Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason 9781474229319, 1474229326, 9781474229340, 2015033026

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Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

Kant's Source s in Translation The texts that shaped Kant's thought

Series Editors

Lawrence Pasternack, Professor of Philosophy, Oklahoma State University, USA Pablo Muchnik, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Emerson College, USA

Editorial Board Fred Beiser, Syracuse University, USA; Karin de Boer, KU Leuven, Belgium; Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo Marques, Sao Paulo State University, Brazil; Corey Dyck, University of Western Ontario, Canada; Paul Guyer, Brown University, USA; Heiner Klemme, Marti n Luther University ofHalleWittenberg, Germany; Ricardo Pozzo, Sapienza University of Rome , Italy; Eric Watkins, University of California, San Diego, USA; Guenter Zoeller, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, Germany.

The aim of this series is to retrieve the rich intellectua l world that influenced Kant's philosophical development. Many of these sources are in Latin or in German, and remain inaccessible to Anglophone readers .

Available titles

Excerptfrom the Doctrine of Reason,Georg Fried rich Meier Preparationfor Natural Theology,Johann August Eberhar d

Forthcoming titles

Ethica philosophica,Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Initiaphilosophiaepracticaeprimae acroamatice,Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten ]us naturae inusum auditorium, Gottfried Achenwall

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason Georg Friedrich Meier Tr anslated by Aaron Bunch

in collaboration with Axel Gelfert and Riccardo Pozzo

Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Pie

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www .bloomsbury.com BLOOMSBURY and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Pie First pub lished 2016 Translated mat erial © Aaron Bunch, 2016 This t ranslation is based on Auszug aus der Vernfunftlehre , George Friedrich Me ier. Johann Justinus Gebauer: Halle. 1752 All rights reseN ed. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transm itted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechan ical, including photocopy ing, reco rding, or any info rmat ion st orage or ret rieval system, w it hout prior permission in wri ting from t he publishers. No respons ibility fo r loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining fro m act ion as a result of the mater ial in this publication can be accepted by Bloomsbury or t he author.

British Library Cataloguing -in-Publication Data ISBN: HB: 978-1-47 42- 2931- 9 ePDF: 978-1-47 42- 2934-0 ePub: 978-1- 4742-2932-6

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Me ier, Georg Friedrich, 1718-1777 [Auszugaus der Vernunft lehre. Selections . English I Excerpt from the Doct rine of reason / Georg Friedrich Meie r : t ranslated by Aaron Bunch. pages cm Includes bibliograph ical references and index. ISBN 978-1-4742-2931-9 (hb: alk. paper)- ISBN 978- 1-4742-2932-6 (epub) ISBN 978-1-4742-2934-0 (epf) l Logic- History - 18th century . 2 Know ledge, Theory of-H istory- 18th century. I. Tit le. B2685.A9 72E5 2016 160- dc23 2015033026 Series: Kant's Sources in Translat ion Typeset by Newgen Know ledge Works (P) Ltd. , Chennai, India

Contents Series Editors' Preface Translator's Preface Acknowledgments Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason Preface

vii xi

xiii xiv xvi

Introduction to the Doctrine of Reason First Main Part: Of Learned Cognition First Section : Of Learned Cognition In General Second Section: Of the Amplitude of Learned Cognition Third Section: Of the Greatness of Learned Cognition Fourth Section: Of the Truth of Learned Cognition Fifth Section: Of the Clarity of Learned Cognition Sixth Section: Of the Certainty of Learned Cognition Seventh Section : Of Practical Learned Cognition Eighth Section: Of Learned Concepts Ninth Section: Of Learned Judgments Tenth Section : Of Learned Rational Inferences Second Main Part : Of the Method of Learned Cognition Third Main Part : Of Learned Exposition First Section: Of the Use of Words Second Section: Of the Learned Style of Writing Third Section: Of a Learned Discourse Fourth Section: Of Learned Writings

3

5 11

17 21 27

37 51

57 67 81

93 101 103 109 113 121

vi

Contents

Fourth Main Part: Of the Character of a Learned Man

125

Afterword Riccardo Pozzo

135

Concordance German-Eng lish Glossary English-Germa n Glossary Index

147 189 19 1

193

Series Editors' Preface I Before becoming a famous philosopher, Kant was a famous teacher. For over forty years, he lectured on a wide array of topics-ranging

from metaphysics

to mineralogy, physics to pedagogy, anthropology to logic. Before officially entering the ranks at the University of Konigsberg with the Inaugural

Dissertation (1771), Kant's living depended on the popularity of his lectures. He took them very seriously, and used, for each of them, one or another of the textbooks recognized by the Prussian authorities . In many cases, he used even the same copy for decades. As a result, these copies accumulated scores of marginal notes, which acted sometimes as reminders, sometimes as objections, and sometimes as springboards for Kant's own thoughts. This wealth of material has been transcribed and printed into volumes of the

Akademie Ausgabe. Likewise, most of the extant notes composed by students who attended Kant's lectures have too been incorporated into the German edition of Kant's complete works. These resources have, over the years, received modest attention, but with Cambridge University Press's translation of selected lectures and Reflexionen, interest in them (especially among Anglophone Kant scholars), has burgeoned. Unfortunately, however, it is common for interpreters to overlook the fact that Kant's lecture notes are not his own writings, but transcriptions from his students. Similarly,his Reflexionen,though of his own hand, are nevertheless often glosses on some point made in the textbook from which he was teaching. Hence, instead of citing this material in isolation, scholars should review the salient textbook contents he was responding to. Without doing so, it cannot be known whether a particular

Reflexionor student note merely conveys Kant's restatement of a passage, or is, instead, a qualification, extrapolation, criticism, or simple digression on Kant'spart. In short, the textbooks provide the context through which Kant's notes must be read and understood, for only through comparison with the textbook passage can this material be reliably interpreted. Kant's Reflexionen and

viii

SeriesEditors' Preface

lecture notes should not be used, as unfortunately they have been, as stand alone indications of his thoughts - often they are not. Responsible scholarship demands that they be read with, and interpreted through, the textbook passage from which Kant was then lecturing. Our hope is that this volume and the ones to follow will contribute to the development of Kant scholarship, promoting a more accurate interpretation of his Reflexionen and lecture notes. By translating the textbooks that framed Kant's teaching career, we also hope to make the larger intellectual world that influenced his philosophical development mor e accessible. Many of the source materials are iJ1Latin and German, and hence remain inaccessible to Anglophone reader s, preventing them from gaining a more comprehensive view of the intellectual climate of Kant's day. TI1e first phase of this series will focus on the most iJnportant philosophical textbooks Kant used in the classroom. In addition to newly translated material, each volume will be accompanied by a system of concordances that will allow readers to correlate Kant's reflections and lectures to their corresponding textbook passages. In the second phase, the ser ies will cast a broader net and offer translations of

influentialGermanand Latintextsofthe eighteenthcenturythat are not currently available in English or need updating. Our goal here is to help scholars place Kant in conversation with his contemporaries, making the broader intellectual world of the German enlightenment available to the Anglophone scholars .

II We are excited to begin this series with a translation of Georg Friedrich Meier's

Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre . Not only does this textbook serve as the basis for Kant's logic lectures and related Reflexionen,but is also crucial for studying the so-called Jasche Logic of 1800,which is redacted from the marginal and interleave notes found in Kant's personal copy of the Auszug Given the recent growth in scholarship on Kant's logic, normative epistemology, and the psychology of belief, this volume will make a major contribution to contemporary debates in the field. Meier's Vernunftlehre[Doctrine of Reason] and Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre [Excerptfrom the Doctrineof Reason] appeared together in 1752. The latter was written as a textbook and was widely adopted by German instructors, most notably by Immanuel Kant. Like all professors in Pmssian universities at the time, Kant was required to take a published text as the basis for his lectures. He used

SeriesEditors'Preface

ix

the Auszug to teach logic at least thirty -two times between 1756 and 1796: Thus, it is fair to say, Meier's text is one of Kant's most enduring influences, since it accompanied him throughout the most productive period of his intellectual life. Meier's Auszug does not deal with what we know today as formal logic. Its scope is much broader: it concerns "the elements of thought and language, which make human understanding

possible."2 Epistemology (broadly conceived)

includes pedagogy and rhetoric, as well as "the character of the learned man." In addition, Meier was one of the first German philosophers who studied John Locke's work in depth. Meier's texts were instrumental to the introduction of English philosophy into Germany, 3 and can be seen to straddle the two dominant intellectual forces in modern philosophy, the rationalist and the empiricist traditions, indirectly helping to wake Kant from his "dogmatic slumber."

III Georg Friedrich Meier (1718 - 77) studied and taught philosophy at the University of Halle and was among the most authoritative figures of the German Enligh tenment. He was a student of Alexander Baumgarten, who, together with the latter's teacher, Christian Wolff, were the principal architects of the post -Leibnizian

rationalism

that dominated

German -speaking

universities through the eighteenth century. Meier's star rose quickly. In 1748, he was appointed as a full-time professor at the University of Halle. Between 1744 and 1753 he was inducted into four different scholarly societies, including the Royal Academy ofSciences in Berlin. He published voluminously on theology, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, logic, rhetoric , and aesthetics (a new science invented by his teacher, Baumgarten). 4 Meier's influence spread through the university textbooks he wrote on these topics, as well as through his many influential students. His disciples included Immanuel Kant's vehement critic Johann Eberhard, and Frederick the Great's eventual minister of religion and education, Karl Abraham von Zedlitz und Leipe.

IV The significance of Meier's Auszug for contemporary Kant scholarship cannot be overstated. Kant's views about logic and the elements of human cognition

X

SeriesEditors'Preface

lie at the heart of his Critical Philosophy. Among the richest sources of information about these views are the student transcripts of his logic lectures, as well as Kant's handwritten notes in the margins and on interleaved pages of his personal copy of Meier's book. As with the other volumes in this series, without knowledge of the textbook from which Kant's lectures are based, it is difficult to determine how Kant should be understood. The same is true of Kant's handwritten notes, which are often fragmentary and have meaning only in the immediate context of their source. For this reason, Meier'sAuszug is reprinted in Volume 16 of Kant's Gesammelte Schriften. This important text, however, has until now not been available in an

English translatio n, posing a serious prob lem for Kant scholars and students of eighteenth-century philosophy who are unfamiliar with German. Lastly, since the publication of Rae Langton's Kantian Humility, there has been a significant increase in interest in Locke's influence on Kant's Crit ical Philosophy .5 Scholarship on this topic ranges from the parallels between their respective views on the limits to human knowledge to Kant's appropriation of Locke's understanding of propositional assent. Access to Meier's Auszug,

the principal text through which Kant was exposed to Locke'sthought, will therefore be of significant interest to those pursuing this line of inquiry. Lawrence Pasternack and Pablo Muchnik

Notes l

J.Michael Young, "Translator's Introduction" to Immanuel Kant, Lectureson Logic

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, l992), xxi. 2 Pozzo, "Prejudices and Horizons," "Prejudices and Horizons: G. F. Meier's

Vemunftlehreand Its Relation to Kant," Journalof the Historyof Philosophy43: 2 (2005), 185. 3 Pozzo, "Meier, Georg Friedrich: About Logic, Aesthetics and Rhetoric in German Enlightenment Philosophy," A GORA 22: 2 (2003), 133. 4 A more thorough biographical profile is provided in Ricardo Pozzo's Afterword to this volume. 5 Rae Langton, Kantian Humility: Our Ignoranceof1hings in Themselves(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

Translator's Preface This translation of Georg Friedrich Meier's Auszug aus der Vernfunftlehre (Halle: Johann Justinus Gebauer, 1752) is based on the German text reprinted in Volume 16 of the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences edition of Kant's

gesammelte Schriften (Berlin and Leipzig: Walter de Gruyter, 1924), and checked against the Kessinger Legacy Reprints photographic reproduction of the origina l 1752 edition . This check revealed one discrepancy. In § 446, the original edition has "learned thoughts" [gelehrteGedanken],whereas the Academy edition has "honored thoughts" [geehrte Gedanken].The translation follows the original edition in this case. The pagination of the original edition is provided in square brackets within the text; the volume and page of the

Academyedition are provided in the margins.Boldfacetype followsthe text of the Academy edition. The German is provided sparingly in square brackets where I thought it would be helpful or interesting to the reader . It is worth noting at the outset that "Excerpt" [Auszug] in the title of this work is a technical term, which Meier defines in§ 518 as a writing that treats its subject briefly, in contrast to "a major work," which treats its subject amply. Thus, Excerptfrom the Doctrine of Reason is a single writing, which treats the doctrine of reason briefly, and is not, as contemporary English usage suggests, a snippet from a larger work. One occasionally sees Meier's title translated as the Excerpts (plural), which gives the false impression that the book is a collection of snippets. This translation attempts to convey in English not only the meaning of Meier's Auszug, but also its structure and style. By contemporary English standards, it is a strange text. As Meier explains in his preface, he prepared the Auszug for use in his lectures. Accordingly, the German text often has the rough, fragmentary feel of lecture notes. At the same time, its wording is often ungain ly and repetitive. This combination is on display in the elaborate enumerations that Meier stitches together with a free use of semicolons, colons, and commas . In general, Meier's use of punctuation is both nonstandard

