Euroscepticism as a Transnational and Pan-European Phenomenon: The Emergence of a New Sphere of Opposition [1 ed.] 1138917656, 9781138917651

Citation preview

‘This important new collection pushes forward our understanding of Euroscepticism by extending the range of study to new domains in innovative ways. Taken together, the contributions to this volume mark out new empirical and conceptual territories. This is the first work to deal with this most international of phenomena by properly considering its transnational and pan-European characteristics. This book will become an essential component in the full understanding of Euroscepticism.’ —Paul Taggart, University of Sussex, UK ‘This tightly edited and well-organized volume makes a sustained case for why Euroscepticism is no mere marginal phenomenon in European politics. Euroscepticism is not just central to European integration it is trans-national in nature and organization too. It is sometimes said that edited volumes do not advance theoretical understandings. This is emphatically not the case with this volume that breaks exciting new conceptual ground.’ —Ben Wellings, Monash University, Australia

This page intentionally left blank

Euroscepticism as a Transnational and Pan-European Phenomenon

As the EU enters an increasingly uncertain phase after the 2016 Brexit referendum, Euroscepticism continues to become an increasingly embedded phenomenon within party systems, non-party groups and within the media. Yet, academic literature has paid little attention to the emergence of, and increased development of, transnational and pan-European networks of EU opposition. As the ‘gap’ between Europe’s mainstream political elites and an increasingly sceptical public has widened, pan-­ European spheres of opposition towards the EU have developed and evolved. The volume sets out to explain how such an innately contradictory phenomenon as transnational Euroscepticism has emerged. It draws on a variety of perspectives and case studies in a number of spheres – the European Parliament, political parties, the media, civil society and public opinion. Examining to what extent the pan-European dimension of Euroscepticism is becoming increasingly influential, it argues that opposition to European integration has for too long been viewed somewhat narrowly, through the paradigm of national party politics. This text will be of key interest to scholars, students and professionals in EU politics, European studies, political parties, and more broadly to comparative politics and international relations. John FitzGibbon is Research Fellow at Canterbury Christ Church University, UK. Benjamin Leruth is a Research Associate at the University of Kent, UK. His research focuses on Euroscepticism, differentiated integration in the European Union and public attitudes. He is currently co-editing the forthcoming Routledge Handbook of Euroscepticism and is also working on a forthcoming book entitled The Pirate Parties across Europe. Nick Startin is a Senior Lecturer in French and European Politics whose research focuses on Euroscepticism and the Far Right in contemporary Europe. He co-founded the UACES research network on Euroscepticism and has in recent years been the co-editor for two prominent, special issues on the topic: the Journal of Common Market Studies (2013) and the International Political Science Review (2015). He is currently co-editing the forthcoming Routledge Handbook of Euroscepticism as well as researching and participating in events related to the 2016 referendum on UK membership of the EU.

Routledge / UACES Contemporary European Studies Edited by Chad Damro, University of Edinburgh, UK, Elaine Fahey, City University London, UK, and David Howarth, University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg, on behalf of the University Association for Contemporary European Studies Editorial Board: Grainne De Búrca, European University Institute and Columbia University; Andreas Føllesdal, Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, University of Oslo; Peter Holmes, University of Sussex; Liesbet Hooghe, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; David Phinnemore, Queen’s University Belfast; Ben Rosamond, University of Warwick; Vivien Ann Schmidt, University of Boston; Jo Shaw, University of Edinburgh; Mike Smith, University of Loughborough and Loukas Tsoukalis, ELIAMEP, University of Athens and European University Institute.

The primary objective of the new Contemporary European Studies series is to provide a research outlet for scholars of European Studies from all disciplines. The series publishes important scholarly works and aims to forge for itself an international reputation. 30  The European Union's Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective Beyond the “actorness and power” debate Edited by Ingo Peters 31  The Formulation of EU Foreign Policy Socialization, negotiations and disaggregation of the state Nicola Chelotti 32  Core-periphery Relations in the European Union Power and conflict in a dualist political economy Edited by José M. Magone, Brigid Laffan and Christian Schweiger 33  Russia’s Impact on EU Policy Transfer to the Post-Soviet Space The contested neighborhood Esther Ademmer 34  Domestic Politics and Norm Diffusion in International Relations Ideas do not float freely Thomas Risse 35  Euroscepticism as a Transnational and Pan-European Phenomenon The emergence of a new sphere of opposition Edited by John FitzGibbon, Benjamin Leruth and Nick Startin

Euroscepticism as a Transnational and Pan-European Phenomenon The emergence of a new sphere of opposition

Edited by John FitzGibbon, Benjamin Leruth and Nick Startin

First published 2017 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2017 Selection and editorial matter: John FitzGibbon, Benjamin Leruth and Nick Startin; individual chapters: the contributors The right of the editors to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested. ISBN: 978-1-138-91765-1 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-68889-3 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by codeMantra

Contents

List of illustrations Notes on contributors Acknowledgements

1 Introduction

ix xi xiii 1

J ohn F itZ G ibbon , B enjamin L eruth and N icholas  S tartin

2 Modelling transnational and pan-European Euroscepticism

14

S imon U sherwood

3 To cooperate or not to cooperate? The European Radical Right and pan-European cooperation

28

N icholas S tartin and N athalie Brack

4 Is ‘Eurorealism’ the new ‘Euroscepticism’? Modern conservatism, the European Conservatives and Reformists and European integration

46

B enjamin L eruth

5 Contesting integration: the Radical Left and Euroscepticism

63

M ichael Holmes

6 Transnational mobilisation and critical Europeanism

80

S e Vasti C hatZ opoulou and A ngela Bourne

7 ‘Stop TTIP’: towards a transnational Eurosceptic opposing the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership? D an K eith

97

viii Contents 8 Transnational Euroscepticism as ideational solidarity? The ‘No’ campaign in the Irish referendums on the Lisbon Treaty

113

J ohn F itZ G ibbon

9 Eurosceptic candidate MEPs in the news: a transnational perspective

130

K atjana Gattermann and S ofia Vasilopoulou

10 Religion and the European Union: a commitment under stress

147

S imona Guerra

11 Conclusion

162

J ohn F itZ G ibbon and B enjamin L eruth

Epilogue: Transnational and pan-Euroscepticism after Brexit B enjamin L eruth and J ohn FitZ Gibbon

Index

173 177

List of illustrations

Tables 2.1 Political opportunity structures shaping transnational and pan-European Euroscepticism 23 3.1 Composition of the Identity Tradition Sovereignty group in the European Parliament 35 3.2 Radical Right Representation in the European Parliament after the 2014 elections 39 3.3 Full member parties of ENF and MENF, after the 2014 European Parliament election 41 4.1 Seats of the Gaullist movement in the European Parliament, 1979–1998 48 4.2 Seats of the European Democratic Group in the European Parliament, 1979–1992 49 4.3 Composition of the ECR, by the end of the 2009–2014 parliamentary term 52 4.4 Full member parties of the ECR and AECR, after the 2014 European Parliament election 53 5.1 Seats of the Radical Left in the European Parliament, 1979–2014 66 5.2 Member parties of Group of the United European Left (GUE/NGL and PEL) after the 2014 EP election 67 7.1 Membership of Stop TTIP in 2016 99 8.1 Irish referendums on EU-related issues 116 9.1 Overview of newspaper articles 135 9.2 Most visible lead Eurosceptic candidate per country per year of European Parliament election 139 9.3 Most visible foreign lead Eurosceptic candidate per national newspaper 140 11.1 Divergence of left-wing and right-wing transnational Euroscepticism 166

x  List of illustrations

Figures 1.1  The evolution of Eurosceptic party groups within the European Parliament, 1979–2014 5 9.1 Visibility patterns of Eurosceptic lead candidates 136 9.2 Attention to domestic vs foreign Eurosceptic lead candidates in each newspaper 137 11.1 Conception of a Eurosceptic Demoi 170

Contributors

Angela Bourne is an Associate Professor at the Institute for Society and Globalisation at Roskilde University in Denmark. Her current research looks at processes, justifications and consequences of banning political parties in European democracies. Nathalie Brack is a Lecturer at the Department of Political Science of the Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium and a Visiting Professor at the College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium. Her research focuses on Euroscepticism, European Union (EU) politics and institutions as well as parliamentary studies. Sevasti Chatzopoulou is an Associate Professor at Roskilde University, Denmark. Her research interests include the Europeanisation and transnationalisation of social movements as a response to austerity and Eurozone crisis. John FitzGibbon is a Research Fellow at Canterbury Christ Church University, UK. His main areas of interest are Euroscepticism, European political economy, social movements, referendums and the use of simulations in political science education. Katjana Gattermann is an Assistant Professor at the Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR), The Netherlands, within the program group ‘Political Communication and Journalism’. Her research interests comprise political communication and journalism, political behaviour, public opinion and legislative behaviour in the EU. Simona Guerra is a Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of Leicester, UK. Her main research interest is in attitudes towards European integration and citizens’ perceptions of the EU and its institutions, in particular in candidate countries in the post-Communist region and Western Balkans. Michael Holmes is a Senior Lecturer in Politics at Liverpool Hope University, UK. His main interests are European politics (and more particularly on the impact of European integration on political parties and party systems) and Irish politics. Dan Keith is a Lecturer in Politics at the University of York, UK. His research interests include party politics, comparative politics and the radical left.

xii Contributors Benjamin Leruth is a Research Associate at the University of Kent, UK. His research focuses on Euroscepticism, differentiated integration in the EU and public attitudes. Nicholas Startin is a Senior Lecturer in French and European Politics at the University of Bath, UK. His research focuses on Euroscepticism and the far right in contemporary Europe. Simon Usherwood is Associate Dean and Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of Surrey, UK. His research interests include Euroscepticism, European politics, British politics and negotiation-based teaching methods. Sofia Vasilopoulou is a Lecturer in Politics at the University of York, UK. Her research interests include Euroscepticism, populism and the radical right, EU democracy and representation as well as partisan response during the current economic crisis

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the University Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES) for their support in helping to bring this project to publication. The idea emanated originally from a workshop on this topic organised by the UACES Collaborative Research Network on Euroscepticism back in June 2012 at the University of the West of England in Bristol. The authors would also like to thank Andrew Taylor, Charlotte Endersby and Sophie Iddamalgoda for their patience in helping to bring this book to fruition.

This page intentionally left blank

1 Introduction John FitzGibbon, Benjamin Leruth and Nicholas Startin

The term Euroscepticism first appeared in the context of the United Kingdom (UK) in the mid-1980s. The Oxford English Dictionary defines a ‘Euro-sceptic’ as a person who is not enthusiastic about increasing the powers of the European Union (EU; see Harmsen and Spiering 2004: 14). It was, however, not until Delors’s three-phase plan for Monetary Union and the subsequent preparations for the 1992 Treaty on European Union (TEU) that opposition towards the EU fully emerged as a major issue across EU nation states. There is no doubt that Maastricht, as the TEU is commonly labelled, acted as a key turning point in the evolution of the Eurosceptic debate. For many supporters and opponents alike it signalled the new politicisation of European integration with the name change from ‘European Community’ to ‘European Union’ a symbolic confirmation of this development. As Usherwood and Startin (2013) testify, it marked the moment when divisions between European and domestic policy within the member states began to become increasingly blurred both in terms of perception and reality and when opposition to ‘Europe’ changed from being a straightforward question concerning the pros and cons of EU membership to one that was couched much more in terms of the rationale of the route that the European project is taking. After Maastricht EU referendums become a feature of the political landscape in certain member states and, partly as a reflection of negative public opinion, politicians in many countries increasingly utilised Eurosceptic discourse to gain political advantage. The result of these post-Maastricht events has been the emergence of Euroscepticism as a permanent feature of national debates on Europe. The advent of the economic and financial crisis in the Eurozone pushed the Eurosceptic debate into a new phase as Europe’s leaders struggle to grapple with increased hostility to the European project particularly in northern European countries like the UK and Denmark, and in southern Mediterranean countries like Greece, Cyprus, Spain and Italy, where political leaders and governments have struggled to resolve the social consequences (such as mass youth unemployment) of the sovereign debt crisis. Furthermore, the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ and the failure to reach a EU-wide consensus over refugee resettlement increased tensions between countries, with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán stating that ‘[w]e must acknowledge that the European Union’s misguided immigration policy is responsible for this situation’ (The Guardian 2015). Euroscepticism has now

2  John FitzGibbon, et al. become an increasingly significant phenomenon across the EU member states, impacting on political parties and party systems, on non-party and civil society groups and has become more prominent in EU member states’ media discourse (see Usherwood and Startin 2013). According to the European Commission’s biannual data sets, levels of opposition to the EU are at an all-time high leading academics such as Brack and Startin (2015) to proclaim that we are witnessing the gradual ‘mainstreaming’ of Euroscepticism across Europe. The rise in prominence of Euroscepticism in recent years has not gone unnoticed by academics. The number of scholarly contributions analysing the phenomenon has increased to such an extent that Mudde (2012) describes the evolving field of Eurosceptic studies as a ‘true cottage industry’. Traditionally the majority of work in the field has focused on two main areas, first, on the impact of Euroscepticism on political parties and domestic party systems; and, second, on Euroscepticism in terms of attitudinal data at the mass level. The first major contribution to this field was Taggart’s (1998: 366) much-cited ‘touchstone of dissent’ article, which provided the first academic definition of Euroscepticism: ‘the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration’. Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002) further extended their study of party-based Euroscepticism by introducing their much-cited ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ categorisation. This distinction offers a valuable tool for separating out those parties that are strongly opposed to European integration (i.e. ‘hard Eurosceptics’) and those who show signs of contingent opposition (i.e. ‘soft Eurosceptics’), ‘with attitude towards a country’s membership of the EU being viewed as the ultimate litmus test of whether one fell into the first or second camp’ (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008: 240). However, such binary definition has been questioned by scholars in the field for its looseness (see e.g. Flood 2009 and Mudde 2012). In response, Kopecký and Mudde’s (2002) ‘two sides of Euroscepticism’ presents a typology that distinguishes between support for European integration and support for the EU which in turn leads to four ideal-type categories of party positions on Europe (Euroenthusiasts, Eurosceptics, Eurorejects and Europragmatists). Yet, despite these categories being ideal-types, this approach has not succeeded in solving the terminological issues surrounding the definition of Euroscepticism. By confining ‘Eurosceptics’ to the rank of parties supporting the general ideas of European integration and being pessimistic about the EU’s reflection of these ideas, the authors only captured one facet of this concept. While further contributions have attempted to solve these problems (see Vasilopoulou 2011), the two aforementioned conceptualisations still dominate the Eurosceptic studies literature. This is despite more recent research suggesting that due to the evolving complexity of party-based Euroscepticism, such categorisations contribute to a semantic confusion surrounding this notion (Leruth 2015). In recent years there are signs that a more holistic approach to the study of Euroscepticism as advocated by Usherwood and Startin (2013), with greater focus on other key actors – such as the role of non-party groups and civil society, the impact of referendums (Opperman 2013) and the media (Bijsmans 2015) on the debate as a whole – has begun to emerge and there have been some notable

Introduction  3 contributions in recent years – see FitzGibbon (2013) and de Lange and Guerra (2009) on non-party groups, Holmes (2008) and Startin and Krouwel (2013) on referendums and Daddow (2013) and de Wilde et al. (2013) on the media. One certain conclusion to be drawn from the existing literature, where there is little contention, is that most commentators now agree that the notion that Euroscepticism is just a passing phenomenon, as the EU struggles to create a convincing narrative with regard to its future role and direction, is no longer valid. Euroscepticism has moved from the realm of political phenomenon to constituent element of the European political sphere – at both the domestic and supranational levels. An area of the academic literature on Euroscepticism that has received little or no attention is the emergence of, and increased development of, transnational and pan-European networks of opposition to the EU. While it is understandable that the transnational (or horizontal) dimension of Euroscepticism, i.e. the coordination of opposition to the process of European integration across several countries, has been neglected by the academic community who have traditionally focused their energies on the national dimension, there is no doubt that a pan-European (or vertical) Eurosceptic narrative, i.e. the coordination of opposition to the process of European integration at the EU level, has begun to emerge in recent years, particularly since the advent of the ‘Eurocrisis’. It is therefore time to acknowledge that the assumption, often portrayed by the pro-EU academic community, that Eurosceptics, because of their nationalist and pro-sovereignty sentiment, are unlikely bedfellows in terms of cross-border cooperation is no longer a given. The reality is that through tactical and strategic necessity, we are witnessing the emergence of a pan-European and transnational dynamic among those voices that oppose European integration and that this is a dynamic which is likely to develop and to become more influential in the coming years. As there has hitherto been a lack of modelling and theorising in this area, (partly due to the fact that it is a recent phenomenon and partly because so few scholars are working in this field), the aim of this book is to bridge this gap in the literature in the field of Eurosceptic studies. As a broad theme, the collection of work in this volume will examine how and to what extent the pan-European dimension of Euroscepticism is becoming increasingly influential in the debate about the future direction of the European project. Drawing on the work of leading academics in the field, it will examine, in the context of the economic crisis in the Eurozone and the May 2014 European elections, to what extent we are witnessing an emergent European public sphere with an ostensible government – pro-EU actors – and an opposition – Eurosceptic actors.

Euroscepticism and the transnational dynamic Eurosceptics’ raison d’être is opposition to European integration. That is they oppose, to varying degrees, institutionalised cooperation among European countries. Their alternative is generally for a regression back to the nation state as the basis of all legislative and political sovereignty. From this assumption it follows that Eurosceptics themselves will not seek to build coalitions of like-minded

4  John FitzGibbon, et al. actors across Europe. We would thus expect to find little evidence of formal attempts by Eurosceptics to coordinate their activities between actors from various European countries as this would appear to be diametrically opposed to their pro-sovereignty and nationalist motivations and their distrust of trans-European cooperation. Instead, we would expect to find opponents of European integration focused on the domestic sphere, as on the surface it would appear that the ­political opportunity structures for Eurosceptic activists are almost all rooted in the national domestic sphere – principally referendums, European Parliament (EP) elections and national Parliaments. Corroborating this assertion, Mair (2007) has argued that there is no European political sphere, no arena of contestation for European-related issues. Hitherto, both the ideological orientation and practical, tactical considerations for anti-EU activists have led them to the conclusion that it is the national domestic sphere and not a pan-European one that is the most relevant arena for their energies. A closer look at the empirical evidence, however, appears to contradict this assertion as anti-EU activists have moved beyond the national political sphere. Rather, they have sought to engage with like-minded activists across Europe to build networks of support. Wary of appearing as overtly nationalist, these actors have often sought to portray themselves as ‘internationalist’ in outlook, though sceptical of European integration. What they have sought to articulate is a ‘different form of Europe’ from ‘this type of Europe’ to quote the Irish Eurosceptic activist Declan Ganley (FitzGibbon 2013). Indeed, many Eurosceptics are scathing of the term ‘Eurosceptic’ itself, believing it pejorative with negative connotations to radical nationalism. The fascinating element of this transnational scepticism is its clear contradiction with itself. In other words, in order to further their stated goal of achieving national withdrawal from the European integration process or the ending of the EU project itself, Eurosceptic activists have had to establish some form of transnational cooperation as a singular focus on the national sphere has failed to help them achieve their goals. In the last decade or so European integration has progressed to the extent that a single country cannot alone hold up events at the European level. Eurosceptics who restrict their activities to the domestic level risk not just being labelled as nationalist but of becoming irrelevant as the trajectory of European integration has moved beyond their sphere of influence.

Pan-European European Union scepticism in practice The time when cross-border Eurosceptic cooperation was haphazard, chaotic and ephemeral is passing. Through tactical and strategic necessity, as well as a sense of shared ideological conviction, we have begun to witness the growing ­emergence of cooperation in a number of key areas and between several key political actors. First, within the context of the EP, pan-European cooperation has become increasingly evident among the various Eurosceptic parties. Although as Brack (2013: 51) points out, ‘since 1979, there have been MEPs overtly asserting their opposition to the EU project or its implementation’, what is particularly significant in recent years is the way in which such cooperation has

Introduction  5 25.00%

20.00% Le-wing Euroscepc groups 15.00%

Right-wing "so" Euroscepc groups Right-wing "hard" Euroscepc groups

10.00%

Non-aached MEPs

5.00%

0.00% 1979

1984

1989

1994

1999

2004

2009 2014*

Figure 1.1  The evolution of Eurosceptic party groups within the European Parliament, 1979–2014 Notes: The left-wing soft Eurosceptic groups are: Communist and Allies (1979–1989); Left Unity (1989–1994); European United Left (1989–1995); European United Left-Nordic Green Left (1995–). The right-wing ‘soft’ Eurosceptic groups are: the European Progressive Democrats (1979–1984); the European Democratic Alliance (1984–1995); the Union for Europe of the Nations (1999–2009); the European Conservatives and Reformists (2009–). The ‘hard’ Eurosceptic groups are: the Technical Group of the European Right (1984–1994); Europe of Nations (1994–1996); Independents for a ­Europe of Nations (1996–1999); Europe of Democracies and Diversities (1999–2004); Independence/ Democracy (2004–2009); Europe of Freedom and Democracy (2009–2014); Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (2014–); and the Europe of Nations and Freedom (2015–). *Data from the 2014–2019 parliamentary term is accurate as of August 2015. Source: European Parliament Archives.

become more entrenched and institutionalised as well as statistically more significant in terms of the number of groupings and the number of Eurosceptic Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). While Figure 1.1 suggests that ‘soft’ Eurosceptic parliamentary groups peaked in the late 1970s and 1980s, most of ­ uropean these groups tended to express a much lower degree of opposition to the E Community than to the post-Maastricht Union. The EP currently includes four openly Eurosceptic groupings, two that can be considered as ‘hard’ Eurosceptics and two others that can be considered as ‘soft Eurosceptic’, to use Taggart and Szczerbiak’s classification. The ‘hard’ Eurosceptic grouping Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD; formerly Europe of Freedom and Democracy, EFD), which comprises MEPs from the UK Independence Party (UKIP), the Italian Five Star Movement and the Sweden Democrats, among others, has become a significant voice for dissent within the EP. Similarly, the ‘soft’ Eurosceptic European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group formed in 2009 and set up by the UK Conservative Party in conjunction with like-minded parties of the right in Poland and the Czech Republic has added

6  John FitzGibbon, et al. a new dimension of pan-European party opposition to the EU. In developing distinct alternatives to EU policies based around reform of existing EU policies and return to national competencies in specific areas, the ECR have created something approaching the institutionalised opposition of Western democratic states. Following the 2014 European elections and a major reshuffle in terms of party affiliation within the EP, the ECR became the third largest group, with 70 seats. While the EFDD and ECR groups have significantly raised the profile of Euroscepticism in the EP over the past few years, on the left of the political spectrum the confederal E ­ uropean United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) group has, since 1995, articulated a classical left-wing critique of European integration. The group’s focus on internationalist and not nationalist alternative policies gives them the appearance of pro-­integrationism. However, the participation of their affiliate members in campaigns to defeat EU-­ related referendums in Denmark, France, Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden under the GUE/NGL banner with the use of EP funds, shows that left-wing transnational Euroscepticism in the EP has in many ways a longer history and a more practical impact than its right-wing counterparts. In addition, in most recent years the Greens-European Free Alliance group became increasingly opposed to neoliberal policies advocated by the European Commission, e.g. by voicing concerns over the proposed Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). In contrast to the long-term presence of left-wing Euroscepticism, cooperation in the EP has been ill-fated for the parties of the Radical Right with the implosion of the Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty group after nine months of chaotic existence in 2007 (see Startin 2010). From an historical perspective, the majority of Radical Right MEPs have remained unattached within the EP. In the wake of the 2014 European election results, the two most high-profile Radical Right politicians in European politics, Marine Le Pen (French National Front) and Geert Wilders (Party for Freedom) attempted to form an ‘even harder’ Eurosceptic group together with the Austrian Freedom Party, the Italian Northern League and the Belgian Vlaams Belang, based on the ‘European Alliance for Freedom’, a pan-­European party launched in 2010. After several unsuccessful attempts to find allies from two additional member states in order to comply with EP rules, the Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) group was launched in June 2015, and includes the Polish Congress of the New Right, the United Romania Party and former UKIP MEP Janice Atkinson. As a result, the 2014–2019 EP accounts for the highest number of ‘hard Eurosceptic’ MEPs since the first direct elections took place in 1979, with EFDD, ENF and non-attached MEPs accounting for 13.05 per cent of the EP (see Figure 1.1). While the EP is the most obvious arena for pan-European Euroscepticism to develop, it is by no means the only arena in which those seeking to contest European integration have mobilised. Moreover, the groups listed above are in many ways political ‘marriages of convenience’ that form to gain access to resources, speaking time and other parliamentary privileges. Outside of the EP there is also much evidence of transnational and pan-European Euroscepticism. A key contribution of this book to the literature on Euroscepticism is to bring together the various isolated strands of Euroscepticism that exist in many different arenas and tie them together as part of the development of a genuine movement to oppose European integration

Introduction  7 across national borders. Though the book does engage with the world of party politics at the EP level as discussed above, it reaches out to several esoteric areas that it argues are important parts of the tapestry of transnational scepticism – transnational parties outside the EP, civil society groups, referendums and the media. When discussing transnational and pan-European parties, the assumption is always that these are one of the ‘Euro-parties’ that operate in the EP with national affiliates. The example of Libertas and their campaign for the 2009 EP elections shows how there is a disjuncture between the Euro-parties and an actual transnational party. Libertas was an attempt by Irish multimillionaire Declan Ganley to develop a genuine transnational European party that, though competing at the EU level, would have a direct national base in each member state and not an affiliate from a pre-­ existing political party. His party sought to challenge what he perceived as the elitism and policy failures of the existing Euro-party system by providing a more grassroots-focused party that directly engaged with the European integration process. Scholarly work on civil society groups who have campaigned against the EU has been viewed almost completely through the paradigm of social movement studies (McAdam et al. 2001; della Porta and Diani 2006). Though some scholars (FitzGibbon 2013) have sought to address this, the role of civil society in working across countries to oppose the EU is quite well established. The European ­Alliance of EU-critical Movement (TEAM) network in particular has since the early 1990s brought Eurosceptics together to share information, experience and expertise so as to build up a critical mass to campaign against European integration. Such transnational Eurosceptic networks have increased in the wake of the Eurocrisis as the economic and financial crisis has affected several EU states. A wave of Eurosceptic civil society mobilisation has occurred because of the Eurocrisis since 2008 and this book will discuss the strong transnational links between these movements. While referendums have long been used to understand individual national attitudes towards Europe, the study of their impact on other state attitudes and their active involvement in them by non-native actors has not been significantly acknowledged. Looking at referendums from the transnational Eurosceptic position shows how opponents of European integration have sought to become involved in EU-­related referendums in other states. Referendums present a rare opportunity for the process of European integration to be halted and even redirected. Given Eurosceptics are generally based on the political margins and lack resources relative to the pro-­European mainstream largesse, they have employed the experience of other Eurosceptics from across Europe with great efficiency to defeat EU-related referendums, with the French and Dutch ‘no’ votes in 2005 on whether to adopt the European Constitution being obvious examples. The June 2016 referendum on the United Kingdom's withdrawal from the European Union further gave the opportunity for pan-European Eurosceptic (and Europhile) groups to try and exert their influence across Britain. The relationship of the media to Euroscepticism has been repeatedly investigated but with the globalisation of media ownership several media outlets have sought to export their opposition to the EU into other countries. In particular ­British newspapers that have expanded their circulation into Ireland have brought their strong Eurosceptic editorial line with them. Moreover the European media

8  John FitzGibbon, et al. as a whole have focused disproportionately on the apparent significant increase in support for the Eurosceptic Radical Right. Indeed the 2014 EP elections were framed in the media almost solely in the terms of a revolt against the EU, while the emergence of a significant element of European-level political competition, the Spitzenkandidaten, was almost wholly ignored. From this perspective the media have played a critical role in creating a platform for, and raising the public’s awareness of, transnational Euroscepticism. This outcome of the media’s engagement with the topic is explored in several chapters of this book. These examples reveal transnational and pan-European Euroscepticism as both multifaceted and longitudinal. There have been repeated and explicit attempts to forge Eurosceptic alliances across borders. The existing academic literature has largely missed these occasions of anti-European solidarity due to its focus on national-level political parties. Despite the twenty plus years of existence, the GUE/ NGL group in the EP was considered as a curious outlier to the pro-EU consensus. With the shock of the aforementioned referendum defeats in France and the Netherlands, the relative success of the ECR EP group, Euroscepticism and its transnational/pan-European nature has developed into a crucial area of mobilisation which the EU and its proponents can no longer ignore. Previously E ­ uroscepticism was treated as a ‘British disease’ confined to that island ­(Wellings 2007) and a handful of relatively small states such as the Czech Republic and ­Denmark. The dominant outlook among Europe’s political mainstream was that nothing could stand in the way of the EU and its supranational institutional ­structure. The breakthrough of Euroscepticism into the mainstream has given anti-­European activists the organisational sustainability to mount a sustained and focused transnational challenge to the EU which serves as the main focus of this edited volume. Quite how this has been achieved will be investigated in this collection.

The structure of the volume The structure of this volume sets out to explain how such an innately contradictory phenomenon as transnational and pan-European Euroscepticism can r­ ealistically function. Following on from this theoretical consideration, the body of the book examines transnational and pan-European Euroscepticism from a wide variety of perspectives, across various countries and in different spheres – the EP, the media, civil society and public opinion. This broad perspective facilitates the argument of the book that for too long opposition to European integration has been viewed through the narrow paradigm of national party politics. Such limited scope has facilitated the ’shock’ results of increased votes for Eurosceptics and EU-related referendum defeats. In short, a wide scope reveals transnational and pan-­European Euroscepticism to be a long-term ­phenomenon that has only recently come to the notice of scholars. The central question underlying this book’s analysis of transnational and pan-­ European Euroscepticism is: to what extent does transnational scepticism represent the development of a genuine political opposition in the European political sphere? And furthermore can the actions of EU opponents even be considered as ­participation in such an arena? Embracing these issues, this edited volume considers

Introduction  9 the empirical evidence of transnational and pan-European Euroscepticism within the context of an emerging E ­ uropean polity. Following this introduction where the three editors lay out the debate as a whole and argue that Euroscepticism needs also to be analysed as a transnational and pan-European phenomenon, Simon Usherwood develops a model for analysing transnational Euroscepticism. He argues that it transcends previous categorisations of Euroscepticism and recognises that the opportunity structures available within and around EU institutions are producing novel forms of political and social action. In doing this he evolves the study of Euroscepticism beyond its domestic party political roots and into a new era of opposition to European integration. From here the volume moves into a series of empirical case studies that focus on the areas already identified in this chapter where opposition to the EU has recently taken on an increasingly transnational dynamic. In Chapter 3, Startin and Brack focus on the Radical Right in the EP. They point out that although most existing research in this area stresses the failure of the Radical Right to collaborate, fixed as they are to notions of sovereignty and national identity, that in reality in recent years there has been growing cooperation between such parties both inside and outside the EP. Based on interviews with Radical Right representatives, the authors focus on some of the barriers that have prevented closer cooperation among Radical Right Parties, analyse the motives of their elites in terms of seeking group formation, before examining the extent to which a pan-European dynamic has begun to emerge in the EP – as epitomised by the ENF group in 2015. As highlighted above, following the 2014 European election, the ECR became the third largest group represented in the EP, thus establishing itself as the most successful Eurosceptic group and overtaking the pro-European Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE). The group campaigns for ‘Eurorealism’, i.e. a pragmatic, anti-federalist and flexible vision of European integration where the principle of subsidiarity prevails. One of the main reasons behind this success was the major reshuffle that took place in the wake of the election results, as the ECR was able to attract incoming parties, parties involved in other EP groups and defectors. In Chapter 4, Benjamin Leruth analyses the success of the ECR as well as the changes in the composition of the EP group between 2009 and 2014. He demonstrates that Eurorealism became an attractive alternative for well-­ established Eurosceptic parties such as the Finns Party, but also for some former federalist parties such as the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA). Though developing over a long period of time, left-wing criticism of the perceived ‘neo-liberal’ model of contemporary European integration has become increasingly relevant with the Eurocrisis. In Chapter 5, Michael Holmes argues that Radical Left parties share significant features to allow them to develop an alternative ‘European’ outlook and analyses the extent to which such parties are developing a more coherent and coordinated stance. He also examines the extent to which the Eurocrisis has led to an acceleration of the transnational element of this criticism. In Chapter 6 Sevasti Chatzopoulou and Angela Bourne analyse the mobilisation of transnational social movements and the nature of Eurosceptic claims

10  John FitzGibbon, et al. articulated during the European Sovereign Debt (ESD) crisis. Taking the examples of the European Federation of Trade Unions, Alter Summit and Blockupy, they show how the singular exogenous event of the Eurocrisis has led to a heightened degree of cooperation between civil society groups. These groups have kept themselves firmly in civil society and avoided political contestation. The transnational element of their interaction has been focused on the swapping of protest tactics and showing solidarity with each other. They argue that this showing of transnational solidarity and joint opposition to so-called ‘austerity’ measures has been crucial in developing a wider narrative of opposition to present EU economic and financial policies across both states. Similarly, in Chapter 7 Dan Keith looks at the emergence of Stop TTIP, a transnational group opposing the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the United States (US) and the EU, which seeks to lower barriers to trade in order promote competitiveness across borders. This proposed treaty is strongly criticised by its opponents who see job losses as well as the erosion of existing consumer protection and environmental regulations as TTIP’s most likely outcomes. Using the model developed by Simon Usherwood in Chapter 2, Keith shows that opposition to TTIP provided a window of opportunity for transnational Eurosceptics to campaign against the direction of EU trade policy. In Chapter 8, John FitzGibbon focuses on the No campaigns during the Irish Fiscal Compact Treaty referendum. Both left and right-wing advocates of a No vote sought to bring in Eurosceptic actors from across Europe to display their internationalist bona fides and to counter any criticism of their actions as nationalist. Left-wing campaigners utilised politicians and speakers from the Scandinavian countries to emphasise how a No vote would be in tune with their perception of the progressive politics of Denmark, Norway and Sweden. British and ­Danish Eurosceptic politicians joined with fundamentalist Catholic anti-Treaty campaigners to urge Irish voters to vote No on behalf of EU citizens who did not have a vote. The Fiscal Compact Treaty campaign, though somewhat esoteric, showed how Euroscepticism from both the left and the right embraces transnationalism to avoid the appearance of nationalism. Following on from the discussion of referendums, Chapter 9 switches attention to the media. Katjana Gatterman and Sofia Vasilopoulou use a quantitative analysis of Eurosceptic MEPs in the media and demonstrate a clear left/right divide. This divide is based around the differing arena and audience targeting of left and right-wing Eurosceptics. Their research finds that left-wing Eurosceptic MEPs are more focused on building transnational links in the EP and on using transnational issues to achieve this – such as critiques of the neo-liberal bias of the Commission. Right-wing Eurosceptics, they discover, are focused more on domestic national media at the expense of activities in the EP. Where they find a transnational element is when right-wing Eurosceptic MEPs engage in EU debates in other countries. This has obvious limitations in terms of issue promotion as opposed to left-wing activists but it shows how right-wing Eurosceptics can overcome their ideological aversion to transnational and pan-European coordination.

Introduction  11 In Chapter 10 Simona Guerra discusses how transnational Euroscepticism interacts with the EU institutions with an analysis of Euroscepticism among religious groups. Religion is both an obvious source of Euroscepticism and transnationalism due to the increasing policy influence of the EU in social issues and to the very nature of religion itself. Her research leads her to conclude that such existing civil society networks based in Brussels that seek to coordinate specific group-based interaction with the European institutions will in effect facilitate increasing levels of transnational Euroscepticism.

Moving towards a true European public sphere? The book then concludes with the various themes developed in these chapters synthesised by John FitzGibbon and Benjamin Leruth into a singular narrative. This narrative is based around the development of a distinct European political discourse. What has challenged the assertion of many Europeanists that the EU must be considered a distinct political space is the absence of political competition. Though there are furious debates over policy in the Council and increasingly in the Parliament, once this policy is agreed there is no space for opposition in the EU system. This is how the ‘founding fathers’ of European integration wanted it to proceed and how it has, by and large, been up to this point. Facilitating opposition to the European project would, from this perspective, have allowed the political forces of nationalism to infiltrate and undermine the European institutions built on consociational agreement towards the common European good. It was precisely against this type of politicisation that European integration was developed. Nevertheless, the results of the 2014 EP elections have shown that the EU has become deeply politicised by Eurosceptic activists regardless of the intentions of the founders of European integration and contemporary European integrationists. What this book will argue, however, is that the most pertinent point about this apparent rise in Euroscepticism is how it needed to embrace the transnational dimension in order to achieve a deep impact. It was only when Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders announced the launch of their ‘European Alliance for Freedom’ project in November 2013 that the growth of Eurosceptics in the opinion polls became a very real issue for the EU, the media and mainstream political actors. This high-profile attempt of Le Pen and Wilders to form a new transnational Eurosceptic EP group (and the subsequent formation of the ENF group in 2015) is emblematic of how Euroscepticism has evolved from introspection and chaotic organisation into some form of genuine, pan-European political movement. Coordination across member and non-member EU states presents Eurosceptics with the single most important opportunity to exercise real political power and directly impact and even reverse the trajectory of European integration. This book seeks to understand what this means both for the study of Euroscepticism and for European integration more generally – is Euroscepticism as we understand it today a redundant concept? Does it infer the end of popular support for the European project itself? Or is it part of the natural evolution of the EU into a fully functioning polity with a fully-fledged political opposition?

12  John FitzGibbon, et al.

Bibliography Bijsmans, P. (2015) ‘Media and Euroscepticism: Exploring Unchartered Territory’, Paper presented during the 45th Annual UACES Conference, 7–9 September, Bilbao. Brack, N. (2013) ‘Euroscepticism at the Supranational Level: The Case of the “Untidy Right” in the European Parliament’,  Journal of Common Market Studies 51(1), pp. 85–104. Brack, N. and Startin, N. (2015) ‘Introduction: Euroscepticism, from the Margins to the Mainstream’, International Political Science Review 36(3), pp. 239–249. Daddow, O. (2013) ‘Margaret Thatcher, Tony Blair and the Eurosceptic Tradition in ­Britain’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations 15(2), pp. 210–227. de Lange, S. and Guerra, S. (2009) ‘The League of Polish Families between East and West, Past and Present’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies 42(4), pp. 527–549. della Porta, D. and Diani, M. (2006) Social Movements: An Introduction (Second Edition), Oxford: Blackwell. de Wilde, P., Michailidou, A. and Trenz, H.-J. (2013) Contesting Europe: Exploring Euroscepticism in Online Media Coverage, Colchester: ECPR Press. FitzGibbon, J. (2013) ‘Citizens against Europe? Civil Society and Eurosceptic Protest in Ireland, the United Kingdom and Denmark’, Journal of Common Market Studies 51(1), pp. 105–121. Flood, C. (2009) ‘Dimensions of Euroscepticism’, Journal of Common Market Studies 47(4), pp. 911–917. Harmsen, R. and Spiering, M. (eds. 2004) Euroscepticism: Party Politics, National Identity and European Integration, Amsterdam: Rodopi. Holmes, M. (2008) ‘The Referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon in the Republic of Ireland’, EPERN Briefing Paper 16, Guildford: European Parties Elections and Referendums Network. Kopecký, P. and Mudde, C. (2002) ‘The Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe’, European Union Politics 3(3), pp. 297–326. Leruth, B. (2015) ‘Operationalizing National Preferences on Europe and Differentiated Integration’, Journal of European Public Policy 22(6), pp. 816–835. Mair, P. (2007) Political Opposition and the European Union, Government & Opposition 42(1), pp. 1–17. McAdam, D., Tarrow, S. and Tilly, C. (2001) Dynamics of Contention, Cambridge: ­Cambridge University Press. Mudde, C. (2012) ‘The Comparative Study of Party-based Euroscepticism: The Sussex versus the North Carolina School’, East European Politics 28(2), pp. 193–202. Opperman, K. (2013) ‘The Politics of Avoiding Referendums on the Treaty of Lisbon’, Journal of European Integration 35(1), pp. 73–89. Startin, N. (2010) ‘Where to for the Radical Right in the European Parliament? The Rise and Fall of Transnational Political Cooperation’ Perspectives on European Politics and Society 11(4), pp. 429–449. Startin, N. and Krouwel, A. (2013) ‘Euroscepticism Re-galvanized: The Consequences of the 2005 French and Dutch Rejections of the EU Constitution’, Journal of Common Market Studies 51(1), pp. 65–84. Taggart, P. (1998) ‘A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems’, European Journal of Political Research 33(3), pp. 363–388. Taggart, P. and Szczerbiak, A. (2002) The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in EU Member and Candidate States, Brighton: Sussex European Institute. Taggart, P. and Szczerbiak, A. (2008) ‘Theorizing Party-based Euroscepticism: Problems of Definition, Measurement, and Causality’, in P. Taggart and A. Szczerbiak (eds), Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism Volume 2: Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 238–262.

Introduction  13 The Guardian (2015) ‘Migration Crisis: Hungary PM Says Europe in Grip of Madness’ [online]. Available at: www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/03/migration-crisis-­ hungary-pm-victor-orban-europe-response-madness [Accessed 1 February 2016]. Usherwood, S. and Startin, N. (2013) ‘Euroscepticism as a Persistent Phenomenon’, Journal of Common Market Studies 51(1), pp. 1–16. Vasilopoulou, S. (2011) ‘European Integration and the Radical Right: Three Patterns of Opposition’, Government & Opposition 46(2), pp. 223–244. Wellings, B. (2007) ‘Rump Britain: Englishness and Britishness, 1992–2001’, National Identities 9(4), pp. 395–412.

2 Modelling transnational and pan-European Euroscepticism Simon Usherwood

Introduction The scholarship on Euroscepticism has developed in close step with the phenomenon itself. In this, is reflects the broader development of research around the European integration process, from Hoffman’s turn in the 1960s to the rise of new institutionalism in the 1990s: the nascent and evolving political system has required a constant adjustment of approach by academics to capture each new step. Euroscepticism is a case in point, with a handful of individuals and of pieces of research in the 1990s developing into a wide-ranging, diverse and ever richer literature today. However, that literature has a considerable way to go before it addresses all with which it is confronted. In particular, as the pieces collected together in this volume highlight, until now there has been very little consideration of transnational and pan-European Euroscepticism, both in terms of case studies and of theorising (e.g. Pridham 2008; Startin 2010; Brack 2013; Dutceac Segesten and Bossetta Jr 2015; Chryssogelos 2015). The reasons for this gap are multiple. First, it has only been in the past decade or so that such activity has developed any real volume and profile, most obviously in the context of the Constitutional Treaty process of the 2000s: prior to this, isolated instances appeared marginal and ephemeral enough to fail to trigger much interest, both by academics and by wider public debate. Second, and coupled to this, academics have been trying to catch up with the wider development of Euroscepticism. The riot of organised groups, political parties and public opinion, each seemingly differing between individual countries, has provided a surfeit of objects to study and the perception that the impact of all this was more likely to be felt in national frameworks meant that such approaches have tended to be prioritised. Even then, there remains a very uneven coverage, between countries and between types of Euroscepticism. This in turn points to a third factor. Theorising Euroscepticism has been one of the least developed parts of the academic research conducted (Vasilopoulou 2013 provides a helpful review). Precisely because it does cover so much, it has proved very difficult or, arguably, impossible to produce universal models or frameworks, since Euroscepticism is not an ideology, but rather a popular label for a very heterogeneous mix of things linked only by some sense of disliking some aspect of

Modelling transnational and pan-European  15 European integration. To marry public opinion models to political party ones does not happen in the wider literature, so to expect it in the context of Euroscepticism is perhaps unreasonable, but even on either side of that most obvious cleavage there is little agreement about what to look for. With psephologists torn over utilitarian and affective models, and party politics types unsure of what dimensions are really relevant (see Mudde 2012 for a good discussion), there has been little willingness for scholars to step into an arena that promises more pain than reward. All of which brings us to a more particular reason for the lack of theorising around transnational or pan-European Euroscepticism. In essence, what work has been done on Euroscepticism has taken one of two approaches. The first takes Euroscepticism as being essentially constructed on the basis of national political systems (e.g. Taggart 1998). Whether for socio-historical reasons or for politico-­institutional ones, these scholars consider that the particular structures found within the national political space are central in determining Eurosceptic activity. As a consequence, their focus has tended to be very onward-facing, both seeing what happens through a national prism and making an (at least implicit) assumption that national priorities are the only ones to matter. Such an approach is particularly found in the work on political parties, which has had good reason to consider that such a national basis exists. By contrast, the second perspective has been more typical of public opinion scholars, who look for generic, cross-cutting explanations (e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2004). Here, the national level is largely redundant, and explanatory variables are sought in socio-economic variables – such as gender, age, education or professional status – or in affective dimensions of belonging and identification, as well as underlying psycho-social dispositions. By taking large, aggregated datasets, these models seek to pull out the relative importance of each factor, to build up an integrated model. Both approaches have their merits and shortcomings and it is not the purpose of this chapter to challenge either of them, except to note that neither is it well positioned to deal with transnational or pan-European Euroscepticism. The mixture of national and European elements (in the former case) and the more purely European-level activity (in the latter) has meant that those with national focuses have often ignored or overlooked what has happened, while the still relatively small-scale nature of what is happening has not leant itself well to those looking for generic factors. This very particular situation – of low-profile, recent development and theoretical awkwardness – has had the effect of leaving a clear gap in the literature. This chapter seeks to close that gap. It provides a conceptualisation of the phenomena of transnational and pan-European Euroscepticism, offering a programme for further investigation and some theoretical connection between the cases presented in this volume. More precisely, it suggests that the notion of political opportunity structures offers a way forward: by providing a framework for both motivation and opportunity, such structures can transcend and incorporate national constraints, while simultaneously allowing for the identification of pervasive and horizontal characteristics. The chapter begins by considering political

16  Simon Usherwood opportunity structures in general, before moving to a discussion of the most important opportunities available to Eurosceptic groups and organisations operating in this space (through ideology, institution and events), which leads in turn to a final section on the consequences and ramifications for future study.

Political opportunity structures: some opening thoughts Kitschelt’s (1986) work on political opportunity structures sought to understand and explain the relative successes and failures of the anti-nuclear movements in four countries, both in terms of mobilisation and impact. His construction of an opportunity structure within each county drew on primarily exogenous factors, relating to the political and party systems and the degree of ‘openness’ to new actors and inputs. In so doing, he identified the need to place groups within wider contexts, as well as highlighting the range of possible impacts a group can have: from procedural changes to the channels of participation, through substantive policy impacts, to structural transformations of opportunity structures as a whole. His definition of opportunity structures as ‘specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilization, which facilitate the development of protest movements in some instances and constrain them in others’ (1986: 58) is one that offers a useful analytical framework. However, Kitschelt’s work was not without critics, not least from those authors who focused more on the endogenous factors within groups (e.g. Tarrow 1998). As Princen and Kerremans (2008) point out, even if opportunity structures are exogenous in origin, they still need to be recognised as such by groups, framed as opportunities and exploited through the use of the group’s resources (also see McAdam et al. 1996). Kitschelt had recognised this to a certain extent in his identification of resource types that might be of use – coercive, normative, remunerative and informational – but this was not the main thrust of his work. The cleavage that emerged between these endogenous and exogenous views in the 1990s has persisted, most obviously with the literature on framing that has developed very extensively (see Benford and Snow 2000 for a useful overview). However, a second tension also became apparent, affecting both sides of the debate. As Rootes (1999) notes, while Kitschelt had produced a clear and simple model of opportunity structures, it confounded structural and contingent factors, as did Tarrow and others. Indeed, the very success of the idea had led to extensive concept-stretching, to the point that almost anything could be considered part of an opportunity structure under certain conditions. The primary danger in such stretching was potentially to render the concept meaningless and untestable, but the increasing focus on contingent factors also risked losing sight of those elements within the opportunity structure that might condition the actions of all actors. In more recent years, scholars have moved away from explicit discussions of political opportunity structures, partly for these reasons. However, such work does still take place and has sought to address the problems outlined above. Arzheimer and Carter (2006 and, in more pointed fashion, 2009) have recombined

Modelling transnational and pan-European  17 endogenous and exogenous factors in looking at far-right party support in Europe, but looking at a mixture of individual-level data and political opportunity structures. These latter variables are further broken down into long-term institutional, medium-term party political and short-term contextual dimensions, in order to try and discern their relative weights and impacts. While the findings (2006) did point to some significant relationships, the cases did not allow for a more generalisable set of conclusions about opportunity structures to be drawn (Spies and Franzmann 2011 make similar findings). This chapter argues for the adoption of a more modest approach than that of Arzheimer and Carter (2006), partly because the necessary data is simply not available and partly because the opportunities for comparative work are much more limited, given the very nature of pan-European and transnational Euroscepticism. However, it does suggest a way forward by which to set up a matrix of analysis, with which to understand and explain the phenomenon. In particular, the recognition that exogenous and endogenous factors have to be brought together is an important one, for the political space in which such groups are operating is largely unstructured, making an appreciation of what matters internally to any given group all the more consequential.

The endogenous perspective: ideology to the fore Eurosceptic groups of any kind operate within an ideological paradox. On the one hand, the label of Euroscepticism has become one of the most visible and widespread in European public debate: the plethora of groups that have adopted (either directly or indirectly) the title sometimes makes it hard to find anyone who doesn’t have some sympathy with it. On the other, Euroscepticism is a non-­ideology, totally absent any positive core belief or intellectual coherence. ­Precisely because so many do claim it, so thin is its substance. This is all reflected in the persistent difficulties that academics have found in building definitions. The most widespread model – that of Taggart and ­Szczerbiak’s (2002) hard/soft approach, dividing up principled and contingent sceptics – has much intuitive sense, but is very impressionistic and rather ambivalent about ideology. Meanwhile, the ‘North Carolina school’ approach is much clearer about focusing on ideology’s role, but does so from the perspective of other ideologies that tend towards scepticism, rather than defining scepticism on its own terms (Hooghe and Marks 2007). Neither side has produced an adequately articulated resolution to this, with those that have tried often ending up with very complex models or diversions towards other underlying factors, such as ­nationalism (e.g. Halikiopoulou et al. 2012). In part, the problem is one that ensues from the historical development of the term itself. In the late 1980s ‘Eurosceptic’ was a label employed to mark out certain individuals within the United Kingdom, especially inside the Conservative Party, who had doubts about the developing European level in the wake of the 1992 programme (Leconte 2010; 2015). This label was then effectively back-­constructed to ‘Euroscepticism’ and passed into ever-wider public use. By the time that academic

18  Simon Usherwood researchers got to it, the natural tendency to treat it as a stablemate of other ‘isms’ was marked, even though it was essentially about attitudinal disposition than about either ideology or strategy. Such linguistic misdirection is unfortunate, but also unavoidable: the only question is how we should deal with the situation as we find it. All that holds Euroscepticism together – at a conceptual level – is the notion that there is something wrong with some aspect of European integration: anything beyond this is to prompt long discussion about marginal cases, which are of little relevance here. Instead, what it does ask us to consider is that there is no one Euroscepticism, but only a multitude of them. As the cases discussed in this collection demonstrate, most of the pan-European and transnational groups involved do not describe themselves primarily through their Euroscepticism, and for one very clear reason. Euroscepticism is necessarily a negative construction, since it can only talk about problems and shortcomings. While that has some place, especially in contemporary European public political debate about the failure of ‘the system’ or ‘the establishment’, it is still very much in need of a positive alternative to share with, and sell to, voters. Thus, all these groups talk more about how they are working towards something better than what they find, i.e. reforming rather than just sniping and criticising (see also Krouwel and Abts 2007). Instead of using the negative notion of Euroscepticism, some groups came up with their own wording in order to define their stance on European integration, such as ­‘Eurorealism’ (see Chapter 4), ‘advocating another Europe’ (see Chapter 5) or ‘change Europe’ (see Chapter 6). Given that the European political sphere – as much as it exists at all (Risse and Van de Steeg 2003; Eriksen 2005; Koopmans and Statham 2010; Bee and Bozzini 2013) – builds out of the pre-existing national political spheres, we might expect a number of characteristics to the ideological imperatives of pan-European and transnational groups. The first is that groups’ ideologies will be more reflective of national political ideologies than of generic international ones. The locus of European political life remains at the national level and the ease of mobilisation is much greater within a national milieu than it is in a European or continental one, if only for simple reasons of physical proximity and shared political languages and frames. Thus pan-European groups are likely to have been formed by pre-existing national groups coming together to make some kind of common cause, which will itself be narrower or thinner in its ideological grounding than that of its formative national elements. This is clearly seen in the European Parliament, where successive Eurosceptic groups have formed among Members of European Parliament (MEPs), but with little or no ideological depth behind them (Brack 2013). Similarly, transnational groups typically build out from a core grouping of national activists, with each new addition to the group enlarging the ideological pool, rather than deepening it (see Chapter 6). This suggests that at some fundamental level, ideological kinship can only be a very weak glue for such groups. By way of extension to this first point, we might then observe that even if it is a weak effect, other things being equal then we should expect that pan-European

Modelling transnational and pan-European  19 and transnational groups will tend to form along some kind of coherent ideological line. The differences between Eurosceptic groups – especially at a continental level – will tend to be bigger (in ideological terms) than those between Eurosceptics and non-Eurosceptics. Framed differently, the European integration cleavage is not as developed as others (see Beetham and Lord 1998; Werts et al. 2012; Cheneval and Schimmelfennig 2013). In particular, we might anticipate a left– right split in these groups, as is found in the European Parliament, where one can even see a left–right–far-right partition at in the 2014 assembly. This highlights the extent to which Euroscepticism is very often a secondary characteristic, rather than a central ideological motor. In addition, that ideology is still a factor, even if it does get thinned out, starts to point us towards the more exogenous factors that we will consider in the following section. The relatively open and unstructured political space that exists – or more precisely, can be made to exist – at a supra-national, European level lacks any strong driving force in its organisation, so weaker dynamics can come to the fore. To draw on a physical analogy, ideology is like gravity: it pervades the space, and provides some general structuration, but a structuration that is much weaker than the other dynamics and forces that it occasionally encounters.

The exogenous perspective: institutional opportunities If ideology is a pervasive, but weak opportunity structure, then formal institutions offer a strong, but intermittent counterpart. Certainly, within a national context, institutions represent the dominant structures, largely because those national spaces are highly articulated and regulated (see Usherwood 2002 for an application to some relevant cases). Indeed, it is possible to argue that political institutions have formed half of a self-reinforcing circle – along with political action – in making national polities the dominant political form globally: political actors direct their efforts to influencing political institutions, building the latter’s importance, so further incentivising actors’ attentions. Regardless of this, it is possible to draw this argument into the European political sphere. Inasmuch as such a sphere exists, it is evident that it is most developed when accompanied by formal political institutions. This primarily means the European Union (EU) and its archipelago of activity and activists – the ‘Brussels bubble’ – but also secondary nodes around other organisations, including the Council of Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Free Trade Association and sub-European groupings. Brussels and Strasbourg are the physical centres of this space, insofar as it has physical dimensions, for the development of new technologies has permitted the formation of a zone of exchange in cyberspace that draws in individuals and groups from across Europe. However, it is important to stress that the physical sphere and the virtual one do strongly interact and provide mutual support. In particular, the formal institutions provide many of the raw materials needed to stimulate and maintain political activity. There are sites of decision-making, both formally and informally, which give a focus and objective for political actors; they have resources, be that funding, networks of

20  Simon Usherwood communication or people who have knowledge of the processes; and they have a public profile, especially when there is media interest. In short, such institutions constitute ripe ground for any political actors. Consequently, they are also likely to be key sites for Eurosceptic activity. Where better to fight against some injustice than at the heart of the system, the head of the snake? If the EU is the problem, then moving one’s response closer to the EU, in physical or conceptual terms, is a logical strategy. Thus, a first hypothesis here would be that most pan-European and transnational Euroscepticism is articulated in close proximity to EU institutions, or even inside them. The reasoning behind is largely driven by the considerations already mentioned, but also by the lack of good alternatives, certainly at a European level. And it is this point, as much as anything else that explains the seemingly paradoxical behaviour of some Eurosceptic groups to seek representation in the European Parliament. For some observers (as Brack 2012 notes), this behaviour has been taken as evidence of the intellectual dishonesty or weakness of Eurosceptics, especially those that seek either their country’s withdrawal from the Union or the collapse of the entire system. Certainly, at first glance, such actions appear contradictory. However, this is to confuse objectives with strategies. For Eurosceptic groups, the European Parliament offers a relatively easy-to-access public platform, from which they can make their case. That ease of access is well understood: the ­second-order nature of European elections (Reif and Schmitt 1980; Hobolt and Wittrock 2011) means that protest and non-governing parties do relatively well, not least because of depressed turnout. As Brack (2013) has convincingly demonstrated, Eurosceptic MEPs might often have poor attendance and voting records, but that is because they are spending their time campaigning elsewhere: their status as MEPs is primarily of value for the legitimisation and funding it brings. Put in more prosaic terms, if the EU is silly enough to give them money, then sceptics are clever enough to take it and use it against the system: as Chapter 8 notes, the institutional credibility of being an MEP (regardless of how the individuals see that body) is a useful platform for gaining access to media and for opening doors to decision-makers and social actors. Such instrumental behaviour is also clear in the opportunities available for securing further funding. Of particular interest is the recent emergence of pan-­ European political parties, with associated foundations, for which significant funding is available from the EU. The Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy’s (EFDD) decision to pursue this line of activity – following some long-running debates within some national parties (The Guardian 2014) – is a good example of how exigency tends to override ideology or principle: similarly the far-right’s formation in mid-2015 of the Europe of Nations and Freedom group within the Parliament is liable to lead in the same direction. Moreover, it suggests a second key structuring effect of political institutions, namely that activity will follow funding opportunities. The relative lack of alternative income streams, especially for groups that are not formal political parties, makes such diversion very important, especially if there is to be any long-term planning.

Modelling transnational and pan-European  21 So far, in this discussion of institutions, we have looked at it from the perspective of formal institutions being created and then drawing in Eurosceptics. However, it is also useful to consider an equivalent effect for informal institutions. While European-level mobilisation against European integration has taken place, it has been uneven, both in form and content: what happens in one country does not necessarily happen in the next, or anywhere else. However, as some of that mobilisation directs itself to European-level activity, it creates new potentials for mobilisation in other national spaces. To take one practical example, the The European Alliance of EU-critical Movement (TEAM) alliance that formed at the time of the Maastricht negotiations initially had a small number of member organisations (FitzGibbon 2013; Usherwood and Startin 2013), but once up and running, it was able to draw in more members and to stimulate the formation of new groups in countries, even at some distance from the initial event. Likewise, the continued success of Eurosceptic formations in the European Parliament – aided by the social media activities of individuals such as Nigel Farage – have given succour to new parties to contest subsequent elections. These processes are partly about the sharing of practice, and partly about the demonstration of potential gains: not only is it about what to do, but also what the future might hold. Early movers then act as role models of a sort to those who follow.

