roger. Thinking Through Confucius. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987. Haraway, Donna. “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective.” In Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature, edited by Donna Haraway, 183–201. New York and London: Routledge, 1991. Harding, Sandra. The Science Question in Feminism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986. ———. “Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What is ‘Strong Objectivity’?” In Feminist Epistemologies, edited by Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter, 49–82. New York: Routledge, 1993. Hartsock, Nancy. “The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism,” in Discovering Reality, edited by Sandra Harding and Merrill Hintikka, 283–310. Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing, 1983.

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He, Yan (何晏). Collected Explanations of the Analects《論語集解》, Si bu cong kan series (四部叢刊經部), 2 vols. Shanghai: Commercial Press (上海: 商務印書館), 1922. Hetherington, Stephen and Karyn Lai. “Practising to Know: Practicalism and Confucian Philosophy.” Philosophy 87, no. 3 (2012): 375–93. Hill Collins, Patricia. “Black Feminist Epistemology.” In Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment, edited by Patricia Hill Collins, 2nd ed., 251–71. New York: Routledge, 2000. Ho, Che Wah; Lau, Dim-cheuk and Chen, Fong Ching (編者何志華, 劉殿爵, 陳方正) eds., A Concordance to the Lunyu《論語逐字索引》. Hong Kong: Commercial Press (香港: 商務印書館), 1995. Holton, Richard. “Deciding to Trust, Coming to Believe.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72, no. 1 (1994): 63–76. Janack, Marianne. “Dilemmas of Objectivity.” Social Epistemology 16, no. 3 (2002): 267–81. Lai, Karyn. Learning from Chinese Philosophies: Ethics of Interdependent and Contextualised Self, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2006. ———. “Li in the Analects: Training in Moral Competence and the Question of Flexibility.” Philosophy East and West 56, no. 1 (2006): 69–83. ———. “Knowing to Act in the Moment: Examples from Confucius’ Analects.” Asian Philosophy 22, no. 4 (2012): 347–64. Lau, Dim-Cheuk, trans., Confucius: The Analects. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, 1979. Legge, James, trans., The Chinese Classics: with a Translation, Critical and Exegetical Notes, Prolegomena, and Copious Indexes, Vol. I (of 7 vols.): Confucian Analects, The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean. Taipei: Southern Materials Center Publishing Inc., 1985. Reprinted from the latest edition by Oxford University Press (1893–5). Leys, Simon, trans., The Analects of Confucius. London and New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997. Longino, Helen. “Feminist Epistemology as a Local Epistemology.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 71 (1997): 19–35. McLeod, Alexus. “Ren as a Communal Property in the Analects.” Philosophy East and West 62, no. 4 (2012): 505–28. Nelson, Lynn Hankinson. “Epistemological Communities.” In Feminist Epistemologies, edited by Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter, 121–59. New York: Routledge, 1993. Olberding, Amy. Moral Exemplars in the Analects: The Good Person is That. New York: Routledge, 2012. Pulleyblank, Edwin G. Outline of Classical Chinese Grammar. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1995.

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Raphals, Lisa. Knowing Words: Wisdom and Cunning in the Classical Traditions of China and Greece. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992. Ryle, Gilbert. “Knowing How and Knowing That.” Proceedings of Aristotelian Society 46 (1945–46): 1–16. Schuessler, Axel. ABC Etymological Dictionary of Old Chinese. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2007. Shun, Kwong-loi and Wong, David B., ed., Confucian Ethics: A Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy, and Community. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Slingerland, Edward, trans., Confucius Analects: With Selections from Traditional Commentaries. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2003. Spelman, Elizabeth V. Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought. London: Women’s Press, 1990. Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty and Rooney, Ellen. “In a Word (Interview).” In The Essential Difference, edited by Naomi Schor and Elizabeth Weed, 151–84. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994. Stanley, Jason, and Williamson, Timothy. “Knowing How.” The Journal of Philosophy 98, no. 8 (2001): 411–44. Tanesini, Alessandra. “Feminist Epistemology.” In Gender: The Key Concepts, edited by Mary Evans and Carolyn Williams, 81–87. New York and London: Routledge, 2013. Tu, Wei-ming. Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985. Wylie, Alison. “Why Standpoint Matters,” in The Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader: Intellectual and Political Controversies, edited by Sandra Harding, 339–51. New York and London: Routledge Publishing, 2004.

CHAPTER 5

Role Epistemology: Confucian Resources for Feminist Standpoint Theory Kevin DeLapp 1 Introduction Proponents of feminist standpoint theory argue that knowledge claims are inexorably commingled with particular features about the knower’s identity, and that identities which are characterized by social marginalization might therefore, in virtue of that same marginalization, furnish privileged epistemic positions. Despite potential political appeal in terms of giving voice to historically silenced perspectives, standpoint theory has run up against a variety of difficulties including the difficulty of articulating what precisely a “standpoint” is and how grounding epistemic justification in such a standpoint does not thereby lead to an undesired relativity. This chapter attempts to requisition a certain reading of classical Confucian philosophy as a way of helping standpoint theory respond to both these objections. According to the interpretation of Confucianism I will defend, and which I will call role epistemology, knowledge claims are justified by reference to the specific social-political roles that the knower occupies, where the knower herself, in turn, is understood as being constituted through her negotiation of such roles. Like traditional standpoint theory, role epistemology affirms the epistemic advantages that can be granted to a knower on the basis of her socially-situated identity: to know is to believe the truth because of a specific social-political role that is occupied. But by shifting the justificatory mechanism to an embodied relationship which obtains between real flesh-and-blood persons, role epistemology dodges worries about feminist standpoints being essentialist or arbitrary. 2

Standing Up for Standpoint Theory

In order to appreciate the resources which Confucian role epistemology can offer feminist standpoint theory, let us first get clear on what feminist standpoint theory (hereafter FST) itself is and why it might welcome help from

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such an otherwise unexpected source. FST became formally incorporated in the 1980s and 90s by feminists critical of the hope that greater “objectivity” in social, political, or scientific inquiry would eventually “disprove” sexist biases. The motivation was that, instead of trying to attain some genderless epistemic ideal, epistemic justification ought to be responsive to the lived experiences and embodied differences of actual epistemic agents; the experience of some of whom, of course, is marked by social-political marginalization. Rather than regard marginalization as epistemic stigmata, FST hoped to rebrand it as a new source of epistemic strength: suffering sexism can give one special insight into the nature of sexism which sexists themselves cannot access. Rather than tease out the many different versions and refinements that have flourished internal to FST, I propose the following general definition: standpoint theory involves at root the claim that knowledge always retains certain ineliminable traces of the knower’s particular situation, experience, and identity. This definition may be analyzed into the following specific theses. First, standpoint theory is committed to the rejection of any trans-­ perspectival or universal standard by which knowledge can be impartially articulated or justified. We can call this the Objectivity Thesis. The objectivity thesis has both a negative and a positive component. Negatively, the objectivity thesis can be understood as the claim that an unbiased standard of epistemic justification is not possible. Positively, the objectivity thesis also says that other justificatory standards are possible, and indeed might offer more satisfactory descriptions of the objects or phenomena under inquiry than the illusory impartial standard could ever have provided, even if it were possible. Part of the motivation driving the objectivity thesis is, first of all, the observation that eliminating perspective might not merely be psychologically impossible, but also conceptually impossible; for, as Peter Railton has put it, “A standpoint without any subjectivity is a standpoint with no point of view—which is to say, no standpoint at all.”1 But even if impartiality were attainable, it would still not be desirable on empiricist grounds: ignoring particular perspectives gives an incomplete description of the world since, after all, those perspectives are also themselves part of the world. As Thomas Nagel remarks in a different context, in attempting to attain a “view from nowhere” which expunges all personal or anthropocentric concepts, we lose sight of the fact that we knowers are also just as much a part of whatever “absolute reality” we are trying to investigate.

1  Peter Railton, “Aesthetic Value, Moral Value, and the Ambitions of Naturalism,” in Aesthetics and Ethics, ed. Jerrold Levinson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 63.

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Not all reality is better understood the more objectively it is viewed. Appearance and perspective are essential parts of what there is, and in some respects they are best understood from a less detached standpoint . . . If what we want is to understand the whole world, we can’t forget about these subjective starting points indefinitely; we and our personal perspectives belong to the world.2 This is one of the reasons why Sandra Harding, rather than abandoning the language of objectivity tout court, argues that taking particular perspectives seriously instead yields a stronger form of objectivity. For one thing, acknowledging the relevance of particular perspectives can help generate new avenues for investigation, ones which might have been previously invisible to the myopia of the wannabe “impartial” scientist. As Harding says, “Marginalized lives [can] provide the scientific problems and the research agendas.”3 Second, FST is committed to the claim that, in the absence of an impartial or universal standard, particular situations and experiences can provide their own sufficient epistemic justification for beliefs formed about those situations and experiences. Let’s call this the Justification Thesis. Being a so-and-so gives you the epistemic right to say things about other so-and-sos that non-so-andsos don’t enjoy. Like the objectivity thesis, the justification thesis also involves a positive prong (you are uniquely situated to speak on your behalf) as well as a negative prong (others don’t have the epistemic authority to speak on your behalf about you). The “epistemic right” envisioned here pertains both to formulating beliefs (about one’s experiences and identity) and also to justifying those beliefs. That is, occupying a particular identity gives someone an “insider” perspective on the experiences shaped by that identity; and it is sufficient to justify a belief about those experiences if the person appeals to occupying the identity that generates the perspective. If you identify (and are identified) as being a woman, then part of what that entails, according to FST, is that you know certain things about being a woman than men do not (or ­perhaps know 2  Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 5–6. 3  Sandra Harding, “Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology—What is ‘Strong Objectivity’?” in Feminist Epistemologies, ed. Linda Martín Alcoff and Elizabeth Potters (New York: Routledge Publishers, 1993), 62. Harding does not think, however, that such marginalization equally, or at least all by itself, also provides the solutions to oppression. That is, the relevant kind of occupancy of a standpoint might be a necessary condition for justifying certain beliefs about oppression, but it is not sufficient. Being politically “recognized” in the sense of being viewed as speaking authoritatively about one’s own identity, is a step toward ending oppression, not an automatic end to that oppression: speaking for oneself is what initiates dialogue, it is not the goal of such dialogue.

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things in a different way than men can) and that your beliefs about being a woman are justified on the basis of your being a woman. Part of the motivation driving the justification thesis is simply practical. We are in a better position to understand our own experience because we are the ones having the experience. In this vein, consider the Combahee River Collective’s statement that “the most profound and potentially the most radical politics come directly out of our own identity, as opposed to working to end somebody else’s oppression.”4 Another part of the motivation is more psychological and, indeed, ethical. When others speak on our behalf and in a way that silences our own authority, they get to set the terms of the discourse which fixes our identity for us in a way that can alienate us from our sense of who we feel we are, if it is dissonant with who we are told to be.5 The final commitment of FST can be referred to as the Membership Thesis. The membership thesis fleshes out the specific criteria for a relevant situation or experience. First, the sorts of situations and experiences which are eligible to become proper standpoints must be collective. A single individual does not get any special justificatory status qua individual, but only qua being a member of a group. Furthermore, this collectivity must be politically selfconscious. That is, an assemblage of people who do not recognize anything in common among them (including simply the fact that others may have viewed them historically as having something falsely in common) will not qualify as a “standpoint” in the relevant sense. This is one reason for differentiating “standpoint” from “perspective”: a standpoint is aware of itself as such, whereas a mere perspective need not be self-aware or collective. An individual woman has a perspective; “women” have a standpoint.6 Moreover, only those ­collectivities 4  Combahee River Collective, “A Black Feminist Statement,” in The Second Wave: A Reader in Feminist Theory, ed. Linda Nicholson (New York: Routledge Publishers, 1997), 65. 5  For a detailed overview of some of the ways that such silencing phenomena operate within academe, see Marianne Janack, “Standpoint Epistemology without the ‘Standpoint’? An Examination of Epistemic Privilege and Epistemic Authority,” Hypatia 12, no. 2 (1997): 125–139. Janack thinks that calling attention to these silencing phenomena involves only a claim to epistemic authority (i.e. access to the epistemic means-of-production that govern discourse about oneself), without needing the stronger epistemic privilege that is traditionally envisioned by FST, and which she worries would inadvertently normalize some women’s experiences at the expense of other women’s experiences. I intend my claims about “epistemic right” to be as neutral as possible as to the distinction between “privilege” and “authority”, and I hope that the Confucian role epistemology developed below can accommodate both. 6  Cf. Sandra Harding, Whose Science/Whose Knowledge? (New York: Cornell University Press, 1991), 127.

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which have faced oppression will qualify as standpoints in the requisite way. Standpoints are only forged through opposition.7 The need to fight for the recognition of being an authority on one’s own identity and experience is part of what gives that identity and experience a claim to epistemic justification in the first place—this is one of the “unique abilities of the oppressed.”8 To summarize, we can understand standpoint theory as the view that genuine or “strong” objectivity is possible only if we recognize that politically selfaware membership in an oppressed group grants the epistemic right to form and justify knowledge claims about that group. Put more formally, according to FST: Knower S will be epistemically justified in believing a proposition P just in case (i) S is a member of a group G that has been marginalized in way(s) M, (ii) the content of P asserts something about G or M, and (iii) S forms P on the basis of her membership in G. 3

The Limitations of Standpoint

FST has proven attractive for a variety of reasons. For one thing, if trans-­ standpoint objectivity is an unattainable standard, an alternate kind of objectivity which links justification to situated perspective might be the only sort of objectivity we can ever have. Furthermore, FST affirms otherwise marginalized identities: instead of viewing marginalization as wholly undermining the possibility of knowledge, FST instead provides a sort of meager consolation prize, where lack of social, political, or economic privilege at least grants epistemic privilege. Having a standpoint that is epistemically authoritative in this way can help guard the autonomy and irreducibility of a group’s own voice, suggesting a powerful framework for an effective identity politics. However, despite these attractions, FST faces several serious objections as a theory of justification. First, critics have worried that it seems to grant an 7  This might be one reason to prefer speaking of a “feminist standpoint” instead of “women’s standpoint,” which Dorothy Smith has suggested. Although Smith offers the latter as a way of defusing what might be regarded as an oppositional tone of the former, it is precisely that oppositional character which makes the standpoint self-conscious in the requisite sense. See Dorothy Smith, “Women’s Perspective as a Radical Critique of Sociology,” in The Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader, ed. Sandra Harding (New York: Routledge Publishers, 2004), 21–34. 8  Harding, “Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology,” 62.

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i­ndefeasible epistemic monopoly solely on the basis of the contingent occupation of a perspective. Of course, as we have seen, the requirements that legitimate standpoints have to be collective and politically self-aware—i.e. the membership thesis—mitigate against perspectives which are capable of changing with the wind. Individual points of view include many contingent and idiosyncratic features, but the nature of standpoints as shared by many individuals who, moreover, have been treated historically in common ways, bonds that point of view together with a much greater stability. Part of the problem with this move, however, is that it threatens a potential circularity, since it would seem to require already occupying a standpoint in order to recognize the need and possibility of a standpoint in the first place. If standpoints do not need to be self-aware, this circularity disappears; but then the threat of indefeasibility and idiosyncrasy arises again. What would help FST here, in other words, would be an analysis of standpoints that preserves a degree of stability in the standpoint, without building into it a priori political selfawareness. (This is one of the advantages I hope to show that a Confucian role epistemology can offer.) A related worry concerns the caveat that standpoints must involve collectivity, for if standpoints must be shared, this might seem to presuppose both a false universalism, according to which all women have the same experiences qua women, irrespective of the interstices with other identities; as well as a false essentialism, according to which all women possess some shared kernel of woman-ness. But women’s experiences are not homogenous: being a white woman, or a poor woman, or a lesbian, or an educated woman could yield almost incommensurable qualia.9 Indeed, the appeal to such an idealized common experience might threaten to smuggle into the privileged epistemic position only those experiences which are judged to be more “authentic” or “representative” than others; and since these judgments would be made by some individual women at the expense of other individual women, the very core of FST, which is supposed to be about not silencing experiences, would be jeopardized.10 On the other hand, if woman-ness is partially socially constructed, then any knowledge to which women might be privy on the basis of that standpoint would also thereby be socially constructed. And saying that knowledge is socially constructed starts to sound as if we are conceding relativism. 9  Rosemary Hennessy, Materialist Feminism and the Politics of Discourse (New York: Routledge Publishers, 1993). 10  Bat-Ami Bar On, “Marginality and Epistemic Privilege,” in Feminist Epistemologies, ed. Linda Martín Alcoff and Elizabeth Potters (New York: Routledge Publishers, 1993), 83–100.

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The traditional response here is to insist on a nominalism about the category that is occupying the standpoint. For instance, Spivak has enjoined us to deploy a “strategic essentialism,” in which we use the language of universal womanhood for political purposes, while disbelieving the metaphysics of this ­language.11 Rorty similarly has defended taking a stance of “ironic solidarity” when it comes to political-cultural membership—we adopt the practices of essentialism with respect to members of our group for the purposes of strengthening solidarity, while retaining an irony about these groups that acknowledges in abstracto the ultimate contingency of our group memberships.12 In addition to potentially promoting an odd form of schizophrenia, these responses seem too deflationary to support the framework for epistemic justification envisioned by FST. If a standpoint is nothing more than a psychologically or politically useful heuristic, then proponents of FST would seemingly have to concede that the beliefs that are justified by our identities are equally contingent. The real value of FST is supposed to be that it gives us a framework for the justification of certain knowledge claims. But if our justification is merely strategic or ironic, then our knowledge would equally become merely strategic and ironic; hence the worry about relativism.13 At any rate, the point of this chapter is not to argue that FST is incapable of adequately addressing these objections. Instead, what I hope to show in what follows is that there already is a rich framework for understanding standpoints which is capable not only of avoiding the pitfalls of relativity and false collectivity, but which is also independently plausible as an account of epistemic justification on its own merits. To see this alternative, we turn to the role epistemology inherent in classical Confucianism. 11  Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 271–313. 12  Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 13  Harding has attempted to respond to this objection by arguing that we should treat “objectivity” as a regulative ideal that seeks to encompass all standpoints. A problem with this strategy, though, is that it seems to shift the mechanism of epistemic justification away from the standpoints themselves and instead onto the idealized objective perspective. “Objectivity” has never been marginalized, and so it is not a standpoint. Grounding epistemic justification in such objectivity would therefore seemly sacrifice the very point of FST. Indeed, it would seem to make FST more of a subspecies of contractarian epistemologies that locate justification in the perspective of an ideal spectator. See Sandra Harding, “Can Democratic Values and Interests Ever Play a Rationally Justifiable Role in the Evaluation of Scientific Work?” Signs 26, no. 2 (2001): 511–525.

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The Role of the Knower

To get a sense of what role epistemology entails, consider as an analog what has become known as role ethics following the recent popularization by Roger Ames and Henry Rosemont.14 According to Ames and Rosemont, role ethics locates moral value within the thick webs of interpersonal relationships that obtain between, for example, traditional Confucian relata such as parents and children, friends, and rulers and subjects.15 According to role ethics, to be good or act rightly would involve occupying an appropriate role in an appropriate way. Thus, if Frances is to be considered a good friend to Bjorn, this will involve, among other things, listening sympathetically when Bjorn wants to talk about something he considers important, thinking about Bjorn’s interests with a degree of personal enthusiasm on her own part, sticking up for Bjorn’s reputation when others might be gossiping about him, etc. And, furthermore, or so the role ethicist will press, there is nothing to being good other than inhabiting these roles properly, for the roles themselves are taken as constitutive of the agent. “Being Bjorn’s friend” is not something which Frances possesses merely in the manner that a subject takes a predicate. Rather, Frances is who she is partially on account of her being Bjorn’s friend (plus, of course, all the other roles she occupies). In this way, role ethics putatively differs from virtue ethics in that, although both eschew overarching universalist normative rules, virtue ethics typically grounds agency in discrete individuals (e.g. Aristotelian substances) who possess character traits as role-transcendent dispositions. Confucius, on the one hand, behaves and feels in certain praiseworthy ways toward his students because he occupies the role of a teacher; Achilles, on the other hand, behaves and feels in certain praiseworthy ways, period. A virtue ethics analysis of Frances’s friendship with Bjorn would emphasize Frances’s possession of traits such as “being a sympathetic listener.” A role ethics analysis would instead emphasize Frances’s “being a friend.” The difference is between viewing Frances’s friendship with Bjorn as being the field in which she expresses her disposition to friendliness, versus viewing her friendship itself as being coextensive with her moral status.

14  Roger T. Ames and Henry Rosemont, Jr., “Were the Early Confucians Virtuous?” in Ethics in Early China, ed. Chris Fraser et al. (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011), 17–39. 15  These Confucian relationships are presented as examples of the sort of roles Ames and Rosemont have in mind, not as necessary expressions. There could just as easily be a nonConfucian role ethics cashed out according to different relationships.

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For our purposes, it is not necessary to settle the controversies concerning whether role ethics is ultimately a distinct theory from virtue ethics, whether Ames and Rosemont are correctly interpreting virtue ethics, or even whether they are correctly reading Confucius as a role ethicist himself. The point at present is simply to leverage this possible interpretation of Confucian ethics as a way of articulating an analogous Confucian epistemology.16 So, in something similar to how the occupancy of social relationships might supply the meaning of ethical terms by constituting the ethical agent herself, so too might the occupancy of those social relationships supply the standards of epistemic justification by constituting the knower. In this light, it may be fruitful to compare the relationship between virtue ethics and virtue epistemology. Just as virtue ethics wants to ground moral evaluation, motivation, and action in features of an agent herself, so too does virtue epistemology seek to reframe epistemic justification in terms of the possession of certain “thick” intellectual dispositions (e.g. fairness, open-­ mindedness, intellectual courage, etc.) which provide the standards for reliable belief-formation, rather than by appealing to some transcendent, impersonal, or “thin” criterion such as “coherence” or “correspondence.” Role ethics is to virtue ethics, then, as role epistemology is to virtue epistemology. Whereas both virtue ethics and virtue epistemology focus on capacities or dispositions that are inherent in individuals, role ethics and role epistemology focus on features that define the proper occupancy of shared social relationships. Role epistemology, thus defined, should also not be confused with contextualism, which is another platform to which recent defenders of FST have appealed in an effort to protect FST from relativism.17 Contextualism sees epistemic justification as dependent on the context in which the knowledge claim is made. Role epistemology, by contrast, shifts the dependence from the external context of the knowledge claim to the social roles that constitute the knower herself. Thus, the difference between contextualism and role epistemology is that the former still insists on the knower as separate from the 16  More specifically, the theory being developed pertains solely to epistemic justification. It is a separate question, not directly considered here, what Confucian texts think “knowledge,” “wisdom,” or “belief” mean. For analyses of those separate issues, see Lisa Raphals, Knowing Words: Wisdom and Cunning in the Classical Traditions of China and Greece (New York: Cornell University Press, 1992) and Christoph Harbsmeier, “Conceptions of Knowledge in Ancient China,” in Epistemological Issues in Classical Chinese Philosophy, ed. Hans Lenk and Gregor Paul (New York: State University of New York Press, 1993), 11–30. 17  For a contextualist version of FST, see Kristina Rolin, “The Bias Paradox in Feminist Standpoint Epistemology,” Episteme 3, no. 1–2 (2006): 125–36.

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context in which her knowledge receives its justification, whereas role epistemology defines the knower herself in terms of the context of justification. Before we see what role epistemology might look like with respect to feminist standpoints in particular, let us look at some of the general textual evidence in favor of viewing classical Confucianism as a role epistemology. Throughout the Analects, situated roles such as parent, child, teacher, student, subject and ruler are used as the locations for ethical cultivation, ethical expression, and ethical evaluation. In Analects 1.2 we are told that such roles (e.g. being a good son) “root” (běn 本) the subsequent development of benevolence (rén 仁), and throughout the text the possibility of being morally exemplary ( jūnzǐ 君子) is intimately linked to the successful negotiation of these roles. If being a good child, parent, or student roots junzi-hood, then it also thereby roots knowledge (zhì 知) since that is one of the core virtues which junzi embody. Indeed, it is hard to see what Confucian zhi would really amount to if it were abstracted from the specific situated roles that embody it. For one thing, the word zhi rarely occurs unmodified in the Analects. Rather, the Analects predominantly deploys zhi as connected to certain objects of knowledge, e.g. knowledge of words (20.3), knowledge of heaven’s mandate (16.8), knowledge of benevolence (1.16, 12.22, 13.2, 14.30, 14.35), knowledge of ritual propriety (3.15, 3.22), etc.18 And as we have seen, these objects of zhi are bound up with certain roles: occupying the role of a good child is the root of coming to know benevolence more broadly (1.2); it was Confucius’s entering into an adult role of public actor that opened up for him venues for ritual propriety that had previously been absent from his role as younger student (2.4); and it is part of the role of junzi (16.8, 20.3) to understand heaven’s mandate. Even the etymology of the word zhi itself suggests the relational nature of roles. The character 知 inherits the pictogram for an open mouth, suggesting the inherently public, dialogic, and social nature of knowledge. As Hall and Ames put it, “Zhi is a communal achievement that emerges out of effective

18  Cf. Stephen Hetherington and Karyn Lai, “Practising to Know: Practicalism and Confucian Philosophy,” Philosophy 87, no. 3 (2012): 375–93. One of the possible exceptions to this generalization that zhi is role-bound might be Analects 2.17, which D.C. Lau has influentially translated as “When you say you know what you know . . .,” suggesting that knowledge is here being understood as a sort of second-order Socratic awareness that is disconnected from any object other than the knowledge itself. However, the text just gives us zhì zhī wéi zhì zhī 知之為知之, which I propose to render as “When you know something, act like you know it,” or perhaps “When you know something, put it into action,” which preserves the specificity of the objects of zhi.

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communication.”19 And according to Ames’s role-ethics reading of the Analects, “effective” communication is in turn fixed by the role-specific functions, duties, and relationships of individual embodied persons. For a role epistemologist, Frances’s knowledge that, for instance, Bjorn is feeling sad even if he doesn’t admit it is justified in virtue of her bearing a special relationship to him as his friend. With this suggestive textual evidence in mind, we can formulate role epistemology as the view that: Knower S will be epistemically justified in believing a proposition P just in case (i) S participates in a role R which is defined in reference to another person(s) Q, (ii) the content of P asserts something about either R or Q, and (iii) S forms P on the basis of her participation in R. 5

“Women” Can Get in the wài

One of the important things to note about Confucian role epistemology, thus defined, is that it requires more, in a sense, than FST does. FST requires the existence of enough other people to form the group (G) by which the knower (S) satisfies the membership thesis and obtains her justificatory authority. But role epistemology breaks the idea of a “group” down into both role-­ relationships (R) and the relata of those relationships (Q). Because these relata take the form of concrete individuals (e.g. Frances’s friend Bjorn, rather than “friends” generically), role epistemology can greatly avoid the problem about false universalism that faces FST. Recall that, according to FST, in virtue of their historical marginalization, women can acquire a special justificatory standpoint regarding claims about women and sexism. But, unless we wish to be ironic or merely strategic when we talk in abstracto about “women” as a category, FST threatens an undesired essentialism. Role epistemology does not face the same threat because “being a woman” is too generic to constitute the sort of thick embodied situations which are required for something to be a genuine role. It is not that Frances is a friend, period, or essentially. Rather, she is a friend specifically to Bjorn. If she is a good friend, then when she tells me something about her friend, I have prima facie reason to believe her assertion. If I were to press her by asking, “Well how can you be so sure?” her role 19  David Hall and Roger Ames, Thinking from the Han: Self, Truth, and Transcendence in Chinese and Western Culture (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 30.

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gives her the justificatory privilege of responding, “Trust me—he’s my friend.” Likewise, if Tom is a parent, he can know certain things (about his children and about parenting in general) that non-parents cannot, and he is within his epistemic rights to appeal to this role as a sufficient justification for believing those things. Many social roles are gendered, of course. Frances is a wife to Michael, a daughter to Dave and Mary, an alumna of a specific women’s college, a member of her local chapter of the League of Women Voters, and perhaps a contributor to the blog, Feminist Philosophers. The big difference between emphasizing Frances’s roles in this way is that the gendered element is placed, as it were, in the roles and not somehow in Frances as if she were carrying around some Platonic woman-ness. At the same time, role epistemology can still accommodate the objectivity thesis that is at the heart of FST. Recall that FST is critical of traditional empiricist appeals to allegedly impartial standards of epistemic justification—­ something Donna Haraway famously derided as the “God trick.”20 FST attempts to supply a stronger form of objectivity by taking embodied perspectives and lived experiences into account. Yet, it seems problematic if the entities that embody these perspectives and live these experiences must be “women” writ large. Role epistemology instead seeks to fold the standards of epistemic justification into the pluralistic paths which different people negotiate according to the roles in which they find themselves for better and for worse. Roles can also change in ways that standpoints, which might founder on the essentialism objection, might find difficult to accommodate. Analects 1.6, for example, suggests that a good son need not act in precisely the same way when he is not physically proximate to his parent: a child, when at home, is filial (xiào 孝), but even when away, there is still an obligation to comport himself respectfully and lawfully (zé 則), since although other elders are not his own parents, his role as a child extends to them an analogous status. The intensity of a role changes not just with physical proximity, but also with time. Thus, the role of being a child commits a person to giving special weight to the interests of a parent even after the parent is deceased, but this weight diminishes as the intensity of the role of child fades in proportion as the memory of the deceased parent fades: Confucius famously offers three years as a good standard before which a deceased parent’s wishes should not be gauchely overturned (Analects 1.11). Different periods in one’s own life can also be characterized by changing roles: Confucius himself occupied different roles in his youth, such 20  Donna Haraway, “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective,” Feminist Studies 14, no. 3 (1988): 575–599.

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as being a good student, than he did as a young adult, when his focus shifted to observing public rites (Analects 2.4). As roles change in these ways, so too does epistemic justification change. For one thing, the very mechanism undergirding the vicarious role-extension from filial son at home to lawful traveler abroad in Analects 1.6 is a certain epistemic capacity: as Analects 6.30 makes clear, being ren involves being able to leverage one’s particular embodied roles into metaphors (pì 譬)—literally, a kind of “role-playing”—that can serve as guides for more generic relationships. That is, one’s knowledge of how to be a good child of one’s own parents entitles one to know also how to be a good traveler amongst the parents of others. Similarly, it is noteworthy that the different roles Confucius occupied at different periods of his life in Analects 2.4 are, by and large, also epistemic ones: “At fifteen I set my mind upon learning; . . . at forty I became free from doubts; at fifty I understood Heaven’s Mandate . . .,” etc. (my italics). Furthermore, coming back to Analects 1.11, the gradual diminishment of the intensity of one’s role as a child over the course of three years has epistemic import as well: not only will a good child not crudely disregard the interests of a recently-deceased parent, but neither will a good child skeptically seek to weed out all beliefs that might have been gleaned from a parent, at least not immediately following that parent’s death and at least so long as that parent was worthy of the role. Consider the following example: if I am a good son and my parents are good parents, then a role epistemologist will say that I am entitled to form and hold certain beliefs by appealing to those beliefs having been my parents’ beliefs. If my mother brought me up with the belief that, for instance, preschool should be a right that is guaranteed for all young children, and if ex hypothesi both my mother and I are “good” at our respective roles, then I can appeal to my mother having taught me this as a justification for why I believe it. I need not, in other words, seek any foundationalist principle to justify my belief. If I were to vehemently attack this belief that is part of my mother’s epistemic legacy to me, then that might show that I was also seriously undermining my and my mother’s roles, since I am partially constituted by the things I believe and many of those beliefs I acquired through being her son. Three years after my mother’s death, as her epistemic role as partial provider for many of my formative beliefs recedes, it becomes much more plausible that I would and should look more impartially at those beliefs. I might still affirm them, of course, but now my justificatory standards would shift to whatever new roles I occupy as opposed to my role as son.21 21  To consider another example, there would be something peculiar, maybe even disingenuous, about a life-long educator believing that “education [of the sort she has been

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Similarly, as Analects 4.21 also tells us, there are certain things a child can know—and certain things a good child should know—about her parents, and vice versa (e.g. the ages of the parents and the location of the children, respectively). And a good teacher knows what and how to teach different pupils in the most effective way; hence Confucius’s frequent act of telling one thing to one student and the opposite thing to another student (e.g. Analects 11.22). In this way, passages such as Analects 1.11 can be taken as prescribing a sort of epistemic fidelity in light of one’s past roles. Epistemic fidelity, of the sort that grants justificatory rights on the basis of the occupancy of specific roles, need not thereby commit a role’s epistemic authority to being inviolate or indefeasible, at least not any more than any standard for epistemic justification (e.g. perceptual warrant, inductive inference, etc.) needs to be indefeasible. And Confucianism has the resources to describe not only when a role is properly inhabited, but also when remonstrance ( jiàn 諫) is appropriate. For example, in Analects 4.18, it is permitted and even encouraged to question and admonish one’s father and mother. That particular passage, of course, is followed by a clause that seems to tell us that, if the parents do not change their ways, the child should accept it without resentment (yuàn 怨). On the face of it, this sounds shockingly conservative and would make for a pretty feeble platform for motivating social change or addressing the sexism of the status quo. However, a more charitable reading is that the Analects are depicting roles normatively. That is, the “mother and father” of 4.18 are to be considered as already occupying these roles correctly, i.e. a bad parent might no longer merit the normative role of parent (even if she retained this identity in a purely biological sense). If the parents of 4.18 are conceived of as good parents then a fortiori their intentions will be good. The child who remonstrates against them might ultimately be in the right, but she should defer to her parents’ better judgment because their ren status, which is guaranteed by their being proper parents, entails a degree of zhi that justifies their course of action. Persistent remonstration is justified only when the recipient is not living up to the prescriptions of her role. Thus in Analects 18.1, Confucius d­ evoting herself to for years] is a waste of time.” Her epistemic identity as an educator ought to make the entertainment of such skepticism a nonstarter. Such a belief would be akin to what William James called a dead hypothesis, where “the notion makes no electric connection with your nature,—it refuses to scintillate with any credibility at all.” James goes on to note that, “This shows that deadness and liveness in an hypothesis are not intrinsic properties, but relations to the individual thinker”; relations which the role epistemologist will instead cash out in terms of situated roles. See William James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York: Dover Publications, 1956), 2–3.