Translator'sPreface

xii

and inconsistent. This translation preserves these qualities of the original. In particular, since Meier's punctua tion is for the most part no obstacle to comprehension, and since it may be of interest to scholars, this translation does not correct it. Owing to the relevance of Meier's Excerpt to Kant scholarship, an effort was made to follow

J. Michael Young's excellent translation of Kant's Lectures

on Logic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Nevertheless, the present translation differs from Young's with respect to several key terms. First, the perfection of cognition that Meier calls die Weitliiufigkeitis translated by "amplitude" rather than by "extensiveness." It was thought that "amplit ude " better captures the connotation of generosity present in die Weitliiufigkeit. This decision frees the term "extensive" to translate ausfuhrlich in place of Young's "exhaustive." Exha ustive suggests a thoroughness that is comprehensive or total: no sto ne is left unturned. But this meaning of "exhaust ive" wou ld be incongruous in § 133, where Meier says that a cognition "can be extensively

[ausfahrlich]dear, even though it is not totally [ganz] dear." An exhaustively clear cognition would be totally clear. Instead , we need a word such as extensive, which means "to a great extent" but not "comprehe nsively" or "totally." TI1eperfection of cognition that Meier calls die Grosse is translated as the "greatness" of cognition as opposed to its "quantity." In Meier's discussion of the perfections of cognition, the greatness of learned cognition has in part not only to do with its quantity(§ 67), but also with its importance and worth (see §§ 26, 68). "Greatness" has all of these senses, but "quantity" does not. On the other hand, in the context of formal logic (see Part One, Sections 9 and 10), die Grosse is translated as "quantity" where Meier refers to the quantity of a judgment, which can be sing ular [ein einzelnes] or common

[ein gemeines] (§ 301). Finally, die Rede is translated as "discourse" rather than "speech." In Meier's text, there are indications that die Rede is prior to the distinction between speaking and writing. In § 442, Meier says that oral and written exposition [Vortrag] use die Rede to produce a cognition in another person. The exposition may be oral or written, but die Rede is strictly neither. As a translation, "discourse" preserves this neutrality between speaking and writing at the expense of a certain ungainliness in contexts where Meier clearly has in mind oral delivery as in a lecture.

Acknowledgment s From the Seri es Edit ors We have many to thank for their assistance in realizing this volume. First, our deepest gratitude goes to Aaron Bunch, whose philosophical sensibilities and remarkable talents as a translator made this volume possible. Although Aaron has chosen to move on to other ventures, this volume is but a small illustration of what he could have offered to the scholarly community and speaks to how much we have lost by his departure . Second, we would like to thank Axel Gelfert and Riccardo Pozzo for their fine work with Aaron's translation and the considerable time spent reviewing and enhancing earlier drafts. Riccardo has also written the Afterword, and his Kant und das ProblemeinerEinleitungin die Logik (1988) and

GeorgFriedrichMeiers Vernunftlehre(2000) stand as benchmarks for all future scholarship on the relationship between Kant and Meier. It has been a pleasure, and a wonderfu l learning experience, to have worked closely with all of them. We would also like to thank Susan Castro, who was of great help in composing the appendix to this volume, as well as our assistants Mary Danley and Siyi Huo, who helped us proofread the appendix and refine its contents . Lastly, our gratitude goes to Colleen Coalter, who persuaded us to publish this series with Bloomsbury and has done much to shepherd this project forward .

From the Translator This trans lation has been improved considerably by the thorough, detailed, and insightful comments of Axel Gelfert and Riccardo Pozzo. I am grateful for their generosity and expertise . I would also like to thank the series editors, Lawrence Pasternack and Pablo Much nik, for the opportunity to contribute to this series, as well as the editors at Bloomsbury and N ewgen Knowledge Works for their meticulous attention to the manuscript.

@eorge Sriebrid) ID?eier~ orbentlidJ en f~~ret~brr ~dttt,eis9eit unb brr &tdinif~m ~cabemfe ber ®iffenf~aften rolitgfiebe!S

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George Friedrich Meier Ordinary Professor of Philosophy and Member of the Berlin Academy of Sciences

Excerptfrom the Doctrine of Reason with most gracious Royal Polish and Electoral Saxon privileges HALLE at Johann Justinus Gebauer, 1752

(AA 16: 31

[ AA 16: 4 1

Preface Since this present writing is a mere excerpt from my larger doctrine of reason, which comes to light at the same time as this one, I have nothing more to remark than that I have prepared this excerpt for use in my lectures, and that I have treated a couple of subjects in the excerpt that I have omitted in the larger work. Since I have worked already for some time on my larger doctrine of reason, let no one believe that I have been too hasty in the production of both these writings . If anyone would reproach me for publishing two doctrines of reason at the same time, I must wait and see what kind of reason he will be able to give for his reproach . By chance I have found a printing error in § 63 in the second line where, instead of to a richdegree[in einemreichenGrade],to the same degree[in

einemgleichenGrade] must be read. Thesympatheticreader willkindlyforgive the remaining printing errors that may have slipped in. I hope that with this writing I may perform an agreeable service for many people.

[ 1]

[AA 16: 5]

Introduction to the Doctrine of Reason

§

1. The doctrine of reason or the art of reason (logica, philosophia

instrumentalis, philosophia rationalis) is a science, which deals with the rules oflearned cognition and oflearned exposition. § 2. In order that the doctrine of reason contain no entirely arbitrary, contrived, and unnatural laws, its rules must be derived (1) from experience of the effects of human reason, (2) from the nature of human reason, (3) from general basic truths on which rests the entirety of human cognition . § 3.TI1e intentofthe doctrineofreasonis theperfectionofa learnedcognition

and of a learned exposition, which are either suitable only for professional scholars, or are also appropriate and usable for other learned men. [2] §4. The doctrine of reason is a means without which one cannot attain learned cognition or science, and through whose proper use a learned cognition and science is attained § 5.

§ 1.

Philosophy [Die Weltweisheit] (philosophia) is a science of the

universal qualities of things insofar as they are cognized without faith [ohne

(AA 16: 5 1]

Glauben]. Now since learned cognition and learned exposition comprise many kinds, their perfections and imperfections are more universal qualities of things, which are completely proved in the doct rine of reason without deriving their truth from testimonies. Thus, the doctrine of reason

[AA 16: 52 I

is a part of philosophy . § 6. The

doctrine of reason deals either with a completely certain learned

cognition and its exposition or with probable learned cognition and its exposition § 1. The former is the rational doctrine of the entirely certain learned cognition (analytica), and the latter the rational doctrine of the probable learned cognition ( dialectica, logicaprobabilium). We treat the first doctrin e of reason .

(AA 16, 121

Excerptfrom the Doctrine of Reason

2

§ 7.

In the doctrine of reason, the rules of learned cognition and its

learned exposition are either applied to their particular kinds or not. The former is the doctrine of reason put into practice [ausiibende] (logica (AA 16, 73J

practica, utens ), and the latter is the theoretical [lehrende] doctrin e of

reason (logica theoretica, docens). § 8.

If the doctrine of reason is so constituted as by its nature it can

and must be constituted,

it has among others a threefold value . (1) It

advances the study and dissem ination of all sciences, and of the complete learnedness. Thus, every student rightly should make a beginning of the study of the doctrine of reason. (2) It improves the understanding

and

reason, and shows how one must use these powers of cognition [3] in order to cognize the truth in a proper way. (3) It promotes the entirety of virtue by improving free will; it provides that cognition on which virtue rests; and in the improvement of conscience it has an in dispensible influence. § 9.

The doctrine of reason treats

I. Oflearned cognition. (AA 16: 74)

1.

Oflearned cognition in general.

2.

Of the amplitude oflearned cognition.

3.

Of the greatness of learned cognition.

4.

Of the truth oflearned cognition.

5.

Of the clarity of learned cognition .

6.

Of the certainty oflearned cognition.

7.

Of practical learned cognition .

8.

Oflearned concepts .

9. Oflearned judgments. 10.

Oflearned rational inferences.

II. Of the method oflearned cognition. III. Oflearned exposition. 1.

Of the use of words.

2.

Of the learned style of writing .

3.

Of a learned discourse .

4.

Oflearned writings .

N. Of the character of a learned man.

[4] The Doctrine of Reason (AA 16: 76)

First Main Part

Of Learned Cognition

Fir s t Section

Of Learned Cognition In General

10. Experience teaches that we imagine infinitely many things. A representation (repraesentatioperceptio)behaves like an image, which the

§

pictorial skill of the soul sketches in its interior. § 11.

Cognition (cognitio) is either a complex [Inbegriff] of many

representations or that action whereby a representation of a matter is produced. One can also take representations and cognition for one and the same without committing an appreciable error. § 12. What

we represent and cognize is distinct from representation

!AA 16: 791

and cognition. The former is called the object of cognition and of representation (obiectum cognitionis et repraesentationis). §

13. We are conscious of our representations and of our cognition

(conscium esse, adpercipere) insofar as we distinguish them and their object from other representations and matters. Consciousness is a double representation: a representation of the object, and a representation of its difference from others. Consciousness acts like light in the material world, which reveals to us the differences between bodies. [5) § 14. When we are conscious of a representation, we are conscious of it either considered merely on the whole [im Ganzen], so that we distinguish nothing at all in it; or we are conscious also of the manifold in it. In the first case, we have an indistinct or a confused cognition (cognition indistincta et confusa), but in the other a distinct one (cognition distincta); for example, when we see a person from a distance, we have an indistinct cognition of his face so long as we do not see the parts and features of his face. But if he comes closer, and we begin to notice his eyes, his nose, and the features of his face, then we gain a distinct cognition of his face.

!AA 16: soi

Exce,pt from the Doctrine of Reason

6

(A A 16: 9.IJ

§

15. The ground of a matter (ratio), the matter may be a cognition or the

object of a cognition, is that from which the matter can be cognized, and the consequence of the ground (rationatum) is what can be cognized from the ground . Light is the ground of the visibility of bodies, and this visibility is a consequence oflight. The connection of matters (nexus, consequentia) consists in the one being the ground of the other, or in containing the other within itself. The ground of a matter is either so constituted that we can derive our entire cognition of the matter from the ground, in such a way that besides the ground nothing else is required in order to cognize all that is found in the matter; or the ground is not so constituted . The former is the sufficie nt ground (ratio sufficiens), and the latter is the insufficient ground (ratio insufficiens). (AA 16, 921

§

16. Everything that is possible and actual has a ground, and everything

also has a sufficient ground. (A A 16: 93)

[6) § 17. When we cognize something, we cognize it either in a distinct way from grounds, or not. In the first case, we have a rational cognition (cognitio rationalis). Three things are required for such a cognition: (1) a cognition of a matter, (2) a cognition of its ground , and (3) a distinct cognition of the connection of the matter with its ground. For example: When I cognize that all hwnan beings can err, because they have a limited

(AA 16: 94J

understanding, and I think: Whoever has a limited understanding can err; all human beings have a limited understanding, therefore they can all err: In this way I have a rational cognition of the truth that all human beings

can err. § 18. Every cognition, insofar as it is not rational, is called a common or a historical cognition (cognitio vulgaris, historica). All things can be cognized historically, and one may even cognize their grounds ; so long as one does not distinctly understand the connection of the consequences with their grounds, one has only a merely historical cognition. (AA 16,991

19. A more perfect historical cognition is a beautiful [schone] cogniti on (cognitio pulcra, aesthetica), and the fine sciences [die schonen §

Wissenschaften] deal with the rules by which historical cognition is (AA 16: l00)

beautified [verschonert]. § 20. Although historical cognition is very distinct from rational cognition

§

17. 18, to such an extent that the most beautiful historical

Of Learned CognitionIn General

7

cognition does not even deserve to be called a rational cognition § 19; nonethe less, the former is indispe nsable to the latter, since a human being cannot attain rational cognition of a matter if he does not first possess a

(AA 16: 1011

historical cognition of it. (7] § 21. The learned and philosophical cognition (cognitio erudita et philosophica) is a rational cognition that is perfect to a higher or more appreciable degree. § 22. When the manifold ina cognition conforms to an intention [Absicht], or contains the sufficient ground of it: this const itutes the perfection of

(AA 16: 1021

cognition (perfectio cognit ionis). The perfections of cognition occur in it either insofar as it is distinct or insofar as it is indistinct§ 14. The former are called the logical perfection s of cognition (perfect io cognitionis logica), and the latter the beauties of cognition (pulcritudo et perf ectio aesthetica cognitionis). E.g. mathematica l certainty is a logical perfection , and pictorial liveliness is a beauty of cognition. § 23. Insofar as a cognition is not perfect, to that extent it is an imperfect

(AA 16: L03J

cognition (imperfectio cognition is). The imperfections of cognition occur in it either insofar as it is distinct or insofar as it is indistinct§ 14. The former are called the logical imperfection s of cognition (imperfect io cognitionis

{AA 16: 104]

logica), and the latter are called the uglin esses of cognition (deformitas, imperfectio cognitionis aesthetica) . E.g. what is indecent and obscene in everyday jokes is an ugliness of cognition; but a false inference is a logical imperfection of cognition. § 24. Learned cognitio n must be adorned with the perfections of cognition § 21. 22. Thus it possesses either merely the logical perfections of cognition by being either not beautiful at all or at the same time even ugly; or besides the logical perfections it possesses the beaut ies of cognition § 22. 23. The former is a merely learned cognition (cognitio [8] mere erudita), and the latter is a cognition that is beautiful and learned at the same tim e (cognitio aesthetico-log ica). The last is more perfect than the first, and the first must not be sought alone. § 25. The more we cognize, the more perfect our cognition is § 22. The first perfection of learned cognit ion consists therefore in its amplitud e (vastitas, ube rtas cognitionis eruditae), which is attributed to a cognition insofar as it represents many objects.

