Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason 9781474229319, 9781474229333, 9781474229340

Citation preview

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

Kant’s Sources in Translation The texts that shaped Kant’s thought

Series Editors Lawrence Pasternack, Professor of Philosophy, Oklahoma State University, USA Pablo Muchnik, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Emerson College, USA Editorial Board Fred Beiser, Syracuse University, USA; Karin de Boer, KU Leuven, Belgium; Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo Marques, São Paulo State University, Brazil; Corey Dyck, University of Western Ontario, Canada; Paul Guyer, Brown University, USA; Heiner Klemme, Martin Luther University of HalleWittenberg, Germany; Ricardo Pozzo, Sapienza University of Rome, Italy; Eric Watkins, University of California, San Diego, USA; Guenter Zoeller, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, Germany.

The aim of this series is to retrieve the rich intellectual world that influenced Kant’s philosophical development. Many of these sources are in Latin or in German, and remain inaccessible to Anglophone readers.

Available titles Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason, Georg Friedrich Meier Preparation for Natural Theology, Johann August Eberhard Forthcoming titles Ethica philosophica, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Initia philosophiae practicae primae acroamatice, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten Jus naturae inusum auditorium, Gottfried Achenwall

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason Georg Friedrich Meier Translated by Aaron Bunch in collaboration with Axel Gelfert and Riccardo Pozzo

Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc LON DON • OX F O R D • N E W YO R K • N E W D E L H I • SY DN EY

Bloomsbury Academic An imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc

50 Bedford Square London WC1B 3DP UK

1385 Broadway New York NY 10018 USA

www.bloomsbury.com BLOOMSBURY and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published 2016 Translated material © Aaron Bunch, 2016 This translation is based on Auszug aus der Vernfunftlehre, George Friedrich Meier. Johann Justinus Gebauer: Halle. 1752 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. No responsibility for loss caused to any individual or organization acting on or refraining from action as a result of the material in this publication can be accepted by Bloomsbury or the author. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data ISBN: HB: 978–1-4742–2931–9 ePDF: 978–1-4742–2934–0 ePub: 978–1-4742–2932–6 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Meier, Georg Friedrich, 1718-1777. [Auszugaus der Vernunftlehre. Selections. English] Excerpt from the Doctrine of reason / Georg Friedrich Meier ; translated by Aaron Bunch. pages cm Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-4742-2931-9 (hb : alk. paper) – ISBN 978-1-4742-2932-6 (epub) – ISBN 978-1-4742-2934-0 (epf) 1. Logic–History–18th century. 2. Knowledge, Theory of–History–18th century. I. Title. B2685.A972E5  2016 160–dc23 2015033026 Series: Kant’s Sources in Translation Typeset by Newgen Knowledge Works (P) Ltd., Chennai, India

Contents Series Editors’ Preface Translator’s Preface Acknowledgments Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason Preface

vii xi xiii xiv xvi

Introduction to the Doctrine of Reason

1

First Main Part: Of Learned Cognition

3

First Section: Of Learned Cognition In General Second Section: Of the Amplitude of Learned Cognition Third Section: Of the Greatness of Learned Cognition Fourth Section: Of the Truth of Learned Cognition Fifth Section: Of the Clarity of Learned Cognition Sixth Section: Of the Certainty of Learned Cognition Seventh Section: Of Practical Learned Cognition Eighth Section: Of Learned Concepts Ninth Section: Of Learned Judgments Tenth Section: Of Learned Rational Inferences Second Main Part: Of the Method of Learned Cognition Third Main Part: Of Learned Exposition First Section: Of the Use of Words Second Section: Of the Learned Style of Writing Third Section: Of a Learned Discourse Fourth Section: Of Learned Writings

5 11 17 21 27 37 51 57 67 81 93 101 103 109 113 121

vi

Contents

Fourth Main Part: Of the Character of a Learned Man

125

Afterword Riccardo Pozzo

135

Concordance German-English Glossary English-German Glossary Index

147 189 191 193

Series Editors’ Preface I Before becoming a famous philosopher, Kant was a famous teacher. For over forty years, he lectured on a wide array of topics—ranging from metaphysics to mineralogy, physics to pedagogy, anthropology to logic. Before officially entering the ranks at the University of Königsberg with the Inaugural Dissertation (1771), Kant’s living depended on the popularity of his lectures. He took them very seriously, and used, for each of them, one or another of the textbooks recognized by the Prussian authorities. In many cases, he used even the same copy for decades. As a result, these copies accumulated scores of marginal notes, which acted sometimes as reminders, sometimes as objections, and sometimes as springboards for Kant’s own thoughts. This wealth of material has been transcribed and printed into volumes of the Akademie Ausgabe. Likewise, most of the extant notes composed by students who attended Kant’s lectures have too been incorporated into the German edition of Kant’s complete works. These resources have, over the years, received modest attention, but with Cambridge University Press’s translation of selected lectures and Reflexionen, interest in them (especially among Anglophone Kant scholars), has burgeoned. Unfortunately, however, it is common for interpreters to overlook the fact that Kant’s lecture notes are not his own writings, but transcriptions from his students. Similarly, his Reflexionen, though of his own hand, are nevertheless often glosses on some point made in the textbook from which he was teaching. Hence, instead of citing this material in isolation, scholars should review the salient textbook contents he was responding to. Without doing so, it cannot be known whether a particular Reflexion or student note merely conveys Kant’s restatement of a passage, or is, instead, a qualification, extrapolation, criticism, or simple digression on Kant’s part. In short, the textbooks provide the context through which Kant’s notes must be read and understood, for only through comparison with the textbook passage can this material be reliably interpreted. Kant’s Reflexionen and

viii

Series Editors’ Preface

lecture notes should not be used, as unfortunately they have been, as standalone indications of his thoughts—often they are not. Responsible scholarship demands that they be read with, and interpreted through, the textbook passage from which Kant was then lecturing. Our hope is that this volume and the ones to follow will contribute to the development of Kant scholarship, promoting a more accurate interpretation of his Reflexionen and lecture notes. By translating the textbooks that framed Kant’s teaching career, we also hope to make the larger intellectual world that influenced his philosophical development more accessible. Many of the source materials are in Latin and German, and hence remain inaccessible to Anglophone readers, preventing them from gaining a more comprehensive view of the intellectual climate of Kant’s day. The first phase of this series will focus on the most important philosophical textbooks Kant used in the classroom. In addition to newly translated material, each volume will be accompanied by a system of concordances that will allow readers to correlate Kant’s reflections and lectures to their corresponding textbook passages. In the second phase, the series will cast a broader net and offer translations of influential German and Latin texts of the eighteenth century that are not currently available in English or need updating. Our goal here is to help scholars place Kant in conversation with his contemporaries, making the broader intellectual world of the German enlightenment available to the Anglophone scholars.

II We are excited to begin this series with a translation of Georg Friedrich Meier’s Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre. Not only does this textbook serve as the basis for Kant’s logic lectures and related Reflexionen, but is also crucial for studying the so-called Jäsche Logic of 1800, which is redacted from the marginal and interleave notes found in Kant’s personal copy of the Auszug. Given the recent growth in scholarship on Kant’s logic, normative epistemology, and the psychology of belief, this volume will make a major contribution to contemporary debates in the field. Meier’s Vernunftlehre [Doctrine of Reason] and Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre [Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason] appeared together in 1752. The latter was written as a textbook and was widely adopted by German instructors, most notably by Immanuel Kant. Like all professors in Prussian universities at the time, Kant was required to take a published text as the basis for his lectures. He used

Series Editors’ Preface

ix

the Auszug to teach logic at least thirty-two times between 1756 and 1796.1 Thus, it is fair to say, Meier’s text is one of Kant’s most enduring influences, since it accompanied him throughout the most productive period of his intellectual life. Meier’s Auszug does not deal with what we know today as formal logic. Its scope is much broader: it concerns “the elements of thought and language, which make human understanding possible.”2 Epistemology (broadly conceived) includes pedagogy and rhetoric, as well as “the character of the learned man.” In addition, Meier was one of the first German philosophers who studied John Locke’s work in depth. Meier’s texts were instrumental to the introduction of English philosophy into Germany,3 and can be seen to straddle the two dominant intellectual forces in modern philosophy, the rationalist and the empiricist traditions, indirectly helping to wake Kant from his “dogmatic slumber.”

III Georg Friedrich Meier (1718–77) studied and taught philosophy at the University of Halle and was among the most authoritative figures of the German Enlightenment. He was a student of Alexander Baumgarten, who, together with the latter’s teacher, Christian Wolff, were the principal architects of the post-Leibnizian rationalism that dominated German-speaking universities through the eighteenth century. Meier’s star rose quickly. In 1748, he was appointed as a full-time professor at the University of Halle. Between 1744 and 1753 he was inducted into four different scholarly societies, including the Royal Academy of Sciences in Berlin. He published voluminously on theology, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, logic, rhetoric, and aesthetics (a new science invented by his teacher, Baumgarten).4 Meier’s influence spread through the university textbooks he wrote on these topics, as well as through his many influential students. His disciples included Immanuel Kant’s vehement critic Johann Eberhard, and Frederick the Great’s eventual minister of religion and education, Karl Abraham von Zedlitz und Leipe.

IV The significance of Meier’s Auszug for contemporary Kant scholarship cannot be overstated. Kant’s views about logic and the elements of human cognition

x

Series Editors’ Preface

lie at the heart of his Critical Philosophy. Among the richest sources of information about these views are the student transcripts of his logic lectures, as well as Kant’s handwritten notes in the margins and on interleaved pages of his personal copy of Meier’s book. As with the other volumes in this series, without knowledge of the textbook from which Kant’s lectures are based, it is difficult to determine how Kant should be understood. The same is true of Kant’s handwritten notes, which are often fragmentary and have meaning only in the immediate context of their source. For this reason, Meier’s Auszug is reprinted in Volume 16 of Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften. This important text, however, has until now not been available in an English translation, posing a serious problem for Kant scholars and students of eighteenth-century philosophy who are unfamiliar with German. Lastly, since the publication of Rae Langton’s Kantian Humility, there has been a significant increase in interest in Locke’s influence on Kant’s Critical Philosophy.5 Scholarship on this topic ranges from the parallels between their respective views on the limits to human knowledge to Kant’s appropriation of Locke’s understanding of propositional assent. Access to Meier’s Auszug, the principal text through which Kant was exposed to Locke’s thought, will therefore be of significant interest to those pursuing this line of inquiry. Lawrence Pasternack and Pablo Muchnik

Notes 1 J. Michael Young, “Translator’s Introduction” to Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Logic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), xxi. 2 Pozzo, “Prejudices and Horizons,” “Prejudices and Horizons: G. F. Meier’s Vernunftlehre and Its Relation to Kant,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 43: 2 (2005), 185. 3 Pozzo, “Meier, Georg Friedrich: About Logic, Aesthetics and Rhetoric in German Enlightenment Philosophy,” AGORA 22: 2 (2003), 133. 4 A more thorough biographical profile is provided in Ricardo Pozzo’s Afterword to this volume. 5 Rae Langton, Kantian Humility: Our Ignorance of Things in Themselves (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

Translator’s Preface This translation of Georg Friedrich Meier’s Auszug aus der Vernfunftlehre (Halle: Johann Justinus Gebauer, 1752) is based on the German text reprinted in Volume 16 of the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences edition of Kant’s gesammelte Schriften (Berlin and Leipzig: Walter de Gruyter, 1924), and checked against the Kessinger Legacy Reprints photographic reproduction of the original 1752 edition. This check revealed one discrepancy. In § 446, the original edition has “learned thoughts” [gelehrte Gedanken], whereas the Academy edition has “honored thoughts” [geehrte Gedanken]. The translation follows the original edition in this case. The pagination of the original edition is provided in square brackets within the text; the volume and page of the Academy edition are provided in the margins. Boldface type follows the text of the Academy edition. The German is provided sparingly in square brackets where I thought it would be helpful or interesting to the reader. It is worth noting at the outset that “Excerpt” [Auszug] in the title of this work is a technical term, which Meier defines in § 518 as a writing that treats its subject briefly, in contrast to “a major work,” which treats its subject amply. Thus, Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason is a single writing, which treats the doctrine of reason briefly, and is not, as contemporary English usage suggests, a snippet from a larger work. One occasionally sees Meier’s title translated as the Excerpts (plural), which gives the false impression that the book is a collection of snippets. This translation attempts to convey in English not only the meaning of Meier’s Auszug, but also its structure and style. By contemporary English standards, it is a strange text. As Meier explains in his preface, he prepared the Auszug for use in his lectures. Accordingly, the German text often has the rough, fragmentary feel of lecture notes. At the same time, its wording is often ungainly and repetitive. This combination is on display in the elaborate enumerations that Meier stitches together with a free use of semicolons, colons, and commas. In general, Meier’s use of punctuation is both nonstandard

xii

Translator’s Preface

and inconsistent. This translation preserves these qualities of the original. In particular, since Meier’s punctuation is for the most part no obstacle to comprehension, and since it may be of interest to scholars, this translation does not correct it. Owing to the relevance of Meier’s Excerpt to Kant scholarship, an effort was made to follow J. Michael Young’s excellent translation of Kant’s Lectures on Logic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Nevertheless, the present translation differs from Young’s with respect to several key terms. First, the perfection of cognition that Meier calls die Weitläufigkeit is translated by “amplitude” rather than by “extensiveness.” It was thought that “amplitude” better captures the connotation of generosity present in die Weitläufigkeit. This decision frees the term “extensive” to translate ausführlich in place of Young’s “exhaustive.” Exhaustive suggests a thoroughness that is comprehensive or total: no stone is left unturned. But this meaning of “exhaustive” would be incongruous in § 133, where Meier says that a cognition “can be extensively [ausführlich] clear, even though it is not totally [ganz] clear.” An exhaustively clear cognition would be totally clear. Instead, we need a word such as extensive, which means “to a great extent” but not “comprehensively” or “totally.” The perfection of cognition that Meier calls die Grösse is translated as the “greatness” of cognition as opposed to its “quantity.” In Meier’s discussion of the perfections of cognition, the greatness of learned cognition has in part not only to do with its quantity (§ 67), but also with its importance and worth (see §§ 26, 68). “Greatness” has all of these senses, but “quantity” does not. On the other hand, in the context of formal logic (see Part One, Sections 9 and 10), die Grösse is translated as “quantity” where Meier refers to the quantity of a judgment, which can be singular [ein einzelnes] or common [ein gemeines] (§ 301). Finally, die Rede is translated as “discourse” rather than “speech.” In Meier’s text, there are indications that die Rede is prior to the distinction between speaking and writing. In § 442, Meier says that oral and written exposition [Vortrag] use die Rede to produce a cognition in another person. The exposition may be oral or written, but die Rede is strictly neither. As a translation, “discourse” preserves this neutrality between speaking and writing at the expense of a certain ungainliness in contexts where Meier clearly has in mind oral delivery as in a lecture.

Acknowledgments From the Series Editors We have many to thank for their assistance in realizing this volume. First, our deepest gratitude goes to Aaron Bunch, whose philosophical sensibilities and remarkable talents as a translator made this volume possible. Although Aaron has chosen to move on to other ventures, this volume is but a small illustration of what he could have offered to the scholarly community and speaks to how much we have lost by his departure. Second, we would like to thank Axel Gelfert and Riccardo Pozzo for their fine work with Aaron’s translation and the considerable time spent reviewing and enhancing earlier drafts. Riccardo has also written the Afterword, and his Kant und das Problem einer Einleitung in die Logik (1988) and Georg Friedrich Meiers Vernunftlehre (2000) stand as benchmarks for all future scholarship on the relationship between Kant and Meier. It has been a pleasure, and a wonderful learning experience, to have worked closely with all of them. We would also like to thank Susan Castro, who was of great help in composing the appendix to this volume, as well as our assistants Mary Danley and Siyi Huo, who helped us proofread the appendix and refine its contents. Lastly, our gratitude goes to Colleen Coalter, who persuaded us to publish this series with Bloomsbury and has done much to shepherd this project forward.

From the Translator This translation has been improved considerably by the thorough, detailed, and insightful comments of Axel Gelfert and Riccardo Pozzo. I am grateful for their generosity and expertise. I would also like to thank the series editors, Lawrence Pasternack and Pablo Muchnik, for the opportunity to contribute to this series, as well as the editors at Bloomsbury and Newgen KnowledgeWorks for their meticulous attention to the manuscript.

George Friedrich Meier Ordinary Professor of Philosophy and Member of the Berlin Academy of Sciences Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason with most gracious Royal Polish and Electoral Saxon privileges HALLE at Johann Justinus Gebauer, 1752

[AA 16: 3]

[AA 16: 4]

Preface Since this present writing is a mere excerpt from my larger doctrine of reason, which comes to light at the same time as this one, I have nothing more to remark than that I have prepared this excerpt for use in my lectures, and that I have treated a couple of subjects in the excerpt that I have omitted in the larger work. Since I have worked already for some time on my larger doctrine of reason, let no one believe that I have been too hasty in the production of both these writings. If anyone would reproach me for publishing two doctrines of reason at the same time, I must wait and see what kind of reason he will be able to give for his reproach. By chance I have found a printing error in § 63 in the second line where, instead of to a rich degree [in einem reichen Grade], to the same degree [in einem gleichen Grade] must be read. The sympathetic reader will kindly forgive the remaining printing errors that may have slipped in. I hope that with this writing I may perform an agreeable service for many people.

[1]

[AA 16: 5]

Introduction to the Doctrine of Reason § 1. The doctrine of reason or the art of reason (logica, philosophia instrumentalis, philosophia rationalis) is a science, which deals with the rules of learned cognition and of learned exposition. § 2. In order that the doctrine of reason contain no entirely arbitrary, contrived, and unnatural laws, its rules must be derived (1) from experience of the effects of human reason, (2) from the nature of human reason, (3) from general basic truths on which rests the entirety of human cognition. § 3. The intent of the doctrine of reason is the perfection of a learned cognition and of a learned exposition, which are either suitable only for professional scholars, or are also appropriate and usable for other learned men. [2] § 4. The doctrine of reason is a means without which one cannot attain learned cognition or science, and through whose proper use a learned cognition and science is attained § 1. § 5. Philosophy [Die Weltweisheit] (philosophia) is a science of the universal qualities of things insofar as they are cognized without faith [ohne Glauben]. Now since learned cognition and learned exposition comprise many kinds, their perfections and imperfections are more universal qualities of things, which are completely proved in the doctrine of reason without deriving their truth from testimonies. Thus, the doctrine of reason is a part of philosophy. § 6. The doctrine of reason deals either with a completely certain learned cognition and its exposition or with probable learned cognition and its exposition § 1. The former is the rational doctrine of the entirely certain learned cognition (analytica), and the latter the rational doctrine of the probable learned cognition (dialectica, logica probabilium). We treat the first doctrine of reason.

[AA 16: 51]

[AA 16: 52]

[AA 16: 72]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

2

[AA 16: 73]

[AA 16: 74]

§ 7. In the doctrine of reason, the rules of learned cognition and its learned exposition are either applied to their particular kinds or not. The former is the doctrine of reason put into practice [ausübende] (logica practica, utens), and the latter is the theoretical [lehrende] doctrine of reason (logica theoretica, docens). § 8. If the doctrine of reason is so constituted as by its nature it can and must be constituted, it has among others a threefold value. (1) It advances the study and dissemination of all sciences, and of the complete learnedness. Thus, every student rightly should make a beginning of the study of the doctrine of reason. (2) It improves the understanding and reason, and shows how one must use these powers of cognition [3] in order to cognize the truth in a proper way. (3) It promotes the entirety of virtue by improving free will; it provides that cognition on which virtue rests; and in the improvement of conscience it has an indispensible influence. § 9. The doctrine of reason treats I. Of learned cognition. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Of learned cognition in general. Of the amplitude of learned cognition. Of the greatness of learned cognition. Of the truth of learned cognition. Of the clarity of learned cognition. Of the certainty of learned cognition. Of practical learned cognition. Of learned concepts. Of learned judgments. Of learned rational inferences.

II. Of the method of learned cognition. III. Of learned exposition. 1. 2. 3. 4.

Of the use of words. Of the learned style of writing. Of a learned discourse. Of learned writings.

IV. Of the character of a learned man.

[4] The Doctrine of Reason [AA 16: 76]

First Main Part

Of Learned Cognition

First S e c t ion

Of Learned Cognition In General § 10. Experience teaches that we imagine infinitely many things. A representation (repraesentatio perceptio) behaves like an image, which the pictorial skill of the soul sketches in its interior. § 11. Cognition (cognitio) is either a complex [Inbegriff] of many representations or that action whereby a representation of a matter is produced. One can also take representations and cognition for one and the same without committing an appreciable error. § 12. What we represent and cognize is distinct from representation and cognition. The former is called the object of cognition and of representation (obiectum cognitionis et repraesentationis). § 13. We are conscious of our representations and of our cognition (conscium esse, adpercipere) insofar as we distinguish them and their object from other representations and matters. Consciousness is a double representation: a representation of the object, and a representation of its difference from others. Consciousness acts like light in the material world, which reveals to us the differences between bodies. [5] § 14. When we are conscious of a representation, we are conscious of it either considered merely on the whole [im Ganzen], so that we distinguish nothing at all in it; or we are conscious also of the manifold in it. In the first case, we have an indistinct or a confused cognition (cognition indistincta et confusa), but in the other a distinct one (cognition distincta); for example, when we see a person from a distance, we have an indistinct cognition of his face so long as we do not see the parts and features of his face. But if he comes closer, and we begin to notice his eyes, his nose, and the features of his face, then we gain a distinct cognition of his face.

[AA 16: 79]

[AA 16: 80]

6 [AA 16: 91]

[AA 16: 92]

[AA 16: 93]

[AA 16: 94]

[AA 16: 99]

[AA 16: 100]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

§ 15. The ground of a matter (ratio), the matter may be a cognition or the object of a cognition, is that from which the matter can be cognized, and the consequence of the ground (rationatum) is what can be cognized from the ground. Light is the ground of the visibility of bodies, and this visibility is a consequence of light. The connection of matters (nexus, consequentia) consists in the one being the ground of the other, or in containing the other within itself. The ground of a matter is either so constituted that we can derive our entire cognition of the matter from the ground, in such a way that besides the ground nothing else is required in order to cognize all that is found in the matter; or the ground is not so constituted. The former is the sufficient ground (ratio sufficiens), and the latter is the insufficient ground (ratio insufficiens). § 16. Everything that is possible and actual has a ground, and everything also has a sufficient ground. [6] § 17. When we cognize something, we cognize it either in a distinct way from grounds, or not. In the first case, we have a rational cognition (cognitio rationalis). Three things are required for such a cognition: (1) a cognition of a matter, (2) a cognition of its ground, and (3) a distinct cognition of the connection of the matter with its ground. For example: When I cognize that all human beings can err, because they have a limited understanding, and I think: Whoever has a limited understanding can err; all human beings have a limited understanding, therefore they can all err: In this way I have a rational cognition of the truth that all human beings can err. § 18. Every cognition, insofar as it is not rational, is called a common or a historical cognition (cognitio vulgaris, historica). All things can be cognized historically, and one may even cognize their grounds; so long as one does not distinctly understand the connection of the consequences with their grounds, one has only a merely historical cognition. § 19. A more perfect historical cognition is a beautiful [schöne] cognition (cognitio pulcra, aesthetica), and the fine sciences [die schönen Wissenschaften] deal with the rules by which historical cognition is beautified [verschönert]. § 20. Although historical cognition is very distinct from rational cognition § 17. 18, to such an extent that the most beautiful historical

Of Learned Cognition In General

7

cognition does not even deserve to be called a rational cognition § 19; nonetheless, the former is indispensable to the latter, since a human being cannot attain rational cognition of a matter if he does not first possess a historical cognition of it. [7] § 21. The learned and philosophical cognition (cognitio erudita et philosophica) is a rational cognition that is perfect to a higher or more appreciable degree. § 22. When the manifold in a cognition conforms to an intention [Absicht], or contains the sufficient ground of it: this constitutes the perfection of cognition (perfectio cognitionis). The perfections of cognition occur in it either insofar as it is distinct or insofar as it is indistinct § 14. The former are called the logical perfections of cognition (perfectio cognitionis logica), and the latter the beauties of cognition (pulcritudo et perfectio aesthetica cognitionis). E.g. mathematical certainty is a logical perfection, and pictorial liveliness is a beauty of cognition. § 23. Insofar as a cognition is not perfect, to that extent it is an imperfect cognition (imperfectio cognitionis). The imperfections of cognition occur in it either insofar as it is distinct or insofar as it is indistinct § 14. The former are called the logical imperfections of cognition (imperfectio cognitionis logica), and the latter are called the uglinesses of cognition (deformitas, imperfectio cognitionis aesthetica). E.g. what is indecent and obscene in everyday jokes is an ugliness of cognition; but a false inference is a logical imperfection of cognition. § 24. Learned cognition must be adorned with the perfections of cognition § 21. 22. Thus it possesses either merely the logical perfections of cognition by being either not beautiful at all or at the same time even ugly; or besides the logical perfections it possesses the beauties of cognition § 22. 23. The former is a merely learned cognition (cognitio [8] mere erudita), and the latter is a cognition that is beautiful and learned at the same time (cognitio aesthetico-logica). The last is more perfect than the first, and the first must not be sought alone. § 25. The more we cognize, the more perfect our cognition is § 22. The first perfection of learned cognition consists therefore in its amplitude (vastitas, ubertas cognitionis eruditae), which is attributed to a cognition insofar as it represents many objects.

[AA 16: 101]

[AA 16: 102]

[AA 16: 103]

[AA 16: 104]

[AA 16: 105]

8 [AA 16: 106]

[AA 16: 107]

[AA 16: 108]

[AA 16: 31]

[AA 16: 110]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

§ 26. The greater and more important our cognition is, the more perfect it is, because a great matter encompasses much § 22. The second perfection of learned cognition consists accordingly in its greatness and importance (dignitas, magnitudo et maiestas cognitionis eruditae), which belongs to a cognition insofar as it is great and important. E.g. cognition of God is more important than cognition of the clothes of the Romans. § 27. Because a false cognition is no cognition at all, the truth of cognition (veritas cognitionis eruditae) is its third perfection. This can be called the basic perfection of cognition, because without it cognition is no cognition at all, and thus also capable of no perfection. § 28. Since we represent to ourselves more in a distinct representation than in an indistinct one § 14, distinctness of learned cognition is its fourth perfection. § 29. Consciousness of the truth of a cognition is its certainty (certitudo subiective spectata). Since now the truth of cognition as well as the consciousness of it is a perfection § 13. 17, the certainty of learned cognition is its fifth perfection. [9] § 30. A learned cognition is practical insofar as it contributes what it has to the direction of our free actions (cognitio erudita practica), and therein consists its sixth perfection § 22. § 31. The more ample, important, correct, distinct, certain, and practical a learned cognition is, the more perfect it is § 25–30. Now since each rational human being must everywhere strive for the greatest perfection that is possible for him; he must, if he aims to attain a learned cognition, (1) seek to attain all of its logical perfections, (2) seek each of them to the highest possible degree, and besides that also (3) seek the beauties of cognition § 22. § 32. Accordingly, whoever would acquire the most perfect learned cognition must not be satisfied with a merely learned cognition § 24. 31. Rather, although not all of his learned representations can be beautiful at the same time, his learned cognition, considered on the whole, must nonetheless be at once a beautiful cognition, if it is otherwise to be improved to as high a degree as possible. § 33. A learned cognition can be (1) logically perfect and imperfect at the same time. E.g. a correct, distinct, and certain cognition can have the flaw that it is not practical; (2) it can be logically perfect to a higher degree than

Of Learned Cognition In General

9

imperfect, or more imperfect than perfect; (3) logically perfect and beautiful or ugly at the same time; (4) logically perfect and neither beautiful nor ugly; (5) logically imperfect and at the same time beautiful or ugly § 22. 23. § 34. Whoever would attain a learned cognition that is at the same time beautiful § 32 must (1) not make it logically perfect in such a way and to such a degree that thereby all its beauty is impeded; (2) he must not beautify it in such a way and to such a degree that [10] thereby the required logical perfection of it is made impossible; (3) he must seek primarily to preserve the logical perfections, and he must apply the beauties only more sparingly, as an adornment. § 35. If some perfections in learned cognition cannot be attained at the same time, one must abandon the smaller and more needless perfections in order to maintain the greater and more needful ones. Accordingly, in a learned cognition that is to be not merely learned, often one must diminish logical rigor in small matters in order to achieve the greater beauty of the cognition. § 36. The imperfections of learned cognition are either deficiencies or errors. A deficiency of learned cognition (defectus cognitionis eruditae) arises when certain rules of its perfection are not observed and also not violated. E.g. if a key concept is not explained at all, the rules of explanations are neither observed nor violated. An error of learned cognition (vitium cognitionis eruditae) arises when the rules of its perfection are violated. E.g. if one explains a concept incorrectly. If one must avoid all deficiencies and errors, one must nevertheless take more care to avoid the latter, because one can say that every error is connected with a deficiency, and an error is thus a greater imperfection than a mere deficiency. § 37. Common and historical cognition can be much more perfect than merely learned cognition, namely, if it is very beautiful § 22. 23. E.g. an unlearned general and minister can possess a much more perfect cognition than a learned and pedantic bookworm. Common cognition acquires this advantage only accidentally [11], when learned cognition is not as perfect as it could and should be. § 38. Learned cognition is always necessarily more perfect than common cognition, if they are equal in all other respects § 18. 21. § 39. Although common cognition is very useful and in infinitely many cases it is sufficient, and even though some common cognition can

[AA 16: 111]

[AA 16: 163]

[AA 16: 167]

[AA 16: 168]

10

[AA 16: 169]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

accidentally be more useful than some learned cognition: nevertheless, in order to advance our welfare, learned cognition is necessarily more useful than common cognition, if they are equal in all other respects. For (1) since it is more perfect § 38, it improves also the cognitive power to a higher degree than common cognition; (2) for just this reason it is more pleasant than common cognition; (3) it is more suitable to the character of humanity and more respectable than common cognition; (4) it promotes the discovery of new truths more than common cognition does; and (5) it can be much more deftly and better applied and exercised than common cognition. § 40. A learned cognition that is also beautiful provides all the benefits of learned cognition §. 39, and all the benefits of beautiful cognition. And since it also avoids all the defects of merely learned and merely beautiful cognition: it is of all types of human cognition the most beneficial and useful cognition.

S e c ond S e c t ion

[AA 16: 170]

Of the Amplitude of Learned Cognition § 41. The imperfection of learned cognition that is contrary to its amplitude § 25 is the meagerness of learned cognition (angustia eruditae cognitionis), and it arises always from ignorance (ignorantia) or from the [12] total lack of cognition of things and their grounds. To the extent that the amplitude of the learned cognition of a human being increases, his ignorance diminishes, and the greater the ignorance of a human being is, the poorer his learned cognition is. § 42. The amplitude of learned cognition is contrary to a two-fold ignorance: (1) a total ignorance (ignorantia totalis), when we do not have even a historical cognition of a matter; and (2) an ignorance of the grounds of things (ignorantia rationum), in which case an excellent historical cognition of the things can still come to pass. § 43. The ignorance of a human being is (1) an absolutely [schlechterdings] necessary and unavoidable ignorance (ignorantia absolute necessaria et invincibilis), which he cannot avoid owing to the bounds of his power of cognition; and (2) a voluntary ignorance (ignorantia arbitraria et vincibilis), whose contrary cognition he could attain if he wanted to. § 44. The horizon, or the field of view of his learned cognition (horizon seu sphaera cognitionis eruditae), is the totality of all those things that a human being can cognize in a learned way without detracting from his remaining total perfection. Thus, all things are excluded from it with respect to which a human being must necessarily or voluntarily remain unknowing § 43. § 45. A matter is raised above the horizon of human learned cognition (res supra horizontem eruditae cognitionis humanae posita) if a human

[AA 16: 171]

[AA 16: 172]

[AA 16: 173]

[AA 16: 174]

12

[AA 16: 175]

[AA 16: 176]

[AA 16: 177]

[AA 16: 178]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

being’s ignorance of it is absolutely necessary, even if the matter is not unworthy of a learned cognition. Human understanding is too weak to be capable of cognizing these important matters in a learned way. Now although one must not disdain such matters [13] that go beyond our horizon, and although without sufficient reason one must assert nothing of a matter that is raised above the horizon of our cognition; nevertheless, one must try one’s best to avoid the futile and harmful striving after a learned cognition of such matters that go beyond our horizon. § 46. A matter is lowered beneath the horizon of human learned cognition (res infra horizontem eruditae cognitionis humanae posita), which could indeed be cognized by a human being in a learned way, but is not great enough to be worth such a cognition. Just as without adequate reason one must not pass off as something a matter that is lowered beneath the horizon of human learned cognition, one also must not endeavor to cognize in a learned way such matters that are really lowered beneath the horizon of human learned cognition. Otherwise one makes oneself ridiculous and contemptible, and one thereby neglects the learned cognition of more important and more necessary matters. § 47. Something is outside the horizon of learned human cognition (res extra horizontem cognitionis humanae eruditae posita), which indeed could be cognized by a human being in a learned way, which also is not unworthy of a human learned cognition, the learned cognition of which, however, would hinder a human being in his other occupations. Without adequate reason one must not pass off as something a matter that is found outside the horizon of his learned cognition; but also one must not strive for a learned cognition of such matters, because otherwise he involves himself in extraneous troubles and would thereby neglect his work. [14] § 48. All those things that are neither raised above the horizon of human learned cognition, nor lowered beneath it, nor found outside it, are found within the scope of the horizon of human learned cognition (res intra horizontem cognitionis humanae eruditae posita), and they constitute the learned horizon § 44. § 49. The supremely ample [allerweitläufigste] learned cognition of a human being consists in the learned cognition of all matters that are found within the scope of his horizon § 48. 25. Now since every learned man must attain the most ample learned cognition that is possible for him, he must

Of the Amplitude of Learned Cognition

13

try to survey the boundaries and the scope of his horizon as exactly as the weakness of human beings permits § 44. § 50. And even if a human being should have attained the supremely ample learned cognition, there yet remains much necessary ignorance, which brings him neither honor nor shame § 43. With regard to voluntary ignorance, however, it is either praiseworthy or blameworthy. Praiseworthy ignorance (ignorantia laudabilis) is ignorance of such matters that are found beneath and outside the horizon of learned cognition. § 46. 47. § 51. Blameworthy ignorance (ignorantia illaudabilis) is ignorance of matters that are found within the horizon of learned cognition § 48. Thus, whoever would attain the supremely ample learned cognition must seek to avoid all blameworthy ignorance, and no other kinds § 49. § 52. It is a ridiculous folly of some poor heads among the learned men when they count their blameworthy ignorance as a merit, [15] and with Socrates, who possessed a very ample learning, pretend that they know nothing except that they know nothing. § 53. The more things someone cognizes in a learned way, the more ample his learned cognition is. A higher or more appreciable, and consequently more rare, degree of amplitude of learned cognition is called polyhistory [Vielwisserei] (polyhistoria). This is undeniably a great perfection of learned cognition, if only one is not tempted by the craving for polyhistory [Polyhistorie] (1) to overstep the bounds of one’s learned horizon, and (2) to neglect too much the other perfections of learned cognition. § 54. Whoever would make his learned cognition ample enough must (1) study many main parts of learnedness. E.g. philosophy [die Weltweisheit], theology [Gottesgelahrtheit], history, philology, etc. (2) He must divide each main part into many subparts, e.g., he must divide philosophy into the doctrine of reason, metaphysics, physics, natural right, etc. (3) He must in turn study each of these parts amply, e.g. the doctrine of reason, and (4) he must in turn seek to attain an ample learned cognition of each individual truth, e.g. of the omniscience of God. § 55. An ample learned cognition is extensive and complete (completa cognitio erudita) when it is sufficient for its purposes, or when we cognize in a learned way as much as the entire purpose of our learned cognition requires. Amplitude without extensiveness is not perfect enough, and thus one must learn to distinguish the highest truths from the minor matters in

[AA 16: 190]

[AA 16: 191]

[AA 16: 194] [AA 16: 195]

[AA 16: 196]

[AA 16: 197]

[AA 16: 198]

[AA 16: 202]

14

[AA 16: 203]

[AA 16: 204]

[AA 16: 205]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

every object of learned cognition, so that by the learned cognition of the former one attains a complete learnedness. [16] § 56. Whoever studies merely in a cavalier fashion by skimming through an ample outline of all the parts of learnedness; perhaps studies a few small parts of learnedness a little more amply, but still goes through them briefly; and perhaps here and there explores a few particular matters because he especially likes them for some reason or other: his learned cognition is a poor skeleton of learnedness, and deserves very little respect § 55. § 57. Because it is impossible for a human being to attain an extensive, ample learned cognition all at once, one must constantly seek to extend one’s learned cognition: so that one does not regress in it by failing to continue to advance. § 58. Because, through the broadening of learned cognition, the powers of cognition are at the same time made more capable, one need not worry that through the constant broadening of learned cognition one’s head will be overburdened, if only in this pursuit one does not overstep the bounds of the learned horizon. § 59. Although art is long and human life is short, this observation must spur us to learn as much as possible with proper haste, rather than fill us with timidity and despondency, which hinders us in the broadening of learned cognition. § 60. So that one does not view the broadening of learned cognition as needless and useless, one must set no end that is too small, insignificant, and base, which one aims to achieve by one’s learned cognition. § 61. Since naturally it is necessary that we human beings forget much, just for that reason one must broaden learned cognition very much, so that one can forget much [17] and nevertheless still retain much. In any case, the truths we forget were not entirely useless, because they improved the quality of our cognitive powers. § 62. The amplitude of learned cognition springs from a twofold source, both of which must be present: (1) from the amplitude and the rich content of the object, when it contains much within itself, and so can be cognized by a human being in a learned way (vastitas obiectiva); and (2) from the extension of the cognitive powers (vastitas subiectiva), by virtue of which one is capable of cognizing much about a thing in a learned way.