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calls a man named Bigan ren for resisting the dictates of the corrupt king Zhou, Bigan’s own nephew. The idea is not that Bigan transcended his role as subject or brother, but that in remonstrating so fiercely, he was actually being true to what those roles ought to have entailed. In opposing his tyrannical brother, he was being a true brother and subject.22 Mencius 5A2 tells a similar story of the sage Shun who married without seeking his parents’ approval. Although this might seem like Shun was violating his role as a filial son, Mencius reminds us that Shun’s parents apparently would have disapproved of the marriage and the implication is that they were too prejudiced to have considered its merits. In this regard, they themselves fell short of the prescriptions of their role as parents. Shun’s action, though, instead of being construed as un-filial, is actually presented as more filial because he was helping his parents overcome their own prejudice in addition to taking on a new role that Mencius considers vital to Shun’s sense of self and therefore also vital to his parents’ role-identities. Whether an actual relationship is living up to its ideal role is something that can be negotiated through the Confucian concept of “rectifying names” (zhèngmíng 正名). Karyn Lai (citing Analects 12.11 as an example), describes the concept thus: Confucius’ advice . . . to first rectify names is not meant to urge a change in the usage of names, but rather to ensure that the names in question are applied to persons fitting the moral stations associated with those names, or to ensure that persons have to change in order to live up to the name they carry. Terms such as “father”, “ruler”, “friend”, and so on bring with them implications of relationships, and have normative import.23 Rectifying names can involve critiquing the ways in which some individuals have been reduced to transcendent and role-insensitive essences such as “woman”, when in reality an individual is the constellation of her many overlapping social roles. Rectification and remonstration can also be tools for examining biased assumptions about why certain roles are gendered in certain ways. Is there, for instance, anything in the role functionally understood 22  Tragically, Zhou seems not to have recognized this as an expression of ren, as the Lüshi chunqiu suggests that he had Bigan executed: “When he [Bigan] remonstrated with Zhou, Zhou responded by saying that he had heard that sages have seven openings in their hearts. He then proceeded to find out if Bigan was indeed a sage.” See Roger Ames and Henry Rosemont, The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation (New York: Ballantine Publishing Group, 1998), 267n311. 23  Karyn Lai, “Confucian Moral Thinking,” Philosophy East and West 45, no. 2 (1995): 252.

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that requires it to be occupied by specific genders? In this way, a Confucian feminist might use the concepts of rectification and remonstration to audit roles such as “nurse” or “soldier” and show that the requirements for performing such roles effectively do not hinge on being a specific gender. Such a remonstrator, in rectifying certain role expectations, would still be operating from within some role—perhaps the role of feminist voice within a certain community. Sor-hoon Tan, for instance, argues that a feminist junzi might establish a feminist moral community, even if such a community might be at odds with wider society.24 Perhaps so too could an epistemic junzi establish a sort of remonstrating sub-culture of feminist knowers. We might even view gender itself as a social role which can change as remonstrance and rectification open up new possible relationships and relata. Ultimately, role epistemology insists that no one is reducible to a single static role. As Analects 2.12 puts it, the junzi is not a “vessel,” referring to a stationary object designed just for a single use. After all, sexism has often proceeded by forcing individual women to be narrowly defined as nothing more than roles such as mother, wife, daughter, etc. Liberation and representation might thus take the form of either rectifying the proper scope of a given gendered role, or else by leveraging other non-gendered roles that women occupy in order to remonstrate against roles which are contaminated by sexism. In this vein, Li-Hsiang Lisa Rosenlee has suggested that a Confucian feminism might proceed effectively by rethinking, for instance, the husband/wife relationship as being less like ruler/subject (as many historical Confucians themselves viewed it) and instead more like the relation between friends.25 One of the things that Rosenlee and others have drawn attention to is the ways in which the Confucian concept of nèi-wài came to dominate the articulation of gendered roles in Chinese history. Nèi 内 is often taken to refer to the “inner” realm of domesticity, the family, and the private sphere; with wài 外 referring to the outer realm of state and military affairs and public ritual observance. The terms nèi and wài are not in the Analects itself, however. Indeed, they barely appear in other classical Confucian texts such as the Liji, the Yijing, the Da Xue, or the Zhongyong—and even there, they are less associated with gender than with physical parts of the royal court. Through subsequent Chinese history, the feminine roles of mother, daughter, and wife became

24  Sor-hoon Tan, Confucian Democracy: A Deweyan Reconstruction (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003). 25   Li-Hsiang Lisa Rosenlee, Confucianism and Women: A Philosophical Interpretation (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), 158.

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increasingly shunted into the world of nèi 内.26 But this development is not a necessary implication of Confucianism. As Dorothy Ko has observed, the historical mutation of the nèi-wài concept suggests that it is not an essential or binary opposition. Rather, it is “a relational category that describes a series of nested hierarchies whose boundary changes with context,” and thus it is capable of change through rectification and remonstration.27 Fortunately, recent scholarship on women in classical China has given us every reason to be optimistic that whatever patriarchy has characterized women’s actual social roles, this was neither necessary nor inherent in Confucian theory. Chinese women’s roles have not always been relegated to the nèi domain, and when they have been, women have successfully utilized their other Confucian roles to push back into the wài domain. Lisa Raphals’s groundbreaking work on representations of women in early Chinese history, for instance, has challenged the conventional wisdom that Confucianism is essentially or uniformly misogynistic, instead highlighting the numerous literary depictions of women as smart, savvy, influential, virtuous, and assertive.28 Tu Weiming has also argued that we should keep distinct the Confucian “five relationships” (wǔlún 五伦) in which men and women are understood to be merely different from one another (nánnǚzhībíe 男女之别), without either being obviously privileged over the other, versus later frameworks such as the “three bonds” (sānkāng 三纲), in which the husband/wife relationship has become much more hierarchical and power-bound.29 Rosenlee sums up her own comprehensive survey of Confucianism’s history with sexism thus: First, there is no fundamental inconsistency between Confucian virtue ethics and the representations of women as intellectual agents of moral 26  For a detailed overview of this development, see Rosenlee, Confucianism and Women, 69–94. 27  Dorothy Ko, Teachers of the Inner Chamber: Women and Culture in Seventeenth-century China (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1994), 144–145. 28  Lisa Raphals, Sharing the Light: Representations of Women and Virtue in Early China (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998). 29  Tu Weiming, “Probing the ‘Three Bonds’ and the ‘Five Relationships,’ ” in Confucianism and the Family, ed. Walter H. Slote and George A. DeVos (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 121–136. Mencius 3A4 articulates the five relationships. Han Feizi is one of the first to mention the three bonds, although it was not until the neo-Confucian Zhu Xi (1130–1200) that they became a canonical feature of Confucian thought, as noted by Chenyang Li, “Can Confucianism Come to Terms with Feminism?” in The Sage and the Second Sex: Confucianism, Ethics, and Gender, ed. Chenyang Li (Chicago: Open Court, 2000), 4.

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and political virtue; second, the change of the representation of women as agents of particularly “female virtues” of widow chastity and motherhood in later dynasties is a problem of historical development that must be contextualized rather than being seen as a natural fallout of Confucian teachings.30 6 Conclusion This chapter has attempted to construct a Confucian role epistemology on the basis of suggestive passages from the Analects. According to role epistemology, knowledge is justified by the occupancy of socially and normatively defined roles which constitute the epistemic identity of the knower herself. Thus, to know is to believe on the basis of the social relationships one inhabits. Much more needs to be said about whether this role epistemology interpretation stands up to broader readings of classical Confucian texts. And it might be an empirical question as to whether or not social roles that are gendered and/or sexist can be adequately redressed from within Confucian roles themselves. However, although I think this is a plausible account of epistemic justification on its own merits, the main purpose of invoking role epistemology here is has been to consider whether “roles” can be a more efficacious way of understanding the sort of group-perspectives that feminist standpoint theory envisions. Feminist standpoint theory offers an attractive account of the epistemic authority which marginalization and lived experience can bequeath. But in specifying what precisely constitutes the requisite standpoint, the theory faces the objection that it invokes a false universalism and that it leads to relativism. Reframing standpoints as roles in a Confucian sense can help mitigate against these objections: roles ground epistemic privilege in something that is insistently concrete in virtue of its relata being other particular persons, e.g. a specific friend, parent, etc. In short, Confucian role epistemology can help augment feminist standpoint theory and provide a framework for women to put themselves in the wài. Bibliography Ames, Roger T. and Henry Rosemont, Jr. “Were the Early Confucians Virtuous?” In Ethics in Early China, edited by Chris Fraser, Dan Robins, and Timothy O’Leary, 17–39. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011. 30  Rosenlee, Confucianism and Women, 97.

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Bar On, Bat-Ami, “Marginality and Epistemic Privilege.” In Feminist Epistemologies, edited by Linda Martín Alcoff and Elizabeth Potters, 83–100. New York: Routledge Publishers, 1993. Combahee River Collection. “A Black Feminist Statement.” In The Second Wave: A Reader in Feminist Theory, edited by Linda Nicholson, 63–70. New York: Routledge Publishers, 1997. Hall, David L. and Ames, Roger T. Thinking from the Han: Self, Truth, and Transcendence in Chinese and Western Culture. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998. Haraway, Donna. “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective,” Feminist Studies 14, no. 3 (1988): 575–599. Harbsmeier, Christoph. “Conceptions of Knowledge in Ancient China.” In Epistemological Issues in Classical Chinese Philosophy, edited by Hans Lenk and Gregor Paul, 11–30. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993. Harding, Sandra. “Can Democratic Values and Interests Ever Play a Rationally Justifiable Role in the Evaluation of Scientific Work?” Signs 26, no. 2 (2001): 511–25. Harding, Sandra. “Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology—What is ‘Strong Objectivity’?” In Feminist Epistemologies, edited by Linda Martín Alcoff and Elizabeth Potters, 49–82. New York: Routledge Publishers, 1993. Harding, Sandra. Whose Science/Whose Knowledge? New York: Cornell University Press, 1991. Hennessy, Rosemary. Materialist Feminism and the Politics of Discourse. New York: Routledge Publishers, 1993. Hetherington, Stephen and Karyn Lai. “Practising to Know: Practicalism and Confucian Philosophy.” Philosophy 87 (2012): 375–93. James, William. The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. New York: Dover Publications, 1956. Janack, Marianne. “Standpoint Epistemology without the ‘Standpoint’? An Examination of Epistemic Privilege and Epistemic Authority.” Hypatia 12 (1997): 125–39. Ko, Dorothy. Teachers of the Inner Chamber: Women and Culture in Seventeenth-century China. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1994. Lai, Karyn. “Confucian Moral Thinking.” Philosophy East and West 45, no. 2 (1995): 249–72. Li, Chenyang. “Can Confucianism Come to Terms with Feminism?” In The Sage and the Second Sex: Confucianism, Ethics, and Gender, edited by Chenyang Li, 1–22. Chicago: Open Court Publishers, 2000. Nagel, Thomas. The View from Nowhere. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. Railton, Peter. “Aesthetic Value, Moral Value, and the Ambitions of Naturalism.” In Aesthetics and Ethics, edited by Jerrold Levinson, 59–105. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Raphals, Lisa. Knowing Words: Wisdom and Cunning in the Classical Traditions of China and Greece. New York: Cornell University Press, 1992.

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Raphals, Lisa. Sharing the Light: Representations of Women and Virtue in Early China. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998. Rolin, Kristina. “The Bias Paradox in Feminist Standpoint Epistemology.” Episteme 3 (2006): 125–36. Rorty, Richard. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. Rosenlee, Li-Hsiang Lisa. Confucianism and Women: A Philosophical Interpretation. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006. Smith, Dorothy. “Women’s Perspective as a Radical Critique of Sociology.” In The Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader: Intellectual and Political Controversies, edited by Sandra Harding, 21–34. New York: Routledge Publishers, 2004. Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. “Can the Subaltern Speak?” In Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, edited by Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg, 271–313. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1988. Tan, Sor Hoon. Confucian Democracy: A Deweyan Reconstruction. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003. Tu, Weiming. “Probing the ‘Three Bonds’ and the ‘Five Relationships.’ ” In Confucianism and the Family, edited by Walter H. Slote and George A. DeVos, 121–36. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998.

CHAPTER 6

How Relational Selfhood Rearranges the Debate between Feminists and Confucians Andrew Komasinski and Stephanie Midori Komashin 1 Introduction In this chapter we look at selfhood in contemporary Confucianism and feminism. We will argue that contemporary Confucians and feminists (and, with some caveats, Confucius and Mencius) have three important points in common when considering the self. In our argument, we will reflect on the debate about Chengyang Li’s suggestion that there are important similarities between 仁 (ren), a term that means roughly “humanity,” “human kindness,” or “humanity at its best,”1 and the care ethics advocated by feminists Carol Gilligan, Nel Noddings, and others.2 Our goal here is not to settle the debates between and among differing Confucians and feminists. Instead, we want to argue that the differences among the views of particular contemporary Confucians and feminists in understanding selfhood and relationality may in fact be smaller than the differences between the two looked at categorically. To maintain this, we proceed in the following way. First, we explain what we mean when we say “Confucian” and “feminist.” We then argue that Confucianism and feminism share a common objection to what we will call the Modern Self, defined as independently rational, autonomous, atomistic, and abstracted from relationships. Moreover, we show that many Confucians and feminists 1  Henry Rosemont, “Right-Bearing Individuals and Role-Bearing Persons,” in Rules, Rituals, and Responsibility: Essays Dedicated to Herbert Fingarette, ed. Mary I. Bockover (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1991), 98; Wm. Theodore de Bary, Asian Values and Human Rights: A Confucian Communitarian Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), 145. 2  Chenyang Li, “The Confucian Concept of Jen and the Feminist Ethics of Care: A Comparative Study,” Hypatia 9 (1994); Chenyang Li, “Confucianism and Feminist Concerns: Overcoming the Confucian ‘Gender Complex,’ ” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 27 (2000); Julia Tao, “Two Perspectives of Care: Confucian Ren and Feminist Care,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 29 (2002); Daniel Star, “Do Confucians Really Care? A Defense of the Distinctiveness of Care Ethics: A reply to Chenyang Li,” Hypatia 17 (2002); Lijun Yuan, “Ethics of Care and Concept of Jen: A Reply to Chenyang Li,” Hypatia 17 (2002); Ranjou Seodu Herr, “Is Confucianism Compatible with Care Ethics? A Critique,” Philosophy East and West 53 (2003).

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi ��.��63/9789004332119_008

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respond by emphasizing the situated and relational nature of selfhood. We then suggest that the disagreements between feminists and Confucians are better understood as disagreements about whether what remains is an ontological autonomous self with relationality, a relational self with autonomy, or a replacement of the concept of selves with moments in non-ontological relationality—each of which occur within both camps. Finally, we will address two objections to any alliance between Confucians and feminists based on the role-based nature of these relationships and their expression in 禮 (li), a term that means “rite” or “ritual.” 2

What We Mean by “Feminism” and “Confucianism,” Respectively

Both “Confucianism” and “feminism” are terms with multiple conflicting meanings today. In its classical meaning, “feminism” referred broadly to those interested in helping women to achieve “political, legal, or economic rights equal to those granted men.”3 Sally Haslanger defines feminism as follows: Feminism is both an intellectual commitment and a political movement that seeks justice for women and the end of sexism in all forms. However, there are many different kinds of feminism. Feminists disagree about what sexism consists in, and what exactly ought to be done about it; they disagree about what it means to be a woman or a man and what social and political implications gender has or should have.4 From its inception, feminism has been intimately linked with politics, advocacy, and activism, but it is clear that the human rights argued for by feminists have always had their base in philosophical ethics and theory. Early feminists addressed sexism, patriarchy, gender identity, and gendered language along with legal rights. In History of Woman Suffrage, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and Matilda Joslyn Gage consider these issues, pointing out, It is said, “the difference between the sexes indicates different spheres.” . . . [D]ifference does not compel us to spread our tables with different food 3  Karen Offen, “Defining Feminism: A Comparative Historical Approach,” Signs 14 (1988): 122–123. 4  Sally Haslanger, Nancy Tuana, and Peg O’Connor, “Topics in Feminism”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2015 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, accessed March 29, 2014, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/feminism-topics/.

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for man and woman, nor to provide in our common schools a different course of study for boys and girls. Sex pervades all nature, yet the male and female tree and vine and shrub rejoice in the same sunshine and shade. . . . Womanhood is the great fact in her life; wifehood and motherhood are but incidental relations. Governments legislate for men; we do not have one code for bachelors, another for husbands and fathers . . . Her rights are as completely ignored in what is adjudged to be woman’s sphere as out of it . . .5 It can be argued that early works (e.g., Christine de Pizan’s The Book of the City of Ladies [1405], Laura Cereta’s letters [written between 1485 and 1488], Marie Le Jars de Gournay’s The Equality of Men and Women [1622], Margaret Fell’s Women’s Speaking Justified [1667], Mary Astell’s A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, for the Advancement of Their True and Greatest Interest [1694], Judith Drake’s An Essay in Defence of the Female Sex [1697], and Mary Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of Woman [1792]) are required feminist reading though they were penned before the nineteenth century’s First Wave.6 From the 1970s, increasing numbers of women began to define feminism— less in terms of political equality and human rights, and more in terms that either “celebrated sexual difference rather than similarity within a framework of male/female complementarity,”7 or in terms that celebrated motherhood 5  Susan B. Anthony explains this last point in more detail in an article published in The Arena: “Fifty years ago woman in the United States was without a recognizable individuality in any department of life. . . . [G]irls of the family. . . . continued to work without wage after they were twenty-one, exactly as they did before. When they were married, their services were transferred to the husband. . . . Any wages the wife might earn outside of the home belonged by law to the husband. . . . She lost not only the right to her earnings and her property, but also the right to the custody of her person and her children. The husband could apprentice the children at an early age, in spite of the mother’s protest, and at his death could dispose of the children by will, even an unborn child. . . . A man might beat his wife up to the point of endangering her life, without being liable to prosecution. . . . The literary woman placed herself forever beyond the pale of marriage, for no man would be brave enough to take for a wife a creature who had thus unsexed herself. If she could write, it followed without question that she could not cook, sew, manage a house, or bring up children. . . . The idea that she owes service to man instead of to herself, and that it is her highest duty to aid his development rather than her own, will be the last to die.” Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and Matilda Joslyn Gage. Introduction to History of Woman Suffrage, second edition, vol. 1 (London: Susan B. Anthony, 1887), 18, 22; Susan B. Anthony, “The Status of Woman, Past, Present, and Future,” The Arena 17, May 1897, 901–903. 6  Some scholars consider these works “protofeminist” while others object to the term. 7  Offen, “Defining Feminism,” 124.

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as a particular power of women and seeking state support for women who are mothers.8 Postmodern critiques considered the Modern Self as an illusion.9 Some feminists such as Julia Kristeva object not only to gender as a nonessential social construct, but also to the very notion of selves (i.e. selves with autonomy), identifying these with the “transcendental ego.”10 For Kristeva, semiotics, when taken to the position of semanalysis, will render subjects as merely the medium of semiotic discourse.11 Judith Butler similarly declares that “there may not be a subject,” and that instead of it there are gendered performances, explaining, “[I]dentity is performatively constituted by the very ‘expressions’ that are said to be its results.”12 Karen Offen suggests that contemporary feminists can best be seen as part of either an individualist or relational strain13—an issue directly relevant to our discussions below. Our goal here is not to disqualify anyone as a feminist, but rather to express the sheer complexity of claims to feminism (and accusations that other competing views are not feminist). Jane Freedman acknowledges that many of the different strands of feminism seem to be not only divergent but sometimes forcefully opposed. . . . [A] common basis of all feminisms may start with the assertion that feminisms concern themselves with women’s inferior position in society and with discrimination encountered by women because of their sex. Furthermore, one could argue that all feminists call for changes in the social, economic, political or cultural order, to reduce and eventually overcome this discrimination against women. Beyond these general assertions, however, it is difficult to come up with any other ‘common ground’. . .14 As this chapter progresses, we will differentiate multiple feminisms around the ways that each group responds to the problem of the Modern Self. “Confucian” has, in our experience, also had many meanings. While Andrew was completing a chapter of his dissertation on philosophical Confucianism, 8  Ibid., 125. 9  Catriona MacKenzie and Natalie Stoljar, eds. Relational Autonomy Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 10–11. 10  Julia Kristeva, The Kristeva Reader, ed. by Toril Moi (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1986): 29. 11  Ibid., 30–33. 12  Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (London: Routledge, 1999), 3, 33. 13  Offen, “Defining Feminism,” 135. 14  Jane Freedman, Feminism (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2001), 1.

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we moved to Japan and his Japanese advisor asked him to read a book on “Confucianism” entitled『儒教とは何か』( Jukyou to wa Nanika?, meaning “What is Confucianism?”). But Jukyou in Japanese is largely about how Confucian (that is, Ruist) rituals and patterns contribute to Japanese religion, rather than about understanding the Great Learning or the Analects. This content had little to no overlap with anything he had studied about Confucian philosophy and its history. To decode the problem, we need to distinguish between several different Confucianisms. As Roger Ames explains, 儒学 (ruxue) is a Chinese word that comprises the original texts of the Confucian classics, as well as eighty generations of commentary on the original works.15 These resulting commentaries have varied from place to place, but overwhelmingly resulted in laws and regulations that were definitely anti-woman.16 This particular mode of Confucianism also produced the Tang dynasty’s yinyang Confucianism, which subordinates women as yin.17 In a similar and related meaning, Confucianism can refer to the political and social implementations of this thought in Chinese, Korean, Japanese, and other Asian contexts. Understood thus, Confucianism was undeniably oppressive towards, marginalized, and undervalued women.18 Sometimes this politicallywielded Confucianism can be overextended such that the word “Confucianism” becomes a foil to represent all that is bad or backwards in China.19

15  Roger Ames, “A Response to ‘Feminist/Confucian: A Search for Dignity,’ ” Religion East and West 11.1 (2012): 22. 16  Chenyang Li, “The Confucian Concept of Jen,” 76. 17  Yuan Lijun, “Ethics of Care and Concept of Jen,” 115; Young-hee Shim, “Feminism and the Discourse of Sexuality in Korea: Continuities and Changes,” Human Studies 24.1–2 (2001): 135; Terry Woo, “Confucianism and Feminism” in Feminism and World Religions, ed. by Arvind Sharma and Katherine K. Young (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999): 123–124; 130. 18   Li, “Overcoming the Confucian ‘Gender Complex’ ”; Henry Rosemont, “Classical Confucian and Contemporary Feminist Perspectives on the Self: Some Parallels and Their Implications” in Culture and Self Philosophical and Religious Perspectives, East and West ed. by Douglas Allen (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997). See especially Sandra Wawrytko, “Kongzi as Feminist: Confucian Self-Cultivation in a Contemporary Context,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 27.2 (2000): 174; Herr, “Is Confucianism Compatible with Care Ethics,” 482. 19  Robin Wang, “Review of Reconceiving Women’s Equality in China: A Critical Examination of Models of Sex Equality, by Yuan Lijun,” Hypatia 23, no. 1 (2008): 217–220; Star, “Do Confucians Really Care?,” 91; Woo, “Confucianism and Feminism,” 111.

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Conversely, Confucianism can refer to “philosophical Confucianism,”20 which focuses on the ancient texts without the ensuing generations of modification, and we will generally have this definition in mind when we use the term here. Li argues that we should not blame the subjugation of women on this original philosophical Confucianism.21 There is some evidence to support seeing this type of Confucianism as more supportive of women. Sandra Wawrytko believes that Confucius was sympathetic to the plight of women and that it was social convention, rather than Confucius’ own views, which prevented their education at his school.22 Similarly, we have the well-known relationship between Mencius and his mother where he took her advice.23 We are not here claiming that Confucianism is a feminism, but we will suggest that the two have much in common in understanding the self. Later, we will suggest at least one integral point where the two camps do not seem capable of convergence. 3

The Feminist/Confucian Objection to the Modern Self

In this section, we show how many contemporary Confucians and feminists are, for similar ethical reasons, united in opposition to the idea of Modern Self that is an atomistic, autonomous, independently rational bearer of rights. This type of Self seems most closely associated with Descartes for its metaphysics and Kant for its moral theory. (For our purposes, the degree of correctness in understanding who in Modernity had this view is moot.) Simone de Beauvoir provides the classic feminist formulation of this objection: [H]umanity is male and man defines woman not in herself but as relative to him; she is not regarded as an autonomous being. . . . She is defined and differentiated with reference to man and not he with reference to her; she is the incidental, the inessential as opposed to the essential. He is the Subject, he is the Absolute—she is the Other.24 20  Kelly James Clark and Robin Wang, “A Confucian Defense of Gender Equity,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 72, no. 2 (2004): 395–422. 21  Li, “The Confucian Concept of Jen,” 81. 22  Wawrytko, “Kongzi as Feminist,” 176. 23  Woo, “Confucianism and Feminism,” 118–119. 24  Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. by H.M. Parshley (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972): xlv.

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In this formulation, she notes that to the Modern Self woman is an object. Woman is not granted the status of self in mutual recognition: “she stands before man not as a subject but as an object paradoxically endued with subjectivity; she takes herself simultaneously as self and as other.”25 For de Beauvoir, the task of feminism is an emancipation of women from this “relation she bears to man” so that she can “have her independent existence and she will continue none the less to exist for him also: mutually recognising each other as subject, each will yet remain for the other an other.”26 For her, drawing a distinction based on gender or race is a social imposition: “femininity is neither a natural nor an innate reality, but rather a condition brought about by society, on the basis of certain physiological characteristics.”27 Some of the contemporary feminists largely agree with de Beauvoir. Seyla Benhabib similarly declares that “[t]he situated and gendered subject is heteronomously determined but still strives toward autonomy. I want to ask how in fact the very project of female emancipation would even be thinkable without such a regulative principle on agency, autonomy, and selfhood?”28 Catriona Mackenzie goes a little further and states, “The notion of autonomy is vital to feminist attempts to understand oppression, subjection, and agency. Moreover, none of the major feminist critiques justifies repudiating the concept altogether.”29 Other feminists, including de Beauvoir’s own later work, reject the goal that “women must become like men, that is, constituting subjects, if they are to attain freedom.”30 Among these, some emphasize relationality and ways in which women were already autonomous even under the conditions she describes.31 Others, like Susan Hekman, point to how pursuing a Modern Self that is atomistic and un-constituted obscures the power relationships behind the social order (such as in Foucault’s work) and hides the p ­ sychological

25  Ibid., 727. 26  Ibid., 740. 27  Simone de Beauvoir, The Prime of Life. trans. by Peter Green (Cleveland: World Publishing, 1962), 291. 28   Seyla Benhabib, “Feminism and Postmodernism: An Uneasy Alliance” in Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange, ed. by Seyla Benhabib and Judith Butler (New York, NY: Routledge, 1995), 21. 29  MacKenzie and Stoljar, Relational Autonomy, 3. 30  Susan Hekman, “Reconstituting the Subject: Feminism, Modernism, and Postmodernism,” Hypatia 6, no. 2 (1991): 46. 31  Diane T. Meyers, “Personal Autonomy or the Deconstructed Subject? A Reply to Hekman,” Hypatia 7, no. 1 (1992): 130.

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­ nderpinnings behind claimed rationality.32 In the process, it reduces the u agency of women: “the subject has been conceptualized as inherently masculine and thus has been a significant factor in maintaining the inferior status of women. The feminist argument is that the subject as it has been conceived at least since Descartes is gendered, not generic.”33 Addressing the same problematic Modern Self, Diane Meyers explains that we must abandon the seemingly Kantian idea of a hidden inner core of selfhood un-buffeted by its world and, instead, accept that the only selves that exist are ones that are in the real world.34 Marilyn Friedman contends that autonomy as a concept often imagines the white enfranchised male and his freedoms and in so doing idealizes one form of human reality over others.35 Against this, Ann Ferguson argues that “the self is not a fixed unity but a dynamic, disunified, subjective process with many levels and aspects.”36 Building on this and looking at the experience of contract surrogate mothers who grow attached to their biological children, Martha Minow and Mary Lyndon Shanley conclude that humans are not linked to others merely by agreement.37 Confucians present similar critiques of the Modern Self. Li argues that “[n]either Confucian nor feminist care ethics bases its morality on individual rights.”38 For Li, this serves as foundation for unifying care ethics and ren as allies in moral philosophy against the moralities of the Modern Self: In this regard philosophers of the care perspective such as Noddings and the Confucian again jointly stand in opposition to Kantian and utilitarian ethics. Kantians and utilitarians subscribe to the concept of impartiality. For them all moral patients exert an equal pull on all moral agents. However, for the Confucian and the one caring, parents and others who are closely related certainly have a stronger pull.39

32  Hekman, “Reconstituting the Subject,” 44–45. 33  Ibid., 45. 34  Meyers, “Personal Autonomy,” 127. 35  Marilyn Friedman, “Autonomy, Social Disruption, and Women” in Relational Autonomy Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self, ed. by Catriona MacKenzie and Natalie Stoljar (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 39. 36  Ann Ferguson, “Moral Responsibility and Social Change: A New Theory of Self,” Hypatia 12, no. 3 (1997): 135. 37  See Martha Minow and Mary Lyndon Shanley, “Relational Rights and Responsibilities: Revisioning the Family in Liberal Political Theory and Law,” Hypatia 11, no. 1 (1996): 12. 38  Li, “The Confucian Concept of Jen,” 71. 39  Ibid., 81.

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While Li emphasizes the ethical dimensions of this symmetry, we here want to keep in mind that this means that both accounts are rejecting the same Modern Self. Julia Tao similarly explains that Confucians and feminists both reject the idea of a society built upon already-rational beings entering into a social contract.40 In the sections that follow, we will look at the camps that appear in terms of their differing replacements for the Modern Self. 4

Relationality in Selfhood

Both accounts are united in seeing a lack of situatedness as one problem with the Modern Self. As Patricia Huntington explains, the feminist critique is not “a merely facile critique of the Cartesian subject for being male, i.e. an atomistic, narcissistic, solipsistic, rational animal with free will.”41 Instead, the critique argues that what is lacking is proper awareness that, whatever selves are, they are situated and relational. In interviews well after the Second Sex, de Beauvoir notes the value of relationality, stating that reciprocity is the best of all possible relationships.42 Susan Sherwin explains that the relational character of selves fundamental to most feminist responses to the Modern Self: “The general consensus of female theorists is that [moral] theories should involve models of human interaction that parallel the rich complexity of actual human relationships and should recognize the moral significance of the actual ties that bind people in their various relationships.”43 Many feminist theorists repeat this point, noting that “relationality has been undervalued” in discussions of personhood that frame the question in terms of independence.44 This is not merely a responsive move, however, but rather one that includes the constructive claim that, at their very core, selves are relational. Minow and Shanley explain by looking at family relationships: 40  Tao, “Two Perspectives of Care,” 217; See also Minow and Shanley, “Relational Rights and Responsibilities,” 11–12. 41  Patricia Huntington, “Toward a Dialectical Conception of Autonomy: Revisiting the Feminist Alliance with Poststructuralism,” Philosophy & Social Criticism 21, no. 1 (1995): 39. 42   Simone de Beauvoir, Margaret Simons, and Jane Marie Todd, “Two Interviews with Simone de Beauvoir,” Hypatia 3, no. 3 (1989): 17–18. 43  Susan Sherwin, No Longer Patient: Feminist Ethics and Healthcare (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 49. 44  See Lynn Morgan, “Fetal Relationality in Feminist Philosophy: An Anthropological Critique,” Hypatia 11 no. 3 (1996): 51.

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First, family members are individuals, but they are individuals who are in part defined by their relationships with others. Second, while loving and committed Relationships might presumably exist without the state, there are in fact no family or family-like relationships that are not shaped by social practices and state action.45 and “Selves” are formed through the intense relationships of infancy and childhood. Community-based theorists also remind us that individuals are shaped by membership in particular ethnic, regional, and religious communities whose values may depart from the values of society’s majority.46 As we will later see, not all feminists or Confucians agree that family relationships should be viewed as the most salient features of relational selves but, for Minow and Shanley, these extraordinary and extra common relationships show that people are relationally constituted and deserve “relational rights.”47 Confucians share the belief that the self is relational. Li also notices this similarity, stating that “Virginia Held, for instance, attacks the assumption that human beings are independent, self-interested or mutually disinterested individuals. She believes that ‘relations between mothers and children should be thought of as primary and the sort of human relation all other human relations should resemble or reflect.’ ”48 Thus, at the center of the similarity between ren and care is the notion of a relational self. Henry Rosemont defines the Confucian self as one who is (in his own case) “first, foremost, and most basically a son; you stand in a relationship to your parents that began at birth, that has had a profound effect on their later lives as well, and that will be diminished only in part at their death . . . [in short,] the totality of roles I live in relation to specific others.”49 In explaining the Confucian role ethic, Ames declares that to be a Confucian self is “to cultivate one’s conduct assiduously as it is expressed through those family, community, 45  Minow and Shanley, “Relational Rights and Responsibilities,” 5. 46  Ibid., 13. 47  Ibid., 5–6. 48  Li, “The Confucian Concept of Jen,” 71. Li quotes from Virginia Held, “Non-Contractual Society: A Feminist View” in Science, Morality, and Feminist Theory, ed. by Marsha Hanen and Kai Nielson (Calgary: University of Calgary Press), 114–115. 49  Rosemont, “Classical Confucian and Contemporary Feminist Perspectives on the Self,” 71.