(AA 16: 1os1

Excerptfrom the Doctrine of Reason

8

[AA 16: 106]

§ 26. The greater and more important our cognition is, the more perfect it is, because a great matter encompasses much §22. The second perfection of learned cognition consists accordingly in its greatness and importan ce (dignitas, magnitudo et maiestas cognitionis eruditae), which belongs to a cognition insofar as it is great and important. E.g. cognition of God is more important than cognition of the clothes of the Romans . § 27. Because a false cognition is no cognition at all, the truth of cogni tion (veritas cognitionis eruditae) is its third perfection. This can be

called the basic perfection of cognition, because without it cognition is no cognition at all, and thus also capable of no perfection. {AA 16: 1011

§ 28. Since we represent to ourselves more in a distinct representation than in an indistinct one§ 14, distinctness oflearned cognition is its fourth perfection. § 29. Consciousness of the truth of a cognition is its certainty (certitudo subiective spectata). Since now the truth of cognition as well as the consciousness of it is a perfection§ 13. 17, the certainty oflearned cognition is its fifth perfection.

[A A 16:

1os1

[9] § 30. A learned cognition is practical insofar as it contributes what it has to the direction of our free actions (cognitio erudita practica), and therein consists its sixth perfection § 22.

(A A 16: 3 1J

§ 31. The more ample, important , correct, distinct, certain , and practical a learned cognition is, the more perfect it is § 25- 30. Now since each rational human being must everywhere strive for the greatest perfection that is possible for him; he must, if he aims to attain a learned cognition, (1) seek to attain all of its logical perfections, (2) seek each of them to the highest possible degree, and besides that also (3) seek the beauties of cognition § 22. § 32. Accordingly, whoever would acquire the most perfect learned cognition must not be satisfied with a merely learned cognition § 24. 31. Rather, although not all of his learned representations can be beautiful at the same time, his learned cognition, considered on the whole, must nonetheless be at once a beautiful cognition, if it is otherwise to be improved to as high a degree as possible. § 33. A learned cognition can be (1) logically perfect and imperfect at the

[AA 16: 1101

same time . E.g. a correct, distinct, and certain cognition can have the flaw that it is not practical; (2) it can be logically perfect to a higher degree than

Of Learned Cognition In General

9

imperfect, or more imperfect than perfect; (3) logically perfect and beautiful or ugly at the same time; (4) logically perfect and neither beautiful nor ugly; (5) logically imperfect and at the same time beautiful or ugly§ 22. 23. § 34. Whoever would attain a learned cognition that is at the same time beautiful §32 must (1) not make it logically perfect in such a way and to such a degree that thereby all its beauty is impeded; (2) he must not beautify it in such a way and to such a degree that [10] thereby the required logical perfection of it is made impossible; (3) he must seek primarily to preserve the logical perfections, and he must apply the beauties only more sparingly, as an adornment. § 35. If some perfections in learned cognition cannot be attained at the

[AA 16: 111)

same time, one must abandon the smaller and more needless perfections in order to maintain the greater and more needful ones. Accordingly, in a learned cognition that is to be not merely learned, often one must diminish logical rigor in small matters in order to achieve the greater beaut y of the cognition. § 36. The imperfections of learned cognition are either deficiencies or

[AA 16, L63J

errors. A deficiency of learned cognition (defectus cognitionis eruditae) arises when certain rules of its perfection are not observed and also not violated. E.g. if a key concept is not explained at all, the rules of explanations are neither observed nor violated. An error of learned cog ni tio n (vitium cognitionis eruditae) arises when the rules of its perfection are violated. E.g. if one explains a concept incorrectly. If one must avoid all deficiencies and errors, one must nevertheless take more care to avoid the latter, because one can say that every error is connected with a deficiency, and an error is thus a greater imperfection than a mere deficiency. § 37. Common and historical cognit ion can be much more perfect than merely learned cognition, namely, if it is very beautiful §22. 23. E.g. an

[AA 16: t67J

unlearned general and minister can possess a much more perfect cognition than a learned and pedantic bookworm. Common cognition acquires this advantage only accidentally f 11], when learned cognition is not as perfect as it could and should be. § 38. Learned cognition is always necessarily more perfect than common cognition, if they are equal in all other respects § 18. 21. § 39. Although common cognition is very useful and in infinitely many cases it is sufficient, and even though some common cognition can

[AA 16: 168]

Excerptfrom the Doctrine of Reason

accidentally be more useful than some learned cognition: nevertheless, in order to advance our welfare, learned cognition is necessarily more useful than common cognition, if they are equal in all other respects. For (1) since it is more perfect

§

38, it improves. also the cognitive power to a higher

degree than common cognition; (2) for just this reason it is more pleasant [AA 16, 1691

than common cognition; (3) it is more suitable to the character of humanity and more respectable than common cognition; (4) it promotes the discovery of new truths more than common cognition does; and (5) it can be much more deftly and better applied and exercised than common cognition. § 40. A learned cognition that is also beautiful provides all the benefits of learned cognition §. 39, and all the benefits of beautiful cognition. And since it also avoids all the defects of merely learned and merely beautiful cognition: it is of all types of human cognition the most beneficial and useful cognition.

Sec ond Sect i o n

(AA 16: 170]

Of the Amplitude of Learned Cognition

§ 41. The

imperfection oflearned cognition that is contrary to its amplitude § 25 is the meagerness oflearned cognition (angustia eruditae cognitionis), and it arises always from ignorance (ignorantia) or from the [12) total lack

(AA 16,1 7 1]

of cognition of things and their grounds . To the extent that the amplitude of the learned cognition of a human being increases, his ignoranc e diminishes, and the greater the ignorance of a human being is, the poorer his learned cognition is. § 42.

The amplitude of learned cognition is contrary to a two-fold ignorance: (1) a total ignorance (ignorantia totalis), when we do not have even a historical cognition of a matter ; and (2) an ignorance of the grounds of things (ignorantia rationum), in which case an excellent histo rical

cognition of the things can still come to pass. § 43. Theig noranceofa

human being is (l) anabsolutely[schlechterdingsJ

{AA 16: 1n 1

necessary and unavoidabl e ignorance (ignorantia absolute necessaria

et invincibilis), which he cannot avoid owing to the bounds of his power of cogn ition; and (2) a voluntary ignorance (ignorantia arbitrar ia et vincibilis), whose contrary cognition he could attain if he wanted to. § 44. The horizon , or the field of view of his learned cognition (horizon

{AA 16: 1731

seu sphaera cognitionis eruditae), is the totality ofall those things that a human being can cognize in a learned way without detracting from his remaining total perfection. Thus, all things are excluded from it with respect to which a human being must necessarily or voluntarily remain unknowing §43. § 45.

A matter is raised above the horizon of human learned cognition

(res supra horizontem eruditae cognitionis humanae posita) if a human

(AA 16: 174]

Excerptfrom the Doctrine of Reason

12

being's ignorance of it is absolutely necessary, even if the matter is not unworthy of a learned cognition. Hum an understanding is too weak to be capable of cognizing these important matters in a learned way. Now although one must not disdain such matters [13] that go beyond our horizon, and although without sufficient reason one must assert nothing of a matter that is raised above the horizon of our cognition; nevertheless, one must try one's best to avoid the futile and harmful striving after a learned [AA 16: 175]

cognition of such matters that go beyond our horizon. § 46. A matter is lowered beneath the horizon of human learned cognition (res infra horizontem eruditae cognitionis humanae posita), which could indeed be cognized by a human being in a learned way, but is not great enough to be worth such a cognition. Just as without adequate reason one must not pass off as something a matter that is lowered beneath the horizon of human learned cogn ition, one also must not endeavor to

fAA 16: 176]

cognize in a learned way such matters that are really lowered beneath the horizon of human learned cognition. Otherwise one makes oneself ridiculous and contemptib le, and one thereby neglects the learned cognition of more important and more necessar y matters. § 47. Something is outside the horizon of learned human cognition (res extra horizontem cognitionis humanae eruditae posita), which indeed could be cognized by a human being in a learned way, which also is not unworthy of a human learned cognition, the learned cognition of which,

(AA 16, m

J

however, would hinder a human being in his other occupations. Without adequate reason one must not pass off as something a matter that is found outside the horizon of his learned cognition; but also one must not strive for a learned cognition of such matters, because otherwise he involves himself in extraneous troubles and would thereby neglect his work. [14] §48. All those things that are neither raised above the horizon of human learned cognition, nor lowered beneath it, nor found outside it, are found within the scope of the horizon of human learned cognition (res intra horizontem cognitionis humanae eruditae posita), and they constitute the learned horizon §44.

[AA 16: 178]

§ 49.

The supremely ample [allerweitliiufigste] learned cognition of a human being consists in the learned cognition of all matters that are found within the scope of his horizon §48. 25. Now since every learned man must attain the most ample learned cognition that is possible for him, he must

Of the Amplitude of Learned Cognition

13

try to survey the boundaries and the scope of his horizon as exactly as the weakness of human beings perm its§ 44. § 50. And even if a human being should have attained the supremely

[AA 16: 1901

ample learned cognition, there yet remains much necessary ignorance, which brings him neither honor nor shame § 43. With regard to voluntary

[AA 16: 191)

ignorance, however, it is either praiseworthy or blameworthy. Praiseworthy ignorance (ignorantia laudabilis) is ignorance of such matters that are

found beneath and outside the horizon oflearned cognition.§ 46. 47. § 51. Blameworthy ignorance (ignorantia illaudabilis) is ignorance of

[AA 16: 194]

matters that are found within the horizon of learned cognition § 48. Thus,

[AA 16, 195]

whoever would attain the supremely ample learned cognition must seek to avoid all blameworthy ignorance, and no other kinds §49. § 52. It is a ridiculous folly of some poor heads among the learned men when they count their blameworthy ignorance as a merit, [15] and with Socrates, who possessed a very ample learning, pretend that they know nothing except that they know nothing. § 53. The more things someone cognizes in a learned way, the more ample his learned cognition is. A higher or more appreciable, and consequently more rare, degree of amplitude of learned cognition is called polyhistory

[AA 16, 196)

[Vielwisserei] (polyhistoria). 11-tis is undeniably a great perfection of learned cognition, if only one is not tempted by the craving for polyhistory [Polyhistorie](1) to overstep the bounds of one's learned horizon, and (2) to neglect too much the other perfections oflearned cognition. § 54. Whoever would make his learned cognition ample enough must (I) study many main parts of learnedness. E.g. philosophy [die Weltweisheit],

[AA 16, 197)

theology [ Gottesgelahrtheit],history, philology, etc. (2) He must divide each main part into many subparts, e.g., he must divide philosophy into the doctrine of reason, metaphysics, physics, natural right, etc. (3) He must in turn study each of these parts amply, e.g. the doctrine of reason, and (4) he must in turn seek to attain an ample learned cognit ion of each individua l truth, e.g. of the omniscience of God.

[AA 16: 19sJ

§ 55. An ample learned cognition is extensive and complete (comp leta

[AA 16, 2021

cognitio erudita) when it is sufficient for its purposes, or when we cognize in a learned way as much as the entire purpose of our learned cognition requires. Amplitude without extensiveness is not perfect enough, and thus one must learn to distinguish the highest truths from the minor matters in

Excerptfrom the Doctrine of Reason

14

every object of learned cognition, so that by the learned cognition of the former one attains a complete learnedness. (16] §56. Whoever studies merely in a cavalier fashion by skimming through an ample outline of all the parts of learnedness; perhaps studies a few small parts of learnedness a little more amply, but still goes through them briefly; and perhaps here and there explores a few particular matters because he especially likes them for some reason or other: his learned cognition is a poor skeleton of learnedness, and deserves very little respect §55. § 57.

Because it is impossible for a human being to attain an extensive,

amp le learned cognition all at once, one must constantly seek to extend one's learned cognition: so that one does not regress in it by failing to continue to advance. (AA 16: 203]

§ 58.

