European Integration and new Anti-Europeanism. Vol. 3: Perceptions of External States on European Integration 9783515112529

Citation preview

European Integration and new Anti-Europeanism III Perceptions of External States on European Integration Edited by Patrick Moreau and Birte Wassenberg

SGEI – SHEI – EHIE

EI SGEI HEI SHEI HIE EHIE Geschichte

Franz Steiner Verlag

European Integration and new Anti-Europeanism III Edited by Patrick Moreau and Birte Wassenberg

Studien zur Geschichte der Europäischen Integration (SGEI) Études sur l’Histoire de l’Intégration Européenne (EHIE) Studies on the History of European Integration (SHEI) Band / Volume 31 Herausgegeben von / Edited by / Dirigé par Jürgen Elvert In Verbindung mit / In cooperation with / En coopération avec Charles Barthel / Jan-Willem Brouwer / Eric Bussière / Antonio Costa Pinto / Desmond Dinan / Michel Dumoulin / Michael Gehler / Brian Girvin / Wolf D. Gruner / Wolfram Kaiser / Laura Kolbe / Johnny Laursen / Wilfried Loth / Piers Ludlow / Maria Grazia Melchionni / Enrique Moradiellos Garcia / Sylvain Schirmann / Antonio Varsori / Tatiana Zonova

European Integration and new Anti-Europeanism III Perceptions of External States on European Integration

Edited by Patrick Moreau and Birte Wassenberg

Franz Steiner Verlag

Umschlagabbildung: © Aurélie Kraft Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek: Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über abrufbar. Dieses Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist unzulässig und strafbar. © Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 2018 Druck: Bosch Druck, Ergolding Gedruckt auf säurefreiem, alterungsbeständigem Papier. Printed in Germany. ISBN 978-3-515-11252-9 (Print) ISBN 978-3-515-11270-3 (E-Book)

Table des matières / Table of Contents / Inhaltsverzeichnis BIRTE WASSENBERG (& PATRICK MOREAU) Introduction / Introduction / Einleitung ...............................................................

7

PATRICK MOREAU (& BIRTE WASSENBERG) Acknowledgements / Remerciements / Danksagung .........................................

23

PART 1: BETWEEN RELUCTANCE, DISTANCE AND EUROSCEPTICSICM: THE EFTA STATES / ENTRE HÉSITATION, DISTANCE ET EUROSCEPTICISME : LES ÉTATS DE L’AELE / ZWISCHEN ZÖRGERN, DISTANZ UND EUROSKEPTIZISMUS: DIE EFTA STAATEN LISE RYE Norwegian Euroscepticism Revisited. The Gap Between Policy and Practice ..

31

CENNI NAJY & RENÉ SCHWOK The Most Reluctant Country with Regard to European Integration ..................

45

ERIKUR BERGAMANN Iceland in Europe – Keeping its Distance ...............................................................

65

PART 2: FOR OR AGAINST EUROPE? EUROPHILES, EUROSCEPTICS, IN-BETWEENS AND ACCESSION CANDIDATES: FOUR CASESTUDIES / POUR OU CONTRE L’EUROPE ? EUROPHILES, EUROSCEPTIQUES, LES ENTRE-DEUX ET CANDIDATS À L’ADHÉSION: QUATRE CAS D’ÉTUDES / FÜR ODER GEGEN EUROPA? EUROPHILE, EUROSKEPTIKER, IN-BETWEENS UND BEITRITTSKANDIDATEN: VIER FALLSTUDIEN RÉMI CAUCANAS Les relations de l’UE avec le Vatican: une dimension « micro » ? .......................

87

WOLFGANG SENDER & IEVA MOTŪZAITĖ Eurosceptics not only by State Definition: The Case of Belarus ..........................

91

KOSTIANTYN FEDORENKO Ukraine: Pro-European Majority and the Chances of Revenge ...........................

113

AFRIM KRASNIQI Die politischen Parteien Albaniens und Europa ....................................................

131

6

Table des matières – Inhaltsverzeichnis – Table of contents

PART 3: RUSSIA AND THE EU: A GROWING EUROSCEPTICISM? / LA RUSSIE ET L’UE : UN EUROSCEPTICISME EN CROISSANCE ? / RUSSLAND UND DIE EU: EIN WACHSENDER EUROSKETPIZISMUS? JEAN-CHRISTOPHE ROMER Vladimir Poutine et l’Europe: malentendus et maladresses ................................

147

ANDREY MAKARYCHEV Russia’s Eurosceptic Discourses: Imitations, Contestations, Sutures .................

155

ANNEXES / ANHÄNGE / APPENDICES LES AUTEURS / DIE AUTOREN / AUTHORS ...............................................................

179

CONCERNANT LA SÉRIE « ÉTUDES SUR L’HISTOIRE DE L’INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE » .............................................................................................................

182

ZUR REIHE „STUDIEN DER GESCHICHTE DER EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION“ .......

183

ABOUT THE SERIES “STUDIES ON THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION” ......

184

INTRODUCTION BIRTE WASSENBERG (& PATRICK MOREAU) The Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950 marks the start of the unification process of Europe with six founding member states, namely France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Benelux, and Italy. Its goal was to bring Europe together step by step by sharing functions in order to abandon sovereignty in small but essential fields initially.1 This resulted in the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952, followed by the European Economic Community (ECC) in 1957 and the European Union (EU) in 1992.2 In the course of history, this unification process did not only result in the integration of more and more economic sectors, from the customs union with a common market in 1958 to the single market in 1992 and the monetary union in 2002. It also made the EU develop into a quasi-state system whose institutions and decision-making processes are a construction sui generis but functions like a democratic system of government.3 The success of this history of European integration cannot be measured by the EU’s substantial role in global economy only. It is also proven by the fact that until 2012, more and more European States joined this community: The number of its member states grew from 6 to 9 in 1973 (United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark), to 10 in 1980 (Greece), to 12 in 1987 (Spain and Portugal), to 15 in 1995 (Sweden, Finland, and Austria), to 25 in 2004 (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Cyprus, Malta), to 27 in 2007 (Romania and Bulgaria), and to 28 in 2013 (Croatia).4 This trend towards enlargement was only stopped by the United Kingdom’s Brexit vote: For the first time in EU history, a member state decided to leave the European Union (EU).5 In spite of the success story of the enlargement from 6 to 28 member states, we should not forget that not every European state belongs to the EU. From the very beginning, not all of them were willing to accept the model of integration promoted by Schuman. Thus, in the course of the history of European integration, there were always “external states” that did not subscribe to the functional approach of economic integration for various reasons.6 In addition, the EU has 1 2 3 4

5 6

Klaus SCHAWABE (ed.), Die Anfänge des Schuman-Plans, 1950/51, Brussels/Bruylant-Milano/ Giuffrè/-Paris/LGDJ-Baden-Baden/Nomos-Verlag, vol. 2, 1988. Marie-Thérèse BITSCH, Histoire de la construction européenne de 1945 à nos jours, Brussels, Editions Complexe, 1996. Marie-Thérèse BITSCH (ed.), La construction européenne, enjeux politiques et choix institutionnels, Brussels, Peter Lang, 2007. Jan VAN DER HARST (ed.), Beyond the Customs Union: The European Community’s Quest for Deepening, Widening and Completion, 1969–1975, vol. 11, Brussels/Bruylant-Milano/Giuffrè/ -Paris/LGDJ-Baden-Baden/Nomos-Verlag, 2007; Neill NUGENT, European Union Enlargement, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2004. Ben ROSAMOND, “Brexit and the Problem of European Disintegration”, Journal of Contemporary European Research, vol. 12, n°4, 2016, pp. 864–871. See Alan MILWARD, The European rescue of the Nation State, Routledge, London, 1992.

8

BIRTE WASSENBERG (& PATRICK MOREAU)

been beset by crises. Since 2008, the financial crisis and since 2015, the migration and Schengen crises have been challenging the model of a united Europe “without borders”.7 In the EU member states, Euro-skepticism has continually increased as demonstrated by the negative outcome of referenda on various EU treaties (Maastricht – 1992, Amsterdam – 1997, Nice – 2001, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe – 2005, and the Lisbon Treaty – 2007) as well as by the increasing strength of anti-European parties in the national as well as European political arena.8 One of the shocking results of the last European elections was the fact that Euro-skeptics did not only register electoral gains among the extreme left and right political spectra but that in almost all EU states, Euroskeptic parties were elected to the European Parliament.9 Today, it may even have become attractive to be an “external state” of the EU since many of the hard Euro-skeptic parties clearly fight for withdrawal from the community. These “external states”, i.e., those that belong to Europe but not to the European Union are the issue of this present volume. What is their attitude towards Europe? Why are they not EU members? Did the EU reject them? Or do they oppose the European Union or the process of European unification in principle? Are they Euro-skeptics, anti-Europeans or do they strive for a different model of European cooperation? Is their non-participation in or rejection of the EU an essential historical constant or do they change their attitude according to the geopolitical context? Do some of them consider the EU accession process, do they prefer bilateral agreements, or do they want to remain completely independent of the EU? Or do they look at the EU as a rival, an unacceptable community, a new “empire” to be counteracted? To answer these questions, we have to distinguish precisely who is an “external state” and what exactly this is. And in fact, it is possible to identify various groups of “European” external states. From a historical perspective, it is important to note that the process of European unification took place during the Cold War. Therefore, from 1950 to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, only Western European states were able to participate in this process.10 For this reason, all the states of the Eastern Bloc (including Yugoslavia), and especially the Central and Eastern European countries clearly belonged to this category of “external states”. As for the EU, this classification

7 8

9

10

Tanja A. BÖRZEL, Thomas RISSE, “From the euro to the Schengen crisis”, Journal of European Public Policy, 24, 2017, pp. 1–26. For further analysis see the two volumes by: Birte WASSENBERG, Frédéric CLAVERT, Philippe HAMMAN (eds.), Contre l’Europe ? Anti-européisme, euroscepticisme et altereuropéisme dans la construction européenne de 1945 à nos jours (Volume 1) : les concepts, Stuttgart, Steiner Verlag, 2010 ; Maria GAINAR, Martial LIBERA, Contre l’Europe ? Antieuropéisme, euroscepticisme et alter-européisme dans la construction européenne de 1945 à nos jours (Volume 2) : Acteurs institutionnels, milieux politiques et société civile, Stuttgart, Steiner Verlag, 2013. For further analysis see the two volumes by Patrick MOREAU, Birte WASSENBERG (eds.), European Integration and new Anti-Europeanism, Volume 1, The 2014 European Election and the Rise of Euroscepticism in Western Europe, Stuttgart, Steiner Verlag, 2016; Patrick MOREAU, Birte WASSENBERG (eds.), European Integration and new Anti-Europeanism, Volume 2, The 2014 European Election and New Anti-European forces in Southern, Northern and Eastern Europe, Stuttgart, Steiner Verlag, 2016. Malcolm ANDERSON, Eberhard BORT, The frontiers of the European Union, Chippenham, Palgrave, 2001.

INTRODUCTION/INTRODUCTION/EINFÜHRUNG

9

remains valid until the date of the eastward enlargement in 2004, i.e., for more than half a century.11 From the very beginning, some Western democracies did not participate in the process of European integration. They remained “external” out of conviction. This is the category of states that had joined the Council of Europe – the “other” European organization – in 1949 but did not accede the ECSC.12 Already at the time of the Hague Congress of May 1948, this category appears on the horizon because the advocates of the “European idea” represented two different views that could be assigned to certain national delegations: Thus, the majority of the representatives of the states later to be founders of the ECSC, i.e., especially the Belgian, French, and Italian delegations, supported the model of a federal Europe. The Scandinavians, British, and Irish preferred intergovernmental European cooperation instead.13 The advocates of intergovernmental cooperation had prevailed at the negotiations on the founding of the first European organization. This is the reason why the Council of Europe, established in Strasbourg in May 1949, had not been designed as the basis of the structure of a federal European state.14 The Scandinavian states – Norway, Sweden, and Denmark – as well as the United Kingdom and Ireland were quite satisfied with the intergovernmental structure of the Council of Europe. Consequently, they remained “external states” when the Schuman Declaration heralded a new federally oriented model of European unification.15 However, with the exception of Sweden, all these states applied for EEC membership in 1961 and joined in 1973 for predominantly economic reasons: They needed access to the Single European Market.16 In Norway, the population was so skeptic about the EEC model that accession was rejected in a referendum. Thus, Norway remained an “external state”. One of the initial reasons for the non-accession of these states in 1958 was their different attitude towards the EC’s model of economic integration: In 1960, the Customs Union was countered by the foundation of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), a free trade area without common external tariffs. Then, the EFTA united all member states of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) founded in 1948, which had not joined the EEC: the United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, Austria, and Portugal.17

11 12 13 14 15 16 17

For the Eastern enlargement of the EU see John O’ BRENNAN, The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union, Routeledge, Abingdon, 2006. François LAMOUREUX, Jacques MOLINÉ, Un exemple de coopération intergouvernementale : le Conseil de l’Europe, Paris, PUF, 1972. Jean-Michel GUIEU, Christophe Le DRÉAU, Le Congrès de l’Europe à la Haye (1948–2008), Brussels, Peter Lang, 2009, pp. 15–20. Birte WASSENBERRG, History of the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, Council of Europe edition, 2013, pp. 10–30. Birte WASSENBERG, Histoire du Conseil de l’Europe 1949–2009, Brussels, Peter Lang, 2012, pp. 64–72. Wolfram KAISER, Jürgen ELVERT (eds.), European Union Enlargement. A Comparative History, Routledge, Abingdon, 2004. Lise RYE, ”Integration from Outside : the EC and EFTA from 1960 to the 1995 enlargement”, in: Haakon A. IKONOMOU, Aurélie ANDRY, Rebekka BYBERG (eds.), European Enlargement across Rounds and Beyond Borders, Routledge, Abingdon, 2017, pp. 194–215.

10

BIRTE WASSENBERG (& PATRICK MOREAU)

Another reason was the issue of neutrality:18 In fact, among the “Northern states”, for reasons of neutrality, Sweden and Finland remained “external states” until the end of the Cold War. While they joined the EU in 1995, Norway rejected membership for the second time. And to this day, Iceland, which joined the Council of Europe in 1951 already, has not become an EU member. Neutral Switzerland joined the Council of Europe in 1961. But to date, it has rejected EU membership preferring bilateral agreements instead. Historically, there is still another category of “external states”: the so-called micro-states. Among them, Luxemburg is the only ECSC founding member and Malta joined the EU in 2014. By contrast, in the course of the history of European unification, all these states (with the exception of the Vatican) became members of the Council of Europe: Luxemburg as a founding state in 1949, Iceland in 1951, Malta in 1965, and Liechtenstein in 1978. San Marino followed in 1988, and finally Andorra in 2003, and Monaco in 2004.19 In the 1960s, during the debates about the admission of these states to the Council of Europe, their dependency on bigger neighboring states (Switzerland, Italy, France, and Spain) posed a problem, and their capacity to act as international players was questioned.20 Today, different issues play a part in considerations to apply for EU membership, for instance their tax system (havens) and the difficulties of these small countries to completely transpose the acquis communautaires. Presently, five categories of „external states” can be identified that shall be examined in this volume. Firstly, there are the remaining EFTA states and those who joined since 1960 (Liechtenstein, Iceland, Switzerland, and Norway). They still prefer the model of a free-trade area to the Single Market.21 Secondly, there are the European states who cannot become EU members for legal reasons since they do not fulfil the political criteria for the opening of accession negotiations. In 1993, the so-called Copenhagen Criteria for EU membership were defined: There are political and economic criteria.22 The political criteria also apply to the membership of the Council of Europe, i.e., a candidate country must be a recognized European state in the form of a democracy, respect human rights and apply the rule of law.23 This is not the case in three European states: the Vatican, Belarus, and Kosovo. The third category of “external states” are the micro-states. Of these, to date only Luxemburg and Malta are EU members. The fourth category of “external states” are the current or potential accession countries.24 Presently, the EU conducts negotiations with seven candidates (Turkey since 1999, Albania 18

19 20 21 22 23 24

See Neutral States and the European Community, London, David Memorial Institute of International Studies, 1994; Surya P. SUBEDI, “Neutrality in a Changing World: European Neutral States and the European Community”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 4, 2, April 1993, pp. 238–268. Thomas M. ECCARDT, Secrets of the Seven Smallest States of Europe: Andorra, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, San Marino and Vatican City, Hippocrene Books, New York, 2005. See Markus-René SEILER, Kleinstaaten im Europarat, Fallstudien zu Island, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Malta und San Marino, Université de St. Gallen, Bamberg, 1995. For current members and objectives of EFTA see www.efta.int (2.7.2017). See European Parliament, Briefing n°23 “Legal questions of enlargement”, 19.5.1998, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/23a2_en.htm (2.7.2017). Florence BENOÎT-ROHMER, Heinrich KLEBES, Le droit du Conseil de l’Europe. Vers un espace juridique européen, Strasbourg, Editions of the Council of Europe, 2005, p. 29. List and state of play available on official EU website: https://europa.eu/newsroom/ highlights/special-coverage/enlargement_de (2.6.2017)

INTRODUCTION/INTRODUCTION/EINFÜHRUNG

11

since 2003, Serbia and Macedonia since 2005, and Montenegro since 2006). However, due to the present crises, negotiations with Turkey have been suspended. Furthermore, Kosovo (2008) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (2016) applied for membership. Iceland had applied for membership in 2009 but withdrew its application in 2015.25 Finally, the fifth category consists of the states with whom the EU maintains a bilateral or multilateral neighborhood policy but who are ineligible for membership, either because they do not wish to join (Russia), or because the present geopolitical situation does not permit it, or because there is no consensus on a membership application (Ukraine, Moldavia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia).26 Not all “external states” can be studied in this volume. In the first section, three EFTA states are examined. In her contribution “Norwegian Euroscepticism revisited. The Gap between Policy and Practice”, Lise Rye analyzes the only country – Norway – to reject accession to the EC/EU twice in the history of European integration. She explains that the basic rejection of EU membership per se has not changed in Norway. But in practical terms, a transfer of sovereignty to the EU is quite accepted. The economic situation of the country is the cause of Norwegian Euro-skepticism which is not a “hard” one. In contrast, Cenni Najy and René Schwok’s article “The Most Reluctant Country with Regard to European Integration” demonstrates the strong resistance of Switzerland against EU membership. In line with the specific Swiss Euro-skepticism, there appear to be tendencies to even call into question the bilateral accords with the EU. Paradoxically, the British Euro-skeptics who consider these bilateral accords their model would be considered pro-European in Switzerland. Finally, Eirikur Bergmann’s contribution “Iceland in Europe – Keeping its Distance” examines the special case of Iceland which is closely linked with the EU by the European Economic Area Agreement (EEA) but recently withdrew its 2009 membership application. He claims that the key to understanding the procrastination of this micro-state is the internal dilemma between emphasizing independence and the desire to actively participate in international relations. The second part of this book presents four case studies. Firstly, in his contribution “Les relations de l’UE avec le Vatican : une dimension « micro » ?”, Rémi Caucanus analyzes the Vatican, a pro-European micro-state whose EU membership has been out of the question due to its special state structure. In his article, Caucanus stresses the Vatican’s tight relations with the EU which surpass institutional and formal aspects and assume a political dimension: It is emphasized that the ECSC founding fathers already advocated the Christian identity of Europe thus opening the way for close ties between the EC/EU and the Vatican. The second case study concentrates on a former state of the Soviet Union: Belarus. Due to its dictatorial state structure, it does not meet the political requirements of a membership of the Council of Europe or of the EU. In their article “Eurosceptics not only by State Definition: The Case of Belarus”, Wolfgang Sender and Ieva Motūzaitė point out that the Belarusian attitude toward European integration 25 26

“Iceland drops EU membership bid: ‘interests better served outside union”, The Guardian, 12.3.2015, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/12/iceland-drops-europeanunion-membership-bid (2.6.2017) However, these states are all members of the Council of Europe, see Birte WASSENBERG, History of the Council of Europe, op.cit.

12

BIRTE WASSENBERG (& PATRICK MOREAU)

cannot be assigned to one of the “classic categories” of Euro-skepticism. The analysis of politics, media discourses, and opinion research prove the Belarusian view of Europe to be strongly influenced by Russia and the pro-Russian president Lukashenko. Due to its strong dependency on Russia, pro-European options are not really open to the country. Concerning their EU relations, the difficult situation of states located in close vicinity to Russia also becomes evident in the third case study on the Ukraine. In his essay “Ukraine: Pro-European Majority and the Chances of Revenge” Kostiantyn Fedorenko shows that in spite of a pro-European majority, left-wing Ukrainian parties lobby for the restauration of a common political space with Russia while right-wing parties fuel a Euro-skepticism which denounces European integration and especially the EU’s supra-nationality. The so-called “soft Euro-skepticism” is also said to be deeply rooted in Ukrainian politics with many parties maneuvering between Europe and Russia. The fourth case study presents a candidate country: In his contribution “Die politischen Parteien Albaniens und Europa”, Afrim Krasniqi demonstrates that – contrary to the other former Eastern Bloc countries – no political group, organization, or party has ever opposed the process of European integration in Albania. He argues that there is a broad political and social consensus concerning EU accession in Albania. Thus, there are no fertile grounds for Euro-skepticism. Among the population, the EU has become something like a positive “myth” which shall have to withstand the concrete preparations for accession. The third part of the volume concentrates on Russia’s position towards the EU. Two contributions point out why Russia’s attitude towards the EU has become more and more skeptical and why there has never been any intention or prospect of EU membership even though Russia joined the Council of Europe in 1996. In “Vladimir Poutine et l’Europe : malentendus et maladresses”, Jean-Christophe Romer explains how since Vladimir Putin’s assuming the Russian presidency in 2000, the relationship with the EU has continually deteriorated due to the accumulation of errors, ineptitudes, and incompetence of Western Europe and the United States, finally even leading to a form of “rupture” due to missed opportunities. By contrast, in his contribution “Russia’s Eurosceptic Discourses: Imitations, Contestations, Sutures”, Andrey Makarychev underlines that the Euroskeptic discourse in Russia arises from imitation and distorted presentation of European concepts or from fierce criticism of European values considered alien and unacceptable for Russia. The rejection of the EU happens parallel to the process of the dissolution of Russian identity which is newly defined against Europe and the EU.

INTRODUCTION La déclaration Schuman du 9 mai 1950 marque le début du processus d´unification de l´Europe. Il allait tout d´abord être signé par six membres fondateurs – France, Allemagne, Pays du Benelux et Italie. Il avait pour objectif de donner, par étapes, des dimensions communes à l´Europe, et ceci en renonçant à une partie, certes limitée dans un premier temps, des souverainetés nationales. Cette démarche aboutit en 1952 à la création de la Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier (CECA), en 1957 à la Communauté économique européenne (CEE), enfin en 1992 à L´Union européenne (UE). Au fil du temps, ce processus d´unification a non seulement abouti à une intégration grandissante d´un nombre grandissant de secteurs économiques – de l´union douanière avec un marché commun en 1958 jusqu´au Marché unique de 1992, enfin à l´union monétaire de 2002 – mais aussi à ce que l´UE se développe en un système quasi-étatique, dans lequel les institutions et les processus de décision fonctionnent certes sui generis, mais de manière comparable à un système démocratique. Le succès de l´histoire de l´intégration européenne se mesure non seulement au poids considérable de l´UE dans l´économie mondiale ou aux dimensions globales des normes communautaires du droit européen, mais aussi au fait que jusqu´en 2012, de plus en plus d´Etats européens ont rejoint cette communauté. Elle est passée en 1973 de 6 à 9 (Royaume-Uni, Irlande et Danemark), en 1980 à 10 (Grèce), en 1995 à 15 (Suède, Finlande et Autriche), en 2004 à 25 (Pologne, Tchéquie, Slovaquie, Hongrie, Slovénie, Lettonie, Lituanie, Estonie, Chypre, Malte), enfin en 2013 à 28 (Croatie). Cette tendance à l´élargissement allait toutefois être stoppée avec le choix du Brexit fait par le Royaume-Uni en 2016. Pour la première fois, un Etat membre a fait le choix de quitter l´UE. Le succès de l´élargissement de l´UE de 6 à 28 membres ne doit pas nous faire oublier que celle-ci n´englobe pas tous les Etats européens et que, depuis l´origine, un certain nombre d´entre eux ne souhaitait pas suivre le modèle d´intégration de Robert Schuman. Tout au long de l´histoire de l´intégration européenne, il a toujours existé des « Etats extérieurs » qui n´adhérèrent pas à l´approche fonctionnelle de l´intégration économique, et ceci pour des raisons fort diverses. De plus, il faut se rappeler que l´UE a été ébranlée par des crises : Depuis 2008, la crise financière, depuis 2015 celles des migrations et de l´espace Schengen, qui ont remises en cause le modèle d´une Europe unie « sans frontières ». L´euroscepticisme dans les pays membres de l´UE s´est renforcé constamment depuis le début des années 90, ce que mesure les référendums négatifs des différents traités européens (Maastricht 1992, Amsterdam 1997, Nice 2001, la constitution européenne de 2005 et le traité de Lisbonne en 2007), mais aussi la montée en puissance de partis hostiles à l´Europe dans les contextes politiques européens et nationaux. A l´occasion des dernières élections européennes, on ne peut que déplorer la progression électorale des partis d´extrême gauche ou d´extrême droite dans un certain nombre d´Etats membres, mais aussi le fait que dans presque tous les pays de l´Union européenne des partis eurosceptiques aient été élus au Parlement européen. Il semble aujourd´hui être attractif de se

14

BIRTE WASSENBERG (& PATRICK MOREAU)

vouloir un « Etat externe », puisque que ces partis eurosceptiques durs se font l´avocat d´un retrait de la Communauté européenne. Ce livre porte sur ces « Etats externes », c´est à dire appartenant à l´Europe, mais n´étant pas membre de l´Union européenne. Nous devons nous interroger : Quelle est leur vision de l´Europe ? Pourquoi ne sont-ils pas membres de l´UE ? Sont-ils rejetés par elle ? Rejettent t´ils l´Union européenne ou le processus d´unification européen ? Sont t´ils eurosceptiques, anti-européens et défendent t´ils un autre modèle de la coopération européenne ? Leur non-participation ou rejet de l´UE est-il constant dans l´histoire ou ont t´ils modifié leurs comportements selon les contextes géopolitiques ? Considèrent t´ils l´UE comme une rivale, comme une communauté ne venant pas en question, comme un « empire » que l´on doit combattre ? Pour répondre à ces interrogations, il nous faut d´abord précisément différencier, qui et ce que nous comprenons comme « Etat extérieur » à L´UE. De fait, il est possible d´identifier différents groupes d´Etats « européens » externes. Sur le plan historique, il faut tout d´abord se rappeler que le processus d´unification européenne a eu lieu pendant la guerre froide et que, de 1950 à la chute du mur en 1989, seuls les Etats ouest-européens pouvaient y participer. Ceci place tous les pays de l´Est (y compris la Yougoslavie) et surtout les pays de l´Europe centrale et orientale dans la catégorie des pays externes ; ceci vaut pour l´Union européenne jusqu´à la date de l´élargissement à l´Est, c´est à dire plus d´un demi-siècle. Parmi les démocraties occidentales, il y eu aussi, dès le début processus d´intégration européen, quelques Etats qui n´y participèrent pas et qui restèrent, par conviction, « externes ». Il s´agit, pour la plupart, de la catégorie constituée par les Etats qui à partir de 1949 appartiennent au Conseil de l´Europe, mais n´adhèrent pas à la Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier (CECA). Cette catégorisation se dessine déjà à l´occasion du congrès de la Haye en mai 1948. En effet, parmi les défenseurs de « l´idée européenne », deux conceptions différentes rassemblant des délégations nationales spécifiques s´affrontaient. D´un côté, on trouvait les pays qui allaient fonder plus tard Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier, c´est à dire avant tout les délégations belges, françaises et italiennes plaidant pour le modèle d´une Europe fédérale, alors que les Scandinaves, les Britanniques et les Irlandais préféraient une collaboration européenne intergouvernementale. Les tenants de l´option intergouvernementale allaient obtenir gain de cause avec la fondation de la première organisation européenne. Le Conseil de l´Europe fondé à Strasbourg en mai 1949 ne fut, en effet, pas conçu comme la base d´une structure d´Etat fédérative. Les Etats scandinaves – Norvège, Suède, Danemark – ainsi que le Royaume Uni et l´Irlande se satisfaisaient de la nature intergouvernementale du Conseil de l´Europe et restèrent en toute logique, par la suite, des « Etats externes », lorsque le plan Schuman donna le signal d´un nouveau modèle fédéral d´unification européenne. Il est néanmoins incontestable que ces Etats, à l´exception de la Suède, allaient demander à adhérer en 1961 à la Communauté économique européenne et en devenait membre en 1973, mais ce fut pour des raisons essentiellement économiques. Ils avaient besoin d´avoir accès au marché intérieur. Dans le cas de la Norvège, la population était à ce point sceptique vis-à-vis du marché unique qu´elle allait le rejeter par référendum et que, ce faisant, la Norvège reste un « Etat externe ».

INTRODUCTION/INTRODUCTION/EINFÜHRUNG

15

Une des raisons de la non-adhésion de ces Etats à la Communauté économique européenne en 1958 avait aussi pour cause une vision différente du modèle d’intégration économique de l´UE. Avec la fondation de l'Association européenne de libre-échange (AELE) en 1960, l´Union douanière se voyait opposée une zone de libre-échange sans contrôle douanier extérieur commun. L'Association européenne de libre-échange regroupait à cette date tous les Etats membres de l´ Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques (OCDE), qui n´adhéraient pas à la Communauté économique européenne : Le Royaume Uni, la Norvège, la Suède, la Finlande, la Suisse, l´Autriche et le Portugal. Une autre raison était la question de la neutralité. Parmi les « Etats du Nord », la Suède et la Finlande restèrent jusqu´à la fin de la guerre froide des « Etats externes ». Alors qu´en 1995 ils sont devenus membres de l´UE, la Norvège allait, pour la seconde fois, refuser de rejoindre l´UE, ceci comme l´Islande qui avait pourtant adhérée dès 1951 au Conseil de l´Europe. La Suisse, qui est neutre, a elle aussi refusée d´adhérer à L´UE et préfère les accords bilatéraux. Sur le plan historique, il y a une autre catégorie d´Etats « externes » : les micro-Etats, dont seul le Luxembourg est membre fondateur de la Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier et Malte qui a adhéré en 2004 à l´UE. Tous les micro-Etats (sauf le Vatican) sont devenus, au fils de l´histoire de l´intégration européenne, membre du Conseil de l´Europe (Luxembourg comme membre fondateur en 1949, l´Islande en 1951, Malte en 1965, le Liechtenstein en 1978, San Marino en 1998, Andorre en 2003, enfin Monaco en 2004. A l´occasion des débats dans les années 60 sur l´adhésion de ces Etats au Conseil de l´Europe, ce fut avant tout leur dépendance vis-à-vis de leurs grands voisins (Suisse, Italie, France, Espagne) qui fit problème, – on doutait de leur capacité à être des acteurs internationaux –, alors qu´aujourd´hui ce sont d´autres dimensions qui viennent mettre en question leur adhésion à l´Europe, par exemple leur système d´imposition (les oasis fiscales) ou les possibles difficultés pour ces micro-Etats à adopter la totalité des acquis communautaires. Aujourd´hui, on peut identifier cinq types d´Etats externes à L´UE, qui sont abordés dans ce livre. Il y a d´abord les quatre membres restants ou ayant rejoint depuis 1960 l´Association européenne de libre-échange (Liechtenstein, Islande, Suisse et Norvège), qui préfèrent encore le modèle de la zone de libre-échange au grand marché unique. Deuxièmement, les Etats européen qui ne peuvent devenir membres de l´UE, parce que les conditions juridiques pour leur adhésion ne sont pas remplies. Les critères dits de Copenhague pour l´adhésion à l´UE ont été fixés en 1993. Ils distinguent entre le politique et l´économie. Les critères politiques jugés nécessaires à une adhésion sont que le pays candidat doit être une démocratie, respecter les droits de l´homme et être un Etat de droit. Trois pays sont pour ces raisons exclus : le Vatican, le Belarus et le Kosovo. Dans la troisième catégorie d´Etats « externes », on trouve les micro-Etats, dont seuls le Luxembourg et Malte sont membres de l´UE. La quatrième catégorie rassemble les candidats potentiels ou actuels à l´adhésion. L´UE négocie aujourd´hui avec sept candidats : La Turquie depuis 1999, l´Albanie depuis 2003, la Serbie et la Macédoine depuis 2005 et le Monténégro depuis 2006. A cause de la crise actuelle, les négociations avec la Turquie sont suspendues. Une demande d´adhésion a été aussi faite par le Kosovo (2008), la Bosnie-Herzégovine (2016). L´Islande qui avait fait une demande en 2009 l´a, en 2015, retiré. La cinquième catégorie est constituée par les Etats qui pratiquent une politique de voisinage bilatérale ou multi-

16

BIRTE WASSENBERG (& PATRICK MOREAU)

latérale avec l´UE, mais qui ne viennent pas en question pour une éventuelle adhésion, soit parce qu´ils ne le souhaitent pas (Russie) ou parce que il n´existe pas de consensus sur une demande d´adhésion (Ukraine, Moldavie, Géorgie, Azerbaïdjan, Arménie). Tous les Etats « externes » ne peuvent être traités dans ce livre. Dans la première partie, nous nous penchons sur trois Etats membres de l´Association européenne de libre-échange. Lise Rye analyse dans sa contribution « Norwegian Euroscepticism Revisited. The Gap Between Policy and Practice » le seul pays – la Norvège – qui a par deux fois dans l´histoire de l´intégration européenne refusé d´adhérer à la Communauté européenne / Union européenne. Elle montre que, dans la durée, le rejet fondamental de l´adhésion à l´UE perdure, mais que dans la pratique un transfert de souveraineté en direction de l´UE est accepté. L´Euroscepticisme norvégien est donc de nature économique et n´est pas un euroscepticisme « dur ». Cenni Najy et René Schwok nous montent au contraire dans leur article « The Most Reluctant Country with Regard to European Integration » la force de la résistance de la Suisse à l´adhésion à l´UE. De manière consistante avec son euroscepticisme spécifique, il existe aujourd’hui des tendances remettant en cause les accords bilatéraux avec l´UE. De manière paradoxale, les eurosceptiques britanniques qui ont comme modèle ces accords bilatéraux seraient plus pro-européens que les Suisses. Eirikur Bergmann analyse dans sa contribution « Iceland in Europe – Keeping its Distance » le cas spécial de l´Islande, qui est liée de manière étroite avec l´UE à travers l´Espace économique européen, mais qui a, après une demande d´adhésion en 2009, retiré depuis cette requête. La clé permettant de comprendre le choix de ce micro-Etat est à rechercher dans le dilemme interne existant entre l´affirmation de l´indépendance du pays et le souhait parallèle d´une participation active aux relations internationales. Dans la seconde partie de cet ouvrage, nous présentons quatre études. Remi Caucanus présente le Vatican, un Etat ami de l´Europe, mais qui pour des raisons de structures étatiques ne peut adhérer à l´UE. Dans son article « Les relations de l’UE avec le Vatican : une dimension « micro » ? » il montre que le Vatican a établi des relations étroites, qui par-delà les aspects formels et institutionnels, ont pris une dimension politique. On affirme ainsi que les pères fondateurs de la Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier étaient favorables à une identité chrétienne de l´Europe et avaient ouvert, ce faisant, la voie à une coopération étroite de la Communauté européenne / Union européenne avec le Vatican. La deuxième étude porte sur une partie de l´ancienne Union soviétique, le Belarus, qui de par ses structures étatiques dictatoriales ne remplit pas les conditions d´une adhésion, ni au Conseil européen, ni à L´UE. Dans son article « Eurosceptics not only by State Definition: The Case of Belarus » Wolfgang Sender et Ieva Motūzaitė montrent que l´attitude du Belarus vis-à-vis de l´intégration européenne n´appartient à aucune catégorie « classique » de l´euroscepticisme. L´analyse de la politique, des discours dans les médias et des données des sondages d´opinion montre que la vision anti-européenne du Belarus dépend fortement de celle de la Russie et des positions du président pro-russe Lukaschenko, et que la forte dépendance du Belarus vis-à-vis de la Russie ne permet pas d´options réellement pro-européennes. La situation difficile des Etats se trouvant au voisinage de la Russie est corroborée par l´étude du cas ukrainien. Kostiantyn Fedorenko montre dans sa contribution « Ukraine: Pro-European Majority and the Chances of Revenge » que, malgré une majorité d´opinions favorables à l´UE en Ukraine, les partis de

INTRODUCTION/INTRODUCTION/EINFÜHRUNG

17

gauche plaident pour la restauration d´un espace commun avec la Russie et que les partis de droite attisent un euroscepticisme condamnant l´intégration européenne et en particulier la supranationalité de l´UE. L´euroscepticisme dit « mou » est lui-aussi enraciné dans la politique ukrainienne et nombre de partis pratiquent une balance entre l´Europe et la Russie. La dernière des contributions porte sur un des candidats à l´adhésion à l´UE. Dans son article « Die politischen Parteien Albaniens und Europa » Afrim Krasniqi montre qu´au contraire d´autres pays de l´Est, il n´existe aucun groupement, organisation ou parti hostiles au processus d´intégration européen. Il argumente qu´en Albanie un large consensus politique et social sur l´adhésion à l´UE existe et qu´aucun humus n´existe pour la croissance d´un euroscepticisme, ceci malgré le fait que celle-ci soit devenu un « mythe » positif qui devra résister aux exigences concrètes de la préparation à l´adhésion. La troisième partie du livre porte sur l´attitude de la Russie. Deux contributions montrent pourquoi la Russie est de plus en plus sceptique vis-à-vis de l´EU et n´a jamais eu l´intention, ni la perspective d´en devenir membre, malgré le fait qu´elle soit, depuis 1996, membre du Conseil de l´Europe. Jean-Christophe Romer montre dans son article « Vladimir Poutine et l’Europe: malentendus et maladresses » comment, depuis l´arrivée à la présidence de la Russie de Wladimir Poutine les relations avec l´UE se sont dégradées avec l´accumulation d´erreurs, de maladresse et d´incompétences de la part de l´Europe de l´Ouest et des USA, qui ont fini par aboutir à une sorte de « rupture ». Andrey Makarychev dans son article « Russia’s Eurosceptic Discourses: Imitations, Contestations, Sutures » affirme que le discours eurosceptique en Russie est né de l´imitation et de la représentation déformée des concepts européens ou de la violente critique de valeurs européennes perçues comme étrangères et inacceptables pour la Russie. Le rejet de l´UE se produit parallèlement au processus de la dissolution de l´identité russe, qui se redéfinit contre l´Europe et l´UE.

EINFÜHRUNG Mit der Schuman-Erklärung vom 9. Mai 1950 begann in Europa ein Einigungsprozess, der zunächst 6 Gründungsmitgliedstaaten – Frankreich, Bundesrepublik Deutschland, die Benelux-Staaten und Italien – umfasste und der es zum Ziel hatte, Schritt für Schritt über gemeinsame Funktionen Europa zusammenzuführen und zwar so, dass in zwar zunächst kleinen, aber wesentlichen Bereichen Souveränität abgegeben wurde. Dies führte 1952 zur Schaffung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl (EGKS), 1957 zur Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (EWG) und 1992 zur Europäischen Union (EU). Im Laufe der Geschichte hat dieser Einigungsprozess nicht nur bewirkt, dass immer mehr Wirtschaftsbereiche integriert wurden – von der Zollunion mit gemeinsamem Markt 1958 zum einheitlichen Binnenmarkt 1992 bis hin zur Währungsunion 2002 –, sondern auch dazu, dass die EU sich zu einem quasistaatlichen System entwickelt hat, in dem Institutionen und Entscheidungsprozesse zwar sui generis, aber mit einem demokratischen Staatssystem vergleichbar funktionieren. Der Erfolg dieser europäischen Integrationsgeschichte misst sich nicht nur an dem erheblichen Gewicht der EU in der Weltwirtschaft oder dem global übergreifenden Gemeinschaftsnormen des Europarechtes, sondern auch an der Tatsache, dass bis 2012 immer mehr europäische Staaten dieser Gemeinschaft beigetreten sind: So wurde sie 1973 von 6 auf 9 (Vereinigtes Königreich, Irland und Dänemark), 1980 auf 10 (Griechenland), 1987 auf 12 (Spanien und Portugal), 1995 auf 15 (Schweden, Finnland und Österreich), 2004 auf 25 (Polen, Tschechien, Slowakei, Ungarn, Slowenien, Lettland, Litauen, Estland, Zypern, Malta), 2007 auf 27 (Rumänien und Bulgarien) und 2013 auf 28 (Kroatien) Mitgliedstaaten erweitert. Erst die Brexit-Entscheidung des Vereinigten Königreiches 2016 hat diesen Erweiterungstrend gestoppt: Zum ersten Mal in der Geschichte der EU entschied sie ein Mitgliedsstaat dazu, die EU zu verlassen. Trotz der Erfolgsgeschichte der Erweiterung von 6 auf 28 Mitgliedstaaten gilt es jedoch nicht zu vergessen, dass die EU nicht alle europäischen Staaten umfasst und dass von Beginn an nicht alle dem von Robert Schuman propagierten Integrationsmodell folgen wollten. So gab es im Laufe der Europäischen Integrationsgeschichte immer auch die „externen Staaten“, die sich nicht dem funktionalen Ansatz zur Wirtschaftsintegration anschlossen, und zwar aus unterschiedlichen Gründen. Dazu kommt, dass die EU heute von Krisen geschüttelt wird: seit 2008 die Finanzkrise, seit 2015 die Migrations- und Schengenkrise, die nun das Modell des vereinigten Europas „ohne Grenzen“ in Frage stellen. Der Euroskeptizismus in den Mitgliedstaaten der EU hat sich seit Beginn der 1990ger Jahre immer weiter verstärkt: dies wird sowohl in den negativen Referenden zu den verschiedenen EU-Verträgen (Maastricht 1992, Amsterdam 1997, Nizza 2001, die Europäische Verfassung 2005 und der Lissaboner Vertrag 2007) deutlich, wie auch durch den Anstieg von europafeindlichen Parteien im nationalen und im Europäischen politischen Umfeld. Bei den letzten Europawahlen war es ein erschütterndes Ergebnis, dass die Europaskeptiker nicht nur im extrem linken oder rechten Spektrum einiger Mitgliedstaaten Gewinne erzielten, sondern dass aus fast allen EU-

INTRODUCTION/INTRODUCTION/EINFÜHRUNG

19

Ländern europaskeptische Parteien in das Europaparlament einziehen konnten. Es ist also heute vielleicht sogar attraktiv geworden ein „externer Staat“ der EU zu sein, da viele dieser harten euroskeptischen Parteien den Austritt aus der Gemeinschaft eindeutig verfechten. Um diese „externen Staaten“, d.h. die, die zu „Europa“, aber nicht zur EU gehören, geht es im vorliegenden Band. Wie ist ihre Einstellung zu Europa? Warum sind sie nicht Mitglied der EU? Werden sie von der EU abgelehnt? Oder lehnen sie die EU ab, oder grundsätzlich den Europäischen Einigungsprozess? Sind sie Euroskeptiker, Anti-Europäer oder verfechten sie ein anderes Modell der Europäischen Zusammenarbeit? Ist ihre Nichtbeteiligung oder Ablehnung gegen die EU konstant in der Geschichte oder ändern sie ihr Verhalten je nach geopolitischem Kontext? Erwägen einige von ihnen ein Beitrittsverfahren zur EU, bevorzugen sie bilaterale Abkommen oder wollen sie gänzlich von der EU unabhängig bleiben? Oder betrachten sie die EU als Rivalen, als nicht in Frage kommende Gemeinschaft, als neues „Empire“ dem man entgegenwirken sollte? Um diese Fragen zu beantworten, muss zuerst jedoch genauer differenziert werden, wer und was unter „externen Staaten“ zu verstehen ist. Man kann in der Tat verschiedene Gruppen „europäischer“ externer Staaten identifizieren. Aus der geschichtlichen Perspektive heraus gilt es zunächst festzuhalten, dass der Europäische Einigungsprozess im Kalten Krieg stattfand und daher von 1950 bis zum Berliner Mauerfall 1989 nur die westeuropäischen Staaten an diesem Prozess teilnehmen konnten. Dies stellt eindeutig alle Staaten des Ostblocks (inklusive Jugoslawien) und vor allem die ost- und mitteleuropäischen Länder in die Kategorie der „externen Staaten“ und in Bezug auf die EU hält diese Klassifizierung bis zum Datum der Osterweiterung 2004 an, d.h. mehr als ein halbes Jahrhundert. Aber auch unter den westlichen Demokratien gab es schon von Beginn an einige Staaten, die nicht am europäischen Integrationsprozess teilnahmen, die sozusagen aus Überzeugung „extern“ blieben. Es handelt sich dabei zumeist um die Kategorie von Staaten, die zwar von 1949 an dem Europarat – der „anderen“ europäischen Organisation – beitraten, aber sich nicht der EGKS anschlossen. Diese Kategorie lässt sich schon zum Zeitpunkt des Haager Europa-Kongresses im Mai 1948 erahnen, da unter den Verfechtern der „europäischen Idee“ zwei unterschiedliche Auffassungen aufeinandertrafen, die jeweils bestimmten nationalen Delegationen zugeordnet werden konnten: Demnach befürworteten die Teilnehmer der Länder, die später die EGKS gründeten, d.h. vor allem die belgischen, französischen und italienischen Delegationen, mehrheitlich das Modell eines föderalen Europas, während die Skandinavier, Briten und Iren eine intergouvernementale europäische Zusammenarbeit bevorzugten. Die intergouvernementalen Befürworter konnten sich bei den Verhandlungen zur Gründung der ersten europäischen Organisation durchsetzen, und dies führte dann auch dazu, dass der im Mai 1949 in Straßburg eingerichtete Europarat nicht als Grundlage einer föderativen europäischen Staatsstruktur konzipiert war. Die skandinavischen Staaten – Norwegen, Schweden, Dänemark – sowie das Vereinigte Königreich und Irland waren durchaus mit der intergouvernementalen Struktur des Europarates zufrieden und blieben logischerweise dann auch „externe“ Staaten, als der Schuman-Plan 1950 ein neues, föderal ausgerichtetes Modell europäischer Einigung einläutete. Es ist zwar Tatsache, dass diese Staaten, mit Ausnahme von Schweden, 1961 die Mitgliedschaft bei der EWG beantragten und 1973 dann auch

20

BIRTE WASSENBERG (& PATRICK MOREAU)

beitraten, aber dies hatte vor allem wirtschaftliche Gründe: Sie benötigten Zugang zum Europäischen Binnenmarkt. Im Falle von Norwegen lässt sich sogar feststellen, dass die Bevölkerung dem EWG-Modell so skeptisch gegenüberstand, dass sie den Beitritt in einem Referendum ablehnte und Norwegen damit „externer“ Staat blieb. Einer der Gründe für den Nichtbeitritt dieser Staaten zur EWG 1958 war auch eine zunächst unterschiedliche Haltung gegenüber dem Wirtschaftsintegrationsmodell der EG: Der Zollunion wurde 1960 mit Gründung der Europäischen Freihandelsassoziation (EFTA) eine Freihandelszone ohne gemeinsamen Außenzölle entgegengesetzt. Die EFTA umfasste damals all die Mitgliedstaaten der 1948 gegründeten Europäischen Organisation für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit (OEEC), die nicht der EWG beigetreten waren: das Vereinigte Königreich, Norwegen, Schweden, Finnland, die Schweiz, Österreich und Portugal. Ein weiterer Grund war die Frage der Neutralität: Unter den „Nordstaaten“ blieben in der Tat Schweden und Finnland aus Gründen der Neutralität bis Ende des Kalten Krieges „externe“ Staaten. Während sie 1995 dann EU-Mitglieder wurden, lehnte Norwegen zum zweiten Mal die EU-Mitgliedschaft ab, und auch Island, das schon 1951 dem Europarat beigetreten war, wurde bis heute kein Mitglied der EU. Die neutrale Schweiz hat sich zwar 1961 dem Europarat angeschlossen, hat jedoch ebenfalls bis heute eine EU-Mitgliedschaft abgelehnt und eher bilaterale Abkommen bevorzugt. Geschichtlich betrachtet gibt es zuletzt noch eine weitere Kategorie „externer“ Staaten: die sogenannten Mikro-Staaten, von denen nur Luxemburg Gründungsmitglied der EGKS ist und Malta seit 2004 der EU angehört. Im Gegensatz dazu sind im Laufe der Europäischen Einigungsgeschichte alle diese Staaten (mit Ausnahme des Vatikans) Mitglieder des Europarates geworden: Luxemburg als Gründungsstaat 1949, Island 1951, Malta 1965 und Liechtenstein 1978; San Marino folgte 1988 und danach letztlich noch Andorra 2003 und Monaco 2004. Während bei den Debatten zur Aufnahme dieser Staaten in den Europarat in den 1960er Jahren vor allem ihre Abhängigkeit von größeren Nachbarstaaten (Schweiz, Italien, Frankreich, Spanien) ein Problem bereitete und ihre Fähigkeit, als internationale Akteure zu agieren, in Frage gestellt wurde, spielen heute andere Elemente eine Rolle bei der Überlegung, einen Antrag auf Beitritt zur EU zu stellen, wie z.B. ihre Steuersysteme (Oasen) oder die Schwierigkeiten für diese kleinen Länder der gesamten Übernahme des acquis communautaire. Aus heutiger Sicht lassen sich fünf Kategorien von „externen“ Staaten identifizieren, die in diesem Band behandelt werden sollen. Es gibt zunächst die verbleibenden bzw. seit 1960 neu hinzugekommenen vier EFTA-Staaten (Liechtenstein, Island, die Schweiz und Norwegen), die immer noch das Modell der Freihandelszone gegenüber dem einheitlichen Binnenmarkt bevorzugen. Zweitens gibt es die europäischen Staaten, die aus rechtlichen Gründen nicht EUMitglieder werden können, da sie die politischen Kriterien für die Aufnahme von Beitrittsverhandlungen nicht erfüllen. Die sogenannten Kopenhagener Kriterien für die EU-Mitgliedschaft wurden 1993 festgelegt: Man unterscheidet zwischen den politischen und wirtschaftlichen Kriterien. Erstere sind die Kriterien, die auch für eine Mitgliedschaft im Europarat notwendig sind, d.h. ein Beitrittskandidat muss ein anerkannter europäischer Staat in Form einer Demokratie sein, die Menschenrechte respektieren und einen Rechtsstaat bilden. Dies trifft auf drei europäische Staaten nicht zu: den Vatikan, Belarus und den Kosovo. Eine dritte

INTRODUCTION/INTRODUCTION/EINFÜHRUNG

21

Kategorie „externer Staaten“ sind die Mikrostaaten, von denen bis heute nur Luxemburg und Malta Mitglieder der EU sind. Die vierte Kategorie „externer Staaten“ sind die aktuellen oder potentiellen Beitrittskandidaten. Die EU verhandelt zurzeit mit sieben Kandidaten (Türkei seit 1999, Albanien seit 2003, Serbien und Mazedonien seit 2005, Montenegro seit 2006), wobei allerdings aufgrund der momentanen Krise die Verhandlungen mit der Türkei suspendiert wurden; ein offizielles Beitrittsgesuch haben außerdem noch der Kosovo (2008) sowie Bosnien und Herzegowina (2016) gestellt. Island hatte 2009 einen Beitrittsantrag gestellt, ihn jedoch 2015 wieder zurückgezogen. Die fünfte Kategorie sind letztlich die Staaten, mit denen die EU eine bilaterale oder multilaterale Nachbarschaftspolitik pflegt, die jedoch nicht als Beitrittskandidaten in Frage kommen, entweder weil sie es selbst nicht wünschen (Russland) oder weil die geopolitische Lage es momentan nicht ermöglicht oder kein Konsens über ein Beitrittsgesuch besteht (Ukraine, Moldawien, Georgien, Aserbaidschan, Armenien). Nicht alle dieser „externen“ Staaten können in diesem Band näher behandelt werden. In einem ersten Teil werden zunächst drei EFTA-Staaten näher beleuchtet. Lise Rye analysiert dabei in ihrem Beitrag „Norwegian Euroscepticism Revisited. The Gap Between Policy and Practice“ das einzige Land – Norwegen – das in der Geschichte der europäischen Integration zwei Mal den EG/EU-Beitritt abgelehnt hat. Sie zeigt dabei auf, dass sich an der grundsätzlichen Ablehnung einer EUMitgliedschaft in Norwegen an sich nichts geändert hat, dass aber in der Praxis ein Transfer von Souveränität auf die EU durchaus akzeptiert wird. Der norwegische Euroskeptizismus sei daher eher von der wirtschaftlichen Lage des Landes bedingt und kein „harter“ Euroskeptizismus. In Gegensatz dazu führen Cenni Najy und René Schwok in ihrem Beitrag „The Most Reluctant Country with Regard to European Integration“ aus, wie stark die Resistenz der Schweiz gegen einen EU-Beitritt ist. Konsistent in ihrem schweizerisch spezifischen Euroskeptizismus gäbe es heute sogar Tendenzen, die bilateralen Abkommen mit der EU infrage zu stellen. Paradoxerweise wären daher für die Schweiz im Vergleich die britischen Euroskeptiker, deren Leitbild diese bilateralen Abkommen sind, sogar proeuropäisch. Eirikur Bergmann untersucht zuletzt in seinem Beitrag „Iceland in Europe – Keeping its Distance“ den speziellen Fall Islands, das durch das Abkommen über den Europäischen Wirtschaftsraum (EWR) zwar eng mit der EU verbunden ist, jedoch sein Beitrittsgesuch von 2009 kürzlich wieder zurückgezogen hat. Der Schlüssel zum Verständnis des Zauderns dieses Mikrostaates sei das interne Dilemma zwischen der Betonung der Unabhängigkeit und dem gleichzeitig bestehenden Wunsch nach einer aktiven Beteiligung an den internationalen Beziehungen. Im zweiten Teil dieses Bandes werden vier Fallstudien präsentiert. Zunächst analysiert Rémi Caucanus den Vatikan, einen europafreundlichen Mikrostaat, für den aus Gründen seiner speziellen Staatstruktur eine Mitgliedschaft bei der EU nie in Frage kam. In seinem Artikel „Les relations de l’UE avec le Vatican : une dimension « micro » ?“ betont er, dass der Vatikan zur EU sehr enge Beziehungen aufgebaut hat, die über die institutionellen und formellen Aspekte hinaus auch eine politische Dimension annehmen: So wird oft betont, dass schon die Gründungsväter der EGKS eine christliche Identität Europas befürworteten und einer engen Anbindung der EG/EU an den Vatikan damit den Weg ebneten. Die zweite Fallstudie betrifft einen früheren Teilstaat der Sowjetunion, Belarus, der aufgrund seiner diktatorischen Staatstruktur die politischen Kriterien für eine Mit-

22

BIRTE WASSENBERG (& PATRICK MOREAU)

gliedschaft weder beim Europarat noch bei der EU erfüllt. In ihrem Beitrag „Eurosceptics not only by State Definition: The Case of Belarus” zeigen Wolfgang Sender und Ieva Motūzaitė auf, dass die Haltung von Belarus zur Europäischen Integration in keine „klassische Kategorie“ des Euroskeptizismus eingeordnet werden kann. Die Analyse der Politik, Mediendiskurse und der Meinungsforschung zeige, dass die belarussische anti-europäische Sicht auf Europa stark von Russland und dem pro-russischen Präsidenten Lukashenko beeinflusst wird und dass durch die starke Abhängigkeit des Landes von Russland keine wirklichen pro-europäischen Optionen offen stünden. Die in Bezug auf die EU schwierige Situation von Staaten, die sich in der näheren Nachbarschaft Russlands befinden, wird auch in der dritten Fallstudie zur Ukraine deutlich. Kostiantyn Fedorenko zeigt in seinem Beitrag „Ukraine: Pro-European Majority and the Chances of Revenge”, dass trotz der EU-freundlichen Mehrheit in der Ukraine die linken Parteien des Landes für die Wiederherstellung eines gemeinsamen politischen Raums mit Russland werben und die rechten Parteien einen Euroskeptizismus schüren, der die Europäische Integration und insbesondere die Supranationalität der EU verurteilt. Auch der sogenannte „weiche“ Euroskeptizismus sei fest in der ukrainischen Politik verwurzelt und viele Parteien praktizierten die Taktik einer Balance zwischen Europa und Russland. Die letzte der vier Fallstudien behandelt dann einen der Beitrittskandidaten der EU: In seinem Artikel „Die politischen Parteien Albaniens und Europa“ führt Afrim Krasniqi auf, wie, im Gegensatz zu anderen Ländern des früheren Ostblocks, in Albanien keine politische Gruppierung, Organisation oder Partei sich jemals gegen den europäischen Integrationsprozess ausgesprochen hat. Er argumentiert, dass es in Albanien einen breiten politischen und sozialen Konsens bezüglich des EU-Beitritts und daher keinen fruchtbaren Boden für Euroskeptizismus gäbe, obwohl die EU in der Bevölkerung schon fast zum positiven „Mythos“ geworden sei, der nun noch den konkreten Anforderungen der Beitrittsvorbereitung standhalten muss. Der dritte Teil des Bandes ist der Haltung Russlands gegenüber der EU gewidmet. In zwei Beiträgen wird aufgezeigt, warum Russland der EU immer skeptischer gegenübersteht und warum nie eine Absicht oder Aussicht auf EUMitgliedschaft bestand, obwohl Russland schon 1996 dem Europarat beigetreten ist. In „Vladimir Poutine et l’Europe: malentendus et maladresses“ erläutert JeanChristophe Romer, wie seit Wladimir Putins Übernahme der Präsidentschaft Russlands im Jahr 2000 das Verhältnis zur EU durch eine Akkumulation von Irrtümern, Ungeschicklichkeiten und Inkompetenzen Westeuropas und der USA immer weiter verschlechtert wurde und es schließlich durch verpasste Gelegenheiten sogar zu einer Art „Bruch“ kam. Andrey Makarychev hingegen betont in seinem Beitrag zu „Russia’s Eurosceptic Discourses: Imitations, Contestations, Sutures“, dass euroskeptische Diskurse in Russland zum einen durch Nachahmung und verzerrte Darstellung europäischer Konzepte oder durch die heftige Kritik an europäischen Werten als fremd und unannehmbar für Russland entstünden. Die Ablehnung der EU erfolge parallel zum Prozess einer sich auflösenden Identität Russlands, die sich gegen Europa und die EU neu definiere.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS PATRICK MOREAU (& BIRTE WASSENBERG) The economic crises of 2008–2009, the tensions around the Euro, the Greek question, and the refugee problem have fueled a strong “Eurosceptic” movement within the process of the European unification, but also on the periphery of Europe. The vague term “Euroscepticism” hides complex political and social realities as well as an extreme variety of political discourse and practice. At the 2009 European elections and at the national elections between 2009 and 2017, the rise of Eurosceptic forces could be observed in virtually every single political system of the member states of the European Union. We followed a dual approach: At first, we analyzed this Euroscepticism/antiEuropeanism within the European Union. In the second step, we concentrated on the periphery of Europe. The first stage resulted in several publications.1 Besides the traditional classification as “hard” or “soft” anti-European groupings, we focused on the numerous actors within the political systems who are ideologically both on the left and on the right, extremist or not. Sometimes, for example in Italy, they cannot be assigned to a category at all. This variety was a challenge for the analysis. To meet this defiance, we analyzed the discourse of Eurosceptic parties of the conservative camp, for example, in Poland or Great Britain, as well as those of nationalpopulist formations from the Nordic countries, France, and Austria. The authors of the contributions demonstrated the similarities of the anti-European agitation from Greek or Cypriot extreme right hardliners to that of regionalist parties like the Northern League or Vlaams Belang. Our approach also dealt with the question of the anti-Europeanism of the Greek and Czech Communists and the alter-Europeanism of post-Communist parties, but also of “parties of disruption” like the Five Star Movement in Italy or Podemos in Spain. As regards the periphery of Europe, our approach was completely different. We did not concentrate on extremist actors and “parties of disruption”. Instead, we focused on presenting the perception of European integration of the states (advantages and disadvantages, hostility or desire for rapprochement, development of pro- or anti-European feelings over time). Are the arguments of countries 1

The publications already available are: Stéphane COURTOIS, Patrick MOREAU, (ed.), Communisme 2014, En Europe. L´éternel retour des communistes 1989–2014, Communisme 2014, En Europe. L´éternel retour des communistes 1989–2014, Paris, Éd. Vendémiaire, 2014 ; Stéphane COURTOIS, Patrick MOREAU, (ed.), Communisme 2015, La guerre des mémoires, Paris, Éd. Vendémiaire, 2015 ; Martial LIBERA, Sylvain SCHIRMANN, Birte WASSENBERG (ed.), Abstentionnisme, euroscepticisme et anti-européisme dans les élections européennes de 1979 nos jours, Stuttgart, Franz-Steiner Verlag, 2016 ; Patrick MOREAU, Birte WASSENBERG (ed.), European Integration and new Anti-Europeanism I. The 2014 European election: the rise of anti-europeanism in Western Europe, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag, 2016, Patrick MOREAU, Birte WASSENBERG (ed.), European Integration and new Anti-Europeanism II. The 2014 European election and New Anti-European Forces in Southern, Northern and Eastern Europe, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag, 2016.