Of the Amplitude of Learned Cognition

15

§ 63. Because it is impossible for a human being to learn all the parts of learnedness to the same degree of perfection, each person must pick out one part with which he will occupy himself most and of which he aims to attain the most perfect learned cognition. This is his principal science (scientia eruditi principalis). Each person must choose as his principal science that part of learnedness (1) which can be cognized by human beings to a very high degree of perfection, and (2) for which he possesses the most skill, rational desire, and other means of advancement. § 64. Each person must (1) study his principal science most amply and extensively, and (2) investigate all other parts of learnedness in relation to his principal science. The more closely another part of learnedness is connected with the principal science, the more perfectly and amply one must seek to cognize it in a learned way § 63. § 65. The meagerness of learned cognition causes, among others, a threefold harm: (1) [18] learned pedantry and charlatanry (pedantismus et charlataneria eruditorum), by virtue of which one values much too highly the little that one understands and completely disdains everything else; (2) a ridiculous conceit and a vain pride; and (3) a little learnedness can make a human being unhappy all his life in that he can find himself in just those circumstances in which what he studied is not required of him, and what he has not studied is expected of him.

[AA 16: 206]

T h ird S e c t ion

[AA 16: 219]

Of the Greatness of Learned Cognition § 66. The greatness of learned cognition requires not only a great object, but the cognition must also be great enough for the object § 26. The greater the object is, and the more proportioned the cognition, the greater the learned cognition is. § 67. The object of learned cognition is great considered for itself [vor sich] (magnitudo eruditae cognitionis obiectiva absoluta) if it contains many diverse things that can be cognized in a learned way. For example, God, philosophy [die Weltweisheit], history, etc. § 68. The object of learned cognition is great in view of its consequences (magnitudo eruditae cognitionis obiectiva respectiva), (1) if it is important (res digna, gravis), that is, if it has great consequences, e.g. if the happiness of human beings, the welfare of the fatherland, etc., depend on it; (2) if it is fruitful (res foecunda), that is, if many consequences flow from it. E.g. blessedness in God, for it is good for all things. [19] § 69. Whoever would make his learned cognition truly great must seek to cognize many absolutely great, important, and fruitful matters. The more the object contains in itself, the greater its consequences are, and the more consequences it has, the greater, more important, and more fruitful it is; and the greater, more important and more fruitful the learned cognition of it is, namely, insofar as one considers it with respect to its object. § 70. The greatness of learned cognition attributable to the cognition itself (magnitudo cognitionis eruditae subiectiva) consists in the cognition being proportioned to the greatness of its object § 66. The greater the object is, the more ample, correct, distinct, certain, and practical the learned cognition of it must be, and the more time and effort must be devoted to its

[AA 16: 220]

[AA 16: 221]

[AA 16: 223]

[AA 16: 224]

18

[AA 16: 225]

[AA 16: 227]

[AA 16: 228]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

attainment. The less great the object is, the less perfect the learned cognition must be, and the less time and effort must be devoted to its attainment. § 71. The imperfection of learned cognition that is contrary to its greatness is called its smallness (parvitas, vilitas cognitionis eruditae); and it arises either from the smallness of the object or if the learned cognition is not proportioned to the object § 66. § 72. The object of learned cognition is small considered for itself (parvitas cognitionis eruditae obiectiva absoluta) if it contains in itself little that can be cognized in a learned way. E.g. the hairpins of Roman women. § 73. The object of learned cognition is small in view of its consequences (parvitas cognitionis eruditae obiectiva respectiva), (1) if it is not important (res leviores), that is, if it has no great consequences, e.g. the doctrine of the composition of [20] bodies from monads; (2) if it is unfruitful (res infoecunda, sterilis), that is, if it does not have many consequences, e.g. the doctrine of the incorporeality of the soul. § 74. If a matter is small in all respects § 72. 73, it is not worth a learned cognition, for it is lowered beneath the horizon of learned cognition § 46. The less a matter contains in itself, the fewer and smaller consequences it has, the smaller it is. To these small matters one must also add uncouth and base things (res plebeiae, abiectae), the learned investigation of which would be actually repugnant to respectable morals, e.g. outbreaks of the vices among the rabble. § 75. The smallness of learned cognition attributable to the cognition itself (parvitas cognitionis eruditae subiectiva) consists in its being not proportioned to the objects § 71. Thus, (1) if one seeks a more perfect learned cognition with more effort, and one spends more time on it, than the object deserves; and (2) if one cognizes an object not as perfectly, and one investigates it with less effort, and spends less time on it, than it deserves. E.g. whoever assails errors more learnedly and diligently than the vices, his learned cognition is not sufficiently proportioned. § 76. Whoever would make his learned cognition truly perfect must, (1) if it is possible for him, choose the greatest § 67. 68 part of learnedness as his principal science § 63; (2) the greater a part of learnedness is, the more effort and diligence he must devote to it, and the more perfect the learned cognition of it must be; (3) the greater the truths are, the more effort and time he must devote to them, and the more perfect his learned cognition of them must be.

Of the Greatness of Learned Cognition

19

[21] § 77. Whoever possesses no mature and manly judgment cannot possibly judge the true worth of things, and it is thus impossible for him to attain the greatness of learned cognition. § 78. Because all objects of learned cognition stand in a universal connection, they are all infinitely great, important, and fruitful § 67. 68. Thus, an object is called a small matter only in relation to us, because it is impossible for us to cognize its greatness, importance, and fruitfulness in a learned way. § 79. Just as a learned cognition together with its object is not to be regarded as great just because this or that little mind makes a big deal of it; one must therefore also not deem it small because it is passed off as something of little value by the very same person. § 80. A learned cognition is therefore not a small, unfruitful matter of little value just because this or that dry and unfruitful head is incapable of deriving many important consequences from it. The plant is not responsible for the infertility of the soil. § 81. The application of a great learned cognition to small, ridiculous, uncouth, and contemptible cases can indeed make this cognition ridiculous, contemptible, and uncouth in an accidental way; yet it must not for that reason be counted among the small matters of little value. § 82. If the great objects of learned cognition are represented or presented in a contemptible and ridiculous way by this or that person, they must not for that reason be counted among the small, contemptible matters. § 83. A learned man must not through his own fault make learned cognition ridiculous and contemptible by wretched application and by ridicu-[22]lous representations and expressions § 81. 82. § 84. If a learned cognition should be unimportant and unfruitful in our present circumstances, because we do not yet understand its consequences, it can nevertheless become important and fruitful in the future, and it is for that reason no small matter. We must plant trees also for our descendants, the fruits of which we will not enjoy. § 85. One abuses oneself if one deems abstract cognition, subtleties, and profound distinctions not to be great and important matters, because they require much arduous reflection. § 86. The intermediate truths in an ample doctrinal system indeed do not signify much in themselves; yet because without them one cannot rightly

[AA 16: 229]

[AA 16: 230]

[AA 16: 231]

[AA 16: 232]

[AA 16: 233]

[AA 16: 234]

20

[AA 16: 235]

[AA 16: 236]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

cognize the principal truths in a learned way, they are therefore great and worthy objects of our learned cognition. § 87. A learned investigation is therefore important not because it requires much effort, diligence, and time, and not because it cannot be undertaken without great learnedness: for there is also very difficult tomfoolery. § 88. A part of learnedness is therefore not to be counted among the small matters, just because it is filled with many small matters. § 89. A learned cognition, which is not great in one respect, can be great in another respect, and thus it need not be deemed a small matter § 67. 68. E.g. a cognition can be unimportant, but nevertheless fruitful. § 90. Because various learned men can have chosen various principal sciences § 63, a learned investigation can be great with respect to one, and small with respect to the other. [23] § 91. A great mind possesses the ability to have only a great learned cognition. His inclination for this and his aversion to all small matters impel him always first to investigate the greatness of the matter before he tries to cognize it in a learned way, so that he knows whether it is worth a learned cognition and to what degree of perfection.

Four t h S e c t ion

[AA 16: 237]

Of the Truth of Learned Cognition § 92. A false or incorrect cognition (cognitio falsa) is a cognition that is no cognition, and yet appears to be a cognition. A false learned cognition (cognitio erudita falsa) only appears to be a learned cognition, and it is either no cognition at all, or at least no learned cognition. E.g. those who assume the vegetative soul of plants, and deduce the growth of plants from that, have a false learned cognition. § 93. A true or correct cognition (cognitio vera) not only appears to be a cognition, but also is one in fact. A true learned cognition (cognitio erudita vera) not only appears to be a learned cognition, but also in fact deserves this name. E.g. whoever convincingly demonstrates the reality of God from the contingency of this world has a true learned cognition. § 94. The characteristics of the correctness and incorrectness of cognition (criteria veritatis et falsitatis cognitionis) are the grounds from which can be cognized that a cognition is true or that it is false. And they are either present [24] in the cognition itself, or not. The former are the internal and the latter are the external characteristics of correctness and incorrectness (criteria interna et externa veritatis et falsitatis cognitionis). § 95. The first internal characteristic of the truth of a cognition consists in its inner possibility (possibilitas cognitionis interna) insofar as it represents something possible and contains nothing contrary to itself, and also if one considers it totally by itself. The internal impossibility of cognition (impossibilitas cognitionis interna), if it represents nothing, and if the many diverse things in it conflict with each other, is thus the first internal characteristic that it is false § 94. 93. 92.

[AA 16: 238]

[AA 16: 239]

[AA 16: 240]

22 [AA 16: 241]

[AA 16: 242]

[AA 16: 243]

[AA 16: 262]

[AA 16: 263]

[AA 16: 264]

[AA 16: 265]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

§ 96. The other internal characteristic of the truth of a cognition consists in its being possible in a connection (possibilitas cognitionis hypothetica). Consequently, (1) if it is a consequence of correct grounds, and (2) a ground of correct consequences § 94. 93. Accordingly, a cognition is true if it is not impossible and it is in conformity with the principle of sufficient ground § 16. § 97. A cognition is false if it is impossible in connection (impossibilitas in nexu); consequently, if it has no grounds or false grounds, and no consequences or false consequences § 96. And this is the other internal characteristic of its incorrectness § 94. § 98. We must not assume: (1) that a cognition is true, just because we are aware of no internal impossibility in it; (2) that it is false, just because we are aware of no internal possibility in it; (3) that a cognition is true, the groundlessness and false grounds and consequences of which we are unaware; (4) that a cognition is false, of which we cognize no correct grounds and consequences. For we human beings are not all-knowing. § 99. When we conceive a thing otherwise than it is, we believe that we cognize it, and yet we do not cognize it. Accordingly, our cognition is false § 92. Moreover, all possible things have an internal possibility, grounds, and consequences § 15. 16. Thus, the logical truth of cognition (veritas cognitionis logica) consists in its agreement with its object, and the logical incorrectness of it (falsitas cognitionis logica) consists in its not agreeing with its object § 95. 96. 97. § 100. If a cognition contains nothing true, it is totally false (falsitas totalis), and if it contains nothing false, it is totally true (veritas totalis). It can, however, be true and false at the same time, but in different respects (veritas et falsitas partialis). Thus, one need not entirely accept an ample cognition, just because most of it and the most important parts in it may well be true; and one need not entirely discard it, just because most of it and the most important parts in it may well be false. For example, the doctrinal systems of various religions. § 101. The more numerous and diverse the parts that are possible together, which a cognition contains within itself, the greater these parts are: and the more numerous and greater the correct grounds and consequences it has, the more correct the cognition is § 95. 96. Thus, whoever would improve his learned cognition to the greatest possible extent must aim to attain in it the highest degree of truth.

Of the Truth of Learned Cognition

23

§ 102. A cognition that is correct to a higher degree is called an exact cognition (cognitio exacta, exasciata); but a cognition that is true to a smaller degree is called a crude cognition (cognitio crassa). All crude cognition must be avoided, and indeed [26] the more so the cruder it is, or the more numerous and more important the falsities is contains. By contrast, perfect learned cognition must be as exact as possible § 101, and the greater the objects are, the more exactly one must seek to cognize them § 70. But the smaller they are, the less correct their cognition may be § 70. § 103. Learned cognition can be false in a threefold way: (1) if the cognition of the things is false, although the cognition of the grounds is correct; (2) if the cognition of the grounds is false, although the cognition of the things is correct; (3) if the representation of the connection between the true grounds and consequences is incorrect § 100. Thus, a true learned cognition must be at the same time a correct cognition of the things, of the grounds, and of their connection § 21. § 104. Through truths (veritates) one understands also true cognition itself, and so all truths are either dogmatic (veritates dogmaticae) or historical (veritates historicae). The former can and must be cognized from the internal characteristics of truth, but the latter only from the external characteristics. E.g. that a God exists is a dogmatic truth; however, that David, the second king of the Israelites, exists is a historical truth. A doctrinal system (systema) is a set of dogmatic truths, which are connected with each other in such a way that altogether they constitute a cognition that one can consider as a whole. § 105. The more truths there are in a doctrinal system, the greater and more correct the truths are, the more perfect the system is § 104. The most exact truth of a doctrinal system requires: (1) that all parts of the system are correct to the greatest exactness; (2) that none [27] contradict the others; and (3) that they are all connected in that every one is either a ground of the others, or a consequence, or both at the same time § 95. 96. Because there is no truth outside the doctrinal systems § 96. 104, learned cognition must be systematic, if it otherwise should be perfectly correct. § 106. All truths are either merely aesthetic truths (veritates mere aestheticae), which must be cognized only beautifully, and with which learned cognition must never occupy itself; or they are merely learned (veritates mere eruditae), which can be cognized only in a learned way, and

[AA 16: 266]

[AA 16: 267]

[AA 16: 275]

[AA 16: 276]

[AA 16: 277]

[AA 16: 281]

24

[AA 16: 282]

[AA 16: 283]

[AA 16: 287]

[AA 16: 288]

[AA 16: 289]

[AA 16: 290]

[AA 16: 291]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

learned cognition must not occupy itself with those alone, for otherwise it would be merely learned § 32; or they are both at the same time (veritates aesthetico-eruditae), and they are the highest object of a truly perfect learned cognition. § 107. Because truth is not the only perfection of learned cognition, a learned man can never be excused if he occupies himself with a learned investigation simply because it is true. It is not good to think and to say all truths. § 108. Each person must aim to cognize his principal science most exactly § 102 and as systematically as possible § 105, § 63. § 109. Error (cognitio erronea, error) consists in our taking false cognition to be true, and true cognition to be false. Consequently, (1) every erroneous cognition is false § 99; (2) not every false cognition is erroneous, namely, if we cognize that it is false; (3) error arises from false cognition. Had we no false cognition at all, we could also have no errors. Error is worse than merely false cognition, for error is a [28] secret poison. Learned cognition can therefore be erroneous in a threefold way § 103. § 110. Error arises § 109 if we break the rules of the 98th paragraph. The first source of all errors is thus ignorance § 41, if it is accompanied by the haste, whereby we deny that of which we have no cognition. § 111. Error is either avoidable (error vincibilis) or unavoidable (error invincibilis). The former arises from an avoidable ignorance, and the latter from an unavoidable ignorance § 43. The former is nothing but a blameworthy disgrace to learned cognition, but the latter cannot and may not be avoided. § 112. The more ample, important, and fruitful an error is, and the more easily it could have been avoided, the greater it is. The greater the error is, the more it abuses learned cognition, and the more meticulously it must be avoided. Thus, each person must aim to avoid especially the errors in his principal science § 108. § 113. A cognition is manifestly false (cognitio aperte falsa) if its incorrectness is discovered merely by considering it, e.g. a four-cornered triangle. However, if one must undertake a more ample investigation in order to discover its incorrectness, it is false in a hidden way (cognitio cuius falsitas latet), e.g. matter can think. An error by which a manifestly false cognition is assumed to be true is a vulgar, absurd and stupid error (cognitio absurda, absona). Not all errors are absurdities.

Of the Truth of Learned Cognition

25

§ 114. All truths are either absolutely necessary (veritates absolute necessariae) [29] or contingent truths (veritates contingentes). With the former it is totally impossible that they should be false, e.g. there is a God. However, the latter could also be false, e.g. this world is actual. Because error is easier to avoid with the former, it is greater than error in the contingent truths § 112.

[AA 16: 295]

Fif t h S e c t ion

[AA 16: 296]

Of the Clarity of Learned Cognition § 115. A mark, a characteristic of cognition and of matters (nota, character cognitionis et rei), is that in the cognition or in the matters, which, when cognized, is the reason why we are conscious of them; or they are the distinguishing parts of cognition and its objects. Thus, wherever there is consciousness, marks are cognized § 13. E.g. reason is a mark of human beings, and of the cognition we have of them. § 116. Marks have in turn their marks § 115. Consequently, all marks of a matter are either immediate marks (notae immediatae, proximae) or mediate (notae mediatae, remotae). The latter are marks of marks; but the former are only marks of the thing [des Dinges], though they are no marks of its marks. E.g. reason is an immediate mark of human beings, but because reason is a faculty for understanding distinctly the connection of things [der Dinge], so the faculty is a mediate mark of human beings. Consciousness rests on the immediate marks § 13. § 117. Marks are either negative (notae negativae) or affirmative (notae affirmativae, positivae). Through the former we represent something as [30] absent in the matter, and we cognize thereby only what it is not; e.g. the unreason [Unvernunft] of nonrational [unvernünftigen] animals. Through the latter we represent something as present in the matter, and we cognize through them what the thing is, e.g. the reason of human beings. Although both kinds can cause a consciousness of something, the affirmative marks are nevertheless better than the negative. § 118. Marks are either more important marks (notae graviores) or more slight marks (notae leviores). The former identify a greater difference in the matter, and the latter a more slight difference. Either fruitful (notae foecundae) or unfruitful marks (notae infoecundae). The former identify a

[AA 16: 297]

[AA 16: 301]

[AA 16: 305]

[AA 16: 307]

28

[AA 16: 308]

[AA 16: 309]

[AA 16: 310]

[AA 16: 311]

[AA 16: 312]

[AA 16: 315]

[AA 16: 316]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

multifaceted difference between many things, but the latter do not. Reason is an important and fruitful mark of a human being; that a human being is a thing, however, is a more slight and less fruitful mark. Accordingly, the more important and the more fruitful the marks are, the more they promote consciousness. § 119. Since marks are grounds § 115, they are either sufficient grounds of consciousness or insufficient grounds § 15. The former are sufficient marks (notae sufficientes), and the latter are insufficient marks (notae insufficientes). The former are better marks than the latter. The capacity to think is an insufficient mark of a mind, but that it has understanding is a sufficient mark. § 120. Marks are either absolutely necessary and invariable (notae absolute necessariae et invariabiles) or contingent and variable marks (notae contingentes et variabiles). The former are so constituted that without those same marks the matter cannot be represented, e.g. the reason of human beings; however, the latter are so constituted that without them [31] the matter can still be represented, e.g. the actual thinking of human beings. The former are better marks than the latter. § 121. Marks can either be represented in a matter without considering them in connection with other matters outside it, or not. The latter are external marks or relations (notae externae, relationes), e.g. the rule [Herrschaft] of a human being. The former are internal marks (notae internae). Internal marks are either necessary or contingent § 120. The latter are called contingent qualities (modi), e.g. the learnedness of a human being. The former are either the grounds of all other determinations, or not. The latter are the attributes (attributa), e.g. the capacity to think in a human being. The former are called the essential parts (essentialia), e.g. the reason of human beings. The totality of all essential parts is the essence (essentia). § 122. The more marks we cognize of a matter, the greater these marks are, and the more perfectly we cognize the marks, the greater and better the consciousness is § 13. Thus, affirmative, important, fruitful, internal, necessary and sufficient marks cause a greater and better consciousness than those contrary to them § 117–21. § 123. A representation, insofar as we are conscious of it, is called a thought (cogitatio). Thus, not every representation and cognition is a thought. And what has been proven of consciousness is valid also for thinking § 115. 116. 122.

Of the Clarity of Learned Cognition

29

§ 124. A cognition either contains as many marks as are required for consciousness, or it does not. The former is a clear cognition (cognitio clara), which is one and the same as thought and cognition of which we are conscious § 123. The latter is an ob-[32]scure cognition (cognitio obscura), which is thus neither a thought nor attached to consciousness § 123. The former is more perfect than the latter. If we cannot recall a word, and it nevertheless seems as if it were on the tip of our tongue, then we have an obscure representation of it. § 125. Obscure cognition is either absolutely (cognitio absolute obscura) or relatively [beziehungsweise] obscure (cognitio relative obscura). The former would have to be so obscure that it would be absolutely impossible to make it clear. No true cognition is absolutely obscure, and thus one must take nothing to be absolutely obscure. All true obscure cognition is only relatively obscure, that is, the powers of this or that thinking being are not sufficient to make it clear. And then either the object is primarily to blame for this obscurity, or the human being is, for whom the cognition is obscure. The former is obscurity of things [Sachen] (cognitio obiective obscura), and the latter is obscurity in the head of the one for whom the cognition is so obscure (cognitio subiective obscura). E.g. things [Sachen] that are too distant from us, or are too small, are to blame for the fact that we perceive them obscurely. But whoever finds the doctrine of reason obscure is himself to blame. Finally, an obscure cognition is either totally obscure (cognitio totaliter obscura), if we are not conscious of it at all, or only partially obscure (cognitio partialiter obscura), if we are conscious and also not conscious of it at the same time. All of our clear cognition is always partially obscure to us, because there is not a single matter we are capable of thinking through completely. § 126. One human being can cognize what another does not cognize, and thus the one can cognize marks that are unknown to the other § 115. Consequently, one person can cognize clearly what another cognizes only obscurely § 124. Thus, one must not conclude: (1) what is clear to me is also clear to others; (2) what is obscure to me is also obscure to others; (3) what is clear to me now will remain clear to me in the future; (4) what is now obscure to me will remain obscure to me in the future. § 127. The more marks that are unknown to us, which are required for consciousness, and the greater the marks that are unknown to us, and the

[AA 16: 317]

[AA 16: 318]

[AA 16: 320]

[AA 16: 321]

30 [AA 16: 322]

[AA 16: 323]

[AA 16: 324]

[AA 16: 325]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

more power that is required to make a cognition clear, the greater is its obscurity. Thus, before a cognition can become clear, one must often devote much time and effort to reduce its obscurity. § 128. Because we have much clear cognition, whose marks we indeed cognize § 115, but not clearly, there are actually obscure representations present in our soul, which make up the materials from which the soul gradually assembles its clear cognition. § 129. The obscurity of cognition arises from a threefold source: (1) if a human being does not possess sufficient powers to make it clear. This lack of powers is either necessary or not, and in the latter case the human being should either have acquired the powers or not; (2) from the lack of attention, which arises either from a necessary lack of powers, or because we may not take an interest in a certain cognition, or because we do not take an interest in it, even though we should ; (3) from the ignorance of such things without which a certain cognition cannot become clear, whether this ignorance is necessary or contingent, praiseworthy or blameworthy § 43. 50. 51. All obscurity of cognition is thus either necessary or contingent, praiseworthy or blameworthy. Consequently, in improving cognition one must seek to avoid only the contingent and blameworthy obscurity; and the obscurity that is necessary and praiseworthy in one person can be contingent and blameworthy in another. § 130. Obscure cognition (1) can be true, but it can also be false § 92. 93. Thus, not every obscure cognition is false; (2) [and not every obscure cognition] is no learned cognition, insofar as it is obscure. In the learned cognition of human beings it is an unavoidable evil. § 131. That action whereby the obscurity of cognition is reduced and the clarity of cognition is produced and increased is called the unwrapping [Auswickelung] or developing [Entwickelung] of cognition (evolutio, explanatio cognitionis), just as the contrary action is called the wrapping up [Einwickelung] of cognition (cognitionis involutio). For the first, (a) provisionally three things are required: (1) one investigates to the greatest possible extent whether the obscurity of the cognition one wants to develop is necessary or contingent, no fault of one’s own or one’s own fault. Only in the latter case may we attempt developing. (2) One investigates whether the developing of the cognition belongs to the horizon of our clear cognition or not. Only in the first case is this work permitted to us. (3) One investigates

Of the Clarity of Learned Cognition

31

whether this developing does not presuppose a clear cognition somewhere else without which it cannot occur. And if in fact this is the case, one must not undertake this work before one has attained this other clear cognition § 129. (b) For the unwrapping itself, three things are required: (1) one directs one’s attention to the matter that one wants to cognize clearly; (2) one compares it with other matters that are different from it so that one cognizes its marks § 115; (3) one abstracts from all other things, or one obscures them, by [35] paying attention to the object. The more often, the more intensely, and the longer one attends to a matter, the more things one compares with it, the more intensely one abstracts from other things, the better and sooner cognition of the matter develops, even if right in the beginning one performs this work a few times without success. § 132. Through a clear cognition we are either able constantly and in all circumstances to distinguish the object from all other possible objects, or not. In the first case our cognition is extensively clear (cognitio complete clara), e.g. the representation of the color red; in the other case, however, our cognition is not extensively clear (cognitio incomplete clara), e.g. when we can indeed taste that a wine is Rhine wine, but we cannot taste what variety it is. The former is more perfect than the latter, because the latter contains more obscurity than the former § 124, and we attain it through the cognition of necessary, invariable, and sufficient marks § 119. 120. 121. § 133. If we have a clear cognition, then we are either conscious of everything to be found in the object, or not. In the first case, the cognition is totally clear (cognitio totaliter clara). In the latter case, it is only a partially clear cognition (cognitio partialiter clara). No human clear cognition is totally clear § 125, and a cognition can be extensively clear, even though it is not totally clear § 132. At the same time, a cognition is that much more perfect the more its clarity approaches total clarity § 124. § 134. The more marks we cognize, consequently the more numerous and similar the things that we can distinguish from a matter; the greater the marks, and the better we cognize all marks; the more easily we can be conscious of a cognition and its object: the clearer our cognition is § 124, and thus [36] also the more perfect it is. In the improvement of a cognition, one must therefore seek to achieve the highest possible degree of its clarity. § 135. A cognition that is clearer through the abundance of marks is called a vivid cognition (cognitio extensive clarior, vivida); e.g. the melodious

[AA 16: 326]

[AA 16: 327]

[AA 16: 328]

[AA 16: 329]

[AA 16: 330]

[AA 16: 333]

32

[AA 16: 338]

[AA 16: 339]

[AA 16: 340]

[AA 16: 341]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

song of the nightingale resounds throughout the valleys. But what is clearer through the magnitude of marks and their clearer representation is clearer in terms of intensity (cognitio intensive clarior). The doctrine of reason deals only with the latter degree of clarity § 1. 17. 21. § 136. If we forget marks of clear cognition, a clear cognition can be transformed into a less clear cognition, and finally into a totally obscure cognition § 124. Thus, whoever would prevent the wrapping up [Einwickelung] of clear cognition § 131 must prevent its being forgotten. § 137. A cognition that is considered with respect to the intensity of clarity is either distinct or confused § 14. 135. In the former, the marks are also clear, but in the latter they are obscure § 14. 115. 124. Thus, because distinctness is a manifold clarity, distinct cognition is more perfect than confused cognition § 124. § 138. Because all learned cognition is distinct § 21. 17, confused cognition is not learned insofar as it is confused § 137. Thus, just as the fine sciences [die schönen Wissenschaften] deal with the improvement of the confused half of human cognition, so must a learned man improve the distinct half of it by means of the doctrine of reason. Obscurity and confusion is a necessary evil in learned cognition, which one either also seeks to improve along the way, or not. In the latter case, a merely [37] learned cognition arises, and in the first case a learned cognition that is also beautiful § 24. § 139. The action whereby a certain degree of distinctness is produced in our cognition is called the analysis of cognition (resolutio, analysis, anatomia cognitionis). A cognition can be analyzed, if it can be made distinct by any thinking being (cognitio resolubilis). But insofar as it cannot become distinct, to that extent it is a cognition that cannot be analyzed (cognitio irresolubilis). And then it is either absolutely impossible that it become distinct, or it cannot become distinct only by the powers of this or that thinking being. In the first case, it absolutely cannot be analyzed (cognitio absolute irresolubilis). In the latter case, it only relatively cannot be analyzed (cognitio respective irresolubilis). If a true cognition absolutely could not be analyzed, its marks would have to be absolutely obscure § 137. Now since this is impossible § 120, all true cognition that cannot be analyzed is only relatively so constituted.

Of the Clarity of Learned Cognition

33

§ 140. Insofar as we have a distinct cognition of a matter, to that extent we conceive it (concipere). What can be distinctly cognized is conceivable (conceptibile). What cannot be distinctly cognized is inconceivable (inconceptibile) either absolutely (absolute inconceptibile), if it absolutely cannot be analyzed, or only relatively (relative inconceptibile), if it relatively cannot be analyzed. All possible things are only relatively inconceivable § 139, and, what we cognize in a learned way, we always, to that extent, conceive § 21. 17. [38] § 141. What we do not conceive is not for that reason something muddled. And since to one person a cognition can be distinct, which is confused or perhaps even obscure to another § 126, one must not conclude: what we do not conceive, others also do not conceive; what we conceive, others also conceive; what I now conceive, I will also conceive in the future; what I now do not conceive, I will also not conceive in the future. These conclusions are valid also when we speak of mere possibility or impossibility. § 142. If one would analyze a cognition, one must (1) develop it § 131, if it should not already be clear in us. (2) One must think through the clear cognition, or gradually develop its marks, according to § 131. The more marks and the better the marks one develops, the better it is. (3) One considers the developed marks, or one represents them together as a single cognition; otherwise we would think the object only piecemeal, and that is yet no distinct cognition of the whole object. (4) One represents the developed marks in just the connection and in just the order as there is in the object. Otherwise, the distinct cognition does not agree with the object, and all disorder confuses us. (5) One must obscure or abstract from all other matters and representations that are not brought into consideration with the cognition; thereby the cognition does not immediately become confused again. § 143. The more and the greater the clear marks we cognize of a matter, the better we cognize the marks, thus the more amply, proportionately, correctly, clearly, certainly, and practically: the more distinct our cognition is § 137. 25–30. [39] § 144. A distinct cognition is either totally distinct (cognitio totaliter distincta) or only partially (cognitio partialiter distincta). The former

[AA 16: 342]

[AA 16: 346]

[AA 16: 347]

[AA 16: 348]

[AA 16: 349]

34

[AA 16: 350]

[AA 16: 351]

[AA 16: 352]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

contains absolutely no obscurity and confusion, but the latter contains the like. No human distinct cognition is totally distinct § 133. But it is the more distinct, the closer its distinctness comes to total distinctness § 142. § 145. The confusion of cognition arises (1) from the sources of obscurity, for it consists in the obscurity of marks § 137. 129. (2) From necessary or contingent, praiseworthy or blameworthy lack of reflection; likewise (3) of consideration; (4) from the lack of order in thinking, and (5) from a necessary or contingent, praiseworthy or blameworthy lack of abstraction § 142. § 146. Thus, there is not only a confusion in all our cognition that we absolutely cannot avoid; there is also a confusion that we could avoid, but we may not, because it is found below or outside our horizon § 146. Thus, before we attempt the analysis of a cognition, we must previously investigate to the greatest possible extent whether we can or may carry it out. § 147. The marks of a distinct cognition are clear § 137. Thus, they are either distinct or confused § 137. In the first case, we have a complete cognition (cognitio adaequata), but in the other an incomplete (cognitio inadaequata) cognition, e.g. vice is an acquired aptitude for sinning. An acquired aptitude is a facility for action that we have acquired by practice, and we sin when we undertake evil free actions. This is a complete cognition of vice, but it would [40] be incomplete if I had no distinct cognition of aptitude and sin. Completeness is a manifold distinctness, and thus a perfection of cognition § 137. Incompleteness consists in confusion of the cognition of marks, and thus arises from the sources of confusion in general § 145. The more distinct marks a cognition contains, and the more distinct they are, the more complete the cognition is. And the most complete learned cognition must be as complete as possible § 21. § 148. Completeness arises from the analysis of marks § 147. 142. The more remote the marks are that we reanalyze [wieder zergliedern], the more complete our cognition becomes § 116. 147. A higher degree of completeness is a profound cognition (cognitio profunda, purior). And as we analyze a cognition, we complete this enterprise when we discover marks that we cannot analyze further. But we stop short in analysis when we no longer analyze marks that we could still analyze. Now since it would be a horrible labor if we wanted always to complete the analysis of all our distinct cognition, we must always have a reasonable purpose for our

Of the Clarity of Learned Cognition

35

analysis of a cognition, and as soon as we have reached it, we must stop this work for the time being. In any case, it is impossible that a human being avoid all incompleteness in his cognition § 144. § 149. Distinct cognition is either extensively distinct (cognitio complete distincta) or not extensively distinct (cognitio incomplete distincta) § 132. The former is more perfect than the latter § 132. E.g. if I represent a spirit as a being that can think, I have distinct but not extensive cognition of [41] it. But if I represent it as a thing that has understanding, my distinct cognition of a spirit is at the same time extensive. § 150. If one would make a distinct cognition of a matter extensive, one must (1) seek to discover those marks that are found in no other thing besides it; or (2) one must discover as many marks as, taken together, belong to no other thing. E.g. virtue is an aptitude for free rightful actions. Although each one of these marks is found also in things that are not virtues, nevertheless taken together they are found in no other matter. And thus the totality of these four marks makes the distinct representation of virtue into an extensive, distinct representation. § 151. A distinct cognition is either a determinate (cognitio determinata) or an indeterminate cognition (cognitio indeterminata). The former is extensively distinct, and contains not a single mark more than is necessary for extensiveness. E.g. a spirit is a being that has understanding. This contains either too few marks, and that is the distinct cognition that is not extensive § 149; or it contains more clear marks than are necessary for extensiveness, and that is a much too ample cognition (cognitio nimis prolixa). E.g. a spirit is a thinking being that possesses understanding and free will. Thus, if from an extensive distinct cognition one separates those marks that either are unnecessary for extensiveness or follow from other marks of the same cognition, it becomes determinate. Determination is only a perfection of merely learned cognition § 24. if one would ease the understanding of a matter for human beings’ profound, yet weak, understanding [wenn man dem schwachen tiefsinnigen Verstande des Menschen das Begreifen einer Sache erleichtern will]. [42] § 152. The most complete cognition can gradually become less complete, incomplete, confused, and eventually completely obscure, if clear cognition becomes obscure because of being forgotten § 136. Thus, whoever would avoid this loss of perfections must seek to prevent their

[AA 16: 353]

[AA 16: 354]

[AA 16: 355]

[AA 16: 356]

36

[AA 16: 357]

[AA 16: 358]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

being forgotten. We human beings are never completely secure in the possession of our perfections, and thus we must everywhere be vigilantly on our guard. § 153. Whoever would make learned cognition really perfect with respect to its clarity must proportion the degree of clarity and the degree of the greatness of the objects § 70. Consequently, the more ample and greater the object is, the more, better and greater kinds and degrees of clarity will be required to illuminate the learned cognition of it. In the opposite case, one must conduct oneself in this matter in the opposite way. § 154. Every learned man, if it is possible for him, must choose for his principal science that part of learnedness that is capable of the most manifold and greatest clarity; and each must seek to attain in his principal science the clearest possible cognition § 63. 64. Thus, he must be a bright mind, or love superbly the clearest truths, and constantly think as clearly as possible. A dim mind hardly deserves to be called a learned man.

