Exempla externa in Cicero’s Orations (Studies in Classical Literature and Culture, 13) [New ed.] 9783631850138, 9783631854846, 9783631865514, 3631850131

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Exempla externa in Cicero’s Orations

Studies in Classical Literature and Culture Edited by Mikołaj Szymański

Volume 13

Damian Pierzak

Exempla externa in Cicero’s Orations A Rhetorical Approach

Bibliographic Information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data is available in the internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A CIP catalog record for this book has been applied for at the Library of Congress. This publication was financed as part of the SONATA 12 competition; project No. 2016/23/D/HS2/0240. The project was carried out at the University of Silesia in Katowice, Poland.

This work has been reviewed by Bartosz Awianowicz (Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń). Cover illustration: Courtesy of Benjamin Ben Chaim. ISSN 2196-9779 ISBN 978-3-631-85013-8 (Print) E-ISBN 978-3-631-85484-6 (E-PDF) E-ISBN 978-3-631-86551-4 (EPUB) DOI 10.3726/b18910 © Peter Lang GmbH Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften Berlin 2021 All rights reserved. Peter Lang – Berlin ∙ Bern ∙ Bruxelles ∙ New York ∙ Oxford ∙ Warszawa ∙ Wien All parts of this publication are protected by copyright. Any utilisation outside the strict limits of the copyright law, without the permission of the publisher, is forbidden and liable to prosecution. This applies in particular to reproductions, translations, microfilming, and storage and processing in electronic retrieval systems. This publication has been peer reviewed. www.peterlang.com

Acknowledgments This book would never have come into existence if not for the funding from the Polish National Science Centre grant. During various stages of its development, the project has benefited from the generous assistance of many individuals and institutions. Prof. Antoni Bobrowski and Prof. Przemysław Marciniak helped with the grant proposal by offering criticism and advice. Thanks to the scholarship awarded by the Lanckoroński Foundation (Cracow), I have been able to lay the groundwork for my research at the American Academy in Rome and the Deutsches Archäologisches Institut (Abteilung Rom) in March 2018. Furthermore, I am most grateful to Prof. Katarzyna Marciniak and Prof. Jakub Pigoń not only for their encouragement, but also for directing my attention to some recent and relevant secondary literature. Prof. Bartosz Awianowicz kindly undertook to review the present volume and, by pointing out a number of shortcomings, led to its considerable improvement. Thanks are also due to Prof. Mikołaj Szymański, editor of ‘Studies in Classical Literature and Culture’ published by Peter Lang, for accepting the manuscript for the series, reading, and commenting on the final draft. Needless to say that the responsibility for all the remaining errors of fact and interpretation as well as other faults lies solely with myself. I am much obliged to the staff at the Project Service Office at the University of Silesia in Katowice, and especially to Mrs. Aleksandra Sokoła, Dr. Dawid Matuszek, and Mrs. Anna Dziadek, who helped me navigate the twists and turns of the complex administrative matters, and to the editors at the Warsaw office of Peter Lang, Mr. Łukasz Gałecki, Dr. Adam Gorlikowski, and Mr. Rafał Szklarski for their guidance and editorial assistance. Finally, I would like to take this opportunity to express my deepest gratitude to my family and friends, without whom this journey would have been meaningless –​ nam et secundas res splendidiores facit amicitia, et adversas partiens communicansque leviores. They have contributed to this book in ways that they will never know.

Table of Contents Preface ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  11 List of Abbreviations ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  13 A. Part One.  Theoretical Background 1. Introduction ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  17

1.1. Exempla domestica and externa ��������������������������������������������������������������  23



1.2. Research Aims, Methods, and Scope �����������������������������������������������������  31

2. The Aristotelian Paradigm ���������������������������������������������������������������������  33

2.1. Aristotle’s First Example: The Greek Tyrants ����������������������������������������  39



2.2. Aristotle’s Second Example: The Persian Invasion of Egypt ���������������  41



2.3. Summary ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  44

3. Exemplum in the Roman Context: Quintilian’s Degrees of Similarity ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  45

3.1. Preliminary Remarks �������������������������������������������������������������������������������  47



3.2. Similarity and Dissimilarity ��������������������������������������������������������������������  49



3.3. Refutatio and Faulty exempla ������������������������������������������������������������������  54



3.4. Extreme Dissimilarity: The exemplum contrarium ������������������������������  60



3.5. Arguments a fortiori: The Inequality �����������������������������������������������������  63



3.6. Closing Remarks: Exempla and Commonplaces ����������������������������������  71

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B. Part Two.  Exempla externa in Cicero’s Orations 4. Confronting Theory and Practice �������������������������������������������������������  77

4.1. ‘C. Fannius’ and the Greek Tyrants ��������������������������������������������������������  79



4.2. Cicero and the Greek Tyrants �����������������������������������������������������������������  83 4.2.1. The Primary and Secondary Referents �����������������������������������������  84 4.2.2. The Reversed Antonomasia ������������������������������������������������������������  89 4.2.2.1. Semiramis illa ���������������������������������������������������������������������  97



4.3. Form and Function of exempla externa: A Summary �����������������������  103

5. The Series of exempla ������������������������������������������������������������������������������  107

5.1. The Early Orations ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������  109



5.2. The Speeches of Cicero’s Consular Year �����������������������������������������������  122



5.3. The Post-​exile Period �����������������������������������������������������������������������������  134



5.4. The Philippics �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  144



5.5. Summary �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  152

6. Alexander of Macedon as Individual exemplum ������������������������  157

6.1. Identification �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  159



6.2. Contrast ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  165



6.3. A Missed Opportunity? �������������������������������������������������������������������������  169

7. Hannibal as Individual exemplum ����������������������������������������������������  173

7.1. Identification �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  176



7.2. Juxtaposition �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  181



7.3. Contrast ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  188



7.4. Counterexample �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  201



7.5. A Stock exemplum ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������  205

Table of Contents

9

8. Antiochus the Great as Individual exemplum �����������������������������  209

8.1. Juxtaposition �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  210



8.2. A Subsidiary exemplum �������������������������������������������������������������������������  215

9. Spartacus as Individual exemplum ���������������������������������������������������  219

9.1. Identification �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  221



9.2. An exemplum in the Making? ���������������������������������������������������������������  233

10. Conclusions ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  237

10.1. Similarity and Dissimilarity between Referents ����������������������������  239 10.1.1. Identification ���������������������������������������������������������������������������  240 10.1.2. Juxtaposition ����������������������������������������������������������������������������  241 10.1.3. Contrast ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  243



10.2. Means of Expressing the Degree of Similarity �������������������������������  244



10.3. Single and Multiple Referents ����������������������������������������������������������  251



10.4. The Choice and Meaning of exempla externa ��������������������������������  254



10.5. Exempla externa as Tools of Praise and Blame ������������������������������  256

Bibliography ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  259 Index of Names �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  293 Index of Passages ���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  299

Preface This book originates from a research project funded by the Polish National Science Center (UMO-​2016/​23/​D/​HS2/​02408) entitled Argument from the Past in Cicero’s Orations. Theory and Practice. The task I have set myself is to develop a coherent methodology for studying Cicero’s use of historical exempla. More specifically, my aim is to explore to what extent the precepts of rhetorical theory concerning exemplum are applicable to practical oratory. As a consequence, this book has been divided into two parts. Part One comprises three chapters detailing the theoretical framework; Part Two begins with a chapter that sets the stage for the subsequent analysis of Cicero’s orations by recasting the ancient terminology into modern terms; of the five chapters that follow each deals with Cicero’s use of various historical figures as exempla. Thus, because the analytical portion of the book draws on the terminology developed in Chapters 1–​4, the former part is a prerequisite for the latter, as it were. For reasons that will be explained in the introductory chapter, I have decided to narrow down the research area to exempla externa (‘foreign examples’). In the “Conclusion” my research findings are summarized and organized according to the proposed categories. With the exception of short quotations, Latin words, and titles, all the passages in the main body of the text are translated. Whenever possible, I have used recent translations available in English (esp. for Cicero). Otherwise, they have been taken from the Loeb Classical Library editions. The first part of this book is largely based upon previously published articles. Earlier thoughts on what became Chapters Two and Four appeared as “References to Historical Figures as a Means of Persuasion in Ancient Rhetoric. A Research Methodology Applicable to Cicero,” in Scripta Classica 15 (2018), 13–​35; Chapter Three is a slightly adapted version of “The Degrees of Similarity in Quintilian’s Discussion of Exempla. A Reappraisal,” Eos 106 (2) 2019, 259–​ 288, while “Spartacus as a Point of Reference in Cicero’s Orations,” in: D. Słapek (ed.), Spartacus. History and Tradition, Lublin 2018, pp. 47–​62, forms the basis for Chapter Nine of the monograph. All are reprinted here with the kind permission of the editors of the said volumes. The papers on the research methodology and Spartacus were read at conferences in Katowice and Lublin respectively. I am indebted to the participants in those events for valuable comments and suggestions.

List of Abbreviations The ancient authors and their works are for the most part abbreviated after LSJ and OLD. I have not included here the authors of standard editions, e.g. M for B. Maurenbrecher or R for O. Ribbeck. DKP

= K. Ziegler, W. Sontheimer (eds.), Der Kleine Pauly. Lexikon der Antike, Stuttgart 1964.

FRHist = T. J. Cornell et al. (eds.), The Fragments of the Roman Historians, 3 vols, Oxford 2013. FRL

= G. Manuwald (ed.), Fragmentary Republican Latin. Oratory, Parts 1–​3, Cambridge (Mass.)–​London 2019.

ILS

= H. Dessau (ed.), Inscriptiones Latinae selectae, 3 vols, Berlin 1892–​1916.

ILLRP = A. Degrassi (ed.), Inscriptiones Latinae liberae rei publicae, 2 vols, Firenze 1957–​1963. K-​S

= R. Kühner, C. Stegmann, Ausführliche Grammatik der lateinischen Sprache: Satzlehre, 2 vols, München 41962.

LSJ

= H. G. Liddell, R. Scott (eds.), A Greek–​English Lexicon, rev. by H. Stuart Jones, Oxford 91940.

MRR

= T. R. S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, 3 vols, New York–​Atlanta 1951–​1986.

3

OCD

= S. Hornblower, A. Spawforth (eds.), The Oxford Classical Dictionary, Oxford 32003.

OLD

= P. G. W. Glare et al. (eds.), Oxford Latin Dictionary, Oxford 1968.

2

ORF

= E. Malcovati (ed.), Oratorum Romanorum fragmenta liberae rei publicae, Torino 21955.

RE

= A. Pauly, G. Wissowa, W. Kroll (eds.), Real-​Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, Stuttgart 1893–​1980.

RLM

= C. Halm (ed.), Rhetores Latini minores, Leipzig 1863 (repr. Frankfurt a. M. 1964).

newgenprepdf

14

List of Abbreviations

SB

= D. R. Shackleton Bailey (ed.), Cicero’s Letters to Atticus, 7 vols, Cambridge 1965; Idem (ed.), Cicero: Epistulae ad familiares, 2 vols, Cambridge 1977; Idem (ed.), Cicero: Epistulae ad Quintum fratrem et M. Brutum, Cambridge 1980.

TLL

= Thesaurus linguae Latinae, Leipzig 1900–​.

A. Part One. Theoretical Background

1. Introduction This book examines the use of exempla externa in Cicero’s orations, a subject that has been seemingly neglected despite the vast scholarship that the exemplary discourse in Roman culture has recently attracted.1 In spite of (or perhaps due to) the fact that only about two dozen out of some 400 individuals invoked as exempla in Cicero’s speeches are non-​Romans (cf. n. 62 below), there is no exclusive study of this particular means of persuasion.2 Therefore, it seems to be a promising area of investigation, not least because the number of passages to be scrutinized is relatively limited. The current introductory chapter begins with an overview of how the concept of exemplum had developed over the centuries, discusses the distinction between native and foreign examples and, finally, it establishes the aims, methods, and scope of the present study. Antiquity’s most valuable theoretical accounts of exemplum are those of Aristotle, the author of the Rhetorica ad Herennium, Cicero, and Quintilian.3 For the moment, I shall put aside the question of the Aristotelian paradigm, which is

1 See most recently the general studies of exemplarity by Langlands 2018 and Roller 2018, both with ample bibliographies. On Cicero’s use of exempla specifically, cf. e.g. Sauer 1909/​1910; Schoenberger 1910; David 1980; Robinson 1986, 1994; Stinger 1993; Stemmler 2000; Bücher 2006; van der Blom 2010, 2011; Casamento 2011; Urban 2011; Martin 2013, and now Bellini 2020. 2 Several studies concerned with Cicero’s use of exempla touch upon the subject (notably Robinson 1986; Stinger 1993; Bücher 2006, and van der Blom 2010). Some valuable discussion can be found in the commentaries on specific orations (e.g. Lenaghan 1969 on Har.; Adamietz 1989 on Mur.; Klodt 1992 on Rab. Post.; Gotoff 1993 on the Caesarian Speeches; Ramsey 2003 on Phil. 1, 2; Kaster 2006 on Sest.; Manuwald 2007 on Phil. 3–​9, 2018 on the Agrarian Speeches; Dyck 2008a on the Catilinarians, 2012 on Scaur.; Coşkun 2010 on Arch.). Also available are articles and chapters in books devoted to individual foreign characters: Bruhl 1930; Heuss 1954; Weippert 1972; Wirth 1976; Green 1978; Spencer 2002 on Alexander; Berger 1978; Stocks 2014, and Matusiak 2015 on Hannibal; Dziuba 2016 on Spartacus, and Berthold 1965 on Themistocles, to name a few examples. Additionally, van der Blom 2007 deals with Cicero’s choice between Greek and Roman exempla. 3 This section is a revised version of Pierzak 2018b: 15–​20. On exemplum in ancient rhetorical theory see e.g. Alewell 1912; Clark 1959: 124; Lumpe 1966; Martin 1974: 119–​121; Price 1975; Zorzetti 1980; Daxelmüller 1984: 634; Brinton 1988: 174 f; Gazich 1990; Coenen 1992; Demoen 1997; Franchet d’Espèrey 2010. I look more closely at Quintilian’s discussion of exempla in the third chapter.

18

Introduction

discussed in the next chapter, and focus on the more universal, Roman concept of exemplum. The way in which the earliest extant Latin definitions are formulated suggests that historical examples need to be specific, in the sense that the name of the agent or the object of an action has to be explicitly stated.4 This quality is what distinguishes exempla from more general comparisons.5 According to M. Stemmler, both definitions which I have just quoted in n. 4 (i.e. at Rhet. Her. and in Cicero’s De inventione) emphasize that exemplum’s efficacy rests upon the authority (auctoritas, resp. auctor) of that specific person whose action had been invoked as precedent.6 This authority, in turn, depends on the unique position the ancestors held among the Romans7 and is absent from the discussion of exempla in Greek theory (cf. n. 30 below). 4 See Rhet. Her. 4.62: Exemplum est alicuius facti aut dicti praeteriti cum cer ti auc tor i s nomine propositio. Id sumitur isdem de causis quibus similitudo. When dealing with exemplum in his well-​known handbook, Leeman 1963: 40 simply translates the definition offered by Rhet. Her.: “The third figure of this triad is exemplum (παράδειγμα), in which something said or done in the past is cited with the name of its auctor. […] The aim of the exemplum is the same as that of the comparison.” Cicero’s take on exemplum is only slightly different (Inv. 1.49: exemplum est, quod rem auc tor itate aut casu alicuius hominis aut negotii confirmat aut infirmat) in that by saying casu he seems to take into account something that befell a person in the past as well. The passive voice is used in one of the examples quoted by Quintilian (Inst. 5.11.6 fin.): iure occ i su s est Saturninus sicut Gracchi in which people who were just ly k i l le d are juxtaposed. Cf. Grillo 2015: 175 on Cic. Prov. 26. 5 See Price 1975: 98, 104; Gazich 1990: 81. 6 See Stemmler 2000: 151 f; cf. Schoenberger 1910: 14; Maslakov 1984: 439, n. 5 and esp. 440, n. 5; Franchet d’Espèrey 2010: 71 and the comment by van der Blom 2010: 126: “A historical exemplum presented had to possess (perceived) auctoritas in order to lend credibility to the argument. However, the orator or author employing an exemplum had himself to hold, or be understood to hold, auctoritas, otherwise his credibility and thereby his case would suffer.” 7 For the Romans, their history to a large degree amounted to a chain of exemplary deeds which were evaluated as either (morally) good or bad (there were some actions, however, that would count as “ethically unmarked,” as noted by Roller 2004: 35). Some of them were to be imitated, some avoided (Liv. praef. 10). The young Roman, especially if born to one of the major aristocratic families, was raised in the midst of these role models. Ever since records of what had happened in the past were kept, the nobiles watched carefully which events and ancestors were fitting to serve as an object of imitation for the posterity. See on the subject: Gnauk 1936: 8, 11; Rech 1936: passim; Drexler 1954: 171 f = 1973: 260–​262, who quotes Cato, orig. fr. 83 Peter = Gell. 3.7 as one such example; Marrou 61965: 347–​349; David 1980: 82; Christ 42000: 415; Pina Polo 2004: 156 f, 159; Roller 2009: 214 f, 218, 228, and van der Poel 2009: 333

Introduction

19

Modern definitions of exemplum (e.g. the influential one by H. Lausberg), on the other hand, usually draw on Quintilian’s notion of historical example.8 There is a general consensus among scholars that exemplum involves people and/​or events from the past but, depending on the literary genre under investigation, its function is variously determined.9 The ancient authors as well provide different insights into the matter.10 To put it very briefly, exemplum can serve as either a means of persuasion, as ornamentation, illustration of an argument or, finally, as a role model. The latter function is closely tied to the notion of mos maiorum (cf. n. 7) and it underlies the definitions of the author of Rhetorica ad Herennium and Cicero. Some of the precepts set forth by rhetoricians, however, are more suitable to poetry,11 especially that exemplum is often subsumed under the rubric “figures of thought.”12 We need to bear in mind that ancient manuals of rhetoric (who compares Tac. Hist. 1.2–​3) on Livy’s preface; van der Blom 2011: 49 (p. 63, n. 1 for further literature). On the mos maiorum in general see the valuable collection of papers in Linke, Stemmler 2000. 8 See Quint. Inst. 5.11.6: quod proprie vocamus exemplum, id est rei gestae aut ut gestae utilis ad persuadendum id, quod intenderis, commemoratio with Lausberg 31990: 227 f (§ 410). Cf. David 1980: 68–​71; Demoen 1997: 139. On the phrase res gesta aut ut gesta cf. Price 1975: 149; Gazich 1990: 115; Franchet d’Espèrey 2010: 75 f. The studies on exemplum in ancient rhetorical theory are listed above, n. 3. On the meaning of Quintilian’s id quod intenderis see the discussion in Section 3.1 below. 9 To give but few examples: for Robinson 1986: 1 it is “to make an argument more persuasive,” whereas for van der Blom 2010: 3 an exemplum “is intended to serve as a moral-​didactic guide to conduct.” Various meanings of the noun ‘exemplum’ were closely examined by Kornhardt 1936 (cf. the remarks of Fuhrmann 1973/​1983: 451); for a useful modern definition see Demoen 1997: 147 f. The scholarship on exemplum is discussed e.g. by Daxelmüller 1991: 77–​80 and more recently Bücher 2006: 152, n. 1. 10 See e.g. Rhet. Her. 4.62: Rem ornatiorem facit cum nullius rei nisi dignitatis causa sumitur; apertiorem, cum id quod sit obscurius magis dilucidum reddit; probabiliorem, cum magis veri similem facit; ante oculos ponit, cum exprimit omnia perspicue ut res prope dicam manu temptari possit; cf. 2.46: quoniam exornatio constat ex similibus et exemplis et amplificationibus et rebus iudicatis et ceteris rebus […] and the discussion of other sources in Martin 1974: 119–​121 and Demoen 1997: 130–​133. A convenient overview of various applications of exempla has been recently offered by Schulz 2018: 309. 11 On exemplum in poetry see e.g. Öhler 1925; Canter 1933; Willcock 1964; Davis 1980; Williams 1980: passim; Gazich 1995; Bobrowski 1997; Puk 2013. 12 E.g. Rhet. Her. 4.62 quoted in n. 10 above; Cic. De or. 3.205, Top. 41–​45; see in general Williams 1980. Cf. McCall 1969: 100; Wisse, Winterbottom, Fantham 2008: 318; van der Poel 2009: 335; Schulz 2018: 310.

20

Introduction

were concerned with poetry as much as with oratory. A good deal of illustrative material in the Rhetorica ad Herennium is drawn from republican tragedy, while Vergil is the second (next to Cicero) most often quoted author by Quintilian. It is also apparent that the persuasive function of exempla had been gradually in decline since rhetoric had basically lost its political meaning at Rome during the Principate.13 In Livy, exemplum serves mainly as a moral guide for the characters of the Ab urbe condita “within the text.”14 Although from the Early Empire onwards, as the work of Valerius Maximus clearly indicates, exempla were increasingly becoming subordinate to the imperial policy,15 they have retained their educational value and the collections of facta et dicta were still useful to lawyers, declaimers, and writers.16 Later on, historical examples were often employed by philosophers and Christian writers as fitting illustrations for their arguments.17 The gradual detachment of exemplum from practical oratory eventually led to the development of a new literary genre in the Middle Ages, namely exempla as “parables” or “anecdotes.”18 13 See Panitschek 1989: 232: “Exempla treten, wie die Quellen zeigen, nach der Institutionalisierung des Prinzipats nur noch als moralisch-​ethische Lehrbeispiele, nicht aber als Argumente in einem politischen Disput über Sachfragen auf […].” Among the most relevant ancient sources are Tac. Dial. 1.1 and passim; Petr. 1 f, 88; Vell. 1.16–​18; Sen. Con. 1, praef. 6–​8; cf. Caplan 1944 = 1970. The standard work on the subject is still Heldmann 1982 (see esp. pp. 207–​299). Already Cicero, as Mayer 2001: 12, n. 34 notes, had prophesized about this decline (Tusc. 2.5) and Quintilian later wrote a piece entitled De causis corruptae eloquentiae, only fragments of which survive (discussed by Brink 1989; cf. Winterbottom 1998 = 2019: 189 f). 14 See Zorzetti 1978; Chaplin 2000: 3; 2015; Roller 2009: 218, 228; however, cf. Section 3.2 below on ‘internal’ and ‘external audience’ and the short bibliographical survey in van der Blom 2010: 5, n. 16. 15 See the dedication to Tiberius in V. Max. 1 praef.: Te igitur huic coepto, penes quem hominum deorumque consensus maris ac terrae regimen esse voluit, certissima salus patriae, Caesar, invoco, cuius caelesti providentia virtutes, de quibus dicturus sum, benignissime foventur, vitia severissime vindicantur with the discussion by Maslakov 1984: 437 f with n. 1, 446, 452 and passim. 16 For more details see e.g. Lucarelli 2007: 24–​35; cf. Marrou 61965: 414; Maslakov 1984; Bloomer 1992: 12: “Clearly, declaimers and schoolboys –​apprentice declaimers –​ found this book [i.e. Facta et dicta memorabilia] useful and in all likelihood contributed to its form and contents.” 17 See e.g. Honstetter 1977; Daxelmüller 1984: 636; Mayer 1991; Roller 2001: 88–​108. 18 This does not mean, of course, that the mediaeval exemplum was simply a debased version of its ancient counterpart. There is a vast literature on exemplarity in the

Introduction

21

I am well aware that this sketch merely scratches the surface of the problem and might seem largely oversimplifying. It was intended to show that exemplum, in terms of its form and function, has been a very complex phenomenon. Even in the narrower sense of the term (i.e. rhetorical example), it applies to two different types of argumentation, one more general and one more technical. The former is closely associated with the mos maiorum and depends on the authority of the ancestors.19 The idea that one will benefit from contemplating the past in deciding future courses of action was of course not uncommon in antiquity,20 but the Romans became obsessed with it. The latter is what Cicero counted among the conparabilia (Inv. 1.49), and what Quintilian understood by the Greek term παράδειγμα (Inst. 5.11.1): quo nomine et generaliter usi sunt [sc. Graeci] in omni similium adpositione et specialiter in iis, quae rer um gestar um auc tor itate nituntur, i.e. “any matching of similar things” in general, and those “which rest on the authority of history”21 in particular. In this respect, I believe, the rhetorical procedure whereby an orator refers to an individual or an action from the past in order to improve his argument did not change, at least from theoretical point of view, since it was expounded for the first time by Aristotle. At Rh. 1393a he divides exempla into historical ones (τὸ λέγειν πράγματα προγεγενημένα) and the ones invented by a speaker (τὸ αὐτὸν ποιεῖν). Those invented by a speaker are in turn specified as either similitudo

Middle Ages. See e.g. Stierle 1973/​1983: 360 f = 1978: 346, 348 and passim; Berlioz, David 1980: 23–​30; von Moos 21996; Demoen 1997: 142 and the collection of essays in Aerts, Gosman 1988 and Haug, Wachinger 1991. Daxelmüller 1984: 627–​ 633 surveys various ways in which exemplum had been understood and approached through the centuries. 19 See n. 7 above. Cf. Cic. De or. 1.18: tenenda praeterea est omnis antiquitas exemplorumque vis, neque legum ac iuris civilis scientia neglegenda est with Gnauk 1936: 12; Petzold 1972: 258 = 1999: 91 and passim; Leeman, Pinkster 1981: 40 f; Fleck 1993: 19, 33; Stinger 1993: 14–​16; van der Blom 2010: passim and Kenty 2016: passim. 20 Cf. e.g. Arist. Rh. 1368a: ἐκ γὰρ τῶν προγεγονότων τὰ μέλλοντα καταμαντευόμενοι κρίνομεν with Rapp 2002: 430; 1418a: ἔστιν δὲ τὰ μὲν παραδείγματα δημηγορικώτατα, τὰ δ’ ἐνθυμήματα δικανικώτερα· ἡ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὸ μέλλον, ὥστ’ ἐκ τῶν γενομένων ἀνάγκη παραδείγματα λέγειν, ἡ δὲ περὶ ὄντων ἢ μὴ ὄντων, οὗ μᾶλλον ἀπόδειξίς ἐστιν καὶ ἀνάγκη· ἔχει γὰρ τὸ γεγονὸς ἀνάγκην; Lys. 25.23: χρὴ τοίνυν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, τοῖς πρότερον γεγενημένοις παραδείγμασι χρωμένους βουλεύεσθαι περὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι. See on the subject e.g. Schoenberger 1910: 6; Stierle 1973/​ 1983: 357 f = 1978: 344, and Marincola 2010: 267. 21 Here and below tr. D. A. Russell. Cf. van der Poel 2009: 335; Encinas Reguero 2017: 251.

22

Introduction

(παραβολή), or fables (λόγοι, οἷον Αἰσώπειοι καὶ Λιβυκοί).22 Quintilian, after discussing the degrees of similarity between various types of exempla (cf. Chapter Three), makes the same distinction. First, he speaks of poeticae fabulae and fabellae (5.11.17–​20), and then he rounds off the survey of exempla by saying (§ 22): Proximas exemplo vires habet similitudo […] (“Similitude has much the same force as Example”). Furthermore, when he calls attention to their usefulness in deciding future courses of action, he chooses Aristotle’s example concerning Dionysius’ aiming at tyranny as illustration.23 It appears that a similar type of argument was put forward at Rome as early as the latter half of the second century bce, when ‘C. Fannius’ (cos. 122?) argued against C. Gracchus’ munificence (the grant of citizenship to the Latins and Latin rights to the Italians?). Namely, he compared his opponent to Dionysius, Pisistratus, and Phalaris.24 If this sort of historical parallel was common in either school exercises or political debates, it would to some extent account for the relative conciseness with which the Roman rhetorical handbooks known to us deal with exemplum as a means of persuasion. Perhaps fuller elaborations upon the subject existed and such authors as Cicero, who was never much fond of the technicalities,25 did not feel the need to stress the obvious. In what follows, I will try to determine the most suitable approach to examine the type of exemplum that was employed by ‘C. Fannius’. What is immediately apparent, however, is that from the Roman perspective this example draws on foreign history (exemplum externum). Since the present study engages with this category of exempla in Cicero’s orations, a deeper consideration thereof is required before we can proceed.

22 Cf. Solmsen 1941: 171 = 1968: 330; Caplan 1968: 376, n. b; Price 1975: 38 f; Grimaldi 1988: 250 f ad loc.; Coenen 1992: 322; Rapp 2002: 731 f ad loc.; van der Poel 2009: 334 f; Blank 2014: 17, and Schulz 2018: 310 f. 23 See Quint. Inst. 5.11.8 ~ Arist. Rh. 1357b (full quotation in Section 4.1 below). Cf. Price 1975: 284, n. 38; Gazich 1990: 69, n. 23; Franchet d’Espèrey 2010: 67. 24 Cf. Robinson 1986: 10 f, 16 with n. 21. On the historical background see the sources listed in MRR 1.516 and the discussion below (Section 4.1). Though these fragments are classified by Malcovati 21955: 144 as incertae sedis, they could belong to C. Fannius’ speech De sociis et nomine Latino. Cf. Morstein-​Marx 2004: 127; 222, n. 82. Contra [implicite] Stockton 1979: 156 f. Ferrary 1983, however, argues convincingly against the attribution of these fragments to C. Fannius. According to him, C. Iulius Victor (to whom we owe the quotation) might have drawn them from an anti-​Gracchan declamation. For the sake of argument, I shall call Gracchus’ adversary ‘C. Fannius’, since the supposed declaimer might very well have impersonated him. 25 See e.g. Narducci 1997: 24–​28; Wisse, Winterbottom, Fantham 2008: 303 f.

Exempla domestica and externa

23

1.1. Exempla domestica and externa As with many other rhetorical notions, the distinction between exempla externa (resp. aliena) and domestica, which later became crucial in Roman oratory, was first introduced by the Greeks. Aristotle does not explicitly recognize this distinction, but it was quite common among the Attic orators. Isocrates, for instance, recommended native (οἰκεῖα) rather than foreign examples on the grounds that a person should follow in the footsteps of his own forebears.26 Apsines of Gadara, a rhetorician active in the third century ce, states27 that every exemplum (πᾶν παράδειγμα) “is taken either from domestic or foreign instances” (λαμβάνεται δὲ ἢ ἐξ οἰκείων ἢ ἐξ ἀλλοτρίων [sc. γεγονότων]). He stresses that the native παραδείγματα are “more useful in debate and more appropriate” (ἀγωνιστικώτερα καὶ προσεχέστερα) and cites Demosthenes in support of this view: the speaker is convinced that his audience will better appreciate references to their own history.28 A little further, however, Apsines admits that foreign exempla too have their merits and are especially suitable to/​as “deprecations [made] in advance” (προπαραιτήσεις; cf. LSJ, s.v.). Once again, a passage from Demosthenes is quoted as an illustration.29 It must be noted that in general Demosthenes used foreign examples very sparsely, and his οἰκεῖα παραδείγματα refer to the Athenian community as a whole rather than to any specific individual.30 Beside those two handbook illustrations, there are at least few other passages in Attic oratory where this distinction is made explicit.31 Whenever an Attic orator referred to the history of Athens, he did not normally need to make any additional comment. He could, as Demosthenes at 3.23 (n. 28), emphasize

2 6 See Isoc. 9.77 with Jost 1936: 121. Cf. Nouhaud 1982: 65. 27 See Aps. Rh. 6.2 Dilts–​Kennedy (p. 280 Spengel–​Hammer). The translations of Apsines are those of M. R. Dilts and G. A. Kennedy. 28 Dem. 3.23: ἔσται δὲ βραχὺς καὶ γνώριμος ὑμῖν ὁ λόγος‧ οὐ γὰρ ἀλλοτρίοις ὑμῖν χρωμένοις παραδείγμασιν, ἀλλ’ οἰκείοις, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εὐδαίμοσιν ἔξεστι γενέσθαι. Almost exactly the same phrasing occurs at Dem. 13.21. According to Price 1975: 230, n. 46, τὰ οἰκεῖα παραδείγματα “can refer to two different types of paradigms; domestic vs foreign […] and personal experiences vs the experiences of others.” 29 See Dem. 24.139: Βούλομαι δ’ ὑμῖν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, ἐν Λοκροῖς ὡς νομοθετοῦσι διηγήσασθαι‧ οὐδὲν γὰρ χείρους ἔσεσθε παράδειγμά τι ἀκηκοότες, ἄλλως τε καὶ ᾧ πόλις εὐνομουμένη χρῆται. 30 See Jost 1936: 163–​165. Cf. May 1988: 6 f; Treggiari 2003: 162: “The insistence on the moral ancestry of the individual is peculiarly Roman. It cannot be paralleled in Greek thought to anything like the same extent […].” 31 See Dem. 19.269; Lycurg. 128; cf. Aesch. 1.180.

24

Introduction

the fact, that what the audience is about to hear draws not on foreign but on native tradition, for rhetorical effect; he could also justify (or apologize for) his use of exempla externa, as Demosthenes (n. 29), Lycurgus, and to some extent Aeschines (n. 31), but the normal practice seems to have been such as described by Apsines, who obviously based his precepts on the actual orations (and those of Demosthenes in particular).32 For the Athenians the native exempla, as opposed to externa, were on the one hand “unmarked,” that is drawn from the shared cultural heritage, and, on the other, they carried more weight in rhetorical contexts, because any citizen could easily relate to the experiences of his ancestors. Originally, this distinction may have passed into Roman schools of rhetoric (and philosophy) from the Greek theory and practice regarding παραδείγματα, and with it came a collection of ready examples derived from mythology and natural sciences.33 In the republican Rome, however, the division of exempla into domestica and externa seems to have already been firmly established. The biographer of the first century bce, Cornelius Nepos, arranged the material in his work De viris illustribus on this principle.34 In a well-​known anthology of exempla composed during the reign of Tiberius, namely Valerius Maximus’ Facta et dicta memorabilia, the same rule applies: native examples are followed by foreign ones.35 Valerius Maximus might have been influenced by Nepos,36 but his arrangement also conforms to what “Cicero advised,” i.e. that “Roman examples precede and dominate.”37 Cicero, as we shall see, indeed implies on several occasions that the national exempla should dominate, but what arrangement best suited him has to be extrapolated from his practice. In the philosophical writings, Cicero often expresses his preference for native over foreign examples. At Div. 1.55, for instance, he makes his brother

32 See Jost 1936: 167. Cf. Dilts, Kennedy 1997: xvii: “Quotations from Demosthenes [they count some 86 references], whom he clearly admired above all other authors, far outnumber others.” 33 See Kornhardt 1936: 64, 85. 34 Cf. Nep. Hann. 13.4 = fr. 47 Marshall: Sed nos tempus est huius libri facere finem et Romanorum explicare imperatores with Geiger 1985: 94. See also von Moos 2 1996: 203 f, n. 464 (cf. Daxelmüller 1991: 90) who points out that later, in the patristic literature, the pagan examples (and the ones drawn from the Old Testament) were perceived as externa, and the Christian as domestica. 35 See in general Honstetter 1977: 29–​31 and passim; Bloomer 1992: 17. 36 Cf. Dyck 1996: 400 on Cic. Off. 2.26b. Other similar works of which we know, mostly later than Valerius Maximus, are listed by Litchfield 1914: 62 f. 37 Thus Bloomer 1992: 28.

Exempla domestica and externa

25

Quintus say: “Why am I speaking of Greek examples? Somehow our own give me more pleasure” (Sed quid ego Graecorum? nescio quo modo me magis nostra delectant),38 while in the next Book, Cicero “himself ” approves of this approach.39 That is not the case in the Tusculan disputations, where at one point some examples are downplayed as being “old and of Greek origin” (1.74 init.: sed haec et vetera et a Graecis), whereas elsewhere Greek exempla are chosen over nostra (5.105: malo enim Graecorum quam nostra proferre). This does not, however, reflect Cicero’s views in general but, as H. van der Blom points out, “seems to be specifically tied into his current discussion of Aristides.”40 It needs to be stressed that by far the distinction has been made solely between “our,” i.e. Roman/​native, and Greek examples. Given that the majority of subjects treated by Cicero in his philosophica had already been covered by his Greek predecessors, moreover, it is safe to assume that in order to make his point he could either choose their exemplum as illustration or provide his Roman audience with one drawn from the national history.41 At Off. 2.26, when speaking of people whose power was based on fear, Cicero names Dionysius of Syracuse, Alexander of Pherae, Phalaris, and few others, examples that were probably supplied by Panaetius, and makes the following observation: “In such a matter it gives me more pleasure to recall foreign examples than ones from home” (E xter na libentiu s in tali re quam domestica recordor ).42 Only then, in line with his general practice, does

38 Tr. D. Wardle who (2006: 244), relying on Valerius Maximus (2.10 ext. 1, 5.7 ext. 1, etc.), comments that “foreign examples served primarily a literary purpose in the provision of less familiar and thus more interesting material” and that “this may be a stance Cic. felt necessary to use before a Roman popular audience.” 39 See Cic. Div. 2.8: Atque ego: adcurate tu quidem, inquam, Quinte, et Stoice Stoicorum sententiam defendisti, quodque me maxime delectat, plurimis nostr i s ex empli s usus es, et iis quidem claris et inlustribus. See on the subject van der Blom 2007: 157. 40 Van der Blom 2010: 140. 41 Cf. Cic. Tusc. 1.116: Harmodius in ore et Aristogiton; Lacedaemonius Leonidas, Thebanus Epaminondas viget. nostros non nor unt, quos enumerare magnum est: ita sunt multi, quibus videmus optabilis mortes fuisse cum gloria. The author of the Rhetorica ad Herennium also speaks on several occasions of either nostra or aliena exempla (e.g. 4.1.1, 4.2.3 fin.). In his study of Cicero’s views on the Gracchi, Béranger 1972: 760 had interpreted the former as examples drawn from Roman history. This view was refuted by Ungern-​Sternberg 1973: 149 with n. 35, 154 f, followed by Bücher 2006: 69 f, according to whom these expressions mean “(invented on) my own” and “borrowed” respectively. 42 Tr. E. M. Atkins.

26

Introduction

he add Romans to the list.43 According to modern scholars, this indicates that Cicero was more inclined to use native examples, and he considered the foreign ones to be especially suitable for negative lessons.44 Given that all these remarks were made by the end of Cicero’s life and in a philosophical rather than rhetorical context, however, one needs to be careful in drawing general conclusions about his use of exempla externa. Two passages from Cicero’s orations are very instructive in this regard. At an early stage of his career, in the unpublished Actio secunda against Verres, the speaker compares the defendant’s greed with Scipio Aemilianus’ generosity towards the inhabitants of Sicily. He says about the latter (Verr. 4.73): videte hominis virtutem et diligentiam, ut et domestici s praeclar i ssimae v ir tuti s ex empli s gaudeati s et eo maiore odio dignam istius incredibilem audaciam iudicetis […]. I would have you [i.e. gentlemen of the jury] observe his scrupulous uprightness, that you may rejoice in the noble patterns of upright conduct that our countrymen afford to us, and may hold Verres’ incredible lack of scruple the more detestable on that account.45

The Latin words which I have highlighted are suspiciously reminiscent of Demosthenes (cf. n. 28),46 and in both cases an inference can be made that the audience was simply more eager to hear about their own than about foreign history. When discussing praise (ἔπαινος), Aristotle recalls what Socrates used to say, namely that it is not difficult to praise the Athenians in front of the Athenian audience. He then adds that one needs to take into account what a given nation considers praiseworthy.47 For one thing, therefore, Roman exempla were more

43 See Rambaud 1953: 42 with references; Walbank 1972: 145 = 1985: 57; Fleck 1993: 89 f; Dyck 1996: loc. cit. who compares Off. 2.16: Commemorantur ab eo [sc. Panaetio] Themistocles, Pericles, Cyrus, Agesilaus, Alexander, quos negat sine adiumentis hominum tantas res efficere potuisse. 44 See Volkmann 21885/​1987: 236; Schoenberger 1910: 36 f; Van der Blom 2007: 158: “foreign exempla are better for lessons of what to avoid, that is, for negative exempla”; 2010: 141. On Alexander the Great as an exception to this rule cf. Weippert 1972: 143. 45 Tr. L. H. G. Greenwood. 46 Not in Weische 1972. 47 See Arist. Rh. 1367b 7–​11 (cf. 1415b 28; Pl. Mx. 235d): σκοπεῖν δὲ παρ’ οἷς ὁ ἔπαινος‧ ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔλεγεν, οὐ χαλεπὸν Ἀθηναίους ἐν Ἀθηναίοις ἐπαινεῖν. δεῖ δὲ τὸ παρ’ ἑκάστοις τίμιον ὂν λέγειν ὡς ὑπάρχει, οἷον ἐν Σκύθαις ἢ Λάκωσιν ἢ φιλοσόφοις. Cf. Quint. Inst. 3.7.23 with Adamietz 1966: 165 f who supplies other passages from Quintilian; Gazich 1990: 90, n. 69; Rapp 2002: 420 f ad loc.

Exempla domestica and externa

27

appropriate for Cicero since he was addressing a Roman audience.48 Another important feature of the passage from the Verrines is that Scipio’s conduct is described explicitly as exemplum virtutis,49 an expression that applies above all to the (Roman) ‘grand old men’, their moral superiority and achievements.50 The other passage, to which I want to pay attention, comes from the Philippics. Cicero addresses M. Aemilius Lepidus, reminding him that he should live up to the example of his great-​grandfather who was also pontifex maximus (13.15): sin hominibus tantum licere iudicas quantum possunt, vide ne alie ni s e x e mpli s eisque recentibus uti quam et antiquis et domestici s malle videare. But if you judge that people are permitted to do anything they have the power to do consider lest you seem to be preferring to follow recent precedents drawn from outside your family rather than ancient and familial ones.51

We will later see (Section 3.3 with n. 48) that either old or recent examples carry more authority, depending on what the case requires. Our main focus now is on the distinction between exempla aliena and domestica. Here, these adjectives are employed in a more literal sense: domesticum (sc. exemplum) means ‘of or belonging to a family or household, domestic, family (OLD, s.v. 2 as opposed to 3: “native”)’, hence alienum is an example from outside that particular family.52 What is called in modern scholarship ‘a family exemplum’53 formed an important 48 Cf. Cic. Orat. 71 f, De or. 2.337 with Leeman et al. 1996: 54; 3.210–​212; Quint. Inst. 3.8.36 f (cf. 11.1.43): Itaque quamvis exempla plurimum in consiliis possint, […] refer t tame n quor um auc tor ita s et quibu s adhibeatur […]. Nam consultant aut plures aut singuli, sed in utrisque differentia, quia et in pluribus multum interest senatus sit an populus, Romani an Fidenates, Graeci an barbari […]. 49 Cf. Lazzaretti 2006: 220 ad loc. and van der Poel 2009: 337. 50 Cf. e.g. Plin. Nat. 7.130: Gentium in toto orbe praestantissima una omnium virtute haud dubie Romana extitit; Quint. Inst. 12.2.30: An fortitudinem, iustitiam, fidem, continentiam, frugalitatem, contemptum doloris ac mortis melius alii docebunt quam Fabricii, Curii, Reguli, Decii, Mucii aliique innumerabiles? Quantum enim Graeci praeceptis valent, tantum Romani, quod est maius, exemplis; Litchfield 1914: 15; Austin 21954: 90 f ad loc.; Daxelmüller 1984: 635; Winterbottom 1998 = 2019: 180; Roller 2001: 88 with n. 39. See also Cic. De or. 1.229 with Leeman et al. 1985: 150; Schulz 2018: 309. 51 Tr. D. R. Shackleton Bailey. On the choice of Lepidus as pontifex maximus see Hoffman Lewis 1955: 72 f; Szemler 1972: 134. On his great-​grandfather as family example: Treggiari 2003: 157. 52 See Hofmann, TLL 5.1.1869.15–​21 for more references. Cf. van der Blom 2011: 53. 53 See e.g. Kornhardt 1936: 15–​24; Daxelmüller 1991: 85; von Moos 21996: 69–​72; Stemmler 2000: 185, n. 163; 192 with n. 189; Flaig 2003/​2013: 77–​94; Treggiari

28

Introduction

part of the Roman socio-​political discourse.54 At Rome, a child born to an aristocratic family would learn about their ancestors, and an adult of noble origin was expected to follow in the footsteps of or even surpass his forefathers.55 This inclination of the Romans to think of the maiores as role models is likely to have originated from a family custom, but by the end of the republic it was a universal perception. Imitating or failing to imitate a historical figure under certain circumstances affected the way people were perceived by others.56 In extreme cases, like that of M. Brutus, one was expected to act almost in the same manner as one’s distant ancestor.57 That being the case, exempla domestica, in either broader or narrower sense, were simply more relevant in Roman oratory than the foreign or “alien” ones.

2003: 148–​150; van der Blom 2010: 87–​103, 316 f; 2011: 50 and passim. Cf. Flower 1996: 128–​158. 54 The Romans had developed a system of government in which the power was in the hands of a small group of aristocratic families, often related through marriage to each other. Members of a family that boasted of many office-​holders and accomplished generals had far better opportunities for social advancement than the ‘new men’ (homines novi). See e.g. May 1988: 7; Blösel 2000: 53–​59; Treggiari 2003: 142 and passim; Dugan 2005: 7–​13, and van der Blom 2010: 35–​59 with further literature. 55 Cf. e.g. Sen. Con. 10.2.16: Silo Gavius ait: Solebas mihi, pater, insignium virorum exempla narrare, quaedam etiam domestica; aiebas: avom fortem virum habuisti; vide ut sis fortior; V. Max. 1.7.2; cf. in general van der Poel 2009: 333 with n. 3 for other sources. On Cic. Mur. 66 compare also the discussion in Section 5.2 below. On the Roman mindset, according to which the members of the same gens behave in a consistent manner, see Richardson 2012: 18–​20, 30–​38, 47, 52 and passim on the gens Fabia. 56 For a very concise and accurate account consult Roller 2004: 24 f (with n. 54 on relevant literature). It was also a common theme of funerary inscriptions, as the epigraphical records show. A good example is the so-​called Tomb of the Scipios. See e.g. ILS 4 = ILLRP 311, ILS 6 = ILLRP 316, etc. where those commemorated express hope that they have not let their ancestors down (see on this inscription Treggiari 2003: 143 f). This habit was most characteristic of, but not limited to, the family exempla. For a similar tendency among the Greeks cf. Plut. Mor. 85a (= De profectibus in virtute 15): ἤδη δὲ τοῖς τοιούτοις παρέπεται βαδίζουσιν ἐπὶ πράξεις τινὰς ἢ λαβοῦσιν ἀρχὴν ἢ χρησαμένοις τύχῃ τίθεσθαι πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν τοὺς ὄντως ἀγαθοὺς γεγενημένους, καὶ διανοεῖσθαι ‘τί δ’ ἂν ἔπραξεν ἐν τούτῳ Πλάτων, τί δ’ ἂν εἶπεν Ἐπαμεινώνδας, ποῖος δ’ ἂν ὤφθη Λυκοῦργος ἢ Ἀγησίλαος’. For an overview of Greek sources dealing with examples as a source of moral guidance see e.g. Marrou 61965: 42–​44, 255 f; Skidmore 1996: 3–​12. 57 Cf. Cic. Phil. 1.13, 2.26; Gnauk 1936: 11; Kornhardt 1936: 17 f, 21; May 1988: 6; Treggiari 2003: 153 f; Roller 2004: 25, n. 54; Richardson 2012: 22 f, 33, 38, 44 with further references and literature.

Exempla domestica and externa

29

The predominance of “native” or “national” exempla in Cicero’s speeches is due to the Romans’ preoccupation with their own past.58 The history of the foreign nations played little role in politics at Rome, except where it overlapped with the Roman history. This causes some methodological difficulties: if we count among exempla externa only the references to characters and events that had nothing to do with Rome, there will be a fair amount of these in Cicero’s letters and philosophical writings, but, for the reasons outlined above, hardly any in his orations.59 In fact, R. Volkmann, having cited Dem. 3.23 (cf. above), wrote that “Auch Cicero nimmt seine Beispiele ausschließlich aus der Römischen Geschichte.”60 A. W. Robinson’s reply is worth quoting here at length: Since Volkmann has just quoted here a passage in which Demosthenes recommends the use of native rather than foreign examples (Olynth. 3.23), he is evidently speaking of native Roman exempla and not including even foreign exempla connected with Roman history such as Hannibal,61 whom Cicero uses as an exemplum often […]. However Volkmann is interpreted he is mistaken, since Cicero also uses as exempla people from other countries who played no role in Roman history.62

It is true that the majority of foreign characters are invoked by Cicero as enemies either of Rome in general or of an individual Roman commander (e.g. Scipio the Elder vs Hannibal), but that is not always the case. Themistocles and Alexander the Great, though they had no direct connection with the Roman past whatsoever,63 recur several times in Cicero’s orations. When it comes to foreign persons whose fate became inseparably intertwined with Rome, moreover, 5 8 See e.g. Walbank 1972: 155 = 1985: 65; Bücher 2006: 320; van der Blom 2007: 159 f. 59 See Rambaud 1953: 40–​46; Oppermann 2000: 20–​23 (whose overview is based on Schoenberger and Rambaud); Stemmler 2000: 193 with n. 197; van der Blom 2007: 159; 2010: 136–​144. See also on exempla in Cicero’s letters Schoenberger 1914 and in his philosophical works Blincoe 1941. Unfortunately, the two latter works have been unavailable to me. 60 Volkmann 21885/​1987: loc. cit. Cf. Litchfield 1914: 25 f: “On the other hand, the great «enemies» –​Pyrrhus, Hannibal, Spartacus, and the like –​are included as virtually national, having derived their chief significance from a relation to the Roman state.” 61 See below, Chapter 7. 62 Robinson 1986: 13 f, n. 10. The scholar also points out that David 1980: 84 counts 25 non-​Romans among 400 individuals used as exempla in Cicero’s orations. These numbers, however, could vary depending on how one defines an exemplum. 63 There was a tradition, perhaps reaching back as far as the late fourth century bce, according to which the Romans had sent an embassy to Alexander before he died in 323 bce. Regardless of whether it was invented or not (cf. Weippert 1972: 1–​10), however, this event seems “historically unimportant” (Bosworth 1988: 167).

30

Introduction

they too are sometimes used as exempla in another capacity. Let me give but one example: Hannibal is usually referred to as t he enemy, but there are passages (Verr. 5.31, Balb. 51) where the emphasis is put on his character, which is independent from the ‘history’ understood as a chronological sequence of events (~ res gestae). I see no point in excluding from the present study those whom H. W. Litchfield had called “national enemies” (cf. n. 60) nor in treating them separately. As we have seen, a wide range of factors affected the orator’s preference for exempla domestica. Above all, as drawn from the Roman history, they were well-​known to the audience and their protagonists represented the traditional, national virtutes. On top of that, they were ingrained in the specific socio-​cultural identity and conveyed a message to which those who shared the same ancestral custom (mos maiorum) could easily relate.64 As a result, the foreign examples were thought of as less significant and useful mainly for literary purposes. Such a tendency can be observed in the work of Valerius Maximus. Moving on to the externa in his chapter de prodigiis, the author makes the following remark (1.6. ext. praef.): “So I will turn to external items. Put into Latin writings they have less authority [auctoritatis minus habent], but may bring some welcome variety.”65 This auctoritas, as we saw earlier, was a feature of exemplum specifically Roman, absent from Greek theory. It reflects the hierarchical as well as emotional aspects of the references to historical figures in oratorical practice.66 In this context, M. Stemmler introduces a helpful distinction between logical and symbolical exempla, the former corresponding to the Aristotelian (or more generally Greek) paradigm, based on comparison, the latter to the more elusive Roman concept based on auctoritas. The symbolical examples are not meant to appeal to reason, but to emotions; by employing them, the speaker calls upon the values on which the republic stands and claims the authority of the ancestors whose names are tantamount to the ideal of the past.67 The scholar also notes that 6 4 See Stemmler 2000: 180 f. 65 Tr. D. R. Shackleton Bailey. Cf. V. Max. 6.9. ext. 1: Attento studio nostra commemoravimus: remissiore nunc animo aliena narrentur, 9.5. ext. 1; Price 1975: 291, n. 66. 66 See Bücher 2006: 152 f following Stemmler 2000: 152 f and passim; cf. in general Gaillard 1978. 67 See Stemmler 2000: 159 f (cf. 192 f): “Erstere [d.h. logische] dienen der rationalen Erfassung und der Argumentation; sie sind somit im wesentlichen funktional. Letztere [d.h. symbolische] hingegen erzeugen durch ihre auctoritas eine nicht-​rationale Form der Normativität; sie transzendieren quasi das konkret geschilderte Fallbeispiel durch die persönliche Autorität des Protagonisten.”

Research Aims, Methods, and Scope

31

as far as rhetorical theory at Rome is concerned, the logical reasoning is absent from the discussion of exempla because it could not be reconciled with the mos maiorum.68 This being considered, the application of the Aristotelian paradigm, which I am about to discuss in the following chapter, to the study of Cicero’s use of exempla in general would seem fruitless. My concern, however, is with exempla externa that by their very nature cannot be measured by the same yardstick, except, of course, when national enemies are paired with the Roman generals. On the whole, most of the foreign persons invoked as individual exempla will be compared with someone involved in a given case and such a comparison must have entailed logical reasoning. The symbolical factor will come into play especially in the case of the so-​called series of exempla (below, Chapter Five), because they comprise both native and foreign persons.

1.2. Research Aims, Methods, and Scope The main goal of the present study is to contribute to the understanding of Cicero’s rhetorical strategies by looking closely at one specific means of persuasion, i.e. the use of exempla externa. Unlike in the case of the national exempla virtutis, the close examination that involves both theory and practice is possible not only because foreign examples are less “elusive” with regard to their form and function, but they also occur far less frequently. One of my objectives is to demonstrate that they were not always perceived as the so-​called stock exempla and that, although “a foreign example was [i.e. especially] suitable for a negative lesson,”69 Cicero’s orations display varied uses thereof and the speaker would shape them in such a way as to serve the needs of a given case. This leads to another question: when/​in what type of cases was he prone to cite individual foreign examples and the series of exempla externa? Incidentally, this book may also be of interest to those who wish to learn more about how the Romans of the late republic perceived Alexander of Macedon, Hannibal, Spartacus, and other famous or infamous foreigners. Given that most of the passages to be covered in Part Two fall under the category of logical exempla, the best approach for studying them should consist of confronting rhetorical theory and practice.70 This methodology seems promising 6 8 Stemmler 2000: 157. 69 See van der Blom 2007 and 2010: 113 for the quotation. 70 On the extent to which a speaker’s practice corresponds with rhetorical theory as one of the possible approaches to Ciceronian oratory see Classen 1982: 149 f followed by Craig 1993: 3. Cf. Douglas 1973: 98 f and the general discussion in Stroh 1975: 7–​30. See further Section 4.

32

Introduction

since, as K. Demoen had pointed out, “the few examinations of the use of the exemplum in works of a specific author are not based on an adequate theoretical model.”71 It is also my intention to look at every passage as closely as possible, taking into account the historical context and motivation of a given reference to the past.72 Insight into the cultural and rhetorical background is a necessary prerequisite for an adequate interpretation of each exemplum, since the precepts that we find in rhetorical handbooks are often vague when looked at in isolation from oratorical practice, and vice versa –​some of the usages of examples in actual orations become more transparent when confronted with theory. Ancient theory, in turn, needs to be supplied with certain modern terminology. The methodology and terminological issues will be described in detail in the following chapters. Now, let me conclude my introductory remarks by clarifying briefly what is and what is not to be found in this book. What I understand by ‘exempla externa’ are not only the exempla “proper,” but any reference to a foreign historical figure made by the speaker for rhetorical purposes, i.e. not simply as part of the narrative. Excluded are therefore those instances where Cicero mentions a person who simply took part in the events he is describing, e.g. Leg. Agr. 1.5, 2.50; Balb. 50; Rab. Post. 27; Phil. 9.4. For similar reasons, P. M. Martin,73 in his recent study of the rhetorical manipulation of history in Cicero’s Philippics, does not take into consideration the “modern” history, i.e. events nearly contemporary with the date of the speech.74 In consequence, there will be no separate chapter on Mithridates as an individual exemplum for the principle that I have just outlined applies to the majority of Cicero’s references to him. The Roman native examples and some minor foreign characters invoked as exempla, on the other hand, are not the focus of the present study, but will be discussed in passing whenever such discussion is required in order for the text to be fully understood. 71 See Demoen 1997: 126. Cf. Price 1975: 215 f; Robinson 1986: 183, and van der Blom 2010: 6. The more recent works on Cicero listed above (n. 1) fail to meet this desideratum in that the brief discussion of exemplum in rhetorical theory that they offer is independent from the following study of Cicero’s practice. 72 This, as Stinger (1993: iii) admits, was beyond the scope of her study. See also the comment by Bücher 2006: 12: “Die Texte müssen in und mit ihren Kontexten gelesen, Rede und Redner im Umfeld ihrer politischen Kultur gesehen werden.” 73 See Martin 2013: 112. 74 Cf. Litchfield 1914: 25: “I have not reckoned as genuine cases of exemplary citation either nar r at ive me nt i on by historians in the chronological sequence of their account, or a laudatory epigram […], or c onte mp or ar y re fe re nc e s ; […] Nearly contemporary references –​references, that is, to a given exemplum in the works of an author born in his lifetime –​I have regarded as of inferior importance” (emphasis added).

2. The Aristotelian Paradigm Since my attempt is to establish a methodology suitable to the study of historical references that for the most part fall under the category of ‘logical exempla,’ it seems best to begin with Aristotle’s concept of paradigm, which is closely related to comparison. Aristotle describes the paradigm as a mode of arguing from similar to similar or, in other words, from particular to particular.1 The resulting analogy is therefore based upon a partial similarity between the event referred to during a speech and an action connected to the matter under dispute. Both items, moreover, should belong to the same γένος –​‘general class.’2 The example of Dionysius of Syracuse and other Greek tyrants before him who asked for a bodyguard serves as an illustration.3 Aristotle does not delve into details of the mechanism of the analogy, for he has already explained it on another occasion, in his Prior Analytics. As this passage is crucial for the following discussion, I shall quote it here at length (68b–​69a): Παράδειγμα δ’ ἐστὶν ὅταν τῷ μέσῳ τὸ ἄκρον ὑπάρχον δειχθῇ διὰ τοῦ ὁμοίου τῷ τρίτῳ. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ μέσον τῷ τρίτῳ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον τῷ ὁμοίῳ γνώριμον εἶναι ὑπάρχον. οἷον ἔστω τὸ Α κακόν, τὸ δὲ Β πρὸς ὁμόρους ἀναιρεῖσθαι πόλεμον, ἐφ’ ᾧ δὲ Γ τὸ ᾿Αθηναίους πρὸς Θηβαίους, τὸ δ’ ἐφ’ ᾧ Δ Θηβαίους πρὸς Φωκεῖς. ἐὰν οὖν βουλώμεθα δεῖξαι ὅτι

1 See Arist. Rh. 1357b: ἔστι δὲ οὔτε ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον οὔθ’ ὡς ὅλον πρὸς μέρος οὔθ’ ὡς ὅλον πρὸς ὅλον, ἀλλ’ ὡς μ έρ ο ς πρ ὸ ς μ έρ ο ς, ὅ μ ο ι ον πρ ὸ ς ὅ μο ι ον —​ὅταν ἄμφω μὲν ᾖ ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ γένος, γνωριμώτερον δὲ θάτερον ᾖ θατέρου, παράδειγμά ἐστιν·. Cf. Rhet. Her. 4.61 fin.: Non enim res tota totae rei necesse est similis sit, sed id ipsum quod conferetur similitudinem habeat oportet; Brinton 1988: 182, and Encinas Reguero 2017: 243 f with n. 6, whose article concentrates on the relationship between the notions of similarity and exemplum in Aristotle’s Rhetoric. The present chapter is a revised and expanded version of Pierzak 2018b: 20–​23. 2 Cf. Grimaldi 1980: 69 on 1357b 27; Schweinfurth-​Walla 1986: 54; Demoen 1997: 133 f; Rapp 2002: 208 on 1357b25–​1358a2. The other type, apart from the analogical, is the inductive paradigm, where “the example is quoted as an illustration of a general rule” (Demoen 1997: 134). Somewhat different understanding of Aristotle’s double meaning of παράδειγμα was suggested by Kantelhardt 1911 = 1968: 159–​163. For a useful summary of the various meanings of that substantive in the Rhetoric see Price 1975: 82 f. 3 See Sections 1 and 4.1. Cf. for instance Pl. R. 566b: Τὸ δὴ τυραννικὸν αἴτημα τὸ πολυθρύλητον ἐπὶ τούτῳ πάντες οἱ εἰς τοῦτο προβεβηκότες ἐξευρίσκουσιν, αἰτεῖν τὸν δῆμον φύλακάς τινας τοῦ σώματος, ἵνα σῶς αὐτοῖς ᾖ ὁ τοῦ δήμου βοηθός. The example of Dionysius will be discussed in Section 2.1 below.

34

The Aristotelian Paradigm τὸ Θηβαίοις πολεμεῖν κακόν ἐστι, ληπτέον ὅτι τὸ πρὸς τοὺς ὁμόρους πολεμεῖν κακόν. τούτου δὲ πίστις ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων, οἷον ὅτι Θηβαίοις ὁ πρὸς Φωκεῖς. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὸ πρὸς τοὺς ὁμόρους κακόν, τὸ δὲ πρὸς Θηβαίους πρὸς ὁμόρους ἐστί, φανερὸν ὅτι τὸ πρὸς Θηβαίους πολεμεῖν κακόν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὸ Β τῷ Γ καὶ τῷ Δ ὑπάρχει, φανερόν (ἄμφω γάρ ἐστι πρὸς τοὺς ὁμόρους ἀναιρεῖσθαι πόλεμον), καὶ ὅτι τὸ Α τῷ Δ (Θηβαίοις γὰρ οὐ συνήνεγκεν ὁ πρὸς Φωκεῖς πόλεμος)· ὅτι δὲ τὸ Α τῷ Β ὑπάρχει, διὰ τοῦ Δ δειχθήσεται. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον κἂν εἰ διὰ πλειόνων τῶν ὁμοίων ἡ πίστις γένοιτο τοῦ μέσου πρὸς τὸ ἄκρον. φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι τὸ παράδειγμά ἐστιν οὔτε ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον οὔτε ὡς ὅλον πρὸς μέρος, ἀλλ’ ὡς μέρος πρὸς μέρος, ὅταν ἄμφω μὲν ᾖ ὑπὸ ταὐτό, γνώριμον δὲ θάτερον. We have an Example when the major extreme [τὸ ἄκρον] is shown to be applicable to the middle term [τὸ μέσον] by means of a term similar to the third [διὰ τοῦ ὁμοίου τῷ τρίτῳ]. It must be known both that the middle applies to the third term and that the first [τὸ πρῶτον] applies to the term similar to the third. E.g., let A be ‘bad,’ B ‘to make war on neighbours,’ C ‘Athens against Thebes’ and D ‘Thebes against Phocis.’ Then if we require to prove that war against Thebes is bad, we must be satisfied that the war against neighbours is bad. Evidence of this can be drawn from similar examples, e.g., that war by Thebes against Phocis is bad. Then since war against neighbours is bad, and war against Thebes is against neighbours, it is evident that war against Thebes is bad. Now it is evident that B applies to C and D (for they are both examples of making war on neighbours), and A to D (since the war against Phocis did Thebes no good); but that A applies to B will be proven by means of D. The same method will obtain supposing that our conviction that the middle term is related to the extreme is drawn from more than one similar term. Thus it is evident that an example represents the relation, not of part to whole or of whole to part, but of one part to another [οὔτε ὡς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον οὔτε ὡς ὅλον πρὸς μέρος, ἀλλ’ ὡς μέρος πρὸς μέρος], where both are subordinate to the same general term, and one of them is known.4

Only through the understanding of this passage, as S. Schweinfurth-​Walla suggests, are we able to draw conclusions on the nature of the device at large.5 We need to bear in mind, however, that the rationale at work here is based on the principles of Aristotle’s syllogistics. According to this system, a syllogism consists of three propositions that involve three “terms”: a minor term D, a middle term B, and a major term A.6 Each of the terms appears twice, D as a subject, A as a 4 Tr. H. Tredennick. 5 See Schweinfurth-​Walla 1986: 58: “Erst die Analyse von An.pr. 68b38–​69a19 ermöglicht das Verständnis von Rhet. 1357b25–​36.” Cf. Solmsen 1941: 39; Rapp 2002: 204–​207. 6 In my discussion of syllogism, induction, and their relation to paradigm, I follow Coenen 1992 (with slight variations; on Aristotle’s variables cf. also Coenen 1987: 79) who uses the standard symbols S for minor term, M for middle, and P for major. For

The Aristotelian Paradigm

35

predicate, B as a subject and predicate. Within the syllogism, the two former propositions serve as premises, and the latter as a conclusion: 1. If all B is D

If D is predicated of all B

2. and all A is B

and B is predicated of all A, then

3. then all A is D

D is predicated of all A

For example: 1. If all men are mortal 2. and all Greeks are men, then 3. all Greeks are mortal7 The induction consists of the same items, but their arrangement is slightly different: now, propositions 1 and 3 serve as premises and proposition 2 as a conclusion. Assuming that A and B are applicable to D we draw a conclusion that A also applies to B. In that case, under D are listed elements which hold true for A and B. In order for both the induction and the syllogism to be valid, the list of elements should be a complete one. H. G. Coenen observes that it is almost never the case with historical examples. The invalidity of the induction does not, however, reduce its persuasive force, unless an opponent quotes a counterexample.8 The following scheme can now be obtained: 1. All D equal B

All D equal B

2. All D equal A

All D equal A, therefore

3. All B equal A

All B equal A

For example: 1. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle are philosophers 2. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle have a beard, therefore 3. All philosophers have a beard /​whoever is a philosopher, has a beard

the sake of convenience, I have replaced these with the Latinized versions of Aristotle’s capital letters. The same approach has been recently adopted by Encinas Reguero 2017: 244 f. 7 Example supplied by Łukasiewicz 21957/​1972: 2. 8 See Coenen 1992: 324 f, 328 f. Cf. Fuhrmann 1973/​1983: 451; Schulz 2018: 309 and Rapp 2002: 794 on 1402b12–​1402b20 whose example I have used below. This example could be challenged by saying that Wittgenstein is a philosopher and has no beard.

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The Aristotelian Paradigm

The paradigm is a little less straightforward in that it consists of more elements, one of which is only implied. In short, the argument which Aristotle is discussing at APr. 68b–​69a runs as follows: we know that the war between the Thebans and the Phocians was an evil; this war was waged against neighbors; it leads to a general premise that to fight against neighbors is an evil; therefore, a war of the Athenians against the Thebans, since they are neighbors, would also be something evil.9 S. Schweinfurth-​Walla has suggested the following pattern10 on that basis: 1) D = A (it is a fact that the war between the Thebans and the Phocians was a disaster) and 2) D = B is obtained through induction (because it was a war against neighbors). 3) All B equal A, and further 4) C = B (the Athenians against the Thebans amounts to fighting against neighbors) which inevitably leads to 5) C = A. The three last propositions, which were obtained through induction, correspond to what was later described by formal logic as ‘the Barbara-​1 syllogism’: If A is predicated of all B, and B is predicated of all C, then A is predicated of all C.11 By comparison, the interpretation of H. G. Coenen seems to be complex,12 but more in line with Aristotle’s syllogistics. At the preliminary stage, the following items are defined: C –​the subject of dispute (war between Athens and Thebes), D –​the incident serving as an example (Thebes against Phocis), and A –​a predicate, the application of which to C needs to be proven, but its application to D is beyond question (an evil). As we already know, the thesis to prove

9 This example may have been inspired by the circumstances of the third Sacred War (356–​346 bce) fought between the Phocians and the Thebans over the control of Delphi (on this war in general: C. J. Tuplin in 3OCD, p. 1343), as well as Demosthenes’ diplomatic mission to Thebes, whereby he managed to convince the Thebans to join forces with Athens against Philip of Macedon in 339 bce. See e.g. Dem. 18.168–​179; Plut. Dem. 18; Ross 1957: 488 ad loc. Cf. D.H. Amm. 11 (p. 273 f Usener–​Radermacher); Quint. Inst. 9.3.55; Jaeger 21963: 183 f; Nouhaud 1982: 66 f; Wooten 1983: 6, 8 f. 10 Where A = (ἄκρον) ‘the major term’ –​‘[a thing] is evil’ (Oberbegriff); B = (μέσον) ‘the middle’ –​‘to fight against neighbors’ (Mittelbegriff); C = (τρίτον) ‘the third’ –​‘war between the Athenians and the Thebans’ (Unterbegriff); D = (ὅμοιον) ‘the similar’ –​‘war between the Thebans and the Phocians’ (das Ähnliche). Cf. Schweinfurth-​Walla 1986: 56 f. 11 See Łukasiewicz 21957/​1972: 3, 10; Strobach, Malink 2015: 95 f. On the basis of the words Παράδειγμα δ’ ἐστὶν ὅταν τῷ μέσῳ τὸ ἄκρον ὑπάρχον δειχθῇ διὰ τοῦ ὁμοίου τῷ τρίτῳ. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ μέσον τῷ τρίτῳ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον τῷ ὁμοίῳ γνώριμον εἶναι ὑπάρχον N. Strobach in Strobach, Malink 2015: 517 proposes the following scheme (where a = ‘is predicated of ’ [d.h. “zukommt”]): 1. AaD, 2. AaB, 3. BaC, 4. AaC. Nos 2–​4 correspond exactly to Barbara-​1. 12 See Coenen 1992: 326 f.

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The Aristotelian Paradigm

is C = A given that D = A. In order to use a paradigm as rhetorical argument, a middle term B (here, the war between neighbors) is required which would apply to both D and C. Hence the scheme: 1. C = B 2. D = B

the last two elements of which

1. D = B

3. D = A

form the premises of an induction:

2. D = A, therefore 3. B = A.

The first of the propositions used above (C = B) and the conclusion of the following induction (B = A) form, in turn, the premises of a syllogism, the conclusion of which (C = A) is the thesis to prove. The paradigm is therefore a mode of inductive reasoning which leads to a syllogism that enables to deduce the thesis.13 Its scheme consists of two sets of propositions: A. The inductive part: 1. D = B: the war between Thebes and Phocis was a war between neighbors 2. D = A: the war between Thebes and Phocis was an evil, therefore 3: B = A: a war between neighbors is evil. B. The deductive part: 1. C = B: If the war between Athens and Thebes is a war between neighbors 2. B = A: and a war between neighbors is evil, then 3. C = A: the war between Athens and Thebes is evil. Although Aristotle himself, as was noted above (n. 1), speaks only of arguing from part to part, it is implied in his reasoning that a sort of mediated generalization is

13 Since induction is an argument from particular to universal, and syllogism from universal to particular, then paradigm, which comprises both induction and syllogism, leads from particular to particular. Cf. Price 1975: 59; Gazich 1990: 68: “E invece il paradeigma di Aristotele era processo talmente ricco sul piano logico, da non poter neppure essere ridotto alla semplice induzione, coinvolgendo bensì anche un processo deduttivo”; Rapp 2002: 793 on 1402b12–​1402b20, and Encinas Reguero 2017: loc. cit. On the terminological difficulties cf. Rapp 2002: 159 f on 1356a35–​1356b10: “Weil das ist so, wird es schwer sein zu sagen, wie die so genannte rhetorische Induktion, das Beispiel, einzuschätzen ist, wenn es als Schluss vom Einzelnen auf das Einzelne charakterisiert wird: Repräsentiert es einen erweiterten Begriff der Induktion oder handelt es sich um eine Kombination aus einem induktiven und einem deduktiven Schluss?.”

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The Aristotelian Paradigm

involved in the process.14 Now that we understand a little better how this process works, it will be worthwhile to simplify the terminology so that it becomes more accessible and transparent. The ‘first part’, as W. L. Benoit postulates, is the ‘premise’ that it was evil when the Thebans fought the Phocians, their neighbors. This is what we have called with H. G. Coenen ‘the inductive part’. The ‘second part’ is the ‘conclusion’ to be drawn, that it would be wrong for the Athenians to fight their Theban neighbors (resp. ‘the deductive part’). What connects them is ‘a whole’: it is evil to fight one’s neighbors (B = A).15 The exemplum in its narrowest sense (παράδειγμα par excellence), according to Aristotle, is D = ‘war between the Thebans and the Phocians’ (ὅτι δὲ τὸ Α τῷ Β ὑπάρχει, διὰ τοῦ Δ δειχθήσεται). B (‘to fight against neighbors’) is the intermediate action (‘middle’, μέσον) that helps to establish a universal proposition through which one is able to ascribe C and D to the same general class (γένος). When finding an argument, how would a speaker proceed according to the scheme I have just outlined? If he were to use a logical exemplum, he would need to decide whether the action he is about to discuss (C) is right or wrong or, alternatively, whether something that had already been done was just or unjust ([B =] A, in the present case ‘[a thing] is evil/​wrong’). Let me call this procedure a ‘justification of action.’16 Then, an example drawn from the past (D) of a similar action, that is, an action belonging to the same general class (B), ought to be presented. Once he has gathered all the particulars, the speaker will possess a premise (D = A) leading to a conclusion (C = A) based upon a predicate (B). Obviously, whether an action is/​was actually right or wrong is irrelevant to the speaker as he is arguing a case and his objectives depend on a certain viewpoint.17 To clarify this procedure further, I will now take a closer look at the examples Aristotle has given in his Rhetoric.

14 See Benoit 1987. Cf. von Moos 1988: 61 f and the comment by Grimaldi 1980: 69: “A moment’s reflection will show that one c annot us e example w it hout implicit ly or explicit ly ma k i ng a re a l i ndu c t i on in order to apprehend the general class under which the particulars fall and therefore resemble one other” (emphasis added). 15 See Benoit 1987: 263. 16 Cf. Stierle 1973/​1983: 356 = 1978: 342 f (“Was das Exemplum impliziert, ist der moralische Satz”). 17 Cf. the comment by Price 1975: 54: “The orator does not try to determine whether or not he is right; he tries to convince the audience that he is right.” This way of using exempla is called by Roller 2018: 12, following Barchiesi 2009: 46 and others, an ‘injunctive mode’ (as opposed to the ‘illustrative’).

Aristotle’s First Example: The Greek Tyrants

39

2.1. Aristotle’s First Example: The Greek Tyrants As the discussion of the paradigm in the Prior Analytics involves details of its mechanics but lacks those of the rhetorical context, we may now turn to the example from the Rhetoric where the opposite is the case. This example follows Aristotle’s definition of the παράδειγμα which I have quoted at the beginning of the present chapter (n. 1 above; 1357b30–​36): οἷον ὅτι ἐπεβούλευε τυραννίδι Διονύσιος αἰτῶν τὴν φυλακήν· καὶ γὰρ Πεισίστρατος πρότερον ἐπιβουλεύων ᾔτει φυλακὴν καὶ λαβὼν ἐτυράννησε, καὶ Θεαγένης ἐν Μεγάροις· καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσους ἴσασι, παράδειγμα πάντες γίγνονται τοῦ Διονυσίου, ὃν οὐκ ἴσασίν πω εἰ διὰ τοῦτο αἰτεῖ. πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ καθόλου, ὅτι ὁ ἐπιβουλεύων τυραννίδι φυλακὴν αἰτεῖ. […] to prove that Dionysius is aiming at a tyranny, because he asks for a bodyguard, one might say that Pisistratus before him and Theagenes of Megara did the same, and when they obtained what they asked for made themselves tyrants. All the other tyrants known may serve as an example of Dionysius [παράδειγμα πάντες γίγνονται τοῦ Διονυσίου], whose reason, however, for asking for a bodyguard we do not yet know [ὃν οὐκ ἴσασί πω εἰ διὰ τοῦτο αἰτεῖ]. All these examples are contained under the same universal proposition, that one who is aiming at a tyranny asks for a bodyguard.18

The audience is aware that Dionysius asks for a bodyguard, but it remains unclear to what purpose he is doing so (ὃν οὐκ ἴσασί πω εἰ διὰ τοῦτο αἰτεῖ). The speaker, who wants to prove that he is aiming at tyranny, may point to the fact that his actions are not unprecedented and recall that Pisistratus and Theagenes of Megara made themselves tyrants after obtaining a bodyguard.19 In other words, they have acted in the same way as Dionysius is now acting, and therefore serve as his example (παράδειγμα […] γίγνονται τοῦ Διονυσίου). The universal proposition (resp. ‘the implied whole’, B [= A]), which Aristotle reveals in the

18 Tr. J. H. Freese. Cf. Aphth. Prog. 20.21–​21.3 Rabe: Ῥᾷον δὲ τὴν τοῦ παρόντος ἐργάσασθαι κόλασιν‧ οὐ γάρ, ὥσπερ αὐτῷ δορυφόρων ἐδέησεν εἰς τὴν τῆς τυραννίδος ἐπίθεσιν, οὕτω καὶ ἡμῖν δεήσει συμμάχων εἰς τὴν τοῦ τυράννου κατάλυσιν, ἀλλὰ δικαστῶν ἀρκέσει ψῆφος ὅλην ἀνελεῖν τυραννίδος τὴν δύναμιν. Formally, Aristotle’s universal proposition is: ‘whoever aims at tyranny, asks for a bodyguard’, but in what follows I emphasize the former instead of the latter clause, because in practice the thesis to prove is that someone aims at tyranny. See also Encinas Reguero 2017: 244 f. 19 Cf. in general Andrewes 1956: 138; Robinson 1986: 4. On Pisistratus’ successful deceit see Hdt. 1.59.4–​6 with Asheri in Murray, Moreno 2007: 122; Plut. Sol. 30.2 f; Polyaen. 1.21.3. On Theagenes of Megara see for instance the literature cited by Grimaldi 1980: 70 on Arist. Rh. 1357b30.

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The Aristotelian Paradigm

last sentence, is absent from the paradigm proper. As a mediated generalization, as we have just seen, this is an indispensable element of a paradigm, because without it the speaker would be unable to build the final syllogism.20 Hence, it needs to be obtained through the following induction: 1. D = B: Pisistratus, Theagenes of Megara, and others asked for a bodyguard 2. D = A: Pisistratus, Theagenes of Megara, and others became tyrants, therefore 3: B = A: whoever asks for a bodyguard, aims at tyranny. No. 3 above is the universal proposition that we have been looking for. This element, which we have called earlier ‘a mediated generalization,’ is crucial in that it allows the audience to make out the message for themselves.21 Thus, by not being entirely explicit, the speaker keeps the attention of his audience focused on the argument. With the universal being obtained, the next and final step is the deduction: 1. C = B: If Dionysius asks for a bodyguard 2. B = A: and whoever asks for a bodyguard, aims at tyranny, then 3. C = A: Dionysius aims at tyranny.22 Here, the fact that Pisistratus and Theagenes of Megara succeeded in procuring for themselves absolute power b e c aus e they asked for a bodyguard constitutes a premise (‘first part’), hence the conclusion (‘second part’) that Dionysius too, since he asks for a bodyguard, aims at tyranny. One will quickly notice, however,

2 0 See Gazich 1990: 69; Franchet d’Espèrey 2010: 68. 21 See Gazich 1990: 69 f. Cf. Coenen 1987: 75: “Der Argumentierende überläßt es dem Adressaten, aus wenigen genannten Elementen des Argumentationsinhaltes einen schlüssigen Zusammenhang herzustellen” and Price 1975: 48, who at pp. 58–​65 (and 82 f) distinguishes between the “inductive-​deductive paradigm” and the “analogical paradigm.” The example of the war between Athens and Thebes belongs to the former, Aristotle’s First Example to the latter category. What characterizes the paradigms by analogy is that the “universal” (the mediated generalization, B = A) is not expressed. This distinction, to my mind, does not affect the use of historical exempla in practice, when the universal is almost always only implied. In his analysis of Cicero’s use of historical examples in moral argument, Brinton 1988: 176 holds that enthymeme (and by implication also paradigm) is a kind of argument that requires participation by the hearer. A little further (p. 180), on the other hand, he states that “when the examples are presented, a contribution to the substance of the argument is elicited from the hearer.” 22 Franchet d’Espèrey 2010: loc. cit., following Calboli Montefusco 2000, offers a slightly different scheme. She begins with the universal (B [= A]) and introduces C = B as the second proposition. The conclusion remains the same, but this scheme somewhat disturbs Aristotle’s combination of induction and syllogism.

