European Foreign and Security Policy towards China: The Cases of France, Germany and the United Kingdom 3031122585, 9783031122583

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European Foreign and Security Policy towards China The Cases of France, Germany and the United Kingdom Claude Zanardi

European Foreign and Security Policy towards China

Claude Zanardi

European Foreign and Security Policy towards China The Cases of France, Germany and the United Kingdom

Claude Zanardi Paris Institute of Political Science Paris, France

ISBN 978-3-031-12258-3    ISBN 978-3-031-12259-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12259-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: Marina Lohrbach, shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

To my grandmother, Ada Mimmi, and my aunt, Anna Maria Zanardi, who always supported me in whatever I was doing.

Preface

In the twenty-first century, the European Union (EU) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) play a growing role as both international actors and security providers. Despite in 2018 the EU releasing the EU’s Asia security strategy as well as a European strategy on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (EEAS, 2018), except from trade, the European approach towards China remains underdeveloped and defence cooperation is ruled out by the EU’s arms embargo vis-à-vis China (1989). Nevertheless, bilateral relations have expanded in fields such as counterpiracy and military-­ to-­ military relations. Since the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) remains intergovernmental, understanding major European countries’ foreign policy is thus crucial to analyse CFSP’s advance towards China. This research considers the approach of three big European states, namely France, Germany, and the UK, towards China—even if the Brexit referendum of 2016 has caused the exit of the UK from the EU with consequences that are difficult to forecast in the medium and long terms. This volume utilises the Foreign Policy Approach (FPA) as the theoretical framework since it helps trace European and national policy changes, analyses and compares their development and the shaping of the CFSP. The main hypothesis was that the absence of the CFSP vis-à-vis China provided the Member States with the opportunity to project their national policies to the EU.  To investigate this, this book contemplates the German, British, and French policies towards the PRC by analysing primary sources, such as interviews of experts, public documents by governments,

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parliaments, foreign and defence ministries, speeches by heads of s­tate/ government, and so on, which may inform decisions on foreign and security policies. Paris, France

Claude Zanardi

References Council of the EU. (2018). Enhanced EU Security Cooperation in and with Asia. Retrieved  from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/35456/st09265-­ re01-­en18.pdf European Commission. (2018). Connecting Europe and Asia—Building blocks for an EU Strategy. Retrieved  from https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/ default/files/joint_communication_-­_connecting_europe_and_asia_-­_building_blocks_for_an_eu_strategy_2018-­09-­19.pdf

Acknowledgements

I am extremely grateful to my supervisor, Ramon Pacheco-Pardo; second supervisor, Alessio Patalano; and the two jury members, Spiros Economides and Nicola Casarini, for their impressive understanding and support. A special thank you to Kerry Brown who was the example that inspired my research and the need to become a better scholar. Special thanks to the Graduate School and the Disability Support at King’s College London (KCL) for the precious help they provided during my long and often difficult path to complete my PhD.  Another special thank you to the Royal Literary Fellows who endlessly corrected my academic English and gave me valuable suggestions; to the editor, Anne Birchley-Brun; and the anonymous reviewers for their useful feedback and suggestions. Finally, I would like to acknowledge all those experts and scholars who kindly accepted to answer my questions over the years, as well as to those who did not. During this research I have learnt a lot, and not just on the way in which to run academic research, but also how to listen to different voices and interact with people so much more knowledgeable than me, busy people who took time out of their tight schedules to reply to the best they could to my questioning. This was highly appreciated.

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Contents

1 Introduction  1 2 T  he EU as a Foreign and Security Actor: Towards a CFSP Towards China? 17 3 T  he Re-emergence of China and the Deepening of EU-China Relations 53 4 G  erman Foreign and Security Policy Towards China in the Twenty-First Century 93 5 B  ritish Foreign and Security Policy Towards China in the Twenty-First Century147 6 F  rench Foreign and Security Policy Towards China in the Twenty-First Century217 7 Conclusions267

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List of Figures

Fig. 3.1 Fig. 3.2 Fig. 3.3

Largest traders worldwide (2021) EU’s main trading partners (2020) EU trade deficit with China (2011–2021)

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List of Tables

Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 4.3 Table 5.1 Table 5.2 Table 5.3 Table 6.1 Table 6.2 Table 6.3 Table 7.1 Table 7.2 Table 7.3 Table 7.4

German vision of China’s military modernisation 109 German vision of lifting arms embargo/export opportunities 118 German vision of China’s maritime disputes 126 British vision of China’s military modernisation 178 British vision of Chinese maritime disputes 184 British vision of lifting arms embargo/export opportunities 195 French vision of China’s military modernisation 243 French vision of Chinese maritime disputes 245 French vision of lifting arms embargo/export opportunities 251 France, Germany, and the UK’s contribution to EU’s foreign policy towards China 271 German, British, and French vision of lifting arms embargo/ export opportunities 273 German, British, and French vision of Chinese military modernisation274 Main three European countries and Chinese maritime disputes 274

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

In China, the progressive forces that have been continuously inspired by our political tradition for almost a century, have been defeated again and again. Nowadays, the goal of the people in power in Beijing is to win over them definitively within China and to weaken them everywhere else [and] turn China into the number one lasting power. They know what they want, while Europe does not know where it goes. She has no vision for its future. [Author personal translation] —Billeter, Jean François (2020), Pauraque L’Europe. Réflexions d’un sinologue, Paris: Allia, pp. 7–8

Since the normalisation of Sino-European relations in 1975 and the economic opening of China in 1978, the relations between the EU and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have developed rapidly. However, they remain focused on trade. For instance, in 1991 the Foreign Minister of Luxembourg, Jacques Poos, criticised ‘the political insignificance of Europe’. And the then foreign minister of Belgium, Mark Eyskens, famously defined Europe as ‘an economic giant, a political dwarf and a military worm’ (Whitney, 1991). Both acknowledged the disunity and irrelevance of European countries in the face of common foreign policy issues. Nevertheless, since the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and the launch of the European Foreign Policy (1999), the foreign and security policy of the

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 C. Zanardi, European Foreign and Security Policy towards China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12259-0_1

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EU has developed rapidly. In fact, in an intertwined world characterised by new global security challenges, the EU has increasingly been called upon to play a growing international role in maintaining peace and security. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, when the powershift to Asia became palpable, China was already a major economic partner of the EU and its Member States, notably Germany, the UK, and France. Driven by China’s fast economic development, the powershift to Asia has enhanced the relevance of that region and modified the regional balance of power. Furthermore, ambitious Chinese Foreign policy projects, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (PRC, 2015), have strong implications for the EU and its Member States. For instance, the BRI requires the protection of China’s economic interests abroad, thus justifying a wider role for the PLA that increasingly intervenes out of its traditional confidence area. A case in point is Africa where former European powers retain important ties: the Chinese presence, including the PLA’s presence, has been growing fast (e.g. PLA Navy counterpiracy effort in the Gulf of Aden). Although increasing interactions have led to the deepening of bilateral relations between the EU and China, the EU’s approach to China remains underdeveloped. This is due to several factors, such as the economic nature of the European integration, the intergovernmental nature of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the European arms embargo that hampers bilateral military cooperation, and the fact that the relations between the EU and China have long remained the reflection of the US-China relations (Shambaugh, 2005; Bates & Murphy, 2008; Ruan, 2008). This contrasts greatly with US Secretary of State Clinton’s declaration that the twenty-first century will be ‘America’s Pacific century’ and ‘the future of politics will be decided in Asia [where] the US will be right at the centre of the action’ (Clinton, 2011; Lieberthal, 2011). In 2012, the new Strategic Guidance for the Ministry of Defence and the US Pivot to Asia fully recognised the strategic challenge posed by the powershift to Asia and the need for the US to rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific region (US Department of Defence, 2012). Regarding the EU, despite the progress made by the Lisbon Treaty (2009), such as the establishment of a European diplomatic service or the upgrade of EU-China relations to a strategic partnership in 2003, the Sino-European relations remained focused on trade. Notwithstanding the first EU Global Strategy (EEAS, 2016), at the time of writing, the EU does not have a specific strategy to address the rise of China. Since this strategic deficit is not automatically mirrored at Member States’ level, the author of this volume posited that this vacuum at the EU level provided the Member States with a golden opportunity to fill this gap.