A third perspective: events as opportunities Institutions provide a degree of stability, in addition to their other benefits and attractions: they are relatively reliable in their existence, at least in a medium-term perspective. However, there is a third type of political opportunity structure that merits discussion. This structure is that of specific events. It is a somewhat eclectic category and one whose specific outcomes and impacts are hardest to model or predict. However, it also offers some of the best opportunities for pan-European and transnational groups to mobilise and to have an impact. The argument for considering specific events as an opportunity structure equivalent to that of formal political institutions rests on a similar argument to that ­category. The relative lack of structuration in the European public sphere has already been discussed so it will suffice here to suggest that just as when formal political institutions do exist they tend to provide a clear focus for group mobilisation and activity, so too do specific events. In particular, Europe-wide events create extended moments where pre-existing political actors and processes move into a contingent constellation of interaction, to debate and seek policy outcomes. What comparative research that has been done on the proximate causes of Eurosceptic group mobilisation (Usherwood 2007) points very clearly to European events as the predominant factor, both at national and European level, a rare instance of the EU as first-order politics. Some more definition of the type of events involved is required. Two main categories can be suggested. These link to that already noted, namely pan-­European events that have no national source, but which affect many (or even all) EU member states and even beyond that. On the one hand there are intentionally created

22  Simon Usherwood events, under which we would place treaty reforms, while on the other are unintentional events, including crises and crisis management. Each of these deserves further explanation. Intentional pan-European events are rare, especially in an era where the unintentional sort appear to provide more than enough to deal with. The cycle of treaty reform that began with the Single European Act and (especially) the Treaty on European Union presented shared spaces for the discussion and contestation of the structure, operation and even existence of European-level political action. As Usherwood and Startin (2013) argue, the Maastricht treaty is the point of crystallisation and mobilisation of much current Euroscepticism, through its wide scope and (seemingly) sudden appearance on the political horizons of many eventual activists. The extended moment in which national politicians, media and publics have their attention turned towards European integration and engage – however imperfectly – in attempts to produce new arrangements in turn creates a structuration of the political space, within which Eurosceptic actors can operate (see de Bruyn 2012 for a discussion of the impact of the referendum phase of this process). The event gives both an impetus and a rationale for pan-European or transnational action, or the involvement of national groups in other countries’ political debates (e.g. UKIP in the Nice and Lisbon referendum campaigns; see also Chapter 8 on the Irish Fiscal Compact Treaty referendum No campaigns). The degree to which this focuses on substantive points will vary: consider the strong mobilisation in the 2000s around the Constitutional Treaty on the issue of referendums to ratify the final outcome. This brought together Eurosceptics – who thought it a good way to stop the process – with more pro-integrationists – who spotted an opportunity to embed and legitimise the system – in a debate that did not really engage with the substance of the Constitutional Treaty itself (Norman 2005). At its limits, we might even argue that European elections provide a linking instance between this category and the formal institutions of the previous section, given the sometimes highly tangential connection between campaigning and the European Parliament and its powers. The unintentional events present a more complex picture, not least because they lack such clearly defined boundaries as the intentional ones. However, even if we take a very restrictive view of them, using the definition already outlined above, we can point to the Euro-crisis that has run since the late 2000s as the classic example. As numerous studies have pointed out (e.g. Clements et al. 2014; Kuhn and Stoeckel 2014; Miklin 2014; Grimm 2015), the crisis has provided much opportunity and incentive for national and transnational mobilisation against the EU, both as an individual organisation and as part of a wider international order (particularly by those on the left; see Chapter 5). As with the intentional events, the logic is similar, in that attention and interest is drawn to the European aspect, which in turn provides space for alternative worldviews. The difference with this category is that national political orders seem to play a more important role: in the case of the Eurozone crisis, this is largely down to the need for specifically national policies to address the problems. As such, the incentive to act transnationally or in pan-European spaces is reduced. Whether the migrant and refugee

Modelling transnational and pan-European  23 crisis that became more fully developed in 2015 becomes an equivalent event, where the intrinsic cross-border nature of the issues creates more of an incentive remains to be seen, even if there are already some indications of impacts at national level (Triandafyllidou 2014). In both categories, the hypothesis would be that the more wide-reaching the event and the more profound the impacts, so the more likelihood that there will be a transnational or pan-European response and contestation. However, the shape of that response and contestation will be highly dependent upon the event itself and the opportunities for any actors to exercise any agency. By way of contrast, we might argue that intentional events are more likely to have formally structured spaces – and even fall within the broader definitions of ‘political institutions’ as discussed beforehand – but that unintentional events offer more opportunity for Eurosceptical voices to set agendas and frame debate, since there is much less structuration.

Conclusion Pan-European and transnational Euroscepticism is difficult to theorise, because it is a recent phenomenon, because it does not fit well with existing models and because the space in which it occurs is itself in a state of flux. This chapter has argued that, despite these difficulties, there is still value in offering a framework of analysis, not least because the structural indications are that such Eurosceptic activity is likely to become ever more developed and consequential. Table  2.1 provides a summary of the key points. The continuing failure of the EU to find a broadly acceptable means of democratising and legitimising its political system, coupled to the multiplication of major challenges – economic, social and Table 2.1  Political opportunity structures shaping transnational and pan-European Euroscepticism Structure

Nature of Impact

Examples

Ideology

Endogenous. Weak, but pervasive. Aligns groups first to national political currents, then to transnational ones Exogenous. Rarity of formal institutions in transnational political space tends to draw in group mobilisation and activity. Groups tend to be drawn towards other groups Exogenous. Provide opportunity for mobilisation, public profile and impact. Can be intentional (e.g. treaty reforms) or unintentional (e.g. crises)

Far-right/right/left cleavages in group formation

Institutions

Contingent Events

Locus of activity in and around European Parliament Instrumental group formation to access resources Group formation at times of treaty reform and in crisis situations

24  Simon Usherwood political – to the EU’s hitherto primary means of securing popular and elite buy-in by producing useful outputs, all means that those who are disaffected or disconnected are liable to take whatever opportunities they can to express their unhappiness and opposition. In the face of such a development, the EU has two basic options (see also Usherwood and Startin 2013). The first is to continue its historical preference, namely to ignore or marginalise such voices and activity, either through inactivity or through seeking to cast aspersions. Historically, such an approach might have been justified when such voices were very rare indeed, but that scarcely seems appropriate in the present day. The second option is to engage and embrace Eurosceptics, to bring them into the consensus-building process that drives integration; something that fits much more closely with the notion of the Union as ‘governance without opposition’ (Neunreither 1998). Certainly, given the failure of the first approach, the second would appear to be the logical next step. However, it is important to note that in either case, whether there is engagement or not, we would expect Eurosceptic activity in pan-European or transnational spaces to increase. The emergence of groups that has been seen to date and which this collection discusses provides seeding points for further group formation and activity, in line with the institutional perspective outlined above: the trails have been blazed and the obvious opportunities – electoral, financial and ­organisational – have been shown to function. The only choice for the EU is whether to try to find new ways to bring this activity back into the more general process of finding useful outputs. Whatever the outcome of that might be, it is still possible to draw together the aspects discussed in this chapter into a summary of the factors that can be argued to shape the formation and operation of transnational and pan-European Eurosceptic groups. Activity will be focused in and around any formal political institutions that exist at the European level, with groups weakly organising along ideological lines, but noticeably conditioned by access to funding or other resources. The existence of pan-European events will create further opportunities for mobilisation and action, although this may be more ephemeral than that which locates alongside or in institutions. In short, such Euroscepticism will resemble its national counterparts in its opportunistic exploitation of those spaces that are available: certainly at the European level, Eurosceptic groups and actors remain too weak to be able to shape and create opportunities except in highly exceptional cases. This last point is important, for the pressure that Eurosceptics strongly contributed to applying in demanding national referendums on the Constitutional Treaty is arguably a development that has continued to make big pay-offs. The stopping of the Constitutional Treaty itself after the French and Dutch votes in 2005, followed by the retreat from the explicit constitutionalisation debate with the Lisbon treaty, and even the recent British referendum on membership: all of those might be traced back to that initial effort, which crossed national boundaries and demonstrated an ability to work with other political forces and actors. While it might have resulted from a very unusual set of circumstances, it does still highlight how important it is to study these groups.

Modelling transnational and pan-European  25

Bibliography Arzheimer, K. and Carter, E. (2006) ‘Political Opportunity Structures and Right-Wing Extremist Party Success’, European Journal of Political Research 45(3), pp. 419–443. Arzheimer, K. and Carter, E. (2009) ‘How (Not) to Operationalise Subnational Political Opportunity Structures: A Critique of Kestilä and Söderlund’s Study of Regional Elections’, European Journal of Political Research 48(3), pp. 335–358. Bee, C. and Bozzini, E. (eds. 2013) Mapping the European public sphere: Institutions, media and civil society. Farnham: Ashgate. Beetham, D. and Lord, C. (1998) Legitimacy and the European Union. Abingdon: Routledge. Benford, R. D. and Snow, D. A. (2000) ‘Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment’, Annual Review of Sociology 26, pp. 611–639. Brack, N. (2012) ‘Eurosceptics in the European Parliament: Exit or Voice?’, Journal of European Integration 34(2), pp. 151–168. Brack, N. (2013) Euroscepticism at the Supranational Level: The Case of the ‘Untidy Right’ in the European Parliament, Journal of Common Market Studies 51(1), pp. 85–104. Cheneval, F. and Schimmelfennig, F. (2013) ‘The Case for Democracy in the European Union’, Journal of Common Market Studies 51(2), pp. 334–350. Chryssogelos, A. S. (2015) ‘Patterns of Transnational Partisan Contestation of European Foreign Policy’, European Foreign Affairs Review 20(2), pp. 227–245. Clements, B., Nanou, K. and Verney, S. (2014) ‘We No Longer Love You, But We Don’t Want To Leave You’: The Eurozone Crisis and Popular Euroscepticism in Greece’, Journal of European Integration 36(3), pp. 247–265. de Bruyn, M. (2012) ‘The Irish Referendums on the Lisbon Treaty: Did the Recession Save Lisbon?’, Journal of Contemporary European Studies 20(1), pp. 91–101. Dutceac Segesten, A. and Bossetta Jr, M. J. and (2015) The Europeanization of Eurosceptics? A Hyperlink Network Analysis of the Sweden Democrats, Paper presented at ECPR Joint Sessions in Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland. Eriksen, E. O. (2005) ‘An Emerging European Public Sphere’, European Journal of Social Theory 8(3), pp. 341–363. FitzGibbon, J. (2013) ‘Citizens against Europe? Civil Society and Eurosceptic Protest in Ireland, the United Kingdom and Denmark’, Journal of Common Market Studies 51(1), pp. 105–121. Grimm, R. (2015) ‘The Rise of the German Eurosceptic Party Alternative für Deutschland, between Ordoliberal Critique and Popular Anxiety’, International Political Science Review 36(3), pp. 264–278. Halikiopoulou, D., Nanou, K. and Vasilopoulou, S. (2012) ‘The Paradox of Nationalism: The Common Denominator of Radical Right and Radical Left Euroscepticism’, European Journal of Political Research 51(4), pp. 504–539. Hobolt, S. B. and Wittrock, J. (2011) ‘The Second-order Election Model Revisited: An Experimental Test of Vote Choices in European Parliament Elections’, Electoral Studies 30(1), pp. 29–40. Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2004) ‘Does Identity or Economic Rationality Drive Public Opinion on European Integration?’, Political Science and Politics 37(3), pp. 415–420. Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2007) ‘Sources of Euroscepticism’, Acta Politica 42(2), pp. 119–127. Kitschelt, H. P. (1986) ‘Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-­ nuclear Movements in Four Democracies’, British Journal of Political Science 16(1), pp. 57–85. Koopmans, R. and Statham, P. (eds. 2010) The making of a European public sphere: Media discourse and political contention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Krouwel, A. and Abts, K. (2007) ‘Varieties of Euroscepticism and Populist Mobilization: Transforming Attitudes from Mild Euroscepticism to Harsh Eurocynicism’, Acta ­Politica 42(2), pp. 252–270.

26  Simon Usherwood Kuhn, T. and Stoeckel, F. (2014) ‘When European Integration Becomes Costly: The Euro Crisis and Public Support for European Economic Governance’, Journal of European Public Policy 21(4), pp. 624–641. Leconte, C. (2010) Understanding Euroscepticism. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Leconte, C. (2015) ‘From pathology to Mainstream Phenomenon: Reviewing the Euroscepticism Debate in Research and Theory’, International Political Science Review 36(3), pp. 250–263. McAdam, D., McCarthy, J. D. and Zald, M. N. (eds. 1996) Comparative perspectives on social movements. Political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Miklin, E. (2014) ‘From “Sleeping Giant” to Left–Right Politicization? National Party Competition on the EU and the Euro Crisis’, Journal of Common Market Studies 52(6), pp. 1199–1206. Mudde, C. (2012) ‘The Comparative Study of Party-based Euroscepticism: The Sussex versus the North Carolina School’, East European Politics 28(2), pp. 193–202. Neunreither, K. (1998) ‘Governance without Opposition: The Case of the European Union’, Government and Opposition 33(4), pp. 419–441. Norman, P. (2005) The accidental constitution (second edition). Brussels: EuroComment. Pridham, G. (2008) ‘European party cooperation and post-communist politics: Euroscepticism in transnational perspective’ in A. Szczerbiak and P. Taggart (eds) Opposing Europe: The comparative party politics of Euroscepticism. Volume 2: Comparative and theoretical perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 76–102. Princen, S. and Kerremans, B. (2008) ‘Opportunity Structures in the EU Multi-Level ­System’, West European Politics 31(6), pp. 1129–1146. Reif, K. and Schmitt, H. (1980) ‘Nine Second-Order National Elections – A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results’, European Journal of Political Research 8(1), pp. 3–44. Risse, T. and Van de Steeg, M. (2003) ‘An Emerging European Public Sphere? Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Clarifications’, International conference on ‘Europeanisation of Public Spheres, Political Mobilisation, Public Communication and the European Union’. Berlin: Science Center. Rootes, C. (1999) ‘Political Opportunity Structures: Promise, Problems and Prospects’, La Lettre de la Maison Française d’Oxford 10, pp. 75–97. Spies, D. and Franzmann, S. T. (2011) ‘A Two-dimensional Approach to the Political Opportunity Structure of Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe’, West European Politics 34(5), pp. 1044–1069. Startin, N. (2010) ‘Where to For the Radical Right in the European Parliament? The Rise and Fall of Transnational Political Cooperation’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society 11(4), pp. 429–449. Taggart, P. (1998) ‘A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems’, European Journal of Political Research 33(3), pp. 363–388. Taggart, P. and Szczerbiak, A. (2002) The party politics of Euroscepticism in EU member and candidate states. Brighton: Sussex European Institute. Tarrow, S. (1998) Power in movement: Social movements and contentious politics (second edition). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. The Guardian (2014) ‘UKIP to get £1.5m EU taxpayers’ cash by forming new political party’ [online]. Available at: www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/dec/16/ukip-eu-­ taxpayers-cash-new-political-party [Accessed 2 December 2015]. Triandafyllidou, A. (2014) ‘Greek Migration Policy in the 2010s: Europeanization Tensions at a Time of Crisis’, Journal of European Integration 36(4), pp. 409–425. Usherwood, S. (2002) ‘Opposition to the European Union in the UK: The Dilemma of P ­ ublic Opinion and Party Management’, Government and Opposition 37(2), pp. 211–230.

Modelling transnational and pan-European  27 Usherwood, S. (2007) ‘Proximate Factors in the Mobilization of Anti-EU Groups in France and the UK: The European Union as First-Order Politics’, Journal of European Integration 29(1), pp. 3–21. Usherwood, S. and Startin, N. (2013) ‘Euroscepticism as a Persistent Phenomenon’, Journal of Common Market Studies 51(1), pp. 1–16. Vasilopoulou, S. (2013) ‘Continuity and Change in the Study of Euroscepticism: Plus ça change?’, Journal of Common Market Studies 51(1), pp. 153–168. Werts, H., Scheepers, P. and Lubbers, M. (2012) ‘Euro-scepticism and Radical Right-wing Voting in Europe, 2002–2008: Social Cleavages, Socio-political Attitudes and Contextual Characteristics Determining Voting for the Radical Right’, European Union ­Politics 14(2), pp. 183–205.

3 To cooperate or not to cooperate? The European Radical Right and pan-European cooperation Nicholas Startin and Nathalie Brack Introduction One of the most controversial developments in European politics in recent years has been the electoral rise of Radical Right Parties (RRPs). This phenomenon has been prevalent across European Union (EU) member states, as from Scandinavia to the Mediterranean and from the Benelux countries to the post-communist nations, the Radical Right has made advances in national, local and European electoral settings (Startin 2014). Parties such as the French National Front (FN), the Danish People’s Party (DFP), the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, the Vlaams Belang in Belgium, Golden Dawn in Greece and Jobbik in Hungary have all become significant contenders within their respective countries in terms of both votes cast and impact within their party systems. Academic literature on this subject has been in abundance in the last decade (Norris 2005; Ignazi 2006; Mudde 2007; Hainsworth 2008). Most explanations for the rise of the Radical Right have traditionally focused on a combination of ‘supply-side’ and ‘demand-side’ variables, with an inevitable link to the historic legacy of fascism and Nazism featuring as an explanation for some scholars. One interesting supply-side explanation that has been acknowledged in recent years to account for the electoral rise and durability of the Radical Right is the way that such parties have, in an effort to widen their domestic appeal beyond their traditional ‘bread and butter’ anti-immigrant discourse, tactically exploited opposition to the EU in conjunction with opposition to globalisation in an attempt to broaden their electoral support (Brack and Startin 2015). This, it is argued, has helped such parties to gain legitimisation, to become mainstreamed and to contribute to an internal process of ‘sanitisation’ or ‘detoxification’. It is not coincidence that those RRPs that made significant progress in the 2014 European elections such as the DFP, the FN (both of which polled around a quarter of the popular vote) and the FPÖ (which gained the support of one in five voters), have, in the context of the Eurozone crisis, increasingly utilised a ‘hard’ Eurosceptic and anti-globalisation discourse as a major policy plank within their broader programmes, in short a tactical lever to gain electoral traction.

To cooperate or not to cooperate?  29 Interestingly though, despite an increase in support for the Radical Right within EU member states, which according to Mudde (2014a) has led to a record fifty-two members of European Parliament (MEPs) being elected in the 2014 European elections, discussion of the significance of this development continues to generate much less scholarly interest in terms of its consequences from a pan-European perspective. The predominantly media-driven thesis that cooperation among the Radical Right in the European Parliament (EP) is largely motivated by financial incentive rather than ideological drivers remains the dominant narrative. Such a standpoint focuses on the differences between RRPs and stresses that given their rationale and raison d’être is largely driven by concerns related to national sovereignty and identity, cooperation among such parties is thus likely to be both difficult to launch and difficult to coordinate into something durable. Minkenberg and Perrineau’s (2007: 51) assertion that ‘there is nothing more difficult to establish than an international group of nationalists’ encapsulates the essence of the argument which asserts that transnational cooperation among the Radical Right is therefore likely to flounder once established and is, thus, likely to be short-lived. The rise and fall of the Identity Tradition Sovereignty (ITS) grouping which lasted from January until November 2007 and the subsequent failure to coordinate a further Radical Right grouping until a year after the 2014 European elections, with the emergence of the Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) group, seem on the surface, to fit this narrative. Although there have been some academic studies in recent years that have sought to proffer more nuanced empirical explanations for the potential development of pan-European cooperation among the Radical Right (Almeida 2010; Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou 2014), the notion that such actors will be ‘unlikely bedfellows’ (Fieschi 2000) and thus likely to reject the idea of institutionalised cooperation remains the dominant thesis. However, despite somewhat haphazard cooperation among the Radical Right since the introduction of European elections in 1979, there is nevertheless evidence over the last decade that both a pan-European dynamic (within the context of the EP) and a transnational dynamic (outside the confines of the EP) has started to develop among Europe’s Radical Right. The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the extent to which this dynamic has begun to emerge among the European Radical Right. It begins with a chronological overview of Radical Right cooperation in an EP context since the first European elections in 1979 and focuses on some of the barriers that have prevented closer cooperation among RRPs. It seeks to move beyond the dominant ‘unlikely bedfellows’ narrative and to proffer a more nuanced explanation for the failures of the Radical Right in this respect. The authors posit that where pan-­ European cooperation in the EP has led to group formation by the Radical Right, it has been built around transnational dialogue outside of the dynamics of the parliamentary setting. From here, based on elite interview data with representatives of the Radical Right, as well as other sources such as party documents, it explores the motives behind group formation among RRP elites and argues that although a mixture of strategic, tactical and financial necessity predominate, nevertheless a growing sense of shared ideals (in particular with regard to the defence

30  Nicholas Startin and Nathalie Brack of national sovereignty within an EU context) has begun to emerge. This fledgling pan-­European dynamic among the Radical Right is epitomised by the emergence of the ENF group in 2015. The authors conclude by speculating on its future and on the likelihood of closer transnational ties emerging among the Radical Right moving towards the 2019 European elections.

The Radical Right as unlikely bedfellows: transnational cooperation from an historical perspective Phase 1: 1979–2005, the Radical Right on the margins – disunited and disenfranchised There have been several recent studies trying to explain the formations of political groups in the EP in the last decade (Hix et al. 2007; Bale et al. 2010; McElroy and Benoit 2010). However, as noted by Whitaker and Lynch (2014), the motives behind the formation of a group for Eurosceptic parties differ as they are opposed to the European integration process. The very concept of political cooperation on a transnational basis has historically been a troublesome one for RRPs, and attempts to organise such cooperation have been short-lived and considered to be counter-productive. As Fieschi (2000: 518) pointed out as long ago as the beginning of the millennium, ‘the difficulties encountered by [Radical Right] parties in attempts to form parliamentary groups [in the EP] are indicative of the primacy of nationalisms which undermine any potential for ideological alliances’. Such parties, the dominant thesis runs, are unlikely bedfellows as the basis for their cooperation seems to be born from tactical necessity rather than stemming from any clear ideological conviction, other than the preservation of their country specific national identities. Added to this, the rationale of the EP’s party system is one where ‘national lines are suppressed in favour of ideological cleavages’ (ibid.) and this traditionally has posed a dilemma for RRPs. A brief overview of the scale of transnational cooperation among the Radical Right since the first EP elections in 1979 and the fifth plebiscite in 2004 underlines this point. At the 1979 European elections, before the rise of significant public and party-based opposition to the EU, there were no RRPs elected to the EP among the ten member states with the exception of four members of the Italian Movemento Sociale Italiano (MSI). By the time of the 1984 European elections, the breakthrough of the FN with ten MEPs, combined with the arrival of Greece in the European Community (and one elected representative from Ethniki Politiki Enosis (EPEN), led to the formation of an informal inter-parliamentary group known as the Group of the European Right. This group instigated by Jean-Marie Le Pen (see Mudde 2007) also included the five Italian MSI members and was later joined by the Ulster Unionist MEP John Taylor. Five years later, despite the defeat of the Greek EPEN member, the 1989 European elections afforded an opportunity to expand the Group of the European Right with the election of six MEPs from the German Republikaner Party (REP) as well as two Italian Lega Nord (LN), and two Belgian Vlaams Blok (VB, now known as

To cooperate or not to cooperate?  31 Vlaams Belang) representatives (Startin 2010). However, after a dispute between the Italian MSI representatives and the German REP over the status of the South Tyrol region – a long-term source of dispute between Austrian, German, and Italian nationalists – the group initially disbanded (Williams and Atkinson 2007). It was rebranded a month later in July 1989 under the title of The Technical Group of the European Right (TGER; see Fieschi 2000) without the presence of the Italian MSI MEPs but with Jean-Marie Le Pen as its chair. Fieschi (ibid.: 523) posits that ‘the group … was riddled with conflict and, although it drafted resolutions and continued to exist more or less until 1994, it had more conflict between members of the group than concerted action’. At the subsequent set of European elections in 1994 the TGER was disbanded as the German REP failed to reach the 5 per cent threshold for EP representation, leaving insufficient MEPs to form a party group. Thus, during the 1994–1999 mandate, the remaining Radical Right MEPs from France and Belgium were not affiliated to any transnational grouping and little cooperation or any formalised dialogue between the various parties was evident during this period (Startin 2010). The entry of Austria into the EU following the enlargement of 1995 resulted in the election of six FPÖ MEPS and this appeared to afford the Radical Right an opportunity to foster closer dialogue. However, according to Mudde (2007), the Austrian party refused to join forces with the other RRPs in the EP. At the 1999 European elections, although the number of French FN members more than halved from eleven to five,1 the number of countries sending Radical Right MEPs to the EP increased, with the DFP joining the existing parties from Austria, France, Belgium and Italy. Again, Jean-Marie Le Pen attempted to form a transnational political grouping among the Radical Right but was forced to set up a non-ideologically aligned Technical Group of Independent Members which comprised the Italian LN, Movimento Sociale Italiano–Destra Nazionale (MSI– DN), and the Belgian VB, as well as a member of the Basque Eusakol Herritarrok party and nine MEPs from the Italian ultra-libertarian, anti-statist Partito Radicale (Startin 2010). Le Pen’s attempts to create a formalised Radical Right grouping failed once the one Danish DFP MEP, Morgans Camre, chose to join the pro-­ sovereignty Europe of Nations group (see Chapter 4), and the four Austrian MEPs decided to remain non-affiliated, not wanting to be associated with the perceived extremism of the FN and the VB as it struggled to assert itself as a party of government within the coalition in Austria (ibid.). As a result the Technical Group did not endure with the Constitutional Affairs Committee decreeing in September 2009 that they lacked any coherent political affinity and the group was obligated to disband. While the French FN and the Belgian VB continued to collaborate quite closely, including sharing a secretariat (see Fieschi 2000) formal cooperation among the RRPs did not materialise for the remainder of the 1999–2004 Parliament. The ‘big bang’ enlargement in 2004 ensured that the number of Radical Right MEPs increased further with ten Liga Polskich Rodzin (LPR) MEPs elected, but elsewhere in Hungary, Latvia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia more orthodox right-wing parties dominated the polls and the Radical Right was largely

32  Nicholas Startin and Nathalie Brack squeezed out in terms of representation (see Minkenberg and Perrineau 2007). Thus, the 2004 enlargement, which appeared on the surface to offer a window of opportunity for the Radical Right in terms of crystallising transnational collaboration, did not produce such an outcome. It was cooperation among the Radical Right outside of the EP context, on the back of the 2004 European elections, followed by the 2007 enlargement, with Bulgaria and Romania joining, that was to lead to the emergence of the first stages of any meaningful transnational dynamic among RRPs in Europe. Phase 2: 2005–2014, a decade of cooperation, set-backs and collaboration By 2004, despite the failure of Central and Eastern European (CEE) RRPs to gain any significant representation in the EP and no meaningful evidence of concrete cooperation among the Radical Right within the context of the EU’s institutional framework, it was becoming increasingly evident among the leaders of the major RRPs in Europe that transnational cooperation both inside and ­outside the EP was desirable both in strategic and logistical terms for a number of reasons. First, within the context of the EP, the financial benefits of forming a political group, which would include entitlement to about a million Euros for staff and ­administrative costs (Startin 2010) was a clear encouragement for overcoming potential, nationalist differences. These resources, even if unofficially (and potentially illegally) deployed, could be used to kick-start local and national campaigns. ­Second, the practical, strategic benefits of EP group formation was also a significant motivation. As Williams and Atkinson (2007) surmise within the context of the EP, only transnational groupings have any real opportunity to set the agenda, table amendments to legislation and get speaking time in debates. Third, and linked to the previous point, from a tactical and strategic perspective, transnational political cooperation served to enhance the notion of legitimacy so sought after among European Radical Right elites. In his seminal text ‘Ten theories of the Extreme Right’, Eatwell (2003) argues that one of the key factors which helps to explain the electoral emergence and durability of RRPs is the perception of achieved legitimisation. In this respect, achieving group status in the EP can be viewed as the transnational equivalent of this process with the potential to act as a clear and transparent confirmation that RRPs are able to play by the existing rules of the game within a clear democratic framework. In short, the quest for respectability and legitimisation via the route of transnational cooperation in the EP can be viewed as part of the wider process of detoxification or de-demonisation so prevalent in the literature on the contemporary European ­Radical Right (see ­Mondon 2014). There is no doubt that these strategic motivations were increasingly at the forefront of Radical Right elites’ tactical rationale in the context of the 2004 European elections. Interestingly though, it was developments outside the EP which were to help kick-start a growing pan-European dynamic among Radical Right elites, one that was rooted in more than just strategic and tactical necessity, but in some sense of

To cooperate or not to cooperate?  33 shared ideological agreement. Taylor (2005: 8) acknowledged over a decade ago that ‘a burgeoning Radical Right is beginning to coalesce around a common set of ideas and discourses that project an abstract vision of Europe that is at once independent, exclusive and superior’. It is this sense of Euro-nationalism, drawing on common heritage, destiny and shared goals, which was at the forefront of the revamping of Euronat in Paris in October 2005, an informal grouping of RRPs, which had originally been instigated by Jean-Marie Le Pen back in 1997. Whereas, in its initial guise ‘it showed trends of instability and lack of unity’ (Ivaldi 2011: 19) the 2005 meeting, again instigated by Le Pen, was a turning point with the 2004 ‘big bang’ enlargement acting as the backdrop for galvanising collaboration among the Radical Right in Western, Northern and Southern Europe. Le Pen, who was instrumental in the formation of Euronat in Paris in October 2005, made much of the common heritage, destiny and goals shared by the people of Europe, as the following statement on the Euronat website homepage illustrates: All Nationalist people in Europe must learn to look far beyond their borders considering all the aspects of their politics, their culture, their identity and their common future … The Nationalist phenomenon cannot be and will not be restricted to an island, cooperation is essential to achieve freedom and our common goals. (cited in Startin 2010: 437) However, in part inspired by the intra-party rivalry between the FN and the FPÖ to be the leading European RRP in terms of influence and impact (as well as building on the momentum of the Paris meeting), this was followed by the latter organising a meeting of parties from seven different countries in Vienna the following month.2 According to Mudde (2007: 180) it was the FPÖ-inspired venture in Vienna that concluded with some concrete and quite far-reaching decisions on a number of levels. First, it established a ‘Contact Forum for European Patriotic and National Parties and Movements with a Permanent Office in Vienna’; second, it was agreed to conduct annual meetings to develop common actions at the European level, and, finally, the Vienna meeting also led to an attempted common ideological programme as the basis for future cooperation. While it is somewhat disputed (between the two parties) as to which of these meetings acted as a ­catalyst – in reality it was probably a combination of both as events in Paris and Vienna were a clear turning point in the evolution of cooperation among RRPs. This was not just because it hinted at a growing, shared, ideological bond but also because it paved the way for tighter cooperation within the EP. Andreas Mölzer, the Austrian FPÖ MEP, who was the main driver in organising the transnational Vienna collaboration and subsequent declaration, hinted that the Vienna declaration would be the springboard for a pan-European grouping to emerge in the EP once Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in 2007 (Mudde 2007: 180). With the rules stating that a political group shall comprise members elected in at least one-fifth of the member states and that the minimum number of members required to form a group would be twenty this target now seemed

34  Nicholas Startin and Nathalie Brack achievable. Significantly as well, part of the emerging realpolitik in this respect was that the FN and the FPÖ appeared, at least on the surface, to have toned down their intra-party rivalry in terms of vying to be the leading political force among the pan-European Radical Right. The ITS group was, thus, formed in the EP on 15 January 2007, following the enlargement of the EU to twenty-seven nations. It included the Bulgarian Natsionalen Sayuz Ataka (NSA) and the Romanian Partidul Romania Mare (PRM). The group was initially made-up of twenty MEPs from seven different countries and included a number of high-profile and controversial MEPs, including Jean-Marie Le Pen and his daughter Marine, as well as the FN’s then deputy leader Bruno Gollnisch (who became the President of ITS) and Alessandra Mussolini, the grand-daughter of Benito (see Table 3.1). Somewhat ironically, given the hostility of the EU’s political elites to the Radical Right, the formation of ITS occurred initially without the direct election of any Bulgarian and Romanian MEPs, as the representatives from these two countries were not initially elected to the EP, instead being nominated by their national governments, based on election results from their previous general elections (Startin 2010). The group was short-lived in terms of its existence, not surviving until the end of the calendar year and disbanding in November 2007 amid media reports of a fall-out between Alessandro Mussolini and the Romanian contingent, following her inopportune comments about Romanian gypsies. This served to reinforce the dominant reportage of the mainstream media and anti-Radical Right pressure groups that the sole motivation behind the formation of ITS was opportunistic, based primarily on the financial and practical advantages of being in a pan-­European political group (see Kraske and Schlamp 2007; Mahony 2007; Williams and Atkinson 2007). Startin’s (2010) article on the rise and fall of ITS, based on interviews and a survey of ITS members, suggests that the group would have fallen apart irrespective of the Mussolini spat with the Romanian contingent and that this was not the sole reason for the group’s demise. Interestingly though, the author’s findings would also appear to suggest that the rhetoric and discourse apparent at the time of the group’s formation were pointing towards a growing, common Euro-nationalist, ideological solidarity (ibid). The existence of ITS – all be it short-lived – was proof of some sense of pan-European coherence among the Radical Right which pointed beyond just economic and tactical motivations. The demise, however, did not prevent a transnational dynamic among the Radical Right from continuing to emerge outside the confines of the EP. In February 2009 Radical Right political elites from Austria, France, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Bulgaria, Switzerland and Russia met in Vienna to strategise a common response to the proposed Lisbon Treaty, in light of the announcement of a second referendum on the issue scheduled in Ireland for October 2009 (see Phillips 2009). The 2009 European elections, the combination of the legitimisation of immigration as an issue and the growing sense of global economic uncertainty reinforced by the worldwide recession, unsurprisingly led to the election of more RRP MEPs from more EU countries. In terms of Western European parties, the notable winners were on the one hand the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV, four seats), the

To cooperate or not to cooperate?  35 Table 3.1  Composition of the Identity Tradition Sovereignty group in the European Parliament Party

Seats

Name of MEP

France

Front National

7

Belgium

Vlaams Belang

3

Austria

Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs Movimento Sociale Italiano Fiamma Tricolore Independent Natsionalen Sǎyuz Ataka

1

Bruno Gollnisch (Chair of Group); Carl Lang; Jean-Marie Le Pen; Marine Le Pen; Fernand Le Rachinel; Jean-Claude Martinez; Lydia Schenardi Philip Claeys (Vice Chairman of Group); Koenraad Dillen; Frank Vanhecke Andreas Mölzer

1

Alessandra Mussolini

1 1 3

Luca Romagnoli Ashley Mote Dimitar Stoyanov (after initial observation status in January 2007 he was elected in May 2007); Slavcho Binev and Desislav Chukolov (both elected in May 2007) Daniela Buruiană; Eugen Mihăescu (Vice Chairman of Group); Viorica Moisuc; Petre Popeangă; Cristian Stănescu Mircea Coşea (after initital observation status in The Alliance of Liberals and Democrats Group in the EP, he left the Romanian National Liberal Party to join ITS in March 2007 as an Independent)

Italy United Kingdom Bulgaria

Romania

Partidul România Mare

5

Independent

1

TOTAL

23

Source: European Parliament archives.

British National Party (BNP, two seats) in the UK and the Finns Party (one seat), which all obtained seats for the first time; and on the other hand the Italian LN (nine seats), the Austrian FPÖ (two seats) and the Danish DFP (two seats), which all increased their share of the vote and their number of seats. In contrast, the Belgian Vlaams Belang (two seats) and the French FN (three seats) lost seats. Major gains were also made among the Radical Right in the CEE states with the Hungarian Jobbik party leading the way in terms of votes cast (15 per cent, three seats). Despite this increase in the number of Radical Right MEPs to thirty-five and the previous discussions at the Vienna meeting, a Radical Right grouping similar to ITS failed to emerge for the duration of the five-year Parliament. While there

36  Nicholas Startin and Nathalie Brack were attempts to form a group, notably led by PVV Leader Geert Wilders, such a development failed to materialise as the Radical Right found itself unable to unite the requisite number of MEPs from the requisite number of countries. In essence, despite the growing sense of closer cooperation that had emerged in the previous five-year term of the EP (2004–2009) both in and outside the Parliament, a number of factors proved a barrier in preventing Radical Right group formation beyond the traditional interpretation that nationalist differences acted as an obvious blockage. First, the change of rules introduced by the EP’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs in July 2008, which stated that a group be comprised of twenty-five MEPs instead of twenty, and from seven countries rather than six was a blow for the Radical Right’s chances in this respect (see Mahony 2008). In essence this acted as an institutionally imposed ‘cordon sanitaire’, which was perceived by some as a deliberate attempt to block the progress of the Radical Right. Added to this, in the search for legitimacy (as the key to electoral success) the more ‘reconstructed’ RRPs were wary about formal association with those parties perceived to be more extreme than themselves. Hence, the Danish DFP and the Italian LN, despite some negotiations with other RRPs at various stages, did not feel comfortable about joining forces with the French FN and the Austrian FPÖ and joined the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)-driven Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) group. They were subsequently followed by the Finns, the Slovakian Nationalist Party and Greek Popular Orthodox Rally MEPs. In reality, despite attempts at forging closer ideological bonds, the Radical Right is a ‘broad church’ in party family terms which was reflected in disagreements in 2009 about developing a united policy on the future direction of the EU with disagreements over even the basic question of whether a political, pan-European group should support EU membership or not. Another barrier to group formation for the Radical Right in the 2004–2009 EP was the division between East and West which acted as a barrier to any potential, emerging cooperation. Given the electoral maths in terms of the number of countries required to form a group this division would need to be bridged. This was a bridge too far for two main reasons, one historical and one more contemporary. As Startin (2010: 444) posits: Historically, the RRPs have been notoriously anti-communist and this distrust remains among some of the elites in the Western parties. Conversely, the parties from the CEE states, raised in a political culture hostile to extreme right and fascist politics, view their historical circumstances differently to those of the Western parties, and this has ensured the perception that as a region they face different economic and political challenges and difficulties. This historical division has spilled over to the contemporary context since the 2004 ‘big bang’ enlargement and the subsequent 2007 entry of Bulgaria and Romania, as RRPs in Western, Northern, and to a lesser extent Southern, Europe have gradually developed their hostility towards the EU’s Freedom of Movement (and with it Schengen) and have increasingly scapegoated CEE migrants as a central part of their anti-migration discourse.

To cooperate or not to cooperate?  37 A final explanation for the failure of the Radical Right to form a grouping during the 2009–2014 Parliament was the reopening of elite-level disagreements as the historic tensions between the FN and the FPÖ’s leadership appeared to resurface when faced with the added presence of Geert Wilders as a significant rival to the two best-known RRPs. The decline of the FN (albeit temporary) in terms of representation in 2009, and the subsequent shift in the balance of power within the Radical Right, did not assist the process of elite-level unity in Brussels as Jean-Marie Le Pen sensed his influence waning. Despite signs of closer cooperation among RRPs leading up to 2009 it would be the 2014 European elections that would reignite the pan-European dynamic among the Radical Right. This process was assisted by the election of Marine Le Pen as FN leader three years previously, whose more conciliatory approach ensured that bridges could be built both with the FPÖ’s Hans-Christian Strache and the PVV’s Geert Wilders. Transnational cooperation among the Radical Right continued after the 2009 European elections, but unlike the influence of Euronat and the subsequent Vienna meeting prior to the formation of ITS in 2007, this did not provide the necessary direct momentum to lead to a pan-European Radical Right group in the EP. A  fledging European political party (outside the confines of the EP) was formed in Budapest in October 2009: The Alliance of European National Movement (ANEM) which comprised the following RRPs – Jobbik, the FN, the Italian Tricolour Flame, Sweden’s National Democrats and the Belgian FN. However, by the end of 2011, Marine Le Pen, as the new leader of the FN, withdrew from the organisation, which was viewed as too extreme for her strategy of detoxification, a crucial element of which was developing the party’s image on a transnational level. Other members of the FN, however, such as Bruno Gollnisch and Jean-­Marie Le Pen, remained members until the end of 2013. The FN subsequently joined the European Alliance for Freedom (EAF), which was founded in 2010 on the basis of individual membership (instead of party membership). This European Party of Radical Right members, recognised as an unofficial group by the EP, would serve as the basis for the future ENF group in the EP as it comprised members of the Vlaams Belang (Gerolf Annemans), of the FN (Marine Le Pen), of the PVV (Geert Wilders), of the FPÖ (Andreas Mölzer and Harald Vilimsky) and of the LN (Matteo Salvini) as well as members from other parties (Jobbik, Sweden Democrats, Lithuanian Order and Justice, Citizens in Rage, The Maltese Labour Party and the former UKIP MEP Janice Atkinson). The development of this party served to underline that, whereas pan-­European cooperation has been more challenging to achieve, transnational cooperation among RRPs outside the EP has been more achievable. This is because collaboration outside the confines of the EP has been less dependent on outside constraints such as high-profile media interest (see Chapter 9), has not been subject to the institutional, internal (anti-Radical Right) pressures of group formation in the EP and has also afforded the capacity to include smaller parties not elected in the EP. As with Euronat, in the build-up to the formation of the ITS group in 2007, so collaboration outside of the confines of the EP would nevertheless have a bearing on the development of the ENF group.

38  Nicholas Startin and Nathalie Brack Phase 3: the 2014 European elections and the emergence of the Europe of Nations and Freedom group in 2015 Before and during the campaign for the 2014 European elections, there was much debate in the media about the potential formation of a new Radical Right group in the EP. The three aforementioned political parties, the French FN, Austrian FPÖ and Dutch PVV, took the dominant lead on this. Even more so than in 2009, the backdrop of democratic malaise and economic crisis provided fertile ground for the mobilisation of Eurosceptic parties. This was particularly the case for RRPs in Western Europe, whose discourse was increasingly pitched against the notion of the Freedom of Movement enshrined in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and the Schengen agreement with Central and Eastern European migrants acting as the bone of contention. As  noted by Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou (2014: 285), these parties have adopted ‘a narrative that links the salient issue of the economy with questions such as immigration, citizenship law, employment law and the EU more broadly’. They have presented themselves as the sole defenders of the welfare state and of the preservation of social standards against the perceived threat of immigration. It has also helped them to reach out further to a blue-collar, working-class e­ lectorate (Rydgren 2012). According to Mudde (2014a) the number of Radical Right MEPs rose to ­fifty-two, up by fifteen seats since the 2009 election, although as Brack and Startin (2015: 244) point out ‘his calculations exclude the Finns Party and the National Alliance in Latvia, both of which could arguably be included in this group’. Despite this increase in RR numbers in the EP as a whole, they fared less well in the CEE states, with only Jobbik in Hungary gaining representation along with the National Alliance (see Table 3.2). The big winners were the Danish DFP and the FN who both topped the poll in their respective countries, winning around a quarter of the popular vote with the former continuing its upward curve improving by 11 per cent compared to 2009 and the latter quadrupling its score from 2009. The FPÖ polled one-fifth of the popular vote and Golden Dawn in Greece won seats in the EP for the first time with almost 10 per cent of votes cast. Other parties, such as the LN and the Vlaams Belang were less successful: while the former lost 4 per cent and four seats, the latter lost 5 per cent and one seat. Despite their electoral success, RRPs were unable to initially form a group in the EP after the elections. Indeed, only five parties officially agreed to collaborate: the FN, FPÖ, the PVV, the LN and the Vlaams Belang. They behaved like a group in the EP, in the sense that they had regular meetings, especially before the plenary sessions in order to discuss their voting behaviour (interview 4, 25 February 2015). They did not, however, meet the threshold to form a group (twenty-five MEPs from seven member states). Some potential allies went to other groups (such as the Finns or the DPP who joined the European Conservatives and Reformists Group, see Chapter 4), while the Sweden Democrats joined the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) group. UKIP topped the poll in the UK winning 27.5 per cent of the vote

To cooperate or not to cooperate?  39 Table 3.2  Radical Right Representation in the European Parliament after the 2014 elections Party France Italy Denmark Austria The Netherlands Hungary Greece Finland Sweden Belgium Latvia

Germany TOTAL

Front National Lega Nord Danish People’s Party Austrian Freedom Party Party for Freedom Jobbik – Movement for a Better Hungary Golden Dawn Finns Party Sweden Democrats Vlaams Belang National Alliance ‘All for Latvia!’ + For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK National Democratic Party of Germany

Percentage of Vote

Seats

Election Ranking (within Country)

24.85% 6.15% 26.6% 19.7% 13.2% 14.68%

24 5 4 4 4 3

1 4 1 3 3 2

9.38% 12.9% 9.7% 4.14% 14.3%

3 2 2 2 1

3 3 5 10 2

1

12

1%

55

Source: European Parliament archives.

(twenty-four seats), and continued to refuse to cooperate with the better-known RRPs such as the FN, the FPÖ and the PVV. In reality it took more than a year after the European elections to finally see the creation of a fully-fledged Radical Right group inside the Parliament: on 16 June 2015, the ENF group was established as the perseverance of Geert Wilders and Marine Le Pen finally produced results (see Table 3.3). As with ITS in 2007, the formation of the ENF group was undoubtedly influenced by developments outside the confines of the EP. After the failure to initially form a grouping, most members left the transnational EAF after the European elections. This still exists de jure but died de facto (Mudde 2014b). This paved the way in October 2014 for the creation of the Movement for a Europe of Nations and Freedom (MENF) which was instigated by Marine Le Pen and which laid the foundations for the formation of ENF. MENF comprises four parties involved in the ENF (VB, FN, LN and FPÖ), plus the Czech Civic Conservative Party. Interestingly, two parties are members of the EP group but not of the MENF: the Polish of the Congress of the New Right and Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom (PVV), the latter because allegedly it did not want to be the recipient of EU funds (Mudde 2014b). The divergent views of Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders on this issue were not, however, serious enough to prevent the formation of ENF nearly a year after the May 2014 European elections.

40  Nicholas Startin and Nathalie Brack

The rationale for pan-European cooperation between Radical Right Parties As already highlighted, cooperation among the Radical Right within the EP has been rather sporadic and the traditional narrative is that it has taken the form of tactical necessity rather than any meaningful political collaboration. The next part of the discussion looks at the reasons behind the formation of the ENF group in terms of the political elites’ motivations and discusses to what extent they were fueled by strategic and tactical incentives or by some sense of a growing transnational, ideological bonding among the Radical Right. Drawing on interview data with the MEPs conducted by the authors,3 the following reasons emerge to explain the formation of the ENF group. First, confirming the findings of Bressanelli (2012) and of Whitaker and Lynch (2014), the formation of the ENF was undoubtedly motivated by strategic, pragmatic explanations noticeably coupled with a desire for publicity. Indeed, as recognised back in 2007 with the formation of ITS, whereas the status of being ‘non-attached’ in the EP means less rights, belonging to a group gives opportunities to its members to have access to additional resources inside the assembly. MEPs who are part of a formalised transnational political group can stand for positions in committees, rapporteurship and coordinatorship. Subsequently they are also entitled to greater speaking time and have the right to submit amendments in plenary for instance. Several interviewees stressed the fact that in effect they have more parliamentary tools at their disposal because they are in a group, which they would not have if they were non-attached. In addition to that, some stressed they also have access to additional financial resources, which allows them to finance campaigns on EU issues and to recruit more staff. The second major driving force to emerge as an important factor with regard to the formation of the group was the role played by interpersonal relations. All interviewees stressed two elements: the dynamism and key role of the FN and its president, Marine Le Pen, and the inclusion of party leaders in the process. One of the reasons the group took almost a year to be created following the May 2014 European elections was the need to establish interpersonal relations between party leaders: ‘we had to establish trust so it took quite a while. Human relations are key in this process’ (interview 4, 25 February 2015). The changes in the leadership of those parties (Strache for the FPÖ in 2005; Marine Le Pen for the FN in 2011 and Annemans for the Vlaams Belang between 2012 and 2014) ensured that these relations were able to develop. Over the last few years, there have been several meetings between these leaders, with the aim of (re-) establishing mutual trust. By 2014, the historic rivalry from the 1980s between the French FN and the Austrian FPÖ (largely fueled by Jean-Marie Le Pen and Jorg Haider’s struggle to be the leading RRP in the EP) seemed to be fading. One interviewee somewhat stoically alluded to the historic dynamics of party leaders’ egos noting that ‘now, the interpersonal relations are good after these meetings and each president of the party has to play an important role in the formation of the group. But each of them has a big ego, so as party leader, I intend to focus on

To cooperate or not to cooperate?  41 Table 3.3  Full member parties of ENF and MENF, after the 2014 European Parliament election EU Member States Belgium Czech Republic France Italy Netherlands Austria Poland Romania UK Total

Flemish Interest Civic Conservative Party National Front Lega Nord Party for Freedom Freedom Party of Austria Congress of the New Right Independent Independent

ENF

MENF

1

√ √ √ √

20 5 4 4 2 1 1 38

√

Former EP Group Non-attached Non-attached EFD non- attached Non-attached newly elected Newly elected1 EFDD/ non-attached2

Sources: European Parliament; ENF (2016); MENF (2016). Table accurate as of 30 April 2016. Notes: 1 Laurenţiu Rebega was first elected as a member of the Conservative Party but defected to join the ENF as independent in July 2015. 2 Janice Atkinson was elected as UKIP MEP in 2014. She was expelled from UKIP and from EFDD in March 2015 and became a member of ENF as independent in June 2015.

the group management rather than the parliamentary work’ (interview 2, 26 April 2014). Forming a coherent transnational grouping was further complicated by the image each party has with other countries’ media. Indeed, despite attempts to change their reputation and to detoxify their brand, all parties involved faced reluctance from potential, likeminded parties because their potentially ‘detoxified’ image and reputation abroad had not yet impacted on their own domestic media. National media play an essential role in that respect: they portray Radical Right parties in a more radical manner than the leaders of these parties would wish. It was especially a concern for the FN, whose leader has been relatively successful in changing the party’s image in the French media but who is still grappling with a negative image in terms of foreign media portrayal (interview  5, 25  February 2015). The FN’s potential partners had to consider the impact it would have for them to be associated with such a party in terms of their own v­ oters’ perceptions. It was, for instance, the case for the S ­ weden Democrats who did not want to be publicly associated with Marine Le Pen because of her reputation (interview 1, 20 September 2012). The third most important motive for the pan-European group’s formation emerging from the findings of the authors’ interviews was a tactical desire to enhance their strategy of legitimisation. Radical parties have always used the EP as an arena to portray their strategic outlook at the national level. Because of the ‘second-order’ nature of the European elections, RRPs tend to be more successful in this electoral setting than at the national level. The EP has the capacity to serve as a facilitator of political mobilisation, to help share experience and show domestic voters that the national party in question has allies, a network in Europe and that

42  Nicholas Startin and Nathalie Brack it is legitimate. Whereas in the past, RRPs tended to have diverging strategies of legitimisation, on this occasion the parties belonging to the ENF were very careful to choose allies with similar objectives in mind. Compared to 2009, it was very clear, especially for the FN, that they were looking for Radical Right partners with a similar sense of the importance of the ‘detoxification’ agenda. As noted by one interviewee, they ‘did not want to be caricature. The aim was to build something coherent, well-thought, with serious people who have governmental ambitions. We did not want to be associated with Jobbik or Golden Dawn, even within the non-attached’ (interview 3, 18 March 2014). In essence, the strategy was to create two categories among RRPs in Europe, through a process of ‘inter-diabolisation’, with self-proclaimed reformed parties and the ‘excluded’ parties, considered too extreme by everyone (interview 6, 20 October 2015). The process of group formation was also facilitated by the decision to ‘agree to disagree’. The parties involved have established a coherent but very broad project concentrated on a few key points, all related to Europe: the fight against a federal Europe, against the Euro, against mass immigration (with Schengen a key ­factor) and the defence of national sovereignty. On this occasion, contrary to other attempts to form a transnational group, the Radical Right elites involved decided to leave aside any national issues of contention including any discussion on core social values, as they were of the belief these are strictly a national matter. The findings suggest that Radical Right elites are aware that there are differences of opinion (in areas such as foreign policy, same-sex marriage, etc.) but made the decision to develop a purely Europe-oriented programme by which to justify their pan-­European cooperation. While this would not imply a fully-fledged core ideological set of values, nevertheless it would suggest a common bond implying closer ties which run deeper than those purely created by tactical and strategic motivations.

Conclusion What are the chances of the current ENF group surviving? The very principle of transnational cooperation has long been controversial and the degree of engagement in the EP is also a very sensitive issue (Brack 2014). Only time will determine whether ENF will survive to the end of the full parliamentary term in 2019 or whether it suffers a similar fate to the short-lived ITS group. On the face of it ENF remains rather unstable in that it just meets the threshold for EP group formation, with the added vulnerability created by the fact that two independent MEPs from two countries are essential to the group’s survival. However, the group has already survived some significant turmoil with the departure of several important figures from the FN who have become non-attached members – including former leader and deputy leader Jean-Marie Le Pen and Bruno Gollnisch after the former was expelled from the FN in August 2015 for comments relating to the holocaust. This occurred only two months after the formation of the ENF group and threatened to bring a premature end to its existence but Marine Le Pen,

To cooperate or not to cooperate?  43 the other principle protagonists within the FN and the other leaders in the group were able to overcome this perceived setback. In fact in terms of shoring up a pan-European dynamic among the Radical Right, which builds both on a shared outlook on issues related to the EU and to Sovereignty and on a shared notion of ‘inter-­diabolisation’ among a group of likeminded, more ‘reconstructed’ parties, this development has potentially served to make the group more secure in terms of its future existence. While it would be exaggerated to talk of a f­ ully-fledged pan-­ European ideologically driven coherence among the European Radical Right, there are certainly signs that a more coherent dynamic is emerging in a Marine Le Pen/ Wilders/­Strache era within and beyond the confines of the EP. Against the backdrop of the refugee crisis in Europe, the ISIS terrorist attacks in Paris, B ­ russels and Nice this dynamic has the potential to become both stronger and more coherent as the 2019 European elections seem likely to lead to a larger cohort of Radical Right MEPs. The result of the so-called Brexit referendum in June 2016, with Marine Le Pen immediately calling for a referendum in France on EU membership and Geert Wilders looking to follow suit in the Netherlands, will only serve to strengthen both the influence and the unity of the European Radical Right.

Notes 1 This was due to the setting up of rival Bruno Mégret’s short-lived breakaway Mouvement National Républicain (MNR) which competed for the same electoral space thus splitting the vote. 2 Parties represented at this meeting were as follows: The Austrian FPÖ, the Belgian VB, the French FN, the Italian Azione Sociale and Social Movement – Tricolour Flame (Ms-FT), the Romanian PRM, and the newly founded Spanish Alernativa Espangnola. The Danish DFP, the Italian LN and the (Conservative) Polish Law and Justice (PiS) movement sent official greetings to the meeting (Mölzer 2005). 3 Ten interviews were conducted between the end of 2012 and autumn 2015 with MEPs from Radical Right parties (from ENF and non-attached) as well as staff members involved in the creation of the ENF. Given the central role of the FN, its members are overrepresented in the sample.

Bibliography Almeida, D. (2010) ‘Europeanized Eurosceptics? Radical Right Parties and European Integration’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society 11(3), pp. 237–253. Bale, T., Hanley, S. and Szczerbiak, A. (2010) ‘ “May Contain Nuts”? The Reality behind the Rhetoric Surrounding the British Conservatives’ New Group in the European Parliament’, Political Quarterly 81(1), pp. 85–98. Brack, N. (2014) L‘euroscepticisme au Parlement européen. Stratégies d‘une opposition anti-système au coeur des institutions. Luxembourg: Larcier. Brack, N. and Startin, N. (2015) ‘Introduction: Euroscepticism, from the Margins to the Mainstream’, International Political Science Review 36(3), pp. 239–249. Bressanelli, E. (2012) ‘National Parties and Group Membership in the European Parliament: Ideology or Pragmatism?’, Journal of European Public Policy 19(5), pp. 737–754. Eatwell, R. (2003) ‘Ten Theories of the Extreme Right’, in P. Merkel and L. Weinberg (eds) Right-Wing Extremism in the Twenty-First Century. London: Frank Cass, pp. 47–73.

44  Nicholas Startin and Nathalie Brack Fieschi, C. (2000) ‘European Institutions: The Far-Right and Illiberal Politics in a Liberal Context’, Parliamentary Affairs 53(3), pp. 517–531. Hainsworth, P. (2008) The extreme right in Western Europe. London: Routledge. Halikiopoulou, D. and Vasilopoulou, S. (2014) ‘Support for the Far Right in the 2014 European Parliament Elections: A Comparative Perspective’, The Political Quarterly 85(3), pp. 285–288. Hix, S., Noury, A. and Roland, G. (2007) Democratic politics in the European Parliament. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ignazi, P. (2006) Extreme right parties in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ivaldi, G. (2011) ‘The Populist Radical Right in European Elections 1979–2009’ in U. Backes and P. Morreau (eds) The extreme right in Europe: Current trends and perspectives. Gottinghen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht. Kraske, M. and Schlamp, H. J. (2007) ‘Far-Right MPs Join Forces in EU Parliament – A Small Thorn in the EU’s Side’ [online]. Available at: www.spiegel.de/international/ spiegel/0,1518,461425,00 html [Accessed 1 February 2016]. Mahony, H. (2007) ‘Plans for European Far-right Group Intensify’, EUObserver [online]. Available at: http://euobserver.com/9/23196 [Accessed 1 February 2016]. Mahony, H. (2008) ‘New Rules to Make it Harder for MEPs to Form Political Groups’, EUObserver [online]. Available at: http://euobserver.com/9/26468 [Accessed 1 ­February 2016]. McElroy, G. and Benoit, K. (2010) ‘Party Policy and Group Affiliation in the European Parliament’, British Journal of Political Science 40(2), pp. 377–398. Minkenberg, M. and Perrineau, P. (2007) ‘The Radical Right in the European Elections 2004’, International Political Science Review 28(1), pp. 29–55. Mölzer, A. (2005) Europa unser. Für ein Europa der freien Völker und der kulturellen Vielfalt. Vienna: Eckartschrift 177. Mondon, A. (2014) ‘The Front National in the Twenty-First Century: From Pariah to Republican Democratic Contender’, Modern and Contemporary France 22(3), pp. 301–320. Mudde, C. (2007) Populist Radical Right parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge ­University Press. Mudde, C. (2014a) ‘The Far Right in the European Elections: Of Earthquakes, Cartels and Designer Fascists’, Washington Post [online]. Available at: www.washingtonpost.com/ blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/05/30/the-far-right-in-the-2014-european-elections-ofearthquakes-cartels-and-designer-fascists/ [Accessed 1 February 2016]. Mudde, C. (2014b) ‘The EAF is Dead! Long Live the MENL!’, Open Democracy [online]. Available at: www.opendemocracy net/can-europe-make-it/cas-mudde/eaf-is-deadlong-live-menl [Accessed 28 April 2016]. Norris, P. (2005) Radical Right: Voters and parties in the electoral market. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Phillips, L. (2009) ‘EU Far Right Meet for Lisbon Treaty Pow-wow’, EUObserver [online]. Available at: http://euobserver.com/883/27540 [Accessed 1 February 2016]. Rydrgen, J. (2012) Class politics and the Radical Right. London: Routledge. Startin, N. (2010) ‘Where to For the Radical Right? The Rise and Fall of Transnational Cooperation?’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society 11(4), pp. 429–449. Startin, N. (2014) ‘Contrasting Fortunes, Differing Futures? The Rise (and Fall) of the Front National and the British National Party’, Modern and Contemporary France 22(3), pp. 277–300. Taylor, J. (2005) ‘Euronationalism: The Discursive Development of a European Right’ [online]. Available at: www.unomaha.edu/esc/2005Proceedings/Euronationalism.pdf [Accessed 1 February 2016]. Whitaker, R. and Lynch, P. (2014) ‘Understanding the Formation and Actions of Eurosceptic Groups in the European Parliament: Pragmatism, Principles and Publicity’, Government and Opposition 49(2), pp. 232–263.