Six t h S e c t ion

[AA 16: 359]

Of the Certainty of Learned Cognition § 155. Certainty (certitudo subiective spectata) is the consciousness of truth, or the clear cognition of truth § 29. Thus, if one would possess a certain learned cognition, according to the rules of the fourth [43] section it must be true, and according to the rules of the fifth section it must be clear in the appropriate way. § 156. If we do not clearly cognize either that something is true or that it is false, then our cognition of it is uncertain (incertitudo). Uncertainty is thus found only as an imperfection in our cognition. A cognition that is not uncertain to us is either certainly true (certo vera cognitio), if we are conscious of its truth, or certainly false (certo falsa cognitio), if we are conscious of its incorrectness § 155. § 157. All certainty is either a distinct or a confused cognition of truth § 155. 137. The latter is sensible certainty (certitudo sensitiva), and when it is perfect to a higher degree, aesthetic certainty (certitudo aesthetica). The former is rational certainty (certitudo rationalis), and when it is perfect to a higher degree it is called logical or learned certainty (certitudo logica, erudita). No human certain cognition can be merely rational and learned § 144. § 158. Rational certainty is either a complete certainty (certitudo adaequata), when we are in turn rationally certain of the characteristics of truth; or an incomplete certainty (certitudo inadaequata), when we are only sensibly certain of the characteristics of truth § 157. 147. E.g. what thinks is actual, I think, therefore I am actual. Because I have a distinct certainty of the first proposition, I am to that extent completely certain of the last proposition. But because the second proposition is only sensibly certain, the last proposition is to that extent only incompletely certain.

[AA 16: 360]

[AA 16: 361]

[AA 16: 362]

38

[AA 16: 363] [AA 16: 364]

[AA 16: 365]

[AA 16: 366] [AA 16: 367]

[AA 16: 368]

[AA 16: 369]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

§ 159. Certainty is either an extensive (completa certitudo) or not an extensive [44] certainty (incompleta certitudo) § 132. 149. Determinate certainty (certitudo determinata) is an extensive certainty that contains no more characteristics of truth than are indispensable for extensive certainty § 151. § 160. Through extensive certainty the mind is always assured in such a way that it is raised above all rational fear of the contrary; but certainty that is not extensive cannot totally dispel this rational fear § 159. At the same time, a human being often can be freed of all fear of the contrary, and nevertheless not be at all certain. § 161. Determinate certainty, when moreover it is as complete as possible, is mathematical certainty (certitudo mathematica). § 162. We have a total certainty (certitudo totalis) of a matter, if everything we cognize of it is certain; but if not all of this is certain, then the matter is only partially certain (certitudo partialis). § 163. A certain cognition is called (1) convincing (cognitio convincens) insofar as it is extensively certain, and the bringing forth of such a certain cognition is called conviction (convictio); (2) undeniable (cognitio evidens, indubitata) insofar as we clearly cognize that what we are convinced of could not possibly be false; (3) thorough (cognitio solida) insofar as the certainty is complete; or also if it is as great as required and of the required kind. § 164. The more matters we cognize certainly, and the more of each object we cognize certainly; the greater the matters are that we cognize certainly, and the more clearly we cognize the truth: the greater is our certainty § 155. Thus, whoever would really improve learned cognition [45] must make it as certain as possible by bringing forth all the kinds of certainty, and the greatest degree of certainty in each kind, so far namely as the other rules of the perfection of learned cognition allow. § 165. We must not conclude: (1) What is certain to me is also certain to other people, and conversely § 126. (2) What is uncertain to me is uncertain, or perhaps even false, considered in itself § 156. (3) What is uncertain to me is also uncertain to other people, and conversely § 126. (4) What is now certain to me will also always remain certain to me in the future § 126. (5) What is now uncertain to me will also always remain uncertain to me into the future § 126. (6) If not everything in an object is certain, the object has no certainty at all § 162.

Of the Certainty of Learned Cognition

39

§ 166. Because we attain some kinds of certainty, especially logical certainty, only gradually, on the one hand one must not become annoyed when certainty is not attained as quickly as we sometimes wish; on the other hand, if in some case we become certain much too quickly, one must be suspicious of whether one has not somehow overlooked something. In the attainment of certainty, one must hurry slowly [langsam eilen]. § 167. If a cognition does not have the kind or degree of certainty that it could and should have, it is called a shallow cognition (cognitio superficiaria). § 168. We give our assent to a cognition, or we accept it (assentiri, ponere aliquid), when we hold it to be true; we reject it (tollere aliquid) when we hold it to be false; and we withhold our assent (suspendere iudicium) when we do neither of the two. When we accept or reject an uncertain cognition, we do this either because we cognize some characteristics of correctness or incorrect-[46]ness, or we cognize absolutely none of these characteristics. In the latter case, we act rashly (praecipitantia), and the uncertain cognition that we accept or reject out of rashness is a begged cognition, a prejudice, a preconceived opinion (praecaria cognitio, praeiudicium, praeconcepta opinio). Begged cognition is no learned cognition at all § 21. 17, and all prejudices can be avoided in learned cognition, and they are therefore an irresponsible disgrace to it. § 169. Because the correctness and incorrectness of matters does not depend upon our understanding, (1) what we accept through a prejudice can be false, and what we reject through a prejudice can be true. (2) What we accept through a prejudice can in fact be true, and what we reject through a prejudice can actually be false. (3) Within every prejudice there is always something erroneous and false, because we believe we are certain when in fact we are not certain § 168. § 170. A logical prejudice (praeiudicium logicum) is a prejudice whereby the perfection of learned cognition, especially the thoroughness of it, is hindered. For example: (a) the prejudice of excessive confidence (praeiudicium nimiae confidentiae), when one rashly holds something to be logically perfect. (1) The prejudice of excessive authority (praeiudicium autoritatis), when we accept or reject something because a person accepts or rejects it, whom we revere so much that we take him to be worthy of imitation. (2) Logical egotism (egoismus logicus), when someone holds

[AA 16: 370]

[AA 16: 371]

[AA 16: 396] [AA 16: 397]

[AA 16: 398] [AA 16: 399] [AA 16: 400]

[AA 16: 401]

[AA 16: 402]

[AA 16: 412]

[AA 16: 413]

40

[AA 16: 414]

[AA 16: 415]

[AA 16: 416]

[AA 16: 417]

[AA 16: 427]

[AA 16: 428]

[AA 16: 429]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

something to be logically perfect for the reason that he himself is the originator of it. (3) The prejudice of antiquity (praeiudicium antiquitatis), when we hold something to be true because [47] it is an old opinion. (4) The prejudice of novelty (praeiudicium novitatis), when we hold something to be true because it is a new opinion. (5) The prejudice of the accepted doctrinal system (praeiudicium systematis), when one accepts something only because it conforms to our doctrinal system, and one rejects it only because it is contrary to our system. (6) The prejudice of lazy confidence (praeiudicium pigritiae), when one believes that one can come just as far in learned cognition through a small effort as through a greater one. (7) The prejudice of shallowness (praeiudicium corticis), when one believes that one can come just as far with a shallow cognition as with a thorough one. (b) The prejudice of excessive mistrust (praeiudicium nimiae diffidentiae), when one rashly holds something to be logically imperfect. (1) The prejudice of antiquity (praeiudicium antiquitatis), when one rejects something because it is old. (2) The prejudice of novelty (praeiudicium novitatis), when one rejects something because it is new. (3) The prejudice of peoples [Völkerschaft] (nazarethismus), when one rejects something because it springs from a particular people. (4) The prejudice of mistrust, which one places on oneself (praeiudicium nimiae diffidentiae in se ipsum positae), when one has too little confidence in oneself, etc. § 171. If we accept or reject an uncertain cognition on account of a few characteristics of correctness and incorrectness § 168, then we cognize either more and stronger grounds to accept it than to reject it, and then our cognition is probable (cognitio probabilis, verosimilis), or we cognize more and stronger grounds to reject it than to accept it, and thus we have an improbable cognition (cognitio improbabilis); or the grounds are [48] equal on both sides, and then it is a doubtful cognition (cognitio dubia). E.g. it is probable that the planets are inhabited, but it is improbable that the sun is. As long as we can come to no conclusion [Entschlusse], we have a doubtful cognition. § 172. Because human beings are so infinitely different from each other in their cognition, one person can accept or reject a matter by a prejudice that another holds to be totally certainly true, that a third holds to be totally certainly false, a fourth holds to be probable, a fifth holds to be improbable, and a sixth holds to be doubtful. The first always acts wrongly. The next two

Of the Certainty of Learned Cognition

41

cannot possibly both be right or wrong. But the last three can all be right together § 159. 168. 171. § 173. Probability, improbability, and doubtfulness are uncertainties § 171, and therefore not to be found in the objects of our cognition § 156. The most probable things can be false, and the least probable can be true. § 174. One must neither hold prejudices to be true nor hold them to be false § 168, and the same goes for doubtful cognition § 171. One must hold improbable cognition to be false, and probable cognition to be true, yet hold both under a constant fear of the contrary § 171. We must give our assent to extensively certain cognition with the greatest confidence, without fearing the contrary § 159. § 175. The more and greater the grounds we cognize for accepting something, the fewer and smaller the grounds we cognize for rejecting it, the better we cognize the former and the worse we cognize the latter: the greater the probability is, the greater the improbability of the contrary is § 171. A degree of probability, which in our regular conduct is as good as an extensive certainty, is called moral certainty (certitudo moralis). § 176. When we hold something to be true or false, one calls every cognition of a ground to the contrary a doubt (dubium). Doubts are either cognized merely in an obscure and indeterminate way, or in a rational and learned way. The first are called scruples (scrupulus), and the others are called objections (obiectio). § 177. All doubts are either true doubts (dubium verum) or false doubts (dubium falsum) § 176 92. 93, which, when they appear to be true, have a great credibility [Schein]. When one clearly cognizes what is incorrect in a false doubt, the doubt is resolved or answered (dubium resolvitur, seu ad dubium respondetur). All doubts are either answerable or unanswerable, and both either absolutely or relatively (dubium absolute et respective resolubile aut irresolubile). Consequently, (1) doubts can be raised about all truths, and there is nothing false just because doubts are raised about them; (2) doubts can be raised about a truth that are unanswerable for this or that person; (3) absolutely unanswerable doubts can be raised about no truth. Settled truths (veritates indubitatae, extra omnem dubitationis aleam positae) are either such truths as are extensively certain, or about which no other doubts can be raised except ones that are answerable and have already been answered. Truths that are not settled are unsettled truths (veritates non indubitatae).

[AA 16: 430]

[AA 16: 431]

[AA 16: 432]

[AA 16: 444]

[AA 16: 446] [AA 16: 4447]

[AA 16: 450]

[AA 16: 451]

42 [AA 16: 452]

[AA 16: 453]

[AA 16: 454]

[AA 16: 455]

[AA 16: 461]

[AA 16: 462]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

§ 178. To be completely convinced of a truth (1) it is not required that unknown dou-[50]bts about it be answered; nor (2) that scruples be answered, for they deserve no answer at all; (3) nor that all known doubts be answered; there can be some among them, which are unanswerable for a person, and who nonetheless can be totally convinced; (4) it is required that all doubts be answered that make the mind waver; (5) answering doubts is always sufficient to increase certainty and to fortify conviction § 176. § 179. Uncertainty of cognition arises (1) from the limitation of our power of cognition, for which we are either to blame or not to blame; (2) from lack of the proper heedfulness of reflection, diligence, and patience § 129. 145, which can be either necessary or contingent, blameworthy or praiseworthy; (3) from a necessary or contingent, praiseworthy or blameworthy ignorance of such truths, without whose cognition another truth cannot be certain § 43. 50. 51; (4) from an excessively strong heedfulness of doubt § 176. § 180. There is an uncertainty in human cognition (1) which is totally unavoidable, and which brings neither shame nor honor upon us; (2) a certainty which we may not avoid even if we could, because its object is found outside our horizon or beneath it, and this uncertainty brings a person honor; (3) a certainty which a person can and should avoid, because the contrary certainty lies within his horizon § 178. This last always brings shame upon us, and whoever would improve his learned cognition to the greatest possible extent must seek to avoid only all uncertainty of the third kind. [51] § 181. An opinion (opinio) is any uncertain cognition, insofar as we accept it, and at the same time cognize that it is not certain. An opinion is accepted either as a ground from which we explain appearances in the world, or not. The latter is a common opinion (opinio vulgaris). The first is a philosophical or learned opinion (hypothesis philosophica, erudita), e.g. when one assumes the efflux of a magnetic material in order to explain how the magnet attracts iron. § 182. All opinions (1) have in themselves the nature of all uncertain cognition; (2) common opinions, at least in learned cognition, are to be completely despised; (3) what is an opinion for some is not an opinion for all; (4) one must not make too big a deal of learned opinions, for they belong to the imperfect half of learned cognition; (5) one must not totally despise them, because they are the transition from historical cognition to totally certain learned cognition § 181.

Of the Certainty of Learned Cognition

43

§ 183. With learned opinions one must observe the following rules: (1) one must hold no learned opinion to be certainly true, and not display as much zeal for it as for certain truths. (2) One must accept them only in case of necessity, when we can yet have no better learned cognition. (3) One must accept no obviously false opinion, which either is internally impossible, or contradicts another undeniable truth, or contradicts appearances. An appearance does not contradict an opinion just because we cannot derive it from it. (4) One must be prepared to let go the most splendid and most learned opinion as soon as one discovers its incorrectness. (5) One must not accept a learned opinion before [52] one has made it to some extent probable. Thus, among other things, one must be able to explain most appearances by it. (6) One must constantly strive to transform an opinion into a certain cognition. (7) One must have no excessive inclination for opinions, and not make too much of them. (8) One must not hold an opinion to be true just because it is new, grand, miraculous, harmless, edifying, and required much trouble, learnedness, wit, and perspicacity to come up with it. § 184. Certainty and conviction are either true or merely plausible. Error, by which we imagine we are convinced when we are really not convinced, is called persuasion in the bad sense (persuasio malo significatu). Since by means of this the certainty of learned cognition is hindered, one must try one’s best to prevent it. But it arises: (1) from ignorance of the rules of the doctrine of reason; (2) from lack of a certain cognition, for then one does not yet know what it is like to have a true conviction; (3) from prejudices § 169. 170. 171; (4) from a rather too great negligence and hastiness. Now insofar as it lies within the power of a person to clear away these causes of persuasion, to that extent he is also capable of avoiding these mistakes himself. § 185. Now if one prevents persuasion and arrives at a thorough conviction, one attains a science (scientia subiective spectata), that is, a learned cognition, insofar as it is extensively certain. § 186. The greater, more important, and more fruitful the object of our learned cognition is, the more certain our cognition must be § 70, that is, we must seek the most and best kinds of [53] certainty, and to make them thorough to the highest degrees. With smaller objects the situation is exactly the reverse. § 187. Each must not only choose for his principal science that part of learnedness which is capable of the greatest certainty, so far as it is possible

[AA 16: 463]

[AA 16: 464]

[AA 16: 473]

[AA 16: 474]

[AA 16: 475]

[AA 16: 476]

[AA 16: 479]

44 [AA 16: 480]

[AA 16: 481]

[AA 16: 482]

[AA 16: 483]

[AA 16: 484]

[AA 16: 485]

[AA 16: 486]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

for him; but he must also seek to raise his chosen principal science to the greatest possible degree of certainty § 63. 64. § 188. Extensive certainty consists in the consciousness of truth § 155, thus that it is possible and grounded § 94. 96, so that no fear of the contrary remains § 160. Thus, we are then conscious that the contrary is false, impossible and unfounded § 95. 97. Thus, extensive certainty arises from consciousness of the necessity of the truth § 114. § 189. Extensive certainty arises either from our clear cognition that the truth is absolutely necessary, or that it is necessary only in this world § 113. If we cognize the first with mathematical certainty, this constitutes mathematical certainty of the first order (certitudo mathematica primi ordinis). In the other case we have mathematical certainty of the second order (mathematica certitudo secundi ordinis), e.g. with our experiences. § 190. Consciousness of the contingency of truth causes uncertainty, and at most a certainty that is not extensive § 189. 113. Arbitrary truths (hypothesis) are those whose truth depends on the choice of human beings, and their arbitrariness does not hinder the complete certainty of them. § 191. Proof (probatio) is that which is added to a truth so that it becomes [54] certain. The ground of proof [Beweisthum] (probatio materialiter sumta, ratio probans) is the ground from which the truth can be clearly cognized, and those are the characteristics of truth § 94. The consequence of proof (probatio formaliter sumta, consequentia) is the connection of truth with the ground of proof § 15. Every proof consists therefore in the ground of proof and the consequence, and it can cause either an extensive certainty or a certainty that is not extensive § 159. In the first case, it is called a sufficient proof or a demonstration (probatio sufficiens, demonstratio); in the other case, it is an insufficient proof (probatio insufficiens). The latter is extensively treated in the rational doctrine of probable cognition. § 192. Cognition of a truth is either a demonstrable (cognitio demon­ strabilis) or an indemonstrable cognition (cognitio indemonstrabilis). The latter becomes certain for us as soon as we cognize it distinctly, but not the former. The latter is totally certain without proof, but not the former. One must be careful to take neither begged cognition nor demonstrable cognition to be indemonstrable § 168.

Of the Certainty of Learned Cognition

45

§ 193. If we would attain extensive certainty of a truth by proof and from it, or if a proof should be a demonstration § 191, then (1) every ground of proof contained in the proof must be extensively certain. Thus all demonstrable grounds of proof must in turn be demonstrated until one comes to nothing but indemonstrable grounds of proof; (2) the consequence must be extensively certain § 191. Besides these two parts, nothing more is required for a proof, if it should be a demonstration § 15. § 194. If (1) even a single ground of proof in a proof is false or (2) uncertain; (3) if a [55] single consequence in the proof is false or (4) uncertain; or (5) if a number of these mistakes are found in a proof at the same time, it can be no demonstration § 193. § 195. Just as someone can hold an insufficient proof to be a demonstration, one can also hold a demonstration to be an insufficient proof, or perhaps even to be a false proof § 165. Thus, one must not at all reject a demonstration just because it does not have the proper effect on our mind. § 196. Through a demonstration we seek either to become certain that something is true, or that something is false § 191. 156. In the first case, one can demonstrate a truth in a twofold way: (1) in a direct way (demonstratio directa, ostensiva), when we derive a truth from its characteristics; (2) in an indirect way (demonstratio indirecta, apogogica, deductio ad absurdum), when we demonstrate the incorrectness of its contrary, and thereby infer its truth. Similarly, one can demonstrate that something is false, or refute (refutatio) it, (a) in an indirect way (refutatio mediata), when we demonstrate the truth of its contrary; (b) in a direct way (refutatio immediata), when we derive the incorrectness of it from its characteristics. But one can prove that something is false: (α) when we prove that it is impossible and ungrounded, (β) that it is contrary to other undeniable truths, and (γ) that something false follows from it. § 197. A demonstration causes either a distinct or indistinct extensive certainty § 191. 188. The latter are aesthetic demonstrations (demonstratio aesthetica), but the former are logical, philosophical, and learned demonstrations (demonstratio logica, philo-[56]sophica, erudita). A logical demonstration, which causes a mathematical certainty, is a mathematical demonstration (demonstratio mathematica) § 161. § 198. We can always infer: (1) if the entire proof is correct and certain, then the matter proven is also correct and certain; (2) if the matter proven

[AA 16: 487]

[AA 16: 488]

[AA 16: 489]

[AA 16: 491]

[AA 16: 492]

46

[AA 16: 493]

[AA 16: 494]

[AA 16: 495]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

is false and uncertain, then there is a mistake in the proof § 194. However, we cannot infer: (1) if the proof is false, then the matter proven is also false; (2) if the proof is uncertain, then the matter proven is also only uncertain; (3) what we cannot prove is therefore false; (4) if the matter proven is true and certain, then the proof is also true and certain. § 199. The spirit of demonstration (spiritus demonstrationis) consists in the sufficient aptitude of a person for demonstration and the natural drive for such a certain cognition as one attains through demonstration. Without this spirit no one can demonstrate, and without it no one should dare to undertake it. § 200. The excessive love of demonstration is the lust for demonstration (pruritus demonstrandi). This learned sickness manifests itself in the following ways: (1) when one seeks to demonstrate what one cannot and may not demonstrate; (2) when one demonstrates actually in a spurious way so that one gives only the appearance of demonstration to imbeciles; (3) when one stops only with mere demonstration, and does not properly use or apply the demonstrated truths; (4) when one is a pedant in demonstrating, or completely despises what is not demonstrated, whether it is really not demonstrated or we only take it not to be; (5) when one raises demonstration too high, like a charlatan, and boasts too much [57] of it, even when one demonstrates small things of no use. § 201. A sensation (sensatio) is a representation of a present matter, and while we sense something clearly, we experience that thing. Experience (experientia) thus consists in that cognition, which is clear through sensation. Clear sensations are immediate experience (experientia immediata), and the remaining clear cognition, which is derived from immediate experience by a short proof, is called mediate experience (experientia mediata). E.g. that I think is a sensation and immediate experience, but that I have a capacity to think is a mediate experience. § 202. When something is certain to us, it is either certain from experience, or from other grounds, and in the first case either from our own experience, or from the experience of other people. Thus we have a threefold source of all proofs § 191, namely, our own experience, the experience of other people, and other grounds that are not experiences. § 203. If we conduct a proof (1) from our own immediate experience, then we may clearly represent only a single case in which we have sensed

Of the Certainty of Learned Cognition

47

something § 201. (2) In proofs from mediate experience, not only must at least one immediate experience be adduced, but the other grounds of proof including the consequence must also be certain § 201. 193. (3) Even what we are certain of also by immediate experience is no indemonstrable cognition § 192. 201. (4) Experience gives us an extensive certainty in that it contains all characteristics of truth of the object § 201. 94. 96. (5) Experience gives us only an extensive certainty of the second order § 189, and (6) it represents the [58] truth only from external characteristics § 94. § 204. If we prove a truth from other grounds of proof that are not experience, then we conduct a proof from reason (probatio ex ratione). In such a proof (1) there must be no ground of proof that is an experience, and (2) all its grounds of proof must be extensively certain without experience, if it should be a demonstration § 193. § 205. All experience, and what we prove from it, is cognition from behind [von hinten her] (cognitio a posteriore), but the other rational cognition is called cognition from ahead [von vorne her] (cognitio a priore). When we are certain of a truth from our own experience as well as from reason, one calls this the agreement of reason and experience (connubium rationis et experientiae). § 206. From the experience of other people we become certain by means of belief. Whoever asserts an actual thing [eine wirkliche Sache] to be true so that another person should also hold it to be true is called a witness (testis), and his action is called a testimony (testimonium, testari). To believe (credere) is to accept something on the basis of a testimony. Belief (fides, fides historica) is the assent that we give to a matter on the basis of a testimony. The object of belief consists in past, present, and future things, but not in other truths. § 207. The authority of a witness (autoritas testis) consists in the degree of his honor, by means of which in his cognition he is held to be worthy of imitation. We can believe no witness who has no standing with us. And this authority con-[59]sists (1) in the proficiency of the witness (dexteritas testis), when he possesses sufficient powers not only to obtain a correct cognition, but also to designate it in a correct way; (2) in the sincerity of the witness (sinceritas testis), or in the inclination of his will to designate his experiences as he holds them to be true. Neither of the two without the other can give a witness the proper authority.

[AA 16: 496]

[AA 16: 497]

[AA 16: 504]

48 [AA 16: 505]

[AA 16: 506]

[AA 16: 507]

[AA 16: 508]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

§ 208. An eyewitness (testis oculatus) is a witness who himself experienced the matter to which he bears witness. An earwitness (testis auritus) is no eyewitness, but rather he has experienced only others’ testimony of the matter. § 209. The proficiency of an eyewitness requires that: (1) he must have been present at the matter to which he bears witness; (2) he must be able to obtain a correct experience; (3) he must have a good and faithful memory, or he must write down his experiences at once; (4) he must possess the gift of designating his own cognition in a correct and sufficient way. § 210. An earwitness, with respect to the testimony to which he bears witness, is an eyewitness, and accordingly he must possess all the proficiency required for that § 209. But to the extent he is an earwitness, the following parts are required for his proficiency: (1) he must repeat only the testimonies of proficient eyewitnesses, and thus he must always be able to cite a proficient eyewitness, who is his source. A common tale (fama) is a testimony of many earwitnesses of a matter, whose eyewitness is unknown. These earwitnesses live either at the same time, and then their saying is a public rumor (rumor sine capite), or at different times, and then it is an oral tradition (oralis traditio). The common tale [60] lacks the necessary authority; (2) he must possess enough understanding to correctly grasp what he hears or reads; (3) he must possess a faithful memory, in order to communicate the reports to others as he received them. § 211. The sincerity of a witness depends solely on his good will not to lie § 207. That witness who expects from a true testimony only good things for himself, or more good than bad, and who expects from lies only bad things, or more bad than good, he speaks the truth. And in the contrary case he lies. This good or bad can concern his soul or his body, or his external condition, he can hope or fear it of God, of those persons for whom he testifies, or of whom he testifies, etc., he may deceive himself in this matter or not. § 212. The certainty of a testimony rests (1) on the internal characteristics of its truth § 95. 96; (2) on the external characteristics of its truth, namely, on the sufficient authority of the witness, which must be at least very probable § 207, 94. The testimonies of a proficient and sincere witness cannot be false. § 213. What we believe, we do not beg § 212. 168. Unbelief (incredulitas) is the aptitude not to believe a certain or probable testimony. Credulity (credulitas) is the aptitude to believe an improbable testimony. Both mistakes are irrational § 174.

Of the Certainty of Learned Cognition

49

§ 214. A witness is credible (testis fide dignus), when one can in a learned way cognize at least probably that he has sufficient authority; the testimony of such a witness is a credible testimony (testimonium fide dignum). Ration-[61]al or sighted belief (fides oculata, rationalis) is the aptitude to believe only credible witnesses. § 215. There is (1) an agreement of experience and belief (connubium experientiae et fidei), when we cognize something from our own experience as well as from credible testimonies; (2) an agreement of belief and reason (connubium fidei et rationis), when we are certain of a matter from reason as well as through belief; and (3) an agreement of reason, belief, and experience (connubium rationis experientiae et fidei), when we convincingly cognize a truth by all three ways. The agreement of belief with the other sources of cognition is also called mixed belief (fides mixta); but when we accept something solely on the basis of belief, it is called pure belief (fides pura). Because we can demonstrate neither the proficiency nor the sincerity of human witnesses, belief gives only a probability, and at most only a moral certainty § 175.

[AA 16: 509]

[AA 16: 510]

S e ve nt h S e c t ion

[AA 16: 516]

Of Practical Learned Cognition § 216. A cognition is practical (cognitio practica) insofar as it can move us in an appreciable way to perform or to refrain from an action. All more perfect cognition that is not practical is called a speculative cognition (cognitio speculativa, speculatio). All learned cognition is therefore either practical or speculative. § 217. A cognition in which we represent that something should be done or left undone is [62] also called practical insofar as it is opposed to theoretical cognition (cognitio theoretica, theoria), cognition that does not represent that something should be done or left undone. All learned cognition is either practical or theoretical, and both kinds belong either to practical or speculative cognition § 216. § 218. Practical cognition is better than speculative cognition § 216, because a greater agreement of diverse things is found in it § 22. Thus, whoever would improve his learned cognition to the greatest possible extent must avoid speculation and seek only practical cognition. § 219. No true learned cognition is speculative by its nature, but only because of the lack of insight of a learned man who cannot or will not understand its connection with the conduct of human beings. In the latter case, the learned man abuses himself. § 220. It is irrational if one would take to be speculation: (1) all profound, determinate, precise and difficult learned cognition; (2) all learnedness in general; (3) all theory; (4) that learned cognition which in this or that human being is not practical; (5) all cognition that does not have an immediate influence on the moral conduct of a human being. § 221. A cognition is either practical because of its object (cognitio obiective practica) or because of its character (cognitio subiective practica),

[AA 16: 517]

[AA 16: 520]

52

[AA 16: 521]

[AA 16: 522]

[AA 16: 523]

[AA 16: 524]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

or both at once. In the first case it must have an object that can be cognized in such a way as is required for a practical cognition. In the second case, it is so constituted that it can affect the power of desire. [63] § 222. A learned cognition is practical because of its object: (1) when the cognized truths are good and useful. And in this respect all true learned cognition is practical § 39. 221. § 223. A learned cognition is practical because of its object: (2) insofar as it is the foundation of the rational actions whereby human perfection is obtained § 221, and whose lack one notices at once in the actions of a human being. § 224. A learned cognition is practical because of its object: (3) when its object consists in the rules we must observe if we would maintain our total welfare in the best way § 221. § 225. A learned cognition is practical because of its object: (4) when its object has an influence in a remote and mediate way on our entire good conduct § 221, e.g. the cognition of such truths without which the remaining practical truths § 222–24 either could not be cognized at all by us human beings, or at least not in a learned way. § 226. Because no human being is capable of cognizing all practical truths, that learned cognition is called superbly and eminently practical (cognitio obiective et comparative s. eminenter practica), which is practical to a higher degree, e.g. which is appreciably more useful to us than another, and which has an immediate or very near influence on our conduct. § 227. All learned cognition is called comparatively speculative (cognitio comparative speculativa) if it is practical to a very small degree. E.g. (1) if it has a very small and un-[64]appreciable influence on our regular conduct; (2) if it is of very little use; (3) if it hinders us from a more needful and more useful cognition. § 228. Because of different ways of life and principal sciences, a learned cognition can rightly be held to be practical by one person, and to be speculative by another § 226. 227. Of course, because of his slight powers of cognition, and from neglect, someone can fail to see the connection of a learned cognition with our conduct, which he therefore takes to be a speculative cognition. § 229. Insofar as a learned cognition is practical, to that extent it is also useful. One must therefore (1) hold no truth and no learned cognition to

Of Practical Learned Cognition

53

be totally useless § 222. (2) A learned cognition is not useless just because it is of no use to this or that person, and may even be harmful to him. (3) A learned cognition, which is not useful in one respect, can be useful in a different respect. (4) One must not conclude that: what is not now useful to us will not be useful to us also in the future. § 230. The more benefits a learned cognition provides, the greater they are, and the greater and more diverse their influence on our entire conduct, the more practical it is § 216. § 231. For every learned man to improve his learned cognition to the greatest possible extent, he must (1) cognize most perfectly those truths that are practical to the highest degree. The degree of diligence and of perfection of learned cognition must be proportioned to the degree of the practical in its object § 70. (2) Each must, where possible, choose for his principal science that part of learnedness that is practical to the highest degree § 63. [65] § 232. A cognition that is practical by its character is called a lively and stirring cognition (cognitio viva, movens). A lively rational cognition (cognitio rationalis viva) is a rational cognition that is constituted so that rational desires and revulsions are awoken by it; or it contains motives (motiva), that is, such rational representations of the good and the bad, through which desires and revulsions arise. All rational cognition that is not so constituted is called a rational moribund cognition (cognitio rationalis mortua). § 233. That character of cognition by virtue of which it causes desires and revulsions is called the life of cognition (cognitionis vita), which, when it consists in motives § 232, is called the rational life of cognition, or then stirs and moves cognition in a rational way (vita rationalis cognitionis). § 234. A learned cognition can (1) be exceptionally practical with respect to its object, and nevertheless be moribund; (2) it can be false and exceptionally lively; the life of cognition is thus no characteristic of its truth; (3) a learned cognition can be very ample, great, correct, certain, and distinct, and nevertheless be moribund § 232. Life is thus yet another perfection of learned cognition, which is distinct from all other perfections of it. § 235. What is practical in learned cognition becomes really practical only through life. Lively rational cognition is thus more perfect than the moribund, even if they both should be adorned with all other logical perfections to the same degree.

[AA 16: 525]

[AA 16: 526]

[AA 16: 527]

54

[AA 16: 528]

[AA 16: 529]

[AA 16: 530]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

[66] § 236. If rational and learned cognition should rationally stir us, then it must (1) be an intuitive cognition. A cognition is intuitive (cognitio intuitiva) when we represent the object more intensely than its signs; but if we represent the signs more intensely than the object, the cognition is symbolic (cognitio symbolica). All learned cognition is either intuitive or symbolic. If one occupies one’s attention, reflection, and consideration primarily with the object of learned cognition, then it becomes a distinct intuitive cognition. § 237. Pleasure [das Vergnügen] (voluptas) is the intuitive cognition of perfection, and the intuitive cognition of imperfection is displeasure (taedium). A cognition causes us an indifference (indifferentia) when it causes us neither a pleasure nor a displeasure. Thus, if rational and learned cognition should rationally stir us, it must (2) arouse pleasure and displeasure; (a) about itself it must arouse in us only pleasure: because by virtue of all the rules of the doctrine of reason it must be exceptionally perfect, and the feeling of its perfection must drive us to desire it and to attain it. Thus, whoever is indifferent about whether or not he cognizes a thing in a learned way, for him learned cognition is not lively. § 238. Rational and learned cognition, if it should rationally stir us, must (b) arouse either pleasure or displeasure over the object, or both at once, by representing it to us in an intuitive way either as good or as bad, or as both at once. Then learned cognition contains motives § 232 not only to desire learned cognition itself [67] § 237, but also either to desire or to detest its object. § 239. If rational and learned cognition should rationally stir us, then it must (3) represent in a learned way that all the good and all the bad, on account of which it pleases or displeases us, will become actual in our ensuing conditions [in unseren folgenden Zuständen]. § 240. If rational and learned cognition should rationally stir us, then it must (4) represent in a learned way that it is or can be within our power to actualize the good, on account of which the cognition pleases us, and to prevent the bad, on account of which the cognition causes us displeasure. § 241. If learned cognition should be really lively, then it must (1) cause no equilibrium, or at least soon lift it. We are namely in an equilibrium (aequilibrium) when the motives on both sides are equal and opposed to each other; (2) learned cognition must outweigh the sensible life of indistinct cognition, or this must not at all contradict it.

Of Practical Learned Cognition

55

§ 242. If rational and learned cognition is really lively, then it causes a strong and lasting decision, which breaks out through the deed as we really act in accordance with learned cognition. § 243. The genuine life of learned cognition (vita vera cognitionis eruditae) consists in the true use of it (usus verus cognitionis eruditae), when we produce all the true benefits of it, or actually make ourselves more perfect by it. But if we make ourselves less perfect by it, or only apparently more perfect, therein consists its misuse (abusus cognitionis eruditae), and that is the [68] spurious life of learned cognition (vita cognitionis eruditae spuria). A perfect learned cognition must be lively in a genuine way. § 244. The more numerous and greater the motives a learned cognition contains, the better they are cognized, and the more numerous and greater the desires and revulsions aroused by them, the more lively the learned cognition is. § 245. One must not conclude: (1) learned cognition that does not stir me, does not stir others; (2) learned cognition that stirs me also stirs others. § 246. The lack of the life of learned cognition arises from ignorance § 236–240. 41. Now as this ignorance is either necessary or contingent, praiseworthy or blameworthy § 43. 50. 51, so too is the lack of life characterized. It cannot be required that all learned cognition stirs us constantly and to the same degree. § 247. The greater and more practical the objects are, the more intensely their learned cognition must stir us; but the smaller and less practical they are, the less their learned cognition must stir us § 70. All our learned cognition must stir us in some respect § 237. § 248. Each must choose for his principal science that part of learnedness, which by its nature is capable of the most lively learned cognition possible; and each must seek to cognize his principal science in the most lively way § 63. 64.

[AA 16: 531]

[AA 16: 532]

[6 9 ] Eig ht h S e c t ion

[AA 16: 533]

Of Learned Concepts § 249. A concept (conceptus) is a representation of a matter in a thing that possesses the capacity to think. Thus, all our representations are concepts. § 250. As many different kinds of cognition there are, there are just as many different kinds of concepts § 249. Thus, concepts are either learned concepts (conceptus eruditus, logicus), or not § 21. The former is a distinct concept, which is logically perfect to an appreciable degree. An unlearned concept (conceptus ineruditus) is a concept that possesses no appreciable degree of logical perfection. And then it is either a beautiful concept, or not § 19. The former is an aesthetic concept (conceptus pulcher, aestheticus), but the latter is a common [ein gemeiner] concept (conceptus vulgaris). A learned concept is either also beautiful, or not. The latter is a merely learned concept (conceptus mere eruditus). But the former is a concept that is not merely learned (conceptus non mere eruditus). And these are the best concepts § 32. § 251. A learned cognition must conform to the greatest possible extent to the rules of amplitude, greatness, truth, clarity, certainty, and the practical character of learned cognition § 41–248. § 252. The object of learned concepts is not determined by the nature of them. A learned concept is possible of each and every possible thing § 250. § 253. Each person must improve primarily only those concepts according to the doctrine of reason that belong to his principal science § 64, and in each doctrinal system primarily the principal concepts. It is not possible or necessary to improve all of our concepts according to the doctrine of reason, and just as little to improve all of our concepts to the same degree. The greater a concept is, the more one must improve it § 70.