Because, through the broadening of learned cognition, the powers

of cognition are at the same time made more capable, one need not worry that through the constant broadening of learned cognition one's head will be overburdened, if only in this pursuit one does not overstep the bounds of the learned horizon. § 59. Although art is long and human life is short, this observation must spur us to learn as much as possible with proper haste, rather than fill us with timidity and despondency, which hinders us in the broadening of learned cognition. § 60.

So that one does not view t he broadening of learned cognition as

needless and useless, one must set no end that is too small, insignificant, and base, which one aims to achieve by one's learned cognition. (AA 16: 204]

§ 61.

Since naturally it is necessary that we human beings forget much,

just for that reason one must broaden learned cognition very much, so that one can forget much (17] and nevertheless still retain much. In any case, the truths we forget were not entirely useless, because they improved the quality of our cognitive powers. § 62. 1he amplitude of learned cognition springs from a twofold source, (AA 16, 2os 1

both of which must be present: ( 1) from the amplitude and the rich content of the object, when it contains much within itself, and so can be cognized

by a human being in a learned way (vastitas obiectiva); and (2) from the extension of the cognitive powers (vastitas subiectiva), by virtue of which

one is capable of cognizing much about a thing in a learned way.

Of the Amplitude of Learned Cognition § 63.

15

Because it is impossible for a human being to learn alJ the parts of

learnedness to the same degree of perfection, each person must pick out one part with which he will occupy himself most and of which he aims to attain the most perfect learned cognition. This is his principal scie nce (scientia eruditi principalis). Each person must choose as his principal science that part of learnedness (1) which can be cognized by human beings to a very high degree of perfection, and (2) for which he possesses the most skill, rational desire, and other means of advancement. § 64.

Each person must ( 1) study his principal science most amply and

extensively, and (2) investigate all other parts of learnedness in relation to his principal science. The more closely another part of learnedness is connected with the principal science, the more perfectly and amply one must seek to cognize it in a learned way § 63. § 65.

The meagerness

of learned cognition causes, among others, a

threefold harm: (1) [18] learned pedantry and charlatanry (pedantismus et charlataneria eruditorum), by virtue of which one values much too highly the little that one understands and completely disdai ns everything else; (2) a ridiculous conceit and a vain pride; and (3) a little learnedness can make a human being unhappy all his life in that he can find himself in just those circumstances in wh ich what he studied is not required of him, and what he has not studied is expected of him.

[AA 16: 206)

Third

Sec tion

[AA 16: 2 19)

Of the Greatness of Learned Cognition

§ 66. The greatness of learned cognition requires not only a great object, but the cognition must also be great enough for the object§ 26. The greater the object is, and the more proportioned the cognition, the greater the learned cognition is. § 67. The object of learned cognition is great considered for itself [vor

sich] (magnitudo eruditae cognitionis obiectiva absoluta) if it contains many diverse things that can be cognized in a learned way. For example,

[AA 16, 2201

God, philosophy [die Weltweisheit],history, etc. § 68. The object oflearned cognition is great in view of its consequences (magnitudo eruditae cognition is obiectiva respectiva), (1) if it is important (res digna, gravis), that is, if it has great consequences, e.g. if the happiness of human beings, the welfare of the fatherland, etc., depend on it; (2) if it

[AA 16, 22 11

is fruitful (res foecunda), that is, if many consequences flow from it. E.g. blessedness in God, for it is good for a11things. [19] § 69. Whoever would make his learned cognition truly great must

fAA 16,223 )

seek to cognize many absolutely great, important, and fruitful matters. The more the object contains in itself, the greater its consequences are, and the more consequences it has, the greater, more important, and more fruitful it is; and the greater, more important and more fruitful the learned cognit ion of it is, namely, insofar as one considers it with respect to its object. § 70. The greatness of learned cognition attributable to the cognition itself (magnitudo cognitionis eruditae subiectiva) consists in the cognition

being proportioned to the greatness of its object § 66. The greater the object is, the more ample, correct, distinct, certain, and practical the learned cognition of it must be, and the more time and effort must be devoted to its

[AA 16, 224J

Excerptfrom the Doctrine of Reason

18

attainment. The less great the object is, the less perfect the learned cognition must be, and the less time and effort must be devoted to its attainment. § 71. The imperfection of learned cognition that is contrary to its greatness is called its smallness (parvitas, vilitas cognitionis eruditae); and it arises either from the smallness of the object or if the learned cognition is not proportioned to the object § 66. § 72. The object of learned cognition is small considered for itself (parvitas cognitionis eruditae obiectiva absoluta) if it conta ins in itselflittle [AA 16: 22sJ

that can be cognized in a learned way. E.g. the hairpins of Roman women. § 73. The

object of learned cognition is small in view of its consequences

(parvitas cognitio n is eruditae obiectiva respectiva), (1) ifit is not important (res leviores), that is, if it has no great consequences, e.g. the doctr ine of the composition of (20] bodies from monads; (2) if it is unfruitful (res infoecunda, sterilis), that is, if it does not have many consequences, e.g. the doctrine of the incorporeality of the soul. § 74. If a matter is small in all respects § 72. 73, it is not worth a learned cognition, for it is lowered beneat h the horizon of learned cognition

§ 46.

The less a matter contains in itself, the fewer and smaller consequencesit has, the smaller it is. To these small matters one must also add uncouth and base things (res p lebeiae, abiectae), the learned investigation of which would be actua lly repugnant to respectable morals, e.g. outbreaks of the vices among the rabble. [AA 16: 22i ]

§ 75.

The smallness of learned cognition attributable to the cognition

itself (pa rvitas cognit ionis erud itae subiectiva) consists in its being not proportioned to the objects § 71. Thus, (l) if one seeks a more perfect learned cognition with more effort, and one spends more time on it, than the object deserves; and (2) if one cognizes an object not as perfectly, and one investigates it with less effort, and spends less time on it, than it deserves. E.g. whoever assails errors more learnedly and diligently than the vices, his [AA 16: 22s1

learned cognition is not sufficiently proportioned. § 76. Whoeve r would make his learned cognition truly perfect must, (1)

if it is possible for him, choose the greatest § 67. 68 part of learnedness as his principal science §63; (2) the greater a part oflearned ness is, the more effort and diligence he must devote to it, and the more perfect the learned cognition of it must be; (3) the greater the truths are, the more effort and time he must devote to them, and the more perfect his learned cognition of them must be.

Of the Greatnessof Learned Cognition

19

(21] § 77. Whoever possesses no mature and manly judgment cannot possibly judge the true worth of things , and it is thus impossible for him to attain the greatness of learned cognition. § 78.

Because all objects of learned cognition stand in a universal

connection, they are all infinitely great, important, and fruitful

§

67. 68.

Thus, an object is called a small matter only in relation to us, because it is impossible for us to cognize its greatness, importance, and fruitfulness in a learned way. § 79.

Just as a learned cognition together with its object is not to be regarded as great just because this or that little mind makes a big deal of it; one must therefore also not deem it small because it is passed off as

fAA 16, 2291

something of little value by the very same person. § 80. A learned cognition is therefore not a small, unfruitful matter of little value just because this or that dry and unfruitful head is incapable of

fAA 16: 2301

deriving many important consequences from it. The plant is not responsible for the infertility of the soil. §

81. The application of a great learned cognition to small, ridiculous,

uncouth, and contemptible cases can indeed make this cognition ridiculous, contemptible, and uncouth in an accidental way; yet it must not for that reason be counted among the small matters of little value. § 82. If the great objects oflearned cognition are represented or presented in a contemptible and ridiculous way by this or that person, they must not

fAA 16: 231)

for that reason be counted among the small, contemptible matters. § 83.

A learned man must not through his own fault make learned

fAA 16: 232J

cognition ridiculous and contemptible by wretched application and by ridicu-[22 ]lous representations and expressions §81. 82. § 84.

If a learned cognition should be unimp ortant and unfruitful in our present circumstances, because we do not yet understand its consequences,

fAA 16: 233]

it can nevertheless become important and fruitful in the future, and it is for

that reason no small matter. We must plant trees also for our descendants, the fruits of which we will not enjoy. § 85. One

abuses oneself if one deems abstract cognition, subtleties, and

profound distinctions not to be great and importan t matters , because they require much arduous reflection . § 86. The

intermediate truths in an ample doctrinal system indeed do not

signify much in them selves; yet because without them one cannot rightly

!AA 16: 2341

20

Excerptfrom the Doctrine of Reason

cognize the principal truths in a learned way, they are therefore great and worthy objects of our learned cognition . § 87. A learned investigation is therefore important not because it requires much effort, diligence, and time, and not because it cannot be undertaken without great learnedness: for there is also very difficult tomfoolery. (AA 16: 235)

§ 88.

A part of learnedness is therefore not to be counted among the small matters, just because it is filled with many small matters. § 89.

A learned cognition, which is not great in one respect, can be great

in another respect, and thus it need not be deemed a small matter § 67. 68. E.g. a cognition can be unimportant, but nevertheless fruitful. (AA 16: 236)

§ 90.

sciences

Because various learned men can have chosen various principal § 63, a

learned investigation can be great with respect to one, and

small with respect to the other. (23] §91. A great mind possesses the ability to have only a great learned cognition. His inclination for this and his aversion to all small matters impel him always first to investigate the greatness of the matter before he tries to cognize it in a learned way, so that he knows whether it is worth a learned

cognition and to what degree of perfection.

Fou rth Sec tion

[AA 16: 237]

Of the Truth of Learned Cognition

§ 92. A false or incorrect cognition (cognitio falsa) is a cognition that is no cognition, and yet appears to be a cognition. A false learned cognition (cognitio erudita falsa) only appears to be a learned cognition, and it is either no cognition at all, or at least no learned cognition . E.g. those who assume the vegetative soul of plants, and deduce the growth of plants from that, have a false learned cognition. § 93. A true or correct cognition ( cognitio vera) not only appears to be a cognition, but also is one in fact. A true learned cognition

!AA 16 : 2381

(cognitio erud ita vera) not only appears to be a learned cognition, but also in fact deser ves this name. E.g. whoever convincingly demonstrates the reality of God from the contingency of this world has a true learned cognit ion. § 94. The characteristics of the correctness and incorrectness of cognition (criteria veritatis et falsitatis cognitionis) are the grounds from

which can be cognized that a cognition is true or that it is false. And they are either present [24) in the cognition itself, or not. The former are the

[AA 16: 239]

internal and the latter are the external characteristics of correctness and incorrectness (criteria interna et externa veritatis et falsitatis cognitionis).

§ 95. The first interna l characteristic of the truth of a cognition consists in its inner possibility (possibilitas cognitionis interna ) insofar

as it

represents something possible and contains nothing contrary to itself, and also if one considers it totally by itself. The internal impos sibility of cognition (impossibilitas cognitionis interna), if it represents nothing, and

if the many diverse things in it conflict with each other, is thus the first internal characteristic that it is false§ 94. 93. 92.

!AA 16: 2401

22

(AA 16 , 24 1J

Exce,pt from the Doctrine of Reason § 96. The other internal characteristic of the truth of a cognition consists

in its being possible in a connection (possibilitas cognitionis hypothetica).

Consequently, (1) if it is a consequence of correct grounds, and (2) a ground of correct consequences § 94. 93. Accordingly, a cognition is true if it is not impossible and it is in conformity with the principle of sufficient ground§ 16. (AA 16: 242]

§ 97. A cognition is false if it is impossible in connection (impossibilitas in nexu); consequently, if it has no grounds or false grounds, and no consequences or false consequences § 96. And this is the other internal characteristic of its incorrectness § 94.

(AA 16: 2431

§ 98. We must not assume: (1) that a cognition is true, just because we are aware of no internal impossibility in it; (2) that it is false, just because we are aware of no internal possibility in it; (3) that a cognition is true, the groundlessness and false grounds and consequences of which we are unaware; (4) that a cognition is false, of which we cognize no correct grounds and consequences. For we human beings are not all-knowing.

(AA 16: 262I

§ 99. When we conceive a thing otherwise than it is, we believe that we cognize it, and yet we do not cognize it. Accordingly, our cognition is false § 92. Moreover, all possible things have an internal possibility, grounds,

and consequences § 15. 16. Thus, the logical truth of cognition (veritas cognitionis logica) consists in its agreement with its object, and the logical

incorrectness of it (falsitas cognitionis logica) consists in its not agreeing with its object§ 95. 96. 97. § 100. If a cognition contains nothing true, it is totally false (falsitas (AA 16: 263]

totalis), and if it contains no thing false, it is totally true (veritas totalis). It can, however, be true and false at the same time, but in different respects (veritas et falsitas partialis). Thus, one need not entirely accept an ample

(AA 16, 264]

cognition, just because most of it and the most important parts in it may well be true; and one need not entirely discard it, just because most of it and the most important parts in it may well be false. For example, the doctrinal systems of various religions. § 101. The more numerous and diverse the parts that are possible together , which a cognition contains within itself, the greater these parts are: and the

(AA 16, 265]

mor e numerous and greater the correct grounds and consequences it has, the more correct the cognition is§ 95. 96. Thus, whoever would improve his learned cognition to the greatest possible extent must aim to attain in it the highest degree of truth.