24

PATRICK MOREAU (& BIRTE WASSENBERG)

like Switzerland similar to those of Norway or Iceland? Is the Ukraine proEuropean like Belarus? Is Putin’s Russia really anti-European? For this book, we had to select countries to be represented and refrain from dealing with states geographically situated on the very fringes of the European Union, like Georgia or Armenia. To our great regret, we were not able to include Turkey because due to the present transformation of the political system, it is impossible to get a clear picture of what president Erdogan thinks of and expects from the European Union. Still, this book presents profound answers to our questions. For this, our thanks go to our authors. The immensity of the project required the participation of scientists from the whole of Europe who had already addressed this issue in their research before. Three partners helped us realize the various phases of our research project and have supported us to this very day. The first to be mentioned are the University of Strasbourg and the Centre de la Recherche Scientifique. The have co-financed the excellence project IDEX “The European Integration and the New antiEuropeanism” of the UMR Dynamiques européennes. The support of the scientific and administrative directions of the University and the CNRS was a key factor of success of our work. And finally, we want to express our deep gratitude to the Airbus Group. With a significant financial contribution, it has funded our research. With this publication, we can refer to our achievements: Three international conferences were held, four books were published, and another volume is currently in production. There again, the University of Strasbourg, the CNRS and the Airbus Group support our efforts to understand the present crisis of the European integration. We hope that this way, we shall be able to contribute to the re-foundation and re-vitalization of this great collective project.

REMERCIEMENTS Les crises économiques de 2008–2009, les tensions autour de l´Euro, la question grecque comme celle des réfugiés sont venus nourrir un puissant courant « eurosceptique » dans le cadre de la construction européenne, mais aussi en périphérie de l´Europe. Derrière ce terme vague « eurosceptique » se cachent dans l´Union Européenne des réalités politiques et sociales complexes et une extrême variété de discours et de pratiques politiques. A l´occasion de l´élection européenne de 2009, mais aussi dans la quasi-totalité des systèmes politiques des pays membres de la Communauté européenne, on a pu observer à l´occasion des élections nationales de la période 2009–2017, la montée en puissance des forces eurosceptiques. Notre démarche fut double. D´abord analyser cet euroscepticisme/anti-européanisme au sein de l’Union Européenne, puis dans une seconde phase, de se pencher sur la périphérie de l´Europe. Dans la première, qui a abouti à plusieurs publications, nous avions, par-delà la classification traditionnelle entre les formations anti-européaniste « dures » et « molles », porté notre attention dans les systèmes politiques sur les nombreux acteurs idéologiquement situés tant à gauche qu´à droite, extrémistes ou non, mais aussi parfois « hors normes » comme dans le cas italien. Cette variété était un défi. Nous avons, pour y répondre, analysé les discours des partis eurosceptiques du champ conservateur en Pologne ou en Grande Bretagne par exemple, celui des formations nationales-populistes des pays nordiques, de France ou d´Autriche. Les auteurs des contributions ont montré combien l´agitation antieuropéenne de l´extrême-droite dure du type grec ou chypriote ressemblait à celle des partis régionalistes comme la Ligue du Nord ou le Vlaams Belang. Cette démarche a aussi abordé la question de l´hostilité à l´Europe des communistes grecs ou tchèques, l´alter-européisme des partis post-communistes, mais aussi celui des partis de rupture comme le mouvement Cinq Étoiles en Italie ou Podemos en Espagne. En ce qui concerne la périphérie de l´Europe, la démarche était profondément différente. Les acteurs extrémistes ou de rupture des systèmes politiques n´étaient pas au cœur de la recherche. Ce que nous attendions était une présentation de la perception de la construction européenne par des Etats. (avantages et inconvénients, hostilité ou volonté de rapprochement, évolution dans le temps du sentiment pro- ou anti-européen) L´argumentaire de pays comme la Suisse est-il proche de celui de la Norvège ou de l´Islande ? L´Ukraine est-elle proeuropéenne comme le Bélarus ? La Russie de Poutine est-elle réellement hostile à l´Europe ? Nous avons dû, dans ce livre, faire un choix de pays et renoncer à nous pencher sur des Etats très en marge géographiquement de l´Union européenne comme la Géorgie ou l´Arménie. A notre grand regret, la Turquie n´a pas non plus trouvé sa place dans ce livre, à cause de la transformation en cours du système politique, qui ne permet pas encore une clarification de ce que pense et veut de l´Europe le président Erdogan. Néanmoins, ce livre apporte des réponses fouillées à nos interrogations et nos remerciements vont à nos auteurs.

26

PATRICK MOREAU (& BIRTE WASSENBERG)

L´immensité du projet impliquait une mobilisation de scientifiques venus de l´ensemble de l´Europe et ayant dans le cadre de leurs recherches abordé cette question. Trois partenaires nous ont aidé à réaliser plusieurs étapes de la recherche et nous ont soutenu jusqu´à aujourd´hui. Tout d´abord, l´Université de Strasbourg et le Centre de la Recherche Scientifique qui ont cofinancé le projet d´excellence IDEX « L’intégration européenne et le nouvel anti-européisme » de l’UMR Dynamiques européennes. L´appuis des directions scientifiques et des administrations de l´Université et du CNRS a été une des clés de nos avancées. Enfin, toute notre reconnaissance va au Groupe Airbus, qui a lui aussi largement contribué financièrement à notre recherche. Nous pouvons avec cet ouvrage évoquer nos acquis. Trois colloques internationaux ont été tenus, quatre livres ont été publiés, un ouvrage est en cours d´édition. Là encore, l´université de Strasbourg, le CNRS et le Groupe Airbus nous accompagnent dans notre travail qui vise à comprendre la crise que connait l´intégration européenne, ceci afin – et nous l´espérons – de pouvoir contribuer à la refondation, à la revitalisation et peut être à l´adhésion de nouveaux pays ce grand projet collectif.

DANKSAGUNG Die Wirtschaftskrisen von 2008 und 2009, die Spannungen um den Euro, die griechische Frage und das Flüchtlingsproblem haben sowohl im europäischen Eingungsprozess als auch an der Peripherie Europas eine starke „euroskeptische“ Bewegung erwachsen lassen. Hinter dem unscharfen Begriff „Euroskeptizismus“ verbergen sich komplexe politische und soziale Realitäten und eine extreme Vielfalt von politischen Diskursen und Handlungsweisen. Bei den Wahlen zum Europäischen Parlament von 2009, aber auch bei den nationalen Wahlen zwischen 2009 und 2017 war in praktisch allen politischen Systemen der Mitgliedsstaaten der Europäischen Union das Erstarken euroskeptischer Kräfte zu beobachten. Wir verfolgten einen doppelten Ansatz: Zunächst analysierten wir den Euroskeptizismus/die Europafeindlichkeit in der Europäischen Union. Im zweiten Schritt wandten wir uns der Peripherie Europas zu. Die erste Phase zeitigte mehrere Veröffentlichungen. Neben der traditionellen Unterscheidung zwischen „harten“ und „weichen“ antieuropäischen Gruppierungen konzentrierten wir uns auf die zahlreichen Akteure in den politischen Systemen, die ideologisch sowohl links als auch rechts stehen, extremistisch sind oder auch nicht und manchmal, z.B. in Italien, auch keiner Kategorie zugeordnet werden können. Diese Vielfalt war eine Herausforderung für die Analyse. Um darauf zu reagieren, analysierten wir den Diskurs der euroskeptischen Parteien des konservativen Spektrums, etwa aus Polen oder Großbritannien, sowie denjenigen der nationalpopulistischen Gruppierungen aus den nordischen Ländern, Frankreich und Österreich. Die Autoren zeigten in ihren Beiträgen die Ähnlichkeiten der antieuropäischen Agitation der griechischen oder zypriotischen harten Rechtsextremen mit derjenigen der regionalistischen Parteien wie Lega Nord und Vlaams Belang. Mit diesem Ansatz wurde auch die Frage der Europafeindlichkeit der griechischen und tschechischen Kommunisten und der Altereuropäismus der postkommunistischen Parteien untersucht, aber ebenso die Positionen von „Umbruchparteien“ wie der Fünf-Sterne-Bewegung in Italien oder Podemos in Spanien. Bezüglich der Peripherie Europas war die Vorgehensweise eine völlig andere. Unser besonderes Interesse galt nicht den extremistischen und „Umbruchparteien“. Vielmehr ging es uns darum, das Bild der Europäischen Einigung der jeweiligen Staaten zu präsentieren (Vor- und Nachteile, Ablehnung oder Willen zur Annäherung, Entwicklung einer pro- oder anti-europäischen Einstellung im Laufe der Zeit). Ähnelt die Argumentation von Ländern wie der Schweiz derjenigen von Norwegen oder Island? Ist die Ukraine so proeuropäisch wie Belarus? Ist Putins Russland wirklich europafeindlich? Wir mussten für dieses Buch eine Auswahl von Ländern treffen und konnten uns nicht mit Ländern befassen, die geographisch ganz am Rand der Europäischen Union liegen, wie z.B. Georgien oder Armenien. Zu unserem großen Bedauern wird auch die Türkei nicht behandelt, da infolge der aktuellen Transformation des politischen Systems nicht geklärt werden konnte, was Präsident Erdogan über Europa denkt und von der

28

PATRICK MOREAU (& BIRTE WASSENBERG)

Europäischen Union will. Dennoch gibt dieses Buch umfassende Antworten auf unsere Fragestellungen. Dafür gilt unser Dank unseren Autoren. Der immense Umfang des Projekts erforderte die Beteiligung von Wissenschaftlern aus ganz Europa, die sich in ihren Forschungen bereits mit dieser Fragestellung befasst hatten. Drei Partner unterstützten uns bei der Umsetzung der einzelnen Abschnitte unseres Forschungsprojektes und taten dies auch dieses Mal. An erster Stelle sind die Universität Straßburg und das Centre de la Recherche Scientifique zu nennen. Sie haben das Exzellenzprojekt IDEX „Die europäische Integration und der neue Antieuropäanismus“ des UMR Dynamiques européennes kofinanziert. Die Unterstützung der wissenschaftlichen und administrativen Leitung der Universität und des CNRS waren einer der Schlüssel zum Erfolg unserer Arbeit. Und schließlich sind wir der Airbus Gruppe zu tiefstem Dank verpflichtet. Sie hat mit ihrer großzügigen finanziellen Unterstützung unsere Forschung gefördert. Mit dieser Publikation können wir auf unsere Leistungen verweisen: Drei internationale Konferenzen fanden statt, vier Bücher sind erschienen, ein weiterer Band ist derzeit in Vorbereitung3. Auch hierbei unterstützen die Universität Straßburg, der CNRS und die Airbus Gruppe unsere Arbeit. Wir wollen die derzeitige Krise der europäischen Integration verstehen, um so hoffentlich einen Beitrag zur Erneuerung und Wiederbelebung dieses großen Gemeinschaftsprojektes leisten zu können.

Part 1

BETWEEN RELUCTANCE, DISTANCE AND EUROSCEPTICISM: THE EFTA STATES Partie 1

ENTRE HESITATION, DISTANCE ET EUROSCEPTICISME : LES ÉTATS DE L’AELE Teil 1

ZWISCHEN ZÖGERN, DISTANZ UND EUROSKEPTIZISMUS: DIE EFTA STAATEN

NORWEGIAN EUROSCEPTICISM REVISITED. THE GAP BETWEEN POLICY AND PRACTICE LISE RYE Norway has a reputation for being Eurosceptic. It earned this reputation for having rejected membership of the European Union (EU) on two separate occasions. Both rejections followed advisory referenda where a small majority had voted down the government’s negotiations with the EU: In September 1972, 53.5% voted against joining the then European Community (EC), and in November 1994, 52.2% opposed the Norwegian EU accession. This makes Norway the only country which rejected an offer to partake in the European integration project on two separate occasions. Previous research has highlighted the reasons for Norway’s reluctance to join the EU. While rationalists emphasize the characteristics 1 of the country’s industrial structure , constructivists draw the attention to aspects 2 3 related to identity and values. This chapter’s point of departure is that Norway, alongside its refusal to join 4 the EU’s political unification project, is the EU’s most integrated outsider. This current but less known position is the result of an economic integration process between Norway and the EC that goes back to 1973. In an attempt to compensate for the failed attempt to enter the EC together with Denmark and the United Kingdom in the early 1970s, the Norwegian governments engaged in a political process aiming at formalizing and then gradually extending relations between the remaining members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the 5 EC. This process entered a new and more dynamic phase with the 1994 commencement of the Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA), which institutionalized Norway’s relations with the EU and extended them to new policy 6 areas. Norway’s continuous quest for ever-closer relations with the EU nuances its image as a Eurosceptic country and calls for closer examination of its multifaceted relation with Europe. 1 2 3 4 5

6

Christine INGEBRITSEN, The Nordic States and European Unity, Ithaca and London, Cornell University Press, 1998. Iver B. NEUMANN, “This little piggy stayed at home: Why Norway is not a member of the EU,” in: Lene HANSEN and Ole WÆVER, (eds.), European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States, London, Routledge, 2002. Marianne SUNDLISÆTER SKINNER, “Norwegian Euroscepticism: Values, Identity or Interest,” Journal of Common Market Studies 50, May 2012, p. 422–440. Christophe HILLION, “Integrating an outsider. An EU perspective on relations with Norway,” Outside and Inside: Norway’s agreements with the European Union, NOU 2012: 2, Official Norwegian Reports, Report 16, Oslo, 2011. Lise RYE, “EFTA’s quest for free trade in Western Europe (1960–92). Slow train coming,” EFTA Bulletin, July 2015, p. 4–17; After the 1973 enlargement of the EC to Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom, the remaining members of EFTA were Austria; Finland; Iceland; Norway; Portugal; Sweden and Switzerland. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Outside and Inside: Norway’s agreements with the European Union, NOU 2012: 2, Official Norwegian Reports, Oslo, 2012.

LISE RYE

32

This chapter contains three parts. First, the different stances towards Europe are mapped by examining party programmes and public opinion surveys of Norwegian political parties and public. These positions testify of a noticeable gap between the predominantly pro-EU membership political elite and the considerably more EU-sceptic general public. Thereafter, the second part investigates perceptions of supranational European integration, as presented in party programmes and parliamentary discourse. Hard Eurosceptics explained their position with the virtues of national democracy and the wish to remain in control of the Norwegian natural resources. In contrast, principled supporters of EU membership underpinned their positions with a broader range of arguments pertaining to economy, democracy, security, and solidarity. This part of the chapter also highlights a gap between policy and politics at the level of political parties. In the anti-membership camp, this gap was created in relation to a readiness to accept a considerable transfer of sovereignty to the EU level. Amongst the EU membership-supporters, it found expression in the reluctance to raise the issue of full membership. The last section identifies three aspects that need to be taken into account when attempting to understand popular Euroscepticism in Norway: the high level of apathy toward EU affairs, Norway’s status as a well-functioning democracy, and the state of its economy. This chapter argues that economic factors are more influential than the results of Norwegian referenda surveys might suggest. In the future, opposition against Norway’s entry into the EU could thus be likely to decrease in relation to the state of the Norwegian economy.

1. Positions on European Integration: The Elite-Masses Gap As pointed out by Kopecký and Mudde, any analysis of Euroscepticism must 7 start with a precise definition of the term. The concept has its origins in the British press. It first appeared in a November 1985 article in The Times where it 8 denoted basic opposition to participation in the European integration project. This is also how it was used when entering the vocabulary of the Norwegian 9 press, in a 1992 story covering the Swiss reluctance to join the EC. Efforts to capture the various degrees and targets of Euroscepticism have resulted in a rich and gradually more nuanced scholarly literature. The majority of this literature concerns Euroscepticism within the EU. When the object of study is a country where the question of whether or not to become an EU member is still valid, Szczerbiak and Taggart’s widely used distinction between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Euroscepticism remains relevant. Moreover, the formal positions of Norwegian political parties regarding the question of EU membership have remained stable. The Norwegian case, thus, avoids one of the essential objections raised against the ‘hard-soft’

7 8

9

Petr KOPECKÝ, Cas MUDDE, “The Two Sides of Euroscepticism. Party Positions on European Integration in East Central Europe,” European Union Politics 3, 3, 2002, p. 297–326. Robert HARMSEN and Menno SPIERING, “Introduction. Euroscepticism and the Evolution of European Political Debate,” in Robert HARMSEN and Menno SPIERING, (eds.), Euroscepticism: Party Politics, National Identity and European Integration, Amsterdam, Editions Rodopi B.V., 2005, p. 16. Per NORDRUM, “Laber EF-stemning. Økende euroskepsis hos nølende sveitsere,” Aftenposten, March 28, 1992, p. 4.

NORWEGIAN EUROSCEPTICISM REVISITED. THE GAP BETWEEN POLICY AND PRACTICE

33

conceptualization, namely, that it is based on policies likely to be conjunctural or 10 opportunistic. According to Szczerbiak and Taggart, hard, or principled, Euroscepticism signifies outright rejection of the entire project of European political and economic integration. It also opposes joining or remaining a member of the EU. Soft Euroscepticism denotes a contingent, or qualified opposition to European integra11 tion. Transferred to the Norwegian political landscape, this distinction enables the separation of the parties formally opposed to EU membership and those that are not. Table 2.1 presents the position of the eight political parties currently represented in the national parliament (The Storting) on the question of EU membership as stated in party programmes. The parties are listed in keeping with their position on the left-right political spectrum. Table 1 Party positions on EU membership12 Principled supporters of membership The Socialist Left Party The Labour Party The Green

Principled opponents of membership

No official Position

x x

Party13

x

Support in 2013 general elections

Seats

4.1

7

30.8

55

2.8

1

The Centre Party

x

5.5

10

The Christian Democratic Party

x

5.6

10

5.2

9

26.8

48

16.3

29

The Liberal Party The Conservative Party The Progress Party

x x x

The table shows that in Norway, hard Euroscepticism is not reserved for the fringes of the political spectrum. The Centre Party – the former Farmers’ Party – has always been the leading group opposing EU membership. The Centre Party is located in the midst of the political spectrum, and a former participant in both centre-right and centre-left governments. The Socialist Left Party also opposes the Norwegian membership of the EU. On paper, these two parties oppose the EEA Agreement, which they would like to replace with a less comprehensive free trade agreement. This last point separates them from the Christian Democratic Party which pursues a pro EEA, but still anti EU membership policy.

10 11 12 13

Aleks SZCZERBIAK and Paul TAGGART, Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 242. Paul TAGGART and Aleks SZCZERBIAK, “Contemporary Euroscepticism in the party systems of the European Union candidate states of Central and Eastern Europe,” European Journal of Political Research, 43, 1, 2004, p. 1–27. Source: Party programmes and Stortinget.no. The Green Party does not position itself along the traditional left-right axis. Nevertheless, the prevailing view of the Norwegian electorate is that this is a leftist party.

LISE RYE

34

A second lesson to be drawn from the above table is that hard Eurosceptics constitute a minority. The two large catch-all Norwegian parties, the Labour Party and the Conservative Party, are both in favour of EU membership. The Conservative Party was the first party to come out in favour of EC membership and the only party to have done so before the first national referendum of 1972. The Labour Party followed in spring 1992 after having negotiated the EEA Agreement. This agreement ensured that Norway’s access to the EU internal market proceeded on equal terms with other EU member states. It is fair to say that in spite of the pro-EU positions of both parties, the question of EC membership remains a far more divisive issue in the Labour Party than in the Conservative Party. The political constellation on the issue of EU membership is the opposite in Iceland, which is one of Norway’s fellow EFTA EEA countries. The large catch-all party on Iceland’s political right is vehemently opposed to Icelandic EU membership, while the social democratic party is not. Previous research has described the elite-masses gap in European integration 14 as notorious. Norway forms no exception to this rule. The gap between the relatively EU-optimistic political elite (the political parties) and the far more EUpessimistic public is considerable. This has been evident ever since the question of European supranational integration entered the Norwegian political agenda in the beginning of the 1960s. Two decades after Norway’s last referendum on EU membership, popular opposition against joining the EU shows no sign of slackening. On the contrary, since 2009, the percentage of the population opposing EU membership has increased to a record high of approximately 70%. Figure 1 presents the attitudes of the Norwegian population towards the question of EU membership as they have developed since the turn of the millennium. Figure 1 : Norwegian attitudes towards EU membership, 2000–201515

14

15

Wolfgang C. MÜLLER, Marcelo JENNY, Alejandro ECKER, “The Elites-masses Gap in European Integration,” in Heinrich BEST, György LENGYEL, Luca VERZICHELLI, (eds.), The Europe of Elites: A Study into the Europeanness of Europe’s Political and Economic Elites, Oxford Scholarship Online, May 2012, p. 2. Source: Sentio Research Group, http://www.sentio.no/

NORWEGIAN EUROSCEPTICISM REVISITED. THE GAP BETWEEN POLICY AND PRACTICE

35

The elite-masses gap is politically consequential. The Norwegian constitution stipulates that the transfer of powers “that are normally vested in the authorities of the state” to an international organization “to which Norway belongs or will 16 belong”, requires a three-fourths majority in the Storting. The granting of such consent also demands the presence of two thirds of the parliamentarians. The present government does not have EU membership on its agenda. However, with the current makeup, another popular refusal to join the EU would have entailed a negative vote in parliament. As table 1 shows, three political parties have no official position on the question of EU membership. The Green Party refrains from taking a position because the issue is not on the political agenda. The Liberal Party and the Progress Party make it clear that they will cast their votes in accordance with popular advice. The Christian Democratic Party holds this latter position as well. Together with the votes of the Centre Party and the Socialist Left Party, the Liberal Party, the Progress Party, and the Christian Democratic Party hold enough seats to block a decision to enter the EU.

2. Perceptions of European Integration and the Policy-Practice Gap The political parties that oppose the Norwegian entry into the EU are brought together by the view that EU membership will weaken the conditions for national democracy. The Centre Party states the following: “We believe in active democracy with short distances between decision-makers and decision-takers. 17 The EU offers poorer conditions for representative democracy”. The Socialist Left Party argues along similar lines: “Norwegian membership in the EU will increase the distance between the people and the decision-makers in a number of 18 areas, and weaken representative government in Norway.” The central concept in this context is that of “national sovereignty”. In the Norwegian anti-membership discourse, this is referred to as selvråderett, and used to denote the supreme and independent power of the state. For parties opposing EU membership, the maintenance of national sovereignty is incompatible with the transfer of sovereignty to supranational institutions. An entry into the EU implies a loss of Norway’s sovereignty. The concern to preserve national sovereignty is closely linked with the wish to remain in control of Norway’s rich natural resources. Norway’s current association with the EU allows this. The EEA Agreement does not cover the EU Customs Union, the Common Agricultural Policy or the Common Fisheries Policy. National control of agriculture and fisheries are, in turn, essential instruments of Norwegian regional policy. The motives underpinning this policy differ fundamentally from the ones supporting EU regional policy. EU regional policy has developed in response to the challenges of the EU political project. These challenges arise from the considerable economic differences existing between 16 17 18

The Constitution of Norway, Article 115, https://www.stortinget.no/globalassets/pdf/ constitutionenglish.pdf. (2.3.2016). The Centre Party Political Programme 2013–2017, http://www.senterpartiet.no/partipro grammet/(2.3.2016). The Socialist Left Party Political Programme 2013–2017, https://www.sv.no/arbeids program/(2.3.2016).

36

LISE RYE

rich and poor regions. As a consequence, EU policy has a strong focus on convergence – on the reduction of economic, social, and territorial disparities between regions. In contrast, the primary ambition of post-war Norwegian regional 19 policy is to uphold the country’s settlement pattern. The aim to keep the entire country populated is a struggle against the much stronger forces of centralisation and urbanisation. Norwegian regional policy has provided people that prefer to live outside major cities with opportunities to do so. The regulation of agriculture and fisheries is a key framework of this policy. The political discourse of hard Eurosceptics has been consistent for decades. The Eurozone crisis did not change this discourse in a substantial way, but rather only gave it new relevance. The Eurozone crisis is presented as general proof of the inherent weaknesses of the EU political project. The economic and monetary policies of the EU are singled out as particular examples of the Eurozone weakness. Hard Eurosceptics acknowledge Norway’s interest to collaborate with the EU but disagree on the form this should take. The Socialist Left Party and the Centre Party argue that the EEA Agreement should be replaced by trade and cooperation agreements with the EU. In contrast, the Christian Democratic Party holds, and is unique among Norwegian political parties to state this, that the EEA Agreement serves Norwegian interests best. The party emphasises that Norway’s commercial interests necessitate good relations with the EU, and that the EEA Agreement is exemplary because it provides access to the EU internal market 20 while maintaining Norway’s freedom of action in other important areas. Principled supporters of Norwegian entry into the EU firmly believe that Norway’s EEA association with the EU is democratically problematic. The 1994 EEA Agreement provides Norway and its fellow EFTA countries Iceland and Liechtenstein with access to the EU internal market on equal terms to EU member states. As participants of the internal market, Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein are subject to internal market legislation. While the EEA Agreement includes provisions for their participation in the formulation of EU law, the passing of such legislation is the prerogative of EU members. The result of this is, as the Conservative Party points out, that the “Norwegian society is formed by decisions made in a political system in which Norwegian electors remain unrepre21 sented.” For the principled supporters of EU membership – the Conservative Party and the Labour Party – economic integration with the EU is necessary but not sufficient. Both parties acknowledge the beneficial impact of access to the EU internal market for Norwegian businesses. As the Labour Party points out, eighty per cent of Norwegian exports go to the EU market, and more than fifty per cent of Norwegian imports come from this market. Against this backdrop, predictable conditions for trade and access to markets are of immense importance. The Labour Party also emphasises that the EEA Agreement grants Norwegian busi19 20 21

Ministry of Local Government and Modernisation, “On Regional Policy,” Regjeringa.no, 2014, https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/kommuner-og-regioner/regional--og-distrikts politikk/om-regionalpolitikken/id2345452/(2.3.2016). The Christian Democratic Party Political Programme 2013–2017 https://www.krf.no/ politikk/politisk-program/(2.3.2016). The Conservative Party Political Programme 2013–2017, http://publikasjoner.hoyre.no/ hoyre/160/(2.3.2016).

NORWEGIAN EUROSCEPTICISM REVISITED. THE GAP BETWEEN POLICY AND PRACTICE

37

nesses access to labour and expertise while providing the entire country with 22 new residents. On this last point, it is worth noting that Norway is a country 23 with a geographical size comparable to Germany. While Germany is a country with more than 80 million inhabitants, Norway’s population is 5.2 million. Thus, the challenge inherent in the political aim of keeping the entire country populated is considerable. Nevertheless, in order to obtain political influence and participation, both the Labour Party and the Conservative Party want to replace the EEA Agreement with full membership of the European Union. For the Labour Party and the Conservative Party, EU membership is more than a question of participation in the passing of internal market legislation. These parties’ position is underpinned by normative arguments pertaining to security and solidarity. The Labour Party holds that European integration is conducive to ensuring a peaceful continent. Moreover, “Norway ought to seek cooperation and influence, and not place itself outside co-operation that may provide a better basis for increased political governance and a better distribution of wel24 fare in Europe.” The Conservative Party argues that cooperation with the EU has contributed to Norway’s economic growth, welfare, and to environmental and security improvements. As a result, “Norway is under an obligation to assume co-responsibility for the development in Europe, and this obligation is best 25 met by EU-membership.” On the level of public opinion, attempts to grasp the essence of, and reasons for, Euroscepticism are hampered by the lack of systematic information. The standard Eurobarometer would constitute a useful source to such information but is only conducted in EU member states. Moreover, due to its contested nature, the EU question is subjected to little coverage and debate in Norwegian 26 media. The periods leading up to the two referenda were exceptions to this pattern. As a result, much information is available about why a majority of the voters rejected the EC/EU in 1972 and 1994. This information testifies of continuity over time, as well as of convergence between party-level and popular level Euroscepticism. Election surveys show that in both 1972 and 1994, voters named arguments related to sovereignty and democracy their most important reason for 27 voting no. More specifically, opponents of the Norwegian EC/EU accession held that membership was a democratically inferior alternative to non-membership. This group highlighted the increased distance between decision-makers and decision-takers that the surrender of sovereignty to supranational institutions would entail. The principal slogan during a major demonstration in Oslo 22 23 24 25 26 27

The Labour Party Political Programme 2013–2017 http://arbeiderpartiet.no/Politikken-AAA/Partiprogram-2013-2017 (5.11.2016). Norway’s total area is 385,199 km2 (the islands of Svalbard and Jan Mayen included). Germany’s total area is 357,021 km2. The Labour Party Political Programme 2013–2017, http://arbeiderpartiet.no/Politikken-AAA/Partiprogram-2013-2017 (20.11.2016). The Conservative Party Political Programme 2013–2017, http://arbeiderpartiet.no/ Politikken-A-AA/Partiprogram-2013-2017 (20.11.2016). Tore SLÅTTA, “Fortiet, forsinket og forvrengt?,” Outside and Inside: Norway’s agreements with the European Union, NOU 2012: 2, Official Norwegian Reports, Report 11, 2011. Kristen RINGDAL, “Velgernes argumenter,” in Anders TODAL JENSSEN, Henry VALEN, (eds.), Brussel midt imot. Folkeavstemningen om EU, Oslo, Gyldendal, 1996, pp. 45–66, 56; Marianne RYGHAUG, Anders TODAL JENSSEN, Den store styrkeprøven: om EU-avstemningen i norsk politikk: sluttrapport fra Folkeavstemningsprosjektet, Trondheim, Tapir, 1999, p. 19.

38

LISE RYE

days before the second referendum in November 1994 illustrates this position: “Yes to the people’s democracy – no to the Union” (Ja til folkestyre – nei til Un28 ion). Twenty years after the second Norwegian rejection of EU membership, the leading newspaper Aftenposten established that Norway’s 1994 “no to the EU had 29 become a yes to quite a lot.” New research presented in the form of an Official Norwegian Report commissioned by the Norwegian government substantiated the claim. The report established that the democratic problems inherent in the EEA association had increased. It pointed out the gap between formal and actual sovereignty – between formal autonomy and actual subjugation to decisions taken without Norwegian participation. The report also emphasised that the democratic deficit inherent in the EEA association had grown. The agreement works in ways that “dampens political engagement and debate in Norway and makes it difficult to monitor the Government and hold it accountable for its 30 European policy.” The gap between formal positions on the question of EU membership and political practice in Norway is equally evident at the level of political parties and public opinion. The political parties’ “formal positions”, in this context, signify party positions as stated in political platforms and/or party programmes. When discussing public opinion, this is inferred from data stated in public opinion polls. “Political practice”, in turn, signifies active action, such as voting, but also non-action, such as omission to raise the question of EU membership. The existence of a gap between the underlying positions of the Norwegian parties’ treatment of EU membership, and the way they accommodate the issue in Norwegian politics, is not an original observation. The political scientist Nick Sitter called 31 attention to this aspect in 2008. In light of the developments since then, it is nevertheless astonishing that this gap has not narrowed but increased. Bringing to light the unfortunate democratic consequences of Norway’s EEA association has had no traceable impact on the politics of hard Eurosceptic parties. These parties recently spent eight years in government together with the pro-membership Labour Party. During this period (2005–13), Norway did not once make use of the right to reserve itself against EU legislation. In addition, parties with principled support of EU membership have put the question of EU membership on hold. The Conservative Party confines itself to present membership as its long-term ambition. The Labour Party is equally unwilling to raise the issue and relates this stance to the European economic crisis: “To give up the anchor pile that the EEA Agreement constitutes for Norwegian businesses at a time of economic storm in Europe, would be to gamble with

28 29 30 31

Alf OLE ASK, “For 20 år siden, 28. november, sa Norge nei til EU for andre gang,” Aftenposten Innsikt, 25.11.2014. Ibid. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Outside and Inside: Norway’s agreements with the European Union, op. cit., 2012, p. 7. Nick SITTER, “The European Question and the Norwegian Party System since 1961: The freezing of a modern cleavage or contingent opposition?” in P. TAGGART & A. SZCZERBIAK (eds), Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008.

NORWEGIAN EUROSCEPTICISM REVISITED. THE GAP BETWEEN POLICY AND PRACTICE

39

Norwegian businesses. Today it is more important than ever to ensure predic32 tability and safety for Norwegian workplaces. The EEA Agreement does that.” The discrepancy between formal positions and political practice at the level of public opinion is even more striking. In 2009, approximately 50% of the Norwegian public declared their opposition to EU membership. In the general elections that year, 12.6% gave their votes to the two hard Eurosceptic parties that opposes both EU and EEA membership. Four years later, popular opposition to EU membership had risen to approximately 70%. In that year’s general elections, the Centre Party and the Socialist Left Party together collected 9.6% of the vote.

3. Explaining Norwegian Euroscepticism The hard-soft conceptualization enables drawing a line between the political parties that are formally opposed to Norwegian membership of the EU and those that are not. However, this fails to capture the willingness of the first group to partake in the European integration project, as well as the reluctance of the latter to actively promote their pro EU membership position. Evidence suggests that in the first case, practice is the result of office seeking. In the 2005–13 period, the Centre Party and the Socialist Left Party formed part of the red-green coalition governments headed by Jens Stoltenberg from the Labour Party. These three parties were divided over the EU question. Their forming of a government was based on a compromise in which the pro EU Labour Party agreed to keep the membership question off the political agenda. In return, the Centre Party and the Socialist Party accepted a stated ambition to step up Norway’s European policy on the basis of the EEA Agreement. This was a price the hard Eurosceptics were willing to pay in 2005, and again in 2009. As for the principled Euro optimists, the omission to raise the issue of full membership is the result of pragmatic adjustments to the changing mood of the electorate. The crisis clearly entailed a shift towards a stronger defence of the EEA association among the advocates of Norwegian accession to the EU. However, even before the strong increase in popular opposition to EU membership from 2009 onwards, the Conservative Party made it clear that it did not want a new debate on EU membership. It would only engage in such a debate when public attitude on the issue would render a positive outcome of a referendum 33 likely. At the height of the crisis, the Labour Party maintained that full membership would have served Norway better, “but when 70% of the population say that they are not interested, I agree with the Prime Minister that we have other 34 issues to spend time on now.” Thus, in both camps, principal policies have given way to pragmatic politics. The situation indicates that European policy is an area where people lead and politicians follow. In turn, this calls for a closer look at the factors that are likely to impact Norwegian public opinion on the EU question. In this section, I highlight three interrelated aspects of Norwegian popular Euroscepticism: apathy, 32 33 34

The Labour Party Political Programme 2013–2017, http://arbeiderpartiet.no/Politikken-AAA/Partiprogram-2013-2017 (2011.2016). Finn MARTIN VALLERSNES, Stortingsforhandlinger, 8.11.2007, p. 384. Svein ROALD HANSEN, Stortingsforhandlinger, 22.11.2011, p. 582.

40

LISE RYE

perceptions of the quality of Norwegian democracy, and the country’s relatively strong economy. The apathy toward the question of Norway’s relations with the EU is striking. At a time when 70% of the population is opposed to EU membership, less than 10% gave their vote to the two most pronounced Eurosceptic parties. The situation is contrasted by the high turnout at the 1972 and 1994 referenda, where 79.2% and 89%, respectively, turned up at the ballot boxes. On one level, the situation is surprising. The majority of the Norwegian electorate rejected EC/EU membership on the grounds that this would weaken national democracy. The EEA Review has since established that Norway’s relations with the EU works in undemocratic ways. The surprising facet of this information is that nearly 60% of voters continue to express their satisfaction with the EEA association nevertheless. This is regardless of the fact that the EEA association dampens political de35 bate and breaks with central democratic principles of participation and control. There are at least two possible explanations for this apparent paradox. One is that EU membership opponents consider the EEA association the lesser of two evils. Support for the EU’s political integration project has never been strong in Norway. The number of members in the European Movement in Norway, as opposed to the number of members in the corresponding association of opponents of EU membership is illustrative of this fact. At the height of the campaign leading up to the 1994 referendum, the European Movement had 35,000 registered members. At this same point in time, the No to the EU membership was 145,000. While the country’s dependence on European markets has driven it towards the EU, the wish to remain in control of its natural resources has caused Norway to keep a distance. The EEA Agreement was conceived to accommodate both of these interests. Today, the EU has changed while the EEA Agreement has not. Consequently, its fit with Norwegian interests is not as good as it once was. A majority of Norwegians still perceive it as preferable to full EU membership. A second possible explanation may lie in the contrast between the workings of the EEA Agreement and Norway’s overall status as a well-functioning democracy. Norway figures at the top of several democracy-indexes, and has done so 36 for years. It is tempting to suggest that the country’s general and high compliance with democratic standards is conducive to its population’s readiness to accept the inherent democratic weaknesses of the EEA association. Against this general positive backdrop, the negative aspects of the EEA association may appear as minor and manageable flaws. It is, however, also possible that Norwegians ignore facts that might compromise the image of Norway as one of the world’s foremost democracies. The economy is a third aspect requiring consideration when discussing Norwegian popular opposition against EU membership. A focus on the critical junctures in Norway’s relations with the EU draws a picture of continuity as well as of a prioritization of political concerns. Both in 1972 and 1994, membership op35 36

As of January 2014, 58% of the Norwegian public opinion expressed itself in favour of the EEA Agreement, http://www.nrk.no/okonomi/flertallet-vil-beholde-eos-avtalen-1.11447446 (2.3.2016) See for instance, The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, which assesses the quality of democracy in 167 states. In its 2015 index, the EIU ranked Norway as number one. The EIU ranked Norway’s fellow EFTA EEA country Iceland second. That same year, as in 2010–11 and 2012–13, Norway also figured on top of the Global Democracy Ranking.

NORWEGIAN EUROSCEPTICISM REVISITED. THE GAP BETWEEN POLICY AND PRACTICE

41

ponents formulated their responses along similar lines, using the topics of national democracy and sovereignty as reasons for voting no. Research based on time series analyses reach different conclusions. In 2005, Grünfeld and Sverdrup analysed the relationship between economic fluctuations and attitudes to EU membership. They found that fluctuations in the Norwegian economy, measured in unemployment rates and growth in GDP, had considerable impact on the variation of Norwegian attitudes to EU membership. In hard times, Norwegians were more likely to endorse membership, and even small changes in employ37 ment rates were able to shift the majority from one position to the other. This argument is still valid in 2016. The period since the EEA Agreement took effect is described as a golden era of the Norwegian economy. It is a period mar38 ked by strong economic growth and high employment. In the latter part of this period, the Eurozone suffered a crisis that left Norway largely unaffected. Unemployment rates may serve to illustrate this point. When the financial crisis hit Europe in 2009, the level of unemployment in Norway was 3.1%. In comparison, unemployment in the EU was at an average of 8.9%. Five years later, the corres39 ponding figures were 3.4% as opposed to 10.8%. During this same five year period, the percentage of Norwegians opposed to EU membership went from 50% to 70%. The figures suggest that fluctuations in the EU economy are just as decisive for Norwegian attitudes towards the EU as are fluctuations in Norway’s economy. It is the relative strength of each that matters. If Norwegian positions towards Europe are formed by economic factors, recent developments suggest that Norwegian opposition against EU membership is likely to drop. While Norway escaped the financial crisis, the fall in crude oil prices has had a significant impact on the employment rate in Norway. Unemployment rates for Norway and the EU showed opposite trends in spring 2016. While unemployment in Norway rose to 4.6%, unemployment in the EU decreased to 40 8.9%. Moreover, the European Commission expects the EU economy to grow by 1.8% in 2016, while it has recently reduced its growth forecast for Norway 41 from 1.5% to 1.2%.

Conclusion On a day-to-day basis, hard Euroscepticism in Norway is more formal than real. Parties that oppose the Norwegian accession to the EU have proved both willing and able to govern on the basis of an agreement with the EU that, from a purely democratic perspective, is the worst of all possible options. As a full EU member, Norway would have a say in EU policy-making. Had Norway been associated to the EU through a less comprehensive trade and cooperation agreement, the EU influence on Norwegian affairs would have been smaller. Norwegian support for 37 38 39 40 41

Leo A. GRÜNFELD, Ulf SVERDRUP, “Når penga veier tungt – Nordmenns holdninger til EU medlemskap,” Økonomisk Forum, 5, 2005, p. 39–48. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Outside and Inside: Norway’s Agreements with the European Union, op. cit., 2012 OECD, “Unemployment Rate (indicator),” OECD Data, 2017, https://data.oecd.org/unemp/ unemployment-rate.htm – indicator-chart (2.1.2017). OECD.Stat, http://stats.oecd.org/(2.1.2017). “EU ser for seg lavere norsk vekst,” Dagens Næringsliv, 3.5.2016.

42

LISE RYE

EU membership is also more formal than real. Principled support for Norwegian entry into the EU goes hand in hand with a firm reluctance to promote this policy in an active manner. For those who still believe that the job of a politician is to lead rather than to follow, the situation is disheartening. However, it also suggests that the answer to the question of how Norway’s relations with the EU will proceed in the future is to be found at the level of public opinion. The gap between formal positions and action is evident at this level, too. The current and, from a historical perspective, unusually high level of popular opposition against Norway’s membership of the EU fails to translate into increased support of political parties promoting this position. While this tells us that the question of EU membership is not one that mobilizes voters at general elections, it is probably also an expression of an attempt to achieve the best of two worlds: Access to the EU internal market and the preservation of Norway’s formal sovereignty. This strategy has proved economically beneficial for two decades. Evidence of the unfortunate actual consequences of the EEA Association for the quality of Norwegian democracy has had, so far, no discernible effects. This leads to the conclusion that Norwegian Euroscepticism is first and foremost a function of Norway’s economic situation.

L’EUROSCEPTICISME NORVÉGIEN REVISITÉ La Norvège est dans l´ histoire de l´intégration européenne le seul pays qui a rejeté par deux fois l´adhésion à L´Union Européenne. L´opposition à une adhésion éventuelle ne donne aucun signe d´affaiblissement, et s´est maintenu depuis 2009 à un niveau record de 70%. Tant dans l´opinion publique que dans les partis politiques, le rejet fondamental d´une adhésion va de pair avec l´acceptation d´un vaste transfert de la souveraineté concrète de la Norvège à l´UE. L´euroscepticisme norvégien est donc plus formel que réel. Le fossé existant entre la théorie politique et l´action politique quotidienne montre que pour expliquer l´euroscepticisme norvégien les facteurs politiques sont moins importants que les résultats des sondages d´opinion à l´occasion des référendums d´adhésion ne le suggèrent. Il consolide bien plus la thèse que l´euroscepticisme norvégien est induit par la situation économique du pays.

NORWEGISCHER EUROSKEPTIZISMUS UNTER NEUER BETRACHTUNG In der Geschichte der Europäischen Integration sticht Norwegen hervor als das einzige Land, das zwei Mal den EG/EU-Beitritt ablehnte. Die Opposition zum norwegischen EU-Beitritt zeigt keinerlei Anzeichen der Abschwächung, sondern hat sich vielmehr seit 2009 auf einem Rekordniveau von 70% gehalten. Sowohl in der öffentlichen Meinung als auch in den politischen Parteien verbindet sich die grundsätzliche Ablehnung der EU-Mitgliedschaft mit der Bereitschaft, einen er-

NORWEGIAN EUROSCEPTICISM REVISITED. THE GAP BETWEEN POLICY AND PRACTICE

43

heblichen Transfer der konkreten Souveränität auf die EU zu akzeptieren. Der norwegische Euroskeptizismus ist also eher formal als real. Die Kluft zwischen politischer Theorie und politischem Alltagshandeln zeigt, dass für die Erklärung des norwegischen Euroskeptizismus politische Faktoren weniger wichtig sind, als es die Umfrageergebnisse der norwegischen Referendumsabstimmungen suggerieren. Sie untermauert vielmehr die These, dass der norwegische Euroskeptizismus vor allem von der wirtschaftlichen Lage des Landes bedingt ist.

THE MOST RELUCTANT COUNTRY WITH REGARD TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION CENNI NAJY & RENÉ SCHWOK In its reluctance about joining the European Union, Switzerland is unique. As a matter of fact, every European government and parliament has expressed his wish to become a member at least once in its history. This goes, without saying, for the 28 member states. However, it is also the case for Turkey, the Western Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. Certainly, these countries are not and perhaps shall never be members of the European Union, but this is essentially because the EU has not welcomed them as new entrants. The only countries whose cases are comparable with Switzerland are Norway and Iceland, even though their reluctance is less pronounced. We have to remember that the Norwegian government, supported by parliament, was twice on the point of signing the accession treaty to the EU, but the Norwegian people refused to authorize ratification. Even in Iceland, the government had started accession negotiations when a new political majority stopped them. We should also note that contrary to Switzerland, Norway and Iceland are members of the European Economic Area (EEA). They are thus more deeply integrated than Switzerland. The EEA constitutes a true economic union allowing these countries to access fully the EU’s internal market. This is not the case with Switzerland. Moreover, Switzerland has never started accession negotiations and has not the slightest intention to do so in the near future. Likewise, the EU has never considered it a candidate country. Relations between Brussels and Bern are built on a bilateral basis. As of 2016, Switzerland and the EU concluded nearly 130 sectoral agreements. Their nature is often considered sui generis since the EU has not signed treaties of this type with any other country. However, this “bilateral way” has not been a long quiet river. Its future was imperilled many times. This was the case in 2014, when the Swiss people accepted a federal popular initiative aiming at the restriction of foreign immigration. This referendum demanded the introduction of fixed quotas of residence permits for foreigners (including EU citizens) and of the principle of national preference on the labour market. This was a clear breach of one of the principal bilateral agreements, namely, the one on free movement of persons. In late 2016, after months of uncertainty, the Swiss parliament decided for a very soft implementation that would not go against the agreement though. To elucidate this very special case, we have divided this study into several chapters. First, we will develop the main elements shedding light on the peculiarities of Swiss political Euroscepticism compared to the rest of Europe. In order to do this, we use the key conceptual contributions introduced in scientific literature to explain the phenomenon of Euroscepticism. Secondly, we will analyse the chain of events that brought Switzerland into this particular situation of relative

46

CENNI NAJY & RENÉ SCHWOK

isolation. At that point, we emphasize the specificities of the identity-related, economic and institutional aspects shaping the foreign policy of this country. Thirdly, we will tackle the effects of the 2008–2009 economic crisis and the following slowdown in growth. Thereon, we find that – quite paradoxically – it is because Switzerland suffered very little, that its Euroscepticism increased and its relations with the EU deteriorated. Finally, in our fourth chapter, we will highlight the most important implications of the Swiss case for the suitability of the main theories explaining the phenomenon of Euroscepticism.

1. Compared with Other European Countries, Swiss Euroscepticism has a Distinctive Nature The term “Euroscepticism” is a neologism often taking on a polysemic definition. It was first introduced in Great Britain in the early 1990s. At that time, political observers used the term to describe the development of a new sovereigntist group within the British Conservative Party (which rejected the Maastricht Treaty). Later, this term is used again. But this time, it defines different political 1 realities in certain countries in mainland Europe. Today, it has emancipated from its origins. The media in particular often use it to describe more or less any structured opposition to the EU. In this context, however, we shall define Euroscepticism more precisely, based on specialized academic contributions. Scientific literature has developed several typologies and conceptualizations of Euroscepticism as a political phenomenon. These typologies are mainly based on observations of the behaviour of the main political powers of the EU member states and accession candidates from the beginning of the 1990s until today. One of the simplest conceptualizations is based on the “hard/soft” dichotomy. Primarily, it defines these parties’ positioning in relation to the question of EU membership. So-called “hard” Euroscepticism is defined as opposition in principle to any EU membership. Unfortunately, this is where the definition stops. It does not illuminate whether these Eurosceptic formations define a political alternative to EU membership (association agreements, bilateral treaties, a solitary path, etc.) nor even whether they have the vision of a European order differing from the one established by the EU. Accordingly, “soft” Euroscepticism refers to contingent and less adamant criticism of the EU. This line is considered moderate criticism. It is often based on the perception that national interest contradicts the political development of the 2 EU. Chris Flood has developed another scientific typology, which is a little more precise as it distinguishes six types of Euroscepticism clearly visible in the discourse of European political formations. Among them three are of particular interest. The first one is “rejectionism”. It is defined as opposition to any of the major European policies or, in its harshest form, to continued membership. Still, according to the author of this typology, these rejectionist parties are not necessarily opposed to the idea of building an integrated Europe. The study of their 1 2

Cécile LECONTE, Understanding Euroscepticism, Basingstoke, Palgrave-MacMillan, 2010. Aleks SZCZERBIAK and Paul TAGGART, “The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in EU Members and Candidate States,”Sussex European Institute, SEI Working Paper 51, 2002.

THE MOST RELUCTANT COUNTRY WITH REGARD TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

47

discourse shows that most of them only reject the EU’s too ambitious or politicized nature. The second one is built around the concept of “revisionism”. This is less broad and less categorical than “rejectionism”. The revisionist’s main criticisms focus on one or, at the most, several particular EU policies (for example, the economic and monetary union). They plead for a European Union with a lower level of integration. Finally, the third is defined as “minimalism”. The Eurosceptic minimalists defend the status quo of integration and criticize the irreversibility of the process of ever-deepening integration. Hence, none of these conceptual approaches advocate for the end of integration leading to isolationism 3 or a solitary path. These authors’ contributions are particularly important because they facilitate a better perception of Euroscepticism as a political phenomenon. Still, it is significant that the samples these authors assess often overlook Western European, non-EU member states (Norway, Iceland, Switzerland, etc.). One researcher very justly comments that these scientific works deprive themselves of studying cases which – due to their singularity – may well contribute to a better understanding 4 of the phenomenon of Euroscepticism. Applying these previously developed typologies, it is now possible to compare the case of Switzerland with other European countries. According to Flood’s conceptualization, the prevailing behaviours and attitudes of Swiss political actors refer to a Euroscepticism of the “harsh”, rejectionist type. In fact, its nature is so harsh that it is difficult to compare with the cases studied by Flood in various other European countries. As a matter of fact, a recent poll found that around 80 to 85% of the Swiss population believed that their country ought not to join the EU. Furthermore, the results of such surveys have remained quite consistent over time. In fact, with results between 68 and 85%, they show that rejection has hardly changed over 5 the last 10 years. This emphatic rejectionism is not only symptomatic of Swiss public opinion. The major political forces’ manifestos and programs prove that they are not disconnected from their voters at all. In fact, during the last 10 years, many of these texts settled the issue of accession negatively. Actually, in Switzerland, the main political divide between parties is not proand anti-accession. As we will see later, even the few Swiss political actors considered as pro-European do not advocate full membership but rather one “with exceptions”. In fact, we have to go back at least 25 years in order to find a slightly different situation. In 1992, just after the end of the Cold War, the Swiss government applied to join the EU. Because the Swiss parliament had not voted on any such measure, and no other political actors were consulted. Moreover, this application request was soon shelved sine die (and even officially retracted in July 2016). Meanwhile, by referendum, the Swiss people voted down accession to the Euro3 4 5

Chris FLOOD, “Euroscepticism: a Problematic Concept,” UACES 32nd Annual Conference, 7th Research Conference Queen's University Belfast, September 2–4, 2002. Marianne SUNDLISAETER SKINNER, “Different Variety of Euroscepticism? Conceptualizing and Explaining Euroscepticism in Western European Non-Member States,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 5, 1, 2013, pp. 122–139. Tibor SZVIRCSEV TRESCH and Andreas WENGER, Sicherheit 2014. Aussen-, Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitische Meinungsbildung im Trend, Zurich, Centre for Security Studies, ETH Zürich, 2014.

48

CENNI NAJY & RENÉ SCHWOK

pean Economic Area (EEA) which was supposed to constitute one step before 6 joining the EU. Later, the question of EEA or EU membership became a taboo subject. The deeply rejectionist nature of the main Swiss political actors is thus undeniable. It must be compared with other European countries that are not EU members. First of all, a relevant comparison must focus on countries that – like Switzerland – specifically decided not to join the EU: Norway and Iceland. The analysis of the Norwegian and Icelandic main political actors’ attitudes and policies reveals characteristics differing somewhat from those of Switzerland. For example, polls show that in these countries, public opinion has a different perception of the accession issue. Presently, about 50% of the Icelanders and 7 70% Norwegians are against joining the EU. Surveys conducted over the years show that these results are quite stable even though, in both cases, rejection rates tend to rise. Furthermore, contrary to the Swiss case, several Norwegian and Ice8 landic parties still favour accession. From a historical point of view, the political paths of these two countries are also different. We have to keep in mind that with the support of parliament, the Norwegian government had twice negotiated and signed an accession treaty to the EU (in 1972 and in 1994). The process of accession was only stopped in extremis because the Norwegian people declined to authorize ratification at two referenda with quite close results. In Iceland, too, the government had started accession negotiations in 2009. In 2015, a new majority expressed the desire to cancel them though. Finally, it should also be recalled that both Norway and Iceland are members of the European Economic Area (EEA). Thus, their level of integration is much deeper than the Swiss one. The sectoral bilateral agreements presently linking 9 Brussels and Bern cover fewer integration and cooperation areas. In fact, the only European states – in the traditional geographic sense of the word – that could be considered as reluctant about EU-membership as Switzerland are Russia, Belarus, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. The governments of these 10 countries have never indicated any long-term will to join the EU. However, it should be noted that these four countries are not liberal democracies where the population and the political parties are able to freely express their views on the

6 7

8

9 10

Philippe NELL, Suisse-Communauté européenne. Au cœur des négociations sur l’Espace économique européen, Lausanne, Fondation Jean Monnet pour l’Europe, 2012. KLASSEKAMPEN, “Massiv Norsk EU-Motstand – Nyheter,” Oslo, August 2014, Accessed June 19, 2015 http://bit.ly/1IZD1Lt (2.6.2017); Zoë ROBERT, “Support for EU Accession Unchanged,” Iceland Review Online, February 2015, Accessed December 29, 2015 http://bit.ly/ 1E3dZal (2.6.2017). John Erik FOSSUM, “Norway’s European Conundrum,” Arena Working Paper, 4, Oslo, University of Oslo – Centre for European Studies, 2009; Baldur THORHALLSON, “Europe: Iceland Prefer Partial Engagement in European Integration,” Centre for Small States Studies, Reykjavik, University of Iceland, June 10 2014. Marius VAHL and Nina GROLIMUND, Integration without Membership. Switzerland’s Bilateral Agreements with the European Union, Brussels, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2006. Boris NAVASARIAN, “Armenia. Imagining the integration of the Southern Caucasus with the EU,” Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, 3, 2011, pp 62–73 ; Rashad SHIRINOV, “A Pragmatic Area for Cooperation: Azerbaijan and the EU,” Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, 3, 2011, pp. 74–81; Vladimir ULAKOVICH, “Belarus and the Eastern Partnership: Still a Long Way to Go,” Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, 3, 2011, pp. 82–94.

THE MOST RELUCTANT COUNTRY WITH REGARD TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

49

issue of European integration. This complicates any analysis of the phenomenon of Euroscepticism in their societies. Finally, its singularity would raise fewer questions if Switzerland were more geographically isolated, i.e., on the edge of the major European flows of people, goods, capital, and services (such as the countries mentioned above). Most studies emphasize the total interdependence of Switzerland and its European neighbours. From a demographic, economic, or even a cultural or scientific perspective, Switzerland finds itself always right at the centre of Europe and not at its periphery. All this ought to have worked towards Switzerland fully entering or at least considering the possibility of joining the European Union. But this has never happened.

2. The Motivations of Swiss Rejectionism : An Interpretation Why does Switzerland remain the only state of continental Europe that rejects accession even though it could join the EU without difficulty since it would, almost effortlessly, meet all the accession criteria? In order to answer this question, it is important to investigate the origins of this distrust which has lasted for many decades. Below, we will analyse the Swiss reluctance about accession by presenting five factors explaining Switzerland’s rejectionist Euroscepticism: the weight of history, neutrality, (direct democracy, economic concerns and the Euroscepticism of the elites. It goes without saying that these five factors are here differentiated for didactical reasons. In reality, they interact in a very complex way, creating a sense of exceptionalism very conducive to anti-Europeanism among a large part of the Swiss population. Furthermore, we have to underline that we use them essentially as tools for an interpretative analysis and not as theoretical explanations. 2.1 The weight of History In various layers of society, the vicissitudes of history have forged a sense of exceptionalism which does not favour participation in a supranational community of states. In their recent history, the Swiss have not experienced political traumas that could have made them reconsider their sovereigntist conceptions. For almost two centuries, they have endured neither an international conflict nor a civil war. Furthermore, they have not suffered the torments of authoritarianism or dictatorship. Switzerland remained untouched even in the darkest hours of European history. It also avoided foreign occupation. Finally, Switzerland was spared the traumas connected with the process of decolonization. In a nutshell: this country never suffered any of the major political dramas that affected almost every other country on the European continent over the last 200 years. During that whole period, the Swiss political and institutional situation remained very stable. The constitutional order was always respected, and political crises were insignificant and rare.

CENNI NAJY & RENÉ SCHWOK

50

This remarkable stability has had consequences on the Swiss economic climate. The Swiss economy has steadily maintained a relatively high level of prosperity (especially during the 20th century). More remarkable still, Switzerland has not experienced sudden economic upheavals like almost all its neighbours. To a certain extent, this long period of political and economic stability also contributed to the sense of exceptionalism in Switzerland. Moreover, one period distinguishes itself by its decisive character in the development of Switzerland’s exceptionalism: the Second World War. At that time, the Swiss Confederation emphasized its difference from its neighbouring countries by pursuing policies with strong patriotic tones. The external threats which were quite tangible between 1939 and 1945 (coming from both fascist Italy and Nazi Germany) contributed to the success of these policies and to the development of strong internal unity. This moment of national unity contrasts with the internal discord which prevailed during the First World War. The turn of these events strengthened the sense of exceptionalism and legitimized a tendency towards isolationism. This tendency was reinforced even after the end of the conflict. In fact, Switzerland was the only country in Europe (together with Sweden) that went through this period of war without greatly im11 poverishing. During the post-war period (1945–1960), and to a certain extent during the whole Cold War, the Swiss government remained wary of the efforts to build a new international order around supra-national organizations. Contrary to concepts it had developed in 1919 in joining the League of Nations, the Federal Council, driven by the desire to prolong this new interior harmony, decided that Switzerland did not have to reconsider in any way its foreign policy. Therefore, it continued a largely sovereigntist and somewhat isolationist policy. This political orientation had long-term effects on Swiss foreign politics. To a certain extent, these effects can still be felt today in the form of the phenomenon of historical inertia (path dependency). 2.2 Neutrality It has often been stated that Switzerland’s accession to the EU would cause problems linked with the neutral status of this country. From an objective point of view, however, accession would not lead to the surrender of neutrality as defined in international law. The principle of neutrality would not be threatened in the case of accession because the Union is not a military alliance like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) whose members are obliged to military solidarity should one 12 of them be attacked by a third state. Besides, six EU member states are neutral and do not consider this to be incompatible with their status as member states.