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and c­ osmic roles and relations that one lives. In this Confucian tradition, we need each other, if there is only one person, there are no persons. Becoming consummate in our conduct (ren) is something that we do, and that we either do together, or not at all.”50 It is only in and through relationship that ren can be attained. As Rosemont clearly sketches, the Modern Western notion of the self depends on a vocabulary that views “human beings as rights-holding, autonomous, and self-interested individuals” before it can even get off the ground in describing things likes Kant’s Kingdom of Ends.51 While critical of Li’s claim about the overlap between care ethics and ren, Ranjoo Seodu Herr concludes that “Like Confucianism, this ‘relational’ theory of the self emphasizes human relationships in two ways; they are constitutive of both human identity and moral goals” and takes these relations to be basic to the self’s ontology.52 Thus, we see that both Confucians and feminists place an emphasis on the situated and relational nature of selves. 5

Disagreeing about the Relational Self in Confucianism/Feminism

At the same time, there are three ways of relating relationality and selfhood, ways which we argue do not divide neatly between Confucians and feminists. One approach adds relationality to a picture of the self that still focuses on autonomy. Another view, which inter alia includes the post-structuralists, argues we need to remove the idea that there are ontological selves at all. In between these are views that consider relationality central to what the self is, and that these selves are somehow autonomous. In feminism, care ethics is a major arena where the debate about the nature of selves occurs, and serves to highlight at least some of the positions at stake. At times, it is a disagreement about autonomy with care ethicists critiquing Kantian autonomy and modern liberals critiquing enmeshed care selves.53 At other times, the debate is whether the care ethicists remain too Modern in maintaining the existence of selves. The two camps to the left and right of care ethics represent two solutions to the problem with Modern Selfhood: 50  Ames, “A Response to ‘Feminist/Confucian: A Search for Dignity,’ ” 23. 51  Rosemont, “Classical Confucian and Contemporary Feminist Perspectives on the Self,” 70–71. 52  Herr, “Is Confucianism Compatible with Care Ethics,” 474. 53  Jean Keller, “Autonomy, Relationality, and Feminist Ethics,” Hypatia 12, no. 2 (1997): 153–154.

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to ­decenter the self completely (i.e., deny that there are selves) or to balance the constituted and constituting dimensions of a relational autonomous conception of self.54 Kristeva, Butler, and bell hooks think there is too much self in care ethics. For hooks, care feminism cannot sufficiently advance the cause of women and is complicit in the “subordination of working-class and poor women.”55 Butler’s Gender Trouble is part of a dispute within feminism where she found herself “in an embattled and oppositional relation to certain forms of feminism, even as [she] understood the text to be a part of feminism itself.”56 Kristeva, hooks, and Butler identify the very concepts of selves and essences as the means of women’s subjugation: “[Post-structural feminists] came to regard the idea that ‘Woman’ as such can be defined, as just another version of the misogynistic modern philosophy of the subject they want to move beyond.”57 Kristeva sees the self as the totalizing moment of the system of discourse rather an entity with continued valuable existence.58 She reverses the moment’s harm to women by identifying women as the revolutionary force that produces selves. Following Michel Foucault, Butler sees Identity as a thinking process. For Butler, gender is just a performative occurrence: “there is no gender identity behind the expressions of gender . . .”59 Thus, there is no self behind these gendered expressions but only “a relative point of convergence among culturally and historically specific sets of relations.”60 Ferguson, Huntington, and others object to feminism without the self and suggest a more balanced approach. The crux of their objections is that, without selves that endure, the concept of progress makes no sense.61 Similarly, Ferguson critiques Butler’s idea of gendered expressions on the grounds that it avoids answering whether this gendered expression can expect things to get better.62 As Huntington argues, feminism needs selves who are situated and autonomous to offer anything to women: “feminist ­theory cannot afford to 54  Hekman, “Reconstituting the Subject,” 47. 55  bell hooks, Feminism is for Everybody: Passionate Politics (Boston: South End Press, 1984), 5, 41, 111. 56  Butler, Gender Trouble, vii. 57  Huntington, “Dialectical Conception of Autonomy,” 40. See for instance, hooks, Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center, 9, 24–26. 58  Kristeva, The Kristeva Reader, 30. See Hekman, “Reconstituting the Subject,” 53–54. 59  Butler, Gender Trouble, 33. 60  Ibid., 10. 61  Ferguson, “Moral Responsibility and Social Change,” 120–121. 62  Ibid., 123–124.

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dismiss a dialectical notion of situated autonomy because precisely this notion or one like it is requisite to reveal and thematize how humans mediate their world.”63 Without this, feminism can merely state that oppression is occurring and has no recourse. Post-structuralists, on the other hand, can point to the continued existence of deeply problematic essences and Archimedean points of autonomy as flaws in the positions that give the self ontological existence. In summary, the feminists we have looked at agree that whatever agency there might be, it must be relational and situated.64 There is, however, little agreement among feminists about how to balance the situatedness of the self and her freedom within feminism, and to what extent essences are to be feared.65 What we do see are three basic camps: (a) feminists who think women are autonomous selves with relationships, (b) feminists who think women are relational selves with autonomy (or the right to it), and (c) feminists who think the self is the Trojan Horse that brings in all the other problems. Care feminists tend to lie somewhere in the second camp. For Meyers, we are selves that are at times autonomous and at times determined by our history, culture, and environment, and we live our lives between the extremes on a moment-to-moment basis.66 Care feminists lean strongly in the direction of a relational but distinct self, thus raising accusations that their account of the self is illogically or oppressively enmeshed in the selves of those for whom she or he cares. Other feminists such as Lynn Morgan are unimpressed and maintain that the relational account supported by care ethicists (among others), “remains fundamentally, paradoxically, and uncritically rooted in the Western individualism and Cartesian dualism they assail.”67 Thus, care feminists are subject to attacks from both sides. Understanding this debate in expression that is internal to feminism helps us to partially diffuse Lijun Yuan’s critique of Li’s thesis. Yuan explains that she will “argue that the concept of ren for centuries served an ideology of domination and that it is quite inhospitable to the values of equal concern and respect, which are central to . . . feminist thinking,”68 and she does raise several such arguments focusing on the treatment of women and families in several different Confucianisms (which we will address briefly below), but Yuan’s main 63  Huntington, “Dialectical Conception of Autonomy,” 38. 64  Keller, “Autonomy, Relationality, and Feminist Ethics,” 152. 65  Ferguson, “Moral Responsibility and Social Change,” 118. 66  Meyers, “Personal Autonomy,” 125–127. 67  Lynn Morgan, “Fetal Relationality,” 49. 68  Yuan, “Ethics of Care and Concept of Jen,” 108.

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c­ ritique is interesting in that it rejects both 仁 (ren) and care ethics as inadequate for feminism: Regarding my [question ‘Does the idea of other-regarding matter for women’s position in the hierarchical societies’], I would say that whether or not the ethics of care or ren explicitly advocated the suppression of women, its implicit consequences are unfavorable with regard to the position of women.69 What then is it that makes both views on Yuan’s interpretation ultimately inadequate? Yuan explains this when asserting that the task is for the relational self to not wind up enmeshed in relationships of care: “care for others, and understanding of them, are only possible if one can adequately distinguish one’s self from that of others.”70 Thus, the critique has little to do with the Confucian nature of ren and much to do with the question of how relationality and autonomy should mesh. Yuan’s position at its simplest is that the feminist self should be more autonomous than relational. Yuan is not alone among feminists in believing care ethics presents a self that is too relational. Elizabeth Spelman’s “Treating Persons as Persons” critiques both treating something in accordance with their right and treating someone in accordance with their role: I suggest that not being treated as a person in this other sense (the sense not connected to the notion of rights) involves this: one is being recognized and responded to not on the basis of the person one is but on the basis of some title one bears, on the basis of some relationship one has to others, or on the basis of some feature of oneself which from one’s own point of view is relatively inessential to the person one is.71 Against this, Spelman advocates treating others in accordance with their selfconception, understood as a chosen position in the community. Spelman spells this out as not being treated as someone’s wife because this is not essential.72 While this critique is not directed at either Confucianism or care ethics feminism, it is clear that, for those with a somewhat weakened belief in the relationality of selves, it would apply. Thus, Yuan champions the claim that “feminists 69  Ibid., 119. 70  Ibid. 71  Elizabeth V. Spelman, “On Treating Persons as Persons,” Ethics 88, no. 2 (1978): 150–151. 72  Ibid., 161.

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suggest that such a narrowly orientated care ethics [i.e., Nel Nodding’s Caring] may not promote women’s emancipation but rather may reinforce and even intensify and justify the unequal social arrangements and treatments of different sexes.”73 Confucianism also has similar internal debates about the relationship between the ideas of autonomy, relationality, and the self. As with the feminists, there are Confucians who believe that Confucianism can be aided by allying itself to the Modern notion of an autonomous self so long as this includes a sufficiently relational component. Second, there are those who think that the self is fundamentally relational but still has some sort of autonomy. Finally, there are those who think the term “self” refers not to a personal entity but to a temporary occurrence in a situated milieu of some kind, such as a discourse. Rosemont and Ames take the side of those who deny there are selves qua entities: “Said another way, the Confucian notion of person cannot be separated from the continuing context that is itself integral to what persons are becoming. Confucian persons are irreducibly relational and gerundive.”74 For Ames, we should not speak of human beings but rather of human becomings: “Among the most distinctive aspects of Confucian role ethics is that it is grounded in a relationally constituted conception of persons—that is, gerundive human becomings—who begin their project of achieving moral competence in immediate family relations.”75 Rosemont, like Ames, states that the relationality of the classical Chinese thinkers “clearly militates against the view that the early Chinese thinkers were essentialistic in their accounts of women and men.”76 Rosemont notes that this relational account is not per se incompatible with being a “purely rational, rights-holding, autonomous individual,” but it surely places the emphasis elsewhere.77 Moreover, he explains that this is not meant to “to deny our strong sense of being continuous selves” but does loosen the idea of unchanging self-identity. Thus, both Rosemont and Ames both mirror Morgan’s feminist account in seeing the Confucian relational self as a fluid node and repudiating the idea of pure active agents.78

73  Yuan, “Ethics of Care and Concept of Jen,” 120. 74  Ames, “A Response to ‘Feminist/Confucian: A Search for Dignity,’ ” 23. 75  Ibid., 25. 76  Rosemont, “Classical Confucian and Contemporary Feminist Perspectives on the Self,” 67. 77  Ibid., 71. 78  Morgan, “Fetal Relationality,” 55ff.

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David Wong takes a more moderate position, attracted to the situatedness of Confucian selves but seeing them as also defined by autonomy.79 One of the specific features that attracts him to the Confucian concept is the lack of a need for “ghostly agent” as is found in the Modern Self. For Wong, this self is relational insofar as it is responsible, grew up in a family, and is constituted as a self at least in part by these relationships.80 At the same time, Wong does not think that making the self-relational eliminates the self as a lasting entity or eliminates the possibility for its autonomy.81 Irene Bloom seems even more inclined to make the self something similar to an entity. Bloom argues against many of his contemporaries that 人性 (renxing) can, in fact, be reasonably understood as “human nature” with certain qualifications.82 For Bloom, these selves have essentially relational selfhood.83 Wm. Theodore De Bary also supplies a position where the Confucian self is situated, but he thinks this level of situatedness is no different from contemporary communitarians.84 What seems wholly absent from the Confucian picture is a version where the Modern Self merely adds a dab of relationality.85 From these considerations, we can see that while both Confucians and feminists believe the Modern Self is flawed for not being relational enough, there is disagreement about what should replace the Modern Self. Some feminists, such as Benhabib, adamantly reject the post-structuralist’s option: A certain version of postmodernism is not only incompatible with but would undermine the very possibility of feminism as the theoretical articulation of the emancipatory aspirations of women. This undermining occurs because in its strong version postmodernism is committed to three theses: the death of man, understood as the death of the autonomous, self-reflective subject, capable of acting on principle; the death of history, understood as the severance of the epistemic interest in history of struggling groups in constructing their past narratives; the death of metaphysics, understood as the impossibility of criticizing or l­ egitimizing 79  David Wong, “Relational and Autonomous Selves,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 31, no. 4 (2004): 426–427. 80  Ibid., 421. 81  Ibid., 428–429. 82  Irene Bloom, “Mencian Arguments on Human Nature (Jen-Hsing),” Philosophy East and West 44, no. 1 (1994). 83  Ibid., 27. 84  de Bary, Asian Values and Human Rights, 22. 85  See Tu Weiming, Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation (Albany: State University of New York, 1985), 8.

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institutions, practices, and traditions other than through the immanent appeal to the self-legitimation of “small narratives.” Interpreted thus, postmodernism undermines the feminist commitment to women’s agency and sense of selfhood, to the reappropriation of women’s own history in the name of an emancipated future, and to the exercise of radical social criticism which uncovers gender “in all its endless variety and monotonous similarity.”86 She thinks the Modern Self should be simply corrected to include more relationality in its rationality. There are those in both camps who think the self should be rethought among relational lines. Finally, there are some feminist and Confucians who think the entire concept of the self should be abandoned and replaced with a conceptualization where non-selves are fleeting moments rather than enduring (or perduring) entities. Our goal here is not to settle these debates. Instead, it is to note that the disagreement is not essentially across the two camps but rather within both respective camps. 6

Confucianism/Feminism and the Particularity of Relationships and Li

Even when Confucians and feminists agree about what should come after the Modern Self, potentially salient differences remain in how they understand the relational situation of the self. With these considerations in mind, we can now address some of the critiques against the idea that Confucians and feminists can be allies. Yuan and Herr raise two objections to Confucianism as an answer to the Modern Self: one related to the salience of family love in the Confucian picture and one on the role of li (禮). First, they think the Confucians emphasize the family in a way that they believe is anti-woman. Yuan articulates the objection to the Confucian emphasis on family by noting that, “appeal to family values is often code for women’s subordination.”87 Similarly concluding that feminism and Confucianism are incompatible, Herr tells us that parent-child filial piety is the inviolable relationship in “Confucianism.”88 However, it is not clear which Confucianism she means.

86  Benhabib, “Feminism and Postmodernism,” 29. 87  Yuan, “Ethics of Care and Concept of Jen,” 108. 88  Herr, “Is Confucianism Compatible with Care Ethics,” 472.

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Different Confucians address the centrality of the family in different ways. While Confucians do see “the family is the moral starting point for our ethical life, for the learning, practice, and experience of ren”89 and “the governing metaphor,”90 they differ as to how this should happen. As Karyn Lai explains, this means that Confucianism maintains distinctions and uses these as the basis for understanding relationships.91 Lai argues that the family­centeredness of the relational system in Confucianism is idealistic and needs to be adapted to deal with modern times, and that this is contrary to the need to treat those outside the family as family in certain acts of li (禮).92 Other contemporary Confucians are more willing to accept the prima facie importance given to the family in both classical and ruxue Confucianism. Terry Woo believes that what happens here is largely the two views talking past each other, with the Confucians emphasizing how a stable family system leads to a harmonious society and feminists emphasizing the manners in which traditional family structures and societies have normalized great oppression for women and others.93 As Woo explains, ren requires both parties to take responsibility for each other even if the expressions differ. She believes philosophical Confucianism condemns the most egregious offenses against women in Chinese history (e.g., foot binding and female infanticide).94 Thus, Woo concludes that Confucians do not differ greatly from care feminists in understanding people as selves in their particular situatedness within the most natural unit of human social organization—the family.95 Ann Pang-White notes that care ethics too is a role ethic insofar as it looks at the role of “mother” and “child,” and in this respect it shares a focus on roles with Confucianism.96 For Tao, Noddings’ version of care ethics turns out to be more restrictive and narrow in its understanding of relationships since 89  Tao, “Two Perspectives of Care,” 222. 90  Ames, “A Response to ‘Feminist/Confucian,’ ” 26. 91  Karyn Lai, “Confucian Moral Thinking,” Philosophy East & West 45, no. 2 (1995): 263. 92  Ibid., 264. 93  Woo, “Confucianism and Feminism,” 115. 94  Ibid. Woo specifically cites Lü K’un (1536–1618) as a feminist and Confucian who opposed gendercide to avoid paying the dowry for daughters (Woo, “Confucianism and Feminism,” 135). Wawrytko and Woo also see Lady Ban Zhao (1st Century BCE) and her writing as a positive document showing the possibility of women’s self-development—but Yuan views this document as anti-feminist, supporting the subordination of women (Woo, “Confucianism and Feminism,” 124–125; Wawrytko, “Kongzi as Feminist,” 176; Yuan, “Ethics of Care and Concept of Jen,” 115). 95  Woo, “Confucianism and Feminism,” 115. 96  Ann Pang-White, “Caring in Confucian Philosophy,” Philosophy Compass 6.6 (2011): 379.

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the Confucian account of ren ultimately includes loving the entire cosmos.97 For care feminists, the central relationship is the mothering relation. Thus, Tao believes that Confucian role ethics proves more capable of resolving this problem: This leads us to the other significant implication of Confucian ethics, which is not only directed to questions of individual morality. Its care ethics can be extended to address issues of social morality, a move which might pose more difficulties to feminist care ethics as conceived by its original proponents, Gilligan and Noddings, for it deals primarily with dyadic relationships.98 Tao is not alone in suggesting that care feminists need to move beyond the ideal of mothering relationships. Ferguson suggests that feminists should pursue their own “existential communitarianism” built around “networks of people who share a critique of the existing order and who choose to identify with and engage in some material or political practices to express this critique.”99 One example she suggests is feminist-lesbian communities. This ties into the second objection because, as Lai explains, Confucian role ethics functions precisely by having individuals “live appropriately according to the titles and names, indicating their ranks and statuses within relationships, by which they are referred to” and makes attempting to escape one’s role inappropriate in Analects 14.47.100 In addressing the role identities that occur in Confucianism, Rosemont expresses that this means that he is not only a father to his daughter but also her father to her friends.101 For Lai, this is the means for a good protocol in interpersonal relationships.102 For Yuan and some feminists, however, this is the means of subjugation: “from the beginning of Confucianism a disdainful image of women dominated its discussions of relations between men and women and its extensive system of rules, norms, and admonishment about women’s subordination to men.”103 Before we accept the objection, however, we must ask what 禮 (li) means. Herr calls 禮 (li) a barrier to the spontaneity necessary for morality and 97  See Tao, “Two Perspectives of Care,” 223–225. 98  Ibid., 226. 99  Ferguson, “Moral Responsibility and Social Change,” 132–133. 100  Lai, “Confucian Moral Thinking,” 252–253. 101  Rosemont, “Classical Confucian and Contemporary Feminist Perspectives on the Self,” 72. 102  Lai, “Confucian Moral Thinking,” 263. 103  Yuan, “Ethics of Care and Concept of Jen,” 115–116.

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asserts that it means the same thing in ruxue Confucianism and philosophical Confucianism.104 Daniel Star states that he will “stress the hierarchical, and, traditionally, patriarchal nature of Confucian relationships . . . to rebut the claim made by the contemporary Confucian scholars Chenyang Li and Henry Rosemont that Confucians and feminists are natural allies in the challenges they make to contemporary moral philosophy.”105 For Star, the fact of 禮 (li) as the expressive means of 仁 (ren) renders it uncaring, because Confucians (however this is defined) practice “an ethical framework made explicit by philosophical thinkers.”106 Philosophical Confucians mean something more flexible by 禮 (li), seeing it as the cultural grammar which expresses 仁 (ren), rather than the rites of Zhou China reborn unchanged for the present.107 Second, these objections turn out to be a reformulation of the objection to the mode in which the Confucian self is situated (i.e., it is in families). Star makes this explicit: “In particular, I believe the Confucian is always going to be interested in understanding relationships through role-based categories, especially those of a hierarchical kind, and this is what prevents Confucian care from being deeply particularistic.”108 But this is merely to cut the views precisely on axes where there is internal disagreement about to what extent the self is to be understood relationally rather than autonomously. These considerations are also largely mitigated by the flexibility that philosophical Confucians believe they have in addressing 禮 (li). As Lai explains, 禮 (li) should be mediated as we engage the relational dimensions of care.109 Rosemont similarly notes that “[t]he Confucian ideal must of course be modified significantly if it is to have any contemporary purchase in China or elsewhere, for the earlier charge of patriarchy is well taken” since the Confucians, early or not, were “sexist as we use the term today.”110 Thus, this second objection about the oppressiveness of some Confucian 禮 (li) does not impress contemporary Confucians who take 禮 (li) to be the cultural grammar which expresses 仁 (ren).

104  Herr, “Is Confucianism Compatible with Care Ethics,” 477. 105  Star, “Do Confucians Really Care?,” 80. 106  Ibid. 107  Rosemont, “Classical Confucian and Contemporary Feminist Perspectives on the Self,” 72–73. 108  Star, “Do Confucians Really Care?,” 92. 109  Lai, “Confucian Moral Thinking,” 266. 110  Rosemont, “Classical Confucian and Contemporary Feminist Perspectives on the Self,” 72–73.

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7 Conclusion Woo provides a starting point for us to discuss our conclusion: Confucians conceive of woman and man not as individuals but as natural complements, and their relationship is regarded as the root of all others, since family begins there and family is the foundation of society. Furthermore Confucianism differs from feminism in its emphasis on selfcultivation over the fight for rights and justice.111 Here, Woo is identifying feminism with advocacy and activism for justice regarding the subjugation and marginalization of women, but it is not clear that this is the cause célèbre of all feminists, nor that the family as the standard societal unit will be defended unequivocally by all Confucians. While we think Tao is completely right in noting that both views find a basis for value other than God, we believe she errs when she claims that feminist care ethics locates “the source of caring in relation” where care is raw sentiment and Confucianism in the particular and general is a “virtue” of 仁 (ren).112 In our view, both find their origin in relation and both could be said to make virtue maximizing one’s care/仁 (ren) in relationship.113 To some extent, we are relocating the point Philip Ivanhoe makes when he identifies gendered virtue, where being a woman involves certain excellences that differ from men, and vocational virtue, which locates virtue in excelling at the task one chooses, as a debate present in both Confucian and feminist thought.114 On this point, some Confucians and some feminists will have much in common. While there are legitimate questions about how well philosophical Confucianism can be separated from the ensuing historical attempts to implement it, there are also questions about whether eliminating selfhood altogether is either beneficial or true. These debates will continue, but our hope is that Confucians and feminists can recognize whether their objections to each other’s views actually strike at real differences between two main camps, or are 111  Woo, “Confucianism and Feminism,” 137. 112  Tao, “Two Perspectives of Care,” 231–233. 113  Thus, Star’s categorization of Confucian ethics as virtue ethics and care ethics as something else (Star, “Do Confucians Really Care?”) is somewhat moot, insofar as both seek to have the self maximize its relational nature—even if they understand the relational nature in somewhat different ways. 114  Philip J. Ivanhoe, “Mengzi, Xunzi, and Modern Feminist Ethics.” in The Sage and the Second Sex, ed. by Chenyang Li (Chicago: Open Court, 2000), 57–74.

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merely misplaced frustrations about the degree to which what comes after the Modern Self is relational, autonomous, or even still an entity at all. Bibliography Ames, Roger T. “A Response to ‘Feminist/Confucian: A Search for Dignity.’ ” Religion East and West 11, no. 1 (2012): 21–29. Anthony, Susan B. “The Status of Woman, Past, Present, and Future.” The Arena 17, May 1897, 901–908. Benhabib, Seyla. “Feminism and Postmodernism: An Uneasy Alliance.” In Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange. Edited by Seyla Benhabib and Judith Butler, 17–34. New York: Routledge, 1995. Bloom, Irene. “Mencian Arguments on Human Nature (Jen-Hsing).” Philosophy East and West 44, no. 1 (1994): 19–53. Butler, Judith. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. London: Routledge, 1999. Clark, Kelly James and Robin Wang. “A Confucian Defense of Gender Equity.” Journal of the American Academy of Religion. 72, no. 2 (2004): 395–422. De Bary, Wm. Theodore. Asian Values and Human Rights: A Confucian Communitarian Perspective. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press: 1998. de Beauvoir, Simone. The Prime of Life. Translated by Peter Green. Cleveland: World Publishing, 1962. ———. The Second Sex. Translated by H.M. Parshley. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972. de Beauvoir, Simone, Margaret Simons, and Jane Marie Todd, “Two Interviews with Simone de Beauvoir.” Hypatia 3, no. 3 (1989): 11–27. Ferguson, Ann. “Moral Responsibility and Social Change: A New Theory of Self.” Hypatia 12, no. 3 (1997): 116–41. Freedman, Jane. Feminism. Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2001. Friedman, Marilyn. “Autonomy, Social Disruption, and Women.” In Relational Autonomy Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self, edited by Catriona Mackenzie and Natalie Stoljar, 36–51. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Haslanger, Sally, Nancy Tuana, and Peg O’Connor. “Topics in Feminism.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2015 Edition), edited by Edward N. Zalta, Accessed March 29, 2014. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/ feminism-topics/. Hekman, Susan. “Reconstituting the Subject: Feminism, Modernism, and Postmodernism.” Hypatia 6, no. 2 (1991): 44–63.

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Held, Virginia. “Non-Contractual Society: A Feminist View.” In Science, Morality, and Feminist Theory. Edited by Marsha Hanen and Kai Nielson, 111–37. Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1987. Herr, Ranjoo Seodu. “Is Confucianism Compatible with Care Ethics? A Critique.” Philosophy East and West 53, no. 4 (2003): 471–89. hooks, bell. Feminism is for Everybody: Passionate Politics. Boston: South End Press, 2000. ———. Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center. Boston: South End Press, 1984. Huntington, Patricia. “Toward a Dialectical Conception of Autonomy: Revisiting the Feminist Alliance with Poststructuralism.” Philosophy & Social Criticism 21, no. 1 (1995): 37–55. Ivanhoe, Philip J. “Mengzi, Xunzi, and Modern Feminist Ethics.” In The Sage and the Second Sex, edited by Chenyang Li, 57–74. Chicago: Open Court, 2000. Keller, Jean. “Autonomy, Relationality, and Feminist Ethics.” Hypatia 12, no. 2 (1997): 152–64. Kristeva, Julia. The Kristeva Reader. Edited by Toril Moi. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1986. Lai, Karyn. “Confucian Moral Thinking,” Philosophy East & West 45, no. 2 (1995): 249–72. Li, Chenyang. “The Confucian Concept of Jen and the Feminist Ethics of Care: A Comparative Study.” Hypatia 9, no. 1 (1994): 70–89. ———. “Confucianism and Feminist Concerns: Overcoming the Confucian ‘Gender Complex.’ ” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 27, no. 2 (2000): 187–200. MacKenzie, Catriona and Natalie Stoljar, ed. Relational Autonomy Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Meyers, Diane T. “Personal Autonomy or the Deconstructed Subject? A Reply to Hekman.” Hypatia 7, no. 1 (1992): 124–32. Minow, Martha and Mary Lyndon Shanley. “Relational Rights and Responsibilities: Revisioning the Family in Liberal Political Theory and Law.” Hypatia 11, no. 1 (1996): 4–29. Morgan, Lynn. “Fetal Relationality in Feminist Philosophy: An Anthropological Critique.” Hypatia 11, no. 3 (1996): 47–70. Offen, Karen. “Defining Feminism: A Comparative Historical Approach.” Signs 14, no. 1 (1988): 119–57. Pang-White, Ann A. “Caring in Confucian Philosophy.” Philosophy Compass 6, no. 6 (2011): 374–84. Radden, Jennifer. “Relational Individualism and Feminist Therapy.” Hypatia 11, no. 3 (1996): 71–96. Rosemont Jr., Henry. “Right-Bearing Individuals and Role-Bearing Persons” in Rules, Rituals, and Responsibiliy: Essays Dedicated to Herbert Fingarette. Edited by Mary Bockover, 71–101. La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1991.

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———. “Classical Confucian and Contemporary Feminist Perspectives on the Self: Some Parallels and Their Implications.” In Culture and Self Philosophical and Religious Perspectives, East and West. Edited by Douglas Allen, 63–82. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997. Sherwin, Susan. No Longer Patient: Feminist Ethics and Healthcare. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992. Shim, Young-hee. “Feminism and the Discourse of Sexuality in Korea: Continuities and Changes.” Human Studies 24, no. 1–2 (2001): 133–48. Spelman, Elizabeth V. “On Treating Persons as Persons.” Ethics 88, no. 2 (1978): 150–61. Stanton, Elizabeth Cady, Susan B. Anthony, and Matilda Joslyn Gage, eds. “Introduction.” In History of Woman Suffrage, second edition, 13–25. London: Susan B. Anthony, 1887. Star, Daniel. “Do Confucians Really Care? A Defense of the Distinctiveness of Care Ethics: A Reply to Chenyang Li.” Hypatia 17, no. 1 (2002): 77–106. Tao, Julia. “Two Perspectives of Care: Confucian Ren and Feminist Care.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 27, no. 2 (2000): 215–40. Tu, Weiming. Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985. Wang, Robin. “Review of Reconceiving Women’s Equality in China: A Critical Examination of Models of Sex Equality, by Yuan Lijun,” Hypatia 23, no. 1 (2008): 217–20. Wawrytko, Sandra A. “Kongzi as Feminist: Confucian Self-Cultivation in a Contemporary Context,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 27, no. 2 (2000): 171–86. Wong, David. “Relational and Autonomous Selves.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 31, no. 4 (2004): 419–32. Woo, Terry. “Confucianism and Feminism.” In Feminism and World Religions, edited by Arvind Sharma and Katherine K. Young, 110–147. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999. Yuan Lijun. “Ethics of Care and Concept of Jen: A reply to Chenyang Li.” Hypatia 17, no. 1 (2002): 107–130.

Part 3 Feminist Confucian Ethics: Its Relevance in the 21st Century

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CHAPTER 7

Confucian Ethics and Care: An Amicable Split? Andrew Lambert 1

Introduction: Feminists, Care and Confucians

Feminism has an uncertain relationship with care. On one reading, care represents an important dimension of morality. It gives voice to care-givers’ experiences of everyday action and moral commitments1 and many care-givers are women. These experiences have been neglected in moral theories that construe morality as a question of moral justification grounded in an impartial or objective point of view. As a response, care ethics contributes to the feminist aspiration of greater equality and justice for women, while also enriching discussions about what morality is. But on the other hand, some feminists2 have worried that care might be a manifestation of ingrained gender inequality and oppressive structures. Caring behaviour is a rational coping mechanism that enables women to make the most of social limitations imposed upon them by men. Unable to find equality with men in other areas of social life, which largely reflect patriarchal forms of social organization that favour men, women retreat to the domestic realm. There, they exert some autonomy in caring for infants and working spouses, and secure for themselves some security under male patronage. But such care does not indicate an important dimension of women’s experience in need of recognition and support; rather it is symptomatic of a social structure that is unjust and in need of reform. Faced with this disagreement, and trying to assess the value of care as a mode of moral conduct, Confucian thought can offer some insights. First, it can contribute to the ongoing discussion as to exactly what “care” is, as different definitions and descriptions continue to emerge. Exploring the idea of care by exploring Confucian thought might strengthen its standing as a viable moral perspective, or at least reveal why care was once considered an important approach.

1  Carol Gilligan. In a Different Voice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982). 2  See, for example, Claudia Card, ‘Gender and Moral Luck,’ in Justice and Care: Essential Readings in Feminist Ethics, ed. Virginia Held (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 79–98.

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One feature of Confucian ethical thought renders it particularly well placed to contribute to the debate about care. A long-standing criticism of care ethics is that it suggests an objectionably gendered ethics—women focus on care while men focus on justice. Such a division does not serve women’s interests, for the reasons noted above. However, the Confucian tradition has valued notions of care that are clearly not limited to women (see Chenyang Li’s account below). At the same time, the tradition and its ethics have also been bound up with notions of patriarchy and hierarchy. This suggests that care is not intrinsically limited to a feminine perspective and, more importantly, it is not the regrettable by-product of male dominance. Furthermore, the Confucian tradition can furnish novel conceptions of care. As I argue below, a non-feminine Confucian notion of care is worth developing. This highlights dimensions of care neglected in contemporary discussions that focus on the mother-child relationship, and the problem of other minds, empathy, and sympathy. In addition, this conception of care can help proponents of care ethics to develop responses to objections that are commonly raised against them, some of which are made by feminists. In order to develop this novel conception of care, however, it must first be distinguished from the most well-known presentation of Confucian ethics as an ethics of care provided by Chenyang Li. 2

Confucianism and Care Ethics: Chenyang Li’s Claim

In his much-discussed 1994 article, Chenyang Li argues that classical Confucian ethics and Care ethics “share common ground far more important than has previously been realized.”3 According to Li, Confucian ethics should be understood in terms of a cardinal virtue or value, ren, and ren is importantly similar to the concept of care that characterizes contemporary care ethics. While often translated as humaneness or goodness, Li suggests the core content of “ren” is best understood as “caring,”4 since this term captures what is common to various facets of ren, including, “altruism, kindness, charity, compassion, 3  Chenyang Li. “The Confucian Concept of Jen and the Feminist Ethics of Care: A Comparative Study,” Hypatia, 9, no. 1 (1994): 71. Li is not the only one to explore parallels between the two ethics. See also Henry Rosemont, Jr., “Classical Confucian and Contemporary Feminist Perspectives on the Self: Some Parallels and their Implications,” in Culture and Self: Philosophical and Religious Perspectives, East and West, ed. Douglas Allen (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 63–82. 4  Li, “Confucian Concept of Jen,” 73.

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human-heartedness and humaneness,”5 Significantly, Li anchors his account of ren in Analects 17.22. Li writes, “Confucius came closest to a definition of ren when he said ‘Ren is to ai others’ (17.22).” Sometimes translated as “love,” Li argues that ai is best understood as “caring for tenderly,”6 thus making the link between ren and caring explicit.7 Li makes two other claims of similarity. The first is that both classical Confucian ethics and Care ethics are “ethics without general principles.”8 Confucius does not offer a single guiding principle to guide behaviour and achieve the elevated status of ren, but gives varying piecemeal advice.9 Further, while ritual and social mores (li), with their implicit emphasis on rule-governed action, were important in early Confucian thought, Li suggests that ren was more important. To support this claim, he cites Analects 3.3 that, without ren, li “is of no use.”10 Li sees a connection here with the work of care ethicist Nel Noddings. He quotes Noddings’ claim about care that “The one-caring is wary of rules and principles. She formulates and holds them loosely, tentatively, as economies of a sort, but she insists upon holding closely to the concrete.”11 Li suggests that “both remain flexible with rules,”12 and it is the particulars of the situation and the persons involved that determine the right action. The third point of similarity is that both ethics prioritize partiality or “graded love.” Echoing Analects 1.2 that filial piety and brotherly love are the root of ren,13 Li notes that ren “demands that one love one’s parents first and other people second.”14 Li notes a similar idea in Noddings’ work. She writes, “I care deeply for those in my inner circles and more lightly for those farther removed from my personal life.”15 Care, as a natural sentiment, arises in face-to-face encounters and is thus primarily directed to those around us, with whom we have daily interactions. Its influence on action wanes when more distant o­ thers 5  Ibid. 6  Ibid. 7  For Analects passages on ai see, for example, 11.10, 14.7, 17.4 and 17.21. 8  Li, “Confucian Concept of Jen,” 73. 9  In Analects 11.21, for example, Confucius gives different advice to the same question, apparently in response to the different temperaments of the questioners. 10  Li, “Confucian Concept of Jen,” 76. 11  Nel Noddings. Starting at Home: Caring and Social Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 55, cited in Li, “Confucian Concept of ren,” 77. 12  Li, “Confucian Concept of Jen,” 77. 13  Ibid., 79. 14  Ibid., 80. 15  Nel Noddings, Caring A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 16.