Of the Truth of Learned Cognition

23

§ 102. A cognition that is correct to a higher degree is called an exact cognition (cognitio exacta, exasciata); but a cognition that is true to

a smaller degree is called a crude cognition (cognitio crassa). All crude cognition must be avoided , and indeed (26] the more so the cruder it is, or the more numerous and more important the falsities is contains. By contrast, perfect learned cognition must be as exact as possible § 101, and

[AA 16: 266)

the greater the objects are, the more exactly one must seek to cognize them § 70. But the smaller they are, the less correct their cognition may be § 70. § 103. Learned cognition can be false in a threefold way: (1) if the

[AA 16:2 671

cognition of the things is false, although the cognition of the grounds is correct; (2) if the cognition of the grounds is false, although the cognitio n of the things is correct; (3) if the representation of the connection between the true grounds and consequences is incorrect§ 100. Thus, a true learned cognition must be at the same time a correct cognition of the things, of the grounds, and of their connection § 21. § 104. Through truths (veritates) one understands also true cognition

[AA 16: 275)

itself, and so all truths are either dogmatic (veritates dogmaticae) or historical (veritates historicae). The former can and must be cognized

from the internal characteristics of truth, but the latter only from the

[AA 16: 276)

external characteristics. E.g. that a God exists is a dogmatic truth; however, that David, the second king of the Israelites, exists is a historical truth. A doctrinal system (systema) is a set of dogmatic truths, which are connected with each other in such a way that altogether they constitute a cognition that one can consider as a whole. § l 05. The more truths there are in a doctrinal system, the greater and

[AA 16: 2771

more correct the truths are, the more perfect the system is§ 104. The most exact truth of a doctrinal system requires: (l) that all parts of the system are correct to the greatest exactness; (2) that none (27] contradict the others; and (3) that they are all connected in that every one is either a ground of the others , or a consequence, or both at the same time§ 95. 96. Because there is no truth outside the doctrinal systems §96. 104, learned cognition must be systematic, if it otherwise should be perfectly correct. § l 06. All truths are either merely aesthetic truths (veritates mere aestheticae), which must be cognized only beautifully, and with which learned cognition must never occupy itself; or they are merely learned (veritates mere eruditae), which can be cognized only in a learned way, and

[AA 16: 2s I]

24

Excerptfrom the Doctrine of Reason

learned cognition must not occupy itself with those alone, for otherwise it would be merely learned§ 32; or they are both at the same time (veritates aesthetico -eruditae), and they are the highest object of a truly perfect learned cognition. (AA 16: 282)

§ 107. Because truth is not the only perfection oflearned cognition, a learned man can never be excused if he occupies himself with a learned investigation simply because it is true. It is not good to think and to say all truths. § l 08. Each person must aim to cognize his princ ipal science mos t exactly § 102 and as systematically as possible § 105, § 63. § 109.Error (cognitio erronea, error) consists in our taking false cognition to be true , and true cognition to be false. Consequently, (1) every erroneous

(AA 16: 2s3J

cognition is false § 99; (2) not every false cognition is erroneous, namely, if we cognize that it is false; (3) error arises from false cognition . Had we no false cognition at all, we could also have no errors. Error is worse than merely false cognit ion , for error is a [28] secret poison . Learned cognition can therefore be erroneous in a threefold way§ 103.

(AA 16: 287)

§ 110. Error arises § 109 if we break the rules of the 98th paragraph. The first source of all errors is thus ignorance § 41, if it is accompanied by the haste, whereby we deny that of which we have no cognition.

(AA 16: 2881

§ 111. Error is either avoidable (error vincibilis) or unavoidable (error

(AA 16: 2891

invincibilis). The former arises from an avoidable ignorance, and the latter from an unavoidable ignorance § 43. The former is nothing but a blameworthy disgrace to learned cognition, but the latter cannot and may not be avoided . § 112. The more ample, impo rtant, and fruitful an error is, and the more easily it could have been avoided, the greater it is. The greater the error is, the more it abuses learned cognition, and the more meticulously it must be avoided. Thus, each person must aim to avoid especially the errors in his principal science§ 108.

(AA 16: 290)

§ 113. A cognition is manifestly false (cognitio aperte falsa) if its incorrectness is discovered merely by considering it, e.g. a four-cornered triangle. However, if one must undertake a more ample investigation in

(AA 16,29 1)

order to discover its incorrectness, it is false in a hidden way (cognitio cuius falsitas latet), e.g. matter can think. An error by which a manifestly false cognition is assumed to be true is a vulgar, absurd and stupid error (cognitio absurda, absona). Not all errors are absurdities.

Of the Tru th of Learn ed Cogni tion

25

§ 114. All truths are either absolutely necessary (veritates absolute necessariae) [29] or contingent truths (veritates contingentes) . With the former it is totally impossible that they should be false, e.g. there is a God. However, the latter could also be false, e.g. this world is actual. Because erro r is easier to avoid with the former, it is greate r than error in the contingent truths§ 112.

[AA 16,295]

F if t h Sec ti o n

[AA 16: 296)

Of the Clarity of Learned Cognition

§ 115. A mark, a characteristic

of cognition and of matters (nota, character

cognitionis et rei), is that in the cognition or in the matters, which, when cognized, is the reason why we are conscious of them; or they are the distinguishing parts of cognition and its objects. Thus, wherever there is consciousness, marks are cognized § 13. E.g. reason is a mark of human

!AA 16: 2971

beings, and of the cognition we have of them. § 116. Marks have in turn their marks §115. Consequently, all marks of a matter are either immediate marks (notae immediatae, proximae)

!AA 16: 3011

or mediate (notae mediatae, remotae). TI1elatter are marks of marks; but the former are only marks of the thing [des Dinges], though they are no marks of its marks. E.g. reason is an immed iate mark of human beings, but because reason is a faculty for understanding distinctly the connection of things [der Dinge], so the faculty is a mediate mark of human beings. Consciousness rests on the immediate marks § 13. 117. Marks are either negative (notae negativae) or affirmative (notae affirmativae, positivae). Through the former we represent someth ing as [30] absent in the matter, and we cognize thereby only what it is not; e.g. the §

[AA 16, 305)

unreason [ Unvernunft] of nonrational [unverniinftigen]animals. Through the latter we represent sometlling as present in tlle matter, and we cognize through them what the thing is, e.g. the reason of human beings. Although both kinds can cause a consciousness of something, the affirmative marks are nevertheless better than the negative. § 118. Marks are either more important marks (notae graviores) or more slight marks (notae leviores). The former identify a greater difference in the matter, and tlle latter a more slight difference. Either fruitful (notae foecundae) or unfruitful marks (notae infoecundae). The former identify a

!AA 16: 3071

28

Excerptfrom the Doctrine of Reason

m ultifaceted difference between many things, but the latter do not. Reason (AA 16, 3osJ

is an important and fruitful mark of a human being; that a huma n being is a th ing, however, is a more slight and less fruitful mark. Accordingly, the more important and the more fruitfu l the marks are, the more they promote consciousness.

[AA 16, 309 ]

§ 119. Since marks are groun ds§ 115, they are either sufficient grounds of consciousness or insufficient grounds § 15. The former are sufficient

[AA 16, 3 101

marks (notae sufficientes), and the latter are insufficient marks (notae insufficientes). The former are better marks than the latter. The capacity to think is an insufficient mark of a mind, but that it has understanding is a sufficient mark. § 120. Marks are either absolutely necessary and invariable (notae absolute necessariae et invariabiles) or contingent and variable marks (notae contingentes et variabiles). The former are so constituted that witho ut those same marks the matter cannot be represented, e.g. the reason of human beings; however, the latter are so constituted that without them [31] the matter can still be represented, e.g. the actual thinking of human

beings. The former are better marks than the latter. [AA 16:3 11]

§ 121. Marks can either be represented in a matter without considering them in connection with other matte rs outside it, or not. The latter are external marks or relations (notae externae, relationes), e.g. the rule [Herrschaft] of a human being. The former are internal marks (notae internae). Internal marks are either necessary or contingent§ 120. The latter are called contingent qualities (modi), e.g. the learnedness of a human being. The former are either the grounds of all other determinations, or not. TI1elatter are the attributes (attrib uta), e.g. the capacity to think in a human

[AA 16: 3 121

being. The former are called the essential parts (essentialia), e.g. the reason of human beings. The totality of all essential parts is the essence (essentia).

[AA 16, 315 1

§ 122. The more marks we cognize of a matter, the greater the se marks are, and the more perfectly we cognize the marks, the greater and better the consciousness is § 13. Thus, affirmative, important, fruitful, internal, necessary and sufficient marks cause a greater and better consciousness than those cont rary to them§ 117- 21.

(AA 16: 3 16]

§ 123. A representation, insofar as we are conscious of it, is called a thought (cogitatio). Thus, not every representation and cognition is a thought. And what has been proven of consciousness is valid also for thinking§ 115. 116. 122.

Of the Clarityof Learned Cognition

29

§ 124. A cognition either contains as many marks as are required for consciousness, or it does not. The former is a clear cognition (cognitio clara), which is one and the same as thought and cognition of which we are conscious§ 123. 1he latter is an ob-[32]scure cognition (cognitio obscura), which is thus neither a thought nor attached to consciousness § 123. The former is more perfect than the latter. If we cannot recall a word, and it nevertheless seems as if it were on the tip of our tongue, then we have an obscure representation of it. § 125. Obscure cognition is either absolutely (cognitio absolute obscura) or relatively [beziehungsweise] obscure (cognitio relative obscura). The former would have to be so obscure that it would be absolutely impossible to make it clear. No true cognition is absolutely obscure, and thus one must take nothing to be absolutely obscure. All true obscure cognition is only relatively obscure, that is, the powers of this or that thinking being are not sufficient to make it clear. And then either the object is primarily to blame for this obscurity, or the human being is, for whom the cognition

[AA 16: 3 17]

is obscure. The former is obscurity of things [Sachen] (cognitio obiective obscura), and the latter is obscurityin the head of the one for whom the cognition is so obscure (cognitio subiective obscura). E.g. things [Sachen]

that are too distant from us, or are too small, are to blame for the fact that

[AA 16, 3181

we perceive them obscurely. But whoever finds the doctrine of reason obscure is himself to blame. Finally, an obscure cognition is either totally obscure (cognitio totaliter obscura), if we are not conscious of it at all, or

only partially obscure (cognitio partialiter obscura), if we are conscious and also not conscious of it at the same time. All of our clear cognition is always partially obscure to us, because there is not a single matter we are capable of think ing through completely. § 126. One human being can cognize what another does not cognize,

[AA 16, 3201

and thus the one can cognize marks that are unknown to the other§ llS. Consequently, one person can cognize clearly what another cognizes only obscurely § 124. Thus, one must not conclude: ( 1) what is clear to me is also clear to others; (2) what is obscure to me is also obscure to others; (3) what is clear to me now will remain clear to me in the future; (4) what is now obscure to me will remain obscure to me in the future. § 127. The more marks that are unkno,vn to us, which are required for consciousness, and the greater the marks that are unknown to us, and the

[AA 16: 3211

Excerptfrom the Doctrine of Reason

30

(AA 16, 3221

more power that is req uired to make a cognit ion clear, the greater is its obscurity . Thus, before a cognition can become clear, one must often devote much time and effort to reduce its obscurity. §

128. Because we have much clear cognit ion, whose marks we indeed

cognize

§

115, but not clearly, there are actually obscure representations

present in our soul , which make up the materials from which the sou l gradually assembles its clear cognition. (AA 16,32 3]

§

129. The obscurity of cognition arises from a threefold source: ( 1) if a

human being does not possess sufficient powers to make it clear. This lack of powers is either necessary or not, and in the latter case the human being should either have acquired the powers or not; (2) from the lack of attention, which arises either from a necessary lack of powers, or because we may not take an interest in a certain cognition, or because we do not take an interest (AA 16, 3241

in it, even though we should; (3) from the ignorance of such things without which a certain cognition cannot become clear, whether this ignorance is necessary or contingent, praiseworthy or blameworthy

§ 43.

50. 51. All

obscurity of cognitio n is thus either necessary or cont ingent, praiseworthy or blameworthy. Consequently, in improving cognition one must seek to avoid only the contingent and blameworthy obscurity; and the obscurity that is necessary and praiseworthy in one person can be contingent and blameworthy in another . § 130. Obscure cognition (1) can be true, but it can also be false § 92.