11 12

René SCHWOK, Suisse-Union européenne, l’adhésion impossible?, Lausanne, Presses Polytechniques et Universitaires Romandes, 2015. René SCHWOK, “Le Traité de Lisbonne remet-il en cause la neutralité?,” in Thomas COTTIER and Rachel LIECHTI-MCKEE, (eds.), Die Schweiz und Europa. Wirtschaftliche Integration und institutionelle Abstinenz, Zürich, VDF Hochschulverlag, 2009, pp. 247–250.

THE MOST RELUCTANT COUNTRY WITH REGARD TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

51

In fact, by the Swiss government has itself acknowledged this legal argument. On a certain number of occasions, the Federal Council admitted that accession would not affect neutrality at all unless the EU was to develop a common defines policy tantamount to a military alliance. Nevertheless, many Swiss think that neutrality is embodied in prudent foreign policy (read: relative isolationism). Generally, they look favourably on the existence of international organizations. They are, however, more reserved about the question of whether their own country ought to be a member, especially, if these entities possess supra-national as13 pects or if they deal with questions of international security. One particular element has to be taken into special consideration in order to understand this attitude. According to many Swiss, neutrality has been a very important factor in the success of Swiss foreign policy for the past 200 years. Consequently, they consider it a principle of foreign policy comparable with a sort of timeless magic formula. This perspective differs widely from that of numerous political observers for whom – in the light of the post-Cold War political order in Europe – neutrality is an outdated concept. Thus, it is no surprise that during the last decades, every opinion poll has shown that a large majority of Swiss remains attached to the principle of neutrality, and even to a rather restrictive interpretation of it. The most recent polls show that about 95% of the Swiss population support it in principle. This strong support has let some analysts assume that neutrality ought to be understood as a 14 marker of Swiss identity. While the majority of Swiss attribute numerous benefits – chief among them having avoided the war –, it is helpful to remember that other peoples have drawn opposite conclusions. For example, immediately after the Second World War, the Dutch and the Belgians definitively rejected neutrality because it had 15 not helped them avoid the aggression of Nazi Germany. 2.3 Direct Democracy Direct democracy constitutes another obstacle on the way to Switzerland’s integration into the EU. However, contrary to the other obstacles, this one can be considered as a “real problem” because it poses practical, political questions. Presently, no country has a practice of direct democracy as developed and that permeates the functioning of its institutions as profoundly as Switzerland. In fact, the Swiss population regularly votes on many political issues including those that touch on international affairs. Such a system, unique in the world, does indeed result in certain consequences. Above all, it produces severe constraints on Switzerland’s European policy. We shall depict these constraints in the following three sub-sections.

13 14 15

Daniel GANSER and Georg KREIS, “Swiss Neutrality: Incompatible with EU Membership?,” in Clive Church, (ed.), Switzerland and the European Union. A Close, Contradictory and Misunderstood Relationship, London, Routledge, 2007, pp. 52–78. Tibor SZVIRCSEV TRESCH, Andreas WENGER, Sicherheit 2014. Aussen-, Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitische Meinungsbildung im Trend, Zurich, Centre for Security Studies, ETH Zürich, 2014. Martinus NIJMAN, The Quest for Security: Some Aspects of Netherlands Foreign Policy (1945–1950), The Hague, Van Campen, 1958.

52

CENNI NAJY & RENÉ SCHWOK

2.3.1 Swiss Direct Democracy and the So-Called “Double Majority” Rule Articles 140 and 142 of the Swiss Constitution require the organization of a double majority referendum in the case of joining a supranational community (EU, NATO, etc.). In other words, accession to the EU requires the approval not only of the simple majority of the population, but also the majority of the population in the majority of the 23 cantons and semi-cantons of the Swiss confederation. Since the most isolationist segments of the population are concentrated in the numerous (sparsely) populated rural and traditionalist cantons, a “super majority” of around 55% of the population on the national level would be necessary to overcome the compulsory requirement of the majority of the cantons. This 16 constitutes a major practical difficulty. 2.3.2 Accession Would Have Effects on the Ambit of Direct Democracy By joining the EU, Bern would transfer certain legislative competences to Brussels and would be committed not to apply those that remained if they contradicted applicable European law. In concrete terms, this would imply the intrinsic restriction of the field of application of Swiss direct democracy wherever 17 the EU regulates directly applicable standards. The extent of this limitation due to the incompatibility of European legislation has been estimated at about 14% of the topics submitted to the Swiss people and cantons at referenda and other popular initiatives during the 1990s. Based on these results, it is difficult to draw conclusions because much the Swiss and 18 European legislative processes may vary over time. Nevertheless, they give an idea of the importance this restriction might have should Switzerland join. 2.3.3 Direct Democracy also has a Strong Identitarian Dimension. Direct democracy is one of the essential components of the national identity of a country that shares neither a common language nor culture or religion. It constitutes an efficient political tool to integrate numerous communities whose structure differs, especially concerning language, culture and social aspects. In fact, due to the federal nature of Switzerland, the numerous referenda regularly punctuating Swiss political life are practically the only moments when the different constituent parts of the country can discuss and decide together. Furthermore, these votes greatly contribute to the formation of a distinctive, Swiss public space. They also perform the function of political cohesion contributing to the recuperation and pacification of the new claimant forces that regularly emerge on the Swiss political scene. In this context, any reduction of the fields of application of direct democracy (see below) is often perceived very negatively in Switzerland. 16 17 18

René SCHWOK, Suisse-Union européenne, l’adhésion impossible?, op. cit., 2015. Alexander TRECHSEL, “Direct Democracy and European Integration – A Limited Obstacle?,” in Clive Church, ed., Switzerland and the European Union. A Close, Contradictory and Misunderstood Relationship, London, Routledge, 2007, pp. 36–51. Alexander TRECHSEL, “Direct Democracy and European Integration – A Limited Obstacle?,” op. cit., 2007.

THE MOST RELUCTANT COUNTRY WITH REGARD TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

53

2.4 Economic Apprehension Many citizens also consider accession a threat to the economic interests of their 19 country. Furthermore, contrary to most European peoples, many Swiss are not convinced of the economic benefits of European integration. Therefore, they expect hardly any economic advantages in the case of accession. This conviction has existed in Switzerland for a long time. Studies of the 1990s already indicate its prevalence in Swiss public opinion. They also show that respondents do not base this widely shared view on a cold and rational economic evaluation. Actually, they are incapable of explaining in detail the possible disadvantage for the economic situation if Switzerland were to join the EU. They often content themselves with referring to “common sense” while underlining that Switzerland is already prosperous in spite of not being an EU member 20 state. Arguably, should Switzerland join, from a financial point of view, it would certainly become one of the net contributing members of the EU budget. According to the latest disposable data, its contribution would amount to 4 billion 21 Euros per year compared to the 500 million due through the bilateral treaties. Still, an objective economic analysis has shown that accession would also have positive economic effects for Switzerland that would, in all likelihood, far outweigh the additional expenses mentioned above. Actually, Switzerland’s GDP could gain several additional tenths of a point should the country chose the path 22 of accession rather than that of bilateralism. This gap between the economic notions of a large part of Swiss society and objective reasoning is difficult to analyse. Still, at least partly, it may be attributed to the strong performance of the Swiss economy since 1945. Enjoying high wages due to high levels of productivity and lack of human capital, the Swiss often have a hard time finding the EU economically attractive. 2.5 The Euroscepticism of the Elites 2.5.1 The Most Eurosceptic Employers in Europe One of the specific features of Switzerland’s case is the fact that a large majority of Swiss employers have always been rejectionist – even more so today than during the preceding decades. This situation is a sort of enigma. Several studies show that in every European country that recently joined the EU, this socio23 professional group constituted the spearhead of membership advocates. Obviously, the opposition of employers is particularly strong in sectors less competitive on the international markets (like agriculture). Indeed, they largely 19 20 21 22 23

Thomas CHRISTIN and Alexander TRECHSEL, “Joining the EU Explaining Public Opinion in Switzerland,” European Union Politics, 3, 4, 2002, pp. 415–443. Hans-Peter KRIESI, Claude LONGCHAMP, Florence PASSY, Pascal SCIARNI, “Analyse de la votation fédérale du 6 décembre 1992,” Vox Analyses des votations fédérales, GFS, Berne, 1993. René SCHWOK, Suisse-Union européenne, l’adhésion impossible?, op. cit., 2015. Rudolf MINSCH, Peter MOSER “Teure Grenzen. Die volkswirtschaftlichen Kosten der Zollschranken: 3.8 Milliarden Franken,” Avenir Suisse, Zurich, 2006. A Andreas BIELER, “The Struggle over EU Enlargement: An Historical Materialist Analysis of European Integration,” Journal of European Public Policy, 9, 4, 2002, pp. 575–97.

CENNI NAJY & RENÉ SCHWOK

54

benefit from Switzerland’s protectionist politics. In the case of accession, they fear the reconsideration of their privileges. In fact, especially concerning rules and regulations, they would be placed on equal terms with their more competitive rivals within the interior market of the EU. The genuine uniqueness of the case of Swiss employers is the fact that the most competitive and globalized economic sectors (services) are also rather Eurosceptic. Yet, they would enjoy every advantage should Switzerland join the EU. Membership would provide them with better access to the European market than the bilateral treaties currently in force. This specificity is a result of the fact that a large part of this globalized sector profits from the differences of legislation between the EU and Switzerland. Multinationals, banks, and insurance companies have transformed Switzerland into a haven of special legislations. In the case of accession, they fear Bern will enter a gear of European regulatory interventionism that could jeopardize their pros24 perity. The issue of the value added tax is also regularly raised by a section of employers. Indeed, in the case of accession, Switzerland would be obliged to introduce the minimal VAT currently in force within the EU. Consequently, the “standard” Swiss rate of 8% would practically double to 15%. In the same way, the “reduced” rate would also take a leap from 2.4% to 5%. Quite obviously, such fiscal changes would constitute a significant burden for many Swiss economic actors. In other respects, Swiss employers do not want accession because they would also lose some of their influence on Swiss politics. In Switzerland, political authorities systematically consult employers, 25 especially during the so-called “pre-parliamentary” legislative phase. Thus, they benefit from more impact on public affairs than many of their counterparts in the other European capitals and in Brussels. Another source of influence is provided by the possibility for the employers to exploit direct democracy as a strategic or tactical instrument to defend their political interests. 2.5.2 No Political Party is truly in Favour of Accession For many years, none of the Swiss political formations have openly advocated for accession. In fact, only the Swiss Social Democratic Party (SP) considers such an option possible, but only in the long run and under certain conditions. This timid Socialist position is essentially motivated by the dynamics of Swiss interior politics. The SP tries to compensate its structural electoral weakness (around 20% at the last elections) using the perspective of accession to shake the defenders of the status quo. This way, it attempts to put certain social issues on the legislative agenda that it has been promoting for a long time. Still, the SP is now confronted with several internal Eurosceptic currents. As a consequence, its leadership generally expresses its Europhilia only sotto voce. If the SP officially supports accession, it does so on its own terms. Indeed, some of 24 25

René SCHWOK, Suisse-Union européenne, l’adhésion impossible?, op. cit., 2015. Hanspeter KRIESI and Alexandre TRECHSEL, The Politics of Switzerland. Community Change in a Consensus Democracy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008

THE MOST RELUCTANT COUNTRY WITH REGARD TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

55

its leaders regularly criticize the lack of protection of workers in the EU member countries. In the case of accession negotiations, they would demand the introduction of guarantees against possible wage dumping into Swiss law. Based on the typologies of Euroscepticism developed at the beginning of this contribution, we characterize this position of Euroscepticism as revisionist. Another original feature of the Swiss case is the fact that the centre-right parties are less Europhile than the centre and centre-left ones. This political configuration may not be unique, but it is rather rare in Europe. Thus, for many years, the Christian Democratic People’s Party (CDP) and the Free Democratic (or Radical Democratic) Party FDP, two pillars of the centre-right have refused to make an official statement on EU accession. Both parties are convinced that it is not a realistic perspective for Switzerland. Thus, both of them answer the classic criteria of rejectionism. Recently, several members of these parties distinguished themselves by delivering particularly Europhobic statements. They were even the driving forces behind the withdrawal of the Swiss request for membership, 26 though frozen since 1992, in order to “clarify things”. Undoubtedly, the most rejectionist party of the political spectrum is the Swiss People’s Party (SVP). It is this formation, too, which receives the most votes at general elections: almost 30% at the October 2015 national elections. Since the beginning of the 2000s, the SVP has been able to monopolize the field of direct democracy launching several, sometimes surprisingly successful referenda. Today, the SVP is no longer the Peasants’ Party it used to be. Instead, it is a populist formation capable of constantly enlarging its electoral base. Its argumentative matrix centres on sovereigntism, often with xenophobic and above all, Europhobic accents. This political positioning made numerous SVP members demand the termination of the bilateral treaty on the free movement of persons (the implementation of their anti-immigration initiative would collide with the obligations of this treaty). However, such a denunciation would endanger the whole bilateral approach and risk forcing Switzerland to a national solo effort (Alleingang) against the EU. It seems that a part of the Swiss population is on this wavelength: according to a 27 recent poll, 45% of the Swiss share this opinion. Comparisons between political parties of different countries are always difficult. Still, the SVP’s Euroscepticism may be considered sui generis. This party is without doubt more rejectionist that some Eurosceptic parties par excellence, like the French Front national (FN) or the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). In fact, the FN as well as UKIP called Switzerland’s bilateral approach a 28 model for their countries. However, and this is a fundamental difference with the FN and UKIP, the SVP is an integral part of the Swiss political system and participates in every Swiss political institution (on the local, cantonal, and federal levels). Thus, for almost a century and without interruption, SVP members have been members of the Fede26 27 28

Hubert MOOSER, “Darbellay bricht mit einem Tabu,” Tages Anzeiger, November 29, 2012, Accessed January 6, 2016 http://bit.ly/1MSvVHb (2.6.2017). VIMENTIS SONDAGE, Opinion Publique 2015, Résultats du sondage portant sur ambiance populaire, AVS, Migration et UE, concurrence fiscale, formation, Berne, PWC, 2015, Accessed June 19, 2015, http://bit.ly/1LfEP5e (2.6.2017). Nigel FARAGE, “The Doomed Euro,” Discours tenu à l’occasion de l’Assemblée extraordinaire de l’Association pour une Suisse indépendante et neutre (ASIN), Winterthur, 4, October 2014.

56

CENNI NAJY & RENÉ SCHWOK

ral Council. Furthermore, the party is less demonised by the other political formations and media in Switzerland than the FN in France or UKIP in Britain. As it started to radicalize and develop populist strategies in the 1990s it remained part of what ought to be called the “Swiss establishment”.

3. The Paradoxical Effects of the 2008–2009 Economic Crisis In the previous sections, it has become quite clear that the principal Swiss actors’ (economic world, people, political parties, etc.) Euroscepticism is deep-seated and ancient. However, it is also obvious that it has gotten stronger in recent years. In the following section, we will develop an original thesis to account for this phenomenon. As we have seen, Swiss Euroscepticism is challenging the habitual conceptual framework. Both the long history and the extent of this Euroscepticism are striking, but these are not its only particularities. The Swiss case is also unique because it does not follow the “classic” mechanism depicted by a part of the scientific literature devoted to the study of Euroscepticism. More precisely, Swiss scientific literature has not been able to observe the conventional gears according to which the pauperization of large social groups almost automatically results in votes for anti-EU political parties. Observing the economic performance of Switzerland, the unemployment rate, the levels of personal satisfaction, etc., and comparing it with the evolution of anti-European feeling in Switzerland, one reality emerges quite fast: there is no correlation between these two factors. The SVP’s electoral power and the level of rejectionism measured by polls have not evolved in response to Switzerland’s economic strength. As regards the conditions, we can also observe that Switzerland was hardly touched by the deterioration of the economic situation which has affected Europe since 2008. On the contrary, its growth has remained relatively strong in spite of the soaring of the Swiss Franc on the currency exchange markets. Unemployment has remained very low, at around 3% of the work force. A study of the World Economic Forum continuously considered Switzerland the most competitive 29 country in the world from 2009 to 2015. By all standards, these figures are remarkable. If one takes them into account, no other European country has withstood the crisis so well. Paradoxically, this relative prosperity had a reinforcing effect upon Swiss Euroscepticism. 3.1. The Issue of Migration as a Catalyst for Euroscepticism (and for a New Instability between the EU and Switzerland) Because of a complex chain of reactions, Switzerland still faced constraints in the aftermath of the 2008–2009 crisis. Actually, quite against its own intentions, the resilience of its prosperity attracted an even greater number of European immigrants than before. 29

Klaus SCHWAB and Xavier SALA-I-MARTIN, “The Global Competitiveness Report 2015–2016,” World Economic Forum, Genève, 2015.

THE MOST RELUCTANT COUNTRY WITH REGARD TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

57

In 2001, shortly before the agreement on the free movement of persons between Switzerland and the EU entered into force, Bern estimated the net effect of immigration would be around 8.000 persons per year only. These figures were accurate when they were been estimated. At that point, the difference between the European and the Swiss economic situations was marginal. Thus, the liberalization of work-related immigration would not have produced a great impact. In the meantime however, things have changed a lot. By the end of 2013, net migration rose to 89.500 persons (due to the freedom of movement, about 70% of 30 them are immigrants from the EU). In relation to the Swiss population (8.2 million inhabitants) and by European standards, this represents a significant population growth. The reason for the increase in immigration is the following: since 2007–2008, the European economic situation has become lacklustre while the fundamentals of the Swiss economy stayed relatively healthy. Thus, many Europeans were able to find a job in Switzerland when they could no longer hope for one at home. This situation was reinforced by the fact that during this period, Swiss salaries increased significantly while incomes stagnated or even decreased in several European countries. Consequently, this influx of people provided a platform for the launching and, in fact, the approval of several referenda used by isolationist movements, especially the SVP, to occupy the Swiss political scene and impose their agenda. In addition to being indicators of the strengthening of Euroscepticism among the Swiss population, these political events have caused lasting damage to the relations between Switzerland and the EU. As we have already mentioned, on February 9, 2014, 50.3% of the voters approved of an anti-immigration initiative launched by the SVP. It demanded the introduction of quotas for immigration and the introduction of the national preference rule. During the campaign, the initiators argued that it was necessary to reduce the negative effects of immigration on Switzerland, for example the strain on the infrastructure, and to make it easier for Swiss people to find a job on a highly competitive job market. After the surprising result (a large part of the Swiss political and economic establishment had fought it), the already complex bilateral relations between Switzerland and the EU turned into a serious political headache. Effectively, this referendum incorporated into the federal constitution (art. 121a) a rule according to which the number of residence permits issued to non-nationals must be limited by ceilings and an annual quota. But such a provision is absolutely incompatible with the terms of the agreement on the free movement of persons implemented by the EU and Switzerland since 2002. Bern and Brussels had to find a solution for this incompatibility before February 2017. This task was too arduous. Indeed, the EU repeatedly stated that it would not renegotiate this bilateral treaty and that it would not accept Switzerland introducing an immigration quota. After a while, Brussels even increased the pressure by refusing to conclude new bilateral agreements, even provisional ones, as long as the Swiss did not present guarantees for maintaining the free 30

Office fédéral de la Statistique (OFS), “Evolution de la population suisse en 2014, Le solde migratoire recule légèrement par rapport à 2013,” Communiqué de Presse, Neuchâtel, September 29, 2015, Accessed January 5, 2016 http://bit.ly/23727CK (2.6.2017).

58

CENNI NAJY & RENÉ SCHWOK

movement of persons. This new tension constituted a turning point in the bilateral relations between Switzerland and the EU because until 2014, they were characterized by a certain stability. Switzerland’s position soon became untenable. The Swiss government could not unilaterally violate the agreement on free movement, as that would put in danger several other important bilateral agreements. Indeed, the six marketaccess agreements were linked to Switzerland respecting free movement (in accordance with the so-called “guillotine clause” the EU imposed on Switzerland shortly before the signing of the first package of bilateral agreements). If these bilateral accords were to be called into question, Switzerland would find itself in a position of economic marginalization unprecedented since the 1990s. Consequently, the Swiss Parliament backtracked and decided to implement the initiative in a very light manner (through soft measures of national preference on the Swiss job market). Even if it does not seem obvious at first glance, the initiative against mass immigration had a specifically Eurosceptic component. In fact, it was aimed at EU immigration without clearly naming it. This is due to the fact that non-European immigration was already subjected to a very strict annual quota. Besides, nonEuropeans have already been discriminated against on the job market by the application of the national preference rule. The political conduct of the Swiss population at this referendum is hard to explain. The arguments put forward by the authors of the initiative stressing practical difficulties due to the substantial immigration from the EU (stress on infrastructure, increasing competition in the job market, salary dumping, etc.) seem to have paid off. Indeed, according to a study released immediately after the poll, it seems that these two arguments were well received by the population and influ31 enced the result of the vote. However, the geography of this vote shows that, paradoxically, it was the Swiss regions with the highest immigration rates and, at the same time, facing a phenomenon of saturation of the public infrastructure and higher unemployment rates that voted against the initiative. The regions least affected by these problems clearly voted in favor of the introduction of an immigration quota. These different elements suggest that identitarian explanations (like the defines of traditions, rejection of international openness etc.) may also be relevant to explain this 32 anti-immigration vote. The geography of the vote also enables us to identify an important aspect of Swiss Euroscepticism. It reveals the existence of divisions Swiss political scientists consider “traditional” at referenda on European issues or on foreign policy questions in general. These are twofold: linguistic (between Francophones and Germanophones/Italophones) and geographic (between urban and rural communities). Thus, the majority of Germanophone and Italophone communities 33 voted in favour of limiting immigration. In contrast, francophone Switzerland clearly voted against it. At the same time, the large cities (including those in 31 32 33

Pascal SCIARNI, Alessandro NAI, Anke TRESCH, Analyse de la votation fédérale du 9 février 2014, Berne, Vox Gfs, 2014. Ibid. Thomas MILIC, “For What They knew What They did – What Swiss Voters did (not) know about the Mass Immigration Initiative,” Swiss Political Science Review, 21, 1, 2015, pp. 48–62.

THE MOST RELUCTANT COUNTRY WITH REGARD TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

59

German-speaking Switzerland) rejected the proposition while numerous Swiss peri-urban areas, small towns and rural regions (in the French-speaking part, too) voted in favour. In the long term, the 2008–2009 crisis had an impact on the strengthening of the Swiss rejectionist forces. The surprising acceptance of the initiative against mass immigration in 2014 tends to prove it. This strengthening is linked with reasons much more complex than the one given by classic socio-economic analysis. Contrary to other European states, it is not the slowing down of the economic situation, but rather Switzerland’s solid economic performance, which has fuelled anti-immigration feelings and, by extension, an increase of Euroscepticism and the deterioration of the relations with the EU.

4. Implications of the Swiss Case for the Theories of International Relations and the European Integration In this section, we will consider to what extent the case of Switzerland is atypical from a different perspective, namely, the academic theories. In fact, the Swiss case tends to question, and maybe even challenge numerous theoretical approaches used by political scientists. Since we cannot deal with all of them here, we shall focus on three of them. 4.1 The neo-Realist Approach (Theory of International Relations) The neo-realist current of international relations theory has often suggested that the pronounced Euroscepticism of some Western European countries (like Switzerland, Sweden, Austria, and Finland) was primarily linked to the characteristics of the Cold War. In fact, this current considers the bi-polar equilibrium between the Soviet and Western powers as an important factor in explaining the conduct of these recalcitrant countries. It underlines that the EU was essentially designed as an economic construction intended to reinforce the power of the Western European countries in their confrontation with the communist coun34 tries. During the Cold War, Finland and Austria had been led to develop rejectionist policies essentially because of their neutralization by the Soviet bloc. This neu35 tralization had taken place with the tacit consent of the West. The nonparticipation of Sweden and Switzerland in the process of European integration was not the result of an exogenous neutralization but rather it had a geopolitical dimension because their neutrality contributed to the preservation of the balance 36 of power between the two blocs in the north and in the centre of Europe. 34 35

36

John MEARSHEIMER, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” International Security, 15, 1, 1990, pp. 5–56. Paavo LIPONNEN, “Finnish Neutrality and EC Membership,” in Sheila Harden, (ed.), Neutral States and the European Community, London, Brassey’s, 1994, pp. 63–103; Peter JANKOWITSCH and Hannes PORIAS “The Process of European Integration and Neutral Austria” in Sheila Harden, (ed.), Neutral States and the European Community, London, Brassey’s, 1994, pp. 35–62. Thomas PEDERSEN, European Union and the EFTA Countries: Enlargement and Integration, London, New York, Pinter Publishers, 1994.

60

CENNI NAJY & RENÉ SCHWOK

In other words, the neo-realist approach assumed a causal link between the configuration of the international balance of power and the state Euroscepticism of some European countries. One of the principal contributions of neo-realism is to underline the undeniable impact of the international system’s global evolution on the participation in the building of Europe. Today, it is widely accepted that the end of the EastWest confrontation increased the freedom of action of the neutral European states and gave them incentives to approach and, in the end, join the EU. This is the case especially with Finland, whose foreign policy was constrained by the geopolitical configuration. This Nordic country filled an application and joined the EU right after the end of the cold War. The timing seems to confirm the rele37 vance of the neo-realist explanation. Still, an approach reducing the explanation to the dynamics of the international balance of power collides with the Swiss case. In fact, the end of the Cold War had hardly any effect on the intensity of Switzerland’s rejectionism in the short and medium term. Although in 1992, there was some movement in government towards the EU, the rejection in December 1992 of the referendum on joining the European Economic Area (EEA) quickly put an end to this. Since then, as we have seen, the situation has remained unchanged and the principal Swiss political actors categorically exclude any possible accession to the EU. 4.2 The Federalist Approach (Theories of European Integration) Switzerland’s obstinate rejectionism also poses serious problems for the basic theories of European integration, especially federalism. Generally speaking, this approach postulates that a pan-European political organization based on a federal and supranational rationale is a necessity because it is intrinsically more efficient (both economically and politically). More precisely, it must prevail over the others because every other form of governance is considered less rational in organizational terms and, especially, less favourable for the preservation of peace 38 in Europe. Based on the founding fathers of European integration’s goal to create “an ever closer union”, the federalist approach proposes a constitutional structure of the European Union quite similar to states like the United States, Germany, and especially, Switzerland. In fact, the Swiss Confederation is often presented by a number of federalists as a model because it is based on a specific federal structure (polycentric) and history has proven it to be stable and efficient concerning its capacity to solve complex political problems. In spite of the development of European integration in accordance with federally inspired principles like subsidiarity and proportionality, and regardless of a 39 federal future based on the Swiss model sometimes promised to/by the EU, the 37 38 39

Lee MILES, “Sweden and Finland,” in Ian Manners and Richard Whitman, (eds.), The Foreign Policies of European Union Member State, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2000, pp. 181–203. Michael BURGESS, Federalism and the European Union: The Building of Europe 1950–2000, London, Taylor and Francis, 2000. Dusan SIDJANSKI, The Federal Future of Europe, Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 2000.

THE MOST RELUCTANT COUNTRY WITH REGARD TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

61

Confederation persists in its refusal to join. Thus, this country, though federalist par excellence, does not accept the virtues of the federalist future of European integration. This is a new paradox. Switzerland remains indifferent to a European construction endeavouring to develop a more and more federal and de-centralized system even though it has used it skilfully and patiently for centuries. 4.3 Theory of the Economic and Monetary Integration The Swiss case also challenges some theories developed in the field of political economy, like the theory of economic integration, which claims that there is an economic logic prompting the European states to join the EU. According to this approach, EU membership is intrinsically profitable for European states because it brings about the abolition of tariff barriers and the creation of a single market which fosters economic prosperity in its member states. More precisely, the implementation of this market has essentially three positive effects on the activity of its economic operators: it stimulates competition between them; it enables them to exploit economies of scale; and it gives them the opportunity to specialize in the fields where they have potential comparative 40 advantages. These effects are sufficient to largely explain the European countries’ similarity of preferences favouring economic aspects of integration. According to some researchers, it is only in the case where the interests of the economic actors are so “weak, vague, and indeterminate” that the path of accession is not considered a 41 worthwhile option. Due to Switzerland’s imbrication in the European economic flows and, especially, its dependence on the EU internal market, this seems difficult to argue. On the other hand, this approach emphasizes an important point: small European states like Switzerland ought to be even more inspired to join the EU. They are more dependent on international markets than others. Their internal markets are too small to sell their own products to. Thus, they are more likely to benefit from the effects of the comprehensive and deep free trade provided by European 42 integration. In addition, some economists refer to a “domino effect” according to which each EU enlargement expands the interior market and automatically provokes further enlargements in return. Besides the increase in economies of scale, the EU enlargement imposes new discriminations on third-country export43 ers. It is true that Switzerland’s bilateral agreements with the EU allow the Swiss economic operators to access the EU internal market indiscriminately. Still, this access is not complete, and certain sectors of the Swiss economy would like their country to deepen its integration through more bilateral agreements (for instance

40 41 42 43

Bela BELASSA, The Theory of Economic Integration, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1962. Andrew MORAVCSIK, The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht, Cornell, Cornell University Press, 199). Paul KRUGMAN, “EFTA and 1992,” Occasional Paper 23, EFTA Secretariat Economic Affairs Department, 1988. RICHARD BALDWIN, “A Domino Theory of Regionalism,” NBER Working Paper 4465, Cambridge MA, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1993.

CENNI NAJY & RENÉ SCHWOK

62

in areas that cover issues such as the Cassis de Dijon principle) which the EU refused. Introducing another aspect, some researchers insist on the importance of growth to understand the accession policy of the European countries. According to them, countries whose GDP growth rates had lagged behind those of the EU for a longer time, tended to join. This explanation was suggested in order to understand the wave of accession of members of the European Free Trade Associa44 tion (EFTA) between 1970 and 1990. Switzerland, like most EFTA countries, also knew a long period of weaker economic growth than the EU (between 1980 and 2000, to be precise). However, this did not induce it to join. In sum, these economic theories collide with the realities of the Swiss case. In fact, this Alpine country possesses every characteristic that ought to push it towards accession from the point of view of the economic rationality we just described (size, presence of many exporting and interdependent economies, growth differential) and yet it has not.

Conclusion Since February 9, 2014, the relations between Switzerland and the European Union have changed in nature. Even if the Swiss government decided to preserve the bilateral agreements with Switzerland, Switzerland’s Euroscepticism is on the rise. In this context of exacerbated Euroscepticism, no Swiss political actor of any importance dares to speak about the prospect of accession any longer. This topic remains taboo in the Swiss public sphere. There is no indication that this situation might change in the short or even medium term. This has nothing to do with the discussions prevailing in other EU member or non-member states. For example, in Switzerland, somebody qualifies as “pro-European” when he/she favours the type of relationship with the EU promoted by political formations often qualified as very Eurosceptic, like the FN or UKIP. As we have seen, the phenomenon of Swiss Euroscepticism is based on a multitude of complex and interconnected factors ingrained in the history of this small alpine country situated simultaneously in the centre and on the fringes of political Europe. Because of the paradoxical effects of the economic crisis in 2008–2009, this ancient Euroscepticism, deeply rooted in the Swiss psyche, seems to have developed into a more radical form. This type of Euroscepticism has not been categorized/identified/studied yet in the scientific literature specialized in the study of anti-Europeanism. Therefore, new research needs to be conducted to better conceptualize it. Finally, in the last section of this study, we have shown that, to a large extent, the persistence the Swiss Confederation has shown in its refusal to join the EU is inconsistent with the explanations advanced by the major theories of the different scientific approaches concerned with European integration. This Swiss “uniqueness” tends to make visible the theoretical approaches’ limitations in explaining the phenomenon of European integration. They should 44

Walter MATTLI, The Logic of Regional Integration. Europe and Beyond, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999.

THE MOST RELUCTANT COUNTRY WITH REGARD TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

63

perhaps be adjusted (all the more because most of them are quite old). To do this, we consider a theoretical study that takes into account Swiss domestic policy’s Euroscepticism as well as its recent development as necessary. From our point of view, this work of readjustment ought to investigate the contributions of constructivist theory with a particular focus on the importance of building a nation state’s identity and the way it has developed its Euro45 integration policies. The latter would be useful to establish a theoretical framework more suitable for understanding the Swiss case (and maybe other European cases such as Britain). It is encouraging that some signs seem to indicate that the scientific literature has now decided to turn its attention to the atypical cases of 46 rejectionist Euroscepticism, like Norway.

LE PAYS LE PLUS RETICENT PAR RAPPORT A L’INTEGRATION EUROPEENNE La Suisse est un cas unique dans sa réticence à adhérer à l’Union européenne. En effet, tous les gouvernements et parlements d’Europe ont au moins une fois dans leur histoire cherché à en devenir membre. Ce n'est pas le cas de la Suisse qui n’a jamais entamé de négociations d’adhésion et qui n'entend pas le faire prochainement. Actuellement le débat se situe entre les partisans du maintien d’accords bilatéraux avec l’UE et les rejectionnistes qui sont même prêts à y renoncer. Ainsi, paradoxalement, les eurosceptiques britanniques, qui ont érigé en modèle les accords bilatéraux Suisse-UE Suisse, apparaîtraient en Suisse comme des intégrationnistes. Pour éclairer ce cas très particulier, ce chapitre se base sur une grille d'analyse composée de plusieurs niveaux d'explications (historique, politique et économique). Les résultats obtenus démontrent que les théories politologues de l’euroscepticisme ne sont pas suffisamment développées pour expliquer ce phénomène helvétique.

DAS AM MEISTEN ZAUDERNDE LAND IN BEZUG AUF EUROPÄISCHE INTEGRATION Die Schweiz ist ein einzigartig in ihrem Unwillen, der Europäischen Union beizutreten. Schließlich wollten alle europäischen Regierungen und Parlamente mindestens ein Mal in ihrer Geschichte Mitglied werden. Dies gilt nicht für die Schweiz. Sie hat niemals Beitrittsverhandlungen aufgenommen und wird dies auch in absehbarer Zeit nicht tun. Derzeit erfolgt die Auseinandersetzung zwischen den Verfechtern der Beibehaltung der bilateralen Abkommen mit der EU und den Verweigerern, die diese sogar kündigen wollen. Paradoxerweise wären 45 46

Alexander WENDT, “Collective Identity formation and the International State,” American Political Science Review, 88, 2, 1994, pp. 384–396. Marianne SUNDLISAETER SKINNER, “Norwegian Euroscepticism: Values, Identity or Interest?,” Journal of Common Market Studies, 50, 3, 2012, pp. 422–444.

64

CENNI NAJY & RENÉ SCHWOK

die britischen Euroskeptiker, deren Leitbild die bilateralen Abkommen zwischen der Schweiz und der EU sind, in der Schweiz Integrationisten. Um diesen ganz speziellen Fall genauer zu untersuchen, nutzt diese Studie eine Analysemethode mit mehreren Erklärungsansätzen (historisch, politisch und ökonomisch). Die erzielten Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die politikwissenschaftlichen Thesen zum Euroskeptizismus nicht entwickelt genug sind, um das helvetische Phänomen zu erklären.

ICELAND IN EUROPE – KEEPING ITS DISTANCE EIRIKUR BERGAMANN In January 1994, Iceland joined the European Economic Area agreement (EEA) which bridged the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the European Community (EC). Iceland, Norway, and Liechtenstein gained access to the Single Market in exchange for adhering to the European Union’s rule set. A recent study indicates that Iceland adopts around three quarters of the acquis communautaire, 1 without any democratic representation in the union, however. To understand the rationale behind this peculiar relationship – formally outside the EU, but practically deeply integrated – one has to understand Iceland’s national identity and its political impact. Iceland fought its struggle for independence from Denmark for more than a hundred years. It finally became sovereign in 1918 and unilaterally declared independence in 1944. This struggle was instrumental in carving out the Icelandic national identity. Since then, an ever-lasting struggle for independence has been embedded in the tiny country’s politics. It is based on the fundamental belief in formal sovereignty which still dictates rhetoric on foreign relations. Growing from a population of around 60,000 inhabitants in the mid-19th century to 330,000 at present, Iceland borders on being a microstate. However, even though its smallness surely puts limits on its administrative capacity to operate a fully functioning modern independent state, no alternative has ever been voiced. Since achieving full independence, Iceland has been struggling to find its proper place in the world. Here, I analyse how post-imperialism shapes Iceland’s foreign relations, particularly in its relationship with neighbours and Europe. I maintain that the key to Iceland’s foreign relations is found in the internal dilemma between the emphasis of self-rule and thus isolationism in foreign relations on the one hand, and active participation in international relations on the other, in order to support its claim for recognition as an equal partner. As I shall illustrate, the heritage of the struggle for independence is still shaping the discourse Icelandic politicians use in the debate on Europe. The strong emphasis on sovereignty has become the foundation on which Icelandic politics rests. In a way, pooling sovereignty in a supra-national institution falls outside the framework of the Icelandic political discourse, which highlights formal sovereignty and stresses the everlasting struggle for independence.

1. Revoked EU Application The International Financial Crisis hit Iceland particularly hard. In October 2008, its entire oversized financial system came tumbling down. The currency plum1

Europautredningen, Utenfor og innenfor: Norges avtaler med EU, Norges offentlige utredninger, 2012, 2, Oslo, 2012.

EIRIKUR BERGAMANN

66

2

meted thus spurring rampant inflation and sudden economic devastation. The shock was severe and the country entered a period of unprecedented political upheaval. The conservative led government was ousted in what came to be called the “pots-and-pans-revolution“ (búsáhaldabyltingin). Leading up to the crash, pressure had been building to adopt the Euro and replace the small and volatile Icelandic Króna. The over-sized Icelandic banks were operating on a market of 500 million people. But their currency with a central bank was backed by only 330 thousand inhabitants. Still, rather than debating full membership of the EU and the EMU, many politicians started to entertain the idea that Iceland might unilaterally adopt the Euro without EU-membership. This approach fits in completely with Iceland‘s current relationship with the European integration process, namely participating actively but not being a formal part of the EU institutions with the apparent loss of formal sovereignty that it entails. Until the collapse of the whole banking system, Iceland was in no hurry to join the EU and seemed quite happy with its de-facto membership via the EEA agreement. However, the collapse of its currency alongside the financial system put strong pressure on the government to apply for EU membership. The lure of the Euro was splitting the population across the usual political lines, i.e., between “internationalists” and “isolationists”. Iceland was the last of the fully-functioning sovereign states in Western Europe to apply for membership of the European Union. It took a complete meltdown of the whole banking industry to bring the question of possible EU membership back on the political agenda. Even though Iceland was facing its greatest recession in modern times, the EU debate was fiercely fought. In fact, it shook the whole political landscape. On the surface, the controversy revolved around two main factors: the benefits of the Euro and the inconvenience of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). Below the surface, however, lies good old nationalism, not in the classical sense, but rather in a special understanding of Iceland's sovereignty. In June 2009, Iceland’s parliament decided to apply for EU membership.

2. Populist Turn Though nationalism has always been strong in Iceland, anti-EU populist political parties similar to those on the European continent and throughout Scandinavia did not emerge as a viable force until after the financial crisis of 2008. For decades before the 2008 crash, the Progressive Party, Iceland’s established agrarian party, had seen steadily diminishing support and seemed more likely to be leaving Icelandic politics. In the wake of the crisis, however, a completely renewed leadership took over. The party was rapidly geared towards a more populist direction: against foreign creditors, international institutions. Eventually, its rhetoric be-

2

For more, see Eirikur BERGMANN, Iceland and the International Financial Crisis: Boom, Bust and Recovery, Basingstoke and New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

ICELAND IN EUROPE – KEEPING ITS DISTANCE

67

came partly anti-Muslim. Until then, this attitude had been absent in the country 3 – there is no significant Muslim minority in Iceland. As a result, the PP surged leading up to the 2013 elections, grabbing a quarter of the vote and landing at the helm of subsequent coalition government, together with the old hegemonic mainstream right-of-centre conservative Independence Party (IP). Thus, under the new post-crisis leadership, the Progressive Party moved closer to populist parties in Europe. If ranked within the flora of European populism, the PP was the first such party in the Nordics to head a government, coming into power after a landslide win. Though rooted in the traditional agricultural society and based on national sentiments, in the years leading up to the crash, the PP had gradually been modernizing and moving to bait urban voters. Traditionally, the party had been reluctant regarding EU relations but since the 1990s it had become at least EU 4 curious – and during the period 2000–2004 even leads the pro-EU debate. The new post-crisis leadership, headed by novice Sigmundur Gunnlaugsson, however, quickly returned to politics of a former era, aggressively fighting the EU application put forward by the left-wing government in 2009. In the public debate, the EU application was directly linked with the dispute on Icesave: Iceland fought with the British and Dutch governments over the responsibility for deposits in the fallen Icelandic owned Icesave Internet based bank, a branch of the Icelandic Landsbanki. Gunnlaugsson had emerged as one of the most defiant voices against the foreign pressure Iceland felt in the dispute. He took the public stage with his citizens protest group InDefence formed in opposition to British actions against Iceland implemented under the British Anti-terror, 5 Crime and Security Act 2001. The post-crisis left wing government left the impression of softness in the dispute which helped spur a new wave of protests. Immediately, the dispute with the British and Dutch governments fell into the familiar trenches of nationalist rhetoric. In the long-drawn out dispute, the Icesave agreements appeared to have become the most unpopular since the notorious Old Treaty with Norway in 1262, when, according to the national myth, Iceland’s economy started to deteriorate after it had fallen under foreign rule and entered into a period of humiliation by losing its independence.

3. Three pillars In previous analyses, I divided Iceland’s foreign relations into three main pillars: 6 the European pillar, the Atlantic pillar and then the rest of the word. The European pillar is by far the most important and contains most of the country’s major trade agreements and its vital foreign links underpinning the economy, like the EFTA membership and the EEA-agreement. Iceland is also a member of the 3 4 5 6

Eirikur BERGMANN, “Populism in Iceland: Has the Progressive Party turned populist?,” Stjórnmál Og Stjórnsỳsla, 11, n°1, 2015, p. 33. Eirikur BERGMANN, Iceland and the EEA 1994–2011, Europautredningen, 2011, http:// www.europautredningen.no/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/Rap7-island.pdf (2.5.2016). The Landsbanki Freezing Order 2008, Pub. L., 2668, 2008, http://www.legislation. gov.uk/uksi/2008/ 2668/contents/made. (2.6.2016). Eirikur BERGMANN, Opið land: Ísland í samfélagi Þjóðanna, Reykjavik, Skrudda, 2007.

EIRIKUR BERGAMANN

68

Council of Europe and is firmly rooted within the heritage of Nordic cooperation. The bilateral trade and close cultural relationship with the UK should also be mentioned. Ever since the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957, Icelanders have debated their place in Europe. Directly resulting from the heritage of the struggle for independence, debates on foreign relations have become more 7 vicious than almost any other political disputes in the country. Iceland joined the EFTA in 1970, a decade after it was established. It entered the EEA with its EFTA partners in 1994 which resulted in it becoming a kind of de-facto member of the EU. The Atlantic pillar is the second most important and comprises the founding membership of NATO in 1949, and the defence agreement with the US since 1951. This latter, in turn, resulted in the close bilateral relationship with Washington on foreign policy matters. Icelanders were unified in their struggle for independence with more than 90 per cent of the electorate agreeing with full independence in a national referendum in 1944, thus ending the relationship of 600 years while Denmark was still under Nazi occupation. This feeling of unity was shattered only a few years later when a fierce debate on Iceland’s membership in NATO developed and peaked in violent riots in front of Parliament. While Iceland mostly relied on the European pillar to underpin its economy, it relied much more heavily on the Atlantic pillar for its strategic security. However, after the US government decided to close its army base in Keflavik in 2006, the Atlantic pillar became less important than before while the European cooperation in foreign and security policy matters in addition to the economic cooperation were given more weight. The third pillar consists of foreign relations with the rest of the world, for example through the United Nations and the World Trade Organisation, to mention just a few. Political Science Professor Baldur Thorhallsson maintains that since 1990, Iceland became more active and more ambitious in its international cooperation due to its no longer only focusing on bilateral relationships but also fostering more 8 complex multilateral relationships. Still, despite this shift perhaps being true, Iceland was not prepared to join the EU. When the crisis hit, this resulted in a more ambiguous position in foreign relations.

4. Outside in Europe Iceland has remained outside of the European Union mainly in order to guard its sovereignty. After having struggled for independence from Denmark for more than a century, this independence and formal sovereignty have been almost synonymous for democracy in the Icelandic public debate. Economically, however, Iceland feels the same need as other European states to participate in European co-operation, which can explain its membership in the 7 8

alur INGIMUNDARSON, Í eldlínu kalda stríðsins: Samskipti Íslands og Bandaríkjanna, 1945–1960, Reykjavik, Vaka-Helgafell, 1996; Eirikur BERGMANN, Sjálfstæð þjóð – trylltur skríll og landráðalýður, Reykjavik, Veröld, 2011. aldur THORHALLSSON, “Can Small States Choose their own Size? The Case of a Nordic State – Iceland,” in: Andrew F. COOPER, Timothy SHAW, The diplomacies of small states: between vulnerability and resilience, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

ICELAND IN EUROPE – KEEPING ITS DISTANCE

69

European Economic Area agreement (EEA). The agreement brings Iceland into the European Single Market, but at a cost: Iceland has de-facto agreed to adopt the EU’s legislation within the boundaries of the agreement, which is in fact a transfer of decision making and domestic governmental power to the EU. 9 Through the EEA, Iceland adopts three quarters of the EU legal acts and close to one fifth of all laws passed in the Icelandic parliament arrives from the EU. This 10 percentage is higher than in many EU member states. There is a dilemma between economic interests on the one hand and ideas of the sovereignty of the Icelandic nation and thus democracy on the other. This has created a kind of rift between the emphasis on the free and sovereign democratic nation and the reality Iceland is facing in the co-operation. Only after the collapse of its entire financial system in 2008 did the new left wing government apply for EU membership in July 2009 – the very last of the Nordic five. In many ways, this was the response to a fundamental flaw in the systemic setup Iceland found itself in as being an active participant in the European internal marked, but without the collective backup from being a full and formal member of the EU institutions and its political machinery: Iceland had become a participant in a vast legal framework without due democratic representation. In some regard, in the financial crisis, Iceland was thrown out of its comfort zone and forced to face the situation it found itself in within the European integration process. However, soon after the initial shock had calmed, opposition against the membership rose again, even beyond previous levels. Opinion polls indicated increased opposition against the accession negotiations, with more than 11 two thirds saying they would reject membership in a referendum. This permitted the new right of centre coalition to freeze negotiations after the April 2013 Parliament elections.

5. Challenges To understand Iceland’s approach to Europe, it is important to note that even though Iceland formally remained outside of the EU, it was still an active participant in European integration. In fact, Iceland was in some ways more deeply involved in the European integration process than some of the EU’s official members. To name a few examples: Denmark has many formal opt-outs from the EU treaties that Iceland was subject to through the EEA; and the EU’s border regulation is applied in Iceland through the Schengen agreement while the UK and 12 Ireland are exempted from this part of EU cooperation. The EEA has facilitated the active Europeanization of Iceland, bringing it into the Single Market at the cost of adopting the regulatory framework of the European Union. The agreement called for the constant revision and update of Icelandic law to ensure the country was in line with European laws and regula13 tions. Thus, Iceland was very deeply involved in the European project and ex9 10 11 12 13

Europautredningen, Utenfor og innenfor: Norges avtaler med EU, op.cit. Eirikur BERGMANN, Iceland and the EEA 1994–2011, op.cit. Samtök IÐNAÐARINS, Viðhorf almennings til ESB, Reykjavik, 2013. Rebecca ALDER-NISSEN, “The Diplomacy of Opting Out: A Bourdieudian Approach to National Integration Strategies”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 46, n°3, 2008, p. 663–684. For more see Eirikur BERGMANN, Iceland and the EEA 1994–2011, op.cit.

70

EIRIKUR BERGAMANN

cluded from very few areas. In certain matters, such as those relating to the environment, transport and food hygiene, the vast majority of all legislation passed in the Icelandic parliament was initiated by the EEA. Furthermore, the border between what was considered part of the Single Market (and therefore what is considered EEA relevant) and other parts of EU legislation became increasingly blurred. Still, the agreement did not provide access to the EU’s institutions and decision-making processes. Furthermore, it did not cover the Common Agricultural Policy and regional cohesion policies, and, perhaps most importantly for Iceland, it excluded the Common Fisheries Policy. Iceland did not participate in the EU’s trade policy, monetary policy, tax regimes, foreign affairs, or many of the EU’s internal matters, including judiciary affairs that fell outside the Schengen and Dublin Agreements. Iceland’s economy has been transformed by the EEA. Not only did it grown rapidly but it also became more diversified and internationalised. However, despite the obvious economic benefits, the EEA agreement also presented grave challenges to the tiny economy and, more importantly, to Iceland’s cherished democracy. Despite formal equality in the institutional framework, it was always clear that the EU was the leading partner. As a result, the automatic implementation of EU legislation was rarely discussed in the Alþingi as Iceland, Norway, and Liechtenstein cannot refuse EU legislation without threatening the whole arrangement. Vetoing EU legislation could lead to withdrawal from the EEA Agreement, not only for the individual Member State, but also for its two other EEA EFTA partners. Often referred to as the “nuclear bomb clause”, the formal veto right might be effective, but perhaps not to anyone’s benefits if it was used. Entering the European Single Market altered the composition of the Icelandic economy, for example by opening up the international financial market. But it also created a new vulnerability for Iceland which became evident in the 2008 financial crisis. After privatisation and extensive deregulation, the Icelandic banks grew rapidly on European markets and well beyond our capability to bail them out when the crisis hit. The Depositors’ Guaranty Fund set up on the basis of a European directive never had enough funding to cover a systemic collapse. No help came from the European institutions, which Iceland was not part of. This neither-in-nor-out arrangement – one foot inside the European Single Market, with all the obligations it entailed, and the other foot outside the EU institutions, and therefore without access to back-up from, for example, the European Central Bank – proved to be flawed when faced with a crisis of this magnitude. The emphasis on formal sovereignty combined with active practical participation in the European market had excluded Iceland from the safety net that the Euro and other institutional mechanisms bring to EU members. Thus, when the international financial crisis hit Iceland, not only did the country's oversized banks come crashing down, but the Króna instantly went in freefall, with devastating effects on the general public. Even though the EEA is dynamic, it still does not respond to the operational and institutional changes of the EU. Since the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, various political shifts and institutional turns have altered the EU, meaning the political and legal environment in which the EEA operates has changed dramatically. With only Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway representing EFTA, while the EU

ICELAND IN EUROPE – KEEPING ITS DISTANCE

71

has grown to 28 Member States with a total of around 500 million inhabitants, the influence of the EEA-EFTA Member States within the EEA has diminished significantly. Icelandic officials working in the field are convinced that the EEA is becoming increasingly less important to the EU and thus relegated to a status lower than it enjoyed previously. As a result of its smallness, Iceland can only operate a much smaller administration than most of its counterparts within EFTA and the EU. Roughly only a hundred diplomats are working in the entire Foreign Service. Because of this systemic lack of resources, Iceland has been forced to prioritize much more ac14 tively specific policy areas to focus its limited potential on. 15 Thus, smallness, as such, compels to external cooperation. To compensate for its smallness, Iceland relies on close cooperation with neighbours, and even outsources some of its stately duties, for example its strategic security to Washington, and part of its legislation to Brussels through the EEA. In this regard, foreign services of neighbouring states, especially of the other Nordics, most frequently Copenhagen and Oslo, have become a strategic source of information and assistance. It is a strategic game of a small administration to gain access to information and background analysis that require greater manpower than Iceland has at its disposal. Due to Iceland’s forced relationship with Norway in the EEA, both countries are forced to harmonise their positions and speak with one voice within the EEA. This is not always satisfactory. Senior diplomats of Iceland’s Foreign Service claim that occasionally, their Norwegian counterparts seem to forget that they 16 have a binding agreement with two smaller partners. Norway, as the largest power within EEA EFTA, tends to operate alone on issues that are of concern to all three of them. The two countries have often pursued quite different European policies. It is claimed that, after the population refused twice to accede to the EU, the Norwegian government is very concerned with proving itself to be a good European. Iceland, on the other hand, has never felt the same need to gain that kind of approval in Brussels. As a result, the Icelandic government feels that Norway is keen to give in to the demands of the EU, rather than sticking firmly 17 to the principles of the EEA Agreement, and, indeed, the EFTA Convention. The relationship between Iceland and Norway in the EEA can perhaps be compared to an arranged marriage between distant cousins. This is not a relationship entered into on the basis of true love; there is, instead, an uneven balance of power and on-going and unresolved tensions between the two parties that are exacerbated by the obligation to make it work.

14 15 16 17

Baldur THORHALLSSON, The role of small states in the European Union, Ashgate Aldershot, 2000. Andrew F. COOPER, Timothy SHAW, The diplomacies of small states: between vulnerability and resilience, op.cit. Eirikur BERGMANN, Sjálfstæð þjóð – trylltur skríll og landráðalýður, op.cit. Eirikur BERGMANN, Iceland and the EEA 1994–2011, op.cit.

EIRIKUR BERGAMANN

72

6. Importance of the Struggle for Independence Rationalist international relations scholars have explained Iceland’s hesitance to join the EU mainly with the interest of the fisheries sector which claims that the 18 EU Fisheries Policy contradicts Iceland‘s economic interest. This may well be questioned: Had fisheries as such truly been the main economic obstacle, the parliamentarians otherwise in favour of seeking membership should have raised this issue at accession negotiations in order to see whether their concern would be met with adequate opt-outs. Until the crash of 2008, they had never been willing to do that. Furthermore, they never even secured a majority in Parliament to put the fisheries question to the test at the negotiations. Combined with the increased opposition the accession negotiations faced in the wake of the crisis, this indicates that other factors might have contributed to Iceland’s EU policy. I therefore maintain that the fisheries factor is not solely an economic argument but indeed a pivotal part of Iceland’s post-independence identity. The rationalist approach underestimates the importance of Iceland’s strong national identity created during the struggle for independence. Instead, I hold that to fully understand Iceland’s relationship with the EU and its hesitant position with regards to the European integration process, it is necessary to analyse its historical relations, the legacy of its colonial past, and the rhetoric of the struggle for independence – which is still central in the Icelandic political discourse. Indeed, most students of Icelandic politics do acknowledge the importance of the struggle for independence for the development of Iceland’s political identity. Still, the importance of post-imperial identity has been ignored by the established scholars of Iceland’s EU relations. For example, Kristinsson only mentions in passing that “the word independence strikes a key note in Icelandic political rhetoric” before returning to fisheries and demographic factors when explaining 19 Iceland’s EU relations. The interest based rationalist approach neglects the political effect of Iceland’s postcolonial identity and the strong emphasis on formal sovereignty that was created during the struggle for independence. I maintain that within the parameters of Iceland’s national identity, EU membership is considered a threat to Iceland’s sovereignty and its cherished democracy which Icelanders claim can be traced back to the parliamentary court of the settlement society of the year 930: the Alþingi. To study the impact of national identity on European integration policies in 20 Iceland, Lene Hansen’s and Ole Wæver’s poststructuralist framework is useful. They show that national identities and their impact can be studied through analysing the domestic political discourse in order to understand the margin of manoeuvre of governments in foreign policy. Accordingly, it useful to analyse the conceptual constellation of the nation to study if, and how, the idea of participation in the European integration can fit in with the confines of its political discourse. This framework claims that when during the domestic debate, the idea of “Europe” threatens the idea of the “nation”; it becomes difficult to promote fur18 19 20

Christine INGEBRITSEN, The Nordic states and European unity, Cornell University Press, 2000. Gunnar Helgi KRISTINSSON, Íslenska stjórnkerfið, Háskólaútgáfan, 2006. Lene HANSEN, Ole WAEVER, European integration and national identity: the challenge of the Nordic States, Routledge, 2002.

ICELAND IN EUROPE – KEEPING ITS DISTANCE

73

ther participation in European integration. Thus, when studying the nation’s relationship with Europe, the idea of the Icelandic nation and its sovereignty and how this concept fits in with being an integral part of the supra-national European integration process is just as important, if not more so, as the interests of the leading economic sector, i.e., fisheries. Similarly, Iver B. Neumann finds that the core concept of Norway’s relationship with Europe is that of “the people” (folket) 21 which is linked with patriotism. By contrast, the European project is considered tied to bureaucracy and the elite, and therefore in opposition to the people. This is, however, a pointed contrast to Iceland where the debate does not distinguish between the ordinary public and the elite. The corresponding Icelandic concept to folket is þjóðin, which incorporates both the common population and the elite. According to this model, it is therefore not the personal conviction of the participants that is most important, but rather the discourse they apply in the political debate to bring their arguments forward – or in other words: how they manoeuvre within the domestic linguistic games made possible and necessary by the concept of sovereignty under post-colonial conditions. To understand Iceland’s foreign policy and its policy on Europe, it is therefore necessary to frame the analysis within the historical context and map the impact of our nation and state building, which emerged from the struggle for independence, on the present foreign policy. This frame is able to provide the understanding of the contemporary political discourse. In the following section, I shall examine if and how politicians try to fit in or contradict participation in European integration with the Icelandic nation's political discourse. Even though it is not easy, for economic reasons, Iceland needs to participate in the EU internal market, which entails the EEA-agreement, in order to uphold its modern Nordic welfare state.

7. The Discourses on Europe In this section, I shall analyse the rhetoric politicians use when debating participation in European integration, especially focusing on the effect on Iceland’s internal democracy and external independence. In order to illustrate the continuity and the way the nationalist discourse occurs throughout contemporary politics, I shall provide examples taken from the main debating rounds on Europe: first on the EFTA (1970), secondly on the EEA agreement (1994), and thirdly on a possible EU-membership. The rhetoric used in foreign relations during the boom years leading up to the collapse of the financial system in autumn 2008 also provides an interesting insight into the impact of the discourse on national identity including the postcolonial rhetoric. This is also true for the rhetoric used after the Crash on the Icesave-dispute with the UK and the Dutch governments and the involvement of the IMF. The postcolonial emphasis on guarding Iceland’s democracy by never surrendering to foreign authority again is frequently a sort of “background sound” of the contemporary political discourse. This makes it often difficult to identify specific examples. In times of crisis, however, this rhetoric becomes more explicit, for example, in the Icesave dispute. 21

Iver B. NEUMANN, “This little piggy stayed at home: why Norway is not a member of the EU,” in: Lene HANSEN, Ole WAEVER (eds.), European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States, Routledge, 2002, p. 88–129.

74

EIRIKUR BERGAMANN

Icelandic politics revolve around a double axis. The traditional left/right axis and an internationalist/isolationist axis structured by the issue of Iceland’s sovereignty in relation to NATO and European cooperation. As described before, the party system consists of four main political parties. The left of centre Social Democratic Alliance (SDA) is the only one that has consistently campaigned for EU membership. The right of centre Independence Party (IP) supported Iceland’s membership of EFTA and the EEA but then turned against EU membership. The leftist Left Green Movement (LGM) has campaigned against further participation in European integration. The small centre Progressive Party (PP) has been split on the European issue, and, in effect, did not have a clearly defined policy for a long time. After a recent change of the leadership, the party turned ever more vigorously against EU membership. When debating EFTA membership (1968–1969), Icelandic parliamentarians mostly based their argument on the economy. However, the narrative of the struggle for independence and conservative ideas on the nation and its sovereignty were always underlying. In effect, they formed the base of the eco22 nomic arguments. Parliamentarians referred to what they called the undisputed distinctiveness of the nation, and for example considered it “only natural that our 23 relationship with EFTA will be marked by that distinctiveness.” Then, this understanding of uniqueness and distinctiveness was used as an argument for the multiple opt-outs and special solutions Iceland brought to the negotiating table. Those arguing against further participation in the European integration process feared the loss of identity in such a close relationship with the big nations of Europe. Directly tapping into the national myth, many parliamentarians referred to the old treaty of 1262 and to the introduction of absolutism in Denmark in 1662 when arguing against integration with other nations. In the parliamentary debates leading up to the EEA agreement (1989–1993), 24 the sovereignty argument moved to the forefront. When referring to economic benefits, EEA advocates emphasised the struggle for independence and its’ striving for progress and modernisation to bring Iceland forward as an equal partner in Europe. Foreign minister Hannibalsson (SDP) argued that the EEA would be 25 Iceland’s “passport” into the future and the key to economic prosperity. He referred to Jón Sigurðsson, the main hero of the struggle for independence, to support the claim that the EEA was the continuation of Sigurðsson’s efforts and would push Iceland further into modernity. Sovereignty was the central argument of the No-camp’s discourse used systematically and forcefully. They accused the Yes-side of being unpatriotic and argued that the EEA threatened Iceland’s sovereignty which would be shifted to undemocratic institutions in Brussels. Thus, Iceland would be subject to foreign rule once again. And in spite of the expected economic benefits, the agreement should be rejected solely because it violated the Icelanders’ “sense of sover26 eignty;” Interestingly, however, the meaning of sovereignty, what it consists of, was hardly discussed. A PP parliamentarian emphasised the necessity to protect 22 23 24 25 26

Eirikur BERGMANN, Sjálfstæð þjóð – trylltur skríll og landráðalýður, op.cit. Tómas ÁRNASON, Alþingis Parliamentary Archives: 1968, 08 11. Eirikur BERGMANN, Sjálfstæð þjóð – trylltur skríll og landráðalýður, op.cit. Jón Baldvin HANNIBALSSON, Alþingis Parliamentary Archives: 1991, 23 10. Jóhann ÁSÆLSSON, Alþingis Parliamentary Archives: 1992, 03 09.