[AA 16: 534]

[AA 16: 535]

[AA 16: 536]

58 [AA 16: 541]

[AA 16: 542]

[AA 16: 543]

[AA 16: 544]

[AA 16: 545]

[AA 16: 549]

[AA 16: 550]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

§ 254. We have only three ways to attain concepts: experience, abstraction, and arbitrary association. § 255. All of our sensations are concepts § 249. 201. A concept of experience [ein Erfahrungsbegriff] (conceptus per experientiam formatus) is a concept that we acquire by experience. E.g. concepts of the alterations of our soul, our body, and other things outside us [ausser uns]. We acquire a concept of experience either through immediate or through mediate experience § 201. § 256. Through immediate experience we can acquire only concepts of actual things, insofar as they are present to us, and indeed these concepts contain only affirmative and variable marks. Mediate concepts of experience can represent also other objects, and represent something different in them § 201. § 257. Because concepts of experience can be learned concepts only insofar as they are distinct § 250, one must carefully analyze them § 142. And this work is often aided (1) by the use of instruments of the senses, e.g. magnifying glasses. (2) By the anatomy of physical things, whereby one knows the parts and the manner of their composition. And thereby one attains the concept of the essence of a physical thing. (3) By attention to that from which a thing arises and how it arises, if one is present at the arising of it, and [71] from that one also attains concepts of the essence. (4) If one seeks to experience the object often in various circumstances: for then one more easily discovers the best marks, whereby the concept of experience becomes extensive. § 258. All concepts of experience are true and certain § 202, and they represent the objects to us as they are constituted, because otherwise we would be inhabitants of another world. But when we take a concept to be a concept of experience when it is not, or take something to be an object of the concept of experience when it is not: then it does appear as if the concept of experience were false, but the mistake lies in another concept. § 259. We make a concept through logical abstraction (conceptus per abstractionem logicam formatus) when we compare corresponding [übereinstimmende] concepts of various things and distinctly represent only the marks they have in common with each other. To that end, (1) one takes some concepts that are different and similar at the same time. E.g. a rational animal and a nonrational [unvernünftiges] animal; (2) one analyzes

Of Learned Concepts

59

each of these § 142; (3) one abstracts the marks that are different in them, or one obscures them; (4) one collects the remaining marks in a concept, e.g. an animal. § 260. All concepts that are made through logical abstraction [Absonderung] are abstracted [abgesonderte] or abstract [abstracte] concepts (conceptus abstractus, notio). Concepts that are not abstracted are called singular concepts (conceptus singularis, idea). E.g. Leibniz. All immediate concepts of experience are singular concepts § 255. 201. Whatever is represented as a mark of the other is contained in it and belongs to it (in altero contineri, ipsi convenire). The abstracted concept is [72] thus contained in all those concepts from which it can be abstracted § 259. The abstracted concept contains those under it from which it was abstracted, and these are contained under it (conceptus alios sub se continet, et conceptus sub alio continentur seu ad eum referuntur). § 261. An abstracted concept is called a higher concept (conceptus superior) insofar as it contains others under itself; but insofar as a concept is contained under another, to that extent it is called a lower concept (conceptus inferior). The lower concept always contains marks that are not contained in the higher concept § 259, and these are called the difference of the lower concepts (differentia conceptus inferioris). An abstracted concept that includes only singular concepts under itself is called a species [eine Art] (species), but one that also contains abstracted concepts under itself is called a genus [eine Gattung] (genus). § 262. The totality of all concepts that are contained under an abstracted concept is its extension [der Umfang] (sphaera notionis). Thus, the more abstract and higher a concept is (i.e., the more often logical abstraction is repeated with it), the greater its extension is. Either more concepts belong to an abstracted concept than those that are contained under another, or fewer, or neither. In the first case, it is a broader concept than the other (conceptus latior), in the second, a narrower concept (conceptus angustior), and in the third case they are convertible concepts, of which neither is broader than the other. Insofar as all concepts that are contained under another belong to an abstracted concept, to that extent it is called a universal concept (conceptus universalis), but insofar as not all of them belong to it, it is called a particular concept (conceptus particularis). An abstracted [73] concept can be called a higher or lower, broader or narrower, universal or

[AA 16: 551]

[AA 16: 559]

[AA 16: 560]

[AA 16: 561]

60

[AA 16: 562]

[AA 16: 563]

[AA 16: 568]

[AA 16: 569]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

particular concept in various respects. Every abstracted concept is universal in a certain respect. Abstract learned cognition is therefore called universal learned cognition (cognitio erudita universalis). § 263. With universal cognition (1) one can infer: whatever belongs to or contradicts the higher concepts also belongs to or contradicts all lower concepts contained under it § 260. (2) One cannot infer: whatever belongs to or contradicts a lower concept also belongs to or contradicts other lower concepts that belong with it to a higher concept § 261. (3) One can infer: whatever belongs to or contradicts each and every lower concept also belongs to or contradicts their higher concept § 259. 261. § 264. Abstract cognition requires (1) the distinctness and completeness of cognition § 143. For the more abstract it is, the less it contains within itself § 259, and thus the more easily it can be thought through without much confusion; (2) the amplitude of cognition § 263. 25. (3 ) The thoroughness of cognition § 263. 163. (4) The benefit and the use of learned cognition § 39. § 265. An abstracted concept contains nothing that is not contained in the lower concepts § 259; thus, if these are true, the higher concept cannot possibly be false. If one would then prove an abstracted concept, one may only show that it has been abstracted from true concepts. When one abstracts from a false concept the marks that contradict the others, then one obtains a true concept § 95. § 266. A concept is made by learned arbitrary combination (combinatio conceptu-[74]um arbitraria, logica, erudita, philosophica, rationalis) when one represents two concepts, of which one cognizes in a learned way that they are not contrary to each other, as a single concept. To that end, one takes (1) an abstracted concept, one may either have already abstracted it, or abstract it first now; (2) a difference of a lower concept of which we are either already convinced, or are convinced only afterward, that it does not contradict the abstracted concept. This difference is either left out by abstraction from the abstract concept, or not. In the first case, we obtain a lower concept, from which we have abstracted the abstract concept; but in the other case we obtain a new lower concept; (3) one represents the abstract concept together with this difference as a single concept. § 267. A learned concept that has been made by arbitrary combination must be proved or refuted. Both occur (1) from experience, when one shows that their objects either are actual or are not actual; (2) from reason,

Of Learned Concepts

61

either directly or indirectly § 196. E.g. when one shows either that and how its objects can be actual, or that they cannot be actual. § 268. A definition, or a logical definition (definitio, definitio logica) is a determinate concept of a matter. The object of the definition is the matter defined, or the concept defined (definitum) § 151. § 269. A description (descriptio) is an indeterminate concept, and it is either an extensive or not an extensive description § 151 (descriptio completa, vel incompleta). No description is a definition, and must not even be taken for one [75] § 268. At the same time, they can be very perfect, useful, and necessary learned concepts. § 270. Definitions must conform to six rules: (1) A definition must conform to the rules of the amplitude of learned cognition § 41–65. Consequently , it must be an extensive concept § 268. 151. 55. Consequently, (a) it must not contain fewer marks than are required for an extensive concept; also not (b) more than are necessary § 269. Thus, the definition must be the most brief of all possible extensive concepts of a matter, that is: contain as few marks as extensiveness allows. (c) It must not be broader than the matter explained § 262; consequently its marks, taken together, must belong to no other thing than the matter defined and to it alone. (d) It must not be narrower than the matter defined § 262. Consequently, the concept defined and the definition are convertible concepts § 262. § 271. If one defines the higher concepts in a doctrinal system before the lower, then, if one should define a concept that is not the highest, one can put together the definition of it from the next higher concept and from the difference § 261. Thereby, the definitions become brief and extensive, the definitions cohere more systematically, they are more in conformity with the nature of the lower concepts, and they forge an easier path to the demonstrations. § 272. Because the concept defined and the definition are convertible concepts § 270, one can infer: (1) whoever possesses the concept defined also possesses the definition; (2) whoever possesses the definition also possesses the concept defined; (3) whoever does not possess the concept defined also does not possess the definition; [76] (4) whoever does not possess the definition also does not possess the concept defined § 262. § 273. (2) A definition must conform to the rules of the greatness of learned cognition § 66–91. It must therefore consist of the greatest, most

[AA 16: 572]

[AA 16: 573]

[AA 16: 589]

[AA 16: 590]

[AA 16: 591]

[AA 16: 592]

62

[AA 16: 593]

[AA 16: 594]

[AA 16: 595]

[AA 16: 596]

[AA 16: 597]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

important, and most fruitful marks, of the essence, essential parts, and attributes, and, as often as possible, of affirmative marks § 115–21. It is thus a mistake (a) if a definition consists of accidental qualities: then it would not even be an extensive concept § 121. (b) If it consists of relations: then it would also be no extensive concept § 121. (c) If it consists needlessly of negative marks. If one should explain opposing concepts in a doctrinal system, then the opposition must be evident from the definitions, and thus one of the two must be defined negatively. § 274. (3) A definition must conform to the rules of the truth of learned cognition § 92–114. The truth of definitions requires still further that they must conform to all rules that one must observe with the definitions. A regular definition (definitio legitima) conforms to all rules of definitions, but one that is contrary to one or more of these rules is an irregular definition (definitio illegitima). § 275. (4) A definition must conform to all rules of the distinctness of learned cognition § 115–55. However, it can be an incomplete concept § 147. Now since all its marks must be clear § 137, one can assume they are clear either partly from common life, partly from other doctrinal systems; or one must first explain them before one puts them as marks in the definition § 268. [77] § 276. If a definition is absolutely obscure, or has absolutely obscure marks, then it is no definition at all § 275. 125. But if it is only relatively obscure, or it contains marks that are only relatively obscure, then it can indeed be a good definition, but not for those to whom it is obscure § 125. § 277. The concept defined is not clearer than itself. Thus, in order that the definition does not become obscure and indistinct § 275, one must be careful that the concept defined is put neither as an immediate nor as a mediate mark in its own definition § 116. If the latter occurs, one calls this mistake the circle in definition (circulus in definiendo). § 278. (5) A definition must conform to the rules of the certainty of learned cognition § 155–215. Consequently, one must prove in every definition (a) that it either is a correct concept of experience § 258, or a correct abstracted concept § 265, or a correct arbitrary concept §. 267, (b) that it is regular § 274. § 279. (6) A definition must conform to the rules of practical learned cognition § 216–48. Consequently, one must choose the most important and the most fruitful marks for a definition, from which the most beneficial

Of Learned Concepts

63

and the most useful things can be most easily shown, that which we must examine in the matter defined in order to cognize it in a practical way. § 280. A definition presents either the essence of the matter defined, or not § 273. The former is a real definition (definitio realis, genetica), but the latter is a nominal definition (definitio nominalis). A nominal definition contains either the essential parts of [78] the matter defined, or its attributes § 273. The former is an essential nominal definition (definitio essentialis), but the latter is a contingent nominal definition (definitio accidentalis). § 281. If one would make a real definition, then (1) one seeks to cognize the essence of the matter explained, either by mediate experience, e.g. § 257, or by abstraction, or by a proof from reason, or by arbitrary combination; (2) one makes a determinate concept of the essence § 280. § 282. If one would make a nominal definition, then one seeks to cognize (1) the essential parts or attributes of the matter to be defined, either from mediate experience § 256, or by a proof from reason, or from the essence if it is already known to us. (2) One picks out those essential parts and attributes, and as many of them as are necessary, for a perfect, regular definition § 270–79. § 283. Because the matters to be defined can have many essential parts and attributes, one can choose as one pleases those parts and attributes that make up a nominal definition § 282, as long as one otherwise observes the rules of definitions. And to that extent nominal definitions are arbitrary. § 284. Just as we cannot define all concepts § 139. 150. 268, we also may not define all concepts, but rather only those which belong within the horizon of our learned cognition, and without whose definition our learned cognition could not achieve the required degree of its perfection. Immoderate defining is called the lust for defining (pruritus definiendi). § 285. The logical division of concepts (divisio logica) consists in a distinct presentation of all lower concepts that are opposed to each other and that are contained under one and the same higher concept. This higher concept is called the divided concept (divisum), and the lower concepts are called the members of the division (membra dividentia). Thus, if one would make a logical division, (1) then one takes an abstracted concept; (2) one discovers all the differences of its lower concepts that are opposed to each other; (3) through an opposition one gradually connects these differences with the higher concept. E.g. all concepts are either obscure or clear concepts.

[AA 16: 598]

[AA 16: 601]

[AA 16: 602]

[AA 16: 603]

[AA 16: 604]

[AA 16: 605]

[AA 16: 612]

[AA 16: 613]

64

[AA 16: 614]

[AA 16: 615]

[AA 16: 616]

[AA 16: 617]

[AA 16: 618]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

§ 286. A division of a member of the division is called a subdivision (subdivisio), and various divisions of a concept, which are made in various respects, are called codivisions (codivisiones). It is clear on its face what the divided concept of the subdivision (subdivisum), and of the codivisions (codivisum), is. Likewise are the members of the subdivision (membra subdividentia), and of the codivisions (membra codividentia). § 287. If a logical division is to be correct, then (1) the divided concept must not be broader than the members of the division when they are taken together through an opposition (disiunctive); or there must be no member of the division left out, because otherwise not all lower concepts that are opposed to each other would be presented § 285. 262. (2) The divided concept must not be narrower than the members of the division when they are taken together through an opposition § 262. Otherwise one would introduce a concept among the [80] members of the division that is not a lower concept of the divided concept § 285. Thus, the divided concept and the members of the division, when they are taken together through an opposition, are convertible concepts § 262, and the division must exhaust the divided concept. § 288. (3) The members of the division must be opposed in such a way that no member belongs to another § 285. 260. (4) The divided concept must contradict no member of the division: for it is contained in it § 285. 260. (5) The members of the subdivision must not be put among the members of the division: otherwise not all members would be opposed to each other n. 3. 4. § 286. (6) The number of members of the division must be determined solely by the nature of the divided concept and by the respect in which it is divided. § 289. If a divided concept belongs to someone, one member of the division also belongs to him; if one member of the division belongs to someone, the divided concept also belongs to him; if the divided concept does not belong to someone, none of the members of the division belong to him; if none of the members of the division belong to someone, the divided concept also does not belong to him § 287. § 290. Logical divisions (1) promote the invention of learned concepts through arbitrary combination § 285. 266. (2) They help us to put our abstracted concepts in a proper order and combination, and to retain them

Of Learned Concepts

65

the more easily; (3) they convince us of the universality of our abstract cognition. § 291. With divisions one must beware that one does not heap them up too much, or their subdivisions, because otherwise a great confusion arises; and one must avoid all affectation with them.

[AA 16: 619]

[8 1 ] Nint h S e c t ion

[AA 16: 624]

Of Learned Judgments § 292. Concepts that belong to each other § 260 agree with each other; but concepts that do not belong to each other are contrary to each other, or conflict with each other (repugnare). The agreement or conflict of several concepts is the logical relation of concepts (logica conceptuum relatio). A judgment (iudicium) is a representation of a logical relation of several concepts; and insofar as everything unnecessary for the learned cognition of its truth is abstracted from it, it is called a logical judgment (iudicium logicum), which is a learned judgment (iudicium eruditum) when, so far as possible, it conforms to all rules of learned cognition. § 293. That concept, of which we represent in a judgment that another does or does not belong to it, is the subject (subiectum); the other, on the contrary, of which we represent that the subject does or does not belong to it, is the predicate (praedicatum). The representation of the agreement of several concepts is the concept of combination [Verbindungsbegriff] (copula). Negation (negatio) is the representation of the absence of a matter, and the representation of the absence of the concept of combination is the negation of the concept of combination (negatio copulae). It is thus the representation of the conflict of the predicate with the subject § 292. § 294. In a logical judgment we represent either that the predicate belongs to the subject, or that it does not belong to it § 292. 293. The former is an affirmative judgment (iudicium affirmans, affirmativum), the latter [82] a negative judgment (iudicium negans, negativum). E.g. the soul can think, matter cannot think. The negation in a negative judgment is of the concept of combination § 293. And if there is a negation in a judgment, either in the subject or predicate, or in both at once, if only the concept of combination is not negated, then it is an affirmative judgment, which is

[AA 16: 625]

[AA 16: 626]

[AA 16: 635]

[AA 16: 636]

68

[AA 16: 637]

[AA 16: 642]

[AA 16: 643]

[AA 16: 644]

[AA 16: 645]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

called an infinite judgment (iudicium infinitum). Thus, one can transform all negative judgments into affirmative ones, if one moves the negation from the concept of combination to the predicate. E.g. the soul is not mortal, the soul is immortal. The quality of judgments (qualitas iudicii) consists in their affirmation and negation. § 295. An affirmative judgment is true when the predicate belongs to the subject, and indeed in just the way that the former is affirmed of the latter; however, it is false when the predicate does not belong to the subject, or at least does not belong to it in the way that it is affirmed of it. A negative judgment is true when the predicate does not belong to the subject, and indeed just as it is negated of it; however, it is false when the predicate belongs to the subject, or at least is not contrary in the way it is negated of it § 294. 99. If a true judgment is held to be false, and a false judgment is held to be true, then it is an erroneous judgment § 109. § 296. The truth and incorrectness of a judgment lies in the concept of combination and in the negation of it § 295. 293. Consequently, (1) the subject and predicate of a false judgment can be true; (2) the subject and predicate of a true affirmative judgment can be false; (3) the subject can be true and the predicate false, or the reverse in a true negative judgment. [83] § 297. All true judgments have a ground and a sufficient ground of their truth § 16. This ground is called the condition of the judgments (hypothesis, conditio iudicii). Consequently, the truth and incorrectness of judgments can be cognized from it. It is thus the characteristic and the ground of proof of the truth § 94. 191. § 298. The conditions of judgments are (1) either sufficient or insufficient conditions § 297. 119. 191; (2) either internal or external conditions § 297. 94; (3) either absolutely necessary or contingent conditions. The former are the essence, the essential parts, the attributes, or the definition of the subject, and the latter are its contingent qualities and relations § 297. 121. 273. If the contingent condition of a judgment is combined with the subject of the judgment, then the condition is called the determination or limitation of the judgment (determinatio et limitatio iudicii). § 299. If the condition of a judgment (1) is an internal, absolutely necessary and sufficient condition, then it is inseparable from the subject. Thus, one may think of it or not, it is nevertheless there, and consequently also the predicate belongs to the subject or not, according to which it either affirms

Of Learned Judgments

69

or negates. Truth, then, does not require that one combine this condition with the judgment § 295. However, if it is (2) a contingent condition, then sometimes it is present, sometimes not, and the judgment would be sometimes true, sometimes not true. Thus, truth requires that one combine these conditions with the judgment. A determinate judgment (iudicium determinatum, limitatum) is a judgment that has a determination; a judgment that is not determined is an indeterminate judgment (iudicium indeterminatum, illimitatum). [84] § 300. The analysis of a judgment (analysis, resolutio iudicii) consists in one’s inspecting, bit by bit, all parts of the judgment. All judgments can be analyzed § 139, and by this work one finds not only the proof of the judgments § 297; rather, one also comes to truly comprehend them and present them to others. § 301. The subject of a judgment is either a singular or an abstract concept § 293. 260. The former is a singular judgment (iudicium singulare), the latter a common judgment (iudicium commune). The judgment affirms or negates the predicate either of everything contained under the subject, or of some things contained under it. The former is a universal judgment (iudicium universale), the latter a particular judgment (iudicium particulare). The latter is either at the same time universally true, a judgment that is not merely particular (iudicium non tantum particulare), or not, a merely particular judgment (iudicium tantum particulare). All these judgments either affirm or negate § 294. The universal affirmative judgments are called A; the universal negative judgments are called E; the particular affirmative are called I; and the particular negative are called O. The predicate of all universal judgments is a universal concept with respect to the subject, because the negative judgments can be transformed into affirmative judgments § 294. 262. And because in singular as well as in universal judgments the predicate is judged to belong to the whole subject or not, one can count the singular judgments among the universal. Insofar as a judgment is either singular or common, one attributes to it a quantity (quantitas iudicii). § 302. A universal affirmative judgment is true if the predicate belongs to everything contained under the subject § 301. 295. Thus, it is false if the predicate belongs to not a single thing contained under the subject, [85] or to some, or if it does not belong even to just a single one of them. A

[AA 16: 646]

[AA 16: 647]

[AA 16: 648]

70

[AA 16: 649]

[AA 16: 651]

[AA 16: 652]

[AA 16: 653]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

universal negative judgment is true if the predicate is contrary to everything contained under the subject § 301. 295. Thus, it is false if the predicate belongs to all things contained under the subject, or to some of them, or even to just a single one of them. § 303. If the sufficient condition of a common judgment (1) is absolutely necessarily in the subject, then it is inseparable from it, and is present wherever the subject is, consequently in everything contained under it § 263. Thus, the judgment is then universally true, for wherever the condition is, there also is the predicate § 299. If then a predicate is affirmed or negated of an abstract concept on account of its essence, or essential parts, or attribute, or definition, then the judgment is universally true § 298. 299. (2) If this condition is a determination, then it is absolutely necessary as soon as it is combined with the subject, because thereby all things are excluded from it to which this determination does not belong § 299. And thus the determinate judgment is universally true. § 304. A judgment has either only one subject and one predicate, or several. The former is a simple judgment (iudicium simplex), but the latter is a composite judgment (iudicium compositum). If the subject and predicate are compounded from several concepts, then either some of them are thought with respect to the others, or none are thought with respect to the others. In the first case, the concepts with respect to which the others are thought are the principal subjects and principal predicates (subiectum et praedicatum principale), and the others are the auxiliary subjects and auxiliary predicates (subiectum et praedicatum minus principale). In the second case, the com-[86]posite judgment is a judgment of combination [ein Verbindungsurteil] (iudicium copulativum). § 305. A judgment that affirms that a judgment follows from the condition without asserting that the former or the latter are true or false is a conditional judgment (iudicium hypotheticum, conditionale). The condition of conditional judgments is called the first or antecedent condition (prius, antecedens), but the judgment that follows from it is called the last or consequent (posterius, consequens). Thus, not all judgments that have a condition are conditioned § 297. § 306. For the truth of conditional judgments it is not required that the first and last be true; rather, it is required that it has a correct consequence, or that the first is the sufficient ground of the truth of the last. In the opposite case, the conditional judgment is false § 305. 295.

Of Learned Judgments

71

§ 307. A disjunctive judgment (iudicium disiunctivum) is a judgment that affirms that among several judgments one is true and the others are false, but in such a way that it is not determined which is true and which is false. The several judgments from which it is compounded are called the members of the disjunction, or of the opposition (membra disiunctionis, disiunctiva), e.g. the soul is either simple or composite. § 308. If a disjunctive judgment should be true, then the members of the disjunction must relate to each other in just the way one represents them in the judgment § 295. Consequently, (1) there must be no more than one true member. Thus, if all members or even only two are true at the same time, then the judgment is false; (2) one member must be necessarily true; thus if all members are false, or one is only accidentally true, then the judgment is false; (3) no member must be left out, [87] for even if the member that is left out were false, it would nevertheless not be clear from the disjunction that of the given members one is necessarily true § 307. § 309. The representation of the manner in which the predicate belongs to the subject or not is the determination of the concept of combination and the negation of it (modus formalis). A judgment either has such a determination or not. The former is an impure judgment (iudicium modale, modificatum, complexum qua copulam), but the latter is a pure judgment (iudicium purum), e.g. this world exists necessarily, it does not exist necessarily. With the truth of impure judgments one must pay special attention to the determination of the concept of combination and the negation of it. § 310. A judgment that is put together from an affirmative and a negative judgment in a very covert way is called an exponible judgment (iudicium exponibile). If it should be true, then both judgments must be correct, and one must therefore analyze it to assure oneself of that. E.g. God alone is absolutely immortal. § 311. Judgments that at the same time represent the state of mind with respect to a certain judgment are judgments that are not logical (iudicia non logica). For example: O, how greatly the sinner deceives himself! Such judgments are very practical, and in order that learned cognition does not become merely learned, one must take care that not all learned judgments are simple or merely logical.

[AA 16: 654]

[AA 16: 662]

[AA 16: 663]

[AA 16: 664]

72 [AA 16: 665]

[AA 16: 666]

[AA 16: 667]

[AA 16: 668]

[AA 16: 669]

[AA 16: 670]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

§ 312. All learned judgments are either theoretical judgments [Erwägungsurtheile] (iudicia theoretica) or practical judgments [Übungsurtheile] (iudicia practica) § 217. The latter judge that something should be done or omitted, e.g. we must observe the laws; but the former do not, e.g. virtue makes us happy. [88] § 313. All learned judgments are either demonstrable (iudicia demonstrativa) or indemonstrable judgments (iudicia indemonstrabilia). The truth of the latter is evident from themselves as soon as we cognize them distinctly; but the former cannot be certain without proof § 192. § 314. The predicate of an affirmative judgment is either identical with the subject or it is distinct from it. The former is an empty judgment (iudicium identicum), which is either totally empty (iudicium ex toto identicum) or partially empty (iudicium ex parte identicum). The predicate of the first is not at all distinct from the subject, but the predicate of the last is only a part of the subject. Because no concept is contrary to itself, we cognize the truth of all empty judgments as soon as we understand them § 295; thus they are indemonstrable § 313. If a judgment is not empty, then one must fear that there could be such a great disparity between the subject and the predicate that they do not belong to each other. Consequently, they are not indemonstrable, and thus there are no indemonstrable judgments besides the empty ones § 313. § 315. Indemonstrable judgments are either theoretical judgments or practical judgments. The former are axioms (axioma), but the latter are postulates (postulatum). One must hold no demonstrable judgment to be an indemonstrable one § 313. § 316. Whenever we affirm a concept of itself, or a part of the concept itself, we have an axiom § 315. 314. One can thus find axioms in the definitions if one affirms of the defined concept: (1) the entire definition, and to that extent the logical definitions are indemonstrable; (2) some marks of the definition; (3) the individual marks of the definition § 268. [89] § 317. Whenever I think of a matter that can be regarded as an effect, and I affirm of that which would produce it, that it must produce it or a part of it, then I have a postulate § 315. 314. Thus, if the defined concept can be regarded as an effect, and I affirm of that which would produce it, that it must produce (1) the entire definition, (2) or some marks, or (3) individual marks, then I find postulates in the definitions § 268.

Of Learned Judgments

73

§ 318. In a demonstration from reason, all grounds of proof must be completely certain § 193. 204; thus, they are either demonstrable or not § 313. In the first case, they must be proved again. Consequently, a proof does not become a demonstration until I arrive at nothing but indemonstrable grounds of proof. Empty judgments, axioms, and postulates are thus the first beginnings of all demonstrations from reason § 314. 315. When the proof has been conducted up to such judgments, the understanding rests completely. § 319. Demonstrable judgments are certain either solely through experience, or not. The former are intuitive judgments (iudicium intuitivum), but the latter are discursive judgments (iudicium discursivum). The intuitive judgment consists exclusively of concepts of experience, and is an immediate experience § 201, and a singular judgment § 301. No intuitive judgment is indemonstrable § 313. 314, for I must always remember a single case, and from that cognize how and whether I have reached such a judgment without deception § 202. All intuitive judgments are the first beginnings of all demonstrations from experience § 202. § 320. If one would find an intuitive judgment, then one takes (1) the matter one senses [90] as the subject; (2) one analyzes the sensation, according to § 142. 257; (3) one affirms the discovered marks of the subject § 319. § 321. The predicates of intuitive judgments can be contingent qualities, alterations, relations, effects, causes, actions and passions; but never the essence, the essential parts, the attributes, or negative marks § 256. No negative judgment is an intuitive judgment, though it can be derived from an intuitive judgment, since the marks that are opposed to those we can sense in the subject can truthfully be negated of it § 295. § 322. Universal judgments are derived from intuitive judgments: (1) when one makes an intuitive judgment about all things of a kind, according to § 320, and then concludes that the predicate can be affirmed of the entire kind § 263. (2) If one would derive a universal judgment from a single intuitive judgment, then (a) one seeks the higher concept under which the subject belongs, according to § 259. (b) One seeks the condition of the intuitive judgment. (c) One examines whether it is in the higher concept absolutely necessarily, or contingently. In the latter case, one combines it with the subject, and then in both cases one can affirm the predicate of the higher concept universally § 299.

[AA 16: 674]

[AA 16: 675]

[AA 16: 676]

[AA 16: 677]

74 [AA 16: 678]

[AA 16: 679]

[AA 16: 680]

[AA 16: 681]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

§ 323. Discursive judgments are demonstrated either from experience or from reason § 319. The former are mediate experiences § 203. 204. A judgment of experience is any judgment that is certain through experience, whether it is an intuitive judgment § 319 or a discursive judgment. § 324. Discursive judgments require either a shorter or a longer proof § 319. The former are called corollaries (consectarium, corollarium), and they can be [91] either theoretical or practical judgments § 312. They are usually offered without proof, and are easily found if one compares a few definitions, indemonstrable judgments, and other truths with each other. § 325. Discursive judgments that require a longer proof (either from experience or from reason) are either theoretical judgments or practical judgments § 312. The former are called theorems (theorema), but the latter are called problems [Aufgaben] (problema). § 326. If one would formulate a theorem, then one must (1) formulate the judgment, or it can be known already; (2) one must devise a longer proof, consequently (a) one must seek out all grounds of proof, these may be already known to us, or one may learn them from others, or come up with them for the first time; (b) one must place them in a clear context, and (c) one must understand the art of putting together a proof from many grounds of proof without causing confusion § 325. § 327. Whoever would practice formulating theorems must begin with the easier ones, and with those that can be tested by experience, so that he can recognize his missteps more easily. § 328. For the sake of distinctness, a problem is analyzed into three parts: (1) The question (quaestio problematis) is the representation of the action that should be done or omitted. Whenever we represent a matter that can be regarded as an effect, one can raise a question. (2) The solution (solutio problematis) analyzes the manner in which the question arises. Thus, it must present either all actions of which the question consists, or all causes, or both at once, and if one would find them, one must logically define the object of the question. (3) The [92] proof of the problem (demonstratio problematis), which demonstrates that the question becomes actual by observing the solution. Thus, it presupposes the solution as a condition, and the entire solution can be viewed as a conditional theorem § 305. The test of the problem (proba, examen problematis) is that whereby one becomes convinced that one has observed the solution.

Of Learned Judgments

75

§ 329. If one can discover no impossibility in the question, then one can attempt the solution, and one can devise this either through experience, or from reason and through abstraction, or in an arbitrary way. If one would find it through experience, then one must (1) try to be present when the matter emerges, and make a distinct concept of its manner of emergence through experience § 257. (2) One must carefully observe all causes and everything that happens in the emergence as long as it is perceptible to our senses. (3) One must try to guess the other causes and the other parts of the emergence that are not perceptible to our senses by means of the parts of learnedness in whose extension the object belongs. (4) One compares the effect, whose manner of emergence we cannot experience, with another that we can solve through experience, and infer: that the former arises in a similar way and through similar causes. § 330. If one just arbitrarily accepts an effect, (1) then one must be well versed in those parts of learnedness to which it belongs, make a distinct concept of it, and recall all the powers and causes familiar to us, to see whether we might find something that belongs in the solution of the question. (2) If one arbitrarily combines many actions and causes with each other, and pays attention to what comes [93] out of it, then one also finds some solutions to some problems. § 331. Within a doctrinal system, one comes unawares upon many solutions by following demonstrations from reason; and if one has already found solutions to the lower questions, one may simply exclude their differences to obtain the solution to the higher question, which may speak of an abstract action or of a different abstract effect. § 332. For the sake of the distinctness of the problem, one must find, from the distinct concepts of the effect and the causes contained in the solution, what every cause contributes to the effect. § 333. To keep the problems in a doctrinal system brief, (1) in the preceding problems one must resolve the actions and effects from which the actions and effects of the following problems are put together; (2) in the preceding problems one must resolve those actions and effects under which the questions of the following problems are contained. § 334. A problem is (1) true (veritas problematis) if it contains nothing impossible within itself, consequently, if the solution is not contrary to the question; (2) complete (completum problema) if, through the observation of the solution, what the question is about occurs; (3) exact (problema

[AA 16: 682]

[AA 16: 683]

[AA 16: 684]

[AA 16: 685]

[AA 16: 686]

76

[AA 16: 687]

[AA 16: 688]

[AA 16: 689]

[AA 16: 690]

[AA 16: 691]

[AA 16: 692]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

accuratum, adaequatum) if it contains within itself neither too little nor too much. And those are three perfections of problems. § 335. A problem is false (1) if the solution is absolutely impossible; (2) if the solution is impossible in a certain respect, e.g. if it is not possible through the powers of human beings, or in certain circumstances ; (3) if the solution can indeed be [94] actual, but contributes nothing to the question; (4) if it actually contradicts the question § 334. § 336. A problem is incomplete (1) if the purpose is not achieved through the most exact observation of the solution; (2) if one does not know how the solution can be realized; (3) if the solution cannot be implemented in all cases where it is needed § 334. § 337. A problem is not exact if it is indeed true and complete, but leads through detours, and contains too much within itself § 334. § 338. Occult qualities [Eigenschaften] (qualitates occultae) are qualities [Beschaffenheiten] of which we have no clear and distinct cognition, and which we accept without sufficient ground. Now since they contradict the nature of learned cognition § 21. 168, whoever accepts them is either stupid or a fraud. Consequently, one must avoid them especially, if one examines the grounds of things, their nature, and alterations, consequently also in the solution of problems. § 339. A lemma (lemma) is a demonstrable judgment that is accepted without proof in a doctrinal system, because it and its proof belong to another doctrinal system. § 340. Notes (scholia) are judgments in a doctrinal system that are neither grounds of proof nor proven, but which, because of several beneficial uses, were mixed among the others. § 341. Equivalent judgments (iudicia aequipollentia) are different judgments in which the logical relation of one and the same subject and predicate is the same. E.g. not all human beings are virtuous, some human beings are not virtuous; it is not the case that no human being is learned, some human beings are learned; everything has a ground, nothing is without ground. Now since the [95] truth and incorrectness of a judgment is found in the logical relation § 295. 296, (1) all other equivalent judgments are true if one is true; and (2) all others are false if one is false. The equivalence of the judgments depends on modifications of the judgment that do not alter the truth or incorrectness of it; otherwise they are not equivalent judgments.

Of Learned Judgments

77

§ 342. Judgments that have the same subject, predicate, and quality, and among which only one is universal, contain each other within themselves (iudicia subalternata). The universal judgment contains the others within itself (iudicium subalternans), and the rest are contained in it (iudicium subalternatum). E.g. all human beings can err, some human beings can err, one human being can err; no human being is without sin, some human beings are not without sin, one human being is not without sin. (1) If the universal judgment is true, then those contained in it are also true, but not conversely; (2) if the judgments that are contained in the universal judgment are false, then the universal judgment is also false, but not conversely § 302. § 343. Judgments contradict each other (iudicia contradictoria) when one negates exactly what the other affirms. E.g. the judgments A and O contradict each other, likewise E and I, if they have one and the same subject and predicate § 301. 341. Now since every concept either belongs or does not belong to any other concept: for it is absolutely unthinkable that both could be at once, or neither of the two; so among all contradictory judgments either the affirmative judgment is true and the negative is false, or the negative is true and the affirmative is false § 295. Consequently, one can infer (1) from the truth of one contradictory judgment the incorrectness of [96] the other; and (2) from the incorrectness of one, the truth of the other. § 344. If a judgment affirms in particular what the other negates in particular, then they are opposed to each other in a particular way (iudicia subontraria). Consequently, the judgments I and O, if they have the same subjects and predicates. (1) These judgments can be true at the same time. For since their predicate can be a particular concept with respect to the subject § 262, it may truthfully be affirmed and negated of it in particular § 295. (2) These judgments can never both be false at the same time. For if I and O are false, then A and E are also false § 342. Consequently, A and O, E and I, which have the same predicates and subjects, could be false at the same time, which is impossible § 343. § 345. If a judgment affirms universally what the other negates universally, consequently if A and E have the same subject and predicate, then they are opposed to each other in a universal way (iudicia contraria). (1) These judgments can both be false. For their predicate can be a particular concept with respect to the subject § 262. Consequently, it can be neither affirmed universally nor negated universally of it § 302. (2) These judgments cannot

[AA 16: 693]

[AA 16: 694]

[AA 16: 695]

[AA 16: 696]

[AA 16: 697]

78

[AA 16: 698]

[AA 16: 699]

[AA 16: 700]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

both be true. For if A and E were true, then also I and O would be true § 342. Consequently, A and O could be true at the same time, likewise E and I, though they would have the identical subject and predicate, and that is impossible § 343. § 346. That alteration by which the predicate is made out of the subject of a judgment, and by which the subject is made out of the predicate, is called the conversion of a judgment (conversio iudicii). The judgment with which the alteration proceeds is called the converted judgment (iudicium conversum), and that which emerges [97] from it is called the converting judgment (iudicium convertens). In conversion either the quantity of the judgment is changed or not. In the first case, the conversion happens in a contingent way (conversio per accidens), but in the second case absolutely [schlechtweg] (conversio simplex). Insofar as a true judgment also remains true after the conversion, to that extent it can be converted (iudicium converti potest, iudicium reciprocabile). § 347. All affirmative judgments whose subject and predicate are convertible concepts can be converted absolutely, whether they are universal or singular judgments. For the subject belongs also to everything contained under the predicate § 262. Consequently, it can be affirmed universally of the predicate § 302. 346. E.g. judgments that affirm the definition of the defined concept, and those that affirm the members of the division, taken together under a disjunction, of the divided concept § 270. 287. § 348. All true particular affirmative judgments can be converted absolutely. For the abstract concept of the subject belongs to the several concepts contained under it § 260, and thus can be affirmed of them in particular § 295. And since the predicate belongs to the several concepts contained under the subject § 295, as their higher concept § 260 it can be adopted as the subject. Consequently, the previous subject can be affirmed in particular of the previous predicate § 346. § 349. A universal negative judgment (1) can be converted absolutely. Otherwise, the subject could not be contrary to all things contained under the predicate § 302, consequently it would have to belong to some of them § 343. Consequently, also the predicate would have to belong to some thing contained under the subject § 348. Consequently, the universal negative judgment would be false [98] § 302, which is absurd; (2) can be converted contingently. For since it can be converted absolutely, also the particular

Of Learned Judgments

79

judgment contained in the universal converting judgment is true § 342, and through that it is converted contingently § 346. § 350. All universal affirmative judgments can be converted contingently. For if they are true, then also the particular affirmative judgments contained in them are true § 342. These can be converted absolutely § 348, and precisely thereby the universal judgments are converted contingently § 346. § 351. If, in particular negative judgments one applies the negation to the predicate, then they become particular affirmative judgments § 294, and then they can be converted absolutely § 348. § 352. A universal affirmative judgment is contraposited (contrapositio) when one transforms its predicate into a negative concept, and universally negates of it the previous subject. All true universal affirmative judgments can be contraposited, that is, if their predicate does not belong to someone, their subject also does not belong to him. Otherwise, the predicate would have to be contrary to some things, and the subject would have to belong to them § 343. One could thus truthfully negate the predicate of some things contained under the subject § 295. Thus, the universal affirmative judgment would be false § 302, and that is absurd.