To cooperate or not to cooperate?  45 Williams, D. and Atkinson, G. (2007) ‘Far Right Forms New Group in European Parliament’, Searchlight [online]. Available at: http://www.searchlightmagazine.com/index. php?link=template&story=191 [Accessed 11 October 2008].

Interviews Interview 1, non-attached MEP, Brussels, 20 September 2012. Interview 2, ENF MEP under the 8th legislature, Brussels, 26 April 2014. Interview 3, Group staff member, ENF, Brussels, 18 March 2014. Interview 4, ENF MEP under the 8th legislature, Brussels, 25 February 2015. Interview 5, ENF MEP under the 8th legislature, Brussels, 2 February 2015. Interview 6, non-attached MEP, Brussels, 20 October 2015.

4 Is ‘Eurorealism’ the new ‘Euroscepticism’? Modern conservatism, the European Conservatives and Reformists and European integration Benjamin Leruth Introduction For many right-wing conservative political parties across Europe, the European integration project has always been somewhat controversial. In the European Parliament, while the overwhelming majority of parties belonging to the European People’s Party (EPP) tend to be strongly supportive of developments at the EU level, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group, created in 2009 under the leadership of David Cameron, involved political parties that raise some concerns over some aspects of the European Union (EU). In the existing literature, the ECR group is often considered as a ‘soft Eurosceptic’ (see e.g. Usherwood and Startin 2013; Brack and Startin 2015) or ‘anti-federalist’ (see e.g. Taggart and Szczerbiak 2013). However, the group prefers to be referred to as ‘Eurorealist’, a notion that has been around since the early 2000s but still remains unclear in the literature. This chapter examines the transnational and pan-European ‘Eurorealist’ movement and aims at determining whether Eurorealism can be understood as a synonym of ‘soft Euroscepticism’. The chapter begins by contextualising right-wing soft Euroscepticism in Europe. This first section assesses the development of pan-European European Parliament groups, from the creation of the Gaullist-led European Progressive Democrats in 1965 to the dissolution of the European People’s Party–European Democrats (EPP–ED) in 2009. There are two major branches of right-wing soft Euroscepticism, which find their roots in national ideologies: Gaullism and British conservatism. The differences between these two branches are highlighted, with Gaullism becoming more diffuse and British conservatism being increasingly influential in the beginning of the twenty-first century. The second section then focuses on the early years of the ECR and the creation of the transnational Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists (AECR) following the 2009 European elections. The movement’s key principles, as outlined in the founding text (The Prague Declaration), are dissected in order to assess whether this grouping differs from previous right-wing soft Eurosceptic movements. Particular attention is given to the notion of ‘Eurorealism’, which is widely used by the ECR in order to define its position on European integration. The third section analyses

Is ‘Eurorealism’ the new ‘Euroscepticism’?  47 the success of the ECR in the 2014 European elections, and the subsequent series of party affiliations to the transnational and pan-European factions, which enabled the group to overtake the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) and become the third largest political group represented in the European Parliament. On the one hand, some parties switched from a pro-European stance to the ‘Eurorealist’ position advocated by the ECR, such as the Flemish nationalist New Flemish Alliance (N-VA); on the other, some parties softened their opposition to the process of European integration to join the group, such as the Finns Party and the Danish People’s Party. This section aims at understanding these changes in the group composition. The fourth and final section then concludes the chapter by assessing the success of the ECR in establishing itself as an influent transnational and pan-European Eurosceptic force in the European political sphere.

Right-wing soft Euroscepticism in the European Parliament: a brief history Euroscepticism in the European Parliament is far from being a new phenomenon, as Eurosceptic Members of European Parliament (MEPs) were appointed from the early stages of the European construction (Hanley 2007; Brack 2013). Rightwing Euroscepticism finds its roots in two national movements: Gaullism and British conservativism. Even though the main objective of Gaullists and British Conservative representatives was to protect their national interests, the former were perceived as too nationalistic by the latter, thus leading to the creation of two distinct pan-European soft Eurosceptic groups in the European Parliament. This section briefly reviews the history of both pan-European movements. The Gaullist movement in the European Parliament Gaullist MEPs were first appointed in the European Parliament by the French Assembly as early as 1958, and the first Gaullist-led pan-European group, the European Progressive Democrats (EPD, renamed European Democratic Alliance, EDA, in 1984), was founded in 1965 when Gaullist MEPs decided to withdraw from the Liberal Group. The main objective of the EPD was to protect France’s national interests and defend a Gaullist vision of European integration where national sovereignty prevails, as illustrated by the ‘empty chair crisis’ of 1965. Throughout the 1970s, the Gaullist-led group remained a fairly marginal Eurosceptic force in the European Parliament, supporting a transfer of competences to the European level provided that national veto is retained, and opposing Qualified Majority Voting (Rabier and Inglehart 1981). The movement eventually abandoned its opposition to European integration in the 1980s to become a loose association of right-wing political parties (see Table 4.1). In the early 1990s, the transformation of the European Community to a political Union led to strong internal divisions within the Gaullist movement in France. On the one hand, its leadership, under the influence of Jacques Chirac, adopted a pro-European stance, thus moving away from a traditional Gaullist vision (Knapp

48  Benjamin Leruth Table 4.1  Seats of the Gaullist movement in the European Parliament, 1979–1998 Election

1979 1984 1989 1994 1995

European Parliament Total 410 434 518 567 626

Group

Seatsa

%b

EPD EDA EDA EDA UFE

22 29 22 26 48

5.3 6.7 4.2 4.6 7.7

Source: European Parliament archives. Notes: a total seats held at outset of Parliament. b Gaullist seats as % of total seats in European Parliament. Abbreviations: EPD – European Progressive Democrats EDA – European Democratic Alliance UFE – Union for Europe

and Wright 2006). On the other, some senior figures of the movement, such as Charles Pasqua and Philippe Séguin, defended a sovereigntist approach by campaigning against the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Due to these internal divisions, concerns over the survival of the EDA arose. Following the fourth round of EU enlargement in 1995, the Italian Conservative-led group Forza Europa merged with the EDA to form the Union for Europe. The group eventually ceased to exist following the 1999 European elections, as elected representatives from the French Rally for the Republic joined the EPP–ED group. A neo-Gaullist, national conservative and openly Eurosceptic pan-European group, the Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN), rose from the EDA’s ashes, and was initially composed of sovereigntist/nationalist parties from France (Rally for France), Denmark (Danish People’s Party), Ireland (Fianna Fáil), Portugal (CDS – People’s Party) and Italy (Segni Pact/National Alliance). Even though considered a Eurosceptic/Euroreject party by Kopecký and Mudde (2002), the UEN mostly campaigned for ‘a Europe based on the freedom of nations to decide, where diversity is the first of all riches and not a federal Europe which would subject sovereign nations and take away the identity of European peoples’ (cited in Williams 2006: 74). Thus, while the group did not oppose the core principles of European integration per se, it was strongly opposed to a federal Union, much like the ECR. The group ceased to exist in 2009, when the existing affiliated parties joined other pan-European groups mostly located to the right of the European political landscape (EPP, ALDE, Europe of Freedom and Democracy, and the ECR). British conservatism in the European Parliament Following the United Kingdom’s accession to the European Community in 1973, the British Conservative Party, which wanted to be regarded as ‘Britain’s Party of

Is ‘Eurorealism’ the new ‘Euroscepticism’?  49 Table 4.2  Seats of the European Democratic Group in the European Parliament, 1979–1992 Election

European Parliament Total

1979 1984 1987 1989

410 434 434 518

Seatsa

%b

63 50 66c 22

5.3 6.7 15.2 4.2

Source: European Parliament archives. Notes: a total seats held at outset of Parliament. b European Democratic Group seats as % of total seats in European Parliament. c The People’s Alliance of Spain joined the European Democratic Group following Spain’s accession to the European Community. The party then joined the EPP group following the 1989 European elections.

Europe’ (George 1994), decided to form its own political group in the European Parliament, the European Democratic Group (EDG), together with the Danish Conservative People’s Party and the Ulster Unionist Party (see Table 4.2). From its early years, the EDG worked towards reforming the European Community by focusing on specific issues such as controlling the European Commission’s financial expenditures and defending national interests in the European Parliament (Palmer 1981). Even though a merger of the Conservative and Christian Democratic pan-­ European groups was not feasible due to the competing ideologies and fierce opposition from Belgian, Dutch, French and Italian Christian Democrats, EDG parties joined the European Democratic Union at the transnational level. The European Democratic Union, which was a loose model of party cooperation and not a Europarty like the EPP, brought together Christian Democratic, Conservative and other non-collectivist parties in an attempt to form an anti-socialist block (Hanley 2002; Van Hecke 2004). This transnational cooperation eventually moved towards a formal pan-European parliamentary alliance (or ‘Fraktionsgemeinschaft’) in 1992, when the British Conservative Party allied with the EPP after years of discussions (Johansson 1997). The main objectives of this new affiliation were for the British Conservative Party to gain more influence within the European Parliament, and for their Christian Democratic allies to numerically compete against the Party of European Socialists (Lynch and Whitaker 2008). The influence of British conservatism was later highlighted in the new EPP name, the European People’s Party– European Democrats (EPP–ED), which was adopted in 1999. Incompatible views over the very nature of the European integration project led to tensions between the EPP and the European Democrats. While the former defends a federal vision of Europe (as stated in its Basic Programme, adopted in Athens on 12–14 November 1992), the latter adopted an increasingly Eurosceptic

50  Benjamin Leruth stance from the late 1990s onwards, mostly under the influence of the British Conservative Party. In 2005, Conservative Party Leader David Cameron pledged to leave the EPP–ED group and to form a new pan-European group with likeminded ‘pro-market, anti-integrationist and Atlanticist’ centre-right political parties (Bale 2006). On 22 June 2009, following the European elections, the British Conservatives left their EPP partners to form the new ECR group, together with the Polish Law and Justice Party (formerly sitting in the UEN group), the Czech Civic Democratic Party (formerly part of the EPP–ED group) and smaller parties from Belgium (Lijst Dedecker, newly elected), Hungary (Hungarian Democratic Forum, formerly part of the EPP–ED group), Latvia (For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK).

Transnational and pan-European Eurorealism: the emergence of the European Conservatives and Reformists The British Conservative Party’s decision to leave the EPP–ED was controversial in the United Kingdom. On the one hand, media reports and former senior party figures denounced an association with parties that have little in common with Conservative values. Among them, Edward McMillan-Scott, a Conservative MEP since 1984 protested against the inclusion of the Polish Law and Justice Party as a major Conservative partner within the ECR which, in his words, symbolised ‘the rise of disguised extremism in Europe’ (McMillan-Scott 2009); he was expelled from the party and later joined the Liberal Democrats in the ALDE. On the other hand, David Cameron’s decision to form the ECR was justified as a way to cope with internal issues within the party, such as preventing the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) from criticising the Conservatives for joining forces with European federalists (Bale et al. 2010). The Prague Declaration of 2009 set out the founding principles of this new grouping, in order to ‘reform the EU on the basis of Eurorealism, Openness, Accountability and Democracy, in a way that respects the sovereignty of our nations and concentrates on economic recovery, growth and competitiveness’ (ECR 2009). While the notions of openness, accountability and democracy have been widely discussed in the existing literature (see e.g. Schmitter 2000; ­Eriksen and Fossum 2000; Follesdal and Hix 2006), Eurorealism stands out as an oddly under-studied political notion. Initially used by Václav Klaus’ Civic Democratic Party (ODS) in its 2001 party manifesto, Eurorealism was used by the British Conservatives to rebrand their stance on European integration under David ­Cameron’s leadership, as the party was strongly divided over this issue since the early 1990s (Bale 2006). Eurorealism can be defined as a pragmatic, anti-­ federalist and flexible vision of European integration where the principle of subsidiarity prevails, aiming to reform the current institutional framework to extend the role of national Parliaments in the decision-making process. Even though this concept could be interpreted as a form of soft Euroscepticism as defined by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2008; see introduction to this volume), Eurorealists attempt to distinguish themselves from Eurosceptics by emphasising their support for the

Is ‘Eurorealism’ the new ‘Euroscepticism’?  51 European institutions and the process of European integration. In the words of the ECR (2009), Eurorealists ‘believe in a new direction for the EU, which does not destroy the organisation or undermine cooperation’. Finally, Eurorealists call for a more flexible and differentiated EU, based on the member states’ needs and rejecting the idea of ‘United States of Europe’. David Cameron’s renegotiation of the United Kingdom’s terms of membership in the EU, strongly supported by ECR parties and aiming to grant the UK a more differentiated agreement based on the domestic context, is an example of Eurorealists’ commitment to an ever more flexible (if not ‘ever more differentiated’) European integration (Leruth and Lord 2015). The ECR group was initially composed of fifty-four MEPs from eight countries (see Table 4.3). Three of them (the British Conservative Party, the Czech Civic Democratic Party and the Hungarian Democratic Forum) used to cooperate with the EPP–ED group. However, the Polish Law and Justice and the Latvian For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK parties were part of the Eurosceptic UEN. Even though both parties were often pictured as aggressively nationalist, their position on European integration has often been close to the one defended by their ECR partners: anti-federalist, yet in favour of stronger and closer European integration based on an intergovernmental approach (Bale et al. 2010). The Dutch Christian Union’s decision to join the ECR was somewhat surprising, especially since the party’s electoral ally in 2009, the Reformed Political Party, decided to join the ‘hard’ Eurosceptic Europe of Freedom and Democracy. In sum, despite the Conservative Party’s relative autonomy within the EPP through the recognition of the European Democrats as an influent faction, the formation of the ECR was perceived as a necessity in order to break away from the European political mainstream. Even though ECR parties may strongly differ in many ways (such as in their support for gay rights or their degree of nationalism and populism), they tend to be united in their position on European integration, thus giving an ideological foundation for cooperation at the pan-European level. By allying their forces, many of these ‘Eurorealist’ parties were also able to distinguish themselves from other Eurosceptic radical right movements. The AECR was created on 1 October 2009 as a transnational group to complement the pan-European ECR. It is described as ‘an association of Eurorealist parties that believe in personal freedom, open markets, subsidiarity, limited government, parliamentary democracy and national sovereignty’ (AECR 2014). The structure and functioning of the AECR is comparable to other ‘Euro-­parties’ such as the EPP or the Party of the European Left (see Chapter 5 in this volume), and aims to promote transnational cooperation between parties sharing common conservative and Eurorealist principles, outlined in the Reykjavík Declaration ­ hristian Union adopted in March 2014. Among the initial ECR parties, the Dutch C is the only one not to have joined the AECR, as the party already belonged to the transnational European Christian Political Movement (ECPM). Political parties from non-EU member states joined the AECR, such as the Icelandic Independence Party, the Turkish Prosperous and Development Party but also the ­Georgian Christian Democratic People’s Party, demonstrating the close relationship between

52  Benjamin Leruth Table 4.3  Composition of the ECR, by the end of the 2009–2014 parliamentary term Party

Conservative Party1 Ulster Unionist Party David Campbell Bannerman2 Marta Andreasen2 Poland Law and Justice/Poland Comes First/Poland Together Czech Civic Democratic Party Republic (ODS) Latvia For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK Lithuania Poles in Lithuania (LLRA) The Netherlands Christian Union (CU) United Kingdom

Belgium Hungary

Denmark Italy

Croatia TOTAL

Dedecker List (LDD) Hungarian Democratic Forum (2009–2013) Modern Hungary Movement (2013–2014) Independent (2010–2011) Fokus (2011–2014) Conservative and Social Reformers (2012–2014) Forza Italia (Susy De Martini, 2013–2014) Party of Rights (2013–2014)

Seats

Joined ECR in

Former European Parliament Group (2004–2009)

24 1 1

2009

EPP–ED

2011

EFD

1 123

2013 2009

EFD UEN

9

2009

EPP-ED

1

2009

UEN

1 1

2009 2009

1 1

2009 2009

Newly elected Independent Democrats Newly elected EPP-ED

1

2010

EFD

1

2012

EPP

1

2013

EPP

1 57

2013

Newly elected

Source: European Parliament archives. Notes: 1 Roger Helmer was elected as Conservative MEP in 2009, before joining UKIP and the EFD in 2012. 2 Elected as a UKIP MEPs in 2009, they both defected to join the Conservative Party and the ECR. 3 Following the 2009 elections, a total of fifteen Polish MEPs, all members of Law and Justice were elected. Four other Law and Justice MEPs joined United Poland, a new party sitting in the EFD group, in 2011. Following these changes, at the end of the 2009–2014 term, Law and Justice will account for seven MEPs, while four others joined Poland Comes First in 2010 (rebranded as Poland Together in 2013) while remaining in the ECR.

Conservative and Christian democratic movements at the European level. As of the end of 2015, a total of twenty-two political parties are members of the AECR (see Table 4.4). In addition, five conservative parties from outside Europe are formally affiliated to the AECR as ‘regional partners’. These five parties are the American Republican Party, the Canadian Conservative Party, the Australian Liberal Party, the National Party from New Zealand and the Moroccan Istiqlal Party.

Table 4.4  Full member parties of the ECR and AECR, after the 2014 European Parliament election ECR

AECR

Former EP group

EU member states Belgium Bulgaria Croatia Czech Republic Denmark Finland Germany Greece Ireland Italy Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Netherlands Poland Romania Slovakia

United Kingdom

New Flemish Alliance Bulgaria without Censorship Bulgarian National Movement Croatian Conservative Party Civic Democratic Party Danish People’s Party Independent (Rikke Karlsson) Finns Party Alternative for Germany Family Party of Germany Independent MEP (Notis Marias) Independent MEP (Brian Crowley) Conservatives and Reformists4 For Fatherland and Freedom/ LNNK Poles in Lithuania Alternative Democratic Reform Party Christian Union Reformed Political Party Law and Justice Right Wing of the Republic Independent (Monica Macovei) New Republic Party New Majority Ordinary People Freedom and Solidarity Civic Conservative Party Conservative Party Ulster Unionist Party

4 1 1 1 2 3   12 2   73 1 1

√1 √ √1

1

Greens-EFA Newly elected Newly elected Newly elected ECR EFD ECR EFD Newly elected Newly elected Newly elected ALDE

2

√1

EPP

1

√

ECR

1

√ √

ECR N/A

√

ECR EFD ECR Newly elected EPP

1 1 18 1   11 1 1 1 205 1

√ √ √1 √ √ √

N/A Newly elected Newly elected ALDE N/A ECR ECR

Non-EU member states Armenia Azerbaijan Faroe Islands Georgia

Prosperous Armenia Party Popular Front Party for the Whole of Azerbaijan Faroese People’s Party Christian Democratic People’s Party Georgia Conservative Party

√ √1 √ √ √ (Continued )

54  Benjamin Leruth ECR Iceland Montenegro Turkey Total

Independence Party Movement for Change Justice and Development Party

AECR

Former EP group

√ √1 √ 75

Sources: European Parliament archives; ECR (2015); AECR (2015). Table accurate as of 31 December 2015. Notes: 1 Joined in 2015. 2 Rikke Karlsson left the Danish People’s Party on 15 October 2015, but remained a member of the ECR. 3 Five Alternative for Germany MEPs defected in July 2015 and created the Alliance for Progress and renewal, which still sits in the ECR group. 4 Raffaele Fitto was elected as MEP for Forza Italia, but left his party to join the ECR and create the Conservatives and Reformists party in Italy on 21 May 2015. 5 Amjad Bashir was elected as MEP for the UK Independence Party, but defected to the Conservative Party on 24 January 2015.

The AECR is itself part of the conservative international alliance of parties, the International Democrat Union, together with the transnational EPP.

The 2014 European elections The first term of the ECR can be considered as broadly successful. The grouping succeeded in extending its influence within the European Parliament, and listed a series of twenty achievements as part of its 2014 manifesto (ECR 2014). Despite some turmoil within the Law and Justice party, the ECR ended this parliamentary term with fifty-seven MEPs, including new parties from Croatia, Denmark and Italy. The 2014 European elections offered the opportunity for the ECR to extend its influence, by confirming seats for existing members and by convincing a maximum of ‘outsider’ and newly elected political parties to join the group. The main objective was to overtake the ALDE, which faced disappointing results across Europe, and become the third largest pan-European group represented in the European Parliament. This was eventually achieved when, after more than a month of negotiations, the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) surprisingly joined the ECR. Table 4.4 summarises the composition of the ECR and AECR following the 2014 European elections. A total of seventeen new political parties joined the ECR group which, by the end of 2015, accounted for a total of seventy-five MEPs, eighteen more than by the end of the 2009–2014 parliamentary term. While most of the new parties were newly elected in the European parliament, others left well-established pan-European groups. Four cases deserve some particular attention and were widely discussed in the media: the Flemish

Is ‘Eurorealism’ the new ‘Euroscepticism’?  55 independentist N-VA, which switched from the Greens– European Free Alliance (EFA) to join the ECR in June 2015; the newly elected ‘anti-Euro’ Alternative for Germany (AfD); two Nordic populist right parties, namely the Danish People’s Party and the Finns Party, which were both part of the Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) pan-European group until 2014; and the Italian Conservatives and Reformists (CR) party, the first national party founded on the basis of the ECR group. The New Flemish Alliance The decision for the N-VA to leave the Greens-EFA group and join the ECR came as a surprise to many observers. The centre-right party, which succeeded in establishing itself as Belgium’s largest political party in 2010, was one of the founding members of the transnational European Free Alliance (EFA), back in the days when the Flemish nationalist movement was named People’s Union (­Volksunie). The EFA is a transnational organisation composed of f­ orty-five nationalist, ­ethno-regionalist and autonomist political parties from across Europe. While some of its members, such as the Scottish National Party (SNP), were considered as Eurosceptical in the 1980s, De Winter and Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro (2002: 500) suggest that the ‘EFA membership has provided the opportunity to turn Eurosceptics into moderate Eurocritics’, thus softening party stances over time. Since the dissolution of the Volksunie and its creation in 2001, the N-VA has been a pro-European political party. Following the 2004 European elections, the party was successful in having one elected MEP, Frieda Brepoels, as part of a cartel formed with the Christian Democrats. Brepoels eventually decided to join the EPP group. Following her re-election in 2009, she switched sides to join the EFA wing of the Greens-EFA group, thus joining other ethno-regionalist parties such as the SNP, Plaid Cymru and the Republican Left of Catalonia. Despite this switch, the N-VA remained a pro-European political party: its 2010 federal manifesto stated that the party campaigns for ‘an ever stronger and more united Europe, not only economically but also politically. … We cannot solve future challenges at the level of individual member states’ (N-VA 2010: 10; author’s translation). Yet, many observers felt like this alliance was not a natural fit, as the N-VA tended to be much more of a centrist party than the rest of Greens-EFA parties (McElroy and Benoit 2011). The party switched its stance on European integration ahead of the 2014 European elections, and adopted an explicitly Eurorealist stance, thus referring to one of the key principles of the ECR group: ‘The N-VA is not a Eurosceptic party that wants to attack everything that is European. … As a Eurorealist party, the N-VA choses a viable and achievable European cooperation that is rooted in the people’ (N-VA 2014: 82; author’s translation). In this manifesto, the party also supports differentiated European integration, stating that countries should have the right to leave the Eurozone without having to leave the EU as well.

56  Benjamin Leruth After gaining four of the twelve Flemish seats in the European Parliament, the party held an internal vote on its pan-European affiliation. Of its 140 members, sixty-six voted in favour of joining the ECR group, while forty-two voted in favour of remaining with the Greens-EFA, thirty-one were undecided and three supported the idea of joining Belgian liberal parties in the ALDE (European Voice 2014). This decision reflected the changes brought to the party’s position on European integration in the context of the election campaign. At the transnational level however, the party did not join the AECR, thus remaining in the EFA. Three main reasons explain this ideological switch. First, the N-VA wanted to differentiate itself from other Belgian political parties (especially the liberal family), by advocating an unusual critical stance on European integration. ­Second, the party has often pictured the British Conservative Party as a model for its socio-economic policies. Third, former N-VA MEP Jan Van Overtveldt stated that the decision to join the ECR instead of ALDE was partly influenced by the party’s opposition to Guy Verhofstadt’s European project, and existing tension between Spanish nationalists and regionalists within ALDE. These three elements combined made the party change their stance on European integration and cooperate with the Conservatives at the pan-European level. Alternative for Germany Founded in 2013 by former members of the Christian Democratic Union, AfD is a populist right and soft Eurosceptic political party, which first emerged as an antiEuro-party and drew up its first full-length manifesto in the context of the 2014 European elections (Arzheimer 2015). While it is still too early to tell whether AfD will successfully establish itself in the German political landscape, its success in the context of the 2014 European elections (7.1 per cent and seven seats) and the party’s decision to join the ECR group deserves some particular attention, since most German political elites tend to be strongly supportive of the European integration process (with the exception of the Left party; see Chapter 5; see also Lees 2008) and since cooperation between British Conservatives and AfD had a negative impact on the relations between German Chancellor Angela Merkel and David Cameron. Focusing on the Euro-crisis, AfD first ran for elections in 2013, less than six months after its foundation. Even though the party failed to reach the 5 per cent threshold to gain seats in the Bundestag (with 4.7 per cent), the respectable electoral score obtained by AfD hinted at the emergence of a Eurosceptic force within the German political landscape. As mentioned above, AfD cannot be considered as a ‘hard’ Eurosceptic party. Its stance on European integration, as described in its 2014 European manifesto, is close to key principles advocated by the ECR group: strengthening the principle of subsidiarity, close intergovernmental cooperation at the European level, and a strong opposition to a federal European state. The party also opposes current and future bailouts, and is strongly critical of the way the financial and economic crisis has been managed by European institutions. However, what makes AfD unique is

Is ‘Eurorealism’ the new ‘Euroscepticism’?  57 its strong opposition to the Economic and Monetary Union as it stands, though the party softened its stance after withdrawing its demand for a return to the Deutschmark (Arzheimer 2015). As stated in its European manifesto, AfD believes that the EU is threatened by the single currency and, like the N-VA, supports the idea that countries should be free to leave the Eurozone. Yet, AfD does not campaign for dismantling the EU, but wants to make it more flexible, more democratic and more liberal. The notion of Eurorealism, however, is not mentioned in the manifesto (AfD 2014). As early as April 2013, media reports indicated that the British Conservative senior officials made contact with AfD leaders in order to build an alliance, ahead of the 2014 European elections (The Telegraph 2013). While moderate Conservative MEPs warned the party leadership of such a move as it would disrupt Cameron’s relationship with Angela Merkel ahead of his plans to renegotiate Britain’s terms of EU membership, AfD effectively joined the ECR group on 12 June 2014. This decision was largely favoured by AfD Leader, Bernd Lucke, even though the youth wing of the party favoured an alliance with the hard Eurosceptic Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD). However, on 12 April 2016, the ECR board meeting decided to expel AfD from the pan-European group after Beatrix von Storch, one of the two AfD MEPs, called for police to use firearms to stop migrants entering Germany (The Guardian 2016). von Storch joined the EFDD group in early April, while the other AfD MEP Marcus Pretzell joined the list of non-attached members. Nordic Eurorealists: The Danish People’s Party and the Finns Party In Nordic EU member states, populist right political parties are now well established and have always tended to oppose European integration. On the one hand, the Sweden Democrats won their first two European Parliament seats in 2014 and joined the EFDD, even though the party cooperated with the radical right transnational European Alliance for Freedom group in 2013. On the other hand, the Danish People’s Party and the Finns Party used to be members of the EFD before joining the ECR on 4 June 2014. Yet, both of these parties are often considered as part of the most Eurosceptic parties within the ECR (Brack 2015). Why did these two parties switched from a ‘hard’ Eurosceptic group to join Eurorealists? The Danish People’s Party has been represented in the European Parliament since 1999, and always linked to Eurosceptic pan-European groups. Between 1999 and 2009, the party was a member of the national conservative UEN, before joining the ‘hard’ Eurosceptic EFD in 2009. At the transnational level, the party has been a member of the nationalist Movement for a Europe of Liberties and Democracy (MELD) since 2011. In the 1990s, the Danish People’s Party strongly opposed European integration. The party was able to establish itself in the Danish political landscape by criticising the EU, especially since Danes are among the most Eurosceptical populations in Europe (Green-Pedersen 2012). From the mid-2000s onwards, the party softened its position on European integration, opposing the introduction of a strong,

58  Benjamin Leruth centralised and federal EU but accepting the benefits of European cooperation in specific areas such as trade and environmental matters. In 2014, the party did not change its stance on Europe, keeping an anti-federalist stance and emphasised the need for more flexibility in the EU as well as the reintroduction of border controls. The party’s decision to leave the EFD and join the ECR was made in order to extend the party’s influence within the European Parliament, according to MEP Morten Messerschmidt (DR 2014). In contrast to the Danish People’s Party, the Finns Party has historically been a soft Eurosceptic political party. Founded in 1995, the Finns Party accepted the people’s decision to join the EU and has never campaigned for Finland to leave the EU, despite the party’s opposition to the Economic and Monetary Union (Leruth 2015). Nevertheless, the party adopted a EU-critical stance in its European manifestos, opposing a federal Europe, further EU enlargement and criticising the EU for being an ‘anti-democratic system’ (Finns Party 2009). In the context of the 2014 European elections and in an attempt to improve the reputation of the party and join a future coalition government, Party Leader Timo Soini attempted to modernise and moderate the party’s European platform, which was based on four key principles: anti-federalism; opposition to existing and future bailouts; further economic cooperation; and reforming the institutions to make the EU more democratic. In sum, the Finns Party moved from a EU-critical position to adopt a stance close to Eurorealism, and its 2014 manifesto stated that the party wants to be ‘part of the influential EU-critical group in the European Parliament’ (Finns Party 2014). The two newly elected MEPs joined the ECR group in June 2014, and the Finns Party became a full member of the transnational AECR in November 2015 (unlike the Danish People’s Party, which remained part of the MELD). Both parties’ decision to join the ECR was influenced by David Cameron’s attempts to reform the EU following his 2013 speech at Bloomberg. However, experts voiced concerns that this alliance would damage the UK Prime Minister’s plans to renegotiate Britain’s membership in the EU, due to the parties’ bad reputation at the European level (The Guardian 2014). The Italian Conservatives and Reformists In April 2015, Forza Italia MEP Raffaele Fitto, along with twenty-eight Italian MPs, published a letter backing David Cameron’s stand on the EU ahead of the UK General Election. The letter stated that ‘[t]he EU needs profound change rather than the status quo, and only with David Cameron will we have any chance of achieving it. Therefore, from Italy, we express our support, our admiration, our friendship’ (The Telegraph 2015). In May, following internal disputes and opposing Silvio Berlusconi’s party leadership, Fitto left the EPP group to join the ECR and announced the creation of his own political party, CR, which became a full member of the transnational AECR in November 2015, alongside the Finns Party and the Croatian Conservative Party. Most of the twenty-eight MPs who signed the letter supporting David Cameron eventually joined this

Is ‘Eurorealism’ the new ‘Euroscepticism’?  59 new political party by the end of 2015. In the European Parliament, Fitto will be joined by MEP Remo Sernagiotto, who also left Forza Italia and the EPP to join the ECR. The foundation of CR as a centre-right political force in Italy deserves some particular attention, as it is built on the foundations of the transnational and pan-­ European groups. Besides the name similarity, the party’s logo features the same blue lion used by the AECR. The party describes itself as inspired by the British Conservative Party, as well as by the American Republican Party. While the party does not explicitly describe itself as ‘Eurorealist’, it is committed to The Prague Declaration of 2009 and campaigns to reform Italy and the EU. In their words, ‘our political orientation is “reformism”: more Italy, more jobs, more business, more credit, less taxes, less spending, less debt, less EU constraints’ (CR 2015; author’s translation). It remains to be seen whether CR will succeed in establishing itself as a relevant political force in Italy. Nevertheless, the foundation of the party, explicitly based on principles defended by the AECR and the ECR, shows that parties and politicians have become attracted to the British Conservative Party’s alternative reformist vision for Europe. This demonstrates the influence transnationalism and pan-Europeanism can have on the domestic political sphere.

Conclusion Right-wing soft Euroscepticism has evolved over time. Until 2009, pan-­European Eurosceptic groupings were openly opposed to the process of European integration. Since the introduction of the ECR, ‘Eurorealism’ and reformism have replaced the use of the term ‘Euroscepticism’, which is often associated with extreme, radical political parties (see Chapter 3). The reformist project launched by David Cameron has proved to be popular and successful across Europe, with no fewer than forty-one political parties affiliated to the ECR, the AECR or both (including the five regional partners from outside Europe). For parties with a tradition of ‘harder’ Euroscepticism, such as the Finns Party and the Danish ­People’s Party, affiliation to the ECR was an opportunity to become more influential within the European Parliament, as well as to appear more moderate by leaving a group dominated by UKIP. For parties that were more supportive of the EU, such as the N-VA, the ECR offered an opportunity to distinguish itself at the domestic level. In addition, the transnational and pan-European alliance already had an impact on domestic politics in Italy, as demonstrated by the foundation of the CR Party. Even though the rise of the ECR gave the opportunity for ‘Eurorealists’ to gain more influence within the EU and to establish itself as the most successful reformist group since the first European elections of 1979, it has deteriorated the relations between David Cameron and his European colleagues, especially in the context of the UK–EU renegotiation debates. As the United Kingdom just voted to leave the European Union, it remains to be seen whether the ECR will be able to increase their influence at the pan-European level in order to shape the future of European integration, to move Europe away from an ‘ever closer Union’ and head towards an ‘ever more differentiated Union’.

60  Benjamin Leruth

Bibliography Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists (AECR) (2014) Bylaws of the Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists [online]. Available at: www.aecr.eu/ media/AECR-Bylaws.pdf [Accessed 19 January 2016]. Alternative for Germany (AfD) (2014) Courage to Stand Up for Germany: For European Diversity [online]. Available at: www.alternativefuer.de/wp-content/uploads/ sites/7/2014/04/AfD-Manifesto-for-Europe-summary.pdf [Accessed 19 January 2016]. Arzheimer, K. (2015) ‘The AfD: Finally a Successful Right-Wing Populist Eurosceptic Party for Germany?’, West European Politics 38(3), pp. 535–556. Bale, T. (2006) ‘Between a Soft and a Hard Place? The Conservative Party, Valence Politics and the Need for a New “Eurorealism”’, Parliamentary Affairs 59(3), pp. 385–400. Bale, T., Hanley, S. and Szczerbiak, A. (2010) ‘“May Contain Nuts”? The Reality behind the Rhetoric Surrounding the British Conservatives’ New Group in the European Parliament’, The Political Quarterly 81(1), pp. 85–98. Brack, N. (2013) ‘Euroscepticism at the Supranational Level: The Case of the “Untidy Right” in the European Parliament’, Journal of Common Market Studies 51(1), pp. 85–104. Brack, N. (2015) ‘The Roles of Eurosceptic Members of the European Parliament and Their Implications for the EU’, International Political Science Review 36(3), pp. 337–350. Brack, N. and Startin, N. (2015) ‘Introduction: Euroscepticism, from the Margins to the Mainstream’, International Political Science Review 36(3), pp. 239–249. De Winter, L. and Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro, M. (2002) ‘European Integration and Ethoregionalist Parties’, Party Politics 8(4), pp. 483–503. DR (2014) DF på udkig efter mere magtfuld gruppe i parlamentet [online]. Available at: www. dr.dk/Nyheder/Politik/EP14/Artikler/2014/05/08/111428 htm [Accessed 13 ­January 2016]. Eriksen, E. O. and Fossum, J. E. (eds. 2000) Democracy in the European Union: Integration through Deliberation? Abingdon: Routledge. European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) (2009) The Prague Declaration [online]. Available at: ecrgroup.eu/policy/the-prague-declaration/ [Accessed 13 January 2016]. European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) (2014) Taking the EU in a New Direction: 20 Achievements of the ECR Group 2009–2014 [online]. Available at: ecrgroup. eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/ECR-Group-Achievements-brochure.pdf [Accessed 13 January 2016]. European Voice (2014) N-VA Opts to Join ECR Rather than ALDE [online]. Available at: www .politico.eu/article/n-va-opts-to-join-ecr-rather-than-alde/ [Accessed 13 January 2016]. Finns Party (2009) Perussuomalaisten EU-Vaaliohjelma 2009 [online]. Available at: www.perussuomalaiset fi//wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Perussuomalaisten_EU-­ vaaliohjelma2009.pdf [Accessed 13 January 2016]. Finns Party (2014) EU-Vaaliohjelma [online]. Available at: www.perussuomalaiset.fi/ eu-vaaliohjelma/ [Accessed 13 January 2016]. Follesdal, A. and Hix, S. (2006) ‘Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik’, Journal of Common Market Studies 44(3), pp. 533–562. George, S. (1994) An awkward partner: Britain in the European Community (second edition), Oxford: Oxford University Press. Green-Pedersen, C. (2012) ‘A Giant Fast Asleep? Party Incentives and the Politicisation of European Integration’, Political Studies 60(1), pp. 115–130. Hanley, D. (2002) ‘Christian Democracy and the Paradoxes of Europeanization’, Party Politics 8(4), pp. 463–481. Hanley, D. (2007) Beyond the nation state: Parties in the era of European integration, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Italian Conservatives and Reformists (CR) (2015) Chi siamo e cosa vogliamo: la nostra carta d’identità [online]. Available at: conservatorieriformisti.it/chi-siamo-manifesto/ [Accessed 13 January 2016].

Is ‘Eurorealism’ the new ‘Euroscepticism’?  61 Johansson, K. M. (1997) Transnational party alliances: Analysing the hard-won alliance between Conservatives and Christian Democrats in the European Parliament, Lund: Lund University Press. Knapp, A. and Wright, V. (2006) The government and politics of France (fifth edition), Abingdon: Routledge. Kopecký, P. and Mudde, C. (2002) ‘The Two Sides of Euroscepticism: Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe’, European Union Politics 3(3), pp. 297–326. Lees, C. (2008) ‘The Limits of Party-Based Euroscepticism in Germany’, in A. Szcerbiak and P. Taggart (eds), Opposing Europe? The comparative party politics of Euroscepticism Volume 1: Case studies and country surveys, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 16–37. Leruth, B. (2015) ‘Operationalizing National Preferences on Europe and Differentiated Integration’, Journal of European Public Policy 22(6), pp. 816–835. Leruth, B. and Lord, C. (2015) ‘Differentiated Integration in the European Union: A Concept, a Process, a System or a Theory?’, Journal of European Public Policy 22(6), pp. 754–763. Lynch, P. and Whitaker, R. (2008) ‘A Loveless Marriage: The Conservatives and the European People’s Party’, Parliamentary Affairs 61(1), pp. 31–51. McElroy, G. and Benoit, K. (2011) ‘Policy Positioning in the European Parliament’, European Union Politics 13(1), pp. 150–167. McMillan-Scott, E. (2009) Stop ‘Respectable Fascism’ Now, The Guardian [online]. Available at: www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/jul/31/conservative-­fascismkaminski-europe [Accessed 13 January 2016]. New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) (2010) Verkiezingsprogramma 13 juni 2010: Nu Durven Veranderen [online]. Available at: www.n-va.be/sites/default/files/generated/files/­ election-attachment/verkiezingsprogramma_n-va_2010_0.pdf [Accessed 13 January 2016]. New Flemish Alliance (2014) Verandering Voor Vooruitgang: Verkiezingsprogramma, Vlaamse, federale and Europese verkiezingen 25 mei 2014 [online]. Available at: www.n-va.be/sites/default/files/generated/files/brochure-attachment/verkiezingspro​ gramma_n-va_2014.pdf [Accessed 13 January 2016]. Palmer, M. (1981) The European Parliament: What is it, what it does, how it works, Oxford: Pergamon Press. Rabier, J.-R. and Inglehart, R. (1981) ‘What Kind of Europe? Support for National Independence, Cooperation and Integration in the European Parliament’, Government and Opposition 16(2), pp. 185–199. Schmitter, P. (2000) How to democratize the European Union… and why bother?, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield. Taggart, P. and Szczerbiak, A. (2008) ‘Introduction: Opposing Europe? The Politics of Euroscepticism in A. Szcerbiak and P. Taggart (eds),Opposing Europe? The comparative party politics of Euroscepticism Volume 1: Case studies and country surveys, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–15. Taggart, P. and Szczerbiak, A. (2013) ‘Coming in from the Cold? Euroscepticism, Government Participation and Party Positions on Europe’, Journal of Common Market Studies 51(1), pp. 17–37. The Guardian (2014) ‘Conservative Leader in Euro Parliament Courts Danish Anti-­ immigration Party’ [online]. Available at: www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/ may/16/conservative-leader-euro-parliament-courts-anti-immigration-party [Accessed 13 ­January 2016]. The Telegraph (2013) ‘Tories Build Secret Alliance with Eurosceptics behind Merkel’s Back’ [online]. Available at: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/david-­cameron/9990805/ Tories-build-secret-alliance-with-Eurosceptics-behind-Merkels-back html [Accessed 13 January 2016].

62  Benjamin Leruth The Telegraph (2015) ‘Letters: Voters Want Politicians to Stop Hiding the Facts about Debt’ [online]. Available at: www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/letters/11562117/LettersVoters-want-politicians-to-stop-hiding-the-facts-about-debt html [Accessed 13 January 2016]. Usherwood, S. and Startin, N. (2013) ‘Euroscepticism as a Persistent Phenomenon’, ­Journal of Common Market Studies 51(1), pp. 1–16. Van Hecke, S. (2004) ‘A Decade of Seized Opportunities: Christian Democracy in the European Union’, in S. Van Hecke and E. Gerard (eds) Christian Democratic parties in Europe since the end of the Cold War, Leuven: Leuven University Press, pp. 269–296. Williams, M. H. (2006) The impact of radical right-wing parties in West European democracies, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

5 Contesting integration The Radical Left and Euroscepticism Michael Holmes

Introduction: the Radical Left and Europe The relationship between the left and European integration has always involved a tension. On the one hand, the left has always sought to portray itself as a fundamentally internationalist political philosophy, committed to promoting peaceful cooperation between states. On the other, translating that commitment to support for European integration has never been easy. Left-wing parties have always been suspicious of the process, attracted by the spirit of cooperation but wary of the policies. In the case of the social democratic left, those concerns have over time been almost entirely over-ridden and the parties have become strong advocates of the European Union (EU). But further to the left, the tension remains an important factor. This chapter will examine the transnational Radical Left, evaluating how they have dealt with the twin pressures: the Europeanising pull of working within the EU and the Eurosceptic push of rejecting the Union. The chapter begins with an analysis of the structure and development of the cooperation between Radical Left parties in Europe. There are two such groups, a pan-European European Parliament (EP) group (the Confederal Group of the United European left, usually referred to just by its EP acronym of GUE) and a transnational Euro-party (the Party of the European Left, or PEL). The literature on transnational parties ranges from the early analysis that they are ‘­nascent European parties’ (Hix 1996: 323) to the suggestion that the European arena is ‘remarkably under-politicised’ (Mair 2008: 165). In this chapter, I will argue that there are significant differences between the two forms of cooperation which makes the relationship more complex. The EP group is more driven by organisational convenience than a strong sense of a shared political vision about Europe, but at the same time it has a political platform which is largely absent from the Euro-party. The next section examines their policies towards European integration. The approach distinguishes between three aspects of integration: as a normative ideal, as a particular institutional structure (namely, the EU), and as a specific set of policies. Although Mair (2000: 47) suggests that ‘party systems appear to remain relatively impervious to the direct impact of Europeanisation’, Ladrech (2002) has suggested that political parties are undergoing a subtle process of Europeanisation, by which they increasingly adapt themselves – organisationally and in terms

64  Michael Holmes of policies – to the EU. And one aspect of that adaptation is a preparedness to work within the EU’s structures, which creates a pro-European pull factor. In this chapter, I will argue that there is clear evidence of just such a pull factor at work on the Radical Left, with the Euro-party especially showing a readiness to operate within the EU and to seek to reform it. However, I will also argue that the evidence from the Radical Left EP group is that a more Eurosceptic strand remains. The third section looks at the impact of the financial crisis on the Radical Left, and argues that the crisis has weakened the unity among the member parties, leaving the transnational groups more marginalised. It has highlighted the extent to which the EU itself is a dividing line between parties of the Radical Left, creating a split between ‘Eurorealism’ and Euroscepticism which limits the effectiveness of the transnational and pan-European groups. For realists, the crisis has underscored the need to work together at the European level to have any chance of shaping political, economic and social outcomes. But for Eurosceptics, the crisis is evidence that the EU is fundamentally flawed and incapable of reform. If integration is to be achieved, it will have to be a case of starting anew. The issue of European integration is becoming a central and divisive debate for the Radical Left. While there is a strong level of agreement on particulars, the member parties disagree about how best to respond to the EU. It is clear that many parties are critical of integration and the EU but have nonetheless created organisational structures at the European level to enable them to cooperate more effectively. But there are also parties that cooperate not because they are becoming more pro-European, nor just out of organisational convenience, but because they feel they have a genuinely different vision of how Europe could operate. An examination of the transnational Radical Left draws us to seeing it in terms of a much more contested concept. There are several different visions of Europe, several different visions of European integration, several different visions of an EU. So the title of this chapter is not intended to suggest that the Radical Left ‘contests integration’ in the sense of rejecting it; instead, it argues that the Radical Left has the potential to offer alternative ideas for integration, and that there is a genuine ‘contest of ideas’ going on. In the words frequently trotted out by the Radical Left, ‘another Europe is possible’. This chapter explores the Radical Left’s vision of Europe. It is based on a detailed analysis of PEL and GUE documents, drawing on manifestos, policy programmes, press releases and other party documents, along with speeches and statements from a range of party members. The analysis is supplemented by a series of interviews carried out in 2015 with a number of current and former GUE Members of European Parliament (MEPs) and with PEL officials.1

Transnational and pan-European cooperation between Radical Left parties The process of European integration has led to the creation of a political system that goes beyond the boundaries of the traditional national political contexts

Contesting integration  65 within which the vast majority of political parties work. This is epitomised by the emergence of a parliamentary assembly – the EP – which has gradually developed some significant powers. With the development of such a political arena, transnational parties could make sense as working entities rather than just as loose affiliations of like-minded parties where there was little to do other than declare friendship with one another. As one report commissioned by the EP declares, perhaps still a bit optimistically, ‘the prospects for transnational parties now look rather good’ (Bardi et al. 2010: 97). Over time, the main European party families have developed structures for cooperation. In fact, in most cases they have developed two separate structures – a pan-European group made up of those from the party family who hold seats in the EP – an EP group – and a broader transnational group made up of all parties prepared to affiliate together – a Euro-party. Even though the idea is clearly to promote a degree of unity and agreement among the member parties, the existence of two different structures creates the possibility of disunity and disagreement. The pan-European EP group might appear more limited, as it might attract parties interested only in the organisational efficacy of being part of a group in terms of the workings of the Parliament, but by the same token offers parties a direct route into EU policy-making deliberations. The transnational Euro-party does not have the same real power, but it does have an element of voluntary ascription which can give its member parties a greater sense of choosing to work together. Of course, families are known for their rows and squabbles, and party families can be just as argumentative. This is evident in tracing the development of the Radical Left’s European groups. The Radical Left features both kinds, an EP group and a Euro-party, but has managed a unique level of intricacy in these arrangements (see Dunphy 2004; Hudson 2012; March 2012). At the pan-European level, a Communist and Allies group emerged in the EP in 1973, dominated by the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the French C ­ ommunist Party (PCF) and also somewhat riven by their disagreements. These differences came to a head with the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). In the 1989 election, the Communist EP group split in two. A more reformist contingent, United European Left, emerged around the Italians, alongside a more hard-line Left Unity group. But events were moving very fast, and when the Italian MEPs joined the (then) Socialist Group in 1992, the remnants of the United European Left were able to rediscover common cause with those in Left Unity. The outcome was the GUE. One further development is worth noting: after the 1995 enlargement, a number of Nordic Green-Left parties chose to sit with them in the Parliament, creating the combined GUE/NGL group (see Table 5.1). Since then, ‘GUE/NGL has become an active forum for international cooperation as the locus for frequent meetings between party leaders, receptions of national delegations and (in contrast to the situation before 1989) coherent policy statements’ (March 2012: 160). A transnational Radical Left Euro-party took longer to appear, not least because of the very evident disagreements that have just been outlined among the MEPs. But in the 1990s, a discussion forum called the New European Left sought to promote

66  Michael Holmes Table 5.1  Seats of the Radical Left in the European Parliament, 1979–2014 Election

EP total

1979 1984 1989

410 434 518

1994 1999 2004 2009 2014

567 626 732 736 751

Group COM COM GUE LU GUE GUE/NGL GUE/NGL GUE/NGL GUE/NGL

seatsa

%b

44 41 28 14 28 42 41 35 52

10.7 9.5 8.1c 4.9 6.7 5.6 4.8 6.9

Source: European Parliament 2014. Notes: a total seats held at outset of Parliament. b Radical Left seats as % of total seats in EP. c combined figure for GUE and Left Unity. Abbreviations: COM – Communists and Allies GUE – United European Left LU – Left Unity NGL – Nordic Green Left

a more coherent shared vision on European integration among Radical Left parties. When the EU brought in new legislation governing the rules for Euro-­parties,2 this provided the additional organisational impulse to found the PEL, which came into being in 2004. Even so, it still contained a wide range of views ranging from those who wanted a ‘real supranational party’ to those content with a looser ‘coordination of sovereign parties’ (Hudson 2012: 42), and its first attempt at a common ­manifesto – for the 2004 European elections – ‘was exceedingly vague’ (March 2012: 160). But ‘in a short period the PEL has attained a level of integration and common purpose that the European Radical Left has not possessed for decades’ (ibid.: 163). A comparison of the membership of the two groups in the wake of the 2014 EP elections demonstrates immediately the discontinuity between them (see Table 5.2). Not counting independents who sit with the group, there were nineteen parties represented in GUE/NGL, spread across twenty countries.3 The European Left had twenty-seven member parties, again from twenty different countries. But only five parties4 were simultaneously represented in GUE/NGL and in the Europarty. As March notes, there is a lack of integration between the two groups, and ‘GUE/NGL is emphatically not the PEL parliamentary group’ (ibid.: 164). Some of the reason for that is very straightforward. The transnational PEL includes parties from four states which are not members of the EU (Belarus, ­Moldova, Switzerland and Turkey). In other cases, it is simply the fact that the relevant Radical Left party has no MEP which restricted them to PEL – for example, it can be safely assumed that the Luxembourg Left Party and the Swedish

Contesting integration  67 Table 5.2  Member parties of Group of the United European Left (GUE/NGL and PEL) after the 2014 EP election GUE Austria Belarus Belgium Bulgaria Cyprus Czech Rep. Denmark Estonia Finland France

Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy

Luxembourg Moldova Netherlands Portugal Romania Slovakia Spain

Communist Party of Austria Belarusian Party of the Left ‘Free World’ Communist Party-Wallonie/Bruxelles Bulgarian Left Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL) Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM) Party of Democratic Socialism People’s Movement Against the EU Red-Green Alliance Estonian Left Party Left Alliance Finnish Communist Party Left Front Union for Overseas Left Party Unitary Left French Communist Party Left Independent German Communist Party Coalition of the Radical Left Workers’ Party of Hungary 2006 Sinn Féin independent The Other Europe With Tsipras independent Communist Party of Italy Communist Refoundation Party The Left Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova Socialist Party Party for the Animals Portuguese Communist Party Left Bloc Socialist Alliance Party Communist Party of Slovakia Podemos United Left Basque Country Unite Left Alternative – Galicia United Left Alternative Spanish Communist Party

PEL √ √

2 3 1 1 3 1

7 1 6 3 1 2 1

2 1 3 1 √ 5 4 1

√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √

√ √ √ √

√ √ √ 1 √ √ (Continued)

68  Michael Holmes GUE Sweden Switzerland Turkey UK Total

Left Party Swiss Labour Party Freedom and Solidarity Party Sinn Féin

1 1 52

PEL √ √

Sources: European Parliament (2014); PEL (nd-a).

Left Party would happily have taken their places in the pan-European GUE/NGL group had they won a seat. And it is also necessary to be aware that the fashion for loose alliances of the left mean that a number of parties are in a kind of half-in/ half-out situation. For example, while the cross-party Danish People’s Movement Against the EU is in GUE/NGL but not in PEL, one of its constituent parties, the Red-Green Alliance, is in the European Left. Similarly, several Italian leftwing groups formed an alliance for the 2014 EP elections, The Other Europe With Tsipras, whose members sit with GUE/NGL, and this alliance incorporated the Refoundation Communists, who are members of PEL. However, that still leaves plenty of disarray. Four main lines of division can be identified. First, the very name of GUE/NGL indicates an amalgamation. The EP group includes members who come from slightly different political traditions. Most obviously, there is an environmental wing, epitomised by the Nordic GreenLeft contingent – the Finnish Left Alliance, the Swedish Left Party and the Danish Red-Green Alliance.5 This also extends to a small coterie of animal rights activists who sit with the group. In 2014, this included one MEP from the Dutch Party for Animals and one independent MEP who had formerly been in the German Animal Rights Party. And there is also a distinct nationalist cohort, including the Irish Sinn Féin and the Basque EH Bildu. In all of these cases, it is not to say they do not ascribe to a left-wing outlook, but their position is shaped by other perspectives as well. Second, there are cases where there is more than one Radical Left party in the same country, creating national electoral tensions. In such circumstances, parties are in competition with each other for votes in their national arenas. One example would be in Ireland, where the Socialist Party and Sinn Féin were both in GUE/ NGL, but were of course also rivals in the domestic setting.6 In a number of cases, the recent emergence of new Radical Left alliances in a number of countries, such as the United Left in Spain, the Left Bloc in Portugal and The Left in Germany, has perforce helped overcome some of this parochial rivalry, but it still affects both GUE/NGL and the European Left – the groups have to steer a path between such rivalries, and tend to do so by watering down any ideas that might spark disputes. Third, there is of course an ideological dimension. There are two significant lines of ideological division. On the one hand, there is a straightforward left– right divide in evidence. Some parties definitely perceive themselves as being more to the left than others, and this would apply both in GUE/NGL and in the

Contesting integration  69 PEL. On the other, there is an authoritarian–democratic divide. Some parties are perceived as still being tainted by old-style Communist ‘democratic centralist’ leanings, with too much emphasis on the authority of the party hierarchy and not enough grasp of the need for a more open, democratic and accountable structure. And both of these divides can spill over into views and attitudes relating to the fourth and final line of division. This relates to the core issue of this chapter – European integration. In a number of interviews, Radical Left politicians who identified a left–right line of division (with themselves, of course, identified as being on the left) also identified those deemed to be on ‘the right’ as being too pro-European. This tendency is more marked within GUE/NGL than in the PEL, since parties in the EP group can readily defend participation on the grounds of organisational convenience. It is somewhat different in the PEL, because membership there involves more of a commitment to supporting the principle of working together on a European stage. Of course, that becomes quite readily an actual commitment to working in the EU, as we will see in the next section. In order to deal with these challenges, the transnational associations essentially rely on an agreement to disagree. The importance of confederalism is explicitly stated by GUE/NGL as a core value: ‘Confederalism for us means respecting and preserving the diversity of identities and opinions of our members’ (GUE/NGL 2013). Accordingly, no party is required to go down a common path; generally, they can say and do what they want. This has allowed parties of all sorts from the quite EU-hostile to the more EU-supportive to co-exist. And it would be wrong to exaggerate their differences. In most cases, they agree on a broad swathe of policies (see for example March 2012: 160); it is simply a case of how to go about achieving them which creates an element of dissensus. PEL is a slightly different story. The idea of belonging to a transnational party which does not have a direct parliamentary role to play clearly implies that there is a greater degree of shared opinion and that member parties are prepared to work towards common ideals. Indeed, some parties chose not to join PEL specifically because they considered it ‘to implicitly endorse the European Union by participating in its structures’ (Hudson 2012: 44–45). The PEL declares its aim to be to ‘contribute to common political action of the democratic and alternative left in EU member states as well as on the European level’ (PEL nd-b). It is not explicitly confederal, but Article 1 of the Party’s statutes declares that it ‘works on the basis of consensus’; it recognises the ‘diversity of our situations’ and accepts that it is ‘not a force free of contradictions, having differing views on many issues’ (ibid.). Even so, its 2014 European manifesto identifies six overarching areas of agreement covering economic policy, environmental policy, social rights, democratic rights, trade policy and foreign policy (PEL 2014: 2–3)

Euroscepticism in the context of the Radical Left One of those issues is how to deal with European integration. It is necessary to distinguish a number of different aspects to the broad concept of European

70  Michael Holmes integration. First of all, European integration can be seen as a normative ideal. Second, there is the EU as the contemporary organisational embodiment of that integration. And third, there is integration as the particular set of policies being followed by the EU. A distinction is perhaps required with this third aspect. Opposition to, say, one policy area such as the Common Agricultural Policy does not of itself constitute a rejection of the entire European project. But opposition to the core values and policies of the EU – and particularly, of course, the economic policies of free trade, a single market and a common currency – represent a much more fundamental challenge to the idea of integration in practice (see also Leruth 2015). Given the professed commitment to internationalism to be found in all Radical Left parties, it is hardly surprising that the transnational and pan-European formations are supportive of the principle of European cooperation and integration. GUE/NGL supports ‘a socially equitable, peaceful and sustainable European integration process based on international solidarity’ (GUE/NGL 2013) and espouses ‘a vision of a European integration process based on solidarity, workers’ rights, peace, gender equality, civil liberties, democracy and environmental responsibility’ (GUE/NGL 2014a). Similarly, the principle of unity and cooperation across Europe is seen as a positive goal by the PEL. PEL President Pierre Laurent has called for all on the Radical Left to ‘unite our forces’ (PEL 2014). While acknowledging problems, he accepts that ‘letting Europe break up and return to war, to fall back into nationalism and xenophobia would not be the solution’ (PEL 2014). When it comes to the second aspect, the EU as the current form of that integration, the European Radical Left begins to take a different view. Both GUE/NGL and the PEL are critical of the EU as an institution, arguing that it is undemocratic in several key respects. Most particularly, the EU is seen as an organisation where business interests are given priority all the time, at the expense of those of ordinary workers and citizens. But the tone of these criticisms is still strongly pro-­integration. The perceived democratic crisis of EU politics is criticised because it ‘endangers the process of European integration’ (PEL 2007: 4), while ­German MEP Lothar Bisky expressed it in terms which also capture a strong pro-­ integration tone: ‘European integration can be successful only if it meets the needs of the majority of the people. There cannot be a European Union against the will of the majority of the people’ (Bisky 2008). There is a clear and consistent rejection of the EU’s economic programme, which was branded a project of ‘neoliberal condemnation’ (Bertinotti 2005) and ‘a new form of neo-liberal organism … undermining the very roots of politics’ (PEL 2007: 1). In similar vein, GUE/NGL rejected the European Constitutional Treaty for being the ‘constitutionalisation of the liberal model’ (GUE/NGL 2004; see Lightfoot 2012: 26–29 for a full discussion). This neo-liberalism is also seen as permeating many other aspects of what the EU does – so for example, policy on international trade is criticised for imposing inappropriate and damaging neo-­liberal conditions on developing countries, and regional policy is criticised for being inadequate and excessively geared to support for private business (see GUE/NGL 2014b: 17–18). There is also a clear and consistent critique of the

Contesting integration  71 extent to which the EU’s foreign and security policies are deemed to be subservient to American interests through NATO. However there is also clear support for other areas. The idea of a social union is regularly put forward, as is the importance of having a strong common environmental programme. The Union is still criticised in these areas, but from a position of hoping for a stronger and more progressive EU position. Again, the pro-­ integration language is notable, with one GUE/NGL report asserting ‘we believe in a social union’ and stating that ‘we must build a Europe where people can live in dignity’ (GUE/NGL 2014a). Taking these features together, what appears is a very clear-cut call for ‘another Europe’ (PEL 2015). Both transnational and pan-European Radical Left groups are consistent in this – the idea that the EU is flawed because of its neo-liberalism and lack of democracy, but that integration is important as a means of building a Europe of social solidarity. So both groups advocate transformative policies, with the European Left declaring ‘yes, we can change Europe!’ (PEL 2005). This pro-integration position is captured nicely by Lothar Bisky’s argument that ‘rampant capitalism’ is ‘destroying the opportunity for European integration’ (Bisky 2007). And one PEL policy document gives an illustration of the extent of this, with calls for ‘harmonisation of the social and environmental standards at the highest existing European level’; for ‘harmonisation of taxes’ and ‘coordinated European tax and financial policies’; for a ‘coordinated monetary and budgetary policies’ that would promote public investment across the EU; suggesting the building of ‘universal European social protection’; and proposing ‘a new social contract at the European level’ (PEL 2007: 6–9). This is not the language of a Eurosceptic group. But one problem remains – what are the specifics? If the Radical Left is proposing ‘another Europe’, what exactly does it look like in terms of policies and institutional architecture, and how exactly is it to be reached? Such details are not specified, and this is deliberate. It is due to the underlying division between those parties that are more pro-European and those that are more anti-European. By keeping policy statements vague, both GUE/NGL and the PEL were able to maintain the delicate balancing act between the competing stances on European integration. This is especially notable in relation to calls for a more democratic EU, which are couched in very vague language. GUE/NGL might talk of the need ‘to reform the architecture of the EU’ (GUE/ NGL 2012a) but neither GUE/NGL nor the PEL advocate a particular programme of democratic reform. Their own ‘architects’ cannot agree on a building plan, largely because the various member parties do not agree on specific proposals about the appropriate balance of powers between Parliament, Council and Commission (Holmes and Roder 2012: 273). Thus there is clearly a pro-integration language and discourse throughout the Radical Left, captured well by the PEL’s assertion that ‘we have a project for Europe’ which ‘requires an all-European cooperation’ (PEL 2007). But there is recognition that such cooperation has not yet been achieved, and that there is still a need to build ‘closer links among our parties at the European level’ (PEL 2007: 5). The reality is that member parties have very different understandings of what such

72  Michael Holmes cooperation might entail, ranging from vague reform of the EU to outright rejection of the EU. Two things should be emphasised. First, few constituent parties have the resources or the inclination to clearly set out a comprehensive vision of their preferred ‘Other Europe’, so the competing left-wing ‘types’ of Europe can only really be discerned implicitly rather than explicitly. Second, neither GUE/ NGL nor the PEL has any interest in airing this debate, so their documents simply either ignore the differences of opinion or elide them under catch-all headings like ‘Another Europe’. And the way that both GUE/NGL and PEL have been able to preserve unity in the face of such contradictions has been by agreeing to disagree. For much of the time, this device has worked well for the Radical Left. The parties share a broad ideological outlook which stresses internationalism and eschews nationalism, and have all been prepared to contest European elections and to participate in the EP. Once in the EP, the potential disagreements have easily been avoided, largely by pursuing a strongly oppositional stance. This is captured well in the 2014 Manifesto, which is peppered with words like ‘resist’, ‘fight’, ‘reject’, ‘refuse’, ‘stop’, ‘demand’, ‘oppose’, ‘defend’ (PEL 2014: 2–3). But of course, the parliamentary setting can also serve to draw parties deeper and deeper into compromises. The temptation to accept some things in order to be better able to resist others has pulled some parties towards their more Eurorealist stances. When reform was a distant prospect, this did not matter. But as the next section shows, the financial crisis brought the issue of reform of the EU very much to the fore and changed the basic equation for the Radical Left.