Aristotle’s Second Example: The Persian Invasion of Egypt

41

that those two cases, that of the war between Athens and Thebes and the one under discussion, differ in one crucial respect, namely their principal (legal) issue. In the former, the speaker is deciding whether to consider the action right or wrong, and in the latter he is stating a fact (does or does not Dionysius aim at tyranny?). This question, which underlies the paradigm, depends on the rhetorical context and, on a theoretical level, it corresponds to what later came to be known as the status causae. The division of cases according to four various staseis itself is post-​Aristotelian, but its application will help to solve the difficulty. The case in which it is being decided whether the war between Athens and Thebes is right or wrong comes under the status of quality (an iure fecerit /​ facturus sit) whereby an action is justified if it results in some greater good in the future; the one concerning Dionysius, on the other hand, under the conjectural status (an fecerit /​ faciat) or question of fact.23 It is noteworthy that Cicero (Inv. 1.49, 2.19) recommends exempla and similes for the conjectural kind of cases, especially in establishing the motive.24

2.2. Aristotle’s Second Example: The Persian Invasion of Egypt In the previous chapter, I have called attention to Aristotle’s division of exempla into historical ones (τὸ λέγειν πράγματα προγεγενημένα) and those which have been invented by the speaker (τὸ αὐτὸν ποιεῖν). To illustrate the difference between the two, Aristotle quotes the following example of the former class (Rh. 1393a30–​b3): ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν πράγματα λέγειν τοιόνδε τι, ὥσπερ εἴ τις λέγοι ὅτι δεῖ πρὸς βασιλέα παρασκευάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ ἐᾶν Αἴγυπτον χειρώσασθαι· καὶ γὰρ πρότερον Δαρεῖος οὐ πρότερον διέβη πρὶν Αἴγυπτον ἔλαβεν, λαβὼν δὲ διέβη, καὶ πάλιν Ξέρξες οὐ πρότερον ἐπεχείρησε πρὶν ἔλαβεν, λαβὼν δὲ διέβη· ὥστε καὶ οὗτος ἐὰν λάβῃ, διαβήσεται· διὸ οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτέον.

23 See Craig 2001: 115–​117. Cf. Price 1975: 205 f on Arist. Rh. 1376a14–​17 and the valuable remark by Schulz 2018: 311: “Zur Bildung eines Beispiels steht dem Redner die rhetorische Topik zur Verfügung. Die Topik zur Charakterdarstellung ist v.a. im status coniecturalis relevant, d.h. wenn ein Redner dafür argumentieren muss, dass jemand eine Tat begangen hat oder nicht […].” On the status theory of Hermagoras in general see e.g. Grube 1965: 142–​144; Lausberg 31990: 89–​108 (§ 150–​197); on its influence upon the Romans cf. Calboli 1982: 66. Solmsen 1941: 177 with n. 85, 180 f argues that Aristotle may have to a certain degree inspired the system. The standard work on staseis is Calboli Montefusco 1986. 24 Cf. van der Blom 2010: 82 f.

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The Aristotelian Paradigm It would be an instance of the historical kind of example, if one were to say that it is necessary to make preparations against the Great King and not allow him to subdue Egypt; for Darius did not cross over to Greece until he had obtained possession of Egypt; but as soon as he had done so, he did. Again, Xerxes did not attack us until he had obtained possession of that country, but when he had, he crossed over; consequently, if the present Great King shall do the same, he will cross over, wherefore it must not be allowed.25

Both examples are very specific and the one that I have just quoted goes into some detail on the actions of the Persian kings.26 From a historical viewpoint, this is a hypothetical case that could be argued many years before Aristotle’s lifetime.27 So far as we know, Darius accompanied the Persian king Cambyses when the latter had conquered Egypt in 526/​525 bce. Then, himself a Great King, he crossed over to Greece in 490 bce. Likewise Xerxes, Darius’ son and successor, after having suppressed the uprising in Egypt (486 bce), invaded Attica in 480/​ 479 bce.28 Let us assume for the sake of argument that the Greeks of the fourth century bce are considering whether or not to prevent Artaxerxes III from (re)conquering Egypt.29 Those in favor of taking military action against the Persian king argue that his successful invasion of Egypt would be inevitably followed by the conquest of their own homeland. To prove their thesis, those Greeks we are now impersonating put forward the examples of Darius and Xerxes. On that basis, H. G. Coenen distinguishes four items that fit into Aristotle’s model introduced at APr. 68b–​69a: C: Artaxerxes’ conquest of Egypt D: Persian successful campaigns against Egypt, especially: D1: Darius’ conquest of Egypt D2: Xerxes’ conquest of Egypt A: Persian invasion of Greece as an inevitable consequence B: Persian conquest of Egypt

2 5 Tr. J. H. Freese. Cf. Encinas Reguero 2017: 254. 26 Cf. Price 1975: 40 f; Gazich 1990: 70. 27 See Grimaldi 1988: 252 ad loc. 28 See Grimaldi 1988: 252 f ad loc. and Rapp 2002: 732 ad loc. 29 As Coenen 1992: 330 f does, whose line of thought I am following here. For a brief discussion of the historical context and a possible threat from the Persian king at that time, see Rapp 2002: 732 on 1393b2. Ironically, the Greek mercenaries formed an important part of Artaxerxes III Ochus’ army during his invasion of Egypt in 343 or 342 bce (see Bosworth 1988: 14, 17).

Aristotle’s Second Example: The Persian Invasion of Egypt

43

The present question differs from the two mentioned above in some respects: like the previous one, the case comes under the conjectural status, but, as being entirely hypothetical, it concerns the future course of action. The inductive part of the paradigm, however, is duly based on the past events: 1. D = B: Darius and Xerxes had conquered Egypt. 2. D = A: having conquered Egypt, Darius and Xerxes invaded Greece, therefore 3: B = A: whenever a Great King conquers Egypt, he later invades Greece. The deductive part might take the following form: 1. C = B: If Artaxerxes, the present Great King, is about to conquer Egypt 2. B = A: and whenever a Great King conquers Egypt, he later invades Greece, then 3. C = A: Artaxerxes is bound to invade Greece. The Greeks who are in favor of taking military action against the Persian king seek to convince their fellow countrymen that it is in their best interest to prevent Artaxerxes from subduing Egypt. Based on the conviction that history repeats itself, they draw an inference that “whenever a Great King conquers Egypt, he later invades Greece” which forms the universal proposition (B = A) of the paradigm. Therefrom they deduce that “the present Great King shall do the same.”30 In a nutshell, their premise (‘first part’) was that Darius and Xerxes invaded Greece after having conquered Egypt, hence the conclusion (‘second part’) that Artaxerxes, because he is now the Persian king, will under the same circumstances act in the same way. Here too the intermediate action which connects the two parts, although merely implied, is what accounts for the final assertion. In the following chapters, I will elaborate further on this mechanism underlying the logical exemplum. In order to challenge the kind of paradigm we are currently discussing, one needs to supply a counterexample. It does not require to invent an entire, “new” paradigm. It only takes to undermine the second proposition of the opponent’s inductive part by invoking a person/​event D that does not hold for A. As a result, the first part of the exemplum is rendered invalid, in that it fails to provide a universal proposition that would lead to the final assertion. For that reason, the induction of an ideal paradigm should consist of as many precedents as possible, 30 This inference, as Gazich 1990: 70 observes, is reinforced by the use of the moods and tenses. The subjunctive (modus eventualis) followed by the future tense correspond to two aorist forms: Darius καὶ γὰρ πρότερον λαβὼν… /​διέβη; Xerxes καὶ πάλιν λαβὼν /​διέβη; καὶ οὗτος (= Artaxerxes) ἐὰν λάβῃ /​διαβήσεται.

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The Aristotelian Paradigm

so that its conclusion is inevitable. In practice, as we have already observed, this is hardly ever the case.

2.3. Summary For now, let me briefly summarize the main points set forth in this chapter. According to Aristotle, the historical exemplum as a means of persuasion consists of several elements which are interrelated on the principle of analogy. What he calls ‘the third’ is that which constitutes the matter under dispute (C). A speaker needs first to determine ‘the major term’ (A) coming under one of the status causae. Then, he has to produce an event or events (the more examples the harder to challenge a paradigm) from the past (‘the similar’ or the paradigm proper, D) that would enable him to ascribe C to A. The two occurrences must belong to the same ‘general class’ (γένος) which is attainable through ‘the intermediate proposition’ (B = A). The mechanism of the paradigm involves two stages which we have called ‘the inductive part’ and ‘the deductive part’. The former serves to establish the universal proposition upon which the following syllogism is based. In the latter, this proposition is used to form an analogy between the past events and the matter under dispute. In other words, the process runs from the premise connecting D to B and A respectively, through the mediating generalization (the implied ‘whole’: ‘whoever /​whatever /​whenever Α, Β’) to a conclusion proving that A holds for (is predicated of) C.

3. Exemplum in the Roman Context: Quintilian’s Degrees of Similarity In the introductory chapter a distinction had been made between logical and symbolical exempla. The logical type was shown to correspond roughly to the Greek paradigm as described by Aristotle, whereas the term ‘symbolical exempla’ to apply above all to the Roman exempla domestica that are predicated on the authority (auctoritas) of a historical figure. So far, our theoretical investigation has focused on the Aristotelian paradigm. Now, I would like to shift my attention to rhetorical theory at Rome. The most comprehensive treatment of exempla is that by Quintilian, of whose acquaintance with Aristotle we already know.1 In what follows, I shall take the other handbooks, those of Cicero and the author of the Rhetorica ad Herennium in particular, into account only where they complement or significantly deviate from the views of Quintilian. Before moving on, however, let me introduce at this point several modern terms that are equally applicable to Aristotle’s and Quintilian’s discussion of exempla.2 The speaker who employs exemplum, as we have seen, links together two items: one which is drawn from the past, and one which pertains to the matter under dispute. K. Demoen, when creating his own “paradigm for the analysis of paradigms,” describes these as illustrans and illustrandum respectively.3 Furthermore, he defines the narrowly conceived exemplum as “an appeal to a similar or illustrative incident (the illustrans) which is not intrinsically connected with the matter under discussion (the illustrandum).” Additionally, the scholar has appropriated the terms Ernstbedeutung –​‘a semantic intention within the context’ and Eigenbedeutung –​‘a meaning in itself ’ of the illustrans, from the work of H. Lausberg.4 The ‘semantic intention’ is roughly tantamount to what Aristotle meant by ‘the universal proposition’, i.e. the implied whole mediating

1 Cf. above, Section 1. The present chapter is a revised version of Pierzak 2019b. 2 Cf. Gazich 1990: “Ma in Quintiliano c’è un recupero della valenza logica e la sua teoria dell’exemplum non è analizzabile senza il richiamo diretto alle prove logiche di Aristotele.” 3 See Demoen 1997: 126 (cf. Encinas Reguero 2017: 243). The scholar had adopted these useful terms from Price 1975 who, in turn, followed Friis Johansen 1959. His dissertation, General Reflection in Tragic Rhesis: A Study of Form, was devoted primarily to Greek tragedy. Cf. Pierzak 2018b: 24. 4 See Demoen 1997: 127.

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Exemplum in the Roman Context: Quintilian’s Degrees of Similarity

the relation between the particulars (‘parts’), and what Quintilian specifies succinctly as id quod intenderis.5 Against this backdrop, Aristotle’s First Example can be reinterpreted in the following way: the audience is aware of Dionysius’ actions (illustrandum), but unaware of his intentions. To unveil his agenda, the speaker puts forward the examples of Pisistratus and Theagenes of Megara (illustrantia). What we have referred to earlier as the universal, i.e. whoever asks for a bodyguard aims at tyranny, is his semantic intention (Ernstbedeutung). The events in which the said tyrants were involved might have had different overtones (their respective Eigenbedeutungen) outside of this rhetorical context. This sort of argument runs, as Aristotle would put it, from particular to particular (μέρος πρὸς μέρος) or from similar to similar (ὅμοιον πρὸς ὅμοιον), which leads us to Quintilian’s rather complex theory of the degrees of similarity. This classification had not previously been applied to exempla (cf. below, n. 79). Although Quintilian provides illustrations of individual types (simile, contrarium, etc.), his discussion is often vague in that he does not clarify the relationship between the illustrans and illustrandum of a given exemplum. As a consequence, modern scholars’ subdivisions, which hinge on the classification introduced at Inst. 5.11.5–​14, vary from author to author,6 which is why some find it unhelpful.7 I argue that such an assessment, too hasty at least when it comes to rhetorical theory, results from a misapprehension of certain terminology. Given that most of the illustrations of various types of exempla in the Institutio oratoria are drawn from Cicero’s orations, moreover, a close examination of the degrees of similarity will allow us to better understand the way in which historical examples were employed in Roman oratory.

5 See Lausberg 31990: 231 f (§ 421): “Das exemplum […] zeigt eine Doppelschichtigkeit der semantischen voluntas […]: in der ersten Schicht wird die […] Eigenbedeutung des exemplum-​Inhaltes gemeint […]. Aber die semantische Intention (Quint. 5,11,6 id quod intenderis […]) des Sprechers geht über diese sich abgeschlossene normale Eigenbedeutung des exemplum hinaus: das exemplum wird als Träger einer gültig gemeinten Ernstbedeutung in den Dienst der causa genommen: die Eigenb e deutung d es exemplu m ist e i n spi el e r is che s Mittel zur Er re i chung de s Z i el e s d er E r nstb e d e utu ng” (emphasis added). Cf. OLD, s.v. “intendo” 9, 10c, 11d, 12. 6 See Demoen 1997: 136, n. 38. 7 Cf. e.g. Price 1975: 209: “His div is i on of e x ampl e s into five distinct kinds of comparisons, (simile, dissimile, etc.), is antiquity’s most complex but hard ly s e e ms wor t h h is ef for t since his advice on when to employ each of these five types is so scanty” (emphasis added), and Demoen 1997: 136: “The difference between dissimile and both simile and impar is rather vague.”

Preliminary Remarks

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3.1. Preliminary Remarks Degrees of similarity are absent from Aristotle’s discussion of the παράδειγμα, but the author of the Rhetorica ad Alexandrum, who divides παραδείγματα into ὅμοιαι8 (~similia) and ἐναντίαι (~contraria), was already aware of the idea. He recommends the use of the former whenever a speaker’s statement seems unconvincing and an argument based on probability would not apply. By comparing the matter under dispute with a similar event from the past which had the consequences we say it had, we shall render our case more credible. An opposite example, on the other hand, serves mainly as a warning for the future: if someone went to war unprepared and was defeated, then we may say that our chances of victory increase once we make the proper preparations.9 A little more elaborate classification was developed by later Greek rhetoricians, namely Apsines and Hermogenes: 1) ἀφ’ ὁμοίου (simile), 2) ἀπ’ ἐναντίου (contrarium), 3) ἀπὸ μείζονος (ex maiore ad minus), and ἀπ’ ἐλάττονος (ex minore ad maius), which “seems more practical” (i.e. than that of Quintilian) to K. Demoen.10 It is quickly obvious, however, that their subdivisions are practically the same as Quintilian’s, except that he has an additional category of dissimilar. It is precisely the exemplum dissimile that causes the most difficulties for the students of the Institutio oratoria. In what follows I shall first review the current scholarly debate, and next propose my own view on this puzzling issue. According to H. Lausberg, there are three main degrees (gradus) of similarity: 1) exemplum simile, which is either a) totum simile or b) impar (this one falls into another two subcategories: α) ex maiore ad minus, β) ex minore ad maius), 2) exemplum dissimile, and 3) exemplum contrarium. The “«Dissimilarities» take various forms: they may turn on Kind, Manner, Time, Place, and so on” (5.11.13: Dissimile pluris casus habet.11 Fit enim genere modo 8

Sc. πράξεις –​matters similar or contrary (~illustrantia) to those under discussion (~illustranda). 9 See [Arist.] Rh. Al. 1429a 21–​27, 1429b 37–​41, 1430a 5–​7 and the discussion by Price 1975: 15–​17, 22 f and Gazich 1990: 71–​73. 10 See Aps. Rh. 8.1 Dilts–​Kennedy (p. 285 Spengel–​Hammer) and Hermog. Stat. 11 (p. 89 Rabe); Demoen 1997: loc. cit. 1 1 I quote the English translations of Quintilian from the LCL edition by D. A. Russell. For the Latin text I have used the edition of Winterbottom (OCT) throughout. Radermacher (Teubner) reads pluris excursus habet. Lausberg’s reading (plures causas) is absent from either’s critical apparatus, but it occurs in the older LCL edition by H. E. Butler. The text of Russell 2001: 436 (LCL), on the other hand, agrees here with that of Winterbottom.

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Exemplum in the Roman Context: Quintilian’s Degrees of Similarity

tempore loco ceteris […]). As regards Quintilian’s example (5.11.7): “«Brutus killed his sons when they were plotting treachery; Manlius punished his son’s valour with death»” (‘Brutus occidit liberos proditionem molientis, Manlius virtutem filii morte multavit’), the dissimilarity lies in the cause of death (“Die Unähnlichkeit […] liegt in der causa […] des Tötens”).12 Lausberg then notes en passant that the dissimilarity is always only partial, and even simile, due to the lack of a complete correspondence, shares some common traits with dissimile. B. Price, author of a valuable dissertation on the subject, is fully aware of the difficulties we face in trying to determine what Quintilian meant by exemplum dissimile: like in other instances, no definition is given, and here there is but one illustration, which complicates the matter rather than helping to solve it. For Price, what makes the example of Brutus and Manlius (quoted in the previous paragraph) dissimilar is the contrast between proditio and virtus, but this double sentence can hardly even be called exemplum, as it remains unclear which part forms the illustrans and which the illustrandum. It lacks what Lausberg understood by Ernstbedeutung and Quintilian himself described as id quod intenderis (‘a semantic intention within the context’).13 Having compared this one to other means of argumentation ex dissimili in the Institutio oratoria, the scholar came to the conclusion that “a ‘dissimile’ argument is one in which there is one point of dissimilarity between illustrans and illustrandum which is not in the main verb” and, further on, he divided the dissimilia into (1) faulty exempla, easy to refute by the opponent, and (2) those which include a “non” proviso, i.e. “it is not the case that…”14 The latter, as with each exemplum where the illustrans and the illustrandum do not resemble one another, is faulty as well, but it is recognized

1 2 Lausberg 31990: 230 f (§ 420) followed by Daxelmüller 1984: 637. 13 Cf. Demoen 1997: 127. 14 As in Quint. Inst. 5.11.33: non si, qui argentum omne legavit, videri potest signatam quoque pecuniam reliquisse, ideo etiam quod est in nominibus dari voluisse creditur. This passage had been shown to be a conflation of Cic. Top. 13 and 46: if a man has bequeathed all his money (argentum), it does not follow that he has also bequeathed what is owed him (quod est in nominibus). “The essence of the argument is in the difference between tangible assets […] and debts owed” (Price 1975: 160). This observation, ingenious though it is, seems unnecessary when applied to exempla for two reasons: 1) Quintilian is speaking here of similitudo, and Cicero’s examples serve to illustrate individual loci, and 2) these examples are not ‘historical’ (res gestae), and we do not need them to see that there is only one difference between the cases of Brutus and Manlius.

Similarity and Dissimilarity

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as such by the speaker.15 Only when this reservation (non si) is absent does the speaker expose himself to refutation. Finally, R. Gazich seems to have implicitly taken the opposite view to that of Lausberg, in that he perceives dissimile as “partially similar” (“di somiglianza parziale, [i.e. si tratta]”). Its validity therefore rests upon vicinitas, which, alongside simile and contrarium, constitutes the third element of the exemplary spectrum. His brief analysis of the example put forward by Quintilian comes down to a statement that out of four items three coincide and one differs (1. Brutus /​ Manlius, 2. occidit /​ morte multavit, 3. liberos /​ filii, 4. proditionem molienti s /​ v ir tutem ). The two agents are of similar stature and the actions they perform are analogical, while the difference lies in their motivation. Gazich concludes thus: “Se ne ricava che il dissimile è una forma di somiglianza incompleta, una vera vicinitas.”16 The commentators agree that the difference between the sentences cited at Inst. 5.11.7 is in the agents’ motivation. More in-​depth considerations, however, lead each of them to express conflicting views about the nature of dissimile as one of the subtypes of exemplum: it is either partially dissimilar/​similar or faulty. But if the illustrans and illustrandum of the simile type of exemplum, as Lausberg had already pointed out, can hardly ever be wholly identical, then how is that helpful to say about dissimile that its main quality is a partial dissimilarity/​similarity? Before we delve deeper into the issue, it seems worthwhile to take a closer look at Quintilian’s handling of the simile type of exemplum.

3.2. Similarity and Dissimilarity Quintilian’s discussion may appear ambiguous because he combined exemplum with several related notions, such as similitudo and auctoritas. The close connection between the simile in a broader sense and the historical example is due to 1 5 Price 1975: 158–​163 (the quotation on p. 158). 16 Gazich 1990: 123 f, n. 133. In more general studies of ancient rhetoric, Quintilian’s subdivisions are usually acknowledged without reservations, e.g. Volkmann 21885/​ 1987: 233 f; Lumpe 1966: 1230; Martin 1974: 121. Cf. Calboli Montefusco 1979: 397 and more recently Śnieżewski 2014: 133 f. Franchet d’Espèrey 2010 and Encinas Reguero 2017, on the other hand, focus on the status of exemplum in relation to similar rhetorical categories. On Quintilian’s occasional departure from the classifications found in other works, see Cousin 1935/​1967: 290. It is also worth noting that the scholars often analyzed the subsequent categories in isolation, with little attention paid to their mutual relations. This may be one of the reasons why the overall picture seems somewhat unclear.

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Exemplum in the Roman Context: Quintilian’s Degrees of Similarity

the fact that both are a means of comparison. Although their formal qualities differ, the functions they fulfill in a speech usually overlap.17 Before providing specific examples, Quintilian states clearly that we ought “to consider whether it is similar as a whole or only in part” (5.11.6: Intuendum igitur est totum simile sit an ex parte), “so that we can take either all its features into use or only the potentially useful ones” (ut aut omnia ex eo sumamus aut quae utilia sunt). An illustration of the simile follows: “Saturninus was rightly killed, as were the Gracchi” (‘iure occisus est Saturninus sicut Gracchi’). Here, the likeness is expressed in a comparative way (sicut),18 pointing to the exact analogy between the illustarans and illustrandum, but it only takes a moment’s reflection to see that this statement is not entirely accurate. Cicero indeed often invoked the Gracchi as a negative example/​lesson.19 Especially when paired with Saturninus, as H. van der Blom observes, “they exemplify the radical tribune.”20 Nevertheless, on several occasions when Cicero was addressing the people, and not the senate, he portrayed the brothers’ political activity in a more positive light.21 This is most apparent in the second speech on the agrarian law and the Pro Rabirio perduellionis reo. On both occasions, of course, he had to adjust his viewpoint to the audience’s expectations, but what is equally important –​his opponents were tribunes of the

17 Sometimes therefore, especially when comparison in actual texts is being investigated, it might be convenient to speak of a less precise “exemplary area.” Thus Gazich 1990: 106–​112 (“L’area esemplare”) followed by Urban 2011: 36–​44. See also Daxelmüller 1991: 87 f. 18 Cf. McCall 1969: 194. 19 On exempla as conduits of moral teaching see recently: van der Blom 2010: 84, 105 (positive and negative exempla) and Langlands 2011; 2018: passim; on the criteria of ethical judgement within exemplary discourse: Treggiari 2003: 158 and Roller 2004: 32 f (cf. p. 5 –​an action can be either “good” or “bad,” and n. 25, 42 below). See also above, Section 1, n. 7 for a brief discussion of the Roman exemplary discourse, which Roller 2009: 216 defines as “a (loosely) coherent system of symbols that organizes and represents the past in a particular way, and thereby facilitates a particular way of knowing it.” 20 van der Blom 2010: 107. Cf. Robinson 1986: 46; David 1998: 10, 12 f, who explains the process whereby historical personages are reduced to a set of characteristics of which they came to be considered as the embodiment, and Bücher 2006: 283; see on Ti. Gracchus specifically e.g.: Cic. Planc. 88 and Mil. 8. 21 Before the Catilinarian conspiracy, Cicero portrayed the Gracchi either in a positive or at least in a neutral light, e.g. Font. 39, Clu. 151 (cf. Robinson 1986: 63 f). We need to bear in mind, however, that these passages cannot be read as exempla proper because they lack a discernible illustrans and illustrandum.

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plebs, P. Servilius Rullus and T. Labienus respectively.22 By praising the tribuni of the past he was able, among other things, to contrast “his adversary with the brothers in both actions and character.”23 As with many other historical figures, Cicero referred to the Gracchi in a flexible manner, depending on the political background and the audience of a given oration. He speaks for the first time of their death being justified towards the end of the first Catilinarian,24 and from the fifties bce onwards they were invoked almost exclusively as an example of dangerous troublemakers (seditiosi). This reflects the increasing political divisions and is not confined to this particular case, for as F. Bücher rightly puts it, “Der Wert und die Qualität eines exemplum waren nicht losgelöst und für sich (fest) stehend, sondern stets gegenwartsbezogen.”25 Ancient sources –​above all Cicero’s orations –​attest to the existence of at least two different traditions about the Gracchi,26 one which was unfavorable, propagated by the optimates, and one which was favorable, advocated by the populares. When delivering a speech, Cicero subscribed to the tradition which was best represented among his hearers. The same does not seem to be true of L. Appuleius Saturninus. The speaker seldom had anything commendable to say

2 2 MRR 2.167 f; Alexander 1990: 110 (no. 220); David 1992: 264. 23 Robinson 1994a: 76 and passim; cf. David 1980: 79 f; Classen 1985: 359 f. Similarly Stinger 1993: 110, 113, 117, and Bücher 2009: 103 f. On the flexibility of the Gracchi example see also van der Blom 2010: 103–​107 and Berry 2020: 119 with n. 4. I will not discuss Cicero’s use of the Gracchi here in detail as many works on the subject are available, e.g. Béranger 1972; Gaillard 1975; Robinson 1986: 41–​82, 1994a; Bücher 2009. The recent scholarship on the subject is surveyed by Santangelo 2007: 488. 24 Cic. Cat. 1.29 with Dyck 2008a: 117. Cf. Bücher 2006: 239–​242; 2009: 110 f. 25 Bücher 2009: 111. Cf. Kornhardt 1936: 14; Rambaud 1953: 48; Daxelmüller 1991: 85, 87; Hölkeskamp 1996: 304, 318 = 2004: 72, 185 f; David 1998: 11; Bücher 2006: 236, 248–​250; Urban 2011: 59–​91 and the comment by Roller 2004: 7: “An action may be evaluated positively in one ethical category, but negatively in another.” See also n. 42 below; Chaplin 2015: 106 f on the flexibility of exempla in Livy and now Schulz 2018: 315, 319, 323 f on Suetonius’ use of the same event/​action as example of either right or wrong mode of conduct. 26 See e.g. Pina Polo 2004: 158; van der Blom 2010: 106. Cicero was not the only author to use the Gracchi as exemplum. Caesar, when expressing his indignation over a (so-​called) scu issued against him by the senate, compares his own case with those of the Gracchi and Saturninus (Civ. 1.7.6; for a detailed discussion cf. Appel 2013: 259–​262). They also already had a firm place in rhetorical handbooks (e.g. Cic. Inv. 1.91; Rhet. Her. 4.31, 67; cf. Cousin 1935/​1967: 293).

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either about his character or his actions.27 It suffices to glance over the text of Cicero’s defense of C. Rabirius to see that he deemed the murder of Saturninus entirely justified (which, of course, matched his rhetorical goal). This speech, however, could hardly have been the source of Quintilian’s example of simile, for all the references to the Gracchi which occur in it (§ 12–​15) are positive. From among other passages in the orations where the Gracchi and Saturninus are juxtaposed,28 the most likely candidate seems to be the first Catilinarian. In support of his view that Catiline deserves capital punishment, the speaker recalls that those who occupied high offices were not only not defiled by killing Saturninus and the Gracchi, but even enhanced their standing (Cat. 1.29): “[…] our leading men and most distinguished citizens have been honoured rather than besmirched [non modo se non contaminarunt, sed etiam honestarunt] by the blood of Saturninus, the Gracchi, Flaccus, and of many before them […].”29 If this sentence indeed underlies Quintilian’s iure occisus est Saturninus sicut Gracchi, it would follow that his example lacks the illustrandum and has two illustrantia instead. What he probably meant is that Cicero successfully availed himself of these exempla. To put it another way, he mentions only the useful features (quae utilia sunt), given that the extraordinary measures, which he was now accounting for, were taken against the Gracchi and Saturninus under different circumstances. That said, let us now take another look at the dissimile: ‘Brutus occidit liberos proditionem molientis, Manlius virtutem filii morte multavit’ which B. Price calls atypical precisely because “there is nothing in it to show which half is the illustrans, which half the illustrandum.”30 For both him and other scholars, as 27 Cf. Lenaghan 1969: 161 on Cic. Har. 41; Bücher 2006: 285; Kaster 2006: 206 on Cic. Sest. 37. According to Kenty 2020: 185, however, Cicero bestowed “some limited praise” on him. On Saturninus’ death see recently Gaughan 2010: 121–​124 and Appel 2013: 117–​149. 28 Cic. Verr. 1.151; Cat. 1.4, 29; 4.4; Dom. 82; Har. 41, 43; Sest. 101, 105; Vat. 23; Mil. 14 and Phil. 8.13–​15. In the latter two passages it is only implied that both were rightly killed. 29 Tr. C. MacDonald. On Cicero’s phraseology see Dyck 2008a: 117 ad loc. On his use of these exempla for personal motives: Robinson 1986: 54; Bücher 2006: 241. Bücher 2009: 105 highlights the fact that Cicero portrays the misdeeds of the past tribunes of the plebs with moderation in order to denigrate Catiline’s character more emphatically. The circumstances under which the Gracchi were killed are summarized in Stockton 1979: 75–​77; 195–​200; Appel 2013: 22–​116, on the other hand, addresses the issues of the so-​called scu in the context of the brothers’ death. 30 Price 1975: 159.

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was observed above, the dissimilarity depends on the antithesis virtus –​ proditio. Taken out of context, this statement does hardly allow for any other conclusion, but in what way could such an argument prove useful to a speaker? More important, I presume, is the question of Quintilian’s possible source of his illustration. This time it is not necessarily Cicero, who does not mention Manlius alongside Brutus anywhere in his extant writings. Both incidents, i.e. the execution of his sons by L. Iunius Brutus (cos. 509) and similar action on the part of T. Manlius Imperiosus Torquatus (III cos. 340), were used as exemplum by L. Papirius Cursor (V cos. 313), whose speech is recorded by Livy (8.34.2 f): “His opponent [i.e. Papirius] urged […] the severity of Manlius [Manliana imperia], who had preferred the general good to the love he bore his son, even as Lucius Brutus, the founder of Roman liberty, had done before, in the case of his two children.”31 Papirius was appointed dictator in 325 bce. During the military campaign against the Samnites, he intended to put to death his Master of the Horse, Q. Fabius Maximus Rullianus (V cos. 295), for disobedience, but eventually was persuaded by the senate and the people to spare him.32 This passage needs to be put into wider perspective, for we know that Livy is addressing two different kinds of audience, the external one (the “readers”) and the internal one (the people within the text), at the same time. The exempla, usually transmitted through the speech of a historical personage who is a character in the story, need not always have the same impact on both audiences.33 Papirius lay stress on the disciplina militaris, of which Manlius’ imperia have become the most notorious example.34 He goes on to say that Brutus had acted in the same 31 Tr. B. O. Foster. Interestingly, most scholars (Price 1975: loc. cit.; Lausberg 3 1990: 231 [§ 420]; Śnieżewski 2014: 133, n. 180) quote only Liv. 8.7 as parallel, on which see below, n. 34. For a similar line of argumentation cf. Sen. Con. 10.3.8 fin. Cousin 1935/​1967: 291 f holds the view that nearly all Quintilian’s examples were drawn from Cicero’s writings. 32 Chaplin 2000: 108–​112 (cf. 2015: 109–​111) discusses this episode in detail. See esp. pp. 110 f for the exempla of T. Manlius Torquatus and L. Iunius Brutus. More sources are listed in MRR 1.147 f. van der Poel 2009: 341 discusses this exemplum as employed in Roman declamation. 33 See Chaplin 2000: 50–​54; 2015: 104–​106; Marincola 2010: 269, 287. Cf. van der Blom 2010: 79, who cautions against misapplying the notion of internal audience (as understood by Roller 2004), useful in studying historiography, to the analysis of exempla in real (political) life as they occur in Cicero’s works. 34 The punishment which he inflicted on his son for engaging in single combat in defiance of a direct order is recounted by Livy earlier in the same book (8.7). The father presages that (8.7.17) triste exemplum sed in posterum salubre iuventuti erimus. On

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way, but what Brutus had done, as must have been well known to his hearers, did not correspond exactly to Manlius’ actions.35 Though Papirius neatly leaves out the causa (virtus /​ proditio), which constitutes the point of disagreement in Quintilian’s example, there is at least one other major discrepancy between his illustrantia and illustrandum: the precedents he puts forward concern fathers and sons, whereas in the present case –​the dictator and his magister equitum. Q. Fabius Rullianus will have eventually learned his lesson, but his later change of attitude reflects the “cumulative effect” of Livy’s “exemplary history.”36 As the immediate response to Papirius’ exempla shows, his argument from the past must have been unsuccessful at that very moment.

3.3. Refutatio and Faulty exempla For Quintilian, therefore, it simply might have seemed a faulty exemplum, susceptible to refutation (λύσις, refutatio). Ancient rhetoricians were alert to the danger of misapplying exempla long before. Every exemplum, according to rhetorical theory, could be challenged in two ways: 1) by quoting a counterexample, which would demonstrate that the opponent’s argument is not inevitable (ἀναγκαῖον),37 or 2) by showing that the illustrans is either not similar to

the proverbial character of the imperia Manliana see e.g. Gell. 9.13.20; Cic. Sull. 32 with Schol. Bob. ad loc. (p. 15 f Hildebrandt = 82 St.) and Berry 1996: 202 on 32.11; Kornhardt 1936: 40; Nisbet 1959: 73 f; Chaplin 2000: 59, n. 29; Langlands 2018: 292 with n. 3. Sallust (Cat. 52.30) confuses not only the praenomen of Manlius (A. instead of T.), but also the occasion (the Gallic War of 361 bce instead of the Latin War of 340 bce). Cf. Vretska 1976: 599 f ad loc. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (8.79.2), who also juxtaposes Brutus and Manlius, seems to have made the same mistake (perhaps following Sallust: McGushin 1977: 266). On Manlius as an example of disciplina militaris in later tradition (esp. V. Max.) see: Honstetter 1977: 55–​63; on some scholars’ attempts to view it as a ‘negative exemplum’: Langlands 2018: 292–​294; for more references consult MRR 1.135 f. 35 On Brutus’ execution of his sons for conspiring with the Tarquins see e.g. Liv. 2.3.1–​5, 10; Verg. A. 6.817–​823 with Horsfall 2013: 559 on the line 820; D.H. 5.8.1–​9; V. Max. 5.8.1; Hallett 1984: 25, 156. Litchfield 1914: 44 f, n. 8 and Hölkeskamp 1995 = 2004: 252, n. 159 list more references. 3 6 See Liv. 10.3.7–​8 with Chaplin 2000: 112. 37 Cf. Arist. Rh. 1403a 5–​9 and the discussion in the previous chapter. The counterexample, as we have seen, usually serves to undermine the inductive part of the opponent’s exemplum.

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illustrandum or inappropriate for the case in question.38 Since we have already discussed the first method, here I shall focus on the second one. The author of the Rhetorica ad Herennium deals with the misuse of exempla in the section on faulty embellishments (2.46). He states that ‟an Example is defective (vitiosum) if it is either false (falsum), and hence refutable, or base (inprobum), and hence not to be imitated, or if it implies more or less than the matter demands (maius aut minus, quam res postulat).”39 The meaning of falsum is ambiguous: either the illustrans put forth by the speaker is not parallel to the illustrandum, and hence questionable, or the action that is referred to did not happen, and therefore can be denied.40 Inprobum, on the other hand, relates to the ethical dimension of exemplarity, pointing to its strong association with the Roman concept of mos maiorum. This is especially relevant for the symbolical exempla:41 the deeds of the ancestors were susceptible of moral evaluation, and the Romans conceived of them as either positive or negative lessons, the latter of which showed what behavior should be avoided.42 Finally, the third type of fault (maius aut minus, quam res postulat) –​contrary to the author’s assertions –​is the only 38 See Demoen 1997: 137. Cf. in general Marincola 2010: 268. Anaximenes’ view on refutatio was somewhat different. According to him (1429b 25–​37), if an orator argues probabilities (κατὰ λόγον), his opponent should reply by pointing to probable matters that turned out against expectations; conversely, if one argues for an improbability (παρὰ λόγον), his opponent should demonstrate that the event referred to was just a lucky accident. For more detailed discussion see Fuhrmann 1973/​1983: 452; Price 1975: 19–​22; van der Poel 2009: 334, and Blank 2014: 16 f. 39 Tr. H. Caplan. 40 Thus Price 1975: 91 (however, cf. the discussion in Blank 2014: 19). Falsum is wrongly taken exclusively in the latter sense by Gazich (1990: 76), so it therefore cannot be reconciled with Aristotle’s remark (1393a 29 f) that παραδείγματα can be invented, and with Quintilian’s phrase rei gestae aut ut gestae (cf. Franchet d’Espèrey 2010: 75 f). See also Cic. Part. 44: Aut totum est negandum quod in argumentatione adversarius sumpserit, si f ic tum aut fal sum esse possis docere. 41 On exempla’s dependence on the mos maiorum cf. e.g. Gnauk 1936: 9; David 1980 (esp. pp. 74, 81, 84); Hölkeskamp 1995 = 2004: 251; 1996: 304, 316–​320 = 2004: 172, 183–​187; Stemmler 2000: passim (here esp. pp. 168–​170); Bücher 2006: passim; van der Blom 2010: 12–​17 with secondary literature quoted there, and above, Section 1, n. 7. On the ancestral custom in Cicero’s orations, see recently Kenty 2016. 42 Cf. Cic. Verr. 3.210: Non fugio ne hos quidem mores, dum modo ex his ea quae probat populus Romanus exempla, non ea quae condemnat sequamur; Robinson 1986: 21; 38, n. 11; Roller 2004: 44 and passim; Pina Polo 2004: 168: “In der ersten Hälfte des zweiten Jahrhunderts v. Chr. erhielt der Begriff mos maiorum in der römischen Geschichtsschreibung einen konkreten Ausdruck durch die exempla maiorum, die

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one concerning matters of style: the illustrans needs to be adjusted to the relative importance of that to which it is compared.43 In his juvenile handbook on rhetoric Cicero expresses the same idea when discussing conparabilia (Inv. 1.82 init.): Cum autem pro conparabili aliquid inducetur, quoniam id per similitudinem maxime tractatur, in reprehendendo conveniet simile id negare esse, quod conferetur, ei, quicum conferetur. When something is introduced as a parallel [pro conparabili], since this topic is largely treated by showing similarity, it will be proper in refutation to deny that the thing compared is similar to that to which it is compared.44

In order to refute an argument based on comparison, one ought to deny that the illustrans (id, quod conferetur) resembles the illustrandum (id, quicum conferetur). Cicero follows his own advise in the third book of his Actio secunda in Verrem (the so-​called De frumento),45 but in a somewhat reversed order. When addressing Hortensius, who spoke on behalf of Verres, he suggests that his opponent needs to put forward some historical examples to substantiate his claims, because this is what the audience expects.46 Then a lengthy list of older s owoh l i n p o s it ive r a ls au ch i n ne g at ive r Form in der Geschichte des archaischen Rom angeführt werden” (emphasis added). 43 David 1980: 78 f quotes the following passage as exemplum maius quam res postulat (Cic. S. Rosc. 50 f): etenim qui praeesse agro colendo flagitium putes [sc. Eruci], profecto illum Atilium, quem sua manu spargentem semen qui missi erant convenerunt, hominem turpissimum atque inhonestissimum iudicares. […] neque ego haec eo profero quo conferenda sint cum hisce de quibus nunc quaerimus […]. Contra Stemmler 2000: 155 with n. 42, who reads this passage as an illustration of the symbolical exemplum in which the emphasis is put on the tradition, and not on the comparison/​ analogy. Stemmler himself (2000: 168, n. 86) suggests Cic. Phil. 1.11 as example, a passage which I discuss below, Section 5.4. 44 Tr. H. M. Hubbell. Exemplum, alongside imago and conlatio, belonged in this category (Inv. 1.49). Cf. Quint. Inst. 5.11.2: Nec vereor ne videar repugnare Ciceroni, quamquam conlationem separat ab exemplo; Martin 1974: 119; David 1980: 69. 45 We need to bear in mind that the Actio secunda was never actually delivered, because Verres went into exile voluntarily before the proceedings were resumed. See e.g. Humbert 1925/​1972: 204–​215; Nisbet 1965: 53; Quinn 1979: 23; Mitchell 1986: 10; Fantham 1996: 8; Narducci 1997: 170; Lazzaretti 2015: 96. 46 Cic. Verr. 3.209: Tametsi quae ista sunt exempla multorum? Nam cum in causa tanta, cum in crimine maximo dici a defensore coeptum est factitatum esse aliquid, e xspec tant ii qui audiunt e x e mpla e x vete re memor ia, ex monumentis ac litteris, plena dignitatis, plena antiquitatis; haec enim plurimum solent et auctoritatis habere ad probandum et iucunditatis ad audiendum.

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and contemporary individuals is drawn up (some of whom were even present at the trial) who had like Verres governed a province, but in a completely different way.47 As is stated more or less explicitly each time, none of them would make an appropriate illustrans for Hortensius. Should his rival dare to mention any of them, the exemplum would be easily refuted. A fitting illustration of how such counterargument might have looked is provided by Quintilian himself in the chapter on refutatio (Inst. 5.13). To counter an argument based on comparison (simile in the broader sense), we need to show that it is irrelevant to the matter under dispute. This approach echoes to some degree Aristotle’s views on λύσις (§ 24): “if they [i.e. factual examples] are from antiquity (vetera), one can call them mythical; if they are undoubted (indubia [~ ἀναγκαῖον]), one can stress the dissimilarities.” That historical precedents should not be too remote in time was a commonplace among ancient rhetoricians.48 More important is the second part of the sentence: if we are unable to show that something did not happen (~ falsum of the Rhet. Her.), it will be crucial to demonstrate that it does not under any circumstances match the present situation. Considering the above, Quintilian’s example is very instructive: […] si Nasica post occisum Ti. Gracchum defendatur exemplo Ahalae a quo Maelius est interfectus, Maelium regni adfectatorem fuisse, a Graccho leges modo latas esse popularis, Ahalam magistrum equitum fuisse, Nasicam privatum esse dicatur. […] if, after the murder of Tiberius Gracchus, Nasica were defended by the example of Ahala, who killed Maelius, we could argue that Maelius aimed to be king [regni

47 Cic. Verr. 3.209–​222 discussed in more detail for instance by Gnauk 1936: 75; Kornhardt 1936: 71; Robinson 1986: 19–​21; Stinger 1993: 63–​66 (esp. p. 65); Stemmler 2000: 188–​190; Bücher 2006: 155–​157, 159, and van der Blom 2010: 73–​77. 48 See e.g. Aps. Rh. 6.6 Dilts–​Kennedy = p. 281 Spengel–​Hammer: χρὴ δὲ τὰ παραδείγματα γνώριμα εἶναι καὶ σαφῆ καὶ μ ὴ π άν υ ἀρχα ῖ α μηδὲ μυθώδη. Cf. Alewell 1912: 32; Price 1975: 26 f; Demoen 1997: 140, n. 53; Urban 2011: 12 f. See also Cic. Verr. 3.182: Quid ego vetera repetam aut quid eorum scribarum mentionem faciam quos constat sanctissimos homines atque innocentissimos fuisse? Non me fugit, iudices, vete ra e x e mpla pro fictis fabulis iam audiri atque haberi: in his temporibus versabor miseris ac perditis with the comments by Kornhardt 1936: 69, 73. Interestingly, this statement will later be contradicted at Verr. 3.209 (just quoted above, n. 46). Elsewhere Cicero himself will count the example of C. Servilius Ahala mentioned below among the nimis antiqua (Cat. 1.3). In practice, however, the more ancient an exemplum was, the greater authority it enjoyed (Rambaud 1953: 40; Hölkeskamp 1995 = 2004: 251 f; cf. Chaplin 2015: 111).

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Exemplum in the Roman Context: Quintilian’s Degrees of Similarity adfectatorem], whereas Gracchus had only brought forward popular laws, and that Ahala was Master of the Horse [magistrum equitum], and Nasica simply a private citizen [privatum].49

These cases differ in two respects: 1) Maelius was aspiring to autocracy, while Tiberius just wanted to put forward laws in the interest of the people; 2) Ahala was Master of the Horse, while Nasica only a private citizen.50 Here, not unlike in earlier rhetorical handbooks, the suggested means of countering the examples is to show that the illustrans and illustrandum are not comparable.51 The dissimilarities to which the hypothetical speaker points, however, are tendentious in that what later writers interpreted as Maelius’ regal ambitions was in fact the distribution of grain which he undertook at his own expense.52 In older annalistic tradition, moreover, Ahala acted as a private citizen, and not as Master of the Horse appointed by a dictator.53 Even Cicero on several occasions juxtaposes Ahala and Nasica as if both of them were privati at the time of the crisis.54 As for the Gracchi, their death was often thought of as a result of their craving for power.55 4 9 Cf. Maslakov 1984: 484. 50 See in general Volkmann 21885/​1987: 247. Price 1975: 185 allows for the possibility that Quintilian singles out dissimilarity here as a universal means of refuting exempla, recognized by the author of Rhet. Her. and Cicero; Gazich 1990: 125 f focuses on exemplum’s close proximity to metaphor (A: B = C: D): although at first glance a proportional analogy between the two pairs can be drawn (Ahala is to Maelius as Nasica is to Tiberius), upon closer inspection the dissimilarities between the illustrans and illustrandum prevail. 51 Price 1975: 292, n. 69. Similar rationale lies behind Quintilian’s illustration of a false analogy. If someone advances the following argument: si turpis dominae consuetudo cum servo, turpis domino cum ancilla, an ex dissimilibus argumentatio would be that non idem est dominum cum ancilla coisse quod dominam cum servo (Inst. 5.11.34 f). Cf. McCall 1969: 209 f. 52 Thus Urban 2011: 44. Cf. Rickman 1980: 30 f. 53 See D.H. 12.4.2–​5 = Calp. F26 FRHist (24 Peter /​26 Chassignet) = Cinc. F4 FRHist (6 Peter /​8 Chassignet). Cf. Maslakov 1984: 484 and Cornell 2013: 52 ad loc. (comm. E. H. Bisham, T. J. Cornell): “On this view the alternative version, that Servilius had acted as magister equitum, was a pro-​Gracchan rejoinder.” 54 See Cic. Cat. 1.3 with Dyck 2008a: 70, who points out that the defenders of the Gracchi must have preferred the version in which Ahala acted as a magistrate, “in contrast to Scipio’s action as a privatus”; Mil. 8, 72 with Iul. Ruf. Fig. 23 (RLM, p. 44 who mistakes Mil. 8 for Cat. 1.3); Panitschek 1989: 239 f; Stinger 1993: 120; Hölkeskamp 1996: 311 = 2004: 179 f; Bücher 2006: 239. 55 E.g. Plut. TG. 19.3 and esp. Iul. Vict. 11 (RLM, p. 413) = 2ORF, p. 144 f = FRL 1.180–​ 182. Cf. the discussion in Sections 1 and 4.1.

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This exemplum was therefore not dissimile in itself, but by Quintilian’s lifetime it would certainly have been open to challenge, and this is most likely what the author meant. In the end, the effectiveness of any exemplum will always depend on the speaker’s ability to select an illustrans adequately qualifying (or proving something about) the individual or situation to which it is compared.56 Thus, a certain amount of flexibility characterizes every potential exemplum, because once used by a speaker, it conveys the meaning he wishes to ascribe to it (Ernstbedeutung) in a given historical reality.57 The case of the Gracchi discussed briefly above and the example of Ahala and Nasica may therefore serve as illustrations of a general principle. Against this background, Quintilian’s notion of dissimilarity can be looked at in a new light. In Livy, L. Papirius Cursor was the speaker who sought to justify his decision to execute Q. Fabius Rullianus for disobedience by putting forward the examples of T. Manlius Torquatus and L. Iunius Brutus. His exemplum can be summarized, after the fashion of R. Gazich, in the following way: 1. Brutus, Manlius /​Papirius, 2. capital punishment, 3. s on(s) /​ Master of t he Hors e 4. proditio , virtus /​ v ir tu s . In addition to the difference in causa of the decontextualized example used by Quintilian, here the agents/​objects of the action also vary (Papirius set out to punish his Master of the Horse, his predecessors had punished their own sons/​son). A diagram based on the example of refutatio would be analogous: 1. Nasica /​ Ahala, 2. occidit /​ interfecit, 3. popularem /​ adfec tatorem reg ni , 4. pr ivatu s /​ mag i ster equitum. Now, one can easily imagine a hypothetical speaker arguing against Papirius by showing that his illustrantia are not parallel to his illustrandum on two grounds: both the motive of the action (proditio of Brutus’ sons /​virtus) and the stature of the people involved (father –​son[s]‌/​dictator –​Master of the Horse) differ. Quintilian therefore could have simply meant that the Brutus /​ Manlius exemplum is dissimile because it was open to challenge.

56 Cf. van der Blom 2010: 116 and now Roller 2018: 12: “An adversary […] may seek to discredit the exemplum by contending that the fit is bad. He may allege that the situations are different […], or that the old story lacks credibility, or that the recommended action is badly rather than well done […].” 57 Cf. Hölkeskamp 1996: 312 = 2004: 180; Stemmler 2000: 149, 165, 174 f; Bücher 2009: 112 f; Urban 2011: 61: “Exempla as atomized, decontextualized tokens of cultural and ethical authority provide flexible tools for advancing almost any goal while nevertheless appearing to adhere to a persistent, shared moral tradition.”

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3.4. Extreme Dissimilarity: The exemplum contrarium This ties in neatly with Quintilian’s next remark on exemplum dissimile, which I have already quoted above (Section 3.1): pluris casus habet. Fit enim genere modo tempore loco ceteris (Inst. 5.11.13). Quintilian goes on to say that “Cicero uses almost the whole range to subvert the previous decisions (praeiudicia) which seemed to apply to Cluentius.”58 Then, without offering any illustration of this kind of argument, he lists two examples of contrarium: a loose paraphrase of Cic. Clu. 134 followed by a short quotation from Vergil.59 In the Pro Cluentio (§ 133), Cicero argues that the censors had stigmatized the defendant with a subscriptio without good reasons, so their decision should not have any bearing on the trial. Next he asserts that certain exemplum from the past will help put Cluentius’ case into perspective (§ 134): P. Scipio Africanus, whom all men held in high esteem, was restrained in his use of the subscriptio to the point that he did not stigmatize C. Licinius Sacerdos60 during the census equitum even though he knew that Licinius had committed perjury. Cicero’s conclusion is61 that if equally lenient censors had judged Cluentius’ conduct, he would have never received the nota censoria. There are three points of dissimilarity between the illustrans and illustrandum: Cluentius was stigmatized (1) on the basis of mere hearsay (2) by censors who were incompetent (3); Sacerdos, on the other hand, was not stigmatized (1), although there was substantial evidence against him (2), and his cause was overseen by excellent censors (3).62 From the way Quintilian introduces this exemplum (per quae […] Cicero praeiudicia […] subvertit: contrario vero exemplo censoriam notam [subvertit is implied]), an inference can be made that contrarium is most effective whenever a speaker wants to prove that the 5 8 Russell 2001: 436, n. 18 refers to Cic. Clu. 88–​96. 59 A. 2.540 f. See on the passage Horsfall 2008: 409 f ad loc., who notes that “[i.e. Pyrrhus] does not live up to his father’s standards of magnanimity.” On the exchange of words between Priam and Pyrrhus cf. Highet 1972: 116 f; 1974: 198, 219. The contrariety of this exemplum is discussed briefly by Price 1975: 167. 60 Little is known about this man. He might have been an ancestor of the senator (ca. 100 bce) C. Licinius Sacerdos (cf. Wiseman 1971: 237 [no. 225]) who was probably the father of C. Licinius Sacerdos (pr. urb. 75 [MRR 2.97, 3.124]). The latter was later among Cicero’s competitors for the consulate. See Asc. Tog. 82 C = 64 St. (= Cic. Tog. T 2.1, 2.8 Crawford); Ps. Asc. 251 St.; Crawford 21994: 160 f (with n. 8). 61 Pace Classen 1985: 72: “Was durch diese Parallele erläutert, geklärt oder bewiesen werden soll, läßt er [d.h. Cicero] allerdings mit Hilfe einer unklaren Formulierung im Dunkel.” 62 See Price 1975: 166, Bücher 2006: 266 and cf. Kirby 1990: 100; Stinger 1993: 89 and Stemmler 2000: 163, n. 68. See also the general remarks by Stroh 1975: 217.

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opponent’s claims are false. Given the flexibility and partial dissimilarity between the illustrans and illustrandum of any exemplum taken out of context, I think that Quintilian’s main focus here is not on its form, but on its function. For this reason B. Price’s understanding of the exemplum contrarium63 seems to me to rely too heavily on the formal aspects of Quintilian’s illustrations. We have just seen that there could be more than two points of dissimilarity, and the dissimile itself could also involve more than one. I agree, however, that the indispensable feature of this subtype of exemplum is a clear antithesis between the actions (“main verbs”) performed by the illustrans and illustrandum.64 The example of contrarium adduced at Inst. 5.11.7: “Marcellus restored works of art to the Syracusans when they were the enemy; Verres took them from them though they were our allies” (‘Marcellus ornamenta Syracusanis hostibus restituit, Verres eadem sociis abstulit’), though somewhat historically inaccurate, backs up this view. These two clauses must have been loosely based on Cicero’s narrative in his De signis, Book 4 of the Verrine orations. M. Claudius Marcellus (V cos. 208), who as proconsul captured Syracuse in 211 bce, is described as a generous conqueror. Unlike Verres,65 who as governor of Sicily extorted works of art from Roman allies, Marcellus, although as a military commander he had the right to seize war booty, donated all the goods he had taken to the state.66 In fact, other sources are not as favorable to him,67 but Cicero’s aim was to portray the general in an idealized manner –​as the exact opposite of Verres.68 Quintilian

63 Price 1975: 163: “The exemplum […] ex contrario seem[s]‌to require that two points of dissimilarity or contrariety exist between illustrans and illustrandum and that one of these dissimilarities is in the main verb.” 64 This is also stressed by Lausberg 31990: 231 (§ 421): “dieses unterscheidet sich vom exemplum dissimile […] durch di e G e ge ns ät z l i ch ke it m i nde ste ns de r Haupt ve r b e n und damit des Gesamtinhalts der Eigenbedeutung des exemplum und der […] Ernstbedeutung” (emphasis added). 65 See esp. Cic. Verr. 2.4; 4.115, 121 fin., 123 init., etc. Russell 2001: 433 considers Quintilian’s passage to draw specifically on 4.123. 66 See Vasaly 1993: 106 f and cf. in general Shatzman 1972. A suitable overview of the case of Marcellus and the Syracusans can be found in Ferrary 1988: 573–​576 and Rives 1993. 67 Cf. Plb. 8.3–​7, 37; Liv. 25.23–​31; D.S. 26.18; Plut. Marc. 13–​21 with Heftner 1997: 257. 68 See Lazzaretti 2006: 320 f on Verr. 4.115: “E ss o s i b as a , infatti, su l l a cont rapp osizione f ra Marcel lo e Ver re: ad ogni affermazione relativa all’uno ne corrisponde una contraria riguardante l’altro. […] Questa versione dei fatti data dall’oratore corrisponde all’idealizzazione della figura di Marcello […]” (emphasis added). Cf. Ferrary 1988: 576; van der Blom 2010: 111 f.

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even goes a step further when he ends the first sentence with restituit instead of reliquit, which would be more consistent with the text of the Verrines. In order to obtain the sharpest possible contrast between the two actions, some exaggeration was apparently required. It is noteworthy that Cicero saw his own depiction of the two men as an instance of what the Greeks called ἀντίθετον. When discussing the prose rhythm in his dialogue Orator (§ 165–​167), he states that a speaker is able to achieve harmony without any effort simply by juxtaposing opposites (contraria). This form of expression was a distinguishing feature of Gorgias’ style, but Cicero also took advantage thereof on many occasions,69 as can be seen from the fourth book of his accusatio (In Verrem is meant here).70 As the Actio secunda was, from the viewpoint of Cicero’s contemporaries, primarily a masterpiece of literary prose, it is often difficult to determine in what rhetorical context the speaker’s argument was advanced. Although never actually delivered (cf. n. 45), this speech was written as though it had been revised for publication after the trial –​in other words, it purports to be a record of an oral performance. A modern critic would call it “fictive orality,”71 but for Quintilian it must have been an extensive store of source material,72 just as useful as any other oration. The numerous passages in which Cicero presents Marcellus as the opposite of Verres could be therefore perceived as a means of countering an argument ascribed by the speaker to Hortensius,73 even though most scholars 69 Cf. the following passage from the Pro rege Deiotaro, a speech delivered nearly one and a half year (cf. Marinone 22004: 192 [B5] and 216 [B13]) after the Orator had been published (§ 31): vide quid intersit –​etsi inique Castorem cum Domitio comparo –​sed tamen ille inimico servum remisit, tu ab avo abduxisti; ille incorruptum audire noluit, tu corrupisti; ille adiutorem servum contra dominum repudiavit, tu etiam accusatorem adhibuisti. By saying inique […] comparo Cicero seems to be implying that this exemplum is maius quam res postulat. 70 Cic. Orat. 167 = Verr. 4.115 fin.: Conferte hanc pacem cum illo bello, huius praetoris adventum cum illius imperatoris victoria, huius cohortem impuram cum illius exercitu invicto, huius libidines cum illius continentia: ab illo qui cepit conditas, ab hoc qui constitutas accepit captas dicetis Syracusas. See also Cic. Sull. 32 as an example of argumentum ex contrario where T. Manlius Torquatus is cited as exemplum. Cf. on the subject Berry 1996: 201 f ad loc. and Langlands 2018: 296 with n. 11. 71 Enos 1988: 59 f (“literary fiction”); Fuhrmann 1990: 60 (as example of “fiktive Mündlichkeit”). 72 Cf. van der Poel 2009: 345 with n. 35. 73 His hypothetical argument could be that Verres acquired all his wealth legally (Verr. 4.36): Fing itur improba de fe nsio, praetorem omne id argentum coemisse (cf. the following comment by Lazzaretti 2015: 97: “The main defense of Verres –​that he had bought those sculptures –​is not consistent with the rest of the facts”). Note also

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are convinced that the latter failed to respond to the Actio prima.74 Crucial to the present discussion is the fact that Quintilian himself seems to believe that Hortensius had delivered an oration Pro Verre.75 This enables him to reduce the exemplum contrarium scattered throughout the De signis (n. 65) to a simple antithesis which might have served to undermine one of the alleged (or hypothetical) statements made by Cicero’s opponent. It follows from our discussion above that a speaker can respond to or use exempla (contraria) in several ways: 1) assuming that the prosecutor had employed a historical example to compromise the defendant, the speaker’s task would be to show that this exemplum is faulty, i.e. there are too many dissimilarities between the illustrans and illustrandum (as regards time, place, and other circumstances) for it to be coherent /​significant /​relevant, etc.; 2) if any other potentially harmful statement was made against himself or his client, to use a contrary example would be an efficient way of counterbalancing it. This, of course, applies in reverse order to prosecution speeches: by comparing Verres with Marcellus, Cicero managed to challenge Hortensius’ hypothetical claim that all the wealth amassed by the defendant was gained legally (n. 73); 3) finally, by employing exemplum contrarium in the form of antithesis, the speaker can point to a contrast between two actions, thereby presenting one of them as unjust /​cruel /​unnecessary, etc. Seen from this perspective, therefore, the contrarium ranks as the outermost point of the dissimilarity spectrum, where the illustrandum is a complete opposite of the illustrans.

3.5. Arguments a fortiori: The Inequality As regards the degree of similarity between the illustrans and illustrandum, an exemplum can be either simile, contrarium, or dissimile, the latter of which was introduced to show what an example should not look like. We have already seen

the use of improbus, the same adjective with which the author of the Rhetorica ad Herennium described one of the categories of faulty exempla. 74 See Cic. Orat. 129 (Hort. orat. 25 [2ORF, p. 319] = FRL 2.188 f): nobis pro familiari reo summus orator non respondit Hortensius; Ps. Asc. arg. Cic. Verr. 205 St.; Malcovati 1955: 318; Ross Taylor 1968: 111; Kennedy 1972: 161, etc. 7 5 See Quint. Inst. 10.1.22 f with Alexander 1976 and 1990: 90 followed by Dyck 2008b: 151 who notes that “in spite of reports to the contrary [esp. Cic. Orat. 129 quoted in the previous footnote], Hortensius offered some sort of defense during the actio prima.” For some previous discussions of the subject cf. Mazzarino 1961: 99 f, n. 2.

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from the example of the Gracchi quoted by Quintilian that the similarity itself is relative in character: the speaker needs to adjust a potential exemplum or the so-​ called stock example to a particular communication situation in order to avoid what might be considered a point of disagreement. Unless any difference can be detected, the exemplum will count as totum simile (Inst. 5.11.6, 9). It follows from previous discussion (Section 1) that Quintilian perceived this category to be tantamount to Aristotle’s ‘similar’ (ὅμοιον). After quoting the latter’s First Example, the Roman rhetorician states (5.11.9) that “while Examples are sometimes complete parallels (like this last one), they are sometimes […]” (ut sunt exempla interim tota similia, ut hoc proximum , sic interim […]). A speaker may suggest that in terms of their intentions, Dionysius and Pisistratus are the exact counterparts of each other. Nonetheless, if the speaker decides to juxtapose two persons or actions that are not similar as a whole, but only in part (ex parte), he may avail himself of what is somewhat dimly called impar. Quintilian recommends the use of this type especially in deliberative speeches (5.11.10): “Unequal parallels are particularly useful for exhortations” (Ad exhortationem vero praecipue valent imparia).76 If we want to inspire courage, the woman who killed Pyrrhus,77 the king of Epirus, would make a better illustrans than Horatius and Torquatus; if contempt for death is to be aroused, examples of Cato and Scipio will carry less weight than that of Lucretia.78 Both of these are labelled ex maioribus ad minora because “courage is more to be admired in a woman than in a man” (admirabilior in femina quam in viro virtus). The other subtype of the exemplum impar is ex minoribus ad maiora.79 Quintilian, having introduced these categories, quotes 76 Cf. also Arist. Rh. 1368a 29–​31 with Rapp 2002: 430; Rhet. Her. 3.9; Cousin 1935/​ 1967: 289 f; Martin 1974: 121; Price 1975: 170, 173 (cf. pp. 49, 81, 92, 156); Zorzetti 1980: 44; Brinton 1988: 175 on “deliberative reasoning”; Lausberg 31990: 55 (§ 61.2), 124 (§ 228); Gazich 1990: 93; Demoen 1997: 131 with n. 18, and more recently Franchet d’Espèrey 2010, 68. 77 Cf. Plut. Pyrrh. 34.2–​4; Paus. 1.13.8; D. Kienast, RE 24 (1963), col. 161; Heftner 1997: 40. 78 Cf. e.g. Cic. Rep. 2.46 with Büchner 1984: 219; Liv. 1.57.6–​59.6; D.H. 4.66 f; Ov. Fast. 2.787–​832, etc. On the use of this story in Roman declamation see van der Poel 2009: 343–​345. 79 Quintilian is the first author known to us to apply this terminology to exempla (Price 1975: 167). As regards the argumentation from lesser to greater (and vice versa), the ancient rhetorical theory does not seem to have developed any generally accepted phraseology. For instance, what Cicero calls ex maiore (= ex minore ad maius, and minus maioris in Quint.) when discussing loci communes (De or. 2.172; Leeman et al. 1989: 112 ad loc. cite some parallel passages, mainly from the Topica) is represented

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an example of each, and then one of a (totum) simile, a minus maioris and a maius minoris from Cicero’s orations. The way he arranges his material suggests that the division of simile into three various types is to a large degree independent from his previous distinction between exemplum simile, dissimile, and contrarium.80 What characterizes the imparia is not dissimilarity, which could easily be challenged (cf. above), but a sort of inequality, literally. The illustrans and illustrandum may be unequal to each other with regard to the status of the agents, the nature of the actions they perform, or the circumstances under which the actions take place.81 In practical oratory, this inequality will manifest itself in the form of an argument a fortiori.82 The two examples with which Quintilian begins are very general in tone. The inequality is stressed explicitly in both of them: 1) “If whole cities have been overthrown because of violated marriages, what should be done to an adulterer?” (‘Si propter matrimonia violata urbes eversae sunt, quid f ier i adultero par est? ’), 2) “The pipers, having left the city, were recalled by the authority of the people; how much more should leading citizens […] be recalled from exile!” (‘Tibicines, cum ab urbe discessissent, publice revocati sunt: quanto mag i s pr incipes civitatis […] ab exilio reducendi!’). The former example is obviously an allusion to Paris’ abduction of Helen and the sack of Troy, a subject firmly established in the rhetorical schools.83 The first sentence of the latter

in later Greek theory as ἀπ᾽ ἐλάττονος and, conversely, his ex minore (= ex maiore ad minus, and maius minoris in Quint.) equals Greek ἀπὸ μείζονος. Apparently, the point of departure for Greek rhetoricians must have been what we call the illustrans, and for Cicero accordingly the illustrandum. 80 The preceding portion of the text (Inst. 5.11.5–​8) concerns simile as opposed to dissimile and contrarium, which I have discussed above, whereas in what follows (§ 11.9–​12) the simile is further specified as forming either totum simile, maius minoris, or minus maioris. 81 Price 1975: 168. 82 Cf. Leeman et al. 1989: 113 on Cic. De or. 2.172: ex maiore: si bona existimatio divitiis praestat et pecunia tanto ope re expetitur, quanto gloria mag i s est expetenda!. A deft argument a fortiori occurs near the end of Quintilian’s Education of an Orator (Inst. 12.11.20: Nec vero si geometrae et grammatici ceterarumque artium professores omnem suam vitam […] in singulis artibus consumpserunt, sequitur ut pluris quasdam vitas ad plura discenda desideremus) which Winterbottom 2005 = 2019: 238 paraphrases thus: ‟if a mere geometer can do so much, then, we the students of the grandest of all arts, can do anything!.” 83 See Ov. Ep. 16; 17; Sen. Suas. 3.1–​4. Cf. Quint. Inst. 7.2.3 and the comment by Langlands 2006: 194 on Ov. Ep. 17.41: “The love affair of Paris and Helen is of

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example refers to a well-​known aition explaining the origins of the Quinquatrus minusculae. Probably in the year 311 bce the tibicines went into exile to Tibur, because the censors Appius Claudius Caecus and C. Plautius Venox forbade them from celebrating their annual feast in the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus. An embassy was sent by the senate to bring them back.84 Given the impreciseness of the second clause, it is hard to tell who the illustranda are. In the Roman republican history, however, there is no shortage of accomplished statesmen who were banished and whom Cicero thought should have been restored to their homeland, e.g. L. Opimius,85 T. Annius Milo, M. Claudius Marcellus, P. Popilius Laenas, Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus,86 etc. Whomever Quintilian had in mind, the pipers are of a lower social status than the principes civitatis, so the progression from lesser to greater is fairly clear. Likewise, there is no punishment for adultery87 (quid fieri adultero par est?) that would equal the fall of Troy, caused by Paris’ love affair with Helen (hence ex maiore ad minus). These two preliminary examples serve primarily to inform the reader on how the imparia work in general. For the sake of clarity, Quintilian had chosen well-​known events and, as already noted above, expressed the inequality between the illustrans and illustandum explicitly by saying quid […] par est and quanto magis respectively.

84

8 5 86

87

course an arche t y p a l a du lte r y t a l e, and we know from the start that she will end up with Paris and precipitate the Trojan War […]” (emphasis added). See Liv. 9.30.5–​10; V. Max. 2.5.4; Ov. Fast. 6.651–​691 with Bömer 1958: 379–​382; Warde Fowler 1899/​1969: 157–​159; MRR 1.160; Wiseman 1979/​2003: 87 f. Plutarch (or his source) confuses Appius Claudius Caecus with the Decemvir and wrongly associates the festival with the Ides of January instead of those of June (Mor. 277e; cf. Scheid 2012: 151 ad loc.). Cf. Cic. Sest. 140: praeclare vir de re publica meritus; Pis. 95, etc. See e.g. Cic. Red. Pop. 10: Tribuniciis superiores illi rogationibus […] sunt restituti […]; cf. Dom. 86: […] cum essent optime de re publica meriti, tamen […] cum in exsilium profugissent, rursus ab eodem populo placato sunt in suam pristinam dignitatem restituti on Kaeso Quinctius, M. Furius Camillus and C. Servilius Ahala (see on this passage Robinson 1994b: 477, n. 12). On Metellus Numidicus cf. the references quoted below, n. 103 and 104. See also Cic. Aer. Al. Mil. fr. 22 Crawford (Schol. Bob. p. 157 Hildebrandt = 174 St.) with Kumaniecki 1977a: 398 f and Bücher 2006: 249. On Cicero’s use of “exilic exempla” see in general Claassen 1992: 32, 1999: 158 f. According to Roman law, the husband had the right to kill the adulterer alone, and the father, provided that he caught his daughter and her lover in his own house or in the house of his son-​in-​law, was permitted to kill them both. See Ulp. dig. 48.5.20–​25; Hopkins 1983: 243 f. Cf. Sen. Con. 1.4.

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Having introduced various subtypes of the simile type of exemplum, Quintilian goes on to provide each with an illustration from Cicero’s orations. The example of (totum) simile is Cicero’s statement from the Pro Murena (§ 17) that, just as the defendant proved superior to Ser. Sulpicius Rufus, he himself had won the consular elections by defeating Catiline and P. Sulpicius Galba, both of whom were also men of patrician origin. By drawing this analogy, the speaker aimed to show that the voters’ judgements are guided by a candidate’s personal qualities, and not their nobilitas.88 As E. Fantham observes, “Cicero’s explanation –​that he excelled Catiline in status and Galba in popularity and influence –​makes indirectly his unvoiced argument why Murena defeated Sulpicius Rufus.”89 From the speaker’s viewpoint, therefore, he and his client are of nearly identical status and perform nearly the same action under nearly the same circumstances.90 All examples of the imparia that follow are taken from the Pro Milone. The defense of Milo, on trial for the murder of Clodius, afforded Cicero opportunities to present some of the well-​known homicide cases as unequal to the one under dispute. Shortly after the exordium, Cicero enumerates men who confessed to a murder, but, all things considered, they had no other choice. One of them was M. Horatius (§ 7), a man who killed his own sister, because she lamented over the death of the Curiatii, enemies of Rome. The king Tullus Hostilius had him stand trial for treason (perduellio), but Horatius was acquitted on appeal to the people (provocatio ad populum).91 Cicero invokes this exemplum in response to his opponents’ assertion “that a man who admits to having killed another person should automatically forfeit the right to look upon the light of day.”92 The legendary narrative enables the speaker to undermine their premise and, at the same time, to define his approach as relatio criminis.93 Cicero’s main line 88 See Adamietz 1989: 118 ad loc. and Stinger 1993: 134. On Cicero’s competitors cf. Cic. Att. 1.1.1 = 10 SB; Asc. Tog. 82 C = 64 St. with Marshall 1985: 281–​283; [Q. Cic.] Pet. 7 with Laser 2001: 117 f; Gelzer 1969: 67; Nardo 1970: 64–​67; Mitchell 1979: 174 f. 89 Fantham 2013: 110 ad loc. Cf. Alexander 2002: 124 f. 90 See Price 1975: 156 f and the remarks of Robinson 1986: 88: “Murena’s situation is similar. He too defeated Catiline and another patrician rival, who like Galba was worthy but lacking in gratia.” 91 See for the story e.g. Liv. 1.24–​26 with Ogilvie 1965: 109–​117 (ad loc. esp. p. 115 for more references) and Maslakov 1984: 467–​471. 92 Tr. D. H. Berry. 93 Cf. Cic. Inv. 1.15, 2.78: Relatio criminis est, cum reus id, quod arguitur, confessus alterius se inductum peccato iure fecisse demonstrat. ea est huiusmodi: Horatius occisis tribus Curiatiis et duobus amissis fratribus domum se victor recepit. is animadvertit sororem

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of argument rested on the assumption that it was Clodius who organized the ambush, thereby forcing Milo to defend himself.94 According to the scholiast, the cases of Milo and Horatius differed significantly in that the latter, despite having committed parricide, deserved a pardon.95 It becomes apparent that killing an assailant counts as a lesser crime than taking life of one’s own close relative. As an example of minus maioris, in turn, Quintilian quotes the passage with which the so-​called compensatio extra causam (§ 72) begins. Cicero, by means of a deft ethopoeia, impersonates the defendant and makes him speak on his own behalf.96 It can be plainly seen that Cicero no longer argues question of fact, but rather status of quality, and he now implies that the death of Clodius serves the interests of the state.97 Milo confesses to homicide. His victim, however, was not Spurius Maelius, who fell under suspicion of aiming at tyranny because he seemed to court the people too eagerly; it was a man who had committed all wickedness imaginable.98 Next to Spurius Maelius, Cicero names Tiberius Gracchus,

suam de fratrum morte non laborantem, sponsi autem nomen appellantem identidem Curiatii cum gemitu et lamentatione. indigne passus virginem occidit. accusatur, […]; Litchfield 1914: 67, n. 1; Bonner 1949/​1969: 27; Lausberg 31990: 99 f (§ 179); Craig 2001: 117 f and more recently Bücher 2006: 177 and Langlands 2018: 301. See also Liv. 1.26; V. Max. 6.3.6; 8.1. absol. 1 and for a discussion of the series of exempla in Cic. Mil. 7 f: Maslakov 1984: 484; Stinger 1993: 240 f, and Casamento 2011: 144–​146. 94 Cf. Asc. Mil. 41 C = 37 St.: Itaque cum insidias Milonem Clodio fecisse posuissent accusatores […] Cicero apprehendit et contra Clodium Miloni fecisse insidias disputavit, eoque tota oratio eius spectavit. 95 See Schol. Bob. p. 63 Hildebrandt = 113 St.: Cui responsioni adhibet firmamentum… antiquitus Horatium quoque non caede vulgari, set de parricidio, hoc est interempta sorore confessum absolvi tamen probata aequitate meruisse. 96 More on the subject, cf. Volkmann 21885/​1987: 490; May 1979; 1988: 133–​140; Dyck 1998: 228; Casamento 2011: 149 f; Guard 2013: 87 f; Riedl 2016: 372 with n. 13. On ethopoeia in general see e.g.: Calboli Montefusco 1979: 460 f and Lausberg 3 1990: 407–​411 (§ 820–​825). 97 De qua [sc. Clodii morte], si iam nollem ita diluere crimen, ut dilui, tamen impune Miloni palam clamare ac mentiri gloriose liceret (Quintilian’s example follows). Cf. Craig 2004: 206. 98 Quintilian does not quote the entire passage (which continues through § 76). He assumes that his readers know their Cicero (…et totus in Clodium locus). The speaker refers, among other things, to the Bona Dea scandal, Clodius’ alleged sexual relationship with his sister, his role in expelling Cicero from Rome and in assigning the provinces of Macedon and Syria to L. Calpurnius Piso and Aulus Gabinius respectively. For a more detailed discussion of this passage see Casamento 2011: 150 f. Cf. also

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both of whom were considered to have been rightly killed.99 What they did, according to the speaker, to deserve to die (1: qui […] in suspicionem incidit regni appetendi; 2: qui conlegae magistratum per seditionem abrogavit) is not comparable with the wide range of Clodius’ transgressions. Those at the hands of whom Maelius and Gracchus died (C. Servilius Ahala and Scipio Nasica respectively) are, like Milo, to be perceived as heroes (quorum interfectores implerunt orbem terrarum nominis sui gloria). The inequality, not unlike in the previous example, concerns the character of the objects of the action. The illustrantia were guilty of crimes considerably less dangerous to the state than those of P. Clodius Pulcher. It follows that whenever a speaker wanted to highlight differences between the illustrans and illustrandum “on his own initiative,” he did so by employing what Quintilian meant by exemplum impar, and not dissimile. A good example of such a rhetorical strategy is Cicero’s comparison of his own personal experience with the fate of Q. Caecilius Metellus Numidicus (cos. 109).100 Numidicus was forced to withdraw into exile after refusing to take an oath to which Saturninus had obliged all the senators in 100 bce. About a year later he was recalled to the delight of his fellow countrymen.101 Cicero had been interdicted “from fire and water” in a similar fashion by Clodius, also a tribune of the plebs, in 58 bce, and after his return he drew parallels between himself and Metellus a number of times.102 In the speech Pro Sestio, however, his line of argumentation required him to stress the distinctions between the two “voluntary exiles.” The main points of his argument are neatly summarized by R. Kaster: […] insofar as C.’s support was more broad-​based than Metellus’, he had less reason to withdraw, and more need to explain his withdrawal; insofar as Metellus’ act was a gesture of purely personal principle, made in the face of a fait accompli and with no consequence for the public good, it was unlike C.’s actions […] that had preserved the

Schoenberger 1910: 23–​25 who examines Cicero’s use of people aiming at tyranny as exempla. 99 On the flexibility of the Gracchi exemplum see the previous discussion. On Sp. Maelius cf. e.g. D.H. 12.2.2–​8; Liv. 4.15.1: […] et Maelium iure caesum pronuntiavit [sc. L. Quinctius Cincinnatus] […]. 100 Cic. Sest. 36–​40. Another good example of simile impar (Cic. Clu. 94) is briefly analyzed by David 1980: 76 f, 81. Cf. Classen 1985: 64 with n. 137 and Dyck 2004: 300. 101 See e.g. Cic. Red. Sen. 38, Dom. 87, Planc. 89, Pis. 20 with Nisbet 1961: 80; Plut. Mar. 29; App. BC 1.129–​140, 149; van Ooteghem 1967: 172–​176. Cf. Vell. 2.45.3. 102 Cf. Lintott 2008: 181 f; van der Blom 2010: 181, 195–​203.

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As Cicero’s immediate purpose in this part of the speech was to justify his own discessus, he needed to put it into some perspective. He managed to do so by downplaying the merits of the famous Numidicus, whose exile had been considered exemplary long before,104 on the one hand, and on the other, by stating that their actions took place under entirely different circumstances. Whether an exemplum counts as ex maiore ad minus or the other way round often depends on the point of view.105 In the present case, minus maioris is what the speaker probably sought to achieve: leaving one’s country for the sake of personal beliefs would seem less praiseworthy than doing so for the benefit of the state, and having to grapple with dishonorable opponents is a greater challenge than facing a respectful one (cf. n. 103). Using Quintilian’s terminology, we would define the relation between the illustrans and illustrandum –​Metellus and Cicero respectively –​as inequality, and not dissimilarity. This category (the imparia), like those discussed previously, might be useful in describing a given exemplum, but it has limited value for our understanding of how exempla work in general, and any pair of characters, once decontextualized, can hardly be ascribed to it. A ready illustration is at hand: in some of his speeches, Cicero invokes the example of Metellus Numidicus in such a way so that it fits better into other categories of Quintilian’s distinctions.106 In other words, the degree of similarity is always secondary to the practical capacity of any potential exemplum.

103 Kaster 2006: 203 on Cic. Sest. 37. Cicero refers to Metellus’ exile in the same vein once again at Pis. 20 (55 bce), pointing out that Metellus’ opponent, C. Marius, was more honorable than the consuls of 58 bce. Otherwise, the actions of Metellus Numidicus were most often referred to by Cicero as his personal exemplum (cf. Bücher 2006: 275; van der Blom 2010: 200 f). 104 Cf. Cic. Clu. 95 with Classen 1985: 65. That the speaker’s superior attitude was just a pose becomes apparent when later in the same oration (Sest. 101), as van der Blom 2010: 200 rightly observes, he praises Metellus Numidicus “for renouncing his country rather than his principles.” 105 Cf. n. 79 above and add Cic. Top. 23: Ex comparatione autem omnia valent quae sunt huius modi: Quod in re maiore valet valeat in [re] minore, ut si in urbe fines non reguntur, nec aqua in urbe arceatur. Item contra: Quod in minore valet, valeat in maiore. Licet ide m e x e mplum conve r te re. 106 E.g. in Red. Pop. 9–​11, Dom. 87: exemplum contrarium; in Planc. 89: simile.