ICELAND IN EUROPE – KEEPING ITS DISTANCE

75

the purity of Iceland´s identity and language from contamination due to too intimate foreign relations: “if we submit [to the EEA] we would of course instantly 27 loose our language, culture and independence in a very short time period.” This supports Kristín Loftsdóttir’s thesis that Icelanders continued to associate 28 national identity with the purity of the nation and its language. In the debate on a possible EU-membership in the beginning of the 2000s, the 29 importance of sovereignty was dominant. The No-side claimed that the EU fisheries policy not only violated Iceland’s economic interest but – like one IP parliamentarian maintained – also brought with it the “complete transfer of our 30 nation’s sovereignty and authority.” The national heritage and unique culture were emphasised when debating the EU’s fisheries policy; Icelanders should continue to develop a competitive society and strong economy on their own. The No-camp claimed that it would be a retrograde step of great consequence if Iceland were to lose its self-rule through EU membership. Iceland would be locked inside an unproductive trade block and trapped in an undemocratic bureaucracy. As mentioned before, Prime Minister Oddsson described the EU as one of the world’s most undemocratic bureaucratic monstrosities ever created. On the other side of the left/right axis, the leader of the LGM similarly remained firmly within the boundaries of the postcolonial discourse: According to him, membership would mean “diminished independence and sovereignty, loss of distinctive31 ness.” Not until after the collapse of the whole financial system and with the IP/SDA coalition ousted in the so-called “Pots-and-pans revolution” in January 2009 did 32 the new left wing government (SDA/LGM) apply for EU-membership. The Yes-side tapped straight into the postcolonial independence discourse promoting the EU as a way forward to protect and strengthen Iceland’s sovereignty instead of a step away from independence, and by continually referring to Jón Sigurðsson to advance their argument. Campaigning against the EU, however, one parliamentarian (IP) remembered Iceland’s 65th anniversary of independence: “We were the poorest nation in Europe after 600 years of cooperation with those nations to the South in Europe 33 we would be joining now.” In line with the national myth, he explained that Iceland’s misfortune and humiliation had started after acceding to the old treaty in 1262, and only independence transferred us to being among the richest. He concluded that with the EU membership, Iceland would again become a “depopulated poor province in a huge European super-state.” A colleague (IP) insisted Icelanders should never forget that they are a unique nation, “tough and hardworking and with a soul that could never been broken by foreigners.” One parliamentarian (PP) claimed that formal sovereignty “makes the nation what she 34 is today;” another (LGM) held that Iceland’s main independence hero, Jón 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34

Páll PÉRURSSON, Alþingis Parliamentary Archives: 1989, 09 03. Kristin LOFTSDÓTTIR, “The loss of innocence: The Icelandic financial crisis and colonial past,” Anthropology Today, 26, 6, 2006, p. 9–13. Eirikur BERGMANN, Sjálfstæð þjóð – trylltur skríll og landráðalýður, op.cit. Einar K. GUÐFINNSSON, Alþingis Parliamentary Archives: 2000, 08 05. Steingrímur J. SIGFiÚSSON, Alþingis Parliamentary Archives: 2000, 08 05. The PP had left a long standing coalition with the IP in spring 2007. Pétur BLÖNDAL, Alþingis Parliamentary Archives: 2009, 10 07. Höskuldur ÞÓRHALLSON, Alþingis Parliamentary Archives: 2009, 14 07.

76

EIRIKUR BERGAMANN 35

Sigurðsson, “would turn in his grave if the EU application were to go forward;” and still another (LGM) feared that the will of the nation would diminish after EU membership and concluded that “he who is glad when beaten to obey be36 comes a slave.” In every debate on the further integration with Europe, the same tropes of the sovereignty argument are constantly applied. When analysing this discourse, it becomes evident that the fish factor, central as it has been, is not only an economic matter but also an integral part of Iceland’s sovereignty discourse as developed during the struggle for independence. The frequently used argument that Iceland cannot join the EU because of its Common Fisheries Policy is therefore not a purely economic argument but a pivotal part of Iceland’s postindependence identity. Complete control over the fishing zone is a symbol of the free and independent Icelandic nation. In continuation, keeping European vessels out of Iceland’s fishing zone is considered a part of the everlasting struggle for independence. It is also noteworthy that, although the discourse does indeed revolve around protecting Iceland’s “formal” sovereignty, the meaning of “real” sovereignty is hardly discussed. Hermannsson argues that even though Icelanders do agree on the importance of protecting their sovereignty, they have little common under37 standing of its constellation and therefore refrain from debating it. The importance of sovereignty claims, based on Iceland’s national identity, was thrust forward in the debate on the EEA and continued through the dispute about a possible EU membership. After the crash of 2008 until the EU-application in summer 2009, the debate was dominated by harsh nationalistic rhetoric on both sides. It stemmed directly from the struggle of independence, for example by referring to the uniqueness of the Icelandic nation. The No-side applied this discourse more directly. The Yes-side preferred to their economic argument with the part of the sovereignty discourse about modernisation and economic progress, arguing that further integration would promote growth and adequately insure Iceland’s economic independence. The pro side argued that gaining free access to the Single Market for fish was an indirect continuation of the struggle for independence– the EEA thus an instrument to secure Iceland’s economic sovereignty. The No-side, on the other hand, claimed that keeping control of the fishing grounds was vital to guarding Iceland’s independence. However, when digging into the discourse around the impact of EU-membership on Icelandic fisheries interests, it is evident how the fisheries argument is indeed fuelled by nationalist rhetoric. In the struggle for independence, the peasant was the symbol of the independent Icelandic nation. But with the increasing importance of fisheries, the seaman gradually took over as the representative of the sovereign Icelandic nation state. Icelanders fought the British in the socalled Cod Wars to gain control over their fishing resource around the country. Since independence, the fish industry has been the most important sector of the economy and has certainly been the foundation of Iceland’s economic independ35 36 37

Ásmundur Einar DAÐASON, Alþingis Parliamentary Archives, 2009, 14 07. Jónasson ÖGMUNDUR, Alþingis Parliamentary Archives: 2009, 10 07. Birgir HERMANNSSON, Understanding Nationalism. Studies in Icelandic Nationalism 1800–2000, Stockholm University. 2005.

ICELAND IN EUROPE – KEEPING ITS DISTANCE

77

38

ence. The nation and the seaman are then intertwined in fishermen’s folksongs that represent the patriotic Icelander and have become de-facto national anthems. In this respect, the fish in the sea and the fisherman are symbols of the independent Icelandic nation. This is especially interesting in this context because sometimes during the debate, the importance of keeping control over the fisheries resources is, at least up to a point, also an integral part of the independence struggle. The often used argument that Iceland cannot join the EU because of its Common Fisheries Policy is therefore not simply an economic argument but also a vital part of Iceland’s independence. In this way, complete control over the fishing zone becomes a symbol of the free and independent Icelandic nation.

8. Populism and the Progressive Party As stated before, the old agrarian Progressive Party (PP) faced steadily diminishing support. After the crash of 2008, its new leadership rapidly retuned it into a more populist direction. After the surge leading to the 2013 elections, the party ended at the helm of a coalition government, together with the old hegemonic IP (2015). The change of the national rhetoric, from the superiority discourse of the boom years to the idea of being under siege by ill-willed foreigners after the 39 crash of 2008, was quite rapid. On the surface, it might even seem that those two ideas were contradictory. However, when analysing the harsh nationalist rhetoric of the Icesave debate, it becomes obvious that its origins were the same as those of the rhetoric on the Icelandic economic miracle voiced in the first decade of the new millennium: Iceland’s postcolonial national identity. The core of both ideas is found in the national myth created during the struggle for independence in the 19th century, written down by Jón Jónsson Aðils at the beginning of the 20th century, and kept alive and nourished by politicians of all ranks throughout the decades, and then put into new perspectives by the likes of President Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson. Tapping into this rhetoric, the new PP leadership claimed that Iceland was a victim of vicious foreigners who had conspired to bring it to its knees. Once again in autumn 2010, thousands of protesters were surrounding the parliament building. Flags symbolizing Iceland’s independence were flying high in front of the Parliament building. Amongst them were blue EU flags on which a red noentry sign had been painted right across the yellow stars. PP leader Gunnlaugsson went so far as to accuse then PM Ms Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir of “humiliating the nation” by “forcing her nation to pay the Icesave 40 debt burden.” Instead of protecting the nation, he claimed, the government was working on behalf of the British and Dutch to attack Iceland. Similarly, one of the PP’s most prominent MPs, Mrs Eygló Harðardóttir (2009) accused the government of high treason. The rhetoric was very much driven by emotion. PP leaders

38 39 40

Birgir HERMANNSSON, Understanding Nationalism. Studies in Icelandic Nationalism 1800–2000, op.cit. See Eirikur BERGMANN, Iceland and the EEA 1994–2011, op.cit., chapter VI. Sigmunder David GUNNLAUGSSON, Speach in Parliament, Reykjavik, 2009.

78

EIRIKUR BERGAMANN

forcefully and systematically accused those they claimed belonged to the left wing Reykjavik elite of betraying their nation at a time of need. Being the only of the four mainstream parties to consistently fight against any agreement on Icesave, the PP was gaining further ground in the wake of two extraordinary referendums on the issue in 2010 and 2011, spurred by a president’s 41 veto. After the EFTA Court ruling in favour of Iceland on 28 January 2013, the PP surged. The party gained further popularity by promising to force foreign creditors they systematically referred to as ‘vulture funds’ (hrægammasjóðir) to pay for debt relief of household loans. Gunnlaugsson indicated they would amount to 20 per 42 cent, an estimated 300 billion krona. Aligning themselves alongside the ordinary households and against the international financial elite, this is perhaps an example of providing a simple solution to a complex problem. In a radio interview on his policy of forcing foreign creditors to pay for household debt relief, he linked the issue to the Icesave dispute, describing Icelanders as David defeating 43 Goliath. When opposition grew, Gunnlaugsson insisted it was time for Iceland44 ers to legislate against the lobbyism of foreign stakeholders. In the end, the party claimed to have made good on their promise by implementing state funded debt relief of 80 billion kronas to households with inflation indexed loans. Gunnlaugsson used his first ceremonial PM address on Iceland’s National Day, on 17 June 2013, to place himself even more firmly than most of his predecessors within the established postcolonial discourse, mainly emphasizing Iceland’s heritage and celebrating the nation’s defiance of foreign oppression in 45 the Icesave dispute. While dismissing the IMF’s concerns, he added that international institutions – which he mockingly referred to as ‘international abbreviations’ – would no longer dictate Iceland’s economic policies. Referring to the Viking heritage, he explained that precisely because they were descended from Vikings, Icelanders were independently minded and thus would not surrender to foreign authority. This is an example of how the discursive representation of the past is indeed continually present in Icelandic politics. Accordingly, it can be argued that the contemporary political condition in Iceland is very much a result of its historical relationship with neighbouring countries. At his party congress after the 2013 election, the new leader referred in a 46 romantic fairy-tale style to Iceland as the model country of the world. Skipping over the more liberal and pro-EU times in the PP’s recent history, the post-crisis leadership aligned itself closer with the party’s older and more nationalist history, most commonly with its founder Jónas Jónson frá Hrifu, but also referring to his inspiration, the nationalist writings of the historian Jón Jónsson 41 42 43 44 0 46

Judgment of the Court in Case E-16/11, EFTA Court, 28.1.2013, http://www.eftacourt.int/ images/uploads/16_11_Judgment.pdf (2.6.2016). Ingi VILHJÁLMSSON, “Sigmundur Davíð missaga: Lofaði 300 milljörðum,” DV, Reykjavik, 3.12.2013 ; http://www.dv.is/frettir/2013/12/3/sigmundur-david-lofadi-300-milljordum/ (2.3.2016). Sigmunder David GUNNLAUGSSON, Reykjavik síðdegis, Reykjavik, Bylgjan, 21.1.2014. See J.J KARLSSON, “Forsætisráðherra sendir kröfuhöfum tóninn,” Fréttablaðið, 26.1.2014. Sigmunder David GUNNLAUGSSON, Ávarp forsætisráðherra, Sigmundar Davíðs Gunnlaugssonar á Austurvelli 17 júní 2013, Reykjavik, 2013 ; http://www.forsaetisraduneyti.is/radherra/ raedur-greinar-sdg/nr/7625 (2.3.2016). Sigmunder David GUNNLAUGSSON, Stefnuræða forsætisráðherra, Reykjavik, Alþingi, October 2013.

ICELAND IN EUROPE – KEEPING ITS DISTANCE

79

Aðils. The party’s use of imagery and symbols mirrored this turn to nationalism. The new version of its logo used at the 2011 party congress underlined the change: It shows the Icelandic flag being born as a rising sun out of the party’s agrarian flag with its slogan reading “Iceland in bright hope” (“Ísland í vonana birtu”). Symbols expert Guðmundur Oddur Magnússon, Professor at Iceland’s University of the Arts, maintains that the party’s new imagery refers to the nationalist – bordering on fascist – ideology of the 1930s, to be found in the collec47 tion of its founder Jónas Jónsson frá Hriflu, for example. PP leader Gunnlaugsson displayed a more benign nationalism when, remaining true to his party’s long standing heavy protectionism of Icelandic agriculture, 48 he announced his new diet of Icelandic food only. These changes are all in line with the development of populist politics in Europe, i.e., being nationalist, anti-elite, anti-EU, emotionalist, protectionist, and providing simple solutions to complex issues. As a result, many members holding more liberal views left the party due to their opposition to the change. One of the more prominent opponents was MP Guðmundur Steingrímsson, the son and grandson of two of the party´s former leaders. He left with the more liberal faction of the PP and established a new centrist liberal party called Bright Future, together with SDA splinters and people of the so-called Best Party – a humourist protest party in Reykajvik. Bright future won four seats at the 2013 parliamentary election, before its support diminished according to opinion polls. The last of the liberal faction left when the PP delved further into populist communication by increasingly voicing concerns about immigrants in Iceland. In question time at Parliament’s, Gunnlaugsson for example insisted that the state 49 should specifically map organized crime of asylum seekers. This led the PP’s own association in Kópavogur, Reykjavik’s neighbouring town, to publicly object to the anti-immigrant rhetoric of the new leadership. Subsequently, most of the critical members left the party. With critical voices gone, Gunnlaugsson became the party’s uncontested and, indeed, celebrated leader, keeping its MPs firmly on the new party line, another common feature in populist politics. The party’s antiimmigrant rhetoric was only to intensify, for example, when one of its leading MPs, Vigdís Hauksdóttir, suggested that asylum seekers should wear a GPS tracking device around their ankle. This change in the party’s rhetoric was even objected by some of its traditional nationalists, like one its former leaders, Jón Sigurðsson, who described himself as 50 a “nationist” celebrating Icelandic “Nationism” (þjóðhyggja). This retuning of the established Progressive Party into a populist direction caused widespread criticism. However, Gunnlaugsson and his new team easily dismissed it as the undermining tactics of urban elitist left-leaning liberals. Many in the leadership widely complained of being victims of bullying by the left wing intelligentsia in politics, academia, and media, accused of collectively branding 47 48 49 50

Guðmundur Oddur MAGNÚSSON, Ný útfærsla á merki Framsóknarflokksins, Facebook. Note, 11.11.2011. Sigmunder David GUNNLAUGSSON, “Íslenski kúrinn,” Sigmunderdavid.is, 21.8.2011; http:/sigmundurdavid.is (2.3.2016). Sigmunder David GUNNLAUGSSON, “Fyrirspurng til innanríkisráðherra um erlenda fanga,” Alþingi, 20.5.2011; http://www.althingi.is/altext/139/s/1506.html (2.3.2016). Eirikur BERGMANN, “Populism in Iceland: Has the Progressive Party turned populist?,” Stjórnmál Og Stjórnsỳsla, 11, 1, 2015, p. 33.

80

EIRIKUR BERGAMANN

the PP as populist without merit. But it was not only their external critics who linked the PP with populist parties in Europe. For example, linking with a documentary on Nigel Farrage on Facebook, one of the PP’s more prominent members, former Reykjavik chairman of the party, Jón Ingi Gíslason, wrote that UKIP 51 was the British version of the PP. However, anti-Muslim rhetoric generally lacking, critics were still not able to firmly assign the PP to the ranks of contemporary right wing populists in Europe. This changed before the 2014 municipal election when PP candidates objected to a Muslim mosque being built in Reykjavik on a lawn the City Council had already assigned for that use to the Association of Icelandic Muslims. PP’s top candidate Sveinbjörg Sveinbjörnsdóttir wrote: “While we operate a [Christian] National Church, we should not provide building lawns for houses like 52 mosques or Greek Orthodox churches.” When explaining her statement in a TV debate, she added: "Would you like to live in society, in which it is punishable – like the Swedes had to implement last week – who could have imagined, that Swedes had to implement laws making it 53 punishable – to force people into marriage?’ There are less than thousand registered Muslims in Iceland. No serious clashes between Muslims and Icelanders have been reported. Therefore, Sveinbjörnsdóttir’s comments spurred aggressive opposition in the public debate – but also widespread support, for example, in social media and on radio discussions’ public question time. Many ordinary PP members went much further than their representatives. One described Muslims in general as vicious rapists and murderers while stating: “We Progressive Party members do not want any Mos54 que.” Suddenly, the debate on Muslims in Iceland became perhaps the hottest campaign topic. Many people called on the PP leadership to condemn the move of its Reykjavik candidates but Gunnlaugsson kept silent. When opinion polls showed a subsequent massive increase of the party’s support, he criticized those who objected to the anti-Muslim rhetoric for imposing political correctness and forcefully suppressing an issue which indeed, he claimed, was important to discuss. Some PP candidates in other municipalities followed suit. In Kópavogur, one candidate said that it was time to protect Christian values which were under attack, and linked Muslims with notorieties such as honour killings, acid attacks, 55 rapes and stonings. Not all PP candidates, however, agreed with the anti-Muslim rhetoric. The candidate on the second place of the party’s Reykjavik list resigned, describing

51 52 53 54 55

Jon Ingi GISLASON, Facebook, Post, 11.11.2014; https://www.facebook.com/kjarnholt?

fref=ts (2.3.2016). Sveinbjörg SVEINBJÖRNSDÓTTIR, Facebook, Post, 23.5.2014, https://www.facebook.com/ sveinabirna?fref=ts (2.6.2016). Sveinbjörg SVEINBJÖRNSDÓTTIR, Áhyggjur af nauðungarhjónaböndum múlima á Íslandi, 30.5.2014. S. Þ. EINARSSON, Facebook, Status update, 24.5.2014, https://www.facebook.com/ sverrirtattoo?fref=ts (2.6.2016). Reported in: Jóhann Páll JÓHANNSSON, “Framsóknarkona úthúðar múslimum,” DV, Reykjavik, 6.5.2014.

ICELAND IN EUROPE – KEEPING ITS DISTANCE

81

an atmosphere of bigotry in the party: Muslims were widely mocked while 56 members emphasized the promotion of Christian values. The PP was not represented in the Reykjavik City Council. At the previous election, it had fallen below the 5 per cent threshold – the capital being the party’s weakest spot. Before the anti-mosque move, the PP was polling at around 2 per cent. However, after applying anti-Muslim rhetoric, the party sextupled its vote, securing 12.8 percent and winning two representatives. This clearly resembles what the Liberal Party was able to do before the 2007 parliamentary election. Instead of properly backpedalling from anti-immigrant rhetoric after the election, they kept going. In January 2015, the PP announced the appointment of one of Iceland’s most vocal campaigners for Christian values and harsh critic of Muslim and gay rights – former talk radio host Gústaf Níelsson, who incidentally was a registered member of the IP – to the Reykjavik City committee on human rights. This caused such outrage both in society and within the PP that the ap57 pointment was withdrawn. Often, party members referred to Iceland as somehow pure and benign while describing other countries as less pure and less benign. MP Vigdís Hauksdóttir made one of the more peculiar comments in a debate on laying a landline for exporting electricity from Iceland through the seabed to the European continent. Claiming that the Icelandic energy was the purest in the world, she asked: “… are we then ready to mix our pure energy with energy of the European Union countries, and in doing so, degrading our own and pollute it with the dirty en58 ergy which is found there?”

Conclusion The colonial experience is still very present in contemporary politics in Iceland, both in terms of rhetoric and practice. The national myth carved out in the struggle for independence laid the foundation on which the Icelandic republic still rests and sets the parameters of its political identity and its relation with the EU. The postcolonial political identity puts emphasis on formal sovereignty and insists on being recognised as an equal partner in Europe, rather than a microstate that relies on a larger metropole. Formal independence is seen as a prerequisite of a prosperous modern Iceland enjoying external recognition. This postcolonial identity still characterises the rhetoric Icelandic politicians use when debating participation in European integration. Furthermore, it was very present in the identity politics of the boom years as well as in the debate over the Icesave deposit accounts after the crash. And the discussion shall continue. Thus, when claiming that economic interest around fisheries are the root of Iceland’s Euroscepticism,

56 57 58

Reported in: Kristjan GUÐJÓNSSON, “Mér fannst orðið múslimur ekki fyndið,” DV, 28.5.2014; http://www.dv.is/frettir/2014/5/28/mer-fannst-ordid-muslimur-ekki-fyndid/ (2.3.2016). Sunna Kristin HILMARSDÓTTIR, “Við stigum þarna út af línunni og ætlum að fara inn á hana aftur,” Vísir.is, Reykjavik, 21.1.2015; http://www.visir.is/-vid-stigum-tharna-ut-aflinunni-og-aetlum-ad-fara-inn-a-hana-aftur-/article/2015150129801 (2.3.2016). Vigdis HAUKSDÓTTIR, “Raforkustrengur til Evrópu,” Alþingi, 5.11.2013; http://www. althingi.is/altext/ raeda/143/rad20131105T143832.html (2.3.2016).

82

EIRIKUR BERGAMANN

rationalist theorists neglect the importance of Iceland’s postcolonial relations in contemporary politics, especially when it comes to Iceland’s foreign relations. Postcolonial analyses have proven helpful in understanding how the colonial experience still frames the discourse of Iceland’s political economy. When analysing contemporary political debates, it is therefore important to consider the historical context. In fact, Iceland’s relationship with the EU only makes sense when taking into account its colonial history and postcolonial national identity, which emphasises formal sovereignty. For example, when digging into the role of the fisheries in opposing the EU, we see how it is fuelled by nationalist rhetoric. In modern politics, the rhetoric of the struggle for independence travels through different avenues. When analysing the Icelandic debates on Europe, the emphasis on modernisation and economic progress is clearly present. Economically, like others in Europe, Icelanders felt the pressure to participate in the European project, which might explain the EEA membership – which brought Iceland into the European Single Market. Through the EEA, Iceland has agreed to transfer decision-making in significant economic fields to the European level. At the same time, however, other forces are pulling in the opposite direction. The postcolonial political discourse, so deeply rooted in the struggle for independence, has had the effect that Icelanders have been hesitant to accept the “formal” transfer of sovereignty following full membership of the European Union. In this regard, participation in EU’s supra-national institutions falls outside the framework of the established political discourse which emphasises a formally sovereign and independent Icelandic nation-state. This makes it more difficult for Icelandic politicians to argue in favour of a full and formal membership of a supra-national organisation like the EU. However, for a brief period after the crash of 2008, a majority for membership application emerged in Parliament. It resulted in the application in mid-2009. Since then, opinion polls have indicated that a majority of the electorate favours cancelling the negotiations and that any accession agreement would be rejected in a national referendum. Icelandic postcolonial sovereignty games are currently played within these boundaries: To uphold a modern Nordic welfare state recognised as an equal partner in the Western culture, Iceland feels the need to participate in the European Single Market, thus accepting the EEA. However, formally surrendering to supra-national EU institutions challenges the boundaries of Iceland’s postcolonial political framework. This can also be described as a dilemma between economic interests and ideas on formal sovereignty – illustrating an interesting rift between the practical participation in European integration and the ideas of a free and sovereign Icelandic nation. Handling this dilemma, Iceland’s relation with the other Nordic countries plays a significant role. Despite the heavy impact of the past colonial relationship with imperial Denmark and Norway on the contemporary political discourse, Iceland is consistently discursively represented without a foreign metropole. The Nordic states are decisively presented as equals. But they also clearly serve as a point of reference for Iceland when positioning itself in the world. In diplomatic practice, though, Iceland is very dependent on its close cooperation with, and even help from, its Nordic counterparts and other European states like Germany. In that regard, it is interesting that Iceland is reported to be relying more heavily on Oslo than on Copenhagen – to support the insistence on being recognised as

ICELAND IN EUROPE – KEEPING ITS DISTANCE

83

an equal, Iceland is keen on distancing itself from its most recent metropole. Any which way, this dependency on diplomatic assistance from neighbours is somewhat in tension with the emphasis laid on being capable and self-sufficient. Iceland's history and sense of nationhood draws back to the Middle Ages and feels quite ancient while the modern Icelandic society also a quite a young aspect to it. As a newly independent republic, Iceland’s identity has a juvenile side evident in the strive to be noticed in the world – especially by the other Nordics, as became evident in the boom years when Icelandic Viking Capitalists bought everything they could get their inexperienced hands on in Scandinavia and in the UK. The other Nordic capitals, Copenhagen and Stockholm, and even Oslo and Helsinki, have been established for a long time while Reykjavik is still an unfinished project. In this sense, the Icelandic sovereignty project is still in progress. The crisis of 2008 opened up a space for a new leadership in the established agrarian Progressive Party to tap into this fear subsequently. Rapidly, the party was retuned into a populist direction, as has been established here. It was firmly nationalistic and sceptical of multiculturalism, aggressively anti-EU, and heavily protectionists of the domestic agricultural production. Its leaders were prone to discursively creating an elite out of their adversaries and claiming to speak for the common man. Most often, the rhetoric revolved around protecting ordinary households against both the domestic left leaning elite and powerful foreign forces. In doing so, they firmly separated between “us” who belong to the inner society, and “the others” who they considered falling on the other side of the fence, thus separating Icelanders from outsiders. Furthermore, to a higher degree than common in other parties, its activists were accustomed to praising their young leader and often provided what can easily be described as simple solutions to complex problems. Moralistic communications were perhaps less evident but anti-immigrant rhetoric heightened, often directed at asylum seekers but more recently being anti-Muslim. Being rooted in an agrarian society and ranking as Iceland’s oldest mainstream political party, the PP was of course not entirely populist. It was still perhaps more firmly nationalist than populist. However, analysing communicational changes of the new post-crisis leadership between 2009 and 2016, it was unavoidable to categorize the party at least as the softer version of European populist parties, perhaps closest to the Norwegian Progress Party and, to some extent, the Finns Party. Elsewhere, populist parties had most often been founded in opposition to mainstream political parties. In European politics, at least in the period between 2009 and 2016, the retuning of an established mainstream party to place it amongst populist movements, and in doing so, arriving at helm of government, is only comparable with the Peoples Party in Switzerland, and the Freedom Party in Austria.

L’ISLANDE EN EUROPE – MAINTENANT SA DISTANCE L´Islande est liée à Union européenne par l´accord sur l´Espace économique européen (EEE), qui fait le pont entre l´Association européenne de libre-échange (AELE) et l´Union européenne. Cet accord assure à l´Islande, à la Norvège et au

84

EIRIKUR BERGAMANN

Lichtenstein l´accès au marché intérieur européen, ceci au prix du respect des règles de l´Union européenne. Cet accord convient, malgré un lourd déficit démocratique, à l´identité nationale de l´Islande. L´ile reste, sur le plan formel, indépendante, mais participe de manière active au processus de collaboration économique sur le continent. De cette manière, l´Islande est intégrée de manière globale à l´Union européenne sans en être formellement membre. La clé pour comprendre les relations internationales de l´Islande est le dilemme existant entre l´affirmation de l´indépendance – et donc de l´isolationnisme – et en même temps sa participation active aux relations internationales.

ISLAND IN EUROPA – AUF ABSTAND BEDACHT Island ist durch das Abkommen über den Europäischen Wirtschaftsraum (EWR), das eine Brücke schlug zwischen der Europäische Freihandelsassoziation (EFTA) und der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (EG), eng mit der EU verbunden. Dieses Abkommen gewährt Island, Norwegen und Liechtenstein den Zugang zum Binnenmarkt im Gegenzug für deren Einhaltung der Regeln der Europäischen Union. Trotz seines schweren demokratischen Defizits passt diese Übereinkunft vorzüglich zur nationalen Identität Islands: Die Insel bleibt formal unabhängig, beteiligt sich aber aktiv an der wirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit auf dem Kontinent. Auf diese Weise ist Island umfassend in die EU integriert, ohne ihr jedoch formal als Mitglied anzugehören. Der Schlüssel zum Verständnis der Auslandsbeziehungen Islands ist das interne Dilemma zwischen der Betonung der Selbständigkeit – und also des Isolationismus – und gleichzeitig der aktiven Beteiligung an internationalen Beziehungen.

Part 2

FOR OR AGAINST EUROPE? EUROPHILES, EUROSCEPTICS, IN-BETWEENS AND ACCESSION CANDIDATES: FOUR CASE STUDIES Partie 2

POUR OU CONTRE L’EUROPE ? EUROPHILES, EUROSCEPTIQUES, LES ENTRE-DEUX ET CANDIDATS A L’ADHESION : QUATRE CAS D’ETUDE Teil 2

FÜR ODER GEGEN EUROPA? EUROPHILE, EUROSKEPTIKER, IN-BETWEENS UND BEITRITTSKANDIDATEN: VIER FALLSTUDIEN

LES RELATIONS DE L’UE AVEC LE VATICAN : UNE DIMENSION « MICRO » ? RÉMI CAUCANAS S'interroger sur les liens entre le Vatican et l'Union européenne pourrait impliquer une longue dissertation sur l'histoire de l'Europe, son origine, son esprit et son projet. Il n'est cependant pas question ici de se prononcer sur la hiérarchie entre pouvoir spirituel et pouvoir temporel, question structurante et brûlante pour le Moyen-Age européen au moins à partir du XIe siècle. Notre propos ne vise pas non plus à trancher le débat plus contemporain sur l' « identité chrétienne de l'Europe ». Il serait même hasardeux et risqué de mettre en avant l'esprit chrétien de quelques-uns des « Pères de l'Europe ». En introduction, nous pouvons seulement relever ce mélange des genres qui semble caractériser les relations entre le Vatican et l'Union européenne. Car au-delà des aspects institutionnels et formels, les relations avec le plus petit État du monde prennent très vite une tournure politique, à la hauteur d'enjeux anthropologiques et éthiques de dimension universelle. Microscopique territorialement parlant, le Vatican semble imposé une dimension bien plus vaste. Les relations entre l'Union européenne et l'État de la Cité du Vatican se placent d'abord à un niveau territorial, voire de proximité car lié à une situation d'enclave géographique. Comme Saint-Marin, la Cité du Vatican a une frontière ouverte avec l'Italie, sans pouvoir cependant délivrer de visas Schengen. Disposant d'un héliport comme seule porte ouvrant sur les routes aériennes, l'entrée dans l'État de la Cité du Vatican est conditionnée par une autorisation de passage dans l'espace Schengen. Les relations avec l'Italie voisine apparaissent comme une donnée de base. En 1929, les accords du Latran ont permis notamment de définir les rapports douaniers entre les deux États. « Les marchandises provenant de l'extérieur et envoyées à la Cité du Vatican ou, en dehors de celles-ci, aux Instituts et Offices du Saint-Siège, seront toujours admises, de quelque point des frontières italiennes que ce soit et de n'importe quel port du royaume, à passer par le territoire italien avec pleine exemption de droits de douane et d'octroi »1 . L'introduction de l'euro a donc naturellement nécessité un accord préalable avec la République italienne. L'État de la Cité du Vatican ne fait pas partie de l'union douanière de l'Union européenne mais utilise l'euro et a, comme d'autres MicroÉtats, obtenu le droit d'émettre un nombre limité de pièces en euros. Bien que membre d'organisations internationales de dimension européenne comme Interpol, le Micro-État ne pourrait guère aller plus loin vers une intégration européenne: les critères de Copenhague sont en effet strictes sur la nature démocratique des États candidats à l'entrée dans l'UE. Or le chef de l'État de la Cité du Vatican est souverain de droit divin et absolu et concentre tout à la fois 1

Art. 20 des accords du Latran, 1929.

88

RÉMI CAUCANAS

les pouvoirs législatif, exécutif et judiciaire. Souverain d'un État de 44 hectares et d'un riche patrimoine artistique, il est surtout le titulaire du Siège apostolique ou « Saint-Siège », l'autorité suprême de l'Eglise catholique. L'État de la Cité du Vatican est de nature théocratique. Comme chef d'État et chef d'Eglise, le pape est entouré d'un gouvernement - la curie - et d'une administration - qui bénéficie du territoire de la Cité du Vatican mais également d'extensions romaines - au sommet desquels se trouve la secrétairerie d'État qui est dirigée par le Cardinal secrétaire d'État. Sous l'autorité du pape, ce dernier est le véritable chef de gouvernement et de la diplomatie du Saint-Siège. Il est en effet à la tête d'un édifice diplomatique extrêmement vaste qui s'appuie sur les nonciatures apostoliques (les ambassades)2, des organisations internationales catholiques (la Caritas dans le domaine caritatif), sans parler d'un réseau multiforme d'informateurs. La dimension catholique prend ici toute son ampleur. Comme l'explique John Bazire, « la diplomatie du Saint-Siège est l’une des plus grandes diplomaties au monde, non pas par le nombre, mais certainement par sa présence sur le terrain et la spécificité de sa mission. Le Saint-Siège dispose en effet d’un réseau d’informateurs extrêmement dense qui lui permet de suivre attentivement l’évolution internationale ». La diplomatie du Saint-Siège compte avec les remontées d'informations et les capacités d'influence des communautés catholiques, des associations et des hiérarchies ecclésiales présentes dans la plupart des pays du monde, en particulier dans les pays de l'Union européenne. Les structures nationales catholiques ne doivent cependant pas être comprises comme autant de dociles forces d'appoint et de relais automatiques des décisions du Saint-Siège. L'histoire du gallicanisme en France illustre bien ce rapport conflictuel entre une partie de la hiérarchie catholique française et la papauté. Le récent débat autour du « Mariage pour tous » montre aussi l'imperfection d'un monolithisme catholique ou d'un alignement sur la papauté, plus souvent fantasmé que réel. Il semble cependant que le projet d'intégration ait reçu une adhésion large des catholiques occidentaux. Très tôt le pape Pie XII a apporté son soutien au Traité de Rome. Dès cette époque, à Strasbourg puis à Bruxelles, les Jésuites ont pris l'initiative de créer et d'animer un Office catholique d'information et d'initiative pour l'Europe (OCIPE). Le mouvement œcuménique a été aussi le cadre d'initiatives, d'observations et d'apprivoisement du projet européen pour les catholiques européens. En 1970, un nonce apostolique est nommé auprès de la Communauté économique européenne. L'élection du Parlement européen au suffrage universel à partir de 1979 ouvre ensuite des perspectives plus larges de relations entre l'Eglise catholique prise comme institution et les institutions européennes. « Le 3 mars 1980, en accord avec le Saint-Siège, un collège d'évêques crée la Commission des Episcopats de la Communauté européenne (COMECE) pour suivre et accompagner les politiques européennes »3. A côté du Conseil de l'Europe qui rassemble un plus grand nombre de pays que l'Union européenne et qui siège également à Strasbourg, le Parlement européen demeure une enceinte 2 3

Michael F. FELDKAMP, La diplomazia pontificia, Milano, Jaca Book, 1995, p. 117. Selon l’auteur, le Saint-Siège disposait du troisième réseau diplomatique mondial, derrière les ÉtatsUnis et l’Allemagne.

Camille, ALBRIEUX, « L’Église Catholique dans l’Union Européenne », Histoire 1980–2015, Bruxelles, COMECE, http://www.comece.eu/dl/NKNMJmoJKoJqx4KJKJKJ nmmL/COMECE_HISTORY_FR.pdf (2.5.2016).

LES RELATIONS DE L’UE AVEC LE VATICAN : UNE DIMENSION « MICRO » ?

89

privilégiée pour les relations entre l'UE et le Saint-Siège. Pour le chef de l'Eglise catholique, répondre à l'invitation du président du Parlement européen est l'occasion de prononcer un discours d'envergure non seulement sur l'attachement du Saint-Siège au projet européen mais aussi, de manière plus critique, sur différents enjeux de nature éthique, culturel et anthropologique. Avant le pape François qui interpellait les représentants de l'Europe sur « la dignité humaine », Jean-Paul II est intervenu en 1988 sur « la valeur inestimable de la personne humaine ». Et « si Benoit XVI ne s'est pas rendu devant le Parlement européen durant ses huit années de pontificat, pour reprendre les termes d’une journaliste de Radio-NotreDame, le Parlement européen est venu au Vatican, en la personne de son président, Jerzy Buzeck. Les deux hommes ont alors abordé la question des relations entre l'Eglise et les différentes institutions européennes, ainsi que la contribution de l'Eglise à l'Union européenne »4. Dans cette relation entre l'UE et le SaintSiège, une certaine forme de réciprocité a pu se mettre en place. Outre les visites devenues communes des représentants des instances de l'UE au Vatican, le premier chef de la délégation de l'UE a été accrédité en 2006: Luis Ritto est installé le 24 juin 2006 après l'approbation des États membres; il est remplacé le 6 février 2012 par Laurence Argimon-Pistre. Comme les autres ambassadeurs nommés auprès du Saint-Siège, son statut peut être encadré par l'article 19 des accords du Latran. « Les agents diplomatiques et les envoyés du Saint-Siège, les agents diplomatiques et les envoyés des gouvernements étrangers près le SaintSiège et les dignitaires de l'Église venant de l'étranger pour aller à la Cité du Vatican et munis de passeports des États d'où ils viennent, et visés par les représentants pontificaux à l'étranger, pourront sans autre formalité accéder à cette Cité à travers le territoire italien. Il en sera de même pour les susdites personnes qui, munies du passeport pontifical en règle, se rendront de la Cité du Vatican à l'étranger »5. Les activités de la délégation de l'Union européenne concernent principalement la participation aux cérémonies et événements organisés par le Vatican. Le chef de la délégation préside à la rencontre de coordination mensuelle avec les États membres accrédités auprès du Saint-Siège. Dans la relation entre l'UE et le Micro-État, ces activités ne sont là que pour signifier la profondeur et la variété des sujets traités qui vont bien au-delà de l'envergure géographique du Micro-État. L’intérêt accordé à la reconnaissance des diplômes universitaires dit aussi l’importance d’une dimension immatérielle et très variée dans les relations entre l’UE et le Vatican. Les discussions sont assez larges et couvrent une série de champs. « L’UE et le Saint-Siège dialoguent sur un certain nombre de thèmes européens ou mondiaux, notamment: le dialogue entre les cultures et les religions; la pauvreté et le développement; la viabilité environnementale; la prévention et la résolution des conflits; les droits de l'homme, notamment la liberté de religion et de conviction »6. Bref, autant de champs de coopération et de réflexion qui dépassent l'horizon des sept collines de Rome et 4 5 6

Juliette, LOISEAU, « Les papes et l’Union européenne : une longue histoire », Radio Notre Dame, 25.11.2014, http://www.radionotredame.net/2014/vie-de-leglise/visite-papestrasbourg-histoire-32168. (2.5.2016). Art. 19 des accords du Latran, op.cit. http://eeas.europa.eu/vatican/index_fr.htm (2.6.2016)

90

RÉMI CAUCANAS

du précarré de l'État de la Cité du Vatican. On pourrait même se demander si finalement l'appellation "Micro-État" est bien légitime...

THE RELATIONS OF THE EU WITH THE VATICAN: A “MICRO” DIMENSION? A mix of different forms seems to characterize the relations between the Vatican and the European Union. For, above the institutional and formal aspects, the relations with the smallest state in the world quickly take on a political dimension, at the level of anthropological and ethical macro-stakes. In reality, if the territorial and proximity character remains an essential level of relations to analyze, it is still necessary to also question the “macro” dimension which structures the relations with the “micro-state of the Vatican”.

DIE BEZIEHUNGEN DER EU MIT DEM VATIKAN: EINE „MIKRO“ DIMENSION? Ein Gemisch verschiedener Gattungen scheint die Beziehungen zwischen dem Vatikan und der Europäischen Union zu charakterisieren. Denn über die institutionellen und formellen Aspekte hinaus nehmen die Beziehungen mit dem kleinsten Staat der Welt schnell eine politische Dimension an, die anthropologische und ethische Makrofragen hervorrufen. In Wirklichkeit, wenn auch der territoriale und Nähe-Faktor ein grundlegendes zu analysierendes Niveau der Beziehungen bleibt handelt es sich doch auch darum, die „Makro“-Dimension zu erforschen, die die Beziehungen mit dem „Mikro-Staat des Vatikans“ strukturieren.

EUROSCEPTICS NOT ONLY BY STATE DEFINITION: THE CASE OF BELARUS WOLFGANG SENDER & IEVA MOTŪZAITĖ Since 1994, President Alexander Lukashenko governs the Republic of Belarus with a strong power-vertical similar to today’s Russian style of political leadership. Belarus currently remains the only state participating in the EU Eastern Partnership policy without an action plan to foster systematically relations to the EU. Until today, it even lacks a general bilateral political agreement with the EU. Furthermore, the Republic of Belarus is the only state in Europe, which is not integrated into the Council of Europe and, until 2015, was not even a part of the European Area of Higher Education. Narrowly bound to the Russian Federation by a large-scale interwoven economy, a Union State, a common customs area, a coordinated foreign and defense policy with integrated troops, and a practically non-existent border inter alia, Belarusian leadership has clearly opted to follow the Eurasian track of integration for more than 20 years. Hence, it is not surprising that Belarus became a founding member of the Eurasian Economic Union in 2014. Given the long record of authoritarian leadership and predominantly staterun economy as well as the long-lasting integration of Belarus into Russiacontrolled structures, one could reasonably question why Belarus is included in this book project about “the building of Europe and the new anti-Europeanism.” To outline it from the very beginning: a far cry from any EU integration efforts and cut off from some of the most important European structures, discourses and exchanges, the position of the government of Belarus does not fit into any category of a new anti-Europeanism. Firstly, the ideas on Europe in the governmentcontrolled part of the society of Belarus are massively influenced by a Russiadriven geopolitical anti-Europeanism, predominantly defined and imposed on the country by President Lukashenko and the state structures steered by him. Only in recent months, a certain distancing from Russia has been visible in some parts of the Belarusian authorities. Secondly, in the case of Belarus, Euroskepticism is predominately defined by a strong dependency of the Belarusian system from Russia that currently lacks viable alternatives. It is a general lack of immediate interest in Europe and European integration. However, there are indeed good reasons to include Belarus into our analysis of the building of Europe and the new anti-Europeanism as well as into the policy advice in the framework of European studies. Firstly, the sole orientation on Russia is discussed more intensely within Belarus – in general, and especially since the annexation of Crimea by Russia. The deciding new element in this regard is the growing skepticism of Russia in some parts of the Belarusian power system. Ideas about the diversification of foreign policy have gained more momentum in recent months by virtue of this background. Secondly, promoters of a fundamentally different approach to the current political system in Belarus – the political opposition – suggest mostly, but not exclusively, a stronger European

92

WOLFGANG SENDER & IEVA MOTŪZAITĖ

vector of the Belarusian foreign policy, in some cases even advocating Belarus’ joining NATO and EU. Thirdly, the support over many years of President Lukashenko’s more or less exclusively pro-Russian course is no longer unanimously shared within society. Polls show the emergence of a generation under the age of 45 who calls for a more European orientation of their country more strongly than their parents’ one. We shall introduce these aspects below and end with an outlook on the perspectives of European integration for Belarus.

1. Current Foreign Policy Orientations of Belarus In the Eastern European region, Belarus has remained an outlier in almost all aspects of internal and external policy arrangement. Neither did it follow the way of the former neighboring Soviet republics in the Baltics, which joined the NATO in March 2004 and the EU in May 2004. Nor did Belarus follow the Russian, Ukrainian, or Moldovan domestic way with the massive introduction of private property in an Oligarch-run economy. Until today, Belarus preserved a strong leader, a state economy, and a strong social model. Some analysts see in this model the preservation of a number of Soviet elements; indeed, the former leading power in the Soviet Union has remained the most important political and economic partner: Russia. In matters of security, Belarus is setting on a close alliance with Russia in the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and bilateral agreements. It hosts two Russian military facilities of technical support within its borders. It has traditionally counterbalanced the Russian overweight in the security issue by concluding Treaties on Confidence and security-building measures with all its other neighbors – Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine, and NATOrelations.1 In addition, Belarus is currently actively developing its own territorial defense forces, taking into account the recent visibility of hybrid threats in the region. Having been comfortable with the strategic alliance with Russia for around 20 years, this relationship has only recently obtained some fractions. Starting with the — according to international law — illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, like other politicians in the region, Lukashenko became quite sceptic about Moscow's intentions in its neighborhood. Even though Belarus supported Russia in the vote on Ukraine in the General Assembly, Lukashenko made it clear many times that he disapproved of the annexation and even reprimanded the Ukrainians for not having defended Crimea. Russia’s actions on Crimea became a real game-changer in the post-Soviet space: For the first time after the collapse of the USSR, it showed that territorial changes by force are possible, and that Russia is the one who can refer to force to this end. Especially the then following actions of the Russian Federation towards Eastern Ukraine seem to have altered Lukashenko’s formerly denunciatory view on EU and NATO. In the rhetoric of the last 20 years in Belarus, EU and NATO were often criticized as putting pressure on Minsk in regards to economy and politics. In the areas of human rights and political freedom, this was definitely the case, 1

“Relations with Belarus.” NATO. 7.4.2016., http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics (18.8.2016).

EUROSCEPTICS NOT ONLY BY STATE DEFINITION: THE CASE OF BELARUS

93

but a lot of the anti-Western rhetoric had its origin in Lukashenko’s long-lasting conviction that a common path with Russia was the right one for his country. Already in the mid-2000s, this view of Lukashenko was challenged when ideas of the incorporation of Belarus into Russia were discussed more prominently in Moscow. President Lukashenko’s steps of distancing from the Kremlin since then have not gotten proper recognition in the West. Most of the Western observers did not realize the emerging cleavages and continued their critical dialogue instead of offering alternatives to Belarus. For many in the West, the continuing close collaboration of Belarus and Russia excluded the possibility for Belarus to become a real partner of the West. When official Minsk emphasized its longexisting concept of the “multi-vector foreign policy” more prominently after Russia’s actions in regard to Ukraine, some views on Belarus in the West started to change, especially taking into account the preparations of Belarus to defend the country against hybrid threats, and the newly developed military doctrine that calls for better relations with NATO and EU. The currently ongoing honeymoon phase in the relationship between Minsk and the EU is a clear outcome of these developments. However, the general goal setting and strategy regarding this engagement seems to be highly disputed within the Belarusian power system as well as within the EU. Whilst a number of decision makers in Minsk are convinced that it would be better to stay in a close alliance with Moscow, many leaders in the West are skeptical on putting Realpolitik as the new prerogative for Belarus. Currently, however, there seems to be at least a preliminary general basis for the development of relations with the West: Minsk clearly sees that neither the Union State with Russia nor its regional model of the Eurasian Economic Union delivers the economic terms promised for Belarus. Hence, improved economic relations with the West are the main goal of the current phase of Belarusian foreign policy, but they are not based on structural reforms. Until now, this state-defined pro-Europeanism in the economic field is a tactical one and by far not based on values – neither in the area of human rights and political freedoms, where Minsk only improves as much as necessary to keep Brussels on track with its Belarus engagement, nor in the area of the economy where Minsk is not changing its general approach of running a state economy, nor in regard to the rule of law where the political establishment is focused on keeping its power instead of crafting a reliable legal system that attracts international investment on a large scale. In this regard, the majority of the Belarusian governing elite stays skeptical about the values of the EU, about the question on how far to cooperate with it and whether this whole engagement is the right approach. It is the uncertainty due to the big Eastern neighbor that causes the official Minsk to continue on the path of cooperation with the West. Looking at the recent difficulties of the relations between the EU and Belarus, one should be prepared that someday, the current arrangement might also end. Between 2008 and 2010, too, one could observe similar patterns of engagement. However, the current engagement is much more security-driven and might therefore have a new quality. Similar difficulties characterize the relations between Belarus and the Council of Europe. In 1992, Belarus received the special guest status and joined the European Cultural Convention as well as the Venice Commission. In 1994, a cooperation program to prepare full-fledged membership was elaborated, but due to

94

WOLFGANG SENDER & IEVA MOTŪZAITĖ

changes in its constitution, Belarus lost its status at the Council. After an attempt of step-by-step involvement of Belarus during an interim democratization process in 2001–2004, relations were frozen again after a report of Christos Pourgourides on politicians who had disappeared in Belarus.2 During the BelarusianEuropean thaw of 2008–2010, the Council of Europe was ready to restore the special guest status for Belarus if the country were to introduce a moratorium on the death penalty. However, after the crackdown of protests after the presidential elections in 2010, another new ice age brought this plan to a full stop. Being currently in a new phase of rapprochement that started in August 2015 when the political prisoners in Belarus were released, the Council is currently open to restore the special guest status of Belarus again but only under the condition, that Belarus introduces a moratorium on the death penalty and provides free elections. For Belarusian authorities, the importance of this integration process lies in the sphere of image building – to get rid of the status of being the only European country that is not a member of the Council of Europe. The official Minsk counts on better relations with other Western partners as a consequence. To what extent this leads to a commitment to the democratic values enshrined in the Council of Europe’s agreements remains an open question, since improvements in the area of human rights and political liberties would burden the internal policy of Belarus with new obligations.

2. The view on European integration within the parties In the case of contemporary Belarus, attempts fail to explain the positions on European integration along traditional party lines. This starts with a structural determination: the predominant position of the president in the political system of the country. Since Belarus is a presidential republic, the president with the help of his powerful presidential administration makes almost all key decisions. In the second row, the government via its prime minister and ministries is much more powerful than parliament. To illustrate this: Only six applications on changing laws were handed over to parliament for decision during the election period that ended in 2016. In this setting, political parties are not really part of the political power system – furthermore, usually, compared to the Western models of political systems, they do not even have a real life of their own. Either they have a high number of members and no real policy work like the party-like organizations close to the government, or they have a limited number of members and stronger policy work as oppositional structures. Whilst oppositional parties are stigmatized in the view of the power structure and large parts of society, even President Lukashenko’s most important supporting political structure, an organization named “Belaya Rus”, is not registered as a party according to Belarusian law.3 This or other organizations do not at all act according to the Western-style model of democracy where parties more or less follow the approach of being mediators 2 3

Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Committees. Disappeared person in Belarus. Report no. 10062. Strasbourg: Council of Europe: Parliamentary Assembly, 4.2.2004. Maxim OSIPOV, “Povestka Dnia dlia Organizacii,” Belarus Segodnya, 1.2.2016, http://www. sb.by/belarus/article/povestka-dnya-dlya-organizatsii.html (17.8.2016)

EUROSCEPTICS NOT ONLY BY STATE DEFINITION: THE CASE OF BELARUS

95

between state and population and where they have the chance to take over political power. This is why there are no career politicians to be found in Belarus, but career administrative personnel. Politically thinking politicians – be it proEuropeans or others – are therefore exceptions in the Belarusian political landscape. Most comparable to Edinaya Rossija in Russia, the “power party” Belaya Rus does not work bottom up in matters of articulation, selection, and implementation of political ideas. It rather possesses a profile in apolitical areas such as culture and sports. Nevertheless, almost two-thirds of the members of the lower house are members of Belaya Rus.4 Belaya Rus, like other parties close to the system, usually gets some visibility around elections and keeps a low profile in between. In parliament and other state-controlled institutions, members most of all ensure the implementation of political decisions from the top to the bottom – in most cases starting with decisions of the President who is more or less the only deciding instance in the country. The opposition is condemned to stay at the sideline because no oppositional representative has been a member of parliament since 2005. In addition, one has to mention that in Belarus, alternative intermediate institutions such as free media, pro-European NGOs, or think tanks exist only in a limited scope and functionality. Following these systemic preconditions, foreign policy, the agenda of organizations close to the system, and the main narratives in the state media (which are the most consumed ones) are more or less set by the President. His foreign policy and hence his position on European integration are predominantly shaped not only by his personal attitudes – an important part of his policy seems to be influenced by his Soviet past and education – but also by the foreign policy coercions trapping Belarus. Being a border country of the EU and neighboring Russia, Belarus is heavily dependent on Russian support with regard to its economy – and thus in all political decision-making. It might be due to this general top-down approach that Belaya Rus has no clear statement on European integration since it has to adapt to Alexander Lukashenko’s usual swinging and balancing of foreign policy views determined by the relations with Russia. Belaya Rus logically follows the official state terminology by underlining the importance of “the strategic principle of equal proximity to the East and the West in a multipolar modern world”. By this, Belaya Rus does not position itself clearly against the EU, but it specifically names only partners like Russia, Kazakhstan, as well as the Commonwealth of Independent States, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) as economic partners and actors of integrative processes.5 Since Belaya Rus – just like the similar youth organization BRSM – is also an integral part of the power vertical, it reacts flexibly to all changes of the country’s political direction. Consequently, since 2015, it has followed the current pro-Western course of Alexander Lukashenko. In contrast to Belaya Rus, most of the active opposition parties have ties that are more substantial with pro-European politicians in the West as well as clearer visions on how EU-Belarus relations should be developed. Here, too, a clear 4 5

“Bolshe deputatov: Belaya Rus stavit ambicioznyye celi,” Naviny.by, Belorusskiye Novosti, 18.6.2016, http://naviny.by/rubrics/elections/2016/06/18/ic_news_623_476891 (17.8.2016). “Programma ROO «Belaya Rus»,” Respublikanskoje obshestvennoje obyedineniye, 2.11.2016, http://www.belayarus.by/today/program/ (17.8.2016).

96

WOLFGANG SENDER & IEVA MOTŪZAITĖ

distinction between parties and political organizations can hardly be drawn. Organizations like “Tell the Truth” which calls itself a “Research and Enlightenment Association,”6 or the movement “For Freedom” of Sakharov Prizewinner Alexander Milinkevich are more or less de-facto parties, if participation of their members in elections counts as an indicator. Nevertheless, some identify themselves more as political organizations – whether to avoid harassment by the power or to avoid the difficult registration process for parties. On the other side, in Belarus we find organizations, which are parties by status, but have neither political power nor show visible political activity. One example is the 1.5007 member strong Belarusian Patriotic Party of Nikolay Ulakhovich, a candidate in the 2015 Presidential elections. Traditionally amongst the roughly 15 registered parties, 37 trade unions, and 2.665 public associations in Belarus,8 a very broad scope of views on European integration is visible. They range from a clear pro-European attitude to proBelarusian positions that advocate an independent and sovereign position of their country between East and West, to parties with a clear pro-Russian line, which position themselves against a European orientation of Belarus. Amongst oppositional parties with a clear pro-European attitude are the Belarusian Christian Democracy (BCD), the United Civil Party (UCP), and the Movement for Freedom (MFF), which for the first time ever form a political centerright coalition that was founded in late 2015. All three parties have close relations to the European People’s Party (EPP), with UCP being an observer member. The Belarusian Christian Democracy (BCD), prominently emphasizing human dignity in its activities, has strong roots in religious structures. The BCD is critical of the Soviet past of Belarus, especially by drawing attention to the former Soviet repression in Belarus. They also strive to counterbalance the often-visible proSoviet tone of official positions of the power structures. Transferred into present politics, it considers Belarus a part of the European Christian civilization9 and advocates for Belarus to leave the Union State with Russia. The non-registered but EPP-affiliated BCD calls for the construction of Belarus as a democratic, legal state within the European community of nations. In the understanding of the party, full accession of Belarus to the EU is still a distant perspective. Belarus should instead integrate into the common European market and preserve its freedom in the monetary and fiscal policies in other areas of regulation – an argument that is in reality identical with the government’s approach. BCD believes that the accession of Belarus to the European market will contribute to the development of a more modern economy in Belarus.10 In general, BCD speaks in favor

6 7 8 9 10

Belorusskiye novosti, “«Govori Pravdup» redprimet pyatuyu popytku zaregistrirovat obyedineniye,” Naviny.by, 21.2.2016, http://naviny.by/rubrics/society/2016/02/21/ic_news _116_471105 (23.8.2016). Adarya GUSHTYN, “Kto takoy Ulakhovich i kto ego «kryshuyet»?,” Naviny.by, Belorusskiye novosti, http://naviny.by/rubrics/elections/2015/09/09/ic_articles_623_189698 (2.8.2016). Novosti Belarusi, “Сhislo zaregistrirovannyh orgstruktur politicheskih partij vyroslo,” BELTA, 10.2.2016, http://www.belta.by/society/view/chislo-zaregistrirovannyh-orgstruktur -politicheskih-partij (17.8.2016) Pragrama BHD, “Aficyjny sajt Argkamiteta Partyi Belaruskaja Hryscijanskaja Demakratyja,” BCHD, http://bchd.info/program.html (17.8.2016). Pragrama BHD, “Aficyjny sajt Argkamiteta Partyi Belaruskaja Hryscijanskaja Demakratyja,”BCHD, http://bchd.info/program.html (7.8.2016).