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Since in a globalised world no Member State has the resources to address global issues while the EU has the necessary size to be relevant internationally, the author assumed that this would have triggered the shaping of a comprehensive European strategy on China; in particular, the analysis of how Germany, the United Kingdom, and France tackle the rise of China was fundamental to understand the development of the CFSP vis-à-vis the PRC. Subsequently, the primary purpose of this volume was not to investigate the security relations between the EU and the PRC. Certainly, the analysis of their bilateral relations constitutes the framework under which Germany, France, and the UK until Brexit have shaped their foreign and security approach towards China. However, this research implies an empirical analysis of their national approaches in a deep and well sourced manner. Since the role played by an individual Member State in designing the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) towards China has not yet been researched, the author aimed at filling this gap in the existing literature. Hence, this book was intended as a contribution to the literature on the understudied topic of the bilateral foreign and security relations of Germany, France, and the UK with the PRC. Instead of neglecting the policies of single Member States in order to focus on the EU-China relations, the author of this research argues that the role played by Member States is crucial because, unlike commutarised policies such as trade where the European Commission contributes and directs EU policies, the CFSP depends mainly on the contribution of the Member States. In this regard, she assumes that, due to several reasons—economic, geographic, historical, and cultural reasons—even after Brexit, the position of the UK vis-à-­ vis China is likely to be influenced by and influence its major European neighbouring countries as well as by the EU.  In addition, there is no comparative study highlighting similarities and differences between European countries’ foreign and security policies towards China. Consequently, the purpose of this book is original, and no academic research has been undertaken yet on this topic. Subsequently, Sino-­ European relations certainly provide a framework to this study. The CFSP, and the subsequent development of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), has been the subject of numerous analysis (Cogan, 2001; Jones, 2007; Mérand, 2008; Menon, 2009) and since the Franco-British Declaration of St Malo (1998) has undergone profound changes. The CFSP has provided rules setting out the ambitions to which the Member States have committed themselves and the procedure governing its ‘civilian approach to security’ (Howorth & Menon, 2009).

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Although underdeveloped, the CFSP vis-à-vis China has gradually extended to areas such as military-to-military relations, diplomatic relations, nuclear dialogues, and so on. In the absence of a European comprehensive approach towards China, it is essential to consider the posture of the Member States, particularly those with the means and willingness to conduct a national foreign policy on China. Germany, France, and the UK have long foreign policy traditions and relations with China and, until Brexit, were among the few Member States disposing of the resources to develop a comprehensive foreign policy vis-à-vis the PRC. Furthermore, they have influenced the CFSP and, more than other Member States, disposed of the capacity to shape such an EU policy. Since German, British, and French foreign policies depend on their domestic interests, preferences, and historic relations with China, the specificity of their foreign policy traditions may produce different preferences and goals on EU policies. Thanks to their historical great power status, their international influence remained high. For instance, France and the UK are still members of the UN Security Council and Germany cooperates on several global issues with the Permanent Members of the Security Council (P5) in the ‘P5 Plus One’ format. France, Germany, and the UK are also the main European economies with strong defence industries. Therefore, they are the most likely to think strategically about the rise of China and dispose of the resources to implement a comprehensive foreign policy on the PRC. With well-developed economic and diplomatic relations with China, they have been the most successful in influencing the EU posture on China and have also developed military-to-military relations with the Chinese army. The foreign policy of each of these three European countries is analysed through the lenses of national experts. ‘Experts’ are defined as people with a specific knowledge within a particular domain, namely with a deep knowledge of China, national security, and defence policy or, ideally, both topics. Although it was hard to quantify their exact contribution, it was posited that, thanks to their specific competences and knowledge, they were well placed to influence the national foreign policy decision-making process. Extensive field research showed that their number is usually limited, which supports the claim that they form a particular group of experts. For instance, in France, learning Chinese language and culture at university was usually considered as ‘a waste of time’, or even a ‘useless’ activity. A French expert even noted that the US makes a more comprehensive and well-informed analysis of the PLA and, thus, Europeans often consider

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Chinese issues, especially on foreign and security policy, through the American lenses. A French diplomat on Asia made a provocative suggestion calling for a ‘real sinicising school within the Quai d’Orsay’ to keep a path with the US whose knowledge of China is ‘without any comparison with that of the Europeans!’ Primarily from 2012 to the first half of 2016, 121 interviews were conducted with as many European experts as possible, mainly British, French, and Germans. The interviewees include, among others, Members of national Parliament (MPs), the Army, representatives of defence companies, of academia, private or public think-tanks. Field research highlighted that, especially in France and Germany, they are increasingly urged to provide the necessary knowledge to shape their country’s strategic decisions. Despite the category of experts included MPs, politicians, and representatives of defence companies in the three case studies, it proved sometimes difficult to access them, and they were often reluctant to be interviewed. The author of this volume initially selected four questions focused on security and defence more than foreign and security policy: (1) do you believe that the modernisation of the Chinese army is a threat or a challenge to France/Germany/the UK? And to the EU? (2) What is the aspect of the PLA’s modernisation you are most worried about? (3) Do you see any opportunities coming for the French/German/British defence companies in China’s defence market? (4) How do you see the future development of the French/German/British military relations with China? And of the EU-China military relations? A fifth question was soon added to address the growing issue of maritime tensions in the South and East China Seas: (5) ‘Do you believe that France/Germany/the UK can play a role in easing the maritime tensions down? And the EU?’ The use of semi-structured interviews combining open and closed-­ ended questions with some level of standardisation allowed the interviewed to expand their answers, thus providing broader and better data. Semi-structured interviews were key to understanding recent developments in the field, highlighting unknown developments and providing data that would otherwise remain inaccessible to the academic community and the wider public (Ritchie et al., 2003, pp. 82–85). Despite initially using Europeanisation as a theoretical framework, eventually the author had to dismiss such a theoretical approach as it did not appear appropriate when considering the policies of Germany, France, and the UK. This may validate Hudson’s finding that larger states tend to stick to their sovereign tradition and regard with difficulty the EU as an