93. Thus, not every obscure cognition is false; (2) [and not every obscure cognition ] is no learned cognition, insofar as it is obscure. In the learned cognition of human beings it is an unavoidable evil. §

131. That action whereby the obscurity of cognition is reduced and the

clarity of cognition is prod uced and increased is called the unwrapping

[Auswickelung] or developing [Entwickelung] of cognition (evolutio, (AA 16, 3251

explanatio cognitionis), just as the contrary action is called the wrapping

up [Einwickelung] of cognition (cognition is involutio) . For the first, (a) provisionally three things are required : (1) one investigates to the greatest possible extent whether the obscurity of the cognition one wants to develop is necessary or contingent, no fault of one's own or one's own fault. Only in the latter case may we attempt developing. (2) One investigates whether the developing of the cognition belongs to the horizon of our clear cognition or not. On ly in the first case is this work permitted to us. (3) One investigates

Of the Clarity of Learned Cognition

31

whether this developing does not presuppose a clear cognition some·where else without which it cannot occur. And if in fact this is the case, one must not undertake this work before one has attained this other clear cognition

[AA 16:326]

§ 129. (b) For the unw rapping itself, three things are required: (1) one directs one's attention to the matter that one wants to cognize clearly; (2) one compares it with other matters that are different from it so that one cognizes its marks § 115; (3) one abstracts from all other things, or one obscures them, by [35] paying attention to the object. The more often, the more intensely, and the longer one attends to a matter, the more things one compares with it, the more intensely one abstracts from other things, the better and sooner cognition of the matter develops, even if right in the beginning one performs this work a few times without success. § 132. Through a clear cognition we are either able constantly and in all

[AA 16:3271

circumstances to distinguish the object from all other possible objects, or not. In the first case our cognition is extensively clear (cognitio complete clara), e.g. the representation of the color red; in the other case, however, our cognition is not extensively clear ( cogJ1itio inc omplete clara), e.g. when we can indeed taste that a wine is Rhine wine, but we cannot taste what variety it is. The former is more perfect than the latter, because the latter contain s more obscurity than the former§ 124, and we attain it through the cognition ofnecessary, invariable, and sufficient marks § 119. 120. 121. § 133. If we have a clear cognition, then we are either conscious of

[AA 16: 328]

everything to be found in the object, or not. In the first case, the cognition is

totally clear (cognitio totaliter clara). In the latter case, it is only a partially clear cognition (cognitio partialiter clara). No human clear cognition is totally clear§ 125, and a cognition can be extensively clear, even though it is not totally clear § 132. At the same time, a cogn ition is that much more perfect the more its clarity approaches total clarity§ 124. § 134. The more marks we cognize, consequently the more numerous

[AA 16, 3291

and simi lar the things that we can distinguish from a matter; the greater the marks, and the better we cognize all marks; the more easily we can be conscio us of a cognition and its object: the clearer our cognition is § 124,

[AA 16:330]

and thu s [36] also the more perfect it is. In the impr ovement of a cognition, one must therefore seek to achieve the highest possible degree of its clarity. § 135. A cognition that is clearer through the abundance of marks is called

a vivid cognition (cognitio extensive clarior, vivida); e.g. the mel od ious

[AA 16:333]

32

Excerptfrom the Doctrine of Reason

song of the nightingale resow, ds throughout the valleys. But what is clearer through the magnitude of marks and their clearer represe ntation is clearer in terms of intensity (cognitio intensive clarior). The doctrine of reason deals only with the latter degree of clar ity§ l. 17. 21. [AA 16: 338]

§ 136. If we forget marks of clear cognition, a clear cognition can be transforme d into a less clear cognition, and finally into a totally obscure cognition § 124. Thus, whoever would prevent the wrapping up [Einwickelung] of clear cognition § 131 must prevent its being forgotten .

(AA 16: 339J

§ 137. A cogni tion that is considered with respect to the intens ity of clarity is either distinct or confused § 14. 135. In the former, the marks are also clear, but in the latter they are obscure § 14. 115. 124. Thus, because distinctness is a manifo ld clarity, distinct cognition is more perfect than confused cognition§ 124. § 138. Because all learned cognitio n is distinct §21. 17, confused cognitio n is not learned insofar as it is confused § 137. Thus, just as the fine sciences [die schonen Wissenschaften ] deal with the improvement of the confused half of hu man cognitio n, so must a learn ed ma n improve the distinct half of it by mea ns of th e doctr ine of reaso n. Obscurity and confusion is a necessary evil in learned cogn ition, which one either also seeks to improve along the way, or not. In the latter case, a merely [37) learned cogn ition arises, and in the first case a learned cognition that is also beautiful § 24.

(AA 16: 340]

§ 139. Th e action whereby a certain degree of distinctness is produced in our cognit ion is called the analysis of cognition (resolutio, analysis, anatomia cognitionis). A cognition can be analyzed, if it can be made distinct by any thinking being (cognitio resolubilis). But insofar as it cannot become distinct, to that extent it is a cognition that cannot be analyzed (cognitio irresolubilis). And then it is either absolutely impossible that it become distinct, or it cannot become distinct only by the powers of this

(AA 16 : 34 1]

or that thinking being . In the first case, it absolutely cannot be analyzed (cognitio absolute irresolubilis). In t he latter case, it only relatively cannot be analyzed (cognitio respective irresolubilis). If a true cognition absolutely could not be analyzed, its marks would have to be absolutely obscure§ 137. Now since this is impossible§ 120, all true cognition that cannot be analyzed is only relatively so constituted.

Of the Clarity of Learned Cognition §

33

140. Insofar as we have a distinct cognition of a matter, to that extent

we conceive it (concipere). What can be distinctly cognized is conceivable (conceptibile). What cannot be distinctly cognized is inconceivable

(AA 16: 342]

(inconceptibile) either absolut ely (absolute inconceptibile), if it absolutely cannot be analyzed, or only relatively ( relative inconceptibile), if it relatively cannot be analyzed. All possible things are only relatively inconceivable 139, and, what we cognize in a learned way, we always, to that extent, conceive §21. 17.

§

[38) § 141. What we do not conceive is not for that reason something muddled. And since to one person a cognition can be distinct, which is

(AA 16: 346]

confused or perhaps even obscure to another § 126, one must not conclude: what we do not conceive, others also do not conceive; what we conceive, others also conceive; what I now conceive, I will also conceive in the

{AA 16: 347J

future; what I now do not conceive, I will also not conceive in the future. These conclusions are valid also when we speak of mere possibility or impossibility. § 142. If one would analyze a cognition, one must (1) develop it§ 131,

!AA 16, 348I

if it should not already be clear in us. (2) One must think through the clear cognition, or gradually develop its marks, according to

§

131. The

more marks and the better the marks one develops, the better it is. (3) One considers the developed marks, or one represents them together as a single cognition; otherwise we would think the object only piecemeal, and that is yet no distinct cognition of the whole object. (4) One represents the developed marks in just the connection and in just the order as there is in the object. Otherwise, the distinct cognition does not agree with the object, and all disorder confuses us. (5) One must obscure or abstract from all other matters and representations that are not brought into consideration with the cognition; thereby the cognition does not immediately become confused again. § 143. The more and the greater the clear marks we cognize of a matter, the better we cognize the marks, thus the more amply, proportionately, correctly, clearly, certainly, and practically: the more distinct our cognition is§ 137. 25-30. (39] § 144. A distinct cognition is either totally distin ct ( cognitio totaliter distincta) or only partially (cognitio partialiter distincta). The former

(AA 16: 349I

Excerptfrom the Doctrine of Reason

34

contains absolutely no obscurity and confusion, but the latter contains the like. No human distinct cognition is totally distinct§ 133. But it is the more distinct, the closer its distinctness comes to total distinctness § 142. § 145. The confusion of cognition arises (1) from the sources of obscurity, for it consists in the obscurity of marks§ 137. 129. (2) From necessary or contingent, praiseworthy or blameworthy lack of reflection ; likewise (3) of consideration; (4) from the lack of order in thinking, and (5) from a necessary or contingent, praiseworthy or blameworthy lack of abstraction §

142. §

146. Thus, there is not only a confusion in all our cognition that we

absolutely cannot avoid; there is also a confusion that we could avoid, but we may not, because it is found below or outside our horizon § 146. Thus, before we attempt the analysis of a cognition, we must previously investigate to the greatest possible extent whether we can or may carry it out. § 147. The marks of a distinct cognition are clear§ 137. Thus, they are either distinct or confused § 137. In the first case, we have a complete

cognition (cognitio adaequata), but in the other an incomplete (cognitio (AA 16: 350]

inadaequata) cognition, e.g. vice is an acquired aptitude for sinning . An acquired aptitude is a facility for action that we have acquired by practice, and we sin when we undertake evil free actions. This is a complete cognition of vice, but it would [40] be incomplete if I had no distinct cognition of aptitude and sin. Completeness is a manifold distinctness, and thus a perfection of cognition § 137. Incompleteness consists in confusion of the cognition of marks, and thus arises from the sources of confusion in general § 145. The more distinct marks a cognition contains, and the more distinct they are, the more complete the cognition is. And the most complete learned

(AA 16,35 1]

cognition must be as complete as possible § 21. § 148. Completeness arises from the analysis of marks § 147. 142. The more remote the marks are that we reanalyze [wieder zergliedern], the more complete our cognition becomes § 116. 147. A higher degree of completeness is a profound cognition (cognitio profunda, purior). And as we analyze a cognition, we complete this enterprise when we discover

(AA 16: 352]

marks that we cannot analyze further. But we stop short in analysis when we no longer analyze marks that we could still analyze. Now since it would be a horr ible labor if we wanted always to complete the analysis of all our distinct cognition, we must always have a reasonable purpose for our

Of the Clarity of Learned Cognition

35

analysis of a cognition, and as soon as we have reached it, we must stop this work for the time being . In any case, it is impossible that a human being avoid all incompleteness in his cognition § 144. §

149. Distinct cognition is either extensively distinct (cognitio complete

[AA 16: 353)

distincta) or not extensively distinct (cognitio incomplete distincta) § 132. The former is more perfect than the latter § 132. E.g. ifl represent a spirit as a being that can think, I have distinct but not extensive cognition of [41] it. But ifl represent it as a thing that has understanding, my distinct cognition of a spirit is at the same time extensive. §

150. If one would make a distinct cognition of a matter extensive, one

[AA 16: 354)

must (1) seek to discover those marks that are fow1d in no other thing besides it; or (2) one must discover as many marks as, taken together, belong to no other thing. E.g. virtue is an aptitude for free rightful actions. Although each one of these marks is found also in things that are not virtues, nevertheless taken together they are found in no other matter. And thus the totality of these four marks makes the distinct representation of virtue into an extens ive, distinct representation. §

151. A distinct cognition is either a determinate (cognitio determinata)

or an indeterminate cognition (cognitio indeterminata).

[AA 16: 35SJ

The former is

extensively distinct, and contains not a single mark more than is necessary for extensiveness. E.g. a spirit is a being that has understanding. This contains either too few marks, and that is the distinct cognition that is not extensive §

149; or it contains more clear marks than are necessary for extensiveness,

and that is a much too ample cognition (cognitio nimis prolixa). E.g. a spirit is a thinking being that possesses understanding and free will. Thus,

if from an extensive distinct cognition one separates those marks that either are unn ecessary for extensiveness or follow from other marks of the same cognition, it becomes determinate. Determination

is only a perfection of

merely learned cognition § 24. if one would ease the understanding

of a

[wenn man dem schwachen tiefsinnigen Verstande des Menschen das Begreifen einer Sacheerleichternwill].

matter for human beings' profound, yet weak, understanding

[42] § 152. The most complete cogn ition can gradually become less complete, incomplete, confused, and eventually completely obscure, if clear cognition becomes obscure because of being forgotten § 136. Thus, whoever would avoid this loss of perfections must seek to prevent their

[AA 16: 356)

Excerptfrom the Doctrine of Reason

36

being forgotten. We human beings are never completely secure in the possession of our perfections, and thus we must everywhere be vigilantly on our guard. (AA J6: 357]

§

153. Whoever would make learned cognition really perfect with respect

to its clarity must proportion the degree of clarity and the degree of the greatness of the objects § 70. Consequently, the more ample and greater the object is, the more, better and greater kinds and degrees of clarity will be required to illuminate the learned cognition of it. In the opposite case, one must conduct oneself in this matter in the opposite way. § 154. Every learned man, if it is possible for him, must choose for his principal science that part of learnedness that is capable of the most manifold and greatest clarity; and each must seek to attain in his principal science the clearest possible cognition § 63. 64. Thus, he must be a bright (AA 16: 358I

mind , or love superbly the clearest truths, and constantly think as dearly as

possib le. A dim mind hardly deserves to be called a learned man.