EUROSCEPTICS NOT ONLY BY STATE DEFINITION: THE CASE OF BELARUS

97

of the German model of a social market economy.11 Despite the similarity of names, this concept should not to be confused with Lukashenko’s idea of a “socially oriented market economy.” For the center-right United Civil Party (UCP), membership of the EU is also a long-term goal. The UCP also calls for cooperation with NATO.12 To reach an EU membership, the UCP worked on a platform preparing this integration.13 Due to the prerequisites of the EU (Copenhagen criteria), Belarus is currently not eligible for joining the EU, the party states. Belarus should, however, actively participate in the ENP and develop better relations with its regional neighbors, especially in economic terms, for instance through free trade agreements.14 The third part of the current coalition, the Movement for Freedom, advocates European integration and the neutrality of Belarus in the sphere of military policy. Its premise is that these goals can be achieved only after a change of power in Belarus. The movement works actively at boosting pro-European public sentiment, trying to get Belarus closer to Europe, and fostering a critical conditional dialogue between the EU and Belarus.15 Lectures, events, and publications are carriers of this strategy. The Belarusian Popular Front (BPF) – one source of the Belarusian independence movement of the early 1990s – very strongly opposes the Russian influence in Belarus. The BPF not only demands to leave the existing Union State of Belarus and Russia, the Eurasian Economic Union, and other Eastern integration projects,16 but also to erect a border to Russia.17 In its party program, the BPF outlines that it sees Belarus’ future within the EU. For this to happen, it calls for starting the prospect of an EU accession for Belarus.18 EU membership is considered a guarantee for the independence of Belarus. Through this policy, BPF also hopes to contribute to the support of a democratic development within Belarus. In its party program, it clearly requests Belarus’ membership of NATO.19 However, until now, this has not led to compelling arguments of the oldest opposition movement on how exactly this should be orchestrated. Being a European People’s Party observer, BPF has not yet provided a detailed plan describing how to prepare successfully the ground in the EU as well as in Belarus, and how Belarus should develop its relations to the EU beyond some general aspects. “Tell the Truth” (TtT) is presently a very active organization with a proBelarusian position that advocates for an independent and sovereign position of 11 12 13 14 15

16 17 18 19

Vitalij RYMASHEVSKI, “Nemeckiy opyt dlya reformirovaniya,” Tut.by, 19.7.2016, http:// news.tut.by/economics/456708.html (17.8.2016). United Civil Party, Programma Partii http://ucpb.org/party/program (17.8.2016). Belorusskiye Novosti “OGP predstavila strategiyu integracii,” Naviny.by, 1.7.2004, http:// naviny.by/rubrics/politic/2004/07/01/ic_news_112_251640 (17.8.2016). http://ucpb.org/party/program (17.8.2016) “Ruh za Svabodu,” Nasa bacanne buducaj Belarusi, PAGA, http://pyx.by/bel/news/002/ (17.8.2016). Mezhdunarodnyj Konsorcium Eurobelarus, Aliaksandr Milinkevic vykazausia za daroznuju mapu http://eurobelarus.info/news/policy/2013/03/11/alyaxandr-m-l-nkev-chvykaza-sya-za-darozhnuyu-mapu-zbl-zhennya-belarus-es.html (17.8.2016). Partyja BNF, “Kastounasnaja pliatfroma dzelia kansalidacyi demakratycnyh silau,” Narodny, http://narodny.org/?p=10630 (17.8.2016). Partyja BNF, “Pragrama Partyi BNF,”Narodny, http://narodny.org/?p=1116 (17.8.2016); “Televystupleniye lidera BNF Yanukevicha,” Nasha Niva, August 16, 2016, http://nn.by/ ?c=ar&i=175438&lang=ru http://narodny.org/?p=1116 (17.8.2016). http://narodny.org/?p=1116 (17.8.2016).

98

WOLFGANG SENDER & IEVA MOTŪZAITĖ

Belarus between East and West. In 2015, this organization brought forth the firstever female presidential candidate, Tatsiana Korotkevitch. TtT generally supports the pro-European positions of the other oppositional forces mentioned above. More precisely than others, TtT connected EU influence with national challenges by calling Belarus to sign the European Charter of Local SelfGovernment. This would serve the movement’s domestic goal of more local control of the state budget. On the other side, TtT representatives repeatedly stressed that considering the given realities, the country needs good relations with Russia. However, here as in other parties, a general strategic document outlining the basics of a foreign and security concept is missing. The left-wing communist party “Just World” has to be listed amongst the most EU-critical opposition parties. Being even a defender of Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea,20 this entity is clearly in favor of best relations predominantly with Russia and supports strong economic ties in order to reach that goal.21 Just World, which until 2009 was named “Party of the Communists of Belarus”, was founded as a follow-up of the Soviet Communist Party. In 1996, however, supporters of Alexander Lukashenko split off to set up the Communist Party of Belarus close to government. Today, “Just World” defines itself as Lukashenkocritical, EU-critical, but Russia-friendly.22 The party with allegedly good relations to Moscow not only favors the focus on the relations with Russia. Only recently, the long-term head of the party stated that no one in Europe would be likely to welcome the Belarusians, or would need them.23 Depending on the current government line, the Belarusian pro-government parties vary in their attitudes towards the EU. Programmatically, their positions with regard to the EU reach from silent rejection – as in the case of the strongest pro-government Communist Party of Belarus which aspires a close relationship with Russia, the rebuilding of socialism, and possibly the restoration of the Soviet Union24 – to – as in the case of Ulakhovich of the Belarusian Patriotic party – the aforementioned imitation of relevant messages of the President about the importance of Russia and the necessity of equal relations with other states.25 A number of NGOs working in Belarus aim at strengthening the role of civil society within the pro-European orientation of Belarus. The most prominent group is the international consortium EuroBelarus,26 which consists of Belarusian and foreign organizations. EuroBelarus addresses pro-European ideas in many 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

Gleb LABADZENKA, “Siargej Kaliakin: Geta glupstva, sto kamunisty rasstraliali usiu intelegencyju,” Naviny.by, Belorsusskiye Novosti, 7.10.2015, http://naviny.by/rubrics/elections/ 2015/ (17.8.2016). Denis LAVNIKEVICH, “Analiz karakuley,” Belgazeta, 4.11. 2015, http://www.belgazeta.by/ ru/1019/topic_week/31801/ (17.8.2016). “Partiya levyh “Spravedlivyj Mir” Vydvinula na parlamentskiye vybory 50 kandidatov,” Tut.by, 24.7.2016, http://news.tut.by/politics/505425.html (17.8.2016). Gleb LABADZENKA, “Siargej Kaliakin: Gete glupstva, sto kamunisty rasstraliali usiu intelegencyju,” Naviny.by, Belorsusskiye Novosti, 7.10.2015, http://naviny.by/rubrics/elections/ 2015/10/07/ic_articles (17.8.2016). Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Belarusi, “Programma KPB,” Comparty.by, http://www. comparty.by/(17.8.2016). Ulyana BOBOJED, Olga EROHINA, “S kakimi programmami idut na vybory T. Korotkevich i Nikolaj Ulakhovich?,” Komsomolskaya Pravda, http://www.kp.by/daily/26431/3303440/ (17.8.2016). International Consortium “Eurobelarus”, Consortium http://en.eurobelarus.info/ consortium/ (17.8.2016.)

EUROSCEPTICS NOT ONLY BY STATE DEFINITION: THE CASE OF BELARUS

99

areas of life through education, events, and (media) campaigns, and tries to incorporate European approaches and standards in Belarusian society. The civil society campaign Budzma27 is also noteworthy. It addresses Belarusians primarily via cultural issues and draws attention to their pro-European identity. A certain coordination of pro-European activities of Belarusian NGOs takes place in the framework of the Belarusian National Platform of the Civil Society Forum of the Eastern Partnership which tries to form a dialogue between society and the state in a pro-European sense, and also seeks to influence the relations between the EU and Belarus in the interests of a pro-European civil society. The influence of civil pro-European oriented initiatives is countered by the activity of about 100 pro-Russian organizations28 including Cossack associations.29 They cooperate with military forces, educational institutions, law enforcement agencies, youth organizations, and the Russian Orthodox Church in Belarus. They are believed to have influence in particular on the youth in the sense of loyalty towards the "Russian world". Last but not least, the influence of statedetermined Russian electronic media on Belarus has to be mentioned, which is almost fully freely aired in Belarus and whose content fills about 65 percent of the Belarusian media landscape. Actually, the penetration of Russian mass media in Belarus even goes so far that the Belarusian leadership recently publicly voiced concerns about the informational security of the country.30 If one mentions the statements and positions of the Belarusian parties and organizations on European integration in order to describe the positions on Europe, it should, however, first be kept in mind that neither mentioning EU nor other European institutions or integration processes are popular political issues in contemporary Belarus. An evaluation of the statements of the 2015 presidential candidates showed that EU was a topic in only three or less percent of their statements.31 Looking at the – according to the public in Belarus – more important domestic questions, European thinking in general plays a negligible role.32 Secondly, even if positions on Europe exist in society, they only rarely gain the attention of the population due to the lack of substantial intermediary institutions, including the media. Most information is accessible for Internet users only, but large parts of the population still rely on state media – be they Belarusian or Russian. Looking at the positioning of most of the opposition parties on the EU it is obvious that a number of them do not lack commitment – but rather the power of implementation and access to the population in order to bring Belarus closer to the European community. To be able to do so, civil society in general would need 27 28 29 30 31 32

“Pra Nas,” Budzma Belarusami, http://budzma.by/about (17.8.2016). “V baynete poyavilas ‘chornaya sotnya’ lobbistov ‘russkogo mira’,” Belorusskij Partizan, http://www.belaruspartisan.org/politic/ (17.8.2016). “Specrassledovaniye: Voiny “russkogo mira” v Belarusi zhdut svoyego chasa,” InformNapalm 11.11.2015, https://informnapalm.org/15874-voyny-russkogo-myra-v-belarusy (17.8.2016). Tatyana KOROVENKOVA, “Minsk obespokoilsya informacionnym vliyaniyemMoskvy,” Naviny.by Belorusskie Novosti (2.6.2016). Elena ARTEMENKO, “Vybory Presidenta – 2015: specvypusk politicheskogo mediabarmetra,” BISS, Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies, 18.8.2016, p. 16. “10 voprosov, otvety na kotorye bolshe vsego zhdut ot presidenta,” Tut.by, 27.1.2015, https://news.tut.by/politics/433175.html (18.8.2016). V. DRYOMA, “Chto volnuyet belorusov?,” Tvoj Styl, T-stylinfo, 16.7.2014, http://www.t-styl.info/ru/116/politics/12966/ (18.8.2016).

100

WOLFGANG SENDER & IEVA MOTŪZAITĖ

more political liberty. This is why a number of Belarusian organizations try to use their contacts with EU representatives and structures to achieve the goal of raising the visibility and status of the oppositional organizations within Belarus. In this regard, according to the opposition, the EU should be engaged in Belarus to enable the dialogue between opposition and the power33 or help set up a suitable framework for elections.34 There is a strong case for the view that civil society only could achieve a breakthrough with a real pro-European push only after a liberalization of the political system in Belarus. However, this liberalization runs contrary to the interest of the power system. In addition, the power system wants to channel the European orientation in Belarus. It is not only the fact that the majority of the power obviously prefers to lean on Russia. In addition, pro-European thinkers in government are often in favor of channeling political developments instead of giving free rein to civil society thus risking the potential impact of unforeseeable developments. On the other hand, within the government, one can also observe a widespread skepticism about collaborating with the EU as well as a lack of capacity for doing so. To say, however, that the government is the only brake block of pro-European developments does show the full picture. Inter alia, the majority of the opposition was against lifting recent EU sanctions on Belarus imposed after the 2010 election protest crackdown. Although the sanctions substantially limited European engagement, the opposition considered the lifting of the sanctions a legitimization of the given power system in Belarus and therefore prominently spoke against it. The only current growth driver regarding policy field cooperation is the European Area of Higher Education, which Belarus joined in 2015. Looking at the still limited capacities of the government to shape policy fields in cooperation with Europe, the education sector could indeed be a field of action for the opposition — especially considering the fact that, at least until recently, they often had better personal access than the government to decision makers in Europe. Indeed, structures close to the opposition worked out several policy papers on the Bologna reform; however, government considers these papers as negative criticism rather than as suggestions for improvement. In addition, the impact of pro-European civil society is limited by the general ban on communication with large parts of the opposition. Furthermore, proEuropeanists do not possess a professional public relations structure that would enable them to promote the European idea within the population. A decisive factor for this is the lack of connectivity of the pro-European opposition with business structures. However, this is no surprise since 80 percent of the economy is run by the state. The economy traditionally considers Russia its main business partner. Against this background, infrastructure and potential of pro-European organizations are very modest in Belarus, to say the least.

33 34

“Vostryja vugly «kruglaga stala»,” Narodnaya Volya, 17.11 2015, //goo.gl/PkhMW9 (18.8.2016). Radyjo SVABODA, “Zviartacca da zameznyh strukturau z zaklikam arganizavac nam peramovy,” Svaboda, 3.11.2015, http://www.svaboda.org/content/janukievic/27343210.html (17.8.2016).

EUROSCEPTICS NOT ONLY BY STATE DEFINITION: THE CASE OF BELARUS

101

3. Public Perception of Belarus’ Foreign Policy Orientation as Reflected in the Nationwide Polls Although so far, the European Union has only offered Belarus the participation in the European Neighbourhood Policy, the opinion polls in Belarus regularly inquire into the willingness of the population to join either the EU or other political entities. Interpreting results from these surveys is a true challenge: some of the formulations of the questions or the given sets of answers to choose from raise doubts: They can be suspected to bias the opinions they are expected to merely capture, accumulate, and link with each other. Since the aforementioned question about the Belarus’ membership of the EU or/and a union with Russia is a consolidated element of nationwide opinion polls conducted by independent pollsters, it seems to be an almost irreplaceable indicator of the population’s preferences concerning Belarus’ geopolitical orientation. The adequateness and even the meaningfulness of such question seems to be disputable, though, as such a political development (at least with respect to the Belarusian membership in the EU) is still far from being at least a more or less viable possibility. Currently, the European Union has not announced its intention to offer Belarus a perspective of EU membership negotiations, nor is this an explicit wish on the part of the Belarusian government. Although political parties, at least to some extent, speak in favor of European integration, their rhetoric does not convert into drawing up realistic, concrete strategies for the integration into the European Union or at least a more substantial rapprochement. This political constellation makes the question on the willingness to join the EU seem way out of line with the political reality (it leaves open the unwelcome possibility that the interviewees reject the pro-European orientation of Belarus, when confronted with such question, not because of its normative unacceptability, but because of its sheer improbability), it is not surprising that until now, only a minority of the Belarusian population favors an EU perspective for Belarus. However, the lack of visible and substantial political actions and strategies for the rapprochement of Belarus and the EU should not be considered to suffice for a comprehensive explanation of the overall rather Euroskeptic attitudes of the Belarusian population. Having had a peak in March 2011 with over 45% of the population, pro-EU attitudes have barely exceeded a threshold of 25% since then. In December 2015, the share of respondents opting for joining the European Union slumped to a record low of less than 20%. The percentage of those who supported Belarus joining the EU was even lower than the share of those who either could not decide or did not want to voice their opinion. What is even more unsettling is that well over half of the respondents have indicated they‘d vote against Belarus joining the EU, if such a possibility were given.35 Given the constant debate about Belarus’ geopolitical orientation, such tendencies might lead to the assumption that decreasing support for the EU corresponds with the rise of pro-Russian attitudes. This appears not to be the case, though: In December 2015, only 29.7% of the respondents would have liked Bela35

IISEPS, “Trends of Change in Belarusian Public Opinion,” Independent Institute of SocioEconomic and Political Studies, http://www.iiseps.org/?p=114&lang=en (16.8.2016).

102

WOLFGANG SENDER & IEVA MOTŪZAITĖ

rus to join Russia, while just over 50% voted against such a union. The figures demonstrate that popular support for the hypothetical union with Russia has – from the peak of over 35.7% in December 2008 – declined to 23% in September 2014, and has only marginally increased since then.36 This clearly shows that the declining support for closer political relations with the EU cannot be fully explained by the strength or feebleness of an alternative geopolitical magnet. It is obvious that in the case of Belarus, the Euro-skeptic orientation does not necessarily coincide with pro-Russian attitudes, and that being anti-Russian does not automatically mean being pro-European. This shows that the frequent attempts, at least in Western media, to present a closer integration of Belarus into either the EU or Russia as inevitable do not correspond with the political perception of the Belarusians themselves. An intuitive hypothesis to be drawn from these opinion trends would suggest that there is a growing uneasiness about international alliances in general among the Belarusian population. The gap between the percentage of respondents rejecting Belarus’ accession to the EU and the share of those wishing the fusion of the Belarusian and Russian states is significant. It is clear that there is a substantial segment of the population wishing Belarus to forego both foreign gravitation pulls. Having said that, of course, one has to take into account the uncertainty associated with those who are either undecided or refuse to disclose their opinion. However, there was not much difference of the share of the undecided concerning the two relevant questions in December 2015. Therefore, it is reasonable to separate this undecided segment of the population from those who voiced a clear position, and the previous statement still holds. This insight is also supported by a research paper of the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS) from 2013. Since 2010, BISS has conducted comprehensive research of the geopolitical preferences of Belarusian society. For three years in a row, it has asked respondents where they would prefer to live, allowing them to choose from the following set of options: in the European Union, in a union with Russia, in a union with Russia and the EU simultaneously, or in an independent Belarus. While the “EU exclusive preference” has remained stable at a low level of around 17%, and the share of those preferring a “union with Russia only” option has declined from a little over 30% to 23%, the most remarkable opinion change has been observed concerning those favoring Belarus staying out of both international alliances37 – from a little over 20% in 2010, the respective percentage has risen to over 30% in 2013. 38 While the reasons for the dynamics of the ’’pro-independence“ opinion remain to be suggested and proven, the survey has brought to light yet another curious opinion shift: The percentage of those preferring to live in a union with 36 37

38

Ibid. It has to be noted, though, that the formulation “independent Belarus” suggested by the BISS experts might have caused a certain opinion bias, as it implies that other options to choose from (EU or union with Russia) entail the end of the existence of Belarus as an independent state. Hereby, a fundamental fact is ignored, namely, that belonging to the EU, at least at the current political state of affairs, does not change the status of its member states as sovereign, independent countries. Therefore, the number of the “independency advocates” in the survey might have been inflated due to a not entirely clear formulation of the question. Dzianis MELYANTSOU, Alena ARTSIOMENKA. “Geopolitical Preferences of the Belarusians: A Too Pragmatic Nation?,” Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies, 7, 2013.

EUROSCEPTICS NOT ONLY BY STATE DEFINITION: THE CASE OF BELARUS

103

Russia and EU simultaneously39 has dropped from 28.2% to 20%. BISS experts attribute this to the reason that the “population of Belarus seems to have become increasingly aware that you cannot be part of two unions simultaneously and it is necessary to choose one of the options“.40 While on the one hand, this indicates peoples’ increasing sensitivity to the rhetoric of the media stressing the necessity for Belarus to settle its geopolitical strategy, on the other hand, the number of those ignorant of the impossibility of belonging to a union with Russia and the EU simultaneously is still surprisingly high and proves the need for intensified efforts of civic education. The indecisiveness towards the foreign policy orientation of Belarus, as well as the rejection of any international alliances is prevalent among both the young and middle-aged segments of the population, even though younger respondents are clearly more favorable towards the European Union as the geopolitical choice of Belarus (42% of those supporting European integration are less than 30 years old). The segment of citizens who are older than 45 years is overrepresented among the residents leaning towards Russia – their share amounts to 64%.41 Combining the trend already outlined of the declining support for the integration into the European Union with the increasing tendency to refuse any clear geopolitical binding of Belarus, it can be concluded that the pro-European orientation of Belarusian society has not declined to the advantage of the pro-Russian orientation. Rather, it expresses an increasing skepticism about foreign alliances as such. Therefore, an assessment of the opinions of those Belarusians who refuse to subscribe to either pro-European or pro-Russian integration can only be made by creating a situation of an artificial decision when respondents are not able to escape to the neutral ground of favoring independence or a simultaneous Russian-European alliance. Such an artificial decision structure was simulated in the national surveys conducted by the pollster IISEPS. Its findings demonstrate that when confronted with a necessity to choose between a union with Russia and membership of the European Union, the Belarusians demonstrate an opinion structure close to the one observed in 2008, although the long-time trend goes to the disadvantage of the EU: the ratio of those preferring a union with Russia (53.5%) to the EU (25.1%) is around 2:1. The remaining 21.4% respondents withheld their opinion, which is both an unsettling and a promising fact: We have to keep in mind that the segment of the “undecided“ is the one most susceptible to efforts made to influence opinions and the voting behavior in case of a real voting situation. Back in 2008, the picture was a little more EU minded: 46% in favor of the union with Russia, 30.1% in favor of joining the EU. The sharpest fall, justifying the pessimism of those wishing the Belarusian rapprochement with the EU, can be registered comparing the 2013 and 2015 figures: In 2012/2013 the preference for 39

40 41

For the sake of getting behind the logic of the popular mentality, one has to leave aside the obvious fact that such a possibility does not exist – not even on purely economic terms, not to mention the political ones. Provided that there is no free trade agreement between Russia and EU, belonging to either EU or Russia would require from Belarus the renouncement of an independent trade policy, which would then exclude the possibility of concluding bilateral trade agreements with third countries. Dzianis MELYANTSOU, Alena ARTSIOMENKA, “Geopolitical Preferences of the Belarusians: A Too Pragmatic Nation?,” op.cit. Ibid.

104

WOLFGANG SENDER & IEVA MOTŪZAITĖ

European integration rather than for unifying Belarus with Russia peaked at 43.4% and 44.6%, respectively.42 Referring to the already indicated propensity of Belarusians to disapprove of any international alliances, it has to be noted that while such a stance, at least from the perspective of those valuing the right of people to decide about the geopolitical orientation of their state, is not a reprehensible phenomenon per se, it is important to take a closer look at the opinions of the segment favoring independence. This becomes possible by comparing the responses to the question about the geopolitical preference (without the option of a “third-way”) with those about the preferred place to live (the options being: EU; union with Russia; both unions simultaneously or independent Belarus). Unfortunately, if forced to choose between the two alliances, more than a third of the respondents (37%) declaring that they’d rather live in an independent Belarus prefer a union with Russia over the EU for their country. While the respondents refusing to answer a question allowing no middle stance are represented among those wishing to live in an independent Belarus at an even greater scale, this offers no comfort because the share of those who would rather choose a union with Russia is still more than twice as high as the one of respondents who would prefer Belarus to join the EU. However, the opinion structure of those who would like to live in the EU and union with Russia simultaneously is even more thought provoking. Almost half of them would prefer Belarus to join Russia over the EU if confronted with an either-or decision.43 These findings demonstrate that when drawing conclusions about the geopolitical orientations of the Belarusian population, two opinion tendencies deserve specific attention: an increasingly widespread rejection of any international alliances as well as an ambivalent preference of integration into both political units – EU and Russia – at the same time. Against this background, it must be taken into account that the Belarusians unambiguously indicating Russia as their geopolitical choice for Belarus are not the only social segment with a pro-Russia orientation. For a significant share of those who are either inconsistently (favoring a simultaneous alliance with Russia and EU) or independently oriented, Russia still appears to be a more suitable geopolitical choice for Belarus than the EU. When analyzing the opinion picture of the Belarusian society regarding their foreign policy preferences, the existence of at least two demographic gaps in proEuropean and Euro-skeptic attitudes is obvious at first sight already: the age gap and the gender gap. It stands out immediately that the younger Belarusians are, on average, both more pro-European and anti-Russian than the older ones, and that Belarusian men tend to be more pro-European and more anti-Russian than women are. The idea to analytically split the Belarusian society according to their political attitudes towards the European Union is extremely important for at least two reasons: first of all, because it serves as a basis for more substantiated expectations of the long-term dynamism of opinions taking the generational change into consideration. Moreover, it can help to identify the demographic segment most

42 43

“Trends of Change in Belarusian Public Opinion,” op. cit. Dzianis MELYANTSOU, Alena ARTSIOMENKA, “Geopolitical Preferences of the Belarusians: A Too Pragmatic Nation?,” op. cit.

EUROSCEPTICS NOT ONLY BY STATE DEFINITION: THE CASE OF BELARUS

105

open-minded towards the European idea that therefore may be expected to act as a multiplier of pro-European attitudes. Looking at the raw data extracted from a survey designed by the IISEPS and conducted by Lake Research partners in March 2015, showing a breakdown by age (younger and older than 45 years) and gender of the answers on the voting intention,44 we observe young men are the electoral segment most inclined towards a pro-European orientation: 39% of men under the age of 45 would vote for joining the EU. This makes them the only demographic group in which proEuropean attitudes are stronger than Euro-skeptic sentiments. Moreover, when confronted with the ultimatum “either EU or Russia”, an even higher percentage would opt for the EU (47%). The answers to the question about whether they would vote for unifying Belarus with Russia also reveal that this segment is the only one to reject the union with Russia with an absolute majority. Young women are not far behind, though, while older females remain the segment of the electorate the most sympathizing with Russia (35% of them would vote for a union with Russia). Having identified the age and gender gaps regarding the foreign policy orientations of Belarusian residents, one might ask which one of them is more significant. Considering the answers to all three relevant questions, the correlation of age and geopolitical preference is evident, especially in the case of the EU preference, much stronger than that between political orientation and gender.45 The fact that in all cases, the age gap is more pronounced than the gender gap in turn heightens the plausibility of those explanations of Euro-skepticism in Belarus which take into account the factors in regard to which the younger and older generations can be differentiated: some of them are, without a doubt, the use of Internet and the attitude towards the Soviet past; although it is notable that the latter may not play as important a role as commonly assumed, since the percentage of population rejecting the idea that the Soviet Union ought to be restored 46 amounts to almost 60%. Having reached its peak in March 2011, the support for the European integration of Belarus is, with minor fluctuations, declining. The long-term culturally and socially relevant factors underlying the rejection of the idea of Belarus getting closer to the EU – politically, economically, socially, culturally, – may be hard to grasp without a deeper inquiry into the regional specifics of mentality and cognitive particularities. Leaving them aside, it is possible to identify at least the most obvious political factors that may have influenced this dynamism of opinion over the last couple of years. A sharp rise in pro-European attitudes (and a simultaneous decrease of favoring Russia) in the two last quarters of 2008 and two first quarters of 2009 clearly suggests a linkage with the popular reaction to the Russo-Georgian War of Au44

45 46

The respondents were asked three questions: (1) If now a referendum were conducted in Belarus with a question whether Belarus should join the European Union, what would be your choice? (2) If today a referendum were conducted on unifying Belarus and Russia, how would you vote? (3) If you had to choose between uniting with Russia and joining the European Union, what would you choose? On joining Russia: Age gap is 10 % (31 %–21%), Gender gap is 7 % (29,5%–22,5%); On joining EU: Age gap is 18,5 % (34 %–15,5 %), Gender gap is 7,5 % (28,5 %–21 %); On joining EU or Russia: Age gap is 20,5 % (41,5 %–21 %), Gender gap is 8 % (50 %–42 %). “Trends of Change in Belarusian Public Opinion,” op. cit.

106

WOLFGANG SENDER & IEVA MOTŪZAITĖ

gust 2008. In turn, the start of the Euromaidan in November 2013 and its subsequent evolvement corresponded with the gradually weakening support for the European integration of Belarus, which, as already mentioned, reached a record low at the end of 2015. The EU’s response to the crisis in Ukraine – or, to be more precise, the way it was and is portrayed in the media in Belarus – has clearly contributed to the skepticism of the EU, also affecting the idea of Belarusian rapprochement with the EU, as proven by the analysis of IISEPS’ raw data. Findings of opinion polls conducted in March 2015 show more than one third (36%) of the respondents indicating that the events in Ukraine negatively influenced their opinion of the EU (with women above the age of 45 standing out as having been influenced to the greatest degree). As a contrast, only 22% of the respondents declared their attitudes towards Russia to have deteriorated in view of the situation in Ukraine, which is outweighed by the fact that another 22% indicated that the situation in Ukraine favorably affected their attitudes towards Russia. Again, the segment of older women demonstrated the highest susceptibility to the Russian account of the events – almost one third of 45+ years old women improved their opinion about Russia, while the segment of younger men had the highest share of respondents stating their attitude towards Russia had deteriorated. These figures prove that regional developments as well as the response of major political players to these have always been playing a significant role in the dynamism of opinion of the Belarusian people. Considering recent challenges Europe is facing, less important factors may be worth mentioning: the fear of international terrorism spreading to Belarus and negative reactions to the refugee crisis. Well over half of the respondents (57.4%) interviewed in December 2015 agreed that “Belarus should not participate in the international fight against terrorism, otherwise terrorist acts may start happening in Belarus”, and a similar percentage (52.2%) shared the opinion that “refugees should be sent back and not allowed in, because they do not belong to Europe”.47 Given these attitudes as well as cases of terrorist assaults in Western European countries and the scale of the refugee flow, it would not be surprising that the Belarusian skepticism towards Europe holds or even grows as long as these issues remain relevant on the European agenda. It has to be added, however, that, according to official statements,48 Belarus recently accepted 160.000 refugees from Ukraine who are not perceived as those who should not be “allowed in”. Obviously, the category “refugee” refers to those who are fleeing to Europe and Belarus from outside the Slavic world. Apart from the factors influencing the popular perception of the EU on the level of policy and political developments, it is important to comprehend what reasoning lies behind the opinions supportive of the Belarusian rapprochement with Europe. It is commonly held that the attractiveness of Europe lies in its normative power: the image of Europe as a stronghold of human rights, democratic principles, liberal pluralism, and culture of tolerance, of discussion, and consensus, social cohesion, gender emancipation, environmental sustainability, 47 48

IISEPS, “The Most Important Results of the Public Opinion Poll in December 2015,” Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies, http://old.iiseps.org/e12-15-15.html (1.4.2016). “MVD, v 2016 godu potok ukrainskih bezhencev v Belarus sohranitsia,” Naviny.by, 4.1.2016, http://naviny.by/rubrics/society/2016/01/04/ic_news_116_469023 (1.4.2016).

EUROSCEPTICS NOT ONLY BY STATE DEFINITION: THE CASE OF BELARUS

107

evolved entrepreneurial mentality, and other values and attributes characteristic for post-materialist societies relying on the ideal of individual autonomy. Europe both involuntary generates as well as consciously promotes this image. It is therefore often assumed that the perception of Europe as a potential partner and geopolitical ally is driven by the attractiveness of the value-based political and social merits associated with it. However, the expectation that the attitude towards Europe is primarily value-driven cannot be taken as an established fact. In the case of Belarus, it has to be thoroughly investigated, taking into account the findings of the BISS survey, which clearly demonstrate that the geopolitical orientation of Belarusians is predominantly based on economic considerations, not political ideals and not even concerns related to national security.49 Almost 73% of the respondents of this survey declared that the main goal, when determining the choice of Belarus’ allies, should be to improve the economic situation of the country. Only 7.3% of them considered the strengthening of democracy the most important aim, while an even smaller number regarded the preservation of the national identity as the most important factor. The strengthening of independence and enhancing security was stressed by only 17.9% of the respondents. 50 Comparing these results with the corresponding survey findings from 2010, one cannot fail to note that the economic pragmatism of Belarusians has only gotten stronger since then – while in 2010, only 55.1% of respondents identified economic concerns as the main factor when choosing allies, over the three following years, this share has grown by 17.8%.51 This solidifying of economic pragmatism is not very surprising. It was the third quarter of 2013 when, according to the IISEPS nationwide survey, the share of those stating that their personal social and economic situation had weakened shot to the unprecedented peak of well 52 over 70%. The negative perception of personal welfare coincided with a significant increase in economic pessimism regarding the country’s overall socioeconomic situation. It seems logical to expect that those having experienced financial difficulties would tend to consider economic considerations an important factor when choosing geopolitical orientation. Having paired the importance of economic considerations with the pessimistic evaluation of the socio-economic 53 situation in Belarus, which have intensified since September 2014, economic pragmatism may be expected to continue dominating the popular approach towards the geopolitical questions. In light of the importance attributed to economic matters, the skepticism of Belarusians of the EU is somehow surprising considering that a majority of 60% of Belarus‘ residents insist that in their country, life is worse than in Western coun54 tries. This perception seems inconsistent with the declining support for the Eu49 50 51 52 53 54

Keeping in mind that the respective survey was conducted in April 2013 – before the beginning of the unrest in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea – it is probable that the share of respondents primarily moved by security issues has grown since that time. Dzianis MELYANTSOU, Alena ARTSIOMENKA, “Geopolitical Preferences of the Belarusians: A Too Pragmatic Nation?,” op. cit. Ibid. “Trends of Change in Belarusian Public Opinion,” op. cit. Ibid. IISEPS, “Europe is good, but not for us,” Independent Institute of Socio-Economic and Political Studies, http://www.iiseps.org/?p=842&lang=en (16.8.2016).

108

WOLFGANG SENDER & IEVA MOTŪZAITĖ

ropean integration. However, it is not impossible to find reasonable explanations for this paradox, which could be tested by further research. For example, most people in Belarus are not aware of the European structural and cohesion policy and may not consider the impact of trade liberalization on economic growth. They might not be aware that the EU does not only have strategies and instruments targeting socio-economic inequality among its member states, and they may not realize that the fusion of markets as such generates measurable economic growth.55 However, even more important when analyzing the Belarusians’ perception of the EU is the insight that not only the population in its entirety is driven by economic motives rather than by the normative power of the democratic ideal, but that economic pragmatism is even more widespread among the pro-European Belarusians than among those favoring a union with Russia or an independent Belarus. More than 85% of the residents positively inclined towards the idea of Belarus entering the EU identified the improvement of the economic situation as their main consideration. The share of economic pragmatists among the proRussian and independence-favoring residents amounted to 75.6% and 69.4%, 56 respectively. Given the substantial influence of economic considerations to the geopolitical orientation of the Belarusian population, it is very important to clarify whether the society in Belarus is aware of the EU’s contribution to the economic modernization and social welfare in their country, which of course constitutes only a fraction of the totality of advantages that could be created by intensified economic and political relations between Belarus and the EU. According to a strategy paper developed by the European External Action Service and European Commission on the EU support to Belarus in the period from 2014 to 2017,57 the amount of bilateral assistance to Belarus, in the framework of the European Neighborhood policy, will range from €71 to €89 million in the respective period, the indicative allocation for 2014–2020 is between €129 and €158 million. While it would certainly be absurd to fall into the trap of perceiving Belarus as an area where major regional powers are challenging each other by engaging in some kind of a “win influence by adding the bigger sum to the table competition” (if winning would depend on sheer numbers, that kind of game would certainly be a lost cause), this contribution gains special significance when considering that it is used to foster socially, environmentally and economically positive and sustainable developments, such as the activation of civil society and economic modernization whose impact tends to multiply itself in the long run.

55

56 57

This can be proved by numerous cases, including the European Union’s expansion of 2004, which, as research conducted by experts from International Monetary Fund has demonstrated, was accompanied by rapid economic growth in the eight new member states, even faster than what could be have been expected given their economies’ fundamentals: Martin Cihák, Wim Fonteyne. “Five Years After: European Union Membership and Macro-Financial Stability in the New Member States,” International Monetary Fund, Working Paper, 09, 68, 2009. Dzianis MELYANTSOU, Alena ARTSIOMENKA, “Geopolitical Preferences of the Belarusians: A Too Pragmatic Nation?,” op. cit. European External Action Service, European Commission, Programming of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) -2014-2020 / Strategy Paper and Multiannual Indicative Programme for EU support to Belarus (2014–2017), European Commission, http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/ (1.4.206).

EUROSCEPTICS NOT ONLY BY STATE DEFINITION: THE CASE OF BELARUS

109

Given that, it is very unfortunate that, according to the BISS findings, only a minority (13.7%) of Belarusians are aware of the Eastern Partnership program; the European Dialogue on Modernization with Belarusian society on its part has been barely heard of – in 2013, less than 5% of respondents indicated that they were familiar with this initiative. Therefore, it seems to be both reasonable and necessary to intensify the efforts to improve the understanding of the institutional interrelation between Belarus and European institutions, especially if further research were to prove the correlation between a positive attitude towards 58 the EU and the level of informativeness about the bilateral relations. However, even though concerns about the economic situation are dominating Belarusian voters‘ geopolitical orientations to a much greater extent than the adherence to the democratic form of government, it is also true that among the European-minded Belarusians, the share of those considering the strengthening of democracy the highest priority is almost three times higher than among those in favor of a closer association with Russia, and more than five times higher than 59 among those who would like Belarus to stay independent.

4. Outlook Foreign policy decisions of its bigger neighbors, Russia and the EU, particularly determine any scenario building regarding the future development of Euroskeptics or supporters in the case of Belarus. Certainly, currently, a lot speaks for stability of Belarus’ present general political setting: Firstly, Alexander Lukashenko shows no intention to change the internal power system of Belarus. Consequently, no changes are to be expected concerning the balancing – one might also call it outplaying – between East and West. In this scenario, pro-European parties in Belarus will stay under pressure, and state media will continue to form large parts of the opinions of the Belarusian population. Even if more proEuropean thinkers were to appear in the government as currently seems to be the case, respect for potential countermeasures by Russia will force them to keep a low profile. The European side will probably also stay stable about Belarus: There might be some new offers for economic and political cooperation. However, a real EU perspective seems out of the question for Belarus in view of the internal challenges of the Union and the missing request from Belarus as well as considering the potential reactions of Russia inter alia. Currently, in the West, there are only few voices who argue in favor of a scenario of making a better offer to Belarus in order to pull it out of the Russian orbit. Most politicians and experts call for improvements in the human rights sector and the political system of Belarus only – again without providing scenarios for the time when these milestones might be reached by Minsk. As for Russian politics regarding Belarus, any predictions would be completely erratic considering how black box politics are shaped in the Kremlin. At least now, there is no visible urgent pressure to integrate Belarus into the Russian Federation if one takes in Moscow’s rationale. Summing this up, there are many reasons to believe in the stability of the current situation 58 59

Dzianis MELYANTSOU, Alena ARTSIOMENKA, “Geopolitical Preferences of the Belarusians: A Too Pragmatic Nation?,” op. cit. Ibid.

110

WOLFGANG SENDER & IEVA MOTŪZAITĖ

with a society divided on the question of European integration and with too weak and too few institutions and individuals supporting it. Nevertheless, looking at the poll results outlined above, change cannot be completely ruled out in the long run if drastic events on the political scene will not preclude it. Although Euro-skepticism remains the most prevalent attitude among today’s population in its entirety, the fact that the generation of people under the age of 45 seems to be more pro-European than the older ones suggests that the West might expect a growing segment of pro-European members of the Belarusian society. If positive attitudes towards the EU prove to be a permanent attribute of the relevant generation as it grows older, this might force the current Belarusian power system to adapt and acknowledge the European offers for more cooperation and exchange more responsibly. This might prove to be the case especially if the economic situation worsens. After all, economic motives have been proven to present the primary incentives for favoring cooperation with the EU, as economic reasoning is most prevalent amongst the pro-European segment of society when choosing a geopolitical orientation. However, it is necessary to address the expectations relating to the generationally driven sociopolitical change with a certain amount of caution, since it is arguable whether the uneven dispersion of geopolitical preferences between the younger and older generations is truly generational and not rather age-driven. It remains to be seen whether today’s young and middle-aged generation will continue to adhere to their pro-European values and preferences as they get older, or whether they will fall back on the behavioral patterns of the previous generations, as they get more dependent on social benefits. Moreover, the picture of public opinion also presents some even more substantial reasons for pessimism. One only needs to mention the previously portrayed phenomenon of disguised pro-Russian attitudes: Although a growing rejection of any foreign alliance as such can be observed among the Belarusian population, it should not be overlooked that for a significant share of those who favor neutrality, in case it boils down to an ultimatum, Russia still appears to be the more suitable geopolitical choice. The “revolutionary” approach – to get more support for European integration by overcoming the current Belarusian setting as pursued by oppositional forces – remains not very likely, even given this constellation. President Lukashenko will most probably hold up his power structure even in a potential phase of a stronger engagement with the West. Lukashenko is backed by large, but potentially crumbling, parts of the population being supportive of him, the current state of affairs, and holding a skeptical view of any integration. Therefore, there is a great deal to be said in favor of the West continuing its current engagement and supporting Belarus with economic assistance without obliging the country to make a choice. Any force in regards to integration would not only lead to Russian reactions, but currently also has no basis in the population. As the European Partnership Initiative is not directed against Russia but targeted on a prosperous community, Belarus most probably will accept economic offers. Although a deeper integration beyond these actions seems not to be intended by the West, it should nevertheless be prepared for a future with a more pro-European Belarus. If the outlined age gap grows, Brussels and Minsk could face a new reality in the years to come.

EUROSCEPTICS NOT ONLY BY STATE DEFINITION: THE CASE OF BELARUS

111

EUROSCEPTIQUES NON SEULEMENT DE PAR LA DEFINITION DE L’ETAT: LE CAS DU BELARUS La république du Belarus est un état post-soviétique, appartient aux pays partenaires de l´Initiative de l´Union européenne pour le Partenariat oriental et à ses frontières entre deux aimants géopolitiques, la Fédération de Russie et l´Union Européenne. Cette situation offre au Belarus, d´un côté, des avantages importants, mais exige aussi des décisions difficiles en ce qui concerne son orientation européenne. Cette étude rend compte des évolutions actuelles en ce domaine comme des défis de politique sécuritaire dans la région. Elle se penche sur les diverses positions sur la question de l´intégration européenne dans les trois domaines de la politique gouvernementale, de l´opposition et de l´opinion publique. L´analyse des politiques, des publications dans les médias et des sondages d´opinions montre la spécificité de la vision du Belarus sur l´Europe et permet une mise en perspective des possibles scénarios d´une intégration européenne pour le Belarus.

EUROSKEPTIKER NICHT NUR DURCH STAATSDEFINIERUNG: DER FALL BELARUS Die Republik Belarus ist ein postsowjetischer Staat, gehört zu den Ländern der EU-Initiative der Östlichen Partnerschaft und grenzt an zwei geopolitische Magneten, die Russische Föderation und die EU. Diese Lage bietet Belarus einerseits beträchtliche Vorteile, erfordert aber auch schwierige Entscheidungen bezüglich seiner europäischen Orientierung. Diese Studie berücksichtigt sowohl die aktuellen Entwicklungen in diesem Bereich als auch die sicherheitspolitischen Herausforderungen in der Region. Sie untersucht die diversen Positionen zur Frage der europäischen Integration in den drei Bereichen Regierungspolitik, Narrative der Opposition und öffentliche Meinung. Die Analyse der Politiken, Veröffentlichungen in den Medien und der Meinungsforschung zeigt die Spezifika der belarussischen Sicht auf Europa und ermöglicht einen Ausblick auf mögliche Szenarien der europäischen Integration für Belarus.

UKRAINE: PRO-EUROPEAN MAJORITY AND THE CHANCES OF REVENGE KOSTIANTYN FEDORENKO In November 2013, the decision of Ukraine’s president Victor Yanukovych not to sign the EU-Ukraine association agreement triggered mass protests, known as “Euromaidan”. They resulted in dozens of civilian deaths, and, ultimately, a regime change. These events, as well as the following armed conflict with separatist forces generally considered to be backed by Russia in the east of Ukraine, have solidified mass support of European integration in Ukraine. However, several foreign policy alternatives are still debated. Two are, traditionally, reintegration with Russia and multi-vector foreign policy, cooperating with both Brussels and Moscow. The Baltic – Black Sea union idea is also gaining support. In the upcoming paragraphs, we shall discuss the views of Ukrainian political actors and the general public on the existing foreign policy options.

1. Left-Wing Parties: Looking Eastward Generally, pronounced leftist parties in Ukraine have been anti-European. This is largely due to the fact that these parties, including the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU, descendant of the Communist Party of Soviet Ukraine), the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine (PSPU) and, to some extent, the Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU), exploited nostalgia for the Soviet Union. According to the 2014 exit poll, their electorate comprised mostly older people, with a relatively small share of their voters holding university degrees.1 Soon after the independent state of Ukraine was created in 1991, the Communist Party was officially banned. In the aftermath, the Communists founded the Socialist Party of Ukraine. However, the ban was lifted in 1993.2 In 1996, the SPU’s shift toward social democracy caused a party split: Some radicals, headed by Natalia Vitrenko, created a new Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine. In the opinion of Taras Kuzio, the PSPU was created with the support of Kuchma in order to draw leftist votes from the CPU.3 While all these parties exploit nostalgic sentiments, ideologically, they have different foreign policy attitudes. CPU and PSPU are evidently and strongly anti-

1 2 3

Democratic Initiatives Fund, “Parlaments’ki vybory-2014: pidsumky natsional’nogo ekzytpolu ‘2014,” Exit Poll 2014, Foundation for Democratic Initiatives Fund, http://dif-exitpoll .org.ua/ua/golovna.htm (30.4.2016). Denys GORBACH, “After the ban: a short history of Ukraine’s Communist Party,” OpenDemocracy, January 8, 2016, https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/denys-gorbach/ after-ban-short-history-of-ukraine-s-communist-party (30.4.2016). Taras KUZIO, Democratic Revolution in Ukraine: From Kuchmagate to Orange Revolution, UK, Routledge, 2009, p. 37.

114

KOSTIANTYN FEDORENKO

Western, unlike the SPU. The following quotes are taken from the most recent CPU program: “As a result of the restoration of capitalism [in 1991], Ukraine was (…) turned into a source of raw materials for the capitalist world, a market for the production and waste of Western technologies, a dying country.” “Ukraine remains an object of the attention and constant predatory imperialist impact of the main subjects of geopolitical clashes which try to keep the country in their orbit of influence and turn it into an anti-Russian foothold.” 4 In this program, the CPU’s long-term goal is defined as the “restoration of the voluntary union of equal peoples, their unification in one state – the Union of Soviet Republics”, but in the meantime, it is the accession to the Customs Union and Common Economic Space (currently part of the Eurasian Economic Union framework). While from an ideological point of view, aiming to enter a clearly capitalist organization is a strange goal for a Communist, it is understandable for a party that is targeted at voters nostalgic for the Soviet Union. There is no particular mention of the European Union in the program. But the goals of the CPU are clearly incompatible with European integration. Traditionally, the PSPU had placed a strong accent on its foreign policy, supporting a union with Russia and Belarus and opposing Euro-Atlantic integration. During its congress in September 2015, the party confirmed its strictly antiEuropean attitudes: “Despite the will of our people, the government, setting course on the Ukraine’s accession to the EU and NATO, had completely deprived our state of political and economic sovereignty.” “Progressive socialists (…) have stood, and still stand, as active opponents of the course towards the Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine.”5 At the same time, the SPU adopted clearly different positions. In the 2006 party program, for instance, they call themselves “a party of European socialism”, and aspire for “democratic socialism and Ukraine’s European choice.”6 The current party program offered by the SPU proclaims that Ukraine and Russia, as fellow periphery countries, have to support each other by building strong internal markets and conducting reforms. Yet the goal set for Ukraine is the “European choice”, which the SPU defines as “creating living conditions, a level of welfare, guarantees of human rights and freedoms and of democratic grounds for social relations, characteristic of the majority of European countries”. This shall lead to Ukraine “being an equal member of the community of European states”, al4 5

6

CPU, “Programma Kommunisticheskoi Partii Ukrainy,” CPU, http://www.kpu.ua/ru/ page/programmakpu (20.4.2016). Progressivnaia Sotsialisticheskaia Partiia Ukrainy, “XXIX veocherednoi sjezd PSP. Progressivnye sotsialisty podtverzhdaiut svoiu oppozitsionnost’, zaschischaiut simvoliku, korrektiruiut Programmu i trebuiut ustraneniia prepiatstvii svoei politicheskoi deiatelnosti,” Vitrenko, 8.9.2015, http://www.vitrenko.org/article/27301 (30.4.2016). SPU, “Peredvyborna programa Sotsialistychnoi partii Ukrainy do vyboriv u Verkhovnu Radu 2006 roku,” CVK, http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vnd2006/printblob?pf7171=26&kodvib=600 (20.4.2016).

UKRAINE: PRO-EUROPEAN MAJORITY AND THE CHANCES OF REVENGE

115

though it is unclear whether this statement refers to the EU in particular or just to an abstract “community”. Therefore, despite the fact that the SPU, as mentioned, turned into a social democratic party in the 90’s, they deserve a mention in this text as a party that pursued a multi-vector foreign policy. However, the support for the SPU dropped to negligible levels even before Euromaidan (0.45% in the 2012 elections7), and it did not even run for the last parliamentary elections. It is also important to note that CPU and PSPU, in line with the views of their primary electorate, support socially conservative values, with their attitudes sometimes similar to those of the far right. For instance, prior to the 2006 elections, the Progressive Socialist Party released a campaign video where an old woman in a church is scared by a priest with black skin. The slogan of this advertisement was “Protect canonic Orthodoxy”8. This was apparently supposed to be a statement against the Western way of integration, associated with multiculturalism. A number of times, CPU and PSPU leaders spoke on the issue of sexual minorities as well, each time repeating their negative attitudes towards the idea of granting them any specific rights. In 2012, in particular, Symonenko attempted to push through a ban on “homosexual propaganda”,9 similar to the one existing in Russia. A 2014 article on the official website of PSPU calls on the members of parliament to fight against “gender-homosexualism” and legal norms passed due to pressure of “genderists and feminists”, “clear the education system from the so-called ‘sexual education’”, and even “cancel the demagogic ideology of the socalled ‘children’s rights’”.10 On the other hand, in an act unexpected from leftist parties (yet completely justifiable for parties whose electorate is predominantly religious), they expressed support for the Church and its active role in society. A number of CPU politicians, including its long-time leader Petro Symonenko, were even awarded the Order of the Equal to the Apostles Holy Prince Volodymyr by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow patriarchate).11 As the living standards of Ukrainians – especially of pensioners and those with low income – steeply dropped compared with the Soviet times,12 the leftist parties, in particular the CPU, enjoyed wide electoral success. This is illustrated by the table below, indicating the results of leftist parties in Ukrainian parliamentary elections. (The total number of seats in the Ukrainian parliament is 450.)

7 8 9 10 11 12

Petr USTENKO, “Tochka zoru,” SPU, http://www.spu.in.ua/uk/point_of_view/1/3994 (20.4.2016). UkrainInfo, “Блок Вітренко – Реклама 1 / Bloc Vitrenko,” YouTube, 9.12.2012, https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=hGs18HrFNlw (30.4.2016). “Simonenko po pros’be trudiaschikhsia trebuet zapretit’ gomoseksualizm,” Glavnoe, 4.9.2012, http://glavnoe.ua/news/n108212 (30.4.2016). PSPU, “Novorichna vizija ozdorovlennia ukrains’kogo suspil’stva,” Vitrenko, 17.1.2014, http://www.vitrenko.org/article/18554 (30.4.2016). Andrii STRAODUB, “Po rizni boky tserkovnoi ogorozhi,” Ukrains’ka Pravda, 7.3.2008, http:// www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2008/03/7/3390048/ (30.4.2016). Pekki SUTELA, “The Underachiever: Ukraine’s Economy Since 1991,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 9.3.2012, http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/03/09/underachieverukraine-s-economy-since-1991 (30.4.2016).

KOSTIANTYN FEDORENKO

116

Table 1. Left-wing parties and their results in parliamentary elections13 Year

Share of votea

Parliamentary Seats

1994b

n/a

CPU: 90 SPU: 14 Total: 104

1998c

CPU: 24.65% SPU + Peasants’ Party Bloc: 8.55% PSPU: 4.04% Total: 37.24%

CPU: 121 SPU + Peasants’ Party Bloc: 34 PSPU: 16 Total: 171

2002c

CPU: 19.98% SPU: 6.87% Vitrenko Bloc: 3.22% CPU (renewed): 1.39% Total: 31.46%

CPU: 65 SPU: 23 Total: 88

2006

SPU: 5.69% CPU: 3.66% Vitrenko Bloc: 2.93% Total: 12.28%

SPU: 33 CPU: 21 Total: 54

2007

CPU: 5.39% SPU: 2.86% PSPU: 1.32% CPU (renewed): 0.29% Total: 9.86%

CPU: 27 Total: 27

2012

CPU: 13.18% SPU: 0.45% Total: 13.63%

CPU: 32 Total: 32

2014

CPU: 3.88% Total: 3.88%

Total: 0

It is obvious that both, the share of vote and the number of seats won by the leftist parties dropped significantly during the time of Ukrainian independence. Interestingly enough, two particularly strong electoral blows were dealt to the leftist sector of Ukrainian politics after the popular pro-European uprisings of 2004 and 2014. Between the 2002 and 2006 elections, the share of vote of the left dropped by two thirds, from 31.46% to 12.28%. And in the post-Euromaidan 2014 elections, the left won 3.88% of the vote compared to 13.63% two years before. However, days before the Euromaidan in November 2013, a nationwide opinion poll on the future parliamentary elections was held by KIIS. Only 6.7% of the Ukrainians considered voting for the Communist Party. The share of those who intended to vote for “other” (minor) parties was 3.8%.14 Some of the latter were probably SPU and PSPU voters, but it is impossible to determine exact numbers. 13

14

Source: Central Electoral Committee of Ukraine official data (Central’na vyborcha komisiia) CVK, (30.4.2016): a In years when the mixed electoral system was used – 50% proportional representation, 50% majoritarian constituency vote according to the first-past-the-post principle –, only the share of vote of the proportional representation was counted for this column. b 1994 was the only year when the elections were held on a purely majoritarian basis. c Mixed electoral system employed. KIIS, “Elektoralnye namereniia izbiratelei Ukrainy otnositel’no vyborov v Verkhovnuiu Radu,” Kiev International Institute of Sociology, http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=rus&cat =reports&id=208&page=3 (30.4.2016).

UKRAINE: PRO-EUROPEAN MAJORITY AND THE CHANCES OF REVENGE

117

In any case, an approximately twofold drop in support of the leftist parties, as compared to the 2012 autumn elections, had already happened by November of the following year. As the 2014 vote was not held in parts of the country, this drop got even worse. This should be attributed to the fact that exactly these regions were among the main supporters of the left parties in Ukraine. Consider that in 2012, 30.1% of the nationwide CPU votes were cast in Crimea and Donbas.15 Of course, parts of Donbas were able to vote in 2014; but even in those constituencies of the Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts where the vote was held, the turnout was low (32.40% and 32.87% respectively, as compared to the nationwide turnout of 52.42%).16 The turnout was also low in other regions of the Southeast,17 where the CPU also traditionally enjoyed a relative electoral success. This might be attributed to the popular frustration of those Ukrainians who did not support Euromaidan or the fighting in the Eastern Ukraine. Some of them probably did not vote because they considered the elections held by the post-Euromaidan regime illegitimate; others might have felt that their opinion did not matter since the regime change had happened without their consent. In any case, the drop of support for the Ukrainian left did not seem to have happened due to the Euromaidan itself: they had lost half of their support prior to these events. However, the consequences of Euromaidan resulted in a further loss. In April 2015, the Ukrainian parliament passed a bill to condemn the Communist regime on par with that of the Nazi, and therefore to prohibit propaganda from both.18 This resulted in the CPU being banned from participating in further elections.19 SPU or PSPU, on the other hand, have avoided the ban. As a result of these events, a new civic organization, “Left Opposition”, was created, led by Symonenko and Vitrenko. This term is likely to be used by the CPU and PSPU for the purpose of jointly running in the upcoming parliamentary elections, just like in at the 2015 local elections.20

2. Ukrainian Nationalism and the Intermarium The majority of Euro-skeptic parties in Europe are right-wing. It is no surprise that the nationalist ideology clashes with the shrinking role of nation states and the transfer of competencies to supranational bodies. As of now, Ukraine has three notable right-wing parties, and all of them might be defined as Euroskeptic. 15 16 17 18 19 20

CVK, “Vybory narodnykh deputativ Ukrainy 2012,” CVK, http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/ vnd2012/wp300?PT001F01=900 (30.4.2016). Artur GONCHAROV, “Yavka na vyborakh sklala 52.42%,” Hromads’kyi Prostir, 27.10.2014, http://www.civic.ua/text/news/view.html?q=2321853 (30.4.2016). Denys KANZANS’KYI, “Geografiia Verkhovnoi Rady,” Ukrains’kyi Tyzhden, 6.11.2014, p. 12. Interfax-Ukraine, “Rada bans Communist, Nazi propaganda in Ukraine,” Interfax-Ukraine News Agency, 9.4.2014, http://en.interfax.com.ua/news/general/259775.html (30.4.2016). Interfax Ukraine, “V Ukraini ofitsiino zaboronyly KPU,” TSN, 24.7.2015, http://tsn.ua/ politika/v-ukrayini-oficiyno-zaboronili-kpu-462089.html (30.4.2016). “Liva Opozytsiia” ide na vybory pid haslamy svobody, rivnosti I braterstva. Za myr i dobrobut v Ukraini,” CPU, http://www.kpu.ua/uk/82107/ (30.4.2016).

118

KOSTIANTYN FEDORENKO

The most popular rightist party in Ukraine is Vseukrains’ka Organizatsiia “Svoboda” (All-Ukrainian Organization “Freedom”), usually simply referred to as Svoboda, and formerly known as the Social-Nationalist Party of Ukraine – until the superficial re-branding that was aimed at making the party more acceptable for moderate voters but without significantly changing its ideology.21 The October 2014 elections saw them just on the brink of entering parliament, gaining 4.71% of the vote. Six party representatives became MPs by virtue of winning first-past-the-post elections in their majoritarian constituencies; however, in a parliament of 450, they were hardly able to make a difference. This result, in fact, constituted a major drop in popularity for the party: in the previous elections of 2012, Svoboda had received 10.44% of the vote. At that time, a popular belief was that they would become the radical opposition to the Yanukovych’s regimen,22 and the party was supported by numerous moderate voters. Therefore, among the major parties, they had had the largest share of educated supporters from big cities, according to a nationwide exit poll.23 However, as their support dropped to 5.1% in November 201324 and 6.2% in 2016,25 it seems that the voters were dissatisfied with Svoboda. In its party program, Svoboda generally ignores the European Union. Most importantly, Chapter VII (“Foreign policy and defense. European Ukraine – centrism and the strong state”) reveals that Svoboda has little interest in the EU; in its stead, the party proclaims, Ukraine should aim at creating a strong political and economic Baltic-Black Sea union. Yet Svoboda fails to mention the EU even once in this chapter of their program; almost all the paragraphs here are dedicated to security issues. Overall, paragraph IV.15, declaring the aim to cancel the EUUkraine agreement on migrant re-admission, is the only place in the party program where the EU is mentioned.26 Svoboda speakers declare that “the place of Ukraine is in Europe.”27 However, their vision of the united Europe appears to be closer to that of the European rightists – a loose “Europe of nations” without any meaningful role for supranational institutions. In particular, this was voiced during earlier meetings of Svoboda representatives with their French right-wing counterparts from the National Front.28 However, according to the 2013 poll, 71.4% of the Svoboda voters answered that Ukraine should aim to join the EU rather than stay out of any in-

21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Vyacheslav LIKHACHEV, Right-wing extremism in Ukraine: the phenomenon of “Svoboda,” Academia, https://www.academia.edu/16261331/ (30.4.2016). Ibid, pp. 19–20. Democratic Initiatives Fund, “Parlaments’ki vybory-2014: pidsumky natsional’nogo ekzytpolu ‘2014,” op.cit. KIIS, “Elektoralnye namereniia izbiratelei Ukrainy otnositel’no vyborov v Verkhovnuiu Radu,”op.cit. RBC, “Opros: na vyborakh v Radu prezidentskaia partiia zaniala by 5-e mesto,” RBC Ukraine, 15.4.2016, https://www.rbc.ua/rus/news/opros-vyborah-radu-prezidentskaya-partiya-146 0721942.html (1.5.2016). VO Svoboda, “Programa zakhystu ukraintsiv,”Svoboda, http://svoboda.org.ua/party/ program/ (30.4.2016). VO Svoboda, “Svobodivtsi zustrilysia z predstavnykamy evropeis’kykh dyplomatychnykh vidomstv,”svoboda, http://www.old.svoboda.org.ua/diyalnist/novyny/038625/ (30.4.2016). Vitalii CHERVONENKO, “Le Pen i Tiahnybok: chomu druzi staly vorohamy?,” BBC Ukraine, 3.6.2015, http://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/politics/2015/06/150527_le_pen_svoboda_vc (30.4.2016).