The impact of the crisis The financial and economic crisis that erupted in 2007/2008 is perhaps better considered as a succession of inter-related crises than a single event. First, there was a broad international dimension, with the collapse and near-collapse of a number of financial institutions in the United States and Europe; second, there was the specifically EU context, with the crisis precipitating a particular set of problems for countries in the Euro-zone; and third, there were the multiple national crises as different countries faced different specific sets of problems. While there are unifying elements to each of these as well – most notably the imposition of austerity as a means of responding to the crisis at a number of levels – the different levels have led to different political problems and responses. For the Radical Left, the international and EU dimensions of the crisis fitted rather neatly together. Their mobilisation on European issues is not solely rooted in a critique of neo-liberal integration – the Radical Left stance on Europe is shaped as much by concerns about democracy, foreign policy and social welfare as it is about economic policy. But the financial crisis made it logical to concentrate the focus on the economic aspect. The crisis seemed to prove much of what the Radical Left had been arguing for many years: at the international level, that capitalism was a system destined to fail, while at the European level, the EU was caught up in this system, and that the only way to build genuine European cooperation and integration was on the basis of a fundamental reorientation of the

Contesting integration  73 EU’s economic programme. Another Europe was no longer just possible; it was an absolute necessity. The crisis was very readily portrayed by the Radical Left as evidence of the flawed neo-liberal direction of the EU. Indeed, the PEL went a step further, branding the EU’s austerity policies as ‘ultra-liberalism’ (PEL 2014). Both GUE/NGL and the Euro-party were immediately and consistently critical of austerity, and saw the crisis as confirmation that Europe had to move away from its neo-liberal direction. As one party statement put it, ‘the European Union is not the victim of the current economic, financial, environmental and global food crisis but one of its motors’ (GUE/NGL 2013). In order to do so, both GUE/NGL and the PEL presented a range of proposals. These included calls for tax reform, with the introduction of an international financial transactions tax and the closure of tax havens (GUE/NGL 2012b). Again, there is a clear recognition that a common European position can be of benefit, with an acknowledgement that the EU has the potential to be a bulwark against global financial interests. GUE/NGL called for ‘greater solidarity among EU Member States to counter predatory speculation that threatens the entire Euro area’ (GUE/NGL 2010). The response of the transnational and pan-European movements also underscores the importance of building integration on principles of social solidarity. For GUE/NGL, the crisis reinforced the need for ‘social justice for all’ and ‘a Europe of solidarity’ (GUE/NGL 2014b). Again, the pro-integration tone is evident, with the EP-group declaring ‘we believe in a social union where everybody has equal access to social protections and welfare provisions’ (ibid.), and calling for the ‘replacement of the obsolete Stability and Growth Pact with a pact of social solidarity for employment and training, combating poverty to ensure a minimum income for all’ (GUE/NGL 2010). The crisis also substantiated the criticisms of the Radical Left concerning the undemocratic nature of the EU. Both structures highlighted the lack of democratic control over the European Central Bank (ECB), noting how ‘the European Central Bank and the euro are at the exclusive service of the financial markets’ (PEL 2014), and how this led to a situation where austerity measures were ‘being applied by undemocratic means’ (GUE/NGL 2014b). The preferred solution was for ‘public control of the banking sector’ (GUE/NGL 2012b). In overall terms, the response of the European Radical Left to the crisis showed consistency in respect of their overall standpoint and their previous policy positions. But this consistency dissipated when it came to the third level, the individual national crises. This is partly because each constituent party of the groupings had to respond not just to an international and European crisis but to their own specific national demands, and partly because these national prerogatives coloured the perception of events elsewhere. So while there is an apparent unity, the details of policy show a persistent underlying split between the Euro-­ reformist faction and the more Eurosceptic one. Once again, the way that the transnational and pan-European groups deal with this is essentially by continuing with the approach of agreeing to disagree.

74  Michael Holmes The agreement is largely at the rhetorical level, with in particular numerous expressions of solidarity with the countries on the receiving end of bail-outs and the attendant imposition of austerity measures (see for example the GUE/NGL 2014a). GUE/NGL president Gabi Zimmer decried the ‘scaremongering and threats of the ruling elites’ (GUE/NGL 2015a) and highlighted the ‘disgraceful blackmailing’ of the Syriza government in Greece (GUE/NGL 2015b). And once again there is a pro-integration tone to the language, with Zimmer arguing the ‘No’ vote in the 2015 Greek referendum was a case of ‘saying Yes to European integration and Yes to European democracy’ (GUE/NGL 2015a), while her Greek MEP colleague Dimitrios Papadimoulis said that ‘a united Europe without Greece is like a child without a birth certificate,’ and called for the word ‘Grexit’ ‘to be wiped from European vocabulary’ (GUE/NGL 2015c). However, the responses to the Greek drama show disagreements over how best to turn the rhetoric of solidarity into something practical, both in terms of policies and in terms of how to reform the EU. On the policy side, there is a clear divide between those calling for a bigger EU budget with a strong redistributive element – particularly those from the southern European countries in receipt of bail-out funds – and those who see this as simply ceding power to an EU still in the hands of neo-liberal interests. As one former MEP from GUE/NGL put it, ‘that’s not proper redistribution, it’s redistribution from poor Danish workers to rich Greeks’ (interview, 8 May 2015). And when it comes to EU reform, while there is agreement that Europe must be made more democratic, there is no consensus on doing this by strengthening EU institutions such as the Parliament. Instead, there are hints that power should be returned to the national level, as for example in this critique of austerity: ‘for the GUE/NGL, extreme institutionalised austerity is deepening the recession and shifting power from national capitals to the European Commission and European Central Bank’ (GUE/NGL 2012b, my emphasis). Accordingly, some political actors in the European Radical Left call for a form of European disintegration. And these disagreements are the heart of the issue. The European Radical Left cannot build a strong position on some issues because its member parties do not agree on the basic issue of whether the EU can be reformed or not. Euroscepticism is thus a fundamental dividing line, certainly within GUE/NGL. The PEL is less affected by this, but while this allows it to be somewhat more supportive of the idea of working within the EU, this is the very reason some parties refuse to join the PEL. One former GUE/NGL MEP stated simply ‘it is too pro-EU’ (interview, 7 April 2015). And despite all the policy agreement and the broadly similar visions of politics and economics that the Radical Left parties share, it still comes down to national differences, with parties linking European democracy with a transfer of power back to national settings. This is not a crude nationalism. Instead, it reflects a strong sense that each member state has its own particular socio-economic setting. In particular, Eurosceptic parties in Northern Europe couch their criticisms in terms of wanting to protect their national welfare states, trade union rights and other freedoms. Their concern is that harmonisation of policies in the EU rarely results in raising up of

Contesting integration  75 standards to match the ‘best’ practice; instead, too often it leads to some form of compromise in the middle which weakens the positions of some.

Conclusion This chapter has shown that the European Radical Left is a diverse and somewhat fragmented phenomenon, not just between the two transnational o­ rganisations  – the  pan-European GUE/NGL EP group and the transnational European Left ­Euro-party – but within these formations as well. However, ‘even if the parties as an EU-level group are unquestionably fragmented, they do not lack a basic concord of outlook’ (Charalambous 2013: 37), and there is ‘a tentative policy consensus over Europe’ (March 2012: 160). There is evidence of growing attempts to build a cohesive framework, involving an increasing level of commitment to European integration and some kind of reformed EU. It is clear that ‘the EU has become a necessary terrain of struggle’ (Charalambous 2013: 176). Radical Left parties ‘have a clear and distinguishable ideological and programmatic core’ (Olsen et al. 2010: 6), which includes ‘major reservations about the EU project, because of both its democratic deficit and its alleged facilitator role in supporting capitalism in Europe’ (ibid.: 7). As an early PEL document put it, ‘we firmly believe in the historical need of European unity; we are committed Europeans’ (PEL 2005). Even though not all subscribed to the notion, such differences were elided by the simple measure of agreeing to disagree. And in practice it was usually quite easy to portray opposition to the EU in a pro-integration fashion. Thus, even though the PEL campaigned for No votes in referendums on the European Constitutional Treaty, they claimed this was in a spirit of being ‘positive to European integration’ (PEL 2005). As Bisky (2008) interpreted it, ‘the ones who say “No” to a wrong EU basic orientation are not “anti-European”. Anti-Europeans are rather those, who ignore them and keep on pursuing the same wrong policies’. However, the Radical Left lacks a means of advancing this call for another kind of Europe. They do not offer any clear strategy for how Europe could be altered. Instead, the pro-integration sentiment remains at the rhetorical level, which has also allowed the more Eurosceptical strands in the Radical Left to remain nested in amongst their more Euro-reformist allies. In large part, this is due to the absence of the Radical Left from the forums that really matter. When it comes to advocating a reform programme, this remains in the hands of the national governments, and the Radical Left have been almost entirely absent from that level of participation. Up to 1989, there was a damaging divide between anti-integration parties (such as the PCF and the Communist Party of Greece) and those March terms ‘critical pro-integrationists’ (such as the PCI and the Communist Party of Spain; March 2012: 160). Even in the early twenty-first century, the Radical Left was ‘divided in their strategic assessment of whether [their] goals are best realised through deepening EU integration or in contesting and perhaps rejecting the current model of European construction altogether’ (Dunphy 2004: 167). But further developments have seen the emergence of an ‘increasingly critically pro-integrationist’ majority,

76  Michael Holmes while ‘staunch anti-integrationists who support EU-withdrawal’ are confined to a minority (March 2012: 160). The financial crisis altered this balance. It was an extraordinary opportunity for the Radical Left in Europe. The consistent lines voiced by the Radical Left suddenly gained great traction. The crisis could easily be taken as evidence that neo-liberalism was a deeply flawed set of policies, that key EU institutions were undemocratic, and that another Europe was not just possible, but crucial. And this message seemed to chime with an increasing number of voters. Certainly, the rise of Syriza and Podemos gave an inspiring jolt to their fellow Radical Left parties. A political movement that had to some extent become resigned to a lifetime of preaching in the wilderness suddenly saw that the tantalising goal of actually achieving a significant electoral breakthrough and even governmental power might not be out of reach. The crisis was thus a remarkable opportunity for the Radical Left, but one which was squandered. The agreement to disagree was an effective compromise position when the opportunity for real influence was remote; but the financial crisis reduced that remoteness. This had the effect of disturbing the compromise between the ‘Eurorealist’ and Eurosceptic groups in the transnational Radical Left. And of course, Syriza’s experience of government proved deeply disillusioning. It highlighted the lack of any real ability to work together effectively at a European level for common European solutions. For some, the lesson of the crisis was that parties need to work together more coherently at the European level. Thus, you have the PEL asserting that ‘to form a European front that can make it possible for a left alternative to show a positive way out of the crisis and build European regional cooperation’ is ‘the very raison d’être of the Party of the European Left’ (PEL 2013a). But for others, the lesson of the crisis is that the EU remains beyond reform, and that the path to a better European integration must first involve abandoning the EU project. Most advocates of this position still shy away from the label Eurosceptic. However, one former MEP regretted the manner in which the left had ‘ceded’ the word to the Radical Right: ‘What we have in the crisis is Euroscepticism, but a part of the left refuses to use that and so gave it to the right. If we had utilised Euroscepticism, then perhaps we could have established some forces or gained some forces to put across another agenda’ (interview, 8 May 2015). Both GUE/NGL and the PEL advocate another Europe, one where neo-liberal capitalism is reined in and where social solidarity is the guiding principle. They do so in language that appears strongly pro-European. GUE/NGL asserts that ‘we see it as our mission to make the European Union more human, more transparent and more tangible. We want more direct democracy and active participation by citizens. The European Union must become a project of its people and cannot remain a project of the elites’ (GUE/NGL 2013). Similarly, the PEL declares itself to have ‘the potential and the duty to be a main political actor to change and reform EU politics’ (PEL 2005). However, beyond a broad agreement on ‘another Europe’, there is not yet any comprehensive agreement on how to build it – and in

Contesting integration  77 particular whether the existing institutions of the EU can be reformed or whether the process will have to start again from scratch. Some Radical Left parties now contemplate the idea of exiting the EU as a viable alternative to reforming it. The financial crisis has exacerbated the tensions between these competing ideas among Radical Left parties, leaving the two groups preaching a common message but unable to do anything much about driving it forward.

Notes 1 I am very grateful to Donal Walsh for his work as a research assistant on this project, and to research grants received from Liverpool Hope University and from the Self Foundation. 2 Regulation 2004/2003 of the EP; see EURLEX (2009). 3 Sinn Féin is unintentionally Europeanist in having MEPs elected from two member states: the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom (from its Northern Ireland constituency). 4 The Czech Communist Party, the Finnish Left Alliance, the Greek Syriza, the Portuguese Left Bloc and the Spanish United Left. 5 The Red-Green Alliance contests European elections as part of the People’s Movement Against the EU, but the current People’s Movement MEP is not from the Alliance. 6 For example, Sinn Féin won a seat in the Dublin EP constituency in 2004, then lost it in 2009 to the Socialist Party, then regained it from them in 2014.

Bibliography Bardi, L., Bressanelli, E., Calossi, E., Gagatek, W., Mair P. and Pizzimenti, E. (2010) How to create a transnational party system [online]. Available at: www.eui.eu/Projects/ EUDO-OPPR/Documents/StudyOPPR-PE.pdf [Accessed 3 January 2016]. Bertinotti, F. (2005) Opening speech of Fausto Bertinotti, 31 October 2005 [online]. Available at: www.european-left.org/positions/news/opening-speech-fausto-bertinotti [Accessed 3 January 2016]. Bisky, L. (2007) ‘A European Left, developing alternatives’, speech to the 2nd Congress of the Party of the European Left, Prague, 24 November 2007 [online]. Available at: www.european-left.org/sites/default/files/lothar_bisky_s_intervention.pdf [Accessed 3 January 2016]. Bisky, L. (2008) ‘The People Are Sovereign’, policy statement, 13 June 2008 [online]. Available at: www.european-left.org/positions/news/people-are-sovereign [Accessed 3 January 2016]. Charalambous, G. (2013) European integration and the Communist dilemma: Communist Party responses to Europe in Greece, Cyprus and Italy, Farnham: Ashgate. Dunphy, R. (2004) Contesting capitalism? Left parties and European integration, Manchester: Manchester University Press. EURLEX (2009) The regulations governing political parties and rules regarding their funding at European level [online]. Available at: eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ TXT/?uri=URISERV:l33315 [Accessed 26 July 2015]. European Parliament (2014) Les élections européennes et nationales en chiffres/European and national elections figured out, Directorate-General for Communication – Public Opinion Monitoring Unit [online]. Available at: www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/­elections_ results/review.pdf [Accessed 28 July 2015]. GUE/NGL (2004) Activity report, 1999–2004, Brussels: GUE/NGL.

78  Michael Holmes GUE/NGL (2010) Economic and social crisis: For solutions rooted in solidarity & justice [online]. Available at: www.guengl.eu/uploads/publications-documents/Financial_ EN.pdf [Accessed 30 July 2015]. GUE/NGL (2012a) Who we are, what we stand for, what we do [online]. Available at: www. guengl.eu/uploads/publications-documents/Policy_2012_EN.pdf [Accessed 30  July 2015]. GUE/NGL (2012b) Solidarity to fight austerity, report of GUE/NGL delegation to Athens, 22–24 February 2012 [online]. Available at: www.guengl.eu/policy/action/gue-nglmeps-participate-in-athens-alter-summit [Accessed 30 July 2015]. GUE/NGL (2013) About the group [online]. Available at: www.guengl.eu/group/about [Accessed 30 July 2015]. GUE/NGL (2014a) Who we are, what we work for [online]. Available at: www.guengl.eu/ uploads/publications-documents/EN_web.pdf [Accessed 30 July 2015]. GUE/NGL (2014b) Review of activities 2012–2014, Brussels: GUE/NGL. GUE/NGL (2015a) A victory for European democracy! [online]. Available at: www.guengl. eu/news/article/gue-ngl-news/a-victory-for-european-democracy [Accessed 30  July 2015]. GUE/NGL (2015b) Last-minute agreement prevents Greece from being pushed into a Grexit – Greece no longer faces an uncontrolled exit from the Eurozone [online]. Available at: www.guengl.eu/news/article/gue-ngl-news/last-minute-agreement-preventsgreece-from-being-pushed-into-a-grexit [Accessed 30 July 2015]. GUE/NGL (2015c) GUE/NGL demands respect for the Greek people and a European-style solution to the crisis [online]. Available at: www.guengl.eu/news/article/gue-nglnews/gue-ngl-demands-respect-for-the-greek-people-and-a-european-style-solution [Accessed 30 July 2015]. Hix, S. (1996) ‘The transnational party federations’, in J. Gaffney (ed.) Political parties and the European Union, London: Routledge, pp. 308–331. Holmes, M. and Roder, K. (2012) The Left and the European Constitution: From Laeken to Lisbon, Manchester: Manchester University Press. Hudson, K. (2012) The new European Left: A socialism for the twenty-first century?, ­Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Ladrech, R. (2002) ‘Europeanization and Political Parties: Towards a Framework for Analysis’, Party Politics 8(4), pp. 389–403. Leruth, B. (2015) ‘Operationalizing National Preferences on Europe and Differentiated Integration’, Journal of European Public Policy 22(6), pp. 816–835. Lightfoot, S. (2012) ‘Left parties at the EU level: influencing the Convention’, in M. Holmes and K. Roder (eds) The Left and the European Constitution: From Laeken to Lisbon, Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 18–34. Mair, P. (2000) ‘The Limited Impact of Europe on National Party Systems’, West European Politics 23(4), pp. 27–51. Mair, P. (2008) ‘Political parties and party systems’, in Paolo Graziano and Maarten P. Vink (eds) Europeanization: New research agendas, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.154–166. March, L. (2012) Radical Left parties in Europe, London: Routledge. Olsen, J., Hough, D. and Koβ, M. (2010) Left parties in national governments, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. PEL (2005) Yes, we can change Europe! [online]. Available at: www.european-left.org/ positions/news/yes-we-can-change-europe [Accessed 17 March 2015]. PEL (2007) Peace, development and employment with rights, final declaration, 2nd PEL Congress, Prague. PEL (2013a) Unite for a left alternative in Europe [online]. Available at: www.­europeanleft.org/positions/congress-motions/documents-4th-el-congress/final-political-­ document-4th-el-congress [Accessed 17 November 2015].

Contesting integration  79 PEL (2013b) Escaping from austerity, rebuilding Europe, draft programme, 4th PEL Congress, Madrid, December 2013. PEL (2014) EL Manifesto for the 2014 European Elections [online]. Available at: http:// www.european-left.org/sites/default/files/final_platform_en_7.pdf [Accessed 17 March 2015]. PEL (2015) About the EL [online]. Available at: www.european-left.org/about-el. [Accessed 23 March 2015]. PEL (nd-a) Statute of the Party of the European Left [online]. Available at: www.­europeanleft.org/propos-de-la-ge/documents [Accessed 30 July 2015]. PEL (nd-b) EL-parties [online]. Available at: www.european-left.org/about-el/­memberparties [Accessed 26 July 2015].

6 Transnational mobilisation and critical Europeanism Sevasti Chatzopoulou and Angela Bourne

Introduction One of the most striking consequences of the European Sovereign Debt (ESD) crisis has been the scale and variety of mobilisation of movements and civil society groups, against the policies of national, European Union (EU) or international authorities. These movements have largely focused their activities and practices at the domestic and/or local level. When new opportunity structures emerge, however, some movements collaborate with movements in other parts of the world. This collaboration may result in spreading (diffusion) from one place to another (horizontal) and/or scale shifting from national to EU and international levels (vertical) indicating the emergence of ‘transnational contention’. Transnational social movements involve ‘people and groups who are rooted in specific national contexts, but who engage in contentious political activities’ beyond borders and become part of ‘transnational networks of contacts and conflicts’ (Tarrow 2005: 29). In their work della Porta and Caiani (2009: 43) observed a low level of mobilisation directed at EU institutions which they linked to the EU’s deficit in representative democracy and the preponderance of formally closed institutions at the EU level. They attributed low levels of mobilisation to the difficulty of ‘mobilising against an unaccountable and opaque target’. Current research also points to the importance of ‘cultural differences in impeding transnational networking’ where transnational social movements connect ‘multiple heterogeneous organizations in an imaginative community of resistance’ (Flesher Fominaya 2015: 1). Nevertheless, since the beginning of the Eurozone crisis, a large, interdisciplinary literature has addressed what many regard as a global wave of contention (e.g. Castells 2012; Flesher Fominaya and Cox 2013; Tejerina et al. 2013; Worth 2013; della Porta and Mattoni 2014; Flesher Fominaya 2014). The expanding role of the EU institutions in the management of the Eurozone crisis made these targets clearer, as evident in many movements’ critiques of the EU’s ‘democratic ­deficit’. Indeed, in the social movements literature, increasing attention is paid to the challenges involved in this accumulation of decision-making power in non-state authorities dominated by unelected actors perceived as lacking real ­democracy (Flesher ­Fominaya 2014; 2015).

Transnational mobilisation and critical Europeanism  81 There is ample evidence that social movements from different countries collaborate in collective actions that target the increased role of non-elected EU actors and international institutions (especially the so-called Troika consisting of the European Central Bank (ECB), the European Commission and the International Monetary Fund, joined by the European Stability Mechanism since 2015 renamed as institutions or quartet) in the governance and management of the crisis (Diani and Kousis 2014; Bourne and Chatzopoulou 2015a; della Porta 2015). Transnational movements’ targets can include public (national governments, EU and international institutions) and private (banks and financial institutions) actors, and expand beyond the state to focus upon all levels of governance. However, we observe that an increased sense of common ‘threats’ and ‘targets’ in certain event moments, such as the ESD crisis, may help overcome cultural differences and reorient the focus of movements’ collaborations from the domestic level, facilitating the transnationalisation of collaboration among movements. This does not mean that cultural differences do not remain significant factors of obstructing collaboration, but they are not necessarily sufficient to impede transnational collective actions. Instead, in these specific moments (often linked with external events), the ‘threats’ hold more weight than the cultural differences, bringing together a variety of transnational social movements actors that coordinate collective action and develop new frames. Existing studies on social movements and European integration have been particularly interested in the extent to which these movements also involve and target actors and audiences from other states and the EU (see for example ­Tarrow 1995; Imig and Tarrow 2000; Rucht 2002; della Porta and Caiani 2009; Koopmans and Statham 2010). However, the question of whether civil society organisations and transnational groups cooperate or develop contention activities where they articulate opposition to the process of European integration or express Eurosceptical claims has been under-researched (Vasilopoulou 2013). Although Euroscepticism has, to a certain extent, become a transnational and pan-­European phenomenon, the study of these developments ‘has been neglected in the academic community’ (Usherwood and Startin 2013: 4). Most of the literature on the recent ‘global wave’ of protest focuses on the transnational dimension of the European movements’ collective action, including collaborative strategies, learning and identification processes and especially processes of transnational diffusion, addressing the spread of frames1 (e.g. calls for ‘real democracy’), ­tactical repertoires (e.g. occupation of public spaces), slogans (e.g. ‘We are the 99 per cent’) and movement labels (e.g. Indignados and Occupy; see Tejerina et  al. 2013; della Porta and Mattoni 2014; Flesher Formiyana 2014; Kousis 2014). Transnational mobilisation is more than protest and contentious politics. It may involve adaptation and use of innovative means of collective action that contribute to the legitimation and de-legitimation of EU authorities in the design of solutions to the crisis. As such, they provide valuable insights into the impact of the ESD crisis on contemporary Euroscepticism as well as the role of civil society organisation in the politicisation of EU issues and the emergence of a European public sphere.

82  Sevasti Chatzopoulou and Angela Bourne Our previous work shows that domestic social movements in Spain and Greece articulate Eurosceptical claims contesting the transfer of decision-making and management of the crisis to supranational non-elected actors and raising concerns about the accountability and legitimacy of the strengthened role in public governance (Bourne and Chatzopoulou 2015a). These claims are often more a critique of the nature of the European integration project, referred to as ‘critical Europeanism’, than rejection and strong opposition to the EU (see also della Porta and Caiani 2009). Besides, studies on Euroscepticism show that since the beginning of the crisis Euroscepticism has increased, particularly in Southern European countries that were severely hit by austerity measures (Serricchio et al. 2013). In this context, since transnational social movements are often embedded in domestic movements, it is reasonable to expect that transnational social movements will also articulate Eurosceptical arguments. Thus, this chapter turns to examine mobilisation by transnational social movements and the nature of any Eurosceptical claims articulated during the ESD crisis. More specifically we examine whether we can also observe the articulation of the same kinds of Eurosceptic discourses observed in domestic movement claims in Spain and Greece in those of transnational social movements. We do this by combining theoretical insights from the literature on social movements with theoretical work drawn from that on Euroscepticism. The former provides the tools to understand the collaboration and organisation of contention activities against common threats and austerity policies by transnational movements; the latter offers conceptual tools for addressing the nature of critiques and expression of contention towards the EU institutions. More importantly, our focus on transnational social movements as Eurosceptic actors provides an analysis of non-party-based transnational Euroscepticism. Our analysis considers trade unions, civil society, unorganised citizens but also social groups with certain common world-views. We employ political claims analysis, which focuses on the strategic demands, critiques or proposals that target EU and international institutions and the different dimensions of the transnational movements (scale shift, transnational coalition formation; see Koopmans and Statham 1999). We use manifestos,2 pamphlets, websites, slogans, posts in electronic media and other forms of communication.3 We do not use newspapers, which most political claims analysis entails. While newspapers provide a more detailed coverage (Bourne and C ­ hatzopoulou 2015b), posts in electronic media, manifestos and websites are also useful because they provide a direct view on the movements’ own framing of claims. In this chapter we examine three cases of transnational mobilisation, namely the European Federation of Trade Unions (ETUC), Alter Summit and Blockupy.

The nature of the transnationalisation of anti-austerity social movements In order to understand the emergence of Euroscepticism within transnational social movements, we first consider the nature of the transnationalisation processes of these movements and the shift from the domestic to the transnational

Transnational mobilisation and critical Europeanism  83 level as a dynamic process. Tarrow (2005: 62) attributes the emergence of transnational contention to internationalism, namely the ‘growth of international governance structures’ and the transfer of decision-making from the national to the supranational level. Internationalism signifies ‘a dense triangular structure of relations among states, non-states, non-state actors, and international institutions, and the opportunities this produces for actors to engage in collective action at different levels of this system’. Internationalism also triggers decision-making changes that ‘lack institutionalized methods of citizen influence’ (ibid.). This provides new opportunities for contention collaboration opportunities for social movements (new space for meetings, formation of coalitions at the domestic level and beyond borders), sharing resources and shifting the territorial level of their activities. The coordination of transnational contention activities is facilitated by the use of new technologies that allows for new coordination means and channels of communication that increase information and knowledge of targets and reduce the costs of transnational exchange (Imig and Tarrow 2000; Tarrow 2005; della Porta and Caiani 2009; della Porta and Mattoni 2014). This is combined with face-toface network gatherings and interactions enabled by the reduced cost of mobility (e.g. availability of charter low-cost flights) at least within Europe. The transnationalisation of social movements is not a new phenomenon. In their work on European social forums, della Porta and Caiani (2009) show that some sense of collective identity, social networks of trust, reciprocity and learning may have already taken root among participants in certain pre-crisis European protests addressing issues not dissimilar to those at the centre of anti-austerity protests. Increased transnationalisation of mobilisation involves a broader range of participants and addresses a wider scale of domestic and international concerns (Tarrow 2005: 25). Moreover, transnational activists may act as ‘norms entrepreneurs’ in their efforts to diffuse beliefs and ideas around the world. They may represent specific groups at the international level targeting international institutions and mediate between the local, the national and the international levels. Yet, they are not homogeneous. They often share a set of characteristics (e.g. speak more languages, travel, experiences from domestic-level activism and are better connected than non-transnational activist compatriots). While the national level remains important, changes in the international politics structures and the growing use of concepts of ‘multilevel governance’, ‘world polity’ and ‘global civil society’ also signify internal (changes in party politics, strengthened executive power) and external changes (shift of institutional power from national to supranational and regional empowered the international institutions). The role of international and public–private governance structures intensified in the management of the ESD crisis by the EU institutions. Besides, the new governance structures rendered the social movement targets beyond the state more salient and provided new opportunity structures for mobilisation and the development of new mechanisms and processes. These often lead to ‘an ultimate fusion between domestic and international’ mobilisation and to ‘transform social movements’ institutional and cultural environments (della Porta and Tarrow 2005: 1; Tarrow 2005: 29).

84  Sevasti Chatzopoulou and Angela Bourne In order to study the nature of the transnationalisation processes of social movements during the crisis, we draw on Tarrow’s (2005) typology;4 specifically the concepts of: 1) diffusion, which refers on how movements spread from one place to another (horizontal); 2) scale shift, which considers a type of ‘diffusion’ from one level to another (e.g. national to transnational and pan-European, vertical) and the dynamic coordination of collective action and transfer of practices at a different level than where it began, from local/national or transnational (della Porta and Tarrow 2005); and 3) transnational coalition formation, which denotes the horizontal formation of networks among actors from different countries that contribute to ‘activism beyond borders’ (Keck and Sikkink 1998) or ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’ (Tarrow 2005). Scale shift is facilitated and strengthened by spatial proximity (Reising 1999), interpersonal networks and institutional linkages within particular societies but also similar structural conditions (Roos and Oikonomakis 2014). It involves dynamic cultural and territorial changes at both the domestic and international level. It may also indicate the emergence of clearer common targets and frame bridging beyond the domestic level. When movements move to the transnational level, they bring together common ideologies that are embedded and framed within different domestic contingent structures that they then transform and use to construct new forms of collective action which lead to frame bridging. Frame bridging links ‘two or more ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular issue or problem’ (Tarrow 2005: 62). During the ESD crisis, a number of movements from different countries started forming networks that contribute to ‘activism beyond borders’ and creating ‘transnational coalitions’ that are characterised by scale shift (from the domestic to the EU and transnational levels). Besides, a vertical projection of domestic claims onto international institutions (EU and the International Monetary Fund or IMF) is combined with a Eurosceptical ‘frame bridging’; there the transnational social movements and organisations focus on common broader issues such as unemployment, anti-austerity and lack of democracy instead of specific domestic issues.

Euroscepticism and Transnational social movements In our analysis of Eurosceptical claims of transnational movements and organisations, we use the distinctions between ‘utility’, ‘principled’ and ‘sovereignty’ Euroscepticism made by Ruiz and Egea de Haro (2011). Utility Euroscepticism refers to ‘arguments about expected gains and losses’; Euroscepticism in principle refers to ‘moral or ideological arguments’, such as those about the effect of the EU on democracy or equality; sovereignty Euroscepticism refers to ‘resistance to ceding powers as well as concerns about the loss of national identities’ (ibid.: 127). The identification and simple formulation of the core Eurosceptical concerns by this approach can also be applied across cases at multiple territorial levels. Moreover, it reflects major categories of Euroscepticism developed by other authors (e.g. Sørensen 2008; Leconte 2010). In addition, we consider one more aspect of these claims, the issue of solidarity. In contrast to Vasilopoulou’s

Transnational mobilisation and critical Europeanism  85 (2013) observation, earlier literature on Europeanisation of social movements by della Porta and Caiani (2009) suggest that collaboration among social movement participants from different states moblilising against common European and international targets may foster solidarity and identification. We observe that this kind of transnational anti-austerity movements’ Eurosceptic critiques are similar to these observed by della Porta and Caiani (2009) in the attitudes of social movements at pre-crisis European social forums, characterised as ‘critical Europeanism’. Critical Europeanism is a form of soft Euroscepticism often identified with leftist social movements and parties, which critiques specific policy choices, the neo-liberal systemic logic of the EU and various kinds of democratic deficits, while simultaneously invoking a pro-European and internationalist identification in calls for a different kind of collaboration among Europeans.

European Federation of Trade Unions, Alter Summit and Blockupy and their Eurosceptic critiques The social movements and organisations we studied include the ETUC, and two less institutionalised ‘network’ movements, Alter Summit and Blockupy. It is worth noting that there are many more movements and organisations at the transnational level which express Eurosceptic claims, located particularly on the right of the political spectrum (e.g. anti-immigration). Nevertheless, together, these three movements and organisations are pertinent illustrations of social movement ‘scale shift’, responding to the emergence of new forms of international governance, referred to as ‘internationalization’ by Tarrow (2005). ETUC was founded in 1973 aiming to represent and promote workers’ interests at European level. ETUC is the longest existing of the cases, and includes eightyfive national trade union federations in thirty-six countries, plus ten European trade union federations. ETUC is recognised by the EU, the Council of Europe and the European Free Trade Association as the only cross-sectoral trade union organisation representing workers at European level. Since its founding, ETUC has regularly organised collective protests at the EU and transnational level, in collaboration with national trade organisations. These activities continued on a regular basis during the Eurozone crisis in 2008, all over Europe. They included declarations, talks and internet posts but also organisation and coordination of demonstrations such as the European days of action and solidarity. They aim to promote workers’ rights, more jobs and economic growth against austerity in the difficult times of ‘economic and social’ crisis. In its Paris manifesto, for instance, ETUC (2015) states that it stands ‘for a better Europe based on solidarity and equality, social justice and cohesion, peace and democracy’. ETUC claims to fights for sustainable growth, full employment, quality jobs, fair pay, good public services, education and training, fair taxation, good governance, voluntary and fair mobility, gender equality and respect for fundamental rights. Alter Summit emerged in 2012 around the idea of organising an ‘Alternative Summit’ to push the European institutions to make a U-turn on austerity and restore democracy in Europe. This transnational movement encompasses

86  Sevasti Chatzopoulou and Angela Bourne thirty-five European personalities, twelve networks of researchers and fifty-five national or European organisations, which includes many trade unions, social rights, ecological, feminist, youth, anti-racism movements and think tanks from eighteen EU member states and three non-members (Serbia, Iceland and Norway) as well as other transnational networks such as the Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions and Citizen’s Action (ATTAC), ETUC and Friends of the Earth. The ‘Alternative Summit’ held in 2013 in Athens – seen as symbolically significant as the ‘laboratory of resistance against austerity and the struggle for alternatives’ – was pitched as a first step towards the building of a real social movement opposed to neo-liberalism. The manifesto that was also drafted in Athens identified the movement’s ‘urgent common priorities for a democratic, social, ecological and feminist Europe’ and its core aim to ‘roll back austerity and claim real democracy’ (Alter Summit 2013). Blockupy emerged in 2012, with its first activities targeting the ECB’s financial base and the financial district in Frankfurt with the aim to block operations of banks and to oppose the so-called Troika. Founded in Germany, it is supported by groups and organisations such as the Interventionist Left, ATTAC, Occupy Frankfurt, trade unions, youth and student organisations, the forum of the unemployed in Germany, the German Left Party (Die Linke), the network peace ­cooperative (Netzwerk Friedenskooperative) and the radical left alliance umsGanze. The objective of Blockupy is to connect struggles ‘beyond the nation-state … to create a common European movement’, to ‘break the rule of austerity’ and to ‘start to build democracy and solidarity from below’ (Blockupy nd). All three cases present various common aspects in terms of both targets and interest in promoting equality, anti-austerity, solidarity, democracy and social justice. The main forms of action adopted by these social movements and organisations reflect a transnational orientation targeting EU actors and transnational corporations but also a decentralised membership. Protests predominantly take one of two main forms. The first is the joint mobilisation of organisations and networks from different countries against a common EU target, such as EU institutions or policies. This type of action is a ‘vertical’ scale shift involving a transfer of action from the national to the transnational level against a common target. These mobilisations include transnational participants who mobilise at sites of European institutions, usually in Brussels, but also in other cities, such as protests following EU institution’s meetings in Luxembourg or Budapest. ETUC organised activities from the start of the crisis, supported by its organisational capacity, experience and available resources, which enabled the building of strong networks and contacts all over the EU member states. For example in April 2011, ETUC organised, in cooperation with six other Hungarian organisations, a ‘Euro-­ demonstration’ against austerity in Budapest. The aim was ‘to send a strong message’ to European leaders who were meeting for their Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) informal meeting. The manifesto for this event stated ‘governing Europe means more jobs, more justice and solidarity, no to austerity’ while the main slogan was ‘No to austerity – For a Social Europe, for jobs and welfare, for fair taxes and laws’ (ETUC 2011).

Transnational mobilisation and critical Europeanism  87 In March 2015, Blockupy organised a rally against ECB’s role in Troika austerity policies outside the central bank’s headquarters in Frankfurt. This was followed by a mass demonstration though the city behind the leading banner ‘Our time to act has come!’ And ‘Change Europe – Stop Troika!’ (Blockupy 2015a). The second type of action is more decentralised in form and involves groups from various countries that simultaneously target authorities at multiple territorial levels and with common slogans. This form of action signifies a ‘horizontal’ scale shift, which is characterised by parallel mobilisation across countries against common targets, the EU austerity policies and institutions. Roos and Oikonomakis (2014: 118) emphasise the importance of ‘shared structural conditions’ in spreading movements’ mobilisation activities across borders, a phenomenon referred as ‘structural equivalence’ (Tarrow 2005: 64). EU austerity measures represent such shared structural conditions among the countries particularly hit by the crisis. These shared structural conditions are reflected in the way movements frame their claims and in frame bridging. European ‘days’ – and sometimes ‘weeks’ – of protest organised over the last couple of years illustrate these types of action. ETUC organised the European Day of Protests and strikes in Brussels, held on 29 September 2010, with around 100,000 participants from France, G ­ ermany, Luxembourg, Austria, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Spain, R ­ omania, the United Kingdom and Norway. The Confederation of European Business (UNICE) also participated. In addition, parallel demonstrations were organised in most European countries, including a general strike in Spain and protests in Portugal, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Cyprus, Romania, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Serbia, France and Ireland. The main slogan was ‘No to austerity – Priority for jobs and growth!’. Another example is the 11 October 2014 European Day of Action, where various transnational movements and networks participated in denouncing Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations (see also Chapter 7). ­Activities were planned in more than fifteen countries and coincided with the launch of a European Citizens Initiative to stop negotiations (Alter Summit 2014a). Before the 2014 European Parliament elections, European action days took place under the slogan ‘solidarity beyond borders – building democracy from below’ (Alter Summit 2014b). Actions included a blockade of a European Business Summit and a ‘march for freedom’ in Brussels; actions in front of Apple stores in solidarity with Chinese workers; assemblies in the Puerta del Sol in Madrid; Blockupy demonstrations in Berlin, Hamburg, Düsseldorf and Stuttgart; demonstrations in Paris; as well as demonstrations in Rome ‘against austerity and privatisation, for public water, commons, social rights, democracy in Italy and Europe’ and in Bologna ‘against the re-opening of the deportation centre for migrants’ (ibid.). Despite differences in nature, the examined social movements and organisations present important similarities in terms of their claims about the EU and in the articulation of a ‘critical Europeanist’ anti-austerity critique. Principled critiques of the EU or arguments about moral or ideological shortcomings of the EU predominate in the discourses of the three examined movements. ETUC (2015) insists that ‘active solidarity, social progress and democratic

88  Sevasti Chatzopoulou and Angela Bourne accountability must be an integral part of the European project’. In its 2015 Paris manifesto, the movement demands ‘a different economic model in Europe and the world, and a process of development that respects people and the environment’ and ‘opposes further liberalisation and commercialisation of public services’ (ibid.). Referring to EU austerity policies, ETUC states ‘these policies have widened divergences between citizens and countries. Growing inequality is driving people apart, alienating them from core democratic values and the European project, and fostering support for dangerously extremist ideologies’ (ibid.). ­Furthermore, ETUC refers to TTIP negotiations as a major challenge to democracy in Europe. In contrast to ETUC, however, Alter Summit (of which ETUC is also a member) and Blockupy were much more trenchant in their critique of EU, which they saw as the servant of neo-liberal interests. In their statements and those of various members posted on their websites, Alter Summit and Blockupy repeatedly represent the EU as a ‘neo-liberal oligarchy ruling over Europe with no democratic legitimacy’ while national and EU leaders willingly subject ‘the people to the will of shareholders and multinationals’ (Alter Summit 2015a). Interpretations of the July 2015 negotiations for a third Greek bailout and negotiation of the TTIP illustrate these themes well. Movement slogans repeatedly emphasise democratisation, including calls for ‘not only elections, but … democracy from below’; ‘They want capitalism without democracy, we want democracy without capitalism’; ‘Reclaiming democracy – Peoples united against the Troika …’; ‘­Solidarity beyond borders – Building democracy from below’; ‘No to austerity! Yes to democracy!’ (ibid.). Closely related are arguments of utility Euroscepticism about expected gains and losses, with gains for elites, but losses for many others. An example of utility Euroscepticism is presented in the statement by Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, the then Head of the Party of European Socialists, who said at the 2010 European Day held in Brussels that protesters ‘are the hardworking ordinary citizens of Europe who have had to carry too heavy a burden in the aftermath of the economic crisis. … European leaders, using European solutions, must define a new balanced way to recovery that illustrates that the lessons of the crisis have been learned’ (Traynor 2010). The protesters blame the international financial institutions for causing the crisis that has an important impact on the weaker part of society, namely the workers. This view is expressed in slogans such as ‘We didn’t cause this crisis. The bill has to be paid by banks, not by workers’; ‘Why should the workers bear all the costs of the crisis?’; or ‘They give all the money to the banks and we have to carry the costs’ (ibid.). Utility Euroscepticism is also expressed in the statement, made at the European Day organised by ETUC in Brussels on 14 November 2012, that austerity measures ‘are plunging Europe into economic stagnation, recession, and dismantling the European social model. These measures, far from restoring confidence, are only aggravating imbalances and creating injustices’ (ETUC 2012). As far as Blockupy (2015b) is concerned, one activist claimed ‘… policies imposed by the Troika under the label of unavoidable necessities depend on the deliberate political choice to transform Europe in [sic] a space in which millions of men and women are doomed to precarity in working and living conditions, unemployment

Transnational mobilisation and critical Europeanism  89 and permanent employability as a new normality’. Alter Summit (2015b) also speaks of a radical transformation of Europe’s economic and political structure, with ‘job insecurity, pauperism and mass unemployment; progressive amputation of social, economic and political rights; growing repression of social movements, strikes and resistance, while grim authoritarianism grows by leaps and bounds’. Sovereignty Eurosceptism, or resistance to ceding powers as well as a concern about the loss of national identities, is relatively rare in the claim-making of transnational social movements, given their focus on common experiences of austerity that transcend the state level. However, the sentiment can sometimes be observed. The slogans ‘Out IMF, out Troika’ that was shouted by thousands of protesters in Lisbon in front of the Portuguese Parliament by trade unions is one example of sovereignty Euroscepticism; as is the statement by Jean-Luc Melenchon, leader of the French Left Front, ‘it is an unconditional surrender’, during the 2012 European Day event in Brussels, criticising Socialist President Francois Hollande for failing to address the concerns of French workers who faced similar concerns and fears as the workers in Southern Europe. These types of Eurosceptical claims were more frequently made in support of the Syriza Government’s discussions with EU member states for renegotiation of debt and an end to austerity, following its election to power in Greece in January 2015. Greece, for many activists, had been ‘blackmailed’ by European elites. There were numerous references to the dominant role of Germany in this process. In January 2015, Alter Summit (2015c) demanded that ‘the Greek people [should] be able to sovereignly decide their destiny without the interference of European institutions and national and international major media, and unthreatened by politicians or financial markets’. However, while trenchant in their Eurosceptical critiques, the movements and organisations are critical Europeanists, insofar as they refuse to repudiate European integration as such and reject the national chauvinism of the right in favour of a different, more democratic and social just Europe and express solidarity with other European peoples. Expressions of ‘solidarity’ have been either conveyed through slogans, statements or comments of participants in protests events organised by the ETUC, such as ‘Solidarity has been lacking in the EU’ (Traynor 2010) or ‘this is a crucial day for Europe’ during the ETUC-organised European Day of protests and strikes on 29 September 2010. The ETUC (2015) manifesto also states that ‘governing Europe means more jobs, more justice and solidarity, no to austerity’. ‘Solidarity’ claims become more frequent with time and more concrete with respect to specific countries, particularly Greece. Solidarity has been expressed by statements such as ‘we are all Greeks’ and with Greek dancing during the demonstrations (Wearden 2012), or with respect to social groups, such as young unemployed people, indicated by slogans such as ‘Together for a better future: No to austerity! Yes to jobs for young people!’; and ‘More and better jobs for young people in Europe’. This was also emphasised by the General Secretary Bernadette Segol in the ETUC call for participation at the protest in Luxembourg on 21 June 2011. Alter Summit members frequently sent messages of support for the actions of other members, including support for a general strike in Belgium (Alter Summit

90  Sevasti Chatzopoulou and Angela Bourne 2014c), or support for the Marches for Dignity in Spain (Alter Summit 2014d). Solidarity with Greece was expressed in many different forms, including messages of congratulations or support to the Greek people on election of the anti-­austerity Syriza Government (January 2015). It was also expressed in appropriation of the symbolic ‘OXI’ of the Greek ‘No’ campaigners in the 5 July campaign on proposed EU bailout terms through images and slogans employed by various transnational and national movements mobilising in support of Greek anti-austerity campaigners. Such statements of solidarity were frequently underpinned by identity claims positioning the movements as ‘authentic’ bearers of European identity. This is reflected in the negation of European elites as true bearers of European identity, evident in repeated admonitions that existing elites were destroying the positive achievements of European integration. For instance, Blockupy (2014; 2015c) posits: ‘Europe is not the institutions and the governments who commit to austerity!’ and argue that ‘Europe is not a question of passports or origins for Blockupy – Europe is a region in which we are starting to struggle together. We are expressing a collective refusal of all nationalist, sexist, and racists “crisis solutions” ’. ETUC (2013) also talks of the ‘pan-European supranational project rather than the sum total of the national stimulus or investment programme of the European countries’, in its declaration for a new path for Europe.

Frame bridging What distinguishes the transnational movements and organisations we study is their call for the construction of a Europe other than the one experienced during the Eurozone crisis. This is reflected in their discourses and the way they frame  their claims. This framing expresses a critical Europeanist discourse in which ‘ideologically congruent but structurally unconnected frames’ are bridged and thereby aims to strengthen transnational collaboration (Tarrow 2005: 64). In this respect the ‘internationalisation’ of economic governance, along with ‘communication’ about the common targets, namely the EU institutions, become important mechanisms in the ‘frame bridging’ of claims. These claims then are framed around transnational issues such as: 1) the need for common European strategies, 2) common interests arising from the wide-ranging and various kinds of destruction attributed to EU-sponsored austerity and 3) the undemocratic nature of EU decision-making processes. These transnational mobilisations have followed domestic mobilisation actions throughout EU member states since 2008. They are linked by a common target; the rejection of austerity and structural adjustment demanded by the EU uniformly across the debtor countries. They mobilise at the transnational level, in calls for unified action among groups with diverse goals, and have the same abstract and issue-neutral – to democratise the EU from the bottom-up. This is apparent in all three examined cases, particularly in the newer movements and organisations such as Alter Summit and Blockupy. These movements, organisations and networks justify their transnational collaboration frequently

Transnational mobilisation and critical Europeanism  91 with reference to the perception of changing opportunity structures occasioned by internationalisation of governance (ibid.). Activists are often explicit about the importance of targeting authorities at multiple territorial levels. As ETUC’s (2015) manifesto clearly states: ‘we call for a different approach, with policies that respect and promote our values and objectives across Europe and around the world’. As one Alter Summit activist put it: ‘One of the major issues for social movements in Europe is how to influence policies coming from a European or global level. An increasing number of decisions are indeed now made at this level, while the political influence of social movements and their points of action are still mainly found at the national and local levels’ (Alter Summit 2015d). Blockupy (2015d) is equally explicit in its statement: ‘The struggle against a continental regime of oppression can be conducted in effective terms only if it is immediately transnational on the European level.’ The harsh conditionality imposed by the EU–IMF bailouts in July 2015 during the renegotiations of debt with the Syriza Government strengthened the perception of the EU as an important arena for mobilisation. Blockupy made a clear declaration in its call for ECB 2015 mobilisation in Frankfurt: Now more than ever it’s clear that the policies imposed by the Troika under the label of unavoidable necessities depend on the deliberate political choice to transform Europe in a space in which millions of men and women are doomed to precarity in working and living conditions, unemployment and permanent employability as a new normality. Now more than ever Europe is the minimum framework for our political action. (Blockupy 2015d) Activists are sometimes explicit about the strategic importance of bridging frames around anti-austerity discourses. Alter Summit activists, the Belgian D19–20 Alliance, for example, indicate the importance of ‘working on the basis of an increasing amount of common ground’ with other movements: ‘We are all in the same boat, and we all know the framework of austerity that the European Union and big finance are trying to impose on us’ (Alter Summit 2015a). Similarly Blockupy (2015a) saw actions demonstrating solidarity with the Greek people as a chance to ‘make clear that this is not a conflict of interest between the people in Europe … it is our struggle for all the people of Europe’. Movement membership is clearly diverse, involving not just groups from many countries and ideological persuasions, but also pursuing a variety of issue agendas, ranging from social conditions of precarious workers, migrants, environmentalism and feminism, among others. Yet the movements studied frequently identify common interests, cross-cutting national borders and issue-emphasis. The movements construct ‘frame bridging’ in their discourse by focusing on the common aspects of the various kinds of victims of austerity – for instance Alter Summit (2015b) emphasises ‘job insecurity, pauperism and mass unemployment; progressive amputation of social, economic and political rights; … [and] grim authoritarianism’. The frame then builds on these in an appeal to the common experience

92  Sevasti Chatzopoulou and Angela Bourne of EU-sponsored austerity and a call for movement-led democratisation from the bottom-up. Indeed, many activists see the task of transnational movements as an opportunity to undercut the discourses which emphasise differences among Europeans. For many activists, these common interests crystallised in support for the Syriza Government’s position in bailout negotiations with the EU during 2015. Alter Summit (2015e) declared ‘[t]he institutions of the Troika are not only trying to destroy Greece; they are trying to destroy us all’. Blockupy (2015d) declared that solidary with the people of Greece was not only an obligation, but ‘in our common interest: the interest of all of us who all over Europe struggle against the logics of austerity and fight to improve their working and living conditions’. Although less prominent than appeals to transnational interests, there are also explicit attempts to incorporate issue-focused movements under the anti-austerity umbrella. An Alter Summit activist from ETUC, for example, stated: ‘We at the Alter Summit are convinced that we must focus on acting in concert with other social groups, since the enemies of workers’ rights in Europe likewise menace the freedom of youth, women’s and migrant’s rights and food security’ (Alter Summit 2015b). Similarly, in their call for a week of action in support of Greece from 20–26 of June 2015, Alter Summit claimed: ‘Far from being separate matters, debt, Greece, climate, and austerity fall on one side of a clear line: the interest of the people against those of the banks and the multinationals’ (Alter Summit 2015f). It is also relevant to note that the transnational activists involved in Blockupy and Alter Summit often refer to recent mobilisations and perceived successes in other countries in a discursive move designed to highlight a common enterprise. There are, for instance, frequent mentions of the fifteen million mobilisations in Spain and expressions of hope in the positions of the Greek party, Syriza and the Spanish party, Podemos as bearers of movement aims (e.g. Blockupy 2015a).

Conclusion Analysing the manifestos, declarations, announcements of events and websites of three movements, namely ETUC, Alter Summit and Blockupy, we examined how transnational movements and organisations have expressed Eurosceptic sentiments in the context of the ESD crisis. They develop two main forms of action at the transnational level. The first is the joint mobilisation of organisations and networks from different countries against a common EU target, such as EU institutions or policies, and corresponds to ‘vertical’ scale shift. The second main form of action is more decentralised in form and involves groups from various countries targeting authorities at multiple territorial levels at the same time and with common slogans and corresponds to ‘horizontal’ scale shift. In both forms of action, all three social movements and organisations articulate critiques against the existing European project, management of the crisis by the European institutions and austerity policies. Nevertheless, they do not express a hard Eurosceptic critique such as suggesting the dismantling of the EU. Instead, as our analysis shows, the critique against the EU presents three characteristics: First

Transnational mobilisation and critical Europeanism  93 principled Euroscepticism, namely, critiques against the financial institutions, EU economic governance and EU neo-liberal or market-oriented policies, which is of particular importance for Alter Summit and Blockupy. Second, utility Euroscepticism, or arguments about losses incurred by EU austerity measures, in terms of jobs and other public goods, particularly on young Europeans, is apparent in all three cases. Third, sovereignty Euroscepticism, namely, arguments about the role of non-elected institutions in the management of the crisis, and by extension, of the financial institutions. This type of claim is much weaker than the two other kinds of Eurosceptical claims. Calls for ‘solidarity’ among the people of Europe, among the generations and the severely affected is emphasised more in the framing of claims. Moreover, our research supports the conceptualisation of transnational interaction as a dynamic process of exchange rather than one of passive imitation, particularly apparent in evidence of frame bridging. Instead of focusing on national claims and cultural differences in their claims, the movements and organisations employ frame bridging, which allows them to focus on transnational collaboration and coalition building against common targets, namely the EU institutions and policies. Analysis of the way claims have been framed provides insights into the importance of broad aspects of democracy, equality, economic growth and solidarity, which become common claims irrespective of territorial or national background or cultural differences.