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alternative for either national foreign policy approach but rather persist in pragmatically pursuing their national interests, ‘which may coincidentally support an active EU policy’ (Gross, 2009) (Hadfield & Hudson, 2015, pp.  145–46). In other words, major European Member States tend to resist Europeanisation while small European Member States are more prone to follow it in relation to the EU. Following the dismissal of such an approach, the author adopted a Foreign Policy Approach (FPA) as a theoretical framework as a useful tool for researching the national foreign policy of European countries. Alden and Aran define FPA as: The study of the conduct and practice of relations between different actors, primarily states, in the international system {therefore, it focuses on researching} decision making, the individual decision makers, processes and conditions that affect foreign policy and the outcomes of these decisions. (Alden & Aran, 2017, p. 3)

And Hudson defines FPA as a Subfield of International Relations that takes as its theoretical focus those human beings who make and implement the foreign policy of a collective, usually, but not always, a nation-state. (Hudson, 2015, p. 1)

Despite being criticised for its US-centric approach and being absent in many countries, for instance in the Global South (Hermann, 2001; Brummer, 2015; Feng, 2015), the academic subfield of IR that is FPA is relevant because it seeks at identifying patterns from the analysis of countries’ foreign policies to understand how the state acts in the international arena. Therefore, the author of this book assumed that by applying it to research European countries’ cases would provide for more empirical foundation, which in turn may constitute the basis for more theoretical analysis in the future. Since states interact according to the action taken by human decision-­ makers working singly or in groups (Hudson, 2005), FPA directly challenges the conception of the state as a rational unified actor, traditionally represented by the Billiard ball model in which individual states do not cooperate but collide against one another. In fact, the origins of FPA are rooted in the difficulties of realism in explaining how states interact and cooperate among each other and

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a general dissatisfaction with realism’s ability to provide credible explanations of foreign policy outcomes. In keeping with the realist paradigm, the state is seen as a unitary and rational actor, rendering it unnecessary to analyse the role of the discrete components of the government in order to assess state foreign policy. (Alden & Aran, 2017, p. 5)

For instance, in his seminal contribution, Holsti stresses, among others, the importance of considering foreign policy outcomes, as well as the system in which a certain country operates, as well as the factors behind its foreign policy decisions (1977). Since the idea of the state is a useful but abstract construct, its role as an agent is only approximative and a mere simplification of a much more complex reality. Therefore, the recognition that the state is not always a rational and unified actor led to the formulation of an agent-oriented theory to shed light on the decision-making process (Hudson, 2015, pp. 1, 3; Hadfield & Hudson, 2015, p. 147). As foreign and security policies are not made by a unique actor, they rather result from the contribution of several actors. Hence, FPA allows for opening the black box of the state by analysing the decision-making process as a way of studying international politics (Snyder et al., 1962). In opening the black box of foreign policy decision-­ making in a country FPA considers a wider range of domestic actors, such as experts, researchers, and so on; in the case of the PRC, they form a broad community that contributes to the national foreign policy decision-­ making process because policymakers have little or no knowledge of China and must rely on the knowledge of national experts with the necessary grasp of Chinese affairs. Therefore, FPA better serves the scope of this book by providing the needed analytical tools for understanding the perspective of an actor instead of a mere state while considering the international dimension (White, 1999, p. 46). As several scholars have highlighted, decision-making is necessary to understand the reasons behind a particular event, its conditions as well as state interactions (Snyder et al., 1962, p. 33). Despite keeping the nation-­ state as the basic unit of the international system, by emphasising the decision-making process ‘as a central focus’, these authors ‘provided a way to organise the determinants of action around those officials who act for the political society’ (Snyder et al., 1962, p. 53). At the same time, the states operate within a particular environment characterised by a certain number of poles, for instance two during the Cold War, but also a certain distribution of power among those poles and

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the rules that bind them. All these factors influence the way in which the states act. As Germany, France, and the UK are all middle powers and major European countries, it can be assumed that they share a similar international environment and status. And this despite Germany being neither a nuclear power nor a Permanent member of the Security Council; in fact, post-reunification Germany has acquired an economic power and a political centrality in European and world politics that may compensate for these weaknesses. This is particularly evident when considering its long-standing relations with the PRC. FPA focuses on the foreign policy-making process rather than on its results. While it started by considering the states at the basis of the international system, the discipline has later included new international actors, namely international organisations such as the EU.  As the latter can be considered as an independent actor in several domains, and an increasingly important foreign and security actor in the international arena, the author assumed that its leaders act rationally when pursuing the EU’s goals based on defence, economic, systemic, and ideological interests, exactly as the leaders of European countries would do. Furthermore, FPA helps explain the EU international cooperation with third countries, such as China, and allows for comparisons between the foreign policies of the three Big European countries as well as between their policies and the likely development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) towards China. This research follows ‘a significant strand of FPA which, like diplomatic studies, owes a great debt to the historical method. By accounting for the role of history in shaping foreign policy (Alden & Aran, 2017, p. 4), such an approach is more in line with the tradition adopted by the British International Studies Association (BISA) FPA groups on US foreign policy and British foreign policy respectively. Hence, this volume sits in the tradition set up by BISA FPA, which focuses on empirical findings on certain countries rather than on more theoretical approaches in the traditional North American FPA (Brummer, 2015, pp. 170–171). As Hadfield and Hudson explain, the European foreign policy scholarship is characterised by using qualitative approaches and the ‘sustained use of historical, social, and ideational approaches’, and they even refer to it as the ‘Analysis of Foreign Policy (AFP)’ to distinguish European FPA from North American FPA (Hadfield & Hudson, 2015; Brummer & Hudson, 2015, p. 174). Due to their culture, history, and so on, nations do have specific characteristics that impact on the way in which they act domestically and externally (East, 1978). For instance, each country is characterised by

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higher education and research institutes, ministries, and so on that have created a sort of ‘analytical heritage’ (Hadfield & Hudson, 2015, p. 139) that is embedded in that country’s tradition. Moreover, FPA links the research of CFSP and International Relations as well as policy decision-making and their implementation. Mergenthaler resumes the three approaches of FPA, from structural (neorealism) to sociological-institutional (constructivism and discourse analysis), and agency-based approach (cognitive and psychological dimension of decision-­makers) (Mergenthaler, 2015). According to Hudson, analysis on particular European states includes how they shape their foreign policy, both as members of the EU and as independent countries, while the analysis of the EU foreign policy focuses ‘inter alia, on the institutional competences accrued over time around a given foreign policy area, the manner of decision making by which policies take shape, and the nature of bargaining over a given policy area {…} undertaken by individuals, agencies, institutions, and states’ (Hadfield & Hudson, 2015, p.  140). Since the EU provided the framework under which the three European countries considered developed their foreign and security policies, at least until Brexit, this volume starts by exploring the CFSP towards China to better understand the system in which national foreign policies were framed; in order to do so, it is first necessary to explain why the EU is a foreign policy actor and why it is an important one. By taking the previous elements into consideration and following Alden and Aran’s insight, the author of this volume assumes that While the executive decision maker was clearly a key component of the foreign policy decision-making process (…) any decisions made took place within the context of institutions specifically charged with interpreting and implementing foreign and security policy for the state. The role and contribution of specialised ministries, departments, and agencies—supplemented by ad hoc working groups tasked with a particular foreign policy mandate—needed to be accounted for in FPA. (Alden & Aran, 2017, p. 8)