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3.6. Closing Remarks: Exempla and Commonplaces Finally, let me consider briefly two examples of a fortiori arguments in the works of Hermogenes and Apsines, Greek rhetoricians I have mentioned in the “Preliminary Remarks.” Ex maiore ad minus (ἀπὸ μείζονος): one is allowed to put to death exiles should they return home; someone who flogged an exile for the said reason stands trial for unlawful vengeance (παρανόμου τιμωρίας). This man can say in his defense that since he was permitted to do more (τὸ μεῖζον = ‘to put to death’), he was also allowed to do less (τὸ ἔλαττον = ‘to flog’).107 Ex minore ad maius (ἀπ’ ἐλάττονος): “Put him to death; for your ancestors killed so-​and-​so when he did less wrong” (ἐλάττω ἠδικηκότα).108 As can be plainly seen, both examples are more general in tone as compared with those of Quintilian. Given that the major discrepancy between the Greek rhetoricians and Quintilian concerns the presence or absence of dissimile among the degrees of similarity, their discussion appears to be more mutually consistent on the assumption that exemplum dissimile did not, in fact, form a separate category at Inst. 5.11. Its inclusion therein in the first place could have resulted from the fact that it was, next to all the other categories (simile, contrarium, etc.), one of the well-​established commonplaces (loci). Cicero himself did not make any clear distinction between exempla and loci communes in his dialogue De oratore when dealing with the τόποι (2.162–​177). Admittedly, his discussion of the topoi confines itself to those negotio adiuncta (e.g. maius, minus, contrarium, eventus, etc.), because his mature rhetorical treatise is rather philosophical than strictly technical in character,109 but he states clearly that in particular cases these categories need to be supplied with examples of the sayings and doings of other people.110 An example of ex 1 07 See Hermog. Stat. 11. 108 See Aps. Rh. 6.12 Dilts–​Kennedy (= p. 281 Spengel–​Hammer) as tr. by M. R. Dilts and G. A. Kennedy. Cf. Cousin 1935/​1967: 288. This example is reminiscent of Quintilian’s minus maioris (Cic. Mil. 72). 109 See Leeman et al. 1989: 102 who divide the topoi into personis attributa (nomen, natura, habitus, etc.) and negotiis attributa (A: continentia cum ipso negotio, B: in gestione negotii, e.g. locus, tempus, etc., and C: negotio adiuncta). On Cic. De or. 2.162–​ 177 as resembling Cicero’s later discussion in Top. 8–​78 and Part. 5–​7 cf. Huby 1989 as referred to by Fantham 2004: 171. 110 Cic. De or. 2.169: atque utroque in genere et similitudinis et dissimilitudinis exempla sunt e x alior um fac ti s aut dic ti s aut eventis et fictae narrationes saepe ponendae. Cf. Cic. Top. 44: Ex eodem similitudinis loco etiam exempla sumuntur, ut Crassus in causa Curiana exemplis plurimis usus est […]; David 1998: 9. On the causa Curiana see Cic. Brut. 144 = 2ORF, p. 246 = FRL 1.448–​450 (Crassus) = 2ORF, p. 261 = FRL 1.484 (Scaevola); Alexander 1990: 48 f; Fantham 2004: 119. Cf. in general Enos 1988.

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contrario follows: “If Gracchus did wickedly, Opimius did nobly” (si Gracchus nefarie, praeclare Opimius).111 This sentence can hardly be even called exemplum, because the illustrans is indistinguishable from the illustrandum. My point is that the exempla were closely interrelated with the theory of the topoi from early on, and this must have had some impact on Quintilian’s understanding of them.112 Such a state of affairs has often caused modern readers’ confusion, and it might have exerted influence upon later rhetoricians, for instance C. Iulius Victor (the fourth century ce), who subsumes exempla under the rubric loci circa rem:113 Secuntur hi loci, qui sunt circa rem. omne enim, quod in quaestionem venit, habet aliquid, cui comparetur, cum quo conferatur,114 quia est ei aliquid simile ,115 est par est contrarium, est maius est minus […]. similitudo est res similis ei rei, de qua quaeritur […]. et ducetur aut ab exemplo aut a parabola aut a fabula aut ab imagine116 ab exemplo, sicut hoc est […] (the example of Dionysius and Pisistratus117 follows). Next come the topics concerning the subject matter. For whatever is being investigated, it can always be compared to or juxtaposed with something else, since there is something similar or dissimilar, equal or contrary, greater or lesser […]. The thing similar to the one under investigation is called similitude […]. It can be obtained through either example, parable, fable, or simile. Through example in the following way […].118

Quintilian apparently mixed two different approaches to exemplum, one in which it overlaps with a more general topos of similarity (when it operates within the 111 Tr. E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham. Based apparently on the speech by C. Papirius Carbo Pro L. Opimio of 120 bce (fr. 11 [2ORF, p. 155 = FRL 1.206 f]). Cf. Cic. De or. 2.106 with Leeman et al. 1989: 44–​47 and 110 on 2.169. 112 Cousin 1935/​1967: 288 f believes that Quintilian’s subdivisions were based on Aristotle’s detailed discussion of the loci communes from greater and lesser (τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, Rh. 1363b). This should be distinguished, however, from his later handling of the topos from greater and lesser at 1397b (cf. Coenen 1987). 113 Iul. Vict. 6.3 (RLM, p. 399). I quote the edition of Giomini and Celentano (Teubner 1980, p. 37 f). For Iulius Victor’s dependence on Quintilian cf. e.g. Volkmann 21885/​ 1987: 207 f; Cousin 1935/​1967: 272, 288; Clarke 31996: 140. Similar classification can be found in Fortunatianus (Rhet. 2.23 = RLM, p. 115) and Mart. Cap. Rhet. 49 (RLM, p. 489). See also van der Poel 2009: 336. 114 Cf. Cic. Inv. 1.82. 115 Supplied by Spengel 1836: 36. Marius Plotius (GL 6.469 Keil) names only four subtypes of exempla: a minore ad maius, a maiore ad minus, a simili, and e contrario. 116 Cf. Cic. Inv. 1.49 init.: conparabile autem est, quod in rebus diversis similem aliquam rationem continet. eius partes sunt tres: imago, conlatio, exemplum. 117 As in Quint. 5.11.8. Cf. Arist. Rh. 1357b (= his First Example, discussed in the previous chapter); Gazich 1990: 69 f, 104; Franchet d’Espèrey 2010: 67 f, 79. 118 My own translation.

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‘exemplary area’), and one in which exemplum simile is opposed to dissimile, the ‘faulty’ exemplum. As a result, the portion of the text where he offers illustrations of each category (5.11.9–​12) seems inconsistent at first glance, because it lacks an example of the dissimile. In the next sentence, however, he lists its casus, which correspond roughly to the loci in gestione negotii (cf. n. 109). Perhaps this is how we should understand the problematic example of Brutus and Manlius. Should our opponent invoke a questionable historical parallel, we may challenge it by relying on one of the loci, in this case causa: Manlius put his son to death for an entirely different reason than Brutus. I hope to have shown so far that in functional terms there are two different kinds of logical exempla, both of which became at some point intertwined with the notion of commonplaces. One way of arguing from the past is to either challenge someone’s semantic intention by demonstrating that their example is vitiosum (faulty) or to invoke a precedent (or precedents) that disprove the opponent’s statement. These are the types of exempla that Quintilian had called dissimile and contrarium respectively. The other kind is employed whenever a speaker seeks either to prove something about the matter under dispute or to improve his argument in some way, e.g. by portraying his client in a positive light or an opponent/​a third party in a negative light. Within exemplary area, such a reference to the past can be either a complete or a partial parallel. The former corresponds roughly to Aristotle’s inductive-​deductive paradigm, and the latter takes the shape of an argument a fortiori. As an illustration of the (totum) simile type of exemplum, as we saw, Quintilian quotes the sentence iure occisus est Saturninus sicut Gracchi. I have argued that this comparison might have been inspired by Cicero’s reference to the brothers Gracchi at Cat. 1.29. My reasoning hinges on the assumption that Quintilian, for the sake of brevity, confined himself to name only the two illustrantia, because his primary goal at this point was to distinguish between the right (similia) and wrong (dissimilia) exempla. By looking at Cicero’s original argument in its full context, however, one is able to interpret the passage in question in line with Aristotle’s theory of the paradigm. The speaker felt anxious about the Romans’ reaction should he put Catiline to death. His aim was to show that, as with the ancestors who won glory by killing dangerous troublemakers, such a policy should not attract criticism against him. The semantic intention (Ernstbedeutung) is not expressed explicitly, but obtained through induction: 1. D = B: Saturninus, the Gracchi, and Flaccus were dangerous troublemakers 2. D = A: Saturninus, the Gracchi, and Flaccus were rightly killed, therefore 3: B = A: whoever is a dangerous troublemaker, deserves to be killed.

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Then the deductive part follows: 1. C = B: If Catiline is a dangerous troublemaker 2. B = A: and whoever is a dangerous troublemaker, deserves to be killed, then 3. C = A: it will be justified to kill Catiline. The ‘first part’ of this exemplum remains valid until an opponent names a dangerous troublemaker who either survived or, hypothetically speaking, was killed unjustly.119 To prevent this from occurring, Cicero provides as many as four recent examples, and then he adds: “and of many before them [et superiorum complurium].” That Saturninus and the Gracchi were dangerous troublemakers is taken here for granted, but another speaker, or the same speaker under different circumstances, could exploit their respective Eigenbedeutungen for various other purposes. The ‘second part’ (deduction) serves to demonstrate that what holds for D also holds for the illustrandum (C, in this case Catiline). The same approach does not apply to arguments a fortiori. By their very nature, the unequal examples do not possess the universal proposition (B = A) as described previously, because they present the illustrans and illustrandum as partially similar, but different in some crucial respect(s). The conclusion of an exemplum impar will often be stated explicitly, as in Quintilian’s illustration: “[…] how much more should leading citizens […] be recalled from exile!”120 In the next part of the book, we shall see in what ways these types of argumentation were put to practice in Roman republican oratory.

119 Here, I focus solely on the extant version of Cicero’s Catilinarians, the one which Quintilian probably had at his disposal. The possible revision of these speeches has been the subject of an ongoing scholarly debate (see e.g. Fuchs 1959: 463–​464, n. 3 for the scholarship up to 1950s and more recently Martin 2011). Draheim 1917: 1063–​ 1064, for instance, considered the whole passages of Cat. 1 containing exempla (§ 2–​6, 22–​32) later additions. For Helm 1979: 106, 109–​111 Cicero’s statements at Cat. 1.12 and 30, that he will have Catiline executed (under the authority of the scu) only after the latter leaves Rome, are pointless unless the audience is already aware of the execution of the conspirators. 120 Inst. 5.11.9.

B. Part Two. Exempla externa in Cicero’s Orations

4. Confronting Theory and Practice The ancients were well aware that rhetorical theory had always been dependent on and derivative from practical oratory. According to Cicero and Quintilian, the authors of handbooks were by no means innovative and gathered their material from the speeches of contemporary orators.1 The value of rhetorical theory in studying actual orations has therefore been disputed in modern scholarship. A. E. Douglas nearly a half-​century ago wrote: Above all the investigations have been dominated by the belief that what matters is to see how far Cicero’s speeches ‘obey’ the precepts of rhetorical theory than to see how far the theory is justified by the practice of the most successful exponents of practical oratory.2

Some decade later, however, detailing “the extent to which Cicero’s practice corresponds with rhetorical theory” was still considered by C. J. Classen among “three approaches to understanding Ciceronian oratory as persuasive art.”3 When it comes to the exempla specifically, we have seen that they were employed in republican Rome in various ways and for various purposes. This applies especially to what we have called symbolical exempla, the majority of which were drawn from national history (domestica). National exempla virtutis, family exempla, and personal exempla were among Cicero’s favorite means of persuasion, and his use thereof is so complex and wide that any attempt to examine its correspondence with rhetorical theory would seem counterproductive. H. van der Blom, the author of the invaluable Cicero’s Role Models, states clearly that her analysis does not “aim at applying a specific theoretical framework for understanding Cicero’s use of historical exempla.”4 All this being considered, can a case be made for confronting theory and practice in the present study? In the rhetorical context, the meaning of the Latin term ‘exemplum’, as was shown above, ranged from a broadly conceived reference to the past to a 1 2 3

4

See e.g. Cic. De or. 1.109, 1.146; Quint. Inst. 3.2.3 (Adamietz 1966: 85 ad loc. also compares 1.6.16, 8 praef. 12, and 9.4.114), 5.10.120. Douglas 1973: 98 f. Classen 1982: 149 f as summarized by Craig 1993: 3. Craig 2004: 188, 199 and passim shows how the Hellenistic manuals of rhetoric may be useful for us in determining the audience’s expectations (on the example of ad hominem attacks in the Pro Milone). On the shift away from this approach in the current scholarship cf. now Kenty 2020: 11. See also Russell 1981: 118 f. Van der Blom 2010: 62.

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counterpart of the Aristotelian παράδειγμα understood as a historical parallel based on analogy. Some of its applications, both in theory and practice, must have overlapped, and at some point exempla as a means of persuasion became almost indistinguishable from commonplaces (simile, contrarium, etc.) that draw upon the past. That is the case with C. Iulius Victor, who quotes Aristotle’s First Example among the loci circa rem,5 but such perspective goes back as far as Cicero himself.6 As regards references to the past, both the so-​called stock exempla and the paradigm in a more technical sense, as described by Quintilian at Inst. 5.11, fit into this format.7 Cicero must have also had a broad semantic scope of the term in mind when he recommended to orators mastering of as many exempla as possible.8 Although there are some hints in his writings, especially in the De officiis, as to how should one live up to his or her family/​personal exempla (hence in a wider sense of the word),9 such precepts are more relevant to politics than to oratory. In practical terms, these exempla will fall almost exclusively under the category of ‘symbolical’ ones. No doubt their use in Cicero’s orations goes far beyond the “handbook material.” In the previous chapter I argued that the ‘logical’ exempla, a totum simile corresponding to the Greek paradigm and an argument a fortiori, are also considered among commonplaces,

See Iul. Vict. 6.3 (RLM, p. 399): Omne enim, quod in quaestionem venit, habet aliquid, cui comparetur, cum quo conferatur, quia est ei aliquid simile […]. Et ducetur aut ab exemplo aut a parabola aut a fabula aut ab imagine. Ab exemplo, sicut hoc est: si c u stodes cor por i s D iony sio dede r iti s, etc. 6 At De or. 2.168–​172 he puts forth a wide range of historical personages as examples of loci a simili, a contrario, etc. Caplan 1968: 237, n. e lists De or. 2.169 as one of the passages illustrating the place of exemplum “in Cicero’s theory of argumentation.” Craig 1993: 2, n. 3 points out that “in De Orat. 2.162–​173 and in Cicero’s Topica […] loci are no longer content-​specific, but have become the sedes argumentorum (Top. 8) in the sense of formal patterns.” Cf. more recently Rapp 2002: 794 f on Arist. Rh. 1402b12–​1402b20; Reinhardt 2003: passim and see also the references quoted in Section 1, n. 12, where exempla count among figures of thought. 7 Cf. van der Blom 2010: 107–​117; Schulz 2018: 311, 323. 8 See Cic. De or. 1.18 quoted (with literature) in Section 1, n. 19; Orat. 120 fin.: Commemoratio autem antiquitatis exemplorumque prolatio summa cum delectatione et auctoritatem orationi adfert et fidem; Part. 96 init.: Uterque vero ad augendum habeat exemplorum aut recentium, quo notiora sint, aut veterum, quo plus auctoritatis habeant, copiam. Cf. Quint. Inst. 12.4.1 with Austin 21954: 98 f and Winterbottom 2005 = 2019: 238. 9 See Cic. Off. 1.115–​121, 2.46 f and van der Blom 2010: passim (pp. 83 f for theoretical precepts); Langlands 2011. Cf. Grillo 2015: 176 on Cic. Prov. 27. 5

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but are less elusive in theoretical terms. I have shown, moreover, that the theoretical framework based on Aristotle’s and Quintilian’s views, if slightly modified, can be applied to at least some of Cicero’s references to the past. Exempla externa are particularly suited to test this approach because, unlike the examples drawn from national history, they had, in the eyes of the Romans, less ‘symbolical’ qualities to them. The present chapter is meant to demonstrate the applicability of the ‘rhetorical approach’ to Roman oratory on the already familiar example of the Greek tyrants. In the course of the following discussion, I will also point out some shortcomings of this method and, by introducing additional terminology, suggest how to overcome these shortcomings.

4.1. ‘C. Fannius’ and the Greek Tyrants Towards the end of the second century bce, a man whom we have called ‘C. Fannius’ accused C. Gracchus of aiming at tyranny. If we can believe C. Iulius Victor, a rhetorician of the fourth century ce whom I have mentioned several times by now, the historical example this man had employed is almost exactly the same as Aristotle’s First Example. He is said to have addressed the Romans in the following way:10 non debetis largitionem permittere; nam et Dionysius et Pisistratus cives largitione corruperunt. si Phalaridi et Pisistrato et ceteris omnibus una res maxime, largitio, dominationem comparavit, quid est, quod non idem Gracchum adfectare credatis, quem eadem quae illos facere videatis? You must not allow bribery; for both Dionysius and Pisistratus corrupted the citizens by bribery [nam et Dionysius et Pisistratus cives largitione corruperunt] (fr. 6) […]; If for Phalaris and Pisistratus and all others one thing in particular, bribery, procured absolute dominion, what reason is there that you don’t believe that Gracchus is aiming for the same, since you see him doing the same thing as those men [quid est, quod non idem Gracchum adfectare credatis, quem eadem quae illos facere videatis]? (fr. 7)11

I said “almost exactly the same” because, unlike in the present case, Aristotle’s premise was based on the fact that the tyrants asked for a bodyguard. Here is the Latin text of Quintilian side by side with the “original” version of this argument:

10 Iul. Vict. 11 (RLM, p. 413) = 2ORF, pp. 144 f = FRL 1.180–​183. This section is a revised version of Pierzak 2018b: 24–​27. 11 Tr. G. Manuwald.

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Arist. Rh. 1357b 30–​33

Quint. Inst. 5.11.8

οἷον ὅτι ἐπεβούλευε τυραννίδι Διονύσιος αἰτῶν τὴν φυλακήν· καὶ γὰρ Πεισίστρατος πρότερον ἐπιβουλεύων ᾔτει φυλακὴν καὶ λαβὼν ἐτυράννησε, καὶ Θεαγένης ἐν Μεγάροις· καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσους ἴσασι, παράδειγμα πάντες γίγνονται τοῦ Διονυσίου, ὃν οὐκ ἴσασίν πω εἰ διὰ τοῦτο αἰτεῖ. πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ καθόλου, ὅτι ὁ ἐπιβουλεύων τυραννίδι φυλακὴν αἰτεῖ.

etiam in iis, quae futura dicemus, utilis similium admonitio est, ut si quis dicens, Dionysium idcirco petere custodes salutis suae, ut eorum adiutus armis tyrannidem occupet, hoc referat exemplum, eadem ratione Pisistratum ad dominationem pervenisse.

To prove that Dionysius is aiming at a tyranny, because he asks for a bodyguard, one might say that Pisistratus before him and Theagenes of Megara did the same, and when they obtained what they asked for made themselves tyrants. All the other tyrants known may serve as an example of Dionysius, whose reason, however, for asking for a bodyguard we do not yet know. All these examples are contained under the same universal proposition, that one who is aiming at a tyranny asks for a bodyguard.

A reminder of parallels will be useful also in speaking about the future; for example, someone arguing that Dionysius was asking for a personal bodyguard in order to seize absolute power with their help could adduce as an example the fact that Pisistratus attained power in the same way.12

These passages differ in two respects: Quintilian, perhaps for the sake of brevity, omits Theagenes of Megara and the last sentence in which Aristotle introduces the notion of universal proposition (πάντα δὲ ταῦτα ὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ καθόλου, B = A). However, he does not change the middle term (B ‘to ask for a bodyguard’). So as to make this exemplum relevant, C. Gracchus’ adversary needed to adapt it to the Roman realities.

12 Tr. J. H. Freese (as above, Section 2.1) and D. A. Russell respectively.

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A brief sketch of the historical background should help us to understand the speaker’s motives. By the end of the 120s C. Gracchus as a tribune of the plebs proposed a series of bills to improve the well-​being of the lower strata of the Roman people and one probably aimed at granting the citizenship to the Latins and Latin rights to the Italians. As was the case with his brother, he also faced a rigid opposition from the majority of the ruling class. Among those was his former supporter, C. Fannius, elected as consul for the year 122.13 Regardless of the real objectives of the brothers Gracchi, the nobiles saw their activity as subversive and dangerous to the state.14 As a result, the death of Tiberius was often depicted as a tyrannicide.15 The fragments of the oration incertae sedis quoted above reflect the aristocratic sentiments toward a progressive and revolutionary politician. It remains unclear when exactly ‘C. Fannius’ spoke these words, but his aim was to make the audience believe that C. Gracchus, by being munificent, is in fact aiming at autocracy.16 The speaker’s argument rests on the following universal proposition: ‘whoever corrupts the citizens by bribery, aims at tyranny’ (qui cives largitione corrumpit, dominationem petit [~ fr. 6 f], B = A). This leads, by implication, to the conclusion expressed in the apodosis of fr. 7. Gracchus is said to have been over munificent. To put his behavior into perspective, ‘C. Fannius’ invokes the following historical precedents (the inductive part): 1. D = B: Dionysius, Pisistratus, and Phalaris corrupted the citizens by bribery 2. D = A: Dionysius, Pisistratus, and Phalaris became tyrants, therefore 3: B = A: whoever corrupts the citizens by bribery, aims at tyranny. Those examples by themselves could simply mean (Eigenbedeutung) that as a result of their munificence, they were able to make themselves autocrats. ‘C. 13 See Plut. CG. 8; Schol. Bob. p. 93 Hildebrandt = 132 St.; Carcopino 1928: 235–​244; Meier 1980: 131–​134; Lintott 22006: 78 f, 83 f. That was also the year of C. Gracchus’ second tribunate (MRR 1.517, 3.188). 14 See e.g. Cic. Off. 1.109 with Dyck 1996: 278 for more references; Galsterer 1976: 174 f. Cf. Cic. Brut. 99 fin. (2ORF, p. 143 = FRL 1.176 f): alii [sc. aiebant] multos nobiles, quod quisque potuisset, in illam orationem [sc. De sociis et nomine Latino] contulisse and a brief discussion of that passage in Stockton 1979: 191. The Gracchi were not opposed by the senate as such or all the nobiles but by certain factiones from the start and, in the case of C. Gracchus, by those (including his former supporters) who disapproved of his legislation. See on the subject Rowland 1969. 15 E.g. Plut. TG. 19.3 and Wiseman 2009: 177–​187 who discusses the death of Tiberius in detail. Cf. Dunkle 1967: 159; Clark, Ruebel 1985: 59, n. 7; 69 f, n. 35. 16 Cf. Vell. 2.6.2 and Plut. CG. 14.3 fin.

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Fannius’ had emphasized the cause instead of the result: it is t he aim of those who corrupt the citizens to procure absolute dominion (his Ernstbedeutung). Through the mediating generalization, the audience is able to deduce that: 1. C = B: If C. Gracchus corrupts the citizens by bribery 2. B = A: and whoever corrupts the citizens by bribery, aims at tyranny, then 3. C = A: C. Gracchus aims at tyranny. The major term A is identical with that of Aristotle’s First Example (‘to aim at tyranny’), but the middle term B (‘to corrupt the citizens by bribery’) had to be adjusted so as to match the current circumstances. The speaker first construes the actions of the Greek tyrants in a way that best suits his rhetorical goal (the particular Eigenbedeutungen become his Ernstbedeutung), so that they can serve as illustrantia (fr. 7: si Phalaridi et Pisistrato […] una res maxime, largitio, dominationem comparavit); then, he specifies bribery (largitio) as “the common denominator” (‘the middle’ whereby C and D are ascribed to the same ‘general class’) of the illustrans and illustrandum. This enables him to identify Gracchus with his infamous predecessors through the implied whole (B = A as shown above). The question of whether or not the anti-​Gracchan speaker relied directly on Aristotle must remain unanswered due to the scarcity of the fragments and the lack of any external evidence. It seems plausible, however, that he might have had access to some second-​hand material derived from the Rhetoric as the First Example enjoyed certain recognition among later Roman rhetoricians.17 As regards Phalaris, the tyrant of Acragas, who is absent from “the source,” he might have been implied therein (καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσους ἴσασι) and became later on a part of the catalogue.18 What seems surprising is that ‘C. Fannius’ had employed neither 17 See Quint. Inst. 5.11.8 and Iul. Vict. 6.3 (RLM, p. 399), both passages quoted in this Section. 18 See Cic. Verr. 5.145 cited by Quint. Inst. 8.6.72; Cic. Att. 7.20.2 = 144 SB, N.D. 3.82. It is noteworthy that in later Greek theory he is, alongside Pisistratus and Dionysius, listed as someone who “is going to become tyrant” after receiving a bodyguard. The following example occurs in The Art of Rhetoric attributed to Anonymous Seguerianus (§ 154) who draws on Neocles, a rhetorician of the second half of the second century ce (thus tentatively Dilts, Kennedy 1997: xiii): οἷον τοῦ τινα δορυφόρους λαμβάνοντα τυραννήσειν παράδειγμά ἐστι Πεισίστρατος καὶ Φάλαρις καὶ Διονύσιος. On Phalaris in general see e.g. Andrewes 1956: 129 and more recently the sources and literature listed by Hinz 2001: 55 with n. 149 and passim; Lazzaretti 2006: 225 f on Cic. Verr. 4.73. Cf. Clark, Ruebel 1985: 61 on Phalaris as “Cicero’s favorite exemplum of the tyrant.” See also my discussion of the In Pisonem in Section 4.2.1 below.

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more contemporary Greek examples, e.g. those of Agathocles or Nabis,19 nor any Roman parallel.20 This might be due to the fact that Pisistratus and the others, unlike the two autocrats I have just mentioned, had already been established figures in rhetorical tradition, whereas the exempla of the Romans who craved for absolute power were still “in the making” during the late Republic.21 At any rate, C. Gracchus’ adversary had all the means he required at his disposal, including an illustrandum easily associated with tyranny and a ready exemplum matching his goal.

4.2. Cicero and the Greek Tyrants To ascribe someone such characteristics as crudelitas, libido, superbia, and the like, or to call this person a tyrant outright was a common term of abuse in Roman invective. This attitude towards autocracy was to some extent influenced by the Greek political theory and the depictions of tyrants in tragedy, but it harks back to the early republican period, when the negative picture of Tarquin the Proud was established.22 Therefore, in Cicero’s philosophical and political treatises the Greek tyrants, except for Pisistratus,23 usually exemplify cruelty and the abuse of power.24 Unlike ‘C. Fannius’, however, Cicero nowhere employs Aristotle’s First Example, which to him might have seemed a little hackneyed. That is not to say he was not acquainted with the idea of an armed bodyguard as a symbol of tyranny in Greece.25 On the contrary, in his Republic, he says openly that this was one of the ways in which Pisistratus procured for himself an

1 9 As was pointed out by Ferrary 1983: 56. 20 The negative exempla of Sp. Cassius (Cic. Rep. 2.60 with Büchner 1984: 239 f, Liv. 2.41, D.H. 8.69–​80, etc.), Sp. Maelius (e.g. Cic. Mil. 72, Liv. 4.13–​15), and M. Manlius (Liv. 5.47.4–​9, Plut. Cam. 27.4–​6) would be particularly appropriate. See on these figures as exempla Panitschek 1989. Cf. above, Section 3.5. 21 See Ferrary 1983: loc. cit. and Panitschek 1989: 232–​245 respectively. Cf. Section 9.2. 22 See Dunkle 1967; Koster 1980: passim; Gildenhard 2007: 171; van der Blom 2014: 42. 23 See e.g. Pease 1958: 1188 on Cic. N.D. 3.82 and Wisse, Winterbottom, Fantham 2008: 145 f on Cic. De or. 3.137. Cf. Dunkle 1967: 159 and n. 79 below. 24 See e.g. Cic. Rep. 1.48; Off. 2.23, 26; 3.29; Tusc. 5.61 f; Verbaal 2006: 150–​153 and passim. 25 See on this tradition Hdt. 1.59.4–​6 with Asheri in Murray, Moreno 2007: 121 f and Fraenkel 1950: 781 on A. A. 1650 with further references.

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absolute dominion.26 In the second Philippic, in turn, he reproaches Antony for stationing armed men inside the Temple of Concord, when the senate meeting on 19 September 44 bce took place.27 Antony apparently made the same allegation against Cicero, saying that “Capitol Rise was full of armed slaves” when the latter was consul.28 The implication of such charges must have been sufficiently clear and the audience would easily make the connection between using bodyguards/​armed men and aiming at tyranny. The names of the Greek tyrants occur several times in the speeches, but only in two cases are these references made within ‘exemplary area.’ When discussing each of these passages, we shall note a deficiency in our terminology and attempt to overcome this deficiency by introducing several new notions.

4.2.1. The Primary and Secondary Referents Cicero’s detractors objected not only to what he did during his consulship, but also to what he later wrote about what he did. Such attitude was adopted by L. Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus (cos. 58) who is reported to have claimed that what caused Cicero’s misfortunes was his poetry, and not the invidia (‘unpopularity’). Specifically, it was the unfortunate line29 (cedant arma togae, concedat laurea laudi) from the poem De consulatu suo, widely criticized for vanity by both Cicero’s contemporaries and the posterity.30 In his invective In Pisonem of 55 bce, the speaker addressed this criticism by calling his opponent’s literary expertise into question (§ 73 init.):

26 Cic. Rep. 1.68, following Pl. R. 566b quoted above, Section 2, n. 3. Cf. the commentary ad loc. by Büchner 1984: 163: “Die Leibwache übernimmt Cicero von Plato und fügt aus eigenem Wissen das Beispiel des Peisistratos hinzu.” 27 See Cic. Phil. 2.8, 15, 19, 46, 104, 112. An allusion to this trend can be detected at Marc. 32: omnesque tibi [sc. C. Caesar] […], quoniam subesse aliquid putas quod cavendum sit, non modo excubias et cu stodias, sed etiam laterum nostrorum oppositus et corporum pollice mur . Cf. Gotoff 1993: 88 ad loc.: “According to Dio Cassius 44.6.1, Caesar refused a bodyguard offered by the Senate.” The same incident is also described, for instance, in Vell. 2.57.1; Suet. Jul. 86; App. BC 2.455 and 498. 28 Cic. Phil. 2.16 tr. D. R. Shackleton Bailey. Cf. e.g. Shatzman 1975: 179, n. 9 and Mitchell 1979: 238 for more ancient sources. 29 Fr. 16 Traglia = 12 Courtney = 11 Blänsdorf. Cf. Stinger 1993: 220. 30 See Cic. Off. 1.77 with Dyck 1996: 208 f; Phil. 2.20; Quint. Inst. 11.1.24; cf. on the subject e.g. Ewbank 1933: 13, 18 f, 27–​31; Townend 1965: 118 f; Koster 1980: 355–​357; Habicht 1990: 46; van der Blom 2010: 299, n. 19; 2014: 44.

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Verum tamen, quoniam te non Aristarchum sed Phalarim grammaticum habemus, qui non notam apponas ad malum versum, sed poetam armis persequare, scire cupio quid tandem in isto versu reprendas, ‘cedant arma togae.’ But, since we look upon you not as the Aristarchus, but rather as the Phalaris of criticism [te non Aristarchum sed Phalarim grammaticum habemus] –​one who, instead of stigmatizing a faulty verse, subjects the poet to physical assault [poetam armis persequare] –​ I should like to know, please, what fault you have to find with the line, “Arms to the gown must yield.”31

According to Piso, this verse was directed at Pompey, and it “precipitated Cicero’s exile.”32 To suggest by the end of 63 bce that suppressing the Catilinarian conspiracy was more significant than Pompey’s victories in the East might indeed have seemed tactless.33 Cicero turns the tables on Piso by taking up the pose of a schoolmaster who has to explain the basic rules of poetry to an indocile pupil: toga and arma should not be taken at face value, as a particular piece of clothing and a set of weapons of one particular general, but rather metonymically, as signifying peace and the turmoil of war respectively.34 J. Dugan puts it succinctly: “In Cicero’s defense of the line he tries to fix the meanings of arma and toga at points on their chains of signification where he could defuse Piso’s dangerous reading: arma is not Pompey, nor is toga Cicero.”35 By pretending it to be a school lesson, Cicero trivializes his rival’s hostile interpretation of the poem, but he also manages to convey another message. Earlier in the same speech (Pis. 18, 24) and elsewhere (Red. Sen. 12, Sest. 32) Cicero characterizes Piso as a tyrant,36 and he also mentions the story of Phalaris’ brazen bull (Pis. 42) in order to show that Piso does not understand Epicureanism, which he claims to profess.37 Against this background, but in a 3 1 Tr. N. H. Watts. 32 Dyck 1996: 209 on Cic. Off. 1.77. 33 See Nisbet 1961: 141 f ad loc. Cf. MacKendrick 1995: 317. 34 Cf. Cic. Mur. 30, De or. 3.167 fin.; Pina Polo 1996: 152; Kurczyk 2006: 86 f, 252. Wisse, Winterbottom, Fantham 2008: 227 note that “others like Piso had interpreted it [i.e. the line cedant arma togae…] as an (equally metonymical) reference to the exercise of military vs. non-​military powers.” 35 Dugan 2001: 67 = 2005: 63. 36 See Dunkle 1967: 163 f; Thurn 2018: 226–​228; Kenty 2020: 140. 37 In so doing, Cicero himself misrepresents Epicurus’ teachings (cf. also Fin. 5.85; Tusc. 2.17 f, 5.75; Balsdon 1979: 50; Brinton 1988: 180; Gildenhard 2007: 159 and contrast D.L. 10.118). Phalaris was said to have roasted his victims in a brazen bull. This is attested as early as Pind. P. 1.95–​98. Nisbet 1961: 103 on Cic. Pis. 42.12 observes that Cicero must have often seen the bull as quaestor in Sicily. After capturing Carthage, Scipio Aemilianus brought back to Agrigentum a brazen bull which he thought was

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different context, the speaker calls him “the Phalaris of criticism” as opposed to Aristarchus, who at most athetized (notam apponere) the lines in Homer which he considered spurious.38 By saying that he “subjects the poet to physical assault” (armis persequi) Cicero alludes to the quarrel between the tyrant of Acragas and the poet Stesichorus. The latter is said by Aristotle to have told the citizens of Himera a fable (“The Horse, the Stag and the Man”) as a warning against providing bodyguards for Phalaris.39 That there was an actual quarrel between Phalaris and Stesichorus is historically unlikely, but by the first century bce the tyrant’s use of violence against the poet had apparently become part of the tradition.40 Cicero implies here that he had suffered the same at the hands of Clodius and the consuls of 58 bce. In his speech De domo sua, for instance, he recalls (§ 68) what L. Aurelius Cotta (cos. 65) had said on the first of January 57 bce during the meeting of the senate, namely that “[i.e. Cicero] had been driven out by armed violence [vi, armis], men organized for massacre, and a revolutionary despotism [novoque dominatu].”41 The audience of the In Pisonem would Phalaris’. See also Büchner 1984: 334 on Cic. Rep. 3.43; Hinz 2001: 38 with n. 95 and passim (esp. 36–​47) for a more detailed treatment of the evidence. 38 See MacKendrick 1995: 354 and on Aristarchus’ practice e.g.: Allen 1931/​ 2000: 196 f; Pfeiffer 1968: 210–​213, 225–​232; Kaster 1995: 174 on Suet. Rhet. 14.2, and Zetzel 2018: 22 f, 71 f. Cf. Cic. Fam. 3.11.5 = 74 SB: ut enim Aristarchus Homeri versum negat quem non probat […], 9.10.1 = 217 SB (a grammarian Nicias described as alter Aristarchus) with Shackleton Bailey’s notes. 39 This is quoted as an instance of λόγος (Rh. 1393b = fr. 104a Page [PMG 281]). See recently e.g. Encinas Reguero 2017: 256 and on the story Rapp 2002: 734 ad loc. and Lefkowitz 22012: 39. Cicero, who served as quaestor in Sicily, might have also known this anecdote as a local tradition. Cf. Cic. Verr. 2.87 with Schwameis 2019: 361 f and Lazzaretti 2006: 222 f on Cic. Verr. 4.73; Plb. 21.15.9 with Walbank 1979: 108; Hor. Ep. 1.10.34–​41. See also Price 1975: 43–​45 who notes the remarkable fact that Aristotle devotes twice as many lines to discuss fables than he does to discuss historical example and parable combined although there are barely any fables in the extant speeches. 40 That the tyrant had at some point used arms against Stesichorus follows, according to Nisbet (1961: 141 ad loc.), from Phalaris’ letters. The scholar observes that “though these are late forgeries, they contain older material.” Additionally, as Adrados 1979/​ 1999: 242, 245 maintains, this fable comes “from a book of iambs or epodes by the poet” (quotation on p. 242). More recently, however, Hinz 2001: 52–​56 has argued convincingly against the historicity of this anecdote. He suggests (p. 56, n. 153 with reference to Opelt 1965: 145) that when saying armis persequare Cicero could have simply meant the arma of his verse. 41 Tr. D. R. Shackleton Bailey. Cf. Cic. Sest. 73; Kurczyk 2006: 224.

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therefore easily unravel the message Cicero wanted to convey at the beginning of § 73, i.e. that he is not a Homer to Piso’s Aristarchus, but rather a Stesichorus to Piso’s Phalaris.42 Cicero sought to promote his own interpretation of the line cedant arma togae… on the one hand, and on the other, to demonstrate that his opponent is hardly qualified to pass judgement on literary matters (Quid nunc te, asine, litteras doceam?).43 To achieve his goal, he employed the example of Phalaris in a way which is unconventional, but fitting for a discussion of subtleties of poetic language. For those who either listened to the speech or read it afterwards, the first association would be the ill-​treatment of a poet by the tyrant of Acragas. Then, they would easily identify the poet as Stesichorus. Here, the defining feature of a tyrant is not asking for a bodyguard but, as it were, restricting the freedom of speech:44 1. D = B: Phalaris subjected Stesichorus to physical assault 2. D = A: Phalaris was a tyrant, therefore 3: B = A: whoever subjects a poet to physical assault is a tyrant. It would also be clear that Cicero himself is the one who assumes the role of the ill-​treated poet: 1. C = B: If Piso subjected Cicero to physical assault 2. B = A: and whoever subjects a poet to physical assault is a tyrant, then 3. C = A: Piso is a tyrant. It is quickly obvious that in his use of the Greek tyrant as an example Cicero is far subtler than ‘C. Fannius’. In terms of criticism, Piso is linked to Phalaris, and the connection between the two is explained in a parenthetical remark (‘to subject a poet to physical assault’) that constitutes the middle term B. The audience is expected to extrapolate the propositions which I have listed above. This historical example would be sufficiently intelligible even if Cicero did not give away his semantic intention. Perhaps he stated it explicitly to additionally humiliate Piso, given that throughout Pis. 73 the latter is portrayed as unusually slow-​minded –​ someone who was likely to miss the point unless it was handed to him on a 4 2 Cf. Koster 1980: 266, n. 954. 43 Cf. Nisbet 1961: 142 ad loc.; Thurn 2018: 225. 44 According to Koster 1980: 265 Cicero, by saying Nimis magna poena te consule constituta est sive malo poetae sive libero at § 72, alludes to the quarrel between the Metelli and the poet Naevius, who was thrown into prison for his maledicentia. See for more details Koster 1980: 97–​99.

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platter. At the surface level of the text, therefore, the consul of 58 bce is presented as a tyrant incapable of appreciating poetry and, at the same time, seeking to restrict the freedom of speech. Upon closer inspection, however, another conclusion can be drawn, namely that Cicero fell victim to unjustified violence because he allowed himself poetical license. In other words, a harsh punishment for being ‘a bold poet’ (poetae libero) was inflicted on someone who “had simply used a poetical figure of speech.”45 Given that Stesichorus and Naevius,46 as the tradition had it, did in fact offend men of power, Cicero’s “crime” seems considerably less serious, and Piso’s behavior all the more despicable. The bottom-​line of this exemplum is that Piso, having misunderstood one line from a poem, had driven Cicero into exile.47 This interpretation suggests itself only when we take all the variables into account, and by ‘variables’ I mean the referents, illustrantia and illustranda. Aristotle’s First Example as adapted by ‘C. Fannius’, as we saw, involved only one illustrans in the inductive part (Dionysius, Pisistratus, and Phalaris48) and one illustrandum in the deductive part (C. Gracchus). That is not the case at Pis. 73, where there are two sets of referents: Piso is compared to Phalaris, and Cicero, by implication, to Stesichorus. What we are dealing with in the former case is an exemplum totum simile, showing that Piso’s conduct is equally tyrannical as that of Phalaris. The latter, because it lacks a semantic intention (Ernstbedeutung), cannot be read in the same way. It makes far better sense as an argument a fortiori whereby Cicero suggests that unlike Stesichorus, who had offended a tyrant, he is guilty of merely using a figure of speech that was distorted by his opponent.

4 5 Thus Nisbet 1961: 140 who quotes Cic. De or. 1.70, 3.153, and Orat. 202. 46 Cf. n. 44 and E. Fraenkel, RE Suppl. 6, 1960, coll. 622–​624. 47 Contrast, for instance, Cicero’s story (Arch. 25) of how generously Sulla treated a bad poet (malus poeta, cf. sive malo poetae sive libero) who offered him an epigram in his honor. See on the subject e.g. Vretska, Vretska 1979: 167 ad loc.; Diehl 1988: 119 f and the brilliant interpretation of Zetzel 2003: 124, who suggests that Cicero’s description of this poem as written ‘with every other verse just a little too long’ (alternis versiculis longiusculis) may in fact be “a perfectly accurate, if satirical, description of the elegiac couplet.” As both speeches, the Pro Archia and the In Pisonem, represent the opposing poles of the same, epideictic genre (cf. Dugan 2001, followed by Martinho 2015: 188 f), those who read Pis. 73 in 55 bce or later could associate the two passages to the further detriment of Piso. 48 Those three men count as one illustrans because in this particular rhetorical context all are invoked as examples of the same mode of behavior. This also applies to Pisistratus and Theagenes of Megara in Aristotle’s original version.

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To make the distinction between the two sets of referents clear, I would like to introduce the concept of ‘primary and secondary referents’. Whenever two historical figures are combined by a speaker to form a single exemplum, the one who performs an action is the ‘primary illustrans’ while the one who is the object of that action is the ‘secondary illustrans’. Accordingly, the ‘primary illustrandum’ is the person to whom the primary illustrans is being compared and the ‘secondary illustrandum’ the one to whom the secondary illustrans is being compared. In the passage I have just discussed, therefore, Phalaris and Piso serve as primary referents, whereas Stesichorus and Cicero as secondary ones. Usually, as in the present case, more emphasis will be put on the primary illustrans and illustrandum. This notion seems especially useful for the study of exempla externa in Cicero’s orations because, as we shall see, the foreign historical figures are often referred to as the objects of an action.

4.2.2. The Reversed Antonomasia From among Cicero’s extant speeches, the Greek tyrants are most frequently mentioned in the Verrines. In the late 70s bce Gaius Verres was appointed the governor of Sicily, but it was not long before he began to rule over the province in such a way as if he were an absolute monarch. Because he abused his power, Cicero portrayed him as a tyrant and, as J. R. Dunkle put it, “was aided in this purpose by the fact that Sicily had a long history of tyrants.”49 After many centuries of prosperity and peace, the inhabitants of the island are again subjected to violence and injustice. Now, however, they have to face a new kind of monstrosity that surpassed all the oppression they have ever witnessed. The stone-​ quarries (lautumiae), which were established by Dionysius and used as a state prison, have been reopened during Verres’ governorship. As a place of confinement, the lautumiae became a menace especially for merchants arriving from the ports of Asia, Syria, Tyre, and Alexandria, “whose wares Verres wished to appropriate.”50 Cicero first compares the defendant to the savage peoples known from mythology (illi quos a poetis accepimus, e.g. the Laestrygones of the Odyssey) that lay in wait for the inadvertent travelers on every coast. Then he adds (Verr. 5.145):

49 Dunkle 1967: 160 f. Cf. Verbaal 2006: 146, n. 3: “Dionysios is just an example of a crudelis tyrannis, typical for Sicily.” On “Verres the tyrant” see more recently Frazel 2009: 166–​173. This section is a revised and expanded version of Pierzak 2018b: 27 f. 50 See Levens 1946: 150 on Cic. Verr. 5.145. For historical background and rhetorical context cf. Cowles 1917: 157 f and Berger 1978: 148 respectively.

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At the beginning of the next paragraph, mythological creatures (Charybdis, Scylla, and the Cyclops) are also considered to have been a lesser threat for the sailors than Verres. At this point, the reader must be convinced that if Odysseus were to make his voyage at the present juncture, he would have never made it to Ithaca. As it lacks an implied whole (a semantic intention), the reference to the Greek tyrants cannot be read as an exemplum totum simile. Nor does the argument progress from lesser to greater or greater to lesser, as no specific action of either Dionysius or Phalaris is mentioned that could be compared with Verres’ conduct. In light of these deficiencies, how to best classify Cicero’s statement from rhetorical standpoint? Quintilian (Inst. 8.6.72) quotes the entire passage as an instance of a hyperbole per translationem, which makes sense in a broader context, but does not help us understand what exact role the historical figures play. In more general terms, R. Seager has recently included the passage in question in his analysis of the Ciceronian invective under the rubric ‘the virtuous foil’. “For the technique to be effective,” the scholar explains, “there must exist at least one pivotal point of comparison between subject and foil.” At Verr. 5.145 the point is that Verres outdid in his cruelty and the abuse of power even the notorious Sicilian tyrants.52 This is a sound interpretation and perhaps the best approach in those instances where the speaker indicates clearly that the illustrans and illustrandum are not the same/​comparable (non… ille nec…). To a certain degree, it would also apply to the previous passage, where Piso was opposed to Aristarchus (te non Aristarchum […] habemus). In the In Pisonem, however, a specific action was ascribed to Aristarchus, namely ‘to stigmatize a faulty 51 Tr. D. H. Berry. On Cicero’s depiction of Verres as an inhuman monster see Opelt 1965: 143 f; May 1996: 143 f and on this passage in particular cf. Seager 2007: 40 and Frazel 2009: 163. Cicero often used animal imagery to shame his opponents. Cf. now Thurn 2018: 320 (Namens-​und Sachindex s.vv. ‟Tier /​tierisch /​Ungeheuer /​ belua”). 52 See Seager 2007: 40 (quotation on p. 31).

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line.’ That is not the case, for example, in Ovid’s Ex Ponto (3.9.24), where the name ‘Aristarchus’ virtually means ‘criticism’53 and is opposed to ‘Homer’, who embodies the art of poetry. When discussing these lines, B. Price asks whether this passage is “merely a comparison or is it an historical example as well?” and, in a footnote, he points to the difficulties in classification.54 According to P. von Moos, what causes the problem is that the rhetorical theory does not provide a clear distinction between the broadly and narrowly conceived exemplum, and that the ancients tended to describe any argument based on comparison per antonomasian as a historical example.55 K. Demoen confronts the difficulty by looking at various ways in which an exemplum is inserted into context.56 He distinguishes four elements that historical example can include: (a) illustrans, (b) illustrandum, (c) “Ernstbedeutung or the conclusion drawn from it,” (d) linking term or formula. Then, he introduces four types of exemplum, depending on the presence or absence (explicit or implicit) of the said elements: 1) the ‘full exemplum’, 2) the ‘minimal exemplum’ (abd), 3) the ‘metaphorical exemplum’ (b = a, or a), and 4) the ‘exemplum without insertion’ (b). If we apply this classification to the argument advanced by ‘C. Fannius’, for instance, it would fall under the category ‘full exemplum’, because all the elements, including the conclusion drawn from the Ernstbedeutung, are stated explicitly. This scheme is very useful for descriptive purposes, but it seems to downplay the function of exempla. To my view, the rhetorical goal makes a better criterion. In the case of exemplum proper (or totum simile), as we have seen, it is usually persuasive: the speaker wants to prove something about an action (it was right/​wrong; it happened/​did not happen, etc.) or a person (he or she acts like X). By using exemplum impar, which corresponds roughly to the ‘minimal

53 Cf. Cic. Att. 1.14.3 = 14 SB (cf. Dugan 2001: 60, n. 97 = 2005: 54, n. 98) where Cicero calls Atticus “the Aristarchus of his speeches” (quarum tu Aristarchus es), Fam. 9.10.1 = 217 SB; Hor. Ars 450, etc. See also Grube 1965: 129 and Kaster 1995: 174 on Suet. Rhet. 14.2: “Cic. was fond of invoking Aristarchus’ name in just this sort of conceit.” 54 See Price 1975: 175 f; 290, n. 65. 55 See the insightful observation of von Moos 1988: 62: “Die doppelte, weite und enge Bedeutung von paradeigma, die Quintilian später ausdrücklich für das lateinische Äquivalent exemplum übernimmt, lässt sich daraus erklären, dass das historische Beispiel in der antiken Rhetorik als Beschreibungsmodell für alle Vergleichsargumente diente und so etwas wie das Vergleichsargument per antonomasian darstellte.” 56 The following overview is based on Demoen 1997: 144–​146. For a similar classification of exempla, used in the context of the early modern times, cf. Daxelmüller 1991: 91.

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exemplum’, the speaker draws a contrast between the actions of two (or more) people. The type in which only the name of illustrans is given (~ ‘metaphorical exemplum’), on the other hand, usually serves a different purpose. If Aristarchus’ name could mean ‘criticism’, then by simply calling someone ‘Aristarchus’ we ascribe this person certain qualities that are traditionally associated with the said Alexandrian scholar. To put it another way, the speaker who refers to a historical figure in this manner places emphasis on that person’s character and his aim is to modify accordingly the character of the illustrandum. As stated by K. Demoen, in this type [i.e. metaphorical exemplum] “the Ernstbedeutung is merely implied” and it “takes the shape of a Vossian antonomasia.” Since I have adopted a narrower meaning of the ‘semantic intention’ (Ernstbedeutung),57 I can agree only with the latter statement. So far, the crucial notion for the upcoming discussion has only been mentioned in passing. We have spoken of arguments based on comparison per antonomasian and of the type of exemplum which takes the shape of a Vossian antonomasia. It is high time that we take a closer look at this figure of thought.58 The “standard” antonomasia (pronominatio) is a substitution of a proper name with a common noun or descriptive formula59 (commune pro proprio), e.g. divum pater atque hominum rex (“father of gods and king of men”) for Jupiter or Romanae eloquentiae princeps (“the prince of Roman eloquence”) for Cicero.60 Its inversion, therefore, would be a substitution of a common noun or a set of characteristics with a proper name. Basing on the analogy with metonymy and synecdoche, Gerardus Vossius (1577–​1649) described this form of antonomasia as follows: nam quemadmodum non tantum μετωνυμία est,61 cum causa pro effectu aut subiectum pro adiuncto ponitur, verum etiam fit contrarium; neque tantum συνεκδοχὴ est, cum

57 Demoen 1997: 146 himself admits that “In the form (b = a) […] the exemplary character tells something more ab out t he p e rs on mentioned in the illustrandum” (emphasis added). 58 The ancients did not have a separate name for this figure. Cf. Oppermann 2000: 64, n. 4: “Einen antiken Namen für die metaphorische Verwendung des Namens einer Beispielperson gibt es nicht.” 59 I.e. λέξις or φράσις according to Tryph. Trop. 2.18 (p. 204 Spengel). 60 Both examples in Quint. Inst. 8.6.29 f (the former derives from Verg. A. 1.65). See e.g. Volkmann 21885/​1987: 425; Leeman 1963: 38; Martin 1974: 263; Lausberg 3 1990: 300 f (§ 580); Calboli 21993: 378, n. 190 on Rhet. Her. 4.42 for further references. Cf. Craig 1986: 232 f with n. 8 discussing Cic. Mur. 60. 61 In fact, I. Opelt understands such a use of proper name as metonymy (1965: 145): “der metonyme Gebrauch der Namen historischer oder mythischer Persönlichkeiten.”

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totum pro parte accipitur, sed et cum pars usurpatur pro toto: itidem neque ἀντονομασία solum erit, cum commune sumitur pro proprio […] verum etiam cum proprio utimur pro communi.62 For metonymy occurs not only when the cause is replaced with the effect or the subject with its attribute, but also when the opposite is the case; nor does synecdoche occur only when a whole stands in for a part, but also when a part stands in for a whole. The same applies to antonomasia which will take place not only when a common name is substituted for a proper name […] but also when a proper name is substituted for a common name.63

Since that time, the alternative to standard antonomasia has been called ‘Vossian’, after the Dutch scholar, or simply a ‘reversed antonomasia’ (proprium pro communi). Its use will be best illustrated by example. In the second book of his Attic Nights Aulus Gellius speaks (11.1) of a soldier, L. Sicinius (or Siccius) Dentatus (tr. pl. 454),64 who excelled in many battles. Due to his great military prowess (ob ingentem fortitudinem) he received a nickname ‘the Roman Achilles’. Two important features of the reversed antonomasia can be discerned here. First, the illustrans functions as an equivalent of certain quality (in this case, Achilles = fortitudo) which it shares in common with the illustrandum.65 Second, this mode of expression usually requires a ‘contemporizing indicator’ (pronoun or adjective, e.g. alter, ille, novus) whereby the prototype (historical or mythological character) is brought to the present:66 Dentatus is (i.e. as brave as) an Achilles who lives in nowadays Rome.67 Coming back to Cicero, let us assume 6 2 Voss. II, p. 170 quoted by Lausberg 31990: 301 (§ 581). 63 My own translation. 64 See MRR 1.43, 3.199; Gundel in DKP 5.162, s.v. “Siccius.” 65 Cf. Holmqvist, Płuciennik 2010: 373: “a name for a typical representative of a set is used in order to refer to all representatives of the set.” In our case, both Achilles and Dentatus were characterized by military prowess, but unlike Dentatus, Achilles is a typical representative of the set to which viri fortes belong. 66 See Lausberg 31990: loc. cit.; cf. Demoen 1997: 146 who defines it as “an actualizing attribute (e.g., ἡ ἐμή, ὁ νέος) connected with the name of the exemplary character.” A somewhat untypical instance of this procedure, in that it concerns nearly contemporary figures, occurs at Cic. Brut. 43: quare quoniam tibi ita qudrat, omnia fuisse Themistocli paria et Coriolano, pateram quoque a me sumas licet, praebebo etiam hostiam, ut Coriolanus sit plane alte r T he mi stocles. 67 Reversed antonomasia has been recently described as “the process by which a person or thing is given a name based on an epithet or attributes.” A modern example would be to call someone ‘the George Washington’ of his country (see Kunze 2011: 60, 62). Here, the phrase “of his country” serves as a contemporizing indicator. Accordingly, referring to Napoleon as ‘The Little Corporal’ would be a standard antonomasia.

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for the sake of argument that, instead of using Dionysius and Phalaris as foils at Verr. 5.145, he had called Verres “another Dionysius” (alter Dionysius). In that particular context, the proper name would be a substitute for crudelitas and the pronoun alter would serve to contemporize ‘Dionysius’: Verres is as cruel as if he were another Dionysius. Given the tone of the entire paragraph, however, the reversed antonomasia would have been less compelling. This figure of thought seems to have been very popular among the Romans on the one hand, and originally independent from the historical exemplum, on the other. So, for instance, when Catullus (29.5) calls Caesar cinaede Romule (‘effeminate Romulus’), that is a firmly established term of abuse, where ‘Romulus’ is used ironically for a statesman who “den Staat aus den Angeln zu heben droht.”68 It is more difficult to distinguish between the two means of expression when our source and the speaker are not the same person, as is the case with L. Licinius Lucullus. Several authors report that he had dug a tunnel through a mountain near Naples in order to bring seawater to his fish-​ponds. This earned him a nickname ‘Xerxes in a toga’ (Xerxes togatus).69 Whoever takes credit for that nickname,70 he seems at first sight to have meant that Lucullus, because of his luxurious way of life, acts like an eastern monarch. In fact, the allusion is to an actual event described by Herodotus: during his invasion of Greece, Xerxes had dug a tunnel through Mount Athos.71 Disguised as an antonomasia is therefore an exemplum which can be understood at least in two different ways: the Persian king had acted with impiety and his expedition had failed. The conclusion would be that

For more modern examples see Lakoff 1987: 87 f and Holmqvist, Płuciennik 2010: passim. 68 Thus Opelt 1965: 145. Cf. for similar imagery Sal. Hist. 1.55.5 M = 1.49.5 Ramsey (Sulla is called by M. Aemilius Lepidus ‘this perverse Romulus’ (scaevos iste Romulus)). [Sal.] Cic. 4.7, where Cicero is addressed as Romule Arpinas (‘the Romulus of Arpinum’; cf. Quint. Inst. 9.3.89), may count as an exception to this trend for, as Vretska 1961: 56 ad loc. rightly observes, Cicero himself, for claiming to be the second founder of Rome (Fr. 17 Traglia = 8 Courtney = 12 Blänsdorf: O fortunatam natam me consule Romam), inspired the taunt. More examples in Syndikus 1984: 178 with n. 12. 69 See Vell. 2.33.4 fin.; Plin. Nat. 9.170; Plut. Luc. 39.3. Cf. Shatzman 1975: 380. 70 According to Velleius Paterculus and Pliny the Elder, it was Pompey the Great. Plutarch speaks of “Tubero the Stoic” which may refer to either L. Aelius Tubero or his son, Q. Aelius Tubero. Neither of them, however (van Ooteghem 1959: 187, n. 3; Jolivet 1987: 875, n. 2), was a Stoic philosopher (pace Pollitt 1978: 164). Cf. recently van der Poel 2009: 342, n. 31. 71 See Hdt. 7.22–​24 with Jolivet 1987: 875 f, 889 f and Keaveney 1992: 150.

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whoever commits the same act is impious and doomed to failure.72 The suggestion of V. Jolivet seems more plausible: despite the outcome of the war, Xerxes’ enormous enterprise was undertaken to achieve victory, whereas Lucullus’ motivation was down-​to-​earth: he needed a constant supply of water to satisfy his whims.73 This is a good example of an argument a fortiori (from greater to lesser), where the contemporizing adjective serves to underscore the contrast: although a member of the community of togati (= the Romans),74 Lucullus fails to follow the mos maiorum. Similarly Pompey, when it was rumored that Caesar has an affair with his third wife Mucia, is said to have referred to him, with a groan, as Aegisthus.75 Unfortunately, we do not know how exactly Pompey expressed himself, and whether this was meant as a mythological exemplum or a reversed antonomasia. Again, the former seems plausible, since Aegisthus was known for one action in particular –​seducing other man’s wife. It depends on whether Pompey’s intention was simply to denigrate Caesar’s character or he was also alluding to Aegisthus’ fate. If the latter is true, his witticism would entail further implications. It follows that the difference between exemplum and antonomasia is primarily functional and the choice between the two depends on the speaker’s rhetorical goal. It is possible, as J.-​M. David has argued,76 that frequently used exempla, which had been gradually losing their emotive force and becoming tantamount to models of certain virtues or vices, eventually evolved into antonomasia, but this process seems to pertain to a greater extent to Roman historical figures. Foreign characters (exempla externa) must have been often referred to by the speakers simply by their names because they were less known to the Roman audience and therefore easily reduced to equivalents of certain qualities. No matter what its original relation to exemplum was, the reversed antonomasia became in the course of time a part of everyday speech. For this figure of thought to be used effectively, the person to whom a speaker refers needs to be known

7 2 Thus Keaveney 1992: loc. cit. 73 Cf. Jolivet 1987: 900: “Faut-​il plutôt penser que son inventeur, quel qu’il ait été, mettant en parallèle les gigantesques travaux de l’Athos et l’aménagement médiocre de viviers, a voulu faire mieux ressortir la dérision des entreprises privées d’un imperator du présent en la comparant à la démesure réelle d’un général du passé?.” 74 Cf. Potthoff 1992: 197; Edmondson 2008: 39 f. 75 See Suet. Jul. 50.1 (2ORF, p. 301 [cf. 512] = FRL 2.132) and the discussion by Champlin 2003: 298 f. Cf. van Ooteghem 1954: 271–​273; Marshall 1985: 127 on Asc. Scaur. 19.19 C. 76 See David 1998: 10.

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to his recipient. Unlike in the case of historical exemplum, however, it is not necessarily relevant what that person had done under given circumstances. For this reason, I would limit the use of terms illustrans and illustrandum to “exemplum proper” with which they are commonly associated. To distinguish between their denotata and a pair of persons compared by means of reversed antonomasia, I would adopt the terms ‘paragon’ and ‘target’ respectively.77 For the same reason, I abandon K. Demoen’s term ‘metaphorical exemplum’ in favor of ‘a reversed antonomasia’ or simply ‘antonomasia’. A metaphorical exemplum in the form ‘b = a, or a’, I believe, would still require either a semantic intention or a clearly defined action on the part of the referents so as to draw a parallel between them, and not only to say something more about a person. In this regard, the two illustrations from the previous paragraph are inconclusive in that the authors who attribute the words ‘Xerxes in a toga’ and ‘Aegisthus’ to certain people may as well have simplified them for the sake of brevity. The expressive qualities of an utterance will be more transparent if it is voiced by the same person who composed the work. Given the main subject of the present study, Cicero’s works seem the most appropriate choice to illustrate the relation between the paragon and target. We have already examined the ways in which he refers to the Greek tyrants in his orations. Now, let us shift the focus to his letters, where there are several occurrences of ‘Pisistratus’ and/​or ‘Phalaris’. At the beginning of 49 bce, just before the Civil War broke out, it could easily be imagined that Caesar is willing to seize absolute power. The anxiety which that caused among the Romans is reflected in Cicero’s correspondence with Atticus. As early as February 5 he describes Caesar as a despot, but one “as to whom it is doubtful whether he will take Phalaris or Pisistratus as his model [incertum est Phalarimne an Pisistratum sit imitaturus].”78 At this point, Cicero was unable to decide which type of tyrant Caesar will turn out to be, a cruel or a benevolent one.79 A month later, on March 4, Cicero made an ironical remark about Caesar’s clemency: “But the truth is that any evil this Pisistratus [hic Pisistratus] has not done is earning him as much popularity as if he were to have stopped someone 77 On this terminology see e.g. Lakoff 1987: 84 f, 87 f followed by Holmqvist, Płuciennik 2010: 375. 78 Cic. Att. 7.20.2 = 144 SB. Cf. Yavetz 1983: 188. 79 I. Gildenhard, who analyzes in detail the portrayal of Caesar as a tyrant in Cicero’s Letters to Atticus of early 49 bce, calls them (2006: 202), “as far as tyrants go,” an exemplum malum and an exemplum bonum respectively. Atticus must have been convinced that Caesar will imitate the former. See Cic. Att. 7.12.2 = 135 SB: nam istum quidem cuius Φαλαρισμὸν times omnia taeterrime facturum puto with Hinz 2001: 76.

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else doing it.”80 What it says about Caesar is that he either pretends to be or vainly aspires to become a benevolent ruler, but in fact he only strives for power and recognition.81 Here, the contemporizing pronoun hic helps to distance Caesar from the values that according to Cicero the actual Pisistratus embodies, but there is nothing in the text to suggest in what way specifically the behavior of the paragon and target differs. In this passage, certain attitude or type of behavior is replaced by a proper name and no further implications are easily identified. This, however, is still a non-​rhetorical context.82 One example from the speeches should suffice to make the distinction clear.

4.2.2.1.  Semiramis illa As there is only one reference to Semiramis in Cicero’s orations, which is, at the same time, a shining example of a reversed antonomasia, it will suit my purposes better to consider it now than in a separate chapter later in the book. The name ‘Semiramis’ occurs in the narrative section of the De provinciis consularibus, delivered in the senate in the second quarter of 56 bce,83 a speech in which Cicero opposed in the senate Caesar’s recall from Gaul and proposed to reassign the provinces of Macedon and Syria,84 currently governed by L. Calpurnius Piso

8 0 Cic. Att. 8.16.2 = 166 SB. Here and above tr. D. R. Shackleton Bailey. 81 Cf. Oppermann 2000: 88 f. According to Verbaal 2006: 152 f, the portrayal of Dionysius the Elder in Book 5 of Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations may have been intended as a warning for Caesar. 82 Beside those that I have already mentioned, Oppermann 2000: 64, 67, 74, 85 f, 184 lists the following passages in Cicero’s letters as examples of a reversed antonomasia involving foreign characters or places/​events: at Att. 1.16.5 = 16 SB the judges in Clodius’ trial are called ‘members of the Areopag’; at 2.12.2 = 30 SB Sextus Cloelius is described as signifer Athenio; at 6.1.26 = 115 SB the clash between Clodius and Milo near Bovillae is jokingly referred to as Leuctrica pugna; at 8.4.1 = 156 SB Cicero ironically calls M. Pomponius Dionysius Thrax, a freedmen of Atticus, Dicaearchus or Aristoxenus (two of Aristotle’s pupils); at 9.9.1 = 176 SB a phrase ‘Dionysius in Corinth’ is meant to symbolize “unexpected twists of fate” (of either the optimates, Caesar, or Cicero himself). Only one instance, namely Att. 4.15.4 = 90 SB, where again judges in a trial are called ‘the Areopag’, she considers a “Vossianische Antonomasie ohne Zusatz.” If we were to apply the criteria which I have described above, however, some of these passages would likely be regarded as exempla. 83 Cf. MacKendrick 1995: 289 (late June or early July); Marinone 22004: 119 (May/​ June). Grillo 2015: 13, who reviews the previous scholarship on the matter, suggests a period between mid-​June and mid-​July. 84 See on the procedure Bonnefond-​Coudry 1989: 501.

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and A. Gabinius respectively.85 The initial portion of the speech is devoted almost entirely to denouncing the consuls of 58 bce: the narratio begins with an account of Piso’s misconduct in Macedon (§ 4–​8), and Gabinius’ in Syria (§ 9–​12).86 Cicero’s attack against Gabinius falls into two parts: a brief sketch of his cruelty and incompetence as commander (§ 9) is followed by a longer description (§ 10–​12) of his mistreatment of the tax-​collectors (publicani). Exposing Gabinius’ greed and injustice was not the only reason for Cicero to dwell on the subject of revenues. For him it was personal, because most of the publicani, like himself, came from the equestrian order and they supported him during the Catilinarian conspiracy.87 Stock themes of invective permeate this account as Gabinius is being portrayed as avarus, superbus, crudelis, a helluo, and a praedo.88 For us, the opening sentence is of crucial interest: An vero in Syria diutius est Semiramis illa retinenda? cuius iter in provinciam fuit eius modi ut rex Ariobarzanes consulem vestrum ad caedem faciendam tamquam aliquem Thraecem conduceret. Then again, Syria: is this new Semiramis [Semiramis illa] to be retained any longer there? As he marched to his province, it seemed as though King Ariobarzanes was hiring your own consul to kill and slay like some Thracian cut-​throat.89

Due to lack of any circumstantial information, Cicero’s allusion to king Ariobarzanes II Philopator of Cappadocia (reigned 62–​52 bce) must remain unintelligible to a modern reader. As for Semiramis, two separate images of her exist, one being based on a real person, the other being a legendary character that merges various features of at least several different personages known from history and myth. The historical Semiramis is Sammu-​ramat, wife of Shamshi-​ Adad V of Assyria (reigned 824–​810 bce), formerly a Babylonian princess. She might have been an influential figure in politics as her son Adad-​nirari III 85 For more details about the context and historical background see e.g. Gelzer 1969: 168–​170; Mitchell 1991: 185; MacKendrick 1995: 291–​295; Kurczyk 2006: 242 f, and Grillo 2015: 9–​23, to whose recent edition with commentary of the Prov. I am much indebted in what follows. 86 Cf. Haury 1955: 148; Lintott 2008: 205 f; Grillo 2015: 97. 87 See Strasburger 1931/​1956: 39 f; Mitchell 1979: 100–​105; Oppermann 2000: 182 with n. 4; cf. Cic. Cat. 1.21 (illi equites Romani, honestissimi atque optimi viri […] quorum tu [sc. Catilina] et frequentiam videre et studia perspicere et voces paulo ante exaudire potuisti) with Dyck 2008a: 105. For a fuller discussion of Cicero’s relations with the publicani see Shatzman 1975: 179–​184. 88 Cf. Koster 1980: 129, n. 426; Grillo 2015: 127. 89 Tr. R. Gardner.

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(810–​782) succeeded to the throne in his early youth.90 In Greek legend, she was the daughter of the Syrian goddess Derceto, who was married to an official named Onnes and then to king Ninos. This must be the representation of Semiramis Cicero had in mind, for it is the one that usually appears in Greek and Latin sources.91 She is credited, among other things, for founding Babylon, building its great walls, the Hanging Gardens and many other magnificent structures.92 Some of these were said to have been erected to satisfy her taste for luxury.93 Semiramis was also distinguished in war, having allegedly conquered Bactria and invaded India,94 which is strangely redolent of the story of Alexander the Great. All in all, a picture emerges of a powerful woman who combined warfare with a luxurious way of life, so characteristic of eastern rulers in general. That the senators were familiar with this image of Semiramis (cf. n. 91) is borne out by Suetonius, who relates what had happened some three years earlier, in 59 bce, at the time when Gallic provinces were assigned to Caesar. The latter is said to have boasted in a crowded senate house (frequenti curia) that he acquired what he wanted despite having to struggle with numerous adversaries. This resulted in the following verbal exchange (Suet. Jul. 22.2):

90 See e.g. W. Röllig in DKP 5.95; S. M. Dalley in 3OCD, p. 1383; Hdt. 1.184 (cf. 3.154) with Asheri in Murray, Moreno 2007: 204. How, Wells 21928: 143 ad loc. proposed a slightly different identification, her being the wife of the Assyrian Rammannirari III (812–​783 bce). 91 Our main source for the legend is Diodorus of Sicily, whose account is based on Ctesias. As to Cicero’s inspiration, however, Grillo 2015: 128 ad loc. must be mistaken when he says: “Cicero may have derived this representation from Diodorus (2.4–​20, cf. Ctesias, FGrH 688 F 1b), Hyginus (Fab. 223.6 and 243.8) or Pomponius Mela (Chor. 1.63.3), all active in Rome in the 50s, and we can assume that Roman senators knew of her,” as this statement is, to my knowledge, true only of Diodorus (cf. von Albrecht 32012: 474, 737 f, 1054 and on Hyginus see also Kaster 1995: 205–​ 208; Zetzel 2018: 65–​67). 92 See D.S. 2.7–​10; Ov. Met. 4.58; Prop. 3.11.21–​25; Hyg. Fab. 223.6. 93 Cf. D.S. 2.13.3 f: ἐνταῦθ’ οὖν ἕτερον παράδεισον ὑπερμεγέθη κατεσκεύασεν, ἐν μέσῳ τὴν πέτραν ἀπολαβοῦσα, καθ’ ἣν οἰκοδομήματα πολυτελῆ πρὸς τρυφὴν ἐποίησεν, ἐξ ὧν τά τε κατὰ τὸν παράδεισον ἀπεθεώρει φυτουργεῖα καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν στρατιὰν παρεμβεβληκυῖαν ἐν τῷ πεδίῳ. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ τῷ τόπῳ συχνὸν ἐνδιατρίψασα χρόνον καὶ πάντων τῶν εἰς τρυφὴν ἀνηκόντων ἀπολαύσασα […]. For the view that the said τρυφή did not affect Semiramis’ martial prowess see Gorman, Gorman 2014: 361 (cf. 271). 94 See D.S. 2.6.7–​9, 2.16–​19; Prop. 3.11.26.

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iactaret […] se […] insultaturum omnium capitibus ac, negante quodam per contumeliam facile hoc ulli feminae fore, responderit quasi adludens in Suria quoque regnasse Samiramin magnamque Asiae partem Amazonas tenuisse quondam. [Caesar said] he would pounce on all their heads [insultaturum omnium capitibus].95 When someone said in abuse that that would be a difficult thing for a woman to do, [Caesar] answered as if he were making an allusion: “In Syria too Semiramis was queen [in Suria quoque regnasse Samiramin] and the Amazons once held sway over a great part of Asia.”96

What provoked Caesar’s comment was, as A. Corbeill suggests,97 his opponent’s abusive allusion to “Caesar’s reputation as a passive partner in sexual relations with men.” The manner in which he replied to a charge of effeminacy and desire for conquest indicates that Semiramis was commonly associated with the latter, and this is in keeping with her depiction in Greek legend as briefly outlined above. Moreover, both passages attest to the fact that the Romans cared little about the distinction between Assyria and Syria.98 When launching his attack on Gabinius, therefore, Cicero assumed his audience will be familiar with the paragon. What about its relation to the target? Would the geographical coincidence and a similar taste for luxury provide a sufficient connection between the two? A glance at Cicero’s previous invectives against Gabinius shows that the main intended point of comparison, as in the case of Caesar, was his effeminacy. He was described as the passive lover of Catiline99 and accused of performing oral sex,100 both of which were seen among the Romans as a sign of unmanliness. Apart from that, Cicero jeered at his 9 5 Cf. Verg. A. 8.570 with Fratantuono, Smith 2018: 610 f. 96 I adopt (and slightly adapt) the translation of Corbeill 1996: 196. 97 Corbeill 1996: loc. cit. 98 See Butler, Cary 1927: 70 on Suet. Jul. 22.2 who quote Mela 1.62: Syria late litora tenet, terrasque etiam latius introrsus, aliis aliisque nuncupata nominibus: nam et Coele dicitur et Mesopotamia et Damascene et Adiabene et Babylonia et Iudaea et Commagene; Grillo 2015: loc. cit. 99 See Cic. Dom. 62 fin.: [sc. Gabinius] se Catilinae delicias […] diceret; Red. Sen. 10: Catilinam, amatorem suum, 12: si eius vir Catilina with Boll 2019: 131, 142 who lists further references and literature. Badian 1959: 89 (cf. p. 94) speaks of Cicero’s attacks as “unusual ugly rumours.” 100 See Cic. Red. Sen. 11 init.: quis enim ullam ullius boni spem haberet in eo cuius primum tempus aetatis palam fuisset ad omnium libidines divulgatum, qui ne a sanctissima quidem parte corporis [= os] potuisset hominum impuram intemperantiam propulsare?. Cf. Uría 2007: 50, 55; Williams 22010: 219. On Cicero’s vilification of Gabinius’ sexual misconduct see recently Thurn 2018: 131, 209–​212 and passim.

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effeminate appearance101 and often called him a “dancer” (saltator) or “female dancer” (saltatrix).102 Although most of these charges were conventional,103 Cicero seems to have been consistent in his portrayal of Gabinius, especially in the post reditum speeches, and the picture would hardly have worn off in a year. Consequently, the senators must have known both what Cicero thought of the current governor of Syria and what the legendary queen of this region was like. The title ‘new Semiramis’, as applied by Cicero to a Roman magistrate with proconsular power, evokes several associations. First of all, after many centuries Syria got under the rule of “a woman” again. Upon realizing that Semiramis combined warfare with luxury,104 however, Cicero’s audience would probably disregard her alleged military prowess (cf. below, n. 106). It would be overshadowed by other characteristics such as avaritia and superbia, which are ascribed to Gabinius at § 11. What is more, by simply calling him Semiramis illa Cicero is able to seemingly gloss over all the previous charges of effeminacy while, at the same time, highlighting them even more. Whether this was also an allusion to Caesar’s unmanliness, as L. Grillo tentatively suggests,105 is hard to tell. What seems more plausible is that the speaker borrowed Caesar’s idea for his own abusive appellation that, given the geographical coincidence, was hardly inappropriate.106 By means of the contemporizing pronoun illa, Cicero transfers the worse qualities of Semiramis, which Gabinius is also shown to display, onto the target. As regards effeminacy, greed, and lust for conquest, the paragon is identical with the subject of comparison and in that sense the statement is not ironic107 but rather openly offensive.

1 01 See Cic. Sest. 18 with Kaster 2006: 156. 102 See Grillo 2015: 129 on Cic. Prov. 9; Thurn 2018: 190. 103 See e.g. Nisbet 1961: 194–​197; Koster 1980: passim (C. Invektivisches Sachregister, s.vv. “Homosexualität,” “Unmännlichkeit”); Corbeill 2002: 201, 205, 209 f; Craig 2004: 189–​192; Kenty 2020: 28. For the Greek oratory cf. Süss 1910/​1975: 249 f, 253 to whom we owe the systematic classification of the themes of ancient invective. 104 Cf. Gardner 1958: 550, n. a; Stinger 1993: 202; MacKendrick 1995: 309. 105 See Grillo 2015: 128 ad loc. 106 Corbeill 1996: 196, commenting on Caesar’s uncommon stance, points out that he “embraces the charge of effeminacy by comparing himself to ‘other’ famous women of great military prowess, including Semiramis […].” Cf. Butler, Cary 1927: 69 on Suet. Jul. 22.2 and, for an analogous situation, the comment by Dyck 2008b: 158 on Gell. 1.5.3 [2ORF, p. 324 = FRL 2.203–​205]: “Hortensius’ riposte is a rare instance of a Roman male publicly embracing a feminine persona as well as a foreign language.” 107 Pace MacKendrick 1995: loc. cit.

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This, finally, brings up the question of two different types of reversed antonomasia. In the present case, as we saw, the historical figure to whom someone is compared exemplifies exactly these qualities which the speaker aims to reprove. But, alternatively, he might compare two persons who, when it comes to character and/​or achievements, are the exact opposites of one another. Examples of both usages can be found in the anonymous Rhetorica ad Herennium, in the subchapter on allegory (permutatio, Rhet. Her. 4.46). The author first offers a brief definition of this trope: “a manner of speech denoting one thing by the letter of the words, but another by their meaning” (oratio aliud verbis aliud sententia demonstrans) and next he lists three “aspects” thereof: similitudo, argumentum, and contrarium, of which the first appears to be an allegory par excellence, the second corresponds roughly to reversed antonomasia,108 and the third to irony.109 Both within the first and the last aspect, the author goes on, argumentum can be employed metaphorically: Per similitudinem, sic: “Quid ait hic rex atque Agamemnon noster, sive, ut crudelitas est, potius Atreus?” Ex contrario, ut si quem impium qui patrem verberarit Aeneam vocemus, intemperantem et adulterum Hippolytum nominemus. In an Allegory operating through a comparison [per similitudinem], as follows: “What says this king –​our Agamemnon, or rather, such is his cruelty, our Atreus? [Agamemnon noster, sive, ut crudelitas est, potius Atreus?]” In an Allegory drawn from a contrast [ex contrario]: for example, if we should call some undutiful man who has beaten his father “Aeneas,” [si quem impium… Aeneam vocemus] or an intemperate and adulterous man “Hippolytus” […adulterum Hippolytum nominemus].110

The statement about Agamemnon and Atreus is a perfect example of what I have described earlier as the reversed antonomasia: it lacks any (clear) semantic intention, centers around a specific quality (here: crudelitas), and has a contemporizing indicator (noster). The examples drawn from a contrast, on the other hand, 108 See Caplan 1954: 345, n. c; Martin 1974: 262 f; Calboli 21993: 395: “Dei tre criteri che Cornificio riconosce per questo tropo, […] la similitudo e il contrarium sono due dei tre criteri stoici di formazione dei tropi […]. Manca la vicinitas, ma essa è supplita dall’argumentum. Infatti l’argumentum corrisponde alla ἀντονομασία [following Volkmann 1885/​1987: 430], e l’antonomasia ha nella vicinitas il suo criterio tipico.” What the scholar means is in fact the reversed antonomasia. The terminological ambiguity results from the fact that, as noted above (n. 58), this concept was unknown in Antiquity. 109 Cf. Quint. Inst. 6.2.15, 8.6.44 with Haury 1955: 22–​25. 110 Tr. H. Caplan. Various examples of permutatio in Cicero’s orations are collected by Schoenberger 1910: 72 f. See also Volkmann 1885/​1987: 429–​432.