Notes 1 Frame refers to the way social movements articulate their arguments of contention through symbols, slogans that signal the movements’ intentions, guide actions and are interpreted both by movements’ participants and the society. 2 These manifestos are usually formulated in relation to public demonstrations, gatherings and other forms of contestation. 3 All data for Alter Summit and Blockupy were taken from its webpages between 19 August 2015 and 1 September 2015, while data on ETUC was taken from the website and wide online searches conducted between 4 December 2014 and 20 September 2015. 4 Tarrow (2005) suggests three more processes that concentrate more on the domestic ground while the international level source is the indirect target, namely global framing (mobilization of international symbols is used in order to frame domestic conflicts); internalization (migration of international pressures and conflicts into domestic politics) and externalization (vertical projection of domestic claims onto international institutions or foreign actors). Due to their focus on the domestic aspects, they are not included in our study of the transnational mobilization.

Bibliography Alter Summit (2013) ‘A people’s manifesto’ [online]. Available at: www.altersummit.eu/ manifeste/article/the-manifesto [Accessed 18 September 2015]. Alter Summit (2014a) ‘People of Europe against the looting of multinationals’ [online]. Available at: www.altersummit.eu/communiques/article/people-of-europe-against-the? lang=en [Accessed 1 March 2016].

94  Sevasti Chatzopoulou and Angela Bourne Alter Summit (2014b) ‘Europe: Not only elections, but actions for solidarity and democracy from below!’ [online]. Available at: www.altersummit.eu/accueil/article/­internationalblockupy-coalition?lang=en [Accessed 1 March 2016]. Alter Summit (2014c) ‘International support for the general strike in Belgium’ [online]. Available at: www.altersummit.eu/accueil/article/international-support-for-the?lang=en [Accessed 1 March 2016]. Alter Summit (2014d) ‘Alter Summit call to support the Marches for Dignity in Spain’[online]. Available at: www.altersummit.eu/accueil/article/alter-summit-call-to-support-the? lang=en [Accessed 1 March 2016]. Alter Summit (2015a) ‘After the night of shame, we must and will fight together for another Europe’ [online]. Available at: www.altersummit.eu/accueil/article/after-the-night-ofshame-we-must?lang=en [Accessed 1 March 2016]. Alter Summit (2015b) ‘Rally of the European Trade Union Confederation’ [online]. Available at: www.altersummit.eu/accueil/article/rally-of-the-european-trade-union?lang=en [Accessed 1 March 2016]. Alter Summit (2015c) ‘Support to the Greek people’ [online]. Available at: www.altersummit. eu/accueil/article/support-to-the-greek-people?lang=en [Accessed 1 March 2016]. Alter Summit (2015d) ‘Everyone in Brussels on December 19!’ [online]. Available at: www.altersummit.eu/accueil/article/call-everyone-in-brussels-on?lang=en [Accessed 1 March 2016]. Alter Summit (2015e) ‘Petition: No to austerity! Yes to democracy!’ [online]. Available at: www.altersummit.eu/accueil/article/no-to-austerity-yes-to-democracy?lang=en [Accessed 1 March 2016]. Alter Summit (2015f) ‘The hour of truth for Europe’ [online]. Available at: www.altersummit. eu/accueil/article/the-hour-of-truth-for-europe?lang=en [Accessed 1 March 2016]. Blockupy (nd) ‘What is Blockupy?’ [online]. Available at: http://blockupy.org/en/category/ international-en/ [Accessed 1 March 2016]. Blockupy (2014) ‘#talk #dance #act – Come down from the balcony! Frankfurt Blockupy Festival November 20–23, 2014’ [online]. Available at: http://blockupy.org/ en/3900/talk-dance-act-come-down-from-the-balcony-frankfurt-blockupy-festival-­ november-20–23–2014/ [Accessed 1 March 2016]. Blockupy (2015a) ‘Our time to act has come! Transnational actions against the European Central Bank’s opening: March 18th 2015 in Frankfurt’ [online]. Available at: http://­blockupy. org/en/5098/our-time-to-act-has-come-transnational-actions-against-the-­europeancentral-banks-opening-march-18th-2015-in-frankfurt/ [Accessed 1 March 2016]. Blockupy (2015b) ‘Follow the strikers – against austerity, let’s strike the ECB’ [online]. Available at: http://blockupy.org/en/5581/follow-the-strikers-against-austerity-letsstrike-the-ecb/ [Accessed 1 March 2016]. Blockupy (2015c) ‘Time to act is now!/Activists from many countries will protest against ECB in Frankfurt’ [online]. Available at: http://blockupy.org/en/5761/internationalpress-release-time-to-act-is-now-activists-from-many-countries-will-protest-againstecb-in-frankfurt/ [Accessed 1 March 2016]. Blockupy (2015d) ‘Let’s Raise our European Oxi!’ [online]. Available at: http://blockupy. org/en/6174/lets-raise-our-european-oxi-from-athens-to-brussels-and-berlin-our-no-iseverywhere-in-the-squares/ [Accessed 1 March 2016]. Bourne A. and Chatzopoulou, S. (2015a) ‘Social movements and the construction of crisis actors: Collective responsibility, Identity and Governance’, International Journal of Public Administration 38(12), pp. 874–883. Bourne, A. and Chatzopoulou, S. (2015b) ‘Europeanization and social movement mobilization during the European sovereign debt crisis’, Recerca, Revista de Pensament i Anàlisi 17, pp. 33–60. Castells, M. (2012) Networks of Outrage and Hope, Cambridge: Polity Press. della Porta D. (2015) ‘A 12 step guide to the EU’s crisis of political responsibility’, Open Democracy [online]. Available at: www.opendemocracy net/can-europe-make-it/donatella-

Transnational mobilisation and critical Europeanism  95 della-porta/12-step-guide-to-european-union%E2%80%99s-crisis-of-­political-respo [Accessed 1 March 2016]. della Porta, D. and Caiani, M. (2009) Social Movements and Europeanization, Oxford: Oxford University Press. della Porta, D and Mattoni, A. (eds. 2014) Spreading Protest, Colchester: ECPR Press. della Porta, D. and Tarrow, S. (2005) Transnational Protest and Global Activism, Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield. Diani M. and Kousis, M. (2014) ‘The duality of claims and events: The Greek campaign against the Troika’s memoranda and austerity, 2010–2012’, Mobilization: An International Quarterly 19(4), pp. 387–404. ETUC (2011) ‘9th April 2011 Budapest: Euro-demonstration “No to Austerity - For Social Europe, for Fair Pay and for Jobs”’ [online]. Available at: www.etuc.org/9th-april-2011budapest-euro-demonstration-no-austerity-social-europe-fair-pay-and-jobs [Accessed 1 March 2016]. ETUC (2012) ‘14 November 2012: European Day of Action and Solidarity’ [online]. Available at: www.etuc.org/14-november-2012-european-day-action-and-solidarity [Accessed 1 March 2016]. ETUC (2013) ‘ETUC launches bold investment plan for a new Europe’ [online]. Available at: www.etuc.org/press/etuc-launches-bold-investment-plan-new-europe#.VtWXzvmLS71 [Accessed 1 March 2016]. ETUC (2015) ‘Paris Manifesto - Stand up in solidarity for quality jobs, workers’ rights and a fair society in Europe’ [online]. Available at: www.etuc.org/documents/parismanifesto-­stand-solidarity-quality-jobs-workers%E2%80%99-rights-and-fair-societyeurope#.VtWJwfmLS70 [Accessed 1 March 2016]. Flesher Forminaya, C. (2014) Social Movements and Globalisation, London: Palgrave Macmillan. Flesher Forminaya, C. (2015) ‘Cultural barriers to activist networking: Habitus (in)action in three European transnational encounters’, Antipode 48(1), pp. 151–171. Flesher Forminaya, C. and Cox, L. (2013) Understanding European Movements, London: Routledge. Imig, D. and Tarrow, S. (2000) ‘Political contention in a Europeanising polity’, West European Politics 23(4), pp. 73–93. Keck M. E. and Sikkink, K. (1998) Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Koopmans, R. and Statham, P. (1999) ‘Political claims analysis: Integrating protest event and political discourse analysis’, Mobilisation 4(1), pp. 203–221. Koopmans, R. and Statham, P. (eds. 2010) The making of a European public sphere: Media discourse and political contention, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kousis, M. (2014) ‘The Transnational Dimension of the Greek Protest Campaign against Troika Memoranda and Austerity Policies, 2010–12’, in D. della Porta and A. Mattoni (eds) Spreading Protest: Social Movements in Times of Crisis, Colchester: ECPR Press, pp. 137–170. Leconte, C. (2010) Understanding Euroscepticism, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Reising K. (1999) ‘United in opposition? A cross-national time-series analysis of European protest in three selected countries, 1980–1995’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 43(3), pp. 317–342. Roos J. E. and Oikonomakis, L. (2014) ‘They Don’t Represent Us! The Global Resonance of the Real Democracy Movement from the Indignados to Occupy’, in D. della Porta and A. Mattoni (eds) Spreading Protest Social Movements in Times of Crisis, Colchester: ECPR Press, pp. 117–136. Rucht, D. (2002) ‘The EU as a Target of Political Mobilisation: Is there a Europeanization of Conflict?’, in R. Balme, D. Chabanet and V. Wright (eds) L’action Collective en Europe, Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, pp. 110–137. Ruiz, J. A. and Egea de Haro, A. (2011) ‘Spain: Euroscepticism in a pro-European country’, South European Politics and Society 16(1), pp. 105–131.

96  Sevasti Chatzopoulou and Angela Bourne Serricchio F., Tsakatika, M. and Quaglia, L. (2013) ‘Euroscepticism and the Global Financial Crisis’, Journal of Common Market Studies 51(1), pp. 51–64. Sørensen C. (2008) ‘Love me, love me not … A typology of public Euroscepticism’, SEI Working Paper 101, Brighton: University of Sussex. Tarrow, S. (1995) ‘The Europeanization of conflict: Reflections from a social movement perspective’, West European Politics 18(2), pp. 223–251. Tarrow S. (2005) The New Transnational Activism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tejerina, B., Perugorria, I., Benski, T. and Langman, L. (2013) ‘From indignation to occupation: A new wave of global mobilization’, Current Sociology 61(4), pp. 377–392. Traynor I. (2010) Workers rally across Europe to protest against cuts, The Guardian [online]. Available at: www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/29/workers-europe-protest-cuts [Accessed 1 March 2016]. Usherwood, S. and Startin, N. (2013) ‘Euroscepticism as a permanent phenomenon’, Journal of Common Market Studies 51(1), pp. 1–16. Vasilopoulou, S. (2013) ‘Continuity and change in the study of Euroscepticism: Plus ça change?’ Journal of Common Market Studies 51(1), pp. 153–168. Wearden G. (2012) ‘Europe’s day of anti-austerity strikes and protests turn violent – as it happened’, The Guardian [online]. Available at:www.theguardian.com/business/2012/ nov/14/eurozone-crisis-general-strikes-protest-day-of-action [Accessed 1 March 2016]. Worth, O. (2013) Resistance in the Age of Austerity, London: Zed Books.

7 ‘Stop TTIP’ Towards a transnational Eurosceptic opposing the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership? Dan Keith Introduction In 2013 US President Barack Obama, European Council President Herman Van Rompuy and European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso announced discussions on a range of bilateral trade and investment issues. The subsequent negotiations between the two trade blocs developed the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). This sought to lower barriers to trade through removing obstacles to market access issues (including tariffs, investment protection and public procurement), and non-tariff barriers (including intellectual property rights, environment and labour market laws) to promote competitiveness across borders. Advocates of TTIP claimed that linking United States (US) and European Union (EU) markets would create the largest free trade zone in the world and help the EU to respond to the 2008 economic crisis through promoting growth 0.5 per cent growth in gross domestic product (GDP) (see Hugg and Wilkinson 2015). TTIP was soon criticised by a number of writers and emergent campaign groups, and, most notably the group Stop TTIP, as trade policy gained salience in Eurosceptic campaigns.1 This chapter contributes to filling important gaps in our knowledge of Stop TTIP, a group that has been largely overlooked by political scientists (though not economists, legal scholars or activists including Bauer 2014, 2015a, 2015b; Hiliary 2015; Hugg and Wilkinson 2015; and Schneider 2015). Through analysing Stop TTIP the chapter also contributes to both the emerging literature on the transnational links of Radical Left Parties (RLPs; see Chapter 5; Dunphy 2004; March 2011; 2012; 2015; Dunphy and March 2013; Holmes and Lightfoot 2016) and those of Green parties (Bomberg 1999; Dietz 2000, Qingzhi 2009). Scholars have made inroads to studying how RLPs and Green parties have opposed austerity (March 2012; 2015). More concretely, RLPs have been found to have taken a ‘turn towards civil society’ and movements through participating in protests against austerity (Tsakatika and Lisi 2013: 16). This chapter shows that opposition to TTIP and the current direction of European trade policies has also provided opportunities for these parties to launch new links with social movements and civil society organisations at both the national and transnational level. For parties and groups opposed to neo-liberalism, opposition to TTIP plays an

98  Dan Keith increasingly important role in campaigns and alongside opposition to austerity measures. Through analysing Stop TTIP, this chapter offers support for Usherwood’s claim in Chapter 2 that Eurosceptics are increasingly contesting European integration on a pan-European level rather than simply working in the national/­domestic sphere. The emergence of Stop TTIP as a transnational Eurosceptic group is analysed through drawing on the framework outlined by Usherwood. It begins by analysing the role of ideology in shaping the criticisms made of TTIP by the Stop TTIP group. It shows how Stop TTIP has brought together broadly ideologically connected groups from different member states in common protests and campaigns to criticise EU policy making. Second, by analysing the anti-TTIP movement, this chapter finds support for Usherwood’s argument that transnational Eurosceptic movements seek to respond to events that take place through processes of European integration. It gives evidence to support the idea that these movements increasingly seek to work through the institutions and policy-making channels of the EU. These opportunity structures have helped Stop TTIP to have some success in slowing negotiations on TTIP and in politicising EU trade policy. However, the third section of this chapter shows that Stop TTIP has faced several weaknesses that have limited its impact and that there are major obstacles to developing Stop TTIP as a genuinely transnational organisation. In particular the ideological divisions between those opposed to TTIP are apparent and it is not surprising that Stop TTIP has struggled to advocate a clear alternative to TTIP. Moreover, Stop TTIP is shown to have struggled to expand its support beyond those that are broadly placed on the ‘left’ to engage with other Eurosceptic parties or groups from the radical right.

Ideology and opposition to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Opposition to TTIP has come from a range of political organisations and groups, however, surveying the membership of Stop TTIP (which includes 522 ­organisations – some of which are shown in Table 7.1) shows that most of its affiliated organisations subscribe to radical left or Green politics. It includes the left and Green transnational political parties and groups in the European Parliament and the transnational Transform! Network (a network of twenty-eight European radical left research groups) that has been active in publicising Stop TTIP campaigns (Transform! 2014). The members of Stop TTIP include environmental campaign organisations, groups campaigning against neo-liberalism or connected to the global justice movement, and around thirty political parties (mostly RLPs, Green and Pirate parties). It is clear that ideology has played a significant role in shaping this transnational campaign group when only two supporting parties, the regionalist party from Germany, Bayernpartei and the liberal Civic List from Slovenia, come from beyond the left or Green party families (see March and Mudde 2005). The dominance of left and Green activists within Stop TTIP was apparent early on. Bauer (2015b) traces the emergence of the anti-TTIP movement to Germany

Table 7.1  Membership of Stop TTIP in 2016 Type of Group

Members of Stop TTIP

Anti-racism groups Anti-austerity groups Anti- neo-liberalism campaign groups/global justice movement Consumer groups Cultural groups Development organisations

Afrika Kontakt (Denmark) No Austerity Coordinamento (Italy) ATTAC, Europe Reunited, Red Aldaaba

Digital rights groups Direct democracy campaign groups Environmental campaign organisations

Fair trade campaign groups Farmers Green entrepreneurs Green parties

Marxist groups Party groups in the European Parliament Peace organisations Pirate parties Public sector unions Radical Left Parties (RLP)

Movimento Consumatori (Italy) Artists against TTIP (UK) Action Solidarité Tiers Monde (ASTM)(Luxemburg), Avaaz (United States) Digitale Gesellschaft (Germany) Movement for Direct Democracy (Czech Republic) Greenpeace (Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain, Germany, Belgium), Friends of the Earth (UK), Independent Ecological Alliance, Green Institute (Greece), Green Window (Croatia), Keep Ireland Fracking Free, Institute for Sustainable Development (Slovenia), Not for Shale (Ireland) Weltladen-Dachverband, Forum Fairer Handel (Germany) Bundesverband Deutscher Milchviehhalter BDM e.V. (Germany) Unternehmensgrün (Germany) Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen (Germany), Fis Nua (Ireland), Initiative for Catalonia Greens, Green Party England and Wales, Equo (Spain), Europe Ecologie les Verts (France), Lehet Más a Politika (Hungary), Lithuanian Peasant and Greens Union, Partia Zieloni (Poland), Ecologist Greens (Greece), Bulgarian Zelenite (The Greens) Marx Károly Társaság (Hungary), Marxistische linke e.V. (Germany) Confederal Group of the European United Left, Nordic Green Left, Greens/European Free Alliance Group in the European Parliament Kooperation für den Frieden (Germany) Pirate parties include those in Germany, Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Greece, Slovenia Teachers’ Union of Ireland (TUI), Unite (UK), Bavarian Teacher Association (BLLV) (Germany), National Union of Teachers (UK) Left Party (Hungary), Die Linke (Germany), United Left Slovenia (Društvo gibanje TRS), Estonian United Left Party, Workers’ Party of Hungary, Initiative for Democratic Socialism (Slovenia), Izquierda Unida and Podemos (Spain), Radnička fronta (Workers’ Front in Croatia), Enhedslisten (Denmark) (Continued)

100  Dan Keith Type of Group

Members of Stop TTIP

Social reform/human rights groups

Uplift (Ireland), Associação de Combate à Precariedade – Precários Inflexíveis (Portugal), Action Freedom Not Fear (Germany) Arge Schöpfungsverantwortung) (Austria)

Spiritual and religious groups Transnational parties Wider reform of EU institutions

Party of the European Left and the European Green Party Maison du Peuple d‘Europe (Belgium)

Note: this is a selection of the 522 members of Stop TTIP. For a full list see: https://stop-ttip.org/ wp-content/uploads/2015/12/ECI-Partner-List_15_12_18.pdf [Accessed 18 March 2016].

where activists from the Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions and Citizen’s Council (ATTAC) formed an anti-TTIP group that attracted support from anti-globalisation, environmental activists and civil rights campaign groups in campaigns on social media. The formation of Stop TTIP offers support to the argument that ‘pan-European groups are likely to have been formed by pre-­ existing national groups coming together to make some kind of common cause’ (Usherwood Chapter 2 this book). While a small number of new national-level anti-TTIP campaigns were established, most of these were instigated by campaign groups that existed before 2013 (this includes national-level Stop TTIP organisations in Italy and the UK). Stop TTIP has made three main criticisms of TTIP (Hugg and Wilkinson 2015: 169). Foremost amongst these has been criticism of the Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS). It is argued that ISDS will allow investors to sue states if their actions harm corporate profits. Stop TTIP has claimed that this process would take place through hearings held behind closed doors and would erode the power of democratically elected governments to enact new social policies, environmental regulations and legislation to protect consumers. Consequently, Stop TTIP has argued that TTIP will ‘increase the power of multinationals at the expense of democracy and the general good’ and will mean that companies are included in the policy-making process (Stop TTIP 2016b). Second, Stop TTIP has criticised what it sees as a lack of transparency in the preparatory phase for designing TTIP. It argues that this was subject to excessive lobbying from business and provided little role for consumer groups and trade unions, while negotiations between the US and the EU were conducted in secret, giving little opportunity to campaign for amendments to the agreement (Stop TTIP 2016b). Third, Stop TTIP has argued that a range of negative outcomes will occur from TTIP. These include job losses and the erosion of existing consumer protection and environmental regulations. TTIP is presented as a backdoor to the privatisation of utilities, hospitals and waste collection as well as introducing new risky technologies such as fracking and genetically modified (GM) technology to the EU. Most of the criticisms of TTIP made by Stop TTIP are also found in statements of the Party of the European Left (2015a) and the European Green Party

‘Stop TTIP’  101 (2015). Why do these parties oppose TTIP? Radical Left opposition to TTIP needs to be understood within the broader radical left critique of current processes of European integration for promoting neo-liberalism, imperialism and a democratic deficit (see Dunphy 2004). RLPs have long opposed the ‘Washington Consensus’ of trade liberalisation, marketisation and privatisation, and have shown an increasing propensity to participate in extra-parliamentary protests at anti-G8protests (March 2012: 316). To some, these forms of opposition to globalisation offer potential for the development of a ‘New European Left’ (Hudson 2012: 8). The statements on TTIP made by the Party of the European Left have readily linked the fight against TTIP and austerity to the wider struggle against neo-­ liberalism and the economic elite (Party of the European Left 2015a). Moreover, in Germany, the main RLP Die Linke views TTIP as the ‘economic NATO’ (Transform! 2015a: 52), while Rosa Luxemburg Foundation publications argue that TTIP is an attempt to stop the growth of the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) economies (Dolan 2014: 4); an ‘attack on jobs’, and assert that the European Commission did not publicise findings from impact assessments that pointed to the loss of one million jobs as a result of a TTIP deal and the growing number of legal (Hiliary 2014; 2015). Statements by Pierre Laurent, the President of Party of the European Left, highlight the concern from the left regarding the process that has surrounded the TTIP negotiations: … negotiated in secret, with no transparency, even for the MEPs, who do not have access to any information. More free competition and liberalization of services, privatization of public services, reductions of European social standards, arbitrary courts … These treaties will cause significant impact on the quality of life of the European peoples, while neither them or their representatives was consulted. These treaties are decided against the peoples. (Party of the European Left 2015b) The European Left–Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) group in the European Parliament makes similar criticisms and rejects TTIP because it argues that it is underpinned by a neo-liberal model of economic and trade policy (GUE 2015: 10). In response, GUE funded research by the Austrian Foundation for Development Research to scrutinise the impact of TTIP. The report concluded that there were serious methodological weaknesses in impact studies by the supporters of TTIP and that these understated the social and environmental costs of TTIP. Subsequently, this report has been publicised by the Greens in the European Parliament on their ‘Beware what lies beneath?’ website to publicise how TTIP highlighting that information is spreading between the groups involved in Stop TTIP.2 The Greens have generally been seen to be more in of favour European integration than RLPs because it is a route to promoting environmental regulation (see Hoogh et al. 2002, March 2015). However, these parties can be considered to be soft Eurosceptics because they reject the current direction of European integration. Moreover, the European Green Group in the European Parliament has criticised TTIP for eroding European regulations on health, food, labour rights and

102  Dan Keith environmental standards (European Green Party 2014b). Moreover, TTIP is again criticised for promoting excessive corporate rights as well as the secretive nature of negotiations (European Green Party 2014c). TTIP also undermines Green ideas of grassroots democratic and deliberative decision making (these are also ideas promoted by many RLPs with many being seen as part of the New Left (Gomez et al. 2016, March 2012)). The European Green Party also shares concerns over the role of lobbying from business in TTIP negotiations (European Green Party 2014d). March (2015: 18) finds that the European Greens have increasingly criticised neo-liberalism in their manifestos for European elections since 2004. However, while they echo many of the criticisms made of TTIP by the Party of the European Left, (for whom neo-liberalism is frequently a proxy for anti-capitalism) it is noticeable that the European Green Party manifesto opposes ‘TTIP in its current form’ and does not explicitly link it to a concept of ‘neo-liberalism’ rather than the more outright rejection presented by Party of the European Left (European Green Party 2014a: 31). The Greens appear to be more willing to seek alternative versions of TTIP, as highlighted by the potential they saw for a version of TTIP that might restrict fossil fuel subsidies in order to further their environmental policy goals (Greens in the European Parliament EFA 2014).

Exogenous factors: institutional opportunities and events Stop TTIP has sought to engage with EU institutions rather than simply ignore them. It has also adapted its strategies in response to unfolding at the European level and to focus its efforts to operate within European institutions. This can be seen in the campaign that Stop TTIP groups launched in response to the European Commission’s 2014 public consultation from March to July 2014 on the ISDS. This process took place through online questionnaires aimed at gauging the opinions of ordinary citizens, civil society groups and organised interests on TTIP. Research found that the forceful Internet campaigns of members of Stop TTIP (including Friends of the Earth) meant that the consultation received a far greater number of replies than similar consultations on the quality of drinking water or biodiversity in 2014 (Bauer 2015b: 126). Stop TTIP also sought to engage EU mechanisms for direct democracy through applying for a European Citizens’ Initiative on TTIP. The Citizens Initiative enables EU citizens to petition the Commission for a review of a policy and to hold a hearing in the European Parliament. Activists saw this is seen as the ‘only channel of direct accountability within the institutions of the EU’ (Hiliary 2015: 8). The application for a Citizen’s Initiative was, however, rejected by the European Commission in September 2014 on the basis that a European Citizen’s Initiative cannot be lodged to stop negotiations that are still in progress. Subsequently, Stop TTIP filed a lawsuit at the European Court of Justice challenging the legality of the European Commission’s decision (Hiliary 2014: 9). Stop TTIP also launched an EU-wide online petition which it called a ‘self-organised Citizens Initiative’ in the form of a petition to Stop TTIP negotiations, which by January 2016 had received over 3.28 million signatures.

‘Stop TTIP’  103 The anti-TTIP movement initially focused its attention on campaigning through the Internet and spread anti-TTIP information through paid Google advertisements, Facebook and Twitter, and member organisations’ websites and mailing lists (Bauer 2014). However, Stop TTIP has also shown impressive capacity for mobilising large numbers of protesters. This is particularly apparent in Germany where Stop TTIP claims that 250,000 protesters participated in the October 2015 European Days of Action in Berlin (Stop TTIP 2016a). Stop TTIP actions have been held to coincide with the actions of key institutions and unfolding events during the negotiation process for TTIP. This is demonstrated in several ways, first, Stop TTIP mobilised protests across Europe in ‘European Days of Action against TTIP’ in cities with thousands of protesters participating in Paris, Berlin and Helsinki during the 2014 campaign for the elections to the European Parliament. Second, the anti-TTIP movement has held protests at European institutions. For example, protests in Brussels at the European Business Summit meeting of European business and political leaders led to the arrest of 250 demonstrators; Green Members of European Parliament (MEPs) also protested at the March 2014 EU–US Summit (European Green Party 2014e). Moreover, Stop TTIP’s ‘Global Days of Action Against TTIP’ in April 2015 saw it coordinate 700 protests in ­forty-six countries, with the main focus being on Brussels where Stop TTIP mobilised a protest attended alongside over 300 organisations (Transform! 2015b). Moreover, Stop TTIP has actively targeted its campaigns towards the ­European Parliament. When MEPs were asked to come to a resolution on TTIP in March 2014, Stop TTIP responded by calling for a ‘TTIP Tuesday’ whereby every ­Tuesday its activists would ask MEPs to reject TTIP through Twitter. Further protests were held in Brussels at the beginning of the tenth round of TTIP negotiations in July 2015 as a Day of Action was held to coincide with votes by committees in the European Parliament on resolutions on TTIP and an open letter was sent to MEPs to promote opposition to TTIP. Stop TTIP has also campaigned inside the European Parliament, holding events to discuss TTIP alongside leading figures from GUE/NGL including its Chair Gabbi Zimmer (see, for example, Levy-Abegnoli 2014). This highlights how European institutions provide resources and opportunities that transnational Eurosceptic movements use in developing their activities. Stop TTIP’s attempts to hold a European Citizen’s Initiative and the way that it has engaged in protests at the European Parliament can be understood as being consistent with the wider calls by Greens and RLPs for additional power for European Parliament and more participatory forms of decision making (March 2015, Holmes and Lightfoot 2016). In this way, opposition to TTIP complements the parties’ wider critique of European integration.

Assessing the impact of protests against the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership The impact of Stop TTIP has been evident in several ways. In particular, its engagement with the European Commission’s 2014 public consultation has fuelled

104  Dan Keith debates on whether the EU should reform its deliberative approach to consultation processes. It appears that Stop TTIP groups displayed an unexpected capacity for mass mobilisation (Badouard 2010: 106, Bauer 2015b: 127). The groups involved in Stop TTIP used their resources to present a high number of identical or similar submissions to the consultation through the EU’s easy to use online tools. This has seen scholars criticise the way in which these consultations are too easily hijacked by ideologically motivated groups and how such groups can crowd out space for European citizens to participate or for expert-led fact-based reasoning (Bauer 2015b). Subsequent studies have suggested that as much as 60 per cent of online media coverage from June to November 2014 in Europe can be attributed to anti-TTIP groups, and in Germany, 85 per cent of total online media reporting on all TTIP-related postings in the German online media came from anti-TTIP groups (see Bauer 2015a). This highlights how the EU can encounter difficulties in engaging transnational Eurosceptic movements in the consensus-building ­processes that drive European integration. Stop TTIP may not succeed in its primary aim of preventing TTIP. It is, however, plausible that the Stop TTIP campaign has contributed to slowing the pace of TTIP negotiations. In June 2013, EU member states unanimously asked the Commission to negotiate TTIP and it was intended that TTIP would be agreed upon by the end of 2014 (Schmucker and Braml 2007: 100–103). However, despite intense and regular negotiations, the terms of TTIP remain unresolved and the European Parliament’s Trade Commission delayed decisions on TTIP due to growing opposition in June 2015. Stop TTIP has been at the forefront of publicising criticisms of TTIP and has managed to politicise it. Due to a high level of opposition to TTIP, experts have come to expect that a less ambitious version of TTIP will eventually be agreed on (Hugg and Wilkinson 2015: 146). EU Commissioner De Gucht lamented that the TTIP negotiation ‘is all mixed up with the European Elections … This has now been taken over by … the left side of the political spectrum … Who see TTIP as a topic to be discussed and … beaten in the European elections’ (cited in Hugg and Wilkinson 2015: 219). Attempts made by Stop TTIP to draw attention to a perceived lack of transparency in TTIP negotiations have also had some tangible results. These criticisms forced US and EU authorities onto the back foot, and they responded by setting up websites to provide greater (though not complete) access to information (see Hugg and Wilkinson 2015). In particular, this included the release of a massive amount of information on the website of the European Commission, summaries of EU positions and the procedural status of different areas of the negotiation. Indeed, when the Council of the European Union released its TTIP negotiating mandates on 9 October 2014, the incoming EU Trade Commissioner, Cecilia Malmström, declared that she would be making a ‘fresh start’ in opening up TTIP negotiations to public scrutiny (Hiliary 2015: 8). Researchers have also found evidence to suggest that anti-TTIP campaigns have had an impact on public opinion. In an experimental study, Dür (2015: 25) found that issue framing by anti-TTIP environmental pressure groups in Germany may have had a negative impact on public opinion on TTIP. Moreover, Bauer’s

‘Stop TTIP’  105 analysis of Eurobarometer data concludes that anti-TTIP campaigns in Germany contributed to Germany having the lowest support for TTIP in Europe and to German citizens’ being fourteen times more likely than French citizens to conduct online searches for information on TTIP (2015b: 125). Left-wing activists, including those from the Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung, credit themselves with having raised awareness about TTIP through organising seminars and protests with other anti-TTIP groups (Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung 2014: 5). However, additional survey research is needed to see if the perceived effects of anti-TTIP impacted on public opinion beyond Germany.

Challenges in building a transnational Euroscpetic movement Stop TTIP is best understood as an emerging transnational Eurosceptic movement rather than the finished article. A number of factors contribute to undermining its ability to function as a fully transnational Eurosceptic movement and weaken its chances of success. It is significant that several groups operating within Stop TTIP organise themselves on a transnational basis. These include left and Green transnational parties and groups in the European Parliament as well as anti-­ globalisation groups such as the Seattle to Brussels Network, the environmentalist network End Ecocide, Corporate Europe Observatory and Health Action International Europe. These groups help to provide a transnational infrastructure for Stop TTIP and support the idea that Euroscepticism needs to be viewed from beyond national party politics. However, it is necessary to remember that most of the groups operating within Stop TTIP function largely at the national level. Furthermore, while the 522 organisations that support Stop TTIP come from across Europe (and America), its attempt to develop a genuinely transnational movement remains unfinished when over one-fifth of its supporting organisations originate from Germany. While Stop TTIP seeks to build a movement from grassroots support against TTIP, it has remained dependent on its supporting organisations and foundations for funding. By 2016, 58 per cent (277,000 euros) of the funds it had received came from these sources and this outstripped funding from donations, which contributed 42 per cent of its funds (132,000 euros; Stop TTIP 2016c). It is also noticeable that ideological divisions undermine the anti-TTIP movement. The absence of radical right Eurosceptic parties is particularly noticeable given that some of these parties (including the National Front in France) have also criticised TTIP. Scholars have debated whether the Euroscepticism of parties on the radical left and the radical right share common, nationalist roots (see Halikiopoulou et al. 2012 and Charalambous 2013a). Others have also argued that the ‘growing hostility to the [TTIP] … is uniting far-left and far-right parties’ (Hugg and Wilkinson 2015: 148). However, the membership of Stop TTIP shows little evidence of new connections between radical left and radical right-wing ­Eurosceptics (see Table 7.1). Several groups in Stop TTIP have positions on immigration issues and multiculturalism that seemingly preclude cooperation with the radical right. For

106  Dan Keith example, the website of WeMove.EU campaign group from the UK portrays the French National Front as a shark that seeks to eat migrants (see WeMove. EU 2016). Studies also find that a number of Green and left parties have protested against the growth of the radical right in recent years and generally eschew cooperation with them (Keith and McGowan 2012: 21). The Greens, for example speak of forging broad coalitions against TTIP with ‘civil society organisations from all sectors, with trade unions and, in particular with consumer groups and defenders of democracy’. However, these statements do not mention parties of the right (European Green Party 2014d: 6). In this respect, ideology appears to have played a significant role in structuring membership of Stop TTIP. The large number of organisations that participate within Stop TTIP and their diverse aims (see Table 7.1) present considerable barriers to the development of a deeply ideologically orientated alternative to TTIP. Its policies have been pitched rather vaguely or as Usherwood (in Chapter 2) puts it, ‘much thinner’ than the radical statements of some of its founders (that include Marxists, anti-neo-liberal campaign groups, groups from the global justice movement, peace and environmental campaign organisations). The lack of a clear agenda for European trade policy to rival TTIP has resulted from several tensions. In particular, divisions over the future of European integration are apparent in the campaign groups within Stop TTIP. While some groups such as the French Nouvelle Donne favour institutional integration in the form of a federal Europe, others such as the Newropeans Club call for decentralisation of EU policy making. Stop TTIP has provided radical left and Green parties with new opportunities to work with a range of grassroots initiatives. Some have sought to make ‘a patchwork’ movement of activists on the left (Benatouil 2015). However, Stop TTIP also needs to face the potential tensions which are emerging between the parties and the wider movement. As March notes, RLPs have long struggled to forge links with the global justice movement and divisions between them contributed to several weakening the movement (March 2012: 332). Indeed, some organisations such as ATTAC do not explicitly identify themselves as ‘left’, and seek to lobby the state rather than provoke insurrection, while others seek more radical changes (March 2011: 174). The Stop TTIP movement has provided opportunities for self-identified anarchists to cooperate with left and Green parties at Stop TTIP events (for example, in the UK; Rabble 2015). However, divisions remain and several anarchist groups have also refused to participate in Stop TTIP protests due to a perceived failure by Stop TTIP to call for an end to capitalism and have, instead, resorted to forming their own protests (International of Anarchist Federations 2015). The transnational party organisations of the Greens and radical left also exhibit several weaknesses that undermine their ability to assist in developing the ability of Stop TTIP to function as a transnational organisation. While the European Green Party has moved more to institutionalise itself as a transnational party organisation and Green parties accept a greater level of intervention in their policy making from this transnational organisation, they still find it difficult to implement ‘real transnational actions’ (March 2015: 4).

‘Stop TTIP’  107 Stop TTIP adds support to the idea that hard Eurosceptics with heavily pro-­ sovereignty sentiment – such as the Red–Green Alliance in Denmark – are participating in cross-border campaigns. The members of Stop TTIP also bring important resources and Enhedslisten in Denmark has strong links to wider Eurosceptic movements (see Johansen 2011). Moreover, Stop TTIP includes political parties, which bring experience in running successful campaigns against European integration, and in particular, campaigns against the EU Constitution in the Netherlands (SP) and France (PCF). However, the involvement of RLPs in Stop TTIP brings added obstacles to developing an effective transnational Eurosceptic movement. In particular, divisions exist within the Party of the European Left and GUE group in the European Parliament surrounding the future of European integration. While most RLPs can be considered to be Eurosceptic, they remain divided between hard Eurosceptics seeking a return to national sovereignty and soft Eurosceptics that are more ‘integrationist’, (for example Die Linke and Podemos). These parties seek forms of European federalism to work towards the aim of promoting a social Europe (see Holmes Chapter 5 in this volume; Holmes and Lightfoot 2016; Charalambous 2013b). Such divisions have resulted in a lack of institutionalisation within the Party of the European Left and the GUE group and consequently, these organisations have struggled to set a common agenda (March 2015: 4). Nevertheless, opposition to TTIP is interpreted by some on the left, including Die Linke MEP, Helmut Sholz, as an opportunity for the GUE group to work together as it seeks to develop shared policies in pursuit of a social Europe (speaking at the Rosa Luxemburg-Foundation Conference, Berlin, 6 July 2015). The European Left executive board has also promoted joint actions against TTIP through demanding that its members actively participate in support of the Stop TTIP Citizens Initiative (Party of the European Left 2014). Progress towards meeting these aims, however, remains limited. As Holmes and Lightfoot (2016) argue, while the members of GUE/NGL and the Party of the European Left generally share opposition to TTIP, divisions over the future of European integration mean that they do more to promote opposition to TTIP than to demonstrate that they can develop alternatives. GUE documents remain incredibly vague in specifying alternatives to TTIP and say little beyond putting ‘social justice, democracy, sustainability and gender equality at the heart of any trade deal’ (GUE 2015: 10). These proposals are more underdeveloped than the (still sketchy) alternatives presented by the European Green Party (2014f). ­Divisions between RLPs have also restricted the resources available to Stop TTIP. In particular, the hard Eurosceptic Communist Party of Greece (KKE) has left the GUE/ NGL group and remains outside of Stop TTIP. The KKE rejects TTIP outright and fiercely criticises attempts by Syriza and GUE/NGL to promote motions in the European Parliament and instead aim to ameliorate the worst excesses of TTIP (Communist Party of Greece 2015). Green parties regularly criticise the lack of accountability of EU institutions; however, their Euroscepticism appeared to be weakening through processes of ideological de-radicalisation within the Green Party family (Hoogh et al.

108  Dan Keith 2002:  983). Such developments might have made cooperation with RLPs that are more explicitly Eurosceptic harder and undermined the effectiveness of Stop TTIP. However, publications by the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation research institute of German party Die Linke suggest that Green parties and RLPs have found new ways to cooperate in recent years: ‘The positions set out in the European Green Party’s common manifesto for the 2014 European elections are clearly anchored in the left-wing of the political spectrum, and this provides opportunities for cooperation on a number of issues with the Party of the European Left’ (Weichold 2015: 9). While further research is needed to establish whether Green politicians share the perception that there are now increased opportunities for Red–Green cooperation, analysis of voting patterns in the European Parliament finds substantial overlap in the voting of MEPs from the Greens/European Free Alliance (EFA) and GUE/NGL since the economic crisis. This is made apparent through votes in opposition to austerity and deregulation as well as meetings organised by the two groups alongside social movements in the European Parliament (March 2015). Moreover, it is important to remember that potential divisions within Stop TTIP between Green parties and RLPs may be ameliorated by the number of RLPs that emerged from Green parties or that are explicitly left-libertarian (for example the Danish Red–Green Alliance and Finnish Left Alliance) (see Gomez et al. 2016, March 2012). Historically, when Green parties had offered support to European integration this was often contingent on a belief that the EU could enact environmental regulations at the EU level (Hoogh et al. 2002: 983). Green parties have recently, however, argued that TTIP will erode this ability. Therefore differences in the approaches that RLPs and Green parties take to Euroscepticism may present less of a barrier to cooperation.

Conclusion This chapter showed how opposition to TTIP has provided significant opportunities to develop transnational forms of cooperation between Eurosceptics to campaign against the direction of EU trade policy. The chapter has reviewed the main criticisms levelled at TTIP by those involved in Stop TTIP. Common criticisms surround the role of TTIP in expanding corporate influence over policy making, a lack of transparency, and the erosion of social and environmental regulations. Considerable areas of overlap exist between the goals of the numerous groups involved in Stop TTIP. Ideology has also played a clear role in structuring membership of Stop TTIP which generally consists of those subscribing to radical left and Green politics. Stop TTIP has had a degree of success in politicising TTIP and its impact was felt through several changes in procedure during negotiations on TTIP. This was made possible because Stop TTIP utilised the opportunity structures that were available at European level and focused its efforts at the heart of the system. However, endogenous factors were particularly significant in shaping the ability of Stop TTIP to politicise TTIP. In particular, political parties and transnational

‘Stop TTIP’  109 parties provided finance, campaign structures and access to European institutions including the European Parliament. The chapter also identified a number of endogenous factors that restricted the ability of Stop TTIP to function as a fully transnational movement and identified how ideological differences meant that Stop TTIP has been unable to provide a clear alternative to TTIP. The role of political parties in such transnational Eurosceptic movements is multifaceted. Ultimately the strategies pursued by Stop TTIP (the Citizens Initiative, protests in Brussels and lobbying in the European Parliament) were consistent with the wider approach of the Euroscepticism of the key left and Green parties involved within the Stop TTIP movement. It is also apparent that these parties saw opposition to TTIP as a way to overcome divisions within their own internal or transnational organisations over issues of European integration. Stop TTIP also offered these parties a way to develop new alliances to campaign groups that could provide supporters. These links are also significant when the failure of RLPs to convert support in the electorate into votes has been partly explained as a result of their weak links to movements (see March 2012: 167). This chapter adds support to findings elsewhere in this volume and studies by FitzGibbon (2013) and de Lange and Guerra (2009) that transnational non-party Eurosceptic movements demand greater academic study. More concretely, the links forged between Eurosceptic left and Green parties with campaign groups in transnational protests against austerity remains understudied.

Notes 1 See De Ville and Siles-Brügge (2016) for an excellent analysis of these criticisms. 2 See: http://ttip2016.eu/ [Accessed 18 March 2016].

Bibliography Badouard, P. (2010) ‘Pathways and obstacles to eparticipation at the European level: A  comparative analysis of the European Citizens’ Consultation 2009 and the online consultations of the European Commission’, Journal of eDemocracy, 2(2), pp. 99–110. Bauer, M. (2014) ‘TTIP storytellers and storytelling: Presentation of preliminary findings on online media coverage of TTIP’, Paper presented at the European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE) in Brussels, 19 November 2014. Bauer, M. (2015a) ‘Campaign-triggered mass collaboration in the EU’s online consultations: the ISDS-in-TTIP case’, European View 14(1), pp. 121–129. Bauer, M. (2015b) ‘How anti-TTIP groups dominate online media in Germany’, Atlanticcommunity.org [online]. Available at: www.atlantic-community.org/-/how-anti-ttipgroupsdominate-online-media-in-germany [Accessed 16 September 2015]. Benatouil, M. (2015) ‘Where does the anti-austeritarian European Social Movement Stand?’, Transform Network [online]. Available at: www.transform-network net/en/ blog/blog-2015/news/detail/Blog/-48584d09f0 html [Accessed 1 February 2016]. Bomberg, E. (1999) Green Parties and Politics in the European Union, London: Routledge. Charalambous, G. (2013a) ‘Nationalism, Euroscepticism and the radical left and right: A short response to Halikiopoulou’s, Nanou’s and Vasilopoulou’s 2012 study’, Extremis Project [online]. Available at: http://extremisproject.org/2013/01/nationalism-­ euroscepticism-and-the-radical-left-and-right-a-short-response-to-halikiopoulousnanous-and-vasilopoullous-2012-study-2/ [Accessed 1 February 2016].

110  Dan Keith Charalambous, G. (2013b) European Integration and the Communist Dilemma: Communist Party Responses to Europe in Greece, Cyprus and Italy, Farnham: Ashgate. Communist Party of Greece (2015) Europarliamentary Group of the KKE: The TTIP can not be corrected, it must be rejected by the peoples [online]. Available at: http://fr kke. gr/en/articles/EUROPARLIAMENTARY-GROUP-OF-THE-KKE-The-TTIP-can-notbe-corrected-it-must-be-rejected-by-the-peoples-00001/ [Accessed 1 February 2016]. de Lange, S. and Guerra, S. (2009) ‘The League of Polish Families between East and West, past and present’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies 42(4), pp. 527–549. De Ville, F. and Siles-Brügge, G. (2016) The Truth about the Transatlantic Trade and Investment partnership, Cambridge: Polity. Dietz, T. M. (2000) ‘Similar but different? The European Greens compared to other transnational party federations in Europe’, Party Politics 6(2), pp. 199–210. Dolan, M. (2014) TPP and TTIP: Partners in Crime, New York: Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung. Dunphy, R. (2004) Contesting Capitalism? Left Parties and European Integration. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Dunphy, R. and March, L. (2013) ‘Seven year itch? The European Left Party: Struggling to transform the EU’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society 14(4), pp. 520–537. Dür, A. (2015) ‘Interest group influence on public opinion: A survey experiment on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership’ [online]. Available at: www.researchgate net/ profile/Andreas_Duer/publication/275520617_Interest_group_­influence_on_­public_ opinion_A_survey_experiment_on_the_Transatlantic_Trade_and_Investment_­ Partnership/links/553e49a40cf294deef700385.pdf [Accessed 1 February 2016]. European Green Party (2014a) Change Europe vote Green: Manifesto for European Elections, Brussels: European Green Party. European Green Party (2014b) ‘Greens hold action against TTIP’ [online]. Available at: https://europeangreens.eu/news/greens-hold-action-against-ttip [Accessed 1 February 2016]. European Green Party (2014c) ‘Disarm the secret corporate deals’ [online]. Available at: www.greens-efa.eu/fileadmin/dam/Documents/Publications/TTIP/Disarm_the_secret_ corporate_deals.pdf [Accessed 1 February 2016]. European Green Party (2014d) Position paper ‘TTIP – Too many untrustworthy promises and real risks’ [online]. Available at: https://europeangreens.eu/brussels2014/content/ position-paper-ttip [Accessed 1 February 2016]. European Green Party (2014e) ‘Greens hold action against TTIP’ [online]. Available at: https://europeangreens.eu/news/greens-hold-action-against-ttip [Accessed 1 February 2016]. European Green Party (2014f) ‘Using TTIP to limit fossil fuel subsidies’ [online]. Available at: www.greens-efa.eu/fileadmin/dam/Documents/Studies/Fossil_Fuel_Subsidies_ TTIP__9January2014.pdf [Accessed 1 February 2016]. European Green Party (2015) ‘We are worried about TTIP because …’ [online]. Available at: https://europeangreens.eu/news/we-are-worried-about-ttip-because%E2%80%A6-0 [Accessed 1 February 2016]. FitzGibbon, J. (2013) ‘Citizens against Europe? Civil society and Eurosceptic protest in Ireland, the United Kingdom and Denmark’, Journal of Common Market Studies 51(1), pp. 105–121. Gomez, R., Morales, L. and Ramiro, L. (2016) Varieties of radicalism: Examining the diversity of Radical Left Parties and voters in Western Europe, West European Politics 39(2), pp. 351–379. Greens in the European Parliament EFA (2014) ‘Using the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership to limit fossil fuel subsidies’ [online]. Available at: www.greens-efa. eu/fileadmin/dam/Documents/Studies/Fossil_Fuel_Subsidies_TTIP__9January2014. pdf [Accessed 1 February 2016]. GUE (2015) Stop TTIP Defend Democracy, Brussels: GUE.

‘Stop TTIP’  111 Halikiopoulou, D., Kyriaki N. and Vasilopoulou, S. (2012) ‘The paradox of nationalism: The common denominator of radical right and radical left euroscepticism’, European Journal of Political Research 51(4), pp. 504–539. Hiliary, J. (2014) The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, Brussels: Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung. Hiliary, J. (2015) The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership – Update 2015, Brussels: Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung. Holmes, M. and Lightfoot, S. (2016) ‘Seizing the day? The transnational Radical Left and the crisis’, in L. March and D. Keith (eds) Europe’s Radical Left: From Marginality to Mainstream?, London: Rowman and Littlefield, forthcoming. Hooghe, L., Marks, G. and Wilson, C. J. (2002) ‘Does left/right structure party positions on European integration?’ Comparative Political Studies 35(8), pp. 965–989. Hudson, K. (2012) The New European Left: A Socialism for the Twenty-First Century?, Farnham: Palgrave. Hugg, P. R. and Wilkinson, S. M. (2015) ‘The 2014 European Parliament elections and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: Economics and politics collide’, Journal of Transnational Law & Policy 24, pp. 117–158. International of Anarchist Federations (2015) ‘Anti-capitalist bloc on Stop TTIP demonstration in Prague 13 April 2015’ [online]. Available at: http://i-f-a.org/index.php/ de/zpravy/659-anticapitalist-bloc-on-stop-ttip-demonstration-in-prague [Accessed 1 ­February 2016]. Johansen, I. V. (2011) ‘The Left and Radical Left in Denmark’ in B. Daiber, C. Hildebrant and A. Striethorst (eds) From Revolution to Coalition – Radical Left parties in Europe, Berlin: Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung, pp. 10–25. Keith, D. and McGowan, F. (2014) ‘Radical left parties and immigration issues’, Sussex European Institute Working Paper 132, Brighton: Sussex European Institute. Levy-Abegnoli, J. (2014) ‘Everyone has a good reason to fight TTIP’, The Parliament [online]. Available at: www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/articles/news/everyone-hasgood-reason-fight-ttip [Accessed 1 February 2016]. March, L. (2011), Radical Left Parties in Europe, London: Routledge. March, L. (2012), ‘Problems and perspectives of contemporary European radical left parties: Chasing a lost world or still a world to win?’ International Critical Thought 2(3), pp. 314–339. March, L. (2015) ‘Opposing neo-liberal Europe? The Left TNPs and their Groups in the European Parliament’, Paper presented at the EUSA Fourteenth Biennial Conference, Boston, 6 March 2015. March, L. and Mudde, C. (2005) ‘What’s left of the Radical Left: The European Radical Left after 1989: Decline and mutation’, Comparative European Politics 3(1), pp. 23–49. Party of the European Left (2014) ‘Party of the European Left supports the European Citizen’s Initiative against TTIP and CETA’ [online]. Available at: www.european-left. org/positions/news-archive/party-european-left-supports-european-citizens-­initiativeagainst-ttip-and#sthash.2FMxTCAD.dpuf [Accessed 1 February 2016]. Party of the European Left (2015a) ‘Together for a left alternative in Europe’ [online]. Available at: www.european-left.org/positions/news-archive/together-left-­alternativeeurope#sthash.jV4IXQXe.dpuf [Accessed 1 February 2016]. Party of the European Left (2015b) ‘Letter of Pierre Laurent, EL-President Congratulating the ECI “Stop TTIP and CETA” (3,263,920 signatures!)’ [online]. Available at: www. european-left.org/positions/news-archive/letter-pierre-laurent-el-president-congratulating-eci-stop-ttip-and-ceta#sthash.GaW4wSHh.dpuf [Accessed 1 February 2016]. Qingzhi, H. (2009) ‘The European Green Party as a Euro-party: In the case of the 2009 EP elections’, Chinese Journal of European Studies 6, pp. 59–70. Rabble (2015) ‘5 days of anarchy’ [online]. Available at: http://rabble.org.uk/coming-upthis-week-regeneration-5-days-of-anarchy/ [Accessed 1 February 2016].

112  Dan Keith Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung (2014) ‘Annual Report 2014’ [online]. Available at: www. rosalux.de/fileadmin/rls_uploads/pdfs/stiftung/Annual_Report_2014.pdf [Accessed 1 February 2016]. Schmucker, C. and Braml, J. (2007) Von der TAFTA zum freien Markt: Neue Handelsinitiativen zwischen EU und USA, Internationale Politik March 2007, pp. 100–103. Schneider, M. (2015) ‘Mobilising the masses: A grass-roots communication strategy for TTIP’, European View 14(2), pp. 201–207. Stop TTIP (2016a) ‘About Stop TTIP’ [online]. Available at: https://stop-ttip.org/aboutstop-ttip/ [Accessed 1 February 2016]. Stop TTIP (2016b) ‘What is the problem?’ [online]. Available at: https://stop-ttip.org/whatis-the-problem-ttip-ceta/faqs/ [Accessed 1 February 2016]. Stop TTIP (2016c) ‘How is Stop TTIP funded?’ [online]. Available at: https://stop-ttip.org/ funding/ [Accessed 1 February 2016]. Transform! (2014) ‘Stop TTIP, CETA & TISA’ [online]. Available at www.transform-­ network net/en/blog/blog-2014/news/detail/Blog/-cb3deca78a html [Accessed 1 February 2016]. Transform! (2015a) What Future of the European Union – Stagnation and Polarization or to Fundamental Change?, Hamburg: Transform. Transform! (2015b) ‘EL took to the streets in the global action day against TTIP, CETA and TISA’ [online]. Available at: www.transform-network net/en/blog/blog-2015/news/ detail/Blog/el-took-to-the-streets-in-the-global-action-day-against-ttip-ceta-and-tisa. html [Accessed 1 February 2016]. Tsakatika, M., and Lisi, M. (2013) ‘Zippin’ up my boots, goin’ back to my roots: Radical left parties in Southern Europe’, South European Society and Politics, 18(1), pp. 1–19. Weichold, J. (2015) ‘European Greens: European strategies between eco-social turn and issues of international conflicts’, paper presented at the Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung Conference on European Integration and the left, 5–8 July 2015, Berlin. WeMove.EU (2016) ‘Stand for diversity’ [online]. Available at: https://act.wemove.eu/ campaigns/stand-for-diversity [Accessed 1 February 2016].

8 Transnational Euroscepticism as ideational solidarity? The ‘No’ campaign in the Irish referendums on the Lisbon Treaty John FitzGibbon Opening: leprechauns in the European Parliament On the 24 of June 2008 members of the Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) group in the European Parliament (EP) held a protest in the chamber during the Parliament’s debate on the rejection of the Lisbon Treaty at a referendum held on 12 June. Wearing sweaters emblazoned with ‘Respect the Irish Vote’ and holdings signs with ‘Respect the Irish No’, some wore plastic Leprechaun costumes as they called on the Parliament and the European Union (EU) leadership writ large to scrap the Lisbon Treaty. Their rationale for ending the Lisbon Treaty was that the Irish people had voted No and so their democratic verdict needed to be respected. Moreover, they argued, had other member states held a referendum (Ireland was the only member state to do so) then the Treaty would have been decisively defeated (Farage 2009). This protest was dismissed by the European political mainstream as populist pandering and by an Irish Member of European Parliament (MEP) as ‘little ­Britain at its worst’ (Murphy 2011). Though the optics of the protest by the EFD and some independent MEPs might not have been carefully thought through, their basic argument was an important one in the evolution of pan-European Euroscepticism. Ostensibly from their ideology of nationalism they should have argued that it was a matter for the Irish Government to represent the wishes of the Irish people after the No vote. Instead they argued that not only the Irish people were being denied their voice by the Irish Government and the EU institutions, but that all European citizens should have a voice on the Lisbon Treaty through the medium of a referendum. Far from being solely focused on the national political arena, Eurosceptics in the EP – when referring to the Lisbon Treaty – made a specific call for the sovereignty of the European people as a whole to be respected over the positions of member state governments (Farage 2009). Quite how this was to be balanced out between the sovereignty of individual member state governments to represent on behalf of their people was never specifically articulated. The decision to protest Lisbon and to become involved in the second referendum campaign that took place the following year was made at the highest levels in the EFD (interview with Towler 2011). While other Eurosceptic actors from across Europe also became involved in the debate, at the invitation of No

114  John FitzGibbon campaigners from the first referendum, the EFD decided to intricate themselves in the referendum campaign. Then EFD Vice-Chair Morten Messerschmidt of the Danish People’s Party (DPP) spent five days campaigning around the country, while United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) leader Nigel Farage made several appearances on national radio and gave interviews to national newspapers (Cullen 2009). From a political perspective the involvement of the EFD and other non-Irish Eurosceptics in the Lisbon Treaty referendum campaigns was perfectly logical. It represented a rare opportunity to halt the process of European integration and raise their profile for doing so. Moreover, the holding of a second referendum on the same Treaty with no substantive changes exemplified their arguments of the total lack of democratic accountability in the EU (Farage 2009). From an ideological perspective, however, the rationale was counter-intuitive. Such decisions should ostensibly have been the sole preserve of actors from Irish politics and society. Non-nationals entering into the debate would be the equivalent of EU leaders telling citizens how to vote in national referendums, something which is deeply frowned upon by national political leaders. Indeed, then Commission President José Manuel Barroso paid only a fleeting visit to the country between the referendums and limited his comments to the necessity for a free and fair debate on the substance of the Treaty (Smyth 2009). So why then did outsider Eurosceptics involve themselves in the Irish Lisbon referendums? Why did the EFD – and other more left-wing Eurosceptics – group intervene directly in a specifically national political event? This chapter makes the argument that the concept of ‘ideational solidarity’1 played an important role in these strategic decisions by Eurosceptics to take an active transnational perspective in their contestation of European integration. By using the example of the ­Lisbon Treaty referendum campaigns in Ireland it illustrates how the specific character of Transnational Scepticism informed this pursuit of ideational solidarity.2 First, it shows how the unique political opportunity of a referendum places an emphasis on ‘the people’ in Euroscepticism over national institutions. Second, in looking at the first and second No referendum campaigns to the Lisbon Treaty it shows how both Irish Eurosceptics and those from other European states used the Eurosceptic actions and rhetoric of others to justify their own Euroscepticism as non-nationalist. Finally, the chapter argues that by pursuing a strategy of ideational solidarity, Eurosceptics are themselves participating in a form of pan-­ European cooperation. Other chapters in this volume detail the many factors driving such cooperation. This chapter seeks to add the specific example of the Lisbon Treaty referendum campaigns in Ireland of how Euroscepticism is increasingly becoming the politics of transnational cooperation between those that oppose European integration.