Furthermore, as a discipline FPA allows for analysing the domestic and international dimensions of decision-making (Putnam, 1988). Putnam’s two-level game attempts to capture the challenges imposed by complex interdependency on foreign policy decision-makers by considering both the domestic dimension with its rules and interests as well as the international dimension with a different set of rules and interests. The foreign

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policy-making process stays at the centre of these two dimensions and tries to find an equilibrium between the two, which represents ‘the central dilemma of foreign policy making’ (Alden & Aran, 2017, p.  10). As explained by Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin: By emphasising decision-making as a central focus, we have provided a way of organising the determinants of action around those officials who act for the political society. Decision makers are viewed as operating in dual-aspect setting so that apparently unrelated internal and external factors become related in the actions of the decision-makers. (Snyder et al., 1962, p. 85)

This more bureaucratic approach follows the research of established authors such as Graham Allison (1969), Morton Halperin or Paul t’Hart and Uriel Roenthal (1998, pp. 236–237). It also considers the growing relevance of think-tanks and institutes in the foreign policy-making process (Stone & Denham, 2004). Finally, the author of this volume applies the theoretical framework adopted by Nuechterlein in his work of 1976. Nuechterlein considers the states at the basis of the international system and sets up a two-­dimensional framework to assess the decision-making process in a specific country. On the one hand, he identifies four categories of national interests pursued by a country: defence, economic, world order (here, I prefer the word ‘systemic’), and ideologic interests. Defence interests are defined as ‘the protection of the nation-state and its citizens against the threat of physical violence directed from another state and/or an externally inspired threat to its system of government, while economic interests consist in the pursuing of country’s well-being compared to other states’. World order interests comprise the defence of a secure international political and economic system where the citizens and companies can operate undisturbed. Finally, the ideological interests include: the protection and furtherance of a set of values which the people of a nation-­ state share and believe to be universally good. (Nuechterlein, 1976, p. 248)

On the other hand, Nuechterlein classifies these interests according to their decreasing intensity: in particular, they can be distinguished as survival, vital, major, and peripheral issues. While survival issues put the very existence of the country at stake, which is typical of the defence domain, vital issues can also involve economic, systemic, and even ideological matters (Nuechterlein, 1976, p. 249). When major issues are involved:

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political, economic, and ideological well-being of the state may be adversely affected by events and trends in the international environment and thus requires corrective actions in order to prevent them from becoming serious threats (vital issues). (Nuechterlein, 1976, p. 250)

This is the largest category since economic and ideological matters are usually dealt with diplomatic negotiations. Finally, peripheral issues involve the interests of private citizens or companies. By intersecting these two-­ dimensional factors, it is possible to create a table to position each country’s position on a particular foreign issue. This will later help visualise the likely similarities and differences among the three major European countries. Finally, to assess an issue, Nuechterlein considers two dimensions: the value factors and the cost factors that impact the decision-making process, both in the number of eight. The value factors include the proximity of the danger, the nature of the threat, the economic stake, the attachment, the type of regime, the effect on balance of power, the prestige and the allies’ posture. On the last, Nuechterlein already noted in 1976 that the European Community clearly binds the nine members together in closer association than before and causes each to pay far greater attention to the views of its partners. (Nuechterlein, 1976, p. 255)

And it is evident that this trend has certainly been constantly growing, especially after the Maastricht and the Lisbon Treaties. Eventually, the cost factors include the economic costs and conflict, the military effort necessary (Nuechterlein speaks about the ‘number of troops needs’), the likelihood duration of hostilities, the risk of enlarged conflict, the likelihood of success, the domestic opinion, the international reaction, and the impact on international politics. Eventually, since case studies can verify or falsify whether generalisations hold across the case studies, they can allow future analyses of different sub-groups of European countries. Hence, FPA provides the necessary analytical tools for broadening comparisons to include for example other big Member States, such as Poland, Italy, or Spain (East & Hermann, 1974). This would be particularly interesting in the aftermath of Brexit since their power within the EU has likely increased. Further analysis could also consider other sub-groups of Member States, such as Scandinavian Member States, the CEECs, small European countries, neutral European states, Southern European countries, and so on. This will also allow for comparing some or all these sub-groups.

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1.1   Plan of the Book This book unfolds as follows. After a brief explanation of the reasons for this research, the introduction discusses the theoretical framework adopted by the author, namely a multi-dimensional Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) approach. The author considers that the EU provides the broad framework impacting on Germany, France, and the UK, even after the exit of the UK from the EU. This is due to the proximity of the EU to the UK in geographic terms but also in cultural, economic, and political terms. Moreover, NATO represents another key element of such a framework, as it has inevitably influenced and interacted with the establishment of a European foreign and security policy as well as with the foreign and security policy of its Member States. In this context, she applies the two-­dimensional framework adopted by Nuechterlein in his 1972 article, ‘National Interest and Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Framework for Analysis and DecisionMaking’, to the case studies. The author emphasises how important it is to consider the historical context when researching policy-making processes in a particular country or actor such as the EU. Subsequently, she describes the relevant and most recent changes in foreign and security policy in the twenty-first century in the three case studies. In Chap. 2, the author explains how the EU has undoubtedly become a foreign and security actor, although sui generis, which increasingly counts on the international arena. However, this only partially applies to its relations to the PRC. Hence, the question of whether the EU will develop a full-flag CFSP towards China due to the steady growth of the Sino-­ European relations over the past three decades. Afterwards, she examines the empirical focal point of recent international events that are likely to have a profound impact on the establishment of an EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) vis-à-vis the PRC; this is particularly the case of the deterioration of the EU-China relations reflecting the worsening of the trading war between Washington and Beijing, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the Strategic Concept of NATO agreed in 2022. Chapter 3 sets the stage for the security environment in the twenty-first century by presenting the state of the art of the re-emergence of China and the deepening of EU-China relations. Although academics may perceive differently the rise of China, the latter is a complex international player whose policies are now capable of impacting the entire world; from its investments in European countries to the transfer of European technology to China or, more recently, the development of the Belt and Road Initiative

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(BRI). Since the EU foreign policy is rooted in market opening and liberalisation, the EU has welcomed Chinese investment. However, reciprocity is often lacking, and European influence on China has not produced the expected result, prompting a more active European stance on Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) protection, technology transfer, or investment screening mechanisms. Moreover, despite Angela Merkel’s attempt to have it passed before the new Biden administration takes office, the Sino-EU investment agreement was not adopted. The deterioration of EU-China relations reflects the worsening of Sino-American relations, even if we are far from the trade war launched by the Trump administration. After providing the background knowledge to understand the environment in which Germany, the UK, and France operate, the author can proceed by discussing the three case studies. Chapter 4 is devoted to Germany. The author first describes the country’s foreign and security policy as well as its constraints. Second, she considers Germany’s foreign policy towards the PRC: its traditional foreign policy approach to foreign policy since reunification is analysed, as well as Germany’s boost of its trading relations with Beijing in the twenty-first century. Germany’s trade preference towards China has also influenced the EU’s approach. Despite the existence of a European arms embargo against the PRC, a look at German technology transfer to China shows that dual-use technology is an often-overlooked trend that has been going on for decades. More recently, the growth of Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in German companies has triggered a reaction from the German government. This is an example of the new trend in German foreign and security policy that points to a more active role of Germany in its relations with the PRC, and perhaps shaping the European approach to it. The chapter also examines the implications of China’s maritime disputes for Germany and how German experts perceive them. Finally, it highlights a neglected dimension of EU-China relations, the development of Sino-German military-­to-military relations. Chapter 5 deals with the second case study, the UK. After briefly analysing the main characteristics of British Foreign and Security Policy, the author considers the development of Sino-British relations since the end of the Second World War. Hong Kong’s return to China from the UK has removed a significant obstacle to deepening bilateral relations under the banner of pragmatism. Blair continued his predecessors’ pragmatic stance towards Beijing and even lobbied Brussels to grant China market economy status. But it was the Conservative/Liberal-Democrat coalition