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or ­strangers are involved. Further, when a conflict arises between personal attachment and other, more impersonal, normative claims, then both ethics grant priority to personal attachment. The famous sheep-stealing passage in the Analects (13.18) is often cited to illustrate this point, alongside Noddings’ example of a person remaining loyalty to family despite racist sympathies.16 3

Reaction to Li’s Account—Criticisms

How accurate is Li’s claim of significant similarity between the two approaches? It has been challenged in various ways. Perhaps most striking is the objection that the ideal of ren should not be understood as care, but rather forms part of a highly patriarchical social and moral order that has often oppressed women; this traditional order is incompatible with the aims of contemporary care ethics, which seeks to give voice to women’s experiences. Lijun Yuan makes such an argument.17 Her account understands ren in terms of li, often translated as ritual, based on Analects 12.1: “he who can submit himself to li is ren.”18 Here “li” are understood as customary norms, dating from the Zhou, and largely dismissive of women. This leads her to argue that care ethics, “contrasts with the Confucian concept of li (rites), which portrays women as a lower rank of human, or as petty people (morally retarded people).”19 She points to the lack of references to women in the Analects, coupled with derogatory remarks on the rare occasions they appear, such as 17.25: “It is only women and petty persons who are difficult to provide for. Drawing them close they are immodest; keeping them at a distance they complain.” Further, Yuan then identifies a close link between the classical text and the institutionalized sexism and theories of the later Chinese tradition. She claims that a historical study of the Confucian tradition confirms this. Citing the Liji, the Nüjie (Admonitions for Women) and the Yinyang framework of Dong Zhongshu, Yuan points out how these both conveyed highly gendered 16  Ibid., 109–12. 17  Lijun Yuan, “Ethics of Care and Concept of Jen: A Reply to Chenyang Li,” Hypatia 17, no. 1 (2002): 107–129. See also Ranjoo Seodu Herr “Is Confucianism Compatible With Care Ethics? A Critique,” Philosophy East and West 53, no. 4 (2003): 471–89. Herr offers similar reservations, asserting that “historical Confucianism was undoubtedly sexist” (482, italics in original). 18  Quoted in Yuan, “Ethics of Care and Concept of Jen,” 111. 19  Ibid., 109.

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moralities and were continuations of the views developed in the Analects. For her, this confirms that the Confucian moral vision cannot be an ethics of care. Yuan’s arguments fail to address the specifics of Chenyang Li’s arguments, however; specifically the claim that the Analects has nothing significant to say about women and so cannot be condemned as essentially sexist. Li argues, for example, that Analects 17.25 refers not to women in general but only to a particular kind of young girl. This, Li believes, allows for the claim that the Analects says too little about women to ascribe to it any meaningful position on gender. Further, even if Analects 17.25 (or 8.20) does appear to present a troubling view of women, it has little obvious connection with the core Confucian ethical ideas of ritualized social interaction and benevolence. And even if later more explicitly gender-orientated philosophies claim classical Confucian roots, including Dong Zhongshu’s Yinyang theorizing in the Han Dynasty (approximately 400 years after the historical Confucius), arguably these do not express the spirit of the early Confucians. Yuan does not address this distinction between gender-biased “Confucianism” and gender-neutral classical Confucian thought. In addition to these unresolved interpretive questions, Yuan’s account contains a significant assumption: that care ethics is necessarily gendered and associated with women’s concerns and experiences. This is one possible approach to the distinguishing features of care ethics. But it ignores a further possibility: a non-feminist and non-feminine care ethics. This would be an articulation of care not derived from an account of women’s experiences but which might still be an informative conception of care. In this chapter, I will consider such an account of care, drawn from Confucian ethics. A second challenge to Li’s position is offered by Daniel Star, who denies that Confucian ethics supports ethical particularism to the extent implied in Li’s second claim of similarity.20 Star argues that the ethics of ren cannot be an ethics of care because the former is based on social rules or norms while the latter is particularistic in nature. For Star, Li’s error lies partly in his failure to account for the relation between the concepts of yi and ren. It is yi (appropriateness) that expresses the occasional need for contextual adjustments in practical matters, not ren. Ren largely expresses the ideal of conduct that accords with role-based norms. Discretionary acts are thus the exception, not the norm. Star writes, “I believe the Confucian is always going to be interested in understanding relationships through role based categories, especially those of a hierarchical kind, and this is what prevents Confucian care from being 20  Daniel Star, “Do Confucians Really Care? A Defense of the Distinctiveness of Care Ethics: A Reply to Chenyang Li,” Hypatia, 17, no. 1 (2002): 77–106.

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deeply particularistic.”21 Confucian ethics, Star claims, are better understood as a “unique kind of role-focused ethics.”22 This worry that Confucian ethics is more rule- and role-governed than Li’s account recognizes seems valid. Identifying ren directly with care does prematurely exclude other aspects of this “master” virtue, such as personal refinement and good reputation. At the same time, however, one can question whether Star’s identification of Confucian ethics as a mix of virtue ethics and role ethics adequately captures that diverse cluster of ethical practices that the Confucians value, and whether role and care might both be feature prominently.23 More pertinent to the present discussion is the worry that Star is perhaps too hasty in classifying care ethics as a form of ethical particularism. Caring need not always take the form of highly personal responses to unique individuals. The caring, for example, of nurses for patients and of adult children for aging parents can be systematic and follow routines, and yet be genuine caring. In focusing on the link between care ethics and particularism, Star overlooks the possibility that Confucian ethics could still be a form of care ethics, just a more complex form than the one sketched by Li—one not defined by particularistic decisions. In the final section, I present an account of Confucian care that suggests a less particularistic account of caring. Another critique is offered by Julia Tao.24 Tao claims a significant difference exists in the approach of the two ethics towards impartiality and commitment to strangers. The motivating force of Noddings’ care ethics is grounded in the 21  Ibid., 92. 22  Ibid., 78. For an additional account of why the Confucian concern with ritual is incompatible with the basic practices of care ethics, see Herr, “Is Confucianism Compatible?,” 476–477 and 481–482. Herr claims that Confucian ritual introduces a “certain deferential distance” into personal relationships, especially parent-child relations. This contrasts with the ideal of a care that seeks to, “dismantle emotional and psychological barriers and to become friends on equal terms.” 23  Shirong Luo also claims that Confucian ethics is a virtue ethics. See Luo’s “Relation, Virtue, and Relational Virtue: Three Concepts of Caring,” Hypatia 22, no. 3 (2007): 92–110. Luo argues that caring interactions can be understood as the expression of two virtues, caring by the carer and gratitude from the cared-for (105). However, in reducing the response of the cared for to a single virtue (gratitude), Luo fails to appreciate the epistemological dimension of the response of the cared-for. Such feedback is important not just as thankfulness for services rendered, but also as a comment on the appropriateness of the caring, which can prevent inappropriate ‘caring’ or domination. 24  Julia Po-Wah Lai Tao, “Two Perspectives of Care: Confucian Ren and Feminist Care,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 27, no. 2 (2000): 215–40.

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possibility that care is given in reciprocal relationships, where the cared-for responds to the care and the carergiver has the benefit of experiencing the reception of that care. Without the possibility of such a concrete connection, it is reasonable to withhold care giving. In contrast, claims Tao, Confucian ethics includes greater concern for strangers and more distant others, even where no possibility of a more personal caring connection exists. Indeed, this is part of the meaning of ren: “Ren requires both general love and relationship love.”25 A difference between the two ethics thus emerges, with Noddings’ care ethics appearing more parochial and limited in its ethical commitments, and Confucian ethics incorporating a commitment to impartiality and broad public concern lacking in the former. Tao’s analysis however, is rather uncharitable in its account of Noddings’ care. Published before the release of Noddings’ later book, Starting from Home,26 Tao’s analysis lacks recognition of Noddings’ distinction between caring for and caring about. This is significant because this distinction enables Noddings to explain how her account of care can generate meaningful concern for strangers, with whom no direct caring encounters are possible. Namely, recognition of the value of direct caring encounters motives a person to care about distant strangers and ensure they enjoy the conditions necessary to enable them to engage in face-to-face caring encounters (caring for). When understood in this way, Noddings’ account of caring includes a concern for and responsibility towards distant strangers which Tao overlooks. The alleged difference between the two approaches, based on Confucianism’s supposed greater recognition of strangers and more distant others, thus dissolves. In short, Yuan’s, Star’s and Tao’s accounts leave unresolved the question of whether Confucian ethics has any significant connections with contemporary care ethics, or merely exhibits superficial resemblances. 4

Reassessing Chenyang Li’s Claims: Confucianism as a Care Ethics?

In what follows, I have two aims. First, despite these reservations about Yuan’s, Star’s and Tao’s objections, I argue that Chenyang Li’s argument that Confucian ethics be understood as an ethics of care is unconvincing. The argument might be expressed as follows. Either the Analects presents an ethics of care, in which case almost any moral theory is an ethics of care; or the Analects is not an ethics 25  Ibid., 224. 26  Noddings, Starting at Home: Caring and Social Policy (Berkeley: University of California Press 2002).

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of care, as this is understood by the care ethicist Li cites in his ­argument—Nel Noddings. There are crucial differences between the Confucian valuing of personal attachment and the structure of Noddings’ care. However, following from this merely destructive project is a second task. This is to draw on Confucian thought to enrich understanding of the notion ‘care’ as an ethical orientation. Classic Confucian thought might not be an ethics of care in the technical sense discussed, but the basic premise of Li’s project is a valid one. Approaching classical Confucian ethics from a care ethics perspective yields a novel conception of care that can enhance understanding of this much disputed concept. This is one based on modeling or setting an example. Consider the first part of the argument: Li’s account of what qualifies as care is too broad to capture what is distinctive about care ethics. Li attributes to the virtue ren a wide variety of care-like dispositions or attitudes, including “altruism, kindness, charity, compassion, human-heartedness and humaneness.”27 But in doing so he fails to distinguish between different interpersonal attitudes, and treats them all collectively as care. But, altruism does not ensure care: a person can wish well to others, and even do what they think is beneficial for them, while failing to fully appreciate what they need—i.e., to fully care for them. Similarly, compassion is compatible with failing to actually act to help others; a person can feel the pain of another without actively assisting them. But care is frequently understood to entail labourful activity and practical assistance.28 Simply put, when care is understood so broadly, so as to include diverse attitudes such as altruism or charity, then most moral systems will be care ethics. They, too, demand kindness, well-wishing and compassion from their adherents. But, as we shall see, Noddings offers a quite precise definition of care, and it is not clear that the Analects places any systematic or sustained emphasis on that conception of care. Li’s failure to address the details of the ethics of care obscures what is distinctive about it as a moral theory. To see what this more precise definition is, and how it fails to map clearly onto classical Confucian ethics, let us turn to Noddings’ formulation of care ethics.29

27  Li, “Confucian Concept of Jen,” 73. 28  Joan Tronto’s account of care, for example, emphasizes the political and embodied dimensions of care. See Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethics of Care (New York: Routledge, 1993). 29  Another potentially deep-rooted difference is worth noting. To the extent that Analects is addressed to adult children or those ready to follow path of self-cultivation à la Confucius, then it assumes completed childhood development. But it is precisely the nurturing of

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Noddings’ Care Ethics: Three-Step Caring

In her book, Starting at Home, Noddings provides the following account of care. Care is a dyadic relationship between a caregiver and a cared for, and a relationship between two people, A and B, “is a caring relation (or encounter) if and only if:”30 i.

A cares for B—that is, A’s consciousness is characterized by attention and motivational displacement—and ii. A performs some act in accordance with i., and iii. B recognizes that A cares for B. On this account, the activity of care is a fundamentally local event; it is a face-to-face interaction that allows for full attention to, and response to, the particular needs of the cared-for. Several elements of this three-step account of care might be examined, to determine whether or not they have a meaningful correlate in classical Confucian ethics. These include the emphasis on face-to-face encounters as the ground of ethical conduct, the importance of laboring to meet the needs of the cared for, and the importance of sensitivity to the response of the cared as to whether an action is appropriate or not. While the above three-step account is taken from Noddings’ work, there is broader agreement that any ethics of care must have something like this structure.31 Here, I will focus on only one core feature of this account of care ethics, asking whether it finds a counterpart in Confucian concepts and practices—the requirement of motivational displacement. Motivational displacement refers to the way in which a person becomes engrossed in the actions and features of the person before one, through careful attention to that person, and becomes motivated to act for their interests and goals. It is, as it were, as if the other’s goals and needs become one’s own during the interaction. Noddings provides an oft-quoted example to illustrate such caring: young children, where the mother-child relationship is central, from which Noddings’ care ethics begins. 30  Noddings, Starting at Home, 19. 31  Vrinda Dalmiya offers a similar, four-step, account of care: Seeing the cared-for as a concrete subject and morally important; an emotional “engrossment” in the cared-for to determine her needs; a motivational displacement to work for those needs; and the cared-for acknowledging the care-giver’s efforts. See Dalmiya, “Caring Comparisons: Thoughts on Comparative Care Ethics,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 36, no. 2 (2009): 192–209, ­especially 195.

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Ms. A, a math teacher, stands beside student B as he struggles to solve an equation. Ms. A can almost feel the pencil in her own hand. She anticipates what B will write, and she pushes mentally toward the next step, making marks and erasures mentally. Her moves are directed by his. She may intervene occasionally but only to keep his plan alive, not to substitute her own. She introduces her own plan of attack only if his own plan fails entirely and he asks, “What should I do?”32 I argue that while there is some evidence of motivational displacement in the Confucian texts, there are other forms of motivation deriving from personal attachment that have an equal if not greater influence on action. But this plurality of motivational sources, and the lack of emphasis on motivational displacement, means it is difficult to agree with Li that Confucian ethics is similar to care ethics of the kind promoted by Noddings. In the latter it is motivational displacement that constitutes the driving motivation of care. It is more plausible to think of early Confucian ethics as what might be called a relational ethics, which includes but is not limited to the kind of care described by Noddings. 6

Motivational Displacement and Confucian Ethics

Perhaps the strongest evidence for thinking of Confucian ethics as being centered on motivational displacement is found in the Mencius, and accounts of the sage king, Shun. Shun is both a paradigm of filial piety and also of empathic understanding. Despite their attempts to kill him, his own emotions remain centered on and mirror those of his family. He is ‘anxious when his brother Xiang was anxious’ and ‘glad when his brother was glad’ (5A2). Similarly, the Mencian account of the four shoots in 2A6 lists compassion (buren ren zhixin 不忍人之心) as the first of these innate affective dispositions; this also suggests the idea of motivational displacement—of a direct and motivating sharing in the experiences of another. The direct link between affective experience and action is made explicit in the statement that the heart that cannot bear the suffering of others produces government that cannot bear the suffering of others (buren ren zhixin 不忍人之政). Further, the Mencius features a term—yang (養)—that suggests the value of nurture and, in particular, caring for elders (yanglao 養老). In 7A22 King Wen was good at “caring for the old” and “guided the women and children in taking care of the old.”33 32  Noddings, Starting at Home, 17. 33  Quoted in Irene Bloom, trans., Mencius (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 149.

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There are, however, reasons to doubt that the motivational displacement described by Noddings is of similar importance in the Mencius. Firstly, the Mencian stories arguably most suggestive of motivational displacement— those of the inability to bear directly perceived suffering featured in the stories of King Xuan and the Ox and the Child and the Well—present extreme situations of impending harm or life-threatening danger, where the moral task is to urgently respond to such suffering. In such cases, motivational displacement might be easiest. But this contrasts with the care ethicists focus on sustained emotional responsiveness to various unremarkable everyday interactions, such as teaching the young. These more extreme and dramatic cases are thus not reliable evidence of the importance of motivational displacement in the text. There is, in addition, explicit textual evidence that motivational displacement is not regarded as a reliable source of action within relationships. In Mencius 4A18, Gongsun Chou asks Mencius why men of virtue do not teach their sons. Mencius replies, “The circumstances do not allow it. Instruction necessarily involves correction and when the correction is not effective then the next thing is that they (fathers) become angry. When they become angry then they hurt each other.” This, Mencius notes, is why “in ancient times people exchanged sons and taught one another’s sons.” This passage warns against teaching one’s own son, betraying a lack of confidence that engrossment and motivational displacement will reliably arise. Rather, there is likely to be frustration, arising from fathers correcting and sons resenting this. The passage then declares that close relationships must be carefully managed to prevent “estrangement” (li 離), thereby revealing a very different view of the psychology of close relationships. Contrast Mencius’ account with Noddings’ example of the teacher, Ms. A. The contrast in attitudes towards educating the young is striking and warns us against too readily equating care and Confucian ethics.34 The prognosis for the Analects—the text upon which Li’s argument is based—is similarly mixed. In general, the demand that children should have a heightened concern with the well-being of their parents seems to express the kinds of motivations captured by the term “motivational displacement.” 34  The Analects account of Confucius as a teacher also contrasts with Noddings’ teacher. Ms. A is utterly supportive of the struggling student, but Confucius’ commitment as educator has a more conditional tone. Confucius does not instruct those who are not eager, nor those who, shown one corner, do not return with the other three (Analects 7.8). Demandingness rather than care describes such teaching. I return to the relationship between the example set by Confucian educators and the structure of care in the final section.

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Passage 2.7, for example, suggests that the right kind of relationship with parents involves more that merely ensuring their material well-being, since this is done for mere horses and dogs; it must involve the right kind of emotional or affective experience, reverence or respect ( jing 敬)—an experience which might motivate caring acts. Similarly, there has been recent interest in the role of empathy in classical Confucian ethics, as expressed by the ideal shu (恕, see 4.15 and 15.24), as well as the Mencius passages on the four shoots.35 Empathy has been understood in various ways, but a broad and inclusive gloss would include how, “the perceived mental states of another provoke some kind of response in some other party.”36 Empathy might be thought to be the key component of motivational displacement, and thus in so far as the Analects values empathy then susceptibility to motivational displacement will also be present. Again, however, it is not clear that motivational displacement is important to the early Confucians. First, it is an open question just what kinds of emotions or psychological experiences should adorn practical care for parents. Respect, awe, affection, and shame all appear in the text in this regard. As will be discussed below, the affective components and attitudes involved are complex, and cannot be neatly reduced to motivational displacement. Second, there are reasons for doubting whether empathy is equivalent to motivational displacement. As already noted, the ability to comprehend or mirror the mind of another is not itself sufficient for an ethical response; for such understanding could also serve deceptive or cruel ends. More importantly, Noddings herself is explicit that her account of motivational displacement is not empathy. She understands empathy as an intellectual exercise in comprehending the thoughts or feelings of another. But this, she claims, is not sufficient for engrossment. This can be illustrated by comparing Noddings’ Ms. A, the teacher with the committed sports fan who becomes immersed in his or her team’s matches. This fan ‘kicks every ball’ with the team, as if the immediate aims of fan and team are one. But is this empathy? Clearly it’s not 35   Brooks and Brooks translate shu as ‘empathy’, as does Daniel Gardner. See E. Bruce Brooks and A. Taeko Brooks, The Original Analects (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), and Gardner’s The Four Books: The Basic Teachings of the Later Confucian Tradition (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2007). For a summary of the debate over the place of empathy in the classical Confucian texts, see Andrew Terjesen, “Is Empathy the ‘One Thread’ Running Through Confucianism?” in Virtue Ethics and Confucianism, ed. Stephen C. Angle and Michael Slote (New York: Routledge, 2013): 201–208. For a discussion of Confucian thought and care ethics that focuses on empathy, see Luo, “Relation, Virtue, and Relational Virtue,” especially 96–98. 36  Terjesen, “Is Empathy the ‘One Thread’?,” 201.

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some kind of direct cognitive understanding of what another person or persons are feeling, since the fans are typically not focusing on the mental states or emotions of the players; and arguably it doesn’t necessarily involve experiencing the same emotions, since two people can be united in a common goal but experience different feelings while working together: the players might be calm while the fans nervous, or the teacher anxious but the pupil without much emotion. The relationship is perhaps better characterized as being bound up in a single task. Motivational displacement is also characterized by another feature that empathy does not necessarily involve. This is attention, the effort to look carefully at what the other is involved in, which then reveals features of a situation which would not otherwise register. We can imagine a different teacher, one who did her job teaching the material, and who was also reasonably sensitive to suffering or discomfort in her students and would help if such these became obvious. Such an attitude might be compared with Mencius’ account of the king’s response to the terrified ox. But arguably, Noddings caring teacher exhibits something more. Namely, she looks carefully and in doing so notices much about the child that would otherwise go unnoticed; and through this effort of this attention comes the understanding of and engrossment in the actions of the child, and more tailored help in solving the maths problems. But this extra level of personal attention, becoming engrossed in the scene before one or the particulars of the person, is not obviously described or conceptualized in Analects or the Mencius. Whether, and to what extent, the idea of motivational displacement corresponds to the ethical vision presented in the Analects and Mencius remains an open question. The ethics of care developed by Noddings presents a highly structured account of care, and it would be stretching the classical texts too far to expect overly precise accounts of such fine-grained distinctions. But this means that the claim that the two approaches share a common approach to care finds, at best, only weak support. 7

Other Ways in Which Personal Relationships Shape Practical Motivation

The above discussion casts doubt on how important motivational displacement is in Confucian ethics, and whether the putative interest in empathy found in the texts can play an analogous role in determining action. But even if we allow that some form of motivational displacement is implicit in the texts, there is another powerful reason for doubting that classical Confucian

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ethics is an ethics of care. This is the presence of multiple other practical motivations that direct the conduct of relationships. Their presence in the texts suggests that care has no foundational or privileged place in this ethics. Perhaps the practical motivation that contrasts most strikingly with care and motivational displacement is the striving for personal cultivation. The Analects is replete with images of the junzi or cultivated person (“gentleman,” “authoritative person”) seeking to improve himself. Confucius’ autobiographical statement at Analects 2.4 is the most definitive statement of this goal, and the frequent references to cutting and polishing jade or gems stones reinforce this ideal. Such refinement is achieved through mastery of a variety of social practices. These include fluency in the social rituals—including dealings with others, such as how to interact with different ages and generations—and understanding tradition and the classical texts, which can be used as a repository of ideas for dealing with the present. There is no doubt that the project of personal cultivation includes securing good relations with others, and working to promote their ends, as the ‘mutual establishing’ of others (liren 立人) advocated in 6.30 makes clear. Still, however, there exists a clear difference between the motivation to develop one’s own character so as to acquire social authority in one’s community (as teacher, clan leader, adviser to a ruler, etc.), and motivations that arise through engrossment in the lives of others. The former only partially and occasionally entails the latter. This difference between such motivation and the ideal care is perhaps best illustrated by a lauded capacity of the junzi: the ability to detest people appropriately (wu 惡). Confucius notes that exemplary figures “detest those who are bold and do not observe ritual propriety; they detest those who, being determined to get what they want, are unrelenting” (17.24). Other passages, such as 4.3, 17.18, 17.24 and 17.26 confirm that detesting and disliking appropriately are desirable. Such passages suggest that, for the Confucian, caring does not have an especially privileged role and that other interpersonal attitudes can be equally important, including those seemingly inimical to care.37 The Confucian commitment to personal cultivation also suggests a reading of shu that raises doubts about equating it with the “empathy.” On this account, shu is closer to consistency or even integrity—basing conduct towards others 37  The Mencius features a similar readiness to condemn others. 4B28 describes Mencius’ response to being treated in an “outrageous manner” (D.C. Lau, trans., 134). After reflecting on whether his conduct was “benevolent and courteous,” and whether he has “done his best” for his interlocutor, Mencius is prepared to dismiss him as “no different from an animal.” A caring, educating response is not required here; concern with maintaining good character is more highly valued.

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on what one believes in. On this interpretation, conduct begins from oneself, with a person’s own self or values taken as the standard of how to treat people, and others afforded the standards regarded acceptable to oneself. This does not necessarily require knowledge of others’ minds. Such an account fits with the “Golden rule” in the text: “What I do not want others to do to me, I also want to refrain from doing to others” (5.11; see also 15.24). The basic standards for conduct come from oneself and are not, pace Noddings, caring responses to others. The importance of personal cultivation in the Analects suggests that the complexity of Confucian stances and attitudes towards personal and interpersonal relationships cannot be reduced to a single attitude of a motivation to care. Indeed, the text values many other motivations deriving from personal attachment that structure and direct action. One such alternative motivation is a sense of duty directed towards significant others. Part of the function of li 禮 (ritual propriety) is to prescribe duties towards certain categories of people, to whom a person relates through socially defined relationships and roles. Relationships described in the Analects include father and son, teacher and mentee, and younger and older brother, while examples of resultant duties are knowing the age of parents (4.21) or not travelling far from them and so causing parents to be anxious (4.19). What motivates here is not personal attention and engrossment but the awareness of duty within personal relationships, or the habitual and conditioned responses that are based on the duty. A popular example would be greeting parents each morning and asking whether they need anything. This consciousness of duty implies that other motivations or desires must sometimes be reigned in and made subservient to duty; this in turn suggests there will sometimes be a tension between the ideal of attending to and becoming engrossed in the actions of the person before one (Ms. A and her student B) and the drive to uphold pre-existing duties to family and significant others; and there is no textual evidence that motivational displacement has any special claim on motivation in such circumstances. Yet other forms of motivation deriving from personal attachment could be described, which are not reducible to care or motivational displacement. These include shame (chi 恥)—consciousness of some weakness or failing being seen by esteemed others (1.13, 2.3, and 13.20).38 Here, again, personal attachment generates a motivation that exerts a practical influence on ­conduct. 38  In the Analects, the term chi 恥 is more capacious that what is typically indicated by ‘shame’, and includes aspects of guilt and perhaps remorse—that is, negative emotions arising from failing to uphold some standard valued by oneself, but which are not necessarily the result of considering what friends or family will think of oneself (see 14.1).

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Another such source of motivation, mentioned above, is reverence for certain esteemed others ( jing 敬).39 Illustrated in students’ attitude towards Confucius, this might be directed towards figures such as parents and other community leaders and heighten a person’s willingness to learn and to serve. In summary, these alternative forms of practical motivation suggest that while the maintenance of relationships are important, as they are also in care ethics, they require the use of the many different forms of motivation that personal attachment engenders, and not merely motivational displacement. The caring attention that gives rise to motivational displacement is not the central tenet of the ethical theory that appears in the Analects, and cannot be considered a central theme of Confucian ethics.40 8

How Confucian Ethics Can Still Inform an Ethics of Care

I have argued that Confucian ethics is not an ethics of care in the sense that Chenyang Li and Nel Noddings have used this term. However, while attempts to align Care ethics and Confucian ethics too closely with each other are misguided, attempts at dialogue between Confucian ethics and care ethics remain worthwhile. Because Confucian ethics has so much to say about personal attachment, it is well placed to enrich contemporary debates about what exactly is ‘care ethics’, and to expand understanding of the most important features of “care.” To see this, we might make a distinction between different levels or degrees of specificity in care ethics. At the more concrete level is the belief that features like highly personal face-to-face encounter, engrossment and motivational displacement and some means of feedback or response from the cared-for are necessary elements of care ethics. However, care ethics can also be described Nor is it always desirable to feel shame (e.g., 9.27). Nevertheless, a sense of shame rooted in family and personal attachment is valued in the text. 39  Some examples of what might be termed “reverence” are found in Analects 2.7, where jing describes the attitudes that should guide assistance to parents, 5.17 where it expresses attitudes of old friends to the venerable Yen Pinzhong, and 12.5 which captures the all round concern of the junzi for his personal interactions. 40  I have argued elsewhere that Confucian ethics is best understood as a kind of relational ethics, where the multiple practices and attitudes that constitute personal attachment collectively function to direct and co-ordinate conduct. This gives rise to one possible conception of harmony, which includes both social stability and the creation of shared delightful social events. Both are achieved through cultivation of the appropriate kind of personable sensibility. See Andrew Lambert, “What Friendship Tells us About Morality: A Confucian Ethics of Personal Relationships,” PhD diss., (University of Hawaii, 2012).

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in more general terms, in terms of less specific features or orientations (though still in more detail than Li’s account above). These more general descriptions of care include the commitment to create and maintain personal relationships and attachment,41 the demand to take responsibility for others with whom one stands in some kind of relationship,42 and some kind of nurturing or helping the other to grow.43 Confucian ethics does appear to contain these features, and this gives us reason to think that the Confucian ethics could be used to develop an alternative conception of care, one which might inform ongoing discussions about how to develop care ethics theory. What might a Confucian approach to care be like? Arguably, it would express the Confucian concern with personal cultivation, and the subsequent acquisition of social influence, whether through formal appointment or through the force of good character. A passage in the Mencius provides an initial gloss on this conception of “care.” We are told, in Mencius 2B2, that what is “most important” to “caring for the world and looking after the people” is de 德. De is sometimes translated as virtue but perhaps better understood as social influence deriving from embodied personal excellence. To anticipate what follows, a conception of care constructed from Confucian concepts and practices is one in which success at personal cultivation is a necessary condition for effective care; this is because it enables one to be an effective role model or exemplar. Furthermore, unlike accounts of care developed by feminist philosophers, this account of care will be a non-feminist and non-feminine account. It does not approach care through the experiences of woman, nor does it seek to redress historical injustice. It will, however—and this is what makes it philosophically interesting—help address some of the objections directed at such accounts of care. So what is this alternative conception of care? It is a form of care that arises in hierarchical relationship such as father-son, mentor and mentee, and teacher and pupil—relationships featuring disparities such as age, experience and even ability or competence. To use a slightly anachronistic term, it is the care embodied in the idea of the traditional Chinese shifu 師父—someone father-like and teacher-like, who seeks to impart knowledge and skills but does so from a position of both relative authority and personal attachment. Such care might be summarized as: concern that the cared-for succeed in the complex social world that they find themselves in, and a readiness to help towards 41  Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982). 42  Gilligan, In a Different Voice, and Virginia Held, The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). 43  Sara Ruddick, Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace (New York: Ballantine Books, 1980).

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this end. Such caring makes the cared-for capable of doing something that they were not previous able to do, and might not have considered doing (i.e., did not think desirable or valuable).This includes care for both children preparing to enter a more structured and responsibility-laden environment, but also junior members already in it but exposed to new aspects of it. This description expresses the idea that more experienced mentors are concerned to prepare those to whom they are personally attached to fulfill social roles, and to cope with less structured social situations not covered by role or social norms. Situations in which requisite conduct is largely prescribed include greetings, weddings, funerals and official posts or appointments, while less structured social interactions with more room for interpretation and also faux pas include relations with neighbours or friends. In all of these the ideal is to attain competency or even mastery. This account of care differs in several ways from the more orthodox account of care that begin from the personal and particularistic. This ideal form of “care” moves away from the psychologized ideal of access to the cared-for’s emotions and mental states, and response to the individual’s present and visceral needs; instead, attention focuses on the intersection of that individual with the social world, and the various social practices that the cared-for must master in order to have good lives. This conception of “care” thus starts from the senior party’s familiarity with what is “out there”—i.e., awareness of the difficulty of adjusting to and mastering a highly-structured social world—and the desire that the cared-for do so. It does not place strong emphasis on attention and openness to motivational displacement—i.e., on response to needs as they arise in face-to-face encounters. Consequently, while the ‘feedback’ of the cared-for might be taken into consideration, going against or even ignoring it is not oppressive, in so far as doing so serves to equip the cared-for with the relevant skills or temperament. Furthermore, this conception of care does not rely on a detailed conception of the cared-for’s interests or good—i.e., a concern for how their different desires and goals form a unified life plan that the carer helps realize as much as possible. It is success in specific social contexts that moves the carer. Confucian concepts and practices also suggest a distinctive way that this kind of care is manifested: by being a role model or setting an example. 9

Care as Modeling

On this approach, “care” consists in showing the cared-for or mentee “how it’s done.” The importance of setting an example appears in various forms in the

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Analects. The text itself is a study in how Confucius sets an example for the students of his school. This beneficial effect of exemplars is captured in the metaphor of the Pole star at 2.1: “The rule of de (excellence) can be compared to the Pole Star which commands the homage of the multitude of stars without leaving its place.” The exemplary figure of Confucius is a kind of touchstone for human conduct, around whom others can find their moral bearings. This leads to confidence that such a figure can transform communities, even those of barbarians (9.14). The text also offers more concrete accounts of model behaviour, such as how the junzi conducts himself under conditions of competition, when personal conflict is presumably most likely to arise. 3.7 explains this by reference to an archery contest: “Greeting they make way for each other, the archers ascend the hall, and returning they drink a salute. Even in contesting, they are exemplary persons.”44 Many additional examples are possible. Book five, for example, is replete with portraits of figures who are worthy of emulation. Confucius, we may presume, cares about his disciples’ development, and with a view to readying them for positions of responsibility that will influence rulers. But this care is not simply a responsiveness to perceived needs. Rather, it is characterized by its suggestiveness. It is prospective and pre-emptive. It invites the cared-for to learn or study it in order to benefit from the help on offer. This is summed up in the well known passage, Analects 7.22: The Master said, “In strolling in the company of just two other persons, I am bound to find a teacher. Identifying their strengths, I follow them, and identifying their weaknesses, I reform myself accordingly”45 As this passage implies there is one method particularly suited to learning from exemplars. That is interpersonal comparison (bi). This is expressed explicitly in 6.30, and the requirement to learn from what is close at hand: . . . Authoritative persons [ren persons] establish others in seeking to establish themselves and promote others in seeking to get there themselves. Correlating one’s conduct with those near at hand can be said to be the method of becoming an authoritative person [ren person]. 44  Quoted in Ames and Rosemont, trans., The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation (New York: Ballantine Books, 1998), 83. 45  Another passage with a similar message is 4.17: “When you meet persons of exceptional character think to stand shoulder to shoulder with them; meeting persons of little character, look inward and examine yourself.”