UKRAINE: PRO-EUROPEAN MAJORITY AND THE CHANCES OF REVENGE

119

ternational union.29 This clearly illustrates the difference between the views of the party and their electorate. The current ideological positions of the party are elaborated upon in an article on the party website by Andriy Illenko, Deputy Head of the party: “Today, of course, this [the EU crisis] is not beneficial to us. First and foremost, we have to split from Russia, decisively and irrevocable. We would have been in a much better situation had we jumped on the last wagon of the EU enlargement, and then went through these hard times as a part of that space. (...) We should throw away illusions. Be realist and pragmatic. (...) And, together with our true allies – the states of the Baltic-Black Sea space – build a powerful political and military alliance against Moscow. Then we will integrate into Europe. And we’ll be powerful players there, not the underdogs.”30 As we can see, Illenko – speaking as the number two at the head of the party – thinks that the EU integration cannot help Ukraine solve its problems. One of the reasons might be that if a Baltic – Black Sea union were actually created, it would not be as keen on the liberal values as the EU – values that which Svoboda, being a nationalist party, clearly opposes. One of the stunning examples involves an article from the party’s earlier draft project of a new constitution for Ukraine: According to Article 29 of the draft, “nobody is allowed to interfere into the private life of an individual, unless it is of immoral or illegal character.”31 While that same article requires such interferences to occur only on grounds of court decisions, this evidently still opens up a path to arbitrary judgment regarding “immorality” and to the abuse of power. Pravyi Sector (Right Sector), a coalition of minor far-right organizations that was created and gained momentum during the events of Euromaidan and later became a party, is also a Euro-skeptic player in Ukrainian politics. Their party program32 talks of the “modern tendency towards degradation”, proclaims that the “cosmopolitan West… struggles for the erosion of state sovereignty, the marginalization and destruction of nations”, and that Ukraine should become a geopolitical and spiritual center rather than join any integration projects. Strategic partnership is only possible “on condition of respect towards our sovereignty and unconditional recognition of our national rights”. According to the party program, uncontrolled migration “destroys European identity”. Finally, the authors elaborate on their attitudes in paragraph 5 of the party program, dedicated towards foreign policy. It is a fragment so clear and illustrative that it deserves to be cited almost in full: 29 30 31 32

“Stavlennia hromads’kosti do evropeis’koi integratsii Ukrainy,” Foundation for Democratic Initiatives Fund, http://www.dif.org.ua/ua/polls/2013-year/mlfgblfbllgmkl.htm (30.4.2016). Andrii ILLENKO, “Referendum u Niderlandakh. Sproba zrobyty pershi vysnovky,” Svoboda, 7.4.2016, Accessed http://svoboda.org.ua/news/articles/00019380/ (30.4.2016). VO Svoboda, “Natsional’na konstytutsiia Ukrainy (proekt VO Svoboda),”Svoboda, 5.8.2007, http://svoboda.org.ua/news/documents/00016792/ (30.4.2016). Right Sektor “Programa partii “Pravyi Sektor,” Pravyysektor, http://pravyysektor.info/ programa.html (30.4.2016).

120

KOSTIANTYN FEDORENKO

“Ukraine cannot enter any union that presumes the existence of supranational ruling bodies. Ukrainian geostrategy should not follow a single direction of adapting towards international politics, values, and ideals-plans (sic) of the European Union. The EU cannot substitute the national idea for Ukraine. The Ukrainian nation has its timeless interests (...) Approximation to the EU cannot become one more phase of losing parts of the Ukrainian national identity that would be determined by the Western-propagated total liberal cosmopolitanism as the main ideology and practice of the future Ukrainian state. Ukraine should not enter the EU, since the obligations it would have to take in this case lead to complete neocolonial subjugation and national degradation.”33 Finally, there’s a third right-wing force that is emerging in Ukraine and might become popular, even if we do not know much about it yet. It is called Derzhavnyts’ka Initsiatyva Yarosha (“Yarosh’s Statehood Initiative”), abbreviated as DIYa (“Action”), and is headed by the former Right Sector leader, Dmytro Yarosh. There is a website – “Sector of Truth” – that contains a section on this movement, yet there are no new unique materials; only the old texts written by Yarosh.34 However, considering that the movement shall clearly be shaped by the personal views of Yarosh, and that he is one of the two country’s most popular right-wing politicians, it is worthwhile to briefly analyze his position on Europe and the European integration of Ukraine. Yarosh, together with the “Right Sector” combatants, actively participated in the Euromaidan. Yet, if we even briefly go through his book “Nation and Revolution”, first printed in 2012, with a second edition of 2015, it becomes evident that his motivation was completely different from that of the pro-European protesters: for him, European integration is an evil in its own right. Early in the book already, it is easy to find substantiation to this claim. Yarosh explains his view of the existing situation in Ukraine: “Internal occupation is a form of enslavement whereupon the peoples find themselves under the oppression not of the foreign occupants, but of the internal anti-popular and anti-nation forces. They diminish the political rights of the корінна nation (that comprises almost 80% of the population)”. He elaborates in the next paragraph: “In Ukraine, the internal occupation is committed by former Muscovite occupants and colonizers, the Muscovite ‘fifth column’ with various ‘red’ and ‘center-left’ organizations, the fifth column of the Western demo-liberalism with various ‘centrist’, ‘center-right’, ‘democratic’, ‘national-democratic’ and even ‘also-nationalist’ organizations. They all serve to the main plunderer and power usurper – the alien, cosmopolite, and transnational oligarchic capital of criminal origin.”35 In their programs, both Svoboda and the Right Sector target the creation of a Black Sea – Baltic bloc and decide against European integration. It is likely that DIYa will follow this path as well. The project of such a security bloc, also known as “Intermarium” – originally proposed in interwar Poland – is growing popular

33 34 35

Ibid. Sektor Pravdy, http://sectorpravdy.com/ua/ (30.4.2016). Dmytro YAROSH, “Natsiia i revolutsiia,” Sector Pravdy (1.5.2016), pp. 4–5.

UKRAINE: PRO-EUROPEAN MAJORITY AND THE CHANCES OF REVENGE

121

in Ukraine;36 not as substitute but as an addition to the overall goal of the European integration, however. It is based on the premise that Ukraine has to protect itself from potential Russian aggression, and that it is unlikely to become a NATO or EU member soon. Therefore, the country risks to be left one on one with a much stronger foe. To deter potential Russian aggression, a security bloc should be created, potentially consisting of the Baltic states, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan – all of them being countries that occasionally feel threatened by Russia and have a number of common strategic interests. This plan does not include an economic dimension, since all these countries, save for Azerbaijan, are either EU members or have DCFTA agreements with the Union. A security union of the Intermarium is exactly what the Right Sector offers in their program, although they reject ideas of Ukraine’s accession to either EU or NATO.37 This is different from Svoboda’s view that presumes the creation of a political and economic union between the mentioned states; yet the latter is quite hard to imagine as long as the EU exists. In parliamentary elections, nationalists have been largely unsuccessful in Ukraine, especially compared to the left-wing parties, as evident from the table below. CUN, the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, joined the moderate centerright block “Our Ukraine” of Victor Yushchenko in 2002,38 although other scholars considered CUN to have been center-right itself.39 UNA was the political wing of the then-well-known UNSO paramilitary group that participated in armed conflicts abroad.40

36

37 38 39 40

Andreas UMLAND, “How to Solve Ukraine’s Security Dilemma, The Case for a New Security Pact between the Baltic and Black Seas,” The Atlantic Council, 12.4.2016, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/how-to-solve-ukraine-s-securitydilemma (1.5.2016). Right Sektor “Programa partii “Pravyi Sektor,” op.cit., Vyacheslav LIKHACHEV, Right-wing extremism in Ukraine: the phenomenon of “Svoboda,” op.cit., p. 6. Mridula GHOSH, “The Extreme Right in Ukraine,” International Policy Analysis, October 2012, p. 4. Vyacheslav LIKHACHEV, Right-wing extremism in Ukraine: the phenomenon of “Svoboda,” op.cit., p. 7.

KOSTIANTYN FEDORENKO

122

Table 2. Right-wing parties and their results in parliamentary elections41 Year

Share of Votea

Parliamentary Seats

1994b

n/a

CUN: 5 UNA: 3 Total: 842

1998c

National Front Bloc (CUN as the leading party): 2.71% Menshe Sliv Bloc (SNPU as the leading party): 0.17%

National Front Bloc: 6 Menshe Sliv Bloc: 1 Total: 7

2002c

UNA: 0.04%

SNPU: 1 Total: 1

2006

Svoboda: 0.36% UNA: 0.06% Total: 0.42%

Total: 0

2007

Svoboda: 0.76%

Total: 0

2012

Svoboda: 10.44% UNA: 0.08% Total: 10.52%

Svoboda: 38

2014

Svoboda: 4.71% Right Sector: 1.80% Total: 6.51%

Total: 7

The latest poll by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) reveals that 5.8% of the Ukrainians who plan to vote and have already made their choice are ready to support Svoboda (as compared to 4.71% received in the 2014 elections). 2.5% would vote for DIYa and 0.7% for the Right Sector (until the division of the latter, it received 1.8% in 2014).43 Thus, the overall growth of the far-right electorate was approximately two and a half percentage points. However, if the ruling government continues to fail to impress the voters, and the socioeconomic situation does not improve, a demand for radical change is likely; in this case, the rightists are expected to benefit.

3. Soft Euro-skepticism in Ukrainian Politics: “Passing Between the Raindrops” The previous paragraphs were dedicated mostly to the openly Euro-skeptic parties. Their influence on the foreign policy of Ukraine, however, was limited. In 41

42 43

Source: Central Electoral Committee of Ukraine official data (Central’na vyborcha komisiia) CVK, Accessed http://cvk.gov.ua/ (30.4.2016): a In years when the mixed electoral system was used – 50% proportional representation, 50% majoritarian constituency vote according to the first-past-the-post principle – only the proportional representation share of vote was counted. b 1994 was the only year when the elections were held on purely majoritarian basis. c Mixed electoral system employed. Vyacheslav LIKHACHEV, Right-wing extremism in Ukraine: the phenomenon of “Svoboda,” op.cit., p. 5. KIIS, “Sotsial’no-politychna sytuatsiia v Ukraini: liutyi-berezen’ 2016 roku,” Kiev International Institute of Sociology, http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=ukr&cat=reports&id=610&page=1 (1.5.2016).

UKRAINE: PRO-EUROPEAN MAJORITY AND THE CHANCES OF REVENGE

123

particular, this can be seen from the fact that no representative of one of these parties ever held the MFA office, even when the CPU (2006–2007, 2010–2013) or Svoboda (2014) participated in the ruling coalition. Yet it is clear that the Ukraine-EU relations went through different phases at different historical points, not remaining equally warm or cold over time. This brings up the question: just how Euro-skeptic, or how pro-European, were the other political forces in power? There is no universally accepted answer – at least not for all of the Ukrainian governments. According to the Ukrainian Constitution article 114 in its original edition of 1996, the president appointed all the ministers following their nomination by the PM (this was also true in 2010–2013)44. After the 2006 reform until 2010, and since 2014, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense were nominated by the president and appointed by parliament.45 Considering that, except for 2006–2007, Ukraine always had a pro-presidential ruling coalition; one may safely say that the president always had a decisive influence on the country’s foreign policy. Even in 2006–2007, when, under President Yushchenko, the majority was dominated by the Party of Regions and Yanukovych worked as the PM, the MFA seat was taken by politicians with a well-known Euro-atlantic stance, Borys Tarasiuk and Arseniy Yatseniuk. Therefore, it would be wiser to review the views of Ukrainian presidents on foreign policy rather than that of the parties. In some cases, they were clear; in others, not so much. During Victor Yuschchenko’s presidency, Ukraine took an obvious turn towards Europe; and after the Euromaidan, with Turchynov as the acting president and then Petro Poroshenko, the country’s foreign policy was doubtlessly pro-European as well. But in Ukraine, one can often hear the statement that the foreign policy under Victor Yanukovych as president was clearly “pro-Russian”. Knowing that he declined to sign the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement in November 2013, it is tempting to define the foreign policy attitudes of this politician as Euro-skeptic. Yet numerous pieces of evidence contradict this. For instance, in the first year after Yanukovych was elected president, the Ukrainian parliament passed the bill “On Grounds of Foreign and Domestic Policy”. For the first time, the bill clearly defined accession to the EU as the goal of Ukraine’s foreign policy (Article 11, paragraph 2).46 The pro-presidential party provided votes to back this bill.47 In fact, the very decision not to sign the Association Agreement was sudden and caused reactions of fury and disbelief among European partners, as described by Spiegel journalists. This decision, officially motivated by “reasons of Ukrainian national security”, was explained by Yanukovych to the President of Austria as having been taken under severe Russian pressure: “I had to urgently turn towards Moscow, but I want to keep the doors to Europe open. Please don’t

44 45 46 47

Constitution of Ukraine, June 28, 1996. Constitution of Ukraine, January 1, 2006. Law of Ukraine, “On Grounds of Foreign and Domestic Policy, 2411–17,”Rada, 1.6.2010, http://zakon3.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/2411-17/ed20100701 (1.5.2016). Verkhovna Rada “On Domestic and Foreign Policy Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, 2411VI,”Rada, 1.7.2010, http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/radan_gs09/ns_arh_golos?g_id=1317606& n_skl=6 (1.5.2016).

124

KOSTIANTYN FEDORENKO

see this as a rejection of Europe”.48 He was motivated by Putin’s move to offer both a carrot in the form of promised $12 bln in subsidies and economic benefits, and the stick of a possible trade war; since then, the Yanukovych’s conduct in talks with the EU visibly changed. All in all, Yanukovych’s behavior in his role as president is not exactly characteristic for a politician who is strictly Eurosceptic or pro-Russian. In fact, in 2013, before Putin interfered, Yanukovych had clearly pushed all-out for European integration, even causing certain dissent within his own Party of Regions.49 Yet, of course, it is also hard to describe Yanukovych as being decisively proEuropean. In fact, it seems that he pursued a foreign policy of cooperating with both Europe and Russia. And in this regard, he appears to be a follower of Leonid Kuchma, the second president of Ukraine who once had turned Yanukovych into a national-level politician by appointing him as PM in 2002. Traditionally, the foreign policy of Leonid Kuchma, who served two terms as the president of Ukraine from 1994 to 2004, is described as “multi-vector tactics”. In practice, this presumed that Kuchma did not make an “unambiguous choice of integration aspirations”, while “at least the façade of normal relations with both Eastern and Western partners” was maintained.50 In 1994, soon after the Soviet Union collapsed, Kuchma was running against then-president Leonid Kravchuk as a pro-Russian candidate – while, at that point, as Mykola Riabchuk writes, Kravchuk seemed to be the pro-Western choice.51 However, Kravchuk himself was not so firm in his attitudes; a popular Ukrainian political anecdote goes that, when offered an umbrella to go outside into the sheet rain, Kravchuk replied: “No need. I’ll just pass between the raindrops”. This is quite an accurate description of how Ukraine tried to act on the international arena for the larger part of its history as an independent state. Kuchma promised to grant Russian the official status of a state language on par with Ukrainian – an issue that always was, and to some extent remains, one of the hottest points of debate in the politics of Ukraine, and an important issue of the bilateral relations with Moscow – and strengthen ties with Russia52. His pro-Russian stance seemed to satisfy the popular demand for nostalgia, empowered by the poor economic conditions in the country. Yet his foreign policy disappointed those voters who expected a quick turn towards Russia. From a pro-Russian position, this looked as follows: “[he] continued the quarrels with Russia, widening their range. On top of fleet and gas, Ukraine claimed its ownership over foreign property and the foreign-exchange reserves of the USSR, while, in a brotherly manner, leaving Moscow to pay the 48 49

50 51 52

SPIEGEL Staff, “Summit of Failure: How the EU Lost Russia over Ukraine,” SPIEGEL International, 24.11.2014, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/war-in-ukraine-a-result-ofmisunderstandings-between-europe-and-russia-a-1004706-2.html (1.5.2016). Korrespondent, “Korrespondent vyiasnil, pochenu Yanukovich prevratilsia iz prorossiiskogo politika v evrointegratora,” Korrespondent.net, 6.9.2013, http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/ politics/1600418-korrespondent-vyyasnil-pochemu-yanukovich-prevratilsya-izprorossijskogo-politika-v-evrointegratora (1.5.2016). Sviatoslav KHOMEKO, “Epokha Kuchmy: desiat’ neodnoznachnykh rokiv,” BBC Ukraine, 9.8.2013, http://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/politics/2013/08/130809_kuchma_epoch_sx (1.5.2016). Mykola RIABCHUK, Uliublenyi pistolet pani Simpson: khronika pomaranchevoi porazky, Kiev, K.I.S., 2009, p. 33. Petro ANDRUSECHKO, “Prezydents’ki vybory po-ukrains’ky,” Ukrains’kyi jurnal,1, 2010.

UKRAINE: PRO-EUROPEAN MAJORITY AND THE CHANCES OF REVENGE

125

Soviet debts. Problems with border demarcation and delimitation emerged.”53 Soon after the 1994 elections, this dissatisfaction brought up a separatist crisis in Crimea, effectively solved by Kuchma.54 In 2003, Kuchma even released a book “Ukraine is not Russia”, where he calls Ukraine “European” numerous times, while juxtaposing it to Russia. Even so, Kuchma argues with some political scientists who “demonize Russia” and view Ukraine as “simply a field of conflict between the West and Russia, a conflict of us being either with one or with the other”, who ask “why does Ukraine not turn from the bad Russia and join the good West where they wait for us so much”. He states that the Ukrainian government “need not be either pro-Russian or proWestern; it is pro-Ukrainian.”55 To illustrate the tactics of Ukraine on the international arena during Kuchma’s rule, we shall mention the fact that in 2003, two important bills on foreign policy were passed. One, the original bill “On Grounds of the National Security of Ukraine”, proclaims in its Article 7 that “Ukraine’s integration into the European political, economic, legal space, and into the Euro-Atlantic security space” was among the “priorities of national interests” of the country.56 While the particular organizations, EU and NATO, were not mentioned (unlike in the 2010 bill passed under Yanukovych), it is clear that this bill aimed at accession to both. However, the same year, Ukraine signed the Treaty on the Formation of the Single Economic Space with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, and the same parliamentary majority had this treaty ratified the year after57. The bill that prioritized European integration was neither cancelled nor amended; it satisfied the Western partners of Ukraine, while the SES treaty satisfied Russia. We have dedicated so much attention to this approach towards Ukraine’s foreign policy because, along with the competing pro-European and pro-Russian directions, as well as the Intermarium project specifically described above, the idea of a multi-vector foreign policy is still present in the Ukrainian political discourse. The next, and final, chapter will touch existing views towards these policy projects in modern Ukraine.

4. Attitudes Towards Europe in 2016: Parties and the Public Public opinion polls provide us with an indicator of current attitudes towards European integration, as well as their shift with time. According to the Razumkov Centre data, in 2002, when their measurements started, 63% of the Ukrainians supported joining the EU while only 14% were against. This essentially confirms the statement that Kuchma was not exactly Euro-skeptic, since otherwise, issuing de facto control over major media outlets, he could have influenced public 53 54 55 56 57

Rostislav ISCHENKO, “Piat’ povodov pogovorit’ ob ukrainskikh prezidentakh,” RIA Novosti Ukraina, 4.6.2014, http://rian.com.ua/columnist/20140604/352158270.html (1.5.2016). Kost’ BONDARENKO, “Krym. Dvadsat’ let tomu nazad,” Gazeta, 17.3. 2015, http:// gazeta.ua/ru/articles/life/_krym-dvadcat-let-tomu-nazad/615657 (1.5.2016). Leonid KUCHMA, Ukraina – ne Rosiia, Moscow, Vremia, 2004, p. 136. Law of Ukraine, “On Grounds of National Security of Ukraine, 964-15,” Rada, 19.6.2003, http://zakon5.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/964-15/ed20030619 (1.5.2016). Verkhovna Rada, “Uhoda pro formuvannia Edynoho ekonomichnoho prostoru,” Rada, http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/997_990 (1.5.2016).

126

KOSTIANTYN FEDORENKO

opinion into being less pro-European. At some points in time – such as in September 2005, following the disappointment about the ineffective post-“Orange revolution” regime of Yushchenko and Tymoshenko –, the shares of EU supporters and opponents were almost equal. However, when asked whether Ukraine should join the EU in a series of polls from 2002 to 2012,58 or which direction integration should take – the EU, the Customs Union or neither – in polls from 2011 to 2015,59 the share of pro-European Ukrainians had always prevailed. At the same time, in Ukraine, there is a traditional cleavage between the regions on the issue of foreign policy, as the West is considered to be rather supportive of European integration, while the Southeast supports a pro-Russian foreign policy. As Mykola Riabchuk describes, an important shift occurred in the early 2000’s, as voters of the Central Ukraine turned from supporting proRussian candidates to being overwhelmingly pro-European.60 However, in that same essay, he also expresses the thought that the Southeast will remain predominantly pro-Russian over time.61 Yet the latest tendencies show that this situation might be subject to a change. According to one of the most recent polls, held by Rating Group in November 2015, when faced with the direct question – “If Ukraine were able to enter only one international economic union, which one of the following should it be?” – 57% of the respondents nationwide chose the EU, while 15% expressed support for the Customs Union. However, 16% remained undecided, while 12% supported some other form of a union. (There was no response option for those who would prefer to stay outside of any economic unions.)62 The answers to this question are strongly dependent on the region. In Western and Central Ukraine, an overwhelming majority of 87% and 65% respectively supports European integration. The South –contradicting the idea that Southeast Ukraine is generally pro-Russian – is in fact also rather pro-EU, with 51% of the population supporting the joining of the Union (against 14% pro-Customs Union respondents). However, in the East (Kharkiv region and the governmentcontrolled areas of Donbas), only 20% of the locals would like to join the EU, while 24% see themselves in the Customs Union. Still, these figures are almost equal. A different poll, held in March 2015 by the Razumkov Centre, sees proRussian views dominating in both the South and the East, but by relatively small margins of 5.2 and 8.4 percentage points respectively,63 thereby confirming the general tendency towards regional cohesion on the issue. Most importantly, however, the share of those undecided on their foreign policy preferences, according to the Rating Group poll, comprises 20% in the South and 33% in the East. Both the Ukrainian government and the European Union 58 59 60 61 62 63

Razumkov Centre, Chy potribno Ukraini vstupaty do Evropeis’koho Soiuzu? (dynamika, 20022012), http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=387 (1.5.2016). Razumkov Centre, Yakym integratsiinym napriamkom maie ity Ukraina? (dynamika, 2011–2015), http://www.razumkov.org.ua/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=865 (1.5.2016). Mykola RIABCHUK, “Uliublenyi pistolet pani Simpson: khronika pomaranchevoi porazky,” op.cit., 32–33. Ibid. Rating Group Ukraine, “Public Opinion Survey: Residents of Ukraine,” IRI, http:// www.iri.org/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/2015_11_national_oversample_en_combined_natl _and_donbas_v3.pdf (1.5.2016). Razumkov Centre. Yak Vy vvazhaiete, chy treba Ukraini vstupaty do Evropeis’koho Soiuzu? (regional’nyi rozpodil). http://www.uceps.org/ukr/poll.php?poll_id=1038 (1.5.2016).

UKRAINE: PRO-EUROPEAN MAJORITY AND THE CHANCES OF REVENGE

127

should understand that if these people do not see any real benefit from European integration, and if popular anti-European politicians or parties reappear in Ukraine, the country risks drifting back to a significant inter-regional cleavage on the matter foreign policy. This is especially important as the South and the East are relatively more populated than the other regions of Ukraine, and thus will maintain a high influence on any elections or referendums to come. Georgia, a long-term partner of Ukraine in the matter of European integration, knows perfectly well that popular foreign policy attitudes can change. There, after the Association Agreement did not bring any early fruits, popular support for the westward foreign policy vector started fading.64 Considering how Ukrainian economy is unlikely to recover soon after the major fall in 2014 and 2015, it is also possible that the wide consensus on the desirability of European integration will evaporate over time. In this case, both Euro-skeptic far-right and proRussian parties are expected to gain popular support. One can suggest that the EU decision to install a visa-free regime with Ukraine might be a step that could deter a foreign policy U-turn to Russia otherwise. Yet will this step be effective to keep the Ukrainian electorate on pro-European positions? A November 2015 poll of the Democratic Initiatives Fund states that 22.9% of Ukrainians view a visa-free regime as “very important”, and 33.7% “generally important”. For 17.4%, it is “not important at all” – a figure close to the share of those supporting accession to the Customs Union instead of the EU.65 In other words, if a visa-free regime is actually granted to Ukraine, almost half of the society will not consider this as a major step forward. Therefore, if economic recovery does not proceed fast enough – and there is no real reason to suspect it will – some of these people will clearly turn to the anti-European opposition, disenchanted in the current foreign policy vector. In accordance with the public position towards European integration, the majority of popular parties in Ukraine are clearly pro-European. Solidarnist’, the de facto party of president Poroshenko, states in its program that its priorities include “effective steps aimed at European and Euro-Atlantic integration, the goal of which is Ukraine’s full membership of the EU and NATO.”66 Narodnyi Front, the winner of the previous elections, then headed by the current PM Yatseniuk, constantly refers to the reforms that Ukraine is required to pass according to the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement in their party program, and states that “fulfilling a strategic course towards Euroatlantic integration” is required.67 These two parties are currently in the de facto ruling coalition, supported by the two parliamentary groups that are comprised of certain former Party of Regions members who won their majoritarian constituency vote as self-nominated politi64 65

66 67

Caucus Research Resource Centre, “Playing on traditions: Has Russia’s propaganda worked?,” Social Science in the Caucasus, Caucus Research Resource Centre, 8.2.2016, http://crrccaucasus.blogspot.com/2016/02/playing-on-traditions-has-russias.html (1.5.2016). Democratic Initiatives Fund, “Yak ukraintsi rozumiiut’ evrointegratsiiu: ochikuvannia ta nastroi suspil’stva,” Foundation for Democratic Initiatives Fund, http://www.dif.org.ua/ ua/publications/press-relizy/jak-ukrainci-rozumiyut-evrointegraciyu-ochikuvannja--ta-nas troi-suspilstva.htm (1.5.2016). Solidarnist, “Programa partii “Blok Petra Poroshenka Solidarnist,” Solydarnist.org, 2015, http://solydarnist.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/programa_solidarnist.pdf, (1.5.2016), p. 7. Narodnyi Front, “Programa “Narodnoho Frontu” – “Vidnovlennia Ukrainy,” nfront, http://nfront.org.ua/program (1.5.2016).

128

KOSTIANTYN FEDORENKO

cians.68 Previously, the coalition was comprised of all five pro-European parties that made it to the parliament. However, in its 2014 electoral program, Samopomich, often considered to be the party for pro-European middle-class Ukrainians,69 has no mentions of European integration.70 Almost the same holds true for the populist Radical Party, although they mention that an “association with the EU will allow us to market our products in Europe.”71 Bat’kivschyna, led by its unchanged leader Yulia Tymoshenko, is also relatively vague in wording, talking about “gradual integration into Europe” and the need to build a “strong democratic society of a European type” “regardless of whether Ukraine is accepted to the EU and NATO or is left beyond the frames of these integration structures.”72 Finally, the only Eurosceptic party in the parliament – the Opposition Bloc, made up of former Party of Regions politicians – have published a piece of infographic on the economic part of the Association Agreement. They qualify it as a piece of the “failed economic policy of the government” and state it should be frozen “in mid-term” in order for the Ukrainian economy to rise. They also imply that the EU market is smaller than that of the BRICS countries, with a population of 508 mln against 2.83 bln.73 To a certain extent, voicing such positions makes them more Euro-skeptic than any mainstream party in Ukraine ever was. However, considering that they are the heirs of the Party of Regions, it is quite likely that this criticism of the EU is aimed at gaining support among pro-Russian voters; but that, had the Opposition Bloc gained power, they would actually have conducted a Kuchma-style multi-vector foreign policy. That said we should understand that the next parliamentary elections in Ukraine can see the political field significantly reshaped. In particular, the Popular Front is apparently changing from a winner of the previous round of elections to a loser in the next round: polls suggest they won’t even make it past the 5% threshold. The other five parliamentary parties are expected to retain their representation, although the share of votes will differ.74 Notably, pollsters indicate that the Opposition Bloc is expected to make significant electoral gains, as compared to the 9.43% it won in October 2014. The other big change is that the party of Mikheil Saakashvili, the former president of Georgia and current governor of the Odessa region, is expected to enter parliament, and moreover, be among the most successful parties in the vote. The creation of this party wasn’t even officially announced yet; but there is hardly any doubt that Saakashvili, who constantly criticizes the government for corrup68 69 70 71 72 73 74

Olha RUDENKO, “Groysman and new ministers take charge of government,” Kyiv Post, 15.4.2016. Balász JARÁBIK, “Ukraine Votes: United in Diversity,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 24.10.2016, http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/10/27/ukraine-votes-united-indiversity (1.5.2016). Samopomich, “Programa Politychnoi partii “Ob’ednannia “Samopomich,” Samopomich, http://samopomich.ua/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/program_OS.pdf (1.5.2016). Radykal’na Partiia, “Plan Lyashka. Peremoha Ukrainy,” liashko, http://liashko.ua/ program?attempt=1 (1.5.2016). Bat’kivschyna, “Programa Vseukrains’kogo ob’ednannia “Bat’kivschyna,” Bat’kivschynakievobl.com, http://www.batkivschyna-kievobl.com.ua/ru/text/programma (1.5.2016). Opozytsiinyi Blok “Antikrizisnaia programma “Za mir I razvitie,” Opposition.org, http://opposition.org.ua/uk/zasidannya-opozicijnogo-uryadu-30032016.html (1.5.2016). RBC, “Opros: na vyborakh v Radu prezidentskaia partiia zaniala by 5-e mesto,” op. cit.

UKRAINE: PRO-EUROPEAN MAJORITY AND THE CHANCES OF REVENGE

129

tion and slow reform pace, will create a political project that he either leads or endorses for the upcoming elections. The more mistakes the government in power makes, the more votes Saakashvili, with his popular image as a reformist, shall secure for his project.

Conclusion As per 2016, Ukraine finds itself in a situation when European integration is supported by the bulk of its political class and of the electorate. After the Communist Party was banned, there is no significant openly pro-Russian party that can expect even entering the national parliament; and the idea of Intermarium as a substitute for, rather than addition to, European integration is limited to the largely unpopular far-right parties. On the backdrop of the armed conflict in Donbas, even multi-vector policy has become almost a taboo, as it presumes a cooperative attitude towards Russia. The only major party to support this foreign policy option is the Opposition Bloc, an heir to the Party of Regions that was once headed by Victor Yanukovych. This is the first time in Ukrainian history that such an overwhelming support of one direction in foreign policy is observed, which might trigger optimism from both Brussels and the EU backers in Ukraine. However, it is wrong to presume that Ukraine’s path towards Europe is determined once and for all. There is a large group of undetermined citizens – in particular, in the Southeast which tends to be the least pro-European region of Ukraine. If the government that strives towards Europe disappoints them, if the economic recovery does not come as fast as they expect, and if they see little personal benefit from the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and the visa-free regime, these voters might decide to take an anti-European stance; and all of these are likely enough. That, in turn, would create a demand for more Euro-skeptic parties, possibly bringing the country back to a situation of a regional cleavage on foreign policy matters, when a strong pro-European majority was impossible. Arguably, there has never been a pro-Russian Ukraine, and there will hardly be one, especially after the events of the last years; but a return to a multi-vector Ukraine has to be considered one of the realistic scenarios.

UKRAINE: LA MAJORITÉ PRO-EUROPÉENNE ET LES CHANCES POUR LA VENGEANCE A la suite du mouvement de protestation de 2014, un conflit armé a éclaté en Ukraine de l´Est avec les séparatistes, soutenus de l´avis général, par la Russie. Ces évènements ont consolidé le soutien massif à l´intégration européenne dans le pays. Plusieurs alternatives ont été discutées. Les partis de gauche se prononcent pour la plupart, en s´appuyant sur une nostalgie sentimentale de l´Union Soviétique, en faveur du rétablissement d´un espace politique commun avec la Russie. Le soutien à ces partis s´est réduit rapidement dans la population et en 2015, la propagande communiste a été interdite. Une autre variante de l´Euroscepticisme en Ukraine est défendue par les partis de droite. Ils condam-

130

KOSTIANTYN FEDORENKO

nent soit l´intégration européenne dans sa totalité ou plus spécifiquement le supranationalisme. Ils critiquent vivement l´Europe moderne comme passive et cosmopolite et au-delà déplore l´abandon par cette dernière de ses racines chrétiennes. En 2016, ces partis ne recueillent qu´un faible soutien. L´Euroscepticisme mou est par contre solidement enraciné dans la politique ukrainienne. De nombreux partis propagent ou pratiquent la « tactique multi-vectorielle » de la balance entre la Russie et l´Europe. Cette stratégie est certes en recul à la suite du conflit dans l´Ukraine de l´Est, mais quelques partis ukrainiens continuent de la propager.

UKRAINE: DIE PRO-EUROPÄISCHE MEHRHEIT UND DIE CHANCEN FÜR RACHE Den Protesten im Jahr 2014 folgte der bewaffnete Konflikt in der Ost-Ukraine mit Separatisten, der nach allgemeiner Auffassung von Russland unterstützt wurde. Diese Ereignisse verfestigten die massive Unterstützung für die europäische Integration im Land. Allerdings werden mehrere politische Alternativen diskutiert. Für die Wiederherstellung eines gemeinsamen politischen Raums mit Russland werben vor allem die linken Parteien, die die nostalgischen Gefühle für die Sowjetunion ausnutzen. Aber die Unterstützung dieser Parteien ließ mit der Zeit rasch nach, und 2015 wurde Propaganda für die kommunistische Herrschaft per Gesetz verboten. Eine weitere Variante des Euroskeptizismus in der Ukraine vertreten die rechten Parteien. Entweder verurteilen sie die europäische Integration insgesamt oder speziell den Supranationalismus. Sie kritisieren aktiv das moderne Europa als zu passiv und kosmopolitisch und darüber hinaus seine christlichen Wurzeln aufgebend. Aktuell, im Jahre 2016, finden diese Parteien nur wenig Unterstützung. Der weiche Euroskeptizismus schließlich ist fest in der ukrainischen Politik verwurzelt. Viele Parteien propagieren oder praktizieren die „multi-vektorielle Taktik“ der Balance zwischen Europa und Russland. Zwar wird dieser Ansatz in der Folge des Konflikts in der Ostukraine weniger unterstützt, aber einige ukrainische Parteien propagieren ihn nach wie vor.

DIE POLITISCHEN PARTEIEN ALBANIENS UND EUROPA AFRIM KRASNIQI Albanien ist seit 2009 NATO-Mitglied. Im Jahr 2014 bekam es den Status eines EU-Beitrittslandes. Seit zwei Jahren führt das Land Beitrittsverhandlungen mit der Europäischen Union (EU). Die absolute Mehrheit der Albaner sieht die europäische Integration als eine Frage von besonderer Bedeutung. Die politischen Parteien betrachten die EU-Integration übereinstimmend als nationale Priorit1. Als Albanien den Übergang zur Demokratie schaffte(1990–2015), behaupteten die albanischen politischen Eliten, dass die europäische Zugehörigkeit und die nationale Identität eng miteinander verbunden seien. Sie bauten auf einen weithin akzeptierten Konsens, demzufolge es unmöglich war, eine politische Alternative für Albanien außerhalb der EU zu gestalten. Der EU-Integrationsprozess hat somit den Entwicklungsweg aller albanischen politischen Parteien und die Gestalt des gesamten politischen Systems nach den 90er Jahren definiert2. Der Schlüssel der albanischen Haltung zu Europa ist in der kargen politischen Tradition des Landes zu finden. Der albanische Pluralismus entstand erst Anfang der 1990-er Jahre. Die albanische Politik ist tief von den autoritären Systemen des letzten Jahrhunderts geprägt, welche nur eine oder gar keine politische Parteizuließen. Nur in der sehr kurzen Zeitspanne zwischen 1921 und 1923 besaß Albanien ein echtes Mehrparteiensystem mit konkreten politischen Programmen, die mit den demokratischen Standards der Zeit einigermaßen vergleichbar waren3. Diese pluralistische Idylle dauerte nicht allzu lange. Von 1925 bis 1939 waren politische Parteien gesetzlich verboten. Während des zweiten Weltkrieges gab es einige illegale politische Kräfte, aber sie waren eher militärisch als zivilorganisiert. Das Jahr 1944 brachte die endgültige Etablierung des kommunistischen Regimes und des Einparteiensystems, das bis Dezember 1990 dauerte. Von 1944 bis 1966 war das sowjetische Vorbild Stalins das einzige Orientierungsmodell für das politische System Albaniens. In der Periode zwischen 1968 und 1976brach das Landseine Anlehnung an Moskau und entwickelte starke Bindungen zum kommunistischen China. Von 1976 bis 1990 bildete sich in Albanien ein einzigartiges politisches Modell, das aus einer weitgehenden Isolation von Ost und West und einer brutalen Regierungsform bestand. Alle Macht berief sich auf den Namen des Diktators Enver Hoxha, und die politische Vertretung wurde im Rahmen der Arbeitspartei Albaniens (PLA) vereinheitlicht4.

1 2 3 4

The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Albania, Law no. 9322, 25.11.2004. Elez BIBERAJ, Shqipëria 25 vjet pas komunizmit, Tirana, Albania Institute for International Studies, 2015. Afrim KRASNIQI, Partite politike ne Shqiperi, 1920–2006 [Die Politischen Parteien Albaniens], Tirana, Ilar, 2007. Afrim KRASNIQI, Sistemet politike ne Shqiperi 1912–2008, [Die politischen Systeme Albaniens 1912–2008], Tirana, UFO Press, 2009.

AFRIM KRASNIQI

132

Der Wandlungsprozess fing in Albanien erst mit den Studentendemonstrationen im Dezember 1990 an. Diese Demonstrationen leiteten die Etablierung des Mehrparteiensystems ein. Seit der Einführung des Pluralismus wurden in Albanien mehr als 126 politischen Parteien gegründet. Das albanische Gesetz5 verbietet die Gründung von Parteien auf ethnischer, religiöser, und lokaler Basis und die Gründung politischer Parteien außerhalb des Territoriums der Republik Albanien. Lediglich 15 der zahlreichen Parteien gelang der Einzug in das Parlament. Zurzeit sind nur acht Parteien im Parlament vertreten, von denen vier jeweils nur einen einzigen Abgeordneten stellen. Nur drei Parteien sind in der Lage, an der Bildung einer Regierung oder an ihrem Sturz effektiv mitzuwirken: die regierende Sozialistische Partei (SP), die Demokratische Partei (DP), zurzeit die größt eOppositionspartei, und die Sozialistische Bewegung für Integration (SBI). Eine kleinere politische Parteimit parlamentarischer Vertretung ist die Partei für Gerechtigkeit, Integration und Einheit (PDIU), die die Interessen der Cham Gemeinde in Albanien vertritt. Die Cham Gemeinde ist die albanische Bevölkerung, die zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen aus Griechenland vertrieben wurde.

1. Der albanische politische Pluralismus als Rennen zum „Ziel Europa“ Albaniens erste politische Begegnung mit Europa fand im Jahre 1990 statt. Bis dahin war der Verweis auf das europäische Konzept verfassungswidrig, und die offizielle Propaganda betonte eifrig, dass der Westen eine Bedrohung für Albanien sei. Der Westen wurde somit wie eine feindliche Macht behandelt6. Erst die Einführung des politischen Pluralismus ermöglichte den neu entstandenen albanischen Parteien, sich politische Identitäten anzueignen. Während der 25 Jahre der albanischen Transition ist der eher kurze Zeitabschnitt 1991–1993 der einzige Zeitraum, wo es (eigentlich minimale) programmatische Unterschiede im Verhältnis zur Europa wahrgenommen werden können. Die Europa-Orientierung wurde zu einem wesentlichen Teil der Programme der Sozialistischen Partei Albaniens (ehemalige Kommunistische Partei) und der Demokratischen Partei (die erste antikommunistische Oppositionspartei). Letztere verpflichtete sich zu einer „Politik der aktiven Beziehungen, die sich auf eine umfassende Zusammenarbeit auf der Grundlage der Gegenseitigkeit mit allen demokratischen Ländern der Welt stützt, gezielt vor allem auf die vollständige Integration Albaniens in die europäischen demokratischen Prozesse“7.Die Sozialistische Partei (SP) verpflichtete sich ihrerseits in ihrem Reformprogramm von Juni 1991, „Albanien auf eine natürliche und gediegene Weise in die Europäische Union zu integrieren ... Die SP verfolgt mit größter Aufmerksamkeit die Fortschritte in Bezug auf die Etablierung eines vereinten Europas und versucht, alle Voraussetzungen zu schaffen, die für die frühestmögliche Einbeziehung der Republik Albanien in das gemeinsame europäische Haus notwendig sind“8.. 5 6 7 8

The Political Parties Law in Albania, Law no .8580, 17.2.2000. “Introduction” in: The Constitution of the People’s Socialist Republic of Albania, Law no. 5506, 28.12.1976, p. 1. Aleksander MEKSI, Dhjetor ’90. Dokumente & Materiale,Tirana, UET Press, 2010, p. 14. Afrim KRASNIQI, Partite politike ne Shqiperi, 1920–2006.op. cit., p. 325.

DIE POLITISCHEN PARTEIEN ALBANIENS UND EUROPA

133

In den Jahren 1991 bis 1995 genießen die antikommunistisch geprägten Rechtsparteien die beinahe grenzenlose Gunst des Westens. Ihr Schlagwort war: „Albanien nach dem Abbild Europas gestalten“9. Auf der anderen Seite waren die soeben von der Macht abgesetzten Linksparteien eher skeptisch gegenüber dem Integrationsprozess eingestellt. Die Linken hatten damals nicht allzu viele Freunde unter den europäischen Regierungen. Sie neigten noch dazu, den Westen für den Zerfall des Kommunismus in Albanien zu beschuldigen. Bis 1996 hatte das Programm der Sozialistischen Partei klare Referenzen auf Karl Marx. Die SP setzte sich „für Albanien als unabhängiges Subjekt auf der internationalen Ebene“ ein. Sie behauptete, „niemals die Einmischung der fremden Mächte und ihren Einfluss zu akzeptieren, insbesondere wenn es dazu kommt zu entscheiden, was die Wahrheit sei. Das albanische Volk muss sich als einziger Entscheidungsträger in Albanien fühlen können, es muss seine Probleme nur nach seiner Meinung und seinem Willen lösen“10. Nach der Krise von 1997 und dem daraus resultierenden politischen Umschwung entwickelte sich die Beziehung von SP und DP zu Europa fast identisch. Es gibt in ihren Programmen keine wahrnehmbaren Unterschiede bezüglich der europäischen Frage. Das Engagement für die EU-Integration als nationale Priorität bleibt maßgebend in der politischen Programmatik beider Parteien. Identische politische Stellungnahmen spiegelten sich in den Regierungsprogrammen von SP und DP seit dem Jahre 1992. Es findet sich kein einziger Fall, wo eine sozialistische oder demokratische Regierung eine Alternative in Bezug auf EU-Integration formuliert hat, die das konsensuelle albanische EU-Projekt in Frage stellen könnte. Als sich Albanien der Welt öffnete (1992 – 1995), gab es weitreichende Versuche, Kontakte mit Gruppierungen, Staaten und anderen Organisationen aufzunehmen, da Albanien viel in Bezug auf internationale Beziehungen nachzuholen hatte. Das Land wurde als Mitgliedsstaat in die Islamische Konferenz aufgenommen und unterzeichnete Zusammenarbeitsvereinbarungen mit einer Reihe von Ländern, unteranderem mit Russland. Diese und andere politische Handlungen, jeweils in Absprache und im Einvernehmen mit den wichtigsten westlichen Partnern Albaniens, hatten keinen Einfluss auf den albanischen Kurs in Bezug auf Europa.

2. Politische Unterstützung für Europa Keine von den 66 politischen Parteien, die an den letzten Parlamentswahlen (2013) teilgenommen haben, hält oder fördert politischen Ansichten, die der Europäischen Union und den „europäischen Werten“ kritisch gegenüberstehen. „Europa“ als politisches, wirtschaftliches, kulturelles und soziales Konzept wird einstimmig als die einzige Alternative gesehen, als eine einvernehmliche politische und nationale Agenda. Aus diesem Grund gibt es unter den albanischen Parteien keine wesentlichen programmatischen Unterschiede in Bezug auf die Ausrichtung auf die europäische Integration und auf die gemeinsamen europäi9 10

Elez BIBERAJ, Albania in Transition – A Rocky Road to Democracy, Colorado, Westview Press, 1999, p. 17. Programi politik i Partise Socialiste, Rilindja, [Das politische Porgramm der SP], 1994, p. 3.

134

AFRIM KRASNIQI

schen Werte11. Das europäische Modell/das Konzept des europäischen Standards ist weitgehend in die Gesetzgebung und in den albanischen politischen Diskurs eingegliedert. Eine Analyse12 der wichtigsten Gesetze, die von dem albanischen Parlament in den Jahren 2005–2012 verabschiedet wurden, zeigt, dass alle Bezugnahmen der parlamentarischen Ausschüsse, des Ministerrats oder der zuständigen Ministerien auf ihre Handlungen, Gesetzentwürfe und Vorschläge sich auf Schlagwörter wie „europäische Normen“, „europäische Herausforderungen“ und „Europäische Integration“ berufen. Die europäische Zugehörigkeit Albaniens ist ein bevorzugtes Thema, das eng mit den Wahlprogrammen und dem Wahlverhalten der albanischen Parteien verbunden ist. Seit dem Jahr 1991 zeigen albanische Wähler maximale Unterstützung für die Idee des Vereinigten Europas und die europäische Integration. 1991 war der dominante Wahlslogan „Wir wollen Albanien wie Europa machen“. Die Worte „Europa“13 und „Integration“ sind zwischen 1996 und 2002 oft in den Wahlslogans der wichtigsten politischen Parteien zu finden. Dies war die Zeit, als die Unterstützung der Bevölkerung für das europäische Projekt mit 94–96%ihrenHöhepunkt erreichte. Seit 2003 wird das Niveau der Unterstützung der Albaner für den Beitrittsprozess zur EU regelmäßig erforscht. Die folgende Tabelle zeigt das Unterstützungsniveau der albanischen Bevölkerung für die EU-Integration in den Jahren 2003–201514. Der Tiefpunkt wurde im Jahre 2014 mit 77% registriert. Die Höchstquote von 95% wurde im Jahre 2008 registriert. Die Tabelle macht ersichtlich, dass die Alternative, der Europäischen Union beizutreten, eine kontinuierlich starke Unterstützung hat. Die politischen Parteienkönnen nicht umhin, diesen Erwartung ihrer Wähler in ihren Wahlprogrammen gerecht zu werden. Wenn eine politische Partei es wagen würde, mit einer EU-kritischen Plattform an den Wahlen teilzunehmen, hätte sie minimale Chancen, viele Stimmen zu gewinnen15.

11 12

14 15

Tonin GJURAJ, Nova Demokratia. 15 ese mbi tranzicionin dhe për demokratizimin, Tirana, UET Press, 2015. The monitoring of Albanian parliament”, Albanian Institute of Political Studies, Tirana, 2014, www.isp.com.al (2.3.2016). Afrim KRASNIQI,”Albanian Transition–The Contrast Between Eastern Mentality and European Identity,” International Journal of Research and Development, 1, 1, 2014. Die europäische Perspektive Albaniens – Wahrnehmungen und Realitäten, Albanian Institute for International Studies, Tirana, 2012. Afrim KRASNIQI, “Voting behaviour: Who do Albanians vote for?”, ILLYRIUS, 3, 2013, p. 141–167.

DIE POLITISCHEN PARTEIEN ALBANIENS UND EUROPA

135

Tabelle 116

Die relative Verringerung der Unterstützung für die EU-Integration (in den Jahren 2009, 2011, 2014) ist mit spezifischen psychologischen und politischen Phänomenen verbunden. In jenen Jahren warben die politischen Parteien intensiv mit verschiedenen Wahlversprechen um die Gunst des Publikums: im Jahre 2009 war der Status des Kandidatenlandes das große Versprechen; im Jahre 2011 wurde die Liberalisierung des Visa-Regimes versprochen, im 2014 handelte es sich um die Einladung, Kandidatenland zu werden. In allen Fällen behaupteten die Parteien, dass die Erfüllung dieser Versprechen wesentliche Veränderungen für das Leben der Bürger und die Qualität der Demokratie bringen würden. In allen drei Fällen haben die Bürger feststellen müssen, ungeachtet der Begeisterung des Augenblicks, dass keine sichtbaren Ergebnisse erzielt wurden und dass ihre jeweiligen vorrangigen Probleme keine konkrete Lösung fanden. Trotz aller Probleme, einschließlich des wachsenden Euroskeptizismus, und trotz aller Angriffe gegen Albanien durchrechtsextreme Parteien in Frankreich, den Niederlanden, Italien, Griechenland und anderen Ländern, hat sich das Niveau der Unterstützung der EU-Integration nicht wesentlich vermindert. Die Albaner unterstützen das Projekt Europa weiter. Sie betrachten die europäische Krise als eine Übergangskrise und die politische Union mit Brüssel als den Höhepunkt der Geschichte des albanischen Staates und der albanischen Nation17.

3. Politische Parteien: aktuelle Ausrichtung und Projektionen für die Zukunft Die Demokratische Partei Albaniens (DP) ist die wichtigste Partei der rechten Mitte. DP hat das Land zwischen 1992–1997 und 2005–2013 regiert und ist derzeit die wichtigste Oppositionskraft. Die Demokratische Partei hat eine durchaus 16 17

Quelle: Annual reports (AIIS) “Perspektiva Evropiane e Shqipërisë. Perceptime dhe Realitete 2003–2012” and IDM “Opinion Polls: Trust in governance 2012–2016”) Die europäische Perspektive Albaniens – Wahrnehmungen und Realitäten, AIIS, op. cit.

136

AFRIM KRASNIQI

positive Bilanz in Bezug auf das Thema „Europa“, die auf Nachhaltigkeit und Kontinuität baut. Die Analyse der Wahlprogramme (1992–2015) der Demokratischen Partei lässt keinen Zweifel in Bezug auf ihr europäisches Engagement. Während der Regierungszeit der DP wurde die Mitgliedschaft Albaniens in der KSZE (OSZE), dem Europarat und der NATO erreicht. Zu dieser Zeit wurden die Verhandlungen über die EU-Mitgliedschaft formell eingeleitet. Die offizielle pro-europäische Linie der Demokratischen Partei fiel gewissen Abweichungen anheim. Sie waren die Folge interner politischer Krisen und der Aussicht auf bessere Wahlergebnisse, die sich durch diese Abweichungen verwirklichen ließen.1996 und 1997 unterstützte die DP die Forderungen nach einer Eskalation der nationalistischen Bewegung im Kosovo und übte deutliche Kritik an der internationalen Gemeinschaft wegen der kritischen Berichte der OSZE und EU über die albanischen Parlamentswahlen des Jahres 199618. Weitere kritische Stellungnahmen gegenüber der internationalen Gemeinschaft und einigen EU-Regierungen wurden in den Jahren 2000–2001 und 2012–2013 beobachtet. Diese waren weitgehend auf kurzfristige Wahlinteressen zurückzuführen. Auf lange Sicht wird nicht erwartet, dass die DP ihren programmatischen Kurs in Bezug auf die EU wesentlich ändern wird, indem sie weiterhin kritisches und oppositionelles Verhalten gegenüber Europa, seinen Werten, Identität und Standards zur Schau stellt. Das gleiche Fazit gilt auch für andere, aus der DP stammende Parteien oder für Parteien desselben politischen Spektrums, wie die Republikanische Partei (RP) die Christdemokratische Partei (PDK) oder andere politische außerparlamentarische Gruppierungen wie die Neue Demokratische Geist (FRD). Die Sozialistische Partei (SP) ist die größte Partei der Linken in Albanien. Die Sozialisten regierten das Land in den Jahren 1997–2005 und nach dem Jahre 2013. Die Sozialistische Partei ist derzeit die wichtigste Regierungskraft Albaniens. Sie folgt einer ausgesprochen pro-europäisch strukturierten programmatischen Ausrichtung. Es gibt gute Gründe zu behaupten, dass diese Orientierung ein wesentliches Teil ihrer langfristigen politischen Identität sein wird. In den frühen 1990er Jahren stand die SP dem europäischen Projekt kritisch gegenüber, vor allem wegen der vorherrschenden Mentalität der „absoluten Souveränität“ und der „Nicht-Einmischung in die inneren Angelegenheiten Albaniens“19. Mitte der 1990er Jahren reformierte die Sozialistische Partei ihr Programm und ihr politisches Verhalten der EU gegenüber. Ihre europäische Ausrichtung wurde nicht mehr in Frage gestellt und entwickelte sich im Weiteren einheitlich mit der EUOrientierung der Demokratischen Partei Albaniens, so dass keine Unterschiede im politischen Verhalten und in öffentlichen Stellungsnahmen beider Parteien wahrgenommen werden können. Die Wahlbedürfnisse haben in gewissen Momenten die SP dazu gebracht, Brüssel und dem westlichen Engagement in Albanien kritisch gegenüberzustehen, vor allem in den Jahren 1991–1993, 1995–1996, 2005 und 2009. In der Regel handelte sich eher um vereinzelte Fälle, in denen die Unzufriedenheit in Bezug auf Europa die Oberhand gewann, als um kritische politische Plattformen gegen Europa. Das Verhaltens der SP gegenüber den europäischen Institutionen ähnelt 18 19

Observation of the Parliamentary Elections Held in the Republic of Albania”, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Warsaw, 1996. Afrim KRASNIQI, Partite politike ne Shqiperi, 1920–2006, op. cit., p. 325.

DIE POLITISCHEN PARTEIEN ALBANIENS UND EUROPA

137

im Grunde demjenigen der DP: Wenn Brüssel Kritik an der linken Regierung ausübte, gab es eventuell eine kritische Auseinandersetzung der SP mit Brüssel. Auf lange Sicht wird die SP höchstwahrscheinlich ihren europäischen Kurs unverändert beibehalten und die EU-Mitgliedschaft weiter als politische Priorität der nationalen Agenda betrachten. Diese Bemerkungen gelten übrigens auch für die kleineren Parteien, die das linksstehende politische Spektrum bilden: die Sozialistische Bewegung für Integration (SBI), die dritte politische Kraft im Parlament, die Sozialdemokratische Partei (PSD), die Partei für Sozialdemokratie (PDS), die Gruppierung 99 (G99), usw. Für alle oben genannten Parteien, (die in den Jahren 1991–2017 mehr als 90% der parlamentarischen Vertretung stellen) gelten die gleichen deskriptiven Merkmale: Die DP ist Mitglied der EVP, SP und SBI sind Mitglieder der Sozialisten im Europäischen Parlament. Keine der beiden Seiten hat offizielle Beziehungen oder Kontakte mit politischen Parteien in Russland. Hingegen haben sie aktive Partnerschaften mit Schwesterparteien in Italien, Griechenland und Deutschland, und „Europa“ wird häufig als positive Referenz in ihren Wahlslogans und in ihren politischen Grundsatzprogrammen genutzt. Außerhalb der Hauptströmungen des politischen Spektrums Albaniens liegen einige kleinere politische Parteien. Die meisten haben eine ähnliche Orientierung gegenüber Europa wie die traditionellen Parteien, andere könnten in der Zukunft potenziell eine kritische Ausrichtung gestalten. Insbesondere ist die Partei für Gerechtigkeit, Einheit und Integration (PDIU), eine kleinere Partei mit stabiler Wählerschaft eine gute Kandidatin dafür. Die PDIU vertritt die Interessen der Cham-Bevölkerung, eine Gemeinschaft von Albanern, die zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen aus Griechenland vertrieben wurden. Die Chams sind zurzeit das wichtigste ungelöste Problem zwischen Albanien und Griechenland. Die PDIU spricht meistens Wähler auf der rechten Seite des politischen Spektrums an, beteiligt sich aber an allen Regierungen – ein Trend, der sich sehr wahrscheinlich auch in der Zukunft fortsetzen wird. Weder hat die PDIU einEU-kritisches Programm, noch ist zu erwarten, dass sie ein solches in der Zukunft erarbeiten wird. Sie wird aber jederzeit ihre kritische Haltung gegenüber Griechenland beibehalten. Die starke nationalistische Rhetorik der PDIU gegen Griechenland wird sich auch in Zukunft fortsetzen, insbesondere, wenn es darum geht, die Stimmen der nationalistisch geprägten Wähler zu mobilisieren – ein Trend, der in fast allen Balkanländern beobachtet worden ist. Es gibt des Weiteren noch kleinere Parteien, wie zum Beispiel die Union für Menschenrechte (PBDNJ), die Partei der griechischen Minderheit in Albanien. Dazu kommen die Bewegung für Nationale Entwicklung (MND) und die Gruppierungen der ehemaligen pro-westlichen Parteien aus dem Zweiten Weltkrieg: die Nationale Front und die Legalitätspartei (eine royalistische Organisation zur Unterstützung der ehemaligen königlichen Familie Albaniens). Alle haben prowestliche politische Programme. Es ist nicht zu erwarten, dass sie in der Zukunft von dem europäischen Kurs abweichen werden.

AFRIM KRASNIQI

138 Tabelle 220

Unterstützungsniveau für Europa unter den albanischen Parteien 1 – Minimale Unterstützung. 10 – Maximale Unterstützung

Das politische Verhalten der albanischen Parteien ist von einem Phänomen gekennzeichnet, das sie alle betrifft, unabhängig von ihrer Zugehörigkeit innerhalb des politischen Spektrums. Wenn sie nahe daran sind, an die Macht zu kommen, sind sie durchaus korrekt gegenüber dem europäischen Projekt. Andererseits reagieren sie kritisch dem europäischen Rat gegenüber, wenn sie an die Macht kommen und wenn sich Probleme in der Staatsführung zeigen oder wenn sie kritisiert werden, oft im Namen der Souveränität. Die Tabelle 2 zeigt die Höhen und Tiefen der Unterstützung für Europader zwei großen albanischen Parteien über eine Zeitspanne von 25 Jahren. Die Vergleichsdaten zwischen den beiden großen Parteien zeigen, dass das Niveau der Unterstützung sich häufig ändert, abhängig von den Wahlen und der politischen Entwicklungen im Land. Zur Zeit des Systemwechsels wies die Demokratische Partei maximale Unterstützung für Europa auf. 25 Jahren danach weisen SP und DP dasselbe Unterstützungsniveau auf. In der Regel funktioniert die Regierung reibungslos, wenn eine regierende Partei maximale Unterstützung aus den europäischen Kanzleien bekommt. Die bringt die andere Seite dazu, eine kritische und misstrauische Haltung zur Schau zu stellen. Das Jahr 1991, die Krise von 1997, die Krise des Jahres 2004 und die Krise von 2010–2011 verweisen auf einige Höhepunkte der kritischen Stellung einiger albanischen Parteien in Bezug auf den Westen. Im Jahr 1991 war die regierende Linke dazu geneigt, die europäische Unterstützung für die Opposition als eine negative Entwicklung für die Souveränität des Landes zu lesen. Im Jahr 1997 betrachteten die regierenden Demokraten ihren Sturz aus der Macht als Teil einer großen Verschwörung europäischer Mächte. Als im Jahr 2004 die sozialistische Regierung in politische Korruptionsskandale verstrickt wurde, die genügend Anlass zu einigen kritischen Berichten der in20

Quelle: Partite dhe Evropa, ulje e ngritje: Instituti i Studimeve Politike, 2016.

DIE POLITISCHEN PARTEIEN ALBANIENS UND EUROPA

139

ternationalen Gemeinschaft gaben, betrachteten die Sozialisten dies als einen direkten Versuch der Rotation der Macht in Albanien. Die politische Krise der Jahre 2010–2011 wurde von heftigen politischen Auseinandersetzungen begleitet. Die Verhandlungen, die von den zwei großen politischen Gruppen des europäischen Parlamentes gesponsert wurden, scheiterten. Es gab kritische Berichte über die Anti-Regierungs-Proteste und die politische Gewalt, die damals in Tirana aufbrach. Was aus dieser Analyse der politischen Haltung der beiden großen Parteien in Bezug auf die EU und ihre Unterstützung zu entnehmen ist, ist eng mit der folgenden wiederholten Erfahrung verbunden: Wann immer es große Ausfälle in der Innenpolitik gibt, werden diese von den lokalen Akteuren eindeutig als direkte Folge des Druckes auf Albanien, der zwecks Umsetzung externer Szenarien fremder Mächte ausgeübt wird, denunziert. Das heißt, wiederholtes internes Scheitern wird als Verantwortung/Fehler Europas betrachtet und niemals als Folge der schlechten Regierungsführung. Die Tendenz, lokale Ausfälle auf die europäischen Staaten und Politiker zu übertragen und so den Westen dafür verantwortlich zu machen, ist ein klares Zeichen der Strukturschwäche der albanischen politischen Bildung und noch dazu eine negative Investition in die albanische bürgerliche und politische Kultur. Des Weiteren sind Anhänger der Parteien in Ländern wie Albanien leider allzu geneigt, das zu glauben, was ihnen von ihren Führern als Wahrheit serviert wird, auch wenn diese auf der Suche nach einem Alibi für ihre eigenen Fehler reine Propaganda machen. Aus diesem Grundbescheren sich albanische politische Führer gerne nominal übereuropäische Politiker, Diplomaten oder bestimmte Staaten der Europäischen Union, um so der Masse der Parteianhänger eine Zielscheibe für die weitverbreitete Frustration mit der Lage in Albanien anbieten zu können. Die Erfahrung hat gezeigt, dass diese Taktik bei den politischen Anhängern gut funktioniert, und dass sie ihren Führern weitgehende Unterstützung in einer Schmutzkampagne geben, wer auch immer deren Zielobjekt ist.