[AA 16: 701]

[AA 16: 702]

[AA 16: 703]

Te nt h S e c t ion

[AA 16: 704]

Of Learned Rational Inferences § 353. If some true judgments contain the sufficient ground of the truth of another, then they are combined with each other § 15, and the connection of truths (nexus veritatum) consists in this relation of true judgments. § 354. A rational inference (ratiocinium) is a distinct representation of the connection of truths; which, if it is perfect to a higher degree, is called a learned or a logical rational inference (ratiocinium logicum, eruditum). § 355. In a rational inference we derive a truth from other truths § 353, 354. And since these other truths are grounds of proof of the first § 191, we make a rational inference when we distinctly derive a truth from its grounds of proof. Consequently, the distinct representation of the consequence of a proof is a rational inference § 191. § 356. That judgment which is derived from others in a rational inference is the conclusion (conclusio, probandum, principiatum). But those judgments from which the conclusion is derived are the premises (praemissae, data, sumtiones, principia). § 357. The subjects and predicates of judgments in which a rational inference consists are called the terms [Hauptbegriffe] of a rational inference (termini). The subject of the conclusion is the minor term (terminus minor), but its predicate is the major term (terminus maior). The term that is found in the premises, besides the minor and the major, is called the middle term (terminus medius). § 358. Since the premises contain the ground of proof of the conclusion § 355. 356, but, besides the parts of the conclusion, nothing more is contained in them than the middle term § 357; so the middle term is the ground of proof § 191, and consequently, the condition of the conclusion § 297. Thus,

[AA 16: 705]

[AA 16: 706]

[AA 16: 710]

[AA 16: 711]

[AA 16: 712]

82

[AA 16: 713]

[AA 16: 714]

[AA 16: 715]

[AA 16: 718]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

one finds the middle [100] term according to the instructions of the 297th and 298th paragraphs; and a rational inference consists in our derivation of a judgment from its condition in a distinct way § 355. § 359. The matter of the rational inference (ratiocinii materia) consists in its premises, but its form (ratiocinii forma) consists in the consequence of the conclusion from the premises [in der Folge des Schlussurtheils aus den Vorderurtheilen]. § 360. A correct rational inference (ratiocinium verum) must be correct in the matter as well as in the form § 359. 355. 193. Thus, if either the matter or the form is false, or both at the same time, then it is a false incorrect rational inference (ratiocinium falsum). An erroneous rational inference (ratiocinium erroneum) is a false rational inference insofar as it is held to be a correct one § 109. If a rational inference has a demonstrative certainty or not is evident from § 193 and 194. § 361. Because the consequence in every rational inference must be distinct § 355, but no distinctness is possible without order § 142, the judgments of a rational inference must be arranged together in the proper way. Now since no order is possible without rules, certain rules of inference are necessary according to which a rational inference must be set up if it should have a correct and distinct consequence. § 362. It is impossible that something is and is not at the same time. Or, if one and the same thing is at the same time affirmed or negated of a thing, then it is nothing. This principle is called the principle of contradiction (principium contradictionis), and it is the first internal characteristic of truth § 95 on which all consequences of rational inferences must rest if they should be true § 361. [101] § 363. Whatever can be truthfully affirmed or negated universally of a concept can also be truthfully affirmed or negated of every other concept that belongs under it § 342. Otherwise, two contradictory judgments would have to be true at the same time § 343, and that is contrary to the principle of contradiction § 362. This principle is called the inference from the universal to the particular (dictum de omni et nullo). § 364. If the sufficient ground is true, then also its consequence is true, otherwise the sufficient ground would be no sufficient ground § 15, which is contrary to § 362. Consequently, if the consequence is false, then also the sufficient ground is false, because otherwise the sufficient ground could

Of Learned Rational Inferences

83

be without consequence. This inference is called the inference from the sufficient ground to its consequence (a ratione sufficiente ad rationatum valet consequentia). § 365. If one of two contradictory judgments is true, then the other is false; and if the one is false, then the other is true § 343. 362. This principle is called: the inference from the opposite (ab uno oppositorum ad alterum valet consequentia). § 366. If a judgment is true, then also that must be true, which arises through a logical alteration of the first that can be made without detriment to the truth. Otherwise, the logical alteration would have to be adverse to the truth and not adverse, which is impossible § 362. This inference is called the inference from the logical alteration of a true judgment. § 367. An ordinary rational inference (ratiocinium ordinarium) is a rational inference in which [102] is inferred from the universal to the particular § 363. For example: all virtues contribute something to my happiness; now all philosophical virtues are virtues, thus all philosophical virtues contribute something to my happiness. All other rational inferences are extraordinary rational inferences (ratiocinium extraordinarium). § 368. All ordinary rational inferences have two premises, which have the middle term in common with each other § 367. That premise in the ordinary inference that contains the major term is called the major proposition of the ordinary rational inference (propositio maior ratiociniorum ordinariorum); but the premise that contains the minor term is called the minor proposition (propositio minor) of the inference. § 369. That genus of ordinary rational inferences, in which the middle term stands in the subject of the major premise and in the predicate of the minor proposition, is called the first figure (figura prima ratiociniorum). For example: all human beings can err; the learned are human beings, thus the learned can err. In this figure the minor proposition and the conclusion have one subject § 368. Consequently, these two judgments always have the same quantity § 301. § 370. That genus of ordinary rational inferences, in which the middle term stands in the predicate of both premises, is called the second figure (figura secunda). E.g. nothing absurd [keine ungereimte Sache] is true, everything in the Bible is true; therefore, nothing in the Bible is absurd.

[AA 16: 719]

[AA 16: 720]

[AA 16: 721]

84 [AA 16: 722]

[AA 16: 723]

[AA 16: 729]

[AA 16: 730]

[AA 16: 731]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

§ 371. That genus of ordinary rational inferences, in which the middle term stands in the subject of both premises, is called the third figure (figura tertia). For example, all learned men have an improved understanding, some learned men are vicious [103]; thus, some vicious men have an improved understanding. § 372. That genus of ordinary rational inferences, in which the middle term stands in the predicate of the major proposition and in the subject of the minor proposition, is called the fourth or the Galenic figure (figura quarta, galenica). For example: no stupid person is learned, some learned men are pious; thus, some pious men are not stupid people. § 373. The figures of the rational inferences (figurae ratiociniorum) are therefore various genuses of ordinary rational inferences, which arise from the various arrangements of the middle term with the other terms in the premises; and there are not more than four figures § 369. 372. § 374. Out of the inference from the universal to the particular § 363 flow the following rules of all ordinary rational inferences: (1) Neither more nor fewer than three terms can be contained in an ordinary rational inference. Such an inference contains only three judgments, consequently only six positions for the terms § 368. 357. Now it contains (1) a term of which something is universally affirmed or negated, and of which is said in the other premises that another concept belongs to it. Thus, it occurs twice, because it is the middle term § 368. (2) The minor term occurs in the conclusion and in the minor proposition § 357. 368; and (3) the major term occurs in the conclusion and in the major proposition § 357. 368. § 375. (2) The middle term must not be put in the conclusion. For in ordinary rational inferences, the major term is affirmed or ne-[104]gated of the minor term in the conclusion, because, according to the statement of the premises, the minor term belongs to the middle term, of which the major term can be affirmed or negated § 364. Consequently, the conclusion can consist only of the minor and major terms. § 376. (3) The premises may not all be negative, for one must affirm that the minor or major term is combined with the middle term § 363, or nothing follows from exclusively negative premises, although something follows from exclusively affirmative premises. If the middle term is a negative concept, then at least one premise is merely infinite § 294, and then it merely seems as if all the premises are negative.

Of Learned Rational Inferences

85

§ 377. (4) The premises may not all be particular judgments; otherwise, one would not infer from the universal to the particular § 363, or nothing follows from exclusively particular premises, although something can follow from exclusively universal premises. § 378. (5) If a premise is negative, then the conclusion must also be negative: for then the rational inference conforms to the negative part of the inference from universal to particular § 363, and thus it must have a negative conclusion. § 379. (6) If a premise is a particular judgment, then the conclusion must also be a particular judgment; for then one infers: because some things of a kind belong to that concept, of which something is universally affirmed or negated, then this something can be affirmed or negated also of those several §. 363. § 380. (7) The conclusion always conforms to the weaker part of the rational inference: for the negative and particular pre-[105]mises are called the weaker part of the rational inference (pars ratiocinii debilior) § 378. 379. § 381. The conclusion must not contain less than the premises. For otherwise the minor and major term would contain in themselves less in the conclusion than in the premises, and thus more than three terms would be found in the rational inference § 374. § 382. (9) The conclusion must not contain more than the premises. Otherwise, the minor and major term would contain more in the conclusion than in the premises , and thus there would be more than three terms in the rational inference § 374. § 383. Besides these rules, in the first figure two more rules must be observed: (1) In the first figure the minor proposition must always affirm. For since it has for its subject the subject of the conclusion § 369, it affirms of it that it belongs to the middle term § 363. If the middle term is negative, then the minor proposition is infinite § 376, and thus indeed an affirmative judgment § 294. § 384. (2) In the first figure, the major proposition must always be universal. For, if the conclusion is universal, then the major proposition can be only universal § 379; but if the conclusion is a particular judgment, then the minor proposition is also of the same kind § 369, and thus the major proposition must again be universal § 377. Because the singular judgments

[AA 16: 732]

[AA 16: 733]

[AA 16: 734]

[AA 16: 735]

86

[AA 16: 736]

[AA 16: 737]

[AA 16: 738]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

belong to the universal judgments § 301, they make no exception to the rules that require the universality of the judgments of a rational inference. § 385. The modes of ordinary rational inference (modi ratiociniorum ordinariorum) are various modes of the rational inferences of a figure, which [106] arise from the different character and quantity of the judgments of a rational inference. § 386. If in the first figure the conclusion affirms universally, then the minor proposition also § 383. 378 affirms universally § 379. 369, and the major proposition must also affirm § 378 and be universal § 384. 379. The mode of rational inferences in the first figure whose conclusion affirms universally is called Barbara, e.g. all truths are useful, all philosophical truths are truths; thus, all philosophical truths are useful. § 387. If in the first figure the conclusion negates universally, then the minor proposition must affirm § 383 universally § 369. 379, and the major proposition must negate § 380 universally § 384. 379. The mode of rational inferences in the first figure that have a universal negative conclusion is called Celarent, e.g. no vice makes me more perfect, all pride is a vice; thus, no pride makes me more perfect. § 388. If in the first figure the conclusion affirms in particular, then the minor proposition must affirm § 383. 378 in particular § 369. 380, and the major proposition must affirm § 378 universally § 384. 377. The mode of rational inferences in the first figure whose conclusion affirms in particular is called Darii, e.g. all persistent unbelievers are damned, some learned men are persistent unbelievers; thus, some learned men are damned. § 389. If in the first figure the conclusion negates in particular, then the minor proposition must affirm § 383 in particular § 369, and the major proposition must negate § 380 universally § 384. 377. The mode of rational inferences in the first figure whose conclusion negates in particular is called Ferio; e.g. no good action is punished by God, some mere natural works [Naturwerke] of human beings are good actions; thus, some mere natural works of [107] human beings are not punished by God. In the first figure only four modes of rational inferences are possible § 385–88. § 390. All true judgments that can be conclusions in ordinary rational inferences are either A or E, or I or O § 301. Consequently, in the first figure all these judgments can be inferred § 386–89, and for that reason it is called a perfect figure. Thus, the other figures are not necessary.

Of Learned Rational Inferences

87

§ 391. If one makes rational inferences contrary to the previous rules of inference, whose premises and conclusions are correct; then the latter do not follow necessarily from the former, but rather they are only accidentally true. Such inferences are thus no objections to the correctness of these rules. § 392. A conditional rational inference (ratiocinium hypotheticum, conditionale, connexum) is a rational inference that infers from the sufficient ground to the consequence § 364. Now since in no kind of judgments other than in the conditional ones is the consequence of a judgment affirmed from its condition § 305; so these rational inferences have a conditional premise, which is called their major proposition. It must have a correct consequence § 306, otherwise one infers from the stick in the corner (argumentum a baculo ad angulum). § 393. In a conditional rational inference, one infers either (1) from the correctness of the first to the correctness of the last § 364. 305. Then the minor proposition affirms that the first is true, and the conclusion affirms that the last is true (modus ratiociniorum hypotheticorum ponens). For example: if there is a providence of God, then all anxious worries are to no purpose: now the first is true, thus also is the last; Or (2) from the incorrectness of the last to the incorrectness of the first § 364. 305. Then the minor proposition affirms the incorrectness of the last, and the conclusion affirms the incorrectness of the first [108] (modus ratiociniorum hypotheticorum tollens), e.g. if there is a blind fate, then there are no free actions; now the last is false, thus also is the first. § 394. Because a thing can have several sufficient grounds, in conditional rational inferences one can infer neither always from the incorrectness of the first to the incorrectness of the last, nor from the correctness of the last to the correctness of the first § 305. § 395. Disjunctive rational inferences (ratiocinium disiunctivum) are rational inferences that infer from one opposite to the other § 365. Consequently, they contain a disjunctive premise, which is called their major proposition § 307. If it is contrary to one of the rules proved in § 308, then it has no consequence, and the disjunctive rational inference is formally incorrect § 360. § 396. In disjunctive rational inferences one infers either (1) from the correctness of one member of the disjunction to the incorrectness of the others § 395. 365. Then the minor proposition must assert a member to

[AA 16: 745]

[AA 16: 746]

[AA 16: 747]

[AA 16: 748]

[AA 16: 749]

88

[AA 16: 750]

[AA 16: 751]

[AA 16: 752]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

be true, and the conclusion must assert the others to be false (modus ratiociniorum disiunctivorum ponendo tollens). For example, matter can either think or not, now the second is true, thus the first is false; or (2) from the incorrectness of all members except one to the correctness of this one § 395. 365. Then in the minor proposition it must be affirmed of all members except one that they are false, and in the conclusion it must be affirmed of this one that it is true (modus ratiociniorum disiunctivorum tollendo ponens). For example: matter can either think or not; now the first is false, thus the second is true. § 397. A dilemma (ratiocinium cornutum, crocodillinum, dilemma, trilemma etc.) is a conditional rational inference whose last is a disjunctive judgment [109] in which all members are false. The conditional judgment whose last is disjunctive is the major proposition; the minor proposition affirms that the last is altogether false, and the conclusion affirms that the first is false. A dilemma must therefore conform to the rules of conditional and disjunctive rational inferences at the same time § 392. 393. 395. For example: if this world were not the best, then either no best world were possible, or God had had no knowledge of it, or he could not have created it, or he had not wanted to create it; now the last is altogether false, thus also is the first. § 398. The rational inferences that proceed from the logical alteration of a judgment to the judgment that arises through the alteration are called immediate inferences (consequentia immediata) § 366. For example: all human beings can err, thus also some human beings can err; or, there is a God, thus it is false that there is no God. § 399. A rational inference is constituted in such a way that either its correct form is manifest or is hidden: the former is a formal rational inference (ratiocinium formale), but the latter is a covert rational inference (ratiocinium crypticum), which can thus appear to be formally incorrect. The covert rational inferences are to be recommended for concealing the logical art and avoiding pedantry. § 400. To the covert rational inferences belong primarily the truncated rational inferences (enthymema), in which a judgment is left out, that is, it is not thought as distinctly as the others because it is entirely certain and is so familiar to someone that it occurs to him at once. E.g. all human beings can err, thus I can also err.

Of Learned Rational Inferences

89

[110] § 401. To the truncated rational inferences belong (1) contracted rational inferences (ratiocinium contractum), when one adds just the middle term to the conclusion, but in such way that it is no longer a conditional judgment. For example: this world is the best, because it was chosen by God. (2) Analytic inferences (inductio), which are the basis of the following major proposition, leave it out: whatever can be affirmed or negated of every lower concept can be affirmed or negated universally of their higher concept § 263. If all lower concepts are stated in the minor proposition, then it is an extensive analytic inference (inductio completa). For example: the first person of the Godhead is God, the second also, the third also; thus, all persons of the Godhead are God. (3) Inferences from example (exemplum in ratiociniis), when one affirms or negates that , which one affirms or negates of a lower concept for the sake of its higher concept, of another lower concept that belongs to the very same higher concept. For example: human beings can sin, thus all holy angels can also sin. § 402. A rational inference that is formally incorrect (paralogismus), if its mistake is covert, is called a fallacy (sophisma, fallacia, captio). § 403. A fallacy can arise: (1) when we connect separate things in an incorrect way, and separate connected things in an incorrect way (sophisma sensus compositi et divisi). For example: where there are three dollars, there are two dollars; now three and two dollars make five dollars, thus where there are three dollars, there are five dollars. (2) If a term is taken in a twofold way (sophisma figurae [111] dictionis). For example: a philosopher [ein Weltweiser] is a category of learned men, Leibniz is a philosopher, therefore Leibniz is a category of learned men. § 404. (3) If one takes a term once with a limitation and another time without limitation (fallacia accidentis, seu a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter, aut vice versa). E.g. whoever says, you are an animal, he speaks the truth; now whoever says, you are an ass, he says, you are an animal, thus he speaks the truth. (4) If one accepts an incorrect middle term (fallacia medii). E.g. whoever looks pale studies diligently; now Cajus looks pale, therefore he studies diligently. § 405. (5) If one holds the judgment one has proved to be that which one should prove (sophisma heterozeteseos). For example: if one should prove the immortality of the soul, and one proves its incorruptibility. (6) If one holds the judgment one has refuted to be that which one should refute

[AA 16: 753]

[AA 16: 754]

[AA 16: 762]

[AA 16: 763]

[AA 16: 764]

90

[AA 16: 768]

[AA 16: 769]

[AA 16: 770]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

(sophisma ignorationis elenchi). E.g. if against one who maintains that the soul can die, one proves that it lives forever. (7) If a composite judgment is viewed merely as a simple judgment in a rational inference (sophisma polyzeteseos). E.g. it is either true that among all four-legged animals dogs alone have reason, or it is not true; if the former, then dogs have reason, if the latter, then all four-legged animals have reason. § 406. A rational inference consists either of several rational inferences or only of one. The latter is a simple rational inference (ratiocinium simplex, probatio simplex), but the former is a composite rational inference (ratiocinium compositum). If a rational inference is composite, the several rational [112] inferences in which it consists are either connected or not § 353. In the latter case, it is a ratiocinium copulatum, e.g. all spirits are immortal, God and all human souls are spirits, therefore they are immortal. In the first case, the premise of the one is the conclusion of the other, and it is called a series of connected rational inferences (ratiocinatio polysyllogistica, probatio composita). For example: whatever conforms to natural laws makes me more perfect, virtue conforms to natural laws, therefore virtue makes me more perfect; whatever makes me more perfect, to that I am obligated, virtue makes me more perfect, thus I am obligated to it. § 407. In a series of connected rational inferences, there occur not only inferences whose conclusions are the premises of other inferences, but there occur also inferences whose premises are the conclusions of other inferences § 406. The former are called prosyllogisms [Vorschlüsse] (prosyllogismus) and the latter are called episyllogisms [Nachschlüsse] (episyllogismus). And some judgments occur twice in such a series § 406. § 408. In order to avoid any confusion in a long series of connected rational inferences, (1) one divides a long proof into many parts by proving individually the most important premises as individual theorems. (2) One does not connect exclusively ordinary and formal rational inferences with each other. (3) One proves either only the major propositions of the prosyllogisms, or only their minor propositions. (4) One derives conclusions from contracted rational inferences § 401 (epicherema). (5) One leaves out all judgments that occur twice § 407, and that is called a sorites [ein gehäufter Vernunftschluss] (sorites). E.g. virtue conforms to natural laws, what conforms to natural laws makes me more perfect, what makes me more perfect obligates me; therefore, I am obligated by virtue.

Of Learned Rational Inferences

91

[113] § 409. If the rational inferences of which the sorites consists are from the first figure, and the minor propositions of the episyllogisms are omitted, then it is a common sorites (sorites communis). E.g. the previously cited example. But if it consists exclusively of conditional premises, then it is called a conditional sorites (sorites hypotheticus). E.g. if human beings have a limited understanding, then they have confused representations; if they have confused representations, then they can err; if they can err, then they can sin: therefore, if human beings have a limited understanding, then they can sin. § 410. If in a series of connected rational inferences one or more judgments are left out, then a leap in proof is committed (saltus in probando). The omitted judgments are either certain to him who should be convinced by the proof and occur to him easily, or not. In the first case, the leap is legitimate (saltus legitimus), but in the other case it is illegitimate (saltus illegitimus). § 411. If a conclusion is derived from premises that are just as uncertain as the conclusion itself, then the grounds of proof are begged (petitio principii seu quaesiti). But if a conclusion is accepted as its own premise, then one calls this mistake the circle in proof (circulus in probando). § 412. A proof proves too little (probatio minus probans) if the entire conclusion is not made certain by it; but if besides the conclusion something false or entirely too different from the conclusion follows from the proof, then it proves too much (probatio plus probans). [114] § 413. Through rational inferences one can: (1) attain the most distinct certainty that is possible for a human being § 355. (2) Most easily resist errors; (3) discover new truths; and (4) discover all the grounds of proof that are needed to erect a learned doctrinal system, etc.

[AA 16: 771]

[AA 16: 772] [AA 16: 773]

[AA 16: 774]

[AA 16: 775]

Second Main Part

Of the Method of Learned Cognition

[AA 16: 776]

§ 414. Method (methodus) is a more appreciable or greater order of thoughts. To the extent that several thoughts are either together, or follow one another, in one and the same way, to that extent there is an order among them, which arises when various thoughts are associated according to the same rules. § 415. The method is in the cognition § 414. 11. and thus is either an order of common cognition, the common method (methodus vulgaris), or of rational cognition § 17. 18, the rational method (methodus rationalis). To the former belongs the aesthetic method § 19, but to the latter belongs the learned method (methodus erudita, logica, philosophica), the method of learned cognition § 21. § 416. The learned method requires (1) the distinctness of learned cognition § 142 n. 4. (2) Truth in a doctrinal system and thoroughness § 105. (3) The unity and thoroughgoing connection of a doctrinal system. (4) The perfection of learned cognition: for all order is a perfection. (5) The retention of truths through memory § 414. [115] § 417. The more thoughts are connected with each other, and the more numerous and important are the common rules according to which this connection occurs, the greater and more perfect the method is § 414. Consequently, the greatest perfection of a learned method requires that it is as methodical as possible § 416. § 418. A method combines thoughts either only according to a single common rule, or according to several. The former is a simple method (methodus simplex), but the latter is a composite method (methodus composita). The latter is more perfect than the former § 417. § 419. The variety of methods is due to the variety of rules according to which thoughts are associated with each other § 414, and the variety of rules flows from the variety of cognitive powers, and from the different character of cognition that should be thought according to a method. § 420. Since learned cognition is a distinct cognition from grounds § 21. 17, thoughts, in the learned method, must follow one another in such a way that their connection thereby becomes distinctly certain § 415. 419. This is the basic law of the learned method.

[AA 16: 777]

[AA 16: 778]

96

[AA 16: 786]

[AA 16: 787]

[AA 16: 788]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

§ 421. The method of dogmatic truths is distinct from the method of historical truths § 419. 104. In the former, thoughts must be proved from each other, either through a demonstration or through an insufficient proof § 191. In the first case, it is called a demonstrative or scientific method (methodus demonstrativa, scientifica, apodictica). § 422. In the learned method of dogmatic truths, only thoughts are associated with each other that are either grounds of the truth, distinctness, and certainty of other thoughts, or they are consequences, or both at [116] once § 421. 420. 15. Thus, the grounds are either placed before [vorgesetzt] the consequences, or placed after [nachgesetzt]. The former is the synthetic method (methodus synthetica), but the latter is the analytic method (methodus analytica). Consequently, the learned method is either synthetic or analytic, whether it is demonstrative or not § 421. § 423. The analytic method is very inconvenient if one wanted to treat or learn an ample doctrinal system according to it. But it is very well suited (1) if one would sketch an outline of a doctrinal system in order to treat it thereafter according to the synthetic method; (2) if one would discover grounds and premises from the consequences and conclusions; (3) if one would frequently repeat a doctrinal system that has already been learned; (4) if one would really think through the individual, shorter parts of a doctrinal system § 422. § 424. The synthetic method is always combined with many incon­ veniences if one uses it in such cases where the analytic method has been advocated § 423. But it has great advantages if one uses it: (1) when one would think through and treat a doctrinal system, considered as a whole, that is already discovered; (2) when one would learn that system; (3) when one would discover the consequences and conclusions from the grounds and premises § 422. § 425. In the synthetic method, the grounds must always be thought before the consequences § 422. Consequently, (1) the concepts that are marks of other concepts must be defined before the others § 115, and thus the higher must be defined before the lower § 261. (2) Indemonstrable truths must precede the demonstrable truths § 314–17. (3) The premises must be thought before the conclusions § 356, and thus the preceding inferences [Vorschlüsse] must be thought before the following inferences

Of the Method of Learned Cognition

97

[Nachschlüsse] § 407. (4) Those demonstrable truths from which others follow must [117] precede the ones that follow. In the analytic method everything is reversed § 422. § 426. The synthetic method, which has only the sole intention of conveying the mathematical certainty of cognition § 161, is called the mathematical method (methodus mathematica). Thus, it must not only conform as exactly as possible to the rules of the synthetic method § 425, but by means of it one also leaves out everything that is not indispensably required for mathematical certainty, or one relegates it to notes § 340. With very difficult demonstrations it has a great usefulness, especially for beginners, but if one becomes accustomed to these alone, one obtains a merely learned cognition § 161, and for this reason it is not advised § 40. § 427. Art (ars) is a totality of rules that are thought according to an order. The artificial method (methodus artificialis, scholae) is method insofar as it is learned and practiced through art. The natural method (methodus naturalis) is method insofar as it is not artificial, but rather follows from the nature of cognition and of that which thinks there. The mixed method (methodus mixta) is the natural method insofar as the artificial comes to its aid. § 428. Among the artificial learned methods, the best are (1) the syllogistic method (methodus syllogistica), when one analyzes all proofs into exclusively formal inferences, and commits no leaps. It serves a beginner well. Otherwise it is too ample, too odious, and not distinct enough. (2) The method according to tables (methodus tabellaris), when one arranges all members of the divisions and parts of the whole in such a way that it is evident to what kind of higher concept and whole each thought belongs. [118] It requires the distinct concept of a whole doctrinal system, and memory; yet it falls often into affectation, attention is overburdened, and thoroughness cannot be properly attained through it. (3) The method according to an analysis of a whole doctrinal system, when one allows judgments to follow one another according to the variety of their subjects; in that way arise chapter, section, etc. If it is combined with the synthetic method, it does not hinder thoroughness, and provides the benefits of the method according to tables.

[AA 16: 789]

[AA 16: 798]

[AA 16: 800]

[AA 16: 801]

[AA 16: 802]

98

[AA 16: 803]

[AA 16: 804]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

§ 429. If one would treat a doctrinal system, then it must proceed according to the synthetic, and in some cases according to the analytic, method § 423. 424, for they are suitable for the nature of a doctrinal system § 420. Now whatever can be combined with that from all other artificial methods in order to promote either distinctness or certainty, or memory, or to increase order, one connects that with the synthetic and analytic method. Consequently, affectation in method (affectatio in methodo) is a mistake, (1) if the artificial method is good for nothing, contrary to nature, and entirely arbitrary. (2) If one adheres to a simple method too exactly, and never wants to make an exception to it. (3) If one observes the rules of the method much too exactly and scrupulously. § 430. The learned method must be natural and uncontrived § 429. It must therefore conform to the nature of learned cognition, and be observed without anxious effort. Consequently, it must accord with the mind of the person who would think according to it. Thus, whoever receives it can help himself to (1) the Socratic method (methodus socratica), by virtue of which thoughts follow one another the way they prompt each other as questions and answers in the conversation of several persons; (2) the Platonic method (methodus platonica), by virtue [119] of which thoughts follow each other as in an impromptu speech [wie in einer freien Rede], so that all kinds of learned thoughts are intermixed, without making formal and explicit conclusions. § 431. If one would treat a doctrinal system according to the synthetic method, then one must (1) place at the foundation a single truth from which everything else is derived, so that the doctrinal system receives a unity and a thoroughgoing connection, so that it contains nothing more and nothing less than is needed. (2) One places an analysis at the foundation, and separates the doctrinal system into several sections, but in such a way that no exception is made to the synthetic method. (3) The learned thoughts themselves must follow one another in the following way. (a) First come the definitions; (b) then follow either the indemonstrable truths or the intuitive judgments; (c) then the demonstrable truths. (d) The corollaries and notes are interspersed wherever they are needed and useful § 420. 425. § 432. The method of historical truth § 421 must conform to the nature of historical truths § 419; consequently, one must think them in the order

Of the Method of Learned Cognition

99

in which their objects are combined with each other either in space or in time. To that belongs therefore the chronological method (methodus chronologica), when one thinks events in just the succession in which they actually occurred; and the geographical method (methodus geographica), by virtue of which one thinks events that occur at a place, or have occurred, according to the chronological method. Now because the actual events of the world are also connected, and often a human being can understand this connection, with historical truths one can, at [12] least often, also help oneself to the rational method § 415. § 433. The best learned composite method can appear disordered [eine Unordnung] to a person who is not acquainted with its rules, or who is accustomed to another method, or only to a simple one. But one can make no founded criticism of such a method on those grounds. § 434. A doctrine [Eine Doctrin, eine Lehre] (doctrina) is a totality of dogmatic truths that have one and the same object. A discipline (disciplina) is a doctrine insofar as it is cognized methodically. A demonstrated discipline is a science (scientia obiectiva spectata). Learned cognition is always in the beginning a doctrine, then one gives it the form of a discipline, and finally the form of a science, and then it has reached its greatest perfection. § 435. Whoever thinks, thinks either according to a method, or according to none § 414. The former thinks methodically (methodice cogitare, methodicum, acroamaticum, disciplinale in cognitione), but the latter thinks tumultuously (tumultuaria cognitio). No tumultuous cognition can be truly learned § 416. § 436. Meditation (meditatio) is that employment of our powers of cognition by which we reflect on a thing according to the rules of a method. If it occurs according to the rules of the learned method, then it is a learned meditation (meditatio erudita), which is as varied as there are kinds of learned method. Without this learned meditation, we can attain no learned cognition. § 437. Whoever would meditate in a learned way (1) chooses an object to which he directs his attention; (2) little by little he thinks its marks [121], which make up its definition, its indemonstrable predicates, and finally its demonstrable predicates. One has either already learned these, and then one does well if one writes while meditating; or one would learn them, and

[AA 16: 805]

[AA 16: 809]

[AA 16: 810]

[AA 16: 811]

[AA 16: 812]

[AA 16: 813]

100

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

then one must read in a book, or listen to oral expositions; or one would first discover them. (3) One examines whether what one thinks is a concept, a judgment, an axiom, etc., and considers it until one satisfies all the rules that the doctrine of reason prescribes for every kind of learned thoughts. § 438. It is a shame if, from pedantry, one despises all kinds of thinking that are not modeled after that method one has fallen in love with, and if, like a charlatan, one makes too much of the method one loves.

Third Main Part

Of Learned Exposition

[AA 16: 814]



First S e c t ion

Of the Use of Words § 439. The logical art of designation (logica characteristica heuristica) is the science of the rules one must observe if one would aptly designate learned cognition. The logical art of interpretation (hermeneutica logica) is the science of the rules for how one should cognize the designated matters from the signs in a learned manner. § 440. A sign (signum, symbolum) is a means by the use of which the actuality of another thing can be cognized; this other thing [122 ] is called the designated matter or the meaning (signatum, significatus). An expression (terminus) is a sign of cognition; the expressions that usually consist in a human voice are called words (vocabulum). The cognition designated by expressions and words is called their meaning (significatus vocabuli et termini). § 441. That meaning, which he who uses the word intends to designate by the word, is the true meaning (significatus hermeneutice verus). But any other meaning is the false meaning (significatus hermeneutice falsus). The true meaning can be a false concept, and the false meaning can be a true concept. § 442. Discourse (oratio) is a series of words that designate representations that are connected with each other. The series of representations is called the sense of the discourse (sensus orationis), which is either a true sense (sensus hermeneutice verus), if the speaker meant to designate it, or a false sense (sensus hermeneutice falsus), if it is not the true one. Exposition (propositio) is the production of a cognition in another person by means of a discourse, which may be either an oral or a written exposition. § 443. As many kinds of cognition as there are, there are just as many kinds of discourse and exposition § 442. Thus, there are common discourses,

[AA 16: 815]

[AA 16: 816]

104

[AA 16: 817]

[AA 16: 818]

[AA 16: 819]

[AA 16: 820]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

aesthetic discourses, rational discourses, and also the same kinds of exposition § 17. 18. 19. A learned discourse (oratio erudita) is a discourse whose sense is a learned cognition § 21, and we exposit something in a learned manner (erudite proponere) when we produce a learned cognition in others through a learned discourse. § 444. Learned discourse, together with all of its parts, must be constituted in such a way that the [123] highest perfection of the learned cognition is not hindered, but rather is promoted and designated § 442. Thus, in learned discourse one must (1) observe all aesthetic rules of discourse that are not contrary to the logical perfection of the cognition § 34. (2) Avoid all aesthetic perfections that are contrary to the required logical perfection of the discourse § 34. § 445. A discourse is either merely learned (oratio mere erudita), if it designates nothing more than a merely learned cognition, but in the opposite case it is no merely learned discourse (oratio non mere erudita). And learned exposition varies in the same way § 443. The latter are the best § 40. 32. § 446. Learned expression must be ample § 25. 444. Consequently, (1) a learned man must know as many expressions as are required to designate all of his learned thoughts. (2) One must know all the needed technical terms of one’s principal science, and if necessary it is permitted to invent new expressions. A technical term (terminus technicus) is an expression that may not be used at all outside of an art or a discipline. (3) One must know all synonymous expressions (synonyma), or all expressions that signify the same thing. (4) Learned expression must designate everything that one thinks, and designate neither more nor less than one intends to say. (5) One must know all the meanings that an expression has already received through the common and learned uses of discourse. The common use of discourse (usus loquendi) is agreement in common life, by virtue of which people who speak a language combine one or more meanings with certain words. The learned use of discourse (receptus terminorum signi-[124] ficatus) is just the same agreement among those who work in a discipline. § 447. For learned cognition, learned expression must be great, important, and respectable enough § 444. 26. Consequently, in learned exposition one must avoid all base, ridiculous, and uncouth expressions, which are common only among the rabble.