Ireland and European Union-related referendums That Ireland should have been the centre of one of the first explicit and concrete forms of Transnational Scepticism is ironic, in that Ireland was, and remains, one of the most pro-European of all member states. Eurobarometer (2015) data shows

Transnational Euroscepticism  115 Irish citizens to be strongly positive towards the benefits of EU membership for Ireland. Some 57 per cent of Irish citizens hold a positive view of the EU against a 41 per cent average across the EU28 members. Moreover, at the time of the referendums in 2008 and 2009 only seven out of the 160 members of the Irish Parliament, the Dáil, could be labelled as Eurosceptic (FitzGibbon 2010). What made Ireland the focus of Transnational Eurosceptic activity was the referendum, and more specifically the political opportunity it offered to both halt the process of European integration and to raise the profile of their anti-EU arguments. Facing a pro-European electorate was not a major issue of concern for Eurosceptics, as the outcome of the Nice I referendum in 2001 showed that Irish voters were more than willing to say No to Europe. Moreover, other factors such as legally guaranteed equal coverage for both sides of the argument in a referendum campaign, and the wider context of the significant increase in opposition to European integration in the mid to late 2000s, paved the way for Transnational Euroscepticism in Ireland. Ireland has had by far the most EU-related referendums amongst the member states, some eight by the time of the second Lisbon referendum in 2008, compared to the next highest, Denmark, who held five in the same time period. Referendums on EU-related issues have been held in Ireland because of a ruling of the Irish Supreme Court case taken by a private citizen, Anthony Coughlan, who went on to become involved in every campaign against EU-related referendums through his National Platform group. The common misconception is that referendums on EU treaties are constitutionally required in Ireland. This is not the case: they are the legacy of the ‘Coughlan’ Judgement and while many pro-European actors have called for this ruling to be challenged on the basis that once the public agreed to the ceding of sovereignty to the then European Economic Community (EEC) in 1973 that principle has not changed, it has become the convention that Ireland holds referendums on EU treaties, regardless of the constitutional need to hold one or not. And so Ireland holds referendums on European integration because of the actions of Eurosceptic activists (FitzGibbon 2013). They succeeded in opening up an access point to the European policy-making structure but it was not until the 2001 Nice I Treaty referendum that they were able to exploit this opportunity. Up until this point EU referendums had passed with a minimum of campaigning from the pro-Treaty side, though with both a declining Yes majority and, more significantly, a decline in turnout (see Table 8.1). Another Supreme Court ruling in 1995, the McKenna Judgement, ordered that the Government could not spend money advocating a specific side in any referendum. Though this ruling was related to the Divorce referendum, its first application was to the Amsterdam Treaty and then the Nice Treaty. Despite the fact that the Nice Treaty was by expert consensus a highly technical compromise to facilitate EU expansion of the Mediterranean and former Communist states (Moberg 2002), Irish Eurosceptics focused their arguments on the threat to Irish neutrality posed by the Treaty. ‘No to NATO: No to Nice’ was the argument of the main Eurosceptic umbrella organisation, the Peace and Neutrality Alliance (PANA).3 With a broad church of civil society actors, political parties and members of mainstream pro-European parties, the PANA mounted a

116  John FitzGibbon Table 8.1  Irish referendums on EU-related issues Referendum

Turnout

%

Accession (1972) Single European Act (1987) Maastricht (1992) Amsterdam (1998) Nice I (2001) Nice II (2002) Lisbon I (2008) Lisbon II (2009) Fiscal Compact (2012)

1,264,278

70.9

1,085,304

Yes

%

No

%

Result

1,041,890

83.1

211,891

16.9

Yes

44.1

755,423

69.9

324,977

30.1

Yes

1,457,219

57.3

1,001,076

69.1

448,655

30.9

Yes

1,543,930

56.2

932,632

61.7

578,070

38.3

Yes

997,826 1,446,588 1,621,037 1,816,098 1,589,204

34.8 49.5 53.1 58 51

453,461 906,317 752,451 1,214,268 955,091

46.1 62.9 46.6 67.1 60.4

529,478 534,887 862,415 594,606 626,907

53.9 37.1 53.4 32.9 39.6

No Yes No Yes Yes

Source: FitzGibbon (2013).

successful campaign that confounded a pro-European mainstream political elite uncertain of how to refute such indirectly relevant arguments or of how to ‘sell’ Nice to the Irish voter (Hayward 2003). The main cause of the No to Nice result was the collapse in voter turnout (see Table 8.1). For the second referendum the political mainstream made sure to mobilise its voters to come to the polls and secure a Yes vote. But the Nice referendum encouraged Eurosceptics in Ireland as it showed that they could defeat the pro-European political establishment. Their mistake was in not anticipating victory, and so when the post-referendum negotiations began they were not in a position to attain the compromises and opt-outs that Danish Eurosceptics had been able to agree after they defeated the first Maastricht Treaty referendum in 1992 (Svensson 1994). The wider effect of the defeat of Nice became apparent with the subsequent defeats of EU-related referendums in France, the Netherlands and Sweden. The combination of these rejections of the EU by popular vote made growing opposition to European integration explicit. It also had the effect of making national and EU political elites more resistant to future referendums on EU issues, lest they lose and halt the advance of European integration even further. In particular the defeat of the EU Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands in 2005, a Treaty designed to be inclusive of European civil society in its construction, scared European politicians away from holding referendums (Hooghe and Marks 2009). That two founding members of the Union could vote against an EU Treaty was considered inconceivable. That the entire project of bringing the EU closer to its citizens, as the Constitutional Treaty was meant to do, had to cease was not just an embarrassment for EU leaders, it signalled to Eurosceptics that they could win and roll back the tide of ever increasing integration between EU member states through defeating EU treaties at referendums.

Transnational Euroscepticism  117 In the study of Transnational and pan-European Euroscepticism, and indeed the majority of chapters presented in this volume, it is the EP that is the main arena of focus. Chapter 9 on right-wing Eurosceptics in the EP suggests that they are more interested in appealing to national audiences through domestic media outlets, than they are in participating in European integration. Principally this takes the form of criticising specific EU policies for their interference in national sovereignty and of the failure of national political elites to defend it. Chapter 5 on left-wing Euroscepticism finds that while it is more focused on contesting Europe in the Parliament than its right-wing counterpart, the left too are heavily focused on playing to their domestic electorate, only for the left the emphasis is on internationalist – not Europeanist – left-wing solidarity. For both left- and right- wing Eurosceptics the arena of the EP is the main arena of contestation open to them. The national political sphere is actively closed to their arguments, as member state governments seek to reduce the salience of European issues by avoiding them as much as possible (Follesdal and Hix 2006). As such, referendums present to both left- and right-wing Eurosceptics a rare opportunity to both successfully challenge the EU but also to emphasise to their domestic electorates that they are not solely nationalists by cooperating with fellow Eurosceptics in another member state during a political event that garners a degree of media attention; specifically referendums on European integration. Increased Eurosceptic success in European parliamentary elections has done little to halt the progress of European integration (Hobolt et al. 2009). The pro-­ European mainstream of Christian Democrat, Liberals and Social Democrats has maintained a governing majority to counter the increased left- and right-wing Eurosceptic presence in the Parliament (Hix et al. 2005), despite the recent success of the European Conservatives and Reformists (see Chapter 4). On the contrary it has been the defeat of the EU treaties and related European issues at referendums that has had a substantive impact on EU policy. The failure of the Constitutional Treaty caused a dramatic shock to the European political elite and the removal of the symbols of a state that the drafters of the Treaty sought to give the EU (Piris 2010). For Eurosceptics, stopping its successor Treaty, Lisbon, would have further compounded the damage to European integration and proved that the EU had lost popular legitimacy when it was put to a direct vote in front of citizens. Ireland had already voted against a EU Treaty, had vibrant Eurosceptic civil society groups and a favourable structural environment to political outsider referendum campaigns. This transnational effort by Eurosceptics to campaign against the Lisbon Treaty referendum in Ireland was a clear contradiction to their belief that national decisions on the EU should be taken by citizens of each member state only. This would suggest that the strategic imperative of stopping European integration overcame ideological concerns that such action was contrary to the main tenets of Euroscepticism. Plainly the opportunity to defeat another EU referendum after the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty was too great for Eurosceptics not to get involved and further halt the process of European integration through Transnational Scepticism.

118  John FitzGibbon The Lisbon I campaign: Irish Eurosceptics reaching out This contextualisation of the referendum campaigns against the Lisbon Treaty in the wider timeframe of the rejection of the European Constitutional Treaty is important in understanding their Transnational Sceptic dimension. It showed to Eurosceptics that the processes of European integration could be halted and diverted towards a less federalist path; Lisbon itself was a response to these defeats with the removal of the main references to statehood for the EU and an emphasis on economic development. While the EU has had periods of political crisis before – the French ‘empty chair’, the Danish No to Maastritcht – in the late 2000s the series of EU-related referendum defeats and dramatic increase in support for Eurosceptics in EP elections was a cumulative series of negative political impacts in popular support for the EU. It was against this background of widespread voter hostility to the EU that then Irish Taoiseach, Prime Minister, Bertie Ahern, in February 2008, three months after the Treaty was signed, indicated that the referendum would be held in June of 2008. The campaign had already begun before that however. As soon as the Treaty was signed and published, Irish millionaire businessman Declan Ganley launched a billboard campaign arguing that the Treaty had reduced Ireland’s influence in Europe due to the removal of a guaranteed Commissioner for each member state. At the time Ganley was treated as an eccentric who was wasting his money on expensive advertising for a Treaty that was bound to pass as the Irish pro-EU political elite had learned their lesson from the defeat of the Nice Treaty referendum (FitzGibbon 2010). To bolster his campaign Ganley met with then Czech President Václav Klaus who lent his support to the campaign and visited Ireland for the second referendum in November 2008. There Klaus upset mainstream Irish pro-EU politicians as he called Ganley a ‘dissident’ and compared the re-running of the Lisbon Treaty Referendum as something that was like the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia during the Cold War (The Irish Times 2008). This action was most decidedly against diplomatic protocol and prompted much complaint from pro-Lisbon politicians. Gaining the support of the Head of State of another EU member gave Ganley vital cache amongst the media and the electorate. What was important to Ganley was that a major non-Irish political figure embraced his arguments and was giving him both credibility in the view of the public and media exposure (interview with Nunn 2008). Klaus received similar benefits in that he bolstered his Eurosceptic credentials with his supporters in the Czech Republic and showed that he was not an isolated advocate for rejecting further European integration. In the recent past, left-wing activists have dominated the Eurosceptic debate in Ireland (FitzGibbon 2013). As stated earlier in the chapter, during the Nice Treaty referendum campaigns it was the PANA that were the leaders of the No side and brought political parties under their umbrella. While there had been some interaction with French, Scandinavian and Swiss Eurosceptics by Irish Eurosceptic civil society actors, the majority were of the opinion that they should not be brought in to campaign on their behalf (ibid. 2013). This would diminish the claim

Transnational Euroscepticism  119 of these activists that the vote was about the opinion of the Irish people and that non-Irish voices were unwelcome. What connections that did exist were mostly based around the sharing of resources and campaigning techniques. With the immediate domination by Ganley of the campaign and his right-wing arguments, these groups believed that they needed to react and embolden their campaign ­(FitzGibbon 2010). This was most apparent in the second Lisbon referendum campaign where the main civil society group on the left, the People’s Movement, organised a series of meetings around the country with Eurosceptic activists from Denmark, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. What they sought to achieve with this strategy was: first, it showed potential supporters that opposing Europe was ‘OK’ and that ordinary people from outside Ireland held Eurosceptic positions; second, it was to boost their social democratic bona fides by countering the argument of pro-Lisbon actors that only through the EU could Ireland develop Scandinavian style living standards (interview with Keoghan 2008). The actions of Ganley and the People’s Movement are illustrative of the different reasons why Eurosceptic actors embrace Transnational Scepticism. The basis of Ganley’s criticism was that he opposed the Europe being put forward by the political elite, one that ignored Europe’s shared Judaeo-Christian heritage (interview with Ganley 2008). For him the focus was on gaining credibility amongst the media and the electorate for his arguments. As an avowed Europeanist he had little ideological baggage with working with Eurosceptics from other member states.4 For the People’s Movement bringing in Eurosceptics from Scandinavia bolstered their standing amongst left-wing voters by associating them with an idealised Scandinavian model that successfully maintained a strong welfare state despite being more politically distant from the EU than Ireland. The common thread of both actors was their belief that Irish voters needed to hear non-Irish voices making Eurosceptic arguments. In as much as Transnational Scepticism is about ideational solidarity for Eurosceptic actors, it also speaks to the need of Eurosceptic activists to convince domestic electorates that voting against the EU is a legitimate option exercised by many across Europe. This perspective emphasises the weak voter cues of Eurosceptic actors as they are either new to the political scene or lack recognition with voters as they operate largely outside the political mainstream. Bringing in non-national actors added a new dimension to the cues that Eurosceptic actors were making. This was in spite of their ideological opposition to non-nationals entering into the debate. Such was their general scarcity of resources and access to the media, that this was one of the few actions left open to them that had the potential to sway voters to their side. More fundamentally it countered the criticism of them as being ‘hypernationalist’ as it allowed their portrayal as internationalist, and positively disposed towards some form of cooperation at the European level. In an almost haphazard, though ultimately strategic, fashion they sought to present Euroscepticim as a legitimate political alternative being considered across Europe and not as a singular rejection of one EU Treaty in a solely Irish context. As Usherwood (2007) argues, Euroscepticism is episodic in nature. This leaves

120  John FitzGibbon little opportunity for anti-European actors to build up their credibility with voters. The only occasions when they can do so are EP election campaigns or during an EU-related referendum. Given the lack of salience of the European issue and the importance of second-order issues (Franklin et al. 1995; Hobolt 2006) in EU-­ related referendums, Eurosceptic actors need to utilise all the resources at their disposal. For Irish opponents of the Lisbon Treaty one of the means of achieving this was through bringing outside Eurosceptic voices to Ireland to provide ideational solidarity for the anti-Lisbon arguments they were making. For Irish Eurosceptics the need to appear internationalist and in favour of some form of cooperation at the European level overcame any ideological misgivings they may have had of engaging in Transnational Scepticism.5 The Lisbon II referendum: European Eurosceptics getting involved The actions of these Irish activists in engaging with Eurosceptics from across Europe presents one form of Transnational Scepticism, one that focuses more on the cooperative element. This can be compared to the actions of the EFD group who entered into the Lisbon II Treaty referendum debate (after not being involved in Lisbon I) without an explicit ‘invitation’ from any existing Irish Eurosceptic organisation. Irish No campaigners were deeply hostile to their involvement in the referendum debate, with many believing that it was facilitated by an elite media who knew that allowing UKIP leader Nigel Farage to debate Lisbon on national media would encourage nationalist No voters to switch sides, such was their abhorrence to any representative of British nationalism (Traynor 2009). There was significant opprobrium from Irish No campaigners causing Farage to leave Ireland early and DPP MEP Morten Messerschmitt took his place in advocating for a No vote on behalf of his Danish voters who had been denied a referendum on Lisbon by the Danish Government. Indeed the EFD sent out pamphlets to each home in Ireland appealing to the Irish citizens to ‘vote on behalf of the people of Europe’ who were denied a voice on Lisbon despite promises from their political leaders for a referendum on Lisbon (EFD 2009). Moreover, it cited the example of Iceland whose recovery from the economic crisis it claimed was greater and swifter than Ireland’s (ibid.). Given the lack of an Irish member of the EFD and the relatively limited coverage the campaign would generate amongst EFD party member’s domestic electorates, the immediate conclusion is that their activity in the campaign was generated by genuine desire to use their Transnational Scepticism to inflict a major political defeat on the EU. This had the added incentive of helping to build the EFD as the main political movement across Europe for contesting European integration, ahead of the then recently formed soft Eurosceptic European Conservatives and Reformists EP group. While the motives of left-wing Nordic Eurosceptic activists and the EFD for getting involved in the Lisbon campaign may have differed, their arguments against the Treaty were the same. Foremost amongst these was that the democratic deficit in the EU was so great that EU leaders were ignoring the wishes of the Irish people and putting the same referendum before the Irish people again.

Transnational Euroscepticism  121 They justified their involvement in the Irish campaign by arguing that citizens from their own states and across Europe had been denied a vote on the Lisbon Treaty by their domestic political elites, and that Irish voters should defeat the Lisbon Treaty again on behalf of all those across Europe, who did not have the same opportunity (EFD 2009). From the arguments of both these left- and right-wing actors, the emphasis of their Transnational Scepticism was on cooperation and solidarity between European citizens, and not through the corrupt national and European political elites. Such arguments were very much akin to populist arguments of a ‘pure’ people disenfranchised by a corrupt and distant elite (Taggart 2000). Moreover the emphasis on the more ‘pure’ form of democracy of the referendum over that of representative democracy is one of the key defining features of populism (ibid.). Both leftand right-wing political actors placed the emphasis on European citizens and not states or institutions per se. As mainstream pro-European political parties dominate the national level, arguing for more national-level decisions could be easily countered by pro-Europeans with the point that all EU treaties must be ratified by national Parliaments who also provide close scrutiny of EU legislation. The Lisbon Treaty referendums allowed Irish Eurosceptics to put European citizens at the centre of their arguments and call for democracy in the EU to be direct from the people and not represented by pro-European political elites. Such an approach allowed Eurosceptics to argue against Lisbon and the EU on the issue of democratic accountability. Using Transnational Scepticism to bring EU opponents from different countries greatly bolstered their arguments. It facilitated Lisbon opponents in putting themselves before the public as simply concerned democrats and negated, to a degree, the arguments of Lisbon Treaty supporters that they were isolationist nationalists. What is perhaps most interesting about the Lisbon referendum campaign and the mobilisation of Transnational Scepticism is how it was one of the first examples of this occurring on a genuine pan-European scale. In the Danish Maastricht Treaty referendums, the Finnish, Swedish and Norwegian 1995 accession referendums, and the Danish and Swedish referendums on joining the Euro in 2000, it was Nordic Eurosceptic activists that were interacting with each other, not Eurosceptics from across the continent (Raunio 2007). At this time it was left-wing activists who dominated the Eurosceptic debate in the Nordic EU member states and their argument against Europe was for greater Nordic cooperation with those states that shared the same values of the welfare state and international solidarity. They opposed the neo-liberalism and/or overt nationalism of other EU member states, and so there was a distinctive form of ‘Trans-Nordic’ Scepticism present in these referendums debates (ibid). Additionally, the Dutch and French Constitutional Treaty referendum No campaigns had little to no presence of Transnational Scepticism. These campaigns witnessed mobilisation from internal political actors who focused on domestic concerns with the direction European integration was taking. What then was different about the Irish Lisbon Treaty referendums that promoted the presence of Transnational Scepticism? There were several important causal factors driving Irish Eurosceptics to reach out to their counterparts across Europe and for non-Irish Eurosceptics to become

122  John FitzGibbon involved in the second Lisbon referendum. While there were the immediate utilitarian factors of the need for credibility amongst voters and the media by having foreign voices reiterate their arguments, there was the specific timeframe of the referendum. It came after a series of humiliating referendum defeats on EU-­ related issues, before European parliamentary elections where Eurosceptics were on course to make a significant breakthrough. Contextualising these two situations was the fact that Ireland was the only member state to hold a referendum on Lisbon. Sensing their opportunity to strike a significant blow against European integration, Eurosceptics across the continent made their way to Ireland in a display of Transnational Scepticism to show ideational solidarity to Irish No campaigners and also to emphasise their willingness to cooperate across borders. Moreover, the Irish referendum process gave equal coverage to both sides; the Irish electorate had already voted down one EU-related referendum (Nice I); and finally pro-EU actors were deeply divided along government and opposition lines. Ireland’s referendum was a case of the right country at the right time for Transnational Scepticism to mobilise. As discussed in the previous section, Irish Eurosceptics reached out to other opponents of European integration as they needed the ideational solidarity of non-Irish voices to illustrate to Irish voters the legitimacy of their arguments. Non-Irish Eurosceptics who became involved, many uninvited, in the second referendum did so as they believed that showing solidarity with Irish voters was the perfect example of the undemocratic nature of European integration. For both sets of Eurosceptic actors, engaging in Transnational Scepticism was not a pre-determined ideological shift but more an opportunistic strategic decision to secure victory over the EU. For the first Lisbon referendum, it was part of a successful effort; for the second it was not.6

The concept of ideational solidarity and Transnational Scepticism In providing a theoretical approach to understanding Transnational Scepticism, Usherwood (see Chapter 2) alluded to the failure of the EU to adequately democratise its political system and cumulative major economic and political challenges as being key components of what this volume labels Transnational Scepticism. This approach has a more pertinent application to the Euroscepticism present in the EP, which is the focus of the majority of chapters in this volume. What this chapter discusses is the emergence of Transnational Scepticism in the temporal arenas of the two Irish referendums on the Lisbon Treaty. Other chapters in this volume discuss Transnational Scepticism in the EP as being in part facilitated by the immediate utilitarian interest of securing funding through the formation of a multi-state parliamentary grouping. There is the additional longitudinal element of ideological conformity be it thick – as amongst the left-wing European United Left–Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) – or thin – the right-wing nationalist Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD). What makes investigating Transnational Scepticism in the Irish Lisbon Treaty referendums unique is the absence of structural incentives. In this sense it provides the opportunity to investigate

Transnational Euroscepticism  123 Transnational Scepticism from a purely strategic perspective, specifically the desire of Eurosceptics to inflict a political defeat on European integration. Irish Eurosceptics were given a platform in the national political arena to contest European integration and they chose to do so with the assistance of counterparts from across the EU so as to better their chances of securing a No vote to the Treaty. Extrapolating further from these observations, this chapter argues that they infer two emergent features of Transnational Scepticism. First, that engaging in Transnational Scepticism allows Eurosceptics to deflect accusations that they are overtly nationalist. Second, Transnational Scepticism plays an important role in facilitating Eurosceptics to express opposition to European integration as a legitimate political option available to voters. It is the second point that it is perhaps the more widely applicable concept of Transnational Scepticism beyond the Irish Lisbon Treaty examples but overcoming the limitations of the first was also important to both Irish and non-Irish Eurosceptics. The desire to avoid the nationalist label was clear amongst all the Eurosceptic groups in the Lisbon Treaty referendum campaigns. Indeed even the members of the EFD group who participated were effusive in their correction of what they viewed as the pejorative labelling of themselves as nationalist (interview with Towler 2011). For left-wing Eurosceptic activists and politicians the disdain for the nationalist label was obvious. Their preferred concept for their outlook on cooperation with other states was internationalist, a key component of socialism more generally (Holmes and Lightfoot 2007). Connotations with right-wing nationalism were both unwelcome and specifically avoided (Keoghan 2008). In other states such as Denmark and the UK, the movement of national rightwing political movements to Euroscepticism caused the left to involuntarily hold a pro-European position, lest they be tarred with the same nationalist brush simply due to their position on the low salient issue of Europe (FitzGibbon 2013). Yet their opposition to the EU remained. To differentiate themselves from right-wing Euroscepticism they were forced to adopt an ‘internationalist’ critique of the EU. Engaging in Transnational Scepticism was the most visceral means of both contesting the EU and differentiating themselves from nationalist-focused Euroscepticism. Why then would right-wing nationalists not want to be labelled as nationalists? The negative connotations of nationalism it would appear stretch out to those who ostensibly embrace the nationalist element of the electorate as well. Right-wing Eurosceptics had to embrace some form of international cooperation in order to differentiate themselves from the radical right who eschew all forms of international interaction. This encouraged them to display some form of engagement with ideological compatriots in other member states, to show their internationalist bona fides. In turn this facilitated their argument that alternatives to the EU existed in much looser, though mutually beneficial, trade-based relationships. Moreover, there was the residual belief that some form of cooperation between European states was not just inevitable but also desirable. Their argument – and that of leftwing Eurosceptics – was centred on the depth and scope of this cooperation. To understand the relevance of the Lisbon Treaty referendums and why Transnational Scepticism was in evidence there, the situational context of the referendums

124  John FitzGibbon occurring at the climax of a sustained period of Eurosceptic success must also be appreciated. It is no coincidence that Eurosceptics from across Europe came to Ireland to show solidarity and campaign with their Irish counterparts in 2008. After the defeat of the Danish and Swedish Euro referendums, and the French and Dutch Nos to the EU Constitution, opposition to the EU became an important issue in European politics. With European elections scheduled for the same time as the referendum, campaigning with Irish Eurosceptics against Lisbon allowed them to portray themselves as realists who understood the importance of international cooperation but not the form of European integration that was dominant at the time. Transnational Scepticism as taken from the example of Lisbon can be understood as the ideological expansion of Euroscepticism beyond the binary, Europe Yes/No, position. In a state such as Ireland with such strong public support for European integration, articulating opposition to Lisbon and putting forward an alternative based on withdrawal from any form of European-level cooperation deviated too far from public opinion. Instead Irish Eurosceptics argued two general positions, that a No vote would allow a renegotiation of the Treaty for more favourable terms for Ireland, and that this was not simply a narrow Irish-­centric critique of Lisbon but a sentiment that was shared by many across Europe. Both of these positions were dependent on the public believing that others outside Ireland were aware of the same arguments. In order to successfully argue that I­ reland would not be left behind or be unduly punished by other member states for voting No, Irish opponents of Lisbon had to bring in Eurosceptic actors from other states to make the same point. Even Danish Eurosceptics who have long argued for withdrawal from the EU put forward the alternative of far closer ­Nordic ­cooperation and internationalisation through the United Nations (­ FitzGibbon 2013). Irish Eurosceptics had to argue that they were in favour of some form of European-level engagement. The best way to illustrate this was to work with Eurosceptics from other member states. Despite the increase in Euroscepticism across the European political landscape, it would appear that some form of political cooperation in Europe is accepted by all political actors. Public opinion in Denmark, while deeply sceptical of Economic and Monetary Union and political union is strongly positive on the importance of membership of the EU in protecting the Danish social model from globalisation (Gable 2009). For Irish voters, international cooperation has long been the most important strand of Irish foreign policy to project Irish opinion onto the world stage, either through the League of Nations, the United Nations or the EU. To the majority of Irish voters non-participation in the form of European-level cooperation was inconceivable. Irish opponents to Lisbon had to show that cooperation across European states was not just possible outside of the confines of European integration, but that political actors in other European states were making the same argument. Following along somewhat with this line of thought, non-Irish actors such as the EFD sought to use the second referendum on Lisbon as an example of the EU’s lack of democratic accountability outside of their home state and the European institutions. The particular focus of their rhetoric was in establishing a direct connection between the citizens of European states outside of both member state governments and European institutions. As other chapters in this volume

Transnational Euroscepticism  125 argue, this was most likely for the benefit of their own supporters in their home member states. Yet this does not discount the genuine ideological underpinnings for their actions, that of the democratic deficit inherent in European integration. Rather their actions, and those of Irish Eurosceptics, point to the evolution of Euroscepticism as one of strategic political decision making to achieve victories over European integration. One of these decisions it would appear, was a willingness to engage in Transnational Scepticism.

Conclusion This chapter sought to use the two Irish Lisbon Treaty referendum campaigns to provide examples of Transnational Scepticism beyond the EP. While the overall impact of this Transnational Scepticism on the outcome of the referendums is difficult to assess, the simple reality of Eurosceptics actively engaging in cooperation with other opponents of European integration in a specifically national arena is of considerable interest to the wider study of Euroscepticism. The chapter drew two principal conclusions about the nature of Transnational Euroscepticism as expressed in the Irish Lisbon Treaty referendum campaigns. First, was the concept of ideational solidarity as a factor behind the decision of Eurosceptics to engage in Transnational Scepticism. Irish opponents of the Lisbon Treaty invited (mostly) left-wing Eurosceptics activists to campaign against the Treaty to show to the Irish public that opposing Europe was a legitimate position to take. For the second referendum radical right-wing Eurosceptics campaigned – uninvited – against Lisbon alongside left-wing activists to emphasise both their openness to cross-national cooperation and their focus on European citizens as the source of legitimacy for all decisions related to Europe. In both examples it was the conscious effort of Eurosceptics to challenge the arguments of pro-Europeans that they were narrow-minded nationalists who rejected all forms of cooperation at the European level. Transnational Scepticism was a way for them to move past these arguments into a more substantive debate about the other issues such as the liberal economic bias in EU policies or the EU’s democratic deficit. The second conclusion drawn was the strategic consideration of Eurosceptics to engage in Transnational Scepticism. This was balanced between the ­national-level focused political opportunity structure of and EU-related referendum, and the wider context of a series of EU-related referendum defeats and increased opposition to European integration across the continent as a whole. Eurosceptics from different states engaged in Transnational Scepticism in Ireland because it was a further opportunity to halt the progress of European integration in a favourable national environment. The imperative of this strategic consideration overcame any ideological conflict that Eurosceptics may have had towards transnational cooperation. Instead they argued that there was no conflict as they were representing the people of Europe who had long been omitted from the EU’s decision-­making process. In making this argument they suggested a potential future ideological basis for increased Transnational Scepticism, that of such cooperation as being the only means of representing the interests of the people of Europe against the combined political elite in the EU and national governments.

Appendix 8.1  Major national organisations campaigning on Lisbon I and Lisbon II1 Yes

Parties

No

Lisbon I

Lisbon II

Lisbon I

Lisbon II

Fine Gael Fianna Fáil Labour

Fine Gael Fianna Fáil Labour

Sinn Féin Socialist Party People Before Profit

Sinn Féin Socialist Party People Before Profit

ODS (Klaus)

EFD Libertas

Cóir Libertas People’s Movement Farmers Say No PANA

Cóir People’s Movement Farmers Say No PANA

June Movement TEAM Transnational Institute Open Europe

June Movement TEAM Transnational Institute Open Europe

Transnational Parties Groups

Yes for Europe Generation Yes Women for Europe The Charter Group We Belong

Transnational Groups

1

From FitzGibbon (2011). For reasons of brevity many smaller groups have been omitted.

Transnational Euroscepticism  127

Notes 1 In the context of Euroscepticism the phrase ideational solidarity refers to the expression of qualified support by actors from different areas of civil society and different states for the position taken towards the EU by the individual Eurosceptic actor in question. As the chapter progresses it is made clear as to why using such a specific concept is particularly useful in studying transnational scepticism. 2 For an overview of all the major groups involved in the campaign see Appendix 8.1. 3 PANA was a stand-alone anti-war group that was used as a flag of Eurosceptic convenience for parties – the Greens, Sinn Féin – and individual TDs (MPs) from ostensibly pro-European parties who were allowed to campaign against Nice, to organise the opposition to Nice I. There was no pro-Nice equivalent, the Yes campaign was led and organised by the ruling Fianna Fáil Government. For more see: FitzGibbon (2010). 4 Ganley would use the relative success of his anti-Lisbon campaigns as the basis for his Libertas party which went on to contest the 2009 European Parliamentary elections in each member state on a ‘soft’ Eurosceptic platform (see Introduction to this volume). 5 This strategy proved to be highly successful as their energy in opposing Lisbon across a range of issues that appealed to a wide spread of the electorate resulted in the defeat of Lisbon. With the Yes campaign comprised of mainstream political parties, those who were in opposition did not campaign while those in Government were preoccupied with running the country. By the time the Yes campaign began the No side had dictated the issues and sowed enough doubt in the minds of voters that the most cited reason for voting No was not enough knowledge of the Treaty (Quinlan 2009). This was the most important factor underlying the defeat of the Treaty by 53.4 per cent to 46.6 per cent. 6 The success of the Eurosceptic activists in Lisbon I was such that for Lisbon II, the pro-Treaty campaign essentially copied them. Pro-Lisbon political parties were effectively side-lined by civil society groups formed to target specific groups in society – women, young people, the middle-class – using ‘celebrity’ endorsements and general non-­Lisbon specific arguments in favour of European integration. This strategy proved highly effective in reaching out to voters who voted No in Lisbon I due to uncertainty of what the Treaty was about but who switched to vote Yes in Lisbon II. This was despite a significant decrease in objective knowledge of the content of the Treaty between the Lisbon I and II referendums (see FitzGibbon 2010).

Bibliography Cullen, P. (2009) ‘Leaflets financed by Europe – Farage’, The Irish Times, 19 September. Euractiv (2009) ‘New Eurosceptic group leader: ‘We’ll probe Irish Lisbon guarantees’ [online]. Available at: www.euractiv.com/section/eu-priorities-2020/interview/neweurosceptic-group-leader-we-ll-probe-irish-lisbon-guarantees/ [Accessed 1 February 2016]. Eurobarometer (2015) Standard EB 83: Standard indicators for Ireland, Brussels: ­European Commission. Europe of Freedom and Democracy (2009) Lisbon Referendum Leaflet, European Parliament: Brussels. Farage, N. (2009) ‘Our future in Irish hands’, The Guardian [online]. Available at: https:// www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/oct/02/irish-referendum-lisbon-treaty [Accessed 4 April 2016]. FitzGibbon, J. (2010) ‘Referendum briefing. The second referendum on the Treaty of Lisbon in Ireland, 2 October 2009’, Representation 46(2), pp. 227–239.

128  John FitzGibbon FitzGibbon, J. (2011) Eurosceptic protest movements: a comparative analysis between ­Ireland, the UK, Estonia and Denmark, Doctoral dissertation, University of Sussex. FitzGibbon, J. (2013) ‘Citizens against Europe? Civil society and Eurosceptic protest in Ireland, the United Kingdom and Denmark’, Journal of Common Market Studies 51(1), pp. 105–121. Follesdal, A. and Hix, S. (2006) ‘Why there is a democratic deficit in the EU: A response to Majone and Moravcsik’, Journal of Common Market Studies 44(3), pp. 533–562. Franklin, M., Van der Eijk, C. and Marsh, M. (1995) ‘Referendum outcomes and trust in government: Public support for Europe in the wake of Maastricht’, West European Politics 18(3), pp. 101–117. Gabel, M. J. (2009) Interests and integration: Market liberalization, public opinion, and European Union, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Hayward, K. (2003) ‘If at first you don’t succeed …’: The second referendum on the treaty of Nice, 2002’, Irish Political Studies 18(1), pp. 120–132. Hix, S., Noury, A. and Roland, G. (2005) ‘Power to the parties: Cohesion and competition in the European Parliament, 1979–2001’, British Journal of Political Science 35(2), pp. 209–234. Hobolt, S. (2006) ‘How parties affect vote choice in European integration referendums’, Party Politics 12(5), pp. 623–647. Hobolt, S. B., Spoon, J. J. and Tilley, J. (2009) ‘A vote against Europe? Explaining defection at the 1999 and 2004 European Parliament elections’, British Journal of Political Science 39(1), pp. 93–115. Holmes, M. and Lightfoot, S. (2007) ‘The Europeanisation of left political parties: Limits to adaptation and consensus’, Capital & Class 31(3), pp. 141–158. Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2009) ‘A postfunctionalist theory of European integration: From permissive consensus to constraining dissensus’, British Journal of Political ­Science 39(1), pp. 1–23. The Irish Times (2008) ‘Martin says Klaus comments on Lisbon ‘Inappropriate’ [online]. Available at: www.irishtimes.com/news/martin-says-klaus-comments-on-lisbon-­ inappropriate-1.831483 [Accessed 1 February 2016]. Moberg, A. (2002) ‘The Nice Treaty and voting rules in the Council’, Journal of Common Market Studies 40(2), pp. 259–282. Murphy, C. (2011) ‘I ditched Irish flag but I’m a patriot, says Avril’, Herald.ie [online]. Available at: www herald.ie/news/i-ditched-irish-flag-but-im-a-patriot-says-avril-27983120. html [Accessed 1 February 2016]. Piris, J.-C. (2010) The Lisbon Treaty: A legal and political analysis, Cambridge: ­Cambridge University Press. Quinlan, S. (2009) ‘The Lisbon treaty referendum 2008’, Irish Political Studies 24(1), pp. 107–121. Raunio, T. (2007) ‘Softening but persistent: Euroscepticism in the Nordic EU countries’, Acta Politica 42(2), pp. 191–210. Smyth, J. (2009) ‘Barroso comes to town to push for Yes vote for Lisbon’, The Irish Times [online]. Available at: www.irishtimes.com/news/barroso-comes-to-town-to-push-foryes-vote-for-lisbon-1.741043 [Accessed 1 February 2016]. Svensson, P. (1994) ‘The Danish Yes to Maastricht and Edinburgh. The EC referendum of May 1993’, Scandinavian Political Studies 17(1), pp. 69–82. Taggart, P. A. (2000) Populism, Buckingham: Open University Press. Traynor, I. (2009) ‘Irish poll predicting victory for anti-treaty lobby dismissed as “voodoo”’, The Guardian [online]. Available at: www.theguardian.com/world/2009/sep/25/ ireland-referendum-lisbon-treaty-poll [Accessed 1 February 2016]. Usherwood, S. (2007) ‘Proximate factors in the mobilization of anti-EU groups in France and the UK: The European Union as first-order politics’, Journal of European Integration 29(1), pp. 3–21.

Transnational Euroscepticism  129

Interviews Author interview with Gawain Towler, UKIP Press Spokesman, 21 February 2011. Author interview with Naoise Nunn, Libertas campaign manager, 14 August 2008. Author interview with Frank Keoghan, Chairman People’s Movement, 31 March 2008. Author Interview with Declan Ganley, founder and Chairman Libertas, 14 August 2008.

9 Eurosceptic candidate MEPs in the news A transnational perspective Katjana Gattermann and Sofia Vasilopoulou

Introduction The eruption of the Eurozone crisis in 2009 marked a new period in the process of European integration, as it called into question the viability of the European Monetary Union (Glencross 2013; Vasilopoulou 2013). In this context of growing uncertainty regarding the future of Europe, Euroscepticism has now become more relevant than ever. While we do know that Euroscepticism is a persistent and embedded phenomenon in the European Union (EU) (Usherwood and Startin 2013), few studies explore whether Euroscepticism is a transnational phenomenon, i.e. whether it goes beyond national boundaries and interests. This chapter addresses this gap from a political communication perspective. We choose to do so because the media is able to provide a forum for Eurosceptic actors to influence European public opinion, electoral outcomes and the EU policy process. European publics also depend on national media in order to gain knowledge on the possible alternatives from the current EU project (Koopmans 2007; Trenz 2008). Our main aim is to contribute to the discussion on transnational Euroscepticism by exploring whether we may observe the development of Eurosceptic opposition in the national quality press. Can we talk about transnational Euroscepticism from a newspaper perspective? Are European publics exposed to Eurosceptic arguments from non-domestic Eurosceptic politicians? And, if so, what affects variation? Finally, has the crisis contributed to the development of this type of public sphere? Previous research has investigated the news visibility of European political actors in general (e.g. de Vreese et al. 2006; Koopmans 2007; Schuck et al. 2011), and individual Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) in particular (Gattermann and Vasilopoulou 2015), but we know little about the transnational visibility of individual EU politicians (for an exception see Gattermann 2015 as regards the news visibility of the Spitzenkandidaten in 2014). If a ‘Eurosceptic public sphere’ were indeed emerging, then we would expect that national newspapers would report upon non-domestic Eurosceptic actors. To investigate the extent to which a transnational dimension of Euroscepticism has developed, we compare the news visibility of Eurosceptic lead candidates during the 2009 and 2014 election campaigns. We choose to focus on lead candidates because these actors are elected to the European Parliament (EP), which is the transnational European institution par

Eurosceptic candidate MEPs in the news  131 excellence. We explore the extent to which Eurosceptic lead candidates of a given country are reported upon by national newspapers from other EU member states. Our focus lies on the news visibility of both right-wing and left-wing Eurosceptic MEP candidates from Britain, France, the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Austria, Italy, Spain and Poland. The underlying rationale of comparing two EP electoral campaigns is to investigate whether the Eurozone crisis has impacted upon their transnational visibility, i.e. whether Eurosceptic candidate MEPs are more visible in national newspapers from other EU member states. We found that, in general, most newspapers paid more attention to Eurosceptic lead candidates during the 2014 EP election campaigns compared to 2009. Our findings suggest that most European broadsheets increasingly report about foreign Eurosceptic candidates relative to their own Eurosceptic candidate MEPs when comparing the 2009 and 2014 campaigns. Yet, the majority of Eurosceptic candidates only receive coverage in the domestic press, and not abroad, in both election years. From a transnational perspective, the most prominent candidate in 2009 was Jean-Marie Le Pen, the (then) party and campaign leader of French National Front (FN). In 2014 his daughter Marine Le Pen as well as Nigel Farage of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) were the most visible transnationally. A close analysis of their reportage reveals that these Eurosceptic candidates are linked with domestic issues as well as transnational themes. The predominant themes in 2014 comprise the common Eurosceptic and anti-EU agenda of these actors, the rising levels of popular disillusionment with centrist parties and the EU, and scenarios of Eurosceptic MEP cooperation in the EP (i.e. pan-European Euroscepticism, see introduction). Overall, our findings point towards the increased relevance of transnational Euroscepticism under conditions of crisis.

The development of a ‘Eurosceptic public sphere’? The process of political and economic integration at the EU level has brought change not only in the governance structures across Europe; but has also created new public political communication spaces. A public sphere is defined as a common communicative space ‘created when individuals discuss common concerns in front of an audience’ (Eriksen 2005: 341). While a ‘genuine’ European public sphere is far from being fully created, research has shown that it is in the making (e.g. Schlesinger 1999; Koopmans 2007). One of the mechanisms for the creation for such a public sphere is the increase in the European ‘audience’s attention to and awareness of European political communication regarding governance at the supranational, national or local level’ (Trenz and Eder 2004: 8). From a rational democratic theory perspective, receiving information through the mass media is crucial for citizens to hold representatives accountable. Information enables citizens to form opinions and empowers them to influence decision making (Eriksen 2005: 342). As such, media reporting on EU-related issues may be used as a proxy for the development and existence of a European public sphere (Risse and van de Steeg 2003: 1). However, the absence of an EU-wide media system that would

132  Katjana Gattermann and Sofia Vasilopoulou provide common information to all citizens residing in EU member states hinders the emergence of a European public sphere (see Gerhards 1993). Scholars have studied the conditions under which the Europeanisation of national public spheres may emerge by examining ‘the ways in which European integration affects public debates in national news media’ (Koopmans 2007: 185). The distinction is between supranational, vertical and horizontal Europeanisation of national public debates (Koopmans and Erbe 2004; Koopmans 2007). Supranational Europeanisation entails more attention to EU-level actors and horizontal Europeanisation means that actors from other EU member states are frequently referenced, while national actors explicitly address EU actors under vertical Europeanisation. Alongside this actor-centred definition of the Europeanisation of national public spheres, Risse and van de Steeg (2003: 2) define a broader perspective, which Risse (2010: 5) summarises as follows: ‘[We] can observe the Europeanization of public spheres whenever European issues are debated as questions of common concern using similar frames of reference and whenever fellow Europeans participate regularly in these national debates’. There is general agreement that the coverage of EU issues in national media outlets has increased over time (e.g. Wessler et al. 2008; Boomgaarden et al. 2010; Koopmans and Statham 2010; Grande and Kriesi 2014). However, findings also indicate that Europeanised national political communication varies across issue fields (Koopmans and Pfetsch 2003; Koopmans and Erbe 2004) and EU member states (e.g., Machill et al. 2006; Risse 2010), and that political elites tend to be the primary beneficiaries of the Europeanisation of public debates (e.g. see Koopmans 2007; Díez Medrano 2010). On the other hand, research shows that there are similarities in the way the European integration process is framed by political elites across Europe (Díez Medrano 2010: 319); and that economic and political television news about the EU is commonly framed in terms of conflict across member states (de Vreese 2003). More specifically, Risse and van de Steeg (2003) find evidence for their thesis that similar points of reference and interpretation patterns applied in the extent to which national newspapers from different EU countries framed the debate about Jörg Haider’s Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) entering a coalition government with the Austrian People’s Party in 2000. Politicisation and contestation over European integration have also been identified as conducive to the creation of a European public sphere (Risse 2014). This refers to debate and societal conflict about the nature and scope of EU integration (Hooghe and Marks 2009; de Wilde 2011). It may also be thought of as a normative requirement for the democratisation of the EU. Voters are exposed to different arguments about the EU; therefore input-oriented participation is more likely to coincide with output democracy in the form of EU legislation (e.g. Føllesdal and Hix 2006). Eurosceptic political entrepreneurs are key to this process as they may provide a counter point to Europhile narratives. They contribute to the public discourse on the legitimacy of European integration by constructing and articulating political grievances against the EU in the public sphere (de Wilde and Trenz 2012). Therefore one of the preconditions for a ‘genuine’ European public sphere is the presence of Eurosceptic elites in national news who by expressing their

Eurosceptic candidate MEPs in the news  133 opposing views contribute to the politicisation of the EU, i.e. what we term in this chapter the ‘Eurosceptic public sphere’. Prior to the crisis, Eurosceptic actors tended to operate on the margins of their domestic party systems. The term Euroscepticism was used to describe to ‘those who stand outside the status quo’ not at the heart of their party systems or governments (Taggart 1998: 366). Single issue and protest parties of both the right and the left articulated concerns over the process of European integration. This has been progressively changing with Euroscepticism no longer being a peripheral phenomenon. The Eurozone crisis has triggered a fundamental change in EU citizens’ attitudes and has marked a new era where Euroscepticism is becoming increasingly mainstreamed (Brack and Startin 2015). Eurosceptic actors articulate a number of concerns against European integration. Their anti-EU message is not necessarily the same and neither is the extent to which they oppose the EU. Eurosceptics of the right tend to formulate a ‘sovereignty-based’ anti-EU argument (Vasilopoulou 2011: 234). Given that the EU is by definition a multinational organisation that transcends national boundaries, right-wing Eurosceptics view it as eroding national sovereignty and potentially creating an undesirable ‘cultural melting pot’. Multilevel governance and deeply interlinked structures of cooperation remove nation-states’ freedom of decision making and intervene in domestic affairs. The cultural argument against the EU largely focuses on immigration. The EU is criticised not only for encouraging high levels of intra-EU migration, but also for causing the ‘Islamisation’ of Europe (Vasilopoulou 2014). The left-wing Eurosceptic argument, on the other hand, focuses on sovereignty but not culture. These parties seek the ‘emancipation and independence from great powers which are seen as exploitative of the popular classes’ (Halikiopoulou et al. 2012: 512). They criticise the EU for being a neo-liberal organisation that takes decisions, which benefit the ‘capital’, namely financial elites such as business owners, banks, industries, investors and multinational corporations at the expense of the popular classes. The EU is yet another external power, which promotes elite domination over the people. Both right and left-wing Eurosceptic argumentation has an element of populism, i.e. it is premised on a distinction between the ‘good people’ and the ‘corrupt elites’ (EU and domestic; Mudde 2007). There is also a common underlying nationalist logic to their narratives (Halikiopoulou et al. 2012). The difference lies in the definition of ‘the good people’. Right-wing Eurosceptics equate the people with the nation whereas left-wing Eurosceptics equate the people with class. Whoever does not belong to the nation or to the popular classes is opposed as they are seen as belonging to the ‘corrupt elite’. The system that Eurosceptics propose, namely either a sovereign nation-state or an EU run exclusively by socialist principles, tends to run counter to the EU project as it has developed in the last decades. One way or another, both right and left-wing Eurosceptics tend to generally call for a ‘regression back to the nation-state as the basis of all legislative and political sovereignty’ (see Chapter 1). Linking this back to our term ‘Eurosceptic public sphere’, it would be useful not only to assess whether Eurosceptic candidate MEPs are visible in domestic news outlets, but also the extent to which national newspapers from other EU

134  Katjana Gattermann and Sofia Vasilopoulou member states report upon them. That is, whether a Eurosceptic public sphere is under way. Extant research on the visibility of MEPs in domestic news across Europe has found that ‘who MEPs are’ in terms of office, seniority and status matters more for their domestic news visibility compared to ‘what they do in the EP’, measured by daily legislative activities (Gattermann and Vasilopoulou 2015). It has also been shown that non-attached MEPs tend to be more visible in their national press compared to those with political affiliation within the EP (ibid.). This suggests that newsmakers tend to report upon ‘vocal’ radical Eurosceptic MEPs and relates to the negativity news value (Galtung and Ruge 1965: 65–71), which would expect that opposition is likely to be picked up by journalists. Moreover, research has shown that European political actors tend to receive increasingly more attention during EU elections over time and across Europe at the expense of national politicians (de Vreese et al. 2006; Schuck et al. 2011). We would thus expect that the news coverage of Eurosceptic candidate MEPs has also increased between 2009 and 2014. The remainder of this chapter represents a first attempt at empirically assessing whether the foreign European press picks upon non-domestic Eurosceptic candidate MEPs. Our exploratory analysis seeks to go beyond debates on whether Eurosceptic actors affect debates in national news media in the member states where they are elected. It does so by examining whether this process is becoming transnational, i.e. crossing borders so that people from other EU member states are aware about the existence and activities of Eurosceptic actors abroad. Through their opposition, Eurosceptic MEPs contribute to the contestation and politicisation of the EU. Their narratives also constitute prime examples of negativity news. In a context where the Eurozone crisis has increased the salience of European integration across the Union, we expect that the Eurosceptic argument may have transnational resonance, which we explore below.

Data and method To examine the news visibility of Eurosceptic candidate MEPs during EP elections, we designed a dataset in which our unit of analysis represents individual lead candidates of Eurosceptic parties from nine EU countries. We consider forty-nine MEPs and fifty-nine MEPs during the 2009 and 2014 EP election campaigns, respectively. These MEPs represent the lead candidates of domestic Eurosceptic parties – of either constituency or nation-wide lists1 – who were elected to the EP and subsequently took up their seat. We chose to focus on lead candidates as they are most likely to be visible transnationally, due to their status. For each of the 108 MEPs, we collected all articles in domestic and foreign quality newspapers that explicitly referred to them. Our country selection comprised Britain, France, the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, Austria, Italy, Spain and Poland. We thus considered EU member states from the North, South, West and East of Europe, which have joined the EU at different stages of integration. In each country, we chose one major politically left-leaning broadsheet. These include, respectively: The Guardian, Le Monde, De Volkskrant, Frankfurter

Eurosceptic candidate MEPs in the news  135 Table 9.1  Overview of newspaper articles Newspaper The Guardian Le Monde De Volkskrant Frankfurter Rundschau Politiken Der Standard La Stampa El Paìs Gazeta Wyborcza Total

Articles in 2009

Articles in 2014

Total

36 57 30 4 34 71 21 7 6 266

119 89 42 37 60 10 29 27 20 433

155 146 72 41 94 81 50 34 26 699

Rundschau, Politiken, Der Standard, La Stampa, El País and Gazeta Wyborcza. Broadsheets tend to have the most comprehensive coverage of European affairs compared to tabloids and television (e.g. de Vreese et al. 2006). Our newspaper selection excludes right-leaning broadsheets. The choice of one newspaper per country allows us to increase the country sample to nine EU member states and evaluate the general patterns in the transnational coverage of Eurosceptic lead candidates. This would not have been possible if we analysed more than one newspaper per country due to limited data availability in some of the chosen countries. The advantage of selecting newspapers with a similar political affiliation lies in their comparability across country. The chosen quality newspapers also have the potential to provide a ‘proxy’ for other media content (Boomgaarden et al. 2010: 511). The time span comprises the four weeks prior to the first Election Day in both years, i.e. 6 May to 3 June 2009 and 23 April to 21 May 2014, respectively. Our total number of articles is 699. Table 9.1 provides an overview of the number of articles collected for each newspaper during each election campaign. It shows that more articles that refer to Eurosceptic lead candidates were published during the 2014 campaigns (433) than in 2009 (266). The majority of newspapers published far more articles in 2014, especially The Guardian, Frankfurter Rundschau, Gazeta Wyborcza and El País. Only the Austrian newspaper, Der Standard, has decreased the attention paid to Eurosceptic candidates by sixty-one articles, which is probably owed to variation in the salience of domestic (party) politics at different points in time. In the following, we provide detailed insight into the varying patterns of the news visibility of Eurosceptic lead candidates across newspapers and over two time periods. We complement our quantitative results by a qualitative analysis of the issues associated with the most visible Eurosceptic lead candidates in our sample.

Findings One major question that we pose in this chapter is whether there is an increase in newspaper attention paid to Eurosceptic lead candidate MEPs from other countries

136  Katjana Gattermann and Sofia Vasilopoulou 2014

2009 22%

43%

4%

31%

24%

44%

0%

32%

Not at all visible

Visible in domestic news only

Visible transnationally only

Also visible transnationally

Figure 9.1  Visibility patterns of Eurosceptic lead candidates

from 2009 to 2014. Figure 9.1 provides an overview of visibility patterns of lead Eurosceptic candidates. On first sight, there are no major differences between the campaigns in 2009 and 2014. Out of the forty-nine candidate Eurosceptic MEPs considered in our analysis of the 2009 pre-electoral period, twenty-one received no coverage at all (43 per cent); in 2014, twenty-six out of fifty-none candidate Eurosceptic MEPs received no attention in European newspapers (44 per cent). Further, 31 per cent (fifteen candidates) and 32 per cent (nineteen), respectively in 2009 and 2014, were only reported upon in their domestic newspapers, but not in any other foreign newspaper. Yet, two Eurosceptic candidates (4 per cent) were solely referred to in foreign newspapers in 2009; and 22 per cent (eleven candidates) also received attention abroad in addition to their domestic coverage. In 2014, slightly more Eurosceptic lead candidates were also mentioned in foreign newspapers, that is fourteen out of fifty-nine (24 per cent). While these findings do not on first sight suggest the emergence of a ‘Eurosceptic public sphere’, the comparison of newspaper coverage reveals that most European broadsheets pay increasingly more attention to foreign Eurosceptic candidates compared to their own Eurosceptic candidate MEPs. Figure 9.2 shows the extent to which newspapers reported on domestic vs foreign Eurosceptic candidates in 2009 and in 2014. El País solely reported on foreign Eurosceptic candidates in 2009, which might be due to the fact that no prominent Eurosceptic MEP from Spain was elected in that year. Yet, this newspaper still devotes more than 80  per cent of its coverage about Eurosceptic candidate MEPs to foreign candidates in 2014, which is the most comprehensive attention in relative terms compared to other newspapers. De Volkskrant also devotes about 76 per cent of its coverage to foreign candidates in 2014, which is a rise of about 50 per cent compared to its coverage in 2009. Only the Frankfurter Rundschau and The Guardian pay slightly less attention to foreign candidates in 2014 than they have done in

Eurosceptic candidate MEPs in the news  137

2009

2014 La Stampa

La Stampa

El Pais

El Pais

Der Standard

Der Standard

Gazeta Wyborcza

Gazeta Wyborcza

Le Monde

Le Monde

Poliken

Poliken

Frankfurter Rundschau

Frankfurter Rundschau

De Volkskrant

De Volkskrant

The Guardian

The Guardian

Total

Total

0%

50%

Domesc candidates

0%

100%

50%

100%

Foreign candidates

Figure 9.2  Attention to domestic vs foreign Eurosceptic lead candidates in each newspaper

2009. One explanation in the case of the Frankfurter Rundschau may relate to the Alternative for Germany, which had been newly founded in 2013 just one year prior to the EP election and was the first German party that focused on the EU and the euro in particular as a predominant issue (see Arzheimer 2015). In the case of The Guardian, Nigel Farage stirred up domestic political debates, which proffered him prominent attention. The remaining newspapers paid more attention to foreign Eurosceptic candidates in 2014 compared to 2009. These findings appear to be in line with previous research on the news visibility of political actors during EP election campaigns, which finds that European actors have become slightly more visible between the 1999 and 2009 elections compared to domestic political actors, although cross-country variations still prevail (de Vreese et al. 2006; Schuck et al. 2011). Furthermore, we noticed that twenty out of our selected fifty-nine lead candidates in 2014 had also been standing in the 2009 EP elections (not shown here). Thirteen of them did not receive more attention, if at all, in foreign news during the 2014 campaigns. And while two right-wing and two left-wing Eurosceptic candidates, namely the Dane Morten Messerschmidt (Danish People’s Party) and the Pole Ryszard Legutko (Law & Justice) as well as the Frenchman Jean-Luc Mélenchon (Front de Gauche) and the Dutchman Dennis de Jong (Socialist Party) were not reported abroad in 2009, each of them featured in some foreign newspaper articles in 2014 (ranging from one to four articles). Moreover, the coverage of Marine Le Pen (FN) and Nigel Farage (UK Independence Party, UKIP) was significantly higher in both domestic and foreign news during the 2014 campaigns compared to 2009. Marine Le Pen was reported five times in Le Monde and twice abroad in 2009. In 2014, when she was national party leader of FN, the number of

138  Katjana Gattermann and Sofia Vasilopoulou articles increased to forty-six and fifty-seven, respectively. Nigel Farage was only referred to in three articles at home and four times in foreign news in 2009. During the 2014 election campaigns, The Guardian published ninety-one articles about him, and the foreign press reported on him in forty-seven cases. However, Jean-Marie Le Pen (FN) received less attention abroad in 2014 (seven articles) compared to 2009 (seventeen); his domestic coverage did not even increase (eight articles in each year), presumably because his daughter Marine had taken over the party leadership in 2011 (Mayer 2013; Shields 2013). In 2009, Le Monde mostly published articles that related to the Jean-Marie Le Pen’s electoral campaign and party disagreements with previous FN MEPs Carl Lang and Fernand Le Rachinel. One article covered the EP reform to stop Jean-Marie Le Pen from chairing the first EP session as the oldest MEP. This reform was also discussed in other newspapers, including Der Standard, Frankfurter Rundschau, Politiken and De Volkskrant at the beginning of May 2009. The British Guardian took a largely domestic perspective: it only reported upon Jean-Marie Le Pen with reference to the Conservative Party’s pledge to quit the European People’s Party and the possibility of sitting with the ‘non-attached’ MEPs at the back of the Parliament alongside MEPs from the FN. Similarly, the Dutch newspaper De ­Volkskrant reported about the possibility of the Dutch Freedom Party (PVV), led by Geert Wilders with Barry Madlener as lead candidate, forming an EP group with Jean-Marie Le Pen’s FN, which was debated with scepticism by journalists and reportedly also other Dutch politicians in the news. Other newspapers, including Der Standard, also reported about French domestic politics, with reference to the FN under the leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen; Frankfurter Rundschau compared their success to the marginal relevance of German populist right parties in German politics. Interestingly, Politiken published a short profile of Jean-Marie Le Pen on its front page on 28 May 2009. When looking at the most visible Eurosceptic candidate per country, i.e. taking into account the total number of articles in both domestic and foreign news, very few candidate MEPs stand out (Table 9.2). During the 2009 campaigns, Morten Messerschmidt was one of the most prominent candidates in terms of number of articles (twenty-five) that referred to him. Yet, these articles only appeared in domestic news. Conversely, Jean-Marie Le Pen was more visible abroad than at home: 68 per cent of all twenty-five articles were published in other newspapers than Le Monde. Nick Griffin, the then leader of the British National Party, was referred to in six out of twenty-six articles abroad; and more than one-third of the Northern League’s Umberto Bossi coverage was in foreign newspapers. As also shown above, Marine Le Pen and Nigel Farage were very visible in domestic and foreign news in 2014. Yet, the majority of Marine Le Pen’s coverage concerned foreign newspapers (61.17 per cent), whereas Nigel Farage was more visible at home in relative terms (65.94 per cent). The remaining candidates received comparatively little attention abroad, especially in absolute terms, during both campaigns. Nigel Farage had the most comprehensive domestic coverage compared to any other Eurosceptic lead candidate in the run-up to the 2014 EP elections.