4. Akteure und Phänomene: Kritisches Potenzial für die Zukunft Albanien ist immer noch eine kleine und zerbrechliche Demokratie, die in vielen wichtigen Bereichen weiterabhängig von den westlichen Einflüssen bleibt21. Externe Akteure waren und bleiben entscheidend für die Erfassung und Durchführung politischer Agenden auf der nationalen Ebene. Obwohl Albanien seine etablierten verfassungsrechtlichen Institutionen hat, ist das Einflusspotenzial externer Akteure (US-Botschafter, EU-Botschafter, die Botschafter von Deutschland, Großbritannien oder OSZE) weiterhin oft größer als die Wirkung einheimischer Institutionen. Fast alle großen politischen Krisen des Landes sind durch Verhandlungen von Botschaftern gelöst worden. Die täglichen Aktivitäten der Botschafter werden zu Hauptnachrichten in den Medien, und ihre Unterstützung gilt als wichtige Voraussetzung, die Gunst der Wähler für Parteien oder den Hauptkandidaten zu beeinflussen.

21

Elez BIBERAJ, “Demokracia shqiptare në 25 vjet. Sfida dhe mundësi,” [Albanischen Demokratie in 25 Jahren. Herausforderungen und Chancen], Gazeta Telegraf, 27.4.2015.

140

AFRIM KRASNIQI

Da die diplomatischen Vertreter natürlich vor allem die politischen Prioritäten ihrer Länder vertreten, werden die Legitimität der Auswirkungen ihrer Intervention und die Realität ihres allgegenwärtigen Einflusses auf die albanische Politik regelmäßig zum Objekt lebendiger Diskussionen. Es steht jedoch fest, dass die albanischen Bürger große Erwartungen an die westlichen Diplomaten haben. Das kann als eine Art Sicherheitsmechanismus betrachtet werden, wodurch die albanischen Bürger sicherstellen wollen, dass die Handlungen der albanischen Politiker im Einklang mit den Empfehlungen aus Washington, Brüssel und Berlin bleiben. Das albanische Verhältnis zu dieser eigentümlich positiven Wahrnehmung „des westlichen Rates“ hat sich mit der Zeit wesentlich verändert: Wurde Anfang der 1990er Jahre alles Westliche bedingungslos akzeptiert22, ist die Einstellung der politischen Parteien und Bürger in den letzten zehn Jahren in Bezug auf Europa pragmatischer und selektiver geworden. Das Verhalten des Westens hat sich auch geändert. Zu Beginn des politischen Übergangs zur Demokratie von Albanienkonzentrierte sich die Botschaft des Westens auf die Konzepte der Demokratie und der pluralistischen Werte. In den letzten zehn Jahren ist die Rede eher von der Notwendigkeit, die Stabilität Albaniens zu gewährleisten. Die „westlichen“ Standards werden von den politischen Parteien nicht einheitlich verstanden. Auf der anderen Seite sind die Europäer politisch gespalten in ihrer Unterstützung für die junge albanische Demokratie. Die EVP unterstützt weiterhin sehr stark die rechten politischen Kräfte Albaniens, während die Sozialisten im Europäischen Parlament die albanischen Sozialisten ebenso intensiv unterstützten. Diese europäische Schwarz-Weiß Trennung nach politischen Linien hat die Wirkung der europäischen Botschaft auf die albanische Politik eindeutig geschwächt und noch dazu beigetragen, dass die albanischen Parteien eine zunehmend pragmatische und wählerische Haltung in Bezug auf Europa einnehmen, die vollständig von ihren eigenen kurzfristigen Interessen bestimmt wird. Als Beispiel dazu dient das Ersuchen beider großen politischen Parteien Albaniens (DP und SP) nach internationaler Vermittlung für die Lösung der Wahlkrisen von 2009 und 2011. In beiden Fällen lehnten die Parteien das westliche Angebot für Vermittlung durch die EVP oder durch die PES/SPE klar ab. Im Jahre 2015 forderten die Rechten und die Linken eine aktive Rolle der internationalen Gemeinschaft für die Verabschiedung des Entkriminalisierungsgesetzes und für das Gelingen der Justizreform. Trotz allem nahmen die beiden Seiten scharf entgegengesetzte Stellungen ein in Bezug auf die Ratschläge, die sie von den jeweiligen europäischen Partnern und Vermittlern bekamen. Alle Ratschläge wurden durch eine politische Linse beobachtet. Es ging den Parteien offensichtlich nicht darum, sich mit dem Kern des angebotenen Ratschlages auszusetzen, sondern diesen nach rechts und links einzuordnen, je nachdem, ob er von der EVP oder von den europäischen Linken gegeben wurde. Die zunehmenden Debatten innerhalb der EU über die weitere EU-Erweiterung und über die wachsenden wirtschaftlichen und politischen Probleme in der Region (Wirtschaftskrise , Migrationswelle, usw.) schaffen gute Voraussetzungen für das Gedeihen populistisch und nationalistisch eingestellter Parteien 22

Bashkim GJERGJI, E duam Shqipërinë si gjithë Evropa.Në Shqipëria midis lindjes dhe perëndimit [Wir wollen Albanien wie Europa], Studime Albanologjike, UT-FHF, 2014, p. 286.

DIE POLITISCHEN PARTEIEN ALBANIENS UND EUROPA

141

in Albanien. Alle Länder in der Region nehmen das Potenzial dieser negativen Entwicklungen wahr, und Albanien ist keine Ausnahme. Das Potenzial für die Verschlechterung der Lage in Albanien ist hauptsächlich auf drei bestimmte Dimensionen bezogen: Nationalismus, Anti-Globalisierung und Religion. Das albanische Gesetz über politische Parteien verbietet ausdrücklich die Gründung von religiösen Parteien, aber trotzdem gibt es in Albanien drei oder vier politische Parteien mit auffällig religiösem Charakter. Unter ihnen sind auch kleinere Parteien, die in der Zukunft beim Versuch, mehr Stimmen von den religiösen Anhängern zu werben, sich dem EU-Projekt gegenüber negativ entwickeln könnten. In letzter Zeit sind in Albanien neue Parteien mit muslimischer religiöser Orientierung gegründet worden (die Heimatpartei und die Union Albanischer Muslime). Derzeit haben diese Parteien eine pro-westliche Haltung. Es ist sehr wahrscheinlich, dass diese Parteien in den kommenden Jahren mehr Anhänger gewinnen werden. Die Entwicklungen in der Region scheinen diesen Trend zu favorisieren. Die Heimatpartei nimmt öfter kritische und angriffslustige Stellung zu verschiedenen westlichen Ländern, insbesondere zu europäischen Volksparteien. Es ist möglich, dass sich diese Haltungen in der Zukunft radikalisieren werden, vor allem, wenn es darum gehen wird, mehr Wähler zu gewinnen, und mehr Unterstützung von politischen Kreisen und Wählern zu bekommen, die gegenüber der EU und der europäischen Identität kritisch eingestellt sind. Besonders besorgniserregend ist die Tatsache, dass das Modell „Erdogan“ als Leitbild eines „energischen Führers“, „dominanten Vormannes“, „Verteidigers der Interessen des Landes“, des „Garanten der Stabilität“ zu Lasten der Demokratie auch in vielen albanischen Parteien aktiv gefördert wird, SP und DP nicht ausgeschlossen. Mehrere andere kleinere Parteien, einschließlich PDIU, die RotSchwarze Allianz oder Heimatpartei, wollen es gar nicht herunterspielen, dass sie Inspiration in Erdogan finden, dass sie ihr politisches Handeln nach ihm modellieren, dass sie Unterstützung von verschiedenen EU-kritischen Kreisen in der Türkei angefordert und erhalten haben (einschließlich finanzieller Unterstützung). Als Erdogan im Jahr 2015 Albanien besuchte, wurde einer seiner größten Versammlungen informell von der PDIU und ihren Anhängern organisiert. Die meisten albanischen Parteien halten keine allzu hohen Standards der internen Demokratie in Ehren, und die Parteiführer werden ständig der Filzokratie und der nahezu unbegrenzten Machtgier bezichtigt. Angesichts dieser Situation kann man leicht verstehen, dass in Albanien in Bezug auf das europäische Modell vieles falsch dargestellt und gewichtet wird und dass die Albaner die Rolle und die Erwartungen der EU nicht erkannt haben. Die könnte eindeutig den Weg zu Krise, Misstrauen und Erschöpfung vom Warten auf Europa ebnen. Zusätzlich zur Tendenz der großen albanischen Parteien, ab und zu einen Vorteil aus der nationalistischen Rhetorik zu ziehen (Zum Beispiel setzte die DP im Jahr 2012 auf die nationalistische Karte, um ihre politische Überlegenheit zu bewahren. Auf der anderen Seite, spielte die SP die nationalistische Karte im Jahr 2014 nach dem Vorfall im Fußballspiel mit Serbien.) gibt es Parteien, die rein nationalistisch aufgestellt sind. Das ist sicherlich der Fall bei der Rot-und-Schwarz Allianz, die zurzeit keine parlamentarische Vertretung hat und vor allem unter den nationalistischen Gruppen aktiv um Unterstützung wirbt. In der Zukunft wird diese Partei versuchen, ihre Vorteile zu maximieren, und jede Gelegenheit dazu nutzen, ungeachtet der Kosten ihre Wählerschaft durch

142

AFRIM KRASNIQI

nationalistische Thesen zu vergrößern. Davon wird sich die Rot-und-Schwarz Allianz sicherlich nicht von Albaniens EU-Verpflichtungen oder weiteren politischen Konditionalitäten abhalten lassen. Die nationalistische Kartewird des Weiteren auch von anderen kleinen Parteien gespielt, etwa PDIU oder die alten konservativen Parteien, wie zum Beispiel die Nationale Front und die Royalisten. Der albanische Nationalismus übt seine Anziehungskraft auch auf die jüngere Generation aus, die darin eine Antwort auf die Probleme der Arbeitslosigkeit, Aussichtslosigkeit, Enttäuschung und Korruption zu finden glaubt. Der Anteil neuer sozialer Bewegungen in der politischen Szene Albaniens hat sich in den letzten Jahren wesentlich erhöht. Auffallend sind vor allem die jugendlichen Bewegungen, die sich gegen ausländisches Kapital im Land und gegen den Trend der Integrationsreformen orientieren. Sie sind der Meinung, der politische Druck nach Integration habe die eigentlichen Prioritäten Albaniens, die mit den Prioritäten der Bürger übereinstimmen, in den Hintergrund verschoben. Sie sehen die politischen Entscheidungsträger Albaniens als Vasallen der westlichen Politik, und sie kritisieren die europäischen Konditionalitäten für Albanien. Diese Gruppen konnten bei mehreren lokalen Protesten ihre Ziele durchsetzen. Der Erfolg der jugendlichen Bewegung gegen die Einfuhr syrischer chemischer Waffen nach Albanien (Oktober 2015) ist ein gutes Beispiel dafür. Im Allgemeinen sind einige der sozialen Bewegungen negativ gegenüber Reformen und den Fortschrittsberichten aus Brüssel eingestellt, vor allem im Bereich der großen politischen und Verfassungsreformen. Es ist sehr wahrscheinlich, dass das Engagement für soziale Probleme seitens dieser Zivilgruppen in der Öffentlichkeit eine zunehmende Wirkung zeitigen wird. Die sozialen Bewegungen haben noch keine Ambitionen geäußert, zu politischen Bewegungen zu werden, aber diese Option kann in der nahen Zukunft nicht ausgeschlossen werden.

Herausforderungen Das Verhältnis zwischen Brüssel und Albanien und die EU-Integrationspolitik sind nicht nur mit lokalen Faktoren sondern auch mit regionalen Realitäten verbunden. Nachrichten über Verzögerungen der Integrationsprozesse des Kosovo werden in Tirana äußerst negativ reflektiert. Anders steht es im Falle von Mazedonien oder Montenegro, wo es ebenfalls große albanische Gemeinschaften leben. Trotz aller Entwicklungen wird Kosovo weithin als ein wesentliches Teil der nationalen Prioritäten und der nationalen Identität betrachtet. Die europäischen Hauptereignisse der letzten Jahre (die Zunahme einer kritischer Haltung gegenüber der EU-Erweiterung, das Fehlen eines EU-Erweiterungsbeauftragten, das Fehlen konkreter Integrationsprozesse, die Wirtschaftskrise, die Flüchtlingskrise, die sicherheitsbedingten Folgen des Krieges gegen den Terrorismus) haben negative Auswirkungen auf die Wahrnehmung der EU durch die albanischen Bürger: Mehr und mehr sind sie der Meinung, dass es immer schwieriger wird, Albaniens Teilnahme am EU-Integrationsprozess zu gewährleisten. Die wachsende Skepsis über Albaniens Aussichten auf eine erfolgreiche Integration in die EU hat zurzeit keine Wirkung auf die Unterstützung

DIE POLITISCHEN PARTEIEN ALBANIENS UND EUROPA

143

der Albaner für Europa. Wenn sich die EU-Krise verschärft, wird sich dies aber auf jedem Fall in der Unterstützung der albanischen Wähler für die pro-europäischen Plattformen und Parteien widerspiegeln. Das ist ein guter Grund dafür, Albanien klare Botschaften der Ermutigung in Bezug auf seine künftige EU-Mitgliedschaft zu senden. Diese Ermutigung sollte aber unter der Bedingung erteilt werden, dass Albanien verstehen soll, dass die Standards der Mitgliedschaft die eigentlichen demokratischen Standards für Albanien und seine Bürger sind. Das zweite Problem betrifft das Verhältnis zwischen Brüssel auf der einen Seite und den albanischen Bürgern und ihre Elite auf der anderen. Einer der größten Nachteile des albanischen politischen Überganges ist die Tatsache, dass die regierenden Eliten immer noch dieselben sind, aber die Bürgereben nicht. Leider macht das keinen fühlbaren Unterschied bezüglich der Eliten23, weil die Bürger gar keine praktische Gelegenheit haben, sie zu wechseln. Die Eliten bedienen sich der EU-Integration eher als Wahlkarte denn als eine Plattform des Denkens und Handelns. Die Interessen der albanischen Eliten werden kaum vom Ausfall des Integrationsprozesses, von den Verzögerungen des Integrationsprozesses oder von dem Phänomen der Ermüdung über die EU-Erweiterung betroffen. Vielmehr profitieren sie von solchen Phänomenen, da diese ihnen eine gute Gelegenheit anbieten, ihre Verantwortung auf dritte Faktoren zu verschieben. Zwischen dem Begriff der politischen Stabilität und dem Konzept der funktionalen Demokratie (beide Themen sind dominant in der EU-Wahrnehmung albanischer Bürger und in ihren Erwartungen an die EU-Integration)muss eine effektive Verbindung geschaffen werden. Dazu bedarf es Mechanismen transparenter Entscheidungsfindung, Beratung und weitere Maßnahmen, die es ermöglichen, dass die Bürger vom Integrationsprozess profitieren, und nicht die alten politischen Eliten. In den letzten Jahren hat sich eine ziemlich verbreitete Hypothese in den politischen Medien breit gemacht: Es wird vermutet, dass die albanische Elite im Grunde gegen die EU-Integration sei, weil sie in einemoffenem und transparenten Wertesystem, mit klaren Mechanismen der Entscheidungsfindung alles zu verlieren und nichts zu gewinnen habe. Die neue Generation der albanischen Bürger hat die kommunistische Epoche nicht miterlebt. Sie hat weder ihre Isolation noch ihre extreme Armut durchhalten müssen. Ihr wurden auch viele negative Erscheinungen der frühen 1990er Jahre erspart. Die jungen Albaner von heute haben eindeutig höhere Erwartungen an das Leben und höhere Ansprüche an eine bessere Lebensqualität. Dazu können sie pragmatischer in ihren politischen Entscheidungen sein als die sowohl idealistischen als auch parteilich gesinnten Jugendlichen der 1990er. Dieser Altersgruppe reichen einfache Integrationsslogans nicht. Ihre Ansprüche sind konkret, und ihre Erwartungen werden durch das Angebot der traditionellen politischen Parteien nicht erfüllt. Wenn diese Erwartungen nicht ernsthaft in Betracht gezogen werden, dann könnten einige von ihnen nach neuen Wegen suchen, einschließlich der neuen sozialen Bewegungen, der nationalistischen Angebote, und der religiösen oder kulturellen Identitäten. Ihre Probleme bedürfen einer tieferen, komplexeren, und langfristigen Einsicht als dies zurzeit der Fall 23

Shinasi A. RAMA,”Failed Transition, Elite Fragmentation and the parliamentary Elections of June29 1997”, International Journal of Albanian Studies, 1, 1, 1999, p. 3

144

AFRIM KRASNIQI

ist. Für Albanien, wie für alle Länder der Region, welche dieselbe Problematik teilen, bleibt das eine große Herausforderung.

THE POLITICAL PARTIES OF ALBANIA AND EUROPE The reference to “EU Integration” remains a recurring theme on the public and political agenda of post-communist Albania. In contrast to other countries of the former Eastern Bloc, no political grouping, organization or party has ever had anything to say against the integration process as such. This study illustrates that Albania's political and social consensus concerning EU accession reflects the national interest as much as it bears witness to the mythical image of the EU integration process and the superficial knowledge of it in the country. The survey discusses the attitude of the different political parties towards the integration process, the Albanian viewpoint on it, as well as risks and future challenges. The key thesis of this study is that Albania will not provide fertile grounds for nationalistic and religious extremism. Its future position on EU integration has a double dependence on the quality of the rule of law and on the quality of a functional democracy, in addition to the quality of agenda-setting and integration standards emanating from Brussels.

LES PARTIS POLITIQUES D’ALBANIE ET L’EUROPE La référence à « l´intégration dans l´EU » est un thème répétitif de l´ordre du jour de la politique comme de l´opinion publique de l´Albanie post-communiste. Au contraire de ce que l´on observe dans d´autres pays du bloc oriental d´avant 1989, aucun groupement politique, organisation ou parti ne se sont prononcés contre le processus d´intégration. Cette étude montre que le consensus politique et social de l´Albanie autour de l´adhésion à l´UE reflète les intérêts nationaux au même titre qu´il prouve la dimension mystique de cette adhésion et sa connaissance superficielle dans le pays. L´essai se penche sur l´attitude des différents partis politiques envers cette adhésion, la façon de voir albanaise, ainsi que les risques et les défis qui en découlent. La thèse centrale est que l´Albanie n´est pas un sol favorable pour des extrémismes nationalistes ou religieux. La position de l´Albanie lors d´une future adhésion dépend aussi bien de l´Etat de droit que du fonctionnement de la démocratie. S´y ajoutent la qualité des priorités et des standards d´intégration, qui viendront de Bruxelles.

Part 3

RUSSIA AND THE EU: A GROWING EUROSCEPTICISM? Partie 3

LA RUSSIE ET L’UE : UN EUROSCEPTICISME EN CROISSANCE ? Teil 3

RUSSLAND UND DIE EU: EIN WACHSENDER EUROSKEPTIZISMUS?

VLADIMIR POUTINE ET L’EUROPE : MALENTENDUS ET MALADRESSES

JEAN-CHRISTOPHE ROMER La question de la relation entre la Russie et l’Europe n’est pas neuve et traverse l’histoire du vieux continent depuis une douzaine de siècles. Il ne s’agira pas ici d’en retracer les péripéties sauf à rappeler qu’il y a toujours eu, dans la Russie contemporaine, des partisans d’une Russie européenne (occidentalistes) et des adeptes d’une Russie spécifique, unique, voire autarcique (slavophiles). De même a-t-on souvent instrumentalisé, tant en Russie que dans le reste de l’Europe, une opposition entre Russie kievienne et principauté de Moscovie, entre Moscou la mongole et Saint Pétersbourg l’européenne, ceci pour ne prendre que quelques exemples. Paradoxalement, on peut aussi rappeler le poids du « clan pétersbourgeois » dans l’entourage de Vladimir Poutine. La crise, puis le conflit, en Ukraine peuvent donner l’illusion d’avoir clarifié les choses. Or, il est clair que celles-ci sont naturellement plus complexes. Comment en est-on arrivé à ce rejet de l’Europe par la Russie et réciproquement ? Qui a perdu qui ? La rupture était-elle inévitable ? Poutine ne serait-il qu’une cible commode pour cacher une accumulation d’erreurs, de maladresses, d’incompétences commises par l’Europe occidentale et les Etats-Unis depuis 1991 – voire plus tôt – et que l’on paye cher aujourd’hui ? Pour tenter de répondre à ces questions auxquelles il n’existe pas de réponse définitive, on abordera la question des relations que la Russie a entretenu avec l’Europe – et notamment l’UE – depuis l’accession de Vladimir Poutine à la présidence en 2000 et ce durant ses trois mandats, y compris la « parenthèse » de la présidence Dmitri Medvedev. On constatera alors une succession de rendez-vous manqués. La mansuétude avec laquelle l’Occident a regardé Boris Eltsine peut également expliquer la volonté de rupture avec Poutine. Car l’on s’aperçoit que, entre les deux présidents, les différences sont moins criantes qu’il apparaît.

1. Poutine I et II (2000–2008) L’élection de Vladimir Poutine a représenté un grand espoir, tant en Russie que dans le monde occidental, en ce qu’elle permettait d’espérer voir ce grand pays sortir du chaos dans lequel l’avait plongé Boris Eltsine pour redonner un visage humain à la fonction présidentielle et rendre leur dignité aux Russes. Certes les premières mesures adoptées par le nouveau président ont pu laisser plus d’un sceptique, telle cette restauration de la « verticale du pouvoir » ou, plus tard, en 2006, l’introduction de la notion de « démocratie souveraine ». Malgré cela, on peut considérer que le premier mandat de Poutine a été marqué par une volonté d’ouverture vers l’Europe et vers l‘UE en particulier. Moscou avait signé avec Bruxelles un accord de partenariat et de coopération (APC) en 1994, entré en

148

JEAN-CHRISTOPHE ROMER

vigueur en 1997 pour dix ans, tacitement renouvelable pour un an chaque année après 2007. Celui-ci est complété par un « partenariat stratégique » en 2001, puis par la mise en place, lors du sommet Russie-UE de Saint Pétersbourg (mai 2003), des « quatre espaces communs ». Même si les résultats de ces différents niveaux de coopération n’ont pas été à la hauteur des espérances, leur symbolique n’en était pas moins particulièrement forte. C’est également durant le premier mandat de Poutine que s’engagent des discussions entre Moscou et Bruxelles au sujet du premier élargissement à l’Est de l’UE. Et sur ce point, même si le dialogue a été reconnu de part et d’autre comme ayant été parfois difficile, il n’a jamais été interrompu car il était considéré comme nécessaire. Il est vrai que, dans le même temps, Moscou avait aussi instrumentalisé sa coopération avec l’UE comme un moyen – vieille pratique issue de l’URSS depuis 1945 – d’affaiblir le lien transatlantique, en jouant les européistes contre les atlantistes. Mais cette tendance est présente dès la décennie 1990 qui avait été marquée par une vision paneuropéenne opposée à une vision transatlantique de l’Europe et de son avenir. Au siècle suivant, le vocabulaire a changé puisque tant à Moscou qu’à Bruxelles on parle désormais de dimension « euro-atlantique » faisant office de synthèse entre les deux visions antérieures. L’européisme de la Russie se manifeste clairement lors de la deuxième guerre du Golfe en 2003. Moscou se retrouve ainsi sur les mêmes logiques que l’Allemagne, la Belgique et la France notamment pour privilégier la voie diplomatique. Paris, Berlin et Moscou ont alors signé un communiqué commun pour 1 constater que cette voie n’avait pas été menée à son terme . Il est vrai que la chose était aisée face à l‘équipe néo-conservatrice en place à Washington Mais la volonté étatsunienne d’en découdre militairement a prévalu. La secrétaire d’Etat, Condoleezza Rice a, d’ailleurs eu cette formule,: « punir la France, oublier 2 l’Allemagne et pardonner à la Russie » . Malgré cette proximité, Moscou ne s’inquiète pas moins des conséquences, pour elle, de l’élargissement de l’UE à l’Est et c’est-à-dire à ses anciens « alliés » tout autant qu’elle s’inquiète de l’affaiblissement de l’UE après le rejet du traité constitutionnel à la suite des votes négatifs lors des référendums néerlandais et français (29 mai et 1er juin 2005). Un chercheur russe estimait ainsi que ces « non » risquaient d’affaiblir le poids de la Commission au profit d’un parlement européen plus enclin, surtout, depuis les nouvelles adhésions à l’UE, à produire un 3 discours démagogique susceptible de faire ressurgir les démons du passé . Malgré ces risques bien réels, le discours récurrent de Moscou est de « favoriser une Russie forte dans une Europe forte », l’une épaulant l’autre. Quant à la mise en place d’une Europe de la défense avec l‘instauration de la PESD comme composante de la PESC, lors du sommet d’Helsinki en 1999, Moscou, non seulement ne s’en inquiète guère mais y est même favorable. Certes ce soutien n’est pas sans arrières pensées car elle y voit aussi un moyen d’affaiblissement de l’Otan et tout ce qui pourra marginaliser cette dernière ne 1 2

3

Déclaration Commune rendue publique le 10 2.2003, www.elysee.fr (2.3.2016). Jim HOAGI, “Three Miscreants,” Washington Post, 3.4.2003. « Punish France, Ignore Germany, Forgive Russia »: une formule qui n’est pas sans rappeler celle de Lord Ismay, premier Secrétaire Général de l’Otan (1952–1957), qui estimait que le but de l’Alliance était de placer, « US in, Russia out and Germany down ». Timofei BORDATCHEV, « L’UE en crise : des opportunités à saisir par la Russie ? », RussieCEI Visions, IFRI, 7.10.2005.

VLADIMIR POUTINE ET L’EUROPE : MALENTENDUS ET MALADRESSES

149

peut être perçu que positivement par les Russes. Certains chercheurs avancent alors l’argument selon lequel la PESD, puis la PSDC, ne s’est pas construite, à la différence de l’Otan, contre la Russie et que, par conséquent, elle n’a pas de con4 tentieux a priori à son encontre . Car, si le comportement de la Russie envers l’Europe a connu plusieurs phases, celui envers l’Otan procède d’une certaine constance depuis au moins 1992. Car, même si les Etats-Unis affirment que l’élargissement de l’Otan ne se fait pas contre la Russie, cette dernière ne se fait guère d’illusion sur ces paroles lénifiantes, aidée en cela par les discours nettement moins diplomatiques des nouveaux pays membres. D’ailleurs, personne n’était dupe ! Ce besoin russe d’une Europe forte est particulièrement affirmé lors du premier mandat de Vladimir Poutine (2000–2004) car durant cette période, Moscou a dû avaler nombre de « couleuvres » de la part des Etats-Unis tels le retrait du traité SALT1-ABM ( décembre 2001), le deuxième élargissement de 2002–2004 qui inclut notamment les Etats baltes et donc empiète sur l’ancien espace impérial russe, la reprise du déploiement des systèmes anti-missiles (DAMB) et le déploiement, dès 2002, de bases de l’Otan sur les territoires de l’Uzbekistan et de la Kirghizie dans le cadre de la « guerre globale contre le terrorisme ». Mais il est vrai que, sur ce dernier point, la Russie y trouve aussi son avantage car elle est autant, sinon plus, menacée que les Etats-Unis par la situation en Afghanistan et participe à une sorte d’union sacrée n’excluant pas, là encore, nombre d’arrières pensées de part et d’autre. Même si l’on peut considérer que le premier mandat de Poutine est un « mandat européen », cette vision n’en est pas moins quelque peu idyllique car les nuages avaient aussi commencé à s’accumuler – et ce, dès avant 2000. Ils prendront toute leur ampleur à partir d’une date que l’on peut arbitrairement fixer au 10 février 2007, lorsque Poutine prononce son discours, largement commenté, à la conférence de Munich sur la sécurité et dans lequel il s’en prend vivement à l’unilatéralisme des Etats-Unis, prônant un nouveau multilatéralisme. Quels sont donc ces nuages d’anti-européisme/anti-occidentalisme qui apparaissent déjà sous Eltsine. Il est communément admis que c’est à l’occasion de son discours annuel du 25 avril 2005 que Vladimir Poutine a déclaré que la « disparition de l’URSS avait été la plus grande catastrophe du XXe siècle ». Or, l’idée est bien antérieure. Elle n’est pas seulement exprimée par les milieux les plus conservateurs (rouge-bruns) durant la décennie 1990 mais elle est aussi reprise, certes dans une version plus douce, dans le message que Boris Eltsine adresse à l’Assemblée fédérale sur la sécurité nationale, du 13 avril 1996. Ce message faisait aussi suite au vote, par la Douma en février 1996, d’une déclaration sur « l’illégalité des accords de Minsk » du 8 décembre 1991. En janvier de l’année suivante – celle du premier élargissement de l’Otan à l’Est – s’est également constitué, à la Douma, un « intergroupe anti-Otan » qui alerte légitimement George 5 Kennan ou Michel Rocard .

4 5

Demitri, DANILOV, « L’UE et l’UEO la voie d’une identité dans la sphère de la sécurité et de la défense », in : N. CHMELEV, L’Europe hier, aujourd’hui, demain, Moscou, Economica, 2002, p. 670–671 *en russe. George F. KENNAN, « A Fateful Error », New York Times, February 5, 1997; Le Monde, 19.4.1997 (pour Michel Rocard ?).

150

JEAN-CHRISTOPHE ROMER

Mais c’est surtout en 1999 que les choses vont prendre une tournure nettement plus radicale avec le conflit du Kosovo et la deuxième campagne en Tchétchénie. Le signe le plus visible de la crise entre la Russie et l’Europe a lieu lors du sommet de l’OSCE qui se tient à Istanbul en novembre 1999 où, pour la première fois, l’organisation critique explicitement – fût-ce en des termes modérés – la Russie. Certes, lors de ce même sommet, les membres concernés de l’organisation signent l’accord d’adaptation du traité sur les forces classiques en Europe (FCE) qui avait été signé lors du sommet de Paris alors que l’URSS et le Pacte de Varso6 vie existaient encore . Dès lors, le discours russe change ou tout au moins le sens et le contenu des termes qu’elle utilise. Jusqu’au sommet d’Istanbul, lorsque Moscou critique l’Occident, elle pense d’abord et même exclusivement aux Etats-Unis. Après l’automne 1999, l’Europe (UE) y est désormais incluse et le conseil d’Helsinki qui, dans le même temps, met en place les principaux éléments de la PESD n’a aucune influence sur cette mutation. Le contenu du terme « occident » devient ainsi une sorte de baromètre de l’anti-européisme du pouvoir russe et ce jusqu’au début de la deuxième décennie du XXIe siècle où la fusion Etats-Unis Europe paraît effectuée. Ceci coïncide avec le troisième mandat de Vladimir Poutine mais aussi avec le moment où l’idée d’Europe puissance paraît avoir vécu et, sur ce point, la Russie n’y est pour rien.

2. L’ouverture européenne de Dmitri Medvedev. Parenthèse ou rendez ou manqué ? (2008–12) Elu le 2 mars 2008, après un « petit roque », le mandat présidentiel de Dmitri Medvedev est très rapidement marqué par la « guerre des 5 jours » en Géorgie 7 (du 8 au 12 août 2008) . Sans doute le Premier ministre, Vladimir Poutine, est-il à la manœuvre. Mais c’est bien l’Union européenne, sous présidence française, qui a réussi à obtenir le cessez le feu en Géorgie. Certes, ce cessez le feu a sans doute été d’autant plus facile à obtenir que la Russie ne souhaitait pas aller au-delà d’une « leçon » donnée à Tbilissi, même si certains militaires avaient envisagé d’aller jusqu’à investir Tbilissi et de renverser Mikhaïl Saakachvili. Quant à l’absence des Etats-Unis, elle s’explique par le fait, d’une part, qu’ils n’ont pas la conscience tout à fait tranquille, d’autre part qu’ils sont en pleine campagne électorale, l’un n’excluant pas l’autre. Malgré cette ombre, la présidence Medvedev avait pourtant commencé par le lancement de plusieurs signes d’ouvertures envers l’Europe. Le 5 juin 2008, soit juste un mois après son entrée en fonction au Kremlin (7 mai), le nouveau président propose, à l’occasion d’une visite à Berlin, l’ouverture d’une négociation en 8 vue de la signature d’un traité de sécurité collective européenne . Il s’agit en fait 6 7

8

A ce jour, l’adaptation du traité n’a été ratifiée par aucun des pays membres de l’Otan. Sur ce conflit, l’analyse la plus rigoureuse est sans doute celle effectuée par le groupe de travail indépendant constitué à la demande de lUE et présidé par Mme Heidi Tagliavini, CEIIG, « Recognizing indication of a cheating husband or boyfriend », Everyday is a Second Change, 9.11.2015, www.ceiig.ch (2.3.2016). Discours devant les responsables politiques, parlementaires et de la société civile allemande, Berlin, 5.6.2008, www.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/320 (2.3.2016).

VLADIMIR POUTINE ET L’EUROPE : MALENTENDUS ET MALADRESSES

151

d’une actualisation de la Charte de Paris pour une nouvelle Europe adoptée lors du sommet de Paris de la CSCE le 19 novembre 1990. Dans son discours de présentation du projet, le président russe considérait que « l’avenir du monde est directement lié à celui de l’Europe, de la région euro-atlantique et donc de la civilisation européenne ». Il prônait « une coopération entre la Russie, l’UE et l’Amérique du Nord, ces trois branches de la civilisation européenne » et proposait la création d’un comité UE-Russie pour les questions de politique étrangère et de sécurité. Deux mois plus tard, le 8 octobre, lors de la conférence politique mondiale organisée par l’IFRI à Evian, il précisait le contenu de l’éventuel futur traité dont le premier projet de texte est rendu public en novembre suivant. Mais ni Bruxelles ni Washington n’ont jugé utile de répondre – fût-ce par la négative – à cette proposition, fermant ainsi une nouvelle fois la porte aux tentatives d’ouverture de la Russie. Mais Moscou persévère et, deux ans plus tard, dans le cadre du Club Valdai – un lieu de débat proche du Kremlin mais également ouvert au monde extérieur – le groupe de travail russe du club propose un document intitulé : 9 L’Alliance de l’Europe : la dernière chance ? Pour les auteurs de ce rapport, 2010 représente la troisième et dernière chance d’un approfondissement des relations Russie-UE dont les négociations sur le renouvellement de l’Accord de partenariat et de coopération sont gelées depuis 2007. Les deux première occasions ont, selon ce rapport, été perdues en 1990–94 lorsque l’UE a préféré privilégier les petits pays d’Europe centrale et orientale au détriment de la Russie ; puis au début de a décennie 2000 lorsque V. Poutine avait offert l‘ouverture d’un dialogue avec l’UE, là encore ignoré. Toujours selon ce rapport, la cause principale de ces deux échecs tenait au fait que ni Moscou ni Bruxelles n’étaient à même de proposer un véritable projet à long terme. Or, au moment où, d’une part, l’UE vient de lancer le « partenariat pour la modernisation » lors du sommet UE-Russie de Rostov (1er juin 2010) et, d’autre part, où l’on « assiste à un affaiblissement simultané de la Russie et de l’UE sur la scène internationale, il faut saisir cette troisième chance car il n’y en aura pas d’autre ». Concrètement le rapport propose la constitution d’une alliance de toute l’Europe – y compris l’Ukraine, le Kazakhstan et la Turquie – formant un espace stratégique commun en coordonnant les politique étrangères ce qui renforcerait autant l’UE que la Russie. On retrouve d’ailleurs là l’un des thèmes récurrents dans la plupart des recherches russes sur l’Europe selon lequel, on l’a vu, il faut « une Russie forte dans une Europe forte » et qui s’inscrit dans la continuité du projet de traité lancé en 2008. Même s’il ne s’agit pas d’un texte officiel, la nature de l’institution (Valdai) et la personnalité de son principal rédacteur, Sergei Karaganov, qui est alors président du Conseil de politique étrangère et de défense (SVOP) incitent à penser que ce document avait nécessairement l’aval des plus hautes autorités de l’Etat et qu’il pouvait être pris au sérieux. Il ne le fut pas ! On rappellera enfin que c’est pendant la présidence Medvedev que la Russie s’est abstenue au Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU permettant d’adopter la résolution 1973 autorisant l’usage de la force en vue de protéger les populations civiles menacées en Libye. L’interprétation pour le moins extensive de cette résolution par les occidentaux et le sentiment des Russes d’avoir été trompés auront un prix. Il sera payé par les Syriens. 9

« Valdai Discussion Club », http://valdaiclub.com./(2.3.2016).

JEAN-CHRISTOPHE ROMER

152

Tous ces rendez-vous manqués avec l’Europe ont, certes parmi bien d’autres facteurs, contribué au retour d’un Vladimir Poutine encore plus intransigeant.

3. Poutine III Il ne sera pas question ici de la crise ukrainienne – même si elle reflète un certain anti-européisme ou plus précisément un européisme déçu, ce qui est peut-être encore pire – car elle constitue un sujet en soi. On rappellera seulement que l’Europe a réussi à jouer un rôle relativement actif et positif dans les diverses tentatives de son règlement depuis l’accord du 14 février 2014 obtenu par le Triangle de Weimar jusqu’au cessez le feu obtenu à Minsk par l’OSCE en septembre 2014 puis, en février 2015, l’accord dit de « Minsk 2 » obtenu à la suite d’une négociation sous le « format Normandie » (Ukraine, Russie, France, Allemagne). Mais les tensions durant ce troisième mandat de Poutine sont d’autant plus fortes et visibles que, d’une part, l’UE est divisée et que, d’autre part, les Etats-Unis jouent parfois un jeu trouble. C’est encore une fois à l’occasion des rencontres du club Valdai d’octobre 2014 que le président russe précisera ses po10 sitions sur ses relations avec l’Europe – et avec le reste du monde . On retrouve dans ses prises de position l’essentiel des thèmes déjà présent pendant la présidence Medvedev, mais désormais sans concession ni pour l’Europe ni pour le monde occidental dans son ensemble. L’idée de Vladimir Poutine – déjà présentée par bribes en des occasions antérieures, notamment dans son justement célèbre et souvent cité discours au forum sur la sécurité de 11 Munich en 2007 – est bien de rebattre les cartes du jeu international. Constatant que, contrairement à ce qui avait été fait au lendemain de la seconde guerre mondiale – et d’ailleurs de toute guerre – aucune négociation digne de ce nom n’avait permis de définir un nouvel ordre international à l’issue de la « guerre froide » et ce, malgré la Charte de Paris qui n’a aucun caractère contraignant. La toute-puissance d’un ordre unipolaire dominé par les Etats-Unis avec une Europe à la traîne n’est pas acceptable par la Russie, quand bien même ce monde unipolaire dont parle Poutine en 2014 n’a jamais existé que dans la tête de certains étatsuniens durant la dernière décennie du XXe siècle mais n’a jamais été réalisé. D’une certaine manière, la situation que l’on observe depuis 2014 pourrait être le fruit, entre autre, d’une non réponse occidentale à une succession de tentatives russes, de créer des conditions en faveur d’une coopération équitable entre Russie, UE et Etats-Unis en tant que « représentants des trois branches de la civilisation européenne ». S’estimant exclus du vieux continent, la Russie a donc choisi sa propre voie et qui sera proclamée haut et fort confortant ainsi l’avertissement déjà mentionné de George Kennan en 1997 qui considérait que l’élargissement de l’Otan à l’est constituerait « l’erreur la plus fatale depuis la guerre froide » en ce qu’elle ferait monter en Russie des forces anti-occidentales ce qui ne saurait aller dans le sens des intérêts ni des Etats Unis ni dans celui des Européens.

10 11

Le thème de la rencontre porte sur « l’ordre mondial : nouvelles règles ou jeu sans règles ? » , www.kremlin.ru/news/46860 (2.3.2016). Cf. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034 (2.3.2016).

VLADIMIR POUTINE ET L’EUROPE : MALENTENDUS ET MALADRESSES

153

Déçu par les Européens qui se sont placés à la traîne des Etats-Unis, le Kremlin donne l’impression d’avoir lancé son propre « pivot asiatique ». Or, s’il est vrai que Moscou se tourne de plus en plus vers l’Asie (Organisation de coopération de Shanghai) et vers les pays « émergents » (BRICS), il apparaît que ce tournant, au moins le premier, ne sauraient constituer une alternative à long terme. Si les intérêts de Moscou et de Pékin convergent sur de nombreux points, le dynamisme chinois – fût-il un peu essoufflé – ne ralentira pas pour attendre 12 une Russie à la traîne . La question qui se pose dès lors est de savoir quand la Russie reviendra à l’Europe et quand l’Europe admettra que la Russie est bien une partie intégrante du vieux continent. Compte tenu des contentieux actuels ce changement, s’il intervient à court terme se fera sous l’influence d’éléments extérieurs à l’Europe. Mais il est tout aussi probable que cette mutation-réconciliation ne se fera pas sous Poutine qui, sauf accident, pourrait être toujours en place en 2024 voire jusqu’en 2030. Il est aussi à noter une montée en Europe occidentale d’un courant néo-conservateur qui n’a rien à envier à celui qui existe aux Etats Unis et qui se distingue de la montée des extrêmes droites dans plusieurs pays de l‘UE, constituant une double source d’inquiétude pur toute perspective de véritable réunification du vieux continent.

VLADIMIR PUTIN AND EUROPE: MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND “MALADROITNESS” How did Russia’s rejection of Europe and vice versa arise? Who lost/gave up whom? Was this rupture inevitable? Might Putin be just a convenient target to conceal the string of errors, blunders, and incompetence of Western Europe and the USA we are paying dearly for today? There are no definite answers to these questions. But attempting to understand the situation, we need to examine the type of the relations between Russia and Europe – especially the EU – since Vladimir Putin’s accession to the presidency in 2000. It is characterized by a series of missed opportunities.

VLADIMIR PUTIN UND EUROPA : MISSVERSTÄNDNISSE UND UNGESCHICKLICHKEITEN Wie kam es zu dieser Ablehnung Europas durch Russland und umgekehrt? Wer hat wen aufgegeben? War der Bruch unvermeidlich? Ist Putin vielleicht nur ein bequemes Ziel, um die Akkumulation von Irrtümern, Ungeschicklichkeiten und Inkompetenzen Westeuropas und der USA zu kaschieren, für die heute ein hoher Preis bezahlt werden muss? Zwar gibt es auf diese Fragen keine definitiven Antworten, aber der Versuch, die Situation zu verstehen, erfordert die Untersu12

Sur ce « pivot asiatique », cf. Dmitri, TRENIN, « From Greater Europe to Greater Asia ? The Sino-russian Entente », Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Moscow, Carnegie Moscow Centre, April 2015, p. 24.

154

JEAN-CHRISTOPHE ROMER

chung der Art der Beziehungen zwischen Russland und Europa – insbesondere der EU – seit Wladimir Putins Übernahme der Präsidentschaft im Jahr 2000. Sie sind gekennzeichnet durch eine Reihe verpasster Gelegenheiten.

RUSSIA’S EUROSCEPTIC DISCOURSES: IMITATIONS, CONTESTATIONS, SUTURES ANDREY MAKARYCHEV Russian Euroscepticism has to be analyzed against the backdrop of the well recorded inconsistencies and incompleteness of Russian post-Soviet identity and the widely spread feelings of marginalization and disrespect shown by the West, however self-inflicted they might be. The Russian collective self on behalf of whom the political community of Russia is constructed remains deeply dislocated and insecure. This has complicated the whole system of Russia’s external relations, in which inclusions and exclusions are very contingent and flexible: In just a few years, Europe, a key reference point in the Russian discourse since the early 1990s, has become negatively re-considered an intruder and a challenger. Starting with perestroika, each ruler in the Kremlin initiated policy projects with a strong pro-European flavor, as exemplified by Gorbachev's idea of a “common European home”, the commencement of a strategic partnership with the EU under Boris Yeltsin's presidency, the Moscow-Berlin rapprochement symbolized by Vladimir Putin's speech delivered in German to the Bundestag in 2001, and the Partnership for Modernization program promoted by Dmitry Medvedev. Yet most of the high expectations evoked by these political moves have turned into mutual disappointments revealing deep-seated structural problems of the relationship between Russia and the EU. The conflict over Ukraine stemmed from the incompatibility of the two integration projects. It became a trigger for a wider confrontation on a pan-European scale. In spite of the incompatibility of EU and Russian foreign policy philosophies, and Russia's comprehension of its inability to meet high normative standards, simple lines of distinction, such as Russia versus Europe, do not work. Even in a situation of normative conflict with the EU, Russia has been trying to normalize itself in Europe using a variety of means including European concepts in communicating with its European partners. In other words, the EU and Russia depend on each other, even though this dependency has taken on the negative form of confrontation and conflicts. Therefore, the unpacking of the driving forces and motives of Russian foreign policy is possible only in close conjunction with the policies of its major Western interlocutors, above all the EU. In this chapter I claim that Euro-skeptic discourses might take different forms, among which I particularly single out imitation and contestation. Both are intersubjective in the sense that references to Europe are used as boosters in stabilizing Russia’s dispersed identity – either through mimicry and distortion of European concepts, or through lambasting European values as alien and inacceptable for Russia. It is the evolution from imitation to contestation that defines the main vector of Russia’s Eurosceptic discourses. From a perspective of critical discourse analysis, imitation, and contestation are two different forms of suture, a concept used to signify that “self-enclosure is a priory impossible, that the excluded externality always leaves its traces

156

ANDREY MAKARYCHEV

within.”1 Suture denotes “a mode in which the exterior is inscribed in the interior” to the point of erasing substantial differences and forming “a consistent, naturalised, organic whole.”2 In a Lacanian sense, suture as a concept is applicable to situations in which fragmentation and dispersal in a semantic field result from a lack, or an understanding of a missing chain in the process of signification. Concomitantly, this lack (or emptiness) is filled or compensated through borrowing meanings from different semiotic fields, with the intention of stabilizing the discourse. Stabilization can be achieved on the basis of ideological closure, with all external elements ousted and obliterated, so that the semantic “field is neatly ‘sown up’, and perceived as a seamless continuity.”3 As a result, one single subject centralizes the field and “appears to dominate and run the process.”4 Suture can be seen as “the mode in which the exterior is inscribed in the interior, thus ‘suturing’ the field, producing an effect of self-enclosure with no need for an exterior, effacing the traces of its own production.”5 Gaps and ruptures are obliterated, and the semantic field appears “as a naturalized organic whole.”6 Mark Salter defines suture “as a process of knotting together the inside and the outside and the resultant scar.”7 Although he tends to see suture mainly through the lens of sovereignty, this is in fact an interactive concept: “the bordercrossing subject stiches him/herself into the narrative of belonging; so too does the sovereign state incorporate the subject as a border-crosser that can be accepted or rejected, defining what populations can move.”8 In this sense, the characterization of suture as “the neglected limit of politics”9 implies its inherent propensity to define the relations of inclusion and exclusion. Suturing might have two dimensions: temporal and spatial. In a temporal sense, the suture supposes the cementing of identity by means of recurrent references to historical experiences that serve to infuse old meanings to this identity. This is how nostalgic discourses work: through reconnecting contemporary identity to its historical predecessors. Spatially, the concept of the suture can be applied to complex situations when no strict line of demarcation between competing or rival identities is possible, which gives a green light for applying this concept in the field of regional studies. Arguably, the most important characteristic of the suture is the subject’s ability to borrow meanings from outside in order to stabilize its own dispersed/dislocated identity up to the point of ideological closure, with all external elements being ousted, so that the semantic “field is neatly ‘sown up’.” As a result, one single subject centralizes the field and “appears to dominate and run the

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Slavoj ZIZEK, The Fright of Real Tears: Krzyst of Kieslowski between Theory and Post-Theory, Suffolk, BFI, 2001, p. 58. Ibid., p. 58. Slavoj ZIZEK, “‘Suture’, Forty Years Later,” in: Peter HALLWARD and Knox PEDEN, (eds.), Concept and Form, Volume 2: Interviews and Essays on Cahiers pour l’analyse, Verso, 2012, p. 155. Ibid., p. 155. Ibid., p. 157 Ibid. Mark SALTER, “Theory of the Suture and Critical Border Studies,” Geopolitics, 17, 2012, p. 734. Ibid., p. 740. Ibid.

RUSSIA’S EUROSCEPTIC DISCOURSES: IMITATIONS, CONTESTATIONS, SUTURES

157

process.”10 Suture paradoxically produces an effect of self-enclosure with no need for an exterior. Therefore, the political field appears “as a naturalized organic whole.”11 In particular, Zizek explains that “suture” “became part of the deconstructionist jargon, functioning as a vague notion rather than a strict concept, as synonymous with ‘closure’: ‘suture’ signalled that the gap, the opening, of a structure was obliterated, enabling the structure to (mis)perceive itself as a selfenclosed totality of representation … It designated the operation by means of which the field of ideological experience get ‘sutured’, its circle closed, and the de-centred structural necessity rendered invisible. In this reading, ‘suturing’ means that all disturbing traces of the radical Outside within the field of ideological experience are obliterated, so that this field is perceived as a seamless continuity.”12 Thus, the destination point in the suturing process is a foreclosure that is often attributed to all modern nation states with their proclivity to appropriate “the meanings of space… They become located within particular regimes of meaning and action,”13 which might lead to the unfolding of totalizing practices with bordering effects and “a consequent effacement of internal differences and multiplicity.”14 The political problem starts when some “elements of the semiotic space which are not identifiable from the point of view of its self-description come to be expelled from this space as excessive … What does not find a place within the structural unity of the self-description, is insignificant and irrelevant: it simply does not exist.”15 The tendency towards an “autonomous closure”, inherent in any suturing experience, might lead to disconnections and miscommunications that, for instance, can take the form of a “sclerotized dialogue, which indicates the lack of openness towards otherness.”16 Yet since “alterity is located inside the subject ... the subject cannot become a closed totality ... The other is necessary to the constitution of the ego and its world, but, at the same time, it is a constitutive impediment to the integrity and the definitive closure.”17 Totalization, in whatever form it comes, is never complete and is always a trend, a tendency, which can be counter-balanced by political momentum coming from the existence of “the position of a within– outside.”18 “The work on the border, by rethinking the relationship between the inside and the outside … functions as an interruption of totalization.”19 A system functioning as a self-enclosed whole is impossible. Moreover, a given system can only pretend “to enclose reality in its entirety.”20

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Slavoj ZIZEK, “‘Suture’, Forty Years Later,” op. cit., p. 155. Ibid., p. 157. Slavoj ZIZEK, Less than Nothing. Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Marxism, London and New York, Verso, 2012b. Prem KUMAR RAJARAM, Carl GRUNDY-WARR, Borderscapes. Hidden Geographies and Politics at Territory’s Edge, The University of Minnesota Press, 2007, p. ix. Daniele MONTICELLI, Wholeness and its remainders: Theoretical Procedures of Totalization and Detotalization in Semiotics, Philosophy and Politics, Tartu University Press, 2008, p. 194. Ibid., p. 195. Augusto PONZIO, “Sign, dialogue, and alterity,” Semiotica, 173, 1–4, 2009, p. 143. Ibid., p. 142. Daniele MONTICELLI, Wholeness and its remainders, op. cit., p. 198. Ibid., p. 176–177. Ibid., p. 191.

ANDREY MAKARYCHEV

158

Therefore, suturing denotes a specific mix of de-bordering and re-bordering under which a dispersed identity is stabilized by means of incorporating elements of a different semiotic order. Concomitantly, external meanings are used as reference points for fixing dislocated and unstable identities. In this sense, the suture is different from the foreclosure in which “the movement of difference is effaced and removed to the outside, while boundaries are traced in order for the system to be a self-contained and coherent whole.”21 Suture – as auto-communication – “implies appropriation of external cultural products by investing them with their own functions and meanings”22 and “relies on fabricated or genuine memories shared by group members.”23 It “constrains the terms of political debate, fails to provide an idiom for the discussion of actual political practice, creates or involves group identities that are largely fictive (in the sense that they lack a social reality behind them or that they are insulated from the course of world events and therefore remain stubbornly static) yet define who is to be considered a political actor, and creates rigid boundaries between group ‘selves’ where one could imagine much more fluid membership circulation.”24 In a policy sense, Russia’s attempts to reconnect itself to Europe through shared norms may be viewed as grounded in the idea of suture that implies using external meanings for stabilizing domestic identity. The concept of suture has to be deployed in intricate inside – outside dynamics constitutive for Russia’s European policies. Yet attempts to suture Russian identity discourses through filling them with European vocabulary were conducive not to a greater opening, but paradoxically, to a greater distancing of Russia from European normative order.

1. EU – Russia Identity Contexts Political dynamics of EU – Russia relations are predominantly defined by the irreconcilable competition of two universalistic projects, each one sustained by its own vision of global normative order. Of course, the EU and Russia might agree on certain points – like, for example, on the desirability and benefits of a multipolar structure of global relations, or on de-bordering policies towards their neighbors, yet on most accounts, positions taken by the two competing poles are drastically dissimilar. The EU-Russia conflict can be explained as the conflation of two interrelated factors: the EU's unwillingness to accept Russia “as it is”, and Russia‘s inability to meet the EU’s high normative and institutional standards. In other words, Brussels insisted on various reforms in Russia as a precondition for strategic partnership, while Moscow considered many of these reforms either economically detrimental (for example, the EU third energy package), or politically dangerous for the stability of the ruling regime (for instance, strengthening the role of civil society institutions). However, the initial expectations and wishful thinking 21 22 23 24

Ibid., p. 177. Andreas SCHOENLE, Jeremy SHINE, “Introduction,” in Andreas SCHONLE (ed.), Lotman and Cultural Studies: Encounters and Extensions, The University of Wisconsin Press, 2006. Ibid., p. 10. Ibid., p. 12.

RUSSIA’S EUROSCEPTIC DISCOURSES: IMITATIONS, CONTESTATIONS, SUTURES

159

dating back to the first decade of the end of the Cold War were so high that the gradual comprehension of the impossibility to implement the cooperative agenda was rather painful for both sides. Seen from this perspective, the roots of the current EU – Russia confrontation can be explained by the collision of two “politics of truth-seeking”, to borrow a concept from Alain Badiou. Russia's defense of moral and political conservatism and its obsession with combatting “falsifications of historical truth” are in disharmony with the European normative project in which the key nodal points are liberal emancipation, tolerance, multiculturalism, transparency, and democratic accountability. For both hegemonic projects external othering of each other on normative grounds is a condition of their functioning. Thus, the EU – Russia conflict over Ukraine cannot be explained from a merely technical perspective, i.e., as an inability to reach a negotiated agreement on the division of zones of interest. The gist of the trouble lies much deeper – in the political incompatibility of the EU's and Russia's foreign policy philosophies. With the end of the Cold War, both Russia and the EU defined their foreign policies in similar terms grounded mostly in the prevalence of managerial, administrative and legal – and thus post-political – aspects of governance over political and ideological issues. Yet paradoxically, the cumulative result of the two technocratic – and in many respects pragmatic – projects was the growing politicization of the entire spectrum of bilateral relations and the common neighborhood area. To better comprehend the logic and conditions of this politicization, in this chapter, I treat EU-Russia relations as both conflictual and interdependent (intersubjective), and uncover the specificity of the current Russian Euro-skeptic discourse. These relations are marked by a series of crises, imbalances, miscommunications, misunderstandings, and accusations. Many of them have a political background. Most European governments are critical of Putin’s regime for its digression from the standards of the European normative order and growing imperial exposures. They blame the Kremlin for mismanaging the country domestically and creating artificial impediments for developing professional and civil societybased contacts with European partners. The EU is unhappy with political repression within Russia but seems hesitant to make it part of the bilateral agenda. In its turn, Russia pessimistically assesses both domestic developments within the EU and the EU’s ability to play a key role in world politics. Russia has refused to participate in the EU-sponsored European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). From the outset, it reacted with suspicion to the Eastern Partnership (EaP) program. In a gesture of reciprocation to EU's critique of Russia’s lack of democracy, the Russian Foreign Ministry has started issuing annual reports on the state of human rights in EU member states. Moscow has often claimed that the EU uses conflict resolution for fostering its own influence in Russia’s “near abroad”, and that EU enlargement has weakened Russian influence on its western borders. New EU member states are portrayed as hindering the effective relationship between Russia and the “old” EU states. Economically, Brussels is dissatisfied with the multiple protectionist measures that Russia keeps applying in spite of its WTO accession. In July 2013, the European Commission brought its first WTO case against Russia for the so-called “recycling fees” on vehicles. Earlier, the EU Commission had initiated a legal trial

160

ANDREY MAKARYCHEV

against Gazprom to prove that the Russian gas giant operated in EU member states in violation of anti-trust laws. Expectedly, the crisis of the Euro-zone made the Russian discourse on the EU even more critical. A former rector of Russian Diplomatic Academy deems that it is time for Russia to say “good-bye” to Europe until it recovers from the economic troubles.25 Another Russian author claims that the EU has fallen victim not only of financial troubles, but also of its inability or else hesitation to articulate more clearly the European identity.26 Her colleague argues that financial troubles within the EU make it a doubtful partner for Russia and seriously damage the prospects of Russia’s European orientation.27 Europe’s weakness may prompt it to more robustly team up with the US in policies concerning Syria and Iran, and thus to disregard the dangers of a possible destabilization of the larger Middle East for Europe itself.28 As seen from this vantage point, the only good news for the Kremlin is that a less ambitious and a more inward-oriented Europe may reduce its normative pressure on Moscow, which may open a new chance for reinvigorating Russia – EU relations. Moscow often explains the difficulties of communicating with the EU with the complicated organizational structure and decision-making procedures in Brussels. But its relations with individual EU countries are not much better. Russian– Polish disputes fueled a harsh discussion on the balance of political and economic instruments in Russia’s foreign policy; as an upshot of the Russian–British collision over the Alexander Litvinenko murder case, the issues of security were raised in their most conflicting articulations; the Russian–Estonian tug-of-war over a Second World War monument evolved from the debate on collective historical memories to the most sensitive matters pertaining to political identities, etc. When trying to explain these troubles, perhaps one has to start with the fact that both Russia and the EU are political subjects in the state transformation. The intricacies of Russian–European relations can be better grasped through the prism of ideational and, more specifically, identity-related factors. This explains the relevance of constructivist and discursive approaches to studying EU – Russian communicative disconnections. Russian policy toward the EU seems quite ambivalent. On the one hand, the Kremlin keeps expressing its sympathy to the efforts of keeping the Eurozone afloat, which can be explained not by a normative attachment of Putin's regime to Europe, but rather by more pragmatic – financial and economic – interests of the Russian corporate elite. On the other hand, the Kremlin has started to more consistently construct a political borderline between Russia and Europe by discursively articulating Russia's political distance from Europe. This bordering seems to be part of Russia's plans to institutionalize the Eurasian Union and bring its neighbors as close to the sphere of Russian influence as possible. To materialize these projects, Russia needs Europe as its unfriendly and weak external Other. 25 26 27 28

Alexander PANOV, “S.Sh.A.: kurs na sderzhivanie,” Strategia Rossii, 2, February 2012, p. 14. Olga BUTORINA, “Evropa bez Evrosoyuza,” Russia in Global Affairs, December 15, 2011. Sergei KARAGANOV, “Evropa bol’she ne rastiot,” Russia in Global Affairs, December 30, 2011. Dmitry EVSTAFIEV, “Glazami konservatora: perezagruzka mertva,” Index Bezopasnosti, 4, July – October 2011, p. 150.