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One seeking to “establish others” (liren 立人) and “promote others” (daren 達人) provides a personal example that permits of interpersonal learning and appropriation, and the cared-for is to learn by drawing analogies and conclusions (pi 譬) from that example.46 It is not difficult to extrapolate and apply this “care by modeling” to practical situations beyond the original Confucian context. For example, older brothers offer a model to younger family members or friends. This might include how they cope with bullying at school, which helps the cared-for to prepare for similar situations as they enter similar settings. Or in the choice of career, children and pupils observe how teachers and parents make a success (or not) of their professions, and have a sense of both how to succeed in them and whether or not they are suitable careers to take up. It might be questioned whether modeling can be considered a species of care. After all, people can learn from the example set by others without any personal relationship existing between them. Modeling, however, retains key elements of care. First, it is an alternative form of nurture: modeling serves to enhance the skills and capacities of the cared for. Further, it is a form of taking responsibility for another, which is commonly regarded as a characteristic of care ethics.47 It involves knowingly and often intentionally setting an example, such as when parents consciously police their language in front of their children or give money to charity collectors on the street to encourage generosity in their children. But perhaps the most salient reason it is a form of care is that the actions of the one who creates a model are rooted in the partial motivation to benefit a particular, limited set of people about whom they care. This desire to benefit certain people without constraint deriving from the interests of a wider set of people is a distinguishing feature of care ethics. Furthermore, the motivation to serve as a model might be rooted in such caring attachment; that is, if the person did not have such attachment he or she would have no interest in becoming a model. A simple anecdotal illustration of this is the possible change in mindset of someone becoming a father for the first time. Such a person might feel a new sense of responsibility, changing his lifestyle, on account of the desire to set a good example for his child. 46  That such modeling is suggestive but not rigid and authoritarian is suggested by Confucius’ reply when Zaiwo questions the need for a three-year mourning period (Analects 17.21). Confucius does not demand Zaiwo copy the model, but only suggests that he does. However, depending on circumstances and what skills or attributes the cared-for needs to acquire, modeling could also be demanding and ‘strict’—i.e., require a more exact ­copying—at least initially. Musical training might be one such example. 47  See, for example, Held’s chapter, “The Caring Person” in The Ethics of Care.

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This conception of care is worth developing because it suggests responses to objections frequently directed at advocates of care ethics. The first such worry is whether acts of care that arise from focused attention and motivational sensitivity to a particular other are appropriate and genuinely helpful or whether they can at times undermine autonomy or even be domineering or oppressive. This objection is rooted in an epistemological problem: whether the carer can ever adequately know, and respond to, the interests of the cared for. A parent might make a decision about a child’s future, acting on what they believe in the child’s best interest, but a question remains as to whether it is really in the child’s interest, or whether it assumes too much or imposes too much of the parents own values or interests. In traditional liberal theory, consent plays an important role here, such that action on behalf of the other proceeds only after consent is given. Possible impingement on interests is thus avoided because the agent, understanding his or her needs, tacitly or explicitly agrees to or refuses the action. But in many cases such clear-cut notions of consent are not feasible, especially when junior parties to agreements, such as children, are not able to fully conceptualise their own interests. The final step of the caring model discussed above, the requirement that the carer taken account of the cared-for’s response to acts of care was intended to address such concerns about paternalism, the imposition of values and the possible creation of dependency. But as Jean Tronto points out,48 some acts of care must be undertaken without the prospect of such feedback. Examples include a nurse caring for an unconscious or incapacitated patient who is unable to give feedback on the treatment received. Such feedback cannot be a necessary requirement of genuine care. The modeling-as-care approach avoids these difficulties because the epistemological basis for action is different. It is not the interests or the good of the one cared for that primarily drive action, but knowledge of the social world and existing practices and standards. Knowledge of these allow the carer to act authoritatively in these situations and so provide a suggestive model that helps the cared-for be successful in such practices and contexts. The carer’s assumptions about the cared-for, however, are relatively limited. This approach lessens the need to know the mind of another—their desires or needs—as a condition of effective care, minimizing the dangers of misrepresentation and potentially oppressive assumptions and inferences.

48  Joan Tronto, “Women and Caring: What Can Feminists Learn about Morality from Caring?’, in Gender/Body/Knowledge: Feminist Reconstructions of Being and Knowing, ed. Alison Jaggar and Susan Bordo (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1989), 172–87.

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A second objection raised against the conventional three-step model of caring is what Vrinda Dalmiya labels the “No Exit” Objection.49 If attentive caring and meeting present need are the most important ethical acts, then a person might do too much caring, sacrificing their own interests or losing their own integrity. How can they avoid remaining committed to relationships from which they ought to extract themselves, such as abusive spousal relations? With modeling as care, although carers are clearly linked to the cared for, they are not hostage to cared-for’s needs or interests. This is because it is not present and clear need that stimulates action. Instead, the carer’s focus lies elsewhere, on integrating the mentee into various social situations and practices. This can be genuine care without being unconditional and vulnerable to dependency and abuse. If the cared-for consistently ignores the model provided, such modeling could be suspended. Confucius, for example, is clear about there being conditions under which a mentoring relationship can be ended, captured in Analects 7.8: The Master said, “To one who is not eager I do not reveal anything, nor do I explain anything to one who is not communicative. If I raise one corner for someone and he cannot come back with the other three, I do not go on.” Finally, modeling as care addresses objections to care ethics based on objections to partiality. Care ethics is founded on partiality and a narrow focus of attention and energy on a select group of people such as family or friends. As a result, it is often accused of being too exclusive, and lacking an adequate account of what is due to strangers or those with whom a personal relationship or bond does not exist. But with care as modeling, the acts of care that are intended to benefit a selected group of cared-for individuals can also benefit those for whom such strong caring motivations do not exist. This is because the example set or the model offered are to some extent public and can therefore be studied by a wider audience. Further, modeling is a way to get the limited motivations of partial attachment to benefit a much broader range of people than that which the agent was actually motivated to help. For example, a father might coach a football team primarily because of his desire to introduce his son to the joys and challenges of football, but all who join the team can benefit from his example.

49  Vrinda Dalmiya, “Caring Comparisons: Thoughts on Comparative Care Ethics,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 36, no. 2 (2009): 196.

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The effect appears especially striking when compared with caring that focuses solely on the nurture on one particular being and responding to their needs. Attempts to defend partiality by highlighting the extended range of the benefits that derive from it might not persuade someone who insists that a more thorough-going impartiality is integral to morally-justified conduct. However, it is not clear that this claim should be accepted. For example, if close personal relationships are accepted as necessary for the good life, and these can only be developed by investing time and energy into a select few relationships, then there is a morally-respectable constraint on the demand to act or reason impartially. 10

Concluding Remarks

This account of modeling-as-care, derived from classic Confucian thought, can enhance the ongoing debate about how the elusive ideal of “care” is to be understood. It offers a paradigm of care that contrasts with the familiar mother-child relationship, and instead invites us to explore the kinds of personal relationships that develop in the context of mentor-mentee interaction. Distilling such an account from prominent Confucian concepts and values does not mean that Confucian ethics is best conceptualized as an ethics of care, however. Here, I have argued that there are several important differences between the three-step model of caring articulated by Noddings and others, and the normative practices sketched in classical Confucian texts. Most significantly, I argued, the classical Confucians, do not regard ideal conduct as most fundamentally being about close empathic connection and deep personal familiarity. Various other practices and concepts that constitute personal attachment are at least as important to action as care. These include according with social norms governing well-defined relationships, participation in shared social events such as ritual, which seek to realise a kind of shared social delight among participants, and being susceptible to powerful motivations such as aversion to shame and reverence towards certain esteemed others. The thought that Confucian ethics might be a form of relational ethics but not an ethics of care confirms the importance of treating Confucian ethics as an independent approach to ethics, not to be treated reductively, as an exotic expression of an already familiar moral theory. It also invites further comparative work and conceptual borrowings to further develop the framework presented here, with the aim of enriching both approaches. The attempt to marry the two perspectives thus ends in an amicable split: the two orientations part ways but on beneficial terms.

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Bibliography Ames, Roger T. and Rosemont Jr., Henry, trans. The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation. New York: Ballantine Books, 1998. Bloom, Irene, trans. Mencius. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009. Brooks, E. Bruce and Brooks, A. Taeko. The Original Analects. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998. Card, Claudia. “Gender and Moral Luck,” In Justice and Care: Essential Readings in Feminist Ethics, edited by Virginia Held, 79–98. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995. Dalmiya, Vrinda. “Caring Comparisons: Thoughts on Comparative Care Ethics.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 36, no. 2 (2009): 192–209. Gardner, Daniel. The Four Books: The Basic Teachings of the Later Confucian Tradition. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2007. Gilligan, Carol. In a Different Voice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982. Held, Virginia. The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, and Global. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. Herr, Ranjoo Seodu. “Is Confucianism Compatible With Care Ethics? A Critique.” Philosophy East and West 53, no. 4 (2003): 471–89. Lambert, Andrew. “What Friendship Tells Us About Morality: A Confucian Ethics of Personal Relationships.” PhD dissertation, University of Hawaii, 2012. Li, Chenyang. “The Confucian concept of Jen and the Feminist Ethics of Care: A Comparative Study.” Hypatia 9, no. 1 (1994): 70–89. Luo, Shirong. “Relation, Virtue, and Relational Virtue: Three Concepts of Caring.” Hypatia 22, no. 3 (2007): 92–110. Noddings, Nel. Caring A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984. ———. Starting at Home: Caring and Social Policy. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002. Rosemont, Jr., Henry. “Classical Confucian and Contemporary Feminist Perspectives on the Self: Some Parallels and their Implications.” In Culture and Self: Philosophical and Religious Perspectives, East and West, edited by Douglas Allen, 63–82. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997. Ruddick, Sara. Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace. New York: Ballantine Books, 1980. Star, Daniel. “Do Confucians Really Care? A Defense of the Distinctiveness of Care Ethics: A Reply to Chenyang Li.” Hypatia, 17, no. 1 (2002): 77–106. Tao, Julia Po-Wah Lai. “Two Perspectives of Care: Confucian Ren and Feminist Care,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 27, no. 2 (2000): 215–40.

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Terjesen, Andrew. “Is Empathy the ‘One Thread’ Running Through Confucianism?” In Virtue Ethics and Confucianism, edited by Stephen C. Angle and Michael Slote, 201–208. New York: Routledge, 2013. Tronto, Joan. “Women and Caring: What Can Feminists Learn About Morality from Caring?” in Gender/Body/Knowledge: Feminist Reconstructions of Being and Knowing, edited by Alison Jaggar and Susan Bordo, 172–87. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1989. ———. Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an Ethics of Care. New York: Routledge, 1993. Williams, Bernard. Shame and Necessity. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993. Yuan, Lijun. “Ethics of Care and Concept of Jen: A Reply to Chenyang Li.” Hypatia 17, no. 1 (2002): 107–29.

CHAPTER 8

Confucian Role Ethics in the 21st Century: Domestic Violence, Same-sex Marriage, and Christian Family Values Sarah A. Mattice 1 Introduction This chapter begins with the question. What would it mean to consider Confucian Role Ethics (CRE), as articulated by Roger Ames, a genuine ethical possibility in our contemporary world? Ames opens his monograph by suggesting that CRE and its commitment to growth in personal relationships have a great deal of contemporary relevance: The contention of this monograph then, is that we are entering upon a transitional period of enormous proportions with the imminent emergence of a new cultural order, and that Confucianism offers us philosophical assets that can be resourced and applied to serve not only the renaissance of a revitalized Chinese culture, but also the interests of world culture more broadly.1 If that is the case, then I would suggest that CRE should be able to enter into a robust conversation concerning both how this ethical vision might respond to certain contemporary issues, and what it might have to contribute to these issues. Since Confucianism generally, and CRE more specifically, is based on and around the family, in this essay I explore possible engagements between CRE and certain broadly feminist commitments on issues concerning families: domestic violence, same-sex marriage, and conservative, family-based ethical systems like those found in Christian Family Values.2 I see this as a c­ onversation 1  Roger T. Ames, Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2011), 2. 2  By “feminist” here I am not suggesting in particular any specific feminist theory or philosophy, but rather what I take to be a broad feminist commitment to gender equality and to ending oppression not only of women but ending oppressions along the broad spectrum of intersectional identities such as gender, race, class, sexual orientation, and so on. In entering

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that cuts both ways—there are certain feminist challenges to CRE that need to be considered very carefully, but there are also resources from CRE that might enrich contemporary discussions of these issues. 2

Confucian Role Ethics

While the task of this essay is not to give a full explanation nor a defense of CRE as an interpretation of Confucianism, a few remarks on the nature of CRE as a project may be helpful.3 Most accounts of Confucian ethics are going to share certain commitments such as an emphasis on the family, the importance of relationships, the value of connections to tradition, and the need for a political dimension of ethical life, to name a few. Ames takes these shared commitments in a radically relational direction, arguing for an interpretive focus that emphasizes the processual nature of Classical Chinese language and ontology, persons as constitutively relational, and ethics as vision of growth in roles and relationships. Although Ames’ interpretation of Confucian role ethics may be radical in some ways, in others it is centrally located as a Confucian interpretation. After all, many Confucian, Neo-Confucian, and New-Confucian thinkers re-appropriate the tradition in light of contemporary-to-them concerns, ideas, and issues, and do so precisely through returning to the classical texts and commenting on them. While I assume readers have some familiarity with Ames’ account of Confucian role ethics, there are a few key aspects of CRE that bear repeating here. As I see it, Ames focuses on vocabulary (the text is, after all, titled Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary) in order to redirect Confucian discourse about ethics (in English) in terms of ontology, language, and identity. He focuses the beginning of the text on philosophical methodology and ambient cultural assumptions, especially as concerns cosmology and ontology. this conversation between Confucianism and feminism, I am also not attempting to highlight women’s voices in the tradition—excellent research on this has been done by Robin Wang, Li-Hsiang Lisa Rosenlee, Lisa Raphals, Chenyang Li, and others. 3  There are many different contemporary interpretations of early Confucian ethics. For some excellent discussions of non-role based accounts, see published works by P.J. Ivanhoe, Bryan Van Norden, Joel Kupperman, Chad Hansen, and others. This essay takes as an assumption that CRE is one of several valuable interpretations of early Confucianism, and seeks to explore the implications of CRE on certain contemporary issues, in order to evaluate Ames’s claim that CRE has something distinct to offer the current philosophical landscape. As such, I am not here providing an argument for CRE, nor am I suggesting that CRE is the only or necessarily the best account of early Confucian ethics.

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He argues that Classical Chinese ontology is best understood as processual and dynamic, drawing on the tradition’s own metaphors of ecological growth and development; musicality, resonance, and harmony; and the language of transforming events and relationships over static substances and entities. Much of the text is spent drawing out the implications of this relevantly different worldview from generally western or contemporary ontological assumptions. He connects this project of highlighting ambient cultural and ontological assumptions with a concern for language, and the particularities of Classical Chinese. Much of the text is concerned with explicating the reasoning behind translations and parses of key terms and phrases. He anchors his discussion of Confucian ethics on several key terms and ideas: persons as human becomings, human nature as conduct, he 和 (flourishing harmony), li 禮 (propriety in roles and relations), ren 仁 (relational virtuosity/consummate conduct), xiao 孝 (family reverence), shu 恕 (putting oneself in the other’s place), zhong 忠 (doing one’s utmost), yi 义 (optimal appropriateness), xin 信 (making good on one’s word), and de 德 (excelling morally), to name a few. He draws on resources from the Yijing 易經 to the Four Books (《論語》,《大學》,《中庸》,《孟子》), commentaries on the Four Books, newly excavated texts, and roughly contemporary thinkers such as Qian Mu and Tang Junyi, suggesting a profoundly anticolonial re-reading of these terms and ideas. Finally, one of the central claims of CRE is that persons are understood as constitutively relational: “Human becomings are their meaningful relations.”4 That is, persons are no more and no less than the sum of their roles and relationships. The Confucian project begins from a recognition of the wholeness of experience and the constitutive nature of relationality that is entailed by it. Moreover, because each person and event is constituted by an interdependent web of relations, what affects one thing affects all things in some degree or another. Meaningful relations within this family make the entire cosmos more meaningful; barren relations detract from it.5 Because persons are constitutively relational, the question at the heart of early Confucian moral discourse—in what way does a person become consummately human—is understood as a question concerning growth and flourishing in relationships, which necessarily begin in the family and radiate outward through the community to the cosmos at large. When Ames discusses the “role” aspect of CRE, he stresses repeatedly that it is not a vision of ethical life wherein one plays certain roles, but it is rather the case that one lives her roles and relationships. Thinking about Japanese 4  Ames, 99. 5  Ibid., 71.

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Nō ­theater and the role of masks, Sakabe Megumi writes that “Nothing exists but surfaces, grids of surfaces. Nothing but ‘omote.’ Nothing but reflections. Nothing but shades. Therefore, there are no substantial beings, no being that has been fixed in its sameness.”6 In other words, there is no one and no thing behind the role, no maskless face waiting to be given direction. Instead, on this account we are no more and no less than our roles and relations, and it is from and in the concreteness of these roles and relations that we grow and learn. There is no blank actor, waiting for ethical injunctions or decision procedures, but rather a drama already in progress. Not only are these roles and relationships given, in many ways, by our socio-historical and cultural situations, but as we grow in them and live them we contribute back to our histories and ­cultures.7 Ames argues that, Confucian role ethics would contend that those family roles and the extended relations we associate with community that designate a specific configuration of activity—the roles of father, mother, son, daughter, teacher, friend, and neighbor, for examples—are themselves a normative vocabulary more compelling than abstract injunctions. Such roles recommend in the most concrete of terms an existentially informed disposition and the search for a course of conduct that is the ground of family and community life.8 That is, our roles and relationships are both the site of moral development and a repository of knowledge about how to cultivate ourselves. Ames suggests that compared to modern western ethical theory, whose normative force tends to come from abstract principles, virtues, or commitments to universality in one way or another, CRE focuses primarily on concrete social roles and relationships for guidance, and tends to be preemptive rather than retributive. Confucian role ethics presents not a “theory,” but an “enduring vision of the consummate life.”9 This intervention builds on certain twentieth century critiques of ethical theory (and philosophical theory) such as those of John Dewey, and in this sense is aimed at the very role and nature of theory qua 6  Sakabe Megumi, “Mask and Shadow in Japanese Culture: Implicit Ontology in Japanese Thought.” Michael Marra, trans. In Modern Japanese Asethetics, edited by Michael Marra. (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1999), 247. 7  This is, then, relevantly different from other discussions of “role” based ethics such as those found in bio-medical ethics or business ethics. 8  Ames, Confucian Role Ethics, 168. 9  Ibid., 257.

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theory in our ethical thinking and living.10 Confucian Role Ethics, then, is not anti-theory, but in its theorizing contains certain critiques of theory as separate from practice, as universalizing, and as searching for something like a decision procedure. From a Confucian perspective, the idea of modern western moral theory that sets out rules, principles, or precepts where 1) the rules determine what is right action in any particular case (decision procedure) and 2) any non-virtuous person could understand and apply the rules, is almost perverse.11 That is, early Confucians recognized that sometimes rules or principles might be pragmatically necessary, but such rules were not considered particularly useful in guiding others to moral behavior. Where laws might keep a society from falling into chaos, Ames follows the Si-Meng thread of Confucianism in arguing that ritual propriety allow for a society to reach greater cultural heights of refinement. One way to think about this ethical vision taking shape in today’s world is to see a shift in emphasis in moral cultivation toward the family and one’s roles and relationships, toward a sense of cultural refinement as morally relevant, and toward education in the full sense of the term. In Analects 12.24, Master Zeng says, “The exemplary person ( junzi 君子) attracts friends through culture and refinement (wen 文), and thereby promotes consummate conduct (ren 仁).”12 Love of learning, cultural refinement, close personal relationships, and consummate conduct are all tied up with one another in this vision of how to live well together. Where Analects 1.2 reminds us that xiao 孝 (family reverence, filiality) and di 弟 (fraternity) are the root of ren 仁, we can also note the reciprocal nature of relational cultivation—in being concerned with being cultured or refined, the exemplary person draws others to her, and so involves others in the process of refinement.

10  See John Dewey, “Three Independent Factors in Morals,” Later Works, Volume 5: 1925–1953. (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), 279–88. Dewey argues that ethical theorists are mistaken in their pursuit of a single, ultimate, unitary principle. Instead, they should be focusing on how to negotiate and reconcile moral conflicts given a situation of moral uncertainty. 11  Particularly deontological and consequentialist theories. Care ethics and virtue ethics, for example, have more resonance with Confucian ethics for a number of reasons. Ames’s use of “theory” tends to be particularly narrow, and include only very stringent, universalist, and principle-based accounts of ethics—Kant and Singer, for example. 12   Analects 12.24: 曾子曰： 「君子以文會友，以友輔仁。」Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own. Translations are done with the Chinese sourced from www.ctext .org, with reference to previous translations by Roger T. Ames and David Hall, D.C. Lau, Bryan Van Norden, D.C. Lau, and Edward Slingerland.

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This Sounds Great for the Patriarch

While Ames is careful to use gender-neutral language in most of his translations, it is not difficult to observe that in the Classical Chinese, not only are most of the key exemplars men—Confucius, Sage Kings Yao and Shun, Zengzi, Yan Hui, etc.—most of the terms of art for moral development in context would connote men (shi 士, junzi 君子, shengren 聖人). It is not difficult, then, to see that Confucianism offers a rich ethical vision for men. But, for someone interested in gender equality, this point may prompt us to inquire as to how CRE might respond to the needs of those whose intersectional identities are not in power. As Ames reminds us, the Confucian insight about the centrality of the family in nurturing and developing moral persons is one that has many existential resonances in the contemporary world, but putting families at the center of an ethical vision should concern us, not only when it comes to a lack of impartiality or a predominance of nepotism, but also when it comes to the welfare of those not in power within a given family structure. A vision of ethical living should be able to respond in a robust way to the voice of the abused wife or child, for example, and provide options and strategies for those who are oppressed to leave oppressive relationships or, on a larger scale, make changes to oppressive heteronormative institutions. Ames writes that “Confucian role ethics begins by considering what is happening, and ends by trying to make what is happening happen better.”13 In what follows, I discuss possible responses from CRE to three ethical issues that are in the public consciousness in the United States: domestic violence, samesex marriage, and the rhetoric of Christian Family Values. These are interesting cases for at least two reasons. First, each centers on the family and the nature of families in ethical discourse—given the centrality of the family for CRE, these are issues that need to be addressed; and, given that Confucianism is often understood as a somewhat “conservative” ethic, can it be understood outside the lens of traditionally western conservative responses to these issues? Second, my interest in these particular issues comes from assumptions arising out of feminist commitments, and as Henry Rosemont Jr. writes in “Whose Democracy? Which Rights? A Confucian Critique of Modern Western Liberalism”, my moral intuitions should be able to be addressed by a contemporary ethical theory, Confucian or otherwise.14 As a traditional reading of 13  Ames, Confucian Role Ethics, 189. 14  Rosemont starts the article describing the project as a critique of modern western liberalism, but says that he wishes to “question the conceptual framework of liberalism, but at the same time believe that those who accept the framework nevertheless have

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Confucianism might be used to justify heteronormativity, domestic violence, and oppressive family situations, the ability of CRE to respond here is important for judging its value in contemporary times. And, this is a question not only of whether or not CRE can withstand contemporary criticisms, but what CRE might have to offer contemporary feminist perspectives on these issues.15 Each of these three issues could be regarded as problematic for Confucian ethics, and thinkers have in the past responded to broadly feminist concerns in one of three ways: (1) Confucianism as an historical reality was oppressive to women, and so should not be considered seriously in the contemporary world; However, (2) Confucianism (and CRE) focuses not on principles or rules but on a situational and particularist account of appropriateness, and this deeply personal and aesthetic account of how to live cannot be generalized so as to respond to these issues—the consummate person would do what is appropriate, and that’s that; and (3) Confucianism lacks something like regulative ideals of justice or equality, and so needs these “external” ideals in order to shore up “weak” areas like gender equality. I take it that (1) is true of many ideas and traditions in historical practice, and that we can as scholars make distinctions both between ideas and how they are used/enacted, and between elements of an idea that are necessary and those that are contingent. (2) and (3) here represent the ends of a spectrum of possibilities, and I think each of these issues (domestic violence, same-sex marriage, and Christian Family Values) has its locus in the family, which as an institution lies between the most personal and the most general, between the individual and the state. My approach in what follows tries to draw out some practical implications of CRE without relying either on the aesthetics of personal appropriateness or on regulative ideals not found in the tradition. 3.1 Domestic Violence How might Confucian role ethics respond to the question: what about family situations that are genuinely oppressive for one party? Was it not the case in China that wives were forced, under the three bonds (三綱), to be subservient to their husbands? Doesn’t Confucius, in the Analects, compare women (女子) to petty people (小人)?16 How can CRE say strongly that a husband moral instincts that closely approximate [his] own” (50). This article is found in Confucian Ethics: A Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy, and Community, edited by Kwong-loi Shun and David B. Wong (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 15  Comparative projects, when possible, should engage in mutual conversation, not just unidirectional critique. 16   Analects 17.25: 子曰：「唯女子與小人為難養也，近之則不孫，遠之則怨。」

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beating his wife, for example, is wrong, without emphasizing concepts like autonomy or justice/fairness? Given that CRE does not rely on ethical principles to establish right and wrong actions/motivations, the key resources for thinking through a CRE response to an issue like domestic violence lie in the thick images of exemplars and in the ideas of harmony, balance, and growth in relationships. It is not the case that a husband shouldn’t beat his wife because she is an autonomous individual, from a CRE perspective, but because violence against another, especially a family member, is violence against oneself, against the family as the root of moral growth, and against the very possibility of moral cultivation.17 In addition, recognizing domestic violence as a problem means looking to a complex nexus of responsibilities, which include past family and community behaviors, how children are educated, how those in relationships learn to communicate and to solve problems, and so on. First, it is important to note that the Classical Confucianism on which CRE is built is not the source for many of the practically and theoretically oppressive gender practices that are often associated with Confucianism. As Robin Wang notes, “a careful reading of the original texts of Confucius and Mencius will verify that the doctrine of the three bonds was not part of early Confucian teaching. It was Dong Zhongshu who developed the Confucian rectification of names (正名) and Mencius’ five relationships (五倫) into the simple formula of three-bonds theory.”18 Dong Zhongshu was a Han Dynasty syncretist, who also reinterpreted yinyang theory in terms of imposed unity (合) rather than harmony (和). As a later thinker, he is certainly part of the larger Confucian tradition, but as Ames articulates CRE, going back primarily to Pre-Qin texts, Dong Zhongshu’s account need not hold sway over all other possibilities, even though it did have a large practical influence from the Han Dynasty onwards. Second, although there are comments regarding women and petty persons in the Analects, as Chenyang Li and others have noted, in the Classical Chinese there is not a blanket generic term for women, but the term used in this passage (女子) refers to young, unmarried—and possibly immature—girls. It is also clear that there is no comprehensive or coherent theorizing in the Analects or any of the early texts about women. The later discussion about the three bonds arises, again, in the Han Dynasty, and as such does not need to be a part of how

17   C RE is morally optimistic, assuming that anyone can become cultivated (sagely, even), although in practice not everyone is able to do so. It also assumes that most people are already persuaded that moral cultivation is valuable. 18  Robin Wang, “Dong Zhongshu’s Transformation of Yin-Yang Theory and Contesting of Gender Identity,” Philosophy East and West 55, no. 2 (2005): 217.

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an account of Confucian ethics is construed, and is not part of how CRE understands women, gender, or relationships between family members. Another important issue to take note of when thinking about a Confucian position on domestic violence is whether or not we see any signs of something like an approval of domestic violence in any of the moral exemplars presented by the early texts. If we saw, for example, passages where Confucius hit his wife or beat his son, we might conclude that even without an explicit approbation of domestic violence, one was implicit in the function of moral exemplars. However, what we see is dramatically different. Moral exemplars are slow to speak, careful to act well, disciplined in their behavior, consciously reflective concerning how their speech and actions impact the moral cultivation of others, and even in contesting with one another they maintain a sense of camaraderie and moral concern. Ames writes, “exemplary persons ( junzi 君子) are communal resources that serve as inspiration for others. What makes them ‘exemplary’ for their community is the assiduous cultivation that has produced personal growth within their manifold of relations . . . [they are] resolute beacons that guide others toward human excellence.”19 The very texts of the early Confucian tradition often serve as thick and concrete images of these exemplars living their daily lives, conversing with students, and meeting with political figures. We see repeatedly that these figures are calm, disciplined, and express great care and concern for their family members. We also see this in one of the most highly valued terms, ren 仁, which has among its oldest formations graphs for person and two, and also a graph indicating pregnancy—the height of moral cultivation is in relation, and in a caring kind of intimacy.20 When Master Zeng, one of Confucius’s most important disciples, examines himself daily, he is concerned with doing everything he can to help others, standing by his word, and putting into practice what he studies (1.4). If we take xin 信, standing by one’s word, as something that exemplary persons are concerned with, we see that the trust that is fostered between persons in a relationship is so important that someone who does not make good on her word (2.22) is not viable as a person—how could someone who makes a vow to love, honor, and cherish another then break that vow in violence and be viable as an exemplar? Or consider Mencius 6A18: Mencius said, “Ren 仁 overcomes cruelty (不仁) just as water overcomes fire. Those who practice ren 仁 today are comparable to someone trying 19  Ames, Confucian Role Ethics, 69. 20  See Ibid., 176–177.

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to put out a cartload of burning firewood with a cupful of water. When they are not successful, they say water cannot overcome fire. People who say this side with those who are cruel to the extreme, and in the end they will indeed certainly perish.”21 However we understand what is it to be ren 仁—consummate personhood, care, benevolence, humanity, humaneness—this is here contrasted with its opposite, cruelty; one who is ren is not cruel. And lest ren seem an impossible ideal, in Analects 7.30 we read “The Master said, ‘How could ren 仁 be at all distant? No sooner do I seek it than it arrives.’ ”22 In other words, the very process of being concerned with moral cultivation, of paying attention to moral exemplar, and examining one’s own conduct, is an aspect of being consummate. While some may assume that classical Chinese culture was sexist and patriarchal, and that something like domestic violence was at the very least tacitly approved of by early Confucians, there is nothing necessarily inherently sexist in early Confucian philosophy, or in the way in which CRE reappropriates early Confucianism. That China was generally patriarchal and that women were often oppressed in various ways throughout Chinese history is not in question; we can make some distinctions between the ideals represented in the texts and the philosophy, and the way in which Confucianism was used as state ideology, especially after the Han Dynasty. One important area in which to make these distinctions is yinyang theory, which on some readings would seem to be the very locus of sexist thinking—the idea of a dominant male force (yang 陽) being complemented by a passive female response (yin 陰). There are several ways, however, in which this is not a good reading of yin and yang. In its earliest usage, yin refers to the shady side of a hill, and yang to the sunny side. From there, these metaphors extend to the complementary and continuously transformative relationship between polarities: shady/sunny, night/day, cold/ warmth, dark/light, wet/dry, and so on. Each side of the pair is understood as a process of change and alternation, where the polarities involve each other and turn into one another. This is very different from how the Pythagorean Table of Opposites, for example, comes to use these binaries as essential and exclusive. Confucian role ethics takes up yinyang theorizing as pre-Han, and argues that these are heuristic metaphors for making sense of our experience, not rigid classifiers or causal structures. Gender, then, is one aspect of experience that 21   孟子曰： 「仁之勝不仁也，猶水勝火。今之為仁者，猶以一杯水，救一車薪之火也；不熄，則謂 之水不勝火，此又與於不仁之甚者也。亦終必亡而已矣。」I follow D.C. Lau here in translating “不仁” as “cruelty”. 22   子曰： 「仁遠乎哉？我欲仁，斯仁至矣。」

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can be made meaningful through yinyang thinking, but it is neither that yin is essentially female nor that women are essentially submissive, although sometimes yin is associated with the feminine and the submissive. Li-Hsiang Lisa Rosenlee argues that The correlation of the yin and the yang cannot be entirely encapsulated by limited, hierarchical gender relations between man and woman, especially if gender relations are interpreted within the dualistic framework of femininity and masculinity. For oftentimes the working of the yinyang binary as a complex metaphor is cross-gender and beyond gender. The complementary yin-yang correlation provide a basic binary scheme for organizing various fields of knowledge such as astronomy, medicine, divination, etc., and hence it functions as an explanatory account of the inner working of the natural as well as the human world. In sum, the yin-yang correlation, as acknowledged by various scholars, although it is applicable to gender, is not based on gender.23 Many thinkers including Ames draw on the Yijing and on correlative cosmology to argue that yin and yang are cyclical instead of oppositional polarities, and that we can recast the give-and-take between those who are more powerful (say, in physical terms) and those who are less powerful (in physical terms), as one expression of changing and reciprocal roles.24 So while I as a woman may be yin with regards to a man, in terms of gender, I may be yang with regards to strength in comparison with my grandfather, although he is a man. This is important because it demonstrates that yinyang thinking (pre-Han) does not philosophically justify the subordination or oppression of women by men. Not only is there no justification for the oppression of women, but the vision of consummate living presented by CRE can provide support for challenging oppressive relationships, a key feminist issue for many theories that rely on relationality. In Mencius 6B3, we see Mencius explain that “not to complain about a major wrong committed by one’s parent is to feel insufficient concern; on the other hand, to complain about a minor wrong is to react too violently. 23   Li-Hsiang Lisa Rosenlee, Confucianism and Women: A Philosophical Interpretation (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), 50. 24  This distinction is made by Lisa Raphals, who argues that oppositional polarities are set up in terms of essential differences, whereas cyclical polarities are constructed like the changing cycles of the seasons. For more on this, see Raphals, Sharing the Light: Representations of Women and Virtue in Early China (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 143.