Of the Use of Words

105

§ 448. Learned expression must be correct § 444. 27. A true expression (terminus verus) must correctly designate its true meaning § 441: an expression that is not true is a false expression (terminus falsus). § 449. An expression is false: (1) if its meaning is a false concept, and the one who uses the expression is convinced of the incorrectness of the meaning; (2) if we believe we understand an expression, but in fact we do not understand it; such a false expression is an empty expression, or an empty word (terminus inanis). We understand an expression (terminum intelligere) when we cognize its meaning from it. An empty word arises: (a) when we hold the concept of the word itself to be its meaning § 440. (b) When the meaning of the word is an erroneous or deceptive concept (conceptus deceptor), a concept that we believe to have, but in fact we do not have. (3) When it does not correctly designate a true concept § 448. § 450. A common expression (terminus familiaris) is an expression to which we have become accustomed, or that we believe we understand, even if we do not understand it at the moment, because we are not paying attention to its meaning. Such expressions can be true expressions, yet in using them we stand in the greatest danger of concocting empty expressions if we combine a couple of [125] common expressions with each other whose meanings are impossible or contradict each other § 449. Thus, people can speak of nothing, and yet appear to understand each other, namely, when they use expressions that are familiar to them. § 451. Although in learned discourse one cannot avoid false expressions of the first kind § 449, if one must refute errors, then one must avoid all other false and empty expressions, because thoughtlessness and errors arise from their use. To that end, one must use no expression (1) whose meaning one has not cognized, and (2) whose meaning one has not examined to see whether it is a true or false concept. § 452. A crude expression (terminus crassus) is an expression whose meaning is a crude cognition § 102. The use of empty expressions in learned discourse is the trafficking in words of learned men, since one peddles words for things [Sachen]. E.g. if a learned man should state the ground of a thing [einer Sache], and he has designated the thing [die Sache] with an expression, which he subsequently gives as the ground, then he peddles words for things [Sachen]. One must avoid all of this § 451.

[AA 16: 821]

[AA 16: 822]

[AA 16: 823]

106

[AA 16: 824]

[AA 16: 825]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

§ 453. Learned expression must be clear § 444. 28. One must therefore be able to distinguish properly not only the expressions themselves from other expressions, but also their meaning must be sufficiently clear. An obscure expression (terminus obscurus) has an obscure meaning, a clear expression (terminus clarus) a clear one, etc. An obscure expression is not for that reason an empty expression § 449, and an expression that is obscure to me is not for that reason obscure absolutely and to other people § 126. § 454. The meaning of an expression either can be clearly cognized from the expression, or not. The former is an intelligible expression (terminus intelligibilis), but the latter [126] is an unintelligible expression (terminus non intelligibilis). Now, although in a learned discourse one cannot exclusively use expressions that are intelligible to all people; one must nevertheless exclusively use expressions that can be intelligible also to people of average intelligence and who have an average command of the language, even if they give the discourse only moderate attention § 453. § 455. Whoever would use the most intelligible expressions possible in a learned discourse § 454 (1) must prefer the better known and more familiar expressions to the less well known and less familiar, if they are otherwise the same. (2) He must always combine with the expression the meaning that is combined with it in the use of discourse in common life as well as in the disciplines § 446, until necessity compels him to the contrary; (3) if the use of discourse is diverse, he must connect with the expressions the most common meanings (significatus famosissimus), that is, those that are combined with the expression by the most people in the most cases; (4) if, in a certain case, the three preceding rules are not sufficient, then one defines the sense [Bedeutung] in which one takes an expression § 268. § 456. Learned expression must be certain § 444. 29. A certain expression (terminus certus) is so constituted that one not only knows for certain that it has a meaning, rather also that it has just this and no other meaning. An expression is uncertain (terminus incertus) if it is not certain; and by the use of uncertain expressions, discourse is fruitless [auf Schrauben gesetzt]. § 457. An ambiguous expression (terminus ambiguus, homonymus, vagus) has not always a single meaning; as soon as it receives it, its meaning is [127] fixed (terminus fixus). The ambiguity of expression hinders its certainty § 456, therefore one must avoid all ambiguity. And if the use of

Of the Use of Words

107

discourse is not sufficient for that § 446, then one must fix the meanings with logical definitions. § 458. Learned expression must please to such an extent that thereby one can be enticed to cognize from it the cognition that lies hidden beneath it § 444. 30. Consequently, it must be adorned with all perfections that are not contrary to learned cognition, so that one reads or listens to it gladly and with pleasure. § 459. In the use of words in logical definitions, there are four more rules to observe: (1) Even in definitions one must observe the use of discourse, as long as it is possible § 455. (2) One must put in the discourse neither the expression of the defined concept nor equivalent [gleichgültigen] expressions of it that designate the definition; for then the definition would not be more distinct than the concept defined § 275, 446. (3) A definition must be expressed with as few words as possible without compromising distinctness; so that attention is not distracted by too many words. § 460. That meaning for the sake of which a word is coined and used, and even if the word should otherwise have no meaning at all, is called the proper meaning (significatus proprius), the other meanings are improper (significatus improprius). If one uses a word to designate the former, then it is a proper word (terminus proprius); but if one uses it to designate the latter, then it is an improper word (terminus improprius). With an improper word we always think the proper meaning in addition to the improper meaning, although one [128] could have an extensive concept of any of them without thinking of the others. Thus, one must (4) avoid all improper expressions in the expression of logical definitions, because otherwise the definition would be too ample § 270, and if sometimes we can find no proper expressions in the language, then we must first transform an improper word into a proper one through the definition of its improper meaning before we use it in another definition. § 461. If one should define the meaning of an ambiguous word, then of its several meanings we can define whichever we please, if the several meanings are equally common. And in this respect definitions are often arbitrary. § 462. A judgment designated by expressions is called a proposition (propositio, enunciatio). A proposition in which not all concepts are designated with particular expressions is called a covert proposition

[AA 16: 826]

[AA 16: 827]

[AA 16: 828]

108

[AA 16: 829]

[AA 16: 830]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

(propositio cryptica). Expressions that designate the quantity of the judgment are called signs of quantity. In a proposition either there are signs of quantity or not (propositio definita, et indefinita). In linguistic usage, the latter are understood to be universal propositions, and thus whoever does not want to be misunderstood must not omit the signs of quantity in propositions that he does not intend to be understood as universal. A proposition is understood when all the expressions occurring in it are understood § 449. § 463. A rational inference, if it is designated by expressions, is called a syllogism (syllogismus). Be careful not to present syllogisms always in the same order and with the same technical terms. And if one uses covert or [129] truncated syllogisms, then one conforms to the listener [richte man sich nach dem Zuhörer], so that he is not confused, and can recall all of the omitted propositions. Those fallacies that rest merely on the ambiguity of expressions (sophisma ambiguitatis, amphiboliae) are hardly worth the trouble of mentioning.

S e c ond S e c t ion

[AA 16: 831]

Of the Learned Style of Writing § 464. The learned style of writing (stilus eruditus, philosophicus) is the agreement or similarity in the way one discourses learnedly. § 465. Since the learned style of writing is a part of learned discourse § 464. 443, it has one and the same purpose as learned discourse, namely, to promote learned cognition in oneself and others. A good learned style of writing (stilus eruditus perfectus) must therefore promote learned cognition and its perfections, but one that hinders these is a bad learned style of writing (stilus eruditus imperfectus). § 466. To the perfections of the learned style of writing belong (1) all qualities of it without which the perfections of learned cognition cannot be maintained; (2) all other beauties of the style of writing, if they are not contrary to the perfection of learned cognition. Without these the style of writing would be merely learned. To the imperfections of the learned style of writing belong: (1) all qualities of it whereby the perfection of learned cognition is hindered, even if they are also beauties; (2) all qualities whereby imperfections in learned cognition are [130] caused; (3) all imperfections that cannot be tolerated in any style of writing § 465. § 467. The learned style of writing must be composed in such a way that it conveys very well the distinctness of the cognition of truth from grounds § 465. This is the basic law of the learned style of writing. § 468. (1) The learned style of writing must be distinct § 467. The distinctness of the learned style of writing (perspicuitas stili eruditi) is the perfection by virtue of which it does not hinder, but rather conveys, the distinctness of the designated cognition. The contrary imperfection is its obscurity (obscuritas stili eruditi). In order to make the style of writing distinct, one must (1) use exclusively clear expressions § 453–55;

[AA 16: 832]

[AA 16: 833]

110

[AA 16: 834]

[AA 16: 835]

[AA 16: 836]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

(2) one must not discourse too briefly, but rather verbosely; (3) one must combine the parts of the discourse with each other in such a way that thereby the combination of thoughts can be cognized most distinctly and easily. Consequently, one must (a) avoid all rare and difficult idioms; (b) not reject idioms; (c) one must not omit too often the expressions that designate the combinations of thoughts; (d) one must not make too many parenthetical remarks [Einschiebsel]; (e) one must not make the points too long. A proposition that is no part of another proposition is called a point (punctum). Thus, one must intermix shorter and longer points. § 469. (2) The learned style of writing must be pure, so far as possible § 467. The purity of the learned style of writing (puritas stili eruditi) consists in its agreement with the improved nature of language. The contrary imperfection is its impurity (impuritas stili eruditi). Since a pure style of writing pleases, [131] it piques the interest of the reader and the listener, and it therefore promotes the distinctness of learned cognition § 142. § 470. If the purity of the style of writing should hinder its distinctness, then one must make an exception of the former § 35. 21. Such a necessary impurity is only an apparent imperfection of the learned style of writing § 466. § 471. For the sake of the purity of the learned style of writing, one must avoid: (1) all hybrid words (vox hybrida), whose parts are taken from various languages; (2) all grammatical mistakes; (3) all barbaric expressions; (4) all expressions from foreign languages, and foreign idioms must already have been naturalized [das Bürgerrecht müssten erhalten haben]; (5) all dated expressions and idioms; (6) all new words and technical terms; (7) all plurality of expressions, if instead one can use a single expression, even if it is impure § 469. One can make exceptions to all these rules for the sake of § 470. § 472. With respect to the purity of the learned style of writing, one must avoid: (1) the careless and inattentive barbarism of pedantic [schulfüchsischer] learned men by which they completely neglect the purity of the style of writing; (2) too great a love for the purity of the style of writing, when one really tries to force purity even at the expense of the perfection of learned cognition § 466. § 473. (3) The learned style of writing must, so far as possible, be elegant. The elegance of the style of writing (concinnitas stili) consists in the proportioned agreement of the parts of a discourse, e.g. when one

Of the Learned Style of Writing

111

makes cycles [Perioden]. This perfection cannot be maintained in a merely learned discourse, yet, in a learned discourse that is not merely learned, one [132] must also look after this perfection, so far as possible, in those places where one also thinks beautifully § 467. 445, because it makes the expression more pleasant § 458. § 474. (4) The learned style of writing must be ornate, so far as possible § 467. The ornateness of the style of writing (ornatus stili eruditi) consists in using, instead of certain expressions, others that designate just the same concepts but in a more beautiful way. In those parts where the discourse is merely learned, no ornate style of writing is possible; but if the learned discourse must also be beautiful, then the learned style of writing must also be ornate § 445. § 475. (5) The learned style of writing must be, so far as possible, mellifluous § 467. The mellifluousness of the style of writing (sonoritas stili) consists in that perfection by which it pleases the ear § 458. One must seek this perfection especially in those passages of a learned discourse where the discourse is not merely learned § 445. § 476. Using only simple propositions, or points that are much too ample, obscures the style of writing § 468. Thus, in a learned discourse, also for the sake of the gracefulness and mellifluousness of the style of writing § 473. 475, simple and composite points must alternate in moderately beautiful cycles, after which the designated thoughts are merely learned, or at the same time more or less beautiful. § 477. (6) The learned style of writing must be, so far as possible, fitting § 467. The fittingness of the style of writing (congruentia stili) is that perfection by which the style of writing is fitting and appropriate for the designated cognition, for the person speaking, and for the listener. Consequently, the learned style of writing must be weighty enough for learned cognition § 447, and thus not ridicu-[133]lous, uncouth, base. And it must be natural for him who uses it, and thus not affected. § 478. For the sake of the fittingness of the learned style of writing, (1) in those passages where one expresses merely learned thoughts, it need not be as pure, graceful, ornate, and mellifluous as (2) in those passages where thoughts are expressed that are also beautiful § 477.

[AA 16: 837]

T h ird S e c t ion

[AA 16: 838]

Of a Learned Discourse § 479. Learned exposition is either an oral exposition or a written one, that is, a book or a writing (liber, scriptum). He who gives a learned exposition is a teacher, and he who acquires his learned cognition from the exposition of another, he learns it, and is a student, whether he is a reader or a listener. § 480. The sense of a learned discourse must be a learned cognition that conforms to all the rules of its perfection § 10–438, § 439–78. In a learned discourse we must therefore present all parts of the learned cognition, and indeed in the order in which they must follow each other, if a learned cognition should arise. § 481. A learned discourse must be ample in an extensive way § 480. 41–65. Thus, it must be neither too short (oratio erudita nimis brevis), when it says less of the object than suffices for the most perfect learned cognition; nor much too ample (oratio erudita nimis prolixa), when it [134] says more than is needed to attain a perfect learned cognition. § 482. A learned discourse can be too ample with respect to one, and too brief with respect to another, and extensive with respect to a third § 481. Consequently, the less ability a student possesses, the less he has already learned, and the less committed he is to a subject, the shorter the learned exposition must be for him. A student of the opposite kind must be instructed by a more ample exposition. § 483. A learned discourse must be important enough § 480. 66–91. 447. 477. Thus, its object must not be a worthless triviality. § 484. A learned discourse must be as correct as possible § 480. 92–114. 448–52. A learned man who himself errs and in addition to that spreads his errors misleads other people, and is doubly imperfect. Thus, one must first examine one’s own cognition as thoroughly as possible before one presents it.

[AA 16: 839]

[AA 16: 840]

[AA 16: 841]

[AA 16: 842]

114

[AA 16: 843]

[AA 16: 844]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

§ 485. A learned discourse must be clear and intelligible § 480. 114–54. 468. It is thus a mistake (1) when the teacher discourses without understanding, or when his discourse has no sense; (2) when his words and idioms are obscure and too difficult; (3) when he cannot even be understood. A discoursing person is understood (proponens intelligitur) when one combines with his words just that series of representations that he wanted to designate by them. Thus, one can often understand the discourse without understanding the person discoursing § 449. Thus, a teacher must either himself define what kind of meaning he takes his words to have, or he must connect no other concept with them than those he knows the student already has and connects with the words. [135] § 486. If a teacher presents confused cognition, then his student must either already possess it, and he only reminds him of it by the exposition, or he must teach it to him in another way than through the exposition. Distinct cognition can be produced in others only through exposition § 14. A teacher must therefore possess a very distinct cognition. § 487. Learned exposition becomes clear: (1) through a distinct style of writing § 468. (2) Through the use of a convenient method § 416. (3) If one explains abstract cognition by beautiful examples. (4) One presents a thing, if it merits it by virtue of its importance, in a diverse and manifold way, and one helps oneself to aesthetic explicating arguments. (5) What is pleasant and lively in an exposition maintains interest, and thus also promotes clarity. § 488. A learned discourse must be convincing and thorough §. 480. 155–215. It is therefore a mistake (1) if a teacher provides no proofs at all when he exposits a demonstrable cognition; (2) if his proofs are not certain to the degree, and are not of the kind of certainty, that the cognition to be exposited requires; (3) if he pulls the wool over his students’ eyes [einen blauen Dunst vormacht] (fucus logicus), that is, if instead of conviction he produces in them a mere persuasion § 184. § 489. A learned discourse must be practical § 480. 216–48. Everything we have said so far about learned discourse must also be applied to learned exposition § 443. § 490. The gift of learned exposition (donum didacticum) is the totality of all aptitudes of the soul and the body without which no perfect [136] learned exposition is possible. Without this gift, no one can be a teacher § 479.

Of a Learned Discourse

115

§ 491. A teacher must orient himself in his learned exposition by his students § 479. Consequently, one must recommend to him (1) condescension (condescendentia) when he has before him a student of little ability, and arrange his exposition in such a way that it does not go over his head; (2) elevation (coadscendentia) to the greater ability of his students, so that the exposition is not too bad for them. § 492. A student of learned cognition (1) must be disposed toward learned cognition by nature; (2) he must have already exercised his understanding; (3) he must often already possess a supply of learned cognition; (4) he must apply the necessary industry to the study of learned cognition. A learned man must therefore present learned cognition to no one but him who is an able student of it; and he must not become angry if he sees that some people learn nothing from his expositions, he must then be angry with himself, because he sees that he expended his effort on the wrong people. § 493. In a learned exposition one has either primarily the intention of refuting someone and his errors, and it is then a refutation of another (refutatio alterius), or not. In the latter case, one considers the reader or listener as a student who is ignorant, but not as someone in error, and thus one seeks to produce in him a perfect learned cognition; such an exposition is called a lesson (docere). § 494. In learned instruction the following rules must be observed: (1) one must begin with the definition or description of all concepts that appear in the subject, if they [137] are otherwise not sufficiently clear to the student; and one must convince him of the correctness of these concepts according to the rules of the 258th, 265th, 267th, and 287th paragraphs. § 495. (2) In the instruction of an indemonstrable proposition, nothing more is needed than to analyze it, and, if one likes, clarify it by an example § 313–18. 300. 487. § 496. (3) In the instruction of an intuitive judgment, one must either remind the student of all the sensations in which the judgment consists; or one must teach them to him in the lesson § 319–21. 202; or one must convince him by probable testimonies that others have had these sensations § 206–15. § 497. (4) In the instruction of demonstrable propositions (a) one analyzes the proposition, and the solution of a problem, so that they are correctly understood; (b) one presents the proof according to the analytic

[AA 16: 845]

[AA 16: 846]

116

[AA 16: 847]

[AA 16: 848]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

method, and brings it into one or two formal syllogisms if it is long § 423. 203. 204. 206–15; (c) one conducts the entire proof until one comes either to indemonstrable and intuitive judgments, or to such demonstrable judgments of which the other person is already sufficiently convinced. The citation of paragraphs in writings is due to that. § 498. (5) One seals the conviction of the truth with a practical representation of its practical character: for what the heart loves, the understanding believes § 216–48. § 499. A correct proof that an error is an error is a true refutation (refutatio vera); yet an incorrect proof that either an error is an error, or that a truth is an error, is an apparent refutation (impugna-[138]tio). Only errors can be correctly refuted. He who undertakes a refutation is the attacking part (adversarius opponens), and he who refutes the refutation is the defending part (adversarius defendens). The defense is thus either correct or false. A learned dispute (controversia) consists in the refutation and defense of an opinion. § 500. That proposition which the attacking part refutes and the attacked part defends is called the contested thesis (thesis controversa), and the proposition of the attacking part, which cannot be true at the same time as the contested thesis, is called the antithesis (antithesis). It is thus opposed to the contested thesis either in a contradictory way § 343 or in a universal way § 345. The matter of dispute is determined (status controversiae, seu quaestionis formatur) if the attacking part clearly shows which is the contested thesis and which is the antithesis. § 501. If a matter of dispute is not correctly determined, the opponents conduct either no dispute at all, or they fall into a verbal dispute (logomachia), that is, into a dispute that arises because they do not under­ stand each other § 500, and that is always a foolish and pointless thing. But disputes over words (controversia philologica) are different from that; they are true disputes, whose object are words or other expressions. § 502. Learned disputes must be conducted according to the following rules: (1) the attacking part looks for a mistake in the proof of his opponent § 194, or in general a deviation of the thoughts of the opponent from the rules of the doctrine of reason. Then of course he has not refuted the matter itself, but indeed his opponent’s way of thinking. Against such an attack [139] one can either not defend oneself at all, if he is correct; or one must

Of a Learned Discourse

117

show that one has not violated the rules of the doctrine of reason that we were accused of breaking. § 503. (2) The attacking part demonstrates the antithesis, from which follows that the contested proposition is false, and that the opponent errs § 500. Against this attack one can defend oneself only if the opponent makes a mistake in his demonstration, and one must show this according to the first rule § 502. If one party can show the other that it accepts demonstrable propositions without proof, then this objection is unanswered until the proof is provided. § 504. (3) The attacking part refutes the contested proposition by an apagogical proof § 196. To that belongs also when one shows that the contested proposition contradicts another opinion of the opponent, although we do not accept this other opinion (argumentatio ad hominem). Against such an attack one can defend oneself only if there is a mistake in the apagogical proof, and one must show this to the opponent § 502. § 505. (4) If one of the opponents abandons the dispute, and brings forward things by which the contested proposition is not refuted and the antithesis is not proved; then one must not get into such matters, but rather grant them in the present dispute, so that the dispute does not become too wide-ranging [weitläuftig] § 481. The other party can defend itself in this case only if the first has admitted something in haste, and then he must show that what was admitted does indeed concern the matter of dispute. § 506. (5) The attacking part can show by a limitation § 299, which he adds to the contested proposition, that it is not as universally true as the opponent asserts. Against this attack we can defend ourselves only by showing either that this limitation has no influence on the present dispute, or that it is false, or if we ably prove that our proposition is true without limitation. § 507. (6) The attacking part brings a distinction (distinctio) against his opponent, or he shows the difference between things that the opponent conflated, and by this conflation that he was misled into a dispute, or into error. One can defend oneself against a distinction just as one does against a limitation § 506. § 508. (7) The attacking part can refute the universality of the contested proposition by instances. An instance (instantia) is an exception to a proposition from which it is sufficiently clear that it is not universally true.

[AA 16: 849]

[AA 16: 850]

[AA 16: 851]

[AA 16: 852]

[AA 16: 853]

118 [AA 16: 854]

[AA 16: 855]

[AA 16: 856]

[AA 16: 857]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

One can defend oneself against an instance only if one either accepts it, or shows that the instance does not fit, or one limits the contested proposition in such a way that the instance does not fit; or one demonstrates the universality of the contested proposition without disregarding the instance. § 509. (8) The attacked part uses reprisals (retorsio) if he shows that what the opponent derives from the contested proposition by an apagogical proof § 504 follows instead from the antithesis. And in that case the attacking part can defend himself only if he shows that his opponent makes a mistake in his proof. § 510. (9) After complete refutation one tries to instill an abhorrence of error in the opponent by showing, of course without violating the duties one owes to the opponent, that it [141] is dangerous, harmful, and absurd. One can defend oneself against this attack only if one shows that the opponent views our opinion from the wrong side. By a correct observation of these rules, refutations become also practical § 489. § 511. If one derives bad and contradictory consequences from the contested proposition, not for instance to convince the opponent of his error, but somehow to insult him, then one is a drawer of malicious conclusions [ein Folgenmacher oder Consequenzenmacher] (consequentiarius). Drawing malicious conclusions is not necessarily a mistake contrary to the doctrine of reason, but it is always a sin, and thus worthy of being detested by all honest people. § 512. The defense against a drawer of malicious conclusions is called answering [Verantwortung] (apologia); one can conduct this either with logical weapons, if the drawer of malicious conclusions makes mistakes contrary to the doctrine of reason § 511, since one must show him at once his stupidity and his evil heart, of course without drawing malicious conclusions; or one must use the weapons of law, and then the doctrine of reason has nothing more to tell us about that. § 513. Although learned disputes have their uses § 178, nevertheless a learned man (1) must not make an occupation of the refutation of others; (2) must not begin his own dispute about a trivial matter; (3) must conduct important and needed refutations completely thoroughly, and (4) not defend himself against all attacks. § 514. Two arguing parties dispute with each other (disputatio formaliter sumta) if the antithesis is exposited and evaluated in a learned way, and if

Of a Learned Discourse

119

both occur orally and in the presence of both parties [142]. The person who exposits the antithesis in a learned way is the opponent (opponens), and the person who evaluates him, that is, who discovers what is false and uncertain in it and in his proof, is the respondent (respondens). Now, in order that the disputation does not become disorderly and too wide-ranging [weitläuftig], only the opponent may conduct proofs, and the respondent does nothing more than evaluate the proofs. § 515. Since the discourses that are held in disputation do not belong within the precinct [den Bezirk] of the doctrine of reason, it is clear that the opponent must begin the disputation, and in doing so he must (1) determine the matter of dispute § 500. 501. If he does not understand the opinion of the respondent, then he must have it explained by him. (2) He attacks the respondent according to one of the rules presented in § 502–10. (3) For the sake of brevity and distinctness, he presents his proofs in formal syllogisms § 399, and (4) just for this reason he uses the analytic method § 423. The Socratic and Platonic methods make the disputation too wideranging [weitläuftig] and cumbersome § 430. By the first, one would be required to uphold the other part in the matter of dispute. § 516. The respondent takes up the argument (assumere argumentum) when he repeats the opponent’s objection, and that is useful in order to consider the criticism well, so that he can answer it effectively. For the sake of brevity, the respondent must do no more than show where the opponent has made a mistake either in the matter or in the form of his proof § 502, and then he must demand that the opponent either change his inference, or demonstrate the premise that seems to be false or uncertain to the respondent. § 517. The mentor [Der Beistand] of the respondent (praeses) should prevent the respondent from conceding an antithesis that is not yet sufficiently proved. He must therefore assume his office if the respondent can think of nothing more, or nothing clever, to say § 516.

[AA 16: 858]

[AA 16: 859]

Four t h S e c t ion

[AA 16: 860]

Of Learned Writings § 518. The exposition of past events is history (historia). Learned writings present either history or dogmatic truths § 104. The former are historical (scripta erudita historica) and the latter are dogmatic writings (scripta dogmatica). These present either a common cognition of dogmatic truths, or a learned one § 18. 21. The former are historical-dogmatic (scriptum historico-dogmaticum), but the latter are systematic writings (scriptum systematicum), which are scientific writings (scriptum scientificum) if they present a science § 434. Each writing is with respect to its content either very ample or very brief. The former is a major work (systema), but the latter is an excerpt (compendium). § 519. History recounts either things that belong to nature and art insofar as one considers thereby neither the free actions of human beings nor their immediate effects; or it recounts the free actions of human beings together with everything that stands in close connection with it. The former is the history of nature and art (historia naturae et artis), but the latter is history as such (historia stricte dicta). To the latter belongs (1) political [144] history (historia politica), which recounts the civil and political actions of human beings; (2) church history (historia ecclesiastica) recounts the fates of churches and the actions of human beings who have an appreciable influence in them; (3) private history (historia privata) recounts the careers of particular persons insofar as they have no appreciable influence in the state, the church, and scholarship; (4) learned history (historia litteraria) recounts the events of the learned world, and it is either a history of disciplines, or of learned men, or of learned writings. § 520. A historical writing must (1) be extensive § 481. 482, neither too ample nor too brief. Thus, it can be extensive in one respect and for one

[AA 16: 861]

[AA 16: 862]

[AA 16: 863]

122

[AA 16: 864]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

reader, too ample in another respect and for another reader, and too brief in a third respect and for a third reader. With time every history becomes too brief. (2) Important, with regard to the entire content as well as to what is recounted of it § 483. (3) Correct § 484. (4) Distinct § 485, thus pictures and engravings are often necessary. (5) Thorough § 488, thus it must prove everything according to the rules of paragraphs 206–15. (6) Practical or pragmatic (historia pragmatica) § 489. (7) Methodical § 487. 432.§ 521. If history should be pragmatic and extensive at the same time, then it must be presented in such a way that an intention is achieved that is practical enough § 520. Now since everything that is actual in this world, if it can be cognized by us human beings, exists not only for the glory of God but also for our happiness, then a historian must seek to achieve these two purposes through history. In particular with natural history one must have a dual purpose § 519: (1) through natural things to become better acquainted with the perfections of God, and (2) to teach the reader distinct concepts of natural things, and thereby clear a path to the learned cognition of them. § 522. History in the narrow sense § 519 suffices for the glory of God if one cognizes from human events the divine government of the human race, and the perfections that God reveals in it. For the happiness of human beings, (1) civil history suffices if one can learn from it political acumen in matters of war and peace; (2) church history suffices if one can learn from it the acumen to govern the church, and if it develops the characteristics of true and false churches; (3) learned history suffices if it promotes scholarship; (4) private history suffices if one can learn from it human acumen in private life. § 523. Historical-dogmatic writings are not learned writings § 518. But if they are extensive, important, intelligible, correct, and practical, then they are very useful to people who cannot and do not want to become learned, likewise also with children, who should be led to the sciences, in order to infuse them with a foretaste of learnedness. § 524. A systematic book must be (1) extensive § 481. 482. Thus, it must either contain everything known about a doctrine at the time the book is written, or it must contain as much of it as the particular purpose of the author requires. The most extensive writings can with time become not extensive, and therefore with respect to time one must carefully distinguish the extensiveness of a dogmatic book for the author from its extensiveness for the reader; (2) important § 483; (3) correct § 484, in that not only all

Of Learned Writings

123

thoughts contained in it [146] are true, but also each conforms to the rules of the doctrine of reason. (4) Distinct and intelligible § 485. (5) Thorough § 488, it must therefore be written coherently and according to the learned method. (6) Practical § 489. (7) Methodical § 414–38. § 525. Throwing something together [Das Zusammenschmieren] (compilatio) occurs when an author compiles all the material he finds here and there that he wants to write about without combining it properly. Although a work that is thrown together can be useful to other learned men, it nevertheless remains, with respect to the author, a wretched work. A writing is plagiarized (plagiarius) if the author poses as the originator of those thoughts he learned from others. § 526. Whoever makes an excerpt of a major work (epitomator) by leaving out of it everything that is superfluous in view of his lesser purpose can write a very useful and necessary book, if only he has chosen his purpose reasonably § 518.

Fourth Main Part

Of the Character of a Learned Man

[AA 16: 865]

Of the Character of a Learned Man

127

§ 527. The character of a learned man (character eruditi) consists in the totality of those marks that are the proximate grounds and causes of learned cognition. § 528. The general character of a learned man (generalis character eruditi) is the character of a learned man insofar as he contains generally the proximate grounds of learnedness in general; but the particular character [147] (character eruditi specialis) [is the character of a learned man] insofar as he contains the proximate grounds of this or that kind, and of this or that part of learnedness. § 529. The first part of the general character of a learned man consists in the learned nature (natura erudita), or in that proportion of all powers of the soul by which a human being is adept at and inclined towards learned cognition § 528. § 530. To the learned nature belongs (1) native wit [Mutterwitz], the learned mind (ingenium eruditum), the proportion of the powers of cognition whereby a human being is adept at learned cognition. To that belongs (a) reason (ratio), the ability to understand distinctly the connection of things § 21, which must be disposed by nature to become sound, broadly expanded, strong, thorough, and beautiful. (b) Understanding (intellectus), the faculty of distinct cognition § 21. 17, which must be disposed by nature to become broadly expanded, profound, pure and beautiful. Consequently, a great attentiveness, reflection, consideration and abstraction belong to native wit § 142. (2) A beautiful mind (ingenium pulchrum), the proportion of the powers of cognition whereby a human being is disposed to beautiful thinking § 32. § 531. To the learned nature belongs (2) the learned temperament (temperamentum eruditum), or the proportion of the powers of desire, and their conformity with native wit, by virtue of which a human being is not only inclined to attain a learned cognition, but by virtue of which also the powers of cognition are properly exerted to produce the most perfect learned cognition § 529. § 532. The learned nature is a mere good of fortune [Glücksgut], which a human being must be born with [148], but without which it is impossible to attain learned cognition by any art.

[AA 16: 866]

128

[AA 16: 867]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

§ 533. Native wit is called the inborn natural doctrine of reason (logica naturalis connata), but the science of learned cognition and of learned exposition is called school wit, or the artificial doctrine of reason (logica artificialis). The indistinct cognition of the rules of native wit together with the skill to observe them, which one attains through the mere use of native wit, is called the acquired natural doctrine of reason (logica naturalis acquisita theoretica et practica), and one counts it as native wit more broadly understood. Native wit does not contradict school wit, it is indispensable to the latter in theory as well as in practice. Outside the disciplines it is even sufficient. Yet without school wit no learned cognition can be attained, it improves native wit, and if a greater school wit is combined with a greater native wit, a human being can take it much higher than by the best native wit alone. § 534. Whoever would become a great, learned man must follow nature, and apply himself to learned cognition only if he possesses the learned nature, and to the extent that he possesses it § 532. § 535. One can know if one possesses the learned nature: (1) if one has a rational inclination towards learned cognition, because its perfections please us; (2) if it goes easily for us whenever we think learnedly; (3) if one becomes aware by an attempt that one can really think learnedly. § 536. The second part of the general character of a learned man consists in the skills he gradually acquires through exercises § 527. To the skills of a learned man belong: (1) The extension [149] of the understanding and of reason (extensio intellectus et rationis), the skill to cognize many things distinctly and in diverse connections, and to cognize many clear marks of every thing § 25. (2) The intensity of reason and of the understanding (intensio intellectus er rationis), the skill to cognize things to a great degree of perfection and mathematical certainty § 27. 28. 29. (3) The skill to think beautifully § 32. (4) A great heart § 91 (magnitudo pectoris), the skill to think and to act in conformity with the learned temperament § 531, which presupposes the skill to think not otherwise than greatly and practically § 26. 30. § 537. Learned exercises are (A) general (exercitia generaliora), the more frequent repetitions of learned meditation in general. To that belongs (1) learned naturalizing, the exercises one undertakes without art, and which make up the natural, acquired doctrine of reason § 433.

Of the Character of a Learned Man

129

§ 538. (2) The more perfect, regular, and artificial exercises (exercitia oculatiora, logica artificialis practica), or the more frequent observation of the rules of the artificial doctrine of reason. To that end, (a) one studies a good artificial doctrine of reason; (b) one tries to practice all its rules; (c) if one has produced and written down a series of thoughts according to the logical rules, one compares them with these rules and examines where one has observed them or not. Through these exercises one must finally bring it about that in thinking and speaking one observes the rules of the artificial doctrine of reason without being aware of them. § 539. (B) The particular learned exercises, or studying (exercitia erudita specialiora), consists in all actions whereby learned cogni-[150]tion arises and is improved in whomever performs these actions. Six exercises belong to this. § 540. (I) Learning from an oral exposition. Because this exercise is the easiest and surest, one must begin with it. Whoever would be instructed by this exercise must (1) have his mind prepared for learnedness by the lower and beautiful sciences. (2) He must find an at least moderately competent teacher from whose oral exposition he can hope to attain a good learned cognition. (3) He must give proper attention to the oral exposition, so that he correctly understands the teacher and his exposition. (4) He must meditate on everything the teacher presents, or at least on the main points of his exposition § 436. 437. (5) He must evaluate logically (logice diiudicare) everything he has heard, that is, try to cognize what kind of logical perfections or imperfections are found in it. Thus, he must examine the kind of species and genus of learned cognition to which the thing he would evaluate belongs; he must recall the logical rules of this species or genus, and from the comparison of the object with these rules try to cognize whether it conforms to them or not. § 541. (II) The reading of learned writings. To that end one must (1) set oneself a reasonable purpose for the sake of which one would read learned writings. Thus, a person studying must read books (1) in order to repeat a discipline that one already learned ; (2) in order constantly to improve our learned cognition; (3) in order to learn a part of learnedness that one does not yet understand; (4) in order to practice the observation of the rules of the doctrine of reason. (b) One must seek out a book that is adept at furthering this [151] intention. Consequently, one must (1) not read all

[AA 16: 868]

[AA 16: 869]

130

[AA 16: 870]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

books just as they come into one’s hands. (2) In the beginning read only such books of which one has found after a logical evaluation that they are adept at furthering our purpose. If one already possesses an aptitude to think learnedly, then one can also benefit from reading such books as are full of defects and mistakes. (c) One must seek to understand the book and the author correctly. (d) One must meditate on and logically evaluate every thought that is presented in the book, as in § 540. n. 4. 5, so that one learns to understand the presented subjects correctly. § 542. The profitable reading of learned writings is furthered by the observation of the following rules: (1) One reads with the greatest attention without entertaining foreign thoughts. (2) One reads the book from the beginning straight through, if it is written systematically. (3) One never stops reading in the middle of intricately connected material. (4) One reads the book through slowly in a hurry [langsam eilend], and neither too quickly nor too slowly. (5) One must not get tired of reading before one has come to the end. (6) One must not read too many books at the same time, especially ones of different content. (7) One begins with the shorter excerpts, proceeds to the greater works, and finally one reads writings that deal extensively with particular subjects. (8) One reads writings that belong to a main part of learnedness, according to the synthetic method. § 543. The study of learned cognition is greatly furthered in part when in the beginning one learns the foundations of learnedness from only one teacher to whom one has devoted oneself; in part when one uses and practices the learned truths immediately. [152] § 544. (III) The frequent repetition (repetitio), or recollection, of what one learned. To this end, it is required that one observe the following rules: (1) One must not turn this repetition into a mere rote learning. (2) In the repetition one must meditate on and evaluate each thought just as when one wanted to learn it for the first time, although this goes increasingly more briskly and easily. (3) The truths one learned according to the synthetic method, one repeats according to the analytic and syllogistic methods § 423. 428. (4) One repeats the repetition frequently, with some variation. (5) One learns ever more, and practices the truths one has learned. (6) If one writes down his meditations in the repetition, the exercise is thereby greatly enhanced. (7) One presents the truths one has learned in writing or

Of the Character of a Learned Man

131

orally in a learned way. (8) One discusses the truths one has learned with others. § 545. The repetition and learning of learned cognition is greatly promoted if one briefly and with a reasonable selection writes down what one is afraid of forgetting, and what brings the rest at once back into our memory. § 546. (IV) Investigation (investigatio), or the rational imitating of other learned men in their learned thinking and exposition. To that end, (1) one chooses a great learned man as a model to follow. (2) One examines what he does to think so learnedly, so thoroughly, so orderly, etc. (3) One examines how he discovered the truths, or how they could be discovered if they were not yet discovered. (4) One tries to think and to speak just so in similar cases. § 547. (V) One exposits the disciplines for others in a learned way, either orally or in writing. [153] Or learned exposition is an exercise in learned cognition; for by teaching we learn. § 548. (VI) The discovery of new truths (inventio), when we cognize something in a learned way without learning it from other people; we may be the first people to cognize it, or it may have been known already by others before us. This exercise is the most difficult, which one must save for last. § 549. An autodidact is a learned man who has become learned without a teacher, whether he created his entire learnedness § 548, or received only no oral instruction. A rational person chooses the easiest and surest way if he first tries to learn from an oral exposition, then reads books, and applies his power of invention [seine Erfindungskraft] to discovering entirely new truths rather than to those which have been known for some time, if all this is even possible for him. § 550. Just as it is a mistake when a person without native wit wants to become learned § 534; it is a negligent kind of learned thinking (negligens eruditionis genus et impolitum) if one does not properly combine art with native wit § 533. § 551. The affected and forced kind of learned thinking (affectatum et coactum eruditionis genus) arises when school wit is combined with native wit in a bad way: (1) when the rules of the artificial doctrine of reason are false and ungrounded; (2) when its correct rules are badly applied in that they are not suitable either for the truths or for the nature of the learned man.