RUSSIA’S EUROSCEPTIC DISCOURSES: IMITATIONS, CONTESTATIONS, SUTURES

161

The roots of Russia's self-assertiveness vis-a-vis the EU have to be searched in the foreign policy concept embraced by the Kremlin which is explicitly revisionist and pointed against EU normative expansionism. Being under the sway of a feeling of inferiority (hence all the lamentations about Russia's intentional marginalization and ostracizing by the West), Putin tried to compensate it with confrontation with the West. In this vein, Kremlin's disdain to Europe can be explained by the failure to duly appreciate the importance of norms and values in a globalizing world, something that Russia can't counter-balance with purely material resources or physical force. Thus, the two key actors, the EU and Russia, play ambiguous and highly complicated games in bilateral relations. While Russia tries to take political advantage of the Eurozone’s financial crisis by portraying the EU as a moribund entity, the EU seems to be tired of socializing Russia in the European normative order. Arguably, the reasons for stark disagreements between the EU and Russia are grounded in the concept of normativity. It is a normative gap that deeply divides the EU and Russia and complicates the dialogue between them. The two parties interpret ideas of freedom, liberty and human rights in very different ways, and disagree on the meaning of sovereignty and the importance of trans- and supranational patterns of integration. Ultimately, the normative gap between Europe and Russia boils down to sharp differences between a political community-inthe-making adapting to a post-modern world, and a political community still stuck in reproducing the old patters of modernity with its hierarchical and statecentric thinking. This gap, by and large, stems from Russia’s adherence to a set of Westphalian and sovereignty-bound approaches that have apparently become less relevant for the EU. Even when the two parties talk business or discuss seemingly technical issues, normative disconnections still interfere in their dialogue. For example, Moscow and Brussels have divergent understandings of modernization, dissimilar approaches to energy security, and even interpret some of WTO norms and regulations differently. The EU – Russia normative disconnections shouldn't, however, be absolutized and ought to be placed in a number of rather nuanced contexts. Russia’s construction of its own identity and subjectivity may be explained with a reference to Alexander Wendt’s “projective identification thesis.29 It might be instrumental in understanding the role of the Other – i.e., Europe in reference to Russia – “for displacing unwanted feelings about the Self… Individuals who, because of personal pathologies, cannot control potentially destructive unconscious fantasies, like feelings of rage, aggression, or self-hatred, will sometimes attribute or 'project' them on to an Other, and then through their behavior pressure that Other to 'identify' with or 'act out' those feelings so that the Self can then control or destroy them by controlling or destroying the Other… A requirement for this process is therefore 'splitting' the Self into 'good' and 'bad' elements, with the latter being projected on to the Other… This can in turn be a basis for the cultural constitution of enmity, since the split Self needs the Other to identify with its ejected elements.”30 The Self is “casting” the Other “in a corre-

29 30

Alexander WENDT, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 277. Ibid., p. 23.

162

ANDREY MAKARYCHEV

sponding counter-role that makes” its own identity meaningful.31 This might shed some light on Russia’s mental – and very artificial – division of Europe into “false” and “true”, “old” and “new”, with judgmental significance ascribed to each of these dichotomies. According to Wendt's “projective identification” concept, the deep split (“dislocation”) within the Russian Self provokes and necessitates corresponding binaries in Russia’s imagination about other countries. Almost all accusations Moscow addresses to “false” European countries – maltreatment of the Second World War veterans, pluralization of historical narratives filled by alternative assessments of the previously glorified past, proAmerican sentiments – can be easily found within Russia itself as a testimony for the dislocated nature of Russian identity. Of course, in Russian discourses, identity is conceptualized in many ways. Some interpretations tend to essentialize Russia’s belongingness to Europe by explaining it through the prism of either geography or history, or both. As the director of the Institute of European Law at MGIMO deems, “social and political transformation of Russia cannot be considered as a precondition for rapprochement with Europe.”32 Russia’s European identity, thus, is simply reduced to the invocation of Russia’s “natural”, “legitimate”, “objective” grounds to be considered a full-fledged European nation.33 Other authors consider Russia's European identity a matter of social construction, recognition, and painstaking adaptation of European ideas.34 The basic intricacy here is that Europe has multiple roles to play and can’t be easily anchored in a single set of meanings. In modern times Europe was associated with Christianity, balance-of-power and monarchic solidarity against republican ideas, but nowadays these meanings are either relinquished or seriously questioned. This made Europe a “moving target” for Russia: “We were thinking of constructing a modern society, as in the West, but it turned out that the West itself is transforming in a direction hardly conceivable for both them and us. We wanted to say farewell to the empire and convert into a nation state, but it turned out that the age of nation states has already gone, and we are on the eve of a new imperial era… We strived for a multi-party system, but we are said that it is moribund in Europe. We wanted public politics, but it occurred that even in the so-called civilized world it is far from sane. We were eager to be modern, but it is exactly in this sense that we have gone hopelessly obsolete.”35 Besides, almost each of the most controversial policies introduced in Russia – from economic protectionism to increasing intervention of the state in political parties’ affairs – usually contains implicit references to various “European experiences”. Indeed, Europe is frequently used as an argument for sustaining certain political discourses in Russia, which turns the conception of Europe into a rather broad and elastic signifier. Yet, in spite of this indeterminacy, Europe does play an underlying role for constructing Russia’s multiple identities. For liberal 31 32 33 34 35

Ibid., p. 329. Mark ENTIN, “Future tasks for the development of the relations between Russia and the European Union,” in Hans-Georg HEINRICH, Liudmila LOBOVA, (eds.), EU-Russia: New Departures and Old Habits, ICEUR Working Papers 3, Vienna, 2010. “Europe: 'Real' and 'Unreal',” Russian Academy of Sciences, Report of the Institute of Europe, 204, Moscow, 2007, p. 7–10. Dmitry DANILOV, “Rossiya i Zapad: bol’she ne vragi… a kto?,” Vestnik Evropy, 7–8, 2002. Boris MEZHUEV, “Sotvorenie kosmopolisa,“ Kosmopolis, 1, Autumn 2002.

RUSSIA’S EUROSCEPTIC DISCOURSES: IMITATIONS, CONTESTATIONS, SUTURES

163

thinkers, the EU is “a complex and sophisticated edifice, the main achievement of post-war Europe.”36 Thus, a shift from a “Europe of nations” to a “Europe of regions” and networks, and, therefore, from modernity to its radical reconsideration, is viewed as a global trend toward the growingly appealing networking type of structures to which Russia has to adapt eventually.37 For conservatives, Russia has to help reviving the continental Europe that hypothetically might become its political ally.38 This implies an explicit disdain of countries of Central Europe that are, in the view of some Russian geo-politicians, overtly proAmerican and therefore Russia-unfriendly.39 Many in Russia consider the EU gradually losing its ability to speak internationally with a single voice, and falling victim to intensive migrations unsettling European identity.40 Therefore, the concept of identity is strongly and sometimes intentionally politicized, i.e., used for political judgments that often spur conflicts of interpretations, involving the issues constitutive for political communities, including democracy, security, legitimacy, collective memories, etc. This is why the analysis of identity as the key factor shaping EU – Russian relations requires focusing on its discursive underpinnings. It is through the analysis of the discourse that one may identify and interpret perpetual references to Europe as Russia’s constitutive Other for substantiating a set of arguments inherent in Russia’s identitymaking.41 The concept of discourse is of primordial importance for this study since “our own formation as subjects is inextricably woven into the relational webs that constitute the social context in which we live,”42 and this context is made up of discourses. Placing discourses at the heart of the analysis makes the mapping of social and political spaces more flexible and constantly changing: in some instances, discourses may gravitate to – and reinforce – each other; in other occurrences, they are in a conflict that fuels what could be called “the battle of the story”. Therefore, a number of different narratives may co-exist and intermingle with each other. Within each of them, statements (“order-words”43) are given their discursive status and expanse for circulation. Discourses form their semantic fields, may serve political purposes, and produce certain types of identity embedded in the dominant speech acts. In the meantime, “no discursive formation constitutes a completely closed system, but, on the other hand, it is never totally exterior to other discursive formations.”44 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44

Mikhail BORSCHEVSKY, Viktor YAROSHENKO, “Eta zhivuchaya Evropa,” Vestnik Evropy, 28–29, 2010. Oleg NEMENSKIY, “Kosovskiy precedent i buduschee Evropy,” APN News Agency, April 21, 2008, http://www.apn.ru/publications/article19807.htm (2.9.2016). Alexander DUGIN, “Evraziyskiy otvet globalizatsii,” Politicheskiy zhurnal 4, 139, November 15, 2009. Mikhail REMIZOV, “Demokratia plus gegemonia bol’shinstva,” APN News Agency, June 24, 2011, http://www.apn.ru/publications/article24379.htm (2.9.2016). Anatoly UTKIN, “Padenie Evropy,’ Prognosis 2, 6, Summer 2006, p. 139. Martin MULLER, “Situated Identities: Enacting and Studying Europe at a Russian Elite University,” Millenium: Journal of International Studies, 37, 3, 2008, p. 3–25. Rob AITKEN, “Embedded Liberalism in Counterpoint: Reading Woody Guthrie’s Reciprocal Economy,” Millenium: Journal of International Studies, 37, 2, p. 460. Jon SHORT, “Outside of Power? Or The Power of the Outside,” Journal of Social and Political Thought 1, 2, June 2000. Mats BRAUN, “Talking Europe – the Dilemma of Sovereignty and Modernization,” Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association 43, 4, 2008, p. 400.

164

ANDREY MAKARYCHEV

Discourses of Russia and the EU are not only in the process of constant formation; both are internally dislocated. Dislocation in this context signifies indeterminacy, instability, uncertainty, and ambiguity. Both Russia and the EU can be portrayed as deeply divided political subjects inevitably referring to their counter-part in the process of constructing their respective identity, which testifies to the non-self-sufficient nature of these identities, and the unavoidable semantic inter-penetrations and overlays. For example, the Russian international discourse is torn between “sovereigntist”, “exceptionalist”, or “nationalist” readings of Russia as a country surrounded by a fundamentally hostile environment with no reliable friends, on the one hand, and the “internationalist discourse” arguing that Russia stays in line with the international community in managing the most deadly security challenges, on the other. In their turn, a variety of European discourses contain both Russia-skeptic voices and those calling for pragmatic accommodation with Moscow in spite of multiple normative disconnections. Yet there is also an external dimension of dislocation that is manifested in the dependence of Russia’s identities “upon an outside which both denies that identity and provides its conditions of possibility at the same time.”45 This dislocates Russia’s discourse by representing it as a country eager to get attuned to the dominating discourses, and by reinstalling Russia’s subjectivity through the reinterpretation of the key components of globally dominating discourses. In this light, Europe may be perceived as a challenge to Russia, but nevertheless, Russian identity is constructed through communication with – and reference to – Europe. Even a negative marking of Europe by Russian Euro-pessimists still corroborates the discursive dependence of Russia from Europe as a key signifier for Russia's international narrative. This leads to another important concept in discourse analysis, that of resignification. It denotes the transformative practice of deploying terms in previously unexplored or even “unauthorized” contexts. Re-signification is mostly used by political agents located at the margins of political structures who wish to change previous meanings by either expanding concepts or by including other meanings into them.46 This appears applicable to Russia who painstakingly tries to avoid marginalization and raise its global profile by propagating structural changes of international society to foster greater plurality of power holders and diversification of their resources. In particular, Russia borrowed the concept of multi-polarity from the realist vocabulary where it denoted a rather conflictual and unstable type of international system, and re-signified it with more positive connotations thus making of it a key strategic landmark for Russian diplomacy. Re-signification is closely related to the concept of language games. Following the logic of Wittgenstein, language has neither ontological stability nor unity; consequently, there is no authoritative, determinate collective “we” that would appeal to a mental or metaphysical source of identity or authority, or unveil “lit-

45 46

Aletta J.NORVAL, Theorising Dislocations, New Stability, Democracy and Nationalism in Contemporary Russia Workshop, Basel, 26–27, September 2008, p. 3. Birgit SCHIPPERS, “Judith Butler, Radical Democracy and Micro-politics,” in: Adrian LITTLE, Moya LLOYD, (eds.), The Politics of Radical Democracy, Edinburgh University Press, 2009, p. 80–91.

RUSSIA’S EUROSCEPTIC DISCOURSES: IMITATIONS, CONTESTATIONS, SUTURES

165

eral, un-interpreted truth.”47 The language games approach claims that under closer scrutiny, each concept decomposes into a series of “pictures” of reality with their “playful and fluid”48 contexts. Of course, not all language games translate into strong political voices that explain how to change the world, yet at least some of them provide different “road maps” to the future. This has important repercussions for EU-Russia discursive relations: for example, both parties may agree on the importance of the modernization agenda, but treat its meaning differently. For the EU, the concept of modernization inevitably presupposes drastic reforms in the Russian system of governance (including eradication of corruption, the establishment of effective public institutions, etc.), while for the Kremlin modernization connotes mainly technical projects of upgrading the Russian industrial and financial sectors.

2. Problematizing Inter-subjectivity With all the disconnections in mind, the two subjects in communication, the EU and Russia, are not simply mutually dependent on each other, but – even more important – mutually constitute each other's identities. Russia is eager to find its proper place in the European political, security, and intellectual milieu but, in doing so, it reinterprets the key terms of the hegemonic discourse and fills them with the content suitable to its needs. The concept of inter-subjectivity defines the nature of Russia’s relations with Europe. In Wendt’s vocabulary, these relations might be termed micro-structural because they are deployed within the deeper structures of international society. It may appear that these relations are “destined for disconnection” and thrive on separation, “distancing, strangeness, and all the risks of miscomprehension.”49 What these disconnections disclose is the interaction between two identity-based subject positions. In a narrow sense, the concept of inter-subjectivity points to the common areas where both parties communicate with each other as partners, and, concomitantly, not only the EU is capable of exerting influence upon Russia, as it used to be throughout 1990s, but Russia may have some impact, too. Intersubjectivity presupposes that each type of influence has its reverse side, a sort of counter-influence. For example, Russia, being an object of EU-sponsored programs, exerted (perhaps unintentionally) some influence upon the EU in response – through either confirming or disproving the initial premises that framed the EU's policies. A Russia that doesn’t meet the EU's normative expectations could be an argument for promoting a policy of stronger bordering and enhancing the “Self – Other” divide. In a wider sense, inter-subjectivity signifies not only a possibility to achieve some practical effects and alter policies of others, but to constitute their identities. In inter-subjective relationship, the formation of Russian identity is impossible without references to European experiences and practices, and vice versa. Identi47 48 49

Christopher ROBINSON, Wittgenstein and Political Theory. The View from Somewhere, Edinbourgh University Press, 2009, p. 12–13. Ibid. p. 49. Jean BAUDRILLARD, Marc GUILLAUME, Radical Alterity, Los Angeles, Semiotext(e), 2008, p. 31.

166

ANDREY MAKARYCHEV

ties always relate to a ‘constitutive other,’50 which was well grasped by Slavoj Zizek: “When I reconstruct my life in a narrative, I always do it within a certain intersubjective context, answering the Other’s call-injunction, addressing the Other in a certain way… My very status as a subject depends on its links to the substantial Other… (I)n the core of my being, I am irreducibly vulnerable, exposed to the Other(s)… (Yet – A.M.) confronted with the Other, I never can fully account for myself… I will never get from the Other a full answer to ‘who you are’ because the Other is a mystery also for him/herself… This mutual recognition of limitation thus opens up a space of sociality that is the solidarity of the vulnerable.”51 Constructivism treats identity as a social construct grounded in “anotherimage rather than self-image52. Therefore, to a large extent, national identity is based on how a state is identified and perceived by another state. Logical consistency does not necessarily need to be a prerequisite for dominating discourses53 and their combinations, since identities of political subjects are intrinsically split. This explains why states often espouse inconsistent premises in their policies. Thus, the Russian image of international relations is “constructed in relation to the great powers and the West”54 with whom Russia competes while simultaneously seeking its recognition and approval. Inter-subjectivity makes any subject position dependent on the outside, sensitive to the opinions and approaches of external others, and thus immanently fluid, mobile, and changeable. In inter-subjective relations, the two parties construct the subject positions of each other, which means that these positions are not pre-given. That is why it would be a gross oversimplification to treat intersubjective relations as relations between two (or more) already given political subjects. The two subjects in/of communication, Russia and the EU, are not only in the process of ongoing formation; what is more important is that both are internally dislocated. Russia can be portrayed as a political subject deeply fragmented by its desire to simultaneously use economic arguments and a normative appeal. Moscow appears eager to speak with many different voices simultaneously. In the interpretation of its past, Russia is both a destructor of the Soviet empire (an argument constitutive for Russia’s role as a co-sponsor of the termination of Cold War) and the inheritor of the USSR (an argument that explains Russia’s resistance to the Ukrainian and Polish memory politics grounded in remembrances of Holodomor and Katyn). Russian policies include both institutional commitments (like the proposal for a Treaty on European Security) and what might be called “reluctant unilateralism”. Russian identity mixes up particularist assumptions (admitting that each act of state recognition is individual and singu-

50 51 52 53 54

Philipp CASULA, The Loss of the Constitutive Outside: Changing Discourses in East and West after the End of the Cold War, Metaphors and Power Panel, 6th Pan-European Conference on International Relations, Turin, September 15, 2007. Slavoj ZIZEK, “Neighbors and Other Monsters: A Plea for Ethical Violence,” in Slavoj ZIZEK, Eric L. SANTNER, Kenneth REINHARD, (eds.), The Neighbor: Three Inquiries in Political Theology, Chicago, London, The University of Chicago Press, 2005, p. 139. Anne CLUNAN, The Social Construction of Russia’s Resurgence. Aspirations, Identity, and Security Interests, Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009, p. 6. Audie KLOTZ, Cecelia LYNCH, Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations, Armonk, New York, London, England, M.E.Sharpe, 2007. Ibid., p. 221.

RUSSIA’S EUROSCEPTIC DISCOURSES: IMITATIONS, CONTESTATIONS, SUTURES

167

lar55) and universal explanations (by declaring that what Russia did in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, “others have done in Kosovo,”56 the Kremlin in fact accepted the logic of the “chain reaction”). Seen from an inter-subjective perspective, any meaningful political characterization of Russia is possible only through its semantic association – positive or negative – with Europe. The political positioning of Russia as a European country has never been seriously challenged: The Russian discourse asserts Russia as a European country in terms of its history, culture and civilizational identity. On a number of occasions, Russian leaders referred to the European experience in order to justify Russia’s “normalcy”, understood as its belonging to the European milieu and alleged compatibility with European normative logic. Many in Moscow sustain the thesis of compatibility between the Russia-sponsored Eurasian association and the institutional mechanisms of the European integrative project. Yet inter-subjective relations are full of distortions, disconnections, asymmetries, ruptures, and imbalances. The concept of “the friction of ideas” (or “ideational friction”) makes the case for “deep-seated cultural differences between Europe and Russia.”57 To quote Slavoj Zizek, “language … is the first and greatest divider”, and this is the reason why we and our neighbors (can) ‘live in different worlds’ even when we live on the same street.”58 To put it differently, language “provides the boundaries of inter-subjective process,”59 and “alterity is thus not given but produced.”60 This perspective certainly applies to Russia – EU relations. While frequently using the same normative vocabulary, European and Russian discourse-makers deliberately infuse different meanings in them. Europe, thus, faces not an opposition to its concepts of democracy, identity, and security, but different interpretations of them. Indeed, Russia questions none of the basic European norms or ideas; instead, it seeks to offers alternative visions for most of them. However, in the Russia–EU relationship, inter-subjectivity can be differently interpreted. For example, it can be explained by the predominantly negative portrayal of Putin’s Russia in Europe by “the internal insecurity of the West, and the growing sense that everything is not proceeding quite as it should… Vladimir Putin ... indicates to western partners their mistakes and failures. He criticizes their hypocrisy and double standards, appearing in the role of an idiosyncratic Savonarola whose utterances are especially annoying because they are often true.”61 55 56 57 58 59 60 61

Dmitry MEDVEDEV, Interview, Russia Today, Sochi, August 26, 2008, http:// www.kremlin .ru/text /appears/2008/08/ 205773.shtml (2.9.2016). Ibid. Kjel ENGELBREKT, Bertil NYGREN, “A Reassertive Russia and an Expanded European Union,” in Kjel ENGELBREKT, Bertil NYGREN, (eds.), Russia and Europe. Building Bridges, Digging Trenches, Routledge, 2010, p. 3. Slavoj ZIZEK, “The Antinomies of Tolerant Reason: A Blood-Dimmed Tide is Loosed,” Jacques Lacan, http://www.lacan.com/zizantinomies.htm.(2.9.2016). Oliver KESSLER, “From Agents and Structures to Minds and Bodies: of Supervenience, Quantum, and the Linguistic Turn,” Journal of International Relations and Development, 10, 3, 2007. Michael HARDT, Antonio Negri, Empire, London, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2000, p. 125–127. Fiodor LUKIANOV, “Putin, Russia, and the West: Beyond Stereotype,” Valdai Club, February 15, 2012, http://valdaiclub.com/usa/38620.html.(2.9.2016).

168

ANDREY MAKARYCHEV

Yet instead of (mis-)presenting the Kremlin as the bearer of a hidden truth for Europe (and implicitly denying Europe a similar role in its relations with Russia), I share a more nuanced approach to inter-subjectivity as an active “power to affect and a passive power to be affected.”62 In other words, even in its role as an object of EU influence, Russia is still able to – perhaps indirectly – influence debates within the EU and its choice(s) of future actions. The notion of inter-subjectivity is instrumental in understanding the intricacies of Russia–EU relations as an interaction of two “ontologically dislocated”, or unstable, divided, split, and unfixed subjects. European and Russian identities are mutually dependent, but the EU’s role in molding Russian identity is stronger than Russia’s role in the EU. The Russian discourse is mostly Eurocentric, even in its negativity, while the EU’s discourse is not necessarily Russiacentric. The EU seems to be embedded in “the Eurocentric procedure of imposing its own hegemony by means of the exclusionary discursive strategy of devaluing the Other.”63 This policy can be explained by the EU’s adherence to the “thick” (solidarist) version of international society, understanding normativity as “a way of thinking that emphasizes the central importance of an autonomous legal order for constraining the arbitrary and personal exercise of political power.”64 Russia plays a different game of rejecting and even challenging its otherness and exteriority that Europe ascribes and imposes to. A menu of Russia’s identity choices may include such roles as a “different Europe,”65 a “non-Western Europe”, a constitutive part of a wider Europe or of a “Euro-Atlantic civilization”. Russia, therefore, tries not to completely alienate itself from the EU, but rather, to discursively divide Europe into different segments and, at the same time, to make the concept of Europe as broad and imprecise as possible, to be able to fit in anyway. Here, one may discover a double function of Russia’s European discourse: forming an image of Europe easy to deal and communicate with, as well as constructing Russia itself by emphasizing the roles it is supposed to play and the qualities it is expected to display internationally. This might be projected onto Iver Neumann’s distinction between two different versions of Europe – “false” and “true” – as a key feature of Russia’s thinking about Europe. “False Europe”, in Kremlin’s interpretation, includes countries with strong anti-Russian sentiments and those having lost “genuine European values”. “True Europe”, on the contrary, is made up of nations friendly towards Russia and adhering to what Russia considers “the original spirit of Europe”. “True Europe” contains, besides what US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld dubbed “old Europe” (France and Germany), countries with some degree of cultural affinity to Russia. Politically, Russia’s leaning toward the French – German “couple” could be an indication of its search for a European subjectivity that is ultimately a pre-condition for Russia’s own self-assertion vis-à-vis Europe. Rec62 63 64 65

Yves CITTON, “Political Agency and the Ambivalence of the Sensible,” in Gabrile ROCKHILL, Philip WATTS, (eds.), Jacques Ranciere: History, Politics, Aesthetics, Durham, London, Duke University Press, 2009, p. 122. Slavoj ZIZEK, “Da Capo senza Fine,” in Judith BUTLER, Ernesto LACLAU, Slavoj ZIZEK, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality. Contemporary Dialogue on the Left, London, New York, Verso, 2000, p. 231. Jef HUYSMANS, “International Politics of Exception,” Presented at SGIR Fifth Pan-European Conference, The Hague Netherlands, 9–22 September 2004, p. 7. Nikolay SHMELIOV, “Rossiya i Evropa: vmeste ili porozn?,” Vestnik Evropy, 19–20, 2007.

RUSSIA’S EUROSCEPTIC DISCOURSES: IMITATIONS, CONTESTATIONS, SUTURES

169

reation of what could be called “a great continental family” became a substantial part of Russia’s rediscovering “old Europe” as its interlocutor. To some degree, the “false – true Europe” dichotomy determines other adjacent conceptualizations. One of them seems to be a contradistinction between “traditional Europe” and “post-Europe”. The “false” features of Europe are associated with the evaporation of national spirit and the growing self-denial of national interests and identities. This Russian discourse, then, seems to deny what Europe itself is proud of – both the refusal of national egos and the valorization of supranational integration. The “false – true Europe” dichotomy has important historical connotations. Russia’s relations with the Baltic countries, being fundamentally damaged by different interpretations of the events of World War II, are an emblematic case of a history-driven clash of identity. The “battle of words” includes a number of dichotomies: “voluntary membership” of the Soviet Union or “annexation”, “liberation” from Nazi Germany or “occupation” by the USSR, etc. In the meantime, the idea of the alleged “Russian Europe”, historically exemplified by Novgorod’s and Pskov’s inclusion into the Hansa medieval trade network, has also to be understood in the light of “true Europe” concept. The “false – true” dichotomy may be approached as a discursive frame allowing Russia to assess other European nations according to its own standards, thus stressing Russian subjectivity in European affairs. Russia needs a “false Europe” in order to reinstall its European credentials and feel at home with what it considers the “true Europe”. The othering of Europe frames and conditions the discursive construction of Russia itself, which sometimes thinks of itself as the “real” Europe, heir to the century-long European culture. The uncovering of the lack of authenticity in today’s Europe leads some Russian scholars to presume that Russia is destined to inherit and incarnate the legacy of the “genuine”, ancient Greece-based European civilization, while the EU has deviated from these “traditional values.”66 Many Russian political thinkers are convinced of Russia’s ability to profess and defend “genuinely Christian and, therefore, genuinely European values, with the central one being human freedom. This freedom derives from the creation of man in the image of the Lord.”67 This type of discourse not only makes today’s Europe a poorly self-articulated entity, but concomitantly questions the strategy of Russia’s integration into it.

3. Imitating Europe A strategy of imitating EU's normative discourse has been underway since the beginning of the 1990s. Russia's attempts to portray itself as a promoter of “international democracy” (in the form of multi-polarity, a dialogue of civilizations, etc.) appear to be political moves aimed at the pluralization and dispersion of power in the world which does not necessarily envisage democratic connotations. Moscow does accept democracy as a value, but interprets it above all as the 66 67

Viktor PERNATSKIY, “Rossiya v mirovom politiko-pravovom prostranstve,” Svobodnaya Mysl, 10, 1605, 2009, p. 56. Arkadiy MALER, “Pochemu ot Dmitryia Medvedeva ne iskhodit netvarniy svet?,” Russkii zhurnal, 2, April 29, 2008, www.russ.ru. (2.9.2016).

170

ANDREY MAKARYCHEV

rule of majority rather than the protection of minorities. The result is a struggle for what academically might be dubbed empty signifiers – concepts of democracy, human rights, equality, justice, individual freedoms, all of them constitutive of specific types of normative orders and open to various interpretations. The debate on international democracy became perhaps the first sign of the growing detachment of Moscow from the earlier largely depoliticized vision of international relations of Boris Yeltsin's presidency in the 1990s. In the context of the post-Kosovo political rifts between Russia and the West, the idea of international democracy was supposed to bear two chief meanings. Firstly, it was meant to lambast the western centered (and thus US-led) world order as undemocratic not only formally (by equating democracy with the mere plurality of policy positions to be taken into account), but also substantially and qualitatively as allegedly conducive to structural imbalances dangerously disruptive of global security. Secondly, the international democracy concept promoted by the Kremlin has the effect of de-valorizing liberal democracy as the globally hegemonic discourse and the de-facto acceptance of any subjectivity, regardless of the nature of its domestic regime. All key elements of Russian foreign policy under Putin's presidency – fierce resistance to NATO enlargement, fear of color revolutions, and claims for a Russian sphere of influence reminiscent of a new edition of the Russian imperial momentum – embrace these two key points of reference. The most important structural factor at this juncture is Moscow's promotion of its own normative platform, either without directly challenging the western centered concepts of democracy, or by trying to infuse them with a set of specifically Russian meanings. Thus, Moscow sees human rights mostly from an economic and social perspective; and the ideas of a responsibility to protect are congruent with concepts of the “Russian world” that presuppose the support of military rebellions in neighboring countries (clearly demonstrated by approach in the Ukraine). By the same token, the most controversial steps undertaken domestically and internationally are always justified by the Kremlin with references to allegedly similar Western approach (the recognition of Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s independence as a political equivalent of the recognition of Kosovo; the annexation of Crimea as being allegedly symmetric to the reunification of Germany; the infamous “foreign agents” legislation as having its precedents in the US, and the idea of a “sovereign democracy” as rooted in European political traditions). A number of legal terms underwent similar ideological reversions/mutations. One of them is the concept of sovereignty. From a predominantly legal notion, it turned into an ideological platform for Russia's political strategy, as exemplified by Putin's praise of sovereignty as the overall value that the Kremlin would never exchange even for a higher quality of life. And the concept is applied not only domestically, but internationally as well. An incident with Sergey Naryshkin, the speaker of the Duma, demonstrates this: In 2015, after having been banned from entering Finland, he ascertained that this country was not independent enough to be able to make its “own decision”. Yet, to a large extent, Putin’s sovereignty is an imitative concept: the Kremlin often copies many Western practices of governance, borrows concepts (like soft power, civil society, etc.) and adapts them to its vision of reality. Sovereignty largely remains a hollow concept: Its legal functioning is disavowed by the rampant corruption and deficiency of the rule of law; its institutional components are

RUSSIA’S EUROSCEPTIC DISCOURSES: IMITATIONS, CONTESTATIONS, SUTURES

171

weak; its economic elements are malfunctioning. And sovereignty is retrospective: Putin intentionally restores and rehabilitates many Soviet practices which may be self-defeating: Russia started revising some Soviet legal acts (coming to the conclusion that of transmitting Crimea to Ukraine under Khrushchev was illegal, or checking the legality of the secession of the three Baltic states from the USSR). As a result, in principle, the whole base of the very existence of Russia may be questioned, if not undermined. In many cases, Russia intentionally politicizes its communicative vocabulary by deploying otherwise relatively neutral concepts in explicitly ideological frames. One example is the idea of the empire that initially existed in literature as a mostly historical term. in the liberal part of the mainstream discourse, it was actualized by Anatoly Chubais' concept of the “liberal empire” that, apart from borrowing meanings from the American discourse, connoted a predominantly managerial approach to Russia's role in the near abroad grounded in the ability of Russian corporate business to exercise its leadership through economic predominance. Yet with the authoritarian devolution of Putin's regime, the term empire transformed into an ideological signifier of Russia's grandeur and the incarnation of Russia's messianic self-perception. One more example concerns an analogous transformation of the concept of “the Russian world” whose protection Russian diplomacy declared a high priority task. Initially the Russian world lexeme was evoked by a group of political technologists (such as Sergey Gradirovsky) who used it in a predominantly instrumental / post-political way, as a technological tool Russia should capitalize on for taking advantage of its numerous ex-compatriots in neighboring countries. They attributed mainly geo-cultural and geo-economic – as opposed to geopolitical – features to this concept.68 Yet under Putin, the Russian world transposed into an ideational construct aimed at justifying interventions in neighbors' affairs. The Kremlin’s Ukraine narrative includes an underlying legal argument: The EuroMaidan is qualified as an illegitimate act of mass violence that provoked a coup-d’état. To this, Russian diplomats add that Crimea was illegally transferred to the Ukrainian jurisdiction under the rule of Nikita Khrushchev; Ukraine's drive for independence in 1991 is equally questioned from the legal point of view. Yet these seemingly legalistic points easily transform into political reasoning. The Kremlin argues that the dethroning of ex-president Viktor Yanukovich was sponsored by the West, and residents of Crimea were threatened by the developments in Kyiv and thus needed protection. The separatist rebellion in eastern Ukraine is, in the Kremlin view, a gesture of desperation of people who wanted to defend their lives and dignity. Putin's comparison of the anti-terrorist operation of the Kyiv authorities with the Nazis’ ruthless destruction of Russian cities during the Second World War is also explicitly political. On other occasions, Russia intentionally invalidates legal provisions for political and ideological purposes. In particular, this is the case of the NATO-Russia Act. While the document states that “NATO and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries,” Russia openly treats the Alliance as its major military threat. While the two parties pledged “to overcome the vestiges of confrontation and strengthen mutual trust and cooperation,” Putin made it clear that any form 68

Sergey GRADIROVSKYI, “Russliy mir kak obyekt geokulturnogo proektitovania,” Soobschenie, 2003, http://soob.ru/n/2003/2/concept/8.(2.9.2016).

172

ANDREY MAKARYCHEV

of NATO’s presence in countries like Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova would be “unthinkable.” The 1997 Act also affirmed the mutual commitment to build a stable, peaceful, free and undivided Europe, yet the annexation of Crimea has nothing to do with any of those expectations. Equally doubtful are references to common interests, reciprocity, and transparency – these legally binding concepts have simply been non-existent in Russia’s rhetoric, and “the allegiance to shared values, commitments and norms of behavior” remains something to be found only on paper. The same goes for “predictability and mutual confidence,” “prevention of conflicts and settlement of disputes by peaceful means,” and “respect for the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of all states and their inherent right to choose the means to ensure their own security, the inviolability of borders, and peoples’ right of self-determination.” Against the background of a Russian-led proxy war in Ukraine, all of these statements look like nothing more than wishful thinking. Russia's commitments to refrain from the threat or use of force against “any other state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence in any manner” had clearly been disavowed by Russia’s military involvement in preventing Ukraine from further Europeanization. Yet in some cases, the Kremlin employs a more sophisticated strategy of discursive mimicry in communicating with the EU: it fights with the West using Western concepts and categories, attaching to them ideological and political meanings. Thus, it might claim open borders with Ukraine as a tool for maintaining its influence in this country. It refers to interdependence making a case for the futility of sanctions against Russia. It also widely utilizes the humanitarian rhetoric – in particular, for justifying Russian assistance to the eastern provinces of Ukraine. Moscow’s insistence on the federalization of Ukraine falls into the category of discursive mimicry as well. On the one hand, Moscow's demand for decentralization and regionalization of the Ukrainian state is a smart move, since neither the EU nor U.S. – who are based on federalist principles – may argue against them. Yet, on the other hand, in spite of being formally a federation, Russia under Putin is a perfect example of a hyper-centralized state with minimal powers for local authorities. It is exactly because of this that Putin's request for federalization in Ukraine, being projecting it onto Russia itself, would trigger a drastic deterioration of Putin's power base.

4. Contesting Europe Since Russia considered attempts to socialize itself into the European normative order by bringing it closer to EU norms as a failure, Moscow opted for a different strategy, that of contestation, which inevitably implied constructing new normative borders with Europe. In fact, this strategy may be dubbed a double contestation: Russia challenged EU values of emancipatory liberalism that it wished to counter-balance with spiritual conservatism and Russia questioned the very principles of the post-Cold-War Europe. Metaphorically speaking, Russia tries to erase the events of 1989–1991 and reconnect itself to the Soviet political legacy. This automatically means welcoming the comeback of the Cold War type of thinking. In this revisionist zeal, the Rus-

RUSSIA’S EUROSCEPTIC DISCOURSES: IMITATIONS, CONTESTATIONS, SUTURES

173

sian parliamentarians accused the Federal Republic Germany of annexing the German Democratic Republic without a referendum; Russian authorities questioned the legality of secession of the three Baltic republics from the USSR; Russia threatened to legally prosecute citizens of the Baltic States who avoided conscription to the Soviet Army; and Putin himself justified the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. The policy of contestation produces a militant aggressiveness that didn’t elide even the Russian Orthodox Church. It created an ideology of a besieged fortress whose roots come from the traumatic comprehension of Russia’s inability to meet the high normative standards of the EU. To be part of the international normative community turned out to be too demanding and cumbersome for Russia. Besides, the Kremlin claimed that it invested a lot in good relations with the West while receiving nothing in response. Structurally, Russia's agenda questions the very concept of globalization and its normative part in particular. The EU is one of the key producers of global norms-in-the-making that bother Russia so much, since it is only within the liberal normative order that Russia's claims for exclusive rights can be questioned. This explains why Russia wants to return to a traditional Westphalian nation state system with no meaningful supranational institutions and normative commitments. It is part of Russia's strategy to publicly discredit both the EU and NATO as futile, yet dangerous institutions. Russia wants the Americans out of Europe, which ultimately leads to a Russian version of spheres of influence. According to the Kremlin propaganda, the only alternative to this concept are military conflicts like in Ukraine or Georgia. Russia’s strategy of contesting Europe might be seen from two different perspectives. Its realist component is meant to challenge the existing political conventions in Europe (inviolability of borders and respect of national sovereignties) and to provoke security situations far beyond the Ukraine (after the Ukraine crisis, Russian military jets, according to NATO reports, have drastically intensified their flights over the Baltic Sea thus increasing the risks of collisions with commercial airplanes). In the role of a norm-challenger, Russia has shown insensitivity to its de-facto expulsion from the G8, and demonstrated only a limited interest in the G20, as exemplified by Putin's earlier departure from its 2014 summit in Brisbane. The ulterior result of these moves is the contribution to a further degradation of international law, and therefore a more anarchic structure of international relations. The kernel of Kremlin's realist strategy is the struggle for recognition as a legitimate actor in a wider Europe and Eurasia by the EU. Paradoxically, Putin wants to achieve this through a policy of de-legitimization of the existing institutions and conventions. Moscow aims to de-legitimize the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the transfer of Crimea under Ukrainian jurisdiction, the commitments stipulated by the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, etc. Arguably, it is this legal uncertainty intentionally created by Moscow that constitutes a fertile ground for normative and ideological impositions. The second component of Russia's policy could be dubbed normative counteroffensive, with the promotion of a conservative policy doctrine as the nucleus of Russia's soft power strategy. It is grounded in the revival of a traditional understanding of social and political actor-hood, from domestic social conservatism (with various bans and restrictions, including the anti-gay propaganda law, the legislation prohibiting foreign adoption, etc.) to the reinvigoration of conserva-

174

ANDREY MAKARYCHEV

tive principles in international relations (nation-state-based diplomacy, noninterference, the ideas of “the concert of great powers”, etc.). In particular, the concept of family as the constitutive background for social liaisons may serve as guidance for comprehending both Russia's policies in the neighboring areas and the doctrinal foundations of Russian neo-imperial temptations. This concept translates into a family-based understanding of the “Russian world” as a specific type of trans-border bio-political (i.e., based on state's regulatory capacities over human bodies rather than over territories) community. Putin's conservatism appeals to body politic in a sense that it tries to normalize Russia through the articulation of the concept of the nation as an analogue of a big family that is cemented not by a particular ideology, but rather by a feeling of natural and allegedly undisputable belongingness to its collective body. The annexation of Crimea can also be interpreted through this type of family-like rhetoric stretching beyond (if nor simply discarding) material calculus. Within this conservative worldview, the West (and Europe in particular) is negatively marked as a source of threats and dangers. Yet the specific modalities of the normative counter-offensive depend on regional contexts. In Western Europe the key groups susceptible to the projection of the Russian conservative agenda are mainly far-right parties. The common points between them and the Kremlin are the cherished restoration of traditional nationstate-based policies, the regulation of migration (hygienic discourse of a “clean” and authentic national body), and a strong resistance to the liberal emancipatory mass culture. In the Baltic Sea Region, the Kremlin's conservatism takes on a different form of ethnically based policy of supporting Russian-speaking minorities. The key recipients of the Russian discourse are Russian-speaking communities that, on the one hand, are objects of Russian cultural projection, and, on the other, reproduce the Kremlin’s imperial discourse. In Eastern Europe (particularly in Ukraine), the idea of bio-political conservatism reaches its apex. The Kremlinpromoted distinction between the collective Self and a variety of collective Others is based on the belongingness to an imagined political community of “the Russian world”. The Kremlin’s whole discourse on Ukraine is bio-politically biased, with numerous references to “infections” and “bacillus” (an allusion to fascism) that need to be cleansed out by sanitary measures. Therefore, the combination of two major concepts – the realist division of spheres of influence and the more identitarian “Russian world” idea – are two sides of the same political coin, and illuminate the two different visions and languages Russia uses for framing its European policy after the break-down of the post-political consensus between Moscow and Brussels. As a result, the arguments from the repertoire of defensive realism (Russia protects itself from the malign West that for decades – if not centuries – has been eager to detach Ukraine from Russia) are interspersed with messianic appeals to Russian spirituality and moral superiority over Europe. Against this backdrop, Russia's policy is at a crossroads and stuck in a collision of different approaches. But arguably, both Russia's role identities – the realist norm-challenger and the conservative norm-projector – boost political elements in the EU-Russia relations, as opposed to economic, legal, or administrative ones. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, these relations were largely dominated by a non-/post-political agenda grounded in the uncontested belongingness of Russia to Europe and the consequent compatibility with its institutional

RUSSIA’S EUROSCEPTIC DISCOURSES: IMITATIONS, CONTESTATIONS, SUTURES

175

rules and standards. In practice, this actualized the search for legal and institutional frameworks for bilateral relations such as the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, the Partnership for Modernization, the Northern Dimension, and other programs. These beliefs were largely sustained by multiple technical initiatives promoted by the EU through different channels on a micro-political level (trans-border cooperation projects, city twinning relations, educational programs, etc.). All of them were based on the presumption of the almost axiomatic inclusion of Russia in a wider Europe necessitating only time and some technical readjustments. Yet the whole spectrum of Russia's relations with the EU gradually turned explicitly political – from energy issues (where the key controversy is between the EU-promoted market liberalization and Gazprom's policy of preserving its exceptional status as the key energy supplier) to the re-actualization of the security debate within the EU that is conducive to the appearance of political gaps between its member states. Even with a number of shared interests in Europe, Russia and the EU politically diverge from each other due to radically dissimilar normative components of their identities. Even more noteworthy and consequential, the current wave of politicization pits some European countries against each other. This questions the overall idea of a united Europe and thus plays into Putin's hands. Ultimately, the crisis in Ukraine made clear that there is very little that Moscow and Brussels share in their policies. The problem of interpretation is fundamental at this juncture: While Russia considers the annexation of Crimea as a merely defensive act, the EU qualifies it as an unacceptable encroachment on the territorial integrity of a European country. The EU portrays its behavior as strictly normative, while Russia, according to this logic, voluntarily detached itself from the European international society by preferring to build its policies on the basis of a questionable understanding of national interests rather than act institutionally. From its part, Russia stems from its allegedly “natural” right to play a protective role in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, legitimized by the judgmental references to history, geography, and culture.69 Moscow's policies toward countries balancing between Russia and the EU have little in common with EU strategies of normative expansion. It is hardly imaginable that the EU would blackmail its neighbors by using security vulnerabilities (as Russia did in the case of Armenia) or inspire insurgency against central authorities (the case of Ukraine). Even with countries that are disinterested to sign Association Agreements (like Azerbaijan), the EU keeps working on many policy tracks without taking any retaliatory measures. By the same token, Russia’s reaction to the events in Ukraine elucidated a direct linkage between foreign policy aggressiveness and domestic repressions, which again distinguishes Russia from the EU. It is not incidental that Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the creeping intervention in eastern regions of Ukraine is paralleled by the growing bans and restrictions within the country – foreign travel bans for certain categories of state employees; shrinking political pluralism, greater control over the Internet, etc.

69

Dmitry MEDVEDEV, “Rossiya i Ukraina: zhizn’ po novym pravilam,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, December 15, 2014, http://www.ng.ru/ideas/2014-12-15/1_medvedev.html.(2.9.2016).

176

ANDREY MAKARYCHEV

Therefore, both Russia and the EU are gradually getting rid of the old illusions of politically and ideologically sterile bilateral relations, and returning to a world full of political collisions. The result is the current clash of two divergent political realities hardly reconcilable with one another. In this context, one may claim that it is Russia that intentionally plays a politicizing game, assuming that it has stronger political arguments and trump cards. In particular, Putin’s strategy includes forging a political alliance with “Russia understanders” in Europe, basically occupying far right or far left positions in European ideological terrains. The controversies over Ukraine have revealed the conceptual incompatibility of EU- and Russia-led integration projects. Rhetorically, the Kremlin echoes the old EU narrative about “Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok“, but has substituted its original content, based on the universal applicability of the European norms of governance, with an under-conceptualized idea of two integration projects competing with each other. Russia’s policy in the Eurasian Economic Union intends not only to diversify its economic relations, but to economically counter-balance the EU. A situation dangerously reminiscent of the Cold War is not unthinkable any longer, though of course it won't repeat the script of the first Cold War. Russia flexes its military muscles, comes up with its explicitly ideological project of both social (domestic) and international (Westphalian-like) conservatism, and intentionally revives the language of confrontation with the West, with “enemies”, “the fifth column”, “national traitors”, and other catchwords. On the long run, Russia‘s strategy aims to split Europe and thus question the rationale of the European project, or at least to make the EU react to the unexpectedly sharpened hard security problems, which the EU is functionally not up to effectively respond to by its very design. Two elements of Russia's strategy play the most important roles. First, Russia intends to de-legitimize the EU and NATO, using contacts with far-right and far-left parties in many European countries to this end. Secondly, Russia is eager to detach neighboring countries from the EU and NATO, and for this purpose tries to publicly expose an institutional futility of both, EU and NATO by demonstrating a) their operational weakness and inability to protect the interests of their members, and b) undue dependence on the US. The Russia-spurred politicization of relations with the EU is conducive to the reproduction of a binary logic of ‘either – or’ confrontation reminiscent of the Cold War, which ultimately leads to the dangerous securitization of the relationship.

Conclusion Both imitation and contestation as key elements of Russia’s Eurosceptic discourse can be analyzed through the concept of suture that denotes Russia’s wish to overcome the dispersion and fragmentation of its dislocated post-Soviet identity through references to European normative discourses. The idea of suture can be used as an academic metaphor that describes the intricacies of inside-outside interrelations and dynamics. In post-structuralist scholarship, “suture” implies

RUSSIA’S EUROSCEPTIC DISCOURSES: IMITATIONS, CONTESTATIONS, SUTURES

177

70

“the mapping of external difference onto the inside,” or “inscription of the exte71 rior in the interior.” In the case of suture, external difference becomes internal. In academic literature, there were only a few attempts to introduce the idea of the 72 suture to the field of EU-Russia relations. The concept of the suture can be instrumental in explaining how the inside and the outside relate to each other and what effects may grow out of their interdependence. The suture characterizes dispersed, fragmented and existentially insecure identities, which borrow significant meanings (concepts, ideas) from the outside to interiorize them and thus stabilize their identities. In a radical way, suture leads to foreclosure–to a state of self-sufficiency and isolation from the outside. A good example of this has been how the EU and Russia have, mostly, effectively worked together in common regions of interest. A variety of Russia’s contemporary discourses on Europe, on the one hand, seek to bind Russia to Europe (though interpreted differently), and on the other hand, to delink Russia’s identity from the dominant European normative order and thus to disavow the indispensability of Europe not just as a mere interlocutor, but, more significantly, as a source of discursive legitimacy for Russia’s European ambitions. Arguably, through defining its identity in overwhelmingly European terms and thus borrowing European vocabulary Russia slides into the self-descriptive genre of political discourse that is largely connotative with auto-communication. Russia becomes an uncooperative neighbour even while using European political language, which nicely illustrates the concept of the suture as applicable for political analysis.

LES DISCOURS EUROSCEPTIQUES DE LA RUSSIE : IMITATIONS, CONTESTATIONS, SUTURES Dans cette contribution, l’auteur montre que le discours eurosceptique peut prendre différentes formes. Il porte particulièrement mon attention sur l´imitation et la contestation. Les deux dimensions sont intersubjectives dans le sens que la référence à l´Europe est utilisée comme un moyen de renforcement dans le processus de stabilisation de l´identité dissoute de la Russie. Ceci soit par une imitation et une représentation déformée des concepts européens ou par la vive critique des valeurs européennes affirmées comme étrangère et inacceptables pour la Russie. L’évolution de l´imitation à la contestation est le vecteur principal des discours eurosceptiques en Russie. Dans le cadre d´une analyse critique des discours, l´imitation et la contestation sont deux formes de sutures. Ce concept décrit la capacité d´un sujet à emprunter de l´extérieur des concepts donneur de sens pour renforcer au moyen d´une vision du monde fermée sa propre identité disloquée. 70 71 72

Steve NOLAN, Film, Lacan and the Subject of Religion. A Psychoanalytical Approach to Religious Film Analysis, London and New York, Continuum, 2009, p. 109. Ibid., p. 54. Aliaksei KAZHARSKI, Andrey MAKARYCHEV, “Suturing the Neighborhood? Russia and the EU in Conflictual Intersubjectivity,” Problems of Post-Communism, 62, 6, NovemberDecember 2015, p. 328–339.

178

ANDREY MAKARYCHEV

RUSSLANDS EUROSKEPTISCHE DISKURSE : IMITATIONEN, STREITIGKEITEN, NAHTSTELLEN In diesem Beitrag geht der Autor davon aus, dass der euroskeptische Diskurs verschiedene Formen annehmen kann. Das besondere Augenmerk gilt der Nachahmung und der Anfechtung. Beide sind intersubjektiv in dem Sinne, dass Verweise auf Europa im Prozess der Stabilisierung der aufgelösten Identität Russlands als Verstärker genutzt werden. Dies erfolgt entweder durch Nachahmung und verzerrte Darstellung europäischer Konzepte oder durch die heftige Kritik europäischer Werte als fremd und unannehmbar für Russland. Die Entwicklung von der Nachahmung zur Anfechtung definiert den Hauptvektor der euroskeptischen Diskurse Russlands. In der Perspektive der kritischen Diskursanalyse sind Nachahmung und Anfechtung zwei verschiedene Formen von Sutur. Dieses Konzept beschreibt die Fähigkeit eines Subjekts, sinnstiftende Bedeutung von außen zu borgen, um so seine eigene dislozierte Identität mit einem geschlossenen Weltbild zu stärken.

LES AUTEURS – DIE AUTOREN – THE AUTHORS EIRIKUR BERGMANN Eirikur Bergmann is Professor of Politics at Bifrost University in Iceland and Visiting Professor at the University of Ljubljana in Slovenia. He is furthermore Director of the Centre for European Studies in Iceland. Professor Bergmann writes mainly on nationalism, populism, European integration, Icelandic politics, and on participatory democracy. Among his recent publications are his books Iceland and the International Financial Crisis: Boom, Bust & Recovery, out in early 2014, and Nordic Nationalism and Wright Wing Populist Politics, released in late 2016, both published by Palgrave Macmillan.

RÉMI CAUCANAS Rémi Caucanus hold a PhD in Contemporary History, he is associate researcher at the IREMAM (AMU) and was until 2017 Director of the Institut catholique de la Méditerranée in Nice, France.

KOSTIANTYN FEDORENKO Kostiantyn Fedorenko is Junior Research Fellow at the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation. Provides regular political analysis for reputed Ukrainian media, such as “Dzerkalo Tyzhnia” and “Focus”. His research interests include domestic politics of European states, radical movements and parties, and international relations in Europe.

AFRIM KRASNIQI Afrim Krasniqi is Executive Director of the Albanian Institute for Political Studies. He is professor in Tirana University, columnist in media and author of different books about political parties, civil society, election and democracy in Albania and Southeast European countries.

ANDREY MAKARYCHEV Andrey Makarychev is Guest Professor at Johan Skytte Institute of Political Science, University of Tartu. His major areas of expertise include Russia’s foreign and security policy, regionalism in Europe, and EU-Russia relations.

180

ANNEXE

PATRICK MOREAU Patrick Moreau is a Senior Researcher in Political Sciences at the National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) in France and member of the team of researchers UMR 7367, Dynamiques européennes of the University of Strasbourg.

IEVA MOTŪZAITĖ Ieva Motūzaitė is a Vilnius University Graduate with an MA in Comparative Politics. After her internship in the German Parliament in 2015, she worked as a Research Associate at the Belarus Country Office of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. Currently, Motūzaitė is writing a doctoral dissertation in the field of political theory at Berlin’s Humboldt University.

CENNI NAJY Cenni Najy is a PhD student, as well as a Research & Teaching Assistant at the Global Studies Institute of the University of Geneva and Senior policy Fellow at the think tank Foraus.

JEAN-CHRISTOPHE ROMER Jean Christophe Romer is Professor of Contemporary History at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques (IEP) of Strasbourg and co-head of the Master 2 “history of international relations and the regional integration process.”

LISE RYE Lise Rye is Associate Professor in Contemporary European History at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU). Her research focuses on economic and political integration in Europe after World War II and Norway’s relations with the EU.

RENÉ SCHWOK René Schwok is Professor at the University of Geneva and Director of the Global Studies Institute of the University of Geneva. He holds a Jean Monnet chair in Political Science.

WOLFGANG SENDER Wolfgang Sender serves as the Belarus Country Representative of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, based in Vilnius, since 2015. The Political Scientist studied in Leipzig, Bonn, and Berlin, and obtained a PhD in Political Science from the

DIE AUTOREN – LES AUTEURS – THE AUTHORS

181

Freie Universtät Berlin. He is the author of several articles and publications in the sphere of military sociology, foreign policy, and education.

BIRTE WASSENBERG Birte Wassenberg is Professor of Contemporary History at the Insitut d’études Politiques (IEP) of the University of Strasbourg (France) and member of the team of researchers UMR 7367, Dynamiques européennes. She holds a Jean Monnet Chair and is co-head of the Master 2 “history of international relations and the regional integration process.”

ZUR REIHE „STUDIEN ZUR GESCHICHTE DER EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION“ Mit zunehmendem Abstand zum Beginn des europäischen Integrationsprozesses nimmt die Bedeutung der Geschichtswissenschaften im Spektrum der wissenschaftlichen Erforschung des Europäischen Integrationsprozesses zu. Auch wenn die übliche dreißigjährige Sperrfrist für Archivmaterial weiterhin ein Hindernis für die Erforschung der jüngeren Integrationsgeschichte darstellt, werden die Zeiträume, die für die Wissenschaft zugänglich sind, kontinuierlich größer. Heute können die Archive zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl bis hin zur ersten Erweiterung eingesehen werden; in einem Jahrzehnt wird ein aktengestütztes Studium der Rahmenbedingungen der Mittelmeererweiterung und der Entstehung der Einheitlichen Europäischen Akte möglich sein. Darüber hinaus ist der Beitrag der Geschichtswissenschaften auch heute schon Rahmen der Erforschung der jüngsten Integrationsgeschichte nicht mehr zu übersehen. Ihre Methodenvielfalt hilft dabei, die durch Sperrfristen der Archive entstandenen Probleme auszugleichen. Allerdings findet der einschlägige geschichtswissenschaftliche Diskurs in der Regel immer noch im nationalstaatlichen Kontext statt und stellt damit, so gesehen, gerade in Bezug auf die europäische Geschichte einen Anachronismus dar. Vor diesem Hintergrund haben sich Forscherinnen und Forscher aus ganz Europa und darüber hinaus dazu entschlossen, eine Schriftenreihe ins Leben zu rufen, die die Geschichte der Europäischen Integration nicht nur aus einer europäischen Perspektive beleuchtet, sondern auch einem europäischen Publikum vorlegen möchte. Gemeinsam mit dem Verlag Franz Steiner wurde deshalb die Schriftenreihe Studien zur Geschichte der Europäischen Integration (SGEI) gegründet. Ein herausragendes Merkmal dieser Reihe ist ihre Dreisprachigkeit – Deutsch, Englisch und Französisch. Zu jedem Beitrag gibt es mehrsprachige ausführliche und aussagekräftige Zusammenfassungen des jeweiligen Inhalts. Damit bieten die Studien zur Geschichte der Europäischen Integration interessierten Leserinnen und Lesern erstmals einen wirklich europäischen Zugang zu neuesten geschichtswissenschaftlichen Erkenntnissen auf dem Gebiet der Geschichte der Europäischen Integration.

CONCERNANT LA SÉRIE » ETUDES SUR L’HISTOIRE DE L’INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE « L’importance des recherches historiques ne cesse d’augmenter au sein de l’éventail qu’offrent les recherches scientifiques sur le processus d’intégration européenne, et ce à mesure que le recul par rapport au début du processus d’intégration européenne se fait de plus en plus grand. Même si le délai d’attente habituel de trente ans pour la consultation des archives constitue encore un obstacle pour les recherches sur l’histoire récente de l’intégration, les périodes accessibles à la recherche se révèlent de plus en plus étendues. A l’heure actuelle, les archives datant de la fondation de la Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l’Acier jusqu’au premier élargissement peuvent être consultées ; d’ici dix ans, une étude documentée des conditions générales de l’élargissement méditerranéen et de la conception de l’Acte unique européen sera possible. La contribution des recherches historiques dans le cadre de la recherche sur l’histoire toute proche de l’intégration est dès à présent remarquable. La diversité de méthodes utilisées permet en effet de régler des problèmes engendrés par le délai de blocage des archives. Toutefois, le débat historique s’y rapportant s’inscrit encore généralement dans le contexte de l’Etat-nation et représente, de ce point de vue, un anachronisme par rapport à l’histoire européenne. C’est dans ce contexte que des chercheuses et chercheurs de toute l’Europe et au-delà ont décidé de lancer une série d’ouvrages qui mettent en lumière l’histoire de l’intégration européenne non seulement dans une perspective européenne, mais qui se veut également accessible à un large public européen. Cette série d’ouvrages, intitulée Etudes sur l’Histoire de l’Intégration Européenne (EHIE), a été créée en collaboration avec la maison d’édition Franz Steiner. Le caractère trilingue de cette série – allemand, anglais et français – constitue une particularité exceptionnelle. Chaque contribution est accompagnée de résumés plurilingues, détaillés et éloquents sur le contenu s’y rapportant. Les Etudes sur l’Histoire de l’Intégration Européenne offrent pour la première fois aux lectrices et lecteurs intéressés un accès réellement européen aux avancées historiques les plus récentes dans le domaine de l’histoire de l’intégration européenne.

ABOUT THE SERIES “STUDIES ON THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION” With increasing distance to the process of European integration, there is a growing significance of the historical sciences within the range of the scientific research on the European integration process. Even if the usual blocking period for archive sources is still an obstacle for researching the more recent history of integration, the periods which are accessible for the sciences are continuously becoming more extended. Today, the archives on the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community are accessible as far as to the first extension; in one decade it will be possible to gain access to the appropriate files for studying the history of the prerequisites of the Mediterranean extension and the development of the Single European Act. Furthermore, already today the contribution of historic sciences in the context of researching the most recent history of integration cannot be overlooked. Their variety of methods helps with balancing problems resulting from the blocking periods for archives. However, usually the relevant historic discourse still happens in the context of national states and is thus, if we like to see things this way, rather an anachronism in respect of European history. Against this background, researchers from all over Europe and beyond have decided to found a series of publications which intends not only to shed light on the history of European integration from a European point of view but also to present this to a European audience. For this reason, together with the Franz Steiner Publishing House the series of publications Studies on the History of European Integration (SHEI) was founded. One outstanding feature of this series will be its trilingualism – German, English and French. For every contribution there will be extensive and telling summaries of the respective contents in several languages. Thus, by Studies on the History of European Integration interested readers will for the first time be offered a really European approach at most resent historic insights in the field of the history of European integration.

The history of European integration has always known “external states” that did not want or were not able to join the process of European integration. The EU might indeed not be seen as attractive: Since 2008, it has had to face many crises, first the financial crisis, then the migration and Schengen crises in 2015, and finally the “leave” vote in Great Britain in 2016, the so-called “Brexit”. Euro-skepticism has continually increased in EU-member states as the rejection of various EU treaties proved. On national as well

as EU levels, the strength of anti-European parties has grown. The present volume, edited by Birte Wassenberg and Patrick Moreau, concentrates on these “external states”, particularly their attitude towards Europe. By looking at the geopolitical context, a wide range from historical constants to a changing of attitudes is shown and proves that the EU remains a fundamental actor of European politics and that its attraction continues to be very powerful.

SGEI SG SHEI SH EHIE E www.steiner-verlag.de

Franz Steiner Verlag

ISBN 978-3-515-11252-9

9 7835 1 5 1 1 2529