Sixth Sect ion

[A.A16: 359]

Of the Certainty of Learned Cognition

§ 155. Certainty (certitudo subiective spectata) is the consciousness of truth, or the clear cognition of truth § 29. Thus, if one would possess a certain learned cognition, according to the rules of the fourth [43] section it must be true, and according to the rules of the fifth section it must be clear in the appropriate way. § 156. If we do not clearly cognize either that something is true or that it is false, then our cognition of it is uncertain (incertitudo). Uncertainty

{AA 16: 360]

is thus found only as an imperfection in our cognition . A cognition that is not uncertain to us is either certainly true (certo vera cognitio), if we are conscious of its truth, or certainly false (certo falsa cognitio ), if we are conscious of its incorrectness§ 155. § 157. All certainty is either a distinct or a confused cognition of truth § 155. 137. The latter is sensible certainty (certitudo sensitiva), and when

(AA 16: 361]

it is perfect to a higher degree, aesthetic certainty (certitudo aesthetica). The former is rational certainty (certitudo rationalis), and when it is perfect to a higher degree it is called logical or learned certainty (certitudo logica, erudita). No human certain cognition can be merely rational and learned § 144. § 158. Rational certainty is either a complete certainty (certitudo adaequata), when we are in turn rationally certain of the characteristics of truth; or an incomplete certainty (certitudo inadaequata), when we are only sensibly certain of the characteristics of truth § 157. 147. E.g. what thinks is actual, I think , therefore I am actual. Because I have a distinct certainty of the first proposition, I am to that extent completely certain of the last proposition . But because the second proposition is only sensibly certain, the last proposition is to that extent only incompletely certain .

(AA 16: 362]

38

Excerptfrom the Doctrine of Reason

§ 159. Certai nty is either an extensive (comp leta cert itudo) or not an extensive (44] certainty (incompleta certitudo) § 132. 149. Determinate certainty (certitudo determinata) is an extensive certainty that contains no more characte ristics of truth than are indispensable for extensive certainty §151. [AA 16, 3631

§ 160. Through extensive certa inty the mind is always assured in such

[AA 16,364]

a way that it is raised above all rational fear of the contrary; but certainty that is not extensive cann ot totally dispel this ratio nal fear § 159. At the same time, a human being often can be freed of all fear of the contrary, and nevertheless not be at all certain. § 16 1. Determ inate certainty, when moreover it is as complete as possible, is mathematical certainty (certit udo mathematica).

(AA 16, 36SJ

§ 162. We have a total certainty (certitudo totalis) of a matter, if everythin g we cognize of it is certa in; but if not all of this is certain, then

[AA 16, 3661

the matter is only partially certain (certitudo partialis). § 163. A certain cognition is called (1) convincing (cognitio convincens)

[AA .16, 367]

insofar as it is extensively certa in, and the br inging forth of such a certa in cognition is called conviction (convictio ); (2) undeniable (cognitio evidens, indubitata) insofar as we clearly cognize that what we are convinced of could not possibly be false; (3) thorough (cognit io solida) insofar as the certa inty

[AA 16:368]

is comp lete; or also if it is as great as required and of the required kind . § 164. The more matters we cognize certainly, and the more of each object we cognize certainJy; the greater the matters are that we cogn ize certainly, and the more clearly we cognize the truth: the greater is ou r certainty§ 155. Thus, whoever would really improve learned cognition (45] must make it as certain as possible by bringing forth all the kinds of certainty, and the greatest degree of certainty in each kind, so far name ly as the other rules of the perfection of learned cognition allow. § 165. We must not conclude: (1) What is certain to me is also certain to

(AA 16:3691

othe r peop le, and conversely§ 126. (2) What is uncerta in to me is uncertai n, or perhaps even false, considered in itself§ 156. (3) What is uncertain to me is also uncertain to other people, and conversely § 126. (4) What is now certai n to me will also always remai n certain to me in the future§ 126. (5) What is now uncertain to me will also always remain uncer tain to me into the future§ 126. (6) If not everyth ing in an object is certain, the object has no certainty at all § 162.

Of the Certaintyof Learned Cognition

39

§ 166. Because we attain some kinds of certainty, especially logical

[AA 16,370)

certainty, only gradually, on the one hand one must not become annoyed when certainty is not attained as quickly as we sometimes wish; on the other hand, if in some case we become certain much too quickly, one must

[AA 16,37 1]

be suspicious of whether one has not somehow overlooked something. In the attainment of certainty, one must hurry slowly [langsameilenJ. § 167. If a cognition does not have the kind or degree of certainty that it could and should have, it is called a shallow cognition (cognitio superficiaria). § 168. We give our assent to a cognition, or we accept it (assentiri, ponere

[AA 16: 396)

aliquid), when we hold it to be true; we reject it (tollere aliquid) when we

[AA 16: 397)

hold it to be false; and we withhold our assent (suspendere iudicium) when we do neither of the two. When we accept or reject an uncertain cognition, we do this either because we cognize some characteristics of correctness or

{AA 16: 3981

incorrect -[46]ness, or we cognize absolutely none of these characteristics. In the latter case, we act rashly (praecipitantia), and the uncertain cognition

fAA 16: 399)

[AA 16: 400I

that we accept or reject out of rashness is a begged cognition, a prejudice, a preconceived opinion (praecaria cognitio, praeiudicium, praeconcepta

opinio). Begged cognition is no learned cognition at all §21. 17, and all

{AA16:4 0ll

prejudices can be avoided in learned cognition, and they are therefore an irresponsible disgrace to it. § 169. Because the correctness and incorrectness of matters does not depend upon our understanding, (1) what we accept through a prejudice can be false, and what we reject through a prejudice can be true. (2) What we accept through a prejudice can in fact be true, and what we reject through

[AA 16: 4021

a prejudice can actually be false. (3) Within every prejudice there is always something erroneous and false, because we believe we are certain when in fact we are not certain§ 168. § 170. A logical prejudice (praeiudicium

logicum) is a prejudice

[AA 16: 4121

whereby the perfection of learned cognition, especially the thoroughness of it, is hindered. For example: (a) the prejudice of excessive confidence

[AA 16:4 13]

(praeiudicium nimiae confidentiae), when one rashly holds something to be logically perfect. ( l) The prejudice of excessive authority (praeiudici um autoritatis), when we accept or reject something because a person accepts or rejects it, whom ·we revere so much that we take him to be worthy of imitation. (2) Logical egotism (egoismus logicus), when someone holds

40

Excerptfrom the Doctrine of Reason

something to be logically perfect for the reason that he himself is the {AA 16: 4 14]

originator of it. (3) The prejudice of antiquity (praeiudicium antiquitatis), when we hold something to be true because [47] it is an old opinion. (4) The

prejudice of novelty (praeiud icium novitatis), when we hold something to be true because it is a new opinion. (5) The prejudice of the accepted [AA 16:4 15]

doctrinal system (praeiudicium systematis), when one accepts something only because it conforms to our doctrinal system, and one rejects it only because it is contrary to our system. (6) The prejudice of lazy confidence (praeiudicium pigritiae), when one believes that one can come just as far

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in learned cognition through a small effort as through a greater one. (7)

The prejudice of shallowne ss (praeiudicium cort icis), when one believes that one can come just as far with a shallow cognition as with a thorough one. (b) The prejudice of excessive mistrust (praeiudicium

nimiae

diffidentiae), when one rashly holds something to be logically imperfect. (I)

The prejudice of antiquity (praeiudicium antiquitatis), when one rejects something because it is old. (2) The prejudice of novelty (praeiudicium novitatis), when one rejects something because it is new. (3) The prejudice !AA 16:41 7]

of peoples [Volkerschaft] (nazarethismus), when one rejects something because it springs from a particular people. (4) The prejudice of mistrust, which one places on oneself (praeiudic ium nimiae diffidentiae in se ipsum positae), when one has too little confidence in oneself, etc.

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§

171. If we accept or reject an uncertain cognition on account of a few

characteristics

of correctness and incorrectness

§

168, then we cognize

either more and stronger grounds to accept it than to reject it, and then [AA 16,428 ]

our cognition is probable (cognitio probabilis, verosimilis), or we cognize more and stronger grounds to reject it than to accept it, and thus we have

an improbable cognition (cognitio improbabilis) ; or the grounds are (48] equal on both sides, and then it is a doubtful cognition (cognitio dubia). E.g. it is probable that the planets are inhabited, but it is improbable that the sun is. As long as we can come to no co nclusion [Entschlusse], we have a doubtful cognition. §

172. Because human beings are so infinitely different from each other

in their cognition, one person can accept or reject a matter by a prejudice that another ho lds to be totally certainly true, that a third holds to be totally [AA 16, 4291

certainly false, a fourth holds to be probable, a fifth holds to be improbable, and a sixt h holds to be doubtful. The first always acts wrongly. The next two

Of the Certainty of Learned Cognition

41

cannot possibly both be right or wrong. But the last three can all be right together § 159. 168. 171. § 173. Probability, improbability, and doubtfulness are uncertainties § 171, and therefore not to be found in the objects of our cognit ion§ 156. The most probab le things can be false, and the least probable can be true . § 174. One must neither hold prejudices to be true nor hold them to be false§ 168, and the same goes for dou btful cognition§ 171. One must hold improbable cognition to be false, and probab le cognition to be true, yet

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hold both under a constant fear of the contrary § 171. We must give our assent to extensively certain cognition with the greatest confidence, without fearing the contrary§ 159. § 175. The more and greater the grounds we cognize for accepting something, the fewer and smaller the grounds we cognize for rejecting it, the better we cognize the form er and the worse we cognize the latter: the

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greater the probability is, the greater the improbability of the contrary is § 171. A degree of probability, which in our regular conduct is as good as an

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extensive certainty, is called moral certainty (cert itudo moralis). § 176. When we hold something to be true or false, one calls every cognition of a ground to the contrary a doubt (dubium). Doubts are either

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cognized merely in an obscure and indeterminate way, or in a rational and learned way. The first are called scruples (scrupulus), and the others are called objections (obiectio). § 177. All doubts are either true doubts (dubiwn verurn) or false doubts (dubium falsum) § 176 92. 93, which, when they appear to be true, have a great credibility [Schein]. When one dearly cognizes what is incorrect in a

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false doubt, the doubt is resolved or answered (dubium resolvitur, seu ad dubiwn respondetur) . All doubts are either answerable or unanswerable , and both either absolutely or relatively (dubium absolute et respective resolubile aut irresolubile). Consequently, (1) doll!btscan be raised about all truths, and

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there is noth ing false just because doulbts are raised about them; (2) doubts can be raised about a truth that are unanswera ble for this or that person; (3) absolutely unanswerable doubts can be raised about no truth. Settled truths (veritates indubitatae, extra omnem dubitat ionis aleam positae) are either such truths as are extensively certain, or about which no other doubts can be raised except ones that are answerable and have already been answered. Trnths that are not settled are unsettled truths (veritates non indubitatae).

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42

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Excerptfrom the Doctrine of Reason

§ 178. To be completely convinced of a truth (1) it is not required that unknown dou -[50]bts about it be answered; nor (2) that scruples be answered, for they deserve no answer at all; (3) nor that all known doubts be answered; there can be some among them, which are unanswerable for a person, and who nonethe less can be totally convinced; (4) it is req uired that all doubts be answered that make the mind waver; (5) answering doubts is always sufficient to increase certainty and to fortify conviction§ 176.

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§ 179. Uncertainty of cognition arises (1) from the limitation of our power of cognition, for which we are either to blame or not to blame; (2) from lack of the proper heedfulness of reflection, diligence, and patience § 129. 145, which can be either necessary or conti ngent, blameworthy or praisewort hy; (3) from a necessary or contingent, praiseworthy or blameworthy ignorance of such truths, without whose cognition another truth cannot be certain

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§ 43. 50. 51; (4) from an excessively strong heedfulness of doubt § 176. § 180. There is an uncertainty in human cognition (1) which is totally unavoidable, and which brings neither shame nor honor upon us; (2) a certainty which we may not avoid even if we could, because its object is found outside our horizon or beneath it, and this uncertainty brings a person honor; (3) a certainty which a person can and should avoid, because the contrary certainty lies within his horizon § 178. This last always brings shame upon

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us, and whoever would improve his learned cognition to the greatest possible extent must seek to avoid only all uncertainty of the third kind.

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[51] § 181. An opinion (opinio) is any uncertain cognition, insofar as we accept it, and at the same time cognize that it is not certain. An opin ion is accepted either as a ground from which we explain appearances in the world, or not. The latter is a common opinion (opinio vulgaris). The first is a philo sophical or learned opinion (hypothesis phi losophica, erudita), e.g. when one assumes the efflux of a magnetic material in orde r to explain how the magnet attracts iron.

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§ 182. All opinions ( 1) have in themselves the nat ure of all uncertain cognition; (2) common opinions, at least in learned cognition, are to be completely despised; (3) what is an opinion for some is not an opinion for all; (4) one must not make too big a deal of learned opinions, for they belong to the imperfect half of learned cognition; (5) one must not totally despise them, because they are the transition from historical cognition to totally certain learned cognit ion§ 181.