[AA 16: 871]

132

[AA 16: 872]

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

§ 552. A cognition and an exposition that are merely learned are the dry, prosaic, coarse, scholastic, and pedantic kind of learned-[154]ness (macilentum, ieiunum, pedanticum, scholasticum eruditionis genus). In order to avoid this a student must spend some time every day during his recreational hours on the fine sciences. § 553. The third part of the general character of a learned man consists in learned diligence (diligentia erudita), or in as great an exertion of all acquired learned aptitudes as is required every time one would learnedly think and exposit to a certain degree of perfection § 527. To that end one must observe ten rules. § 554. (1) A student must, before all else, sketch the horizon of his learned cognition as correctly as possible, so that he always already knows where to apply his learned diligence. And so that this horizon is assumed to be neither too small nor too large, one must gradually expand it as our powers and abilities increase. § 555. (2) A student must evaluate his powers as exactly as possible to determine whether they suffice for learnedness in general, and for that part of it to which he applies himself, and for the cognition of this or that truth. To that end (a) he must examine whether he possesses the learned nature § 529–35. (b) That in respect of which one would test one’s powers § 328–39, one turns into a problem, and examines whether one has powers enough to actualize the solution. (c) Beware of the prejudices of too great a confidence and distrust in the evaluation of one’s powers § 170. (d) One tests one’s powers by a genuine trial. (e) One has oneself evaluated by others. § 556. (3) In studying one must not apply too much diligence, and not direct learned diligence to things that are found above, below and outside the horizon of our learned cognition § 554. [155] § 557. (4) One must also not apply too little diligence, but rather as much as is required to undertake properly all learned exercises, and gradually to study the entire horizon of our learned cognition. § 558. (5) One must begin to study as early as possible; what one would do, one does that soon. § 559. (6) If at all possible, one must study and think learnedly every day. Whoever does not go forwards, goes backwards. § 560. (7) In the middle of the course of study, one must always hurry slowly [langsam eilen]. So that one does not hurry too much, one must not

Of the Character of a Learned Man

133

leave a learned occupation until one has satisfied all the rules of the doctrine of reason in it. But so that one also is not too slow, one must properly enliven the desire to study. § 561. (8) One must never stop learning, either by always learning something new, or by learning to know better what one has already learned. § 562. (9) One must try constantly to improve the learnedness one has already attained, and to correct its remaining defects and mistakes. § 563. (10) In studying one must combine daily experience, intercourse with the reputable world, and use of the very things over which one meditates learnedly; thereby one does not live on school dust as a mere learned worm and dream up Platonic republics.

Afterword

Riccardo Pozzo I Both Georg Friedrich Meier’s Doctrine of Reason and its abridgement, Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason, appeared in 1752. Like other logic texts of the time, they do not merely elaborate upon the formal aspects of logic, but systematically examine the elements of thought and language that make human understanding possible. In these books, Meier investigates quite thoroughly the realms of epistemic, aesthetic, and historic cognition. In addition, they contain numerous expositions pertaining to poetics, hermeneutics, anthropology, and the nature of rhetoric. At the beginning of both books, Meier defines the doctrine of reason as “a science, which deals with the rules of learned cognition and of learned exposition” (Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason, § 1, 1).1 One fundamental question shaped Meier’s philosophical agenda, namely, what is the “plan of the effectiveness of reason”? (Doctrine of Reason, § 5, 6).2 We may understand this question in terms of an inquiry into “how do we recognize what is true?” This issue drives Meier’s interest in speculative philosophy, and we may contrast his approach to those of other philosophers. Locke and Leibniz, for example, distinguished between truths “in a strict sense” and “moral” or “metaphysical” truths. Wolff had asserted the need to distinguish between a theoretical and a practical part of logic—the former concerned with the objective and systematic foundation of science, the latter with the habits we form after we know the causes and relations of things. By extending the scope of logic beyond dogmatic truths to historical

136

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

and aesthetic truths (Doctrine of Reason, § 133–35, 147–52; Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason, § 104–6, 23–24), Meier overcame the strict demarcation between logic and rhetoric, based on a rigorously formal concept of truth. He chose to work, instead, on epistemic truths. According to Meier, human beings are sure of the world’s actuality because they live in it. However, they are also conscious of the fact that they know according to their own limitations, that is, that they know their own subjective worlds. What is distinctive of Meier ‘s approach, therefore, is its focus on the subjective side of cognition and the construction of certainty as the result of our cognitive processes. Only after having gained certainty is one allowed to speak about truth. But it is always a truth affected by its origin; a given truth might be universal and necessary, but it might also be merely probable, doxastic, or simply a belief. Meier and Kant parted ways on this issue. Meier considers the claim that human cognition might be “completely false” to be the effect of prejudice. This is the case, for example, with regard to the partiality of people involved in a heated discussion about some doctrinal issue (Doctrine of Reason, § 128, 140–42; Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason, § 100, 22). Kant, on the other hand, argues from a transcendental standpoint, remarking that to assume the possibility of a total mistake would put into question the very cognitive capacity of the human being. Kant’s strategy against radical skepticism, instead, consists in the legitimation of a transcendental foundation of cognition (Critique of Pure Reason, A294/B350).

II Kant based his logic lectures on Meier’s textbooks for about forty years. From the summer of 1755 to the winter of 1755/56 he adopted the Doctrine of Reason; and from the summer of 1756 to the summer of 1796, he used the Excerpt. Kant brought to class an interleaved deskcopy of this text, which, over the years, became saturated with reading notes and other thoughts. Hence, it is not at all surprising that Kant’s own logical writings, as well as his Critique of Pure Reason, were deeply influenced by Meier.

Afterword

137

This influence is also clear if one considers the pervasive effect of Meier’s terminology, not to mention his influence on Kant’s Reflections and Lectures on Logic, which tackle questions that were central to Meier’s project, such as the constitution of a horizon and the analysis of prejudices. Of course, other philosophers of the German Enlightenment also discussed these matters, but it was Meier’s texts that provided Kant’s point of departure. Locke’s philosophy played an especially important role in this context. In fact, Meier served as mediator between Locke and Kant, helping to introduce key Lockean issues (e.g., the “extent of human knowledge” and the “degrees of assent”) into the teaching of logic in the German universities. In his consideration of continuities and ruptures in Kant’s logical writings, Norbert Hinske has shown that Kant gradually developed a new philosophical language by drawing upon traditional Greek and Latin terms and their recent Germanization. By and large, these terms were available to Kant because of Meier. One thinks first and foremost of notions such as “doctrine of reason,” “egoism,” “genius,” “horizon,” “logic,” “logical,” “party,” “popular,” “prejudice,” and “pure.” But one example stands out: in moving from an initial adherence to Wolff ’s mathematical method to his own critical formulation in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant embraces Meier’s notion of a system as a connected set of “dogmatic truths.”

III Meier was born in Ammendorf, near Halle (Prussia) on March 29, 1718.3 Because of his fragile health, he received his primary education at home. His father, a Lutheran pastor close to Pietism, taught him Latin, German, and arithmetic until 1729, when he was able to enter the house of Johann Gottfried Semler, the founder of the first mathematical and mechanical Real-Schule, where he received his secondary education. Meier supplemented this training by taking classes from 1730 at the Hallisches Waisenhaus, the institution established by the founder of Pietism, which at that time was run by Hieronymus Freyer, and from 1732 at the University of Halle. His name appears in the university’s registry of June 6, 1730, but he actually began his studies on Easter 1735, finishing them on April 25, 1739. In that year, Meier published his first book, De nonnullis abstractis

138

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

mathematicis. The manuscript was co-authored with a fellow student, Jakob Heinrich Sprengel, and defended by both on September 30, 1739 under the presidency of Siegmund Jakob Baumgarten, who together with his brother Alexander Gottlieb were Meier’s intellectual mentors.4 Meier began teaching at Halle in the Fall semester of 1739/40. Until 1746, he taught as a Privatdozent, from 1746 to 1748 as an extraordinary professor, and from 1748 to his death as an ordinary professor. He was a highly effective teacher and could count among his students statesmen such as Christoph Ludwig von Stille, Karl Gottlob von Guichard, Karl Abraham Baron von Zedlitz und Leipe, as well as scholars such as Johann August Noesselt, Johann Salomo Semler, Thomas Abbt, Johann August Eberhard, and Christian Gottfried Schütz. Just before his promotion to ordinary professor in 1748, Meier refused offers by the University of Göttingen and the Duke of Brunswick. They wanted him to teach at the University of Helmstedt and at Brunswick’s technical university, the Collegium Carolinum, respectively. Shortly after his promotion, however, the Oberkuratorium für die preußischen Universitäten (which was then an agency of Berlin’s Etats-Ministerium) charged him with propagating free thinking. He was accused of denying the doctrine of the immortality of the soul in his writing of 1746, Thoughts on the Condition of the Soul after Death. Meier acquitted himself by arguing that the misunderstanding was due to the care he had taken to detail the position of his adversaries. Although Meier never left Halle, the world knew him quite well because of his large number of publications, many of which appeared in several editions and reprints. He was made a fellow of the academies of sciences at Greifswald, Jena, Berlin, and Göttingen. In 1754, he was requested to appear in front of Frederick William II the Great, then on a state-visit in Halle, which was in itself a great honor. The King ordered him to stop employing standard textbooks when teaching philosophy and instead follow John Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, which Meier promptly did in the summer of 1754, becoming the first scholar to do so at a German university. The experiment, however, did not work. Only few students enrolled, and Meier went back to teaching Wolff, Baumgarten, and his own writings. He lived the uneventful life of a scholar and managed to be well off, thanks to

Afterword

139

a comparatively high salary and the royalties from his books. He was prorector twice, from July 1759 to July 1760 (it happened in the middle of the Seven-Years War, and as the university’s representative he was taken hostage for three days when the town fell into enemy’s hands), and from July 1768 to July 1769. In 1750, he married Johanna Concordia Hermann, who, like himself, was the daughter of a Lutheran pastor. Having had no children of their own, the couple adopted a daughter who then married the university secretary. Meier died on June 21, 1777.

IV Meier’s intellectual life can be divided into two main periods: the first was dominated by Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, whom he first met at the Waisenhaus in 1730; the second by Locke, whom he helped to introduce into Germany after 1754. Meier is usually considered a follower of Christian Wolff, and there is some truth to this view. However, this affiliation cannot explain some of the more striking traits of his thought, such as the division of his logic and aesthetics into inventio, dispositio, elocutio, and exercitatio, which used to be part of the rhetorical canon since Cicero’s apocryphal Rhetorica ad Herennium. For instance, the Logica enucleata published in 1731 by Johann Heinrich Zopf, a pupil of Budde, contains a fourfold division very similar to Meier’s. It is clear that Meier was subject to traditions other than Wolffianism. First and foremost, he was influenced by Johann Franz Budde’s eclectic combination of ancient and modern philosophy, but also significant is the strong interest in an effective use of rhetoric in theology and the humanities triggered by the pietists. A. G. Baumgarten’s philosophy was most important in this regard. One can, moreover, trace in Meier’s works his eventual development from the rationalism of his first period to the empiricism as a result of his later exposure to Locke. In his first period, he maintained (with Leibniz, Wolff, and Baumgarten) that all obscure and confused cognition can eventually become clear and distinct; in the second, he gave up this claim, and emphasized instead the fact that the immediate objects of our sensations do not correspond to objects around us.

140

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

During the first period, he published both popular and academic books, writing on every part of philosophy with the exception of natural philosophy. His most original contributions were in the fields of logic, metaphysics, aesthetics, and philosophy of language, in influential titles such as Theoretical Doctrine of the Emotions in General (1744), Foundations of All Sciences Concerned with Beauty (1748–50, 2nd ed., 1754–59), Doctrine of Reason (1752, 2nd ed., 1762), and Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason (1752, 2nd ed., 1760). Meier’s second period began with the Program in Which He Announces His Decision to Give a Course on Locke’s Essay on the Human Understanding (1754), continues with Observations on the Limits of Human Cognition (1755), Metaphysics (1755–59, 2nd ed., 1765), the Essay on the General Art of Interpretation (1757), Excerpt from the Foundations of All Sciences Concerned with Beauty (1758), Consideration on the Nature of Scientific Language (1763), Life of Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1763), and Contributions to the Doctrine of the Prejudices of Mankind (1766). This phase concludes with the essays collected in the Investigations of Several Matters Pertaining to Philosophy (1768–71).

V In the Doctrine of Reason, Meier provided a full theory of the “horizon” of human cognition, which prepared the way for Kant’s new understanding of this concept in light of the critical task of determining the extent and the limits of philosophical cognition. Meier began by considering the whole spectrum of the angustia eruditae cognitionis, which originates either from ignorance or lack of knowledge regarding things and their grounds, and continues until philosophical cognition is achieved. Meier considered ignorance to be, on the one hand, a complete deficiency of cognition, and, on the other, the mere presence of historical cognition, which falls short of philosophical cognition. In contrast to Leibniz’s calculemus! and against the Wolffian principle nullos cognitionis rationum decernimus limites, Meier was keen on determining the limits of human cognition. He argued that it is impossible for “a man to be able to gain a philosophical cognition of every possible thing” (Doctrine of Reason, § 64, 68). He supported

Afterword

141

this claim with several examples from the practice of contemporary natural scientists. Relying on Locke, Meier focused on exactly the same spectrum of experience that, four decades later, Kant would thematize in his “Dialectic of Pure Reason.” The doctrine of horizon or “field of vision” appears at first blush as an invitation to exercise caution in adopting criteria with respect not only to what we cannot know, but also to what we do not need to know. A closer inspection, though, reveals the rhetorical context of this theory. In fact, the outer reach of one’s horizon (what the Greeks called prepon and the Latins aptum) has to be proportionate to one’s faculties and one’s dignity as a human being. Meier outlined four possible points of view with respect to our cognitive horizon. The first one, from above the horizon, refers to the limits of human cognition. However, one should note that Meier considered the limits of knowledge in general, not the limits of knowledge of experience. One thinks especially of religion and cosmology in this context. Faced with the paralogisms and antinomies they generate, Meier pleaded for a re-appropriation of the theory of double truth. There are, on the one hand, truths of philosophical cognition, and all remaining truths stand above it. Of course, the crucial instances here were the debates de coena domini, which were not forgotten since the Book of Concord (1580). It is not just Kant’s distinction between “empirical” and “logical illusion” that is at play here. Kant’s definition of “transcendental illusion,” which ignores “all the warnings of criticism, carries us beyond the empirical use of the categories, and holds out to us the semblance of extending the pure understanding” (Critique of Pure Reason, A295/B352), is an offshoot of Meier’s theory. The second point of view, from beneath the horizon, concerns those rules of scientific ethos that direct our mind when setting up a research project. Meier pleads with particular insistence that we abide by them, and lamented the many occasions we do not, as in treatises concerned with trifles (for example, shoemaking, an enterprise that costs much labor to a scientist and yields little or no practical results). The third perspective, from beyond the horizon, centers on the knowing subject. It originates from purely pragmatic observations. Granted that not all subjects are equal, neither are the limits of their cognition. Meier

142

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

mentions “professional scholars,” as opposed to the examples given by Meier. The analysis of the subject’s cognitive ability becomes central in order to determine her epistemic range. The fourth point of view, from within the horizon, is the appropriate one for a philosopher. Its goal is the legitimation of the research field chosen by the scientist within the horizon of philosophical cognition (Doctrine of Reason, § 66–69, 70–74; Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason, § 45–48, 11–12). While mathematics and metaphysics make possible an exact and correct knowledge of nature (which must be analytical, in the sense of respecting the praedicatum inest subjecto principle), the human being, according to Meier, has to behave carefully when confronted with truths achieved in all other fields. This is so, because these truths are invariably distorted by prejudices (Doctrine of Reason, § 200, 273; Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason, § 168, 39). Eighteenth-century logic deals to a large extent with the set of what Meier calls “logical prejudices,” that is, prejudices that find their origin in the general configuration of human thought and speech, independently of their respective objects. Meier provides a systematic outline of the praeiudicia logica according to the readiness to give one’s assent. This classification is important for Kant scholars since it informs his Logic Lectures. Meier considers a first group of prejudices deriving from an excess of confidence. To this group belong (1) the “prejudice of excessive authority,” (2) “logical egotism,” (3) the “prejudice of antiquity,” (4) the “prejudice of novelty,” (5) the “prejudice of the accepted doctrinal system,” (6) the “prejudice of lazy confidence,” and (7) the “prejudice of shallowness” (Doctrine of Reason, § 202, 276–78; Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason, § 170, 39–40). The second group embraces those prejudices that originate from a deficit of confidence, as when we consider something as generally false, evil, or imperfect. To this set belong the negative versions of some of the prejudices of the first group: the prejudices of (1) “hating antiquity,” (2) “hating novelty,” (3) “hating what is generally thought of,” and (4) “mistrusting one’s own strength” (Doctrine of Reason, § 202, 279–80; Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason, § 170, 46). Meier’s analysis of the prejudices displays considerable insight into the nature of doubt and skepticism. In 1752 he maintained that skepticism must be charged with obliterating the distinction between false and erroneous knowledge. One should note, however, that at the time of the publication of the Doctrine of Reason and the Excerpt Meier conceived the relation to

Afterword

143

external objects in naively realistic terms. We know, Meier thought, insofar as we represent the object to ourselves; the existence of these objects is proved by common usage. Fourteen years later, in his Contributions to the Doctrine of Prejudices of Mankind, Meier abandons this naïve position. The book tackles the subject–object relation by making explicit the “natural necessity” and the inevitability of prejudices. The “prejudice that experiential cognition is the foundation of all other cognition,” Meier realized, is overarching and unifies all the other prejudices from the preceding table. It consists in the assumption “that our sensations represent to ourselves the configuration and quantity or an internal determination of the objects of our sensations. Everyone says that a body, which seems to be red in our sensations, is red. In the same way, we name a food sweet or sour. In short, everyone names objects according to the pattern of sensations one has of them” (Contributions, § 15, 31). Meier’s point is that the immediate object of our sensation is not identical to the object in front of us, and that the world of our sense experience is something different from the world of the objects “in and for themselves” (Contributions, § 30, 61). Although this conclusion is still consistent with the premises of Leibnizian and Wolffian philosophy, it is an important step, as Norbert Hinske has remarked, on the path that leads Kant to distinguish between the phenomenal and the noumenal world. The legacy of Meier’s philosophy is that an effective inquiry into logic and rhetoric can take place only in the context of a more general epistemic model. In this respect, Meier went beyond his teacher A. G. Baumgarten, insofar as he laboriously introduced into a system of artes liberales all theoretical principles and practical rules connected with traditional logic and rhetoric. Nevertheless, it is easy to see where the limits of Meier’s endeavor lie: the continuous reference to the canons of the tradition of rhetoric eventually lead Meier to lose sight of the initial intention of elaborating every special art according to a compulsory, embracing legality, and exhausts himself in enumerating concrete instructions for poetizing. Riccardo Pozzo

144

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

Notes 1 All references to the Excerpt cite the pages of the present volume. References to other works cite the pages of the original editions listed in note 4. 2 Vernunftlehre (Halle, 1752, 2nd ed. Halle, 1762; repr. ed. Günter Schenck, Halle: Hallescher Verlag, 1997). 3 Meier has been the subject of a number of studies: Samuel Gotthold Lange, Leben Georg Friedrich Meiers (Halle, 1778); Josef Schaffrath, Die Philosophie des Georg Friedrich Meier: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Aufklärungsphilosophie (Eschweiler: Phil. Diss. Freiburg/Br, 1940); Max Wundt, Die deutsche Schulphilosophie im Zeitalter der Aufklärung (Tübingen, 1945; repr. Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1992), 226–28; Wilhelm Risse, Logik der Neuzeit (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Fromann, 1964–70), vol. 2, 721–23; Ferdinand Wiebecke, “Die Poetik Georg Friedrich Meiers: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Dichtungstheorie im 18.” Jahrhundert, Diss. phil., Göttingen, 1967; Wolfgang Bender, “Rhetorische Tradition und Ästhetik im 18.” Jahrhundert: Baumgarten; Meier und Breitinger, Zeitschrift für deutsche Philologie 99 (1980), pp. 481–506; Werner Schneiders, Aufklärung und Vorurteilskritik: Studien zur Geschichte der Vorurteilstheorie, FMDA, sect. II, vol. 2 (Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1983); Leonhard P. Wessel, “G. F. Meier and the Genesis of Philosophical Theodicies of History in 18th-Century Germany,” Lessing Yearbook 12 (1981), 63–84; Norbert Hinske, Stellenindex und Konkordanz zu George Friedrich Meier “Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre,” FMDA, sect. III, vol. 5 (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1986); Günter Gawlick, “G. F. Meiers Stellung in der Religionsphilosophie der deutschen Aufklärung,” in N. Hinske (ed.), Zentren der Aufklärung I: Halle: Aufklärung und Pietismus (Heidelberg: Verlag Lambert Scheider, 1989), 157–76; Terry Boswell, Quellenkritische Untersuchungen zum Kantischen Logikhandbuch (Frankfurt: P. Lang, 1991); Norbert Hinske, “Georg Friedrich Meier und das Grundvorurteil der Erfahrungserkenntnis: Noch eine unbemerkt gebliebene Quelle der Kantschen Antinomienlehre,” in Norbert Hinske and C. Cesa (eds.), Kant und sein Jahrhundert: Gedenkschrift für Giorgio Tonelli (Frankfurt: P. Lang, 1993), 103–21; Elfriede Conrad, Kants Logikvorlesungen als neuer Schlüssel zur Architektonik der Kritik der reinen Vernunft: Die Ausarbeitung der Gliederungsentwürfe in den Logikvorlesungen als Auseinandersetzung mit der Tradition, FMDA, sect. II, vol. 9 (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: FrommannHolzboog, 1994); Riccardo Pozzo, “Philosophische Terminologie zwischen Leibniz und Meier,” in H. Breger (ed.), VI. Internationaler Leibniz-Kongreß, 6 vols (Hannover: G.-W.-Leibniz-Gesellschaft, 1994), vol. 1, 605–12; Günter Schenk, Leben und Werk des halleschen Aufklärers Georg Friedrich Meier (Halle: Hallescher Verlag, 1994); Günter Gawlick, “Ein Hallischer Beitrag

Afterword

145

zum Streit der Fakultäten: Georg Friedrich Meiers ‘Betrachtungen über das Verhältnis der Weltweisheit zur Gottesgelahrtheit’ (1759),” in R. Theis and C. Weber (eds.), De Christian Wolff à Louis Lavelle: Métaphysique et histoire de la philosophie: Recueil en hommage à Jean École à l’occasion de son 75e anniversaire (Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1995), pp. 71–84; Ulrich Dierse, “Nachträge zu G. F. Meiers Religionsphilosophie,” in Lothar Kreimendahl et al. (eds.), Aufklärung und Skepsis: Studien zur Philosophie und Geistesgeschichte des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts: Günter Gawlick zum 65. Geburtstag (StuttgartBad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1995), 33–46; Klaus Petrus, Genese und Analyse: Logik, Rhetorik und Hermeneutik im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1997); María Jesús Vásquez-Lobeiras, Die Logik und ihr Spiegelbild: Das Verhältnis von formaler und transzendentaler Logik in Kants philosophischer Entwicklung (Frankfurt: P. Lang, 1998); Norbert Hinske, Zwischen Aufklärung und Vernunftkritik: Studien zum Kantschen Logikcorpus, FMDA, sect. II, vol. 13 (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1998); Riccardo Pozzo, Georg Friedrich Meiers “Vernunftlehre”: Eine historischsystematische Untersuchung, FMDA, sect. II, vol. 15 (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2000); María Jesús Vásquez-Lobeiras, “Kants Logik zwischen Tradition und Innovation,” in Michael Oberhausen et al. (eds.), Vernunftkritik und Aufklärung: Studien zur Philosophie Kants und seines Jahrhunderts: Norbert Hinske zum 70. Geburtstag (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2001), 365–82; Heinrich P. Delfosse, Clemens Schwaiger, and Riccardo Pozzo, Stellenindex und Auswalhlkonkordanz zu Georg Friedrich Meier “Vernunftlehre” mit einer vollständigen Konkordanz auf CDRom, FMDA, sect. III, vol. 21 (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 2005); Riccardo Pozzo, “Prejudices and Horizons: G. F. Meier’s Vernunftlehre and Its Relation to Kant,” Journal of the History of Philosophy, 43 (2005), 185–202; Riccardo Pozzo, “Meier, Georg Friedrich,” in Heiner F. Klemme and Manfred Kuehn (gen ed.) and Hans Adler, Michael Albrecht, Holger Böning, Daniel Breazale, John C. Laursen, Michael Pauen, Riccardo Pozzo, Hanno Schmitt, and Eric Watkins (sp. eds.), The Dictionary of Eighteenth-Century German Philosophers (New York: Continuum, 2010), vol. 2, 767–73; Frank Grunert and Gideon Stiening, Georg Friedrich Meier (1718–1777): Philosophie der Aufklärung zwischen populärer Reproduktion und theoretischer Innovation, (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015). 4 Meier’s most momentous writings: Meditationes mathematicae de nonnullis abstractis mathematicis (Halle, 1739); Theoretische Lehre von den Gemuthsbewegungen überhaupt (Halle, 1744; repr. Frankfurt am Main: Athenäum, 1971); Abbildung eines wahren Weltweisen (Halle, 1745; repr. ed. Mirjam Reischert, Hildesheim: G. Olms, 2007); Anfangsgründe aller schönen Wissenschaften. 3 vols (Halle, 1748–50, 2nd ed. 1754–59; repr. Hildesheim: G.

146

Excerpt from the Doctrine of Reason

Olms, 1976); Vernunftlehre (Halle, 1752, 2nd ed. Halle, 1762; repr. ed. Günter Schenck, Halle: Hallescher Verlag, 1997); Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre (Halle 1752, 2nd ed. 1760; repr. ed. Erich Adickes in Kant, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 16, Berlin: G. Reimer, 1914); Zuschrift an seine Zuhörer, worin er ihnen seinen Entschluß bekannt macht, ein Collegium über Locks Versuch vom menschlichen Verstande zu halten (Halle, 1754); Metaphysik, 4 vols (Halle 1755–59, 2nd ed. 1765); Betrachtungen über die Schrancken der menschlichen Erkenntniß (Halle, 1755); Versuch einer allgemeinen Auslegungskunst (Halle, 1757; repr. ed. Axel Bühler and Luigi Cataldi Madonna, Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1996); Auszug aus den Anfangsgründen aller schönen Künste und Wissenschaften (Halle, 1758; repr. ed. Günter Schenck, Halle: Hallescher Verlag, 1992); Betrachtung über die Natur der gelehrten Sprache (Halle, 1763); Alexander Gottlieb Baumgartens Leben (Halle, 1763); Beyträge zu der Lehre von den Vorurtheilen des menschlichen Geschlechts (Halle, 1766; repr. ed. Heinrich P. Delfosse, Norbert Hinske, Paola Rumore, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: FrommannHolzboog, 2006); Untersuchungen verschiedener Materien aus der Weltweisheit, 4 vols (Halle 1768–71).

Concordance The following table merges data from Volumes 16 and 24 of the Akademie Ausgabe. In the leftmost column we have translated the main headings from Meier’s Auszug, along with the secondary headings added by Adickes. The second through fourth columns are based on Adickes’s work in Volume 16. They correlate the paragraphs of Meier’s Auszug to both the Jäsche Logic in Volume 9 of the Akademie Ausgabe, as well as the Logic Reflexionen in Volume 16. We have also merged the data from Volume 24 into the second and fourth columns, so that readers can more readily correlate each individual paragraph in the Auszug with the corresponding Reflexionen. Columns five through eight follow Volume 24’s table correlating each paragraph of the Auszug to the logic lectures contained in that Volume. Although the table in Volume 24 references its six sets of lectures, we have limited our table to the four that have thus far been translated into English. Lastly, note that the leftmost column follows the paragraph numbering from the Auszug. The remaining columns then use the pagination from Akademie Ausgabe Volumes 9 (Jäsche Logic), 16 (Reflexionen), and 24 (Logic Lectures).

72–3 73 74

8

9

71–5

7

16–20

51–71

72

6–9

Analytic – Dialectic. Theoretical – Practical Logic. Uses of Logic

21–3

6

5

5

4

Concept and Division of Philosophy

5

3

3–50

5

11–21

3–75

2

1–4

Concept, Task and Division of Logic

11–87

Reflexionen (AK 16)

5

1–9

Introduction to the Doctrine of Reason

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

1

Meier Auszug §

Contents (Bunch Translation)

Concordance

—

38–9

38

38

38–9

29–31

—

29

28

26–7

26–9

26–39

Blomberg

—

—

794

793–4

793–4

797–9

—

—

791–2

790, 792

790–2

790–7

Wiener

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Hechsel

—

—

700

695

695, 700

697–8

—

—

693–4

693

693–4

693–700

DohnaWundlacken

148 Concordance

Rational Cognition, Historical Cognition

Ground and Consequence

93–9

92

21–2

16

17–8

91

15

91–3

80–1

—

80

13

14

15–6

79

76–91

12

33–5

76–169

76–7

10–4

Representation. Object of Representation. Kinds of Cognition. Clarity. Distinctness

33–9

76–775

11

10–40

First Section: Of Learned Cognition in General

33–136

Reflexionen (AK 16)

76

10–413

First Main Part: Of Learned Cognition

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

10

Meier Auszug §

Contents (Bunch Translation)

43–9

43

42–3

42–3

41–2

40–1

40

40

39–40

39–42

39–66

39–289

Blomberg

—

—

—

—

797–8

797–8

797–8

797–8

797–8

797–8

797–813

797–940

Wiener

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

86–113

Hechsel

703–4

703

703

703

702–3

702

—

—

701

701–3

701–10

701–78

DohnaWundlacken

Concordance 149

109 109 109–10 110

32

33

34

107

28

31

106

27 107

106

26

108

105

25

29

104

24

30

101–2 103–4

101

21

22

100–1

20

23

99

99–162

19

35–9

94

18

Reflexionen (AK 16) 93–4

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

17

Meier Auszug §

Logical and Aesthetic 19–35 Perfection of Cognition

Contents (Bunch Translation)

61–3

60

60

59–60

58–9

57

56–7

56

55–6

55–6

54–5

52–4

50–2

49–50

49

43–9

43–63

43–9

43

Blomberg

—

—

—

—

815

—

—

—

—

—

—

813–4

809–10

—

—

808–12

808–15

—

—

Wiener

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Hechsel

—

—

—

—

—

—

709

709

709

711–2

—

708

705–7

—

—

705

705

704

703–4

DohnaWundlacken

150 Concordance

171 172 173 174 175–6 176–7

42

43

44

45

46

47

170–90 170–1

40–4

41

41–9

Ignorance. Horizon of Cognition

170–218

168–9 169

39

40

40–9

168

38

41–65

167–8

37

162–6

111

Reflexionen (AK 16)

163

44–5

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

36

36

35

Meier Auszug §

Second Section: Of the Amplitude of Learned Cognition

Imperfections of Cognition

Contents (Bunch Translation)

70

69–70

67–9

67–9

66–7

66

66

66–71

66–76

65–6

65

65

64–5

63–4

63–4

63

Blomberg

—

816

815–6

814–7

—

—

—

814–6

814–20

—

—

—

—

813

813

—

Wiener

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Hechsel

712

711

711

711-2

—

710

—

710-2

710–6

—

—

—

—

710

710

—

DohnaWundlacken

Concordance 151

Polyhistory, Humaniora

Praiseworthy and Blameworthy Ignorance

Contents (Bunch Translation)

75 —

202 203 203 203 204 204–5 205

57

58

59

60

61

62

63

72–3

—

—

74–5

73–4

73

73

202 202

—

55

197–8

54

72

72–5

71–2

—

71

71–2

—

71

Blomberg

56

195–6

195–202

53

45–6

195

52

53–4

194–5

51

190–5

190–1

44–5

50

50–2

178

49

Reflexionen (AK 16) 177

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

48

Meier Auszug §

819

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

818

818

—

—

817

—

817

—

—

Wiener

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Hechsel

—

717

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

714

713–4

713–7

—

—

713

713

—

—

DohnaWundlacken

152 Concordance

65

65

64

Meier Auszug §

75–6

— —

225 225 227 228 228 228 228–9

73

74

75

76

77

78

79

—

—

77–8

77–8

77–8

77–8

77–8

77

224

223–4

70

77

224–5

223

69

76–7

71

220–1

68

—

72

219–20

67

76

76–80

206 219–36

75–6

—

Blomberg

206–18

206

Reflexionen (AK 16)

219

49

46–8

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

66

Third Section: Of the 66–91 Greatness of Learned Cognition

Pedantry, Gallantry

Contents (Bunch Translation)

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

822

—

—

822

820

820

—

Wiener

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Hechsel

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

717–8

—

—

717–8

714–6

714–6

—

DohnaWundlacken

Concordance 153

Reflexionen (AK 16)

49–54

Essence and Criteria of Truth and Falsity 237 238 238–9 239–40

93

94

95

237–61

237–95

92

92–8

49–57

236

91

87

236

234

86

90

234

85

235

233

84

235

233

83

88

232

82

89

230 231

81

229–30

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

80

Meier Auszug §

Fourth Section: Of 92–114 the Truth of Learned Cognition

Contents (Bunch Translation)

89

88

80–8

80–8

80–90

80–106

80

79

79

79

79

79

—

79

78–9

78

—

78

Blomberg

823–4

823–4

823

—

823–4

823–33

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Wiener

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Hechsel

—

718–9

718

—

718–9

718–24

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

DohnaWundlacken

154 Concordance

Dogmatic and Historical Truths. Doctrinal Systems

Logical, Aesthetic and Practical Truth; Total and Partial. Exact and Subtle Cognition, Coarse and Crude

Contents (Bunch Translation)

277 281 282

105

106

107

275–6

104

275–80

267

103

—

265–6

102

104–5

264–5

101

—

100–1

—

99–100

99–101

97–9

96–7

—

93–6

89–90

262 262–4

99

89–99

89–90

89–90

89–90

Blomberg

262–75

100

54–5

243

98

99–103

241 242

Reflexionen (AK 16)

96

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

97

Meier Auszug §

—

832

—

830–1

830–2

—

829–30

—

825–8

823–4

823–30

823–4

823–4

823–4

Wiener

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Hechsel

—

723

—

724

723–4

—

722–3

—

722

718–9

718–33

—

718

—

DohnaWundlacken

Concordance 155

115

116

117

118

Mark

Analytic and Synthetic, Coordinated and Subordinated Marks

Affirmative and Negative Marks

Important and Unimportant, Fruitful and Unfruitful Marks

60

59–60

58–9

58

295

114

307–9

305–7

300–4

296–300

296–358

290–1

113

58–65

289

112

115–54

288–9

288–94

111

55–7

287

111–13

110

282–8

282

Reflexionen (AK 16)

282–3

53–7

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

109

109–10

108

Meier Auszug §

Fifth Section: Of the Clarity of Learned Cognition

Kinds of Error

Essence of Error

Contents (Bunch Translation)

111–2

110–1

108–10

106–8

106–42

106

105–6

—

104–5

—

104

101–4

101–6

—

Blomberg

837–8

836–7

834–5

834

834–48

—

832–3

—

832

832–3

—

832–3

832–3

—

Wiener

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Hechsel

726

726

726

725

725–31

723–4

724

—

724

723–4

—

719–20

719–24

—

DohnaWundlacken 156 Concordance

323–4 324 324–6

129

130

131

320–1

126 321–2

316–8

125

322

316

124

127

316

123

128

315

315–26

311–15

310

309–10

Reflexionen (AK 16)

122

122–31

61–2

60

Clear, Distinct and Obscure Cognition

120

Necessary and Contingent Marks

60

60–1

119

Sufficient and Insufficient Marks

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

External and Internal 121 Marks. Modes, Attributes, Essences

Meier Auszug §

Contents (Bunch Translation)

123

—

—

—

—

—

119–22

118–9

—

—

118–23

113–8

113

112–3

Blomberg

—

—

—

—

—

—

841–2

840–1

—

—

840–2

838–40

838

838

Wiener

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Hechsel

729–30

—

—

—

—

—

729–30

729–30

—

—

729–30

727–8

727

726

DohnaWundlacken

Concordance 157

340–1 341–2 346–7 348 348 349

139

140

141

142

143

144

340–6

339

138

63–5

338–9

137

137

—

—

—

134–7

130–4

130–7

—

—

—

126–30

333 338

126–30

333–8

135

62

136

135

Analytic and 139–40 Synthetic Distinctness. Degrees of Cognition

Liveliness of Cognition

125–6 —

328 329–30

133

123–6

Blomberg

134

327–32

Reflexionen (AK 16)

123–5

61–4

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

327

132–4

Degrees of Clarity. Distinctness

132

Meier Auszug §

Contents (Bunch Translation)

847–8

—

—

—

845–7

842–5

842–8

—

—

—

842–3

842–3

—

—

—

—

Wiener

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Hechsel

—

—

—

—

730–1

730

730–1

—

—

—

730

730

—

—

729–30

729–30

DohnaWundlacken

158 Concordance

356 357 357–8

152

153

154

359 360 361

156

157

359–96

155

155–67

65–73

355–6

151

Certainty of Cognition. Opinion, Belief, Knowledge

354

150

359–515

353

149

65–86

351–2

148

349–58 349–50

62–3

147

147–54

349

146

Reflexionen (AK 16) 349

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

145

Meier Auszug §

Sixth Section: Of the 155–215 Certainty of Learned Cognition

Degrees of Distinctness

Contents (Bunch Translation)

151–2

142–51

142–51

142–53

142–250

142

—

—

141–2

—

138–40

141–2

137–8

137–42

—

—

Blomberg

856–7

—

849

849–57

849–900

848

—

—

849

—

847

847

848–9

847–9

—

—

Wiener

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Hechsel

—

—

731–2

731–5

731–50

731

—

—

731

—

731

731

731

731

—

—

DohnaWundlacken

Concordance 159

168–9

170

Prejudice in General

Kinds of Prejudices. Dealing with Prejudices

77–81

75–7

371

167

412–27

400–12

396–401

370–1

166

73–5

368–9

165

168

366–7

365

162 368

364

161

163

363–4

160

164

362

159

Reflexionen (AK 16) 361–2

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

158

Meier Auszug §

Reservation of Judgment. Provisional Judgments

Contents (Bunch Translation)

161–94

161–94

155–61

154–5

—

—

—

—

—

153

—

152

152

Blomberg

863–79

—

859–61

859

—

—

—

—

—

857

—

—

—

Wiener

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Hechsel

737–42

—

735–6

—

—

—

—

—

—

734–5

—

—

—

DohnaWundlacken

160 Concordance

177

True and False Doubt. Resolution of Doubts. Settled and Unsettled Truths.