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government that pushed ahead a ‘distinctive foreign policy’ to improve UK-China relations. At the same time, the UK has resisted any attempt to develop a CFSP towards China, which would have undermined its national sovereignty. This approach valued the national prosperity over national security issues, a trend that was exacerbated during the conservative ‘Golden Age’ of Sino-British relations. As for the British role as a security provider in East Asia, although the UK has limited resources to play a relevant role, the Royal Navy has contributed to Freedom of Navigation (FoN) operations in the China Seas. Paradoxically, the UK has also contributed to the upgrade of the PLA, first directly and then indirectly after the European arms embargo against China. Britain’s Export Control System is in flux, and it remains unclear whether Brexit would weaken Britain’s compliance with the arms embargo. Finally, although still low-­ level as in the other two case studies, British-China military-to-military relations have developed gradually but progressively. For instance, the UK provided peace-keeping training to Chinese Blue Helmets. The last chapter (Chap. 6) examines the French case. First, the author analyses the gradual adaptation of France and its foreign policy to its status as a middle power. Second, she considers the fluctuating nature of Sino-­ French relations until the attempted French ‘Pivot’ to the Indo-Pacific. This new foreign policy approach does not come from nowhere, but rather comes from the culmination of internal debates and the evolution of the view of French experts on China and its rise. It also shows that, despite Paris seeming to work to actively shape the CFSP on China when proposing to develop the EU’s strategic approach to China, it was trying to defend its preferences and national interest. Therefore, when it failed, Paris went ahead alone. Due to its overseas territories in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean, which give France the second largest Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the world, the country is a particularly interesting case. It is the only European country that, from the outset, has taken part in FoN operations in the China Seas and has the means to do so. It also presents itself as an Indo-Pacific country. France also plays an increasing role in the strategic situation of the Indo-Pacific region since its defence companies have supplied military equipment to the countries of the region and has often been accused by Washington to contribute to the modernisation of the Chinese army. Finally, France was one of the first European countries to develop military-to-military relations with China. Despite persistent complaints about the lack of reciprocity from Chinese counterparts, Paris has deepened its military relations with Beijing in areas as sensitive as counterterrorism.

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References Alden, C., & Aran, A. (2017). Foreign Policy Analysis: New Approaches. Routledge. Bates, G. & Murphy, M. (2008). China-Europe Relations: Implications and Policy Responses for the United States. Washington: CSIS. Brummer, K. (2015). Implications for Mainstream FPA Theory. In K. Brummer & V.  M. Hudson (Eds.), Foreign Policy Analysis beyond North America (pp. 169–186). Lynne Rienner Publishers. Brummer, K., & Hudson, V.  M. (Eds.). (2015). Foreign Policy Analysis beyond North America. Lynne Rienner Publishers. Clinton, H. (2011). America’s Pacific Century. Foreign Policy. Cogan, C. (2001). The Third Option: Emancipation of European Defence, 1989–2000. Westport, Conn.: Praeger. East, M.  A. (1978). National Attributes and Foreign Policy. In M.  A. East, A.  A. Salmore, & C.  F. Hermann (Eds.), Why Nations Act? Theoretical Perspectives for Comparative Foreign Policy Studies (pp. 143–160). Sage. East, M.  A., & Hermann, C.  F. (1974). Do Nation-types Account for Foreign Policy Behaviour? In J.  N. Rosenau (Ed.), Comparing Foreign Policies (pp. 69–303). Wiley. EEAS. (2016). Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. Retrieved https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf Feng, H. (2015). Foreign Policy Analysis in China. In K. Brummer & V. M. Hudson (Eds.), Foreign Policy Analysis beyond North America (pp.  15–35). Lynne Rienner Publisher. Graham, T. A. (1969). Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis. American Political Science Review, 63(3), 689–718. Gross, E. (2009). The Europeanisation of National Foreign Policy. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Hadfield, A., & Hudson, V. M. (2015). North American and European Foreign Policy Analysis. In K. Brummer & V. M. Hudson (Eds.), Foreign Policy Analysis Beyond North America (pp. 139–168). Lynne Rienner Publishers. Hermann, M. (2001). How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Framework. International Studies Review, 3(2), 47–81. Holsti, K. J. (1977). International Politics; A Framework for Analysis. Prentice-Hall. Howorth, J., & Menon, A. (2009). Still Not Pushing Back: Why the European Union Is Not Balancing the United States. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 53, 727–44. Hudson, V. M. (2005). Foreign Policy Analysis Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations. Foreign Policy Analysis, 1, 1–30. Hudson, V. M. (2015). Foreign Policy Analysis Beyond North America, In K. Brummer & V. M. Hudson (Eds.), Foreign policy analysis beyond North America (p. 1). Boulder: Linne Rienneer, 1–13.

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Jones, S. G. (2007). The Rise of European Security Cooperation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Lieberthal, K. (2011). The American Pivot to Asia. Why President Obama’s Turn to the East Is Easier Said than Done. Foreign Policy. Menon, A. (2009). Empowering Paradise: The ESDP at Ten. International Affairs, 85(2), 227–246. Mérand, F. (2008). European Defence Policy: Beyond the Nation State. Oxford: OUP. Mergenthaler, S. (2015). Managing Global Challenges. The European Union, China and EU Network Diplomacy. New York: Springer. Nuechterlein, D. E. (1976). National Interests and Foreign Policy: A Conceptual Framework for Analysis and Decision-Making. British Journal of International Studies, 2(3), 246–266. PRC. (2015). Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Eco- nomic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. Putnam, R. (1988). Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games. International Organisation, 42(3), 427–460. Ritchie, J. L., McNaughton, J., Nicholls, C., & Ormstron, R. (2003). A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers. Los Angeles: SAGE. Ruan, Z. (2008). China-EU-US Relations: Shaping a Constructive Future. In Shambaugh, D. et al. (Ed.), China-Europe Relations. Perceptions, Policies and Prospects (287–300). London: Routledge. Shambaugh, D. (2005). The new strategic triangle: U.S. and European reactions to China’s rise, The Washington Quarterly, 28(3), 5–25. Snyder, R., Bruck, H.  W., & Sapin, B. (Eds.). (1962). Foreign Policy Decision-­ Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics. Macmillan. Stone, D., & Denham, A. (Eds.). (2004). Think Tank Traditions: Policy Research and the Politics of Ideas. Manchester University Press. T’Hart, P., & Roenthal, U. (1998). Reappraising Bureaucratic Politics. Mershon International Studies Review, 42(2), 233–240. US Department of Defence. (2012). Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, January 2012. Retrieved http:// www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_Guidance.pdf White, B. (1999). The European Challenge to Foreign Policy Analysis, European Journal of International Relations, 5(1), 37–66. Whitney, C. R. (1991). War in the Gulf; Gulf Fighting Shatters Europeans’ Fragile Unity, The New York Times.