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Insufficient concern and too violent a reaction are both actions of a bad son.”25 In this passage we see the way in which we are called to remonstrate with others out of our deep concern for both their moral development and our own. Likewise, in situations of domestic violence, CRE calls on us to remonstrate and intervene when we see a neighbor, a friend, a co-worker abusing or being abused by another. In addition, Confucianism does not value relationships just for being in ­relation—nourishing and flourishing relationships are valued. An important ethical issue for early Confucians is with language, and the proper use of language, as seen in persistent concerns for zhengming 正名. Ming are names, naming, and also the values, roles, and relationships that are being named. Ames comments that “Throughout classical Confucianism, the contention is that the proper and effective use of language (zhengming 正名) is the substance of relationships, and is basic to the flourishing community in all of its overlapping dimensions. Using language properly is how we achieve what is most appropriate in our associations, and hence what is most meaningful.”26 In Analects 12.11, Duke Jing of Qi asked Confucius about governing (政). Confucius responded: Rulers should act as rulers, vassals as vassals, fathers as fathers, and sons as sons. The Duke said, “Excellent! Honestly if rulers do not act as rulers, vassals do not act as vassals, fathers do not act as fathers, and sons do not act as sons, even if there is grain, would I get to eat any of it?”27 Here the concern is that the normative expectations of the role—being a “ruler” brings with it certain responsibilities and expectations—coincide appropriately with how the role is in fact being performed. Zhengming, proper naming or attuning names, has two dimensions: when the situation and the attendant roles are properly named and so lived, one’s ethical concern is with nourishing those roles and relationships so that the participants flourish; when the situation and the attendant roles are not properly named and not properly 25  Translation from D.C. Lau, Mencius (New York: Penguin Books, 1970). 曰：   「親之過大而不怨，是愈疏也；親之過小而怨，是不可磯也。愈疏，不孝也；     不可磯，亦不孝也」 26  Ames, Confucian Role Ethics, 100. 27   Analects 12.11: 齊景公問「政」於孔子。孔子對曰：「君君，臣臣，父父，  子子。」   公曰： 「 善 哉 ！信 如 君 不 君 ，臣 不 臣 ，父 不 父 ，子 不 子 ，雖 有 粟 ，吾 得 而食諸？」

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lived, as in the case with a parent who abuses a child, for instance, the ethical concern of zhengming is with identifying the problem and straightening it out.28 In a sense, a parent who abuses a child is not a parent. The mere status of being a relationship does not necessarily imply that the relationship and its corresponding normative dimension do not need work, to be reworked or, in very serious cases, dissolved. One way of thinking about the power dimensions of relationships in Confucian thought is through the continued attention to remonstrance, and the genuine desire to avoid coercive relationships. That is, there are different kinds of power and different obligations in relationships—the wife, for example, is not simply supposed to obey her husband, nor the child the parent. In Analects 2.1 we see that the person who is de 德 draws others to her like the North Star, without coercion but by the power of her moral excellence and example. As we are deeply intertwined with one another, our obligations are to setting up the conditions for supporting each to grow and flourish in the way that is best for that person, and doing so coercively or manipulatively is simply not part of what it is to cultivate oneself. After all, the chapter on remonstrance in the Xiaojing 孝經 ends with this phrase: “How could just obeying your father’s commands be deemed filial?”29 A parent or a spouse just ordering someone else about is not excellent (de), and simply submitting to those orders is not family reverence (xiao). Institutions such as the family, just like persons, are no more and no less than the sum of their roles and relationships, and again, just like persons, these roles and relationships need to be constantly maintained in a harmonious balance: “Harmony (he) is built on cultivating difference or respecting otherness. The harmony that respects otherness or cultivates the maximum benefit from difference is the ideal state of all personal and political interactions.”30 If music is a characteristic example of harmony, and music with only one note is not music—nor, might we add, is it music where the trumpets drown out the harp—then the institution of the family needs to have the same kinds of concerns for itself and its balance. If an authoritarian father dominates his family, giving orders to his wife and children, and responding to them with 28  For more on zhengming, see Sarah Mattice, “On ‘Rectifying’ Rectification: Reconsidering 正名 in Light of Confucian Role Ethics,” Asian Philosophy 20, no. 3 (2010): 247–60 and Kurtis Hagen, “Xunzi’s use of Zhengming: Naming as a Constructive Project,” Asian Philosophy 12, no. 1 (2002): 35–51. 29  「從父之令，又焉得為孝乎！」 30  Robin Wang, “Dong Zhongshu’s Transformation of Yin-Yang Theory and Contesting of Gender Identity,” 215.

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violence, then there is a very real sense in which the possibilities for the family are diminished. The children might grow up without the confidence to develop their own talents, and the father’s possibilities as a father are correspondingly more scarce—he loses the opportunity to have the joy of being proud of his children, for example. For each person in a relationship to flourish to the best of her abilities and possibilities, there needs to be appropriate balance in the relationship. Someone who is continually self-sacrificing, for example, and stays in an abusive relationship, is demonstrating a lack of balance in the relationship that is problematic for the flourishing and moral cultivation of both parties. While many contemporary feminist thinkers have challenged the ideal of harmony as allowing for certain behaviors that perpetuate oppressive situations, and not being a strong enough ideal to provide the tools for women to leave oppressive situations, for example, the harmony described by CRE is precisely not agreement or sameness, but values and requires difference, change, and the full expression of each member. The metaphor of nourishment, which is a common ecological metaphor in early Confucianism, suggests that everyone has responsibilities to nourish one another—nourishing and caring for others is not restricted to “feminine” activities. Just as each person in the relationship needs certain things to flourish, so does each have a responsibility to nourish the others. This ecological metaphor also makes sense of “toxic” relationships, where the different components are not growing together in a way that allows each to flourish. Furthermore, in discussions of xiao 孝, family reverence, we see that it calls for a great deal—“Filial people today are considered so because they are able to provide support for their parents. But even dogs and horses are get that much. Without respect and reverence, what difference is there?”31 In other words, family reverence is not just about satisfying the material needs of your family members, but about respect and care in a more profound sense. How could violence against a family member be reverential? A situation of imbalance in the family is cause for concern and for the members to either seek the means to re-establish harmony or end that relationship. One example of how this re-establishment of harmony might work is given by Chenyang Li, who discusses “role-based care” and the public shaming of a wife-beater by an older female relative in China. “When the process works, the perpetrator learns a lesson through humiliation, the abused wife gets a sense of justice and solidarity with the women villagers, and the older woman earns

31   Analects 2.7: 子游問孝。子曰：「今之孝者，是謂能養。至於犬馬，皆能有養；   不敬，何以別乎？」

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more respect in the village.”32 In this case, although rule of/by law was not in place to deal with the problem, the community was able to respond in a way that addressed the problem and maintained the possibility of growth in relationships. This brought harmony and balance back not only to the couple but to the community at large. There is no foolproof way of preventing bad things from happening—neither laws nor ethical injunctions prevent domestic violence all of the time—but CRE focuses on education and cultivation, and recognizes that there are avenues for reestablishing balance to relationships other than laws or principles. In addition, one of the persistent concerns of early Confucian thinkers is with the vulnerable, and the moral responsibilities those who can attend to the vulnerable have. In addition to recurring concerns with a starving or suffering populace, we also see, in Analects 4.15, an emphasis on zhong (忠) and shu (恕): the different kinds of ethical concerns we have for those who are in positions of power over us (zhong), and that we have for those over whom we have power (shu). Although CRE sees all relationships as hierarchical in some sense, this hierarchy illustrates the fact that all relationships have power dimensions. These power dimensions are also not static—while as children our parents had certain kinds of power over us, over the cycles of time we grow to be parents who have certain kinds of power over children. One might have power over a friend with respect to being a better writer, for example, but be in the weaker position with respect to cooking. A central concern, then, is that when we have power over others we keep in mind what it is like to be in the other position (shu), and when we are in the lesser position, we do our utmost to respond to those in power (zhong). Given that we are understood to be relationally constituted, this constant and unrelenting focus on how to be most appropriate and do one’s best in any given situation reminds us that there is no simple way of making sense of vulnerability and power, and that as we may be vulnerable so do we need to attend to the vulnerability of others. Our lives travel the full circle of vulnerability, from infancy to old age. While the early Confucian texts may not contain principles that state the wrongness of domestic violence, they do provide several different kinds of resources for problematizing domestic violence. Some of these are resources in terms of moral exemplars—who tend to be men—not only expressing explicit commitments to family through xiao, but also demonstrating in their actions a concern for moral cultivation through careful speech, deferential action, and self-discipline. We also see theoretical resources in terms of yinyang theory as 32  Chenyang Li, “Revisiting Confucian Jen Ethics and Feminist Care Ethics: A Reply to Daniel Star and Lijun Yuan,” Hypatia 17, no. 1 (2002): 135.

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exemplifying the complementary and non-essential nature of gender. Finally, the Confucian standards of harmony, growth and nourishment, and flourishing in relationships provide a specific vocabulary for thinking through balance and imbalance in relationships. 3.2 Same-sex Marriage As an ethical vision in the twenty-first century, would CRE be supportive of the efforts that have been made to institutionalize and morally legitimize same-sex marriage? Although Confucianism is often understood as socially conservative, not only is there no reason why CRE would not wholeheartedly provide support for same-sex marriage, but in fact, CRE has certain theoretical resources that might enrich and complicate in valuable ways contemporary discussions about same-sex marriage from at least three different perspectives: ritual, gender essentialism, and procreation. Contemporary arguments supporting same-sex marriage in western countries often stem from concepts like autonomy, fairness, and principles of nonharm. These concepts, however, are not central, organizing concepts for CRE. Instead, we see something like li 禮, ritual propriety, good form, rituals and etiquette, or social grammar, as the key concept when it comes to the issue of same-sex marriage. Marriage, after all, begins in ritual, with major social, religious, and political implications. One of the key functions of li in CRE is to provide a structure so that members of a community can order themselves: The Master said: “Lead the people with government injunctions (zheng 政) and keep them orderly with penal law (xing 刑), and they will avoid punishments but will be without shame. Lead them with excellence (de 德) and keep them orderly through ritual propriety (li 禮) and they will have a sense of shame and will also order themselves.”33 In the United States, same-sex marriage has been legal since June 26, 2015, when the Supreme Court ruled in Obergefell v. Hodges that state bans on samesex marriages are unconstitutional. While this represents a dramatic victory in the pursuit of equal rights, it has not ended resistance to same-sex marriage on moral/religious grounds by some conservatives, and has not settled the question for other countries. The continuing issue is seen not only in private discussions of morality, but in very public cases of resistance to upholding the new 33   Analects 2.3 子曰：「道之以政，齊之以刑，民免而無恥；道之以德，齊之 以禮，有恥且格。」

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laws. Kim Davis, the Rowan County clerk in Kentucky who made national and international headlines in 2015 for refusing to grant marriage licenses, is only one of many examples of Americans who are actively resisting the institutionalization of same-sex marriage on moral/religious grounds, even though the law is now clear. This resistance to including same-sex couples in the instution of marriage creates disorder on a number of levels.34 On a Confucian account, the inclusiveness of the institution of marriage leads not to a devaluation of the family or social disorder, but to increased social order. One of the major functions of li is to be a kind of social grammar, from small ritual activities like shaking hands to more formal activities like weddings and funerals; li punctuate our lives with significance, showing us how to interact with one another and what the appropriate action is in a given context. Without the availability of the marriage ritual, same-sex couples are denied this grammar, and so cannot effectively integrate into the larger community order. Furthermore, li are not simply the formal ceremonies of our lives, but they are also the means by which we gain personal discipline and refinement, and by which we become cultured and demonstrate that refinement and culture. From a CRE perspective, ritual propriety and ritual activity (li) are required for one to become consummately human. As Ames writes, A careful reading of the classical Confucian literature uncovers a way of life carefully choreographed down to appropriate facial expressions and physical gestures, a world in which a life is an embodied performance requiring concentrated and unrelenting attention to detail. Importantly, this li-constituted performance begins from the insight that personal refinement is only possible through the discipline provided by formalized roles and behaviors.35 In other words, the very project of moral cultivation—of becoming a person— cannot get off the ground without the ability to participate in ritual activity. By denying same-sex couples the ability to marry or strongly opposing same-sex marriage on moral grounds, opponents of same-sex marriage are cutting off one of the key expressions of full personhood. 34  Note: this is about the marriage institution in the United States. Issues surrounding homosexuality in China have a different context and although they share some problems, they are not the same. For more on homosexuality in China, see Cui Zi’en’s documentary films, and for more on the movement for government support for gay marriage in China, see the work of Li Yinhe 李银河. 35  Ames, Confucian Role Ethics, 113.

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In CRE, one of the most important elements in a ritual is that the participants have the appropriate feelings: Lin Fang asked about the roots of ritual propriety (li 禮). The Master replied: “What an important question! Concerning ritual propriety, it is better to be modest than extravagant; in mourning, it is better to express genuine grief than to worry over formalities.”36 The vision we get of ritual activity from CRE is not a stagnant and ossified code of rituals from some previous age, but a continued process of refined transformation to learn from the past, take account of the current circumstances, and plan well for the future. There is no reason that the ritual of marriage should not respond to the current circumstances by altering the nature of its participants. As long as the participants have the appropriate countenance (which may change given the times and social conditions) for conducting the ritual, there is no reason under CRE that they should not be permitted to do so. As Confucius expresses in the above passage, the sincerity and genuineness of one’s feelings are one of the most important conditions for the ritual to take place at all, let alone to be done with skill and excellence. As we can identify appropriate feelings for a marriage ritual, when the participants have these appropriate feelings, the ritual is authorized. The ritual of marriage should be, at least to some degree, a celebration of the extension of two families and the creation of a new family—and if the institution of family is at the heart of this vision of ethics, then the institution of marriage should support the creation of new families, especially in such a way as to help to bring about social order. In fact, because CRE recognizes persons as constitutively relational and so constitutively intergenerational, and marriage is a ritual activity that signifies the creation of a new generation, the ritual importantly locates this new family in an intergenerational lineage. In Chinese society, marriage was based not on a transcendent ordering of man and woman, as American conservatives who oppose same-sex marriage might now argue about the Bible and Christian marriage as between a man and a woman, but on the important social functions of families. Historically, marriages in China have undergone a variety of forms and changes. Some contemporary scholars such as Daniel Bell argue that Confucianism could support a re-imagining of marriage in order to respond to contemporary concerns such as karaoke parlors and prostitution. Even such figures as Kang Youwei argue 36   Analects 3.4: 林放問禮之本。子曰：「大哉問！禮，與其奢也，寧儉；喪， 與其易也，寧戚。」

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for changing our understanding of marriage, although neither Bell nor Kang Youwei discusses same-sex marriage specifically.37 For most of Chinese history, marriage involved one man and at least one woman, but often multiple wives and multiple concubines.38 In fact, when the Jesuits first arrived in China, one of the most difficult obstacles they faced in generating new converts was the cultural acceptance of multiple wives/ concubines and of same-sex sexual activities—marriage was understood as an important social convention, with roots deep in tradition, but not as a divinely sanctioned rite between one man and one woman that necessarily only involved heterosexual sexual activity. Polygamy and same-sex activity have a long and well-documented history in China; prohibitions against either only begin to occur seriously after engagement with western ideologies in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In discussing anti-Christian feeling during the late Ming and early Qing dynasties, sinologist D.E. Mungello writes that for first generation Chinese Christians, there was a deep “conflict between Christian monogamy and Confucian concubinage.”39 Mungello also discusses same-sex activities in Ming and Qing China: The Chinese and European attitudes toward same-sex love were quite different . . . When European missionaries began arriving in China in the sixteenth century, they encountered numerous instances of sodomy . . . [There was a] widely accepted practice of taking male lovers in which the partners assumed a typical Chinese relationship based on age, with the elder partner referred to as “elder brother partner” (qixiong) and the younger partner as “younger brother partner” (qidi). The younger male’s living expenses were paid by the older man, who was treated by the younger male’s family as a son-in-law. These male couples frequently lived together until well after their thirties; however, the older male also paid for the marriage expenses of the younger male if he married.40 37  For more on this, see Daniel A. Bell’s “Sex, Singing, and Civility: The Costs and Benefits of the Karaoke Trade” in China’s New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society. 38  In a 2015 article, contemporary radical Confucian scholar Jiang Qing argued for the need for polygamy in contemporary China. See https://u.osu.edu/mclc/2016/04/25/confucianscholars-tell-women-to-return-home/ for an English discussion of this, and http://www .thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1362813 for the original Chinese article. 39   D.E. Mungello, The Great Encounter of China and the West: 1500–1800 (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), 59. 40  Ibid., 125. My italics. As Mungello is particularly interested in Jesuit and Chinese interactions, it is no surprise that he does not discuss lesbian activity during the same period.

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It is clear, then, that not only did traditional Chinese accounts of marriage not require it to be between one man and one woman, but that in fact same-sex practices did not preclude one from fitting in to traditional family structures or participating in elite Confucian culture (same-sex practices were most common among “fashionable” or “sophisticated” urban circles). CRE, then, can appropriate these role and relationship resources to make sense of same-sex relationships and marriages in the contemporary world. In addition, by looking at both the theoretical resources of CRE and the history of same-sex activities in China, we are reminded that the idea of sexuality as a component of essentialist identity is a relatively modern, western phenomenon. If one’s identity is relationally constituted, dynamic, and one’s “nature” is not fixed or given beforehand, then the way in which sexual activities are incorporated into that identity is also relational and dynamic. One of the common critiques of same-sex marriage is that homosexual relationships do not lead “naturally” to children. However, CRE does not have an essentialist perspective on gender or teleology of gender; it does not necessarily see the purpose of women, for example, as only in fulfilling biological possibilities through procreation, or the sole purpose of sexual activity in terms of procreation (although classically this is one important function of it). Classical Chinese culture approached women in terms of various kinds of roles in family life and also in terms of different aesthetic ideas, not solely in terms of procreative potential or idealized essence.41 As Rosenlee argues, The representation of ‘woman’ as a kinship-neutral category supported by a set of feminine qualities or defined by inborn biological functions is in fact quite foreign to premodern China. For woman as funü is always concurrent with the discussion about different social roles, especially familial, kinship roles and along with them the observation of proper rituals and the cultivation of corresponding virtues. This is already evident in ancient writings where the word nü was used originally to designate young, unmarried girls, and the word fu for married women.42

41  For more on this and other issues concerning women and Confucianism, see Robin Wang, ed., Images of Women in Chinese Thought and Culture: Writings from the Pre-Qin Period to the Song Dynasty; Lisa Raphals, Sharing the Light; Bret Hinsch, Women in Early Imperial China (Washington D.C.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010); Rosenlee, Confucianism and Women; and Chenyang Li, ed., The Sage and the Second Sex: Confucianism, Ethics, and Gender. (Illinois: Open Court Press, 2000). 42  Rosenlee, Confucianism and Women, 45.

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Essentialist positions in the current west can be seen to have their origins in a Pauline interpretation of Christianity, and as such are not especially relevant for the application of Confucian ethics in the contemporary world. The idea of marriage as the beginning of a family that continues through children is one that has deep roots in Confucianism. Mencius states that There are three ways of being unfilial. The greatest of these is to not have children. Shun did not tell his parents he was getting married, out of concern he would have no children. The exemplary person would take this as having told them.43 The Chinese here for the key phrase is wuhou 無後, meaning without descendants, or those who come after you. Given that persons exist as part of an intergenerational chain stretching backwards and forwards through time, who will care for you as an ancestor if you do not have children? Who will continue to care for your ancestors if you are left with no descendants? Even in classical China, however, there were systems of adoption and fostering in place for families who were unable to conceive or who lost their own children. The fact of a biological inability to procreate does not mean that one’s family cannot continue. From a Confucian perspective the care and education of children is vitally important, and so marriage is especially important as it not only socially but also intergenerationally authorizes familial continuity. The issue, then, is not whether or not the purpose of a given person is reproduction, but what happens to anyone without someone to take care of them as an ancestor, and what happens to that person’s ancestors. Children need not be of blood relation in order to participate in the familial line.44 Confucian Role Ethics, then, can not only philosophically support same-sex marriage, but also provides theoretical resources like li and intergenerationality that may contribute to contemporary discourse. 3.3 Christian Family Values The last issue I would like to address here is the rhetoric surrounding Christian Family Values (CFV), and the ways in which this is not the vision of the family illustrated by CRE. Christian Family Values is a generic term for a variety 43   Mencius 4A26: 孟子曰：「不孝有三，無後為大。舜不告而娶，為無後也，君子 以為猶告也。」 44  One implication of this, however, is that persons who chose not to enter into significant relationships, and/or who choose not to have children (biological or other), are left out of an important stream of cultural tradition.

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of positions and rhetorical strategies found in conservative, fundamental, and evangelical contemporary Christian groups, especially in the United States. CFV emphasizes the central place and role of the family in one’s life, and the deep ties between family and religious life. From a CFV perspective, the family is a unit created by God, modeled on his image and wishes, and is the place of moral/religious growth and education. Not unlike Confucian ethics, CFV puts the family at the center of an ethical vision, and places great emphasis on tradition. Social and religious conservatives often use the term “family values” to promote a conservative ideology that supports a kind of traditional Christian morality, where not only is marriage between one man and one woman, but the nature of these gendered family roles is very distinct and hierarchical. The similarities between the two in these respects, however, do not imply that CRE has the same values as CFV. For example, The American Family Association believes that God has communicated absolute truth to mankind, and that all people are subject to the authority of God’s Word at all times. Therefore, AFA believes that a culture based on biblical truth best serves the well-being of our nation and our families, in accordance with the vision of our founding documents; and that personal transformation through the Gospel of Jesus Christ is the greatest agent of biblical change in any culture.45 Note some of the important elements from this quotation: there is a commitment to absolute truth; the idea that all persons, including those who are not members of the same group, are under a singular authority; and the idea that the country was founded in accordance with and so should continue to abide by biblical truth. These commitments, and the universalism implied in them, are not shared by CRE. CFV groups variously oppose abortion, pornography, pre-marital sex, homosexuality, certain aspects of feminism and women’s liberation, cohabitation, sex education, separation of church and state, reproductive rights, and depictions of sexuality in the media: “Antifeminism may be the dominant perspective in this conservative Christian subculture.”46 Many of these groups actively and explicitly identify themselves as anti-feminist, and see feminist projects such as women’s equality and reproductive rights as directly contradicting the 45  American Family Association Philosophical Statement: http://www.afa.net/who-is-afa/ our-mission/. 46  Julie Ingersoll, Evangelical Christian Women: War Stories in the Gender Battles (New York: New York University Press, 2003), 2.

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plan of gender distinctions laid out by God and as promoting certain ideas and behaviors that are either immoral or that lead away from a spiritual life.47 Traditionalist evangelicals and fundamentalists pride themselves on laying out a clear, concrete, unchanging blueprint for gender distinctions. They believe that wives should submit to their husbands, who should lovingly lead their families; that pastoral authority and church leadership roles are prohibited to women; and that, when possible, women should find their callings at home caring for their families. They ground this perspective in the variety of biblical texts and in the historical teachings of Christianity, which they believe require the subordination of women to men.48 Given that CRE also puts the family at the center of an ethical vision, the question of the differences between CFV and CRE is a live one for the contemporary world. CRE demonstrates that this is not the only direction a family-based ethical vision can take. The first relevant difference is that each of these ethical visions has a very distinct set of metaphysical commitments. According to one CFV spokesperson, “Christian family values do not come from politicians, judges, or professors, but only from the one book which is in accordance with reality—the Bible, the very word of God.”49 CRE, on the other hand, approaches the world as a radically immanent constant flow of events, a ceaseless production of change and transformation, with no transcendent deity who gives the world and its inhabitants moral order. As Marcel Granet put it, “Chinese wisdom has no need of God.”50 Confucianism historically is also not exclusive—one can “be” Confucian and Buddhist, Daoist, etc. In addition, CRE understands persons as complex nexuses of relationships, with no account of an immortal or unchanging soul. These genuinely different metaphysical commitments lead to differences in conceptions of persons, relations, bodies, and families. These differences also lead to divergent goals of moral development: “American Vision’s mission is to Restore America to its Biblical Foundation,” 47   There are important counter-currents within these movements, including Biblical Feminism and others. For more on this see Ingersoll, Evangelical Christian Women: War Stories in the Gender Battles. 48  Ibid., 17. 49  Rev. P.G. Mathew (1996), Grace Valley Christian Center: http://www.gracevalley.org/­ sermon_trans/Gods_Family_Values.html#.UJ_Qq7SW5Lo. 50  Marcel Granet, La Pensee Chinoise (Paris: Editions Albin Michel, 1934), 478.

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a goal that involves conversion of non-believers, reversion to a particular, idealized version of the past, and commitment to a set of absolute ethical principles. CRE, on the other hand, is not a proselytizing tradition, has an explicit commitment to learning from the past and creatively responding to the needs of the present and future, and begins from the experiential details of actual relationships for moral guidance. As such, although both ethical visions place the family at the center of moral life and development, their accounts diverge radically from there.51 Furthermore, many conservative Christian groups see the development of men’s and women’s spiritual growth as having essential differences. According to Vyckie Garrison, a former leader in the Quiverfull Movement, a fundamentalist movement dedicated to living out the biblical model for marriage and family, and producing so many children as to overwhelm and repopulate the world, women are understood as particularly and especially susceptible to Satanic influence and husbands were meant to be the head of the household and wives must submit without question; in this vision of marriage and family, women have a radically different and lesser position when it comes to spiritual development.52 While historically in Confucianism there were different accounts of moral development, one of the key women’s texts provides evidence that women were understood as having an equal possibility for moral cultivation as men. In Instructions for the Inner Quarters, Empress Xu writes, “The moral nature being innate in our endowment, it becomes transformed and fulfilled through practice. It is not something that comes from the outside but is actually rooted in our very selves.”53 That is, women also have a natural human tendency toward moral cultivation, and this requires specific practices in order to be developed. But the heights of development are not limited by gender.54 Furthermore, the concern with universality and evangelism seen in CFV (everyone’s family should look like this) is not present within CRE—harmony is not sameness. In Classical Chinese thought the standard example for ­harmony 51  One account of Confucianism that would somewhat ironically find more common ground with Christian Family Values is that put forth by Chinese Confucianist JIANG Qing, who self-styles himself a “fundamentalist” Confucian. 52  Vyckie Garrison, “Escape from Duggarville: How Playing the Good Christian Housewife Almost Killed Me,” Rawstory, September 20, 2014. http://www.rawstory.com/2014/09/ escape-duggarville-good-christian-wife/. 53  From Sources of Chinese Tradition, compiled by Wm. Theodore de Bary and Irene Bloom, at http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/ps/cup/empress_xu_inner_quarters.pdf. 54  There are some Confucian thinkers who have historically suggested otherwise. However, again, Confucian role ethics is returning to the pre-Qin texts, and so does not have to incorporate every later thinker’s account of gender.

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is soup—and soup made with only one ingredient is not particularly tasty.55 This insight that the family is both a means and an end for moral growth, development, and flourishing requires that families as institutions nurture their own harmonious development and interactions. This does not require a template for families, nor does it require a strong sense of exclusionism or static conceptions of roles and obligations within the family. Where “conservative Christians may see feminism as a serious threat to ‘the family,’ ” from a Confucian perspective, while the justifications for certain feminist positions may be different, feminism is not a threat to a Confucian family.56 In addition, CFV is often seen as a means for effecting a re-imagined vision of society in which certain gains made in areas such as reproductive rights are erased. As mentioned earlier, there is no reason for CRE to do anything but strongly challenge such an oppressive situation, wherein persons are prevented from realizing a full and flourishing life. The conservatism in CFV is based on the authority of the Bible, the Church, and particular Church figures, and it serves to establish the subservience of women in light of their essential constitution. But, in CRE, there is nothing in particular that is essentially constructed about women (or men), and no reason that one should not be able to control one’s reproduction. Having children is understood as particularly important, but there is no transcendent command to reproduce in multitudes (as for example we see in Quiverfull), and no idea of “ensoulment” at conception that would provide the ground for objecting to birth control or abortions. This does not mean that a Confucian perspective would fully endorse an American “liberal” position on something like reproductive rights, but that the nature of the issues and the discourse is different. As Amy Olberding remarks in her article, “A Sensible Confucian Perspective on Abortion,” from a Confucian perspective the moral issue with abortion is not with abortion, per se, but with the nexus of social conditions surrounding women, families, and communities, especially in terms of economic and social stability. Instead of a simple yes/no response, 55   Zuozhuan 左傳, Duke Zhao 20: The Marquis of Qi had returned from the hunt, and was being attended by Master Yan at the Chuan pavilion when Ju of Liangqiu galloped up to them. The Marquis said, “Only Ju is in harmony (he 和) with me!” Master Yan replied, “Ju is just agreeing (tong 同) with you. Wherein is the harmony?” “Is there a difference between harmony and agreement?” asked the Marquis. Master Yan replied, “Yes, there is a difference. Harmony is like making soup; you use water, fire, vinegar, sauce, salt, and plum together in order to cook fish and meat, and you burn kindling as cooking fuel. The cook harmonizes all of these, blending them in order to achieve a good flavor. She adds flavor when there isn’t enough, and dilutes it if it’s too strong. When you eat it, sir, it will balance your spirits.” My translation. 56  Ingersoll, Evangelical Christian Women, 26.

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What Confucianism best affords is an additional mechanism for critiquing the ways in which much of what transpires in moral discourse about abortion amounts to climbing trees in search of fish. Evidence abundantly indicates that moralizing about women’s choices via abstract and general values insensate to “circumstances in the real world” is not only intellectual folly, but an especially pernicious folly, one that leaves intact and uncritiqued the social conditions from which these choices painfully emerge . . . Confucianism would thereby afford an approach that restores to the subject of abortion an insistence on close attention to the wider social phenomenon in which it participates. It contends that we have duties toward each other and duties to attend to environments we socially construct. To promote family, life, and diginity will entail social policy that is cleverly and astutely sensitive to meeting these duties.57 A family-based ethical perspecive, then, in attempting to respond to problems that give rise to abortion as a solution, might lead to accounts that put great value on birth control, reproductive rights, and family planning, for instance, as a way to preempt the problem of abortion, rather than seeking to condemn women who find themselves in difficult situations. And as Olberding notes, in Imperial China prior to European involvement, “Where we do find intersections between Confucian actors and the subject of abortion, in medical manuals, abortion features not as a controversy, but as one therapeutic remedy catalogued alongside therapies for myriad medical conditions.”58 Abortion, like other ethical concerns that arise out of lived experience, does not call for an abstract or generalizable ethical response from a Confucian perspective, but rather for a sensitivity to the particulars of the relevant persons and conditions. While CRE and CFV share certain commitments regarding the centrality of family to moral and spiritual development, they present strikingly different accounts of what a family-based conservative ethic looks like. 4 Conclusion The purpose of this essay is to examine the claim that Confucianism, seen through the lens of Confucian role ethics, is not only possible but relevant in the contemporary world. To begin to think through this, I wanted to see whether 57  Amy Olberding, “A Sensible Confucian Perspective on Abortion,” in Dao (2015) 14: 235– 253, 252. 58  Ibid., 245.

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or not certain broadly feminist commitments on issues such as domestic violence, same-sex marriage, and Christian Family Values, would be consistent with Confucian role ethics. Not only are these consistent, but Confucian role ethics provides a set of resources to add to the discourse surrounding these issues. Confucian ideas such as ritual propriety, harmony, moral exemplars, and yinyang theory all support a generally feminist position on these issues, while at the same time adding dimensions not often found in contemporary feminist literature. These are complex issues that do not have a single solution from any corner, and so the more resources that can challenge oppressive and sexist circumstances, the better. However, this does not mean that Confucian role ethics is a feminist project, but that there are some important areas of harmony that demonstrate CRE’s relevance to contemporary discourses. Feminist thinkers might raise additional questions about CRE over issues such as the ethics of having children at all, or the way in which Confucianism is currently being revived in PRC China. CRE thinkers might raise questions to contemporary feminists about the way in which vulnerability and relationality are theorized, or the value of ritual activity in connecting the personal and the political. These are valuable conversations that can go beyond questions of “fit” between theories to find resources for rethinking and responding to situations of oppression in the world. Bibliography American Family Association “Philosophical Statement,” from the American Family Association (AFA) website, accessed September 2014: http://www.afa.net/who-isafa/our-mission/. Ames, Roger T. Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2011. Analects 論語. Chinese text accessed September 2014 from www.ctext.org, copyright 2006–2015. Bell, Daniel A. “Sex, Singing, and Civility: The Costs and Benefits of the Karaoke Trade” in China’s New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing Society. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010. Dewey, John. “Three Independent Factors in Morals,” in Later Works Volume 5 1925–1953. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984. Garrison, Vyckie. “Escape from Duggarville: How Playing the Good Christian Housewife Almost Killed Me.” Rawstory, September 20, 2014. http://www.rawstory.com/2014/09/ escape-duggarville-good-christian-wife/. Granet, Marcel. La Pensee Chinoise. Paris: Editions Albin Michel, 1934.

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Hagen, Kurtis. “Xunzi’s use of Zhengming: Naming as a Constructive Project.” Asian Philosophy 12, no. 1 (2002): 35–51. Hinsch, Bret. Women in Early Imperial China. Washington D.C.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010. Ingersoll, Julie. Evangelical Christian Women: War Stories in the Gender Battles. New York: New York University Press, 2003. Li, Chenyang. The Sage and the Second Sex: Confucianism, Ethics, and Gender. Illinois: Open Court Press, 2000. ———. “Revisiting Confucian Jen Ethics and Feminist Care Ethics: A Reply to Daniel Star and Lijun Yuan.” Hypatia 17, no. 1 (2002): 130–40. Mathew, P.G. “God’s Family Values.” June 16, 1996. Accessed from Grace Valley Christian Center Website September 2014: http://www.gracevalley.org/sermon_trans/Gods_ Family_Values.html#.UJ_Qq7SW5Lo. Mattice, Sarah. “On ‘Rectifying’ Rectification: Reconsidering 正名 in Light of Confucian Role Ethics.” Asian Philosophy 20, no. 3 (2010): 247–60. Megumi, Sakabe. “Mask and Shadow in Japanese Culture: Implicit Ontology in Japanese Thought.” Translated by Michael Marra. In Modern Japanese Asethetics. Edited by Michael Marra. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1999. Mengzi 孟子. Chinese text accessed September 2014 from www.ctext.org, copyright 2006–2015. Mungello, D.E. The Great Encounter of China and the West: 1500–1800. Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999. Olberding, Amy. “A Sensible Confucian Perspective on Abortion,” in Dao 14 (2015): 235–253. Raphals, Lisa. Sharing the Light: Representations of Women and Virtue in Early China. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998. Rosemont Jr., Henry. “Whose Democracy? Which Rights? A Confucian Critique of Modern Western Liberalism.” In Confucian Ethics: A Comparative Study of Self, Autonomy, and Community, edited by Kwong-loi Shun and David B. Wong. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Rosenlee, Li-Hsiang Lisa. Confucianism and Women: A Philosophical Interpretation. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006. Sources of Chinese Tradition. Edited by William de Bary and Irene Bloom. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999. Accessed September 2014 at http://afe.easia .columbia.edu/ps/cup/empress_xu_inner_quarters.pdf. Wang, Robin. “Dong Zhongshu’s Transformation of Yin-Yang Theory and Contesting of Gender Identity.” Philosophy East and West 55, no. 2 (2005): 209–31. ———. Images of Women in Chinese Thought and Culture: Writings from the Pre-Qin Period to the Song Dynasty. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2003. Zuozhuan 左傳. Chinese text accessed September 2014 from www.ctext.org, copyright 2006–2015.