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are closer to the exemplum proper in that they involve, explicitly or implicitly, an action upon which the comparison rests: a man had beaten his father; Aeneas, by contrast, is famous for his devotion (pietas) to Anchises, whom he had rescued from the flames of Troy.111 In this regard, they resemble Quintilian’s exemplum contrarium which is tantamount to an antithesis (A did x, and B did y). There is, however, a crucial difference: if, instead of comparing [the actions of] two persons, we call an impious man ‘Aeneas’, the effect is strictly ironic.112 The conclusion to be drawn is that a speaker who chooses to denigrate someone’s character by describing him with a proper name instead of a common noun and/​or adjective, has two options: he can pick out a paragon that either shares some characteristics with the target (e.g. ‘Aegisthus’ for adulter) or exemplifies the opposite qualities (e.g. ‘Hippolytus’ for adulter). The former is a reversed antonomasia ‘by comparison’ (per similitudinem), which is intended as a direct taunt, and the latter a reversed antonomasia ‘by contrast’ (ex contrario), which has an ironic tone.113 So, for instance, if Cicero had called Verres ‘another Dionysius’, it would be an antonomasia by comparison, because both of them were notoriously cruel. If he had called Piso, whom he describes as dull-​witted, ‘an Aristarchus’, it would be the same figure of thought, but now used by contrast. This distinction is useful in determining the speaker’s purpose but, for a modern reader, it will seldom be unequivocal. It is difficult to know, for example, whether calling Gabinius ‘new Semiramis’ was intended by Cicero and perceived by his audience as a direct taunt or irony, given that the two were (allegedly) alike in everything but sex.

4.3. Form and Function of exempla externa: A Summary I have suggested earlier that rhetorical theory is applicable to the Roman exempla domestica only to a limited degree. Being so closely tied to political culture and national history, they appeal to emotions rather than to reason, and hence had been classified as symbolical exempla. The foreign examples (externa), on the other hand, usually invite a comparison that requires from the audience to

1 11 See e.g. Galinsky 1969: 3–​61 and passim. 112 Cf. Lausberg 31990: 303 (§ 584). 113 Cf. Plut. Cat. Min. 19.9: καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δὲ τοὺς φαύλους καὶ ἀκολάστους, τοῖς λόγοις δὲ σεμνοὺς καὶ αὐστηρούς, χλ ε υ ά ζον τε ς ἐκά λουν κάτων ας and Cic. Fam. 15.6.1 = 112 SB: et si non modo omnes verum etiam multi Catones essent in civitate nostra, in qua unum exstitisse mirabile est, quem ego currum aut quam lauream cum tua laudatione conferrem?.

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perform a mental task. For that reason, we have applied to them another term coined by M. Stemmler, namely logical exempla. In each of the last three chapters I have been examining several theoretical works, mainly by Aristotle and Quintilian, in order to distinguish between various shapes an exemplum can take. My conclusion is that within exemplary area an orator can compare two persons by either identification, juxtaposition, or contrast. I will now consider briefly each of these possibilities. 1. The English verb ‘to identify’ derives from Latin and its principal meaning is: ‘to regard as the same (idem)’. When it comes to exemplarity, this is well illustrated by Cicero’s “in advance” refutation of Hortensius’ argument at Verr. 3.209, which I have discussed in the subchapter “Refutatio and Faulty Exempla” (Section 3.3). The speaker asks his opponent whether he will “tell us of a Scipio, a Cato, a Laelius, and assert that they have done t he s ame? [eos fecisse idem dices?].”114 Under the rubric ‘identification’, therefore, I subsume these instances where Cicero aims to demonstrate that someone acts/​had acted in the same manner as a historical figure or the two are identical in terms of personality. Here belong: a) Exemplum totum simile which corresponds to Aristotle’s paradigm and consists of an inductive and a deductive part. Both parts are connected through a mediating generalization (the speaker’s semantic intention) that is usually expressed implicitly. By employing an exemplum totum simile the speaker demonstrates that the illustrans and illustrandum p er for m the same action under nearly the same circumstances, in order to prove that something is right/​wrong; happened/​did not happen or that someone acts like X. b) Reversed antonomasia by comparison (per similitudinem), a means whereby the speaker suggests that the paragon and target are the same kind of people. There is no mention of or allusion to any action on the part of the referents, making their personality the only point of comparison. When employed per similitudinem, the reversed antonomasia often takes the form of a direct taunt and serves to denigrate the character of a person to whom it is applied. 2. Whenever a speaker (on his own initiative115) points to a dissimilarity rather than equality between two persons or events/​actions, we can say that he ‘juxtaposes’ them. In other words, he avails himself of an unequal example 114 Tr. L. H. G. Greenwood. This also applies to the example employed by ‘C. Fannius’ (n. 10 above, fr. 7): quid est, quod non ide m Gracchum adfectare credatis, quem eadem quae illos facere videatis?. Cf. Quintilian’s eadem ratione at Inst. 5.11.8. 115 Cf. below on exemplum dissimile.

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(exemplum impar) which manifests itself in the form of an argument a fortiori, either ex minore ad maius or ex maiore ad minus. The narrowly conceived semantic intention does not apply here, because the speaker’s aim is not to prove anything, but to either evince the superiority/​inferiority of the illustrandum or advocate a certain course of action. When dealing with the past, he needs to show that although the two actions are similar, they were performed either by men of unequal status or under different circumstances, e.g. {A did x under circumstances a, whereas B did x under circumstances b}; when his case concerns the future, the speaker’s aim is usually to convince the audience that something had been done in the past for trivial reasons as compared to the present situation. 3. Finally, the speaker may draw a contrast between either two actions or two persons. Such a use of exempla is especially suitable to disprove an opponent’s argument or to ridicule the subject of comparison. As in the case of identification, there are two possible means of achieving that goal: a) Exemplum contrarium which is typically tantamount to an antithesis. By comparing two actions, the speaker shows that the illustrandum is a complete opp osite of the illustrans. It serves to demonstrate that someone’s behavior is either not such as described by our adversary or otherwise highly unorthodox. In its simplest form, it can be illustrated as {A did x, and B did y}. b) Reversed antonomasia by contrast (ex contrario), like its counterpart per similitudinem, does not involve any action, but centers around the character of the paragon and target. Unlike in case of the reversed antonomasia by comparison, however, here the speaker addresses a person by using the name of a historical figure who is completely dif ferent from that person. The outcome is always ironic. What is described by Quintilian as dissimile constitutes a separate category to which belong a) faulty exempla, easy to refute by an opponent and b) arguments advanced in order to challenge historical examples employed by the opponent. For instance, the speaker can render invalid the inductive part of someone’s exemplum totum simile by showing that there is a certain C of which A is not predicated; alternatively, if someone had used an exemplum simile and chosen only those features that are useful to him (quae utilia sunt),116 an exemplum dissimile can be employed to counterbalance it, e.g. {yes, but A did x under circumstances a, and B did x under circumstances b}. 116 See Quint. Inst. 5.11.6.

5. The Series of exempla Cicero made a fleeting comment on the number of exempla in a section of his juvenile treatise on rhetoric, the De inventione, on the subject of rewards (praemia). Moving on from the issue of arguments in favor of the reward, he lists (2.114) three commonplaces available to an orator advising against awarding a prize: 1) these awards need to be pure and sacred, and should not be given to unworthy and mediocre people; 2) if the reward of virtue becomes too common, men will be discouraged from being virtuous; and finally: si exsistant, qui apud maiores nostros ob egregiam virtutem tali honore dignati sunt, nonne de sua gloria, cum pari praemio tales homines affici videant, delibari putent? 3) if those should rise from the dead who in our forefathers’ day were deemed worthy of such honour [tali honore] because of their outstanding heroism, would they not think that their glory was lessened, when they see such men receiving an equal reward [pari praemio]?1

It is clear that those men brought back to life to deplore the current state of affairs would serve as exempla imparia: unlike some of the contemporaries, they have earned the reward. The speaker should first name a few of those virtuous people from the past (et eorum enumeratio), and then compare both groups. It follows from Cicero’s practice that this principle applies to the use of exempla in general. Instead of referring to an individual historical figure, Cicero will often bring multiple characters together. Such a catalogue or ‘a series of exempla’ usually consists of three or more names of people from the past, for the most part arranged in chronological order.2 They sometimes share a particular quality in common (e.g. industria, fortitudo, pietas, etc.), sometimes they simply embody the Roman virtues altogether.3 Exempla that occur in a series Tr. H. M. Hubbell. At Balb. 47 Cicero brings back to life Marius who, as “a witness,” supports the defendant’s claim that he was granted the Roman citizenship as a reward from Pompey. See on the subject e.g. Schoenberger 1910: 77; David 1980: 75; Barber 2004: 36–​38, Guard 2013: 86. 2 In this brief discussion of the lists of ‘grand old men’ I rely primarily on Schoenberger 1910: 18, 31 f; 60–​63 (triple exemplum); Robinson 1986: 17–​19 and Bücher 2006: 159 f (cf. van der Poel 2009: 347). Among few examples of Cicero’s breaking the chronological order Schoenberger 1910: 32 quotes Mur. 36 and Cat. 1.3. On the application of this principle in later times cf. von Moos 21996: 203, 513. 3 Cf. Hölkeskamp 1995 = 2004: 251–​253. 1

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are either in the generic plural (Catones, Scipiones, i.e. “men like Cato, resp. Scipio”) or in singular. In the former case, Cicero mostly groups three people or a multiple of three by asyndeton (or less frequently polysyndeton) without any further description. In the latter case, the number of historical figures varies and each name is usually followed by a descriptive phrase. The series of exempla differs from an individual exemplum in that its persuasive force is only to a limited degree, if at all, based on comparison. The audience is meant to be impressed by the accumulation of names.4 “The intended effect of the long stream of names,” as A. W. Robinson points out,5 “is evidently to overwhelm the listener with the sheer number of exempla listed in asyndeton.” By means of such an enumeratio, Cicero often manipulates the facts and distorts the historical truth as some of the characters making up the catalogue are only vaguely similar to one another, and some of them do not belong together at all.6 When the maiores are combined into a series, the possible discrepancies between them are less apparent, because the audience does not pay close attention to how one individual relates to others. Given that for the most part such lists consisted of Roman national exempla virtutis, however, the principles outlined above will not apply to the following discussion without reservations. First of all, although exempla externa are never employed in the generic plural, and Cicero never speaks of “men like Hannibal, Pyrrhus, etc.,” he sometimes uses singular to achieve a similar effect. Additionally, the orator tends to supplement a series of foreign examples with names of either a nation with which the Romans had dealt in the past, e.g. the Corinthians, or a city, such as Carthage. When so doing, he usually has a particular event in mind, in which a given nation was involved, and not a set of characteristics commonly associated with this nation. As is also the case with the native exempla, the chronological order, with a few exceptions to be noted below, is generally preserved (cf. n. 2). Finally, whenever the speaker combines exempla domestica with externa, the list begins with the former, and closes with an example of a foreign character, as in Phil.

4 Cf. Bücher 2006: 159. As far as the exemplum totum simile is concerned, the more examples, the harder to challenge the inductive part (cf. Section 2). However, “The quoting of several exempla […] can merely be a form of αὔξησις (amplificatio)” as was observed by Demoen 1997: 147 who also discusses a few remarks on the series of exempla made by Greek rhetoricians. 5 Robinson 1986: 25. 6 See Martin 2013: 121, 124, following Valette-​Cagnac 2008.

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5.48 (Alexander the Great).7 For the sake of convenience, I have included such passages in the following chapters. Whereas for individual exempla it seemed best to consider each historical figure separately, in the present discussion of the series of exempla the subchapters proceed chronologically. Here, I have adopted a slightly modified version of the division of Cicero’s orations proposed by P. Stinger:8 1) The early orations; 2) The speeches of Cicero’s consular year; 3) The post-​exile period; 4) The Philippics.

5.1. The Early Orations As will soon become clear, the majority of the series of exempla externa are in fact what might be called ‘parallel series’, comprising a group of Roman generals and a corresponding group of foreign leaders. What we are dealing here with, as I have suggested in the subchapter “The Primary and Secondary Referents” (Section 4.2.1), are two sets of illustrantia and illustranda. According to the socio-​political and rhetorical context of a given oration, one group of referents will always count as ‘primary’ and one as ‘secondary’. Depending on which of the two sets is more conducive towards his goals, the speaker will put greater emphasis on either national or foreign examples. Given the scope of the present study, my attempt will be to lay more stress on the latter. This kind of parallel series of exempla occurs for the first time in Book 1 of Cicero’s Actio secunda In Verrem, the so-​called De praetura urbana. A lengthy introduction to the main charges, this Book covers Gaius Verres’ vita anteacta and the violations he had committed prior to becoming the governor of Sicily. Sections 41–​61 are devoted to his thefts of works of art during the period when he served as a legate pro quaestore under Cn. Cornelius Dolabella, the proconsul in Cilicia in 80–​79 bce.9 After a detailed account of the robberies (§ 45–​54 init.), Cicero declares that even if Verres was a commander of an

7 See Schoenberger 1910: 32 f. Stemmler 2000: 179, n. 137 offers the following examples: Cic. Orat. 120, 132 f; Sest. 141–​143; Balb. 11 f; Verr. 4.73; Fin. 2.62, 5.64; Parad. 12. The reference to Alexander the Great at Phil. 5.48 will be discussed below, Section 6.1. 8 Cf. Stinger 1993: vi and the similar division adopted by May 1988 (the pre-​consular speeches, the consular speeches, the post reditum speeches, the final years). 9 See MRR 2.76, 80 f, 84 f, 3.65; Cowles 1917: 6–​8; Magie 1950: 246 f; Shatzman 1975: 430 f; Vasaly 1993: 213; Lintott 2007: 13, 2008: 95 and recently Lazzaretti 2015: 92–​95 on Verres’ plundering of works of art and precious objects during his legatio Asiatica. Cf. Berger 1978: 179; 212, n. 4; Enos 1988: 67.

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invading army, he would not have the right to keep all the booty for himself.10 Throughout Roman history there have been many generals who, after having captured cities famous for wealth and conquered entire nations, donated the spoils of war to the Roman people. The speaker names (§ 55) the following individuals: M. Claudius Marcellus who captured Syracuse in 211 bce, L. Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus who defeated Antiochus III at the battle of Magnesia in 190 bce, T. Quinctius Flamininus who defeated Philip V at Cynoscephalae in 197 bce, bringing an end to the Macedonian control over Greece, L. Aemilius Paullus who by defeating king Perseus at Pydna in 168 bce ended the Third Macedonian War, and L. Mummius who captured and destroyed Corinth in 146 bce.11 “The houses of these men,” Cicero goes on to argue, cum honore ac virtute florerent, signis et tabulis pictis erant vacuae; at vero urbem totam templaque deorum omnisque Italiae partis illorum donis ac monumentis exornatas videmus. though they shone with distinction and virtue, were empty of statues and paintings, but we see the entire city and the temples of the gods and all regions of Italy adorned with their gifts and monuments.12

Here, as often elsewhere, the speaker supplements the series of older exempla with a more recent one.13 He announces as a witness P. Servilius Vatia Isauricus (cos. 79), who had captured the city of Olympus during his campaign against the pirates and the tribes of Lycia and Pamphylia in 78–​77 bce.14 Although he succeeded Dolabella as proconsul in Cilicia (78–​74), Servilius had –​unlike Verres –​duly conveyed to the Roman people all the statues and works of art he took away from the hostile city. By adding a contemporary figure, Cicero aims 1 0 Cf. Stinger 1993: 46 f. 11 See e.g. Fuhrmann 1970–​1982, 3.302; Mitchell 1986: 187 ad loc.; Heftner 1997: 327 and passim, and Gildenhard 2011: 67 f ad loc. who identify the commanders listed by Cicero. The literary sources on the works of art those men brought to Rome are discussed by Pollitt 1978: 155–​157 and passim. On Flamininus, Aemilius Paullus, and Mummius see also recently Manuwald 2018: 131 f on Cic. Leg. Agr. 1.5. 12 Tr. T. N. Mitchell. Cf. Pollitt 1978: 165: “Whether or not the remark is true, it is clear that there were Romans in the first century b.c. who were prepared to believe it” (cf. n. 20 below); Seager 2007: 36. 13 See Schol. Gron. 346 St. ad loc.: Aput ineruditos iudices exempla de vetustate prolata minus efficaciae habent […]; Schoenberger 1910: 31 f and on older and more recent exempla in general: Stemmler 2000: 181–​183; van der Blom 2010: 115 f. Cf. above, Section 3.3, n. 48. 14 See MRR 2.87, 90 f, 3.197; Sherwin-​White 1984: 152–​158; Berrendonner 2007: 211.

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to prove that virtuous behavior is not bound to any specific period of time and there is no excuse for acting against the mos maiorum. On the one hand, there is an apparent irony in comparing Verres to some of the greatest generals of the past,15 but, on the other hand, their actions are invoked with a view to highlight the defendant’s transgressions: his treatment of allies was worse than their treatment of hostile peoples; he was merely a legate pro quaestore, whereas they commanded the Roman army and acted in accordance with the rules of war. Not only, therefore, does Verres fall short of living up to their example. His failure is even more disappointing: instead of being concerned for the common good, he is driven by a desire for personal gain.16 Next to those prominent figures, he comes across as an ordinary thief who, having accomplished nothing, has made big profits at the expense of the Roman allies. Most important to Cicero’s efforts to discredit Verres at § 55 was not the choice of appropriate exempla, but the ability to make them fit his argument. He managed to exaggerate the offenses of the defendant, and at the same time to whitewash the way in which some of the maiores captured cities. From the fact that generals “mig ht […] surrender all the booty or their share of it to the treasury [emphasis added]”17 the speaker draws an inference that those whom he had named did exactly that. Other sources, however, are not equally approving of M. Marcellus,18 who figures prominently in the Verrines,19 and Cicero himself disapproves of L. Mummius’ sack of Corinth in his later writings.20 Here, their 1 5 As is emphasized by van der Blom 2010: 111 f. Cf. Robert 2007: 30, n. 89. 16 Cf. Magie 1950: 247; Stinger 1993: 47 f; van der Blom 2010: 111 (“Cicero’s point is that Verres plundered for his personal joy and gain, while the good generals plundered the conquered cities and peoples for the res publica and the common good”) and Robinson 1986: 29 f who, however, seems to have mistaken Verres’ thefts during his service in Cilicia for his misgovernment of Sicily. On “what Cicero considers the proper treatment of the physical remains of Greek culture” see also Zetzel 2003: 128 f and passim. 17 Mitchell 1986: 186 ad loc. following Shatzman 1972. 18 See above, Section 3.4; Drogula 2015: 276. 19 Cf. Shackleton Bailey 1988: 34; Hölkeskamp 1996 = 2004: 192 with n. 73. 20 See Cic. Off. 1.35, 3.46 with Robinson 1986: 39, n. 21; MacKendrick 1995: 7; Dyck 1996: 139 f ad loc.; Gildenhard 2011: 68; however, cf. Shatzman 1975: 255. Lucullus is also reported, in a passage that has certain exemplary overtones (cf. Plut. Luc. 19.5 fin.), to have disapproved of Mummius’ treatment of Corinth. L. Aemilius Paullus, on the other hand, is called by Pollitt 1978: 161 “a renowned plunderer” (cf. Shatzman 1975: 243 f). Vasaly 1993: 107 f, n. 32 offers a list of passages in the Verrine orations where “Cicero emphasizes the pious restraint and generosity supp os e d ly exercised by men like Scipio Aemilianus, Mummius, Marcellus, and others” (emphasis added).

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shortcomings are intentionally suppressed and, alongside the other three men, they serve as exemplars of the proper disposition of booty. Especially at the earlier stages of his career, Cicero employed the series of exempla somewhat conventionally. For the most part those lists consisted of three or more Roman commanders and their conquests.21 As is the case at Verr. 2.1.55, the foreign leaders and peoples those commanders have conquered normally serve as an add-​on to the national exempla virtutis. They comprise what I have called earlier a set of secondary illustrantia. Although their place in the overall argument is subordinate to that of the Roman generals, however, they are by no means dispensable. Most of the descriptive phrases with which Cicero modifies each pair of referents apply to the secondary element.22 “In this way he [i.e. Cicero] achieves more variety, and the wide geographical range of the conquests contributes to this effect.”23 The slight change in chronological order may be due to Cicero’s inadvertence, but it could also serve a purpose.24 The first two regions, Syracuse in Sicily and (implicitly: Magnesia in) Asia Minor, are distant from each other and therefore illustrate well this “wide geographical range.” These are followed by three places in what is now the modern Greece which, as was suggested by the scholiast,25 the Romans would easily envision as abounding with various works of art and precious objects (signa) that are the subject of current discussion. The change of places between L. Scipio and T. Flamininus allows Cicero to achieve within this five-​element series two sequences of three interrelated items: 1) a city /​three kings /​a city (1–​3–​1); 2) two distant regions /​three

2 1 See Robinson 1986: 29 and below, Section 5.5. 22 The two captured cities, Syracuse and Corinth, are called urbs ornatissima and urbs pulcherrima atque ornatissima, […] plenissima rerum omnium respectively. All three foreign rulers: Antiochus III, Philip V, and Perseus are explicitly labelled ‘kings’ (regem… vicit, regem… subegit, regem… superavit). 23 Robinson 1986: 30. Beard 2007: 121, commenting on L. Scipio’s triumph over Antiochus the Great, makes an important observation that “[…] kings were seen as the ideal adversaries of Roman military might. They dominated the imaginative reconstructions of historical triumphs.” See also Plutarch’s remark on Caesar’s fifth triumph, the one over Roman citizens, which was much resented (Caes. 56.8): “For it commemorated no victory over foreign commanders or barbarian kings [ἀλλοφύλους ἡγεμόνας οὐδὲ βαρβάρους βασιλεῖς], but the utter annihilation of the sons and the family of the mightiest of the Romans” (tr. B. Perrin). 24 Cf. Gildenhard 2011: 66 ad loc. who detects “a sense of ring-​composition.” 25 See Ps. Asc. 237 St.: Cur autem Graecorum triumphorum ponit exempla? Quia de signis loquitur, quorum copia apud Graecos est constituta.

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sites in “Greece”26 (2–​3). The psychological impact such triads may have had on the audience is difficult to determine, but the fact that they recur frequently is quite telling. Although exempla externa take up more space in the text, the argument Cicero advances rests primarily on the list of Roman commanders, whose names are introduced anaphorically27 (the interrogative quid is repeated five times28). The descriptive phrases accompanying each foreign place and king, on the other hand, make the achievements of Marcellus, Scipio and others look more impressive. The point of elaborating on how wealthy the captured cities and how challenging the defeated enemies were is to sharpen the contrast between the actions of Verres and these of the maiores on both moral and military level. Thus, Cicero’s argument is an instance of exemplum contrarium, very similar to Quintilian’s handbook example at Inst. 5.11.7 (‘Marcellus ornamneta Syracusanis hostibus restituit, Verres eadem sociis abstulit’).29 Antiochus, Philip, and Perseus lack individual traits and are simply lumped together as “fearsome enemies” because there are no illustranda they could be paired with. The conclusion to be drawn is that the grand old men, unlike Verres, had earned their share in the war

26 This is of course a convenient, but somewhat oversimplifying way of putting it. From the viewpoint of Cicero’s contemporaries, Corinth belonged to the Roman province of Achaea, but both Cynoscephalae and Pydna were part of what they would think of as Macedon. It is worth noting that this triad reappears, but not as exempla, at Leg. Agr. 1.5, where Cicero names lands that the proposers of the bill intend to put up for sale. P. Servilius is also mentioned here: iubent venire agros Attalensium atque Olympenorum, quos populo Romano Servilii, fortissimi viri, victoria adiunxit, deinde agros in Macedonia regios, qui partim T. Flaminini, partim L. Pauli, qui Persen vicit, virtute parti sunt, deinde agrum optimum et fructuosissimum Corinthium, qui L. Mummi imperio ac felicitate ad vectigalia populi Romani adiunctus est […]. V. Marek in the critical apparatus of his Teubner edition considered adding qui Philippum after T. Flaminini. Manuwald 2018: 131 ad loc., who has stated that “both options [i.e. this or deleting qui Persen vicit after L. Pauli] would make the sentence more evenly balanced, and in Marek’s version both kings mentioned in LA 2 would appear here too,” is ultimately against changes to the text. Cf. also Vasaly 1993: 25. 27 According to Aquila Romanus, this rhetorical figure, which he calls ἐπαναφορά, was one of Cicero’s favorites (§ 34, RLM. p. 32): Hac figura vel frequentissime et Demosthenes et M. Tullius et omnes vehementes oratores utuntur, quando praecipue et ipsi commoti videri volunt et iudicem commovere. 28 Cf. Schoenberger 1910: 65. 29 Cf. above, Section 3.4.

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booty, but still chose to surrender it to the community for various purposes such as erecting monuments and decorating public spaces. Series of exempla externa occur twice in Cicero’s first speech in a popular assembly (contio), the Pro lege Manilia of 66 bce.30 This is hardly surprising given both the speaker’s rhetorical goal and the political context in which the bill was proposed: Cicero spoke in favor of entrusting to Pompey an extraordinary command against Mithridates and “[t]‌he likely context,” as A. Lintott suggests,31 “is the period […] when foreign embassies were present and the senate discussed foreign relations.” Due to its international scope and wide temporal range, this speech afforded frequent opportunities for the speaker to use exempla.32 After a brief narration Cicero divides his speech into three main parts (§ 6): “It seems to me best first to discuss the character of the war [de genere belli], then its scale, and finally the choice of a commander.”33 As regards the genus belli (§ 6–​19), Cicero’s main concern was over the safety of allies and of the richest revenues in Asia that are now at the mercy of Mithridates, whose insults remain unavenged: in 88 bce, namely, he gave order to slay many thousands of Romans34 and, having defeated the legate Manius Aquilius in Bithynia, he had him flogged, mocked and tortured to death.35 The maiores would never have let something like this go unpunished, which is illustrated on the example of Corinth, destroyed after the Roman envoys had been addressed with disrespect (§ 11). Cicero suggests that all the communities in Asia expect Pompey, who is not named explicitly,36 to take over the command. Then, building on his previous arguments from the past, the speaker declares (§ 14): Qua re si propter socios nulla ipsi iniuria lacessiti maiores nostri cum Antiocho, cum Philippo, cum Aetolis, cum Poenis bella gesserunt, quanto vos studiosius convenit iniuriis

3 0 See Pina Polo 1989: 290 (no. 253); Kurczyk 2006: 156. 31 Lintott 2008: 428 (“Appendix 2”). 32 Cf. MacKendrick 1995: 7, 23. 33 Here and further tr. D. H. Berry. 34 Cf. already Man. 7 and add e.g. Plut. Sull. 24.7; App. Mith. 85 f; V. Max. 9.2. ext. 3; Tac. Ann. 4.14.2; Plin. Nat. 2.209; D.C. fr. 101.1; Greenidge, Clay 21960/​1976: 168 f. On Cicero’s rhetorical use of the term cives Romani at Man. 7 and the civil status of those massacred in 88 bce see Jonkers 1959: 17–​19. 35 Cf. Cic. Tusc. 5.14; App. Mith. 80; MRR 2.43, 3.24 f; Dyck 2012: 123 on Cic. Scaur. 2. 36 Cf. Classen 1985: 279 f. The same sentiment is ascribed by Cicero to the equites near the end of the short narration (Man. 5 fin.): unum ab omnibus sociis et civibus ad id bellum imperatorem deposci atque expeti, eundem hunc unum ab hostibus metui, praeterea neminem.

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provocatos sociorum salutem una cum imperi vestri dignitate defendere, praesertim cum de maximis vestris vectigalibus agatur? So if our ancestors fought wars against Antiochus, Philip, the Aetolians, and the Carthaginians purely for their allies’ sake, having received no injury themselves [nulla ipsi iniuria lacessiti], just think how eager you ought to be to defend the safety of your allies and the prestige of your empire when you have been injured [quanto vos studiosius convenit iniuriis provocatos] –​and especially when your most important revenues are at stake!

Cicero goes on to argue that Asia, as the richest Roman province, should not only be defended from disaster, but also from fear of disaster, for all branches of economy, including maritime trade, agriculture, and commerce, are jeopardized because of the impending danger of attack (§ 14–​16).37 What does Cicero mean by saying that the ancestors waged war for their allies’ sake (propter socios)? When it comes to Antiochus III it is perhaps the alliance with the kings of Pergamum, Attalus I and Eumenes II (or simply the conflict of ca. 192–​188 bce).38 As for Philip V, it can be described in general terms as the Roman policy of securing “the freedom of the Greeks” at the beginning of the second century bce (the Second Macedonian War, 200–​197 bce). The role the Aetolian League played in this period is somewhat more complicated, as they joined forces with Rome against Philip, but later “invited” Antiochus to Greece. It was probably safe for Cicero to assume, however, that his audience would conceive of all the three exempla as belonging together.39 The war with Carthage (cum Poenis) has been variously interpreted as either the First Punic War (264–​ 241 bce), caused by Rome’s military intervention on behalf of the Mamertines, or the Second Punic War (218–​201 bce) which broke out after Hannibal’s siege of Saguntum, a city the Romans considered their ally.40 Both occasions fit into

37 Cf. Jonkers 1959: 25–​29. On Cicero’s appeal to his audience’ self-​interest see Vasaly 1993: 231 f. 38 See Fuhrmann 1970–​1982, 1.385; Grainger 2002: 136 f and passim. 39 Cf. Bücher 2006: 170: “Cicero gibt seinen Hörern allerdings nur einige Stichworte, ohne irgendwelche genaueren Angaben anzufügen oder historisch-​chronologische Bezüge der Ereignisse untereinander bzw. Entfernung zur eigenen Gegenwart herzustellen.” On the complex Roman policy in the East at the beginning of the second century bce, see e.g. Magie 1950: 12–​19; Badian 1958: 69–​80 and 1959c = 1964: 118–​ 124 (on “the freedom of the Greeks,”) 127–​132 (on the Aetolian League); Deininger 1971: 66–​108; Ferrary 1988: 141–​150; Burton 2011: passim. See also Gelzer 1940: 5 = 1963: 7 and passim. 40 See below, Sections 7.1 and 7.3.

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Cicero’s argument and neither of them should probably be excluded.41 At any rate, in this series, once again introduced by means of anaphora (the preposition cum is repeated four times),42 the speaker seems to be following the chronological order of events, from the most recent to the most remote past, with a small exception of the Aetolian League which was forced to sign a treaty with Rome in 189 bce.43 As in the previous passage, by this rearrangement Cicero seeks to achieve symmetry between the subsequent items: the two kings are listed alongside the two nations (2–​2); additionally, the first three elements are also closely interrelated (3–​1). Although the speech On Pompey’s Command has many epideictic qualities,44 it formally belongs to the deliberative kind of oratory. For this type, as we saw,45 Quintilian recommended exempla imparia, the category under which our passage undoubtedly falls: since the grand old men waged war for the sake of their allies “having received no injury themselves” (nulla ipsi iniuria lacessiti),46 the more eagerly (studiosius) should they –​iniuriis provocati –​defend the honor of their empire, etc. Here, a progression from lesser to greater (ex minore ad maius) is easily detected.47 The difference between the maiores and the Romans of the present day is that those former were concerned solely for the good of their allies, whereas the latter are also bound to avenge the insults to themselves. Cicero’s choice of exempla must have largely depended on this contrast, but he could have also intended to slip in some other analogies: as in the said wars, two of the adversaries are foreign kings (Mithridates and Tigranes); the expulsion of king Ariobarzanes may be reminiscent of how Eumenes II was threatened by Antiochus III; at the beginning of the Second Punic War the enemy was 41 First Punic War: Hodge 1927: 26; Second Punic War: Fuhrmann 1970–​1982: loc. cit.; MacKendrick 1995: 7; both: Nicol 1899: 38 ad loc. Bücher 2006: loc. cit. speaks of the Second and Third Punic War (149–​146 bce) instead, but, apart from Man. 14, he has some passages from other speeches in mind. 42 See MacKendrick 1995: 21. 43 See Burton 2011: 274 f. 44 See MacKendrick 1995: 3 and 14 on Cic. Orat. 102. 45 See above, Section 3.5. 46 The Roman policy of conquest understood as carried out in the interest of allies will be clarified in Cicero’s later writings, see esp. Rep. 3.35 and Off. 2.26 with Dyck 1996: 401. Cf. Gelzer 1940: 4 f = 1963: 6 with n. 14; Schlichting 1975: 4, n. 7. 47 Cf. the example of Quintilian (5.11.9): ‘Tibicines, cum ab urbe discessissent, publice revocati sunt: quanto mag i s [~ quanto… studiosius] principes civitatis viri et bene de re publica meriti, cum invidiae cesserint, ab exilio reducendi!’ which I discuss above, Section 3.5.

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approaching from Spain, where an independent republic had been established by Q. Sertorius, a man with whom Mithridates made an alliance;48 finally, not only Asia, but also Greece has been imperiled.49 Cicero could hardly have expected from his audience to draw exact parallels between individual referents. By raising the theme of the honor and glory of the Roman empire (§ 11 init.), he aimed primarily to arouse certain feelings. At this point, he needed to show that it is in the interest of the common good to employ all possible means against Mithridates. Given the recent achievements of Pompey and the fact that he had been “at hand,” the outcome of the proposal was fairly predictable.50 This did not prevent Cicero from portraying him as an unsurpassed general and a paragon of virtue. What can easily escape our notice, however, is that the speaker seems to avoid naming explicitly any other outstanding individual and his accomplishments. If such men appear, they are referred to simply as maiores (nostri),51 a practice which calls to mind Cato’s Origines. Except for the one under discussion and a mythological one at § 22, juxtaposing Mithridates with

48 It is noteworthy that, according to Greek historians, in the mid-​70s Sertorius had been likened to Hannibal by both Mithridates’ flatterers (Plut. Sert. 23.3: οἳ τὸν μὲν Σερτώριον Ἀννίβᾳ, τὸν δὲ Μιθριδάτην Πύρρῳ παρεικάζοντες, οὐκ ἔφασαν Ῥωμαίους πρὸς τηλικαύτας ὁμοῦ φύσεις τε καὶ δυνάμεις ἐπιχειρουμένους διχόθεν ἀντισχεῖν, τοῦ δεινοτάτου στρατηγοῦ τῷ μεγίστῳ τῶν βασιλέων προσγενομένου) and his own troops (App. BC 1.522: ὅθεν αὐτὸν καὶ οἱ Κελτίβηρες διὰ τὴν ταχυεργίαν ἐκά λο υν Ἀν ν ί β αν, ὃν θρασύτατόν τε καὶ ἀπατηλότατον στρατηγὸν παρὰ σφίσιν ἐδόκουν γενέσθαι). Note also that the wording of the latter passage may suggest that the Celtiberians were expressing their admiration by means of a reversed antonomasia by comparison. 49 See e.g. Cic. Man. 10: Sed tamen alterius partis periculum, Sertorianae atque Hispaniensis, quae multo post firmamenti ac roboris habebat, Cn. Pompei divino consilio ac singulari virtute depulsum est; 12: Regno est expulsus Ariobarzanes rex, socius populi Romani atque amicus; imminent duo reges toti Asiae non solum vobis inimicissimi sed etiam vestris sociis atque amicis; civitates autem omnes cuncta Asia atque Graecia vestrum auxilium exspectare propter periculi magnitudinem coguntur. 50 Cf. Gelzer 1969: 56; Gildenhard et al. 2014: 192, 202. 51 MacKendrick 1995: 17 f counts 10 occurrences in total. On the maiores in Cicero’s works in general cf. e.g. Roloff 1938 = 1967; on the speeches see Stinger 1993: 296 and passim, and recently Kenty 2016, who notes (p. 433) that the references to the maiores “are rather more frequent in the orations delivered to contiones” and calls (p. 437) the De lege Manilia “an oration replete with citations of the maiores.”

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Medea, no “proper” exemplum is invoked until § 47.52 Whenever Cicero has an opportunity to compare Pompey with the ancestors, he passes it over by saying that either now or in the past there has been no one to match Pompey.53 In evading proper names in this way, the orator is persistent to the point that even when laying out qualities of a bad commander he refrains from giving any example (§ 37: ego autem nomino neminem54). Cicero argues instead that following exempla is not mandatory for Pompey since, due to his outstanding personal attributes, he himself can be regarded as one of the maiores.55 Indeed, most of the following “examples” are drawn from Pompey’s public career. Cicero makes use of exempla externa once again at the beginning of his refutation (§ 52–​56). Of the two arguments put forward by his opponents (cf. n. 52) the speaker deals first with the one seemingly less challenging, namely that of Hortensius,56 who is reported to have said (§ 52 init.) “[t]‌hat if everything is to be put in the hands of one man, then Pompeius is the most appropriate person; but that everything should not be handed over to one man.” According to Cicero, the facts themselves deny this point because if Hortensius had successfully opposed the lex Gabinia, the pirates would continue to spread a reign of terror across the Mediterranean. The speaker further argues (§ 54) that even the smallest towns and islands had always been able to defend their harbors and

52 Pace Stinger 1993: 90 f. On this exemplum see van der Blom 2010: 118 f and Gildenhard et al. 2014: 214 ad loc. Apart from that, at § 60 Cicero enumerates people who were entrusted with extraordinary measures as precedents to counter the argument of Q. Lutatius Catulus. 53 E.g. Cic. Man. 27: Nunc vero cum sit unus Cn. Pompeius qui non modo eorum hominum qui nunc sunt gloriam sed etiam antiquitatis memoriam virtute superavit; 29: quae tanta sunt in hoc uno quanta in omnibus reliquis imperatoribus quos aut vidimus aut audivimus non fuerunt. 54 A deft pun, overlooked by both Holst 1925 (in his study of wordplay in Cicero’s orations) and MacKendrick 1995: 23. See on the subject Gildenhard et al. 2014: 165 ad loc. 55 See Man. 36, 39 f, and esp. 44: Itaque ut plura non dicam neque aliorum exemplis confirmem quantum auctoritas valeat in bello, ab eodem Cn. Pompeio omnium rerum egregiarum e x e mpla sumantur with the discussion by Classen 1985: 292 and Bücher 2006: 50, n. 119, 162. Cf. Jonkers 1959: 46. 56 See in general Fuhrmann 1970–​1982, 1.382, and for a more detailed discussion of his and Catulus’ objections e.g. Classen 1985: 295–​301 and Steel 2001: 115–​123. On Catulus cf. additionally Aleksandrowicz 1996: 60; Bellini 2020: 303 f and on Hortensius: Millar 1998: 86; Dyck 2008b: 154.

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shores, whereas for several years before the Gabinian law had been passed, the Romans, renown for being invincible on the sea, have been deprived of their dignity and position.57 Then, another catalogue of fearsome enemies the maiores have conquered follows (§ 55): Nos quorum maiores Antiochum regem classe Persenque superarunt omnibusque navalibus pugnis Carthaginiensis, homines in maritimis rebus exercitatissimos paratissimosque, vicerunt, ei nullo in loco iam praedonibus pares esse poteramus. Our ancestors overcame King Antiochus and King Perseus at sea, and defeated the Carthaginians, the most experienced and best-​equipped seafarers [homines in maritimis rebus exercitatissimos paratissimosque], in every naval engagement they fought with them; but we, by contrast, were nowhere a match for the pirates.

The reasons for Cicero’s choice of these exempla in particular are not entirely clear. There can be little doubt that the first element refers to the naval battles of Corycus (191 bce) and at Side and Myonnesus in 190 bce.58 As to why Perseus is invoked cannot be determined with equal certainty. In the final stages of Paullus’ campaign against the Macedonian king, the Roman fleet commanded by Cn. Octavius (cos. 165)59 was somehow instrumental in the victory. Octavius was ordered to bring the fleet and supplies to Heracleum, but this was part of Paullus’ larger plan which did not envisage fighting at sea. A clandestine attempt on the pass of Pythium was simply to “start off disguised as a naval move.”60 To say that the Romans defeated the Carthaginians “in every naval engagement” (omnibusque navalibus pugnis), however, is a slight exaggeration. That may be true of the Second Punic War, but during both the First (at the Lipari islands, 260 bce,61 and especially at Drepana and Phintias in 249 bce62) and the Third (the battle of the Port of Carthage, 147 bce63) the Romans were not always victorious. 57 On the piratical activity in the Mediterranean from ca. 88 until 67 bce see esp. Liv. Per. 99; Vell. 2.31.2; Flor. 1.41.1 f; Plut. Pomp. 24 with Heftner 1995: 177, 179–​186 on Plutarch’s lengthy digression on pirates; App. Mith. 416–​427; D.C. 36.20–​23.3. 58 See Liv. 37.30; App. Syr. 132–​136; Nep. Hann. 8.4; cf. Cic. Sest. 58; Heftner 1997: 342 f; Grainger 2002: 247–​265, 288–​306. 59 See MRR 1.428, 3.150. Cf. Linderski 1990a: 57 = 1995: 305. 60 Derow 21989: 316; see Liv. 44.35.13–​15; Walbank 1979: 379 on Plb. 39.14. Cf. the commentary ad loc. by Fuhrmann 1970–​1982, 1.387: “Die Flotte des Perseus von Makedonien ergab sich nach der Schlacht bei Pydna kampflos den Römern (168 v.Chr.)” and similarly Heftner 1997: 378; 61 See Plb. 1.21.4–​7 with Walbank 1957: 76 f; Liv. Per. 17; V. Max. 6.6.2, 6.9.11. 62 E.g. Plb. 1.49.6–​51.12; Liv. Per. 19; Flor. 1.18.29; Schol. Bob. p. 26 f Hildebrandt = 89 f St. 63 See App. Pun. 577–​581 (an indecisive naval engagement).

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The misrepresentation is not due to Cicero’s ignorance.64 Perhaps he assumes his audience will think of the overall victory against the Carthaginians who until the First Punic War used to be the most powerful naval force in the Mediterranean. The other possibility is that most of Cicero’s contemporaries could for various reasons disregard some of the lesser defeats: that at the Lipari islands as a result of deceit, that at Phintias as caused by a storm, and that of the Port of Carthage as a skirmish rather than a real battle. The Roman defeat at Drepana, on the other hand, was later blamed on P. Claudius Pulcher’s contempt for the auspices.65 Either way, as long as Cicero kept flattering the Roman pride, an oversight like this would easily be forgiven. As was observed by modern scholars,66 Cicero had hardly refuted Hortensius’ argument. “Rather than confront the point of principle,” as A. R. Dyck put it (n. 66), “Cicero prefers, […] to insist that his [i.e. Hortensius’] argument is obsolete by virtue of […] Pompey’s success against the pirates.” The dominion of the pirates was an insult to the Romans who, according to Cicero, prided themselves as being invincible at sea (nomen invictum in navalibus pugnis). Bringing this point to the extreme, Cicero cries out (§ 55 fin.): Et eis temporibus nonne pudebat magistratus populi Romani in hunc ipsum locum escendere, cum eum nobis maiores nostri exuviis nauticis et classium spoliis ornatum reliquissent! At that period the magistrates of the Roman people must surely have felt ashamed to mount this very platform [the rostra are meant], given that our ancestors had handed it down to us decorated with naval trophies and spoils taken from enemy ships!

This statement must have had a great emotional appeal, especially that the rostra of the Comitium, where Cicero spoke, were decorated with the beaks of enemy ships “probably after one of the signal naval victories of the First Punic War.”67 When he reached the last entry on the list, therefore, he may have pointed at the surrounding monuments commemorating the event, including the columnae rostratae, the one dedicated to C. Duilius (cos. 260 who defeated the Carthaginians at Mylae68) being adjacent to the speaking platform.69 This would explain Cicero’s 64 For the battle of Drepana see e.g. Cic. N.D. 2.7: Qui risus classe devicta multas ipsi [sc. P. Claudio Pulchro] lacrimas, magnam populo Romano cladem attulit; Div. 1.29, 2.20, 2.71. 65 Cf. e.g. Walbank 1957: 113; Linderski 1986: 2177, n. 10. 66 See Classen 1985: 297; Steel 2001: 115, and Dyck 2008b: loc. cit. 67 Richardson 1992: 335, s.v. “Rostra.” Cf. Coarelli 1985: 158. 68 See MRR 1.205 and Roller 2009: passim for ancient sources. 69 See ILS 65 = ILLRP 319. Cf. Bücher 2006: 121; Hölkeskamp 2001 = 2004: 151 f, 159; 2012 = 2017: 242, 244 f; Roller 2009: 221–​223 and Aldrete 1999: 22 f, 25 who (at

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clear emphasis on the last element of the series which alone was accompanied by a descriptive phrase: homines in maritimis rebus exercitatissimos paratissimosque. Against this background, Antiochus III and Perseus seem to have been needed simply to complete the triad, but the speaker might have also chosen them as rulers of the regions that were now threatened by Mithridates. One conclusion to be drawn is that the Roman people had regained its honor thanks to Pompey who has cleared the sea from pirates. By implication, he must also be considered capable of saving the day once again. In terms of exemplarity, this series falls under the category of exemplum contrarium: the maiores had successfully confronted at sea enemies as fierce as the Carthaginians, whereas for many years the Romans of the present day have been unable to defeat the pirates (an apparently lesser threat).70 The one who benefits from the contrast is of course Pompey. He is indirectly viewed as the only general who meets the standards set by the ancestors. The primary aim of the previous catalogue was to prompt the hearers to decisive action. The current one serves to show who is the best person to put in charge of this action. In some respects, the series are complementing one another, in others they are counterparts: the maiores are once again the primary illustrans and the Romans of Cicero’s times the illustranda, whereas a strikingly similar group of foreign enemies serve as the secondary illustrans. Antiochus and Carthage/​Carthaginians are in both cases separated by a Macedonian/​Greek enemy (Philip; the Aetolian League, and Perseus respectively), forming triads which consist of the following elements: “Asian” –​“Greek” –​Carthaginian. The first two of them are accounted for by the political background of the speech, as both “Greece” and Asia were likely to be involved in the upcoming war. The Carthaginians, on the other hand, were a desirable addition to the series as the enemies par excellence. Cicero must p. 78) points out: “At the beginning of his Pro Lege Manilia he [i.e. Cicero] similarly noted that «the Roman people filled the Forum, and crammed every available corner in each of the temples that overlook this platform [the rostra]» (Cic. Man. 14)” except that the quotation is at § 44, obviously not the beginning of the speech. On Cicero’s attention to his surroundings during public performances see Pöschl 1975; on the relationships between exempla and public monuments e.g.: Römisch 1968: 117 f, 131 f; Maslakov 1984: 441 with n. 7; Hölkeskamp 1996 = 2004: 173–​176, 190–​193. 70 Compare Hor. Carm. 3.6.33–​36, where the Romans of the present day are contrasted with those whose ancestors defeated Pyrrhus, Antiochus the Great, and Hannibal, and the speech of 78 bce attributed by Sallust to M. Aemilius Lepidus (Hist. 1.55 M = 1.49 Ramsey), where the descendants of the old noble families are scorned for submitting themselves to Sulla’s tyranny. Unlike them, the great Roman ancestors fought with Pyrrhus, Hannibal, Philip V, and Antiochus III to preserve their libertas.

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have been aware that this seemingly least relevant element would at the same time be most appealing. To provide a similar rhetorical climax, Horace disrupted the chronological order in his series of exempla at Carm. 3.6.33–​36 (the First Punic War, Pyrrhus, Antiochus III, and Hannibal).71 Cicero could easily include Carthage at § 14, because the circumstances under which the First and/​or Second Punic War broke out were relevant to his argument. At Man. 55 they would have been an excellent illustrans except that the defeat they had suffered from the Romans at sea was not as total as Cicero suggests. Perhaps this exaggeration was easier to digest for the hearers who were able to see with their own eyes the beaks of enemy ships and the naval trophies surrounding the rostra.

5.2. The Speeches of Cicero’s Consular Year One terminological issue needs to be addressed before moving on to the next period. Although all the passages to be discussed in this subchapter are from the speeches delivered by Cicero in 63 bce, I think it is more adequate to refer to them as “the speeches of Cicero’s consular year” than “Cicero’s consular orations” in that the latter phrase is normally applied to a set of several orations which Cicero himself considered and had published as a separate “corpus.” One of the three speeches I will examine is the Pro Murena that did not belong to this corpus.72 A long series of foreign historical figures appears in the second speech on the agrarian law, delivered at the beginning of 63 bce.73 At Leg. Agr. 2.86–​91 Cicero warns against allowing Capua to become “the second Rome” (§ 87 fin.: altera Roma74). He interprets the intention of the proposers of the bill to establish a colony at Capua as an attempt to open up a venue for the opposition to the 71 See above, n. 70; Nisbet, Rudd 2004: 110 ad loc. Cf. Bonner 1977: 3 f. Aelius Theon recommended quoting examples in “increasing order of importance” (Demoen 1997: 147). See his Prog. p. 122 Spengel: εἴ πού τινες ἱστορίαι συνᾴδουσι τοῖς λεγομένοις, καὶ τούτων μνημονευτέον μὴ χύδην μηδ’ ὡς ἔτυχεν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ αὔξησιν ποιουμένους τὰ παραδείγματα […]. 72 Cicero lists his ‘consular speeches’ in a letter to Atticus of June, 60 bce (2.1.3 = 21 SB). For a discussion of this programmatic statement see e.g. Brożek 1960: 68 f; Kröner 1990: 66; Narducci 1997: 166 f; Cape 2002: 118 f; van der Blom 2010: 184, n. 39 and recently Manuwald 2018: xxxv f. 73 On the dating and the political vicissitudes see below, Section 7.2. Since the passage currently under investigation does not count as an exemplum proper, it seems more convenient to postpone a more detailed discussion of Leg. Agr. until later in the book. 74 On the concept of altera Roma see Vasaly 1993: 232, n. 61 and below, Section 7.2, n. 49.

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Roman state. Throughout these sections the speaker draws a sharp line between the maiores,75 who knew what measures should be taken to avoid a potential threat, and Rullus, who is prepared to squander all their efforts. Alongside Carthage and Corinth, Capua is said to have been one of the three cities that, due to their topographical advantages, had always been considered dangerous by the Romans.76 The reason why the ancestors decided to remove the political institutions from Capua instead of razing it to the ground, as Cicero suggests, was that, unlike the other two, this city is located near Rome (literally: in oculis senatus populique Romani) and therefore can be easily watched. He then recalls that ever since Capua had been recaptured from Hannibal (in 211 bce77), it has neither undertaken nor even thought of undertaking any action against the republic. On the contrary, it has been a source of constant support for Rome during her many external and internal conflicts. To drive this point home, the speaker offers numerous examples (§ 90): multa postea bella gesta cum regibus, Philippo, Antiocho, Persa, Pseudophilippo, Aristonico, Mithridate et ceteris, multa praeterea bella gravia, Carthaginiense, Corinthium, Numantinum […]. Later [there were] many wars waged with kings, Philip, Antiochus, Perses, Pseudophilip, Aristonicus, Mithridates and others; additionally, many fierce wars, the Carthaginian, the Corinthian, the Numantian […].78

75 A little earlier (2.84), as Kenty 2016: 436 rightly observes, Cicero “stirs up hostility to Rullus’ land reform” by suggesting that the tribune wants to take away from the people what they have received as inheritance from the maiores. Cf. MacKendrick 1995: 37, 49 (under the section “Morality”) and on the “ancestors of the Roman people”: Blösel 2000: 79 f. Helm 1979: 36–​38 considers this paragraph (§ 84) to have been slightly revised for publication in 60 bce (cf. n. 72) as Cicero aimed to tone down his criticism of the inhabitants of Capua. We learn elsewhere (Cic. Sest. 9–​11 with Berry 2020: 100, Pis. 25) that by the end of 63 bce Capua had honored him as a benefactor for sending there a military force during the Catilinarian conspiracy. 76 Esp. Leg. Agr. 2.87: qui [sc. maiores nostri] tres solum urbes in terris omnibus, Carthaginem, Corinthum, Capuam, statuerunt posse imperii gravitatem ac nomen sustinere. When paired with Carthage and Corinth, Capua can thus be seen as a “natural enemy.” See Jonkers 1963: 46–​49; Helm 1979: 37; Classen 1985: 340 f. 77 Cicero’s exact words are: post Q. Fulvium Q. Fabium consules. Those (Q. Fulvius Flaccus and Q. Fabius Maximus Verrucosus) are the consuls of 209 bce (cf. Bücher 2006: 209). In 211 the consuls were Cn. Fulvius Centumalus and P. Sulpicius Galba Maximus (MRR 1.272, 285; Manuwald 2018: 381 ad loc.). 78 Tr. G. Manuwald.

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These are followed by internal uprisings, which Cicero passes over by way of praeteritio, and the wars with allies, neither of which count as (exempla) externa. In the next paragraph, Cicero continues to praise the wisdom of the maiores who ensured that the inhabitants of Capua are no longer ambitious and hungry for glory. The catalogue consists of a group of six eastern kings defeated by the Romans and a triad of wars fought against powerful cities.79 In addition to Philip V, Antiochus III, and king Perseus of Macedon, who have already been invoked as exempla in the previous period, three other names appear: Pseudophilip, an alleged son of Perseus, defeated by Q. Caecilius Metellus in 148 bce; Aristonicus, an illegitimate son of Eumenes II, whose uprising in Pergamum was quelled by M’. Aquilius and M. Perperna in 130/​129 bce; and finally Mithridates himself, soon to be defeated by Pompey.80 Cicero enumerates the eastern rulers, as well as the wars with Carthage (149–​146 bce), Corinth (destroyed in 146 bce), and Numantia (143–​133 bce), in chronological order.81 This series, however, is not an exemplum in its own right as there is nothing to be compared with the said wars. What Cicero aims to emphasize at § 89–​92 is the contrast between the maiores and M. Brutus, resp. P. Rullus. As a result of the ancestors’ good judgement, Capua not only became harmless, but has also served Rome admirably for a long period of time. Now, like Brutus some twenty years before,82 Rullus dares to question these measures.83 It would be unrewarding to attempt to look into the role Capua played during all the above mentioned conflicts. With this wide array of examples Cicero does not seem to imply anything beyond what he says: it must have been obvious that, as being subordinate to Rome, Capua provided revenues, reinforcements, 7 9 Cf. MacKendrick 1995: 55. 80 He was defeated by Pompey in 66, but managed to escape and continued warfare against Rome. As of the beginning of 63 bce, therefore, the war was not yet over. It was not until later in the year that the news of Mithridates’ death reached Pompey and subsequently the senate. See Cic. Mur. 34 with Adamietz 1989: 162 f; Prov. 27 with Grillo 2015: 210 f; Liv. Per. 102; Plut. Pomp. 41.7 with Heftner 1995: 286; App. Mith. 522–​555; van Ooteghem 1954: 242; Shackleton Bailey 1977: 279 on Cic. Fam. 5.7 = 3 SB; Gelzer 1984: 94; Seager 22002: 59 f. At Leg. Agr. 2.52 Cicero still considers Mithridates a threat: nondum denique bello confecto, cum rex Mithridates amisso exercitu regno expulsus tamen in ultimis terris aliquid etiam nunc moliatur […]. What he means in this passage are perhaps the previous Mithridatic Wars. 81 See Manuwald 2018: 382 f ad loc. 82 On Brutus’ colony see below, Section 7.2. 83 Cf. Stinger 1993: 107 f.

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and shelter for the soldiers.84 This is by far the best example of an accumulation of names meant simply to impress the hearers. Neither of the elements by itself serves any particular purpose. Their respective relevance for Cicero’s argument depends upon the position they occupy within the sequence. As in Verr. 2.1.55 he sought to illustrate the wide geographical range of Verres’ transgressions by means of enumerating foreign enemies, so here Cicero’s intention is to show how long-​lasting has been the impact of the ancestors’ treatment of Capua. That this was his main objective is also apparent from the fact that despite the length of the catalogue he maintains the chronological order. While for the reason I have just stated only the First and the Second Mithridatic War (88–​85 and 83–​81 bce) pertained to Cicero’s argument in his second Agrarian Speech, delivered when the Third War was still ongoing (n. 80), in the Pro Murena, delivered after the war with Mithridates was over,85 it was the Second and the Third Mithridatic War (75–​63 bce) that had direct bearing on the case. The defendant, L. Licinius Murena, served in both, in the Second under his father, and in the Third under L. Licinius Lucullus.86 A successful military career, or lack thereof, could have been an (dis)advantage during the electoral campaign at Rome.87 Therefore, in the course of Murena’s trial for electoral bribery (de ambitu) both Cicero and one of his opponents had raised this issue. At some point M. Porcius Cato remarked disparagingly that the war against Mithridates has not been a real warfare, but “was only fought against a lot of women”88 (31: bellum illud omne Mithridaticum cum mulierculis esse gestum). 84 Cicero rounds off his catalogue in the following way (Leg. Agr. 2.90 fin.): quibus omnibus domesticis externisque bellis Capua non modo non obfuit, sed opportunissimam se nobis praebuit et ad bellum instruendum et ad exercitus ornandos et tectis ac sedibus suis recipiendos. Cf. D’Isanto 1993: 18–​21. 85 See e.g. Marinone 22004: 85 (B1), 87 (B11). 86 Cf. Leeman 1982: 212; Adamietz 1989: 16 f. 87 Cicero argues at § 22 that the activities of a soldier are of greater importance for an aspiring consul than the activities of a lawyer: qui potest dubitari quin ad consulatum adipiscendum multo plus adferat dignitatis rei militaris quam iuris civilis gloria?. Cf. Quint. Inst. 2.4.24, 9.2.100, 9.3.32 f; Leeman 1982: 209; Fedeli 1987: 48 f; Adamietz 1986: 110, 1989: 19, 105 f; van der Wal 2007: 184, 197, 201 with n. 41. 88 Here and further tr. C. Macdonald. On Cato’s speech against Murena cf. 2ORF, p. 407 f = FRL 3.14–​21; Alexander 2002: 122–​127 and recently van der Blom 2016: 208 f, 213–​216 with secondary literature. Cato’s involvement was certainly Cicero’s biggest challenge during this trial (see Craig 1986: passim [esp. 229 f]; cf. van der Wal 2007: 189 f). According to Green 1978: 6, Cato’s aim was to diminish Pompey’s victories in the East by alluding to the words of Alexander Molossus who contrasted “his own hard-​fought Italian campaign with that of Alexander the Great in

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To answer to this charge Cicero engages in a short digression (§ 31–​34) which is indirectly relevant to his treatment of the contentio dignitatis (§ 15–​53).89 As in the Pro lege Manilia, his task was to highlight the magnitude of the war but, unlike in the speech of 66 bce, now the danger had already been averted. The bulk of these sections revolves around the subsequent phases of the war, briefly summarizing the military campaigns of Sulla, L. Murena the father, Lucullus, and Pompey (§ 32–​34). To make the Mithridatic War appear more serious, the speaker first asserts that there had been many fierce enemies in the East in general. At § 31 he mentions wars that the Romans had waged against the Greeks: Pyrrhus, Philip V, the Aetolian League, Perseus, Pseudophilip, and the Corinthians –​two triads, both consisting of two kings and a nation (2–​1; 2–​1). From the fact that Cato scorns the recent warfare Cicero infers that he should also look down on the triumphs of the past Roman generals, whose names are included on the list.90 If, however, his opponent is willing to admit that these were significant victories, why does he refuse to acknowledge the Asian enemy as equally fierce? Then follows a slightly exaggerated tribute to Antiochus the Great, as Cicero states “that perhaps the most serious war ever fought by the Roman people was that against Antiochus” (vel maximum bellum populum Romanum cum Antiocho gessisse video) and a eulogy of L. Scipio, who defeated him (§ 31 f).91 To prove that the king of Syria posed a serious threat to the republic and, by implication, that Asian wars in general are great wars, Cicero calls upon M. Cato the Elder, the great grandfather of his opponent (cf. n. 102). If there was no real danger, the speaker argues, the old Cato would not have fought against Antiochus,92 and the senate would not have sent P. Scipio, who had just expelled Hannibal from Italy, alongside his brother. The Carthaginian leader is mentioned here only in passing, but the implication seems straightforward: just

Asia” (Liv. 9.19.10 f; Curt. 8.1.37; Gell. 17.21.33; cf. on the subject Spencer 2002: 49 f). Pompey was known to have been an emulator of Alexander (see below, Section 6.1). 89 Cf. Adamietz 1986: 110 f; Fantham 2013: 127. 90 Those are: M’. Curius Dentatus, T. Quinctius Flamininus, M. Fulvius Nobilior, L. Aemilius Paullus, Q. Caecilius Metellus, and L. Mummius. See Adamietz 1989: 155 ad loc. 91 Cf. Bücher 2006: 260 and Plut. Cat. Mai. 12.1: ἐπ’ Ἀντίοχον τὸν μέγαν συνεξῆλθεν εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα, φοβήσαντα Ῥωμαίους ὡς οὐδένα ἕτερον μετ’ Ἀννίβαν. 92 Cf. Plut. Cat. Mai. 12.1–​4, 13 f; MRR 1.354 f, 3.170; Gnauk 1936: 75. It seems to follow from Cicero’s words that Cato the Elder served under L. Cornelius Scipio, when in fact he had served under M’. Acilius Glabrio (cos. 191) who defeated Antiochus at Thermopylae. See Fuhrmann 1970–​1982, 2.382.

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as P. Scipio acquired the honorific byname ‘Africanus’, so his younger brother earned the name ‘Asiaticus’.93 By placing the honors conferred by the Romans upon both generals on equal footing, the speaker magnifies the seriousness of the war with Antiochus III.94 Against this backdrop, L. Murena’s service under his father and Lucullus in the Mithridatic Wars should also appear more praiseworthy.95 Although the exempla externa serve formally as secondary illustrantia, they are not mere embellishments. Because the speaker’s goal was to show that the war against Mithridates was a serious threat, the foreign examples contribute essentially to the overall argument,96 forming part of the following induction: 1. D = B: The wars with Pyrrhus and Antiochus97 were wars against eastern monarchs 2. D = A: the wars with Pyrrhus and Antiochus were serious, therefore 3: B = A: whenever there is a war with an eastern monarch, it is serious. From theoretical standpoint, this exemplum would be very difficult to challenge as there is a great number of instances to corroborate the universal proposition (B = A). It is doubtful, however, whether all these wars were equally serious. Hence, I believe, Cicero’s decision to put Roman generals in the forefront: even though one could undermine the threat posed by their enemies, no one would dare to take away from the ancestors’ glory. This clever twist on the part of the speaker must have made it easier for the audience to deduce the conclusion: 1. C = B: If the war against Mithridates was a war with an eastern monarch 2. B = A: and whenever there is a war with an eastern monarch, it is serious, then 3. C = A: the war against Mithridates was a serious war. We have already come upon the majority of those exempla in the previous sections. The only exception is king Pyrrhus of Epirus, over whom M’. Curius Dentatus 93 Cf. Stinger 1993: 136. According to J. Briscoe (in 3OCD, p. 398) the more traditional cognomen “Asiaticus does not occur before the Augustan period.” However, cf. the comments by Linderski 1990b: 158 = 1995: 437, who quotes the Fasti Consulares Capitolini (under the year 190 bce: qui postea Asiaticus appellatus est) and Shackleton Bailey 1988: 40 who also prints Asiaticus. 94 See Classen 1985: 147 f; Adamietz 1989: 155 f ad loc. 95 Cf. Robinson 1986: 32. 96 See Robinson 1986: loc. cit. 97 The minor term D is in fact more elaborate: D1: Greek –​Pyrrhus, Philip V, the Aetolian League, Perseus, Pseudophilip, the Corinthians; D2: Asian –​Antiochus the Great. It has been simplified for the sake of convenience. For a similar pattern cf. my discussion of Aristotle’s Second Example (above, Section 2.2)

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(III cos. 274) celebrated a triumph in 275 bce.98 Apart from that, the Aetolian League was earlier referred to in a different context. As in other instances, Cicero now calls attention to their conqueror, M. Fulvius Nobilior (cos. 189), who celebrated a triumph over both the Aetolians and Cephallenians in 187 bce.99 The Greek portion of this catalogue resembles that of Leg. Agr. 2.90 in that it is arranged chronologically and loosely related to the case. Cicero, as C. J. Classen points out,100 wanted first to impress the audience with the sheer number of names, and only then did he focus on more specific analogies. Cato’s charge that the war in which L. Murena has served was cum mulierculis gestum rested on the Romans’ perception of the eastern nations as unwarlike.101 To overcome this prejudice, Cicero links the Asian monarchs to their Roman conquerors. As a result, it looks as though Cato was underrating not only the accomplishments of both Scipios, but also of his own ancestor, whom he himself had earlier cited as his role model.102 The speaker went beyond simply provoking the Romans’ sensitivity to their past military glory.103 To stir the feelings of his audience, he inserted into his discussion the name of their fiercest enemy. Hannibal receives only a brief mention, but, as with the Carthaginians at Man. 55, his inclusion in the catalogue adds weight to Cicero’s argument. The parallel between the recent threat and the one that the Romans were never meant to forget could easily be drawn, and this parallel will be explored later in the speech.104 Given that the forces of Catiline have not yet been suppressed, Murena’s military career was not only relevant to the case, but perhaps even more important than his guilt or innocence. Hence Cato’s attempt to undermine his achievements, 98 See MRR 1.195, 3.78; Büchner 1984: 327 on Cic. Rep. 3.40; Heftner 1997: 38–​40. Cf. Powell 1988: 218 f on Cic. Sen. 55 on M’. Curius as “a favorite example of continentia.” 99 MRR 1.369, 3.95; Heftner 1997: 344 f. 100 See Classen 1985: 147. 101 See Balsdon 1979: 61 f; Adamietz 1989: 154, who quotes Liv. 9.19.10 f and Gell. 17.21.33, and more recently Drogula 2019: 61. 102 See Cic. Mur. 66: Quemquamne existimas Catone, proavo tuo, commodiorem, communiorem, moderatiorem fuisse ad omnem rationem humanitatis? De cuius praestanti virtute cum vere graviterque diceres, domestic um te habere dixisti e x e mplum ad imitandum with Maslakov 1984: 440, n. 5; David 1992: 566 f (on Cato’s motivation). On Cicero’s strategy of dissociating Cato from the maiores in general and Cato the Elder in particular cf. Gnauk 1936: 75, 79; Craig 1986: 237; Treggiari 2003: 157; van der Blom 2010: 154 f, and Drogula 2019: 62, 66. 103 Cf. Fantham 2013: 128. 104 See Mur. 84 and below, Section 5.4. In the speech De provinciis consularibus, Cicero will also juxtapose Hannibal with Mithridates (Section 7.2).

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and hence Cicero’s rather lengthy digression which he felt the need to justify: deque eo pauca disseram; neque enim causa in hoc continetur. Even though on the whole Cicero’s rhetorical strategy was about keeping up appearances,105 the use of historical exempla was precisely what the Roman audience would normally expect. The next catalogue is introduced in a similar fashion. Towards the end of his fourth Catilinarian, Cicero makes a digression that weaves together various themes,106 but revolves mainly around his own recent achievement (Cat. 4.20): Nunc ante quam ad sententiam redeo, de me pauca dicam. Though Cicero admits that there are many people who wish him harm and object to his actions, these sentiments are overshadowed by the praise he received from his fellow countrymen. He further states that he will never regret his decisions, despite the danger he put himself in with those despicable members of the society. After boasting about the thanksgiving (supplicatio) he was granted on December 3107 for saving the state from war, the speaker invokes the exempla of men who had rescued Rome in the past (§ 21) in a like manner. The following military leaders are named: Scipio the Elder for driving Hannibal from Italy, the younger Scipio for destroying Carthage and Numantia, L. Aemilius Paullus for defeating king Perseus of Macedon, C. Marius for having twice freed Italy from siege and finally Pompey the Great, who surpasses all of them with his military prowess. “There will certainly be some place for my fame,” Cicero continues, “amid the praise of these men […]” (erit profecto inter horum laudes aliquid loci nostrae gloriae […]108). Then he expounds on the differences between a triumph over foreign enemies and a war against an internal enemy (§ 21 f), which leads to a conclusion that preserving homeland security is at least as equally important as extending the boundaries of the empire.109 1 05 Cf. Craig 1986: passim, followed by van der Wal 2007: 188. 106 Cf. Dyck 2008a: 234 f ad loc. 107 See e.g. Gelzer 1969: 93 f; Marinone 22004: 84. 108 Tr. C. Macdonald. Cf. van Gils 2009: 93. 109 At Off. 1.78 (cf. Dyck 1996: 210 f ad loc.) Cicero ascribes to Pompey a view that “he [Pompey] would have brought home his third triumph in vain were it not for the fact that my [Cicero’s] service to the state had ensured that there was a home to which he could bring it” (Berry 2020: 186). The following comment is then added: Sunt igitur domesticae fortitudines non inferiores militaribus. Cf. Cato Fam. 15.5.2 = 111 SB with van der Wal 2007: 191. Relevant here is also the scholiast’s remark about Cicero’s boastful letter to Pompey (Schol. Bob. p. 148 Hildebrandt ~ 167 St.): epistulam […] quam Pompeio in Asiam de rebus suis in consulatu gestis miserat Cicero, aliquanto, ut videbatur, insolentius scribtam, ut Pompei stomachum non mediocriter commoveret,

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The chronological arrangement of this catalogue is interrupted by one element: P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, mentioned here next to his adoptive grandfather, captured and destroyed Carthage and Numantia in 146 and 133 bce respectively, a few decades after Paullus’ victory at Pydna. Otherwise, the sequence of events is linear, leading up from the past to the current times. In this regard, as F. Bücher suggests,110 it is reminiscent of the funeral procession during which the ancestors of the deceased, impersonated by professional actors, walked ahead of the bier, beginning with the most distant members of the gens.111 As a result, it looks as if Cicero’s was the crowning achievement of this sequence of events, although in fact military successes were ranked by the Romans above the civilian ones.112 Here, the speaker employs historical exempla for personal motives –​they “are meant to legitimize Cicero’s consular actions.”113 Moreover, the identification with those who distinguished themselves on the field of battle, as was noted by J. M. May, “imparts weight and authority to Cicero’s own ethos and credence to his newly created role as imperator togatus.”114 This passage illustrates well the way in which his attitude to and employment of exempla evolved, from being rather detached at the start to become increasingly more involved. By placing himself on the list of Roman heroes, Cicero regards his own course

quod quadam superbiore iactantia omnibus se gloriosis ducibus anteponeret. Cf. above, Section 4.2.1, on Cicero’s unfortunate line: cedant arma togae with Berry 2020: 161 f. 110 See Bücher 2006: 217 f. 111 See on the subject in general Flower 1996: 91–​127; on pompa funebris as a repository of exempla: Hölkeskamp 1996 = 2004: 188–​190, and Flaig 2003/​2013: 75–​83. The funeral oration (laudatio funebris) which followed the procession also afforded opportunity to glorify one’s maiores by enumerating their consulships, triumphs, etc. See e.g. Kornhardt 1936: 19; Kierdorf 1980: passim; Zorzetti 1980: 39 f; Hölkeskamp 1995 = 2004: 219–​221; Flower 1996: 128–​158; Flaig 2003/​2013: 57–​59. 112 See Dyck 2008a: 236 ad loc. Cf. n. 109 above. That is precisely the point Cicero was making in his speech Pro Murena (!), as we have just seen. See also recently the comment by Berry 2020: 186: “Cicero surely intends the reader to accept, that his own achievement […] in fact surpasses the achievements of Pompey and hence those of all the generals listed.” 113 Van der Blom 2010: 185. 114 May 1988: 57 f; Dyck 2004: 311, 314, and Kurczyk 2006: 178 f, 185, 193 on Cicero’s role as dux togatus. On Cicero’s construction of consular ethos in his first Catilinarian cf. the insightful discussion by Batstone 1994. On rhetorical ethos in general see also Süss 11910/​1975 (mostly on Greek material); Wisse 1989 (p. 351, Index 1 s.v. “Ethos”); Lausberg 31990: 193 (§ 355), and van der Wal 2007.

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of action as exemplary, in the sense that it is unprecedented115 and worth imitating. Because as imperator togatus Cicero claims place among the greatest Roman generals, technically the primary illustrantia are the Scipios, Aemilius Paullus, Marius, etc., and not the foreign enemies they have defeated.116 Depending on the viewpoint, however, this exemplum has several pairs of illustrantia and two illustranda, namely Cicero himself and the conspirators as a group. Another, subsidiary, implication is therefore that both his accomplishments are equally remarkable as that of Scipio, and the Catilinarians are no less a threat than Hannibal.117 The same holds for all the other possible combinations, e.g. Cicero is to Aemilius Paullus as king Perseus is to the conspirators, and so forth. Both perspectives must have had their own merit, for the speaker in some cases modifies additionally the primary, in other the secondary referent.118 On the whole, despite a minor chronological displacement a clear pattern can be discerned: a Roman commander who had triumphed over a powerful enemy (Scipio the Elder and Hannibal; Aemilius Paullus and Perseus) is followed by one who had won a double victory (the younger Scipio over Carthage and Numantia; Marius over Teutones and Cimbri119). The final element (excluding Cicero) is Pompey, an example of imperator militaris who fought in countless wars and achieved unsurpassed glory. This is a unique instance of exemplum impar in that Cicero seeks to strike a balance between the seriousness of the challenge and the consequences of possible failure. Few people would be convinced that the Catilinarians posed 115 Cf. Cic. Cat. 4.20: etenim mors, quam illi fortasse minitantur, omnibus est parata; vitae tantam laudem quanta vos me vestris decretis honestastis nemo est assecutus. ceteris enim bene gesta, mihi uni conservata re publica gratulationem decrevistis. For more references and a brief discussion see Berry 1996: 302 on Cic. Sull. 85.4 and Reinhardt, Winterbottom 2006: 288 f on Quint. Inst. 2.16.7. 116 Cf. Fuhrmann 1970–​1982, 2.378; Bücher 2006: 215–​219. 117 See Robinson 1986: 33 who compares Cic. Mur. 84. 118 Two of the descriptive phrases apply to exempla externa: Carthage and Numantia are called duas urbes huic imperio infestissimas, and Perseus rex potentissimus quondam et nobilissimus. Cf. Hor. Carm. 3.6.35 f: Pyrrhumque et ingentem cecidit | Antiochum Hannibalemque dirum. 119 Cf. Cic. Man. 60: non dicam duo bella maxima, Punicum atque Hispaniense, ab uno imperatore esse confecta duasque urbis potentissimas quae huic imperio maxime minitabantur, Carthaginem atque Numantiam, ab eodem Scipione esse deletas, non commemorabo nuper ita vobis patribusque vestris esse visum ut in uno C. Mario spes imperi poneretur, ut idem cum Iugurtha, idem cum Cimbris, idem cum Teutonis bellum administraret and see on this passage Bellini 2020: 304.

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an equal threat as the foreign leaders that were named, but these were all external foes, with most of whom the Romans fought to expand their empire. If the conspirators were successful, by contrast, the republic in its current form would virtually cease to exist. This inequality is expressed in a conditional clause at the end of the paragraph (§ 21 fin.): […] nisi forte maius est patefacere nobis provincias quo exire possimus quam curare ut etiam illi qui absunt habeant quo victores revertantur. […] unless of course it is a greater achievement [nisi forte maius est] to open up provinces to which we may go as governors than [quam] to ensure that those who have gone out to them have a homeland to which they may return from their victories.

This catalogue is well-​balanced and each element rises in force as they progress towards the present day (heroes of the past ➔ Pompey ➔ Cicero). As for exempla externa, this is perhaps the most impressive series, if somewhat exaggerated and out of proportion to the occasion.120 It comes as no surprise that the passage was later imitated,121 for instance by Capito who, while declaiming against Popillius, is made to say (Sen. Con. 7.2.7): Glorietur devicto Hannibale Scipio, Pyrrho Fabricius, Antiocho alter Scipio, Perse Paulus, Spartaco Crassus, Sertorio et Mithridate Pompeius. Let Scipio glory in the defeat of Hannibal, let Fabricius triumph over Pyrrhus, the second Scipio over Antiochus, Paulus over Perses, Crassus over Spartacus, Pompey over Sertorius and Mithridates.122

The two series of exempla, at Mur. 31 f and Cat. 4.21, share some common traits. In both cases the foreign examples serve as a secondary illustrans; certain honors were conferred upon the Scipio brothers (honorific bynames) as well as upon Cicero (thanksgiving) for their accomplishments. Apart from promoting his own policy (Cat. 4) and shedding a positive light on the defendant’s military 120 Some experts (e.g. Helm 1979: 245 f with previous scholarship; Lintott 2008: 18, n. 15) are convinced that these passages of Cat. 4 (§ 20–22) were added at the time of publication (in 60 bce, cf. n. 72). Cf. also Dyck 1996: 210: “Probably in preparing the Catilinarians for publication in 60 he inserted an allusion to the comment Pompey had made in the meantime” (see above, n. 109). The “historicity” of this speech has been recently defended by Martin 2011, but now again questioned by Berry 2020: 73–​79, 164 f. Cape 1995, on the other hand, argues that Cicero’s words can be reconciled with the role he was expected to play as a presiding magistrate back in 63 bce. For our purposes, however, this is a secondary issue. 121 See Robinson 1986: 161; Dyck 2008a: 235. 122 Tr. M. Winterbottom.

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career (Pro Murena), however, the speaker might have had another reason for highlighting the victories over foreign leaders in general, and Hannibal in particular, by the end of 63 bce. Since at Mur. 32, 34 Cicero draws a parallel between Hannibal and Mithridates,123 it would follow that he also pairs Pompey with Scipio the Elder. In the fourth Catilinarian, on the other hand, Pompey figures as the last illustrans and is said explicitly to have surpassed his predecessors (4.21: anteponatur omnibus Pompeius). This series of exempla opened, as we saw, with Scipio’s victory over Hannibal. Given that Pompey the Great was about to return to Rome the following year, Cicero could have seized the opportunity to pay tribute to the conqueror of Mithridates by juxtaposing him with the conqueror of Hannibal. This conjecture gains support from the fact that Cicero openly flattered Pompey in a letter124 of April, 62 bce, where “he presents himself as a Laelius to Pompey’s Scipio”125 (the younger). He obviously needed to be subtler in his speeches,126 which leads to the last common feature of the two passages. Both are loosely related to the main argument and for that matter can be considered digressions.127 As one would expect, in the years 70–​63 bce the series of exempla externa were useful to Cicero especially when the matter under dispute had some connection to international affairs. In the early speeches, he was concerned with the looting of the works of art Verres committed as legate in the Greek East and 123 The account of the war with Mithridates in the Pro Murena ends with the statement that Pompey kept chasing the king until he was slain. The Romans did not declare that the war was over until he was dead (§ 34): cuius expulsi et eiecti vita tanti aestimata est ut morte eius nuntiata denique bellum confectum arbitrarentur. This seems to be a verbal echo of the previous description of Scipio’s achievement (§ 32): Hannibale ex Italia expulso, ex Africa eiecto. Cf. Fantham 2013: 132 f. 124 Cic. Fam. 5.7.3 = 3 SB. Cicero has been courting Pompey’s favor since 66 bce. See [Q. Cic.] Pet. 5, 51: Efficiendum etiam illud est ut sciant omnes Cn. Pompei summam esse erga te volunatem et vehementer ad illius rationes te id adsequi quod petis pertinere; Cic. Att. 1.1.2 fin. = 10 SB; Laser 2001: 114 f. 125 Van der Blom 2010: 185. Cf. Dugan 2005: 342 on Cicero’s other Scipios. On his possible allusion to the ideal period of the republic see Holliday 1969: 19, n. 7 and Lintott 2008: 153 who also discuss the political context of this letter. 126 Cf. Cic. Man. 70: […] testorque omnis deos, et eos maxime qui huic loco temploque praesident, […] me hoc neque rogatu facere cuiusquam, neque quo Cn. Pompei gratiam mihi per hanc causam conciliari putem, neque quo mihi ex cuiusquam amplitudine aut praesidia periculis aut adiumenta honoribus quaeram […] with the discussion by Kurczyk 2006: 157 f. 127 Nunc ante quam ad sententiam redeo, de me pauca dicam ~ deque eo pauca disseram; neque enim causa in hoc continetur.

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with the question of Pompey’s supreme command against Mithridates; in his consular year, he opposed the agrarian bill of Rullus, who intended to establish new colonies in many different parts of the empire, and he gave an account of the Mithridatic War. These measures proved to be effective, and Cicero apparently decided to use the same rhetorical means to justify his own policies in the published version of the fourth Catilinarian oration (cf. n. 120).