83

453–4 454–5

179

180

452–61

446–51

452

83–4

83

444–6

178

Dogmatism. 178–80 Skepticism. Skeptical Method

176

430–2

175

Doubt, Scruple, Objection

429 429–30

173

174

428–9

427–43

172

81–2

Reflexionen (AK 16)

427–8

171–5

Probability, Plausibility, Moral Certainty

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

171

Meier Auszug §

Contents (Bunch Translation)

204–18

204–18

204–18

204–18

203–4

201–3

198–201

—

—

—

194–7

194–201

Blomberg

—

—

—

—

884

884

—

—

—

—

879–84

879–84

Wiener

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Hechsel

—

—

743–4

743–4

743–4

743

742

—

—

—

742–3

742–3

DohnaWundlacken

Concordance 161

71

483–92

482–3

485–6 487 488 488 488–9

192

193

194

195

196

483–5

191–200

Proof

—

191

190

480–1

189

Arbitrary Truths

480

188

479

479–82

476–8

479–80

70–1

70–1

72

473–5

187

186

Kinds and Degrees of 186–9 Certainty

185

Science. System

73

463–4

184

Persuasion

183

461 462

84–6

181

461–72

Reflexionen (AK 16)

182

84–6

181–3

Hypothesis

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

Meier Auszug §

Contents (Bunch Translation)

233–4

—

—

—

230–3

230–3

230–4

230

229–30

—

—

—

229–30

227–8

226–7

225–6

225–6

218–25

218–26

Blomberg

893

—

—

—

893

892

892–4

892

892

—

—

—

892

891

889–90

—

—

886–9

886–9

Wiener

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Hechsel

748–9

—

—

—

748

748

748–9

748

748

—

—

—

748

747

747

—

—

746

746

DohnaWundlacken

162 Concordance

Witness. Unbelief. Moral Belief

Experience. Reason. Belief

Contents (Bunch Translation)

496–7

206

504 505 505 506 506–7 507

207

208

209

210

211

212

504–15

496

205

207–15

495 496

203

493–4

202

204

493

201

67–72

492–3 493–504

200

66–71

492

199

201–6

492

198

Reflexionen (AK 16) 491

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

197

Meier Auszug §

—

—

247–8

—

246–7

241–6

241–50

241–6

240–1

236–40

236–40

—

235–6

235–46

235

234

—

234

Blomberg

—

—

900

—

900

898–9

898–900

895–7

—

—

—

—

—

895–7

—

—

—

893–4

Wiener

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Hechsel

—

—

750

—

750

750

750

750

749–50

749–50

749–50

749–50

749–50

749–50

—

—

—

749

DohnaWundlacken

Concordance 163

523

228

521–2

225 522

521

224

523

521

223

227

520–1

222

226

520

221

—

520 520

219

220

—

520

218

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

250–1

517

250

250

217

516–9

250–1

516–7

86–7

516–32

249–50

249

248–9

Blomberg

216

216–7

Practical, Speculative, Theoretical

86–7

215

216–48

509 509–10

214

Reflexionen (AK 16) 507–8

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

213

Meier Auszug §

Seventh Section: Of Practical Learned Cognition

Contents (Bunch Translation)

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

900–3

900–3

900–3

900–4

—

—

900

Wiener

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Hechsel

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

751

751

751

751

—

—

750

DohnaWundlacken 164 Concordance

Contents (Bunch Translation)

530 530 531 531 531 532 531 532

242

243

244

245

246

247

248

528–9

238

241

528

237 529

527

236

529

527

235

239

526

234

240

525 526

232

524–5

231

233

524

230

Reflexionen (AK 16) 524

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

229

Meier Auszug §

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Blomberg

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

904

—

—

—

—

904

—

—

—

Wiener

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Hechsel

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

DohnaWundlacken

Concordance 165

Abstraction, Comparison, Reflection

Kinds of Concepts. Concepts of Experience

544 545

257

258 549–58

542–3

256

94–5

542

255

259–60

541

541–9

254

92–4

535 535–6

252

253

254–8

534

251

533–41

534

91–4

533–623

250

249–53

Concept in General. Idea

91-100, 140148

Reflexionen (AK 16)

533

249–91

Eighth Section: Of Learned Concepts

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

249

Meier Auszug §

Contents (Bunch Translation)

256–9

—

255

254–5

254–5

252–4

252–5

—

—

—

252

251

251–2

251–73

Blomberg

907–9

—

—

—

905

—

905

—

—

—

—

—

—

905–28

Wiener

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Hechsel

753–4

—

—

—

753

—

753

—

—

—

753

752

752–3

752–62

DohnaWundlacken

166 Concordance

Definition, Explanation, Description

Arbitrarily Made Concepts

Content, Extension of Concepts. Higher, Lower Concept. Genus, Species.

Contents (Bunch Translation)

569

572 573

268

269

572–89

267

268–9

568

266

140–3

563

265 568–72

562–3

264

93

562

263

266–7

560–1

262

559–67

559–60

95–100

261

261–5

551

260

Reflexionen (AK 16) 549–50

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

259

Meier Auszug §

270–2

263–70

263–72

—

261–3

261–3

—

261

261

260–1

259–60

259–261

256–9

255–6

Blomberg

920–1

912–3

912–21

—

—

—

—

—

—

911–2

910–1

910–2

907–9

907–9

Wiener

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Hechsel

757–8

756–60

756–60

—

—

—

—

—

—

754–6

754–6

754–6

753–4

753–4

DohnaWundlacken

Concordance 167

Nominal and Real Definitions

595 596 597 597–8

276

277

278

279

603–4 604 605

282

284

602–3

281

283

601–2

280

601–11

594

275

143–5

593

274

280–4

591–2 592

272

273

591

589–600

271

144–5

Reflexionen (AK 16)

589–90

270–9

Requirements of a Definition

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

270

Meier Auszug §

Contents (Bunch Translation)

—

—

—

—

268–72

268–72

—

—

265

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

265

Blomberg

—

—

—

—

919–20

919–20

—

—

924

—

920

921

—

—

—

—

921–4

Wiener

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Hechsel

—

—

—

—

760

760

—

—

760

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

760

DohnaWundlacken

168 Concordance

619

291

635–6 636 636–7

295

296

635–41

294

102–4

625–6

293

Quality of Judgments 294–6

624–5

624–35

292

101–4

618

290 624–703

618

289

100–19

615–7

288

292–352

614–5

287

Essence of Judgment. 292–3 Matter and Form

Ninth Section: Of Learned Judgments

613

612–23

286

146–8

Reflexionen (AK 16)

612–3

285–91

Logical Division of Concepts

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

285

Meier Auszug §

Contents (Bunch Translation)

—

—

273–5

273–5

273–5

273–5

273–5

273–82

—

—

—

272–3

272–3

272–3

272–3

272–3

Blomberg

—

—

929–30

929–30

—

928

928

928–39

—

—

—

925–8

925–8

925–8

925–8

925–8

Wiener

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Hechsel

—

—

764

764

763

762–3

762–3

762–71

—

—

—

761–2

761–2

761

760–1

760–2

DohnaWundlacken

Concordance 169

653

306

653–62

653

104–8

651–2

305

305–8

Hypothetical and Disjunctive Judgments

—

648–9 649

302

303

304

647–8

301

647–51

646

102–3

300

301–3

645

299

Simple and Composite Judgments

Quantity of Judgments

642–4

298

642–6

642

—

297–300

Condition, Determination, Analysis of Judgments

Reflexionen (AK 16)

297

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

Meier Auszug §

Contents (Bunch Translation)

—

276

276–7

—

—

—

275–6

275–6

—

—

—

275

275

Blomberg

—

—

—

—

—

—

Hechsel

933–5

932–5

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

929, 931, 932 —

929–32

932

—

—

932

932

Wiener

—

765

765

—

—

—

765

765

—

—

764

764

764

DohnaWundlacken

170 Concordance

Demonstrable and Indemonstrable (Empty) Judgments. Axioms and Postulates. Analytic and Synthetic Judgments 667 668 668 669

313

314

315

316

667–74

665–6

312

313–8

664

664–7

663–4

662–3

311

110–2

110

311–2

Theoretical and Practical Judgments

108–9

109

309

654

308

Reflexionen (AK 16) 654

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

307

Meier Auszug §

Exponible Judgments 310

Modality of Judgments

Contents (Bunch Translation)

—

—

—

278–9

278–9

278

—

278

277–8

—

—

276–7

Blomberg

—

—

936–7

936

936–7

936

936

936

936

—

—

932,933,935

Wiener

87

87

86

—

86–7

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Hechsel

—

767–8

767

767

767–8

766

766

766

766

766

—

765

DohnaWundlacken

Concordance 171

681 681 682–3

329

680–1

326

328

680

325

327

679

679–90

324

112

678–9

677

322

113

676–7

321

323

676

320

674–7 674–5

—

319

319–22

670

318

Reflexionen (AK 16) 669–70

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

317

Meier Auszug §

Corollaries. 324–40 Theorems. Problems. Lemmas. Notes. Occult Qualities

Judgments of Perception and of Experience

Judicia intuitiva – discursiva

Contents (Bunch Translation)

—

280

—

—

280

280

280

—

—

—

—

279–80

279–80

279

—

Blomberg

—

938

—

—

938

—

938

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Wiener

—

88

—

88

87

88

87–8

87

—

—

—

87

87

87

87

Hechsel

—

767–8

—

—

767

767–8

767–9

767

—

—

—

767

767

—

—

DohnaWundlacken

172 Concordance

Inferences: Equivalence, Subalternation, Opposition, Conversion, Contraposition of Judgments

Contents (Bunch Translation)

688 688–9 690 690

337

338

339

340

691–2 693

341

342

691–703

687

336

114–9

686–7

335

341–52

685 686

333

685

332

334

684–5

331

Reflexionen (AK 16) 683–4

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

330

Meier Auszug §

281

281

281–2

280

280

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Blomberg

938

938

938–9

938

938

938

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Wiener

89–90

89

89–92

88

—

88

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Hechsel

769

769

769–71

768

769

768

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

DohnaWundlacken

Concordance 173

704 705 706 706

355

356

704–10

354

114, 120-3, 132

353

353–6

702–3

352

Essence, Constituent Parts, Kinds of Inferences

701

351 704–75

700

350

114, 120-36

700

349

353–413

699 699

698–9

346

347

697

345

348

696

344

Reflexionen (AK 16) 694–5

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

343

Meier Auszug §

Tenth Section: Of Learned Rational Inferences

Contents (Bunch Translation)

284

—

282–4

—

282–4

282–9

282

282

282

282

282

282

282

281–2

281

281

Blomberg

939

—

939

—

939

939–40

939

—

—

—

—

—

939

939

939

938

Wiener

93

—

93

—

93

88–113

92

91–2

91–2

91–2

91–2

91–2

91–2

91–2

91–2

90

Hechsel

771–2

—

771

—

771–2

771–8

771

—

771

771

—

771

770–1

770

770

770

DohnaWundlacken

174 Concordance

Ordinary and Extraordinary Rational Inferences. Major and Minor in Ordinary (Categorical) Rational Inferences

General Rules for Rational Inferences of All Kinds

718 719

365

366 719–20

718

364

120, 122

715

363

367–8

714

362

284–5

—

—

—

284

—

—

284

712–3 714

360

284

284

—

283

283–4

Blomberg

712–9

361

123, 125, 129, 130

712

359

360–6

711-2

710–2

358

121, 122-3

Reflexionen (AK 16)

710–1

357–9

Terms, Matter and Form of Rational Inference

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

357

Meier Auszug §

Contents (Bunch Translation)

939–40

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

939

—

939

939

Wiener

95–6

88–9

99

99

97-9, 101

97

—

93-4, 96

88-9, 93-101

93-4, 96

—

95

93–6

Hechsel

773

—

—

—

773

773

—

772

772–3

772

—

771–2

771–2

DohnaWundlacken

Concordance 175

General Rules for Categorical Inferences

The Four Figures of Inferences

Contents (Bunch Translation)

123–5

732 733 733 733–4

380

381

382

731

377 732–3

730–1

376

378

730

375

379

729–30

729–34

374

374–82

723

373

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

284

284

—

—

—

722 722–3

371

372

—

721

—

—

370

721–9 721

125–8

—

284–5

Blomberg

369

369–73

720

368

Reflexionen (AK 16) 719

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

367

Meier Auszug §

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

939–40

Wiener

—

—

104

104

104

104

104

104

104

104

99–103

99–103

99–103

99–103

99–103

99–103

95–6

—

Hechsel

—

—

775

775

775

775

775

775

775

775

—

774

774

774

774

774

773

—

DohnaWundlacken

176 Concordance

Hypothetical Rational Inferences

129 745 745–6 746–7

392

394

745–8

393

392–4

738

391

736–7

388 737

736

387

737–8

736

386

389

735

385

390

735

734–44

384

126–8

Reflexionen (AK 16)

734

383–91

Particular Rules for the Individual Figures of Categorical Inferences. Modes of these Figures.

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

383

Meier Auszug §

Contents (Bunch Translation)

—

284–6

284–6

284–6

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Blomberg

—

—

939–40

939–40

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Wiener

107

107

107

107

—

103

103-4, 105-6

103-4, 105-6

103-4, 105-6

103-4, 105-6

103-4, 105-6

105

105

103-4, 105-6

Hechsel

—

776

776

776

—

—

—

—

776

776

—

775

775

775–6

DohnaWundlacken

Concordance 177

Composite Rational Inferences

768–72

764–5

405

133–4

763–4

404

406–9

762

762–7 762–3

134–5

752–61

402

402–5

Fallacies

131–3

403

401

Induction and Analogy

751–2 752

399

400

751–2

751

131

398

398–400

Immediate Inferences. Formal and Covert Rational Inferences

750–1

749–50

397

Dilemma

130–1

748–50

396

129–30

Reflexionen (AK 16)

748–9

395–6

Disjunctive Rational Inferences

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

395

Meier Auszug §

Contents (Bunch Translation)

288

288

—

—

287–8

287–8

287

287

286–7

286

286–7

286

286

286

286

Blomberg

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

939–40

939–40

Wiener

112

111–2

111

110–1

110

110–2

109

109

109

88–9

88-9, 109

107

107

107

107

Hechsel

778

778

—

—

777

777–8

776–7

776

776

—

776–7

776

—

772–3

772–3

DohnaWundlacken

178 Concordance

777 777 777 777–8

415

416

417

418

776–85 776

139-40, 148-9

414

414–21

Method in General. Particular Kinds

775 775

412

413 776–813

774

411

414–38

773

410

139-40, 148-50

770–3 773–5

409

135–6

769–70

408

410–3

769

407

Reflexionen (AK 16) 768

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

406

Meier Auszug §

Second Main Part: Of the Method of Learned Cognition

Proofs and their Mistakes

Contents (Bunch Translation)

—

—

—

290

289–90

289–90

289–93

289

289

289

288

288

288

288

288

288

Blomberg

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Wiener

—

—

—

114

114

114

114–7

—

113

113

113

113

112

112

112

112

Hechsel

—

—

—

779

779

779

779–83

—

778

778

778

778

—

778

778

778

DohnaWundlacken

Concordance 179

802 802–3 803–4 804–5 805

429

430

431

432

433

800–9 800–2

149–50

428

428–33

788–9

426

Further Kinds of Method

788

425 798–800

788

424

148

786–7

423

427

786

786–98

422

149

778

421

422–6

778

420

Reflexionen (AK 16) 778

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

419

Meier Auszug §

Scientific and Popular Method

Analytic and Synthetic Method

Contents (Bunch Translation)

—

292

—

292

292

292

292

291–2

—

291

291

291

291

291

290

—

—

Blomberg

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Wiener

—

117

—

116–7

—

116

116

116

—

—

115–6

115–6

115–6

115–6

115

115

—

Hechsel

—

—

—

780

—

780

780

779

779

—

—

—

779

779

—

—

—

DohnaWundlacken

180 Concordance

150

150

435

436–8

436

Methodical and Tumultuous

Meditation

815 815 816 816 816 816–9

441

442

443

444

445

446

814–5

814–30

440

—

814–64

814

439–63

First Section: Of the Use of Words

—

439

439–63

813

438

Third Main Part: Of Learned Exposition

812–3

811–2

811–3

810–11

809–10

Reflexionen (AK 16)

437

148–9

434

Doctrine, Discipline, Science

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

Meier Auszug §

Contents (Bunch Translation)

—

—

—

—

—

—

294

—

294

294–8

—

293

293

293

293

Blomberg

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Wiener

117

—

—

—

117–8

117

117

117

117-8

117–8

117

117

117

117

—

Hechsel

781

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

781

781–3

—

—

783

780

—

DohnaWundlacken

Concordance 181

Second Section: Of the Learned Style of Writing

Contents (Bunch Translation)

826 826–7 827–8 828–9 829–30

459

460

461

462

463 831–7

825

458

—

825

457

464–78

824–5

823

453

456

822–3

452 824

821–2

451

824

821

450

454

820–1

449

455

820 820

Reflexionen (AK 16)

447

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

448

Meier Auszug §

294–5

—

—

—

—

—

—

294

—

—

294

—

294

—

294

294

—

—

Blomberg

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Wiener

117

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

117

—

117

117

—

—

Hechsel

781

781

781

—

—

—

—

781

—

—

—

—

781

—

781

781

—

—

DohnaWundlacken

182 Concordance

Third Section: Of a Learned Discourse

Contents (Bunch Translation)

—

837

478

838–9 839

479

480

838–59

837

477

479–517

837

836

473

476

835

472 837

834

471

837

833–4

470

474

833

469

475

832–3 833

467

832

466

468

832

465

Reflexionen (AK 16) 831

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

464

Meier Auszug §

—

—

—

—

295

—

295

—

295

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

294–5

Blomberg

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Wiener

117–8

117–8

117–8

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

117

Hechsel

—

781

781

—

—

—

781

781

781

—

781

—

781

—

—

—

781

781

DohnaWundlacken

Concordance 183

Contents (Bunch Translation)

846 846 846 846 846–7 847

495

496

497

498

499

500

845

492 845

844–5

491

846

844

490

494

844

489

493

843–4

488

—

843 843

842

485

486

842

484

487

—

841

483

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

295–6

—

295

295

—

—

—

—

—

—

841

—

Blomberg

482

Reflexionen (AK 16) 840

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

481

Meier Auszug §

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Wiener

118

118

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

118

117–8

117–8

117–8

117–8

117–8

117–8

117–8

117–8

117–8

117–8

Hechsel

782

782

—

—

—

—

—

782

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

DohnaWundlacken

184 Concordance

Fourth Section: Of Learned Writings

Contents (Bunch Translation)

—

858 859 859

515

516

517

869–71 862

518

519

860–4

857–8

514

518–26

856

856

510

513

855

509 856

852–4

508

856

851–2

507

511

850–1

506

512

849–50 850

504

849

503

505

848

502

Reflexionen (AK 16) 847

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

501

Meier Auszug §

297

296–7

296–7

—

—

—

296

—

296

—

—

296

296

—

—

—

296

—

—

296

Blomberg

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Wiener

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

118

118

—

118

—

—

—

—

118

—

—

—

Hechsel

—

783

783

783

—

—

782–3

—

782

782

—

782

782

—

—

—

—

—

—

782

DohnaWundlacken

Concordance 185

Fourth Main Part: Of the Character of a Learned Man

Contents (Bunch Translation)

—

866 866 866 866–7 867 867 867

532

533

534

535

536

866

529

530

865–6

528

531

865

527

865–72

864

526

527–63

864 864

864

523

524

864

522

525

863

521

Reflexionen (AK 16) 863

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

520

Meier Auszug §

—

—

—

299

—

—

299

—

—

298

298–301

298

298

—

—

—

—

297–8

Blomberg

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Wiener

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Hechsel

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

783

783

783

783

—

—

—

—

783

DohnaWundlacken

186 Concordance

Contents (Bunch Translation)

870–1 871 871 871 871 871

550

551

552

553

554

870

546

549

870

545 870

870

544

870

870

543

547

869–70

542

548

868 868–9

540

868

539

541

868

538

Reflexionen (AK 16) 867

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

537

Meier Auszug §

301

300–1

—

—

—

300

300

—

300

—

300

—

—

300

299

299

—

—

Blomberg

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Wiener

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Hechsel

—

—

—

—

—

783

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

783

DohnaWundlacken

Concordance 187

Contents (Bunch Translation) 871–2 872 872 872 872 872 872 872

556

557

558

559

560

561

562

563

Reflexionen (AK 16) 871

Jäsche logic (AK 9 )

555

Meier Auszug §

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

301

301

Blomberg

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Wiener

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

Hechsel

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

DohnaWundlacken

188 Concordance

German-English Glossary absondern :  to abstract abstrahiren :  to abstract annehmen :  to accept, to suppose anschaulich :  intuitive das Ansehen :  authority, standing auflösen :  to solve, to resolve aufs möglichste :  to the greatest possible extent, as far as possible ausführlich :  extensive die Ausführlichkeit :  extensiveness ausgeben (etwas für etwas) :  to assert of, to pass off as ausgemacht :  settled die Auswickelung :  unwrapping der Auszug :  excerpt die Bedeutung :  meaning der Beifall :  approval die Beschaffenheit :  character, quality (of judgment) die Beschaffenheiten :  qualities besondere, besonders :  particular, particularly, especially der Betrugschluss :  fallacy bewegend :  moving der Bewegungsgrund :  motive der Beweis :  proof beweisen :  to prove der Beweistum :  ground of proof beziechnen :  to designate die Bezeichnung :  designation das Denken :  thought, thinking deutlich :  distinct, clear

das Ding :  thing die Eigenschaft :  attribute, quality einerlei :  identical, one and the same einzelne :  singular die Einwickelung :  wrapping-up entdecken :  to discover die Entwickelung :  developing erfinden :  to invent, to coin (a term), to formulate (a proposition), to devise, to come up with; to discover die Erkenntnis :  cognition erklären :  to define die Erklärung :  definition das Erwägungsurtheil :  theoretical judgment erweislich :  demonstrable ganz :  total, entire, whole das Gegenteil :  opposite gelehrt :  learned gemein :  common genau :  precise, exact genugsam :  adequate der Glauben :  faith, belief das Gleichgewicht :  equilibrium die Gleichgültigkeit :  indifference (of persons), equivalence (of judgments) die Grösse :  greatness (of learned cognition), quantity (of a judgment) gründlich :  thorough die Gründlichkeit :  thoroughness das Grundurtheil :  axiom

190

German-English Glossary

die Hauptbegriffe :  terms (of a syllogism) das Heischeurtheil :  postulate herleiten :  to derive hinreichend :  sufficient das Horizont :  horizon das Kennzeichen :  characteristic lebendig :  lively die Lehrart :  method das Mannigfaltigen :  diverse things, manifold das Merkmal :  mark das Missvergnügen :  displeasure mittelbar :  indirect, mediate das Nachdenken :  reflection das Nachforschen :  investigation der Nachschluss :  episyllogism das Nachurtheil :  discursive judgment ordentlich :  ordinary die Rede :  discourse (oral or written) regellos :  irregular regelmässig :  regular rührend :  stirring die Sache :  matter, thing der Satz :  proposition, thesis der Schandfleck :  disgrace schlechtweg :  absolutely die Schlussrede :  syllogism die Schreibart :  style of writing übereinstimmen :  to agree das Überlegen :  consideration die Überredung :  persuasion die Überzeugung :  conviction das Übungsurtheil :  practical judgment

der Umfang :  extension ungereimt :  absurd untersuchen :  to examine die Verbindung :  combination der Verbindungsbegriff :  concept of combination das Verbindungsurteil :  judgment of combination der Verdruss :  displeasure die Vergessenheit :  being forgotten das Vergnügen :  pleasure die Vernunftlehre :  doctrine of reason verwerfen :  to reject völlig :  completely vollständig :  complete die Vollständigkeit :  completeness das Vorschluss :  prosyllogism vorstellen :  to present, to represent die Vorstellung :  representation sich vorstellen :  to represent der Vortrag :  exposition die Wechselbegriffe :  convertible concepts weitläuftig :  ample (cognition), wideranging (discourse) die Weitläuftigkeit :  amplitude das Zeichen :  sign das Zergliederungsschlüss :  analytic inference (einander) zugeordnet :  associated with each other zureichend :  sufficient der Zusammenhang :  connection, context die Zusammenstimmung :  agreement

English-German Glossary absolutely :  schlechtweg to abstract :  absondern, abstrahiren absurd :  ungereimt to accept :  annehmen adequate :  genugsam to agree :  übereinstimmen agreement :  die Zusammenstimmung ample (cognition) :  weitläuftig amplitude :  die Weitläuftigkeit analytic inference :  das Zergliederungsschlüss approval :  der Beifall to assert of :  ausgeben (etwas für etwas) associated (with each other) :  einander zugeordnet attribute :  die Eigenschaft authority :  das Ansehen axiom :  das Grundurtheil belief :  der Glauben character :  die Beschaffenheit characteristic :  das Kennzeichen clear :  klar, deutlich cognition :  die Erkenntnis combination :  die Verbindung common :  gemein complete :  vollständig completely :  völlig completeness :  die Vollständigkeit concept of combination :  der Verbindungsbegriff

connection :  der Zusammenhang consideration :  das Überlegen context :  der Zusammenhang convertible concepts :  die Wechselbegriffe conviction :  die Überzeugung to define :  erklären definition :  die Erklärung demonstrable :  erweislich to derive :  herleiten to designate :  beziechnen designation :  die Bezeichnung developing :  die Entwickelung discourse (oral or written) :  die Rede to discover :  entdecken, erfinden discursive judgment :  das Nachurtheil disgrace :  der Schandfleck displeasure :  das Missvergnügen, der Verdruss distinct :  deutlich doctrine of reason :  die Vernunftlehre entire :  ganz episyllogism :  der Nachschluss equilibrium :  das Gleichgewicht equivalence :  die Gleichgültigkeit especially :  besonders exact :  genau to examine :  untersuchen excerpt :  der Auszug exposition :  der Vortrag extension :  der Umfang

192

English-German Glossary

extensive :  ausführlich extensiveness :  die Ausführlichkeit faith :  der Glauben fallacy :  der Betrugschluss greatness (of learned cognition) :  die Grösse ground of proof :  der Beweistum horizon :  das Horizont identical :  einerlei indifference :  die Gleichgültigkeit indirect :  mittelbar intuitive :  anschaulich to invent :  erfinden investigation :  das Nachforschen irregular :  regellos judgment of combination :  das Verbindungsurteil learned :  gelehrt lively :  lebendig manifold :  das Mannigfaltigen mark :  das Merkmal matter :  die Sache meaning :  die Bedeutung mediate :  mittelbar method :  die Lehrart motive :  der Bewegungsgrund moving :  bewegend opposite :  das Gegenteil ordinary :  ordentlich particular :  besondere particularly :  besonders to pass off as :  ausgeben (etwas für etwas) persuasion :  die Überredung pleasure :  das Vergnügen postulate :  das Heischeurtheil practical judgment :  das Übungsurtheil precise :  genau

to present :  vorstellen proof :  der Beweis proposition :  der Satz prosyllogism :  das Vorschluss to prove :  beweisen qualities :  die Beschaffenheiten quality :  die Eigenschaft, die Beschaffenheit quantity (of a judgment) :  die Gröss reflection :  das Nachdenken regular :  regelmässig to reject :  verwerfen to represent :  sich vorstellen representation :  die Vorstellung to resolve :  auflösen settled :  ausgemacht sign :  das Zeichen singular :  einzelne to solve :  auflösen standing :  das Ansehen stirring :  rührend style of writing :  die Schreibart sufficient :  hinreichend, zureichend to suppose :  annehmen syllogism :  die Schlussrede terms (of a syllogism) :  die Hauptbegriffe theoretical judgment :  das Erwägungsurtheil thing :  das Ding, die Sache thinking :  das Denken thorough :  gründlich thoroughness :  die Gründlichkeit thought :  das Denken total :  ganz unwrapping :  die Auswickelung whole :  ganz wide-ranging (discourse) :  weitläuftig

Index amplitude  of cognition  see under cognition of discourse  113 of expression  104 of writing  121–2 art  97 assent  39, 41, 47 autodidact  131 axioms  see under judgments the beautiful mind  127 belief  47–9, 136 certainty  aesthetic  37 of cognition  see under cognition complete  37, 44, 73 determinate  38 extensive  38, 41–7 mathematical  44–5, 97, 128 moral  41, 49 rational  37 sensible  37 of testimony  48 total  38, 40, 44 clarity  see under cognition cognition  amplitude  7, 11–15 beauties of  7–9 beautiful  6–10, 23, 32 begged  39, 44 certainty of  1, 8, 37–9 characteristics of  see cognition, marks of clear  29–33, 36 common  6, 9, 10, 95, 121 complete  13, 34–5 confused  5, 32–7, 114 convincing  38 crude  23, 105

definition of  5 demonstrable  44 determinate  35 distinct  5–8, 32–5, 44, 54, 60, 76, 95, 109–10, 114, 127–8 error of  see error exact  23–4 false  21–4, 30 greatness  8, 9, 17–20 historical  6–11, 42 see also truth, historical horizon of  11–14, 18, 132 intuitive  54 life of  53–5 lively  53–5 marks of  27–35 moribund  53 obscure  29–35 perfection of  1, 7–11, 15, 36 philosophical  7 see also philosophy practical  8, 51–5 probable  1, 40–4 see also testimony, probable profound  34 rational  6, 7, 47, 53 shallow  39, 40 smallness of  18–20 speculative  51–2 stirring  53 symbolic  54 theoretical  51 thorough  38–40, 60 truth of  see truth undeniable  38 concepts  57–65 aesthetic  57 convertible  59, 61, 64 of experience  see under experience consciousness  5, 27–9, 31 of truth  8, 37, 44

194

Index

contradiction  principle of  82–3 see also judgments, contradictory contraposition  see under judgments conversion  see under judgments corollaries  74 credulity  48 definition  61–3 demonstration  44–7, 73–5 lust for  46 spirit of  46 description  61 designation  103 discipline  99 discourse  103–14, 119 disputation  116–19 doctrine  99 of reason  1, 2, 13, 29, 128–9, 131 practical  2 see also under judgments theoretical  2 see also under judgments doubt  40–2 error  9, 24–5, 43 excerpt  see under writings experience  1, 5, 44, 46–9, 58, 60, 63, 73–5, 133 concept of  59, 62, 73 judgment of  74 exposition  1, 2, 100–4, 113–15, 129–32 expressions  103–11 empty  105–6 equivalent  107 faith  1 see also belief fallacy  see under inference greatness, of cognition  see under cognition ground, sufficient  6, 7, 22, 28, 68, 70, 76, 81–3, 87 see also reason, sufficient history  see under writings horizon  see under cognition ignorance  11–13, 24, 30, 42–3, 55 indifference  54 inference 

analytic  89 conclusion of  81, 85 conditional  87 contracted  89 correct  82 covert  88 dilemma  88 disjunctive  87 episyllogism  90 erroneous  82 from example  89 extraordinary  83 fallacy  89 figures of  83, 84 formal  88 immediate  88 matter of  82 modes of  86 ordinary  83–6 premises of  81, 85 prosyllogism  90 sorites  90–1 terms of  81 truncated  88 interpretation  103 investigation  131 judgments  67–79 axioms  72–3 contradictory  77, 82–3 contraposition of  79 conversion of  78–9 demonstrable  72–3 discursive  73–4 empty  72–3 equivalent  76 of experience  74 intuitive  73–4, 115–16 postulates  72–3 practical  72, 74 theoretical  72, 74 learned diligence  132 learned exercises  128–9 the learned nature  127–8, 132 the learned temperament  127–8 lemmas  76 meaning  103–7, 114 meditation  99, 128, 130

Index method  according to tables  97 aesthetic  95 affectation in  98 analytic  96–7 artificial  97 chronological  99 common  95 composite  95 geographical  99 of historical truth  98 mathematical  97 mixed  97 natural  97 Platonic  98 rational  95 scientific  96 simple  95 Socratic  98 syllogistic  97 synthetic  96–7 native wit  127–8, 131 notes  76 opinion  42–3 and disputation  116–19 persuasion  43, 114 philosophy  1, 13, 17 plagiarism  see under writings pleasure  54 postulates  see under judgments prejudice  39–41, 132 problems  74–6, 132 proof  44–7 circle in  91 leap in  91 from reason  47, 63, 73 reason  27–8, 90, 127 adequate  12 demonstration from  73–5 proof from  47, 63, 74 sufficient  12 representation  cognition and  5 concepts and  57

195 discourse and  103 inference and  81 judgment and  67 obscure  30 sensation and  46 thought and  28

science  1, 2, 43, 99, 103, 121–2, 128 fine  6, 32, 129, 132 principal  15, 18, 20, 24, 36, 43–4, 52–7, 104 sensation  46, 58, 73, 115 sign  54, 103, 108 studying  129–33 testimony  1, 47–9 probable  48, 115 theorems  74 truth  aesthetic  23 arbitrary  44 characteristics of  21–3, 37–40, 44–8, 53, 68, 82 contingent  25 dogmatic  23, 96, 99, 121 historical  23, 96, 98–9, 121 logical  22 method and  96–9 necessary  25 practical  52–3 settled  41, 49 writing and  121 unbelief  48 witness  47–9 words  103–10, 114 writing  dogmatic  121 excerpt  121, 123 historical  121–2 learned  121–3 learned style of  109–11 major work  121, 123 plagiarized  123 scientific  121 systematic  121–2