CHAPTER 9

Contemporary Ecofeminism and Confucian Cosmology Taine Duncan and Nicholas S. Brasovan 1 Introduction Ecofeminist philosophy has transformed in the past twenty or so years. Beginning with its roots in critical environmental philosophy and theology, ecofeminism in contemporary continental philosophy has turned to follow two dominant trends: advocating a new materialism and engaging a critical postmodernity. “New materialism” is generally presented in this context as a philosophical and ecological worldview where the reality of matter, material interaction, vitality and energy takes precedence.1 Critical postmodern feminism includes the discourse of posthumanism, where “posthumanism” implies both a rejection of the autonomous subjects of humanist (Kantian) philosophy, and a rejection of the inherited anthropocentrism of modernity. From a posthumanist perspective, neither nature nor humanity exists per se. In other words, posthumanism maintains that ‘nature’ and ‘person’ are not mutually exclusive categories; to the contrary, the concepts of ‘nature’ and ‘person’ mutually imply one another. In the present discussion, we take up the problems and discourse of contemporary ecofeminism, and advance the inquiry by engaging new materialism and posthumanism from perspectives of Confucian and neo-Confucian philosophies. The continuing framework of ecofeminism begins with an identification and foregrounding of patriarchal chauvinism as an unjust ethos. Chauvinism is an assertion of power relations in the family, society, and in de rerum natura. It is predicated on the belief in a natural order of power relations, which subjugates women and nature to men and mankind. Rosi Braidotti explains the traditional humanist framework for anthropocentric chauvinism when she writes, “As if this line of criticism is not enough, this ‘Man’ is also called to task and brought back to its species specificity as anthropos, that is to say the

1  Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010).

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representative of a hierarchical, hegemonic and generally violent species. . . .”2 The ecofeminist critique is based on the insight that anthropocentrism shares fundamental assumptions and a theoretical structure with patriarchal chauvinism. Accordingly, anthropocentrism is referred to as a form of human ­chauvinism.3 The logic of human chauvinism can be expressed in a simple analogy: females are to males as the non-human natural world is to mankind. That is, that anthropocentric ethics assumes persons ought to stand in a dominant power relationship with the non-human natural world. In this relationship, the non-human natural world is subordinated to persons. As such, the former is relegated to the status of natural resource and instrumental value. On the surface, classical Confucianism advocates specifically hierarchical, indeed, patriarchal familial and social structures, which must be critiqued from a feminist perspective. In other words, critical feminist philosophy calls for a reevaluation and deconstruction of traditional Confucian patriarchal chauvinism. One finds suggestions that Confucius was anthropocentric and ­chauvinistic in his attitudes. An anthropocentric humanistic concern is expressed in the Analects, for example, “When his stables caught fire, the Master hurried back from and asked, ‘Was anyone hurt?’ He did not inquire after the horses.”4 Confucius’s chauvinism is also shown in the Analects: “It is only women and petty persons who are difficult to provide for. Drawing them close, they are immodest, and keeping them at a distance, they complain.”5 Although Confucius expresses a primary concern for persons as intrinsically valuable, and though he suggests a chauvinistic attitude, we maintain that deeper neoConfucian metaphysics of yin 陰 and yang 陽, harmony (he 和), vital energy (qi 氣) and continuity of nature and persons (tianrenheyi 天人合一) offer a means of reflexively critiquing the classical Confucian position and advancing a model of contemporary ecological/ecopractical feminism.6 Confucian 2  Rosi Baidotti, The Posthuman (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2013), 65. 3  Chung-ying Cheng, “The Trinity of Cosmology, Ecology, and Ethics in the Confucian Personhood,” in Confucianism and Ecology: The Interrelation of Heaven, Earth, and Humans, ed. Mary Evelyn Tucker and John Berthrong (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 211. 4  Analects 10.17. Translated by Roger T. Ames and Henry Rosemont Jr. in The Analects of Confucius (New York: Ballantine Books, 1998). 5  Analects 17.25 (Ames and Rosemont translation). 6  We are in agreement with Li Jianshan and Zhao Yuanyuan where they state, “With tian and persons as an integrated body at the foundation of organic and holistic, traditional, Chinese culture, the perspective of humane loving (ren ai 仁愛) along with a theory of ‘continuity of nature and persons’ (tianrenheyi) would be incredibly fruitful to the development of ecofeminism.” Li, Jianshan 李建珊 and Zhao Yuanyuan

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natural cosmology can contribute a vocabulary and theoretical structure that advance contemporary posthumanism and new materialism—pushing ecofeminism beyond the limitations of modernity. 2

Critical Review of Ecofeminism

Perhaps the most well-known ecofeminist views are those put forth by Val Plumwood, Karen J. Warren, and Rosemary Radford Ruether in the 1980’s and 1990’s. Ruether argues in Sexism and God-Talk that, “We cannot criticize the hierarchy of male over female without ultimately criticizing and overcoming the hierarchy of humans over nature.”7 Here Ruether articulates the connection between chauvinism and anthropocentrism, although she still seems to privilege a telos of overcoming sexism with overthrowing anthropocentrism as a necessary step along the way. Ruether contends that the western progression of culture was a gradual devaluation of nature and natural functions, including the labors of women that seemed most natural—birth and childcare. In this gradual devaluation people replaced a reverence for earth, creation, and procreation with control, culture, and domination.8 Arguing against this trajectory, Ruether is one of the first theorists to suggest an ecological-feminist position. For her, societies must work against hierarchy and dichotomization by “converting our minds to the earth.”9 There is a caring responsibility on the part of humans to be sensitive to exploitation of the earth.

 媛媛, “生态女性主义与中国传统文化” [“Ecofeminism and Traditional Culture of 赵 China”] in 当代中国的 “人—自然” 观 [Retrospection of Human-natural Relationship in Contemporary China], ed. Zhao Yifeng 赵轶峰 (Changchun, Jilin, PRC: Northeast Normal University Press, 2008), p. 503. Translated by Nicholas Brasovan from Li’s and Zhao’s claim: “以天人一体为基础的中国传统文化当中的有机整体观, 仁爱观以及 ‘天人合一’   观念对生态女性主义理论的发展都是大有裨益的.” 7  Radford Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology (Boston: Beacon Press, 1993), 73. 8  Interestingly, Ruether uses concepts that fit some of both Confucian and posthuman philosophies of nature. She writes that “Nature can also be seen as cosmos, as the encompassing matrix of all things, supported by or infused with divine order and harmony, within which gods and humans stand and in which they have their being” (Ibid., 76). The ideas of harmony and integration of cosmological, natural, and human order resonate with our position. However, unlike our synthetic theory, Ruether’s position also depends on a static sense of “being” and maintains a theological position of theism. 9  Ibid., 91.

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This ethical framework appeals to other comparative philosophy theorists. Ingrid Shafer, for example, argues in her essay “From Confucius through Ecofeminism to a Partnership Ethic of Earthcare” that Ruether’s radical theological justification for ecofeminism correlates with Confucian religious traditions. However, our position differs from both Shafer and Ruether. While we agree that ecofeminism and Confucianism resonate, we disagree with the supernatural (transcendent) metaphysical commitments necessary to make this a theological claim. Additionally, both Ruether and Shafer accept the premise that gender difference is a primary marker of “different relationships to the natural world.”10 We contest this claim, on the basis that there are many markers of particularity that affect changing relationships between natural subjects—gender is not definitively primary, and neither is there a single static expression of the continuity between persons and nature. As a critique, ecofeminism aims to foreground the fundamental assumptions of the chauvinistic ethos. In this spirit, Li Jianshan and Zhao Yuanyuan point to Karen J. Warren’s seminal work in ecofeminism. As Li and Zhao aptly summarize, Warren identifies a concept of “subject/object dualism” (主客二分) as a fundamental assumption of patriarchal- and human-chauvinism.11 This initial assumption provides a theoretical structure and a hermeneutic prejudice, which support a privileging process that subordinates women to men, and the non-human environment to mankind. If human man is the sole proprietor of reason, and the ability to reason is taken to be the grounds for the ability to make moral decisions, and the ability to make moral decisions is the ground for moral value, then men have the highest value in the ecological system. For Warren, the tradition of equating women with nature (menstrual cycles, birth, hysterical episodes) places women in a similarly subordinate position.12 As opposed to subject/object dualism, Confucianism begins with concepts of continuity (he 合) and harmony (he 和). Interestingly, it repeats the theoretical structure of continuity and harmony in its interpretive framework for gender relations and nature-persons relations.

10  Ingrid Shafer, “From Confucius through Ecofeminism to a Partnership Ethic of Earthcare,” in The Sage and the Second Sex: Confucianism, Ethics, and Gender, ed. Chenyang Li (Chicago: Open Court Press, 2000), 98. 11  Li and Zhao, 504. 12  However, Warren goes further to claim that women’s affinity with the natural can be redeemed as a place of resistance—as closer to nature, women can recognize and advocate for a feminist environmentalist philosophy and politics. See Karen J Warren, “The Power and Promise of Ecological Feminism,” Environmental Ethics 12, no. 2 (1990): 125–46.

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Val Plumwood articulates a sophisticated argument for syncretic ecofeminism, wherein she carefully acknowledges many of the limitations of other ecofeminist expressions: Ecological feminists can also be discriminating about the characteristics and aspects of culture they choose to affirm; they need not be confined, as I argue in later chapters, to a choice between Biehl’s alternatives of ‘demolishing’ the complete inheritance of women’s past identity or ‘enthusiastically embracing it’ in its entirety [. . .]. To the extent that women’s lives have been lived in ways which are less directly oppositional to nature than those of men, and have involved different and less oppositional practices, qualities of care and kinds of selfhood, an ecological feminist position could and should privilege some of the experiences and practices of women over those of men as a source of change without being committed to any form of naturalism.13 Plumwood makes a compelling argument for the pragmatism of recognizing women as socialized into sensitivity toward nature. We distinguish ourselves from this argument for two main reasons, however. First, we find that Confucian commitments to harmony and reciprocity of mutually complementary forces suggest an exchange of masculine and feminine qualities—including those of care and consideration. Secondly, we find a care-ethical position does not adequately address the difficulties posed by Confucian political patriarchy, nor does it address the cosmological commitments that supersede it.14 Therefore, although we are indebted to these early ecofeminist positions, we argue for a closer connection between Confucianism, posthumanism, and vital materialism as an alternative ecofeminist model. 3

Posthumanism as Ecofeminism

Traditionally, western philosophers ground practical ethics on human-­ centered values. Such anthropocentric ethics place exclusive (intrinsic) value in human attributes, namely, autonomy, freedom, and a notion of subjectivity generally referred to as the self. This frame of modernism and humanism has 13  Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (Routledge, 2002), 35. 14  For a comprehensive look at the intersections between care ethics and Confucianism, see Li-Hsiang Lisa Rosenlee’s Confucianism and Women: A Philosophical Interpretation (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006).

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been influential in multiple philosophical, political, economic and ecological domains. It has shaped our conceptions of human existence, social participation, moral obligation and, arguably, the very ideal of liberal democracy. It has also shaped our conception of nature and environment, often guiding our understanding of natural resources and our entitlement to them. Autonomy, in this framework suggests the ability of an individuated, rational subject to make self-determined decisions. This notion is connected to freedom, which is defined in the modernist view as the ability to act rationally, free from coercion. We are supposed to understand ourselves in the image of Immanuel Kant’s or David Hume’s rational man.15 According to humanist ideals, this self-understanding is natural, ethical, and morally justifiable.16 However, as Rosi Braidotti describes in her book The Posthuman, “Universal ‘Man’, in fact, is implicitly assumed to be masculine, white, urbanized, speaking a standard language, heterosexually inscribed in a reproductive unit and a full citizen of a recognized polity.”17 This confining set of assumptions converts the ideal of modernist and humanist freedom to a limiting force that legitimizes chauvinism and anthropocentrism, and restricts our very ability to imagine human becoming as anything else. Drucilla Cornell argues in Moral Images of Freedom that human freedom is delimited by a notion of the finite, the absolute, or the end of possibility. Against modernist teleologies—she implicates Hegel, Marxist determinism, and Habermasian consensus—Cornell argues that the “impossible” is seen in daily reality.18 Our experience exceeds what we can know, what we can control, 15  Immanuel Kant’s formulation of rational autonomous selfhood in 1788’s The Critique of Practical Reason has been the most influential western conception for the resiliency of humanist ideals. This conception was guided by Kant’s own anthropological work, which attempted to scientifically justify chauvinistic and anthropocentric 18th Century European norms. See also: Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, trans. and ed. Robert B. Louden (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 16  Defenses of modernity and autonomy continue to pervade western philosophy for a myriad of reasons. Some scholars, like Jürgen Habermas, have argued that the practical reason of modernity offers justificatory frameworks for applying norms that protect individuals and societies. See for example, Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1995). Even feminists like Martha Nussbaum and theorists of race like Charles W. Mills argue that Kantian contractualism may be redeemed from within modernist discourse. See: Martha Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2011); and Carole Pateman and Charles W. Mills, Contract and Domination (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2008). 17  Braidotti, The Posthuman, 65. 18  Drucilla Cornell, Moral Images of Freedom (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 34.

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and how we can understand ourselves and others. In Cornell’s view this impossibility offers new opportunities to postmodern humans by inviting us to open our horizons to potential experiences. We cannot ever know definitively the true limits of our existence; so, we should be open to our own lack of understanding, open to changing our ideas and perspectives, open to becoming. Cornell’s theory introduces a corrective to modernism that applies to political and ethical concerns. By reconfiguring knowledge and control away from the rational self-control of autonomous subjects and to the receptivity of that which is beyond my immediate understanding, Cornell argues that ethics is grounded concretely within difference, otherness, and the non-identical. There is no singular normative ideal, but rather freedom and emancipation are grounded within this recognition of difference and limitation through the “redemptive imagination”—Cornell’s postmodern term for the ethical implications of Kantian sublime experience.19 The redemptive imagination is a way of seeing outside the confines of Eurocentric or otherwise prejudiced philosophy by exploring the very idea of the limit. Cornell argues for several different meanings of the limit, but most relevant to our project is the limit that continues to apply even to Confucianism and feminist thought alike: the limit of self-critique. Cornell rightly points out that feminist criticism of modernism can fall prey to reifying a new universally exclusive norm rather than utilizing the context of the different cultures and traditions that give rise to different ways of living in the world: What is emerging here is a third sense of limitation where we must knowingly confront the limits of what European philosophy has to offer us without falling back into a self-contradictory relativism; that is, we need to understand the complex relationship of a plurality of symbolic forms and our aspiration to universal ideals in issues such as human rights, and even more broadly construed in the very struggle for liberation.20 For Cornell, then, there are universal aspirations—what she calls human rights, but what we might call harmony or procreativity in the Confucian ­paradigm—but these aspirations are not reducible to a single vision or 19  This concept emerges as part of an interesting critique against autonomous choice in consumerist capitalism. Following Frankfurt School Critical Theory, Cornell argues that the ideal of choice as a core for freedom has been misappropriated, so that it now primarily signifies the individual’s ability to buy what she wants; a concept of selfhood she calls “homo economicus” (Cornell, Freedom, 2). 20  Cornell, Freedom, 4.

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experience. In the ethical and political, Cornell asserts that there is harmony in difference. What Cornell’s theory lacks, however, is an argument for a metaphysics of reciprocity, the reciprocity of nature and persons at the heart of Confucian cosmology. Before advancing into the constructive contribution of Confucian cosmology, we proceed by first looking at Confucian ethics with a critical posthumanist eye. 4

Critique of Confucianism

Picking up on Braidotti’s and Cornell’s critiques of the inherited prejudices of Eurocentric modernity, we believe that scholars also need to presently confront the limits of what Confucianism has to offer. From a feminist perspective, if Confucianism is to present a viable ethos in the contemporary world, we must challenge the chauvinism of its ethical ideals and liberate the tradition from its received patriarchy. As an initial reply, it may be pointed out that Confucianism has retained vitality over the millennia in a large part due to the pragmatic plasticity of its philosophy. Over the course of its historical development, the tradition has proven that it is open to progressive advance through reflexive hermeneutic critique and adaptation to external philosophical forces and social changes. During the Song Dynasty, for example, Confucian scholars expanded their philosophy beyond the limits of their ethical discourse by refocusing on classical cosmological texts, such as the Book of Changes Commentaries (Yizhuan 易傳), and appropriating concepts from Buddhist and Daoist philosophies. In light of its pragmatic plasticity, Confucianism may yet serve as a robust model for ecofeminism in a posthumanist world. The Confucian concept or regulative ideal of ‘sagacity’ has to be subjected to redemptive imagination and freed from any stereotypical chauvinistic connotations in order to place the Confucian on a more level ground for the twenty-first century. (We have to keep the Confucian from slipping on a slope toward patriarchal prejudice.) The Confucian sage is a historical model—such as Confucius, whom Mencius referred to as a timely sage.21 Confucius suggests that his idea of a sage is modeled after fabled Yao, Shun, and the founders of the Zhou: King Wen (the Culture King) and his sons, King Wu (the War King) and the Duke of Zhou. Accordingly, classical Confucianism presents decidedly masculine/patriarchal models of sagacity. In this context, Confucius indicates a kind of socio-historical conservatism. He claims to transmit, but not 21   Mencius 5B1.

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create.22 The Analects does not always present us with a consistent system of Confucius’s beliefs: whereas Confucius seems to endorse conservatism in one context, he practiced progressive philosophy in other lessons. Confucius expresses the latter with his claim, “It is the person who broadens the way, not the way that broadens the person.”23 As a primary example of Confucius’s progressive disposition, the Analects marks a transformation in the meaning of the term junzi 君子. Prior to Confucius, the term literally referred to a lord’s son. It was a hereditary title. With Confucius, however, the sense of the term is converted to denote a virtuous person, a moral exemplar: junzi shifts from a birthright to a meritorious achievement. In Confucian philosophical anthropology, one is born a human organism with a natural disposition (xing 性) to achieve exemplary personhood. In this view, we are not born persons by virtue of our social and biological inheritance; instead, we must become persons through the hard work (gongfu 功夫) of edification and cultural ­contributions.24 By subjecting the ideal of the sage to redemptive imagination in a way akin to Confucian progressivism, we may safeguard against limited and reified concepts of masculine sagacity, thereby, liberating the ideal of the sage from its patriarchal connotations, while retaining it as a fundamental component of Confucian normativity. Particularly problematic for classical Confucianism are the doctrines of “rectification of names” (zhengming 正名) and “ritual propriety” (li 禮), which support patriarch-chauvinistic views and practices. The rectification of names is formulated in the Analects along the following lines: “The ruler must rule, the minister minister, the father father, and the son son.”25 The terms analytically imply hierarchical power relationships—relationships between subordinating and subordinated persons. The claim implies a patriarchal normativity: the fathers ought to father, the children ought to be obedient. As classical Confucian concepts of “rectification of names” and “ritual

22   Analects 7.1. 23   Analects 15.29 (Ames and Rosemont translation). 24  The need for the hard work of self-cultivation becomes particularly evident in the book of Mencius. In the Mencius, we are told that the difference between persons and other animals is slight (Mencius 4B19). To be a human person, one must be a humane person (7B16). Human nature, renxing 人性, on this account, is not a given; rather, it is a disposition for achieving moral excellence—a disposition that stands in need of care and cultivation. Mencius proposes a number of horticultural metaphors, analogies, and allegories to make his case: one must work to achieve a consummate experience of personhood by tending to the garden of one’s moral dispositions. 25   Analects 12.11 (Ames and Rosemont translation).

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propriety” s­ upport chauvinism, they should be critiqued for their unjust and problematic implications. The hierarchical structure of familial and social roles and their attendant ritualized practices are intended to produce a highly functional social system that mutually enhances the experience of the diverse constituents involved. We are told in the Analects, “Achieving harmony (he 和) is the most valuable function of observing ritual propriety (li 禮). In the ways of the Former Kings, this achievement of harmony made them beautiful (mei 美), and was a guiding standard in all things large and small.”26 To the extent that Confucianism advocates an intersubjective experience of harmony and flourishing within the context of diversity, it may be embraced by a contemporary theory of ecofeminism. However, as Li Zehou describes it, classical Confucian political philosophy envisions a “harmony of human relations that orders superior and inferior, elder and younger, noble and base (the harmony of superior and inferior).”27 Such hierarchical structure is intended to be productive, creative, and symbiotically fruitful. Nevertheless, we maintain, introducing hierarchical relations such as “superior and inferior” places us on the slippery slope to unjust c­ hauvinistic/anthropocentric views and practices. Perhaps there is no a priori argument proving that “hierarchical harmony” is absurd or unjust. On empirical grounds, however, the assumption and assertion of this concept demonstrably leads to reified and abusive power relationships. Critically speaking, the classical Confucian position on patriarchal hierarchy needs to be pragmatically revised or analytically carved out of its concept of harmony in order to present a viable contemporary social and environmental worldview. Pragmatic revision and analytic deconstruction of Confucian social hierarchy are not new in Confucian scholarship. Joel J. Kupperman, for example, argues in his contribution to The Sage and the Second Sex, “Feminism as Radical Confucianism: Self and Tradition”: If it is plausible to suppose that roles and rituals can play a useful role in the development of self without being based on massive and permanent social differentiations of a traditional hierarchical society, then it is far from clear that the differentiations included in gender inequality are required. As long as there are some important differentiations, many of

26   Analects 1.12 (Ames and Rosemont translation). 27  Li, Zehou. The Chinese Aesthetic Tradition, trans. Maija Bell Samei. (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2010), 19.

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them perhaps temporary, there will be enough foundation for the edifice of ritual.28 Against normative understandings of absolute hierarchy, Kupperman argues that hierarchy itself can be accidental, provisional and temporary. It may be that in the changing structures of interdependence, we can locate a sense of self yet based on ritual propriety, but of a sort that is fluid and critical in ways that converge with feminist postmodernist ethics. Kupperman continues that a partnership between feminism and Confucianism may be fruitful for both traditions, precisely in their respective emphases on ethical self-­cultivation and responsibility: “Both [Confucianism and feminism] take seriously the importance of becoming a certain kind of person, and this implies reflection on the ways of shaping oneself and also of shaping others to come.”29 If such a careful critique is not only possible, but constructive and faithful for both theoretical frameworks, then our next task would be providing a constructive exposition of harmony and procreativity by looking to a deeper metaphysics of qi. 5

Vital Materialism and Qi

Posthumanism relies on the idea that a globalized world is an ecological planetary model. In this framework we can no longer define human existence the way the modernists did, by comparing a rational autonomous subject to other people, exclusively, but who we are and who we become are shaped by our nonhuman, natural, environmental mileu, as well.30 Confucian philosophy agrees with the posthumanist ontological argument that existence itself is fluid and inter-relational; rather than focusing on what it means to already be something or someone, we must conceptualize the activity of becoming. Posthumanist and Confucian models reinforce ideals of novelty, differentiation, and

28  Joel Kupperman, “Feminism as Radical Confucianism: Self and Tradition,” in The Sage and the Second Sex: Confucianism, Ethics, and Gender, ed. Chenyang Li (Chicago: Open Court, 2000), 50. 29  Ibid., 53. 30  Braidotti, Donna Harraway, and Karen Barad argue that pets, computers, and global climate change have forever altered the way that we interact with the world, and, further, that humanity is moving toward even greater interdependence and interaction between humans and non-humans.

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transformation in procreativity.31 The ground for liberation is not based on rational autonomous choice, but on material relations, and it is this concept which posthumanist and vital materialist philosophies share at their cores. In conjunction with posthumanist philosophies of becoming and redemptive imagination, we also see vital materialism as central to our Confucian ecofeminist framework. In her book Vibrant Matter, Jane Bennett explains that a vital materialist position recognizes the situatedness of persons in the world, and sees the continuity between persons and nature: For the vital materialist, however, the starting point of ethics is less the acceptance of the impossibility of ‘reconcilement’ and more the recognition of human participation in a shared, vital materiality. We are vital materiality and we are surrounded by it, though we do not always see it that way. The ethical task at hand here is to cultivate the ability to discern nonhuman vitality, to become perceptually open to it.32 In this description Bennett reinforces our arguments against anthropocentric and chauvinistic hierarchies. As two material bodies among many, we are host to microspheres of bacterial systems, and we participate in a vital planet that is part of an infinite cosmos. These nested systems of vitality correspond to neoConfucian models of the cosmos as nested patterns of energy (qizhili 氣之理).33 Reciprocating this new materialist framework, Braidotti’s posthuman subject depends on understanding the complexity of vital energies. She asks:

31  We argue here that posthumanism values a notion of procreativity, also central to Confucian cosmology. Procreativity is potentially a loaded conceptual term, however, as much of the western feminist response has been overcoming the equation of women to nature as similarly subordinate on the basis of their purely biologic functions: women can and must have babies, just as the earth can and must provide vegetative growth. We contend that procreativity is a concept of every vitally material and integral part of nature— men and women included—and is therefore not a gender specific term. 32  Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter, 14. 33  Bennett actually acknowledges that some might be wary of the term “posthumanism” as philosophizing implies a self-conscious, arguably human, subject performing the activity of philosophy. However, she also argues that subjectivity need not be dominant— “One can note that the human immune system depends on parasitic helminth worms for its proper functioning or cite other instances of our cyborgization to show how human agency is always an assemblage of microbes, animals, plants, metals, chemicals, wordsounds, and the like—indeed, that insofar as anything ‘acts’ at all, it has already entered an agentic assemblage . . .” (Ibid., 121).

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Why is matter so intelligent, though? Because it is driven by informational codes, which both deploy their own bars of information and interact in multiple ways with the social, psychic and ecological environments [. . .]. What happens to subjectivity in this complex field of forces and data flows? My argument is that it becomes an expanded relational self, engendered by the cumulative effect of all of these factors [. . .].34 Bennett’s and Braidotti’s positions therefore reinforce our own commitments to nested systems and the vital energies of life embedded in all of them. Explicitly invoking ecological and posthumanist positions, Bennett’s contribution to a new materialism also resonates with Confucian philosophies of qi. In Bennett’s estimation, vital materiality implies a creative energy that propels everything in nature into activities of becoming; these activities are not taken up as singular atomic selves, but in relation to nature. She writes that, “Humanity and nonhumanity have always performed an intricate dance with each other. There was never a time when human agency was anything other than an interfolding network of humanity and nonhumanity; today this mingling has become harder to ignore.”35 Mirroring Braidotti’s posthuman claims that ecological awareness is imminent and urgent, Bennett implies that the continuity of persons and nature is stronger in contemporary society. Whereas postmodern theorists have only recently come to explicate theories of vital materialism, Confucian cosmology of qi and the recognition of becoming has been integral to Chinese philosophy for over two millennia. Much discussion has been had since the introduction of Marxism into China as to whether or not traditional Chinese cosmologies of qi are materialistic. In particular, philosophers in the People’s Republic of China have been apt to argue that neo-Confucian metaphysics, such as those of Zhang Zai (1020– 1077) and Wang Fuzhi (1619–1692), are models of “naïve materialism.”36 Other philosophers, such as Alison Black, Yan Shoucheng, and Tu Weiming have argued against the Marxist-materialist reading of neo-Confucian cosmology.37 34  Braidotti, The Posthuman, 60. 35  Bennett, Vibrant Matter, 31. 36  For an extensive list of recent materialist readings of neo-Confucianism, see Sky Liu, “State of the Field Report III: Contemporary Chinese Studies of WANG Fuzhi in Mainland China,” Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 3, no. 2 (2004): 307–30. 37  Ibid. See also Alison Harley Black, Man and Nature in the Philosophical Thought of Wang Fu-chih. (Seattle: University of Washington Press: 1989) and Shoucheng Yan’s dissertation, “Coherence and Contradiction in the Worldview of Wang Fuzhi (1619–1692).” (Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures, Indiana University, Bloomington: 1994).

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The latter camp maintains that qi is too alive, too energetic, too conscious, too creative to be equivocated with dead, teleologically-driven, material substance. Tu Weiming represents this camp by arguing that traditional Chinese philosophy envisions a world constituted by “dynamic energy fields rather than static matter-like entities.” Critically reflecting on the idea of qi, Tu continues, “the most basic stuff that makes the cosmos is neither solely spiritual nor material but both. It is a vital force.” Citing Wing-tsit Chan’s seminal work on Chinese philosophy, Tu remarks that “the rendering of the indigenous term for this basic stuff, qi, as ‘matter-energy’ is ‘essentially sound.’ ” Having said this, Tu suggests that Chan’s translation of qi as “material force” is a fitting interpretation, provided that we recognize along with Chan that the term qi, “before the advent of Neo-Confucianism in the eleventh century, originally ‘denotes the psychophysiological power associated with blood and breath.’ ” In final analysis, Tu concludes, qi “should be rendered as ‘vital force’ or ‘vital power.’ ”38 In agreement with Tu, we argue against reading neo-Confucianism as “naïve materialism.” We believe that the equivocation of classical Chinese cosmologies of qi with Marxist materialism is itself naïve. Qi is not simply matter. New materialism advocates that the terms “qi” and “matter” denote ­integrated, psychophysical, vital energy. It is clear that traditional accounts of matter as an inherently inert substance, devoid of life and qualitative experience, do not provide a suitable conceptual apparatus for expressing the shared vision of new materialism and qi-cosmology. Accordingly, we look to advance Confucian metaphysics (and to supersede any materialist vs. antimaterialist debate) by reading ­traditional accounts of qi in a fruitful dialogical relationship with new materialist accounts of vibrant matter. Conversely, as the new materialist ecofeminist calls for a need to conceive of our being and subjectivity as a lived-experienceof-materiality, the philosophy of qi responds with a rich and refined vocabulary. In this vein, we find further corroboration for our thesis in Mary Evelyn Tucker’s “Philosophy of Ch’i as an Ecological Cosmology.” In this work, Tucker argues that the dualistic bifurcation of matter and mind inherited from the European Enlightenment has led the modern world into epistemological, axiological and ecological crises. She describes such crises as an experience of

38  Weiming Tu, “The Continuity of Being: Chinese Visions of Nature,” in Confucianism and Ecology: The Interrelation of Heaven, Earth, and Humans, ed. Mary Evelyn Tucker and John Berthrong (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 106–107. Note, we have changed Tu’s Wade Giles “ch’i” to the pinyin “qi” for consistency.

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“­ profound alienation from nature and indeed from matter itself.”39 As a remedy to the ills begotten by modern materialism, she advocates a new materialism fully informed by neo-Confucian philosophy of qi. A new materialism in this light, she maintains, will have profound implications for both axiology and epistemology. With regard to axiology, a qi-based materialism provides a resource for formulating a kind of naturalistic religious experience, which values persons and their environmental relata as participatory and interactive constituents of a unified field of qi. With regard to epistemology, Tucker continues, qi-based materialism maintains that empirical investigation and indepth understanding of matter is quintessential for our advance of knowledge of ourselves and the world in which we live.40 At the advent of neo-Confucian cosmology, Zhang Zai described the cosmos as entirely constituted by qi. He wrote of an inexhaustible font of energy that fueled the incessant transformations (becoming) of the world. He referred to this wellspring of energy as “sublime vacuity” (taixu 太虚). According to Zhang, “Sublime vacuity cannot not have qi; qi cannot not coagulate and become myriad things; myriad things cannot not disperse and become sublime vacuity.”41 Citing this line, Jacques Gernet comments, “Thus, for Zhang Zai, all the things of the world are only ‘transitory bodies,’ formed of assemblages of energies.” Gernet continues his commentary by rejecting the idea that qi can be conceived in terms of traditional western ontotheological accounts of matter. “Ultimately,” he writes, “there is neither ‘matter,’ nor ‘causes,’ nor ‘architect,’ as was formulated by our medieval scholastics and taught by the first Jesuits to arrive in China around 1600. The universe is through and through, under all of its forms, only energy in incessant and invisible activity.”42 39  Mary Evelyn Tucker, “The Philosophy of Ch’i as an Ecological Cosmology,” in Confucianism and Ecology: The Interrelation of Heaven, Earth, and Humans, ed. Mary Evelyn Tucker and John Berthrong, (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1998), 187. 40  Ibid., 188. 41  Translated from Chinese text: “太虛不能無氣，氣不能不聚而為萬物，萬物不能 不散而為太虛.” Zhang Zai 張載. Correcting Youthful Ignorance (正蒙) (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju), Taihe (太和), 1978. 42  Gernet, Jacques. La Raison des choses : Essai sur la philosophie de Wang Fuzhi (1619–1692) (Paris: Gallimard, 2005), 154–155. Translated by Nicholas Brasovan from Gernet’s French text:   “Toutes les choses du monde ne sont donc, pour Zhang Zai, que des «corps transitoires» formés d’un assemblage d’énergies, il n’y a, en fin de compte, ni «matière», ni «causes», ni «architecte», comme l’enseignaient les premiers jésuites arriveés en Chine aux environs de 1600 et formés à notre scolastique médiévale. L’univers n’est, de part en part et sous toutes ses formes, qu’énergie en activité incessante et invisible.”