CHAPTER 2

The EU as a Foreign and Security Actor: Towards a CFSP Towards China?

2.1   The EU as an Actor in International Affairs and Its Foreign and Security Policy The term ‘actorness’ related to foreign policy was introduced to explain the role of the European Economic Communities (EEC), later the European Union (EU), and namely its ability to display the full range of process-to-policy dynamics, regardless of the absence of statehood, being the EU an odd socioeconomic-political entity that exists in terms of its sheer presence, its active use of instruments, and conscious response to external opportunities (nevertheless) in some significant ways, the EU has yet to come to age as an impact-led foreign policy actor, and analysing EU foreign policy is difficult in this sense. There is plenty of data on actorness to be sure, but it does not always count as evidence of impact. (Hadfield & Hudson, 2015, pp. 155–56)

The goal of this book is not to find innovative concepts of foreign policy analysis of the EU as a foreign policy actor (Brummer, 2015, p. 178), namely vis-à-vis the PRC. Rather, the author of this book considers the EU as a peculiar regional organisation that is an independent actor in international affairs and represents a new kind of foreign policy actor unique in its genre. Due to its advanced integration process, the EU pushed FPA to move from the mere focus on the US.  Thanks to this ongoing process © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 C. Zanardi, European Foreign and Security Policy towards China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12259-0_2

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Theorising not only on the effect of regional integration on the foreign policies of participating states but also on the role of the EU as an independent actor in foreign policy affairs is much more advanced in European FPA scholarship. (Brummer, 2015, p. 183)

And this, even if this is a relatively recent phenomenon. Thanks to its size and supranational nature, scholars and policymakers have presented the EU as the best actor to deal with the growing international challenges that characterise the twenty-first century, thus having a global role to play in the international arena (Hill & Smith, 2005; Howorth, 2010). Hence, this section briefly summarises the evolution of the European foreign policy (EFP) from its inception and highlights the specificity of the EU as a foreign policy actor. Established in 1970 under the name of European Political Cooperation (EPC), with the Maastricht Treaty (1992), it became the CFSP, part of the second intergovernmental pillar of the Treaty on the EU (TEU) (Nuttall, 2000). Although the study of the EU foreign policy was initially based on structural explanations of International Relations, especially Realism, it attempted to define the nature of the EU as an international actor multiplied because Classical Realism struggles to explain the creation of the EU and its foreign policy. While classical realists emphasise the irrelevance of the EU due to it lacking hard power, Neorealists failed to explain why countries engage in institution-building and set up highly institutionalised organisations such as the EU.  However, both denied the EU a foreign policy because the EU is not a state-actor. Other authors posited the impossibility for Europe to be considered or become an international actor (Bull, 1982, p. 151). In 1972 Duchène described the European Community as a civilian power exerting its influence despite lacking hard power (Duchène, 1972), a term then adopted by other scholars (Telò, 2006; Maull, 2010). In 2002, Manners characterised the EU as a ‘normative power’: he argued that Europe’s strength lay in its ability to spread norms instead of using military power (Manners, 2000, 2006; Senden, 2004). Other scholars defined the EU as an ethical power (Aggestam, 2008), a transformative power (Bauer & Brighi, 2009), a realist-normative power (Ruffa, 2011), or a sort of market power (Damro, 2012) and even a ‘superpower’ (McCormick, 2007). Although the growing role of the EU as a security provider somehow relativised Manners’ argument, the academic debate remained focused on

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the normative dimension of Sino-European relations, while more practical aspects were neglected: ‘the nature and effects of bureaucratic cooperation at different levels and in different policy areas have remained largely absent’ (Mergenthaler, 2015, p. 16). Since the study of Nuttall in the early 1990s, the analysis of European foreign policy also highlighted the socialisation of national foreign policymakers, which resulted in common or similar habits, cooperation, consultation, or coordination reflex among national foreign policy elites (Nuttall, 1992; Smith, 2000; Tonra, 2001). At the same time, the development of the CFSP interactively modified the formulation of the EU and national foreign policies (Tonra, 2001). This, in turn, produces European values and norms that influence national interests and intensified national foreign policies’ convergence (Baun & Marek, 2011, p. 14). It was only in 2002 that Smith claimed that the EU already has its own foreign policy (Smith, 2002): although not a sovereign state and having neither an executive with centralised decision-making power nor military capabilities, the EU disposes of ‘the capacity to make and implement policies abroad that promote the domestic values, interests and policies of the EU’ (Smith, 2002, pp. 2–7). This argument was reinforced by Hill’s seminal contribution providing a new analytical perspective for the analysis of foreign policy (Hill, 2003). While recognising that the state remains the main player in the international system, he argued other actors could develop an independent foreign policy. Hill defined foreign policy as the sum of the official external relations of an independent actor, usually a state, in international relations (Hill, 2003, p. 3). Thus, this broader definition of foreign policy also suits entities such as the EU, which is more than an international organisation but less than a state of which it has only certain characteristics. Krahmann broadened Hill’s definition of foreign policy to include ‘the decisions and actions of core European states and their multilateral organisations, which are primarily concerned with the welfare or the region’ (Krahmann, 2003, p. 3). Therefore, a multilevel network approach better describes European foreign policy, as it considers all relevant actors involved, from the national to the regional and international levels (Carlsnaes, 2006, p. 553). Even if this plethora of European actors may constitute a weakness, it can also be a strength if they act in a coordinated way. The size of the EU and its economic power are such that Brussels was already perceived as a powerful actor. Despite lacking an army and a fully

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communitarized defence and security policy, the building of the EU institutional dimension has certainly allowed for more coordinated foreign and security policies, while the slow emergence of a peculiar EU strategic culture has underlined the shaping of CFSP (Hill, 2003; Biscop, 2004; Giegerich, 2004; Meyer, 2006; Haaland Matlary, 2006). Although the status of CFSP in the EU treaties remains mainly intergovernmental, it does have some supranational elements, as highlighted by several authors (Juncos & Pomorska, 2011; Sjursen, 2011; Hadfleid and Hudson, 2015), which increase the nature of the EU as an independent foreign policy actor (Brummer, 2015, p. 183). Regarding China, the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) helped develop a more comprehensive EU foreign policy posture on China. However, it created a dichotomy between the European Commission, a supranational institution, and the Council Secretariat, an intergovernmental institution. Such a dichotomy ‘significantly hampered the development and conducting of the EU’s China policy’ (Mergenthaler, 2015, p. 37). The development of a CFSP towards China remains driven or constrained by institutional limitations, such as the existence of the European arms embargo towards the PRC and the Status of Market economy that China would like to be granted despite not fulfilling its requirements (Brown, 2017, p. 129). Another limitation is the authoritarian nature of the Chinese political system that contrasts with the nature of the EU and its ‘vital interests’, such as peace and security, prosperity, democracy, and a rules-based global order (European External Action Service, 2016, pp. 14–16). Further limitations to the development of a CFSP on China are intrinsic to the institutional structure of the EU as well as to the constant renegotiation of the relationship between the EU and its Member States. The institutional nature of the EU, including the European Commission’s, limits the mandate for initiatives in this field, thus impinging on the development of the CFSP. Following the 2009 Lisbon Treaty, scholars began ‘to analyse the diplomatic machinery of the EU entailed in the hub-and-spoke structure of the EEAS’ (Hadfield & Hudson, 2015, pp. 144–45). In fact, the Lisbon Treaty (2009) has made significant progress, such as the creation of the EEAS (Austerman, 2015) and other initiatives, expanding the EU’s competences about the CFSP and CSDP.  However, the CFSP and CSDP remained intergovernmental and widely the prerogative of the Member States. While the European Commission has limited competence in this