Eurosceptic candidate MEPs in the news  139 Table 9.2  Most visible lead Eurosceptic candidate per country per year of European Parliament election Year

Country

Name

Party

2009

UK

Nick Griffin

FR

Jean-Marie Le Pen Barry Madlener

NL DE DK

2014

AT IT ES PL UK FR NL DE DK AT IT ES PL

Lothar Bisky* Morten Messerschmidt Hans-Peter Martin Umberto Bossi – Michał Kamiński Nigel Farage Marine Le Pen Dennis de Jong and Marcel de Graaff Bernd Lucke Morten Messerschmidt Harald Vilimsky* Matteo Salvini Pablo Iglesias* Janusz Korwin-Mikke

Total No. of Articles (Domestic and Foreign)

Share in Foreign News (%)

British National Party FN

26

23.08

25

68.00

Party for Freedom Die Linke Danish People’s Party Liste Martin LN

13

0.00

4 25

50.00 0.00

34 22

5.88 36.36

Law & Justice UKIP FN Socialist Party Party for Freedom Alternative for Germany Danish People’s Party Freedom Party Northern League Podemos Korwin

4 138 103 5 5

25.00 34.06 61.17 40.00 0.00

22

13.64

38

7.89

9 13 6 10

11.11 30.77 16.67 40.00

Note: * This is the only lead Eurosceptic candidate considered from the respective country at that time.

As  previously mentioned, The Guardian reported on him ninety-one times. Although the newspaper was generally critical of Farage, one of its articles admits that ‘[t]he news can’t get enough of Nigel Farage because he adds a bit of colour, which is ironic considering what he represents’ (The Guardian 20 May 2014), lending support to the applicability of the negativity news value (Galtung and Ruge 1965). The Guardian’s reporting focused largely on the party’s anti-­ immigrant and anti-EU agenda; and what the party’s success could mean for the UK’s place in the EU. Another domestic dimension of the reporting was the impact of UKIP’s increasing influence on Labour party success and the extent to which the Conservative Party would be able to attract the Eurosceptic vote (e.g. Ford and Goodwin 2014). A number of articles mention domestic politicians’ response

140  Katjana Gattermann and Sofia Vasilopoulou over Farage’s alleged racist comments during the campaign. The topic of political disillusionment across Europe also featured (e.g. The Guardian 21 May 2014); but was much less prominent compared to the domestic angle of UKIP’s success. As regards Marine Le Pen, the focus of the forty-six articles in Le Monde was largely on the potential of the FN of gaining more electoral support in the EP election compared to the centre-right Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) and the centre-left Socialist Party (PS). The prospect of the EP electoral outcome marking the start of a solid three-party system (PS-UMP-FN) with FN possibly topping the polls in 2017 featured heavily in the domestic press (e.g. Le Monde 21 May 2014; Le Monde 30 April 2014). Domestic journalists often reported upon the FN leader in articles that provided a general analysis of populism and Euroscepticism across the EU; and they did so with reference to other Eurosceptic parties of the right, such as UKIP and the PVV. Finally, we examined which foreign Eurosceptic lead candidate received most attention in each national newspaper. Table 9.3 shows a much clearer pattern. ­During the 2009 campaigns, Jean-Marie Le Pen was the most prominent foreign candidate in five out of eight newspapers (bar the domestic newspaper), namely The Guardian, De Volkskrant, Frankfurter Rundschau, Politiken and Der Standard. Yet, the absolute number of articles in 2009, ranging from two to four, is lower compared to the number of articles referring to Eurosceptic candidates in 2014. In 2009, Umberto Bossi was prominent in the Spanish El País (five articles); and Nick Griffin was reported twice in La Stampa. Le Monde and Gazeta Wyborcza either paid little or no attention to Eurosceptic lead candidates from abroad. In 2014, Marine Le Pen was the most prominent Eurosceptic lead candidate from a transnational perspective. While Gazeta Wyborcza only reported twice about her, she received more attention in the British, Dutch, Italian and Spanish newspapers with eight to thirteen articles in each press. Der Standard reported very little about foreign candidates, and only published one article each on Marine Le Pen and Morten Messerschmidt in 2014. Similar to the nature of her domestic coverage, the French Eurosceptic candidate MEP was reported upon Table 9.3  Most visible foreign lead Eurosceptic candidate per national newspaper Newspaper

2009

2014

The Guardian Le Monde De Volkskrant Frankfurter Rundschau Politiken Der Standard

Jean-Marie Le Pen (3) Various (each 1) Jean-Marie Le Pen (4) Jean-Marie Le Pen (2) Jean-Marie Le Pen (4) Jean-Marie Le Pen (3)

La Stampa El País Gazeta Wyborcza

Nick Griffin (2) Umberto Bossi (5) None (0)

Marine Le Pen (8) Nigel Farage (11) Marine Le Pen (12) Nigel Farage (5) Nigel Farage (8) Marine Le Pen (1) and Morten Messerschmidt (1) Marine Le Pen (11) Marine Le Pen (13) Marine Le Pen (2)

Note: the number of articles is included between brackets

Eurosceptic candidate MEPs in the news  141 in articles that covered the general problem of political disenchantment among European publics in all foreign newspapers. Interestingly, El País reflected upon why in Spain there is no equivalent to UKIP’s Nigel Farage, the FN’s Marine Le Pen, the PVV’s Geert Wilders, the Northern League’s Roberto Maroni, the Golden Dawn’s Nikolaos Michaloliakos and others (El País 12 May 2014). Most newspapers associated Marine Le Pen with strong anti-EU and anti-immigration rhetoric and mentioned potential collaborations at the EP level, thus focusing on the potential for further pan-European Euroscepticism. The Guardian and La Stampa reported on Marine Le Pen with reference to the possibility of forming a common ‘front’ in the EP with UKIP and the Northern League respectively (The Guardian 21 May 2014; La Stampa 5 May 2014). The Dutch De ­Volkskrant focused especially on the plans of Geert Wilders to enter a coalition with Marine Le Pen (e.g. 10 May 2014). However, this newspaper also devoted considerable attention to French domestic politics, as it had done during the 2009 campaigns. The respective articles included an interview with ‘the second man of the Front National’ (14 May 2014), Florian Philippot; reflections on the French election campaigns; and the domestic debate concerning France’s membership of the Eurozone (21 May 2014). Another common theme in the Dutch and Danish newspapers was the relationship and influence of Vladimir Putin with regard to Eurosceptic parties across Europe, including Marine Le Pen’s FN (e.g. De Volkskrant 3 May 2014; Politiken 20 May 2014). Gazeta Wyborcza also reported about Italy’s Five Star Movement as well as the pan-European lead candidates (Spitzenkandidaten) nominated by the five major EU parties during the 2014 elections in relation to Marine Le Pen, but did not devote much attention to her individually (15 May 2014; 20 May 2014). Lastly, as an anecdote, Politiken also provided an overview of the most active politicians on Twitter during the 2014 campaigns, with Marine Le Pen having allegedly the most Twitter followers (16 May 2014). Table 9.3 further shows that Nigel Farage was most prominent out of all Eurosceptic candidates considered in our analysis in Le Monde (eleven articles articles), Frankfurter Rundschau (five) and Politiken (eight). The foreign press coverage focused on the theme of British politics and British exceptionalism (e.g. Frankfurter Rundschau 28 April 2014; 9 May 2014; Politiken 4 May ­ ritish debate about immigration from the new EU member states 2014) and the B (Gazeta Wyborcza 14 May 2014). Nigel Farage was also subject to several and lengthy personal portraits abroad, focusing on his perceived pastime in British pubs (e.g. De ­Volkskrant 2 May 2014; Frankfurter Rundschau 14 May 2014). The transnational themes of EP cooperation and/or popular disillusionment featured much less in La Stampa and El País. Le Monde reported upon potential links between UKIP and Alternative for Germany (16 May 2014); compared Farage to Marine Le Pen (29 April 2014); and discussed possible cooperation between Beppe Grillo and Nigel Farage (10 May 2014). The coverage of Farage in the Dutch De Volkskrant was similar to that of Marine Le Pen, focusing on the potential electoral alliance with Geert Wilders and the growing influence of Eurosceptics across Europe (e.g. 10 May 2014); and the influence of Putin (e.g. 30 April

142  Katjana Gattermann and Sofia Vasilopoulou 2014). Politiken also took a transnational perspective on Eurosceptics and populists, for example discussing Nigel Farage in relation to the Dane Morten Messerschmidt (e.g. 14 May 2014; 16 May 2014). Beyond references to the common anti-EU agenda of Eurosceptic actors, two main transnational themes emerge from our analysis. First the problem of political disillusionment that is witnessed across Europe. This is a general pan-­ European phenomenon that relates to lack of trust in politics, a general feeling of malaise, disenchantment with the system and fear of globalisation. The election of Eurosceptic MEPs (especially the radical/populist Eurosceptics) is partly a symptom of this political dissatisfaction. Second, issues related to the collaboration of Eurosceptic MEPs. These refer to right-wing Eurosceptics whose cooperation at the EU level has been historically proven difficult (Startin 2010; see Startin and Brack in Chapter 3 of this book) and tends to be resisted by mainstream parties across Europe. Both themes have pan-European resonance and relate directly to one of Risse and van de Steeg’s (2003: 2) preconditions for the Europeanisation of public spheres, i.e. debating Europe as an ‘issue of common concern’ across Europe.

Conclusion In this chapter, we have investigated the news visibility of Eurosceptic candidate MEPs during the 2009 and 2014 European election campaigns in order to assess the potential emergence of a Eurosceptic public sphere. Our findings indicate that most newspapers tend to focus primarily on their domestic Eurosceptic candidates and pay less attention to other Eurosceptic candidates from abroad. A closer look, however, indicates that most newspapers generally pay more attention to Eurosceptic candidate MEPs when comparing the 2009 and 2014 campaigns. We also find an increase for most newspapers between 2009 and 2014 in the extent to which they pay attention to foreign Eurosceptic candidates compared to their own Eurosceptic candidate MEPs. We find that right-wing Eurosceptics stand out in terms of prominence abroad. Jean-Marie Le Pen received the most attention in foreign news in 2009. Marine Le Pen and Nigel Farage were most visible transnationally in 2014. Given their prominence, we chose to take a closer look at the newspaper articles in order to contextualise their coverage. Our qualitative analysis of the articles reporting on these three candidate MEPs reveals that newspapers mention them both with reference to domestic issues relevant to their country of origin but also with reference to transnational themes. We identify three general transnational themes during the 2014 election campaigns. These are: 1) the common Eurosceptic and anti-EU agenda of these actors; 2) the rising levels of popular disillusionment with centrist parties and with the EU; and 3) scenarios of Eurosceptic pan-European cooperation in the EP. Our findings show that the foreign European press picks upon Eurosceptic candidate MEPs, and it does so particularly when it comes to right-wing Eurosceptics. This suggests that the right-wing Eurosceptic arguments that refer to sovereignty and culture have more transnational resonance compared

Eurosceptic candidate MEPs in the news  143 to left-wing EU critiques. Right-wing Eurosceptics, such as Jean-Marie Le Pen, Marine Le Pen and Nigel Farage, put forward a ‘hard’ Eurosceptic argumentation criticising every aspect of the EU and ultimately seeking their country’s withdrawal. This strong opposition to the EU makes their message more attractive to newsmakers in line with the ‘negativity’ news value (Galtung and Ruge 1965: 65–71). In addition, right-wing Eurosceptics historically tend to find pan-European political cooperation at the EP level problematic (see Startin and Brack Chapter 3 of this book). In contrast to left-leaning Eurosceptics who have established long-­standing EP groups, right-wing Eurosceptics have tended to see cooperation more as a strategic necessity rather than the result of ideological affinity. As a result, patterns of cooperation tend to change often due to disagreements and rivalries, and a great part of pre-electoral campaigns is spent in an attempt to find partners, which generates news coverage. But it should be noted that our analysis was limited to newspapers with a centre-left political affiliation and countries in which right-wing Eurosceptics are electorally strong. Left-leaning newspapers are likely to have stronger views regarding the threat right-wing Eurosceptics may pose to democracy (especially parties such as the FN), and given their centre-left stance they may not necessarily disagree with parts of the left-wing Eurosceptic argument that criticises the EU as being too neo-liberal. Future research should extend the research design to politically right-leaning broadsheets as well as to tabloids, television and online media to study whether we find evidence for an emergence of a Eurosceptic public sphere. Furthermore, measures of MEP visibility in the news that would incorporate how many times each MEP is mentioned in each article and newspaper readership (e.g. ­Gattermann and Vasilopoulou 2015); or methods such as claims-making (Statham et al. 2010) or through the analysis of news frames (e.g. see de Vreese 2003) are likely to yield more precise results than simply counting the number of articles. Lastly, future research should compare the transnational visibility of Eurosceptic candidate MEPs to the news prominence of Europhile candidates (e.g. see Gattermann and Vasilopoulou 2015 for domestic news), and especially during non-election times (see Gattermann 2013). Overall, our study represents a first assessment of the visibility of Eurosceptic actors in the European public sphere. Our findings indicate that Eurosceptic actors are contributing to the politicisation of the EU not only in domestic but also in foreign news. This lends support to the progressive emergence of a Eurosceptic public sphere. The increasing levels of visibility of Eurosceptic candidate MEPs in the news imply that European citizens are becoming more aware of Eurosceptic players both domestically and from other EU countries.

Note 1 Nation-wide lists apply to Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain. We consider constituency lists for the UK, Poland, France and Italy. An overview of the Eurosceptic parties considered in 2009 and 2014 is available from the authors upon request.

144  Katjana Gattermann and Sofia Vasilopoulou

Bibliography Arzheimer, K. (2015) ‘The AfD: Finally a Successful Right-Wing Populist Eurosceptic Party for Germany?’ West European Politics, 38(3), pp. 535–556. Boomgaarden, H. G., Vliegenthart, R., de Vreese, C. H. and Schuck, A. R. T. (2010) News on the Move: Exogenous Events and News Coverage of the European Union, Journal of European Public Policy 17(4), pp. 506–526. Brack, N. and Startin, S. (2015) ‘Introduction: Euroscepticism, from the Margins to the Mainstream’, International Political Science Review, 36(3), pp. 239–249. de Vreese C. H. (2003) Framing Europe. Television News and European Integration. Amsterdam: Aksant. de Vreese, C. H., Banducci, S.A., Semetko, H. A. and Boomgaarden, H. G. (2006) ‘The News Coverage of the 2004 European Parliamentary Election Campaign in 25 Countries’, European Union Politics 7(4), pp. 477–504. de Wilde, P. (2011) ‘No Polity for Old Politics? A Framework for Analyzing Politicization of European Integration’, Journal of European Integration, 33(5), pp. 559–575. de Wilde, P. and Trenz, H. -J. (2012) ‘Denouncing European Integration: Euroscepticism as Polity Contestation’, European Journal of Social Theory 15(4), pp. 537–554. Díez Medrano, J. (2010) ‘Europe’s Political Identity: Public Sphere and Public Opinion’, in J. Lacroix and K. Nicolaidis (eds) European Stories: Intellectual Debates on Europe in National Contexts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 316–333. Eriksen, E. O. (2005) ‘An Emerging European Public Sphere’, European Journal of Social Theory 8(3), pp. 341–363. Føllesdal, A. and Hix, S. (2006) ‘Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 44(3), pp. 533–562. Ford, R. and Goodwin, M. (2014) Revolt on the Right: Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain, Oxford: Routledge. Galtung, J. and Ruge, M. H. (1965) ‘The Structure of Foreign news’, Journal of Peace Research 2(1), pp. 64–91. Gattermann, K. (2013) ‘News about the European Parliament: Patterns and External Drivers of Broadsheet Coverage’, European Union Politics 14(3), pp. 436–457. Gattermann, K. (2015) ‘Europäische Spitzenkandidaten und deren (Un-) Sichtbarkeit in der nationalen Zeitungsberichterstattung’, in M. Kaeding and N. Switek (eds) Die Europawahl 2014, Wiesbaden: Springer VS, pp. 211–222. Gattermann, K. and Vasilopoulou, S. (2015) ‘Absent Yet Popular? Explaining News Visibility of Members of the European Parliament’, European Journal of Political Research 54(1), pp. 121–140. Gerhards, J. (1993) ‘Westeuropäische Integration und die Schwierigkeiten der Entstehung einer europäischen Öffentlichkeit’, Zeitschrift für Soziologie 22(2), pp. 96–110. Glencross, A. (2013) ‘The EU Response to the Eurozone Crisis: Democratic Contestation and the New Fault Lines in European Integration’, Discussion Paper Europa-Kolleg Hamburg 13(3). Grande, E. and Kriesi, H. (2014) ‘The Restructuring of Political Conflict in Europe and the Politicization of European Integration’, in T. Risse (ed.) European Public Spheres: Politics is Back, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 190–224. Halikiopoulou, D., Nanou, K. and Vasilopoulou, S. (2012) ‘The Paradox of Nationalism: The Common Denominator of Radical Right and Radical Left Euroscepticism’, European Journal of Political Research 51(4), pp. 504–539. Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2009) ‘A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus’, British Journal of Political Science 39(1), pp. 1–23. Koopmans, R. (2007) ‘Who Inhabits the European Public Sphere? Winners and Losers, Supporters and Opponents in Europeanised Political Debates’, European Journal of Political Research 46(2), pp. 183–210.

Eurosceptic candidate MEPs in the news  145 Koopmans, R. and Erbe, J. (2004) ‘Towards a European Public Sphere? Vertical and Horizontal Dimensions of Europeanised Political Communication’, Innovation 17(2), pp. 97–118. Koopmans, R. and Pfetsch, B. (2003) ‘Towards a Europeanised Public Sphere? Comparing Political Actors and the Media’, ARENA Working Paper 23/03, Oslo: ARENA. Koopmans, R. and Statham, P. (eds. 2010) The Making of a European Public Sphere: Media Discourse and Political Contention, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Machill, M., Beiler, M. and Fischer, C. (2006) ‘Europe-Topics in Europe’s Media: The Debate about the European Public Sphere: A Meta-Analysis of Media Content Analyses’, European Journal of Communication 21(1), pp. 57–88. Mayer, N. (2013) ‘From Jean-Marie to Marine Le Pen: Electoral Change on the Far Right’, Parliamentary Affairs 66(1), pp. 160–178. Mudde, C. (2007) Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge ­University Press. Risse, T. (2010) A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres, New York: Cornell University Press. Risse, T. (2014) ‘No Demos? Identities and Public Spheres in the Euro Crisis’, Journal of Common Market Studies 52(6), pp. 1207–1215. Risse, T. and van de Steeg, M. (2003) ‘An Emerging European Public Sphere? Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Clarifications’, Paper presented at the conference on the Europeanisation of Public Spheres, Political Mobilisation, Public Communication and the European Union, Berlin, 20–22 June 2003. Schlesinger, P. R. (1999) ‘Changing Spaces of Political Communication: The Case of the European Union’, Political Communication 16(3), pp. 263–279. Schuck, A. R. T., Xezonakis, G., Elenbaas, M., Banducci, S. A. and de Vreese, C. H. (2011) ‘Party Contestation and Europe on the News Agenda: The 2009 European Parliamentary Elections’, Electoral Studies 30(1), pp. 41–52. Shields, J. (2013) ‘Marine Le Pen and the “New” FN: A Change of Style or of Substance?’, Parliamentary Affairs 66(1), pp. 179–196. Startin, N. (2010) ‘Where to for the Radical Right in the European Parliament? The Rise and Fall of Transnational Political Cooperation’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society 11(4), pp. 429–449. Statham, P., Koopmans, R., Tresch, A. and Firmstone, J. (2010) ‘Political Party Contestation: Emerging Euroscepticism or a Normalization of Eurocriticism?’, in R. Koopmans and P. Statham (eds) The Making of a European Public Sphere: Media Discourse and Political Contention, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 245–273. Taggart, P. (1998) ‘A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems’, European Journal of Political Research 33(3), pp. 363–388. Trenz, H. -J. (2008) ‘Understanding Media Impact on European Integration: Enhancing or Restricting the Scope of Legitimacy of the EU?’, Journal of European Integration 30(2), pp. 291–309. Trenz, H. J. and Eder, K. (2004) ‘The Democratizing Dynamics of a European Public Sphere: Towards a Theory of Democratic Functionalism’, European Journal of Social Theory 7(1), pp. 5–25. Usherwood S. and N. Startin (2013) ‘Euroscepticism as a Persistent Phenomenon’, Journal of Common Market Studies 51(1), pp. 1–16. Vasilopoulou, S. (2011) ‘European Integration and the Radical Right: Three Patterns of Opposition’, Government and Opposition 46(2), pp. 223–244. Vasilopoulou, S. (2013) ‘Continuity and Change in the study of Euroscepticism: Plus ça Change?’, Journal of Common Market Studies 51(1), pp. 153–168. Vasilopoulou, S. (2014) ‘Far-Right Euroscepticism in the 2014 European Parliament Elections’, in K. Ifantis (ed.) Is Europe Afraid of Europe? An Assessment of the Result of the 2014 European Elections, Athens: Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies/ Karamanlis Foundation, pp. 232–243.

146  Katjana Gattermann and Sofia Vasilopoulou Wessler, H., Peters, B., Brüggemann, M., Kleinen-von Königslow, K. and Sifft, S. (2008) Transnationalization of Public Spheres, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Newspaper articles De Volkskrant (30 April 2014) De Poetin-doctrine. De Volkskrant (2 May 2014) Campagne in straal van drie meter rond de biertap. De Volkskrant (3 May 2014) Extreme vrienden. De Volkskrant (10 May 2014) Wilders’ vrienden. De Volkskrant (14 May 2014) ’De EU wordt alleen maar zwakker’ – Interview Florian Philippot, tweede man van het Front National. De Volkskrant (21 May 2014) Frans debat: bedreigt de euro onze identiteit?. El País (12 May 2014) Endofobia. Frankfurter Rundschau (28 April 2014) UKIP liegt vorn – trotz Skandalen. Frankfurter Rundschau (9 May 2014) Farages Marsch nach Norden. Frankfurter Rundschau (14 May 2014) No title [Frisch-herb, unkonventionell, überschäumend: ein Mann wie ein Bier]. Gazeta Wyborcza (14 May 2014) Polacy, Węgrzy i Czesi znów zalewają Wyspy. A ­Brytyjczycy obawiali się Rumunów…. Gazeta Wyborcza (15 May 2014) Europa szuka czarnego konia. Gazeta Wyborcza (20 May 2014) Włoski komik znów w formie. Jego ruch w eurowyborach ma szanse na 25 proc. Głosów. La Stampa (5 May 2014) Berlusconi crede nella rimonta ‘Forza Italia arriverà al 25%’. Le Monde (29 April 2014) Les europhobes à l‘assaut du Parlement européen. Le Monde (30 April 2014) ENTRETIEN: Cambadélis: Le PS fonctionne toujours sur de vieux logiciels. Le Monde (10 May 2014) Beppe Grillo courtisé par José Bové et Nigel Farage. Le Monde (16 May 2014) La poussée des souverainistes allemands. Le Monde (21 May 2014) ANALYSE Elections européennes; Le Front national met l‘UMP sous pression. Politiken (4 May 2014) Storbritannien: Højrefløj æder fra jubeleuropæere. Politiken (14 May 2014) Under angreb fra EU-skeptiker. Politiken (16 May 2014) Nationalister og EU-hadere i modkamp – men håber på samling efter valget. Politiken (16 May 2014) Populist-hit på Twitter.Politiken (20 May 2014) Franske nationalister: Marine Le Pen hylder Vladimir Putin. Politiken (28 May 2009) Valgkam i privat jetfly. The Guardian (20 May 2014) The news can’t get enough of Nigel Farage because he adds a bit of colour, which is ironic considering what he represents. The Guardian (21 May 2014) Nigel Farage hints at ’common front’ with Marine Le Pen to block EU laws.

10 Religion and the European Union A commitment under stress1 Simona Guerra

Introduction The religious dimension of attitudes towards the European Union (EU) has been an understudied topic across analyses of attitudes towards EU integration. More recent studies (Grzymala-Busse 2012; Scherer 2015) stress the importance of cultural factors, and in particular of religion (see also Nelsen et al. 2001: 192). Religion still matters, and older Europeans from old member states are more sensitive to their confessional culture, while young Muslims may perceive the EU as a cultural threat (Nelsen et al. 2011). The case of Poland (Guerra 2012) has already shown that Catholicism can become an element of opposition towards European integration, but it never becomes a basic element of Euroscepticism (see also Boomgarden and Freire 2009). Nonetheless, when religion is an important element of national identity in countries, which experienced a loss in national identity, such as Poland and South-Eastern European countries, religion is likely to become an element of opposition towards secular Europe (see Guerra 2012). The EU can be perceived as a Christian club, in particular because of its history, but political developments can also become a challenge for Catholicism at the domestic level, despite opening up to a dialogue with religious communities in the 1980s. EU policy changes have led to developed institutionalised channels of participation open to interest groups (Greenwood 2011) that can partly respond to the alleged democratic deficit with low and steadily decreasing levels of turnout at European Parliament elections (42.54 per cent in 2014, European Parliament data), despite the Spitzenkandidaten, the candidate to the Presidency of the European Commission for each political group, stressing that ‘this time it [was] different’ and the absence of a ‘government’, a common language, and a ‘public space’ (Greenwood 2011: 2). The Treaty of Lisbon, ratified in 2009, finally provided for an ‘open, transparent and regular dialogue’ with religious organisations. This chapter addresses the question that guides this volume and explores to what extent transnational scepticism can represent the development of a genuine political opposition in the European political sphere. The analysis seeks to explore the attitude of two religious organisations in Brussels, COMECE (Commission of the Bishops’ Conferences of the European Community) and Pax Christi International. In particular, it examines how religion, in this case Catholicism, can

148  Simona Guerra become an element of Euroenthusiastic or Eurosceptic attitudes, and how these can be vocalised by religious organisations, as an interest group, towards the EU. First, it gives an overview of the way the Catholic Church is favoured over other religions and how policy changes in the EU have increasingly supported a dialogue with the Churches and confessional communities. Second, it introduces the role and limited number of religious organisations in Brussels and examines two faith-based organisations, COMECE and Pax Christi International. The analysis uses semi-structured interviews, as these could also enable an interaction with the interviewees and further probe themes that could be of interest. This also provides more validity to the content of the answers, as those interviewed can talk about their expertise and offer more in-depth understanding. The scope of the research was not to generalise, but to explore different channels of transnational communication that can represent a voice to attitudes towards the EU. As the interest was to maximise the knowledge on the organisation, the selection started from its main member (see Creswell 2009). All the interviews followed the standard UK research practice guidelines. This study shows that although the two organisations are structured differently and work on different targets, they share some research interests in common and can face challenges, based on sovereignty and national identity. It is here suggested that this can represent an endemic problem as the secular dimension of the EU clashes with religious organisations and their beliefs. This is a stance that is likely to represent a significant challenge in the next few years. This analysis suggests that the work of faith-based organisations is based on a pro-EU Eurosceptic base. Nonetheless the institutionalised privileged communication with the EU institutions and further EU enlargements, towards the Western Balkans and Turkey, can provide faith-based organisations with more debates, as at COMECE or at Pax Christi International, with an increasingly diverse executive, sensitive to gridlock.

The Church and the European Union A study of the role of Church and State shows that religion has often played the role of legitimating national authority. It has represented the voice supporting ‘resistance’ against communism in Poland, but it has also ‘resisted’ democratisation in Spain, while it is the ‘official national religion’, in Ireland, with Catholicism, in Iran, with Islam, and ‘Lutheranism in Sweden, or Anglicanism in England’ (Jelen and Wilcox 2002: 7–8). The fathers of European integration were led by their Christian Democratic values. Robert Schuman, Alcide De Gasperi and Konrad Adenauer did not follow the Church and the Pope’s words, but a political strategy based on values rooted in Church teaching. The Catholic ‘religious cleavage’ is definitely likely to be more pro-European, as both the economic and political dimensions of the EU integration process smoothly overlap with the ‘supranational aspirations of the Catholic Church’ and anti-nationalistic stances (Marks and Wilson 2000: 438; see also Nelsen et al. 2001).

Religion and the European Union  149 Hence, Schuman, De Gasperi and Adenauer structured a Christian Democratic network at the European level and supported ‘faster, deeper, and broader’ political integration through the European People’s Party (EPP; Philpott and Shah 2006: 51–53). Nelsen et al. (2001: 192–194) recognised that Catholic nations had ‘envisioned a single European federation’; and ‘committed Catholic politicians’, such as Romano Prodi, the Italian President of the European Commission (1999–2004), Antonio Guterres, Portuguese Prime Minister (1995–2002), and Helmut Kohl, German Chancellor (1990–1998) ‘have been among the staunchest proponents of further integration’. In an analysis on the relationship between the Church and the EU, it is worth first noting how Churches can relate to the EU, as well as the impact of policy changes at EU level on Churches. First, the Roman Catholic Church is the only one that is organised at the international level and is sceptical of the State, therefore also favouring international forms of cooperation. On the other hand, the Orthodox Church, with a firm rejection of western culture, is structured at the national level, and Islam is sceptical towards any type of authority (see Guerra 2012). That favours the Roman Catholic Church. On one hand, at the institutional level, European integration does not threaten the Church’s authority, on the other, at the theological level, the universalist and collectivist ideals are close to the founding cultural and political values that drove integration (1952). Second, in an analysis of the way the EU can affect Churches, policy changes have provided the freedom of religious expression with the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and a channel for dialogue and contribution with the White Paper (2001); while the ‘transfer of power to Brussels’ has diluted the national power of the Churches (Steven 2009). Nonetheless, policy changes have increasingly supported a dialogue with the Churches and confessional communities. In the 1980s, President of the European Commission Jacques Delors (1985–1994) started a dialogue with these communities in Brussels. He envisioned a regular dialogue with religious groups, Churches and communities of conviction, and the dialogue was later introduced in Declaration No. 11 of the Treaty of Amsterdam. In 2001, it was further developed with the White Paper on European Governance and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, where Article 10 reads that ‘Churches and religious communities have a particular contribution to make’. Finally, in 2009, ­Article 17 of the Treaty of Lisbon provides for an ‘open, transparent and regular dialogue’.

From Amsterdam to Lisbon With the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989), the EU was aware that further enlargements demanded policy changes. With the Maastricht Treaty (1992), the European Community became a political union, following institutional and policy changes. These partly addressed the perceived democratic deficit of the EU, with the increased power of the European Parliament through the co-decision procedure, and establishing the appointment by the European Parliament of an Ombudsman

150  Simona Guerra that could gather and investigate claims of maladministration in the activities of the EU institutions by citizens. The creation of a political union had to move hand-in-hand with a sense of common belonging, and President Delors started informal talks with representatives of organisations in the field of culture, science and ‘religion’. In 1992, he launched ‘A Soul for Europe’, that was founded in 1994, ‘to give [the EU] spirituality and meaning’ (European Commission – Ecumenical Centre 1992). The implications and consequences of a new political union were discussed within the perspective of further enlargements. The regular and continuous dialogue with confessional organisations, religious groups and Churches was written down in Declaration No. 11 of the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997). The EU had taken on more countries in 1995 (Austria, Finland and Sweden), and had already signed Association Agreements with Central and Eastern Europe as far back as 1991 (Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia). At the end of the 1990s Turkey accepted a reform package, which included the protection of human rights and the abolition of death penalty – that was welcomed by the EU (Ozzano 2014) in view of the possible opening of the negotiation process. The first reference to religious communities in a Treaty referred to the protection from prejudice and freedom of association, ‘The European Union respects and does not prejudice the status under national law of Churches and religious associations or communities in the Member States. The European Union equally respects the status of philosophical and non-confessional organizations’ (Treaty of Amsterdam 1997). The German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, a Christian Democrat, was successful in overcoming French resistance and religious communities were exempted from Article 13 (prohibiting discrimination on religious and sexual grounds), a first step towards being exempted by EU law and regulations. The role of civil society and its fundamental contributions were stressed only in 2001, with the White Paper on European Governance. As with the Treaty of Maastricht, the White Paper focused on engaging citizens and a ‘structured channel for feedback, criticism and protest’. Among the ‘social partners’, charities, professional and grass-roots organisations, Churches and religious communities had ‘a particular contribution to make … civil society mobilize people and support, for instance, those suffering from exclusion or discrimination’ (European Commission 2001). Religion did not have a reference of its own, but remained as a contributor to debates on fundamental rights. The debate on religious and faith organisations moved forward and became central with the Constitutional Treaty, then the Treaty of Lisbon. The first disagreements emerged on the role and rights of religious organisations in the new constitution. Originally, the constitution drafted a special reference (Article 52, Article 51 in previous drafts) to the ‘Church’, granting ‘significant and unique privileges and rights to religious denominations and make(ing) them exempt from some law and regulations’ (Catholics for a Free Choice nd). The Catholic Church was definitely backing this initiative, and the Vatican was active in influencing the EU institutions and national governments. The Pope,

Religion and the European Union  151 John Paul II, had meetings with the President of the Convention (established in December 2001) Valérie Giscard d’Estaing, the President of the European Parliament Pat Cox, the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, and the German Vice Chancellor Joschka Fischer. The national bishops’ conferences also worked at the national level to make the position of the Church on the constitution clear. The Vatican lobbied strongly for a special status for the Church that had to be distinct from the other social and cultural organisations. That had to be recognised first, at the institutional level (following the individual and collective dimensions of religiosity, and the political dimension of faith communities); second, through the right of the Churches to regulate their administration and life according to their teachings, with the consequent exemptions from the EU law and regulations. Even though these exemptions could have been partly gained in the Amsterdam Treaty, at the time the Vatican asked for an appendix to the Treaty. Third, the Vatican also sought to have a special ‘consultative’ status of its own, as in the institutional dimension (Catholics For a Free Choice nd). ‘The re-evangelisation of Europe’ was one of the main goals of John Paul II’s papacy (Aydin 2009) and the position of Turkey re-emerged in these years after Cardinal Ratzinger answered a question on the possible accession of Turkey in the near future, stressing that the identification of Turkey with Europe would be a ‘mistake’. Still, Churches’ representations in Brussels do not oppose Turkey’s membership, although they do not appear as the warmest supporters (ibid.). The most controversial and emotive debates emerged in 2007, following the reference to the Judeo-Christian roots of Europe, in the preamble of the Constitutional Treaty, supported by the Vatican and the Polish and Spanish Governments of Lech and Jarosław Kaczyński and José Maria Aznar, respectively. The debate that emerged led to a final agreement on the Constitutional Treaty proposed by the EU with reference to the common values pertaining to Europe’s ‘cultural, religious and humanistic inheritance’, a formula which was acceptable to all the Convention members (see European Convention nd) and reflecting Europeans’ answers to the values and meanings of the EU (Eurobarometer nd). The double rejections of the Constitutional Treaty by the French (55 per cent voted ‘No’ from a 69 per cent turnout, 29 May 2005) and Dutch (62 per cent voted ‘No’ from a 63 per cent turnout, 1 June 2005) referendums changed the nature of the debate. The new Treaty, the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) referred to the Churches in Article 17, which lay down that: The Union respects and does not prejudice the status under national law of churches and religious associations or communities in the Member States; 2. The Union equally respects the status under national law of philosophical and non-confessional organisations. (Treaty of Lisbon 2009) This was in partial response to Church’s requests, and this led to a recognised distinctive institutional channel between the Churches and the EU from 2009 onwards.

152  Simona Guerra

Religious representations in Brussels In Brussels today there are different interest representatives; in April 2011 the number reached 3,798 with about 15,000 people involved (Mihuţ 2011: 70). Among these, only seventeen were registered as ‘representatives of religions, Churches and communities of conviction’ and ten as ‘representatives of churches or religious organisations’ (ibid.: 79). As of 2015, the Transparency Register of the European Commission shows a list of seventy organisations, just with reference to the religious dimension. Figures might mislead the overall picture of confessional and interreligious communities in Brussels, because it is mainly dependent on the level of regulations on lobbying of the EU, as ‘European ecumenical bodies, national Churches, NGOs and NGO networks, but also Muslim and Jewish organisations’ all have a representation close to the EU institutions (Hatzinger and Schnabel 2007: 46). In July 2010, following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the sixth annual European faith leaders’ meeting was held in Brussels with representatives from the European institutions (Presidents of the European Council, Commission and Parliament) and from Christian, Muslim, Jewish, Sikh and Hindu religious communities. A similar meeting took place with philosophical and non-­ confessional organisations. The institutional structure of the Church makes its position more favourable compared to other faith-based organisations. Hehir (2006: 97) examined the Church’s ‘systemic level of presence’ in order to explain its influence. From the Papacy to the Secretariat of State and diplomatic corps, relations with national states and ‘both policy statements and moral teaching about international affairs’, the Roman Catholic Church has the closest and most elaborate relationship with the EU. Although the Church is not a typical interest group, ‘its strategies are … affected by several similar factors … group’s perception of its role and of what it is trying to accomplish … public legitimacy… (Warner 2000: 96). As Michalowitz (2007) suggests, there are three factors that can be analysed in order to examine the influence of interest groups on the EU, the degree of conflict, structural conditions and type of influence. Among all the confessional organisations in Brussels, the COMECE is definitely the one that maintains a ‘special’ dialogue with the institutions, although registered only as ‘Lobbyists accredited to the European Parliament’ (Mihuţ 2011: 79). That is likely to reflect the status of the organisation at the beginning, when it emerged from a European Catholic Pastoral Information Service (SIPECA, 1976–1980), just before the first European Parliament elections (1979). The initial objective was to create a ‘liaison between the Bishops’ Conferences and the European Community’ (COMECE nd). Pax Christi International emerged after the Second World War as a ‘non-profit, non-governmental Catholic peace movement’ and its mission is reconciliation after conflict, ‘in the fields of human rights, human security, disarmament and demilitarisation’ on a global scale (Pax Christi International nd).

Religion and the European Union  153 Commission of the Bishops’ Conferences of the European Community The office of COMECE is located in Square de Meeûs, close to the European Parliament buildings, in Brussels. Its missions have developed (t)o monitor and analyse the political process of the European Union; (t)o inform and raise awareness within the Church of the development of EU ­policy and legislation; (t)o maintain a regular Dialogue with the EU Institutions (European Commission, Council of Ministers and European Parliament) through annual Summit meetings of religious leaders, Dialogue Seminars, various Conferences and by taking part in Consultations launched by the European Commission; and (t)o promote reflection, based on the Church’s social teaching, on the challenges facing a united Europe. (COMECE nd) Its common body is made up of ‘bishops’ delegated by twenty-four Catholic Bishops’ conferences. The General Secretary was at the time of the first round of interviews Father Piotr Mazurkiewicz (from Poland; succeeded by Father Patrick Daly, from Ireland, in 2013) and the Deputy General Secretary was Michael Kuhn (from Austria). A further ten members of staff, from Malta, Italy, Spain, Germany, Belgium, France and Portugal, work in the Brussels headquarters as general and legal advisers. The nature of the daily work with the EU institutions at COMECE is 10 per cent at the institutional level and 90 per cent on ethical issues (Interview No. 2). COMECE can contact both the European Parliament (on legislative issues) or the Commission’s cabinet. The work of COMECE develops through different research themes and regular seminars – mainly to disseminate their work to the public (Interview No. 1 and No. 2) – and the seminars may focus on some basic fundamental issues, as human rights and minorities, ‘in the same way the EU approaches them’ (Interview No. 2). During his travels, the Deputy General Secretary can meet with the Serbian metropolitan, or in London ‘with the representative of the Austrian bishops’. When asked about the work with the EU, COMECE has ‘quite a good relationship with the Commission (also regarding their influence on some policy proposals) and the European Parliament’, in particular with some political groups, depending also on the representation of bishops in Brussels by nationality (Interview No. 1). COMECE has ‘very good and solid links with ALDE’ (Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe), ‘the Socialists’ (Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats: S&D) ‘and some MEPs at the European People’s Party’ (Interview No. 1). Also, the nationality of the different members facilitates the relationship with representatives from the same country, but that does not influence any relationship with those considered as more challenging (the reference was towards European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR) Members of the European Parliament from Central and Eastern Europe)

154  Simona Guerra (Interview No. 1). The General Secretary claimed to have quite good relationships with Members of European Parliament (MEPs) from the ALDE group and some from the EPP political group. COMECE members can also have easy access to the European Parliament, as they have a personal badge and do not need to book a meeting in advance to enter the building (Interview No. 2). Additionally, the appointment of Herman van Rompuy (2009–2014) as President of the European Council was welcomed by COMECE and created an easier channel for dialogue at the Council level, as he had a Jesuit education. ­COMECE regularly publishes a monthly newsletter, ‘Europe Info’, with OCIPE (Office Catholique d’Information et d’Initiative pour l’Europe), run by the Jesuits. As a consequence, COMECE tends to maintain good relations with officers who had a Jesuit education (Interview No. 2). COMECE also networks with outside organisations, such as civil society, national governmental representatives, trade unions and other lobbies in Brussels. For the campaign on climate change, COMECE worked with Greenpeace; COMECE works in particular on a few policy themes that can be accessed through their website, and make available documents and report under the banner ‘Ecology and Sustainability’. On policy issues, the organisation can select their institutional partners depending on policy themes. On immigration and asylum, COMECE rarely debates with MEPs from the EPP political group, but with the S&D and ALDE MEPs. COMECE can also address working groups, and much less the Council compared to the European Parliament and the Commission (Interview No. 2). A major concern that COMECE has recently addressed is citizens’ disengagement both at the spiritual and institutional level. At the end of the 1990s, Peter Berger (1999) suggested that a process of secularisation was occurring, with decreasing political and social significance of religious institutions, and found a relationship between modernisation and secularisation. With time, Berger realised that modernisation had instead impacted on ‘pluralisation’. The change has affected ‘how’ people believe; in countries with religious freedoms, and in countries where the state tries to control different religious groups, alternative spiritual movements can emerge (Berger 2012). COMECE’s main concern regarded these movements, as emerging outside of the Church, while ‘there should be a framework, a containment’ (Interview No. 1) for any spiritual movement. According to the organisation, Delors’ ‘A Soul for Europe’ (1994) was a mistake, as a common sense of belonging ‘does not exist’ (Interview No. 1), while COMECE suggests focusing on structuring the work based on different countries and comparing common patterns. Disengagement with institutions is a common European issue and research interest. COMECE is interested in exploring ‘where the Church lost its people’. Issues addressed by COMECE include: the resurgence of spiritual movements, outside the official Church; dangerous relations between the fundamentalist Church and populist (radical right-wing) parties; and the recent child abuse scandals and investigations in the Irish and American Churches (Interview No. 1). Populism was the main theme in a plenary held in November 2010. Plenaries are held twice a year behind closed doors, and COMECE releases a report

Religion and the European Union  155 following each of them. ‘Populist movements’ examined the rise of populism in Europe (COMECE 2011), and issues dealing with the divisions that populism can create across society and its ‘simplification’ to ‘complex problems’. COMECE reacted to that with values underlying European integration, in particular with ‘solidarity’, promoting ‘intercultural dialogue’ and addressing Christians throughout Europe – as some ‘are tempted to follow these (populist) trends’ (COMECE 2011 and Interview No. 3). The COMECE Bishops called upon Christians to resist the pull of populism and to swim against the tide: the Gospel calls us to do this today as it did in former generations. Not in order to engage in battle of cultures or ideologies, but to lay down the principles that are at the root of everything: the steadfast, dignity of the human person – as so loved and wished for by God – and the common good, which reminds us time and time again to show solidarity and to love our neighbour. (COMECE 2010) Although promoting intercultural dialogue, through seminars, meetings and research reports, COMECE usually refers to Christians as a homogeneous group, distinguished from other religious communities; also the Metropolitan Emmanuel of France pointed to a ‘stereotypical and representation of Islam’ that strengthens the perception of a threat (COMECE 2008: 31), almost overlapping with the exclusive dimension of populism (see Taggart 2000). In relation to letters from European citizens, COMECE receives emails from citizens who are concerned with the protection of their own sovereignty and national values. Catholics writing to COMECE are worried about a deeper Union (Interview No. 2), with soft and hard Eurosceptic attitudes, showing the underlying tension between the openness towards solidarity and the reference to Christians as a homogeneous group. It is different with Pax Christi International – which has been less successful in its relations with the EU. Pax Christi International Pax Christi International is a movement and network of over 100 member organisations (Interview No. 4). Its headquarters, in Brussels, is the motherhouse and is located at rue du Vieux Marché aux Grains. The history of the organisation overlaps with that of the EU. Pax Christi International was founded after the Second World War in order to strengthen French and German reconciliation and its main mission is to work ‘to help establish Peace, Respect for Human Rights, Justice and Reconciliation in areas of the world that are torn by conflict. It is grounded in the belief that peace is possible and that vicious cycles of violence and injustice can be broken’ (Pax Christi International, nd). In Brussels, Pax Christi International has regular meetings with the European institutions, advisors to the Council, the Commission and MEPs at the European Parliament (Interview No. 4). Nonetheless, it is often challenging for Pax Christi to maintain good relations at the institutional level as sensitive issues may emerge

156  Simona Guerra depending on the themes and the possible opposition of members in the executive committee of the organisation (Interview No. 4). Partly, it is also recognised that there is a lack of personnel, not only in Brussels, where Pax Christi is a much less capillary organisation compared to COMECE. Their work develops the following eight different themes: (i) Disarmament and demilitarisation; (ii) Human rights, the rule of law and violent conflict; (iii) Human security and violence; (iv) Just World Order; (v) Religion and violent conflict’ – are targeted to eight strategies (i) Advocacy and Campaigning; (ii) Conflict transformation; (iii) Developing peace spirituality and theology; (iv) Education and youth work for peace; (v) I­ nterfaith and intercultural cooperation for peace; (vi) Networking; (vii) Nonviolent Social Change; (viii) Peace Building. (Pax Christi International 2010) Pax Christi International started to develop networks and seek cooperation in the post-communist area during the Cold War years. They established a member institution in the region in order to be ‘in touch with people on the other side’, in ­particular with ‘dissidents in Poland and Czechoslovakia’ in the 1980s (Interview No. 4). Pax Christi maintained a double approach: one with dissidents, and the other at a more institutional and formal level, as with the Peace Council of the regime in Munich, Germany, where the dialogue was kept moderate. In 1973–1974 the Vatican invited Pax Christi International to open a dialogue with the (former) Soviet Orthodox Church. Although Pax Christi was successful, the regime never allowed them to establish a dialogue beyond the ‘second man of the Orthodox Church’ and seminars were held only ‘every two or three years, in Moscow or in Brussels’ (Interview No. 4). Currently, the challenge for Pax Christi International is still the Orthodox Church, because of its national institutional organisation and the overlap with national identity, while ‘the identification with the nation is not accepted by the bishops’. Pax Christi does not accept ‘nationalist’ approaches and ‘proselitism’; in their view the ‘Church should be dialectic, where an action should be followed by a reaction’ (ibid.). Pax Christi International is also targeting areas outside the EU, with projects in Africa and the Middle East, also through the EU institutions, and the ‘advisors to the Council’ in these regions. In Poland, they are engaged with a dialogue with the ‘European Youth Organization’; with Islam, through the ‘mufti’ of Sarajevo. The vice-chair of Religions for Peace is based in New York, and all the religious representatives regularly meet targeting themes – as interfaith dialogue – to debate (ibid.). From this perspective, European integration is approached as one of the next challenges due to an increasing misperception of Islam, especially following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and a lack of ‘institutional capacity’ of the EU. While discussing Islam, a reference was made to the city of Antwerp in Belgium, with immigrants from Morocco and the Netherlands, with an increasing number of Muslim communities (ibid.), further challenged by the economic and immigration

Religion and the European Union  157 situations. Demographic data reported that more than one-third of citizens were from immigrant origins and the most part from Northern Africa (ibid.). Compared to COMECE, the degree of conflict, structural conditions and type of influence (Michalowitz 2007), means that Pax Christi International is less influential and has weaker structural conditions. That limits the channels towards the EU institutions and the lobbying capacity of the organisation. On the contrary, thematically, issues and challenges are quite similar: identity, nationalist stances and the threat of Islam. Nevertheless, European integration does not undermine the structure of Pax Christi International, or the way it is perceived, as it is international and based on cooperation, as the EU. The only challenges can be, internally, from conservative and nationalist members of the executive, and externally, following the next enlargements of the EU and the interfaith dialogue with the Orthodox Church in the Balkans.

A commitment under stress Both COMECE and Pax Christi International are faith-based organisations. They are structured in opposite ways; they do not share the same resources and address the EU institutions through different methods, with different degrees of success. Despite these differences, they both share the same concerns based on nationalism and identity. One of COMECE’s latest research interests has been the influence of populism and the Radical Right and Pax Christi International has also developed a research project on the Orthodox Church and the Radical Right in the Western Balkans, in particular in Serbia. These themes seem to create more tensions at COMECE, as it is organised based on their national references, in order to first inform the European institutions, and second from the European institutions towards a dialogue with other religions to, third, report back towards national countries. Unlike COMECE, Pax Christi has an international organisational structure, but it is weaker at the financial and human resources levels. That creates challenges for both organisations, while Pax Christi undergoes shortcomings in its relations with the EU institutions, COMECE faces an unstable balance between moderate support for European integration and soft/hard Euroscepticism. Broad underlying ideological positions can affect parties, and soft Euroscepticism can be found among right-wing parties in the run up to accession, when the loss of national cultural identity and the threat of sovereignty are successful electoral issues. Finally, it should not be surprising that EU integration is much debated before accession, as currently in the Western Balkans. In candidate countries, citizens can embrace the idea of EU membership enthusiastically, but the impact of the negotiation process and the relationship of the candidate countries with the EU and European Commission, can impact on citizens’ attitudes in a way that does not depend on a direct knowledge and experience of EU integration and is more susceptible to changes (Guerra 2013). For these reasons, unstable levels of EU support for European integration are not unexpected in candidate countries and that is the reason why Pax Christi International has examined religion, nationalism and the Radical Right in Serbia. Both

158  Simona Guerra COMECE and Pax Christi International are researching and dealing with Eurosceptic attitudes, ideologically driven by national identity and sovereignty. That is likely to be an endemic problem for religious organisations and the EU. Leconte (2010: 223–237) defines the relation between the EU and Churches as ‘a pro-­ European commitment under stress’ on three levels: the Churches’ status; disillusion with ‘secular’ (‘atheist’) Europe and ‘national sovereignty on ethical issues’. The Churches’ status was regulated only with the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), but both the Italian and Greek Churches had already perceived their fiscal privileges or identity threatened. With Amsterdam, the EU ‘respects and does not prejudice the status under national law of Churches and religious associations or communities in the Member States’, but concerns still emerge on identity. COMECE (and The Conference of European Churches, CEC2) supported the Treaty of Lisbon, but expressed their reservations on the developing progressive philosophy of the EU underlying the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the last draft of the Preamble, simply referring to ‘Europe’s cultural, spiritual and humanist’ heritage. If the lack of reference to Christianity dissatisfied COMECE, CEC observed ‘the degeneration of European integration into an increasingly soulless, materialistic project: ‘… Is it a community of values or a mere expanding market?’ (Leconte 2010: 225). The secular dimension of Europe also affects sections of the Catholic Church community worried about increasing normative integration on possible issues as abortion, euthanasia and same-sex marriage. That is the case with COMECE, which, while engaging directly in debates with the EU on life from conception, marriage and research on human embryonic stem cells, is still supportive of EU integration. As underlined, it never engages with more radical political groups, and on some issues it does not open any dialogue with EPP MEPs. That can create a tension that may emerge internally at organisational level and feed into more sceptic attitudes of the most conservative religious communities. That could emerge in more volatile circumstances (in the post-communist region in the run up to accession – a theme of research for Pax Christi International) and lead to a difficult balance between general support for EU integration and Eurosceptic stances (COMECE).

Conclusion Churches and religious communities have now established a regular and important dialogue with the EU institutions, and, as faith-based organisations, seem to face different challenges from other lobbies that are represented in Brussels. While promoting dialogue with the EU institutions, and establishing policy information (COMECE) and supporting cooperation in conflict areas (Pax Christi International), faith-based organisations are likely to address identity, with the possible emergence of Eurosceptic attitudes. Ethical issues are on the agenda also at the domestic and European levels (Interview 5) and more contested debates can influence public attitudes towards the EU. Mainstream Churches are pro-EU, but there are more conservative groups that can assume different positions (Madeley 2007), even though ‘religion is largely irrelevant for explaining Euroscepticism’ (Boomgarden and Freire 2009) at the individual level.

Religion and the European Union  159 COMECE generally receives Eurosceptic comments on the process of EU integration from its religious community; Pax Christi International had to trade off positions on further enlargements and put less pressure on one of their research publications, because of more conservative positions among its executive. As a consequence, faith-based organisations may need to maintain a more ‘Euro-­ neutral’ or pragmatic stance if they want to balance their position between a regular dialogue with the EU institutions and ‘their community’. Their words, feedback and letters from their communities can sometimes contain Eurosceptic rhetoric that is often similar to the narrative used by radical political groups in the European Parliament. The answer to our starting question seems to lie in the nature of the relationship of religious communities and Brussels, as defined in the literature (Leconte 2010), a commitment under stress, which shows its opposition as part of the natural evolution of the developments in this relationship itself. The study expected to unearth a rather positive attitude towards the EU institutions due to the nature, in particular, of the Catholic Church, as a transnational and supranational organisation. However, the analysis of COMECE and Pax Christi International showed that they have been challenging the European integration process across many issues. Due to the historic transnational links between the different branches of the Christian faith, not just Catholicism, these two organisations have been acting as interlocutors at the EU level for the Eurosceptic positions of Christians from across many different EU states. It appears that these organisations transmuted the Euroscepticism from their grass-roots associations into a more Euro-pragmatic and Euro-supportive attitude through their privileged access to the EU institutions. This reflects the work and themes developed within the organisation, but also attitudes at the domestic level. Still, the work of these organisations in Brussels and their favoured communication with the EU institutions enabled them to maintain a unique channel with the EU institutions. This provided a legitimate channel for Euroscepticism within the religious institutions and their communities across different member states, while also sustaining a transnational European sphere along the religious dimension.

Notes 1 The definition of ‘commitment under stress’ to the relationship between religion and the EU, here adopted, is given by Cécile Leconte (2010). 2 The Conference of European Churches (CEC) was founded after the Second World War. It is ‘an ecumenical fellowship of Churches in Europe which confess the Lord Jesus Christ as God and Saviour according to the Scriptures and therefore seek to fulfil together their common calling to the glory of the one God, Father, Son and Holy Spirit’ and seeks to lead representatives of the Churches in Europe in order to bring reconciliation (see the Conference of the European Churches website: www.ceceurope.org).

Bibliography Aydin, A. I. (2009) ‘Imagining the EU in the Turkish Mirror’, in C. Arvanitopoulos (ed.) Turkey’s Accession to the European Union: An Unusual Candidacy, Heidelberg: Springer, pp. 171–182.

160  Simona Guerra Berger, P. L. (ed. 1999) The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics, Washington: Ethics and Public Policy Center. Berger, P. L. (2012) ‘Further Thoughts on Religion and Modernity’, Society 49(4), pp. 313–316. Boomgarden, H. G. and Freire, A. (2009) ‘Religion and Euroscepticism: Direct, Indirect or No-Effect?’, West European Politics 32(6), pp. 1240–1265. Catholics for a Free Choice – Europe (nd) ‘Article 52 of the European Constitution’ [online]. Available at: www.seechange.org/what%27s%20new/article52briefingreport. htm [Accessed 1 February 2016]. COMECE (nd) Commission of the Bishops’ Conferences to the European Community [online]. Available at: www.comece.org/ [Accessed 1 February 2016]. COMECE (2008) Islam, Christianity and Europe. Religious Dimension of Intercultural Dialogue, Brussels: COMECE with CEC and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung. COMECE (2010) ‘Press Release, Issued by the Catholic Communications Network’ [online]. Available at: www.catholicchurch.org.uk/Catholic-Church/Media-Centre/ Press-Releases/Press-Releases-2010/European-Bishops-express-concern-over-rise-ofPopulist-­Movements [Accessed 1 February 2016]. COMECE (2011) ‘Europeinfos’ [online]. Available at: http://europe-infos.eu/europeinfos/ en/archive/issue134/article/3712 html [Accessed 1 February 2006]. Creswell, J. W. (2009) Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches 3, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. Eurobarometer (nd) ‘Public Opinion in the European Union [online]. Available at: http:// ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/General/index [Accessed 1 February 2016]. European Commission – Ecumenical Centre (1992) ‘A Soul for Europe’ [online]. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/policy_advisers/archives/activities/dialogue_religions_ humanisms/sfe_en htm [Accessed 1 February 2016]. European Commission (2001) ‘European Governance: A White Paper’, COM(2001) 428, Brussels: European Commission. European Convention (nd) ‘The Founding Principles of the Union’ [online]. Available at: http://europa.eu/scadplus/european_convention/objectives_en htm [Accessed 1 ­February 2016]. Greenwood, J. (2011) Interest Representation in the EU, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Grzymala-Busse, A. (2012) ‘Why Comparative Politics Should Take Religion (More ­Seriously)’, Annual Review of Political Science 15, pp. 421–442. Guerra, S. (2012) ‘Eurosceptic Allies or Euroenthusiast Friends? The Political Discourse of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland’, in L. Leustan (ed.) Does God Matter? Representing Religion in the European Union, London: Routledge, pp. 139–151. Guerra, S. (2013) Central and Eastern European Attitudes in the Face of Union, ­Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Hatzinger, K. and Schnabel, P. R. (2007) ‘Religions and the European Union: A Partnership in the Making’, Delta Publicaciones 499, pp. 45–57. Hehir, B. J. (2006) ‘The Old Church and the New Europe: Charting the Changes’, in T. A. Byrnes and P. J. Katzenstein (eds) Religion in an Expanding Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 93–116. Jelen, T. G. and Wilcox, C. (eds. 2002) Religion and Politics in Comparative Perspective. The One, the Few, and the Many, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Leconte, C. (2010) Understanding Euroscepticism, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Madeley, J. (2007) ‘Grit or Pearl? The Religious Factor in the Politics of European Integration’, Paper presented at the meeting of the European Consortium for Political Research, Helsinki, 7–12 May. Marks, G. and Wilson, C. J. (2000) ‘The Past in the Present: A Cleavage Theory of Party Response to European Integration’, British Journal of Political Science 30(3), pp. 433–459.