5.3. The Post-​exile Period In the upcoming chapter on Hannibal, who is mentioned at Sest. 142 as an accomplished military leader unduly expelled from his own country by his fellow citizens, I touch upon a preceding series of exempla (§ 141) featuring Themistocles, Miltiades and Aristides. Because these references serve virtually the same purpose, I will omit the latter here so as to avoid repetitions. Though both catalogues to be analyzed in this subchapter occur in the speeches (i.e. Scaur. and Rab. Post.) delivered in 54 bce,128 a more general title “post-​exile period” had been chosen because it encompasses the Pro Sestio of 56 bce as well. The exact context of the first passage is not easily reconstructed, for although the bulk of the speech On Behalf of M. Aemilius Scaurus is extant, its beginning is preserved in fragmentary form, while the ending is entirely lost. M. Aemilius Scaurus, son of the famous princeps senatus, served as governor of Sardinia in 55 bce, and upon return to Rome was prosecuted for extortion in his province.129 In the speech on Scaurus’ behalf, Cicero took to his advantage the fact that the father of the defendant was held in high regard among the Romans. The speaker calls attention to the elder Scaurus in order to help the cause of his son, thus making use of what had been called “family exemplarity.”130 Another strong element of this speech, as P. Stinger points out, “is the shameless appeal to Roman prejudice against the Sardinians.”131 Because the testimony to Scaurus’ misconduct was overwhelming, Cicero needed to view upon the matter from a different angle. As often, he decided to focus, as it were, on the cultural affiliation of the people involved: Scaurus was portrayed as his father’s son, whereas the witnesses for the prosecution, because of being the members of that mendacious community of Sardinians, as completely unreliable. 128 See Marinone 22004: 132 (B8) and 134 (B14) respectively. However, Lintott 2008: 246 argues for the dating of the Pro Rabirio Postumo in the latter half of 53 bce. 129 See MRR 2.217 f; Alexander 1990: 143 f (no. 295). 130 See van der Blom 2010: 217 f; 2011: passim. 131 Stinger 1993: 222. Cf. Balsdon 1979: 64.

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In line with the common practice, the ex-​governor was also accused of utmost cruelty, greed, and lust.132 One of the charges concerned the alleged attempt to seduce the wife of Aris of Nola. According to P. Valerius Triarius, the chief prosecutor, the woman had committed suicide to escape Scaurus’ advances.133 In the opening sections of the extant text, we find Cicero arguing that this was a made-​up story. A wide array of exempla is brought in support of this claim, ranging from the early Roman history (these instances are lost) through the more recent events to mythology to stories invented by the Greek writers, a combination which is practically unparalleled in Cicero’s extant orations. All this was to show that the honorable suicide has been a part of the Roman moral code,134 and is rare among the Greeks. The identifiable native examples include P. Licinius Crassus (cos. 97) and P. Licinius Crassus Mucianus, the former of whom committed suicide during the Marian terror in 87 bce, and the latter, after being captured by Aristonicus in 130 bce, provoked one of his Thracian guards to kill him. To further prove his point, Cicero lists other distinguished Romans who were unable to act in the same manner under similar circumstances. M’. Aquilius (cos. 101), the brothers L. and C. Julius Caesar, and M. Antonius Orator are named.135 The speaker continues in the following way (Scaur. 3): in omnibus monumentis Graeciae, quae sunt verbis ornatiora quam rebus, quis invenitur, cum ab Aiace fabulisque discesseris, qui tamen ipse Ignominiae dolore, ut ait poeta, victor insolens se victum non potuit pati praeter Atheniensem Themistoclem, qui se ipse morte multavit? In all the monuments of Greece, which are more embellished in words than facts [verbis ornatiora quam rebus], who, apart from Ajax and characters in plays [cum ab Aiace fabulisque discesseris], who, as the poet says, ‘though an insolent victor, could not for pain of the disgrace suffer himself to be defeated’, besides Themistocles of Athens, punished himself with death?136

1 32 See Dyck 2012: 96–​99. 133 Cf. Stinger 1993: 223; Alexander 2002: 99, 108: “he [i.e. Cicero] argues that either she committed suicide when she discovered her husband’s perfidy or a freedman of Aris was commissioned to murder her in a way that her death would appear to be suicide.” 134 Cf. van Hooff 1990: 107–​120; Hill 2004; Sapota 2009b. 135 See Marshall 1985: 141–​143 on Asc. Scaur. 24–​25.6 C; Dyck 2012: 122–​124 for more details. The scholars disagree as to the identification of M’. Aquilius, the former (p. 142) preferring the consul of 129. To me, Dyck’s interpretation seems more plausible. 136 Tr. A. R. Dyck.

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To add another example of voluntary death, Cicero speaks in the next paragraph of Cleombrotus of Ambracia who, as the “Greeklings” (Graeculi) have it, flung himself down the city walls after having read Plato’s Phaedo. By saying “as I see written [among the Greeks]137” (ut video scriptum [apud Graecos]), Cicero alludes to an epigram by Callimachus, to which a direct reference is made in the Tusculan Disputations.138 Regardless of whether the Alexandrian poet invented the story139 or not, it suited well the speaker’s purpose as highlighting the distinction between Greek and Roman suicide. Had the wife of Aris read either Plato or Pythagoras, Cicero goes on to say, she would have known that their praise of death comes with a reservation “that they prohibit one to escape life” (§ 5). According to Cicero, even the prosecutor is unable to deny that her chastity could hardly have been at stake,140 given how ugly and old she was. We have seen that the series of exempla usually consist of (at least) three elements, and that also appears to be the case at Scaur. 3 f. But the way in which the first element is introduced complicates the matter. Should the woman claim Ajax as her role model, it would be a fairly close parallel, in that both committed suicide out of shame. If such comparison were made, it would undoubtedly engage the audience emotionally, because Ajax was a popular character on the Roman stage141 and the armorum iudicium a favorite subject for declamations in rhetorical schools at Rome.142 Relevant here are also Quintilian’s words (Inst. 5.11.10), that “courage is more to be admired in a woman than in a man” (admirabilior in femina quam in viro virtus), explaining why the example of 137 Omitted by Dyck 2012: 102, 125 as a gloss; retained in Clark’s OCT and by Ghiselli 2 1969: 56. 138 Cic. Tusc. 1.84 init.: Callimachi quidem epigramma in Ambraciotam Theombrotum est, quem ait, cum ei nihil accidisset adversari, e muro se in mare abiecisse lecto Platonis libro. The reading Theombrotum is attested by the Turin palimpsest for Scaur. 4, and it is very likely that this is what Cicero actually wrote, misremembering Callimachus’ poem (A.P. 7.471 = 23 Pfeiffer). The emendation to Cleombrotum is due to Amadeo Peyron (see Ghiselli 21969: loc. cit. in app. crit.). However, cf. Shackleton Bailey 1988: 35. 139 Thus Riginos 1976: 180 f who assembles the testimonia. 140 See Cic. Scaur. 5 f: Atque hoc ille [sc. Triarius] vidit; nam iecit quodam loco vita illam mulierem spoliari quam pudicitia maluisse. Sed refugit statim nec de pudicitia plura dixit veritus, credo, ne quem inridendi nobis daret et iocandi locum. Cf. Corbeill 1996: 42. 141 See e.g. Malcovati 1943: 131; Giomini 1961: 330; Jocelyn 1967: 178 f; Dyck 1996: 283, 621; 2012: 124; Erasmo 2004: 99, 142–​145; Manuwald 2011: 113, 192, 221. 142 See Bonner 1949/​1969: 15, 23–​27, 151; Hill 2004: 123.

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Lucretia is more compelling than those of Cato143 and Scipio. Now it becomes clear that Ajax was a potentially valuable asset for the prosecution, fitting as the illustrans of an argument a fortiori. Cicero therefore, as I have suggested elsewhere,144 dismisses the mythological exemplum in advance, as if to prevent his opponents from making use thereof. With the words cum ab Aiace fabulisque discesseris, which I understand as a hendiadys for ‘the tragic Ajax’, the speaker discounts the Greek hero as an example of the honorable suicide. Cleombrotus of Ambracia, as we saw, also belongs to the realm of fiction, because the Greeks “invent many tales” (multa fingunt, § 4) and their “monuments […] are more embellished in words than facts” (verbis ornatiora quam rebus, § 3). This does not seem to apply to Themistocles of Athens who, as Cicero states,145 se ipse morte multavit. Thucydides, however, reports that Themistocles died of illness and in the next sentence he rejects the alternative version.146 In a well-​known section of the Brutus, Atticus allows Cicero to make the same false claim so that he may express himself more pointedly. He goes on to say that the historians Clitarchus and Stratocles made up the story of Themistocles’ suicide for rhetorical effect.147 In terms of phraseology, these paragraphs of the dialogue bear a striking resemblance to Cicero’s words in the Pro Scauro that I have just quoted. Clitarchus and Stratocles “have invented the story about Themistocles” (§ 42 fin.: de Themistocle finxit;148) because “they could elaborate that kind of death in a rhetorical and tragic manner” (§ 43: rhetorice et tragice ornare).149 Provided that the Romans were familiar with both variants, one of which was viewed as more attractive but less credible, Cicero could assume his audience will read between the lines. On the surface, the speaker counts Themistocles as an exception among Greek 143 Ironically, it was M. Porcius Cato who presided over the trial as praetor (Ghiselli 2 1969: 9; Dyck 2012: 99; Drogula 2019: 191). As we know, in 46 bce he had himself been reading Plato’s Phaedo before committing suicide. See Plut. Cat. Mi. 68–​70; App. BC 2.409 f; D.C. 43.11.2–​5; Flor. 2.13.71 f. 144 See Pierzak 2016: 263–​265. 145 Cf. also Nep. Them. 10.4 and Plut. Them. 31.5 f. 146 See Thuc. 1.138.4. Cf. van der Blom 2010: 214 with n. 144. 147 Cic. Brut. 42 f and see the general discussion in Douglas 1966: 32 f ad loc.; Petzold 1972: 258 = 1999: 91; Wiseman 1979/​2003: 31–​35; Stemmler 2000: 175; Richardson 2012: 12–​14, and Urban 2011: 62–​64, who argues that the fictional embellishment of Themistocles’ death allowed Cicero not only to draw a more exact parallel between Themistocles and Coriolanus, but also to add a moral lesson to their respective stories. 148 On fingo in that sense cf. Vollmer, TLL 06.1.778.5–​64. On the Greek predilection for “literary fiction” see also Balsdon 1979: 32, 38. 149 As tr. by T. P. Wiseman (1979/​2003: 32).

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precedents, the only instance of a suicide committed to avoid shame, but placing him precisely between the tragic Ajax and the story invented by Callimachus150 may suggest that in fact there is no re a l Greek parallel to the Roman exempla.151 Given the ancient gender conventions, it would take more courage on the part of the wife of Aris to commit suicide than on the part of men (viri) for whom virtus is a defining feature. From a technical standpoint, this would have been an instance of exemplum a maiore ad minus, analogical to comparing Lucretia with Cato the Younger or Scipio. The whole point is that the Sardinian woman is nothing like Lucretia, and as soon as this realization occurs to the audience, her story as told by the prosecution comes across as fabricated. Because the speaker aimed to denounce her suicide as fake, he adduces examples that are all but one labelled as fictitious. The ambiguity surrounding Themistocles’ death, which Cicero marks as exception, only makes this impression stronger. Just like the Greek playwrights,152 historians, and poets invent certain events or lie about the past to embellish their works, the speaker seems to imply, so the Sardinians, and in turn also the prosecutor, lie about what really happened to the wife of Aris. In order to demonstrate the implausibility of her suicide, Cicero first enumerates the Romans who set an example of honorable suicide difficult to follow even for other virtuous Romans, and next he introduces a triad of Greeks, who did not re a l ly take their own lives. What she has in common with Ajax, Themistocles, and Cleombrotus of Ambracia is that the stories about their suicides were invented for certain purposes. In that sense, regardless of whether Cicero’s intention was to curb in advance the argument of his opponents or to undermine the credibility of their narrative, this passage classifies as a dissimile type of exemplum.153 1 50 Cf. Berthold 1965: 40. 151 In terms of rhetorical theory, the Roman exempla would fall under the category facta as opposed to ficta –​stories drawn from poetry that are convincing to the extent that they are based upon the authority of famous writers (Quint. Inst. 12.4.2). See on the subject Gazich 1990: 115, 118 f and cf. Franchet d’Espèrey 2010: 73 f. 152 Cf. Quint. Inst. 5.11.17, 12.4.1. 153 Cf. Section 4.3. Elsewhere (Pierzak 2016: 262–​265) I have tentatively suggested the term ‘anti-​exemplum’ for this rhetorical strategy. When discussing Montaigne’s Essays, Stierle 1973/​1983: 371 = 1978: 359 uses the term anti-​exemplum to describe an example which calls into question the ‘introductory statement’ (“[…] das die Titelsentenz […] in Frage stellt”). In that sense, the term anti-​exemplum could also be applied to Suetonius’ narrative technique, whereby he quotes examples that fail to illustrate properly the ‘rubric’ (species) under which they were introduced (cf. Schulz 2018: 316–​318). This term carries still another meaning when applied to poetry. Davis 1980: 415 calls anti-​exempla the mythological exempla in Ovid “which are, by his own

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By the end of the same year Cicero once again lined three Greek individuals up by means of a series of exempla. In the speech Pro Rabirio Postumo, he undertook the defense of a notorious financier and speculator, who had dealings with both Pompey and Caesar. This case was closely connected with the Egyptian affair, and it followed immediately the conviction of Aulus Gabinius. The latter was instrumental in restoring king Ptolemy Auletes to his throne (in 55 bce) for which he is said to have received 10 000 talents. The king borrowed from the Roman publicani to pay the bribe. One of them, C. Rabirius Postumus,154 was later appointed a “financial minister” of Egypt, whose role it was to extort the money from the king’s subjects. He performed his duties so efficiently that he not only incurred hatred of the Egyptian populace, but also fell out of favor with the king. Then, after being imprisoned, he fled to Rome. Now, the same men who had just prosecuted Gabinius claimed that he turned the funds over to Rabirius, which led to another trial.155 The passage containing exempla belongs to the opening sections of the latter part of argumentatio (§ 22–​29) in which Cicero accounts for the defendant serving as the financial minister. This part of the speech can be divided into the following subsections: § 22–​25a concern the fact that Rabirius went to Egypt and attached himself to a tyrant; § 25b–​27 deal with his eastern clothing and, finally, in the paragraphs 28 f his taking up the post of dioecetes is discussed.156 According to the speaker all three charges are bound up together and they originate from Rabirius’ earlier mistake. The rhetorical strategy in this section consists of portraying the character of the defendant in a sympathetic light. He is to be perceived as someone who wants to rescue his investment and keep his good name. Cicero admits that Rabirius’ past actions were foolish (stultitia), while arguing that he has only little or no control over their consequences (necessitudo). In all of his undertakings, Rabirius had been subject to the whims and the will (libido) of a foreign king.157 Despite being a Roman knight, he came to a place where he

admission at the time, not apposite. [I]‌n each case they represent stories which […] did not take place in such a way as to show that his «private experience is consonant with or justified by universal human experiences» but which are applied to the situation anyway” (original emphasis). 154 Cf. Nicolet 1974: 1000–​1002 (no. 297). 155 See e.g. Austin 31960: 152 (“Appendix V”); Gelzer 1969: 204; Gruen 1974/​1995: 328–​ 330; Kumaniecki 1977b: 267 f; Klodt 1992: 23–​51; Alexander 2002: 110–​118; Lintott 2008: 246–​248. 156 See Klodt 1992: 60, 132 f. 157 See Klodt 1992: 133; Riggsby 2004: 168, 184 f.

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had to obey and serve, thereby forfeiting the freedom afforded by his social position. It was indeed very unwise of him to let something like this happen, but then again who can blame a moderately educated man (homini mediocriter docto), if even the wisest people (sapientissimos) are sometimes wrong? Here, Cicero offers a list of three Greeks whose fate was more or less analogical (Rab. Post. 23): virum unum totius Graeciae facile doctissimum, Platonem, iniquitate Dionysi Siciliae tyranni, cui se ille commiserat, in maximis periculis insidiisque esse versatum accepimus; Callisthenem doctum hominem comitem Magni Alexandri ab Alexandro necatum; Demetrium et ex re publica, Athenis quam optime gesserat, et ex doctrina nobilem et clarum, qui Phalereus vocitatus est, in eodem isto Aegyptio regno aspide ad corpus admota vita esse privatum. We are told that Plato, who was easily the wisest man in all Greece, was by the wickedness of Dionysius, tyrant of Syracuse, to whom he had entrusted himself [cui se ille commiserat], exposed to the gravest danger and treachery; that the wise Callisthenes, companion of Alexander the Great, was by Alexander slain; that Demetrius, citizen of a free state which he had administered excellently, eminent and famous for his learning –​ Demetrius of Phalerum I mean –​was in this same kingdom of Egypt [in eodem isto Aegyptio regno] deprived of his life by having an asp applied to his body.158

The speaker continues by elaborating upon the idea that attaching himself to Ptolemy was a foolish act only when looked at in isolation from the previous folly Rabirius had committed. When viewed from a wider perspective, it seems to have been the best solution (§ 24: ut hoc […] sapienter factum esse videatur). Even though the defendant made a mistake, he does not deserve harsh judgement for simply being imprudent. In fact, his involvement with the Egyptian kingdom is nothing out of the ordinary, since many men of high repute had entrusted themselves to foreign rulers in the past and all of them paid the price for their poor decision.159 What each of the Greeks Cicero names had suffered at the hands of foreign rulers resembles, to a varying degree, the situation in which Rabirius found himself. In his attempts to implement the Ideal State, Plato visited Sicily three times. In 390 bce he came to Syracuse on the invitation of Dionysius I. It was not long before the tyrant run into a dispute with the philosopher and arranged to sell him into slavery. While staying at the court of Dionysius II, son of the previous tyrant, in 366 and 361 bce, Plato did not receive better treatment. On the former occasion, after his friend Dion had been banished to exile, he was held a prisoner. On

1 58 Tr. N. H. Watts. 159 Cf. Stinger 1993: 238.

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the latter, Dionysius put Plato in charge of his mercenaries who hated the philosopher for advising the tyrant to live without a bodyguard.160 Though he failed in trying to persuade the tyrants to renounce tyranny, he at least had survived, which cannot be said about the two other men to whom Cicero is referring. Callisthenes of Olynthus, who was a nephew and adherent of Aristotle, accompanied Alexander of Macedon on his expedition as a court historian.161 When the conquest was well under way, the king attempted to impose proskynesis on his subjects which alienated many of the Macedonians. The resentment may have been influenced by Callisthenes who was openly reluctant to perform this form of greeting. Later, after the Pages’ Conspiracy had been discovered and thwarted in 327 bce, he was placed under arrest and executed without trial.162 It is worth noting that there were various accounts of Callisthenes’ death, for instance that he had been kept under arrest and eventually died of sickness.163 In this and in the next case, Cicero apparently chose the variant which seemed most suitable for the occasion. It will also become clear that he had arranged this series in a chronological order. Closing the list is Demetrius of Phalerum, a famous rhetorician and philosopher who served as regent of Athens for Cassander from 317 until 307 bce, when Demetrius Poliorcetes took the city. He then fled to Egypt where he played some role in founding the library of Alexandria and later became involved in the “game of thrones.” Because he did not support the future king, Ptolemy II Philadelphus, he was forced to leave the court in disgrace.164 Once again, there is no certainty as to the manner of his death.165 All the sources agree that it occurred as a result of a snake bite, but this has been variously interpreted 160 See Pl. Ep. 7, passim; Plut. Dio 5.1–​7, 16, 19.8; D.L. 3.18–​23; Reale 1992/​2001: 30 f, n. 1. Klodt 1992: 136 holds the view that Cicero has above all the second and third visit in mind which would have been known to him from Plato’s Seventh Letter (similarly Fuhrmann 1970–​1982, 6.432 f). Cicero may also be referring to Plato’s visits to Sicily at Fam. 9.16.6 = 190 SB (of 46 bce): cum plena sint monumenta Graecorum quem ad modum sapientissimi viri regna tulerint vel Athenis vel Syracusis, cum servientibus suis civitatibus fuerint ipsi quodam modo liberi. See Oppermann 2000: 116; on Plato’s Sicilian voyages in general cf. e.g. Riginos 1976: 70–​92 and more recently Jażdżewska 2013. 161 Cf. Fleck 1993: 69–​72 and below, Section 6.2. 162 See e.g. Curt 8.8.21; Bosworth 1988: 118 f, 285 f; Wardle 2005: 155, 158. 163 See Arr. An. 4.14.3 with Brunt 1976: 534, 543. 164 See e.g. Watts 1931/​1972: 388 followed by Stinger 1993: 237, n. 1; Tracy 2000/​ 2017: 345. On Cicero’s views on Demetrius of Phalerum cf. Fleck 1993: 236–​238; Oppermann 2000: 76 f. 165 See Fuhrmann 1970–​1982, 6.433.

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as suggesting either an accident, a suicide or an assassination commissioned by Ptolemy. F. Jacoby “believed,” as M. J. Sollenberger points out, “that Ptolemy was responsible for Demetrius’ death, basing this on what Cicero reports […] [Rab. Post. 23 follows].”166 We already know, however, that the historical information Cicero provides in his speeches needs to be taken with a grain of salt.167 He must have had a reason to choose this version over other possibilities with regard to both Callisthenes and Demetrius and his reasoning will be best explained if we look at this passage in exemplary terms. As was already observed, this entire section forms a rebuttal to the prosecutor’s allegation that Rabirius served as dioecetes. Cicero begins by stating that: a) he was also the king’s prisoner (in custodia etiam fuit regia) and b) he barely escaped with his life (vita ei ablata paene est). Especially when we consider the first element of the series as referring specifically to Plato’s dealings with Dionysius the Younger (cf. n. 160), the exempla look as though they were carefully tailored to match the defendant’s case: like Plato he had been imprisoned by a foreign king, and he nearly had his life taken away from him. The parallel with Callisthenes and Demetrius is incomplete, but by including them on the list and by implying that almost (paene) the same befell Rabirius, Cicero is able to magnify the danger his client was facing. The speaker himself makes it clear that submitting oneself to the whims of a tyrant is a foolish thing to do (at § 22–​24 he employs the word stultus and its cognates seven times). C. Klodt is right when she states that with these exempla Cicero endeavors to lessen Rabirius’ offence by showing that men of such renown were equally unwise.168 In this respect, the argument should be seen as an instance of exemplum impar: the progression from greater to lesser (ex maiore ad minus) is expressed in the sentence with which Cicero introduces the series of exempla. The illustrandum, described as a moderately educated man (homo mediocriter doctus), is juxtaposed with the sapientissimi homines.169 The parallel would perhaps be more exact if it was said about the illustrantia that they have simply fallen out of grace, but Cicero is not concerned with accuracy; rather, he takes liberties with tradition to raise the stakes on the one hand, and 1 66 F. Jacoby, FGrH IIB p. 643 as referred to by Sollenberger 2000/​2017: 326. 167 See also Lintott 2008: passim. 168 See Klodt 1992: 134: “Cicero stellt die stultitia des Rabirius in diesem Abschnitt überdeutlich heraus (§ 22 stulte; stultius; § 24 stultitiam; stultitia; stultissimus; stulti; stultitia), entschuldigt sie aber zuerst im allgemeinen durch die exempla bedeutender Männer, die sich nicht klüger verhalten hätten als Rabirius (§ 23).” 169 Cic. Rab. Post. 23 init.: sed ego in hoc tandem Postumo non ignoscam, homini mediocriter docto, quo videam sapientissimos homines esse lapsos?. Cf. Rhet. Her. 2.5.

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to achieve balance between his initial statement and the exempla, on the other. It needs to be stressed, finally, that the last element in the series is not only the closest in time, but also in space, in that Rabirius and Demetrius were ill-​treated by a tyrant “in this same kingdom of Egypt” (in eodem isto Aegyptio regno). Egypt is thus marked out as a seat of deceit and corruption,170 a region particularly dangerous for foreigners. In this rhetorical context a Roman catalogue would be perhaps more compelling, but apparently there were no native precedents available for Cicero to invoke. Now, if we look with hindsight at the Civil War that was about to break out within few years, Pompey’s fate would make an excellent example in such a context. According to Greek sources, just before he was murdered at the instigation of Ptolemy Auletes’ son, he had recited the following verses of Sophocles (fr. 789 N.2 from an unknown tragedy): “Whatever man unto a tyrant takes his way, | His slave he is, even though a freeman when he goes” (ὅστις δὲ πρὸς τύραννον ἐμπορεύεται, | κείνου ’στι δοῦλος, κἂν ἐλεύθερος μόλῃ).171 Dionysius the Elder supposedly addressed the same lines to Plato, to which the latter replied: οὐκ ἔστι δοῦλος, ἂν ἐλεύθερος μόλῃ (D.L. 2.82). However, because this quotation is also attributed to Aristippus (ibid.) and Zeno,172 it “would indicate,” as A. S. Riginos asserts, “that ultimately Diogenes Laertius’ source was a collection of apophthegmata.”173 At any rate, though Pompey’s last words as recorded by Greek historians may seem anachronistic, they capture well the essence of all three examples Cicero cites. Each of them deals with the consequences of losing freedom to a tyrant. For the philosophers mentioned at Rab. Post. 23 it might have been, at least to a certain degree, a subject for theoretical reflection, whereas for a Roman knight who is not equally sophisticated, there is no consolation, especially that libertas is a defining feature of every Roman citizen.174 Cicero does not make this explicit, but the descriptive phrases with which he additionally characterizes the illustrantia175 may point in that direction. If that were the case, it would partially compensate for the lack of Roman precedents. Given that in the Hellenistic biography the manner of a person’s death was a source of great fascination and for that reason it tended to be rhetorically brandished,176 1 70 Cf. Balsdon 1979: 68. 171 Plut. Pomp. 78.7 as tr. by B. Perrin. Cf. Plut. Mor. 204de; App. BC 2.358; D.C. 42.4.3. 172 See Plut. Mor. 33d. 173 Riginos 1976: 82. 174 See Hellegouarc’h 1963: 550 f. 175 Plato is described as vir unus totius Graeciae facile doctissimus, Callisthenes as doctus homo, and Demetrius of Phalerum as ex doctrina nobilis et clarus. 176 Cf. Sollenberger 2000/​2017: 325; Schulz 2018: 316; Madejski 2020.

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there were often conflicting accounts about the way in which someone died. Having different variants at his disposal, therefore, Cicero could pick out the one which best suited his goal. It is fairly clear that he made conscious choices in this respect in both orations delivered in 54 bce, in order to make his argument more pointed. By manipulating the historical facts in this way, he was able to suggest at the beginning of the extant text of the Pro Scauro a distinction between Roman exempla, which are facta, and Greek exempla, which are invented (ficta).177 In his defense of C. Rabirius Postumus, on the other hand, this allowed the speaker to weave the examples of Callisthenes and Demetrius into the speech, which otherwise would seem only loosely related to the matter under dispute. It may be a mere coincidence that all the series of foreign exempla that occur in the post-​exile period are Greek, but this is a good opportunity to look at them against the background of the comments Cicero made in his philosophical treatises about the use of Greek examples. He states, as we recall, that sometimes externa are preferable to native exempla (Off. 2.26, Tusc. 5.105) and this statement is usually taken in modern scholarship to mean that the foreign examples are more suitable for negative lessons.178 If negative lesson is understood as example of a course of action that should be avoided on moral grounds, then it does not apply to the series of Greek exempla we are currently discussing. It is true that each of the catalogues consists of people to whom something undesirable had happened: they were either expelled from their homeland (Sest. 141), led to commit suicide (the act of suicide itself being morally neutral for the Romans, Scaur. 3), or ill-​treated (sometimes with a fatal result) by a tyrant to whom they had entrusted themselves (Rab. Post. 23). Moreover, neither of the historical personages Cicero invokes can be described as wicked or dishonorable. It is therefore not the exempla themselves, but rather the Greeks as a nation that look bad for inventing fake stories and for letting good people suffer.

5.4. The Philippics Next series of exempla externa do not appear in Cicero’s extant orations until the Philippics, delivered against Mark Antony in the last moths of Cicero’s life. In the so-​called first Philippic two foreign leaders are referred to in a section that separates the exposition of previous events (§ 1–​10: narratio) from the main

1 77 Cf. above, n. 151. 178 See Section 1.1.

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statement of the speaker’s present intention (§ 14 f: propositio).179 Once again, this is what modern scholars usually call digressio, and what Cicero himself introduces in the following way (§ 11, cf. n. 127): “[…] I shall, before I begin to speak on public affairs, say a few words in protest against Marcus Antonius’ offensive behavior yesterday” ([…] prius quam de re publica dicere incipio, pauca querar de hesterna M. Antoni iniuria).180 At the beginning of the speech Cicero explains what prompted him to leave Rome and then to abandon his journey and return. For the most part, he was driven by the constantly changing political climate, which depended heavily on Mark Antony’s actions as consul.181 First, the speaker justifies his absence at the meeting of the senate held on the previous day (1 September 44 bce). The matter to be discussed was whether to honor Caesar’s memory with a special thanksgiving,182 to which Cicero would have objected, wherefore he did not see fit to attend (§ 12 f). His official excuse for not showing up was the fatigue from a long journey.183 According to Cicero himself, Antony threatened to send soldiers to fetch him by force or otherwise he would have his house demolished, to which the majority of the senators opposed. That was not an ordinary measure of summoning members of the senate to a session and it must have contributed largely to the hostility that broke out between the two men.184 Though Antony probably felt personally offended by Cicero’s absence, the speaker suggests that he had exaggerated the importance

1 79 Cf. Ramsey 2003: 83. 180 Translations of the Philippics are those of D. R. Shackleton Bailey as revised by Ramsey, Manuwald 2009 for the new LCL edition. 181 On Cicero’s journey see e.g. Frisch 1946: 116–​ 126; Gelzer 1969: 341–​ 345; Shackleton Bailey 1971: 242–​245; Mitchell 1991: 300 f; Ramsey 2003: 9. Cf. van der Blom 2011: 57. 182 What is meant here is perhaps the addition of the fifth day, in honor of Caesar, to the ludi Romani (Cic. Phil. 2.100 fin. Cf. D.C. 45.7.2). See Weinstock 1971: 265, 385. Cicero’s main objection was that the supplicationes are offered either to living men or to the immortal gods, whereas traditional festival in honor of the dead was the Parentalia (cf. Dufallo 2007: 59; 142 f, n. 20). According to Lintott 2013: 201 Antony intended to add an extra day in honor of the dead dictator to “a thanksgiving (supplicatio) to a commander, probably L. Plancus.” 183 See Plut. Cic. 43.6: τῇ δ’ ὑστεραίᾳ βουλὴν συναγαγόντος Ἀντωνίου καὶ καλοῦντος αὐτόν, οὐκ ἦλθεν, ἀλλὰ κατέκειτο, μαλακῶς ἔχειν ἐκ τοῦ κόπου σκηπτόμενος. 184 See Cic. Phil. 1.12, 5.19; Plut. Cic. 43.7 with Bonnefond-​Coudry 1989: 367. Cf. Mack 1937/​1967: 3 f; Stroux 1938: 91; Ryan 1998: 45–​51 (esp. p. 49); Ramsey 2003: 110–​112; Kenty 2020: 77. For other causes of enmity between Cicero and Mark Antony see e.g. Epstein 1987: 43, 95.

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of this meeting. He asks: “Was the business in hand such as to demand the attendance even of invalids?.” Then, two historical precedents are invoked ironically185 (Phil. 1.11): Hannibal, credo, erat ad portas aut de Pyrrhi pace agebatur, ad quam causam etiam Appium illum et caecum et senem delatum esse memoriae proditum est. Hannibal was at the gates, I suppose; or peace with Pyrrhus was at issue [Hannibal, credo, erat ad portas aut de Pyrrhi pace agebatur] –​the business for which tradition has it that the great Appius was brought in, blind and aged as he was.

The second one is perhaps more relevant to the case as Cicero compares the situation in which he found himself to what befell Appius Claudius Caecus. Having been censor in 312 and consul for the second time in 296 bce (MRR 1.160, 3.54), Appius was very old at the time when the Romans were setting out to negotiate terms of peace with Pyrrhus in 280 bce. As “a staunch advocate of extending Rome’s power into southern Italy,”186 he stood in strong opposition to any concessions to the king of Epirus. According to the tradition on which Cicero relies (memoriae proditum est), due to his senility and blindness he had himself carried to the senate-​house in a litter.187 There, Appius delivered a powerful speech (known as De Pyrrho rege) dissuading the senate from making peace.188 Rome’s international position depended on what turn the negotiations would take. The matter under dispute was therefore more urgent then the present one189 and Appius in much poorer condition than Cicero claims to have been. There is a sharp contrast between debating peace with Pyrrhus and taking a vote about whether or not to award a thanksgiving.

185 Cf. Haury 1955: 206; Stinger 1993: 250; Ramsey 2003: 109 ad loc.; Cairns 2012: 152; Manuwald 2018: 128 on credo at Cic. Leg. Agr. 1.4 and p. 161 on 1.18: “marks the following statement as ironic.” Berry 1996: 154 on Cic. Sull. 11.7 lists further bibliography. 186 Ramsey 2003: 109 ad loc. 187 See also Plut. Pyrrh. 18.8; V. Max. 8.13.5. 188 See 2ORF, pp. 2–​4 for the testimonia; Cic. Brut. 55 with Douglas 1966: 44; Quint. Inst. 2.16.7 with Reinhardt, Winterbottom 2006: 287 f. The sources for Appius Claudius’ intervention in the senate against peace with Pyrrhus are listed e.g. by Garzetti 1947: 219–​222 = 1996: 56–​59 and Powell 1988: 136 on Cic. Sen. 16. On Cicero’s use of Appius as exemplum see the references collected by Humm 2005: 37. 189 Cf. Heftner 1997: 33 (“Es wurde eine Schicksalsstunde der römischen Geschichte”); Ramsey 2003: 109 f, and Bücher 2006: 185.

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How does the first exemplum contribute to the force of this argument? What the speaker refers to by simply saying Hannibal erat ad portas190 is a dreadful moment in the Second Punic War, during the Roman siege of Capua in 211 bce. Hannibal had just crossed the Anio river, which was the nearest to the city he ever brought his army. This was something the Romans did not see coming, something that required an “impending decision” (ἐνεστηκυίας κρίσεως), to use Polybius’ words.191 The way in which Cicero recalls this episode in the Pro Murena allows the assumption that it still inspired fear among his contemporaries.192 Here, unlike in the first Philippic, the name of the enemy is lacking, but more factual details are given (§ 84): Hostis est enim non apud Anienem, quod bello Punico gravissimum visum est, sed in urbe, in foro –​di immortales! sine gemitu hoc dici non potest –​non nemo etiam in illo sacrario rei publicae, in ipsa, inquam, curia non nemo hostis est. The enemy is not on the Anio [Hostis est enim non apud Anienem], which in the Punic War seemed desperate enough, but in the city, in the Forum, and –​immortal gods! I cannot say it without a groan –​there are even some in our national holy of holies, yes, in the very Senate-​house.

Hannibal was indeed “at the gates,” but the conspirators are inside the city walls. What we are dealing with at Mur. 84 is an argument a fortiori which serves to highlight the fact that the danger still exists and Rome needs a strong leadership (i.e. two presiding consuls) to prevent it, whereas at Phil. 1.11 the tone of the historical parallel is mocking (Hannibal, credo […]). Undoubtedly, Cicero’s overall objective was to suggest that those who complain about his absence on September 1 are simply overreacting.193 This observation, tinged with irony and sarcasm, may have also carried a deeper message. The meeting of the senate which Cicero failed to attend, as we already know, was presided over by Antony and the motion was about public thanksgiving in Caesar’s honor. Both men, in many people’s view, were either directly or indirectly responsible for the outbreak of the Civil War in 49

190 For the expression cf. Liv. 21.16.2: velut si iam ad portas hostis esset (somewhat anachronistically) and 23.16.1: Cum Hannibal ad portas esset (with reference to the town of Nola). These words later became proverbial, see Otto 1890/​1962: 158 f (no. 785); Schoenberger 1910: 16; Fuhrmann 1970–​1982, 7.463; Heftner 1997: 263 f; Ramsey 2003: 109 ad loc. 191 Plb. 9.5.4 as tr. by W. R. Paton; cf. Liv. 26.10–​26.11.7 and for historical background in general see MacDonald 2015: 168 f. 192 Cf. Cic. Fin. 4.22. 193 Thus Stinger 1993: loc. cit. Cf. Stocks 2014: 23.

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bce.194 In a letter to Atticus written at the beginning of that year Cicero explicitly links Caesar to the Carthaginian leader: “Are we talking of a Roman officer or of Hannibal?” (utrum de imperatore populi Romani an de Hannibale loquimur?).195 Perhaps, Hannibal was simply referred to as a byname for Roman enemy but, given the precise context of the letter, Cicero might have had more specific historical vicissitudes in mind, i.e. a threat to the city of Rome itself.196 Five years later, the implication would be that a special tribute is to be paid to a man who, by crossing Rubicon –​like Hannibal had crossed Anio –​inspired fear among the Romans.197 This motion is proposed, moreover, by a man whose actions provided Caesar with an excuse for commencing the conflict. Cicero’s argument from the past at Phil. 1.11 is difficult to classify in that neither Hannibal nor Pyrrhus are compared to anyone involved in the present case.198 The names ‘Hannibal’ and ‘Pyrrhus’ refer to situations of a true crisis, Hannibal’s march on Rome in 211 bce and the embassy of Cineas in 280 bce respectively.199 What serves as a target here is the senate meeting which, according to Cicero, was hardly an emergency. The best way of describing the

194 For Antony’s role in precipitating the war see e.g. Caes. Civ. 1.2.7–​8, 1.5.1–​5, 1.7.2–​6, 1.22.5; Plut. Ant. 5–​6.1 with Pelling 1988: 130 f; App. BC 2.129–​133; cf. D.C. 41.1–​3; Gelzer 61960: 173–​175; Huzar 1978: 47–​49; Seager 2007: 28; Rogosz 2016: 29–​32; Kenty 2020: 216, n. 64. At Phil. 2.55 Cicero compares Antony to Helen, who caused the Trojan War. 195 Cic. Att. 7.11.1 = 134 SB (tr. E. O. Winstedt; cf. Thurn 2018: 107 f). Elsewhere Cicero likens Caesar to Phalaris (Att. 7.12.2 = 135 SB of 22 January 49), Pisistratus (Att. 8.16.2 = 166 SB of 4 March 49; both tyrants are mentioned at Att. 7.20.2 = 144 SB of 5 February 49), or (implicitly) Dionysius the Elder. See on the subject Strasburger 1953: 249 f = 1968: 41; Oppermann 2000: 172 f, and above, Sections 3.2, 3.2.2. 196 See Oppermann 2000: 41 f; cf. Gildenhard 2006: 198 and 2007: 168: “Caesar follows, quite literally, in the footsteps of Hannibal, the most pernicious enemy the Roman people ever had to face.” 197 Cf. below, Section 7.1 198 Such is also the case at Cael. 34, where Cicero impersonates Appius Claudius Caecus in order to censure Clodia. Among other things, the old censor asks sarcastically: “Was it for this that I tore up the peace with Pyrrhus [ideone ego pacem Pyrrhi diremi], that you might daily strike bargains about your infamous amours?” (tr. R. Gardner, slightly modernized). The literature on this famous prosōpopoeia, or, more precisely, eidōlopoeia (cf. Stroh 1975: 282) is vast. See e.g. Vasaly 1993: 174 f; Dufallo 2001, 2007: 19–​30 and passim; Gambreale 2005; van der Blom 2011: 55 f; Pierzak 2019a: 97–​110 with further references. 199 Ramsey 2003: 109 ad loc. notes that Cicero “dates this embassy to the spring of 279.”

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passage under discussion is therefore a reversed antonomasia by contrast, as this figure of thought, when it comes to its referents, was not limited to people.200 In this case, certain proper names are substituted for events with which those names are often associated. The resulting irony is additionally intensified by Cicero’s use of the verb credo. Both elements of this short “series” are strictly to the point and one gets the impression that the argument would lose some of its force if more names were added to the list. The last series to be considered in this chapter is unlike previous examples as well, but this time for the opposite reason: it is unusually long, consisting of nine items in total. On top of that, the way in which Cicero invokes individual illustrantia is uneven: some of them are discussed at length, others only briefly mentioned; moreover, the speaker does not always provide the name of a foreign leader. This selective attitude, as we shall see, is conditioned by the rhetorical context. Towards the end of 44 bce the consul P. Cornelius Dolabella left Rome to take up the governorship of Syria. On his way, he passed through the province of Asia, administered by C. Trebonius, who was previously a follower of Caesar, but eventually became one of his assassins. In February 43 bce, the news arrived in Rome that Dolabella had captured, tortured, and put to death Trebonius. On the motion of Q. Fufius Calenus, the senate reacted by declaring him a public enemy. On the next day, a discussion ensued as to who should be put in command of the war against Dolabella. Several proposals were made: Calenus moved that the provinces of Syria and Asia should be allotted to the consuls, A. Hirtius and C. Vibius Pansa; L. Caesar suggested an extraordinary command to P. Servilius Isauricus, Trebonius’ predecessor in Asia in 46–​44 bce. Cicero opposed both motions and instead, in his eleventh Philippic, he argued that C. Cassius Longinus, who was already active in Syria, be put in charge of the war as proconsul with imperium maius over Eastern provinces.201 In the first part of the refutatio (§ 17–​20) Cicero deals with L. Caesar’s proposal to entrust P. Servilius with an extraordinary command. He begins by stating that “An extraordinary command smacks of «popular» politics and inconsistency; it does not at all suit our gravity, not at all suits this body.” To prove his point, Cicero lists (§ 17 f) numerous occasions when 200 For a reversed antonomasia by comparison cf. Cic. S. Rosc. 89 fin. and Verr. 5.28. In both passages Cicero compares an event to the pugna Cannensis: in the former the bloodbaths of the Civil War, and in the latter Verres’ licentious feasting. See also the passages listed in Section 4.2.2 (n. 82). 201 For a convenient summary see e.g. Gelzer 1969: 382 f; Mitchell 1991: 313 f; Ramsey, Manuwald 2009: 130 f. A more detailed account is offered by Frisch 1946: 223–​228.

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such solution turned out unnecessary: in the war against Antiochus, in the First and Second Punic War, in the wars against Pyrrhus and Philip, in the Achaean War, and the Third Punic War. He further adds the war with Aristonicus and finally the wars against the pirates, Mithridates, and Sertorius, all three assigned to Pompey. In what follows I will focus mainly on those elements upon which the speaker himself elaborates. The first incident Cicero relates concerns the war in Asia against Antiochus III in 190 bce. The province was allotted to L. Cornelius Scipio, but he “was considered to lack spirit and strength for the job.” When the senate was about to entrust the task to his colleague, C. Laelius, Scipio the Elder rose and offered to serve as a legate under his younger brother.202 This example is not entirely adequate, since given that both candidates for the command were consuls, an imperium extraordinarium was not at issue.203 Next, the first two Punic Wars are recalled, “which were waged and brought to their conclusions by consuls or dictators” (a consulibus aut a dictatoribus gesta et confecta), but the speaker leaves out the information that P. Scipio was appointed (at the age of twenty-​four) to the command in Spain with imperium pro consule in 211 bce.204 Similarly, when speaking of Scipio Aemilianus, whom “the Roman people chose as the appropriate general for itself […] in such a way that it had him nevertheless conduct the war as consul [tr. slightly adapted],” Cicero fails to mention that by 147 bce he was five years too young for the office.205 This, of course, needed to be left unsaid as it would count as exception.206 The war with Aristonicus of 131 bce receives a little more detailed treatment. According to the speaker, the consul P. Licinius Crassus as pontifex maximus restrained his colleague, L. Valerius Flaccus, who was flamen Martialis, from leaving Rome, so as to take the command of the war in Asia for himself. Cicero adds somewhat gratuitously207 that even though the younger

202 See Liv. 37.1.9 f; V. Max. 5.5.1. Cf. App. Syr. 100. In fact, L. Cornelius Scipio was assigned Greece “with permission to carry the war into Asia” (MRR 1.356, cf. 1.358, 3.71). See also the comment by Grainger 2002: 337, n. 29: “This time the province really was ‘Asia’; Scipio’s province had been ‘Greece’ according to Livy (37.1.7), though it is clear that the task was the war with Antiochos, as Cicero, Philippic 11.17 notes.” 203 See Martin 2013: 123. 204 See Liv. 26.18.6–​9; V. Max. 3.7.1a; App. Ib. 68 f; MRR 1.280. 205 E.g. Rhet. Her. 3.2; Liv. Per. 50; Vell. 1.12.3; Plut. Mar. 12.2, etc. The evidence is discussed (and variously interpreted) by Astin 1967: 61–​69 and Develin 1978. Cf. Richardson 2012: 41 f and now Bellini 2020: 304, n. 11. 206 Cf. Bücher 2006: 270. 207 Cf. Martin 2013: 123 f.

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Scipio Africanus was available, the Roman people refrained from entrusting an extraordinary command to a private man. The last example is also questionable208 as it regards Pompey’s supreme command against the pirates, Mithridates (both dismissed as bestowed by tribuni plebis turbulenti), and Sertorius. In 77 bce, when the consuls D. Iunius Brutus and Mam. Aemilius Lepidus209 refused to take the command in Spain, Pompey received the imperium pro consule which, according to Cicero, L. Philippus called sarcastically pro consulibus. From the factual viewpoint, as P. M. Martin observes,210 hardly any of these exempla belongs to the category to which the speaker ascribes them. As is apparent from other passages of Cicero’s orations, his use of this kind of historical references was flexible. At Man. 60 he invokes Scipio Aemilianus as a precedent for Pompey, whereas at Phil. 5.48211 Scipio the Elder is invoked in support of the proposal to bestow extraordinary honors on Octavian.212 Here, Cicero attempts to dissuade the senate from taking the course of action proposed by L. Caesar in a way characteristic of deliberative oratory. He quotes as many instances as he can of how the ancestors solved (allegedly) similar dilemmas. It does not, however, underlie his “deep sense of tradition and his tendency to interpret historical events in terms of patterns that have been seen in the past.”213 Rather, the speaker creates a new pattern and imposes it upon his audience. The multitude of examples serves to lend credence to the analogy that, upon closer examination, turns out to be loose. All the names of the foreign leaders, both those stated explicitly, e.g. Pyrrhus and Aristonicus, and those only implied, like Hannibal or Mithridates, are not used as illustrantia. They denote the wars that are being compared to the upcoming campaign against Dolabella. The way in which the subsequent items are arranged and their length is by no means accidental. Cicero’s aim is to emphasize the geographical coincidence between the regions in question: the war with Antiochus III, which opens § 17 and is treated by Cicero in detail, was to be conducted in Syria, the province now

2 08 Cf. Stinger 1993: 277. 209 MRR 2.88, 3.8. 210 See Martin 2013: 124. 211 Cf. below, Section 6.1. 212 The other participants in the debate did not shrink from reminding Cicero of the role he played at that time (Phil. 11.20): at enim –​nam id exaudio –​C. Caesari adulescentulo imperium extraordinarium mea sententia dedi. The speaker himself was careful enough to call it imperium instead of imperium extraordinarium. See the remarks of Manuwald 2007: 702 f on Cic. Phil. 5.45. 213 Thus Wooten 1983: 149.

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governed by Dolabella; the war with Aristonicus, on the other hand, which occupies more than half of the next paragraph, took place in Asia, where Trebonius was treacherously murdered. The other examples chiefly help to maintain the impression that what is being described should be regarded as a general principle. Even the primary illustrantia are not such as one would expect in exemplum totum simile, because there is little they have in common except for not having been granted an extraordinary command. For that reason, the universal proposition is lacking, and if there was one, it would be easily challenged. On the whole, this argument rests on the authority of the maiores whose conduct is presented as a model for the current senators. As in many instances discussed above, Cicero refers to the foreign leaders merely in the background and identifies some of them with the lands over which they ruled.

5.5. Summary At first glance, the series of exempla externa as employed by Cicero appear to be a conventional and fairly predictable means of persuasion, which is only partially true. The series of exempla in the eight passages that I have analyzed (if we put aside for a moment the “post-​exile period”) contain but eight names of historical figures (Pyrrhus, Hannibal, Philip V, Antiochus III, Perseus of Macedon, Pseudophilip, Aristonicus, and Mithridates) that are sometimes accompanied by names of cities or nations, five of which recur frequently (Carthage/​Carthaginians, Corinth/​Corinthians, Aetolian League/​Aetolians, Numantia, and Syracuse).214 So far as we know, some of these characters were also used as individual exempla (e.g. Hannibal and Antiochus), whereas others (e.g. Perseus or Pseudophilip) appear only in catalogues. Against this backdrop, the post reditum speeches are unique in that not only are all the three series of exempla that occur in them entirely Greek, but they also comprise eight different persons (Themistocles, Miltiades, Aristides, Ajax, Cleombrotus of Ambracia, Plato, Callisthenes of Olynthus, and Demetrius of Phalerum). Given that many of Cicero’s orations are either completely lost or extant only in fragmentary form,215 however, it remains unclear to what extent

214 Cf. Schoenberger 1910: 29: “Vielfach hat man den Eindruck, als ob Cicero die Beispiele, die er in vorhergehenden Reden gebraucht, aus dem Gedächtnis frei wiedergebe […]. Bei bekannten Dingen konnte Cicero sich leicht auf sein Gedächtnis verlassen, ohne vorher seine rhetorischen Handbücher und seine Aufzeichnungen nachschlagen zu müssen; tut er dies aber, so gewinnt die Ausführung der Beispiele durch Anfügung von mehr Namen und Bewahrung einer größeren Ordnung.” 215 See Crawford 1984 and 21994 respectively.

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these data are representative of Ciceronian oratory in general. What nearly all the series of exempla seem to have in common is, not surprisingly, that they are especially suitable to cases involving international affairs (Cat. 4.21, Sest. 141, and Phil. 1.11 would thus count as exceptions). Also characteristic of Cicero’s use of foreign examples are his efforts to ensure that the areas associated with the illustrans and illustrandum coincide geographically (esp. Man. 14, 55, Rab. Post. 23, and Phil. 11.17 f). That the intended effect of a long stream of names, as A. W. Robinson whom I quote at the beginning of this chapter had stated, “is to overwhelm the listener with the sheer number of exempla,” holds for most of the exempla discussed above, but only in two cases (Leg. Agr. 2.90 and Phil. 11.17 f) it is the main intended effect. Elsewhere, Cicero draws a parallel between the (usually secondary when it comes to foreign exempla) illustrans and illustrandum for various purposes. I shall break these passages down according to the categories outlined at the end of the previous chapter: 1. There is only one instance of what I have called ‘identification’: at Mur. 31 f Cicero had employed exemplum totum simile in order to prove that the Mithridatic Wars, in which the defendant had fought, were serious. Formally, the foreign characters serve as secondary illustrantia, but, since the analogy revolves around the wars with eastern rulers, their role is pivotal. Although this exemplum forms part of a digression, it is crucial for Cicero’s argument because once his client’s military experience is confirmed, his acquittal at the present juncture becomes a matter of national security. 2. The persuasive strategy that involves ‘juxtaposition’ is a little more complex. In one case, Cicero invokes exempla externa to advo c ate a cer t ain cours e of ac t ion . His argument from lesser to greater at Man. 14 is aimed to show that avenging Mithridates’ insults towards the Roman people is far more urgent than at certain points in the past when such measures were taken. Therefore, this passage well exemplifies the theoretical principle of using imparia in exhortations/​deliberative oratory. Cat. 4.21, on the other hand, is an unconventional instance of exemplum impar in that Cicero, while suggesting that his achievements surpass those of the ancestors, pays tribute to the great military commanders for defeating powerful foreign enemies. Here, the speaker’s rhetorical and political goals coincided, as he was creating his image as an imperator togatus and at the same time seeking to leg it imize his consu l ar ac t ions. As it would be impossible to prove objectively that the conspirators were a greater threat than the armies of Antiochus III or Philip V, Cicero focuses on the potential consequences of defeat: should Roman generals fail to overcome their enemies, they would not expand the boundaries of the empire;

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should Cicero have failed, there would have been no empire to expand. There is also one instance of the ‘unequal’ series of exempla in a judicial oration. At Rab. Post. 23 the speaker recalls how Plato, Callisthenes, and Demetrius of Phalerum, as a result of attaching themselves to tyrants, suffered disastrous consequences. By juxtaposing them with the defendant, Cicero aims to demonst rate t hat R abir ius’ mist a ke was by no me ans unpre c e dente d. What is more, all the Greeks mentioned in this paragraph were, unlike Rabirius, widely recognized as very wise (sapientissimi). As a moderately educated man, therefore, the defendant should not be judged harshly for making the same mistake (a maiore ad minus). 3. Most of the exempla externa which I have studied so far fall under the category ‘contrast’. Cicero makes use of an antithesis (exemplum contrarium) twice to achieve two completely different goals. At Verr. 2.1.55, in order to pres ent t he defend ant’s b ehav ior as unpre ce dente d, he underscores the gap between Verres’ thefts of works of art and the generosity of the Roman generals from the past, who refrained from making profit during their military campaigns, although theoretically they were entitled to. His objective at Man. 55, in turn, is to g lor if y Pomp e y’s v ic tor y over the pirates. To that end, he compares the old Romans’ naval successes with the recent disasters on sea. In these two passages, the references to external enemies (especially Greek and Asian) appeal to emotions, evoking outrage and admiration, respectively. Near the end of his speech On Behalf of P. Sestius (§ 141), Cicero employs exemplum contrarium to show that the Romans, as opp os e d to ot her nat ions, know how to appreciate the benefactors of their people.216 Finally, at Phil. 1.11 certain events in which Hannibal and Appius Claudius Caecus took part are contrasted with the present situation by way of a reversed antonomasia ex contrario. The ironical tone of this figure of thought enables Cicero to deg rade Mark Antony. It is also noteworthy that half the instances of exemplary argumentation by contrast occur on those rare occasions when Cicero spoke against someone (In Verrem and In M. Antonium). 4. Only one passage (Scaur. 3 f) may be classified as a dissimile type of exemplum. When arguing that the wife of Aris did not in fact commit suicide, Cicero lists three Greek instances of a voluntary death: the tragic Ajax, Themistocles, and Cleombrotus of Ambracia. By stating either explicitly or implicitly that the stories about their suicides were invented, he infers that the same is true of

216 See below, Section 7.3.

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the wife of Aris. In other words, Cicero dismisses the exempla his opponents could have potentially used as unbelievable. Cicero often seeks to obtain symmetry between the subsequent elements in a list, e.g. by juxtaposing a triad of kings with a triad of nations or by linking together a number of items from the same geographical area. In most cases, the geographical coincidence is a determining factor for the choice of appropriate exempla, except maybe for Carthage and the Carthaginians, who sometimes seem to be added at random, but in fact their inclusion as the national enemies was hardly ever irrelevant. Whenever it suits his goal, Cicero disrupts the chronological order of events to provide a strong rhetorical climax, as Horace had done at Carm. 3.6.33–​36. On several occasions, esp. at Man. 55, Rab. Post. 23, and Phil. 11.17 f, the speaker manipulates historical facts considerably to make the catalogue longer and more impressive. He also tends to magnify the extent of the danger the ancestors faced from foreign enemies so that, by contrast, the achievements of the illustranda look particularly significant. Similar rhetorical strategy was later used by the emperor Tiberius in 18 ce, when a client king of the Suebi, Maroboduus, was deposed and pleaded for refuge. In a speech delivered in front of the senate,217 Tiberius portrayed the king as a threat more serious than Philip for the Athenians or Pyrrhus and Antiochus III for the Romans. Cicero’s favorite means of achieving the same effect was the descriptive phrases whereby he qualified the secondary illustrantia, be it wealthy cities, powerful nations or fearsome enemy kings. In terms of ingenuity, therefore, his use of the series of exempla externa was more flexible than might appear at the first sight, but still not as poignant as in the case of individual examples.

217 Tac. Ann. 2.63.1–​3 = fr. 39 Balbo. Cf. Gowing 1990: 322–​325; Balbo 2007/​2014: 132 f.

6. Alexander of Macedon as Individual exemplum Much unlike most foreign rulers, Alexander the Great “was a figure of huge fascination for the leading politicians of the late Republic and Triumviral periods,” as C. E. W. Steel wrote.1 This was perhaps partly because he managed to create the largest empire the ancient world has ever seen and yet, due to his premature death, was unable to continue his conquest by invading the West,2 so that the Romans have never thought of him as their enemy. Some of the prominent figures of the republican period were considered emulators of Alexander,3 which applies in particular to Pompey the Great, who early in his military career (ca. 81/​80 bce) received “the same” nickname.4 Pompey’s appearance in his youth is said to have borne a close resemblance to the images of Alexander,5 and later in his lifetime, encouraged by his supporters, he supposedly (cf. n. 13) imitated the Macedonian king.6 Visual representations of Alexander must have been therefore known to the Romans,7 and various works of art depicting the king were kept at Rome. The most famous of these was the bronze statue of Alexander on horseback (forming part of a group known as “the Granicus Monument”),

1

Steel 2001: 154. Secondary literature on the “Roman Alexander” is enormous. For an up-​to-​date bibliography see e.g. Welch, Mitchell 2013: 80, n. 1 and passim. 2 Cf. Bosworth 1988: 167. 3 See Weinstock 1971: 188; Griffin 1985: 189. However, cf. Green 1978: 16 f. 4 See Plin. Nat. 7.96; Plut. Crass. 7.1, Pomp. 13.7–​9, Sert. 18.3, Mor. 203e; App. BC 1.366 (cf. Mith. 448, 582, 599); D.C. 37.21.3 and the discussion by van Ooteghem 1954: 65 f, 69; Gelzer 1984: 41; Seager 22002: 28 and Spencer 2002: 18 f. Cf. Cic. Att. 2.13.2 = 33 SB, 2.19.3 = 39 SB; Liv. 30.45.6; n. 53. 5 See Plut. Pomp. 2.2–​4; van Ooteghem 1954: 37; Welch, Mitchell 2013: 87 f. 6 See Sal. Hist. 3.88 M = 3.62 Ramsey; Plin. Nat. 7.95; Plut. Pomp. 46.1–​2; Bruhl 1930: 206 as quoted by van Ooteghem 1954: 66, n. 1; Gelzer 1943: 12 f = 1963: 155 f; 1984: 53 f and passim; Syme 1964: 194, 206; Weinstock 1971: 37; Weippert 1972: 56–​ 104 passim (here esp. pp. 59 f); Green 1978: 4 f; Yavetz 1983: 28; Heftner 1995: 70 on Plut. Pomp. 2.3; Steel 2001: 155; Spencer 2002: loc. cit. and passim; Rosillo-​ López 2017: 227. 7 Cf. also Cic. Luc. 85, Fam. 5.12.7 = 22 SB; Hor. Ep. 2.1.239–​241; V. Max. 8.11. ext. 2; Suet. Jul. 7.1; Russell 1983: 78. Pollitt 1978: 166 with n. 14 lists paintings of Alexander that were on display at Rome.

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brought to Rome in 146 bce by Q. Caecilius Metellus.8 D. Spencer rightly observes that “Alexander has been integrated into both intellectual and physical topographies of Rome.”9 The impact of his achievements on the Roman imagination was apparently so great that, although being of foreign decent, he won an enormous respect among the Romans. The Roman preoccupation with Alexander is also reflected in the work of Valerius Maximus, where the Macedonian king is a prominent figure10 and in many passages he is mentioned as a positive exemplum. At one point (5.1. ext. 1) the author has this to say: Commemoratione Romani exempli in Macedoniam deductus, morum Alexandri praeconium facere cogor, cuius ut infinitam gloriam bellica virtus, ita praecipuum amorem clementia meruit. Led by the commemoration of a Roman example into Macedonia, I must needs celebrate the character of Alexander. As his valour in war earned him infinite glory [infinitam gloriam bellica virtus… meruit], so did his clemency earn him surpassing love.11

Here, piled up in one sentence, are three traditional Roman values (gloria, virtus, and clementia), a combination that may seem at odds with the Romans’ general view of foreign examples (above, Section 1.1). Removed from this context, all these attributes might easily be assigned to Caesar,12 a man who was often compared to and may also have emulated Alexander the Great.13 Among the sources of many stories about Alexander to be found in the Facta et dicta memorabilia was Cicero,14 another author fascinated with the Macedonian 8 Cf. Weinstock 1971: 86 f; Plin. Nat. 35.92; Plut. Alex. 4.3 with Bruhl 1930: 204 f; Schwarzenberg 1976: 259; Pollitt 1978: 157; Lazzaretti 2006: 396 on Cic. Verr. 4.135; Vell. 1.11.3 f with the comments and literature quoted by Hölkeskamp 2016 = 2017: 304 f. 9 Spencer 2002: 184 (cf. pp. 130 f; 237, n. 17). 10 See Wardle 2005: 142 following Bloomer 1992: 103. 11 Tr. D. R. Shackleton Bailey. Cf. V. Max. 4.7. ext. 2. 12 Cf. Wardle 2005: 151 f. 13 See Meyer 21919: 472–​475; Weinstock 1971: 87, and van der Blom 2010: 258 f. Cf. Oppermann 2000: 177. Some scholars contest the fact that either Pompey the Great (cf. the reservations of Wirth 1976: 187–​189) or Caesar (see esp. Gelzer 1940: 11 = 1963: 12, n. 43; 61960: 299, n. 243, and Green 1978) imitated and/​or emulated Alexander on purpose. See the overview of secondary literature in van der Blom 2010: 240, n. 220. More recently, Welch, Mitchell 2013, by revisiting the evidence, have attempted to show that the imagery related to Alexander was an important element of the competition between Pompey and Caesar. 14 See Bloomer 1992: 105. Cf. Helm 1940: 259.

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king.15 Cicero was of course aware of his humble military achievements and would hardly consider himself worthy of engaging in an imitatio Alexandri. Nevertheless, as governor of Cilicia in 51 bce, having defeated some local tribes, he self-​mockingly juxtaposed himself with Alexander in his correspondence with Atticus and M. Caelius Rufus.16 The rationale for this comparison was that his army had been encamped for a few days near Issus, the same spot where Alexander won victory over Darius in 333 bce.17 Apparently, the temptation to make this remark was difficult to resist. Given Alexander the Great’s popularity among the Romans, it comes as no surprise that he is mentioned frequently in Cicero’s treatises. We need to bear in mind, however, that even though the Romans admired his military prowess and the extent of his conquests, Alexander was also seen as a reckless tyrant, and if a Roman wanted to identify himself with the Macedonian king, he would run the risk of evoking not only the positive, but also the negative associations.18 Although he certainly had the potential to make an effective exemplum externum, Alexander is referred to in the Speeches in this capacity only three times, one of which is a series of exempla (cf. Section 5.3).

6.1. Identification In neither of the passages to be discussed in this chapter is the example of Alexander straightforward and easy to classify. First of them is a combination of exempla domestica and externa, and hence formally ‘a series’, but the foreign component clearly stands out and draws more attention, not least because it occupies the final position (as is the rule with mixed catalogues19). Near the end of his fifth Philippic, Cicero raises the question of honors to be conferred on those who defend the republic. At sections 42–​51 he proposes to bestow upon Octavian special privileges, including an imperium pro praetore, the status of a senator, the right to speak among the praetorii and to seek offices as though he held a quaestorship in the previous year.20 Cicero argues that given C. Caesar’s 1 5 Cf. Green 1978: 12; Spencer 2002: 117. 16 See Cic. Att. 5.20.3 = 113 SB, Fam. 2.10.3 = 86 SB. Cf. Fam. 15.4.9 = 110 SB. 17 Cf. Bruhl 1930: 206; Haury 1955: 253; Shackleton Bailey 1977: 410 on Cic. Fam. 2.10.3 = 86 SB; Green 1978: 10; Atkinson 1980: 470–​476 (“Appendix D”); Spencer 2002: 196–​198; van der Blom 2010: 239 f, 308. 18 Cf. Green 1978: 10; van der Blom 2010: 259. 19 See Schoenberger 1910: 32 f. 20 See Plut. Ant. 17.1 with Pelling 1988: 160, Cic. 45.4; cf. App. BC 3.194; Frisch 1946: 175, 180; Badian 1959b: 86 = 1964: 148; Wooten 1983: 80; Kenty 2020: 151. Drogula 2015: 340–​342 notes, however, that the senate’s choice to offer Octavian the

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(the future Augustus’) outstanding merits for the state, he should not be expected to wait for the advance of age, in order to meet the requirements of the leges annales. The speaker then lists (§ 48) the Romans who became consuls while still very young: three examples in the generic plural (Rulli, Decii, and Corvini) are followed by two recent examples, the Elder Scipio Africanus and T. Flamininus. All of them, he goes on to say, had extended the empire of the Roman people and made its name illustrious.21 A foreign exemplum wraps up the catalogue: quid? Macedo Alexander, cum ab ineunte aetate res maximas gerere coepisset, nonne tertio et tricesimo anno mortem obiit? quae est aetas nostris legibus decem annis minor quam consularis. ex quo iudicari potest virtus esse quam aetatis cursum celeriorem. To take another example, did not Alexander of Macedon begin his career of glorious achievement directly upon achieving manhood [ineunte aetate] and die in his thirty-​ third year? {This age is ten years below the consular qualification under our laws.}22 Hence we may conclude that ability outruns age [ex quo iudicari potest virtus esse quam aetatis cursum celeriorem].23

In what follows through § 50 Cicero quells the concerns of those who feared that Octavian would take advantage of his privileged position to gain more power. This passage, when taken together with Cicero’s argument against entrusting P. Servilius Isauricus with an extraordinary command (Phil. 11.17 f discussed above),24 illustrates well just how flexible the use of exempla could be. With regard to the eleventh Philippic, P. M. Martin observes that “Cicéron, qui voulait que l’affaire fût confiée à Cassius, s’emporta alors... contre la pratique des charges extraordinaires, qu’il défendait dans la 5e Philippique!”25 Cicero was not the first to note the discrepancy between Alexander’s rapid conquests and the limitations imposed upon the Romans by the customary

21 22

2 3 24 25

imperium pro praetore rather than pro consule must have been taken as a tacit insult. On the senate meeting cf. Bonnefond-​Coudry 1989: 500 f. Robinson 1986: 28 oversimplifies the matter by saying that “he [i.e. Cicero] urges that Octavian should be elected consul.” Cf. for their identification e.g. Fuhrmann 1970–​1982, 7.485; Stinger 1993: 264; Stemmler 2000: 191, n. 188; Martin 2013: 120 f. Recent editors suggest to delete this sentence as a gloss (Fedeli 1982: 91, whose text I have quoted, notes in critical apparatus: “fortasse ut glossema delendum”; Manuwald 2007: 715; Magnaldi 2008/​2014: 126). It is retained by Shackleton Bailey 1986: 176. Tr. D. R. Shackleton Bailey. Rev. by Ramsey, Manuwald 2009. See Section 5.4. Martin 2013: 121 f.

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cursus honorum. In fact, some ancient sources, when describing the ambitions of those politicians in the late republic who were often compared to Alexander, put special emphasis on the king’s youth.26 The most famous anecdote concerns Caesar’s visit to Gades during his quaestorship in Further Spain in 69 bce.27 Suetonius reports (Jul. 7.1) that when he came there to hold court at the command of the praetor C. (?) Antistius Vetus (MRR 2.133, 3.17) and saw a statue of Alexander in the temple of Hercules-​Melkart ingemuit et quasi pertaesus ignaviam suam, quod nihil dum a se memorabile actum esset in aetate qua iam Alexander orbem terrarum subegisset, missionem continuo efflagitavit ad captandas quam primum maiorum rerum occasiones in urbe. [H]‌e heaved a sigh, and as if out of patience with his own incapacity in having as yet done nothing noteworthy at a time of life when Alexander had already brought the world to his feet [in aetate, qua iam Alexander orbem terrarum subegisset], he straightway asked for discharge, to grasp the first opportunity for greater enterprises at Rome.28

Regardless of whether this story is true or not,29 it provides us with an insight into how uneasy the Romans may have felt upon realizing that the Macedonian king had got this far despite his young age, especially at the time when there was an increasing number of people aspiring to dominate the political scene. One immediately thinks of Pompey the Great who, in contrast to Caesar, had already firmly established himself by the early 60s.30 Even his brilliant career, however, was pale in comparison with that of Alexander of Macedon. When in 61 bce Pompey celebrated a triumph for his eastern conquests, some of his supporters seem to have spread fake information about his age so as to draw a more exact

2 6 Cf. Green 1978: 4. 27 See e.g. Bruhl 1930: 207; Taylor 1941: 122 f; MRR 2.132, 136, 3.105 f; Gelzer 6 1960: 28; Weippert 1972: 107 f; Spencer 2002: 22, 62 f, 170. 28 Tr. J. C. Rolfe. 29 There is a variant of the story in Plutarch (Caes. 11.5 f) in which Caesar laments the lack of achievements during his praetorship in 61 bce, after having read an account of Alexander’s deeds. “[T]‌he whole point is lost,” however, “if Caesar is portrayed as being considerably older than Alexander at the time of the latter’s death [original emphasis]” (thus Green 1978: 18, n. 20; the same view was already held by Butler, Cary 1927: 51; cf. Weippert 1972: 108). See also Plut. Mor. 206b. 30 Dio Cassius, who has Caesar recall this episode of his quaestorship during his praetorship, makes the following observation (37.52.1): δόξης τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμῶν [sc. ὁ Καῖσαρ], καὶ τὸν Πομπήιον τούς τε ἄλλους τοὺς πρὸ αὐτοῦ μέγα ποτὲ δυνηθέντας ζηλῶν, οὐδὲν ὀλίγον ἐφρόνει, κτλ. Cf. van Ooteghem 1954: 158.

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parallel with Alexander.31 They insisted, as Plutarch has it (Pomp. 46.1), that at this time he “was less than thirty-​four years, though in fact he was nearly forty.”32 The Greek biographer’s statement is still far from the truth, as Pompey was actually forty-​five years old. All this attests to the fact that Alexander of Macedon inspired emulation among the Romans at least when it comes to a capability of accomplishing great things in a relatively young age. Cicero was careful to make clear that the main point of comparison between the illustrans and illustrandum is their youth. In exemplary terms, that feature serves as the major term A. The speaker endeavors to prove that the capability of accomplishing great things (the middle term B) is independent from a person’s age. His semantic intention (B = A) is expressed explicitly in the last sentence of the passage quoted above:33 [sc. ex quo iudicari potest] virtus esse quam aetatis cursum celeriorem. Alexander supplies the example for the inductive part: 1. D = B: Alexander of Macedon was capable of great things 2. D = A: Alexander of Macedon was very young (ab ineunte aetate), therefore 3: B = A: the ability (virtus) outruns age (aetas). As for Octavian, he is said by Cicero to have rescued the Roman people by raising an army against Antony. What is more, he has reacted to the crisis extremely quickly –​quicker than anyone might have expected –​despite his youth.34 The comparison with Alexander, who was only about twenty when he began his conquests, allows the audience to deduce that the nineteen years old Octavian is prepared to assume responsibility: 1. C = B: If Octavian is capable of great things 2. B = A: and the ability outruns age, then 3. C = A: Octavian is old enough.

31 See also App. Mith. 568 and on the subject: van Ooteghem 1954: 283 f; Gelzer 1943: 12 = 1963: 155; 1984: 111. Cf. Seager 22002: 80. 32 Tr. B. Perrin. Cf. Welch, Mitchell 2013: 87. 33 Cf. Weippert 1972: 141; Bücher 2006: 188; Manuwald 2007: 715 f ad loc.: “the conclusion from the argument illustrated by examples is that the development of virtus may be quicker than that of aetas.” 34 See Cic. Phil. 5.43: quis tum nobis, quis populo Romano obtulit hunc divinum adulescentem deus? Qui […] subito praeter spem omnium exortus prius confecit exercitum quem furori M. Antoni opponeret quam quisquam hoc eum cogitare suspicaretur; cf. Phil. 3.3: C. Caesar adulescens, paene potius puer, incredibili ac divina quadam mente atque virtute […] firmissimum exercitum […] comparavit.

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Some scholars consider this exemplum unusual,35 and indeed it is one of the few instances of a foreign historical (or mythological) figure complementing the preceding Roman exempla in Cicero’s extant orations.36 If we were to count it among the series of exempla, it would be equally uncommon in that unlike most of the other foreign rulers whom I have discussed above, the illustrans here is a primary referent. The first impression is, as was already noted, that the two men are assimilated only insofar as their age is concerned. The reason for the speaker’s cautious attitude is aptly explained by C. E. Thompson who wrote that “this exemplum is only briefly stated and hurriedly passed over, for Cicero does not want his audience to pause long enough to realize the ominous implications if this comparison was fully developed.”37 Cicero could not know, as we do now, that the parallel will turn out to be adequate also in other regards. He seems to have been aware, however, that Alexander the Great was not an appropriate obj e c t of imit at ion for a young Roman. For a reason that is not entirely clear to us, Cicero was disappointed with the behavior of P. Licinius Crassus (the son of the triumvir), whom he describes in a letter to brother Quintus (of February 55 bce)38 as “most devoted to me” (nostri […] studiosissimus). Crassus, though a well-​educated and promising young man,39 had apparently disregarded his family exempla by becoming overambitious and hungry for glory. Instead of taking his ancestors as role models, as Cicero states (Brut. 281 f), he followed the wrong exempla of Cyrus and Alexander. This criticism, as D. Spencer suggests, may have resulted from Crassus’ desire to accompany his father on the eastern campaign40 which, as Cicero knew by the time he wrote the dialogue, ended in total disaster. Commenting on this passage, A. E. Douglas

3 5 Thus Robinson 1986: 29. Cf. Bücher 2006: loc. cit.: “außergewöhnlich.” 36 For more examples see Schoenberger 1910: 33. 37 Thompson 1978: 108 as quoted by Manuwald 2007: 715. For a somewhat different view cf. Pollitt 1978: 166 who maintains that Alexander “seems to have become a symbol in the Roman mind for any great ruler.” Similarly Pelling 1988: 220 (“always a powerful heroic ideal for Romans”). 38 Cic. Q. fr. 2.8.2. = 13 SB. Cf. Lintott 2013: 166 f on Plut. Cic. 25.5. 39 Cf. Plut. Crass. 13.5, Cic. 33.8. 40 See Spencer 2002: 34. Cf. Heuss 1954: 81; Weippert 1972: 76 f; van der Blom 2010: 313 f. Bruhl 1930: 207 apparently thought that the reference at Brut. 282 is to M. Licinius Crassus the triumvir, and not to his son. See also Shackleton Bailey 1996: 38 and Narducci 1995: 352 ad loc. and on the young Crassus’ eagerness during the campaign: Plut. Crass. 23.6.

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conjectures that “P. Crassus wished to hold independent imperium in defiance of laws or conventions governing minimum ages […].”41 If this is correct, Cicero employs the same exemplum to either defend (in the Brutus) or undermine (in the fifth Philippic) the lex annalis. As both Caesar’s, if we accept Suetonius’ account, and to a lesser extent Pompey’s in 61 bce, so was Cicero’s focus at Phil. 5.48 exclusively on Alexander’s age. In order to avoid other associations that could put Octavian in a bad light, the speaker made his Ernstbedeutung explicit. Only in that limited sense, therefore, does this exemplum qualify as totum simile. What Cicero wants to convey is that, like Alexander the Great, Octavian had “already accomplished great deeds before he reached the minimum age for the cursus honorum.”42 There is no suggestion that the young Caesar imitates the Macedonian king in any way, but only that he happens to be hamstrung by a law that, if it existed in Macedon, Alexander would never have conquered the East. In a wider context, however, the comparison could be extended to include Julius Caesar, whose rapid military victories became for later authors reminiscent of Alexander’s conquests.43 Velleius Paterculus (early first century ce) draws the following picture of Caesar (2.41.1): vigore animi acerrimus, munificentia effusissimus, animo super humanam et naturam et fidem evectus, magnitudine cogitationum, celeritate bellandi, patientia periculorum Magno illi Alexandro, sed sobrio neque iracundo, simillimus. He was exceedingly keen and vigorous of mind, lavish in his generosity, and possessed a courage exceeding the nature, and even the credence, of man. In the magnitude of his ambitions, in the rapidity of his military operations [celeritate bellandi], and in his endurance of danger, he closely resembled that famous Great Alexander, but only when Alexander was free from the influence of wine and master of his passions [Magno illi Alexandro, sed sobrio neque iracundo, simillimus].44

Although this comparatio was made long after Cicero delivered his Philippics, it may have been borrowed from the work of C. Oppius, a contemporary and supporter of C. Caesar, as K. Welch and H. Mitchell convincingly argue.45 If that 4 1 Douglas 1966: 208 ad loc. Cf. Narducci 1995: 352, n. 892. 42 Thus Manuwald 2007: loc. cit. Cf. Blösel 2000: 75 with n. 229. 43 Cf. Flower 1996: 108 with n. 87. 44 Tr. F. W. Shipley. Cf. App. BC 2.621: ἄμφω γὰρ ἐγενέσθην φιλοτιμοτάτω τε πάντων καὶ πολεμικωτάτω καὶ τὰ δόξαντα ἐπελθεῖν ταχυτάτω πρός τε κινδύνους παραβολωτάτω καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀφειδεστάτω καὶ οὐ στρατηγίᾳ πεποιθότε μᾶλλον ἢ τόλμῃ καὶ τύχῃ. 45 See Welch, Mitchell 2013: 94–​96.

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were the case, Cicero’s reference to Alexander, when coupled with the previous description of Octavian’s quick response to the threat (cf. n. 34), could be evocative of the said celeritas bellandi. The implied correlation between the referents works to the young Caesar’s advantage in that it helps legitimize him as his adoptive father’s true heir: Julius Caesar could be perceived as Alexander’s successor only by association, whereas Octavian can now be seen as Julius Caesar’s successor by both association and lineage. However, since Cicero makes it clear that his point of comparison is the age of the illustrans and illustrandum, if at all, this reinforces his argument from the past only indirectly. The ironic thing about this reference is that Cicero assigns to Octavian only the positive qualities of Alexander,46 while Octavian, for his part, will repay him first by betraying the “republican values” and then by failing to protect him from the proscriptions –​ he thus will assume the role of Alexander as reckless tyrant.

6.2. Contrast As it turned out, Octavian was far more fortunate than his “role model” in one respect in particular. Unlike Alexander, he was surrounded by a host of historians and poets of great talent who praised his achievements and promoted Augustan ideology. The Romans showed a strong propensity for encomiastic literature in general and in the republican times many commanders wished to have their deeds immortalized by famous writers.47 Cicero exploits this trend in his defense of the poet L. Licinius Archias (most likely of 62 bce48), who was accused of usurping Roman citizenship. In several paragraphs of the argumentation extra causam (§ 23/​24–​27) the speaker is preoccupied with recent history, making the point that Rome has been glorified especially through poetry.49 He begins 46 Weippert 1972: 140–​142 notes that at Phil. 5.48 Cicero compliments Alexander’s virtus and that nowhere else in his writings is the Macedonian king equally praised as at this point (“der hier gelobt wird wie sonst nie bei Cicero”). On Octavian/​Augustus’ appropriation of Alexander-​imagery see also Heuss 1954: 83 f; Weippert 1972: 214–​ 259; Spencer 2002: 181 and passim. 47 See Wallach 1989: 321 and Cicero’s statement at Arch. 26: trahimur omnes studio laudis et optimus quisque maxime gloria ducitur with Coşkun 2010: 138. Zetzel 2003: 123–​126, although he reads Cicero’s argument in the Pro Archia as one advocating (Greek) poetry for its social utility, detects “a significant element of satire in the speech” (quotation on p. 126). 48 Bellemore 2002 dates the speech to June 56 bce, a view rejected by Coşkun 2010: 27 f. See also Alexander 1990: 115 (no. 235) and Marinone 22004: 89 (B6). 49 See e.g. Vretska, Vretska 1979: 158–​164; MacKendrick 1995: 111.