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field, the Member States guard their competence; in the absence of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) rule, the Member States can de facto veto CFSP to defend their sovereign power on foreign policy and strategy-making. This hampered the cohesiveness and coherence of the EU’s role as a global security actor and is more blatant when dealing with an assertive China: ‘one of the major challenges for the EU-China relations is that the EU has been lacking a unified position on its China policy’ (Chu & Chen, 2011, p. 101). The creation of a High Representative (HR) for foreign and security policy with a diplomatic arm, the EEAS, helped overcome some shortages within the EU. Nevertheless, institutional limitations persisted, such as fragmented competences among European institutions, as well as among European and Member States competences. It is not excluded that rising popular discontent in several MS and growing anti­EU movements may lead to further ‘exits’, such as Frexit or Polexit, and even to the dissolution of the EU. Finally, the influence of the US, directly or indirectly through NATO, appears to be another factor that hampered the development of a more autonomous and effective CFSP. As an EU official explained, ‘the shadow of the US always accompanied our negotiations with China, blowing wind into the sails of our expanding China strategy’ (Mergenthaler, 2015, p. 39).

2.2  Deepening EU-China Relations: The Case of Foreign and Security Cooperation The establishment of Sino-European diplomatic relations was an indirect effect of President Nixon’s visit to China in 1972. Prepared by Kissinger’s ‘Machiavellian diplomacy’ to counter the Soviet threat, Nixon’s visit paved the way for establishing diplomatic relations between the US and Communist China. In turn, Sino-European diplomatic relations started in 1975: the then Vice President of the European Commission, Christopher Soames, visited China, followed in 1979 by the President of the European Commission, Roy Jenkins. In 1978, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the PRC signed the first bilateral trade agreement, and in 1985 a Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement (TECA). The last remains at the roots of their bilateral relations. In 1988, the European Commission established its first Delegation to China, but the Tiananmen Square massacre (1989)

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temporarily stopped the progression of EU-China relations. The EEC imposed sanctions against the PRC, and European countries seemed to take a hard stance against Beijing. However, as early as in October 1990, national economic interests began to divide the Member States. For instance, about a year before the official lifting of the economic sanctions, Paris and Berlin extended soft loans to their companies operating in China, thus demonstrating the primacy of economic interests over Human Rights (economisation) (Nesshöver & Richard, 1999, pp. 93, 95). This attitude was evident at the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNCHR) in 1997, when the ‘Airbus group’ of France, Germany, Italy, and Spain refrained from criticising China (Stumbaum, 2007, p.  67). Hence, despite the seemingly unified reaction of the European countries amplified by the tough stance adopted by the EEC, shortly after the European condemnation, France and Germany relaxed their tough stance. Thanks to the framework of ESP, since 1983 the European Council has held regular informal consultations on foreign policy issues with the PRC. But it was the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 that made the EU more integrated and started to shape a common foreign policy. This indirectly facilitates the development of Sino-European relations, especially because the PRC was a receiver of European development aid (Mergenthaler, 2015, p. 34). The European Commission, especially the Directorate General for External Relations (DG Relex) with its China Desk and the Directorate General for Trade (DG Trade), has played a central role in developing the EU foreign policy on China. Not only did they lead the drafting of the EU 1998 strategic paper titled ‘Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China’ but their proactive stance resulted in the multiplying of bilateral cooperation at every level. The year of 1998 sees the launch of the annual Sino-European Summits between the Heads of State and government of the EU and the PRC. It followed regular meetings of the European Troika Political Directors, as well as arms control meetings between European political officers in Beijing and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Asian financial crisis (1998) highlighted for the first time the increasing dependence of the European economy on the stability of the Asian markets (Casarini, 2007, p.  217). This prompted the European Commission to release its paper on Europe and Asia (European Commission, 2001), which acknowledged the disruption of the European economy in the event of Asian instability, as well as its first Strategy Paper

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on China (European Commission, 2003). Both documents recognised the growing relevance of East Asia and the need for its stability to preserve the European economy. Regarding security issues, they were discussed at annual Sino-European summits. Moreover, the EU and China interacted within the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). The EU has made efforts to strengthen foreign and security cooperation with ARF and ASEM; it has also started track-two diplomacy with the Council for Security and Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) and the Council for Asia-Europe Cooperation (CAEC). However, in contrast with the US, the EU has no army and, thus, no military presence or alliances in the Asia-Pacific. This has undermined its credibility as a security player in the region. While Washington sees China as a security threat, Europeans worry more about its likely destabilising effect on their economies and/or the international order. Subsequently, the EU stresses the need to engage Beijing on global security issues to strengthen ‘stability in international affairs’ and maintain China within the ‘international framework of global governance’ (van der Putten & Chu, 2011, p. 196). Aware of the different perception that the US and the EU have on the rise of China, Beijing pressured Brussels to support China’s core interests (Wacker, 2011, p. 125). Often referred to as the ‘honeymoon’ between China and the EU, the year 2003 marked a new start for Sino-European security relations: the first European Security Strategy (ESS) (European Council, 2003, p. 14) announced the establishment of strategic partnerships1 with China on top of Canada, India, and Russia. Since then, the strategic partnerships of the EU have multiplied and countries classified as essential partner (US), pivotal partners (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa or BRICs), natural partners (Canada, Japan, and South Korea), and regional actors (Mexico and South Africa) (Grevi, 2013, p. 160). On the one hand, some scholars argued that strategic partnerships matter (Grevi, 2012) and their rising number helps ‘understand the social dynamic among states and other actors in the evolving international system’ (Michalski & Pan, 2017). On the other hand, others stressed the inconsistency of this instrument: their number is so high, that they end up designating mere bilateral relations (The Hindu, 2017). In the case of 1  In 2018, the EU had ten strategic partnerships (Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Korea, South Africa, and the US), while China 29.