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As sublime vacuity, qi is an immanent onto-generative source and force, driving the transformation of things (wuhua 物化). A natural propensity (shi 勢) to create diverse and novel forms of existence is inherent in qi. In view of this natural cosmology, the world does not require an external cause (let alone an agency) to create the world and imbue it with a coherent order of things (wuzhili 物之理). Creativity in Confucian philosophy is in situ. Matter in this context is “intelligent,” to recall Braidotti’s account of new materialism. Such intelligence is not specifically purposive or intentional, nor is it necessarily self-conscious; rather, it is a kind of intelligence that allows for the spontaneous, coherent, transitory, organization and systematization of diverse energetic processes.43 What we find in neo-Confucian philosophy, again, is a vision of the world as naturally emergent patterns of dynamic energy (qizhili 氣之理). Neo-Confucian philosophers following Zhang Zai maintain that the cosmos is a unified coherent pattern (yili一理). “The pattern is unified,” says the neo-Confucian master, Cheng Yi, but “its divisions are many” ­(liyifenshu 理一分殊). Thus, the neo-Confucian provides a means for representing a holistic and harmonious unity of a diverse plurality. In his celebrated “Western Inscription,” Zhang portrays a cosmic ecological experience of being a person-in-the-world: “Heaven is my father and Earth is my mother, and even such a small creature as I find an intimate place in their midst. Therefore that which fills the universe I regard as my body and that which directs the universe I consider as my nature. All people are my brothers and sisters, and all things are my companions.”44 Statements along these lines present a “this-worldly spirituality,” to borrow from Tucker’s account of qi materialism.45 Zhang expresses a profound appreciation for the sublimity of the natural world and the connectedness that he feels with all things. In Confucian terminology, Zhang’s experience is captured by the slogan, “continuity of nature and persons” (tianrenheyi). The continuity of nature and persons is not a simple relationship; rather, it is complex and manifold. As alluded to above, in a primary sense, the continuity of nature and persons is a continuity of energy (yiqi一氣) and a continuity of pattern (yili一理). 43  Our language here is also informed by Roger T. Ames’ account of qi in Roger T. Ames, “Images of Reason in Chinese Culture,” in Introduction to World Philosophies, ed. Eliot Deutsch (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997), 255–256. 44  Translated by Wing-Tsit Chan in A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, Translated and Compiled by Wing-Tsit Chan (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), 497. 45  Tucker 187.

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In a related sense, the dictum, “continuity between nature and persons,” is a crystallization of classical Chinese naturalism, or natural cosmology. On this account, anything and everything within the world, including the world itself is completely the result of natural processes. Persons are no exception. Persons like all things are sui-generis, emergent, configurations of natural vital energy. In yet another related sense, “continuity” denotes the reciprocal, recursive, causally efficacious, interactions that persons (individually and collectively) engage in with their environments. “Continuity,” here, means that persons inform and transform their environment and biological existence, as their environment and biological existence inform and transform their lived experiences. In any case, the neo-Confucian mantra of “continuity of nature and persons” denotes persons-in-the-world. The person-in-the-world is a complex sentient system of vital energy embedded within multiple complex systems of vital energy on varying spatial-temporal scales. Like Bennett’s model of ecofeminist philosophy, neo-Confucianism envisions the person-in-the-world as a situated constituent and active participant in a world of shared vital materiality. The Confucian advances this position into a normative dimension: ideally, relationships of continuity (he 合) ought to be cultivated into relationships of harmony (he 和). 6

Harmony of Persons in the World

Confucian philosophy begins with a belief that persons are radically situated within complex systems of relationships. Whereas Bennett calls for a model of an “expanded relational self” to advance ecofeminism, Confucianism responds with such a model. In other words, Confucianism maintains that persons are embedded within nested structures of familial and social relationships. As opposed to an understanding of persons as “atomic” or exclusively “autonomous” selves, Confucianism has a holistic vision of persons. In this view, each person’s identity is constituted by the shifting relationships that he or she bears to other persons. Persons are understood in terms of the roles and functions that they perform in the family, society, and the world at large. Conventional Confucian wisdom dictates that these human roles and relationships ought to be governed by ritual propriety (li 禮). In the preceding critique of Confucianism, we noted that the goal of ritual propriety is harmonization amongst diverse social forces. Having foregrounded a critique of ritual propriety and a so-called “hierarchical harmony” above, we are now in a position to present a constructive account of harmony in a Confucian context.

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Harmony serves as a kind of regulative ideal guiding the application of ritual propriety (lizhiyong 禮之用). Ritual propriety aims at effective harmonization of the diverse constituent participants in any situation. In the context of Confucianism, harmony entails difference. The idea of harmony is captured by a four character phrase found in the Analects (13.23): 和而不同, harmony but not sameness. “Harmony,” he 和, defined in the classical etymology of the Shuowen jiezi 說文解字, means “mutually responsive,” and the text notes that the character he 和 is constituted by two graphs, grain 禾 and mouth 口.46 Folk etymological speculation allows for an interpretation of harmony as a culinary experience—harmony is something tasty. A culinary aesthetic experience occurs upon tasting a complex dish in which each flavor mutually complements and enhances every other ingredient: harmony is like this.47 Li Zehou describes how the concrete aesthetic experience of harmony was extended into a social and metaphysical ideal in traditional Confucian discourse on ritual propriety: [F]rom the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods through the Han dynasty, when the worldview centered on the Five Phases was widespread, taste, color, and the sound were each divided into “five,” in order to construct a structured system of correspondences between human relations and the universe as a whole. Within this system, first of all, “Harmony begets things; identity produces nothing.” And, “If sound is singular, it finds no audience; if things are singular, there is no pattern; if flavors are singular, they have no effect.” This is to say, singularity cannot produce harmony; harmony is by necessity the unification of plurality [. . .] What we call harmony is chiefly manifested in the intermingling of plural elements or as the mutual complementarity of opposing elements. The world as a whole, all things, society and human emotions—all of these are unities of diverse and contradictory elements.48 Such a description of harmony is certainly amenable to a contemporary ecofeminist program. Just as the Confucian perspective emphasizes the importance of difference and interdependence, so too do both the materialist and posthumanist models. According to materialists, nested systems are connected 46  “和: 相譍也. 从口禾聲.” (Source text found online at http://ctext.org, February 27, 2014). We are reading ying 譍 as a loan for its homonym, ying 應. 47  We are indebted to the lessons of Roger T. Ames for pointing out this metaphorical reading of the character, he 和. 48  Li, 20.

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by the vital energies of material life. According to the posthumanist position, this interdependence radically affects our relationship to those diverse and nested systems of interaction: The posthuman dimension of post-anthropocentrism can consequently be seen as a deconstructive move. What it deconstructs is species supremacy, but is also inflicts a blow to any lingering notion of human nature, anthropos and bios, as categorically distinct from the life of animals and non-humans, or zoe. What comes to the fore instead is a nature-culture continuum in the very embodied structure of the extended self . . .49 What Braidotti means here is that the notion of “humanity” is only problematic insofar as it is unquestioned as a normative verification of human exceptionalism on categorical grounds. Life is in all vital material, and so categorical separation is unscientific. There is still an opportunity to describe or account for human experience and subjectivity, however. It merely needs to recognize its extended nature into the material world, nature, and culture. In light of Li’s exposition, one may see that harmony is postulated as a Confucian ideal in multiple interconnected domains of nature and experience. In other words, harmony is a kind of recursive process that runs through multiple levels. Subjectively, it is experienced as a balanced equilibrium of emotions (zhong 中), as is indicated in the opening passage of the Zhongyong chapter of the Liji. Intersubjectively, harmony is a shared experience of attunement and symbiotic enhancement, as in the case of participating in a jazz band.50 Again, the relational self is fundamentally situated within nested familial and social structures. Harmony is effected when people mutually support, complement and enhance one another within the context of these structures. On yet a broader scale, harmony can and should occur between persons (individually and collectively) and the impersonal forces of nature that constitute persons’ biological and ecological conditions. In addition to persons and their social structures, Confucianism recognizes the natural world of the heavens above, the earth below, and the myriad living things as constitutive of persons’ ecological conditions. Harmony, again, serves as the regulatory ideal for persons’ interaction with these environmental relata. 49  Braidotti, 65. 50  Indeed, Confucianism maintains through and through that ritual propriety is closely connected to the intonation of music. “When the Master was with others who were singing and they sang well (shan), he would invariably ask them to sing the piece again before joining in the harmony” (Analects 7.32). Translated by Ames and Rosemont.

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Harmony in the context of classical Chinese philosophy is procreative. The generative nature of harmony relates to a feminist conception of natality. As a model of subjectivity, natality emphasizes the importance of growth and rebirth. From the Latin word natalis, which means birth or origin, the concept relies on a metaphor of birth, emphasizing both interdependency with others and an opportunity for the “I” to self-innovate in situ. In developing the contrast between autonomy as traditionally understood in humanism and natality, Drucilla Cornell writes: There is a distinction, then, between this view of natality and a more traditional Kantian understanding of the role of autonomy. [. . .] One does not so much change that ‘me’ as control it. What I am suggesting is that Peirce’s understanding of the self as ‘habit’ or, as I have interpreted it, as the natality that allows for innovation, means that there is no empirical ‘me’ that is simply there.51 Cornell is not alone in seeing innovation in collaboration, Braidotti also argues that her work “rests on the firm belief that we, early third millennium posthuman subjects in our multiple and differential locations, are perfectly capable of rising to the challenge of our times, provided we make it into a collective endeavor and joint project.”52 This feminist model of subjectivity, then, corresponds to the concepts of ‘relational self’ and ‘intersubjective harmonization’ advocated by Confucian philosophy. This homo natalis is part of a nested ecosystem of vital materiality. This does not mean that the subject disappears, however. In contrast, the subject has renewed obligations to participate responsibly and responsively within the world of vital energy. As Braidotti explains, “A posthuman theory of the subject emerges, therefore, as an empirical project that aims at experimenting with what contemporary, bio-technologically mediated bodies are capable of doing. These non-profit experiments with contemporary subjectivity actualize the virtual possibilities of an expanded, relational self that functions in a nature-culture continuum and is technologically mediated.”53 Importantly for the posthumanist position neither culture nor humanity disappears, but instead, the subject must be critically aware of its radical situatedness as well as the d­ evelopment and application of its material-and-spiritual culture in its reciprocal interactions with nature. 51  Cornell, Transformations (New York: Routledge, 1993), 42. 52  Braidotti, The Posthuman, 196. 53  Ibid., 61.

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At the cosmic level, the harmonious interactions of the heavens and the earth (tiandi 天地), serve as a primary Confucian model of procreative harmony. Harmony at this level and every level of Confucian discourse is interpreted as dynamic interactions of yin 陰 and yang 陽 modes of energy (qi 氣). The Confucian cosmology of yin and yang forces is grounded in the Book of Changes (Yijing 易經). The symbolism and text of the Yijing provide a locus classicus, as well as a comprehensive expression of classical Chinese correlative cosmology. In their work on “Ecofeminism and Traditional Culture of China,” Li and Zhao discuss the issues of harmony, yin and yang, procreativity, continuity and harmony between nature and persons: The canonical, ancient, Chinese philosophical text, Zhouyi, expresses the initial formulation of this fundamental view: it takes all natural phenomena and the fortune and misfortune of human affairs to be totally integrated into a system of two lines, yin and yang, which are woven into sixty-four hexagrams. The Book of Changes Commentaries advance this a step, pointing to a fundamental conception: ‘The Yi has sublime polarity (taiji); this gives birth to two modes; two modes give birth to four figures; four figures give birth to eight trigrams.”54 Although the terminology of yin and yang is not explicitly stated until the later commentary (e.g. the Appended Phrases Commentary, Xici zhuan) section of the Yijing, archaeological evidence suggests that a correlative cosmology was already present in China as early as the “Shang dynasty, during the closing centuries of the second millennium BC.”55 In particular, the earliest stratum of the Yijing, with its symbols of broken and solid line segments, illustrates a correlative worldview. The earliest stratum of the Yijing, which is traditionally attributed to the forefathers of the Zhou, symbolizes yin and yang processes as broken and solid line segments (yao 爻). Yin is depicted by a broken line segment, with a gap in the middle, . Yang is depicted as an unbroken line, . As Li and Zhao note above, the Appended Phrases Commentary goes on to reference “four figures, sixiang 四象.” These four figures 54  Translated from Li and Zhao, 505: “中国古代哲学经典之一《周易》, 提出了整体 观的初步图式, 把一切自然现象和人事吉凶统统纳入阴, 阳两爻所组成的六 十四卦系统. 《易传》进一步提出 ‘易有太极, 是生两仪, 两仪生四象,  四象 生八卦’ 的整体观.” 55  David N. Keightley, “Shang Divination and Metaphysics,” in Philosophy East and West 38, no. 4 (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press 1988), 367–397.

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constitute the set of couplings of these two segments,  . These four figures represent the interactions of yinyang in their simplest forms. Following this binary system of broken and solid line segments, the Yijing presents eight trigrams (bagua 八卦), which represent yin and yang interactions in a more intricate order of complexity. Each line in the trigram can be either broken or solid. As there are three functions available in each trigram, and only two possible values that can be inputted into each function, the total possible combinations of yin and yang lines at the trigram level is eight. At this level of symbolism, predominately yang forces and processes are symbolized by three yang lines: . Predominately yin processes and forces are represented by the trigram: . Finally, the Yijing systematically models the evolution and diversification of complex organizations of yin and yang modes of qi 氣 by further pairing each of the eight trigrams with one another, which yields an ordered set of sixty-four hexagrams. Following the same structure as the trigrams, each hexagram is made up of a unique pattern of six yin and/or yang lines. At this level of symbolism, the heavens are again symbolized by all yang lines, , and the earth is symbolized by all yin, . As the symbol for yang modes of energy in general, the former also symbolizes masculinity, light, heat, spatially-above, initiating, hard. The latter also symbolizes femininity, dark, cool, spatiallybelow, responding, soft and absorbing. As yin and yang lines exchange places to generate the entire set of sixty-four hexagrams, so the heavens and the earth, yin and yang, male and female harmoniously interact and exchange places to engender diversity, novelty, and complexity. Unlike dualistic metaphysics, which categorically assert the ontological independence of one level of reality and the metaphysical dependence of another, neither yin nor yang are given ontological or axiological priority. Instead, both yin and yang mutually imply one another. The correlativity and reciprocity of these two complementary forces of energy can be demonstrated by character analysis of the Chinese terms: the traditional pictograph for yin 陰 illustrates a shady side of a hill; the traditional graph for yang 陽 illustrates the sunny side of a hill. Of course, the shady and sunny sides of a hill change places over the course of a day. The idea is that the categories of yin and yang are always defined provisionally and relative to one another. Yin and yang are constantly transforming into one another, taking each other’s place, as it were. Insofar as these two primary terms categorize gender relations, the metaphysics undercuts absolute categorical commitments and fixed hierarchical power relationships. Femininity is only understood as a contrastive complement to masculinity and vice versa; neither has any real substantial

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independence, and the transition and exchange between femininity and masculinity undermines any dichotomous binary. As day is day-becoming-night, and night is night-becoming-day, so all beings in this ontology are understood as becomings. The ancient Chinese looked up and saw the sky (tian) above and the earth (di) below, and they saw themselves in the middle (zhong 中). They saw the sun (taiyang 太陽, literally, “great yang”) seemingly traverse the sky. They observed the earth absorb the light’s life-giving energy (qi 氣) as well as the rain (yu 雨) that fell from the sky. In the interactions of the hot sun, the cool rain, they saw transformations of energy take place and life emerge on earth, and they revered the fecundity of nature’s sublime polarity. They experienced the creativity and continuity of yin and yang in their lived bodies through sexual intercourse and social discourse. They came to recognize that by ritualizing their activities in accordance with natural patterns of energy they could effectively harmonize with their environment and biological existence. They discovered that they could cultivate the land and practice husbandry to sustain themselves, build their culture, and improve the quality of their lived-experience. They came to recognize themselves as active participants in a shared vital materiality. Li and Zhao make the case in point by calling attention to key passages regarding the reverence for procreativity in the Great Commentary (Dazhuan 大傳) of the Book of Changes: [The Changes] take the organic discourse of “giving birth to life is called change” (生生之谓易) and “the great virtue of the heavens and earth is said to be life” (天地之大德曰生) to be the heart of its teaching. Moreover, it adopts a pursuit of persons’ “virtue together with the heavens and earth.” It suggests a vision of a trinity of the heavens, earth and persons (天地人) in which “the sovereign values the way of the heavens and earth, and complements the mutual accord of the heavens and earth.” It is apparent, although persons are the most valued amongst the heavens, earth, and myriad things, we must take harmony with heavens, earth and all living things to be a prerequisite, a productive and developmental power, for giving birth to life without cessation (生生不息). “In the intimate intermingling of yin and yang energies, the myriad things transform entirely; In the intercommunication of vital essence between male and female, the myriad things transform with life.”56 56  Translated from Li and Zhao, 505:   [《易》] 以“生生之谓易, 天地之大德曰生”的有机论为轴心, 形成了 一个有机整体论的模式.并通过人 “与天地合其德” 的追求, 提出 “后以

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Persons, on this view, are co-creators of the world along with the heavens and the earth. Persons are recognized as powerful forces of nature, for they have the power to intentionally cultivate and transform their lived-embodied-­ experience and their lived-embodied-environment. In this sense, Confucianism retains a commitment to a kind of human difference. In light of the continuity of nature and persons, however, persons can only be unique to the extent that they creatively interact with personal and impersonal forces of nature. From a Confucian perspective, such creative interaction requires a deferential disposition, intentional harmonization, and recognized interdependence with regard to nature. This interdependence demonstrates that Confucian cosmology shares Cornell’s commitment to an ethics of receptivity and reciprocity. An anti-chauvinism is possible as humans do not have dominion or the warrant to dominate nature in this philosophy. As such, humans represent one cosmic force amongst many, and the ethical goal and mandate is to work in concert with the heavens, the earth and the myriad things. This procreative harmonious interaction does not exist exclusively for human flourishing, but for the flourishing of life in general. Bibliography Ames, Roger T. “Images of Reason in Chinese Culture.” In Introduction to World Philosophies, edited by Eliot Deutsch. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997. Ames, Roger T. and Henry Rosemont, Jr., trans. The Analects of Confucius. New York: Ballantine Books, 1998. Bennett, Jane. Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things. Durham: Duke University Press, 2010. Black, Alison Harley. Man and Nature in the Philosophical Thought of Wang Fu-chih. Seattle: University of Washington Press: 1989. Braidotti, Rosi. The Posthuman. Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2013. Chan, Wing-Tsit. A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, Translated and Compiled by Wing-Tsit Chan. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963. Cheng, Chung-ying. “The Trinity of Cosmology, Ecology, and Ethics in the Confucian Personhood.” In Confucianism and Ecology: The Interrelation of Heaven, Earth, and Humans, 211–35, edited by Mary Evelyn Tucker and John Berthrong. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998. 裁成天地之道, 辅相天地之宜”的天, 地, 人三位一体观. 在它看来, 人在 天地万物间虽然最贵, 也须以天地万物之和为前提, 才能生产发展, 生生 不息.“天地氤氲, 万物化醇; 男女构精, 万物化生.”

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Cornell, Drucilla. Moral Images of Freedom. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007. ———. Transformations. New York: Routledge, 1993. Gernet, Jacques. La Raison des Choses : Essai sur la Philosophie de Wang Fuzhi (1619– 1692). Paris: Gallimard, 2005. Habermas, Jürgen. Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995. Kant, Immanuel. Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, translated and edited by Robert B. Louden. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Keightley, David N. “Shang Divination and Metaphysics,” in Philosophy East and West 38, no. 4 (University of Hawai‘i Press, 1988): 367–397. Kupperman, Joel. “Feminism as Radical Confucianism: Self and Tradition.” The Sage and the Second Sex: Confucianism, Ethics, and Gender, 43–56, edited by Chenyang Li. Chicago: Open Court, 2000. Li, Jianshan 李建珊 and Zhao Yuan Yuan 赵媛媛, “生态女性主义与中国传统文化” [“Ecofeminism and Traditional Culture of China”] in 当代中国的 “人—自然” 观 [Retrospection of Human-natural Relationship in Contemporary China], edited by Zhao Yifeng 赵轶峰. Changchun, Jilin, China: Northeast Normal University Press, 2008. Li, Zehou. The Chinese Aesthetic Tradition. Translated by Maija Bell Samei. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2010. Liu, Sky. “State of the Field Report III: Contemporary Chinese Studies of WANG Fuzhi in Mainland China.” Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 3, no. 2 (Springer 2004): 307–30. Mencius. Mencius: A Bilingual Edition. Translated by D.C. Lau. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2003. Nussbaum, Martha. Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2011. Pateman, Carole and Charles W. Mills. Contract and Domination. Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2008. Plumwood, Val. Feminism and the Mastery of Nature. New York: Routledge, 2002. Rosenlee, Li-Hsiang Lisa. Confucianism and Women: A Philosophical Interpretation. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006. Ruether, Radford. Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology. Boston: Beacon Press, 1993. Shafer, Ingrid. “From Confucius through Ecofeminism to a Partnership Ethic of Earthcare.” In The Sage and the Second Sex: Confucianism, Ethics, and Gender, 97–112, edited by Chenyang Li. Chicago: Open Court Press, 2000. Tu, Weiming. “The Continuity of Being: Chinese Visions of Nature.” In Confucianism and Ecology: The Interrelation of Heaven, Earth, and Humans, 105–22, edited by Mary Evelyn Tucker and John Berthrong. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998.

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Tucker, Mary Evelyn. “The Philosophy of Ch’i as an Ecological Cosmology.” In Confucianism and Ecology: The Interrelation of Heaven, Earth, and Humans, 187–210, edited by Mary Evelyn Tucker and John Berthrong. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998. Warren, Karen J. “The Power and Promise of Ecological Feminism.” Environmental Ethics 12, no. 2 (1990): 125–46. Yan, Shoucheng. “Coherence and Contradiction in the Worldview of Wang Fuzhi (1619–1692).” Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures, Indiana University, Bloomington, 1994. Zhang Zai 張載. Zhengmeng 正蒙 [Correcting Youthful Ignorance] Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1978.

Index ability 72, 73, 95 ableism 87 abortion 222, 223 ageism 70, 76, 86–87 agency 57, 103–107, 111, 115, 117–118, 120–123, 134, 153–154, 159, 163, 237n33, 238, 241 American capitalism 59, 60, 63 American parents 40, 41, 42 American parenting 63–66 Ames, Roger T. 69–71, 78, 80–81, 83, 87, 89–92, 108n31, 134–135, 151, 156–157, 161, 206, 213–214 Analects 4, 17, 21, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 33, 34, 37, 49, 50, 53, 55, 77, 79–80, 84, 93, 107–111, 112–115, 115–119, 122, 136, 138–141, 151, 165, 175, 176–177, 179–180, 183–185, 186–188, 191–192, 202, 204, 205, 207, 209, 210, 212, 227, 234–235, 243 Analects for Women (Nü Lunyu) 5, 18, 30, 32, 33, 43 Anthony, Susan B. 148–149 anthropocentrism 10, 122, 226–227, 228–231, 242 authoritarianism 8, 83, 84, 192n46, 210 authority 8, 79, 92, 129–130 autonomy 22, 147–148, 152–155, 157, 159–162, 168, 205 Ban Zhao 18, 29, 31–33, 36, 164n94 bie (distinction) 42–43 Biographies of Women (Lienü Zhuan) 22–24, 31, 33, 35–36, 38 Book of Changes (Yijing) 43, 142, 200, 208, 246–248 Book of Documents (Shujing) 28n31 Book of Filial Piety 54, 81, 142, 210 Book of Filial Piety for Women (Nü Xiaojing) 36, 90n57 Book of Rites (Liji) 23n8, 29, 54, 78, 78n27, 84, 102n32, 142, 176, 242 Book of Songs (Book of Poetry) (Shijing) 27, 28 Butler, Judith 150, 159 care ethics 4, 9–10, 27, 147, 154, 157–168, 173–195 Chaste Widow Wang (see Madame Liu)

Chen Duxiu 2 Cheng Yi’s mother 44, 45 chi (shame) 187 children 40–67, 134, 136, 138–140, 149n5, 154, 164, 174, 178, 180n29, 182–183, 185, 190, 192–193 China 79, 87, 89, 91 Chinese mothers 40 Chosôn dynasty 45–46, 47, 59 Chosôn dynasty Confucian mothers 45–50 Chua, Amy 6, 40–41, 59, 60, 63 cissexism 87 civic education 63, 65 civic virtues 65 class 70, 72, 73, 75, 94–97 classism 70, 75, 76, 77, 80, 82, 85, 87 college entrance examination 41, 59, 60, 61 Collins, Patricia Hill 95, 105 communitarianism 162, 165 community 107, 111–115, 119–123, 142, 156, 160, 186, 188 complementarity 148–149, 167 Confucian education 47, 50, 53, 63 Confucian mothering 44–45, 47, 49, 53, 54, 57, 63 Confucian state examination 46, 47, 49, 53, 59 cosmology 10, 199, 208, 226–249 Crenshaw, Kimberlé 72, 73–74 Da Xue (see Great Learning) de Beauvoir, Simone 91n59, 103, 152–153, 155 deference 7, 54, 55, 76, 78, 80–81, 86, 92–93, 119, 140 Dewey, John 201 Doctrine of the Mean (Zhongyong) 18, 142, 244 Dong Zhongshu 176–177, 205 ecofeminism 226–230, 233, 235, 242, 246 education 6, 40–66, 152 empathy 174, 184–186 Empress Renxiao Wen 19, 30, 32–34, 36 Empress Xu 221 epistemic agency 103–107 epistemic practice 103

254 equality 1, 2, 17, 36, 91, 149, 173, 198n2, 203–204, 219 inequality 9, 65, 76, 80–81, 84–86, 92–95, 173, 174, 204, 219, 235 essentialism 132–133 Evangelical Christianity 219–220 exemplars 115, 136, 191 experience 70–71, 73–76, 79, 86–88, 90 family 41, 44, 51, 52, 58, 70, 74–77, 81–84, 90, 93, 102–103, 142–143, 149, 156–157, 162, 163–166, 167, 176, 180, 187, 192, 194, 198–224 Family Discourse of Confucius (Kongzi Jiayu) 17–18 Family Genealogy of Confucius (Kongzi Shijia) 19, 20n4, 21 fatherhood 10, 20, 35, 41, 44, 55, 141, 165, 183, 192, 194, 209–211, 234 femininity 25–26, 91n59, 142, 149, 153, 174, 177, 189, 208, 211, 217, 230, 247–248 feminist epistemology 101–123 feminist standpoint theory 128–131 Foucault, Michel 153 Four Books (Sishu) 18 Four Books for Women (Nü Sishu) 5, 11, 17–19, 22, 25, 29–38 friendship 70, 76, 78n27, 82, 84, 87, 88, 134, 141, 142

Index hierarchy 7, 71, 77, 78, 80, 82–85, 91–92, 103, 143, 160, 166, 174, 177, 189, 208, 212, 219, 227, 228, 234–236, 237, 242, 247 Historical Records (Shiji) 19 homosexuality 82 lesbianism 71, 75, 88, 165 Ming and Qing attitudes toward homosexuality 216 same-sex marriage 213–218 hooks, bell 75, 90, 92, 158 Hu Shih 2, 3 identity 6, 7, 8, 140, 148, 157–158, 161, 199, 217, 230, 242 immigration 73–74 intersectionality 69–95 James, William 139n21 Japan 59, 151, 200 Jiafan (see Precepts for Family Life) jing (reverence) 54, 117, 184, 188, 188n39 junzi (exemplary person, authoritative person, cultivated person) 7, 49, 55, 56, 77, 83, 107, 112–113, 136, 142, 186, 188n39, 191, 234 justice 2, 3, 70, 148, 167, 171, 172, 189, 204, 205, 211

gender 3, 22, 35, 69–73, 75, 83, 86, 87, 89–92, 138, 142, 148–150, 152–154, 158, 163, 167, 173, 198n2, 203–204, 235 Gilligan, Carol 147, 165 God 167 God’s eye view 102 “God trick” 138 Great Learning (Da Xue) 18, 28, 34, 52, 142, 151

Kang Youwei 2, 215–216 Kant, Immanuel 154, 231 keji-fuli (self-discipline) 54 knowledge 7–8, 101–123, 127–142 Kongzi Jiayu (see Family Discourse of Confucius) Kongzi Shijia (see Family Genealogy of Confucius) Korean War 41, 59 Kristeva, Julia 150, 158

Hall, David L. 71, 87, 89–92, 108n31, 137 Hanfeizi 84 Harding, Sandra 129 he (harmony) 10, 34, 82, 85, 89, 113, 200, 227–230, 232–233, 235–236, 242–246, 248 He-Yin Zhen 1–2 heterosexuality 88 heterosexism 82, 87

Lessons for Women (Nüjie) 5, 18, 29, 31–33 li (ritual propriety, rites) 10, 21–23, 24, 26–28, 31, 32, 35, 44, 55, 71, 76–78, 80, 83–86, 110, 136, 139, 148, 163–166, 165–166, 175, 176–177, 186–187, 213, 215, 234–236, 242–244 Li Chenyang 4, 69n2, 88, 92, 102, 147, 152, 152–153, 156, 166, 174–188, 205 Li Zehou 235, 243

Index Li Zhi 4 Liang Qichao 2 Lienü Zhuan (see Biographies of Women) Liji (see Book of Rites) Lin Yü-t’ang 3 Liu Xiang 22–23 Lunyu (see Analects) Madame Cheng 36 Madame Liu 19, 30, 33–34 masculinity 27, 89, 91n59, 154, 208, 230, 231, 233, 234, 247–248 May Fourth movement 2 Mencius 1, 18, 42–43, 44, 50, 51–52, 54, 55n60, 79n29, 84, 85, 141, 143n29, 147, 152, 153, 182–185, 186n37, 189, 205, 206–207, 208, 218, 233–234 Mengzi (see Mencius) metaphysics 7, 10, 18, 133, 152, 162, 227, 233, 236, 239, 247 ming (fate) 209 modernization, of China 2 moral education 53, 57, 59, 136 moral perfection 42, 49, 51 motherhood 40–66, 144, 149–150, 152, 154, 156, 164–165 Mother Meng 44 Nagel, Thomas 128–129 Nanzi 21–22 Neixun (see Teachings for the Inner Court) Neo-Confucianism 18, 238, 239, 241, 242 new materialism 226, 228, 238–239 New Text school 1 Noddings, Nel 147, 154, 161, 164–165, 173–174, 178–181 Nü Lunyu (see Analects for Women) Nü Sishu (see Four Books for Women) Nü Xiaojing (see Book of Filial Piety for Women) Nüfan Jielun (see Short Records of Models for Women) Nüjie (see Lessons for Women) obedience 43, 44, 45, 46, 48, 63 oppression 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 22, 69–77, 80–91, 93, 95

255 parenting 6, 10, 40–66, 134, 136, 138–140, 175, 183, 192 patriarchy 2, 10, 18, 36, 37, 45n19, 50, 57, 73, 85, 86, 143, 148–149, 166, 173, 174, 176, 203–204, 233 perseverance (persistence) 56, 59, 63, 64, 65, 66 person 8, 9, 10, 70, 73–76, 79–80, 82–83, 88–90, 93, 103 posthumanism 226, 228, 230, 231, 236, 237 postmodernism 150, 162–163 power 76, 80–86, 92–95, 102–103, 123, 141 practice, and theory 6–7, 8, 102 Precepts for Family Life ( Jiafan) 43 qi (vital energy) 10, 227, 236–241, 246, 248 race 70, 72–74, 77, 88 racism 70, 75–77, 80–82, 86–87, 90 rectification (zheng) 53, 141, 234 relationality 9, 147, 152–154, 155–158, 159–163, 164–165, 167–168 religion 82n37, 87 ren (humaneness, benevolence, authoritative conduct, consummate conduct)  26, 30, 51–52, 54, 57–58, 71, 77–78, 80, 83–85, 89–90, 93, 111, 136, 147, 156–157, 159–160, 164–165, 166, 167, 174–179, 191, 227 renxing (human nature) 164, 234n24 rights 6, 58, 138, 140, 148–149, 151, 156, 157, 167 reproductive rights 219, 220–221 role ethics 7, 10, 134–135 role models 180, 189–193 Rorty, Richard 133 Rosenlee, Li-Hsiang Lisa 5, 37n60, 69, 70n6, 72n11, 83, 89, 90n57, 142–143, 208, 217 sancong side (three womanly obediences and four womanly virtues) 3, 23, 29, 31, 33, 42, 44 self 8, 9, 50, 51, 52, 57, 147–168 self-cultivation 44, 49–53, 57, 65 self-esteem 62, 64 semiotics 150

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Index

sex 70–72, 87–88, 92, 95 sexism 69–72, 74–78, 80–82, 84, 87–92, 128, 137, 140, 142–143, 148–149, 150, 151, 161, 166, 176, 228 Shiji (see Historical Records) Shijing (see Book of Songs) Short Records of Models for Women (Nüfan Jielun) 6, 19, 30, 34–36 shu (empathy, reciprocity) 80n32, 92–94, 186–187, 200, 212 Shujing (see Book of Documents) Sima Qian 19 Sishu (see Four Books) society, traditional Chinese 1, 2, 3 Song Ruoxi and Song Ruozhao 18 South Korea 41, 59–62, 65 submissiveness 43, 49, 208

virtue(s) 44, 45, 54, 71, 80, 82, 83, 85, 89, 90, 93, 118n62, 134–136, 143, 167, 174, 178–179, 180, 183, 189, 201, 217 vital materialism 230, 236–238 vulnerability 212

Teachings for the Inner Court (Neixun) 5, 19, 30, 32–33 tianrenheyi (continuity of nature and persons) 10, 227, 241 “tiger mother” 40–41, 59, 60–61, 63, 65 transcultural feminism 17, 19 transgender 71

zhi (knowledge, understanding, wisdom)  26, 107, 108, 114, 136–137, 140–141 zhong (loyalty, doing one’s utmost) 93, 117, 119, 200, 212 Zhongyong (see Doctrine of the Mean) Zhu Xi 18, 32, 33n46, 43, 44

xiao (filial piety, family reverence) 26, 30, 45, 46, 52, 55, 77–78, 138, 163, 200, 202, 210 Xiaojing (see Book of Filial Piety) xin (reliability, trustworthiness) 7, 107, 115–123 yi (appropriateness, righteousness) 26, 121, 175 Yijing (see Book of Changes) yin and yang 10, 43, 50, 151, 207–208, 227, 246–248