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by distinguishing between Greek and Latin, the former being almost universally known throughout the world, the latter having fairly narrow geographical limits.50 According to Cicero, not only should fame and glory of a nation reach, through poetry, as far as its conquests, but poetry is also an additional incentive to heroic deeds. Then, to illustrate his thought, he offers a few examples, one of which is foreign (Arch. 24): Quam multos scriptores rerum suarum Magnus ille Alexander secum habuisse dicitur! Atque is tamen, cum in Sigeo ad Achillis tumulum astitisset: ‘o fortunate’ inquit ‘adulescens qui tuae virtutis Homerum praeconem inveneris!’ Et vere. Nam, nisi Ilias illa exstitisset, idem tumulus qui corpus eius contexerat nomen etiam obruisset. We read that Alexander the Great carried in his train number of epic poets and historians [quam multos scriptores rerum suarum]. And yet, standing before the tomb of Achilles at Sigeum, he exclaimed,–​“Fortunate youth, to have found in Homer an herald of thy valour!” Well might he so exclaim, for had the Iliad never existed, the same mound which covered Achilles’ bones would also have overwhelmed his memory.51

This passage should be read together with the one that follows, describing Pompey as a man who appreciates the value of literature and literary works. There is an apparent wordplay on the names of the two commanders, as Cicero speaks first of Magnus ille Alexander and then he refers to Pompey as noster hic Magnus.52 The demonstrative pronoun hic, as opposed to preceding ille, points to a temporal proximity rather than Pompey’s presence at the trial, as he had not yet returned to Rome by that time.53 He is said by Cicero to have enfranchised Theophanes of Mytilene, “the historian of his campaigns” (scriptorem rerum suarum). This Theophanes, who contributed largely to advertising his patron’s imitatio Alexandri, was an influential figure. Thanks to Pompey he not only acquired the Roman citizenship, but was also instrumental in awarding his hometown the status of civitas libera, an act for which he became deified after death.54 That Alexander “carried in his train number of epic poets and historians,” 5 0 See Zetzel 2003: 125. 51 Tr. N. H. Watts. 52 See Welch, Mitchell 2013: 86. 53 Thus Vretska, Vretska 1979: 165 ad loc. and Coşkun 2010: 135 ad loc. Cf. Schol. Bob. p. 164 Hildebrandt ~ 178 St.: De Cn. Pompeio dici est manifestum. Et oportune, quoniam supra mentionem fecerat Macedonis Alexandri, cui hoc idem cognomentum fuit, de Pompeio dicturus adiecit hic noste r. Contra Bellemore 2002: 49 with n. 37. See also Weippert 1972: 66, 68. 54 See e.g. V. Max. 8.14.3; van Ooteghem 1954: 268 with n. 2; Sherwin-​White 2 1973: 308 who also quotes Str. 13.618c and SIG 1.752–​755; Schlichting

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on the other hand, is either (deliberate?) exaggeration or oversimplification. So far as we know, the king’s official historian was Callisthenes of Olynthus, whereas the others who accompanied him on his expedition wrote their works only after Alexander’s death.55 By introducing the anecdote in this way, Cicero underscores the role of poetry, of which Homer, the author of the Iliad, is the embodiment. His conclusion is (§ 25 init.) that if a poet such as Archias were not already a Roman citizen legally, he would have certainly become one “through the efforts of one of his prominent friends.”56 Sulla and Q. Metellus Pius are then named as examples of Archias’ potential benefactors (§ 25 f).57 The story of Alexander’s tribute to Achilles at Sigeum was a commonplace in antiquity.58 Cicero refers to it once again in his famous letter to Lucceius of 55 bce, this time expressing his own desire for fame.59 In the Anabasis of Alexander, Flavius Arrian (early second century ce), after describing this event almost exactly as Cicero at Arch. 24, remarks (An. 1.12.2) that “Alexander’s exploits were never celebrated as they deserved, either in prose or verse.”60 Such is also the inference Cicero most likely assumes will be drawn: even though Alexander had a number of scriptores rerum suarum among his followers, he nevertheless (atque is tamen) envied Achilles,61 whose valor was immortalized by Homer in the Iliad. When it comes to exemplary discourse, this passage is ambiguous in

1975: 231–​236 (esp. 232); Gelzer 1984: 96 and passim; Pina Polo 1989: 203, 208; Heftner 1995: 53–​58; Seager 22002: 60; Coşkun 2010: 134; Welch, Mitchell 2013: 88 f. 55 See Bosworth 1988: 296 f; Spencer 2002: 6, 8, 128; cf. Hammond 1993: 32 f. Fuhrmann 1970–​1982, 5.466 and Vretska, Vretska 1979: 164 ad loc. offer a list of authors Cicero could have had in mind. 56 Wallach 1989: loc. cit. 57 Cf. Stinger 1993: 147. 58 See Plut. Alex. 15.7–​9; Arr. An. 1.12.1; cf. D.S. 17.17.3; Plin. Nat. 5.125; Iustin. 11.5.12; Ael. VH. 12.7, etc.; Bosworth 1988: 39; Nawotka 2010: 116 f. 59 See Cic. Fam. 5.12.7 = 22 SB with Murphy 1958: 101; Dugan 2001: 57 and n. 84 = 2005: 49; Kurczyk 2006: 70: “Ciceros Bestreben […] findet eine Parallele bei Alexander dem Großen, der sich von Geschichtsschreibern zur Verewigung seiner Taten nach Asien begleiteten ließ […].” 60 Tr. P. A. Brunt. 61 Cf. Yavetz 1983: 220 and Narducci 1997: 14 f: “Cicerone ricorda l’episodio di Alessandro sulla tomba di Achille, le sue espressioni di invidia nei confronti dell’antico eroe per non avere, tra tanti letterati al suo séguito, un altrettanto grande cantore delle proprie gesta.” See also D.Chr. Or. 2.17 f with a recent discussion by Klooster 2020: 178 f on Alexander’s great admiration of Homer.

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that there are many possible referents, allowing for various interpretations. One can either think of Homer as “the herald of the valor of Achilles” and of Cicero as “the herald of the worth of Archias,” respectively,62 or emphasize the analogy between Alexander the Great and Pompey.63 The general idea, however, is that eulogistic literature plays a crucial role in recording great deeds for posterity and the heroes who accomplish these deeds would have been forgotten if it was not for their rerum scriptores.64 Against this background, the story recalled by the speaker can be understood as exemplum contrarium: the Roman generals, notably Marius and Lucullus,65 were the protagonists of epic poetry composed by Archias of which they both approved; Alexander, by contrast, had a large group of authors with him, but none of them was capable of doing justice to his conquests. Knowing that even such extraordinary men could fail to have their deeds sufficiently extolled in writings, the Romans should be glad to have a gifted Greek poet at their service. If this were a stand-​alone example, however, its connection with the current legal issue would seem a little superficial. That is probably why Cicero placed it before the more recent and relevant case of Pompey the Great and his biographer Theophanes of Mytilene. The latter is a better precedent for Archias than any of the writers accompanying Alexander, but he, on the other hand, was not a poet.66 Taken together, therefore, the two exempla are far more compelling than any of them would have been on its own. The passage under discussion is a good illustration of how difficult it may sometimes be to draw a sharp line between an exemplum proper and a commonplace (locus communis). As I have suggested earlier, the story referred to at Arch. 24 must have been “a memorable saying” by Cicero’s time. Nonetheless, it was not simply retold by the speaker, but rather specifically tailored for the occasion. His audience would have been aware that there were many historians and poets who wrote about Alexander’s campaigns, but they would not necessarily associate this fact with the Sigeum episode.67 None of the other sources (cf. n. 58) except for 6 2 Thus Murphy 1958: loc. cit. 63 Cf. Gelzer 1943: 12 = 1963: 156; Spencer 2002: 123; Coşkun 2010: 133–​135. 64 Cf. Vretska, Vretska 1979: 159. 65 See Arch. 19 fin. and 21 init. respectively; Gnauk 1936: 34; Balsdon 1979: 41; Zetzel 2003: 124 f. 66 Similarly Berry 2004: 310. Cf. Spencer 2002: 124: “Mention of Pompey and Theophanes is relevant to Archias’ case, and sets up a model for a non-​Roman whose services to Rome were held in such regard that the honour of citizenship was bestowed on him.” 67 By that time (in 334 bce) Alexander was only twenty-​two and had not yet won any major victory against the Persians (see e.g. Bosworth 1988: 39). As told by Cicero,

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Arrian makes that connection explicit. A story which in itself (i.e. in terms of its Eigenbedeutung) would simply be entertaining became in Cicero’s hands a complex historical example. This example serves to underscore the contrast between Alexander’s bad luck for not being the subject of skillful poetry and the Roman generals’ good fortune for having their deeds eulogized by Archias.

6.3. A Missed Opportunity? Given that Alexander of Macedon was so admired by the Romans and some of them sought to emulate him or even surpass his achievements, why are there only few references to him in Cicero’s extant orations? Above all, we need to remember that a prominent Roman politician would refrain from taking the Macedonian king as his role mo del lest he be suspected of regal ambitions. Because of these sort of ambiguous connotations of the imitatio Alexandri, Cicero was careful not to push too far the comparison between Octavian and Alexander at Phil. 5.48. After all, Alexander the Great was an un-​Roman figure, an unfit candidate for a primary illustrans to be compared with a person whom the orator wants to paint in a positive light. That being said, would Alexander be more viable as a negative exemplum?68 We have already seen that Cicero considered both Cyrus and Alexander bad examples for P. Licinius Crassus. The title ‘Great’ (magnus), on the other hand, was sometimes applied to Pompey ironically.69 If we can trust Plutarch, he used to be called ‘Alexander’ in derision as early as the mid-​80s. After his father’s death in 87 bce, he stood a criminal trial somehow relating to inheritance (de peculatu?)70 and L. Marcius Philippus, Cn. Papirius Carbo and Q. Hortensius Hortalus spoke on his behalf. The former is reported to have said “that he was doing nothing strange if, being Philip, he was a friend of Alexander.”71 In his

6 8 69 70 71

therefore, this may sound as if he was already anticipating his premature death at this early stage of his reign and lamenting the fact that no one had praised his achievements. Perhaps the speaker, by using the nominative and infinitive construction (Alexander secum habuisse dicitur), aims to tone down this impression. On Alexander as a negative exemplum in Seneca cf. Roller 2001: 88–​90. See Plut. Crass. 7.1 and 12.5. Perhaps in 86/​85 bce. See Alexander 1990: 62 (no. 120); David 1992: 732, and Dyck 2008b: 145. See Plut. Pomp. 2.4 (2ORF, p. 268 = FRL 2.10). Tr. G. Manuwald. Cf. V. Max. 5.3.5; Sen. Con. 7.2.6. Some scholars thought that Philippus’ jest belongs to the year 77 bce, when he proposed to send Pompey to Spain (cf. above, Section 5.4 for Philippus’ another quip about Pompey). For an overview and discussion see Weippert 1972: 61 with n. 4 and Heftner 1995: 71.

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correspondence with Atticus, moreover, Cicero usually employs the cognomen Magnus in a similar fashion.72 Whenever he is sarcastic about this honorific title, as A. Corbeill observes,73 “[Cicero] frequently qualifies it with adjectives such us «our» (noster) or «this» (hic).” Although that is not the case with noster hic Magnus at Arch. 24,74 the potential for mockery is certainly there, especially that the said pronouns, as contemporizing indicators, often form part of the reversed antonomasia.75 Though Cicero clearly dared not make fun of Pompey as ‘our Alexander’ in public, it is a little disappointing that he did not use such expression against one of his foes. That would be a fitting nickname for either A. Gabinius,76 who “invaded Egypt,” or L. Calpurnius Piso, who served as governor of Macedon.77 Of course, Cicero could have made use of this sort of antonomasia by contrast elsewhere, in one of either his fragmentary speeches or those that did not withstand the test of time. It is also apparent that Alexander’s career was a popular subject in rhetorical schools at Rome. The earliest evidence of this being so is perhaps the anonymous Rhetorica ad Herennium where (4.31) his name, variously inflected, supplies an example of polyptoton. This preoccupation with the Macedonian king is reflected in Livy, who at one point (9.17–​19) indulges in a lengthy digression on the question ‘what would have happened to the Roman state if it had had to make war on Alexander?’78 Apart from that, two suasoriae of Seneca the Elder are devoted to him: no. 1 ‘Alexander Debates whether to Sail the Ocean’, and no. 4 ‘Alexander the Great, Warned of Danger by an Augur, Deliberates whether

72 See esp. Cic. Att. 2.13.2 = 33 SB, 1.16.11 f = 16 SB; Corbeill 1996: 80–​82; Bellemore 2002: 48 f, n. 35; Coşkun 2010: 134; cf. Gelzer 1943: 12 = 1963: 155 and Kenty 2020: 111 on the Pro Milone. We have seen that Cicero was equally ironic when comparing himself with Alexander. 73 Corbeill 1996: 81. 74 See Corbeill 1996: 81, n. 82; Berry 2004: 304, 309. 75 See above, Section 4.2.2. 76 Cf. Badian 1959: 89. 77 Cicero does in fact ridicule Piso’s governorship in Macedon by way of reversed antonomasia by contrast when he calls him Paule noster (i.e. L. Aemilius Paullus who defeated Perseus at Pydna in 168 bce) at Pis. 39 init. Cf. on the subject Nisbet 1961: 100 ad loc. and Seager 2007: 44, n. 29. 78 So Bonner 1949/​1969: 157 paraphrasing Liv. 9.17.2. Cf. Bruhl 1930: 212; Walsh 1970: 40, 65, 86; Weippert 1972: 224 f; Spencer 2002: 42–​53; Kapust 2011: 94. On the presence of Alexander in Greek declamation cf. Russell 1983: 107 and Beck 2003: 178–​187.

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to Enter Babylon.’79 The dilemma concerning the ocean must have been the favorite one with declaimers as it reappears several times.80 Whether this had any bearing on actual oratory is hard to say. Cicero, at any rate, was cautious and sparing in his use of Alexander as exemplum externum.

7 9 As tr. by M. Winterbottom. 80 See also Sen. Con. 7.7.19; Quint. Inst. 3.8.16; cf. Luc. 10.36 f.

7. Hannibal as Individual exemplum Another foreign historical figure of whom the teachers of rhetoric were very fond is Hannibal. In his case, unlike in that of Alexander, this tendency in rhetorical theory is mirrored in practical oratory. Hannibal is referred to in Cicero’s orations nearly 17 times1 and, with ca. 38 occurrences, he figures second (alongside Caesar and Pompey) only to Scipio Africanus the Elder (his conqueror) in the work of Valerius Maximus.2 These numbers indicate that Hannibal, as the most fearsome enemy of all times, was a very evocative figure at Rome. The dilemmas of which he was either the subject or the object were popular in schools of rhetoric as early as the Sullan period (roughly in the years 86–​82 bce).3 As an example of exercise in deliberative oratory, the author of the Rhetorica ad Herennium envisions the following situation: “If Hannibal, when recalled to Carthage from Italy, should deliberate whether to remain in Italy, or return home, or invade Egypt and seize Alexandria.”4 This suasoria is most likely based on the events of the year 203 bce, when Hannibal was summoned by his countrymen to Carthage to deal with the threat from Scipio.5 In his juvenile treatise on rhetoric, Cicero offers an example in which a Roman viewpoint is adopted. One has to decide (Inv. 1.17) which course of action is best: sending the army to Macedon against king Philip to support the allies, or leaving the army in Italy to put against Hannibal the strongest possible forces.6 Another dilemma deals with the inhabitants of Casilinum in Campania. The issue is whether they should surrender to Hannibal or not. For the author of the Rhetorica ad Herennium their position in 216 bce lends itself to a dispute over choosing between what is right (res honesta) and what is safe (res tuta). Cicero uses this episode to exemplify

1 See Rambaud 1953: 30; Robinson 1986: 13 f, n. 10; Shackleton Bailey 1988: 53 s.v. Three times, as we saw (Mur. 32, Cat. 4.21 and Phil. 1.11), he appears within a series of exempla, sometimes his name is invoked twice in the same speech (e.g. Phil. 5.25, 27) and once simply as part of the narrative (cf. n. 14 below). 2 See Bloomer 1992: 150; Stocks 2014: 31. Wardle 2005: 146 counts 36 occurrences. 3 Cf. Bonner 1949/​1969: 22 f. 4 Rhet. Her. 3.2 as tr. by H. Caplan. 5 Calboli 21993: 255 rejects the assertions of Caplan 1968: 158, n. b that “Alexandria, once captured, might have appeared to him as a safe refuge from the Romans and his enemies at home” (quoting App. Hann. 58). 6 Quoted also by Cassiod. Rhet. 8 (RLM, p. 497) and Isid. Rhet. 6 (RLM, p. 510).

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the argument based on necessity: they need to surrender lest they starve, etc.7 For the Romans, the long lasting and highly exhausting Second Punic War must have been a store of themes for this kind of declamatory exercises. It seems that Hannibal remained a favorite subject in schools until the Early Empire, since the satirist Juvenal, impersonating a teacher of rhetoric, complains that every fifth day Hannibal gets inside his head (7.160 f): […] mihi sexta | quaque die miserum dirus caput Hannibal inplet. In the next line it is implied that this historical figure provided many various themes for suasoriae (quidquid id est de quo deliberat),8 a few examples of which we have already mentioned. Hannibal appeared frequently in rhetorical exercises, but was his presence equally apparent in actual oratory at Rome? The only mention of Hannibal in extant Roman oratory that predates Cicero is presumably in the speech De Achaeis by Cato the Elder, delivered in 150 bce in favor of releasing the Greek detainees taken captive several years earlier.9 In two of the three surviving fragments,10 one preserved by the Roman writers of the imperial period,11 and one by Plutarch,12 Hannibal is said to have relentlessly ravaged Italy. It is difficult to determine the precise context of those passages. Perhaps Cato refers to the pro-​Roman attitude of the Achaean League during the Second Punic War.13 At any rate, because the cum clause in fr. 187 Malc. = 142 Sblend. is temporal, this reference may have been simply aimed to elucidate the narrative background and as such it does not count as historical exemplum.14 In 7 See Rhet. Her. 3.8 f; Cic. Inv. 2.171 with Stocks 2014: 22. Cf. Heftner 1997: 244. 8 Two examples follow. Cf. Quint. Inst. 3.8.17 with Adamietz 1966: 179; Juv. 10.166 f; Bonner 1949/​1969: 79; Marrou 61965: 415; Calboli 21993: loc. cit.; Clarke 31996: 19 f. 9 See in general Kienast 1954: 113; Astin 1978: 124 f. 10 2ORF, p. 76 f (no Cato the Elder in FRL). 11 Gell. 2.6.7, Macr. Sat. 6.7.10, Serv. auct. B. 6.76 (fr. 187 Malc. = 142 Sblend.). 12 Plut. Cat. Mai. 1.8 (fr. 188 Malc. = 143 Sblend.). 13 Cf. Sblendorio Cugusi 1982: 364. 14 The same episode is perhaps alluded to in the speech On the Answers of the Haruspices of 56 bce. When dealing with one of the religious transgressions reported by the soothsayers, namely that “games [were] carelessly celebrated and profaned” (§ 21–​29; cf. Kumaniecki 1959 = 1967: 220), Cicero blames for this Clodius, whom he says to have brought slaves into theatre during the ludi Megalenses (cf. below, Section 9.1). His mismanagement of public games is all the more outrageous because he was a member of the quindecimviri sacris faciundis (Lenaghan 1969: 128 f; Szemler 1972: 165 [no. 28]; Corbeill 2010: 146, 149) who kept the Sibylline books from which the ancestors derived the cult of the Magna Mater (§ 26; cf. Stinger 1993: 177). In the next paragraph Cicero outlines the historical background of the said event: hac igitur

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this capacity Hannibal appears twice in Cicero’s dialogue De oratore (dramatic date in 91 bce). For the first time, when M. Antonius sets forth the characteristics of an orator’s profession. To elucidate the principles he applies, he gives examples of prominent representatives of other professions (1.209–​212): generals, statesmen, and lawyers. Hannibal of course belongs to the first group. For the second time, Hannibal is the protagonist of a story related by Q. Catulus who argues (2.74–​76) that wisdom comes with experience, which means that rhetoric can be taught only by those well versed in practical oratory. That is why Hannibal, upon hearing a lengthy lecture on the duties of a general by a Peripatetic philosopher Phormio, when asked what he thinks of the philosopher, responded “that time and again he had seen many old madmen but never one madder than Phormio.”15 Catulus’ point is that the rhetoricians with no knowledge acquired in real cases are to Phormio as M. Antonius is to Hannibal, which makes his argument undeniably exemplary. We need to remember, however, that Cicero is not reporting what the interlocutors of his dialogue have actually said, but rather what they might have said. That also applies to philosophical treatises of which both the dramatic date and the date of composition is later.16 To make his dialogues sound convincing to the readers, the interlocutors whom Cicero introduces ought to substantiate their claims by using examples known to both the internal and external audience. As the following analysis of Cicero’s orations will show, that precisely was the case with Hannibal.

vate suadente quondam defessa Italia Punico bello atque Hannibale vexata sacra ista nostri maiores adscita ex Phrygia Romae conlocarunt. What is expressed here in the ablative absolute construction (defessa… atque… vexata) are the circumstances under which Cybele was brought to Rome in 205/​204 bce. Hannibal is not referred to in exemplary manner –​it is simply stated that he was responsible for laying waste to the Italian soil during the (Second) Punic War. It is worth noting that Cicero’s phraseology echoes to a certain degree a sentence from Cato the Elder’s speech as recorded by Gellius (above, n. 11: cumque Hannibal terram Italiam laceraret atque vexaret ~ Italia […] Hannibale vexata). Due to the scarcity of fragments of the De Achaeis, however, it is hard to tell what was the purpose of this allusion. A common trait of both passages is that ‘Hannibal’ represents a certain period of time, and is not invoked for his own sake. 15 Tr. E. W. Sutton, H. Rackham. Cf. Stob. 4.13.58; Balsdon 1979: 32; Leeman et al. 1985: 289 f ad loc.; Gruen 1992: 263; Zetzel 2003: 122, 130, 137; Matusiak 2015: 48 f; MacDonald 2015: 223 f. 1 6 See e.g. Cic. N.D. 3.80; Fin. 2.56, 4.22, 5.70.

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7.1. Identification In his speech On Behalf of L. Cornelius Balbus Cicero introduces Hannibal in a way that brings to mind mythological exempla, that is, he quotes familiar lines from Latin poetry.17 In Ennius’ Annals Hannibal is made to say: ‘He who will strike an enemy –​hear me! he will be a Carthaginian, whatever his name will be.’18 In what way is this quotation relevant to the legal issue in question? L. Cornelius Balbus stood trial in the autumn of 56 bce. He was charged with usurping the Roman citizenship, which he claimed to have been granted by Pompey in 72 bce under the lex Gellia Cornelia. Cicero undertook to defend him on the instigation of the triumvirs, many of whose close associates were being prosecuted at that time.19 In sections 45–​50 Cicero draws up a list of generals who, like Pompey, had bestowed citizenship on their soldiers for serving with a Roman army. To this series of native exempla belong: C. Marius, Cn. Pompeius Strabo (the father of Pompey), P. Licinius Crassus, L. Cornelius Sulla, Q. Metellus Pius, and M. Licinius Crassus.20 Due to their experience and knowledge of the laws of war, those men are called upon as experts in cases like the present one. In the next paragraph Cicero links them to Pompey, but this time their names appear in a slightly different order. “Pompey Strabo is placed in the emphatic final position,” as K. Barber put it, and “Pompey becomes an exemplum himself.”21 After quoting other instances of Pompey’s grants of citizenship, the speaker reiterates his earlier argument (§ 22) that those who serve the interests of the Roman state at the cost of their own danger deserve to be enfranchised. To support his assertion, Cicero cites Ennius, who was then considered the greatest epic poet at

17 Cf. e.g. Cic. Sest. 102 = Acc. trag. 178–​180 W = 214–​216 R2, Pis. 43 = Enn. scen. 296–​ 298 Jocelyn = 309–​311 R2, Scaur. 3 = Inc. trag. 67 f R2, etc. See for more references Pierzak 2016: 258, n. 49. 18 Enn. Ann. 276 f W = 234 f Skutsch: hostis qui feriet mihi erit Carthaginiensis, | quisquis erit (tr. E. H. Warmington). Cic. Balb. 51 is our only source for these lines. 19 See for historical background e.g. Gelzer 1969: 177; Mitchell 1991: 186; Kenty 2020: 64–​66. for the legal issues in the Pro Balbo see the contributions of Brunt 1982 and Venturini 2010. 20 Cf. Fuhrmann 1970–​1982, 6.403 f; Stinger 1993: 209–​211; Bücher 2006: 276. 21 Barber 2004: 75. A similar series of exempla occurs at Balb. 40, where Pompey is listed alongside the Scipiones, Brutos, Horatios, Cassios, Metellos (in the generic plural). His “name appears last, in the climactic position, and is the only one to include a first name and to be in the singular” (Robinson 1986: 27). On Pompey as exemplum cf. also Section 5.1 above.

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Rome (ille summus poeta noster). The lines that follow (Ann. 276 f W = 234 f Skutsch quoted in n. 18) are meant as a general principle and “[t]‌he promise to bestow or procure citizen rights according to Cicero could be made by any commander, not only by Hannibal.”22 It remains unclear on what occasion, if ever, Hannibal delivered this encouraging speech (cohortatio)23 to his army as depicted in the Annals. Later sources have him promise Carthaginian citizenship as a reward for those fighting on his side either at the Ticinus24 (218 bce) or before the battle of Cannae in 216 bce.25 Here, Hannibal’s attitude is one of the several historical precedents that Cicero puts forward to strengthen his main argument. This quotation from poetry, as K. Barber rightly observes, has two additional implications: Ennius himself was a foreigner who received Roman citizenship, and the name of Hannibal, carrying various emotional connotations, “reminds the audience of a time when Rome was in grave danger and in great need of courageous allies.”26 The message this exemplum was intended to convey is therefore twofold: Hannibal, portrayed as a universal role model, is there to instruct the Romans on how important it is to properly encourage one’s soldiers, regardless of their background; at the same time, he epitomizes the kind of enemy who can only be defeated by the use of all possible means. In both cases, Hannibal exemplifies a great leader –​one to be imitated and one to be reckoned with. If this interpretation holds, the reference to Hannibal may be viewed as an exemplum totum simile. In exemplary terms, he closes the list of outstanding generals in whose footsteps Pompey followed when he granted L. Cornelius Balbus citizenship. The audience, knowing how difficult it was to overcome Hannibal, would certainly accept the following propositions: 1. D = B: Hannibal was a great military leader 2. D = A: Hannibal bestowed citizenship on every man who stroke an enemy, therefore 3: B = A: whoever is a great military leader, bestows citizenship upon his soldiers.

2 2 Thus Skutsch 1985: 415. 23 Cf. Highet 1972: 83 with n. 59. 24 See Liv. 21.45.6 and the discussion in Skutsch 1985: 414 f. 25 Sil. 9.209–​211. Cf. Stocks 2014: 60. 26 Barber 2004: 76. Cicero adduces Ennius as an example of a foreign poet who was granted Roman citizenship (in 184 bce) at Arch. 22. See Vretska, Vretska 1979: 148, 155 ad loc.

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Pompey’s action can be now justified on the same premise: 1. C = B: If Pompey is a great military leader 2. B = A: and whoever is a great military leader, bestows citizenship upon his soldiers, then 3. C = A: Pompey had the right to enfranchise Balbus. It needs to be stressed that, as far as personality of the referents is concerned, the speaker does not draw a close parallel between Pompey the Great and Hannibal. He merely suggests that both, as being great military leaders, followed the same modus operandi (B = A). It certainly was to Cicero’s interest to add a foreign example to the list, for, by being inclusive, he appears to rely on universal principles and makes his argument applicable to any nation whatsoever. Hannibal is only once mentioned by Cicero in what can be described as narratio, namely in the sixth Philippic oration. This part of the speech (3b–​15a) has been called ‘Main section’ by G. Manuwald, who explains that Phil. 6 “does not follow a strict order” and “rhetorical terminology cannot be applied properly to the individual sections.”27 The speech was delivered on 4 January 43 bce, three days after the senate meeting presided by C. Vibius Pansa, in a public assembly convened by the tribune of the plebs, P. Appuleius.28 Brought before a contio, the speaker gave an account of the senate proceedings since January 1. Cicero expressed his discontent with the decision to send an embassy to Antony, a proposal which he strongly opposed.29 He was convinced, however, that in the long run this solution complies with his own policy in that Antony and his entourage will never accept the conditions which have been set. As a result, war will be declared anyway.30 The references to Hannibal fit well into this line of argument. At § 4 init., after recalling Antony’s recent transgressions, the speaker addresses the people in the following way: quamquam, Quirites, non est illa legatio, sed denuntiatio[ne] belli, nisi paruerit: ita enim est decretum ut si legati ad Hannibalem mitterentur.

27 Manuwald 2007: 742 and 743 respectively. While she argues that these paragraphs are wrongly considered as narratio (6.5–​15) by Dal Santo 1950: XXVII and argumentatio (6.3b–​15a) by Olbrich 1992: 110, they are called narratio in the Loeb edition of Shackleton Bailey, revised by J. T. Ramsey and herself (2009: 301). Perhaps the editors preferred to keep the terminology simple and consistent. 28 See Pina Polo 1989: 311 (no. 363); Mitchell 1991: 311; Marinone 22004: 255 (B1). 29 Cf. Cic. Phil. 6.3; App. BC 3.250–​253, etc. 30 See e.g. Frisch 1946: 187 f; Gelzer 1969: 376; Shackleton Bailey 1986: 183.

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And yet, Men of Rome, that is not an embassy but rather a declaration of war if he does not obey: the decree reads as though envoys were being dispatched to Hannibal [ita enim est decretum ut si legati ad Hannibalem mitterentur].31

The first part of the sentence reflects Cicero’s general sentiments at that time,32 while it also forms the core of his argument on this specific occasion at the contio. The second part, which contains the exemplum, is aimed to depict Antony as an enemy, unsuitable as a party in negotiations. A little further the terms to which Antony would have to agree are specified: he should withdraw his troops from Gaul to the other side of the Rubicon, but keep it at a distance of at least 200 miles from Rome. That would certainly go against his character (non is est Antonius).33 At this point, the historical parallel is taken up again, with more details added (Phil. 6.6 init.): “If it were [i.e. not unlike Antonius], he would never have so acted as to receive such a message, like Hannibal at the beginning of the Punic War [tamquam Hannibali initio belli Punici], warned by the senate not to attack Saguntum.” Cicero refers to the events of 220 bce. Before Hannibal laid siege to Saguntum in the spring of the next year, an embassy was sent by the Roman senate, urging him to refrain from attacking the city and from crossing the river Ebro. This was a very delicate situation,34 mainly for two reasons: Saguntum had an alliance with Rome, but it was located south of the river Ebro which, according to a treaty of 226 bce, marked the northern limit of Carthaginian power in Spain. During the negotiations, therefore, there were justified complaints on both sides. The Romans reproached Hannibal for interfering with the internal affairs of Saguntum, while Hannibal challenged the Roman claim to represent the Saguntines. Obviously, no agreement was reached. The Roman envoys then brought the same message to Carthage, but after the siege of Saguntum started in 219 bce, the war was inevitable.35 3 1 Here and below tr. D. R. Shackleton Bailey. Rev. by Ramsey, Manuwald 2009. 32 Cic. Phil. 6.4 init.: quamquam, Quirites, non est illa legatio, sed denuntiatio[ne] belli, nisi paruerit is echoed at Fam. 12.24.2 = 361 SB (to Cornificius, of late January): nondum legati redierant, quos senatus non ad pacem deprecandam sed ad denuntiandum bellum miserat, nisi legatorum nuntio paruisset. Cf. Manuwald 2007: 739 f. 33 Cf. Manuwald 2007: 766 ad loc. 34 Cf. Burton 2011: 240 f and Gruen 2011: 123 f who asserts that the ancient sources (mainly Polybius) are ambiguous as to whether it was the Romans or the Carthaginians who violated the treaties. See also a brief summary by Richardson 2012: 54 of the ways in which the Roman imperialism has been perceived. 35 See Plb. 3.15 with Walbank 1957: 319–​324.; Fuhrmann 1970–​1982, 7.483; Briscoe 2 1989: 44 f; Heftner 1997: 202, and more recently Manuwald 2007: 649 on Cic. Phil. 5.27; MacDonald 2015: 74–​81 (esp. 75).

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As Cicero saw it, the town of Mutina, where D. Iunius Brutus took refuge after refusing to hand over Cisalpine Gaul to Antony, was to become a source of conflict for similar reasons. Both of them laid claim to the province,36 but because Brutus’ imperium had been recently approved by the senate, he had the “republican camp” on his side.37 In fact, Brutus had ignored a decree passed in early June 44 bce assigning Antony the two Gallic provinces. Cicero had applauded his actions in several of the Philippics, while at the same time he put the entire blame on Antony. By lining up the latter with Hannibal, the speaker sought to impose his view upon the audience. Many similarities between the events that led to the outbreak of the Second Punic War and the present circumstances are either hinted at or stated explicitly at Phil. 6.4–​6. As a consequence, by following closely Cicero’s train of thought, the audience would easily distinguish the universal proposition: 1. D = B: Hannibal besieged a town allied with Rome 2. D = A: Roman embassy to Hannibal ended in war, therefore 3: B = A: whenever a deputation is sent to an enemy who is besieging a town allied with Rome, the result is always war. The lesson to be learned from this is that by sending envoys to Gaul the senate will achieve as little as it did in 220 bce when an embassy was sent to Spain: 1. C = B: If Antony is besieging a town allied with Rome 2. B = A: and whenever a deputation is sent to an enemy who is besieging a town allied with Rome, the result is always war, then 3. C = A: an embassy to Antony will end in war.38 To further support his proposition, Cicero describes Antony as a madman and drunkard, who obeys only his own desires. He would sooner listen to his greedy wife Fulvia (not named explicitly) than accede to the will of the senate and the Roman people (§ 4 fin.): mulieri citius avarissimae paruerit quam senatui populoque Romano. The comic-​satiric characterization of Antony39 allows the speaker to portray him as incapable of making concessions.40 The analogy, 3 6 MRR 2.342 f, 347, 3.113. Cf. Frisch 1946: 165 f. 37 See Osgood 2006: 50; Manuwald 2007: 349 f on Cic. Phil. 3.8; Ramsey 2010: 158. 38 Cf. the comment by van der Blom 2010: 110: “Cicero’s employment of Hannibal’s exemplum is meant to illustrate that an embassy to Antonius will end in war, as it did in the case of Hannibal at Saguntum.” 39 Cf. Wooten 1983: 82 f; Thurn 2018: 137, n. 109. 40 See also Stinger 1993: 265.

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however, does not end there. This is one of the few individual exempla in which the emphasis is put on the geographical coincidence. Essential here is of course the fact that both men are unwilling to break the siege of an important town, Saguntum and Mutina respectively. What is left unsaid, but perhaps implied, is that Saguntum lay beyond the limit of Roman power as determined by the treaty of 226 bce, and that Antony was at the moment trespassing Brutus’ domain. In both cases, a river was the dividing point: the Ebro in Spain and the Rubicon as marking the boundary between Italy and Gaul.41 Cicero seems to be drawing the following parallel: the Second Punic War broke out because Hannibal crossed the river,42 whereas the upcoming war is about to break out because Antony will most likely refuse to cross the river. According to Cicero’s overall interpretation43 of the senate’s decree to send envoys, therefore, Antony should not be regarded as a proconsul, but rather as an external threat and enemy of the state.44

7.2. Juxtaposition In the speech Pro Balbo, as we have seen just recently, Cicero exploited Hannibal’s reputation as an outstanding military leader. In the passages which I shall presently examine, while this feature is also closely connected to the matter under dispute, it serves to demonstrate that even a person so experienced is sometimes led astray by various external factors. Cicero had good reasons to mention Hannibal when he spoke against Rullus’ agrarian bill in the senate (Leg. Agr. 1) upon entering on his consular office on 1 January 63 bce, and sometime later when he addressed the contio (Leg. Agr. 2),45 because one of the provisions of the bill was to settle new 41 See Plut. Caes. 32.5 (cf. 20.1): εἶτα πρὸς τὸ Ἀρίμινον ἐπιστρέψας [sc. ὁ Καῖσαρ], ὡς ἦλθεν ἐπὶ τὸν διορίζοντα τὴν ἐντὸς Ἄλπεων Γαλατίαν ἀπὸ τῆς ἄλλης Ἰταλίας ποταμὸν (Ῥουβίκων καλεῖται) […]. Cf. Str. 5.1.11, 5.2.10; Plin. Nat. 3.115: fluvius Rubico, quondam finis Italiae; App. BC 2.139: δρόμῳ δ’ ἐλθὼν [sc. ὁ Καῖσαρ] ἐπὶ τὸν Ῥουβίκωνα ποταμόν, ὃς ὁρίζει τὴν Ἰταλίαν […]; 3.251, 3.365, etc. 42 Cf. e.g. Liv. 21.20.9: Civitatem omnem in exspectationem belli erectam invenerunt [sc. legati], satis constante fama iam Hiberum Poenos tramisisse. 43 Cf. the comment by Manuwald 2007: 760: “That this parallelism is Cicero’s interpretation and not part of the Senate’s decree is covered up by the fact that the sentence is introduced by an impersonal est decretum while the construction ita … ut si shows that the sentence gives an interpretation of the decree.” 44 Cf. Oppermann 2000: 42. 45 Cf. Pina Polo 1989: 291 (no. 258). For an overview of the scholarly debate on the date of delivery of this speech see recently Manuwald 2018: xxxiv with n. 127. In

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colonies in Italy, including Capua. A major town in Campania, arguably the richest and most fertile area in Italy, Capua had defected to Hannibal after the battle of Cannae in 216 bce and had lost its political rights after being recaptured by the Romans in 211 bce. According to Cicero, by proposing the colonization of sites that were once a seat of opposition to Rome, P. Servilius Rullus disregards “the wise provisions made by the maiores.” Such an enterprise, the speaker warns, may lead into a disaster in the future.46 In his discussion of the matter (1.16–​22, 2.73–​97), Cicero chooses Capua as an example to illustrate the scope of the danger. As his counterargument involving Hannibal overlaps in both orations, the one in the senate and the one in the assembly,47 it seems best to analyze the two of them at the same time. Throughout his Agrarian Speeches Cicero makes extrapolations based on the supposedly vague wording of the bill. This also applies to the sections on the subject of settling colonies, in that Rullus had not named explicitly any land for that purpose.48 When speaking in the senate, Cicero suggests that the framers of the proposal kept all their options open as to where to establish a colony (1.16): “For where is the provision made [i.e. where in the text of the bill] that you do not found a colony on the Ianiculum, that you cannot press and threaten this city with another city?” Taking Capua as a case in point of a new, potentially powerful colony that would pose a threat to Rome, the speaker stresses that the inhabitants of this region, by leading a prosperous urban life, became arrogant and decadent.49 Unlike Rullus, the ancestors knew what they were doing by depriving the what follows I use this edition for the translations of Cicero’s De Lege Agraria as well as a general reference work. 46 See Vasaly 1993: 225 f, 236 (quotation on p. 226); for historical background cf. Beloch 21890: 302–​305; Nisbet 1961: 88 on Cic. Pis. 24; Manuwald 2018: 160. 47 See Stinger 1993: 108. However, it varied in other respects, as was shown by Classen 1985: 332 (“Doch wird der Unterschied zwischen Volksrede und Senatsrede wohl nirgends deutlicher als bei der Behandlung derjenigen Gegenstände, für die Cicero ein besonderes Interesse beim Volk voraussetzt […] [I 14–​15 und II 62 bis 73; I 18–​22 und II 76–​97]”), 336–​341 (a detailed analysis). Cf. Mack 1937/​1967: 112–​114. 48 See Jonkers 1963: 104; Vasaly 1988: 410–​412 and 1993: 227 commenting on Leg. Agr. 2.66: primum quaero, quos agros et quibus in locis? […] cur eos non definis neque nominas. 49 Cf. Cic. Red. Sen. 17 init.: in qua urbe domicilium quondam superbiae fuit with Boll 2019: 164 quoting Liv. 9.6.5: Quod ubi est Capuam nuntiatum, evicit miseratio iusta sociorum superbiam ingenitam Campanis and Gell. 1.24.2; Koster 1980: 238; Stinger 1993: 98. For a comprehensive discussion of Cicero’s rhetorical strategy of depicting the future colony at Capua (altera Roma) as an external threat, see Vasaly

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Capuans of autonomy. Those who drew up the bill apparently do not, unless they intend to (§ 19) “overthrow the Republic and prepare a new despotic position for themselves [tr. slightly adjusted].” Cicero goes on to consider (§ 20) what should be taken into account in establishing colonies (quid enim cavendum est in coloniis deducendis?). He singles out three qualities: luxuries, superbia, and praesidium. With respect to these qualities, he argues, Capua is obviously not a good place for settlement: si luxuries, Hannibalem ipsum Capua corrupit, si superbia, nata inibi esse haec ex Campanorum fastidio videtur; si praesidium , non praeponitur huic urbi ista colonia, sed opponitur. If luxury [i.e. should be taken into account], Capua has corrupted Hannibal himself [si luxuries, Hannibalem ipsum Capua corrupit], if haughtiness, this seems to have been born in the very same place from the pride of the Capuans, if protection, that colony is not placed in front of the city, but against it.

When discussing the same issues before the people, Cicero is more explicit and provides some additional information. He points out that Rullus is not deterred by the example of M. Iunius Brutus,50 who as tribune of the plebs proposed a lex Iunia de colonia Capuam deducenda. The speaker claims to have visited the colony soon after it was established (in 84/​83 bce51), so he can testify as an eyewitness how fast this place, when “left to its own devices,” fosters greed and pride (2.92–​94).52 Human customs (mores), he asserts, are not in-​born, but absorbed by different cultures according to their environment. That is why Carthaginians are deceitful,53 Ligures hardy rustics, and Capuans, “because of the abundance of

1988: 419–​421; 1993: 231–​243, esp. 231–​234 (cf. Hopwood 2007: 92) who also points out that the orator, in order to build up the tension, had intentionally saved Capua for last. 50 Cf. Stinger 1993: 107; Hopwood 2007: 93: “he accuses Rullus of wishing to colonize Capua criminally, like M. Brutus, and of attempting to control Roman revenues.” 51 Cicero is our only source of information on this colony. See Beloch 21890: 305, 321; Rotondi 1912: 348; Greenidge, Clay 21960: 193 f; D’Isanto 1993: 20; Manuwald 2018: 380. 52 On Cicero’s tendentious attitude cf. Sherwin-​White 21973: 88. 53 Contrast, however, Cicero’s view at Scaur. 42: Fallacissimum genus esse Phoenicum omnia monumenta vetustatis atque omnes historiae nobis prodiderunt. Ab his orti Poeni multis [Carthaginiensium] rebellionibus, multis violatis fractisque foederibus nihil se degenerasse docuerunt. Dyck 2012: 153 ad loc. upholds Müller’s deletion of Carthaginiensium “as an unwanted gloss.” Cf. Gruen 2011: 132.

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crops […] and beauty of the city,” are always full of pride. “Out of this plentiful supply and abundance of all things,” Cicero continues (§ 95), primum illa nata est arrogantia, quae a maioribus nostris alterum Capua consulem postulavit, deinde ea luxuries, quae ipsum Hannibalem armis etiam tum invictum voluptate vicit. first that arrogance was born, which demanded from our ancestors that one of the two consuls be from Capua, then this luxury, which conquered Hannibal himself, at that time still unconquered by arms, by pleasure [deinde ea luxuries, quae ipsum Hannibalem armis etiam tunc invictum voluptate vicit].

It is clear that in both passages the speaker refers to the same episode of the Second Punic War, and that these references serve basically the same rhetorical purpose. The degrading influence Capua had on the Carthaginian army became exemplary in later tradition. The story figures as the first external example of ‘luxury and lust’ in Valerius Maximus’ work (9.1. ext. 1). According to Livy, Hannibal made Capua his winter quarter in 216 bce, something which the experts in the art of war considered a mistake even greater than his failure to march on Rome after the battle of Cannae. The impact of excessive dinner-​parties, wine, warm beds and baths on the soldiers accustomed to hardships and discipline was perilous and irreversible (23.18.10–​16).54 Later on the same author has Marcellus assert that “Capua was Hannibal’s Cannae” (23.45.4: Capuam Hannibali Cannas fuisse). Seneca the Younger made use of this exemplum in one of his Letters to Lucilius, when arguing that luxurious places tend to soften the character. He says (Ep. 51.5) that it only took one winter quarter in Campania to take away the vigor of Hannibal, unconquered by the snow of the Alps. This observation is followed by a pointed sentence, so characteristic of the philosopher: armis vicit, vitiis victus est. The motif of luxury as a pernicious force was also exploited by Silius Italicus in his Punica. At 11.390–​409 Venus, seeing that the opportunity arose, instructs the Cupids, as if she were addressing her troops, to spoil the Tyria pubes with all sorts of pleasure. Her design succeeds, and those who used to be fierce warriors, when

54 For a verbal echo of Cicero’s thought (cf. Jonkers 1963: 132 on Leg. Agr. 2.95) see esp. Liv. 23.18.11: Itaque, quos nulla mali v ice rat v i s , perdidere nimia bona ac voluptates immodicae, et eo impensius quo avidius ex insolentia in eas se merserant. On the theme of corrupting luxury at Rome in general see Gorman, Gorman 2014: 326–​ 426 (on the passage in question 331–​333; cf. D’Isanto 1993: 17), who also list (see pp. 213, 231, 346 f, 383–​385, 440 f for a discussion) parallel Greek passages: Ath. 12.528b = Plb. 7.1.1–​3; Str. 5.4.13, and D.S. 26.11.1 (the latter two –​roughly contemporary with Cicero –​describing Hannibal’s winter quarter).

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exposed to a “pernicious welfare,” lose their virtus.55 This story, as the ancient sources show, could be employed in various social and political contexts as a moral lesson. It would resonate well with Cicero’s audience because of the Romans’ general tendency to differentiate between the harsh countryside life and the more leisurely urban life.56 The argument advanced at Leg. Agr. 1.20, 2.95 might seem internally contradictory, for if Capua had this effect on soldiers, how can it pass as a serious opponent in military terms? The point is, however, that given its inhabitants’ propensity to pride, the city would eventually divorce itself from Rome, thereby depriving the republic of its revenues. Now that Carthage and Corinth are destroyed, this is the only place with a potential to become an altera Roma (2.86) and to build a rival empire in Italy.57 The question is: would the colonists resist the degrading influence of Capua and stay loyal to Rome? It is in this respect that the exemplum is most instructive: Hannibal himself (Hannibal ipse), hitherto unconquered by arms, had surrendered to Campanian luxury. If it was not for Capua, Cicero seems to imply, he would have won.58 With this in view, what are the odds that those sent by the decemvirs to settle a colony there will remain unmoved by the new environment? The audience would perhaps more readily associate this episode from the Second Punic War with the Carthaginian army than its leader. Livy, whom we should expect to follow a traditional version of events, focuses in his narrative almost exclusively on how the stay in Capua affected the soldiers (cf. n. 54). Cicero, as will later Seneca, singles out Hannibal “to show the force of the effect.”59 Silius Italicus also describes the physical degeneration of the army first (11.412–​419), so as to achieve pathos by moving on to the “leader himself ” (line 420): ipse etiam afflatus fallente Cupidine ductor. In the speaker’s “account,” on the other hand, the Carthaginian troops are completely out of the picture. Their exclusion was neatly calculated so that the emphasis is shifted to the individual renowned for his determination and self-​control.60 The implication of this historical example is straightforward. Cicero seeks to prove that some places are particularly unsuitable for settlement of colonies. 55 Sil. 11.419: […] miserisque bonis perit horrida virtus. Cf. 11.481 f, 12.15–​26; Tipping 2010: 73, 77; Stocks 2014: 19; MacDonald 2015: 145 f. 56 On the stereotype ‘city vs country’ see May 1988: 20 f, 25 f, 31; Vasaly 1993: 156–​190; Sapota 2009a: 98–​110; Gorman, Gorman 2014: 329 f, 335 and passim. 57 Cf. Helm 1979: 37; Hopwood 2007: loc. cit. 58 Thus Bücher 2006: 219. 59 Manuwald 2018: 396 on 2.95. 60 Cf. e.g. Liv. 21.4.5–​8.

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Several factors need to be considered, including the topography of the site and the character of the local population. Capua is situated in a fertile plain and surrounded by numerous lesser towns which makes a strategically favorable position. A new colony poses a potential threat to Rome especially when its inhabitants are proud and corrupted by luxury. To demonstrate that Capua falls into this pattern, the speaker invokes the once invincible Hannibal himself who, having won all the battles, was defeated by pleasure (voluptas). The argument progresses from greater to lesser (a maiore ad minus): If someone like Hannibal let himself be seduced by the Campanian luxury, what are the odds that the new settlers will not succumb thereto? It may seem that the exemplum is swallowed up by the mass of other evidence Cicero puts forward in the second agrarian speech (§ 73–​97) to support his claim, but the fact that it also appears in the “abridged version” of the argument (Leg. Agr. 1.16–​22) is indicative of the persuasive force it possessed. In both cases Hannibal is referred to near the end of the oration which conforms to the theoretical precept “to present examples from the past in the greatest possible number” in the conclusions of deliberative causes.61 Another, briefly stated argument a fortiori with reference to Hannibal occurs in Cicero’s speech On the Consular Provinces of 56 bce. The date and the occasion of this speech has already been outlined in Section 4.2.2.1. Therefore, I shall provide only the information relevant to the current discussion. As we recall, one of Cicero’s proposals was to reassign the provinces of Macedon and Syria, governed by L. Calpurnius Piso and Aulus Gabinius respectively, to the future consuls. Before moving on to discuss the mismanagement of the said provinces (narratio, § 4–​16), Cicero briefly explains his rationale for “[n]‌arrowing the focus on four provinces out of the 13 that theoretically could have been considered”62 in a preview (propositio). At this point, the speaker deliberately passes over all the crimes Piso and Gabinius committed as consuls at Rome, crimes, he declares, “which are so great [quae tanta sunt] that Hannibal never wished such misfortune [tantum mali] for this city as [quantum] they have inflicted upon it (§ 4 init.).”63 Then Cicero proceeds to give a more detailed account of Piso’s misconduct in Macedon and Gabinius’ in Syria (ad ipsas venio provincias), which amounts to an invective directed at the proconsuls.64 As regards both the

6 1 See Rhet. Her. 3.9 as tr. by H. Caplan. 62 Grillo 2015: 88. 63 Tr. R. Gardner. 64 Cf. Koster 1980: 128 f, n. 426; Seager 2007: 30, 32 f; Kenty 2020: 40 f.

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structure of the speech and its broader political context, this exemplum applies above all to L. Calpurnius Piso, at whose service as duovir of Capua Cicero hints also on other occasions.65 Piso was guilty of numerous shortcomings: the peace in Macedon was brought to an end under his rule; barbarian tribes started to invade the land; he robbed Byzantium of the statues which it was previously able to defend against Mithridates. All this attests to his failure to take good care of the province assigned to him. By being “lined up with the greatest of all Rome’s enemies as well as a particularly feared recent menace66,” as C. E. W. Steel remarks, Piso “is to be seen as one of Rome’s external enemies.”67 Cicero does not seem to have any particular episode of the Second Punic War in mind. The brief sentence quoted above is meant to encompass all the terrors and cruelties Hannibal had inflicted upon the Romans and Hannibal himself is to be seen as the Romans’ bitterest enemy in general, the enemy par excellence.68 In other words, the historical example in question forms neither part of the narrative within the speech nor does it refer to any specific plot outside of the speech (extra causam). As for the audience’s perception of Hannibal, however, Cicero’s words may have been suggestive of his almost proverbial hatred for Rome.69 In this context, the humiliating defeats at Cannae, Trasimene, and elsewhere would immediately occur to the senators. The portrayal of Piso and Gabinius as a greater menace to Rome than Hannibal himself, therefore, could have been part of Cicero’s “campaign aimed at a complete

65 See Cic. Red. Sen. 17, Sest. 19 with Kaster 2006: 162. Piso was called a Campanus consul twice, at Dom. 60 and Pis. 24. Cf. Nisbet 1961: 87 f ad loc.; Koster 1980: 237 f; D’Isanto 1993: 89 who calls into question Piso’s Campanian origin, and Grillo 2015: 96. On Hannibal’s connection with Capua cf. the previous discussion in this subchapter. Formally, however, both ex-​consuls serve as illustranda (thus Bücher 2006: 219). 66 Cf. Vell. 2.18.1: Mithridates […] odio in Romanos Hannibal. 67 Steel 2001: 48. Cf. Stinger 1993: 202. 68 Cf. Otto 1890/​1962: 158 f (no. 784). 69 Hannibal’s hatred for Rome is perhaps best illustrated by the oath he had taken in his father’s presence (see e.g. Plb. 3.11.7–​9 with Walbank 1957: 314 who lists more sources), but if this were what Cicero wanted to hint at, I think he would have been more precise. Achard 1981: 342 quotes Cic. Amic. 28 and Off. 1.38 in support of the view that the Romans associated Hannibal above all with cruelty. Cf. V. Max. 9.2. ext. 2; Plut. Luc. 32.4, and more recently van der Blom 2010: 111 and Stocks 2014: 22 f. Moore 2010: 140 points out that the historiographical tradition hostile to Hannibal was also supplemented by “a strong oral tradition of Hannibal as a monster” (with reference to Cic. Amic. 28).

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character assassination” of those two.70 Due to its brevity, however, this exemplum is not easily categorized. Since the proconsuls are not identified with Hannibal, and the difference in the actions of the illustrans and illustrandum are rather quantitative than qualitative, it is best classified as unequal example (a minore ad maius): Piso and Gabinius had inflicted more damage to Rome than Hannibal had ever wished. Cicero’s vicious misrepresentation of his opponents must have been compelling, especially that the “lesser element” was considered the Romans’ greatest enemy, and they, though men of consular rank, have outdone him in ruining the empire. In a sense, by their wrongdoings they have alienated themselves from the community, thereby becoming “foreign elements” at Rome (externa). With this derogatory comparison at the end of the opening section (Prov. 4a), the speaker has aptly prepared the ground for what was to come in the narrative proper (4b–​16).

7.3. Contrast Within exemplary discourse, Hannibal’s actions and/​or character are most frequently set by Cicero against those of either the illustrandum or the target. The name ‘Hannibal’ occurs for the first time in Cicero’s orations in the last book of the Verrines. The opening sections of this Book, which is known as De suppliciis, are devoted to Verres’ alleged military achievements and his (dis)abilities as a commander (imperator). Cicero feigns concern over Hortensius’s upcoming efforts to trivialize all the charges against his client by exaggerating Verres’ role in the recent Servile War (73–​71 bce). Verres is purported to have prevented the slaves from crossing to Sicily71 and to have fortified the shores against their invasion. It appears from other sources72 that the latter could have actually been true. By demonstrating that this was not in fact the case, Cicero claims he will thwart Hortensius’ argument, should the latter resort to the so-​called deprecatio.73 By such

70 Van der Blom 2016: 191 on Cicero’s “demand that Piso be recalled from his command” in Macedon (without explicit reference to Hannibal). Cf. Schoenberger 1910: 39. 71 Cic. Verr. 5.5: Obstitisti videlicet ne ex Italia transire in Siciliam fugitivorum copiae possent. 72 See Sal. Hist. 4.32 M = 4.23 Ramsey. Cf. Flor. 2.8.13; Plut. Crass. 10.6 f; Bradley 1989: 132. For a recent discussion of Verres’ (possible) role in suppressing the rebellion of Spartacus see Fezzi 2018, who argues that the evidence from Cicero’s Verrines is inconclusive. 73 Cf. Cic. Verr. 5.2: tum deprecabitur a vobis [sc. Hortensius].

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means,74 Cicero recalls, M. Antonius has secured the acquittal of M’. Aquilius, the governor in Sicily in 100–​99 bce who despite having suppressed a slave revolt was later tried for extortions.75 Aquilius was no doubt guilty as charged, but he redeemed himself as an accomplished general.76 To provide evidence of his bravery, by the end of the trial M. Antonius ripped off the defendant’s tunic and displayed to the judges his numerous scars.77 Once the uprising of Athenio was foiled,78 as Cicero insists, the governors of Sicily took every precaution to ensure that something like this never happens again. The speaker then describes Verres’ conduct as the complete opposite of how his predecessors had been acting: he spent the winter season in his “quarters” in the city of Syracuse; during the spring, he travelled from town to town, carried by eight men in a litter, and at every stop he indulged in drinking spree and sexual escapades (5.26–​28). When the summer came, finally, instead of making rounds of the fields like other governors when the slaves are particularly prone to rebellion, “this new variety of military commander used to pitch a fixed camp for himself in the loveliest part of Syracuse” (§ 29 fin.).79 This “fixed camp” (stativa castra) is where the relevant scene is taking place. At the entrance of the harbor, Verres made his temporary residence to which only his close associates and accomplices in vice were allowed (§ 30). There you could find all the women of Syracuse with whom he had an affair, some of them of noble birth, including Pipa, the wife of Aeschrio, and Nice, the wife of Cleomenes.80 His favorite mistress, however, was an actress Tertia,81 enticed to this place by a crafty trick. She is said to have caused great disturbance as the other women felt uncomfortable with sharing Verres’ favors with someone of a

74 On deprecatio in general see Lausberg 31990: 104 f (§ 192–​194). On Cicero’s use of the future conditional (Mil. 6: nisi oculis videritis […] nec deprecaturi sumus […] nec postulaturi) which allows “for the possibility of a later plea for mercy” that is never fulfilled, cf. Fotheringham 2007: 71. 75 See MRR 1.577; Alexander 1990: 44 (no. 84); David 1992: 709 f with n. 8. 76 See Cic. Flacc. 98: M’. Aquilium patres nostri multis avaritiae criminibus testimoniisque convictum, quia cum fugitivis fortiter bellum gesserat, iudicio liberaverunt. 77 See Cic. De or. 2.124 with Leeman et al. 1989: 64 and Dugan 2005: 141; Liv. Per. 70; Quint. Inst. 2.15.7. On this incident cf. e.g. Pöschl 1975: 207 f; May 1988: 84; Evans 1999: 81 f; Flaig 2003/​2013: 128. 78 See Greenidge, Clay 21960: 104 f, 113 for the sources. 79 Here and further tr. L. H. G. Greenwood. See in general Steel 2001: 25–​29. 80 Cf. Cic. Verr. 5.81 f; Levens 1946: 89; Pittia 2007: 65. 81 Cf. Cic. Verr. 3.78, 83, 5.40; Garton 1966: 497 f (no. 107).

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lower social standing. To ridicule Verres’ value system, Cicero again draws on military imagery (§ 31): Iste autem Hannibal, qui in suis castris virtute putaret oportere non genere certari, sic hanc Tertiam dilexit ut eam secum ex provincia deportaret. But this Hannibal of ours, holding that in his camp promotion should be by merit and not by birth [Iste autem Hannibal, qui in suis castris virtute putaret oportere non genere certari], became so much attached to this woman Tertia that he took her off with him when he left his province.

In his camp, people are ranked according to merit (virtus),82 and not their background. There cannot be certainty as to whether or not this is an allusion to the lines of Ennius’ Annals that Cicero quotes in the Pro Balbo (cf. above, Section 7.1). Either way, what Cicero plays upon here is Hannibal’s “meritocratic attitude”83 and not, as C. Stocks has recently suggested, “the Carthaginian’s established reputation for avarice and cruelty.”84 Moving on, the speaker mentions in passing that in these banquets with women Verres wore a purple cloak and an ankle-​length tunic (tunica talaris). Although this fits the description of Greek clothing, considered by the Romans to be effeminate,85 a longer tunic was also customary among the Carthaginians.86 The specific character trait of Hannibal, though praiseworthy by itself, becomes preposterous when ascribed to Verres, who dresses and behaves like a Carthaginian, but his battleground are convivia muliebria. Cicero’s conclusion is that Hortensius’ attempt to commend his client as an efficient military leader is doomed to failure (§ 32): Hunc tu igitur imperatorem esse defendis, Hortensi?. To further deride his opponent’s strategy, Cicero suggests that Hortensius, following the example of M. Antonius, will make Verres stand up, bare his breast and let the Roman people see the scars. These are, however, “scars made by women’s teeth, the imprinted records of lechery and foulness.” This section of Verr. 5 comes full circle as the previous argument concerning the acquittal of M’. Aquilius is now taken up. Both Verres and Hortensius are

8 2 See Levens 1946: 89 ad loc.; Opelt 1965: 145; Seager 2007: 39. 83 Thus van der Blom 2010: 109. 84 Stocks 2014: 7. 85 See e.g. Fuhrmann 1970–​1982, 4.356; Heskel 2001: 134; Dyck 2008a: 155 on Cic. Cat. 2.22; Edmondson 2008: 35; Frazel 2009: 141; Thurn 2018: 253. 86 See Bonfante, Jaunzems 1988: 1407 as quoted by Potthoff 1992: 207; Eichenseer 1999: 358. Cf. Gell. 6.12.7: Q. quoque Ennius Carthaginiensium ‘tunicatam iuventutem’ non videtur sine probro dixisse.

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shown to have failed to live up to the example set by their predecessors.87 How does the reference to Hannibal fit into this larger picture? It is difficult to determine precisely its function within exemplary area. On the one hand, instead of comparing the actions of two individuals, one from the past and one involved in the present case, Cicero simply calls the target iste Hannibal, as is customary with the reversed antonomasia.88 On the other hand, the speaker may have had in mind a specific occasion on which Hannibal displayed his meritocratic attitude. On balance, I am leaning toward the ‘reversed antonomasia’, for two reasons: 1) it remains unclear whether or not Cicero is in fact referring to any particular narrative possessing a context; 2) although the ultimate rhetorical goal is to show that Verres is not a capable commander, the allusion to Hannibal focuses on his personality rather than his actions. Here, however, the name ‘Hannibal’ is not meant as a substitute for all the characteristics the Carthaginian leader embodied.89 By saying qui in suis castris virtute putaret oportere non genere certari Cicero narrows down the range of possible associations to one specific feature: an ability to assess one’s subordinates. Hannibal used this ability in a military camp, whereas Verres applied it in his “summer residence,” called ironically castra stativa. His conduct in this fixed camp as depicted by Cicero is therefore a caricature of how a real leader should behave. The “Carthaginian” dress, moreover, is a sign not of his military preoccupation, but of his effeminacy; the scars on his chest would not be a proof of bravery in battle, but of debauchery. In this scene Verres is portrayed as breaking the social code on many different levels. By means of the 87 Cf. Schoenberger 1910: 51; Robinson 1986: 21 f; Evans 1999: 82; Seager 2007: 37: “his [i.e. M’. Aquilius’] battle scars are set against Verres’ love-​bites, which Hortensius might do well not to flaunt before the jury”; Flaig 2003/​2013: loc. cit. 88 Van der Blom 2010: 109, n. 122, following Oppermann 2000: 64, has this to say with regard to Cic. Verr. 5.31: “The direct renaming of a person in the present after a historical figure is termed ‘Vossianische Antonomasie’.” Cf. Stinger 1993: 72; Stocks 2014: 6 f. Bücher 2006: 68 quotes Rhet. Her. 4.46 (allegory per argumentum, e.g. if someone calls M. Livius Drusus [tr. pl. 91] another Gracchus) and 4.68 (brevitas). I found only the former reference relevant here, since in the latter, virtually, a standard antonomasia is meant, i.e. the substitution of a proper name with a common noun/​ descriptive formula. For a full discussion see Section 4.2.2. 89 Nevertheless, in a broader context Hannibal may be seen as an ideal commander whose characteristics Verres lacks completely. By comparing Cic. Verr. 5.25–​31 with a description of young Hannibal at Liv. 21.4.3–​8, Berger 1978: 190–​193 has shown that to each virtue of the Carthaginian leader corresponds Verres’ vice. See also Robinson 1986: 31 for Verres as “the exact opposite of the ideal general.” Similarly Seager 2007: 39.

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contemporizing pronoun iste, which by itself often has derogatory overtones,90 the resulting irony is additionally augmented. Hannibal makes another appearance, alongside many prominent Greeks and Romans, in the closing sections of Cicero’s lengthy defense of Publius Sestius of 56 bce. In an appeal to the youth at the beginning of his peroratio (§ 136–​143), the speaker urges the young generations to follow the ancestors in their pursuit for glory. He admonishes, however, that the concern for the well-​being of the state and the struggle against those who act to the detriment of the common good (improbi) comes with a price. The optimates, Cicero explains (§ 139), “must sweat for the sake of our common advantages, they must confront the enmity of others [adeundae inimicitiae], they must often face tempests for the commonwealth’s sake […].”91 To illustrate that point he first adduces a Roman example: although L. Opimius deserved praise for bringing about the death of C. Gracchus, this incident had alienated him from the community. The Greek Themistocles,92 on the other hand, was deterred from serving his country neither by the disaster of Miltiades nor by the exile of Aristides.93 All those men who have met an ill fate at the hands of their fellow-​citizens are now held in high repute, whereas the names of their persecutors fell into oblivion (§ 141 f). The speaker continues in the following way (§ 142): Quis Carthaginiensium pluris fuit Hannibale consilio, virtute, rebus gestis, qui unus cum tot imperatoribus nostris per tot annos decertavit? Hunc sui cives e civitate eiecerunt: nos etiam hostem litteris nostris et memoria videmus esse celebratum. Who among the Carthaginians was worth more –​for planning and manly achievement –​than Hannibal, who all by himself contended for so many years with so many of our generals, with dominion and glory as the stakes? But his own fellow-​citizens cast him out of their community [hunc sui cives e civitate eiecerunt], while we see that he is celebrated, even though an enemy, in our literature and traditions.

9 0 Cf. K-​S 1.621 f (§ 118.2, n. 5). 91 The translations of the Pro Sestio are those of R. A. Kaster. Some scholars have suggested that the segment containing Cicero’s ‘political manifesto’ (roughly § 93–​142) may have been ‘stitched into’ the speech after its delivery. See for the earlier literature Stroh 1975: 51 with n. 89 and a more recent discussion by Kaster 2006: 36 f who, on balance, is in favor of its inclusion in the original performance. On Cicero’s exhortation as filled with ‘partisan rhetoric’ cf. Kenty 2020: 189. 92 Cf. Cic. Tusc. 1.32 f. 93 For a brief discussion of Cicero’s use of these exempla see Schoenberger 1910: 35 f, 53, 63; Berthold 1965: 39; Podlecki 1975: 115–​117 as referred to by Powell 1988: 148 on Cic. Sen. 21; Stinger 1993: 192 and van der Blom 2010: 213–​216.

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Cicero is stretching the facts a little to make the exempla externa more appealing to the Roman audience. When he speaks of the Athenians who were banished from their community (e civitate eicerentur) for willing to protect the interests of the state against the vehemence of the people, what he means is the institution of ostracism, which is more reminiscent of the Roman relegatio94 than exilium. Themistocles and Aristides were in fact ostracized, whereas Miltiades was thrown into prison after his failed expedition against Paros.95 Nor was Hannibal’s “banishment” caused by the ingratitude of his countrymen,96 but he was forced to flee as a result of the intrigues and plotting of the Carthaginian elites. Some six years after his defeat at Zama, in 196 bce, he was appointed one of the two sufetes which aggravated some of the influential families. The enemies of the Barcids were even willing to plot with the Romans to bring Hannibal down.97 As Cicero presents it, his fellow-​citizens drove Hannibal away, while they (= the Romans) celebrate him in their writings and memories, even though he was an enemy. This is, as we shall see, not simply a euphemistic way of saying that he features prominently in Roman historiography and poetry, although the vast majority of this tradition was obviously hostile to Hannibal.98 What was Cicero trying to achieve, then, by manipulating the facts in this way?99 It needs to be noted that the place of honor on the list of those who were undeservedly expelled from their homeland belongs to Cicero himself. The young Romans, whom he purports to be addressing, should not “come to fear this way of life [i.e. to endure difficulties for the sake of the commonwealth] after seeing his misfortune or that of any others besides [ex nostro aut aliquorum 94 This form of banishment from Rome for ten years was prescribed by Cicero’s own lex Tullia of 63 bce, another aspect of which he mentions at Sest. 133 fin. See also Cic. Planc. 83; D.C. 37.29.1; Greenidge 1901/​1971: 425, 508 f; Rotondi 1912: 379; Lintott 2008: 144; Rosillo López 2010: 72; Berry 2020: 95. Cf. Ov. Tr. 5.11.9 f, 21 f. 95 See Kaster 2006: 384 f ad loc. Cf. Fuhrmann 1970–​1982, 5.507. Miltiades and Themistocles are again invoked to exemplify the ingratitude of their fellow citizens at Rep. 1.5. In that passage the historical facts are also slightly distorted (Büchner 1984: 85 ad loc.). 96 Cf. Nep. Hann. 1.2: civium suorum invidia; Juv. 10.160: in exilium praeceps fugit with the discussion in Claassen 1999: 52 and Sapota 2009a: 62 f. 97 See D.C. 17, fr. 86; Zonar. 9.14–​15; MacDonald 2015: 221. 98 However, cf. Enn. Ann. 366–​368 W = 371–​373 Skutsch; Christ 1968: 467. 99 Tipping 2010: 55 points out that “Cicero’s assessment at Pro Sestio 142 of how Hannibal is conceptualized in the Roman collective consciousness completely contradicts the unfavourable judgement that Cicero attributes to Laelius at De amicitia 28.” Cf. above, Section 7.2, n. 69.

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praeterea casu].” Among all those ill-​fated men, he is the only one who was recalled by his fellow-​citizens (§ 128–​131) and whose exile should be perceived as a voluntary one (a discessus, ‘departure’100). Despite Cicero’s efforts to wave away reality, some must have taken his actions for what they were –​as caused by fear for his personal safety.101 By citing all these precedents at Sest. 140–​ 142, therefore, he aims to make his own withdrawal (accounted for in detail at § 36–​52) look better,102 on the one hand, and to distinguish the Romans who, as opposed to other nations, favor the kind of attitude he is encouraging, on the other. Cicero stresses that L. Opimius is the only Roman he can think of (unus in hac civitate) who met with undeserved disaster.103 “Of all the other men who followed this way of life,” he continues, “some were stricken by a sudden violent storm of popular displeasure but were nonetheless recalled and given a new lease on life by the people itself.” Thus, Opimius counts as an exception confirming the rule that the Romans know how to reward their benefactors. From this viewpoint, the Carthaginians provide a suitable example of failing to apply the same rule. This comparison must have found a sympathetic ear 100 Cic. Sest. 49, 60, 128, 133 (cf. the following footnote). On the means Cicero employed to redeem his own past see e.g. Robinson 1986: 25, 1994b: passim (esp. 477), and van der Blom 2010: 210. Cicero refers to his flight from Rome by using phrases such as discessus, calamitas, or other euphemisms and circumlocutions, but never as “exile” (“except in three passages [Dom. 72, Q. fr. 3.2.2 = 22 SB, Parad. 27–​32] […] in which he must rebut someone who has used the words [i.e. exile] against him” –​thus Robinson 1994b: 475). See also the discussion by Robinson 1986: 163, n. 1 and especially Claassen 1992: 33–​36, 1999: 160–​162; Kurczyk 2006: 217 f, and Dyck 2004: 309 who argues that by using the language of devotio in the speeches Red. Pop. and Dom. Cicero takes “the rôle of the military leader who sacrifices himself, with the Roman populace as the army to be preserved” (quotation on p. 311). 101 See esp. Cic. Red. Pop. 19, Dom. 56, 95: obicitur mihi meus ille discessus; Sest. 73: L. Cotta dixit […] declinasse me paulum et spe reliquae tranquillitatis praesentis fluctus tempestatemque fugisse; Vat. 6: Nam quod mihi discessum obiecisti meum. Cf. Cicero’s remorse at Fam. 14.3.1 = 9 SB (to his family, late 58 bce): meum fuit officium vel legatione vitare periculum vel diligentia et copiis resistere vel cadere fortiter. hoc miserius, turpius, indignius nobis nihil fuit, and D.C. 39.60.1, 39.63.5; Robinson 1986: 67, 1994b: 480; Dyck 2004: 303; van der Blom 2014: 46–​48; Kenty 2020: 82 and passim. 102 Cf. Berthold 1965: loc. cit.: “Dieses gegen Ende der Rede eingeführte historische Beispiel wirft auch Licht auf den ausführlichen Exkurs über die Verbannung des Cicero im Mittelteil der Rede.” On Cicero’s portrayal of his banishment and subsequent return from exile in the Pro Sestio see Kurczyk 2006: 233–​238. 103 See Robinson 1986: 71; Stinger 1993: 191.

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with the audience, for who would better appreciate Hannibal’s achievement than those whose ancestors put so much effort, through so many years, into defeating him?104 That the Romans respected Hannibal as their fiercest opponent is evident from the fact that in three different places at Rome statues were erected in his honor.105 In the Pro Sestio, Cicero employs an exemplum contrarium to urge the younger generations against avoiding this way of life (hanc vitae viam) despite what befell Hannibal, because this is the exact opposite of how the Romans treat their leading men. To drive his point home, the speaker was bound to simplify some of the complexities of the aftermath of the Second Punic War. Thus, Hannibal’s flight from Carthage as a result of the intrigues and plotting of his enemies was reduced to a “banishment.” Cicero’s main objective was not to magnify their common ancestors for having finally defeated Hannibal,106 but rather to sharpen the contrast between the foreign nations and the Romans, who were more adequate judges of their fellow-​citizens’ merits. All the remaining passages to be discussed in this subchapter are from the Philippics where, as we shall soon find out, Cicero’s focus was on different aspects of Hannibal’s legacy than in his previous speeches. Apparently, his rhetorical strategy had to be adjusted to the new political climate at Rome in the period following the assassination of Julius Caesar. In the last two preserved speeches of Cicero, Philippics 13 and 14, the example of Hannibal is used to cast aspersions on both Antony and his brother Lucius. At Phil. 5.25, 27, which will be dealt with in the last section of this chapter, the marching of their troops to Cisalpine Gaul had already been depicted as causing more damage to Italian land and towns than Hannibal. Though L. Antonius’ actions became subject to similar criticism, in Antony’s case, to which I move shortly, Cicero had an opportunity to launch a more direct assault.

104 qui unus cum tot imperatoribus nostris per tot annos de imperio et de gloria decertavit. See also Cic. De or. 2.76: Hannibali, qui tot annis de imperio cum populo Romano omnium gentium victore certasset […], Lael. 28: Cum duobus ducibus de imperio in Italia est decertatum, Pyrrho et Hannibale. Cf. Off. 1.38; Liv. 22.58.3; Christ 1968: 466. 105 See Plin. Nat. 34.32: et adeo discrimen omne sublatum, ut Hannibalis etiam statuae tribus locis visantur in ea urbe, cuius intra muros solus hostium emisit hastam. This is, perhaps, what Cicero had in mind when he said litteris nostris et memoria videmus esse celebratum. Matusiak 2015: 61–​63 speaks of a process whereby Hannibal as enemy was becoming “familiarized” in Cicero’s times which, she argues (p. 62), is best illustrated precisely by Sest. 142. 106 Cf. Kaster 2006: 386 ad loc.

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The thirteenth Philippic oration, delivered on 20 March 43 bce107 in the senate, was aimed primarily to silence the voices advocating for a compromise. A large portion of the text (§ 22–​48) deals with Antony’s “open letter” to Hirtius and Octavian, a copy of which was forwarded to Cicero.108 One reason to dwell on this document so long was, as recently suggested,109 that the speaker had finally occasion to “confront” his enemy in a verbal exchange. During this illusionary debate Cicero proceeds by reading out and replying to Antony’s communications. At § 25 it is said about the latter that he holds Hirtius and Octavian responsible for the recent undertakings of the senate, namely “to have Dolabella justly condemned” and “to get this viper [venefica] liberated from a siege.”110 Playing on the nickname given by Antony to D. Brutus, Cicero asks how dare he call that way the man who had found an antidote to his venom. The paragraph ends in the following way: quem ita obsides, nove Hannibal aut si quis acutior imperator fuit, ut te ipse obsideas neque te istinc, si cupias, possis explicare. recesseris: undique omnes insequentur; manseris: haerebis. nimirum recte veneficam appellas a quo tibi praesentem pestem vides comparatam. Yes, you latter-​day Hannibal (or any cleverer general, if there was one) [nove Hannibal aut si quis acutior imperator fuit], you are besieging him in such a way that you are besieging yourself, nor can you extricate yourself from your present situation even if you wish [neque te istinc, si cupias, possis explicare]. If you pull back, they will all be after you from every side; if you stay put, you will be stuck in a trap. Doubtless you rightly call ‘viper’ the contriver of the destruction you see staring you in the face.

1 07 See Marinone 22004: 255 (B1). 108 See Cic. Phil. 13.22 init.: Quod si quis adhuc dubitare potuit quin nulla societas huic ordini populoque Romano cum illa importunissima belua posset esse, desinat profecto dubitare hi s cog niti s lit te r i s quas mihi missas ab Hirtio consule modo accepi. On the importance of this document cf. Frisch 1946: 251 f and Kenty 2020: 194 f. Stroh 1983: 40 (cf. p. 43) points out that the epistula Antonii (= Phil. 13) corresponds to Demosthenes’ speech Πρὸς τὴν ἐπιστολὴν Φιλίππου (= Or. 11). 109 Ramsey, Manuwald 2009, 2.223–​225. On the ways in which this letter informs Cicero’s rhetorical strategy see Ramsey 2010: 160 and passim (cf. Corbeill 2010: 143 f, 153) who (p. 156) argues that Phil. 13 “was intended by Cicero to serve as his long-​delayed response to Antony’s challenge issued in September 44 for the two of them to meet in a face-​to-​face debate in the senate.” Wooten 1983: 161 f compares Phil. 13 to the second half of Phil. 2 in which Cicero reviews Antony’s career in order to blacken his character. 110 Here and below tr. D. R. Shackleton Bailey. Rev. by Ramsey, Manuwald 2009.

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When read at face value, Cicero’s response refers to the difficult position Antony had found himself in.111 The Latin verb (se) explicare was used metaphorically, also in military contexts, to denote the action of setting oneself free from a state of confinement.112 On a more literal level, however, this word meant ‘to set free from folds, creases, coils, etc.’ (OLD, s.v. 1a) and could be applied e.g. to snakes unfolding from a coiled position.113 Now, considering that the Romans sometimes associated the Carthaginians in general and Hannibal in particular with a snakelike treachery/​cunning,114 the following interpretation may be suggested: the name ‘Hannibal’, combined with the phrases: veneficiis remedia and neque te […] possis explicare, invokes an image of a snake.115 Antony, who had “encircled” Brutus, is thus portrayed as unable to free himself from coils –​a picture emerges of a snake helplessly chasing its own tail. In formal terms, the reference to Hannibal at Phil. 13.25 is a good example of the reversed antonomasia, something which I. Opelt calls “der metonyme Gebrauch der Namen historischer […] Persönlichkeiten.”116 Unlike in Cicero’s Philippics Five and Six, where the siege of Saguntum is explicitly determined as the point of comparison, here two characteristics commonly attributed to the Carthaginian leader attract particular attention, i.e. his treachery (perfidia) and cunning (calliditas). With his parenthetical remark: aut si quis acutior imperator fuit Cicero appears at first glance to have almost randomly picked Hannibal instead of any clever general he could invoke. According to the interpretation I have suggested, however, this choice was carefully made. Of the two features 111 Fuhrmann 1970–​1982, 7.505 compares Phil. 10.10: equidem cupio haec quam primum Antonium audire, ut intellegat non D. Brutum quem vallo circumsedeat, sed s e ipsum obside r i[t]‌. tria tenet oppida to in orbe terrarum; habet inimicissimam Galliam, eos etiam quibus confidebat alienissimos, Transpadanos; Italia omnis infesta est; exterae nationes […] optimorum et fortissimorum civium imperiis et praesidiis tenentur. 112 See Hiltbrunner, TLL. 5.2.1729.58–​84–​1730.1–​8; OLD. s.v. 2, 3. 113 See Manil. 1.331–​333; cf. Sol. 24.3. 114 See Plaut. Poen. 1034; Petr. 50.5 with Matusiak 2010, 2015: 52–​55. Cicero speaks of the Carthaginian deceit e.g. at Off. 1.38 and Inv. 1.71. For more references see the discussion by Matusiak 2015: 40, 50–​60 and Manuwald 2018: 395 on Cic. Leg. Agr. 2.95: Carthaginienses fraudulenti et mendaces. 115 For a similar imagery in Cicero’s orations see e.g. Har. 50, 52, 55 (of Clodius as a serpent); cf. Balb. 5, 57; Caec. 61, 66 (delitisco as belonging properly to reptiles); Red. Sen. 15 (of Piso’s Greek advisers as hounds); Phil. 2.77 (of Antony hiding in a cavern/​ tavern) with Fantham 1972: 116, 124; MacKendrick 1995: passim (see “Rhetoric” under the heading “Animals”), and Gildenhard 2007: 174. 116 Opelt 1965: 145. Cf. above, Section 4.2.2.