Religion and the European Union  161 Michalowitz, I. (2007) ‘What Determines Influence? Assessing Conditions for Decision-­ making Influence of Interest Groups in the EU’, Journal of European Public Policy 14(1), pp. 132–151. Mihuţ, L. (2011) ‘Lobbying – A Political Communication Tool for Churches and Religious Organizations’, Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies 10(29), pp. 64–86. Nelsen, B. F., Guth, J. L. and Fraser, C. R. (2001) ‘Does Religion Matter? Christianity and Public Support for the European Union’, European Union Politics 2(2), pp. 191–217. Nelsen, B. F., Guth, J. L. and Highsmith, B. (2011) ‘Does Religion Still Matter? Religion and Public Attitudes toward Integration in Europe’, Politics and Religion 4(1), pp. 1–26. Ozzano, L. (2014) ‘Religion, Political Actors, and Democratization: The Turkish Case’, Religion and Politics 7(3), pp. 590–612. Pax Christi International (nd) ‘About Us’ [online]. Available at:www.paxchristi net/ about-us [Accessed 1 February 2016]. Pax Christi International (2010) Twelve Strengths of Pax Christi, Brussels: Pax Christi International. Philpott, D. and Shah, T. S. (2006) ‘Faith, Freedom, and Federation: The Role of Religious Ideas and Institutions in European Political Convergence’ in T. A. Byrnes and P.  J.  Katzenstein (eds) Religion in an Expanding Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge ­University Press, pp. 34–64. Scherer, M. (2015) ‘The New Religious Freedom: Secular Fictions and Church ­Autonomy’, Politics and Religion 8(3), pp. 544–564. Steven, M. (2009) ‘Religious Lobbies in the European Union: from Dominant Church to Faith-Based Organisation?’, Religion, State and Society 37(11–12), pp. 181–191. Taggart, P. (2000) Populism, Buckingham: Open University Press. Warner, C. M. (2000) Confessions of an Interest Group, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Interviews Interview No. 1 (2010) COMECE Deputy General Secretary, Brussels, 9 September. Interview No. 2 (2010) COMECE Communication Officer, Brussels, 10 September. Interview No. 3 (2011) COMECE Communication Officer, Brussels, 13 April. Interview No. 4 (2010) Fr. Paul Lansu, Pax Christi International, Brussels, 10 September. Interview No. 5 (2015) Italian MEP, S&D political group, Brussels, 17 September.

11 Conclusion John FitzGibbon and Benjamin Leruth

The emergence of a Eurosceptic public sphere? In attempting to grapple with a new area of enquiry for political science, this book brought together many rich and detailed empirical analyses under the banner of transnational Euroscepticism. Before engaging with the collective substance of the book it is important to reassess the underlying rationale of the volume – namely what does it contribute in terms of how we understand Euroscepticism? As Mudde (2012) posits, Euroscepticism has become something of a ‘cottage industry’ that has subsequently expanded significantly. However, in spite of a voluminous body of work outlining different approaches as to how we define a Eurosceptic, a singular idea of what Euroscepticism actually represents is yet to be widely agreed. The complexity of disaggregating criticism of a specific European Union (EU) policy from sustained contestation of the European project has led to the resilience of the basic Taggart-Szczerbiak model of hard/soft Euroscepticism (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002). More recently this complexity has been accentuated by the increase in velocity of the presence of Euroscepticism in European party systems and civil society. As a result it has become something of an impossible task to adequately develop a taxonomy for understanding opposition to European integration, as it evolves at such a pace. What this book adds to the literature on Euroscepticism is empirical evidence presented across its ten substantive chapters with a narrative that contextualises them in an argument that Euroscepticism is inherently dynamic, and that the latest iteration of this dynamism is transnational cooperation. Where can this argument be located within the wider literature on Euroscepticism, however? With reference to the two ‘classic’ texts that formulate the bedrock of academic understanding of opposition to European integration, Hooghe and Marks (2007) and Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002), Transnational and pan-European Euroscepticism do not fit into their respective taxonomies of Green-Alternative-Libertarian/­TraditionalAuthoritarian-Nationalist (GAL-TAN) and Hard/Soft. This is because both approaches seek to understand and explain Euroscepticism by what it is and how it acts relative to European integration, but not necessarily how Euroscepticism acts as a singular entity.

Conclusion  163 Transnational (or ‘horizontal’) and pan-European (or ‘vertical’) Euroscepticism are not mutually exclusive, as illustrated in this book. Yet such a distinction needs to be drawn. For instance, as far as party-based Euroscepticism is concerned, Startin and Brack, Leruth, and Holmes’s chapters illustrated that in order for Eurosceptic parties to coordinate their actions, they need to cooperate at both levels. On the one hand, the transnational element of party-based Euroscepticism allows for such parties to adopt a common ideological platform and to create a ‘Euro-party’ that parties from non-EU member states and parties not electorally significant to be elected to the European Parliament (EP) can join (Poguntke et al. 2007). Pan-European Euroscepticism, on the other hand, gives the opportunity for Eurosceptic parties to take part in the European decision-making process by forming parliamentary groups in the EP. Such early analyses of Euroscepticism were necessarily grounded in normative political concepts as scholars grappled with a chameleonic phenomenon whose presence was most decidedly ephemeral. As Euroscepticism became more established, the literature moved towards more varied and nuanced attempts at categorisation as a means of comprehension. For example Krouwel and Abts (2007) sought to utilise the literature on political support as a means for locating where Euroscepticism could be located in a conceptualisation of the EU as a political actor across a two-dimensional field of policy and institutions. This led them to disaggregate Euroscepticism from what they termed ‘Eurodistrust’, ‘Eurocynicism’ and ‘Euroalienation’ (ibid.: 261–263). This was part of a wider movement in the study of Euroscepticism that called for more rigorous schema to adequately understand the nuances of the phenomenon. While this body of work cannot be criticised for its empirical rigour, insight and open acknowledgement of the conceptual difficulties in grappling with Euroscepticism, with the benefit of hindsight it has one significant failing – that of a rigid reliance on a domestic political focus. Even work which focused on the EP understood the Eurosceptic groups who operated there did so almost strictly in terms of their member state parent parties or as singular entities and not as a part of a wider Eurosceptic narrative. The central argument this book has identified in the study of Euroscepticism is not just about the need to recognise transnational and pan-European action by Eurosceptic actors, but to begin to conceptualise Euroscepticism as both operating beyond the domestic political sphere and inhabiting a supranational political space of its own creation. This is an important consideration as it forces the scholar to conceive of the new political dynamics that have begun to emerge in a contested EU being rapidly shaped by the Eurozone financial and economic crisis, and a series of exogenous events from the global economic crisis, the collapse of Syria, the rise of the so-called Islamic State, and the prolonged refugee and migration crises. Perhaps the most fascinating conclusion from the evidence presented in this book, is that these multiple countervailing forces have not pushed Eurosceptic actors to contest European integration in their own states only, but have caused them to cooperate transnationally across Europe to challenge the EU. At a time of critical pressure on the Union, where the very existence of the project is under the

164  John FitzGibbon and Benjamin Leruth greatest scrutiny since its inception, the most logical course of action for Eurosceptics ostensibly should be to frame their opposition at the national level. From the chapters in this book, it is plainly evident that this is no longer the case. Eurosceptics are engaging in both transnational and pan-European approaches, at a time when opposition to European integration has never been greater in domestic and national polities. Why are Eurosceptics taking this approach? In this conclusion it is posited that the study of Euroscepticism needs to take into account that because the exogenous and endogenous factors negatively impacting the stability of European integration are occurring at a European level (albeit with national effects), their exploitation of them by Eurosceptic actors is also happening at the European level (and also at the national level). The fundamental distinction we make, however, is that this form of European cooperation operates in a specific European space which, while taking some elements of European integration (the EP for example), is largely created by its members, Eurosceptic actors. Such action, we argue, is clearly evident of the emergence of a European public sphere that transcends European integration. Up to this point discussion of a European public space has focused on pro-­ integration actors coming together to create the necessary institutions and civil society spaces that can be understood as being part of a nascent European public space. The conclusion this book reaches, is that looking at Eurosceptic actors as part of a new space is an equally important consideration. As Dahl (1969) has powerfully argued, opposition is the cornerstone of any successful democracy. In drawing from this work Mair (2007) pointed out that the EU is distinctly lacking in policy competition at the European level and therefore cannot be considered a fully functioning democracy. With transnational Euroscepticism we begin to see the emergence of sustained, coherent and coordinated opposition to the EU across multiple member states. Moreover, Eurosceptic actors have begun to put forward their transnational bona fides as evidence of the completeness of their anti-EU policies, be they removing institutions (e.g. Alternative for Germany on the European Central Bank); blocking future membership for specific countries, (e.g. the Dutch Party for Freedom on Turkey); or removing their country from the EU altogether (e.g. the UK Independence Party). This pattern of action (though by no means pervasive or dominant) reveals that Eurosceptics have begun to think and act in their own transnational European space so as to achieve their strategic political goals. In taking such an understanding of European integration, we argue that the belief that the sustained development of transnational Euroscepticism is an important signifier of the emergence of a European public sphere. This conclusion points specifically to the literature on ‘demoi-cracy’ (see Nicolaïdis 2003) as the narrative of political development to which transnational and pan-European sceptic activities can be linked. In so doing it draws a clear distinction between the existing literature on the European public space which has been dominated by scholars in the fields of communications, media studies, sociology and ­philosophy;1 and the slowly developing work of researchers in European studies, international relations and political science2 who have begun to outline a sui generis concept of a European public space, based on empirical political evidence.

Conclusion  165 In this nascent state, transnational Euroscepticism forces its own engaged actors to conceive of a European political space that does not include European integration. The relative success and rate of development of the European project has clouded perceptions of Europe among mainstream politicians, and indeed most EU scholars, to the extent that their only concept of Europe has been one dominated by the EU in some shape or form. The waves of crises and policy failures have resulted in an increase in Euroscepticism that has created the necessary impetus to facilitate new ideas of Europe to emerge and develop. These ideas from transnational and Eurosceptic activities have emerged in different arenas, as discussed in this book. Eurosceptic political parties have joined forces to create pan-European groups, such as the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) and the Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) (analysed by Brack and Startin), the European Conservatives and Reformist group (ECR) (covered by Leruth) and, to a lesser extent, the Confederal Group of the United European Left/Nordic Green-Left (GUE/NGL) (discussed by Holmes). Gatterman and Vasilopoulou showed that Eurosceptic Members of European Parliament (MEPs) also receive transnational media attention during European election campaigns. ­Referendums also offer a good platform for transnational Eurosceptic activities, as FitzGibbon demonstrated. Finally, Eurosceptic civic movements united to form transnational and pan-European organisations, as shown in Chatzopoulou and Bourne, Keith, and Guerra’s contributions.

Explaining the contradiction of Eurosceptic transnational cooperation In making this argument that transnational Euroscepticism is part of a new digression in European integration there is the explicit contradiction of political actors participating in a political practice to which they are formally opposed to. While ostensibly the issue of politicians’ actions contradicting their stated positions might not appear to be the most pertinent of issues, such a phenomenon taking place within the context of European integration, and more specifically of Euroscepticism, is what gives this issue relevance. The various chapters of this collection have focused on identifying specific incidents of transnational cooperation and offering explanations of what may have caused them in these specific contexts. While Usherwood’s conceptual chapter sought to outline how transnational Euroscepticism may be conceptualised and identified relative to other understandings of Euroscepticism, this chapter seeks to build on his work by answering three key questions: 1) why Transnational and pan-European Scepticism; 2) why now; and 3) what does its emergence mean for European integration? In dealing with this emerging phenomenon at a time of unprecedented tumult in the politics of the EU, we believe that this book offers a unique and insightful perspective on how the evolution of Euroscepticism into a transnational dimension will affect ­European integration in the future. The overarching trend common across all chapters was the divergence of positions towards transnational cooperation by left-wing and right-wing Eurosceptics.

166  John FitzGibbon and Benjamin Leruth Table 11.1  Divergence of left-wing and right-wing transnational Euroscepticism

Left-wing Right-wing

Ideology

Strategy

Open Closed

Closed Open

This divergence was based on a dichotomy of ideology and strategy. Table 11.1 lays out this divergence as drawn from the evidence presented in this book. Both Holmes and Keith pointed out the lengthy and repeated attempts of the Radical Left to organise transnationally to contest against the perceived neo-liberal policies of European integration. As Holmes argued, the underlying ideological position of the Left towards the EU has been one of openness towards the possibilities it presents for international cooperation to push for progressive policies – as they perceive them. This openness was given further impetus by the implementation of greater liberal economic policies inherent in the Single Market, in particular the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) agreement outlined by Keith. Both authors argued that this ideological openness to coordination by left-wing actors has been present for many decades, but has repeatedly failed to develop due to strategic limitations. Competition between different actors within the European Radical Left to control the direction of any nascent left-wing cooperation have halted attempts to turn this into a more substantive political movement. What has changed over the past two decades is a groundswell of support for using the processes of European integration to challenge EU policies but also to use these same processes to advance ‘progressive’ policies across the EU as a whole. This change is roughly axiomatic from the French rejection of the EU Constitutional Treaty by referendum in 2005. Other referendum votes and events such as the Norwegian rejection of membership in 1973, the Danish No to Maastricht, the Danish and Swedish Nos to the single currency, or the Irish defeat of the Nice and Lisbon Treaties, were very much idiosyncratic affairs that did not resonate beyond the country in question. It was the French No to the EU Constitution where the first mass mobilisation of the Left calling for an alternative Europe was in evidence. While this is not to marginalise other issues that played a role in the outcome of the referendum, it was a fundamental milestone in the evolution of transnational Euroscepticism as it signalled to left-wing Eurosceptics across the continent that there was wider support for alternative ideas of European integration, beyond the neo-liberal fait accompli being presented to electorates. Up to this point left-wing Euroscepticism had been contained in the domestic arena with a focus on national or international, not European,-based alternatives to the EU. Now for the first time left-wing actors began to realise the necessity (not just the ideal) of advocating a coherent transnational critique of European integration bringing together like-minds from across the continent. What the French rejection of the Constitutional Treaty showed was that the process of ever more liberalisation of the EU could be contested, with a banner of an ‘alternative for Europe’ raised instead. Gradually the ideology of internationalisation

Conclusion  167 and anti-neo-liberalism inherent in Radical Left politics began to facilitate the move towards ever-greater cooperation across Europe as the Radical Left began to embrace the idea of a radically changed Europe acting as a buffer against the forces of globalisation. In contrast to the left-wing counterparts, right-wing Eurosceptics are ideologically predisposed to reject all but the most basic forms of cooperation at the European level. Yet they have moved more quickly and perhaps more decisively towards transnational Euroscepticism in the past few years than the Left. Leruth’s, Startin and Brack’s, Gatterman and Vasilopoulou’s, and FitzGibbon’s chapters all found evidence of Transnational and pan-European Euroscepticism among the European right-wing in the different arenas they examined – the EP, domestic debates on European integration, and both referendums on the Lisbon Treaty in Ireland respectively. All of these chapters found that strategic concerns were the key driving factors behind right-wing actor engagement in transnational Euroscepticism. Initially there was no overarching ideological justification for making this move into European-level cooperation; it was focused on purely strategic and utilitarian concerns. Right-wingers wanted the resources that forming an EP group provided. For convenience these groups would break-up and reform in sync with European elections with only the most tenuous of ideologies to link them. Similarly to the Left, with the defeat of the EU Constitutional Treaty and increased support for Eurosceptic parties at European parliamentary elections, right-wing Eurosceptics saw a strategic opportunity to inflict defeat upon the EU or to call for major reforms. In order to take advantage of this they had to cooperate transnationally and present to European citizens an alternative vision for Europe. This led to the beginnings of an ideological basis for transnational right-wing Euroscepticism. For Radical Right ‘hard’ Eurosceptics, such a basis was that of representing the people of Europe over the corrupt national and European political elite. Despite the fact that this argument was ostensibly focused on prioritising national sovereignty over supranational sovereignty, it actively rejected the established national political process as having being corrupted by a slavishly pro-European elite and sought instead to emphasise the role of the people of Europe (whom they claim to represent) as the true focus of authority with regard to political power in Europe. In making this argument they repeatedly sought to de-emphasise their nationalism and highlight their willingness to cooperate at a European level, albeit in a nascent form.

Mapping the emergence of Transnational Scepticism In seeking to try and understand the fundamental question of this book as to ‘why Transnational and pan-European Scepticism?’ we conclude that there is no singular reason explaining why. More generally, however, we can say that the emergence of such forms of Euroscepticism were to a substantial degree inevitable within the context of European integration. At a fundamental level, Eurosceptics had to begin to cooperate, and to do so transnationally for the simple reason that European integration continued to deepen despite the occasional single state defeats of

168  John FitzGibbon and Benjamin Leruth the EU. Whether strategically or ideologically they came to the conclusion that to defeat European integration they would have to cooperate at a pan-European level. The precariousness of this balance between contestation of European cooperation and engagement in European cooperation has led to inherent instability among Eurosceptics who engage in Transnational and pan-European Scepticism. Nevertheless this book found evidence of an increase in such activity. The next question is why now? Why have these ideological and strategic blocks on transnational cooperation been removed to allow for Eurosceptics to work together across the EU to oppose European integration? The chapters of this book pointed to a series of specific reasons as to why transnational Euroscepticism has emerged. Now it falls upon this conclusion to tie these various reasons together into an explanatory narrative. In order to complement Usherwood’s model and drawing on Stubb’s (1996) early work on differentiated integration in the EU, we suggest that three variables need to be taken in consideration in order to understand Transnational and pan-­ European Euroscepticism as a concept: time, space and matter. This suggests that, based on the findings of this collection, there is not one form of ­Transnational/ pan-European Scepticism, but several. Transnational sceptic activities can be limited over time. As highlighted by FitzGibbon in this volume, referendum campaigns offer a temporary platform for transnational Euroscepticism. The most recent examples are the Dutch Ukraine– European Union Association Agreement referendum and the United Kingdom European Union membership referendum, respectively held on 6 April and 23  June 2016. For the former, Nigel Farage gave a speech in Amsterdam and called Dutch people to vote against the agreement. In the early stages of the latter, two ‘leave’ groups, Leave.EU and Grassroots Out, held events and activities ­co-financed by the pan-European EFDD group. Similarly, transnational Euroscepticism might be limited in space. Some countries or regions are more prone to Eurosceptic activities. As mentioned in the introduction to this volume, Euroscepticism first emerged in the UK in the mid-1980s, and then spread to other countries such as France, Denmark, Ireland, and most recently Greece, Poland and Hungary. Similarly, transnational Eurosceptic activities do not occur all around Europe. While the city of Brussels is one of the main scenes of transnational Eurosceptic activities such as demonstrations against austerity and TTIP (as illustrated in Chaztopoulou and Bourne’s chapter), other countries have been less prone to those. In Hungary for instance, where the Eurosceptic Fidesz Party surfs on the wave of nationalism and opposition to European integration, there has been little evidence of transnational Eurosceptic ­activities. In addition, one might argue that the Early Warning M ­ echanism established by the Lisbon Treaty, allows for the emergence of transnational Euroscepticism. This mechanism (also known as ‘yellow’ and ‘orange’ cards) enables national Parliaments to have a say in the European decision-making process in case at least one-third of them consider that a draft EU legislative act does not comply with the principle of subsidiarity. Yet, since its introduction the Early Warning Mechanism has been used in unusual circumstances, thus acting like

Conclusion  169 an ‘alarm bell’ (Cooper 2012; 2015). Yet, the ‘red card’ initiative suggested by David Cameron could, in the future, give a new dimension to transnational Euroscepticism. Transnational and pan-European Euroscepticism can also focus on a specific aspect of the European integration project, hence the need to take into consideration a third variable: matter. This collection shows that such Eurosceptic activities tend to focus on the political, social and/or economic dimensions of the EU. Opposition to the EU as a political project is the most frequent form of Transnational and pan-European Scepticism. In the EP, the emergence of well-established Eurosceptic groups on both sides of the political spectrum such as the ENF, the EFDD, GUE/NGL and the ECR suggests that pan-European Eurosceptic activity occurs on a regular basis in this political arena. Similarly, the majority of EU-related referendums held across Europe focused on the political dimension of European integration. While pan-European opposition to the social dimension of the EU also takes place in the EP (mostly within left-wing pan-European groups), most transnational Eurosceptic civic movements tend to focus on the negative societal consequences of European integration instead of focusing on the political aspect of the debate. Finally, since the Great Recession, these movements increasingly moved towards transnational opposition to neo-liberal policies, such as TTIP and imposed austerity measures (Walby 2015). Yet, not all events stimulate transnational Eurosceptic activities. The degree of politicisation of an EU-related issue plays an important role in determining whether transnational groups will become involved in the national debate. Politicisation is defined as ‘an increase in polarisation of opinions, interests or values and the extent to which they are publicly advanced towards the process of policy formulation within the EU’ (de Wilde 2011: 560). Accordingly, the more an issue is politicised, the more likely it is to attract transnational Eurosceptic activities.

Conclusion: the future of Transnational and pan-European Euroscepticism So it can be understood that the process of European integration itself has facilitated the emergence of Transnational Euroscepticism. But what does this ultimately mean for the character of Euroscepticism itself? The transnational and pan-­European cooperation of Eurosceptic actors is based on the concept of ­demoi-cracy put forward by Nicolaïdis (2003). Demoi-cracy, as Cheneval et al. (2015: 3) argue, ‘acknowledges the fact that the European polity is evolving on the basis of mainly nationally constituted demoi. It refers to a “Union of peoples – understood as both states and citizens – who govern together but not as one” ’. What links the Eurosceptics into temporal transnational cooperation is their shared desire to create a Europe different than the one that currently exists. This can take the form of a Europe based on socialist principles or on the absolute primacy of the nation state. Transnational Euroscepticism has therefore emerged as a ‘demoi’ in the space between national-demois and the current-European demoi as they exist at present, due to the limitation of each in adequately representing opposition

170  John FitzGibbon and Benjamin Leruth

Pre Crisis

Post Crisis

EU Level

EU Level

Pro-European Actors

Pro-European Actors

National Level

National Level

Eurosceptic Actors

Eurosceptic Demoi

Eurosceptic Actors

Figure 11.1  Conception of a Eurosceptic Demoi

to European integration. While power and political cooperation towards the EU has been transferred to the European level so too has contestation of the EU project though on its own highly specific terms, to its own demoi, as illustrated in Figure 11.1. What this book has demonstrated is that in recent years, Transnational and pan-European Eurosceptic movements have become more prominent. While such Eurosceptic activities were the exception to the rule in the 1990s and early 2000s, with the Dutch and French No to the European Constitution in 2005 their visibility moved to the European level. In more recent years, the impact of the Great Recession and the Eurozone crisis led to the emergence of major European transnational civic movements. Other recent European ‘crises’, such as the refugee crisis or questions surrounding the future of the United Kingdom within the EU, have also paved the way for increased levels of Transnational and pan-European Euroscepticism. This suggests that Transnational and pan-European Eurosceptic activities are likely to become a more persistent feature of Euroscepticism, which will in turn lead to the sustained emergence of a Eurosceptic demoi as outlined in Figure 11.1. So much literature has been written on the creation of a European public sphere. The dominant figures in this literature area namely the German theorists, Habermas (1994) and Beck and Grande (2007), have interpreted it from a sociological perspective as a cosmopolitan community engaging in in free debate about the nature of what constitutes Europe and European-ness. Political scientists and EU scholars have examined elements of the media (mostly broadsheet newspapers, see Koopmans 2007) and debates in the EP in their quest to identify the possible parameters of a nascent European public sphere. In coming to a conclusion on Transnational and pan-European Scepticism this book seeks to add a further dimension to the work on the European public space. The overarching idea of this contribution is that for a public space to exist it must contain dissenting voices

Conclusion  171 who seek the ending of that space but who also use the process and institutions of that space to cooperate across its different locations. In essence this is why transnational Euroscepticism matters. To examine the strength of the European public space it is interesting to note that even those who ostensibly oppose its very existence engage with it. This allows the fundamentals of what constitutes this space to be isolated. At a time of unprecedented challenge to the EU project for the actors who are leading this contestation to mobilise through these same processes that they themselves oppose is not contradictory but evidence of a Eurosceptic demoi. What the emergence of this Eurosceptic demoi means for European integration and Euroscepticism is that some form of European-level cooperation will always be in evidence. What we are potentially witnessing now is the emergence of different movement that seeks to reimagine the European public space. The detail and coordination of these movements is incipient, but nevertheless the examples provided in this collection have clearly shown their presence and to some degree their effectiveness in bringing an alternative vision of what constitutes Europe into being. With the EU facing multiple pressures in terms of its future direction it remains to be seen how influential transnational and pan-European dynamics will be in shaping its destiny.

Notes 1 See Habermas (1994); Van de Steeg (2002); Beck and Grande (2007); and Trenz (2007) and amongst many others. 2 See principally Koopmans (2007); de Wilde (2011); and more recently Kuhn (2014); and Risse (2015).

Bibliography Beck, U. and Grande, E. (2007). Cosmopolitan Europe, Cambridge: Polity. Cheneval, F., Lavenex, S. and Schimmelfennig, F. (2015) ‘Demoi-cracy in the European Union: principles, institutions, policies’, Journal of European Public Policy 22(1), pp. 1–18. Cooper, I. (2012) ‘A ‘virtual third chamber’ for the European Union? National parliaments after the Treaty of Lisbon’, West European Politics 35(3), pp. 441–465. Cooper, I. (2015) ‘A yellow card for the striker: National parliaments and the defeat of EU legislation on the right to strike’, Journal of European Public Policy 22(10), pp. 1406–1425. Dahl, R. A. (1969) Political Opposition in Western Democracies, New Haven: Yale ­University Press. de Wilde, P. (2011) ‘No polity for old politics? A framework for analyzing the politicization of European integration’, Journal of European Integration 33(5), pp. 559–575. Habermas, J. (1994) ‘Citizenship and national identity: Some reflections on the future of Europe’, in B. van Steenbergen (ed.) The Condition of Citizenship, London: SAGE Publications, pp. 20–35. Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2007) ‘Sources of Euroscepticism’, Acta Politica 42(2–3), pp. 119–127. Koopmans, R. (2007) ‘Who inhabits the European public sphere? Winners and losers, supporters and opponents in Europeanised political debates’, European Journal of Political Research 46(2), pp. 183–210.

172  John FitzGibbon and Benjamin Leruth Krouwel, A. and Abts, K. (2007) ‘Varieties of Euroscepticism and populist mobilization: Transforming attitudes from mild Euroscepticism to harsh Eurocynicism’, Acta Politica 42(2), pp. 252–270. Kuhn, T. (2014) Experiencing European Integration: Transnational Lives and European Identity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Mair, P. (2007) ‘Political opposition and the European Union’, Government and Opposition 42(1), pp. 1–17. Mudde, C. (2012) ‘The Comparative Study of Party-based Euroscepticism: The Sussex versus the North Carolina School’, East European Politics 28(2), pp. 193–202. Nicolaïdis, K. (2003) ‘Our European demoi-cracy: Is this constitution a third way for Europe?’, in K. Nicolaïdis and S. Weatherill (eds) Whose Europe? National Models and the Constitution of the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 137–152. Poguntke, T. Aylott, N., Ladrech, R. and Luther, K. R. (2007) ’The Europeanisation of national party organisations: A conceptual analysis’, European Journal of Political Research 46(6), pp. 747–771. Risse, T. (2015) A Community of Europeans? Transnational Identities and Public Spheres, London: Cornell University Press. Stubb, A. (1996) ‘A categorisation of differentiated integration’, Journal of Common ­Market Studies 34(2): 283–295. Taggart, P. and Szczerbiak, A. (2002) ‘The party politics of Euroscepticism in EU member and candidate states’, SEI Working Paper 51, Brighton: Sussex European Institute. Taggart, P. and Szczerbiak, A. (2008) ‘Theorizing party-based Euroscepticism: Problems of definition, measurement, and causality’, in P. Taggart and A. Szczerbiak (eds) Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism Volume 2: Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 238–262. Trenz. H. J. (2007) ‘A transnational space of contention? Patterns of Europeanisation of civil society in Germany’, in V. Della Sala and C. Ruzza (eds) Governance and Civil Society in the European Union Volume 1: Normative Perspectives, Manchester: ­Manchester University Press, pp. 89–112. Van de Steeg, M. (2002) ‘Rethinking the conditions for a public sphere in the European Union’, European Journal of Social Theory 5(4), pp. 499–519. Vasilopoulou, S. (2013). ‘Continuity and change in the study of Euroscepticism: Plus ça change?’ Journal of Common Market Studies 51(1), pp. 153–168. Walby, S. (2015) Crisis, Cambridge: Polity.

Epilogue Transnational and pan-Euroscepticism after Brexit Benjamin Leruth and John FitzGibbon

This volume was written prior to the United Kingdom (UK) referendum on European Union (EU) membership, which took place on 23 June 2016. Following the victory of the Leave side with 51.9 per cent and a significantly high turnout by UK standards (72.2 per cent), we feel it is important to conclude this volume by reflecting on the referendum’s impact on transnational and pan-European Euroscepticism. While at the time of writing, it is still unclear when (and if) the UK will trigger Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union to start the formal mechanism of leaving the EU, the consequences of the Brexit vote in terms of its impact on Euroscepticism studies are already evident. In the particular context of this volume, three lessons from this Brexit vote can be drawn. First, even though several referendums on European issues led to victories for the Eurosceptic sides over the past two decades (see Chapter 8), the extent of the Brexit referendum sets a precedent which, if the UK is successful in negotiating what is perceived as a good deal with the EU, will be used by Eurosceptic movements to show that it is possible to leave the EU. On 24 June, as soon as the victory of the Leave side was made official, prominent Eurosceptic party leaders such as Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders announced they would call for referendums to be held in their respective countries on EU membership. In Finland, the Finns Party leader Timo Soini (currently in government) did not rule out that his party could campaign for a Finnish referendum on EU membership in future elections. However, due to the political and economic instability that resulted from the Brexit vote, it is interesting to note that opinion polls conducted in early July 2016 suggested an increase in support for EU membership in countries where Euroscepticism has tended to be strong, such as Denmark (69 per cent, +10 per cent prior the UK referendum), Sweden (52 per cent, +3 per cent) and Finland (68 per cent, from 56 per cent in March 2016; see Bloomberg 2016). While it is too early to draw concrete conclusions due to existing uncertainties, it is clear that the outcome of the referendum and subsequent negotiations between the UK and the EU have already affected the discourse used by Eurosceptic (as well as Europhile) movements. Second, even though the UK leaving the EU could potentially undermine the existence of some groups in the European Parliament, pan-European

174  Epilogue Euroscepticism is unlikely to disappear. As soon as the UK leaves the EU, the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) (see Chapter 3) and the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) (see Chapter 4) will lose the membership of their founding parties (respectively the United Kingdom ­Independence Party (UKIP) and the British Conservative Party), but calls for the disintegration of the EU or for radical reforms are likely to remain prominent within other European parties. The immediate consequence of a Brexit is that the EFDD and the Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) could disappear, as their existence relies on the presence of UK representatives in the European Parliament.1 At this stage, the most likely scenario is that a Brexit will lead to a major reshuffle within the European Parliament, with new right-wing Eurosceptic alliances being created depending on party preferences and the ECR having the opportunity to attract new Eurosceptic movements. In addition, British parties are likely to try and influence the political agenda within these groups through participation in transnational parties. On the left, however, the European United Left–Nordic Green Left (GUE/ NGL, see Chapter 5) will only lose one UK member (from the Northern Irish Sinn Féin), and will thus not be undermined by a Brexit. Third, regardless of the outcome of UK negotiations with the EU, European integration has been dealt an unprecedented blow by Euroscepticism. The No votes to the EU Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands back in 2005 caused Europe to change tack and avoid engagement with growing Eurosceptic public sentiment. The UK’s vote for Brexit is unparalleled in the history of the European project in terms of the global ramifications it has both for the UK and the EU: Financial markets have been affected, the future of the EU even called into question, the two major British political parties faced leadership crises and the independence of Scotland (which voted in favour of staying in the EU, unlike England and Wales) once again came back on top of the political agenda. While a deep analysis of the long-term impact of these developments lies beyond the scope of this book, what does resonate with the findings of this book is the conclusion that Euroscepticism is a more entrenched, pervasive and dynamic phenomenon than has previously been acknowledged. A key finding of this book was that those actors (in both the political and civil society spheres) who opposed European integration have become flexible in their contestation of the EU to achieve their goals regardless of ideological or strategic parameters. Namely in the context of transnational Euroscepticism this meant cooperation with fellow Eurosceptics at the transnational and pan-European level. We argued in this book that transnational Euroscepticism was the latest iteration of the contestation of European integration, what Brexit may well mean is that this phase has evolved again into one of deeper Eurosceptic ‘contagion’. What the Brexit result underlines is that there is little doubt left that Euroscepticism cannot anymore be conceived of solely in the national context and that Eurosceptic events in member states do indeed have a knock-on effect on other EU members. What this book shows is through what processes this transnational and pan-European ‘contagion’ is facilitated –groups in the European Parliament, ideational solidarity between

Epilogue  175 different Eurosceptic actors, Members of European Parliament’s (MEP) savvy use of national media and transnational activist networks. While the result of the Brexit referendum came as a surprise to many, existing transnational and pan-­ European Eurosceptic processes of contestation might further facilitate its ‘contagion’ to other states. As this book details, these processes have been in motion for some time; the Brexit vote could greatly empower their influence over the future direction of the European project, through tougher calls for reforms or, in the case of radical right movements, calls for further referendums in other countries or even European disintegration.

Conclusion In drafting the original conclusion based on the balance of evidence presented in this book, we reached the tentative position that transnationalism and pan-Europeanism would continue as key elements of Euroscepticism. The outcome of the Brexit referendum has not just confirmed this hypothesis but it has also greatly accelerated the velocity of transnational Euroscepticism. Opposition to European integration has now become a defining feature of an EU political system that neither institutionally nor politically facilitates a classic Westminster style of formal government and formal opposition. In our conclusion we argued that Eurosceptics were slowly constructing their own alternative transnational European space outside of the confines of the EU. From this perspective the fundamental failure of the European project was in the outright reluctance to include opposition to the EU in the political structures that emerged post-­ Maastricht. Though understandable, the driving ideology of consociationalism, which wobbled in 2005 after the scrapping of the EU Constitutional Treaty, has collapsed with the Brexit vote. Since the British referendum, some Eurosceptics have been calling for referendums to withdraw from the EU or for a renegotiation of their state’s relationship with it. These voices have emerged despite an ostensible vacuum of opposition to the EU in the European system itself. In order to fully exploit the political advantage of negative shocks to European integration such as Brexit, Eurosceptics have started to mobilise their own transnational and/or pan-­European forms of cooperation to contest European governance. These Eurosceptic voices have episodically cooperated at the transnational and pan-­European levels to effectively challenge the EU. This has been under-­ analysed and to some extent underestimated by academics, commentators and pro-­European political movements. The EU is now at crossroads. Either pro-European elites can be proactive and use the outcome of this referendum as an opportunity to respond to public concerns to (re)gain trust, or it can opt for the status-quo which could effectively strengthen the capacity of mobilisation of transnational Eurosceptic movements. While the future of the EU post-Brexit is still uncertain, it is clear that the Europe which emerges will be one where Euroscepticism will be more prominent, and where the transnational dynamic is likely to become both more salient and influential.

176  Epilogue

Note 1 In order for a group to be recognised in the EU, it needs to account for a minimum of twenty-five MEPs from a minimum of seven different member states.

Bibliography Bloomberg (2016) ‘EU Support Surges in Denmark as Brexit Scare Spreads in Nordics’ [online], Available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-04/eu-­ support-surges-in-denmark-as-brexit-scare-spreads-in-nordics [Accessed 6 July 2016].

Index

Abts, K. 163 Adenauer, Konrad 148, 149 Ahern, Bertie 118 ALDE see Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists (AECR) 46, 51–4, 58, 59 Alliance of European National Movement (ANEM) 37 Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) 9, 47, 50, 54, 56, 153, 154 Alternative Democratic Reform Party 53 Alternative for Germany (AfD) 53, 55, 56–7, 137, 141 Alter Summit 10, 82, 85–6, 87, 88, 89–90, 91, 92, 93 Amsterdam Treaty 115, 149, 151, 158; Article 13 150; Declaration No. 11 149, 150 Annemans, Gerolf 37, 40 ‘another Europe’ 18, 71, 73 Arzheimer, K. 16–17 Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions and Citizen’s Action (ATTAC) 86, 100, 106 Atkinson, G. 32 Atkinson, Janice 6, 37 ATTAC see Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions and Citizen’s Action (ATTAC) austerity, opposition to 74, 82, 97 Austria 67, 132, 150; see also Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) Austrian Foundation for Development Research 101 Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) 28, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 132; alliances of 6, 35, 37, 38, 39, 41

Austrian People’s Party 132 Aznar, José Maria 151 Barroso, José Manuel 97, 114 Basque Country Unite 67 Bauer, M. 98, 104 Bayernpartei 98 Beck, U. 170 Belarus 67 Belarusian Party of the Left ‘Free World’ 67 Belgium 41, 67; see also New Flemish Alliance (N-VA); Vlaams Belang Berger, Peter 154 Bertusconi, Silvio 58 Bisky, Lothar 70, 71, 75, 139 Blair, Tony 151 Blockupy 10, 82, 85, 86, 87, 88–9, 90, 91, 92, 93 Bossi, Umberto 138, 139, 140 Bourne, Angela 9, 80, 165 Brack, Nathalie 2, 4, 9, 20, 28, 38, 163, 165, 167 Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) 101 Brepoels, Frieda 55 Bressanelli, E. 40 Brexit 7, 24, 168, 173–5 British National Party (BNP) 35, 138 Bulgaria 32, 33, 36; political parties in 34, 35, 53, 67 Bulgarian Left 67 Bulgarian National Movement 53 Bulgaria without Censorship 53 Caiani, M. 80, 83, 85 Cameron, David 46, 50, 51, 56, 57, 58, 59, 169 Camre, Morgans 31 Carter, E. 16–17

178 Index Catholicism see Roman Catholicism CDS – People’s Party 48 Charter of Fundamental Rights 158; Article 10 149 Chatzopoulou, Sevasti 9, 80, 165 Cheneval, F. 169 Chirac, Jacques 47 Christian Democratic party 49, 150 Christian Democratic People’s Party 51, 53 Christianity 147, 148, 158; see also Roman Catholicism Christian Union 51, 52, 53 Citizens in Rage 37 Civic Conservative Party (Czech Republic) 39, 41 Civic Conservative Party (Slovakia) 53 Civic Democratic Party (ODS) 50, 51, 52, 53 Civic List 98 Coalition of the Radical Left 67 COMECE see Commission of the Bishops’ Conferences of the European Community (COMECE) Comes First/Poland Together 52 Commission of the Bishops’ Conferences of the European Community (COMECE) 147, 148, 152, 153–5, 157, 158, 159; ‘Europe Info’ 154; Office Catholique d’Information et d’Initiative pour l’Europe (OCIPE) 154 Communist and Allies 65, 66 Communist Party of Austria 67 Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM) 67 Communist Party of Greece (KKE) 75, 107 Communist Party of Italy (PCI) 65, 67 Communist Party of Slovakia 67 Communist Party of Spain 67, 75 Communist Party - Wallonie/Bruxelles 67 Communist Refoundation Party 67, 68 Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) 6, 8, 65, 66–76, 101, 122, 165, 169, 174 Confederal Group of the United European (GUE) 63, 64, 65, 101, 107 confederalism 69 Confederation of European Business (UNICE) 87 Conference of European Churches (CEC) 158 Congress of the New Right 6, 39, 41 Conservative and Social Reformers 52 Conservative Party (Canada) 52 Conservative Party (Georgia) 53

Conservative Party (UK) 5, 17, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 56, 57, 59, 174 Conservative People’s Party 49 Conservatives and Reformists 53, 55 Constitutional Treaty 14, 22, 70, 75, 150; preamble 151; referendum on 7, 24, 107, 116, 117, 121, 124, 166, 167, 170 Coughlan, Anthony 115 Council of Europe 19, 85 Cox, Pat 151 critical Europeanism 82, 85, 87 Croatia 52, 53 Croatian Conservative Party 53 Crowley, Brian 53 CR Party 58, 59 Cyprus 1, 67 Czech Republic 5, 8, 31; political parties in 67; see also Civic Conservative Party (Czech Republic); Civic Democratic Party (ODS) Daddow, O. 3 Dahl, R. A. 164 Daly, Father Patrick 153 Danish People’s Party (DFP) 28, 35, 36, 38, 39, 114, 137; alliances of 31, 47, 48, 53, 55, 57–8, 59 De Gasperi, Alcide 148, 149 De Gucht, Karel 104 de Lange, S. 3, 109 della Porta, D. 80, 83, 85 Delors, Jacques 1, 149, 150, 154 demoi-cracy 164, 169–70 Denmark 1, 8, 10, 123, 124, 173; political parties in 52, 67, 68; referendums in 6, 115, 121; see also Danish People’s Party (DFP) de Wilde, P. 3 De Winter, L. 55 DFP see Danish People’s Party (DFP) Die Linke see Left, The diffusion 84 Dür, A. 104 EAF see European Alliance for Freedom (EAF) Eatwell, R. 32 Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) 86 Economic and Monetary Union 1, 57, 58, 124, 130 ECR see European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) EFD see Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD)

Index  179 EFDD see Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) Egea de Haro, A. 84 EH Bildu 68 ENF see Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) Enhedslisten 107 EP see European Parliament (EP) EPP see European People’s Party (EPP) Estonia 67 Estonian Left Party 67 Ethniki Politiki Enosis (EPEN) 30 ETUC see European Federation of Trade Unions (ETUC) Eurobarometer 105, 114–15 Eurocrisis see European Sovereign Debt (ESD) crisis Euronat 33, 37 European Alliance for Freedom (EAF) 6, 11, 37, 39, 57 European Alliance of EU-critical Movement (TEAM) 7, 21 European Catholic Pastoral Information Service 152 European Central Bank (ECB) 73, 81 European Christian Political Movement (ECPM) 51 European Citizens Initiative 87 European Commission 81; Transparency Register 152 European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) 5–6, 8, 9, 38, 46, 50–4, 56, 57, 58, 59, 153, 165, 169, 174 European Day of Action 87, 103 European Day of Protests 87, 88, 89 European Democratic Alliance (EDA) 47–8 European Democratic Group (EDG) 49 European Democratic Union 49 European Federation of Trade Unions (ETUC) 10, 82, 85, 86, 87–8, 89, 90, 91, 92; Days of Protest 87, 88, 89 European Free Alliance (EFA) 55, 108 European Free Trade Association 19, 85 European Green Party 100, 101–2, 106, 107 European Parliament (EP) 4, 5, 6, 18, 20; Committee on Constitutional Affairs 36; conservative parties in 46–59; Radical Left Parties (RLPs) in 63–77; Radical Right Parties (RRPs) in 6, 28–43; religions, interaction with 147–59; Trade Commission 104 European People’s Party (EPP) 46, 49, 55, 149, 153, 154 European People’s Party–European Democrats (EPP–ED) 46, 49, 50

European Progressive Democrats (EPD) 46, 47 European Sovereign Debt (ESD) crisis 1, 9, 10, 22, 72–5, 80, 81, 84, 130, 133 European Stability Mechanism 81 Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD) 5, 36, 51, 55, 57, 58, 113, 114, 120 Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) 5, 6, 20, 38, 57, 122, 165, 169, 174 Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) 6, 9, 20, 29, 31, 39, 40, 41, 42, 165, 169, 174 Eurorealism 9, 18, 46–59 Euroscepticism: definition of 1, 133; development of 1–2; history of 17–18; as non-ideology 17–19, 23; political institutions and 19–21, 23; political opportunities structures shaping 16–24; scholarship on 2, 14–16, 81; see also pan-European Euroscepticism; transnational Euroscepticism Eurozone crisis see European Sovereign Debt (ESD) crisis Eusakol Herritarrok 31 events 21–3; see also referendums Family Party of Germany 53 Farage, Nigel 21, 114, 120, 168; news coverage of 131, 137, 138–40, 141, 142, 143 Fiamma Tricolore 35, 37 Fianna Fáil 48 Fidesz Party 168 Fieschi, C. 30, 31 Finland 36, 67, 121, 150, 173; see also Finns Party; Left Alliance Finnish Communist Party 67 Finns Party 9, 35, 38, 39, 47, 53, 55, 57, 58, 59, 173 Fischer, Joschka 151 Fitto, Raffaele 58, 59 FitzGibbon, John 1, 3, 10, 11, 109, 113, 162, 165, 167, 168 Five Star Movement 5, 141 Flemish Interest 41 FN see National Front (FN) Fokus 52 For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK 50, 51, 52, 53 Forza Europa 48 Forza Italia 52, 58, 59 FPÖ see Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) frame bridging 84, 90–2, 93

180 Index France: political parties in 48, 65, 67, 89, 140; referendums in 6, 7, 8, 24, 116; see also National Front (FN) Frankfurter Rundschau 134–5, 136, 137, 138, 140, 141 Freedom and Solidarity (Slovakia) 53 Freedom and Solidarity (Turkey) 68 French Communist Party (PCF) 65, 67 Friends of the Earth 86 Ganley, Declan 4, 7, 118, 119 Gattermann, Katjana 10, 130, 165, 167 Gazeta Wyborcza 135, 140, 141 Georgia 51, 53 German Animal Rights Pary 68 German Communist Party 67 Germany 89; political parties in 30, 31, 39, 53, 67, 68, 98; see also Alternative for Germany (AfD); Left, The Giscard d’Estaing, Valérie 151 Golden Dawn 28, 38, 39, 42 Gollnisch, Bruno 34, 37, 42 Gomez-Reino Cachafeiro, M. 55 Graaff, Marcel de 139 Grande, E. 170 Grassroots Out 168 Greece 1, 82; political parties in 30, 36, 67, 107; referendum in 74; solidarity with 89, 90, 91, 92; see also Golden Dawn Greenpeace 154 Greens– European Free Alliance (EFA) 55, 56 Griffin, Nick 138, 139, 140 Grillo, Beppe 141 Group of the European Right 30–1 Guardian, The 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141 GUE see Confederal Group of the United European (GUE) GUE/NGL see Confederal Group of the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) Guerra, Simona 3, 11, 109, 147, 165 Guterres, Antonio 149 Habermas, J. 170 Haider, Jörg 40, 132 Halikiopoulou, D. 38 Hehir, B. J. 152 Hollande, Francois 89 Holmes, Michael 3, 9, 63, 107, 163, 165, 166 Hooghe, L. 162

Hungarian Democratic Forum 50, 51, 52 Hungary 31, 150; political parties in 50, 51, 52, 67, 168; see also Jobbik Iceland 51, 54, 120 Identity Tradition Sovereignty (ITS) 6, 29, 34, 35 Iglesias, Pablo 139 immigration 1, 133, 141 Independence Party 51, 54 Independent Party (Denmark) 52 Independent Party (Germany) 67 Independent Party (Ireland) 67 Independent Party (Italy) 67 Independent Party (Romania) 35, 41 Independent Party (UK) 35, 41 International Democrat Union 54 internationalism 70, 83, 90 International Monetary Fund 81 Interventionist Left 86 Ireland 53, 118, 148; political parties in 48, 67, 68; referendums in 6, 10, 114–22 Islam 133, 147, 149, 156 Istiqlal Party 52 Italy 1; political parties in 5, 30, 31, 35, 37, 48, 52, 53, 55, 58, 59, 65, 67, 68, 141; see also Northern League Jobbik 28, 35, 37, 38, 39, 42 John Paul II 151 Jong, Dennis de 137, 139 Kaczyński, Jarosław 151 Kaczyński, Lech 151 Kamiński, Michał 139 Karlsson, Rikke 53 Keith, Dan 10, 97, 165, 166 Kerremans, B. 16 Kitschelt, H. P. 16 Klaus, Václav 50, 118 Kohl, Helmut 149, 150 Kopecký, P. 2, 48 Korwin-Mikke, Janusz 139 Krouwel, A. 3, 163 Kuhn, Michael 153 Labour Party (Malta) 37 Ladrech, R. 63 Lang, Carl 138 Latvia 31; political parties in 38, 39, 50, 51, 52, 53 Laurent, Pierre 70, 101 Law and Justice Party 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 137

Index  181 Leave.EU 168 Leconte, C. 158 Left, The 67, 68, 86, 101, 107, 108 Left Alliance 67, 68 Left Alternative – Galicia 67 Left Bloc 67, 68 Left Front 67, 89, 137 Left Party (France) 67 Left Party (Luxembourg) 66, 67 Left Party (Sweden) 66–8 Left Unity 65, 66 left-wing Euroscepticism 6, 133; see also Radical Left Parties (RLPs) Lega Nord (LN) see Northern League Legutko, Ryszard 137 Le Pen, Jean-Marie 30, 31, 33, 34, 37, 42, 173; news coverage of 131, 138, 139, 140, 142, 143 Le Pen, Marine 6, 11, 34, 37, 39, 40, 42; news coverage of 131, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143 Le Rachinel, Fernand 138 Leruth, Benjamin 1, 9, 11, 46, 162, 163, 165, 167 Liberal Party of Australia 52 Libertas 7 Liga Polskich Rodzin (LPR) 31 Lightfoot, S. 107 Lijst Dedecker 50, 52 Lisbon Treaty 24, 113–14, 117, 147, 150, 152, 158, 168; Article 17 149, 151; Lisbon I 34, 113, 116, 118–20, 126; Lisbon II 116, 119, 120–2, 126 Lithuania 37, 52, 53 LN see Northern League Lucke, Bernd 57, 139 Luxembourg 53, 66, 67 Lynch, P. 30, 40 Maastricht Treaty see Treaty on European Union (TEU) McMillan-Scott, Edward 50 Macovei, Monica 53 Madlener, Barry 138, 139 Mair, P. 4, 63, 164 Malmström, Cecilia 104 Malta 37 March, L. 66, 102, 106 Marches for Dignity 90 Marias, Notis 53 Marks, G. 162 Maroni, Roberto 141 Martin, Hans-Peter 139 Mazurkiewicz, Father Piotr 153

media, transnational visibility in 10, 130–43, 165 Mélenchon, Jean- Luc 89, 137 Merkel, Angela 56, 57 Messerschmidt, Morten 58, 114, 120; news coverage of 137, 138, 139, 140, 142 Michaloliakos, Nikolaos 141 Michalowitz, I. 152 Minkenberg, M. 29 mobilisation, transnational 9–10, 21, 80–93; communication in 83; nature of 82–4; Stop TTIP 104; typology of 84 Modern Hungary Movement 52 Moldova 67 Mölzer, Andreas 33, 37 Monde, Le 134, 135, 137, 138, 140, 141 Movement for a Europe of Liberties and Democracy (MELD) 57 Movement for a Europe of Nations and Freedom (MENF) 39, 41 Movimento Sociale Italiano–Destra Nazionale (MSI–DN) 31 Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) 30, 31, 35 Mudde, C. 2, 29, 31, 33, 38, 48, 162 Mussolini, Alessandra 34 National Alliance 38, 39 National Democratic Party of Germany 39 National Democrats 37 National Front (FN) 28, 31, 33, 35, 36, 38, 39, 40, 105, 106, 131, 140; alliances of 6, 30, 31, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 41; image of 41, 42–3 nationalism 17, 18, 30, 133 Natsionalen Săyuz Ataka (NSA) 34, 35 Nelsen, B. F. 149 Netherlands: political parties in 51, 52, 53, 67, 68, 137; referendums in 6, 7, 8, 24, 116, 168; see also Party for Freedom (PVV) Netzwerk Friedenskooperative 86 New European Left 65–6 New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) 9, 47, 53, 54, 55–6, 59 New Majority 53 New Republic Party 53 Newropeans Club 106 New Zealand National Party 52 Nice referendums 115, 116 Nicolaïdis, K. 169 Nordic Green-Left 65, 66, 68 North American Treaty Organization (NATO) 19

182 Index Northern League 36, 38, 39, 138; alliances of 6, 30, 31, 35, 37, 41 Norway 10, 121 Nouvelle Donne 106 N-VA see New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) Obama, Barak 97 Occupy Frankfurt 86 Oikonomakis, L. 87 opportunity structures 16 Orbán, Viktor 1 Order and Justice 37 Ordinary People 53 Orthodox Church 149, 156 Other Europe With Tsipras, The 67, 68 País, El 135, 136, 140, 141 pan-European Euroscepticism 3, 4–8; reasons for cooperation 40–2; transnational Euroscepticism compared 163; see also transnational Euroscepticism Papadimoulis, Dimitrios 74 Partidul România Mare (PRM) 34, 35 Partito Radicale 31 Party for Freedom (PVV) 28, 34, 36, 39, 138; alliances of 6, 37, 38, 39, 41 Party for the Animals 67, 68 Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova 67 Party of Democratic Socialism 67 Party of European Socialists 49, 88 Party of Rights 52 Party of the European Left (PEL) 63, 64, 66–76, 100, 101, 102, 107 Pasqua, Charles 48 Pax Christi International 147, 148, 152, 155–7, 158, 159 Peace and Neutrality Alliance (PANA) 115–16, 118 PEL see Party of the European Left (PEL) People’s Movement 119 People’s Movement Against the EU 67, 68 Perrineau, P. 29 Philippot, Florian 141 Plaid Cymru 55 Podemos 67, 107 Poland 5, 150, 156; political parties in 6, 31, 41, 52, 53; religion in 147, 148; see also Law and Justice Party Poles in Lithuania (LLRA) 52, 53 political opportunity structures 15, 16–17; events 21–3; institutional 19–21 Politiken 135, 138, 140, 141, 142

Popular Orthodox Rally 36 populism 121, 133, 154–5 Portugal 48, 67, 68 Portuguese Communist Party 67 Pretzell, Marcus 57 Princen, S. 16 principled Euroscepticism 84, 87–8, 93 Prodi, Romano 149 Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats 153 Progressive Party of the Working People (AKEL) 67 Prosperous and Development Party 51 public sphere, Eurosceptic 130, 131–4, 162–5 Putin, Vladimir 141 PVV see Party for Freedom (PVV) Radical Left Parties (RLPs) 9, 63–77, 97; cooperation between 64–9; Euroscepticism in 69–72; ideologies of 68–9, 101 Radical Right Parties (RRPs) 6, 8, 9, 105; history of cooperation 30–9; panEuropean cooperation 28–43; rise of 28 Rally for France 48 Rasmussen, Poul Nyrup 88 Ratzinger, Cardinal 151 Red-Green Alliance 67, 68, 107 referendums 1, 4, 7, 114–22, 165; Nice 115, 116; UK 7, 24, 168; Ukraine– European Union Association Agreement 168; see also Constitutional Treaty; Lisbon Treaty Reformed Political Party 51, 53 religion 147–59; representations in Brussels 152–7; status of in EP 147, 157–8 Republican Left of Catalonia 55 Republican Party (US) 52, 59 Republikaner Party (REP) 30, 31 right-wing Euroscepticism 5–6, 133; British Conservatism 46, 48–50; Gaullism 46, 47–8; history of 47–50; see also Radical Right Parties (RRPs) Right Wing of the Republic 53 Risse, T. 132, 142 Roman Catholicism 147, 149, 151; see also Commission of the Bishops’ Conferences of the European Community (COMECE); Pax Christi International Romania 32, 33, 36; political parties in 6, 34, 35, 41, 53, 67 Roos, J. E. 87

Index  183 Rootes, C. 16 Rosa Luxemburg Foundation 101, 108 Ruiz, J. 84 Salvini, Matteo 37, 139 scale shift 84, 86, 87, 92 Schengen agreement 38 Schuman, Robert 148, 149 Scottish National Party (SNP) 55 Segni Pact/National Alliance 48 Segol, Bernadette 89 Séguin, Philippe 48 Sernagiotto, Remo 59 Sholz, Helmut 107 Single European Act 22 Sinn Féin (Ireland) 67, 68 Sinn Féin (UK) 68 Slovakia 31; political parties in 36, 53, 67 Slovak Nationalist Party 36 Slovenia 31, 98 Socialist Alliance Party 67 Socialist Group 65 Socialist Party (France) 140 Socialist Party (Ireland) 68 Socialist Party (Netherlands) 67, 137 Soini, Timo 58, 173 solidarity 84, 89–90, 93; with Greece 89, 90, 91, 92; ideational 114, 119, 122–5 ‘Soul for Europe, A’ 150, 154 sovereignty Euroscepticism 84, 89, 93 Spain 1, 82, 136, 148; political parties in 67, 68 Spitzenkandidaten 8, 130, 141, 147 Stampa, La 135, 140, 141 Standard, Der 135, 138, 140 Startin, Nicholas 1, 2, 3, 9, 22, 28, 34, 36, 38, 163, 165, 167 Stop TTIP 10, 97–109; Global Days of Action Against TTIP 103; ideology 98–102; impact of 103–5; institutional opportunities 102–3; members of 98, 99–100 Strache, Hans-Christian 37 structural equivalence 87 Stubb, A. 168 Sweden 10, 150, 173; political parties of 37, 66–8; referendums in 6, 116, 121; see also Sweden Democrats Sweden Democrats 5, 39, 41; alliances of 37, 38, 57 Swiss Labour Party 68 Switzerland 68 Szczerbiak, A. 2, 5, 17, 50, 162

Taggart, P. 2, 5, 17, 50, 162 Tarrow, S. 16, 83, 84 Taylor, John 30, 33 Technical Group of the European Right, The (TGER) 31 TEU see Treaty on European Union (TEU) Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 10, 97, 104, 166; criticisms of 100–2; European Citizens’ Initiative on 102; Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) 100, 102; opposition to 87, 88, 97–109 Transform! Network 98 transnational coalition formation 84 transnational Euroscepticism 3–4, 24, 163–5; characteristics of 18–19; by conservative parties 46, 50–9; contradictions in 165–7; future of 169–71; ideational solidarity and 122–5; mapping of 167–9; in media coverage 130–43; in mobilisation 98–109, 118–22; model for 9, 14–24; pan-European Euroscepticism compared 163; by Radical Left Parties 64–9; by Radical Right Parties 38–43 Treaty on European Union (TEU) 1, 22, 38, 48, 116, 121, 149; Article 50 173 TTIP see Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Turkey 150, 151; political parties in 51, 54, 68 UK see United Kingdom (UK) UKIP see United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) Ulster Unionist Party 30, 49, 52, 53 umsGanze 86 Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) 140 Union for Europe 48 Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN) 48, 57 Union for Overseas 67 Unitary Left 67 United European Left 65, 66 United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) 5, 36, 38, 50, 114, 131, 174 United Kingdom (UK) 1, 8, 17, 123; United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP); political parties in 35, 41, 68; referendum 7, 24, 168; see also Conservative Party (UK) United Left 67, 68 United Left Alternative 67

184 Index United Romania Party 6 Usherwood, Simon 1, 2, 9, 10, 14, 22, 98, 106, 119, 122, 165, 168 utility Euroscepticism 84, 88–9, 93 van de Steeg, M. 132, 142 Van Overtveldt, Jan 56 Van Rompuy, Herman 97, 154 Vasilopoulou, Sofia 10, 38, 84, 130, 165, 167 Verhofstadt, Guy 56 Vilimsky, Harald 37, 139 Vlaams Belang 28, 30–1, 35, 38, 39; alliances of 6, 31, 35, 37, 38, 39

Volkskrant, De 134, 135, 136, 138, 140, 141 von Storch, Beatrix 57 WeMove.EU 106 Whitaker, R. 30, 40 White Paper on European Governance 149, 150 Wilders, Geert 6, 11, 36, 37, 39, 138, 141, 173 Williams, D. 32 Workers’ Party of Hungary 2006 67 Zimmer, Gabi 74, 103