Of the Certaintyof Learned Cognition

43

183. With learned opinions one must observe the following rules: (1)

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one must hold no learned opinion to be certainly true, and not display as much zeal for it as for certain truths. (2) One must accept them only in case

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§

of necessity, when we can yet have no better learned cognition. (3) One must accept no obviously false opinion, which either is internally impossible, or contra dicts another undeniable truth, or contradicts appearances. An appearance does not contradict an opinion just because we cannot derive it from it. (4) One must be prepared to let go the most splendid and most learned opinion as soon as one discovers its incorrectness . (5) One must not accept a learned opinion before [52] one has made it to some extent probable. Thus, among other things, one must be able to explain most appearances by it. (6) One must constantly strive to transform an opinion into a certain cognition. (7) One must have no excessive inclination for opinions, and not make too mu ch of them. (8) One must not hold an opinion to be true just because it is new, grand, miraculous, harmless, edifying, and required much trouble, learnedness, wit, and perspicacity to come up with it. §

184. Certainty and conviction are either true or merely plausible. Error,

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by which we imagine we are convinced when we are really not convinced, is called persuasio n in the bad sense (persuasio malo significatu). Since by means of this the certainty of learned cognition is hindered, one must try one's best to prevent it. But it arises: ( 1) from ignorance of the rules of the doctrine of reason; (2) from lack of a certain cognition, for then one does not yet know what it is like to have a true conviction; (3) from prejudices

§

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169.

170. 171; (4) from a rather too great negligence and hastiness. Now insofar as it lies within the power of a person to clear away these causes of persuasion,

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to that extent he is also capable of avoiding these mistakes himself. 185. Now if one prevents persuasion and arrives at a thorough conviction, one attains a science (scientia subiective spectata), that is, a §

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learned cognition, insofar as it is extensively certain. 186. The greater, more important, and more fruitful the object of our learned cognition is, the more certain our cognition must be § 70, that §

is, we must seek the most and best kinds of [53] certainty, and to make them thorough to the highest degrees. With smaller objects the situation is exactly the reverse. §

187. Each must not only choose for his principal science that part of

learnedness which is capable of the greatest certainty, so far as it is possible

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44

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Excerptf rom the Doctrine of Reason

for him; but he must also seek to raise his chosen principal science to the greatest possible degree of certainty § 63. 64. § 188. Extensive certainty consists in the consciousness of truth § 155, thus that it is possible and grounde d § 94. 96, so that no fear of the contrary remains § 160. Thus, we are then conscious that the contrary is false, impossible and unfounded § 95. 97. Thus, extensive certainty arises from consciousness of the necessity of the truth§ 114.

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§ 189. Extensive certai n ty arises either from our clear cognition that the truth is absolute ly necessary, or that it is necessary only in th is world § 113. If we cognize the first with mathematical certa inty, this constitutes mathematical certainty of the first order (certitudo mathematica primi ordinis) . In the other case we have mathematical certainty of the second order (mathematica certitudo secund i ordinis), e.g. with our experie nces.

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§ 190. Consciousness of the contingency of truth causes uncertainty, and at most a certainty that is not extensive § 189. 113. Arbitrary truths

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(hypothesis) are tho se whose truth depends on the choice of human beings,

and their arbitrariness does not hinder the completecertainty of them. § 191. Proof (probatio) is that which is added to a truth so that it becomes [54] certain. The ground of proof [Beweisthum] (probatio [AA 16,484]

materialiter sumta, ratio probans) is the ground from which the tru th can be clearly cognized, and those are the character istics of truth § 94. The consequence of proof (probatio formaliter sumta, consequentia) is the connection of truth with the ground of proof§ 15. Every proof consists therefore in the ground of proof and the consequence, and it can cause either an extensive certainty or a c,ertainty that is not extensive § 159. In

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the first case, it is called a sufficient proof or a demonstration (probatio sufficiens, demonstratio); in the other case, it is an insufficient proof (probatio insufficiens). The latter is extensively treated in the rational doctrine of probable cognition. § 192. Cognition of a truth is either a demonstrable (cognitio demonstrabilis) or an indemonstrable cognition (cognitio indemonstrabilis). The latter becomes certain for us as soon as we cognize it distinctly, but not the former. The latter is totally certain without proof, but not the former. One

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must be careful to take neither begged cognition nor demonstrable cognition to be indemonstrable § 168.

Of the Certainty of Learned Cognition

45

§ 193. If we would attain extensive certainty of a truth by proof and from

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it, or if a proof should be a demonstration § 191, then (1) every ground of proof contained in the proof must be extensively certain. Thus all demonstrable grounds of proo f must in turn be demonstrated until one comes to nothing but indemonstrable grounds of proof; (2) the consequence must be extensively certain§ 191. Besides these two parts, nothing more is required for a proof, if it should be a demonstration§ 15. § 194. If (l) even a single ground of proof in a proof is false or (2) uncertain;

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(3) if a [55] single consequence in the proof is false or (4) uncertain; or (5)

if a number of these mistakes are found in a proof at the same time, it can be no demonstration § 193. 195.Just as someone can hold an insufficient proof to be a demonstration, one can also hold a demonstration to be an insufficient proof, or perhaps §

even to be a false proof§ 165.Thus, one must not at all reject a demon stration just becau se it does not have the proper effect on our mind. § 196. Through a demonstration we seek either to become certain that something is true, or that something is false § 191. 156. In the first case, one can demonstrate a truth in a twofold way: ( 1) in a direct way (demonstratio directa, ostensiva) , when we derive a truth from its characteristics; (2) in an indirect way (demonstratio indirecta, apogogica , deductio ad absurdum),

when we demonstrate the incorrectness of its contrary, and thereby infer its truth. Similarly, one can demonstrate that something is false, or refute

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(refutatio) it, (a) in an indirect way (refutatio mediata), when we demonstrate the truth of its contrary; (b) in a direct way (refutatio immediata) , when we derive the incorrectness of it from its characteristics . But one can prove that something is false: (a) when we prove that it is imposs ible and ungrounded, (~) that it is contrary to other undeniable truths , and (y) that something false follows from it. § 197. A demonstration causes either a distinct or indistinct extensive

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certainty § 191. 188. The latter are aesthetic demonstrations (demonstratio aesthetica), but the former are logical, philosophical, and learned demonstrations (demonstratio logica, philo-[ 56]sophica, erudita) . A logical demonstration, which causes a mathematical certainty, is a mathematical demonstration (demonstratio mathematica) § 161. § 198. We can always infer: (l) if the entire proof is correct and certain, then the matter proven is also correct and certain; (2) if the matter proven

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46

Exce,pt from the Doctrine of Reason

is false and unce rtain, then there is a mistake in the proof§ 194. However, we cannot infer: ( 1) if the proof is false, then the matter proven is also false; (2) if the proof is uncertain, then the matter proven is also only uncertain; (3) what we cannot prove is therefore false; (4) if the matter proven is true and certain, then the proof is also true and certain . § 199. The spirit of demonstration (spiritus demonstrationis) consists in the sufficient aptitude of a person for demonstration and the natural dr ive for such a certain cognitio n as one attains through demonstration. Without this spirit no one can demonstrate, and without it no one shou ld dare to undertake it. § 200. The excessive love of demonstration is the lust for demonstration (pruritus demonstrandi). This learne d sickness manifests itself in the (AA 16: 4931

following ways: (1) when one seeks to demonstrate what one cannot and may not demonstrate; (2) when one demo nstrates actually in a spurious way so that one gives only the appearance of demonstration to imbeciles; (3) when one stops only with mere demonstration, and does not properly use or apply the demonstrated truths; (4) when one is a pedant in

demonstrating, or completelydespises what is not demonstrated, whether it is really not demonst rated or we only take it not to be; (5) when one raises demo nstration too high, like a charlata n, and boasts too much [57] of it, even when one demonstrates small things of no use. § 201. A sensation (sensatio) is a representation of a present matter, and while we sense something clearly, we experience that thing. Experience (exper ientia) thus consists in that cognition, which is clear through sensation. Clear sensations are imm ediate experience (experientia immediata), and the remaining clear cognition, which is derived from immediate experience by a short proof, is called mediate experience (experientia mediata). E.g. that I think is a sensation and immediate experience, but that I have a capacity to think is a mediate experience. § 202. When something is certain to us, it is either certain from experience, or from other grounds, and in the first case either from our own experience, (AA 16: 4941

or from the experience of other people. Thus we have a threefold source of all proofs § 191, namely, our own experience, the exper ience of other people, and other grounds that are not experiences.

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§ 203. If we conduct a proof (1) from our own immediate experience, the n we may clearly represent only a single case in which we have sensed

Of the Certaintyof Learned Cognition

47

so mething§ 201. (2) In proofs from mediate experience, not only must at least one imme d iate experience be adduced, but the other grounds of proof incl uding the consequence must also b e certain§ 201. 193. (3) Even what we are certain of also by immediate experience is no indemonstrable cognitio n § 192. 201. (4) Experie nce gives us an extens ive certainty in that it conta ins all characteristics of truth of the object §20 1. 94. 96. (5) Exp erience gives us only an extensive certainty of the second order§ 189, and (6) it represents the [58] truth on ly from external ch aracteristics §94 . § 204 . If we prove a truth from oth er grounds of proof that are not

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experience, then we cond u ct a proof from reason (probatio ex ratione). In such a proof ( l ) there must be no ground of proof that is an experience, and (2) all its groun ds of proof must be extensive ly certain without experience ,

if it should be a demonstration§

193.

§ 205 . All exper ien ce, and what we prove from it, is cognition from

behind [von hinten her] (cognitio a poste riore), but th e oth er rational cognition is called cognition from ahead [von vorne her] (cognitio a priore). When we are certai n of a trut h fro m our own exper ience as well

as from reason, one calls this the agreement of reason and experience (connubium rat ionis et experientiae). § 206. From the exper ience of other people we become certa iJ1 by mea n s of belief . Whoever asserts an act ual thing [eine wirkliche Sache] to be true so that another person should also hold it to be true is called a witnes s (testis), and his action is called a testimony (test imonium, testari). To

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believe (credere) is to accept something on the basis of a testim ony. Belief (fides, fides historica) is the assent that we give to a matte r on the basis of a testimony . The object of belief consists in past, present, and future things, but not in other tru ths . § 207. The authority of a witne ss (autoritas testis) consists in the degree of his honor, by means of wh ich in his cognition he is held to be worthy of imitation. We can believe no witn ess who has no standing with us. And this authority con-[59 ]sists (1) in the proficiency of the witnes s (dexteritas testis), when he possesses sufficient powers not only to obtain a correct cog n ition, but also to designate it in a correct way; (2) in the sincerity of

the witness (sinceritas testis), or in the inclination of his will to designate his experiences as he ho lds them to be true. Neither of the two without the othe r can give a witness the p roper author ity.

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Excerptfrom the Doctrine of Reason

§ 208. An eyewitness (testis oculatus) is a witness who himself experienced the matter to which he bears witness. An eanvitness (testis auritus) is no eyewitness, but rather he has experienced only others' testimony of the matter. § 209. The proficie ncy of an eyewitness requires that: (1) he must have been present at the matter to which he bears witness; (2) he must be able to obtain a correct experience; (3) he must have a good and faithful memory, or he must write down his experiences at once; (4) he must possess the gift of designating his own cognition in a correct and sufficient way.

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§ 210. An earwitness, with respect to the testimony to which he bears witness, is an eyewitness, and accordingly he must possess all the proficiency req uired for that§ 209. But to the extent he is an earwitness, the following parts are required for his proficiency: (1) he must repeat only the testimonies of proficient eyewitnesses, and thus he must always be able to cite a proficient eyewitness, who is his source. A common tale (fama) is a testimony of many earwitnesses of a matter , whose eyewitness is unknown . These earwitnesses live either at the same time, and then their saying is a

public rumor (rumor sine capite), or at different times, and then it is an oral tradition (oralis traditio). The common tale [60] lacks the necessary authority; (2) he must possess enough understanding to correctly grasp what he hears or reads; (3) he must possess a faithful memory, in order to communicate the reports to others as he received them. § 211. The sincerity of a witness depends solely on his good will not to lie § 207. That witness who expects from a true testimony only good things for himself , or more good than bad, and who expects from lies on ly bad thing s, or more bad than good, he speaks the truth. And in the contrary case he lies. (AA 16: 5011

This good or bad can concern his soul or his body, or his external condition, he can hope or fear it of God, of those perso ns for whom he testifies, or of whom he testifies, etc., he may deceive himself in this matter or not. § 212. The certainty of a testimony rests (1) on the internal characteristics of its truth § 95. 96; (2) on the external characteristics of its truth, namely, on the sufficient authority of the witness, which must be at least very probable § 207, 94. The testimonies of a proficient and sincere witness cannot be false. § 213. What we believe, we do not beg§ 212. 168. Unbelief (incred ulitas)

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is the aptitude not to believe a certain or probable testimony. Credulity (credulitas) is the aptitude to believe an improbable testimony. Both mistake s are irrational§ 174.

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49

§214. A witness is credible (testis fide dignus), when one can in a

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learned way cognize at least probably that he has sufficient authority; the testimony of such a witness is a credible testimony (testimonium fide