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mentioned above, Antony shares with Hannibal only his perfidia which makes him an untrustworthy partner in negotiations. The fact that he cannot extricate himself from his present situation, on the other hand, means that he lacks cunning (calliditas). This partial resemblance, I believe, is what Cicero hinted at when he called Antony nove Hannibal, i.e. someone who is equally unreliable, but much less capable.117 Depending on the point of view, therefore, the passage under discussion can be read as an antonomasia either by comparison or by contrast. On balance, and given the ironic undercurrents of this passage, I lean towards the second possibility. A little over month later (21 April), after Antony’s defeat at the hands of Hirtius, the senate convened in the temple of the Capitoline Jupiter. Cicero delivered his last extant speech, the fourteenth Philippic, in which he argued that Antony should at last be formally declared a public enemy (hostis) and proposed a thanksgiving of fifty days to all the victors.118 In the latter half (§ 6–​10) of a long propositio, with which the speech begins, Cicero gives the reasons why Antony and his supporters deserve to be called hostes. He complains (§ 6): “How long then shall this man, who has outdone in crime all public enemies, go without the name of public enemy?” (quo usque igitur is qui omnis hostis scelere superavit nomine hostis carebit?). In these sections of Philippic Fourteen Cicero pays special attention to what seems to have been the most recent atrocity committed by L. Antonius, namely his sack of Parma, a town in Cisalpine Gaul, situated on the via Aemilia to the south of the Po. Little is known about his plundering of that town beyond what Cicero tells us.119 In February 43 bce, it was apparently held by Antony,120 “but must have subsequently passed into the hands of the republicans.”121 L. Antonius’ ill-​treatment of the inhabitants of Parma,122 which he is said to have seized by stealth, may have been therefore a form of punishment (§ 8: crudelissimis exemplis interemit).123 Cicero is vague about what exactly happened. He suggests

117 For a similar idea expressed explicitly, cf. Cic. Phil. 4.15: nam quod se similem esse Catilinae gloriari solet, scelere par est illi, industria inferior. 118 See Frisch 1946: 281–​287; Mitchell 1991: 316. 119 Cf. Tyrrell, Purser 21933/​1969: 149 on D. Brut. Fam. 11.13b. 120 See Cic. Fam. 12.5.2 = 365 SB; Phil. 10.10. 121 Shackleton Bailey 1977: 524 on D. Brut. Fam. 11.13b = 381 SB. 122 Cf. D. Brut. Fam. 11.13b = 381 SB: Parmensis miserrimos; Pol. Fam. 10.33.4 fin. = 409 SB: Parmam direptam; Frisch 1946: 283; Stinger 1993: 281 f; Cairns 2012: 153. 123 On exemplum in that sense (with reference to Cic. Phil. 14.8) see Kornhardt 1936: 46 f. Tyrrell, Purser 21933/​1969: loc. cit. observe that “possibly it [i.e. Parma]

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that the children and wives of the people of Parma had been wronged in some horrible way, but leaves the details to the hearers’ imagination. After stressing that violence should be viewed as an in-​born quality of the Antonii, the speaker links this incident with his main argument (§ 9): est igitur quisquam qui hostis appellare non audeat quorum scelere crudelitatem Carthaginiensium victam esse fateatur? qua enim in urbe tam immanis Hannibal capta quam in Parma surrepta Antonius? Is there anyone, then, who hesitates to call enemies men whose crimes, he admits, put the cruelty of the Carthaginians into the shade? What city taken by assault did Hannibal treat so savagely as Antonius treated Parma, which he took by stealth [qua enim in urbe tam immanis Hannibal capta quam in Parma surrepta Antonius]?

According to Cicero, as we shall see in the next section, Hannibal did not commit any hostile act which Antony has not committed or is not about to commit because, during his campaign in Italy, he was concerned for nothing but his own resources. In Philippic Five, the march of their armies was the point of comparison, whereas in the present case –​it is the mistreatment of a captured city. Stories about Hannibal’s atrocities in this regard, although exaggerated and historically incredible,124 were most likely known to Cicero’s contemporaries. The words tam immanis Hannibal (in urbe capta) could refer to the accounts of how the Carthaginian army under Hannibal suffocated the inhabitants of Nuceria after obtaining their surrender, or how he had the senate of Acerra thrown into deep wells.125 The hearers, once their imagination was triggered by Cicero, could picture for themselves just how far L. Antonius went in punishing the people of Parma. The notion that Antony is an enemy worse than Hannibal extends here to his brother Lucius. They were both already described in the fifth Philippic as having outdone the Carthaginian leader in ravaging the Italian countryside. At Phil. 14.8–​10 their “supremacy” is expanded to cover capturing and sacking cities. Although both brothers are the target of Cicero’s calumny (quorum scelere crudelitatem Carthaginiensium victam esse), the reference to Hannibal applies to

showed an inclination to go over to the side of the senate when Mutina appeared likely to be relieved.” 124 See Pomeroy 1989. However, cf. n. 134 below. 125 See V. Max. 9.6. ext. 2; App. Pun. 278; D.C. fr. 57.30; Zonar. 9.2; cf. Plb. 3.86.11: καθάπερ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τῶν πόλεων καταλήψεσι, καὶ τότε παράγγελμά τι δεδομένον ἦν φονεύειν τοὺς ὑποπίπτοντας τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἡλικίαις. ταῦτα δ’ ἐποίει διὰ τὸ προυπάρχον αὐτῷ μῖσος ἔμφυτον πρὸς Ῥωμαίους; Liv. 23.15.3–​6, 23.17.5–​7.

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a greater extent to L. Antonius. Though the speaker may have had some specific instances of mistreating a captured city in mind, like those I have mentioned earlier, the text itself does not allow for certainty. So far as I know, however, none of the accounts of Hannibal’s atrocities mentions that women and children were among his victims (cf. Polybius’ φονεύειν τοὺς ὑποπίπτοντας τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἡλικίαις), which is precisely the insult that Cicero throws at L. Antonius (quae… liberis et coniugibus effecerit). The illustrans and illustrandum are linked together by means of a comparative clause (qua enim in urbe tam immanis… quam) expressing the idea that C and D are not equally savage.126 The implication might be that despite all his cruelty, Hannibal –​unlike L. Antonius –​left women and children alone (exemplum contrarium). This contrast helps to establish the picture of the brothers as ruthless and violent rebels and contributes to the overall argument that, if they are enemies of the Latin communities, they should be declared public enemies (hostes), too. Finally, it is noteworthy that Cicero may have also extended to L. Antonius the animal imagery employed at Phil. 13.25. The ablative [Parma] surrepta is a past participle of either subripio (sub + rapio, meaning inter alia ‘to take by stealth’ as in the translation quoted above) or subrepo, meaning ‘to creep (under)’, which consists of the prefix sub and the verb repo. This verb repo is used to express a movement ‘in a more or less prone position with the body close to the ground, crawl.’127 The Latin authors tend to apply repere to snakes or reptiles,128 and the English noun/​adjective ‘reptile’ in fact derives from it. Thus, the words Parma surrepta would be primarily taken by the audience to mean that L. Antonius seized the town by stealth, but secondarily that he crawled into it like a snake.129 This latter sense seems more compelling in

126 Cf. K-​S 2.457 (§ 225.1 f). Cicero’s question, of course, presupposes a negative response: qua enim in urbe tam immanis Hannibal capta quam in Parma surrepta Antonius? –​nulla [sc. in urbe] ~ Antonius immanior in Parma surrepta quam Hannibal ulla in urbe capta. Cf. van der Blom 2010: 111. 127 See OLD, s.v. “subrepo” 1a and “repo” 1 respectively. 128 E.g. Plin. Nat. 9.73: haec omnia flexuoso corporum inpulsu ita mari utuntur, ut serpentes terra, et in sicco quoque repunt. Cf. Lucr. 3.388 f; Mart. 4.59.1. 129 The closest parallel that I can find to this use of the verb subrepere in Cicero’s extant writings occurs at Sest. 126: cum sub tabulas subrepserat (“when he crept in under the temporary seating” as tr. by R. A. Kaster) of Appius Claudius Pulcher sneaking into his tribunal (see on this incident esp. Klodt 2003: 64 and Wiseman 2009: 163 f). Cf. Schol. Bob. p. 102 Hildebrandt = 138 St. ad loc.: Sic ergo veniebat, inquit, ut solent umbrarum figmenta subrepere.

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that it retains the notion of treachery in general, but can be additionally associated with the Carthaginians’ lizard-​like cunning.130 Not only, then, does L. Antonius commit acts of violence far exceeding the cruelty of Hannibal, but he has also, as the speaker implies (in urbe capta… in Parma surrepta), captured a town by deceit, in a way one would normally expect from a Carthaginian. In the two last extant Philippics, therefore, unless I am reading too much into this, Cicero took to his advantage the Roman view of Hannibal as sharing some of the negative connotations of snakes/​reptiles (notably their perfidia). By doing so, he was able to highlight Hannibal’s darker side and, by implication, to brand the brothers Antonii as completely unreliable, “treacherous reptiles.” This representation was obviously in line with his aim to dissuade the senate from negotiating with them and to propose to declare them public enemies.

7.4. Counterexample By now, we have looked at several different usages of Hannibal’s example in the Philippics, but it is not until Philippic Five that the Carthaginian leader first appears as a foil for Antony, as it were. This seems to have been a crucial turning point in the Roman conceptualization of Hannibal as a foreign example, especially that, as I shall argue, the new perception of the Carthaginian leader was not promulgated by Cicero. That being the case, our next passage defies the distinctions applied up to this point, and hence the title of this section. On 1 January 43 bce, during Antony’s siege of Mutina (cf. above), the new consuls convened a meeting of the senate to debate the current political situation. One of the consulars, Q. Fufius Calenus (cos. 47),131 proposed a motion to send an embassy to negotiate with Antony. Cicero, for his part, was strongly against this course of action. Instead, he opted for an immediate declaration of war. The speech he delivered on this occasion is known as the fifth Philippic. After a detailed account of Antony’s misconduct (Phil. 5.6b–​25a), the speaker

130 For ancient sources see above, n. 114 and 115. Martial may have used a variation of this idea in his epigram about the statue of Apollo Sauroctonos by Praxiteles (14.142): Ad te reptanti, puer insidiose, lacertae | Parce: cupit digitis illa perire tuis. Cf. Plin. Nat. 34.70: fecit [sc. Praxiteles] et puberem Apollinem subrepenti lacertae comminus sagitta insidiantem, quem sauroctonon vocant. Toynbee 1973: 220 f admits a possibility that the youth as sculpted by Praxiteles may be in fact playing with the lizard and that this is also reflected in Martial’s poem. 131 See MRR 2.286, 350 f, 3.94.

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addressed the question of the embassy and its potential consequences (§ 25b–​ 31a). Hannibal is mentioned twice in this portion of the text (i.e. argumentatio): at the end of the former and at the beginning of the latter subsection. At § 24 Cicero briefly recounts Antony’s departure for Cisalpine Gaul. He deplores the fact that war was waged against a province inhabited by most loyal and righteous citizens, that Mutina, a prosperous Roman colony, is besieged, and that D. Brutus, a consul designate, is under attack. “Therefore:” the speaker continues (§ 25a) ergo Hannibal hostis, civis Antonius? quid ille fecit hostiliter quod hic non aut fecerit aut faciat aut moliatur et cogitet? was Hannibal an enemy and is Antonius a citizen? [ergo Hannibal hostis, civis Antonius?] What hostile act did Hannibal commit which Antonius has not committed or is not committing or is not putting in hand and planning?

Then, the manner in which both generals marched their troops is compared: the brothers Marcus and Lucius132 laid waste to the land and slaughtered the population on their way, whereas Hannibal did not.133 Unlike them, Cicero argues,134 he was only concerned for his own resources.135 The speaker had already made similar accusations against L. Antonius earlier, charging him with making incursions into the towns he was passing by. Antony’s brother is said to have committed many horrible acts as he allowed his soldiers to loot, rape, and slaughter.136 These might have been not just allegations, for he had to obtain supplies for his army.137 At the end of this paragraph Cicero adds that “Marcus Antonius had done just the same, wherever he has led his army.” The savagery and ruthlessness that bring 1 32 Cf. Manuwald 2007: 640 on 6.25: iter Antoniorum. 133 Cf. Flor. 2.6.11 (on the Social War): Nec Annibalis nec Pyrrhi fuit tanta vastatio. See also Martin 2013: 119 f who reads the references to Hannibal as an example of a rhetorical peccatorum comparatio and Stocks 2014: 23 f who calls attention to a later reworking of the parallel ‘Antony –​Hannibal’ in Sen. Suas. 6.26. 134 Cicero distorts the facts at least with regard to Hannibal, who took advantage of the conquered territories “humanely” only as long as it was in his interest. He is said to have ravaged some of these lands on his way back to Africa, when they were no longer useful. See App. Hann. 244–​246, 251; cf. Liv. 21.57.13 f. According to Polybius (3.86.8–​10), after the battle of Lake Trasimene (217 bce), passing through Umbria and Picenum, his army had killed a number of people and collected a large amount of booty. Cf. Roller 2001: 102 on Sen. Nat. 3 praef. 5 f. 135 Cf. MacDonald 2015: 220. 136 See Cic. Phil. 3.31 with Frisch 1946: 166 f. 137 Cf. Brunt 1971: 290.

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to mind conventional depictions of a direptio138 are ascribed in the Philippic Five to the armies commanded by either of the brothers. The speaker’s point is that given all of Antony’s violent and lawless acts, which are hideous even when compared to whatever offence against Rome Hannibal had committed, he can no longer be considered a civis, but rather a hostis.139 In the following paragraphs (25b–​26) Cicero further explains why under current circumstances an embassy is a futile idea: the men with whom the senate is willing to negotiate are ignorant of the laws of war (iura belli) and disregard the examples set by the ancestors (exempla maiorum); this initiative will only break the spirit of the Italian communities and delay what is inevitable. Antony, therefore, “is not to be asked in words, he is to be compelled by force of arms.” Now, the speaker resumes the historical parallel by associating the siege of Mutina with, or rather dissociating it from, that of Saguntum and highlights the difference between the two occasions (§ 27 init.): Non enim ad Hannibalem mittimus ut a Sagunto recedat, ad quem miserat olim senatus P. Valerium Flaccum et Q. Baebium Tampilum –​qui, si Hannibal non pareret, Carthaginem ire iussi sunt: nostros quo iubemus ire, si non paruerit Antonius? We are not sending to Hannibal [Non enim ad Hannibalem mittimus] to demand that he retire from Saguntum, Hannibal, to whom once upon a time the senate sent Publius Valerius Flaccus and Quintus Baebius Tamphilus –​they had been instructed to go on to Carthage if Hannibal refused compliance: where do we instruct our men to go if Antonius refuses? [qui, si Hannibal non pareret, Carthaginem ire iussi sunt: nostros quo iubemus ire, si non paruerit Antonius?].

Surely, the senators would easily follow the legal implications of Cicero’s argument: an embassy cannot fulfill its task unless it is sent to a “normal (i.e. foreign) enemy.” A Roman citizen who has made himself into an enemy of the state cannot be expected to change his attitude. In the former case, should the envoys have failed to persuade Hannibal, they were ordered to negotiate directly with Carthage’s government. In the present situation, by contrast, there is no such possibility.140 Antony, who at this point does not recognize any higher authority, 138 Cf. e.g. Fro. Ep. Ant. 1.2.11 (= Cato, orat. fr. 203 Malc. = 168 Sblend.); Liv. 29.17.15 f and the references quoted in n. 134. Ziółkowski 1988 = 1993 discusses all the relevant sources. 139 See Manuwald 2007: 640 ad loc. and the comment by Seager 2007: 39: “Bitterly ironic is the claim (Phil. 5.25) that Hannibal, the overt hostis (‘enemy’), did less damage to Italy than Antony, the supposed civis (‘citizen’).” Cf. Hellegouarc’h 1963: 188 f; Stinger 1993: 263. 140 See van der Blom 2010: 109 f. Cf. Cic. Cat. 4.22: qui autem ex numero civium dementia aliqua depravati hostes patriae semel esse coeperunt, eos cum a pernicie rei

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is therefore not equivalent to Hannibal.141 Cicero goes on to argue that back in 220 bce it was justified to send an embassy: “they were sent to a Carthaginian; they were sent on behalf of Hannibal’s enemies, our allies. What is at all similar?” (mittebantur ad Poenum, mittebantur pro Hannibalis hostibus, nostris sociis. quid simile tandem? ). The speaker neatly rounds off the comparison by stressing its absurdity: the past envoys were representing the interests of Hannibal’s enemies and their own allies, whereas the current ones are supposed to persuade a civis into stop being a hostis? One significant feature of this exemplum that may at first sight escape our notice is that it underlines the dissimilarities between the illustrans and illustrandum. This way of arguing from the past was, as we saw,142 most suitable whenever a speaker wanted to question his opponent’s statement. It is hard to tell what exactly Q. Fufius Calenus, whose motion Cicero is now advising against, had said on 1 January.143 Only one paragraph of the lengthy speech Dio Cassius puts in his mouth144 revolves around the embassy,145 but it does not seem improbable that he too would find it appropriate to mention Hannibal. One can easily imagine either him or one of the other consulars, whose opinions Cicero claims to have anticipated, saying that if the Romans had once sent envoys to their greatest enemy, why should they deny Antony the same privilege, “as they are all [i.e. Octavian and D. Brutus besides Antony] alike our fellow citizens.”146

publicae reppuleris, nec vi coercere nec beneficio placare possis and the comment by Jal 1963: 69 f: “[…] Cicéron s’indigne qu’on lui envoie une ambassade comme à Hannibal, ennemi régulier […]. Un «ennemi» digne de ce nom ne possède-​t-​il pas […] toutes les garanties qui permettent de conclure avec lui un traité de paix […]?.” 141 Thus Stinger 1993: loc. cit. 142 See above, Section 3.3. 143 Cf. Bonnefond-​Coudry 1989: 99, 514; Ryan 1998: 260–​262. 144 D.C. 46.1–​28. Both this speech and the one Appian attributes to L. Calpurnius Piso (BC 3.222–​248) were fictional and, as Millar observes (1964: 52 f), “designed as a substitute for the complex political history of the time [i.e. the beginning of 43 bce].” See also Koster 1980: 200–​210 who analyses this invective in detail and cf. more recently van der Blom 2014: 47. 145 D.C. 46.27.1–​4. Cf. Ryan 1998: 329. 146 See Cic. Phil. 5.5: qui utinam omnes ante me sententiam rogarentur –​quamquam suspicor quid dicturi sint quidam eorum, qui post me rogabuntur –​, facilius contra dicerem si quid videretur with Manuwald 2007: 63, 564 f. Cf. D.C. 46.27.2: οὔτε γὰρ ὁ παρὼν καιρὸς ἐπιτήδειός ἐστι πρὸς τοῦτο, καὶ πολιτῶν αὐτῶν ἡμετέρων πάντων ὁμοίως ὄντων, ἄν τέ τις πταίσῃ σφῶν, ἡμῖν ἀπολεῖται, ἄν τε καὶ κατορθώσῃ, ἐφ’ ἡμᾶς αὐξηθήσεται. Tr. E. Cary.

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Even if that was not the case, an argument a fortiori based on this historical parallel might have been successfully advanced. Being aware of the possibility, Cicero made sure that this parallel works for the benefit of his cause. That might partially explain his decision to provide more details, and not to confine himself to “take into use only its [i.e. the example’s] potentially useful features” ([ut […] ex eo sumamus] quae utilia erunt).147 In this case, although the circumstances of the siege of Saguntum must have been well-​known to his audience, a mere allusion would not suffice148 in that the speaker would be unable to emphasize the differences between Hannibal, a normal enemy, and Antony, an enemy of the state: in the past (a), the envoys were sent to a Carthaginian on behalf of the Roman allies, his enemies, whereas now (b) they are being sent to a citizen to convince him to cease besieging a Roman general, his army, and the province. Cicero had separated the two statements, here denoted by the letters (a) and (b), with a question implying that they are completely inequivalent (quid simile tandem?). By means of an exemplum dissimile, he managed to dissociate the present situation from its potential counterpart from the past.

7.5. A Stock exemplum As the sheer length of this chapter clearly indicates, Hannibal was unquestionably Cicero’s favorite foreign example. We have already established that the students of rhetoric must have been familiar with declamations featuring Hannibal, but how well in general were the Romans of the late republic, after over a century, acquainted with the events of the Second Punic War? In this, as well as in many other respects, our best guide is Cicero himself. Another in-​depth examination of the evidence is not called for as there have been many scholars who took up the issue, most recently F. Bücher, whose conclusions I follow in this brief overview. The common source of knowledge of the Hannibalic War for Cicero and his peers were the historical works written in Greek by Q. Fabius Pictor and Polybius. Somewhat later came the Latin Annals composed in prose by L. Coelius Antipater and in verse by Q. Ennius.149 The number of references to the Second Punic War in Cicero’s oeuvre is vast150 but heterogenous when it comes to their distribution between various works. According to Bücher, the division of Cicero’s literary output into three periods proposed by M. von 1 47 Quint. Inst. 5.11.6. Tr. D. A. Russell (adjusted). 148 Cf. Quint. Inst. 5.11.16. 149 See Bücher 2006: 200–​202. Cf. Astin 21989: 3–​13. 150 Bücher 2006: 207–​211, following Sauer 1909/​1910 and Schütz 1913.

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Albrecht (the first ends with the production of De or. in 55 bce, the second with the beginnings of philosophical activity in 46 bce) may be applied here.151 It is difficult, of course, to determine the exact knowledge Cicero possessed at a given point in time, but the evidence for most of the events that took place during the war with Hannibal comes from the works written in the last period. Other than that, and regardless of the chronology established above, many a piece of information he might have acquired from the official records listing the achievements of the higher magistrates. As the prosecutor of C. Verres Cicero could have been exceptionally well acquainted with the Sicilian affairs, while in his research for the dialogue De senectute he must have closely followed Cato the Elder’s military career.152 If the records of their military glory were a significant factor in shaping the Romans’ perception of themselves as a nation,153 then the victory over Hannibal afforded a great opportunity for celebrating virtus Romana. That said, it would be ill-​advised to assume that Cicero was considerably better informed on the period of the Second Punic War than an average Roman. If that were not the case, Cicero would have been more restricted in his use of Hannibal as exemplum in oratorical practice. For the same reason in reverse, many other foreign historical figures that feature prominently in his correspondence and treatises are completely absent from the speeches. And although the only reference to Hannibal in orators other than Cicero that we know of is in the De Achaeis by Cato the Elder, there can be little doubt that some of Cicero’s contemporaries (e.g. Q. Fufius Calenus) and predecessors employed this example in a similar fashion. This sort of recurrent and common exempla are described in modern scholarship as ‘stock exempla.’154 The fact that given historical example (or any rhetorical device for that matter) was firmly established, however, does not preclude an unexpected or innovative use thereof. This applies, I think, to Cicero’s deployment of Hannibal as exemplum externum in his orations. Of all the elements that form the overall picture of Hannibal in ancient texts, it was precisely his leadership (Hannibal dux) that had the most positive connotations.155 Cicero, as we have seen, made use of this image twice, though each time for different purposes. In the fifth book of his second Verrine oration he

1 51 Cf. von Albrecht 21992: 416 f (= 32012) as referred to by Bücher 2006: 212. 152 See Bücher 2006: 213 and 212 respectively. 153 Cf. above, Section 6.2. 154 See van der Blom 2010: 107 f. 155 See Nep. Han. 1.1 with Matusiak 2015: 91–​93, 111.

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contrasted the defendant with the Carthaginian leader to bring out the former’s shortcomings as a governor. At Balb. 51, on the other hand, the speaker invoked Hannibal, alongside famous Roman commanders, to justify Pompey’s course of actions in 72 bce. Somewhat different was Cicero’s strategy in his Agrarian Speeches. When advising against the settlement of Capua, he advanced a deft argument a fortiori: if such an experienced military leader could not resist the Campanian luxuries, then who can? At Sest. 142 Hannibal, next to Themistocles, Miltiades, and Aristides, is portrayed simply as a man of great distinction among his people. The fact that his own countrymen were responsible for his demise makes the Romans appear superior because, unlike the Carthaginians, they know how to reward merit. Hannibal’s cruelty and hatred for Rome is first alluded to at Prov. 4 to make the misconduct of L. Calpurnius Piso and A. Gabinius more noticeable. There is a clear demarcation line between the ways in which Cicero referred to Hannibal in his Philippics and the other speeches. Not surprisingly, in the last period of his oratorical career Cicero had many opportunities to exploit the image of Hannibal as enemy (Hannibal hostis).156 In the fifth Philippic he objects to the view that the siege laid by Hannibal to Saguntum was an appropriate historical parallel for Antony’s siege at Mutina as the former was a foreign enemy and the latter an enemy of the state. Just few days later (Philippic Six), however, when speaking before the Roman people, he took an opposite view, maintaining (§ 4 and 6) that because the circumstances of the siege of Saguntum and Mutina are fairly identical, they will have the same result. Finally, as a novus Hannibal Antony, by means of a reversed antonomasia (in Phil. 13), is either equated to Hannibal as regards treachery or set against him as unequally clever. Both Antony and his brother Lucius are according to the speaker enemies worse than Hannibal because while marching their troops they reveled in cruelty and spared no one on their way (Phil. 13 and 14).

156 Matusiak 2015: 61–​90. Cf. Jal 1963: 67 and Powell 2007: 20: “to call Hannibal a hostis would not be an insult but a plain statement of fact.”

8. Antiochus the Great as Individual exemplum Hannibal, as we saw, was occasionally incorporated by Cicero into a series of exempla, but only twice (at Mur. 31 f and Cat. 4.21) he is spoken of as an object of someone else’s action. In most of the instances where his name occurs in the extant orations, it is mentioned for its own sake, and Hannibal serves as a primary illustrans that, for the lack of better expression, possesses an agency of his own. That is not the case with Antiochus III, king of Syria, who appears in majority of the catalogues,1 but almost exclusively as a fearsome enemy defeated by a Roman general, L. Cornelius Scipio. On yet another occasion, when Cicero set out to exculpate C. Rabirius Postumus from the charges of wearing a Greek outfit, he reminded the audience that even in the heart of Rome there are monuments that caution against such prejudice (§ 27): “[A]‌nd you can all see on the Capitol the statue of Lucius Scipio, who conducted the war in Asia and defeated Antiochus [qui bellum in Asia gessit devicit], wearing not only a cloak but also Greek slippers.”2 In this passage, as well as in some of those I have discussed earlier, Antiochus is virtually reduced to a standard descriptive phrase accompanying L. Scipio.3 The association between the two was so strong that this formula passed on to Asiaticus’ son (qu. 167)4 who, having accomplished nothing noteworthy, died at the age of thirty-​three. The only thing he could do was to boast of his father’s accomplishments, as is indicated by his epitaph, where it reads: Pater | regem Antioco(m) | subegit.5 Unlike Hannibal, therefore, the Syrian king appears to have lacked (in the eyes of the Romans) individual characteristics and for Cicero it made little difference whether he spoke of Antiochus himself in particular or of a bellum Antiochinum (as at Phil. 11.17) in general. The same tendency is displayed in the work of Valerius Maximus who, when dealing with the native examples, usually refers to Antiochus III as the king defeated by the Romans.6 Other than that, the story of how he captured and then sent back the son of Scipio the Elder is recounted twice, but more as to underscore

1 Cic. Verr. 2.1.55; Man. 14, 55; Leg. Agr. 2.90; Mur. 31 f. 2 Tr. N. H. Watts. Cf. Plin. Nat. 35.22; Pollitt 1978: 160; Balsdon 1979: 220; Klodt 1992: 141 ad loc. 3 Cf. Bücher 2006: 207. 4 See MRR 1.433. 5 ILS 5 = ILLRP 313. 6 See V. Max. 2.5.1, 5.3.2, 7.3.4; cf. 8.1. damn. 1.

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the latter’s formidable reputation than the king’s generosity and goodwill.7 In fact, Antiochus figures only once as exemplum externum in Valerius Maximus’s work and this exemplum, the only one to be analyzed in the present chapter, was apparently borrowed from Cicero (cf. below, n. 22).

8.1. Juxtaposition The isolated instance that I have in mind involves Deiotarus, a client king of Rome (rank to which Antiochus III himself was eventually degraded). A Roman ally against Mithridates VI Eupator and former supporter of Pompey at Pharsalus, Deiotarus was accused of plotting against Caesar’s life. The charge was brought in absentia by his grandson Castor and Cicero, who had developed a cordial relationship with the king back in 51 bce during his governorship in Cilicia,8 took up the defense. Details of the historical background of this trial need not concern us,9 but a glimpse into how Deiotarus first gained and then lost favor with the Roman “dynasts” will provide us with a necessary context to understand Cicero’s reference to Antiochus. Formerly a tetrarch in Galatia, Deiotarus was rewarded for his services in the Mithridatic Wars and in addition to receiving new territories, including part of Pontus and Armenia, he was granted the title of king. All these arrangements were ratified during Caesar’s first consulship (59 bce). Soon after Pompey’s death Pharnaces, the son and successor of Mithridates, invaded Lesser Armenia and Cappadocia. To avert the calamity, Deiotarus joined forces with Caesar’s lieutenant in Asia, Cn. Domitius Calvinus (MRR 2.301, 3.84), but they were defeated. As for Caesar, he met with Deiotarus twice: once on his way from Egypt to Bithynia, and the second time after his rapid victory over Pharnaces at Zela. On both occasions the king duly expressed regret, and though allowed to keep his throne, he was deprived of some of his possessions, among others Lesser Armenia.10 “However much Cicero tries to gloss it over,” as H. C. Gotoff puts it, “Caesar had punished Deiotarus for disloyalty.”11 2.10.2 and 3.5.1. Cf. Val. Ant. F46 FRHist (42 Peter /​43 Chassignet). See e.g. Cic. Fam. 15.2.2 = 105 SB, Brut. 21 with Douglas 1966: 14; Rowland 1972: 456 f. 9 See in general Schol. Gron. 298 St.; Schimdt 1893/​1987: 362; Magie 1950: 425; Gelzer 61960: 239, 241; 1969: 318–​320; Settle 1962: 268 f; Yavetz 1983: 99; Bringmann 1986: 81–​83; Gotoff 1993: xxxvii–​xl; MacKendrick 1995: 439–​444; Nótári 2012: 100–​103; 2013: 81–​83; Parker 2018: 195–​201. 10 See Magie 1950: 411, 413; Sherwin-​White 1984: 300; Nótári 2012: 101. For a detailed recent discussion see Parker 2018: 188–​195. 11 Gotoff 1993: xxxviii. 7 8

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The speech Pro Rege Deiotaro was delivered near the end of 45 bce in a rather unusual setting:12 the trial was held at Caesar’s residence and Caesar himself, as it were, acted as the sole judge in his own case.13 Although aware of his difficult position, Cicero did his best to appear confident and even stated openly that he was assured of Caesar’s impartiality. After an outline of the events of the Civil War and of Deiotarus’ participation therein, in the refutatio proper, the speaker asserts that the defendant had neither motive nor opportunity for assassination. Next, having dealt with a few supplementary charges, Cicero apostrophizes Castor, the absent prosecutor, and reminds him of his own support of Pompey, even after Pharsalus. Cicero then continues by pointing to Castor’s disloyalty towards his family: he is impudent and shameless to the extent that he produces a slave as witness against his master.14 In the peroratio (§ 35–​41) Cicero finally undertakes to reconcile Caesar to Deiotarus. The king, Cicero insists, holds no grudge over his territorial losses and the situation in which he found himself is not unprecedented, for (Deiot. 36): etenim si Antiochus Magnus ille, rex Asiae, cum postea quam a L. Scipione devictus Tauro tenus regnare iussus est, omnem[que] hanc Asiam quae est nunc nostra provincia amisisset, dicere est solitus benigne sibi a populo Romano esse factum, quod nimis magna procuratione liberatus modicis regni terminis uteretur, potest multo facilius hoc se Deiotarus consolari. ille enim furoris multam sustulerat, hic erroris. Antiochus the Great, king of Asia, when after his defeat at the hands of Lucius Scipio [a L. Scipione devictus] he was compelled to recognize the Taurus as the limit of his realm, and had forfeited all that territory which is to-​day our province of Asia, commonly asserted [dicere est solitus] that he had been kindly treated by the Roman people in that he had been released from a too extensive jurisdiction and his kingdom reduced to reasonable proportions. Deiotarus has far better reason [potest multo facilius] to console himself than had he; for Antiochus had borne the penalty of madness, Deiotarus of a mistake.15

This is one of the few historical examples, let alone exempla externa, that occur in the Caesarian Speeches.16 It may as well be “highly artificial,” as one commentator has it,17 but it certainly meets the demands of the moment. Caesar, who had 12 See Shackleton Bailey 1971: 224; Mitchell 1991: 287, n. 167; Marinone 2 2004: 216 (B 13) and cf. Vasaly 1993: 34 who dates the speech to 44 bce. 13 See esp. Bringmann 1986: 73, 84 and passim; Kurczyk 2006: 270; Kenty 2020: 117. 14 See for an overview MacKendrick 1995: 439–​441. 15 Tr. N. H. Watts. 16 See Schoenberger 1910: 49; Stinger 1993: 244–​248. 17 See Gotoff 1993: xl.

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recently returned from a journey to the East, would know exactly of which territories Cicero is speaking, even if the latter simplifies the matter by calling them “to-​day our province of Asia.” Moreover, to an experienced general, and a literate man at that, the historical events as crucial as the conclusion of the Roman war with Antiochus the Great would also have been well-​known. Whether or not Cicero did justice to historical truth, however, is another question. The protracted peace negotiations that followed Antiochus’ defeat at Magnesia in 190 bce did not go exactly the way the king expected. According to the terms of the Treaty of Apamea (189/​188 bce), he was forced to surrender all the territories north of the Taurus Mountains.18 Although this had been already demanded by the Scipios during the pre-​battle talks, Antiochus, even after the decisive engagement, was apparently hoping to renegotiate the limit of his boundaries. His hope was frustrated by the effective administration of Cn. Manlius Vulso, L. Cornelius Scipio’s successor in Asia, whose responsibility it was to settle this affair.19 Before the treaty in a revised form had been ratified, the Seleucid side kept arguing over what “the Taurus line” precisely was. They insisted, for instance, that because Pamphylia lies south of the Taurus, it should belong to Antiochus.20 It is therefore a matter of conjecture, at the least, whether the king was indeed pleased with the outcome of the negotiations.21 With this in view, did Cicero embellish considerably on the traditional accounts? By introducing in indirect speech the king’s words “that he had been kindly treated by the Roman people” with the phrase dicere est solitus, the speaker seeks to make an impression as if he was drawing on common knowledge. In his version of the story, Valerius Maximus goes so far as to have the king thank the Roman people for freeing him from “too large a responsibility,”22 18 The main sources include Liv. 37.45.14; Plb. 21.17.3; D.S. 29.10 and App. Syr. 197; cf. on the subject e.g. Magie 1950: 278 f; Schmitt 1964: 44; Heftner 1997: 344, and Grainger 2002: 334. 19 See MRR 1.360, 3.137; Errington 21989: 286 f; Grainger 2002: 345. 20 See Liv. 38.39.17; cf. Kaster 2006: 249. 21 The closest in tone to the Ciceronian passage (except for Valerius Maximus quoted in the next footnote) is perhaps Livy’s account of the Syrian embassy at Rome led by Antipater (37.55.1 f): ii vulgato petentium veniam more errorem fassi regis obtestati sunt patres conscriptos, ut suae potius clementiae quam regis culpae, qui satis superque poenarum dedisset, memores consulerent. Cf. Plb. 21.24.2 with Walbank 1979: 116. 22 See V. Max. 4.1. ext. 9 (tr. D. R. Shackleton Bailey): Antiochus autem, a L. Scipione ultra Taurum montem imperii finibus summotis, cum Asiam provinciam vicinasque ei gentes amisisset, gratias agere populo Romano non dissimulanter tulit, quod nimis magna procuratione liberatus modicis regni terminis uteretur. Cf. 5.3.2; 8.1. damn. 1.

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but what he does, essentially, is to carry Cicero’s exaggeration even further, in order to make his example of moderation more pointed. Some decade earlier Cicero himself, when deploring the annexation of Cyprus in 58 bce, relates the same episode without mentioning Antiochus’ alleged gratitude. From the context of this portion of the Pro Sestio (§ 58 f), however, it would follow that both Antiochus, who had been “defeated […] in a massive conflict over land and sea [terra marique superatum],” and Tigranes of Armenia, with whom the Romans “have recently waged a long and hard war”23 should be thankful for how they were treated.24 Ptolemy, on the other hand, although he had always been a loyal friend and ally of the Roman people, is to be dethroned and his property confiscated. If this reference to the Peace of Apamea is more reliable, there is one roughly contemporary source that twists the facts the other way, so that they fit the arguments of the opposite party. In a letter that Sallust ascribes to Mithridates, the king of Pontus addresses Arsaces XII, king of Parthia, trying to convince him that they should form an alliance against Roman oppression. He recalls, among other things, how “Antiochus w as robb e d of all territory this side of the Taurus […].”25 Of course, Mithridates, as portrayed by Sallust, distorts the facts excessively, as one would expect from a man professing ‘spiritual opposition’ to Rome,26 but his stance is most likely representative of all the eastern monarchs, including the (soon-​to-​be) client kings such as Antiochus, Tigranes27 or even Deiotarus. What the Romans regarded as a generous policy of restoration must have been perceived by the vassal rulers not as a mere act of mercy, but rather as ruthless subjugation. Cicero of course adopts the Roman point of view, in an explicit if somewhat overstated manner. He makes it clear that Deiotarus understands the Roman foreign policy in the East and, as a result, is able to come to terms with the inevitable consequences of his actions.28 Antiochus III, whatever his real sentiments might have been, is fit for an illustrans not only due to the geographical coincidence

2 3 Tr. R. A. Kaster. 24 It is worth noting that, according to Plutarch (Crass. 26.8), M. Licinius Crassus, after his son Publius fell in the battle of Carrhae, encouraged his troops by reminding them that “[i]‌t was not without bloody losses that even Lucullus overthrew Tigranes, or Scipio Antiochus” (tr. B. Perrin), that is, by employing a series of exempla in which the foreign rulers serve as secondary referents. 25 Sal. Hist. 4.69.6 M = 4.60.6 Ramsey (tr. J. T. Ramsey). 26 See McGushin 1994: 178 f. 27 Cf. Sherwin-​White 1984: 193–​195. 28 Cf. Gotoff 1993: 261.

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and similar circumstances of the referents’ downfall, but especially because he was one of the greatest opponents of Rome, a fact stressed by Cicero many times. As compared with him, Deiotarus may have appeared an insignificant figure. In order to show that the king of Galatia bears no hard feelings, the speaker provides an example that, even if historically inaccurate (which is usually the case with exempla), lends credence to his assertion. The argument a fortiori progresses from greater to lesser: if after being forced to cede a fair amount of his possessions Antiochus the Great was satisfied with the outcome of the new settlement, then Deiotarus has far better reason to put up with Caesar’s measures. When juxtaposing the two men, Cicero states explicitly (multo facilius) which one of them had suffered less. What also works to Deiotarus’ advantage, as the speaker implies in the final antithesis, is that he had simply committed a mistake (cf. n. 21) by choosing the wrong side in the Civil War. Unlike Antiochus, he has never been an enemy of the Roman people at large. This time, an exemplum impar is employed near the end of a forensic speech (so far as this term applies to Caesarian Speeches). As Cicero’s practice shows, therefore, the imparia were most suitable for but not limited to deliberative oratory. It is difficult to know, however, what impression could this exemplum make on Caesar. A letter of December 45 bce to Dolabella indicates that Cicero himself did not think highly of the speech as a whole.29 What is more, the outcome of the trial was indecisive in that Caesar had postponed the verdict until after his campaign against the Parthians, which never took place because of a real and successful attempt on his life.30 In fact, if Antiochus ever thanked Scipio the way Cicero suggests, it is uncertain whether he “expressed a bitter, but rhetorically clever irony or a stoic acceptance of a calamity.”31 His appreciation of the Roman clementia was much rather a pose, and we can easily imagine a similar attitude on the part of Deiotarus. It is very likely that Cicero intended this juxtaposition to be slightly ironic, in the hope of making Caesar feel uneasy about his own questionable clemency.32 On the one hand, the argument advanced at the beginning of the peroratio has nothing to do whatsoever with the actual charges and, on the other, Cicero, disappointed with the direction the republic was going, 29 See Cic. Fam. 9.12.2 = 263 SB; cf. Schimdt 1893/​1987: 362; Settle 1962: 268; Gotoff 2002: 266. Contra Nótári 2012: 109 and 2013: 87. 30 See Gotoff 1993: xxxix, 2002: 265. 31 Thus Gotoff 2002: 263. 32 Cf. Gotoff 2002: loc. cit.; Nótári 2012: 106; 2013: 85. Kenty 2020: 74 notes that “If Caesar wants to show consistency with his own character as clemens, he must indulge Cicero.”

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may have been disposed to mock Caesar’s character. If that were the case, Cicero must have assumed the dictator will catch the allusion.33 As a highly sophisticated man, Caesar would not be as easily misled by the use of exempla as an average hearer in the Forum. That is probably one of the reasons why there are only few historical examples in the Caesarian Speeches altogether: apart from allusions to Sulla in the Pro Marcello, the only exemplum proper occurs at Deiot. 31 f.34 Was Cicero’s intention to suggest, by presenting examples from the past precisely near the end of the speech, that this trial is far from the standard of judicial procedure? At any rate, the passage under discussion is an uncommon instance of juxtaposition and the only attested reference to Antiochus the Great as individual exemplum.

8.2. A Subsidiary exemplum As was already noted in the introductory section to this chapter, Antiochus III is usually referred to by Cicero as the object of someone else’s action. For the most part, he features as the fearsome enemy defeated by L. Cornelius Scipio and as such he tends to serve as the secondary illustrans. Even at Deiot. 36, where Antiochus is endowed with agency, his action is merely a consequence of Scipio’s victory (cum postea quam a L. Scipione de v ic tu s ) and when the same episode is brought up in the Pro Sestio, the emphasis is also put on his defeat (Antiochum Magnum illum […] superatum ).35 This was apparently a part of the national history that every Roman was familiar with. Because Antiochus had not directly threatened either the City itself or any adjacent part of Italy, his name never became emblematic. One could argue that this applies equally to Alexander, but, as we saw, the Macedonian king was one of his kind in that with his charismatic personality and wide-​ranging vision he paved the way for the future conquerors and rulers. Not only did Alexander inspire the Romans to emulation, but he also was “a model for the interrogation of power and authority at Rome,” as D. Spencer states.36 By contrast to other eastern monarchs, Alexander’s conquests and system of government has exercised an influence upon shaping the Roman concept of a world empire. For this reason, he appears throughout

3 3 Cf. Kenty 2020: loc. cit. on commiseratio. 34 See above, Section 3.4, n. 69. Cf. van der Blom 2010: 241, 270; Kenty 2020: 13, n. 41, and the references quoted in n. 16 in this subchapter. 35 Cf. Schol. Bob. p. 94 Hildebrandt = 133 St. ad loc.: Hic victus a L. Scipione […]. 36 Spencer 2002: 41.

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Cicero’s writings,37 whereas Antiochus is only mentioned once outside of the orations, in the De oratore (2.75), as introducing Hannibal to the Peripatetic philosopher Phormio (cf. Section 7). Once again, he plays a subordinate role. As is apparent from my discussion of the series of exempla, Cicero takes the same approach when referring to the later Macedonian kings: at Verr. 2.1.55 Philip V is simply described as defeated by T. Quinctius Flamininus; likewise, king Perseus is mentioned twice in connection to the victory won by L. Aemilius Paullus (Verr. 2.1.55 and Cat. 4.21), while at Man. 55 the successful campaign of Pydna is attributed more generally to the maiores; finally, the ancestors are also said to have waged war on both Philip and Perseus (Man. 14 and Leg. Agr. 2.90). I have already cautioned against extrapolating an overall pattern from these data, but with respect to the extant orations a preference for certain historical figures over others to be used as individual exempla can easily be discerned. Most of the abovementioned foreign rulers serve as the secondary illustrantia, and their function is to bring out the military prowess of either a particular Roman commander or the Romans of the past at large. Quintilian accurately explains this phenomenon in his discussion of amplificatio, although the examples he chooses are not entirely in keeping with my previous conclusions: Sic quoque solet ex alio aliud augeri cum Hannibalis bellicis laudibus ampliatur virtus Scipionis, et fortitudinem Gallorum Germanorumque miramur quo sit maior C. Caesaris gloria. Similarly, one thing is often magnified by reference to another: as when Scipio’s valour is amplified by praise of Hannibal’s military qualities, or when we admire the courage of the Gauls and Germans in order to enhance [quo sit maior] Caesar’s glory.38

As for Hannibal, Quintilian’s words aptly describe Cicero’s strategy at Mur. 32 and Cat. 4.21, precisely in two out of three instances where he forms part of a larger catalogue. Normally, however, the Carthaginian leader keeps his own distinct qualities and is not, as opposed to Philip, Perseus, Pseudophilip, and others, simply reduced to a fearsome enemy. There is no way of knowing whether or not any of the foreign rulers, who in the extant speeches only appear in the series, was also employed as individual exemplum elsewhere. From among those mentioned, Perseus of Macedon occurs most frequently in Cicero’s other writings, but almost each time he is referred to as being either defeated or captured by

3 7 Cf. Weippert 1972: 123–​153. 38 Quint. Inst. 8.4.20 as tr. by D. A. Russell.

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L. Aemilius Paullus.39 It is very likely that, as in the case of Antiochus III, anyone from this group would prove an effective individual exemplum only under special conditions. On regular basis, they were used as what can be called ‘subsidiary exempla’, the aim of which was to amplify, as the above passage from Quintilian shows, the primary illustrantia.

39 See Cic. Fin. 5.70, Tusc. 3.53 (cf. 5.118 init.), N.D. 2.6. Cf. also Plut. Cat. Mai. 15.6: ὑιὸς [i.e. Scipio Aemilianus] δὲ Παύλου τοῦ Περσέα καὶ Μακεδόνας καταπολεμήσαντος, and Section 6.3, n. 77.

9. Spartacus as Individual exemplum Cicero makes use of exempla externa on rare occasions when the rhetorical context permits, which is well illustrated on the example of Antiochus III. That is because only those foreign personages who most appealed to the Roman imagination were frequently spoken of and reflected upon outside of a purely historical context. The Roman view on Spartacus is a little more problematic. Since the greatest slave upheaval in Roman history took place in the late 70s bce, its leader could not have been, in Cicero’s lifetime, a firm subject for rhetorical debates, as was the case with Alexander the Great and Hannibal. Also noteworthy is Spartacus’ absence from Valerius Maximus’ Facta et dicta memorabilia, although some episodes of his uprising would fit into at least several chapters. Given that the aspiring orators usually practiced by assuming the role of a famous personage and solving a fictitious dilemma, Spartacus would probably seem a poor choice for this exercise.1 In one of the previous chapters (cf. Section 7.5) we have established that by the time Cicero was active in politics and in the courts Hannibal had already been a stock exemplum. Apparently, that was not the case with Spartacus.2 It does not mean, however, that Cicero and his contemporaries were either completely indifferent to or ignorant of Spartacus. Quite the opposite, especially that the revolt in 73–​71 bce spread throughout Italy and deeply affected the politics at Rome.3 But was it enough to capture the imagination of the Romans? For what it is worth, Spartacus is once mentioned in Cicero’s correspondence within exemplary discourse. During his governorship in Cilicia in 50 bce, Cicero had to deal with an administrative matter that caused him much distress. A certain M. Scaptius, an acquaintance of M. Brutus, had lend money to the inhabitants of Salamis in Cyprus and requested Cicero’s help in recovering the amount due. The 1

2 3

Spartacus would easily fit into the following chapters in V. Max.: 3.2 –​De fortitudine, 7.4 –​ Strategemata, 9.2 –​De crudelitate, 9.6 –​De perfidia, etc. As for the declamations, he occurs only in Sen. Con. 7.2.7, but this is an instance of a series of exempla (discussed above, Section 5.2). If Spartacus was indeed one of the central figures in Sallust’s Histories, as is argued by Gerrish 2012: 119, 125–​134; 2019: 35, 88, 90–​92, it would follow that the rhetoricians active during the Augustan Principate and later paid little attention to this work. On Alexander the Great as exemplum see the essays in Aerts, Gosman 1988 and above, Chapter 6; on Hannibal: Bücher 2006: 218–​220 and above, Chapter 7. The present chapter is a revised version of Pierzak 2018a. Pace van der Blom 2010: 107 f. See e.g. Gerrish 2019: 91 and passim.

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problem was that he insisted on four percent interest on the loan, in accordance with the Roman law, instead of one percent, prescribed by Cicero’s own edict.4 Atticus, who was somehow involved in this affair, urged his friend to provide Scaptius with 50 mounted troops so that he can extract the money. As his answer clearly indicates, Cicero was very upset with this suggestion (Att. 6.2.8 = 116 SB): an tu si mecum esses, qui scribis morderi te interdum quod non simul sis, paterere me id facere si vellem? ‘non amplius’ inquis ‘quinquaginta.’ cum Spartaco minus multi primo fuerunt. quid tandem isti mali in tam tenera insula non fecissent? You tell me it sometimes chafes you that you are not here beside me. Well, supposing you were with me, would you let me do that if I wanted? ‘Not more than fifty’ you say. There were fewer with Spartacus to begin with [cum Spartaco minus multi primo fuerunt]. What damage would they not have done in so vulnerable an island?5

When it comes to the original size of the slave revolt, Florus is the only author whose estimate matches the above. According to other sources, around seventy men accompanied Spartacus at the beginning of his uprising.6 The actual number aside, Cicero’s point is that what is originally a small force, if left unchecked, can quickly bring about real trouble. The historical parallel is not aimed to discredit M. Scaptius through a comparison with Spartacus.7 Rather, though spoken outside of a proper rhetorical context, if slightly modified, these words form an argument from lesser to greater: if fewer troops (minus multi) were with Spartacus, what damage will do a detachment consisting of fifty armed horsemen? By means of historical example, Cicero is able to justify his unwillingness to support Scaptius and, at the same time, to argue against taking the course of action advocated by Atticus. The best way to proceed in this case was by juxtaposition, because, whenever a decision is to be made, exemplum impar is the most effective. As this passage shows, a brief mention of Spartacus suffices to refer the recipient to a narrative easily used for argumentative purposes. The exemplary potential of the slave upheaval will become even more transparent as we move to discuss the orations, where ‘Spartacus’ appears no fewer than four times. 4

See on the subject Oppermann 2000: 182 f. Cf. Schmidt 1893/​1987: 87 and for a more detailed survey of the ‘Salamis affair’ Schlichting 1975: 46–​51. 5 Tr. D. R. Shackleton Bailey, who dates the letter to the “latter part of April (?) 50” bce. 6 See Flor. 3.20.3 (30 or more); cf. Liv. Per. 95 (74); Plut. Crass. 8.2 (78); App. BC 1.539 (ca. 70), and the comment by Jonkers 1959: 38 on Cic. Man. 30: “In 73 seventy-​four of them broke out and had soon multiplied their numbers by many thousands”; for the sources consult e.g. Greenidge, Clay 21960/​1976: 261. 7 See Oppermann 2000: 183 f.

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9.1. Identification Though for obvious reasons Cicero occasionally alludes to the slave revolt in his Verrine orations,8 he refers to Spartacus within exemplary discourse almost exclusively near the end of his career, with the exception of the speech De haruspicum responso of early 56 bce.9 Even after Cicero was recalled from exile, P. Clodius Pulcher still sought to destroy him, among other means by interpreting the divine portents reported somewhere in northern Latium as the result of Cicero’s impiety toward the gods. One of the responses of the soothsayers, who were ordered by the senate to investigate the phenomena, concerned the mismanagement of public games (§ 21: ludos minus diligenter factos pollutosque). According to Cicero, what is meant here are the rites of the Great Mother (4–​10 April) which Clodius superintended as curule aedile.10 The speaker reproaches him for assembling packs of slaves in the theatre, which made it difficult for decent citizens to watch the performances (§ 24). This was in all likelihood a slight exaggeration on Cicero’s part. His rival’s real intent may have been either to emphasize some elements of his propaganda (e.g. criticism of the patrician alleged monopoly of politics) or meet the obligations to his clients.11 Regardless of Clodius’ actual intentions, the Megalesia transformed into a sort of Saturnalia, and the lives of Roman citizens, including some high officials, were threatened.12 Cicero made every effort to ensure that Clodius takes the blame for provoking this incident. First, he compared the crowd to a swarm of bees that, if it invaded the theatre and settled on the benches, would likely have been interpreted by the soothsayers as portending a slave rising (§ 25).13 Next, the speaker recalls that

8 See Cic. Verr. 2.27, 99; 3.125; 4.112 fin. Cf. below, n. 57. 9 See e.g. MacKendrick 1995: 177; Marinone 22004: 119 (B12); Corbeill 2010: 141. 10 See Lenaghan 1969: 114–​117; Frézouls 1982: 205; Kowalski 1983: 90; MRR 2.208, 3.58; Benner 1987: 88; Beacham 1999: 59–​61; Gildenhard 2007: 150 f, and Bellini 2020: 301. Scullard 1981: 98 wrongly dates the event to the year 55 bce. On the Megalesia in general see e.g. the brief outlines by Warde Fowler 1899/​1969: 69–​71 and Beare 31964: 162. 11 On Clodius’ possible political motivations see Benner 1987: 99 and 113; on his obligations towards clientes Benner 1987: 122 (in which case Cicero’s servi would have to be an exaggeration). Mouritsen 2004: 141 f suggests that Clodius had been mobilizing people from the local vici so as to demonstrate his disapproval for the centrality of power at Rome. Cf. Słapek 1995: 88 f, 160. 12 See Lenaghan 1969: 124; Beacham 1999: 59 f. 13 On this portent cf. Plut. Brut. 39.5; Cic. Div. 1.73 fin. with Wardle 2006: 286.

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while presiding over the ludi Megalenses, Clodius had the effrontery to call upon his famous ancestors who gave memorable shows in the past. By Cicero’s reckoning, he held up Athenio or Spartacus as his role models (Har. 26): is mihi etiam generis sui mentionem facit, cum Athenionis aut Spartaci exemplo ludos facere maluerit quam C. aut Appi Claudiorum? illi cum ludos facerent, servos de cavea exire iubebat; tu in alteram servos immisisti, ex altera liberos eiecisti. Does he actually talk to me of his family, after preferring to celebrate his games in the manner of Athenio or Spartacus [Athenionis aut Spartaci exemplo ludos facere maluerit], rather than of Gaius or Appius Claudius? When they celebrated games, they ordered slaves to leave the auditorium: you sent slaves into one auditorium and ejected free men from the other.14

Cicero’s point is that not only does Clodius fail to live up to his exempla domestica,15 his disregard for the Roman customs earns him a place among the leaders of the servile insurrections in Sicily and Campania. But who is Cicero referring to as Gaius and Appius? C. Claudius Pulcher (cos. 92) had as aedile in 99 bce organized magnificent games, renowned especially for elephant combats and theatrical shows enacted on a scene adorned with multiple works of art and thus perfectly imitating real buildings.16 Appius Claudius Pulcher (cos. 79), Clodius’ father, had also put on successful games in his aedileship.17 The historical parallel is reinforced by a deft turn of phrase: the noun ludus, which in plural denotes the public games, may in singular (i.e. ludus gladiatorius) also signify a gladiatorial school.18 Little in this respect can be said

1 4 Tr. D. R. Shackleton Bailey. 15 Cf. Kornhardt 1936: 18 and recently Corbeill 2018: 184 f. 16 See on this event V. Max. 2.4.6; Plin. Nat. 8.19, 35.23; Marshall 1985: 114 on Asc. Pis. 16 f C; Dyck 1996: 444 on Cic. Off. 2.57; Beacham 1999: 12 and 31; on the dates of his consulate and aedileship see MRR 2.1. 17 See MRR 2.21, 24 with n. 8; Fuhrmann 1970–​1982, 5.516; Lenaghan 1969: 125 f ad loc. and cf. Corbeill 2018: 185 who notes that “Cicero praises on two occasions in the Verrines [i.e. 4.6 and 4.133] the games that had been performed in the 90s by Clodius’ uncle, C. Claudius.” 18 See OLD, s.v. 3a and 6b respectively; cf. MacKendrick 1995: 185. In republican period, only the Latin noun munera meant ‘the gladiatorial games/​combats’ (see on the distinction between ludus and munus Ville 1981/​2014: 19 and passim; Słapek 1995: 43–​44, 2010: 442 f; cf. Kuhlmann, TLL 7.2.2.1787.58–​77 for later development). We need to bear in mind, however, that the exemplary discourse consists of parts resembling one another. Cf. Rhet. Her. 4.61 fin.: Non enim res tota totae rei necesse est similis sit, sed id ipsum quod conferetur similitudinem habeat oportet (above, Section

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about Athenio, one of the leaders of the slave insurrection in Sicily in 104–​101 bce.19 As we learn from Florus and Appian, however, after some initial victories in Campania, Spartacus honored the funerals of his own companions after the Roman fashion –​by organizing combats of those taken captive.20 Most scholars believe that what motivated his actions was vengeance. An alternative explanation was offered by R. Kamienik, who maintains that the ludi funebres in honor of Crixus comprised gladiatorial combats because it was customary on such occasions; human sacrifice was part of the funeral rites in many ancient cultures and it served to propitiate the spirits of the dead (di manes in case of the Romans). The two ancient sources that we have (n. 20) disagree on this matter, which means that either Florus or Appian misunderstood Spartacus’ real intentions.21 For Cicero’s purposes, the true motives of the runaway slaves were unimportant, because if such event indeed took place, he could attach to it any meaning he saw fit. The strategy he adopts is twofold: on the one hand, he seeks to undermine Clodius’ exemplum and, on the other, he proposes an alternative illustrans that is more similar to the illustrandum. At some point, Clodius must have compared his ludi to the lavish games his ancestors had given (generis sui mentionem facit). In order to show that this comparison is inappropriate, Cicero employs an exemplum dissimile. The resulting antithesis is well emphasized by D. R. Shackleton Bailey in his translation that I have quoted above: “When they celebrated games, they ordered slaves to leave the auditorium [illi… exire iubebant]: you sent slaves into one auditorium and ejected free men from the other [tu… immisisti, etc.].” In addition to disregarding the examples of Gaius and Appius Claudius, Clodius 2, n. 1) On the “partial” comparison of Sextus Pompeius with Spartacus implied in Sallust’s Histories cf. Gerrish 2015/​2016: 206 and 210. 19 See Kowalski 1983: 90 with n. 21. Cf. Greenidge, Clay 21960/​1976: 104 f. 20 See Flor. 2.8.9: quin defunctorum quoque proelio ducum funera imperatoriis celebravit exsequiis, captivosque circa rogum iussit armis depugnare, quasi plane expiaturus omne praeteritum dedecus, si de gladiatore munerarius fuisset. Cf. App. BC 1.117: ὁ δὲ Σπάρτακος τριακοσίους Ῥωμαίων αἰχμαλώτους ἐναγίσας Κρίξῳ […] and a later elaboration in Oros. 5.24.3. I am unable to detect any trace of these munera in Plut. Crass. 9, where Kowalski 1983: 90, n. 20 has found it. 21 Florus’ account was accepted by Ville 1981/​2014: 13 with n. 42, 229 f with n. 6; that of Appian by Kamienik 1983: 43–​47 (cf. 41 f for the scholarship until the 80s and more recently Słapek 2010: 628 f). Another possibility was suggested by Grünewald 2004: 67, who thinks that Spartacus had adopted the Roman burial customs. On the origins and development of gladiatorial shows in general see e.g. Hopkins 1983: 4–​13; Słapek 1995: 18–​46, 2010: 442–​448; Beacham 1999: 13–​16.

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acts against the custom that forbade slaves from partaking in the ludi Megalenses, a festival that was originally reserved for the upper class.22 The antithesis also helps Cicero to articulate the semantic intention of his own example. The mention of Spartacus in connection with Clodius’ mismanagement of public games would easily lead the audience to think of the funeral games held in honor of Crixus.23 In this context, the ludi given by Clodius would be seen as a reenactment of the infamous episode of the slave revolt. The actions performed by the protagonists of these two scandals were not, of course, analogical in every respect. Cicero’s main focus (tertium comparationis) was the “line-​up” of the spectators. Since there is only a subtle allusion to the funeral of Crixus, the universal proposition of the exemplum totum simile is merely implied: 1. D = B: Spartacus gave funeral games at which slaves were the spectators 2. D = A: the games given by Spartacus were disgraceful, therefore 3: B = A: whenever slaves are the spectators, it is disgraceful. The opening premise is that it was disgraceful when Spartacus allowed the slaves to watch the Romans engage in single combat (D = A). Through a mediated generalization (‘whenever slaves are the spectators, it is disgraceful’, B = A) it leads to the conclusion that it was equally disgraceful when among the followers of Clodius many slaves entered the cavea: 1. C = B: if Clodius celebrated public games at which slaves were the spectators 2. B = A: and whenever slaves are the spectators, it is disgraceful, then 3. C = A: the games celebrated by Clodius was a disgrace. By saying Spartaci exemplo ludos facere maluerit, therefore, Cicero adjusts ‘the meaning in itself ’ of the past event to his ‘semantic intention’ (Ernstbedeutung): ‘it is outrageous that a curule aedile allows slaves to partake in public games’. On a

22 See e.g. Warde Fowler 1899/​1969: 70; Kowalski 1983: 90, n. 19; Marshall 1985: 249: “The context in that speech is designed to draw attention to the contrast between the sort of people who attended the Megalesian Games nor ma l ly, and those who attended the games w hen conduc te d by C lo dius” (emphasis added); Benner 1987: 122 f. 23 See the comments by Lenaghan 1969: 128: “The comparison not only alludes to the fact that Spartacus too was the leader of an army of slaves, but it may also be a specific reference to the funeral games which he gave in honor of Crixos, at which games he made Roman captives fight in gladiatorial contests (App. BC 2.117 [misprinted for 1.117]; Flor. 2.8.9)” and Stampacchia 1976: 46: “Un’allusione a questi giochi [in onore di Crisso –​D.P.] è in una fonte non specifica, Cicerone (har. resp. 26).”

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more universal, rhetorical level, the argument based on historical parallel helps him to rebut the interpretation of the soothsayers’ response that Clodius had offered earlier.24 I have noted in passing that the means whereby Cicero challenged the historical example employed by Clodius should be understood as (exemplum) dissimile. This argument was considered under the heading ‘Identification’ for the sake of convenience, as it complemented the exemplum totum simile involving Spartacus. What the other references to Spartacus in Cicero’s extant orations have in common is that they all occur in the Philippics and, very tellingly, all can be subsumed under the same category. One of Cicero’s objectives in the so-​called third Philippic was to urge the senate to declare Antony enemy of the state (hostis rei publicae) –​something which Cicero will constantly insist upon, as we already know. The speaker assumes, on the basis of a tertium non datur reasoning, that one of the opposing leaders –​either Octavian or Antony –​ has to be proclaimed as such. The latter had convened the senate in the temple of the Capitoline Jupiter on November 28 (the speech was delivered on December 20). He was about to propose that Octavian be declared public enemy, but upon receiving the news that the Fourth Legion had joined “the revolt,” he apparently dared not bring out the matter.25 According to Cicero, that amounts to a confession of guilt, since one of the leaders of the two mutually hostile Roman armies deserves the classification hostis.26 Then, the speaker reports what Antony had earlier announced in his edicts: “He [Antony] calls him [Octavian] a Spartacus [Spartacum appellat] in his edicts, but in the Senate he dares not so much as call him a criminal.”27 Cicero goes on to scorn not only the contents of the

2 4 Cf. Kumaniecki 1959 = 1967: 220 f = 1973: 317–​319; Corbeill 2010: 145 f. 25 See Frisch 1946: 152 f, 159; Gelzer 1969: 370; Mitchell 1991: 305 f; Stinger 1993: 259. 26 Wooten 1983: 58–​62 classifies this type of argumentation as ‘the disjunctive mode’ whereby the speaker offers a simple and clear choice. He further suggests that the political context of Phil. 3 resembles that of Demosthenes’ Olynthiacs, in that both Athens and Rome gained an unexpected ally against the common threat (Philip of Macedon and Mark Antony respectively). On Cicero’s Demosthenic inspirations (esp. from the Olynthiacs) see Weische 1972: 99–​112 and passim; Wooten 1983: loc. cit.; Stroh 1982. On this particular Ciceronian syllogism cf. Cic. Phil. 4.8: si consul Antonius, Brutus hostis; si conservator rei publicae Brutus, hostis Antonius quoted also by Quint. Inst. 9.3.86 and Isid. Orig. 2.21.11 as an example of ἀντιμεταβολή. 27 Cic. Phil. 3.21 = Ant. orat. 21 (2ORF, p. 476 = FRL 3.262 f). Tr. G. Manuwald. Cf. Jal 1963: 69, n. 9.

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edicta28 but also their language that makes it impossible for anyone to understand the message. To finish his opponent off, Cicero points out that Antony’s teacher of rhetoric was given 2,000 iugera of land so as to make Antony even duller than he already is.29 At first glance, it appears as if the name ‘Spartacus’ was simply used as a byword for the enemy of the state. It is worth noting that in one of Cicero’s philosophical treatises, nearly contemporary with Phil. 3, similar imagery comes into play. Namely, in his Paradoxa Stoicorum, written in the spring of 45 bce, Cicero argues that only a sage is a citizen, and every fool is like an exile (Paradoxon 5). This proposition is closely connected to the previous paradox, “that every fool is insane” (4: ῞Οτι πᾶς ἄφρων μαίνεται). The imaginary opponent in the dialogue is of course Clodius, whose list of crimes at one point Cicero rounds off in the following way (Parad. 27): “You have perpetrated a massacre in the forum, and occupied the temples with bands of armed ruffians; you have set on fire the temples of the gods and the houses of private citizens. If you are a citizen, in what sense was Spartacus an enemy?” (Caedem in foro fecisti, armatis latronibus templa tenuisti, privatorum domos, aedes sacras incendisti. Cur hosti s Spar tacu s, si tu civ i s?). The Latin sentence which I have just emphasized conforms to the principles of the third Stoic mode.30 For someone like Cicero, who had been hailed as the father of his country and few years later was forced to leave his homeland, the question of what it means to be either a citizen or an exile must have been crucial.31 He probably wrestled with such thoughts very soon after his return to Rome,32 and even then his 28 There seems to be no mention of those edicts elsewhere (Manuwald 2007: 401; Lintott 2008: 387) except, perhaps, for Suet. Aug. 4.2 (verum idem Antonius […] obicit) and 68 (M. Antonius adoptionem avunculi stupro meritum [sc. insectatus est]), cf. Gelzer 1969: loc. cit. 29 On this allegation see also Cic. Phil. 2.43, 101 with Ramsey 2003: 225 f; 3.22; cf. Suet. Rhet. 5 with Bonner 1977: 74 and Kaster 1995: 311–​313; Koster 1980: 130. 30 1) Not both: you are an enemy and a citizen, 2) You are an enemy, 3) Therefore, you are not a citizen, as demonstrated by Wallach 1990: 181. Cf. also my discussion of Cic. Phil. 5.25a (“was Hannibal an enemy and is Antonius a citizen?” [ergo Hannibal hostis, civis Antonius?]) above, Section 7.4. For Parad. 27 I have quoted the translation of C. R. Edmonds. 31 Cf. Kumaniecki 1957 = 1967: 189–​207, 1977b: 335–​336; Kurczyk 2006: 330–​332. 32 Kumaniecki 1957 = 1967: 203 quotes Cic. Dom. 72: Hunc tu etiam, o portentosa pestis, exulem appellare ausus es, cum tantis sceleribus esses et flagitiis notatus, ut omnem locum, quo adisses, exilii simillimum redderes? Quid est enim exul? Ipsum per se nomen calamitatis, non turpitudinis. Quando igitur est turpe? Re vera cum est poena peccati.

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discessus33 must have still caused him much distress. One way of consoling himself would be to reevaluate traditional vocabulary, so that he could swap roles with Clodius, the driving force behind Cicero’s exile. In the dialogue, the comparison with Spartacus serves to demonstrate that an exile is not the one forced to physically leave one’s homeland, but a person who acts to the detriment of the state. With this backdrop, let us shift our focus to the third Philippic. Both from a legislative and philosophical point of view, at least one of the leaders, either Octavian or Antony, should be considered an outlaw.34 The name of Spartacus, as we saw, could easily spring to mind in such context. For his part, Mark Antony as consul in office had every reason to portray the soldiers enlisted into the fourth and the Martian legions as deserters who went over to Octavian. Since the latter was usurping power that truly belonged to Antony, and led the army of men who have violated their allegiance, it must have seemed convenient to call him by the name of an archetype of deserter, Spartacus of Thrace, who used to serve in the Roman auxiliaries before he became a gladiator.35 However, because we do not have the text of Antony’s edict at our disposal, but only Cicero’s testimony, it is difficult to reconstruct his original thought process. Cicero’s phraseology (Spartacum appellat) may lead us to believe that Octavian was simply referred to as ‘Spartacus’ by way of a reversed antonomasia. Even if Antony’s statement indeed took the form ‘b = a, or a’, it does not preclude its exemplary function, especially given the socio-​political context which I have just described. What Antony still wanted to achieve by the end of December was to have Octavian declared hostis. The imagery surrounding the slave leader suited his goal:36

3 3 34

35

36

Cf. Cic. Q. fr. 3.2.2 = 22 SB and Robinson 1994b: 475–​477 with n. 5; Dyck 2004: 309 who also (in n. 44) link this passage to the Paradoxa Stoicorum. Cf. above, Section 7.3 with n. 100 and 101. Cf. Cic. Phil. 4.2: neque enim, Quirites, fieri potest ut non aut ei [sc. C. Iulius Caesar Octavianus, D. Iunius Brutus] sint impii qui contra consulem exercitus comparaverunt, aut ille [sc. M. Antonius] hostis contra quem iure arma sumpta sunt, and Gelzer 1969: 370: “Der Consul, der in den Edicten Caesar als Spartacus bezeichnete, wagte nicht, ihn im Senat als hostis zu behandeln; folglich bekannte er sich selbst als hostis (21).” See e.g. App. BC 1.116: […] ἐστρατευμένος ποτὲ Ῥωμαίοις […]; Flor. 2.8.8: nec abnuit ille de stipendiario Thrace miles, de milite des e r tor, inde latro, deinde in honorem virium gladiator; Bradley 1989: 122; Seager 72006: 221; Schiavone 2013: 20–​24. Kenty 2020: 173 points out that Cicero conveniently suppresses the fact that “the legions had really mutinied and deserted Antony in favor of Octavian.” It is tempting to see in his propaganda a direct reference to Cicero’s earlier abuse of Clodius. After all, Antony was by that time the husband of Fulvia, Clodius’ widow,

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1. D = B: Spartacus had once raised an army of slaves/​deserters 2. D = A: Spartacus was an enemy of the state (hostis), therefore 3: B = A: whoever raises an army of slaves/​deserters is an enemy of the state. In the premise of the historical parallel he had drawn he must have implied that Spartacus, because he raised an army of slaves posing a threat to the republic, was an enemy of the state (D = A). Through a mediated generalization, that ‘whoever raises an army of slaves/​deserters is an enemy of the state’ (B = A), he would have concluded that Octavian is a hostis, because his troops were levied in an unlawful manner:37 1. C = B: if Octavian had raised an army of deserters 2. B = A: and whoever raises an army of slaves/​deserters is an enemy of the state, then 3. C = A: Octavian is an enemy of the state (hostis). Although the proper name Cicero quotes seems to be our only clue as to how Antony’s example should be understood, it is the context of this quotation that reveals his semantic intention. As will soon become clear, however, mentioning Spartacus did not, in the end, pay off for Antony. At any rate, in Phil. 3 the leader of the slave revolt is not the illustrans of Cicero’s example but of the one which his opponent had used to deprecate Octavian. Partly to rehabilitate Octavian’s name and partly to tarnish Antony’s, Cicero availed himself of the Spartacus imagery on the next day, when he gave an account of the decrees either sanctioned or proposed by the senate at the contio (the so-​ called fourth Philippic).38 Cicero asserts that the Roman people consented with the patres in declaring Antony public enemy, and endorsed the actions undertaken by Octavian, D. Brutus, the fourth and Martian legions, and the entire province of Gallia citerior. After the fashion of a general addressing his troops, Cicero goes on to beseech the audience more passionately. He keeps saying that whom he had married in 46 bce, not long before the Paradoxa Stoicorum was published. Regardless of whether or not Antony himself was on good terms with Clodius, both were pursuing similar policies. See e.g. Babcock 1965: 15–​17; Appel 2016: 147, 152 f. Cf. Kenty 2020: 195. 37 Cf. Manuwald 2007: 402: “Applying this term to Octavian therefore suggests that he, a private citizen, has organized a troop of armed bandits and thereby threatens the res publica and its legitimate rulers.” A somewhat different view is held by Stampacchia 1976: 110. She considers Antony’s propaganda an attempt to highlight his own faithfulness to the traditional values. 38 See Pina Polo 1989: 311 (no. 362).

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they are facing a man who (as opposed to Sulla?) renounces peace and negotiations, who has forfeited his citizenship, and therefore is capable of virtually everything (Phil. 4.15 init.): “So, Men of Rome, the whole conflict lies between the Roman people, the conqueror of all nations, and an assassin, a bandit, a Spartacus [cum Spartaco].”39 Antony, the speaker continues, is even worse than Catiline,40 for the latter recruited soldiers when he needed them, and the former was abandoned by those who were entrusted to him.41 In this way, Cicero manages to beat Antony at his own game: on the previous day he rendered the exemplum disseminated by the latter’s edicta null and void; now, when speaking at the contio, he presented his opponent as worse than Sulla, with whom it was not impossible to reach a peaceful settlement because, in his own way, he respected republican institutions (§ 14: qui haberet […] rationem aliquam […] pacis et foederis). Antony, by contrast, shows no signs of conciliatory attitude and is characterized by an utmost cruelty and the lack of credibility (in quo est incredibilis crudelitas, fides nulla). On the face of it, we could simply take ‘Spartacus’ as reversed antonomasia, used in place of such characteristics as treachery, cruelty, and perfidy. If that were the case, the speaker’s aim with the phrase cum Spartaco would be to qualify the target with the traits that I have just listed.42 There is, however, an alternative interpretation, even if a little presumptive. As we tie up all the loose ends, the present situation becomes reminiscent of an episode from the slave uprising. We learn from Appian that Spartacus, aware and afraid of Pompey’s approach, was willing to negotiate peace terms with M. Licinius Crassus, but his offer was rejected.43 It might seem a far-​fetched

3 9 Here and below tr. D. R. Shackleton Bailey. Rev. by Ramsey, Manuwald 2009. 40 The comparison with Catiline rests on the assumption that unlike the ancestors, who fought against external enemies for the benefit of the commonwealth, they (i.e. Antony and Catiline) are both undermining the foundations of their own res publica. See Stinger 1993: 261 and Bücher 2006: 255, 313. On Catiline as an exemplum of evil well established by that time cf. Robinson 1986: 157 f, 160 f. 41 Lintott 2008: 388 points out that the fourth Philippic resembles in character the second Catilinarian as both are directed against “the enemy in retreat.” On the rhetorical context see Wooten 1983: 68–​70 and on the historical background e.g. Frisch 1946: 163 f; Gelzer 1969: 372 f. In her introduction to the speech Manuwald 2007: 463–​485 discusses in detail the issues of both form and contents. 42 Such view would be close to that of Manuwald 2007: 531. 43 See App. BC 1.120: Διὰ δὲ τὴν χειροτονίαν τήνδε καὶ Κράσσος, ἵνα μὴ τὸ κλέος τοῦ πολέμου γένοιτο Πομπηίου, πάντα τρόπον ἐπειγόμενος ἐπεχείρει τῷ Σπαρτάκῳ, καὶ ὁ Σπάρτακος, τὸν Πομπήιον προλαβεῖν ἀξιῶν, ἐς συνθήκας τὸν Κράσσον προυκαλεῖτο.

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association,44 but let us assume for the sake of argument that the audience had detected the semantic intention. In that case, the illustrans and illustrandum do not perform any action, but are the objects thereof.45 On hearing the name ‘Spartacus’, the audience would gather that he too was a person with whom the Romans refused to negotiate: 1. D = B: Spartacus revolted against the republic 2. D = A: Spartacus was denied peace talks, therefore 3: B = A: whoever revolts against the republic is denied peace talks. Then, the universal proposition that ‘whoever revolts against the republic is denied peace talks’ (B = A) being revealed to them, it would lead up to the conclusion that Antony’s actions are to be classified under to the same category: 1. C = B: if Antony revolts against the republic 2. B = A: and whoever revolts against the republic is denied peace talks, then 3. C = A: Antony should be denied peace talks. As has been already noted, the semantic intention behind this reference is not easily unfolded,46 but I think it can be extrapolated from the previous passage, where Cicero first enumerates Antony’s malicious designs,47 and next calls attention to his lack of fides –​a quality indispensable for any negotiations. Antony is

44

4 5 46

47

ὑπερορώμενος δ᾽ ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ διακινδυνεύειν τε ἔγνω […]. Cf. Cic. Phil. 13.20 f; Epstein 1987: 71. The present interpretation may gain support from the fact that the Emperor Tiberius seems to have used Spartacus’ exemplum in a similar fashion, when he turned down an offer of negotiations from Tacfarinas (Tac. An. 3.73): ne Spartaco quidem post tot consularium exercituum cladis inultam Italiam urenti […] datum ut pacto in fidem acciperetur. See on the subject Woodman, Martin 1996: 483 ad loc. and Grünewald 2004: 54. Cf. above, Section 1, n. 4. Cf. recently Dziuba 2016: 193: “This strongly rhetorized sentence […] is full of pathos and captures the emotions of the speaker, but does not help in understanding the semantic context of the epithet Spartacus.” In describing the word ‘Spartacus’ as “epithet,” however, she seems to have taken it in the same sense in which I understand the reversed antonomasia. See also Opelt 1965: 133, 135; van der Blom 2010: 109. See Cic. Phil. 4.14: hic vester hostis vestram rem publicam oppugnat, ips e habet nullam ; senatum, id est orbis terrae consilium, delere gestit, ips e con silium public um nullum habet ; aerarium vestrum exhausit, suum non habet. nam concordiam civium qui habere potest, nullam c um habet c iv itatem? Note that the expressions which I have highlighted might, in the eyes of the Romans, be assigned to Spartacus as well as to Antony.

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to be seen as another Spartacus, and with such men the Romans should handle with arms and not with words. It seems that Spartacus, rather than being a stock exemplum, was called upon by various politicians on specific occasions for propaganda purposes. Cicero had associated Spartacus with Clodius at least twice, and this might have prompted Mark Antony (Phil. 3; cf. n. 36) to use the negative connotations of the slave leader against Octavian. This, in turn, provoked Cicero’s response in his fourth Philippic where he characterizes Antony as ‘a Spartacus’. Upon closer inspection, this semantically obscure reference can be interpreted as exemplum (totum) simile whereby Cicero seeks to establish his opponent, in place of Octavian, as the true counterpart of Spartacus. The process of assimilating Mark Antony to Spartacus culminates in the last passage to be discussed in this chapter. One of Cicero’s objectives in his thirteenth Philippic was to refute M. Lepidus’ proposal to make peace with Antony.48 The speaker’s attitude towards those two men varies considerably: he shows due respect to the newly elected highest priest (pontifex maximus; cf. Section 1.1, n. 51), but cuts Antony to ribbons, several times calling him a “gladiator’s leader.”49 The speaker is deeply convinced that the senators, informed about the contents of Antony’s letter to Octavian and Aulus Hirtius (above, Section 7.3), will turn down any offer of settlement. Cicero therefore proceeds by quoting the letter line by line with running commentary. In one section, Antony expressed his delight at the death of C. Trebonius, whom he called a criminal for taking part in the conspiracy against Caesar,50 to which Cicero retorted (Phil. 13.22 fin.): “Spartacus! [O Spartace!] What better name to call you by? Your abominable crimes make Catiline look tolerable by contrast in retrospect.” He adds that should Trebonius indeed be called sceleratus, it would be because on the Ides of March he kept Antony away from the Curia, thus preventing his death.

4 8 See e.g. Ramsey 2010: 159 f and passim. 49 Cicero was very fond of gladiatorial imagery altogether, but his use thereof in the orations is generic and not necessarily connected with Spartacus. This device had been examined in detail by Słapek 2016 on the example of references to L. Antonius as gladiator in the Philippics (but see p. 169, n. 15 and 175, n. 36 on Antony). Cf. Jal 1963: 69; Imholtz 1972 on the Pro Sexto Roscio; Axer 1989 on the Pro Milone, Thurn 2018: 228 f with n. 520 and passim, and now Kenty 2020: 193. On the political context of the speech see Frisch 1946: 248–​255 and Huzar 1978: 107 f. See also Gerrish 2012: 159–​163 on Antony as latro, gladiator, and Spartacus respectively. 50 Cf. Ramsey 2010: 167.

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Once again, Cicero brings Catiline to the stage.51 Unlike in the previous case, when he drew a parallel between the current state of affairs and the crisis of 63 bce, with himself in the role of the man of the hour, however, this time no similar implication is intended. Instead, the audience is expected to focus on Catiline’s personal traits.52 The same applies to Spartacus, as it would be difficult to compare Antony’s delight at the death of Trebonius with any episode of or particular action undertaken during the bellum servile. Here, the Thracian gladiator is a byname for a villain and a criminal in general.53 The passage in question does not count as exemplum proper, because without a universal proposition it does not refer the recipient to a historical narrative comparable to the present situation. Technically, Catiline forms part of a similitudo (Catilina tolerabilior est quam tu), whereas Spartacus is clearly referred to by way of a reversed antonomasia. With his “abominable crimes” (nefanda scelera) Antony had outdone even the infamous conspirator, so that the only fitting name for him is that of the leader of slave insurrection. The close association between the paragon and target is signaled through the words “what better name to call you by” (quem enim te potius appellem). What we have here is a very well-​calculated strategy aimed at character assassination, for we have seen that a few paragraphs later (§ 25) Cicero addresses Antony as a ‘latter-​day Hannibal’ (nove Hannibal), meaning that he is as unreliable as Hannibal but far less capable. At this point, we are (or at least should be) already convinced that Antony has much more in common with the leader of the gladiators. Like Spartacus, but as distinct from Hannibal, he does not have an entire state on his side, which makes him an ordinary outlaw and rebel. It is always difficult to detect irony in one-​or two-​word phrases, especially for us (modern) readers, as we know nothing of Cicero’s intonation and gestures. Basing on the context of these two passages, however, we may fairly assume that the speaker was more serious when calling Antony ‘Spartacus’ and less serious when applying to him the name ‘Hannibal’. In other words, he availed himself of

51 Cf. Thurn 2018: 229, n. 520: “in 13.22 bezeichnet Cicero Antonius gar als Spartacus und verknüpft diesen Höhepunkt des gladiator-​Vorwurfes auch zugleich mit einem Vergleich mit Catilina.” 52 Cf. Bücher 2006: 313: “Diese Mal dient die Erwähnung Catilinas weniger als exemplum für die Bedrohung des Gemeinwesen, sondern mehr, um die chara kterlichen Zü ge der Durchtriebenheit und Rücksichtlosigkeit eines Antonius hervorzuheben” (emphasis added). According to Kenty 2020: 98 Cicero saw his comparisons of Antony to Catiline as a “self-​fulfilling prophecy.” 53 Cf. Opelt 1965: 145; Kowalski 1983: 93.

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the reversed antonomasia by comparison in the former and by contrast in the latter case.

9.2. An exemplum in the Making? The exempla adduced by Cicero at Har. 26 and Deiot. 36 are both innovative to the extent that the historical figures they feature (if we discount the series of exempla) appear to have been employed for that purpose for the first time. In each case, the matter under dispute bore so close a resemblance to a certain episode of the Servile War and the war with the king of Syria respectively that the analogy must have virtually imposed itself upon the speaker. Neither Spartacus nor Antiochus III had up until then been a stock example, but the latter, as I have tentatively suggested, had been what might be called a subsidiary exemplum, a recurrent element in the catalogues of foreign rulers.54 In his speech On the Answers of the Haruspices, moreover, Cicero’s historical parallel seems to have been tailored specifically for the occasion. By comparing his opponent to Spartacus, the speaker called to question Clodius’ claim that he is following the example set by his ancestors. What makes this argument from the past particularly strong and unique is that by associating Clodius with a foreign instead of the native example he claimed, Cicero estranges Clodius from the Romans and their mos maiorum. The socio-​political tensions that followed the assassination of Julius Caesar gave rise to a struggle for power between his former lieutenant and his adoptive son. When Antony’s consulship was over, neither of them had a legitimate right to command a Roman army, but both acted as if they had. On either side it could easily be argued that the other camp is rebelling against the republic and this was a contest in which a deft political calumny could tip the scales. Mark Antony was quicker to seize the opportunity. By attaching the name ‘Spartacus’ to Octavian in his edicts, he sought to stamp his opponent as an outlaw leading an army of deserters. This may have been a clever move, as Cicero thought it worthwhile first to ridicule this comparison in front of the senate and then, on the next day (Phil. 4 delivered on the contio), to turn Antony’s own weapon against him. Both of them were most likely employing Spartacus as exemplum totum simile. Given their goals, this tells 54 Spartacus, however, may have joined the catalogues later, cf. n. 1 above and Bradley 1989: 131: “By the time of Horace, Spartacus had become one of Rome’s canonical enemies of the past, to be numbered with Porsenna and Hannibal and assuming mythical proportions.”

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us something about the way in which the Romans of the late republic viewed Spartacus –​as a treacherous and perfidious villain.55 If my interpretations are correct, they must have been also familiar with the course of the Servile War, because otherwise Cicero’s allusions would be unintelligible. The characterization of Mark Antony as a gladiator resonates throughout the Philippics (n. 49),56 but whether or not some of these assaults were intended as indirect references to Spartacus is hard to tell (cf. n. 57). Either way, in one of his last extant speeches (Phil. 13.22) Cicero simply identifies the two men by way of a reversed antonomasia. It is noteworthy that whenever the speaker compares Antony with Spartacus, he does so by identification, whereas each time Hannibal is invoked, he is contrasted with Antony. The fact that in almost all the passages examined above the semantic intention (Ernstbedeutung) is merely implied seems to indicate that ‘Spartacus’ was at least to some degree appropriated by the Romans.57 His absence from the works of later authors such as Valerius Maximus is therefore all the more puzzling because Livy, one of the latter’s main sources, dealt with the subject of the slave upheaval in at least three books of the Ab urbe condita.58 Spartacus’ later “disappearance” from exemplary discourse may have something to do with the way in which Cicero used him as exemplum externum. Several factors should be considered: 1) unlike Alexander the Great and Hannibal, he did not have at his service anyone who would tell his story;59 2) the abovementioned historical figures, though non-​Roman (or even un-​Roman), were highly esteemed as generals appointed by their own people. Spartacus, by contrast, was a constant reminder 5 5 Cf. Stampacchia 1976: 108; van der Blom 2010: 113. 56 Cf. Słapek 2016: 170, n. 18: “[…] gladiatorial theatrics did not appear ad hoc, but was a rather carefully considered matter and it represented the implementation of a certain concept.” 57 From among the other passages quoted by Sauer 1909/​1910: 17, however, only Verr. 3.125 and 5.5 concern both slave revolts, thus referring to him indirectly, while the rest focuses on Athenio. See also Kowalski 1983: passim; Gerrish 2012: 123 with n. 145 and 124. At any rate, the references that occur in the Verrine orations are closely tied to the historical background of the case, and therefore not strictly exemplary. 58 Liv. Per. 95–​97 (cf. above, n. 54). On the sources of Valerius Maximus see e.g. Bosch 1929; Helm 1939, 1940; Maslakov 1984: 457–​461; Lucarelli 2007: passim. 59 Gerrish 2012: 129 (see also more recently Gerrish 2019: 82, 88–​92) argues that, unlike e.g. Pompey the Great and Sertorius, “Spartacus does not have the luxury of worrying about his memoria. He is unable to help his own historiographical cause.” The picture of the slave leader as we know it, she suggests, we owe to a large degree to Sallust’s Histories.

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of the prolonged slave insurrection that brought shame on many a Roman general;60 3) it seems that Spartacus only started becoming a rhetorical exemplum when the freedom of speech had already been in decline; 4) finally, Cicero was a poor source for the Facta et dicta memorabilia in this regard, because whenever he referred to Spartacus in exemplary manner, his semantic intention was not explicit. That was not the case with Antiochus the Great at Deiot. 36, a passage that Valerius Maximus had reworked and readily incorporated into his oeuvre. As Cicero’s practice shows, Spartacus could be used very effectively as exemplum, but this was still an exemplum “in the making,” one which was probably seen as unfit for the series comprising foreign enemies, and insufficiently popular and/​ or interesting for the declaimers.

60 See Gerrish 2015/​2016: passim (e.g. 194–​198) on the seriousness of the Spartacus War.

10. Conclusions The Romans had a clear idea of which native examples (domestica) to imitate and which to avoid, because by following the old ways (mos maiorum) they have obtained a sense of what is right and what is wrong, and they felt a moral obligation to live up to their ancestors (Section 1.1). Even though some past actions were variously evaluated by different observers, an experienced speaker, depending on the kind of audience he was addressing, could either approve or disapprove thereof so as to meet the audience’s expectations, as was shown on the example of Cicero’s references to the Gracchi (Section 3.2). If we accept that one is naturally predisposed to assess whether or not certain mode of conduct violates the existing rules only within one’s own cultural environment, the use of exempla externa is less straightforward, because an average Roman would not be equally confident about how a foreign person should have acted under specific conditions. On top of that, the Romans were notoriously prejudiced towards other nations, and they tended, to put the matter simply, to perceive those who were above them in terms of learning as weak and arrogant, and those less culturally developed as savage and ignorant. The division of the world population into Romans and non-​Romans, as an extension of the dichotomy between the Greeks and barbarians, was first enunciated by Aelius Aristides in the second century ce,1 but, if not articulated expressis verbis, it certainly harkens back to the republican times. We can hardly blame them for this attitude, for, as J. P. V. D. Balsdon2 wrote with regard to the Roman criticism of Greeks, “there is always a temptation to criticize the foreigner on the ground that his habits are not the same as your own.” Depending on rhetorical context, Cicero either endorsed this division or sought to blur it. So, for instance, when prosecuting Verres, he portrayed his own witnesses as “the good Greeks,” whereas in his speech Pro Flacco he attacked mercilessly those who testified against his client (mainly “Greeks” from Asia Minor).3 This approach was aptly described by Quintilian (Inst. 11.1.89): See Ael. Ar. Orat. 14.63 (=Ad Romam); cf. Walbank 1972 = 1985: 74; Balsdon 1979: 30. 2 Balsdon 1979: 41. 3 See Schol. Bob. p. 33 Hildebrandt = 94 St.; cf. e.g. Guite 1962: 146; Balsdon 1979: 40; Classen 1982: 159 (for more references) and 1985: 185; Zetzel 2003: 120 and passim. On the trial of Verres see Dyck 2008b: 152 who also refers to Vasaly 1993: 205–​218. 1

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Quod ad nationes exteras pertinet, Cicero varie: detracturus Graecis testibus fidem doctrinam his concedit ac litteras, seque eius gentis amatorem esse profitetur, Sardos contemnit, Allobrogas ut hostis insectatur. As to foreign nations [quod ad nationes exteras pertinet], Cicero’s practice varies. If he is to discredit Greek witnesses, he grants them learning and literature, and says he is a lover of Greece. Sardinians on the other hand he despises, the Allobroges he attacks as the enemies of Rome.4

As we saw in the subchapter “The Post-​exile Period” (Section 5.3), Cicero’s reproval of the Sardinians in the Pro Scauro was calculated. In the opening sections of the extant text, he emphasized the Greek predilection for deceit and literary fiction precisely because his aim was to dismiss the Greek exempla, which means, by implication, that ‘positive’ foreign examples could be successfully employed in Roman oratory. A question arises whether exempla externa was indeed an effective means of persuasion. It goes without saying that unless they served their purpose, Cicero would refrain from citing exempla externa.5 Little beyond that can be ascertained without wandering into speculation. There are two main reasons for this difficulty: 1) there is no way of knowing how the audience responded to particular exempla,6 and 2) even if we know that the speech as a whole was successful, we cannot be sure to what extent any specific argument contributed to its success. Admittedly, M. P. Martin has recently shown7 that six out of eight Philippic orations where Cicero manipulated historical exempla were successful, and four out of five where there was no such manipulation were unsuccessful, but the same approach would not be equally valid in the present study, which covers almost the entire career of Cicero and a wide range of different kinds of speeches. The outcome of some of those cases (which is also true of some of the Philippics) depended more on the political atmosphere than on the speaker’s performance. Therefore, it seems more to the point to ask what was the best way of using exempla externa and what was their function in a given rhetorical 4 Tr. D. A. Russell. Cf. Walbank 1972 = 1985: 68. 5 Cf. Russell 1981: 97. 6 See Stemmler 2000: 148 with n. 21. Kenty’s (2020: 15) general remark is especially relevant here: “We usually operate without any evidence as to how Cicero’s contemporaries reacted to his strategies, or which of them were particularly successful or not; we can analyze our own reactions and assessments, but in the absence of the original political context and belief system, we cannot reconstruct the contemporary reception(s) of the speeches.” 7 See Martin 2013: 129 f.

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context. In what follows, I will address these issues by looking at several aspects of Cicero’s references to foreign historical figures. Here, I speak of broadly conceived ‘references’ because, as we saw, alongside that of exemplum they can take the shape of a reversed antonomasia.

10.1. Similarity and Dissimilarity between Referents As rhetorical theory cannot be always reconciled with and applied to practical oratory, the methodology proposed in the First Part of this book does not pretend to be perfect, but it has proved useful as a descriptive tool for classifying different types of exempla. Whenever a foreign historical figure is invoked by a speaker for other than narrative purposes, that is, to provide evidence extra causam,8 that person is compared to someone involved in the matter under dispute.9 Depending on the degree of similarity between the referents, such a comparison is intended to show that, as regards their actions or character, they are either the same (identification), unequal (juxtaposition), or the opposite of one another (contrast). Given that to Cicero’s audience the non-​Romans were on average less known than their national heroes or “villains” on the one hand, and they were usually portrayed in a stereotypical manner, on the other, certain characteristics and modes of behavior associated with them would easily be recognized as divergent from the traditional Roman values. By linking a Roman with a foreigner, therefore, the speaker can demonstrate, for instance, that the former acts in a similar fashion or even worse than a non-​Roman had acted in the past. Drawing a parallel between the two can also enable the speaker to expose his target’s evil intent or denounce his character in moral terms. In some cases, however, exemplum externum is simply adduced to prove something, and thereby justify certain decisions or provide support for a third party. This kind of “artificial proof ”10 is obtained through a mediated generalization, which connects the inductive with the deductive part of the argument.

See Quint. Inst. 5.11.1 init.; cf. 12.4.2 with Austin 21954: 99; Price 1975: 199. The series of exempla that occur at Cic. Leg. Agr. 2.90 and Phil. 11.17 are discounted in the following overview, because, as was shown in Chapter Five, they form no part of the exemplary discourse. 10 Cf. Arist. Rh. 1355b35–​1356a1, 1417b38–​1418a5; Riggsby 2004: 180, and van der Poel 2009: 334 who, however, at p. 335 notes: “Quintilian informs us [Inst. 5.11.43 f] that some rhetors deviated from Aristotle and did not count exempla among the artistic proofs, but among the non-​artistic proofs.”

8 9

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10.1.1. Identification In Cicero’s oratorical practice, exemplum totum simile is almost never fully expressed, as seems to have been the case with ‘C. Fannius’, who had left next to nothing to guesswork when launching his attack on C. Gracchus, including the thesis to be proved and both the inductive and deductive part (see below, Section 10.2). C. Iulius Victor, a rhetorician to whom we owe this quotation, may have adjusted the wording to fit Aristotle’s First Example for didactic purposes, but it is equally plausible that the fragment is genuine and that later orators, for their part, preferred more subtlety. When identifying L. Calpurnius Piso with a Greek tyrant at Pis. 73, Cicero had merely a l lude d to the story about Phalaris and Stesichorus. As a consequence, his audience was forced to perform a mental task and to reach the conclusion by themselves. Providing all the required information could be counterproductive for, as a famous cognitive linguist wrote, “sentences in a spoken language […] are designed for vocal communication between impatient, intelligent social beings. They achieve brevity by leaving out any information that the listener can mentally fill in from the context.”11 The semantic intention is made explicit only once in Cicero’s orations, namely at Phil. 5.48: virtus esse quam aetatis cursum celeriorem (“the ability outruns age”), but here the speaker needed to be precise lest he ascribe to Octavian un-​Roman characteristics of Alexander the Great. In those passages where the universal proposition is merely implied, the argument that draws on the past can be either developed at length or stated very briefly. At Balb. 51 a one-​line quotation from Ennius’ Annals lends credence to Cicero’s claim that Pompey had the right to confer Roman citizenship on Balbus, given that “whoever is a great military leader [Hannibal is meant], bestows citizenship upon his soldiers.” In the speech Pro Murena, in turn, a long digression (§ 31 f) was called for in order to prove that the Mithridatic War was serious. This may have been due to the Roman prejudice against the eastern nations, commonly perceived as unwarlike. In this catalogue, Cicero had accumulated as many examples as he could, so that the inductive part of his argument be difficult to challenge. In both cases, however, the foreign element was either complementary to native exempla (Marius’ actions were also invoked as precedent at Balb.) or it served as a secondary illustrans. Another reference to Hannibal (Phil. 6.4, 6) falls somewhere in between those two extremes, in that Cicero phrases his argument precisely (ut si legati ad Hannibalem mitterentur), but the

11 See Pinker 1997: 70.

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conclusion, that sending an embassy to Antony will result in war, needs to be “filled in from the context.” Reversed antonomasia by comparison was another means whereby the speaker could say more than the words themselves seem to convey. When calling Aulus Gabinius ‘new Semiramis’ (Semiramis illa) at Prov. 9, Cicero drew attention to his rival’s effeminacy, greed, and lust for conquest. It is not until the (widely understood) post-​exile period (57–​43 bce) that we come upon an individual foreign character used consistently as exemplum simile (or reversed antonomasia by comparison), namely Spartacus. I have tentatively suggested (Section 9.2) that by the time of the late republic he had been still what might be called “an exemplum in the making.” This is the most likely reason why both Antony and Cicero, when referring to the slave uprising, were usually hinting at a specific event. Although, as portrayed by Sallust in his Histories, Spartacus displayed certain positive qualities,12 the Roman orators were keen to depict him, and accordingly his counterpart, as a villain: Clodius’s behavior was disgraceful (Har. 26) because the public games he gave during the ludi Megalenses were more reminiscent of the games Spartacus celebrated than those put on by his own ancestors; by calling Octavian ‘a Spartacus’ in one of his edicts (Phil. 3.21 = Ant. orat. 21), Antony implied that his opponent leads an army of deserters; to this Cicero replied (Phil. 4.15) by urging the Romans to deny Antony peace negotiations on the grounds that they did the same with Spartacus; finally, in the thirteenth Philippic (13.22) Antony is described as ‘Spartacus’ by means of a reversed antonomasia. By then, the two were easily assimilated, because Cicero wasted no opportunity to ascribe to Antony the worse qualities of a gladiator. The way in which the speaker referred to Spartacus, especially in his “verbal exchange” with Antony, shows that it is often difficult to differentiate between exemplum proper and reversed antonomasia. In some instances, the terminology we employ will depend on how we interpret Cicero’s intentions.

10.1.2. Juxtaposition The unequal examples (imparia) pose no such difficulty in that, as I have argued earlier, they derive their persuasive force from the difference between the illustrans and illustrandum, which means that the narrowly conceived semantic intention does not apply. There were two ways, basically, in which Cicero invoked foreign historical figures as exempla imparia. He seems to have 12 See Gerrish 2019: 89–​91. Cf. Plut. Crass. 8.3.

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preferred arguments from lesser to greater (a minore ad maius) when juxtaposing the policies and accomplishments of the old Romans with those of their descendants. By so doing he aimed either to advocate a certain course of action in the future or raise the profile of some measures taken recently. A typical argument a fortiori occurs at Man. 14, where Cicero urges the Romans to retaliate against Mithridates. He reminds them that their ancestors waged wars on numerous enemies (Antiochus III, Philip V, the Aetolians, and the Carthaginians) for their allies’ sake, nulla ipsi iniuria lacessiti. Accordingly, they should go to war much more eagerly because, unlike the maiores, they have been injured –​quanto vos studiosius convenit iniuriis provocatos. Another example, a catalogue which was later imitated by Capito, relates to Cicero’s consular ethos. At Cat. 4.21 the speaker implies (nisi forte maius est… quam) that he has achieved more by suppressing the Catilinarians than the great military leaders have in the past by conquering foreign nations and defending Rome against an external enemy. It is worth noting that on both occasions the comparative degree is explicitly expressed, and the difference between the two occurrences lies with the circumstances under which the action was/​ is about to be performed. A little more problematic is Cicero’s juxtaposition of L. Calpurnius Piso and A. Gabinius with Hannibal at Prov. 4. The speech belongs to the deliberative kind, but this exemplum impar is only indirectly conducive to the speaker’s proposal.13 Rather, it forms part of Cicero’s invective against the proconsuls. Exemplum a maiore ad minus, in turn, was especially useful when either the agents or objects of an action were being compared. Cicero would often remind his audience that even the ‘grand old men’ either had weaknesses or made poor decisions so as to infer therefrom that people of the present age are subject to the same flaws and, as they lack the mental capacities, influence, and experience of their predecessors, are more predisposed to commit similar mistakes. Thus, a list of the sapientissimi homines among the Greeks had been drawn up at Rab. Post. 23 to justify the shortcomings of C. Rabirius, who is described as a moderately educated man (homo mediocriter doctus). In his Agrarian Speeches, Cicero made a similar point with regard to the future. If a man like Hannibal had succumbed to the spell of the Campanian wealth, what are the odds that the new settlers will not give in to temptation (Leg. Agr. 1.20, 2.95)? Finally, in order to reconcile Caesar with Deiotarus, and to assure the dictator that the king holds no grudge, the speaker invokes the example of Antiochus the Great (Deiot. 36). Although

13 In this respect, Man. 14 most closely resembles Quintilian’s example (Inst. 5.11.9 f).

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both of them had to surrender certain territories to the Romans, it is implied that Deiotarus, as a client king of lesser rank, can more easily (multo facilius potest) find consolation.

10.1.3. Contrast Instead of showing that two actions had been performed either under different circumstances or by people of unequal status, the speaker could make use of antithesis in order to set elements X and Y in sharp opposition to one another. By employing antithetical examples, Cicero sought to portray the illustrandum (resp. the target) in a negative light or, conversely, to make a person/​a group of people look better. In his extant orations, there are far less instances of the latter use of contrariety, which comes as no surprise given that the majority of passages which I have ascribed to this category comes from the Verrine orations and the Philippics. Though at Man. 55 the opposition is between the grand old men, who overcame all their enemies at sea (including the fearsome Carthaginians), and the Romans of Cicero’s age, who have been uncapable of defeating the pirates, Cicero’s aim is less to degrade his contemporaries than to highlight Pompey’s achievement. In the speech On Behalf of Publius Sestius, where the speaker urges the young generations to act for the common good at all costs, the Romans are distinguished favorably from other nations (§ 141 f). Unlike the Athenians, who banished Themistocles, Aristides, and Miltiades from their homeland, and the Carthaginians, at the hands of whom Hannibal had met the same fate, they know how to reward their accomplished citizens. A somewhat ambiguous instance of exemplum contrarium occurs at Arch. 24. The implication of Cicero’s story of Alexander visiting Achilles’ tomb is that the Romans should be grateful to the Greek poet Archias for adequately celebrating the military glory won by their commanders, notably Marius and Lucullus. Antithesis works at its best and seems to have been most appropriate in those speeches in which a single person is the main target of Cicero’s abuse, that is the Verrines and the Philippics. In his prosecution of Gaius Verres for misgovernment of Sicily Cicero argued from exempla externa by contrast twice. At Verr. 2.1.55 he enumerates the old military commanders who, after successful campaigns against Antiochus III, king Perseus of Macedon, etc., surrendered all the war booty to the treasury. Verres, by contrast, is said to have plundered allied cities without military justification for his personal gain, although he was merely a legate pro quaestore. In the last book of the Actio secunda Cicero, by means of a reversed antonomasia by contrast, calls Verres iste Hannibal because,

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like Hannibal, he judges his followers according to their merits, and not their descent. The context clearly indicates, however, that in terms of his leadership he is a complete opposite of Hannibal. From a technical standpoint, the same figure of thought was applied in the so-​called first Philippic to an event, and not a person. Cicero had said with regard to the senate meeting of 1 September 44 bce that “Hannibal was at the gates […] or peace with Pyrrhus was at issue” which would normally denote ‘very urgent proceedings’. At that instant it was a far cry from what the speaker really wanted to convey. This ironical remark was, of course, intended to embarrass Mark Antony. After this speech had been delivered, the clash between Cicero and Antony became much more intense14 and, accordingly, the foreign examples later invoked by the speaker were also more combative in style. Cicero must have been aware that the name ‘Hannibal’ evoked various associations, not all of which had negative overtones. For that reason, he ascribed to his enemies only those qualities of the Carthaginian leader with which the audience would find fault. By calling Antony nove Hannibal at Phil. 13.25 the speaker implies that Antony is equally traitorous but not as cunning as Hannibal. If that interpretation is correct, this phrase should be read as a reversed antonomasia, where the contemporizing indicator nove translates as ‘new’ in the sense ‘a worse version of ’. Antony’s brother Lucius, on the other hand, is portrayed as crueler than Hannibal (Phil. 14.9). As opposed to the latter, Cicero suggests, L. Antonius spared no one, including women and children, during his “campaign.”

10.2. Means of Expressing the Degree of Similarity So far, our discussion has mainly focused on various types of exempla, their suitability to a given rhetorical context and their role as either proofs, exhortations, or terms of abuse. The way in which they are formulated, as the form and function of exempla are to a large extent mutually dependent, has also been touched upon in passing. Now, I would like to take a closer look at the means whereby Cicero expresses the degree of similarity. In the case of similia, the semantic intention is stated explicitly only where a different interpretation than that intended by the speaker could suggest itself. Otherwise it ought to be supplied by the context, so that the audience may draw the conclusion by themselves. Consider the following passages:

14 See e.g. Ramsey 2003: 82 f, 155 f; Manuwald 2007: 558 f (“Cicero eventually treated Antonius as an enemy from Philippic Three onwards”), 622.

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Substantially expressed

Partially expressed

1) ‘C. Fannius’ ( ORF, p. 144 f): Fr. 6: non debetis largitionem permittere [thesis to be proved]; nam et Dionysius et Pisistratus cives largitione corruperunt. [illustrans] Fr. 7: si Phalaridi et Pisistrato et ceteris omnibus una res maxime, largitio, dominationem comparavit [~inductive part], quid est, quod non idem Gracchum [illustrandum] adfectare credatis, quem eadem quae illos facere videatis [~deductive part]?

3) Cic. Har. 26: is [sc. P. Clodius] mihi etiam generis sui mentionem facit, cum Athenionis aut Spartaci exemplo ludos facere [illustrans] maluerit quam C. aut Appi Claudiorum? illi cum ludos facerent, servos de cavea exire iubebat; tu in alteram servos immisisti, ex altera liberos eiecisti [illustrandum].

You must not allow bribery; for both Dionysius and Pisistratus corrupted the citizens by bribery […]; If for Phalaris and Pisistratus and all others one thing in particular, bribery, procured absolute dominion, what reason is there that you don’t believe that Gracchus is aiming for the same, since you see him doing the same thing as those men?

Does he actually talk to me of his family, after preferring to celebrate his games in the manner of Athenio or Spartacus, rather than of Gaius or Appius Claudius? When they celebrated games, they ordered slaves to leave the auditorium: you sent slaves into one auditorium and ejected free men from the other.

2) Cic. Phil. 5.47 f: 47: C. Caesar [illustrandum] ineunte aetate docuit ab excellenti eximiaque virtute progressum aetatis exspectari non oportere. [thesis to be proved] 48: quid? Macedo Alexadner [illustrans], cum ab ineunte aetate res maximas gerere coepisset, nonne tertio et tricesimo anno obiit? […] ex quo iudicari potest virtus esse quam aetatis cursum celeriorem [~inductive part/​semantic intention].

4) Cic. Pis. 73: quoniam te [sc. L. Calpurnius Piso = illustrandum a] non Aristarchum sed Phalarim [illustrans a] grammaticum habemus, qui non notam apponas ad malum versum, sed poetam armis persequare [part of the universal proposition], scire cupio quid tandem in isto versu reprendas, ‘cedant arma togae’.

2

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Substantially expressed

Partially expressed

But Gaius Caesar has shown immediately upon achieving manhood that outstanding and exceptional abilities need not await advancing years. […] To take another example, did not Alexander of Macedon begin his career of glorious achievement directly upon achieving manhood and die in his thirty-​third year? […] Hence we may conclude that ability outruns age.

But, since we look upon you not as the Aristarchus, but rather as the Phalaris of criticism –​one who, instead of stigmatizing a faulty verse, subjects the poet to physical assault –​I should like to know, please, what fault you have to find with the line, “Arms to the gown must yield.”

As is evident, the two passages in the column on the left are almost fully expressed in terms of the constituents of an exemplum totum simile. In no. 1 only the mediating generalization (semantic intention) is not given explicitly, but it can be easily derived from the context (qui cives largitione corrumpit, /​ dominationem petit, B = A). This is in line with the model of Aristotle, who includes the semantic intention in his First Example (1357b30–​36) for specific, didactic purposes. When comparing Octavian to Alexander (no. 2), Cicero had good reasons to break this rule, because his illustrans was morally ambiguous from the Roman viewpoint. This passage constitutes an exception to the general principle which is exemplified here by nos. 3 and 4 in the column on the right. In both cases Cicero leaves out nearly all the elements except for the referents. By simply saying Spartaci exemplo ludos facere at Har. 26, he refers to an event easily recognizable for his audience; at Pis. 73, on the other hand, the speaker supplements the primary illustrans with the words qui […] poetam armis persequare either to inform the audience on how the allusion to Phalaris should be understood or to additionally humiliate his opponent whom he describes as slow-​minded. In simple terms, the way in which Cicero employs exemplum simile can be summarized as follows: by referring more or less explicitly (i.e. the constituents of the exemplum are either substantially or partially expressed) to certain past events he aims to show, by way of induction, that someone involved in the present case had acted/​acts/​is about to act (or should be viewed) in the same way as a person/​group of people that has been alluded to. Typically, the conclusion is only implied and needs to be deduced by the audience. As for exempla imparia, the degree of similarity between the referents is usually made explicit (e.g. maius est, quanto magis, etc.) when actions are being

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compared, whereas if the difference lies with the status of the agents, it must be inferred from the context, but the direction in which the argument runs is often indicated by descriptive phrases, e.g. homines sapientissimi or pronouns, esp. ipse. Here is an example of each of the possibilities: A minore ad maius

A maiore ad minus

1) Cic. Man. 14: Qua re si propter socios nulla ipsi iniuria lacessiti maiores nostri cum Antiocho, cum Philippo, cum Aetolis, cum Poenis bella gesserunt, quanto vos studiosiu s convenit iniuriis provocatos sociorum salutem una cum imperii vestri dignitate defendere, praesertim cum de maximis vestris vectigalibus agatur?

2) Cic. Leg. Agr. 2.95 f: ex hac copia atque omnium rerum adfluentia primum illa nata est arrogantia, quae a maioribus nostris alterum Capua consulem postulavit, deinde ea luxuries, quae ipsum Hannibalem armis etiam tum invictum voluptate vicit. Huc isti decemviri cum IƆƆ colonorum ex lege Rulli deduxerint […], quos illorum animos, quos impetus, quam ferociam fore putatis?

So if our ancestors fought wars against Antiochus, Philip, the Aetolians, and the Carthaginians purely for their allies’ sake, having received no injury themselves, just think how eager you ought to be to defend the safety of your allies and the prestige of your empire when you have been injured –​and especially when your most important revenues are at stake!

Out of this plentiful supply and abundance of all things first that arrogance was born, which demanded from our ancestors that one of the two consuls be from Capua, then this luxury, which conquered Hannibal himself, at that time still unconquered by arms, by pleasure. When those decemviri have settled 5,000 colonists there according to Rullus’ law […] what do you think will their airs, their violent impulses, their ferocity be like?

Both passages are taken from speeches that belong to the deliberative kind of oratory for which, as we already know, the arguments a fortiori were particularly fitting. When either advocating a certain course of action (no. 1) or dissuading the senate/​Roman people from taking certain measures (no. 2) Cicero recalls that similar events had occurred in the past from which a lesson is to be drawn. By way of juxtaposition, he shows that at the present juncture an analogical action is either strongly recommended or ill-​advised. In other kinds of oratory, the

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speaker invokes unequal examples e.g. as a means of self-​praise (Cat. 4.21) or in order to justify a course of action taken recently by his client (Rab. Post. 23). To put it another way, examples ‘wholly similar’ (tota similia, resp. a complete parallel) are used to prove that what applies to the illustrans also applies to the illustrandum, whereas those ‘partially similar’ (ex parte, resp. an incomplete parallel) to demonstrate that certain actions are either commendable or not, depending on the circumstances under which, the time at which, and the person by whom they are performed. The contrariety, on the other hand, is always predicated on the opposition between the referents. This opposition is at times only superficially hinted at (Arch. 24, Phil. 14.9), but for the most part it takes the form of either an explicitly stated antithesis (e.g. Verr. 2.1.55, Sest. 142) or a reversed antonomasia by contrast (Phil. 1.11, 13.25). Here is an example of each type: Exemplum contrarium

Reversed antonomasia

1) Cic. Man. 55: Nos quorum maiores Antiochum regem classe Persenque superarunt omnibusque navalibus pugnis Carthaginienses […] vicerunt, ei nullo in loco iam praedonibu s pares ess e poteramu s.

2) Cic. Verr. 5.31: Iste autem Hannibal [sc. C. Verres], qui in suis castris virtute putaret oportere non genere certari, sic hanc Tertiam dilexit ut eam secum ex provincia deportaret.

Our ancestors overcame King Antiochus and King Perseus at sea, and defeated the Carthaginians […] in every naval engagement they fought with them; but we, by contrast, were nowhere a match for the pirates.

But this Hannibal of ours, holding that in his camp promotion should be by merit and not by birth, became so much attached to this woman Tertia that he took her off with him when he left his province.

The key difference between the illustrans and illustrandum of exempla contraria is always with regard to the main verbs. In Cicero’s orations, the foreign historical figures and/​or nations usually serve as secondary referents that complement the antithesis. In the passage no. 1 (left column above) the superiority of the ancestors over their descendants rests primarily on the fact that they, unlike those latter, were victorious on the sea. Secondarily, the contrast between them is further emphasized once we realize that Antiochus, Perseus, and the Carthaginians were more fearsome enemies than the pirates. As regards the series of exempla, the contrast can be achieved only through antithesis (Phil. 1.11 may count as exception). When launching attack against an individual target, however, Cicero could

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proceed by giving that person a name based on attributes which he or she do es not possess. Verres (no. 2 above) earned the name iste Hannibal for having misapplied Hannibal’s meritocratic approach. The effect is reinforced by the use of a contemporizing indicator iste, a pronoun which is often derogatory in tone. However, it is sometimes difficult to differentiate between the reversed antonomasia by contrast and by comparison. At Phil. 13.25 the phrase nove Hannibal as applied to Antony is suggestive of the latter’s perfidia, but also of his lack of calliditas. Similarly, it is hard to tell whether Cicero’s reference to Gabinius as a ‘new Semiramis’ (Prov. 9) was ironic (in the sense which I have specified in Section 4.2.2.1) or not. Of all the passages discussed in the present study, the only clear instance of the antonomasia per similitudinem is Cicero’s reference to Antony (Phil. 13.22) as O Spartace. This time, the speaker meant precisely what he said, because at that point he wanted his opponent to be seen as an outlaw. Depending on the speaker’s intention, the reversed antonomasia will occupy either of the far ends of exemplary spectrum, which can be depicted in the following table: Identification antonomasia by comparison

Juxtaposition

Contrast

Exemplum simile

impar

antonomasia contrarium

Rhetorical denigration statement of exhortation, positive or goal fact/​value justification, negative judgement praise/​ depiction blame of persons/​ events Means of achieving that goal

direct taunt induction + a fortiori deduction argument

Relation between the referents

paragon = target

antithesis

by contrast denigration

irony

illustrans = illustrans illustrans ≠ paragon ≠ illustrandum ˃ ˅ ˂ illustrandum target illustrandum

When it comes to broadly conceived exempla externa, both the complete identification and the complete contrast is achievable only through the reversed antonomasia, because thereby two persons, and not their actions, are being compared in moral terms. As for the exemplum “proper” (i.e. simile, impar, and contrarium), which from practical standpoint is very similar to a commonplace,

250

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more variables need to be taken into account, e.g. time, place, motives, and other accompanying circumstances. Given that some of them can be either highlighted or glossed over according to one’s rhetorical goal, an exemplum tends to be variously interpreted by different recipients/​audiences. Whenever the relation between the illustrans and illustrandum is vaguely stated or questionable on the grounds of its reliability, the historical parallel becomes open to challenge. The arguments put forward to refute faulty exempla belong to a separate category, which I have been calling dissimile. As Cicero’s practice shows, there were at least two possible ways in which such counterarguments can be used: (1) by contesting a statement made by the opponent or (2) by dismissing a potential exemplum “in advance.” An opportunity to adopt the former strategy arose during the senatorial debate on whether or not to negotiate with Antony. One of the participants in the discussion (Q. Fufius Calenus?), who argued in favor of sending an embassy, had probably invoked the example of Hannibal to support his view. Cicero’s reply was (Phil. 5.25, 27) that the siege of Mutina is nothing like Hannibal’s siege of Saguntum in that in the past a town allied with Rome was under attack from a foreign force, whereas now a Roman was leading an army against his own fellow countrymen. In the speech On Behalf of M. Aemilius Scaurus, in turn, Cicero had employed an exemplum dissimile not in response to any historical parallel drawn by the prosecutors, who spoke before him,15 but in order to challenge an example of which they could have potentially availed themselves. The speaker called into question his opponents’ assertion that the wife of Aris had committed suicide by showing that all the Greek role models (Ajax, Themistocles, and Cleombrotus of Ambracia), which she could claim to have been following, were fictitious. Those two passages illustrate well the double meaning of falsum in the Rhetorica ad Herennium (2.46): 1) the illustrans and illustrandum of an exemplum are either not parallel, or 2) the events to which a reference was made had in fact never taken place.16 The two instances also differ as to the number of referents: the first one is an individual exemplum, and the second a series of exempla. As there are some crucial differences between the catalogues and individual persons as invoked by Cicero, this aspect of his use of exempla externa deserves a brief review.17

1 5 Cf. Alexander 2002: 98–​109; Dyck 2012: 95–​99. 16 See above, Section 3.3. 17 See also above, Section 5.5.

Single and Multiple Referents

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10.3. Single and Multiple Referents The series of exempla can be divided into two roughly homogenous groups based on the “line-​up” of the illustrantia. First of them consists of Greek historical figures that with no exception serve as primary referents. Although all three such catalogues occur in the post-​exile period, they vary in terms of both their constituents (only Themistocles appears twice) and their function (contrarium at Sest. 141, dissimile at Scaur. 3 f, and a maiore ad minus at Rab. Post. 23). In each case, except maybe for Cleombrotus of Ambracia, the Greeks Cicero names are men of high esteem and moral standard. As such, they do not conform to what has been described as “negative examples.” On the contrary, there are plenty of contexts where they would easily fit as models of virtuous conduct, but for the Roman audience Cicero was addressing a Roman precedent apparently carried more weight. Therefore, the Greeks are referred to only under specific conditions: if Roman exempla are lacking (Rab. Post. 23); as foil for the Romans (Themistocles, Miltiades, and Aristides being the objects of an action at Sest. 141); or to undermine the testimony of other “Greeks” (Scaur. 3 f). To the second group belong, for the lack of a better term, “the Roman national enemies.” Due to the fact that the wars against external foes formed a significant part of Roman history, the series of exempla featuring national enemies are quite frequent in Cicero’s extant orations. At the same time, however, the number of names that show up is fairly limited. What is more, they are almost exclusively (save one instance of a reversed antonomasia: Phil. 1.11) employed as secondary illustrantia, their role being that of enemies defeated by either the maiores at large (Man. 14, 55) or by distinguished Roman generals (Verr. 2.1.55, Mur. 31 f, Cat. 4.21). Cicero often modifies names of the conquered rulers and cities with descriptive phrases, whereby he seeks to make the Roman campaigns look more impressive. For obvious reasons, this type of catalogues was especially relevant in military contexts, but Cicero had put it to good use in a variety of oratorical genres (the Greek series are confined to defense speeches) and, on top of that, he did so by applying a wide range of the degrees of similarity. In sum, almost all series of exempla externa share some common features: the cases in which they appear are usually in some form or fashion involved with international affairs,18 and the geographical coincidence between the illustrantia and illustranda may 18 See also the general comment by Maslakov 1984: 440, n. 6: “When Cicero gives his catalogues of exemplars he does so when the tradition invoked serves immediate political ends” and “although the catalogues […] were conventional there was no set canonical list of exemplars.”

252

Conclusions

to some extent have influenced Cicero’s choice of appropriate examples.19 The speaker is also inclined to arrange the series in chronological order,20 but sometimes he slightly reverses the sequence of events to either achieve symmetry or provide a rhetorical climax. The recurrent names on the lists of national enemies are, above all, Perseus of Macedon, Philip V, and Antiochus III. As “elements of a chain,” they lack any distinctive features and are simply described as powerful kings, often in command of great armies. In exemplary terms, they are always subordinate to the Roman generals who defeated them and therefore, as illustrantia, are subsidiary to the national exempla virtutis.21 Their names are usually invoked with a view to celebrate the victories of a Scipio or a L. Aemilius Paullus, but on specific occasions, the speaker brings them to the forefront. In Cicero’s extant orations, however, this applies only to Antiochus the Great. The war with Antiochus is singled out among other eastern campaigns at Mur. 31 as one in which Cato the Elder, the great grandfather of one of Cicero’s opponents, took part. In his defense of king Deiotarus of Galatia, on the other hand, Cicero deftly juxtaposed his client with the king of Syria (§ 36) as both were forced to relinquish part of their kingdom. As for Alexander of Macedon it was a whole other story: though the Romans admired his military prowess, they also considered him an autocrat, which is why the concept of a ‘Roman Alexander’ could be very ambiguous.22 Despite him being a figure of huge fascination for Cicero and his contemporaries, therefore, his exemplary potential was never 19 Usually this is fairly explicit, but in some cases a geographical coincidence could be merely hinted at or alluded to, as when Cicero draws an analogy between and calls attention to the consequences of crossing a river in the past and in the present times (Caesar and/​or Antony crossing the Rubicon at Phil. 1.11 and the pairing of Hannibal/​ Ebro and Antony/​Rubicon at Phil. 6.4, 6). 20 When quoting exempla in a chronological order, from the oldest to the most recent ones, the speaker may have been at least partly inspired by the funeral procession, during which the recently deceased came last after his famous ancestors. This is most apparent in the fourth Catilinarian (Section 5.2). 21 That seems to be also the case in Plutarch who, when describing Sulla’s actions during his siege of Athens (in 87 bce), makes the members of the Amphictyony recall nearly the same triad (Sull. 12.9 f): εἰς μνήμην ἐβάλοντο [sc. οἱ Ἀμφικτύονες] τοῦτο μὲν Τίτον Φλαμινῖνον καὶ Μάνιον Ἀκύλιον, τοῦτο δ’ Αἰμίλιον Παῦλον, ὧν ὁ μὲν Ἀντίοχον ἐξελάσας τῆς Ἑλλάδος, οἱ δὲ τοὺς Μακεδόνων βασιλεῖς καταπολεμήσαντες, οὐ μόνον ἀπέσχοντο τῶν ἱερῶν τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ δῶρα καὶ τιμὴν αὐτοῖς καὶ σεμνότητα πολλὴν προσέθεσαν. 22 Cf. Spencer 2002: 165–​167.

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fully explored in oratorical practice. He is mentioned at Rab. Post. 23 as a tyrant responsible for the death of Callisthenes (here as a secondary referent) and serves as a foil for Marius and Lucullus in the oration For the Poet Archias (§ 24). Cicero once openly compares him to a Roman by way of identification (Phil. 5.48) but, as I have already pointed out, it is made explicit that this comparison is limited to a single similarity: both have accomplished great things in spite of their young age. Unsurprisingly, Hannibal’s name also figures in the catalogues of national enemies several times (Mur. 31 f, Cat. 4.21, Phil. 1.11), but beside that he was, by a wide margin, Cicero’s favorite individual foreign example. For reasons I have discussed earlier (Section 7.5), ‘Hannibal’ can be best described as a stock exemplum, though not necessarily a negative one. As a fierce foe, he needed “not be constructed as the moral opposite,” as E. S. Gruen has noted, and Cicero “also had conflicted views about Hannibal, by no means a mere villain.”23 All the references to Hannibal as individual exemplum in Cicero’s speeches can be broken into two groups. In one of them, his image as a leader is explored (Hannibal dux: Verr. 5.31, Balb. 51, Leg. Agr. 1.20, 2.95, Sest. 142), and in the other he is to be seen as t he enemy of Rome (Hannibal hostis: Prov. 4, Phil. 5.25, 27, 6.4, 6, 13.25, 14.9). Though in both groups nearly all possible degrees of similarity between the illustrans and illustrandum (resp. the paragon and target) come into play, the way in which Cicero refers to him as an enemy is particularly instructive when it comes to the use of exempla (externa) in general. The same incident, namely Hannibal’s siege of Saguntum, was said by Cicero to be unlike the current situation (exemplum dissimile in Philippic Five), when the embassy had not yet been decreed, and after the embassy was sent, it was identified with Antony’s siege of Mutina (in the sixth Philippic). It follows that in front of a different audience and under different circumstances the same illustrans could yield various types of exempla. Quite conveniently, coming last on this list is the example of Spartacus, which shares something in common with each of the other individual exempla. Like that of Alexander, it is virtually absent from the catalogues.24 Spartacus is mentioned for the first time at Har. 26, where Clodius’ behavior as depicted by Cicero was practically begging to be compared

2 3 See Gruen 2011: 125 and 132 respectively. 24 Except for Har. 26 where Spartacus is paired with Athenio. Likewise, Alexander of Macedon is mentioned at Rab. Post. 23 alongside Dionysius of Syracuse and Ptolemy II Philadelphus. We have noted, however, that Spartacus appears in the catalogues of later writers imitating Cicero (Sen. Con. 7.2.7).

254

Conclusions

with the slave insurrection. In this respect, that passage closely resembles Deiot. 36 (Antiochus III as a foil for Deiotarus). Finally, all the remaining instances occur in the Philippics (3.21, 4.15, 13.22) and, as in the case of Hannibal, are directed against Mark Antony. It seems that both ‘Spartacus’ and ‘Hannibal’ were introduced to this heated debate by someone other than Cicero and that Cicero, subsequently, made full use of the negative connotations those names entailed. As I have suggested earlier (Section 9.1), moreover, by identifying Antony with Spartacus (simile at Phil. 4.15 and reversed antonomasia by comparison at 13.22) and, at the same time, dissociating him from Hannibal or, at least, from the positive traits of the latter, the speaker makes his opponent’s character appear as despicable as possible.

10.4. The Choice and Meaning of exempla externa We have already found out that the same historical figure (e.g. Ti. and C. Gracchus) can, in front of different audiences, serve as either positive or negative example,25 and we have just seen that whether an event is presented as similar to or dissimilar from the matter in dispute (the siege of Saguntum) depends on the speaker’s point of view and his rhetorical goal. This is due to the flexibility inherent in the exemplary discourse:26 the meaning in itself of a given example seldom overlaps with the speaker’s semantic intention or, to put it another way, every illustrans has many potential meanings, not all of which are equally relevant and conducive to the speaker’s rhetorical goal. The way in which an author adjusts exempla to the immediate context has been aptly described as modus excerpendi by C. Daxelmüller.27 As regards Cicero’s use of foreign historical examples, this ‘mode of selection’ will of course vary depending on whether exempla are invoked individually or in series. In the latter case, because a number of illustrantia is quoted to support the same argument, the speaker 2 5 See above, Section 3.2. 26 With regard to this very flexibility, here concerning Cicero’s references to the introduction by Scipio the Elder separate seats for the senators in 194 bce, Asconius speaks of a “right allowed to the orator’s craftiness” (Corn. 70 C = 56 St.): Non praeterire autem vos volo esse orator iae calliditati s iu s ut, cum opus est, eisdem rebus ab utraque parte vel a contrariis utantur (as tr. by R. G. Lewis). See on that passage Marshall 1985: 248 f and now esp. Bellini 2020: 302 who further notes (p. 303) that “[…] Cicerone rivendica un margine di flessibilità nei confronti del valore normativo del passato stesso, sostenendo la necessità di adattare i modelli alle sempre mutevoli esigenze del presente.” 27 See Daxelmüller 1991: 87.

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needs to ensure that all of them match his Ernstbedeutung.28 To fulfill this demand, Cicero took a slightly different approach to national enemies and to the Greek series. Where the foreign elements played a subordinate role, he would exaggerate the achievements of the Roman maiores, by either concealing some possibly incriminating facts about them (Verr. 2.1.55 on M. Claudius Marcellus and L. Mummius) or glossing over their defeats (Man. 55). When it comes to the Greek exempla, on the other hand, he proceeded by choosing the version of events that best suited his purposes (Scaur. 3 f and Rab. Post. 23). Sometimes, however, the meaning in itself (Eigenbedeutung) of a given exemplum required further reaching adjustments. This is usually, but not exclusively, the case with individual exempla, and especially with Hannibal. In the Agrarian Speeches (1.20, 2.95) Cicero makes him, and not his army (as traditional accounts had it), the victim of corrupting luxury; at Sest. 142 his banishment from Carthage is described as if he were an exact counterpart of a Roman exile; in his Philippics (5.25, 27 and 14.9), finally, Cicero plays down Hannibal’s cruelty and the havoc he had wrought so as to bring out the crimes of Mark Antony and his brother Lucius. Cicero adjusted Hannibal’s example to his line of argumentation by means of either oversimplification, appropriation, or exaggeration (resp. trivialization). He employed similar tactics when referring to Antiochus the Great, who was said to have been satisfied with the treatment which he received from the Romans after the Peace of Apamea (Deiot. 36). Against this backdrop, the example of Alexander of Macedon is a little more complex. We have noted earlier that some of its potential meanings at Phil. 5.48 were suppressed intentionally by the speaker so as to avoid unwelcome implications regarding the illustrandum. The opposite is true in the case of Cicero’s Pro Archia poeta. When recounting the story of Alexander at Sigeum (§ 24), which in itself (Eigenbedeutung) only attests to Alexander’s desire to be commemorated, the speaker mentions the fact that the Macedonian king carried with him a train of historians and poets. Once it occurs to the audience that despite this Alexander did not share Achilles’ fate, Cicero’s semantic intention becomes clear. It follows that the speaker could inform the way in which the audience interprets a historical reference by either taking from or adding to the original message.

28 Cf. Demoen 1997: 146 f. A good illustration, although not strictly ‘exemplary’, is Cicero’s manipulation of historical facts at Phil. 11.17 f.

256

Conclusions

10.5. Exempla externa as Tools of Praise and Blame For the last section, I borrow (and slightly adapt) the title of a paper by H. van der Blom,29 because in my final remarks I would like to stress that, contrary to her previous findings, the use of foreign examples in Roman oratory was not necessarily more suitable for negative lessons.30 Cicero of course preferred exempla externa over the native examples when he sought to demonstrate that one of his countrymen is acting against the accepted norms, and therefore in an un-​Roman way.31 In that limited sense, the foreign examples could be used by Roman orators as an instrument of invective.32 From among the individual exempla discussed in Chapters 4, 6–​9, however, only Semiramis (one occurrence) and Spartacus, as referred to by Cicero, carried exclusively negative connotations. The name ‘Hannibal’ too served as a tool of blame, but it was often invoked when someone whom Cicero wanted to reproach fai le d to act like the Carthaginian leader. The Roman views on Alexander of Macedon, on the other hand, were equivocal. Because he was admired for some reasons and detested for others, he could be a two-​edged weapon in the hands of an orator and hence, I believe, was a frequent subject for declamations, but only on rare occasions appeared in practical oratory. The same applies, to a certain degree, to the Greeks in general. Notwithstanding their learning and military prowess, they were non-​ Romans, and as such of questionable value as illustrantia intended to extol the virtues of a Roman. Whenever Cicero mentioned a Plato or a Themistocles in one of his speeches, he did so by either setting them against his own countrymen or juxtaposing them with a third party, but never by means of identification (i.e. exemplum totum simile). The case is somewhat different with the Greek tyrants. Since there was an apparent cause and effect relationship in their route to absolute power, they became a stock example of historical parallel (exemplum simile) in rhetorical theory and the Roman orators must have seen advantages of this textbook example (‘C. Fannius’). As it might have begun to be looked at as worn out and unoriginal, I presume, Cicero preferred a subtler use of this stock character in his political invective. The most conventional use of exempla externa in Roman oratory, as it seems, was to pair the accomplished Roman commanders of the past with the foreign rulers they have defeated. This was an effective tool of praise, of which Cicero availed himself a number of times in order to highlight 2 9 See van der Blom 2011. 30 Van der Blom 2007: 158 and 2010: 141 (cf. Section 1.1 with n. 44). 31 Cf. above, Section 10. 32 Cf. Corbeill 2002: 199 followed by van der Wal 2007: 184.

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Woodman, Martin 1996: A. J. Woodman, R. H. Martin (eds.), The Annals of Tacitus. Book 3, Cambridge. Wooten 1983: C. W. Wooten, Cicero’s Philippics and Their Demosthenic Model. The Rhetoric of Crisis, Chapel Hill–​London. Yavetz 1983: Z. Yavetz, Julius Caesar and his Public Image, Ithaca. Zetzel 2003: J. E. G. Zetzel, ‟Plato with Pillows: Cicero on the Uses of Greek Culture,” in: Braund, Gill 2003: 119–​138. _​_​_​_​_​2018: J. E. G. Zetzel, Critics, Compilers, and Commentators. An Introduction to Roman Philology, 200 BCE–​800 CE, New York. Ziółkowski 1988 = 1993: A. Ziółkowski, “Urbs direpta, or how the Romans sacked cities,” in: J. Rich, G. Shipley (eds.), War and Society in the Roman World, London–​New York, pp. 69–​91 (previously published as “Urbs direpta. Los miasta zdobytego przez Rzymian w okresie wielkich podbojów,” in: B. Bravo et al. [eds.] Świat antyczny. Stosunki społeczne. Ideologia i polityka. Religia, Warszawa 1988, pp. 87–​116). Zorzetti 1978: N. Zorzetti, “Struttura annalistica e sistema degli exempla nelle storie liviane,” in: Idem, Interpretazioni latine, Padua, pp. 79–​127. _​_​_​_​_​1980: N. Zorzetti, “Dimostrare e convincere: l’exemplum nel ragionamento induttivo e nella comunicazione,” MEFRM 92.1.33–​65.

Index of Names* A Achilles  93, 166–​168, 243, 255 Adad-​nirari III  98 Aegisthus  95, 96, 103 Aelius Aristides  237 Aemilius Lepidus, Mam. (cos. 77)  151 Aemilius Lepidus, M. (the triumvir)  27, 231 Aemilius Paullus, L. (II cos. 168)  110, 111, 119, 129, 130, 131, 216, 217, 252 Aemilius Scaurus, M. (cos. 115)  134 Aemilius Scaurus, M. (pr. 56)  134–​135 Aeneas  102, 103 Aeschrio  189 Agamemnon  102 Agathocles  83 Ajax  135–​138, 152, 154, 250 Albrecht, Michael von  206 Alexander of Macedon  29, 31, 99, 109, 140, 141, 157–​171, 215, 219, 234, 240, 246, 252, 253, 255, 256 Alexander of Pherae  25 Annius Milo, T. (pr. 55)  66 Antiochus III  110, 115, 116, 121, 122, 124, 126, 127, 150–​153, 155, 209–​217, 219, 233, 235, 242, 243, 252, 254, 255 Antistius Vetus, C. (?)  161 Antonius, L. (cos. 41)  195, 198–​ 202, 244 Antonius Orator, M. (cos. 99)  135 Appian of Alexandria  223, 229

Appuleius, P. (tr. 43)  178 Appuleius Saturninus, L. (II tr. 100)  50, 51, 52, 69, 73, 74 Apsines of Gadara  23, 24, 47, 71 Aquilius, M’. (cos. 129)  124 Aquilius, M’. (cos. 101)  114, 118, 135, 190 Ariobarzanes I  116 Ariobarzanes II Philopator  98 Aris of Nola  135 Aristarchus  85–​87, 90–​92, 103, 246 Aristides  25, 134, 152, 192, 193, 207, 237, 243, 251 Aristippus  143 Aristonicus  123, 124, 135, 150–​152 Aristotle  17, 21–​23, 26, 33–​42, 44–​ 47, 55, 57, 64, 72, 73, 78–​80, 82, 83, 86, 88, 97, 104, 127, 141, 239, 240, 246 Arsaces XII  213 Artaxerxes III Ochus  42 Athenio  97, 189, 222–​245, 253 Atreus  102 Attalus I  115 B Baebius Tamphilus, Q.  203 Balsdon, John Percy Vyvian Dacre  237 Barber, Kimberly  176, 177 Benoit, William Lyon  38 Blom, Henriette van der  25, 50, 77, 256 Bücher, Frank  51, 130, 205

* Cicero is not included in this index. For the list of passages from his works discussed in the book, see the 'Index of Passages' below. With few exceptions (e.g. Caesar), all the Romans are arranged according to their nomen gentile.

294

Index of Names

C Caecilius Metellus Macedonicus, Q. (cos. 143)  124, 158 Caecilius Metellus Numidicus, Q. (cos. 109)  66, 69, 70 Caecilius Metellus Pius, Q. (cos. 80)  167, 176 Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio, Q. (cos. 52)  64, 137–​138 Caelius Rufus, M. (aed. cur. 50)  159 Caesar (C. Iulius Caesar)  94–​97, 99, 100, 139, 145, 148, 149, 158, 161, 164, 165, 173, 195, 210, 211, 214, 215, 231, 233, 242 Callimachus  136 Callisthenes of Olynthus  141, 152, 167 Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus, L. (cos. 58)  84, 85, 87–​89, 90, 97, 103, 170, 186–​188, 240, 242 Cambyses  42 Cassander  141 Cassius Longinus, C. (pr. 44)  149 Castor  210, 211 Catiline (L. Sergius Catilina)  52, 67, 73, 74, 128, 229, 231, 232 Cineas  148 Classen, Carl Joachim  77, 128 Claudius Caecus, Appius (cens. 312)  66, 146, 154 Claudius Marcellus, M. (V cos. 208)  61, 62–​63, 110, 111, 113, 184, 255 Claudius Marcellus, M. (cos. 51)  66 Claudius Pulcher, Appius (cos. 79)  222 Claudius Pulcher, C. (cos. 92)  222 Cleombrotus of Ambracia  136–​138, 152, 154, 250, 251 Cleomenes  189 Clitarchus  137

Clodius Pulcher, P. (aed. cur. 56)  67–​68, 69, 86, 221, 222–​227, 231, 233, 253 Cluentius Habitus, A.  60 Coelius Antipater, L.  205 Coenen, Hans Georg  35–​36, 38, 42 Corbeill, Anthony  100, 170 Cornelius Balbus, L. (cos. suff. 40)  176, 177, 240 Cornelius Dolabella, Cn. (pr. 81)  109, 110 Cornelius Dolabella, P. (cos. suff. 44)  149, 151–​152, 196, 214 Cornelius Nepos  24 Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus Africanus, P. (II cos. 134)  26, 129–​ 131, 133, 150–​151 Cornelius Scipio Africanus, P. (II cos. 194)  29, 60, 126, 129, 131–​ 133, 150–​151, 160, 173 Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus, L. (cos. 190)  110, 112–​113, 126, 132, 150, 209, 211, 214–​215, 252 Cornelius Scipio Nasica Serapio, P. (cos. 138)  69 Cornelius Sulla Felix, L.  126, 167, 176, 215, 229 Curius Dentatus, M’. (cens. 272)  126, 127 Cyrus  26, 163, 169 D Darius I  42–​43 Darius III  159 David, Jean-​Michel  95 Daxelmüller, Christoph  254 Deiotarus  210, 211, 213, 214, 242, 243, 252, 254 Demetrius of Phalerum  140, 141, 143, 152, 154 Demetrius Poliorcetes  141

Index of Names

Demoen, Kristoffel  32, 45, 47, 91–​92 Demosthenes  23, 24, 26, 29 Derceto  99 Diogenes Laertius  143 Dio Cassius  204 Dion  140 Dionysius I  22, 25, 33, 39–41, 46, 64, 79–81, 88–90, 94, 103, 140, 141, 143, 245 Dionysius II  140, 142 Domitius Calvinus, Cn. (cos. 53)  210 Douglas, Alan Edward  77, 163–​164 Dugan, John  85 Duilius, C. (cos. 260)  120 Dunkle, J. Roger  89 Dyck, Andrew Roy  120 E Ennius, Q.  176, 177, 190, 205, 240 Eumenes II  115, 116, 124 F Fabius Maximus Rullianus, Q. (V cos. 295)  53, 54, 59 Fabius Pictor, Q.  205 Fannius, C. (cos. 122)  22, 80 ‘C. Fannius’  22, 79, 81–​83, 87, 88, 91, 240, 245, 256 Fantham, Elaine  67 Flavius Arrian  167 Florus (L. Annaeus Florus)  220, 223 Fufius Calenus, Q. (cos. 47)  149, 201, 204, 206, 250 Fulvia  180 Fulvius Nobilior, M. (cos. 189)  126, 128 G Gabinius, A. (cos. 58)  98, 100, 101, 103, 139, 170, 186–​188, 207, 241, 242, 249

295

Gazich, Roberto  49, 59 Gellius, A.  93 Gorgias  62 Gotoff, Harold C.  210 Grillo, Luca  101 Gruen, Erich S. 253  H Hannibal  29–​31, 108, 115, 121–​123, 126, 128, 129, 131–​134, 146–​148, 151, 152, 154, 173–​188, 190–​193, 195–​207, 209, 216, 219, 232–​234, 240, 242–​244, 248–​250, 252–​256 Helen  65, 66 Hermogenes of Tarsus  47, 71 Herodotus  94 Hippolytus  102, 103 Hirtius, A. (cos. 43)  149, 196, 198, 231 Homer  86, 87, 91, 166–​168 Horace (Q. Horatius Flaccus)  122, 155 Horatius, M.  64, 67, 68 Hortensius Hortalus, Q. (cos. 69)  56, 57, 62, 63, 104, 118, 120, 169, 188, 190, 191 I Isocrates  23 Iulius Caesar, L. (cos. 90)  135 Iulius Caesar, L. (cos. 64)  151 Iulius Caesar Strabo Vopiscus, C. (aed. cur. 90)  135 Iulius Victor, C.  72, 78, 79, 240 Iunius Brutus, D. (cos. 77)  151 Iunius Brutus Albinus, D. (cos. desig. 43)  180–​181, 196–​197, 202, 204, 228 Iunius Brutus, L. (first consul)  48, 53–​54, 59, 73 Iunius Brutus, M. (tr. 83)  124, 183

296

Index of Names

J Jacoby, Felix  142 Jolivet, Vincent  95 Juvenal (D. Iunius Iuvenalis)  174 K Kamienik, Roman  223 Kaster, Robert  69 Klodt, Claudia  142 L Labienus, T. (tr. 63)  51 Laelius, C. (cos. 190)  104, 150 Laelius Sapiens, C. (cos. 140)  133 Lausberg, Heinrich  19, 45, 47–​49 Licinius Archias, L.  165, 167–​ 169, 243 Licinius Crassus, M. (the triumvir)  132, 176, 229 Licinius Crassus, P. (cos. 97)  135, 176 Licinius Crassus, P. (son of the triumvir)  163, 164, 169 Licinius Crassus Dives Mucianus, P. (cos. 131)  135, 150 Licinius Lucullus, L. (cos. 74)  94, 95, 125, 126–​127, 168, 243, 253 Licinius Murena, L. (pr. 88)  125–​126 Licinius Murena, L. (cos. 62)  67, 125, 128 Licinius Sacerdos, C.  60 Lintott, Andrew  114 Litchfield, Henry Wheatland  30 Livy (T. Livius)  20, 53, 54, 59, 170, 184, 185, 234 Lucretia  64, 137, 138 Lutatius Catulus, Q. (cos. 78)  118 Lycurgus  24 M Maelius, Sp.  57, 58, 68, 69, 83

Manlius Imperiosus Torquatus, T. (III cos. 340)  48, 53, 54, 59, 73 Manlius Vulso, Cn. (cos. 189)  212 Manuwald, Gesine  178 Marcius Philippus, L. (cos. 91)  151, 169 Marius, C. (VII cos. 86)  70, 129, 176 Mark Antony (M. Antonius)  84, 144, 145, 147, 154, 162, 178–​181, 195–​199, 201, 203–​205, 207, 225, 226, 227, 228–​230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 241, 244, 249–​250, 254, 255 Maroboduus  155 Martin, Paul Marius  32, 151, 160, 238 May, James M.  130 Medea  118 Miltiades  134, 152, 192, 193, 207, 243, 251 Mitchell, Hannah  164 Mithridates VI Eupator  32, 114, 116–​117, 121, 123–​125, 127, 132–​ 134, 150–​153, 187, 210, 213, 242 Moos, Peter von  91 Mucia Tertia  95 Mummius, L. (cos. 146)  110, 111, 255 N Nabis  83 Naevius, Cn.  87, 88 Nice  189 Ninos  99 O Octavian (C. Iulius Caesar Octavianus)  151, 159, 160, 162, 164, 165, 169, 196, 204, 225, 227, 228, 231, 233, 240, 241, 246 Octavius, Cn. (cos. 165)  119 Odysseus  90 Onnes  99

Index of Names

Opelt, Ilona  197 Opimius, L. (cos. 121)  66, 72, 192, 194 Oppius, C.  164 P Panaetius  25 Papirius Carbo, Cn. (III cos. 82)  169 Papirius Cursor, L. (V cos. 313)  53, 59 Paris  65, 66 Perperna, M. (cos. 130)  124 Perseus  110, 113, 119, 121, 124, 126, 127, 129, 131, 152, 216, 243, 248, 252 Phalaris  22, 25, 79, 81, 82, 85–​90, 94, 96, 240, 245, 246 Pharnaces  210 Philip V  110, 113, 115, 121, 124, 126, 127, 150, 152, 153, 155, 173, 216, 242, 252 Phormio  175, 216 Pipa  189 Pisistratus  22, 39, 40, 46, 64, 72, 79–​ 83, 88, 96, 97, 245 Plato  35, 136, 140–​143, 152, 154, 256 Plautius Venox, C. (cens. 312)  66 Plutarch  162, 169, 174 Polybius  147, 200, 205 Pompeius Strabo, Cn. (cos. 89)  176 Pompey (Cn. Pompeius Magnus)  85, 95, 114, 116–​118, 120, 121, 124, 125, 126, 129, 130, 131–​134, 139, 143, 150, 151, 154, 157, 158, 161, 162, 164, 166, 168–​ 170, 173, 176, 177, 178, 207, 210, 211, 229, 240, 243, 257 Pomponius Atticus, T.  96, 137, 148, 159, 170, 220 Popilius Laenas, P. (cos. 132)  66

297

Porcius Cato Sapiens, M.  104, 126, 174, 206, 252 Porcius Cato Uticensis, M.  64, 125–​ 126, 128, 138 Price, Bennett J.  48, 52, 91 Pseudophilip  123, 124, 126, 152, 216 Ptolemy II Philadelphus  141, 142 Ptolemy Auletes  139, 140, 143 Ptolemy (the king of Cyprus)  213 Pyrrhus  64, 108, 122, 126, 127, 132, 146, 148, 150–​152, 155, 244 Pythagoras  136 Q Quinctius Flamininus, T. (cos. 198)  110, 121, 126, 160, 216 Quintilian (M. Fabius Quintilianus)  17, 20–​22, 45–​50, 52–​55, 57–​74, 77–​80, 90, 103–​105, 113, 116, 136, 216, 217, 237 R Rabirius, C.  52 Rabirius Postumus, C.  139, 140, 142–​143, 144, 154, 209, 242 Riginos, Alice Swift  143 Robinson, Arthur Wirt  29, 108, 153 Romulus  94 S Sallust (C. Sallustius Crispus)  213, 241 Scaptius, M.  219, 220 Schweinfurth-​Walla, Sigrid  34, 36 Seager, Robin  90 Semiramis  97–​101, 103, 241, 249, 256 Sempronius Gracchus, C. (tr. 122–​ 123)  22, 79–​83, 88, 192, 240, 254 Sempronius Gracchus, Ti. (tr. 133)  57–​58, 68–​69

298

Index of Names

Seneca the Elder  170 Seneca the Younger  184 Sertorius, Q. (pr. 83)  117, 132, 150, 151 Servilius Ahala, C. (mag. eq. 439)  57–​59, 69 Servilius Caepio Brutus, Q. (M. Brutus, pr. 44)  28, 219 Servilius Rullus, P. (tr. 63)  51, 123–​ 124, 134, 181–​183 Servilius Vatia Isauricus, P. (cos. 79)  110 Servilius Isauricus, P. (cos. 48)  149, 160 Sestius, P. (pr. before 50)  154 Shackleton Bailey, David Roy  223 Shamshi-​Adad V  98 Sicinius Dentatus, L. 93  Socrates  26, 35 Sollenberger, Michael J.  142 Sophocles  143 Spartacus  31, 132, 188, 219–​235, 241, 245, 253, 254, 256 Spencer, Diana  158, 163, 215 Steel, Catherine Elizabeth Wannan  157, 187 Stemmler, Michael  18, 30, 104 Stesichorus  86, 87, 88, 89, 240 Stinger, Patricia  109, 134 Stocks, Claire  190 Stratocles  137 Suetonius Tranquillus, C.  99, 161, 164 Sulpicius Galba, P. (pr. before 65)  67 Sulpicius Rufus, Ser. (cos. 51)  67 T Tarquin the Proud  83 Tertia  189, 190, 248 Theagenes of Megara  39, 40, 46, 80

Themistocles  29, 134, 135, 137, 138, 152, 154, 192, 193, 207, 243, 250, 251, 256 Theophanes of Mytilene  166, 168 Thompson, Christine E.  163 Thucydides  137 Tiberius (the emperor)  24, 155 Tigranes I  116, 213 Trebonius, C. (cos. suff. 45)  149, 152, 231, 232 Tullius Cicero (Quintus, Cicero’s brother)  25, 163 Tullus Hostilius  67 V Valerius Flaccus, L. (cos. 131)  150 Valerius Flaccus, L. (cos. 100)  52, 73 Valerius Flaccus, P. (cos. 227)  203 Valerius Maximus  20, 24, 25, 30, 158, 173, 184, 209, 210, 212, 219, 234, 235 Valerius Triarius, P.  135 Velleius Paterculus  164 Venus  184 Vergil (P. Vergilius Maro)  20, 60 Verres, C. (pr. 74)  26, 56–​57, 61–​63, 89–​90, 94, 103, 109–​111, 113, 125, 133, 154, 188–​191, 206, 237, 243, 248–​249 Vibius Pansa, C. (cos. 43)  149, 178 Volkmann, Richard  29 Vossius, Gerardus  92 W Welch, Kathryn  164 X Xerxes  42, 43, 94–​96 Z Zeno  143

Index of Passages* Aeschines  – 1.180  24 Appian  – BC 1.117  223 – 1.120  229 f Apsines  – Rh. 6.2 D-​K  23 – 6.12 D-​K  71 – 8.1 D-​K  47 Aristotle  – APr. 68b–​69a  33–​38 – Rh. 1357b  33 – 1357b30–​33  80 – 1357b30–​36  39–​41, 246 – 1367b7–​11  26 – 1393a  21 – 1393a30–​b3  41–​43 – 1393b  86 – 1403a5–​9  54 [Aristotle]  – Rh. Al. 1429a21–​27  47 – 1429b37–​41  47 – 1430a5–​7  47 Arrian  – An. 1.12.2  167 Cato  – orat. 187  174 Catullus  – 29.5  94 Cicero  – Arch. 23/​24–​27  165 – 24  166–​169, 243, 248, 253, 255 – 25 f  167 – Att. 5.20.3 =​113 SB  159 – 6.2.8 =​116 SB  220 – 7.11.1 =​134 SB  148

– 7.20.2 =​144 SB  96 – 8.16.2 =​166 SB  97 f – Balb. 22  176 – 45–​50  176 – 50  32 – 51  30, 176–​178, 207, 240, 253 – Brut. 42 f  137 – 281 f  163 f – Cat. 1.29  51 f, 73 f – 4.20  126 – 4.21  129–​133, 153, 209, 216, 242, 248, 251, 253 – Clu. 133 f  60 – Cons. fr. 11 Blänsdorf  84 f, 87 f – De or. 1.209–​212  175 – 2.74–​76  175 – 2.162–​177  71 f Deiot. 31 f  215 – 35–​41  211 – 36  211–​215, 233, 235, 242 f, 252, 254 f Div. 1.55  24 f – 2.8  25 Dom. 68  86 Fam. 2.10.3 =​86 SB  159 – 5.7.3 =​3 SB  133 – 5.12.7 =​22 SB  167 – 9.12.2 =​263 SB  214 Har. 21  221 – 24  221 – 25  221 – 26  222–​225, 233, 241, 245 f, 253 f Inv. 1.17  173 – 1.49  18, 21, 41 – 1.82  56 – 2.19  41 – 2.114  107

* The index does not contain the passages that are only referred to in the footnotes.

300

Index of Passages

– 2.171  174 Leg. Agr. 1.5  32 – 1.16–​22  182, 186 – 1.19  183 – 1.20  183–​186, 207, 242, 253, 255 – 2.50  32 – 2.73–​97  182, 186 – 2.86–​91  122 – 2.87  122 – 2.89–​92  124 – 2.90  123–​125, 128, 153, 216 – 2.92–​94  183 – 2.95  184–​186, 207, 242, 253, 255 – 2.95 f  247 Man. 6  114 – 6–​19  114 – 11  114, 117 – 14  114–​118, 122, 153, 216, 242, 247, 251 – 14–​16  115 – 22  117 f – 37  118 – 52–​56  118 f – 55  119–​122, 128, 153–​155, 216, 243, 251, 255 Mil. 7  67 – 72  68 f Mur. 15–​53  126 – 17  67 – 31  125 f, 132 f, 252 – 31 f  126–​129, 153, 209, 240, 251, 253 – 32  133, 216 – 32–​34  126 – 34  133 – 84  147 Off. 2.26  25, 144 Orat. 165–​167  62 Parad. 27  226 Phil. 1.1–​10  144 f – 1.11  145–​149, 153, 244, 248, 251, 253

– 1.12 f  145 – 1.14 f  145 – 3.21  225–​228, 241, 254 – 4.14  229 f – 4.15  229–​231, 241, 254 – 5.6–​25  201 f – 5.24  202 – 5.25  195, 202–​205, 207, 250, 253, 255 – 5.25 f  203 – 5.25–​31  202 – 5.27  195, 203–​205, 207, 250, 253, 255 – 5.42–​51  159 – 5.43  162 – 5.47 f  245 f – 5.48  150–​165, 240, 253, 255 – 5.48–​50  160 – 6.3–​15  178 – 6.4–​6  178–​181, 207, 240 f, 253 – 9.4  32 – 11.17  209 – 11.17 f  149–​153, 155, 160 – 11.17–​20  149 – 13.15  27 – 13.22  231–​234, 241, 249, 254 – 13.22–​48  196 – 13.25  196–​198, 200, 207, 231, 244, 248 f, 253 – 14.6  198 – 14.6–​10  198 – 14.8  198 – 14.8–​10  199 – 14.9  199–​201, 207, 244, 248, 253, 255 Pis. 18  85 – 24  85 – 42  85 – 73  84–​88, 240, 245 f Prov. 4  186–​188, 207, 242, 253 – 4–​12  98 – 4–​16  186, 188

Index of Passages

– 9  98–​101, 241, 249 – 11  101 Q. fr. 2.8.2 =​13 SB  163 Rab. Perd. 12–​15  52 Rab. Post. 22–​24  142 – 22–​29  139 – 23  140–​144, 153–​155, 242, 248, 251, 253, 255 – 24  140 – 27  32, 209 Red. Sen. 12  85 Rep. 1.68  83 f Scaur. 3  135–​138, 144, 154, 250 f, 255 – 4  137 – 5  136 Sest. 32  85 – 36–​40  69 f – 36–​52  194 – 58 f  213 – 128–​131  194 – 136–​143  192 – 139  192 – 140–​142  194 – 141 f  134, 144, 153 f, 192, 243, 251 – 142  192–​195, 207, 248, 253, 255 Tusc. 1.74  25 – 5.105  25, 144 Verr. 2.1.41–​61  109 – 2.1.45–​54  109 f – 2.1.55  110–​114, 125, 154, 216, 243, 248, 251, 255 – 3.209  56 f, 104 – 3.209–​222  57 – 4.73  26 – 5.2  188 – 5.26–​28  189 – 5.29  189 – 5.30  189 – 5.31  30, 190–​192, 206 f, 243 f, 253 – 5.32  190 – 5.145  89 f, 94

Dio Cassius  – 46.1–​28  204 – 46.27.2  204 Demosthenes  – 3.23  23, 29 – 24.139  24 Diogenes Laertius  – 2.82  143 Ennius  – Ann. 276 f W  176 Florus  – 2.8.9  223 Herodotus  – 7.22–​24  94 Hermogenes  – Stat. 11  47, 71 Horace  – Carm. 3.6.33–​36  122, 155 ILS 5 =​ILLRP 313  209 Isocrates  – 9.77  23 Iulius Victor  – 6.3  72, 78 – 11  79–​83, 245 f Juvenal  – 7.160 f  174 Livy  – 8.34.2 f  53 – 9.17–​19  170 – 23.18.10–​16  184 – 23.45.4  184 Lycurgus  – 128  24 Ovid  – Pont. 3.9.24  91

301

302 Polybius  – 9.5.4  147 Plutarch  – Pomp. 2.4  169 – 46.1  162 Quintilian  – Inst. 5.11.1  21 – 5.11.5–​14  46 – 5.11.6  50, 64, 205 – 5.11.7  48 f, 61, 113 – 5.11.8  80 – 5.11.9  64 – 5.11.9–​12  73 – 5.11.10  64 f, 136 f – 5.11.13  47 f, 60 – 5.11.17–​20  22 – 5.11.22  22 – 5.13.24  57–​59 – 8.4.20  216 – 8.6.72  90 – 11.1.89  237 f Rhetorica ad Herennium  – 2.46  55 f, 250 – 3.2  173 – 3.8  173 – 3.9  186 – 4.31  170

Index of Passages

– 4.46  102 f – 4.62  18 Sophocles  – fr. 789 N.2  143 Sallust  – Hist. 4.69.6 M  213 Seneca the Elder  – Con. 7.2.7  132 – Suas. 1  170 – 4  170 f Seneca the Younger  – Ep. 51.5  184 Silius Italicus  – 11.390–​409  184 f – 11.412–​420  185 Suetonius  – Jul. 7.1  161 – 22.2  99 f Thucydides  – 1.138.4  137 Valerius Maximus  – 4.1. ext. 9  212 f – 5.1. ext. 1  158 – 9.1. ext. 1  184 Velleius Paterculus  – 2.41.1  164

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Vol.

11

Rafał Kosiński / Kamilla Twardowska / Aneta Zabrocka / Adrian Szopa: The Church Histories of Theodore Lector and John Diakrinomenos edited by Rafał Kosiński and Kamilla Twardowska, translated from Greek and Latin sources by Aneta Zabrocka and Adrian Szopa. 2021.

Vol.

12

Paweł Majewski: Textualization of Experience. Studies on Ancient Greek Literature. 2020.

Vol

13

Damian Pierzak: Exempla externa in Cicero’s Orations. A Rhetorical Approach. 2021.

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