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China, critics also notice the lack of tangible results of the Sino-European Strategic Partnership. For example, Hoslag contends that it was established in a ‘strategic vacuum’, thus making China prone to exploit European internal divisions (Hoslag, 2011, p. 293). China-EU bilateral relations received a boost with the establishment in 1999, when the Policy Unit Asia Task Force set up informal relations with Chinese officers from the Department for Policy Planning of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs providing the basis for a regular strategic dialogue of Vice-Foreign Ministers (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008, p. 82). Since the beginning of the 2000s, the trade imbalance of the EU with the PRC has constantly deepened, rendering the EU more vulnerable when dealing with Beijing. Whilst imports of cheap goods from China have benefited European consumers in the short term, they have contributed to the loss of entire industrial sectors, such as the textile or the ceramics. Furthermore, the golden gains expected from the vast Chinese market did not materialise as expected or varied starkly from one European country to the other. Not only did European companies face more and more issues in accessing the Chinese market but Chinese companies ended up becoming European competitors. And this trend was particularly evident after China’s entry to the WTO in 2001 and in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008. The European Commission actively promoted the Chinese entry to the WTO: the DG Trade and the DG Relex contributed to this goal, overlooking China’s violations of Human Rights. But as European deindustrialisation deepened and long-term negative effects such as the rise in unemployment became more noticeable, Brussels was criticised for not having defended European interests vis-à-vis China. When it became clear that this policy had accelerated the deindustrialisation of Europe some Member States called for Brussels to defend their economies (Berkofsky, 2006; Geeraerts et al., 2007; Hoslag, 2006, p.  11; Stumbaum, 2009; Mergenthaler, 2015, pp. 82–83). However, despite condemning Beijing’s unwillingness to respect its commitments the EU remained surprisingly silent. At the 8th EU-China Summit in 2005, Brussels and Beijing expanded the dialogue to vice-ministerial level and inaugurated a bilateral dialogue on disarmament and arms control (Stumbaum, 2007, pp.  63, 67–8) (Mergenthaler, 2015, p. 41). The next year, they launched negotiations for a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) to replace the out-­ of-­date TECA. However, despite the progressive institutionalisation of the Sino-European relations (Mergenthaler, 2015) (Algieri, 2008) and the

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necessity to develop a comprehensive legal framework, negotiations have been stalling. Started in 2013 at the 16th EU-China Summit (Ewert, 2016), the negotiations on an EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) tried to bypass the deadlock on the PCA, but persisting disagreements prevented any advancement. 2003 proved a key year in the development of EU-China relations. On the one hand, the EU released the ESS and established a Strategic Partnership with China (European Commission, 2003). On the other hand, the PRC published its first policy document on the EU (Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2003) while lobbying the Member States to lift the arms embargo. From 2003 to 2005, Paris, Berlin, and London lobbied Brussels to have the arms embargo removed. In addition, the European Council (2003) acknowledged that the embargo should be re-­ evaluated and the High Representative for ESDP stressed the need ‘to focus on intensifying the strategic relations with China’ (Kreutz, 2004, p. 51). Nevertheless, the debate was closed by the American veto and the fact that in 2015 China passed an anti-secession law that targeted Taiwan (deLisle, 2007), the European Council established strategic dialogues with Washington and Tokyo to prevent further attempts to remove the arms embargo. This has constrained the development of security and military relations between the EU and the PRC. Not only does the arms embargo prevent European defence exports to China, but it excludes, or should exclude, the possibility of defence cooperation with the PLA at both the EU and Member States’ level. But surprisingly, military-to-military exchanges and training between European countries and the PRC have been growing quietly, likely to prevent the rise of public alarm (Smith, 2008). For instance, some Member States developed their military relations with the PLA and there was a common belief that China’s contribution to UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) together with the EU would have strengthened their bilateral relations (Mergenthaler, 2015, p. 178). The then EU Political Director, Robert Cooper, even discussed with Chinese representatives the potential cooperation between the EU and the PLA and the possibility that China could join ESDP operations (House of Lords 2009–2010). Nevertheless, these proposals widely remained mere propositions, likely due to harsh critics from the European Parliament (EP), the fear of raising public condemnation, and a limited Chinese willingness to organise this cooperation (Bilal & Rampa, 2011, p.  24; Liu, 2011).

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On the EU side, the CSDP remains the least communitarized among EU policies. Moreover, elements such as different institutional features and cultures, the complexity of the EU institutions with overlapping actors and their changing layout, or the scarce knowledge of China among Europeans complicated the dialogue with Beijing. On the Chinese side, a tradition of secrecy when dealing with foreign actors promoted mistrust and made it difficult for the EU to identify the relevant Chinese counterpart with whom to engage. Finally, Beijing’s tendency to divide and rule hampered at times the EU’s ability to find a common posture vis-à-­ vis China. Despite these issues, on the top of common economic interests, the contribution to regional and international stability has long been the refrain describing the Sino-European relations (Cameron & Zheng, 2007, p. 10). The underlined idea being that China’s security objectives overlapped with the EU’s security goals. Another common belief was that China and the EU shared the same objective of promoting and strengthening the existing international system. As with Washington and Brussels, European countries have built their relations with Beijing forecasting that the integration of the PRC into the international system would have made it more like Western countries (Johnston, 2003; Liu, 2011; Geeraerts, 2011). In its China policy paper of 1995, the European Commission adopted socialisation as the basis for expanding the Sino-European dialogue on foreign policy issues, with the aim of encouraging China’s engagement in the international community. The Commission was favourable to the early entry of the PRC to the WTO and offered its help to Beijing to fulfil the entry requirements (European Commission, 1995). This was ‘a longstanding foreign policy goal for the EU [who] became a key broker in the negotiations’ (Mergenthaler, 2015, p. 35), paving the way for European officials to support China’s internal transition. However, China never adopted the European model on competition; instead, it took advantage of the support provided by the EU to develop its autocratic state-­capitalism (Witt & Redding, 2014). As a result, the EU’s request to China for more reciprocity, transparency, or respect for the rule of law, remained rhetorical. Overall, the expectation that a rising China still harbouring resentment for the century of humiliations caused by European powers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries would have embraced a European model based on different values proved to be naïve at best.

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In 2006, security became a more addressed subject in the EU’s China policy. This included issues such as global governance (e.g. non-­ proliferation), energy security (e.g. Chinese deals with authoritarian countries such as Iran), East-Asian issues (from North Korea to Taiwan), and the lack of transparency in China’s military modernisation (Zaborowski & Xing, 2007, pp. 44–45). In 2010, the HR/VP Catherine Ashton and Dai Bingguo from the Chinese State Council upgraded the vice minister dialogue into a new high-level strategic dialogue. But despite these efforts, China-EU security relations developed slowly because they did not share direct security interests (Chu & Chen, 2011, p. 96). Overall, in the twenty-first century, the growing role played by the EU as a security actor and China’s spreading economic interests in regions of European interests, signalled the growing different European and American security interests in China (Zaborowski & Xing, 2007, p. 41). Nevertheless, the EU remained keen to follow the American steps. Thus, in the wake of Zoellick’s call for China to act as a responsible power (2005), in 2006 the Communication on China by the European Commission acknowledged the existence of normative and political disagreements between Brussels and Beijing and asked China to assume more international responsibility (European Commission, 2006). The same happened with the establishment of the US-China Strategic Economic Dialogue in 2006, followed in 2008 by the creation of the EU-China High Level Economic and Trade Dialogue that mirrored the Sino-US Strategic Economic Dialogue. Therefore, the EU often acts as a follower of the US: this is not just a question of lacking power and influence, but also political inaction or lack of initiative. To overcome this shortage, scholars such as Cabestan called for the then big three EU Member States to coordinate their approach and develop a common foreign policy on China. However, he was fully aware that France, Germany, and the UK refrained from giving up their national cooperation program and dialogue with Beijing to coordinate their policy and convince other Member States to ‘bandwagon’ (Cabestan, 2011, pp. 86–7). At the end of the years 2000s, scholars such as Sandschneider went as far as questioning the existence of a common EU foreign policy vis-à-vis the PRC because the EU had no political competence in that field: ‘a common EU strategy might exist on paper, but in fact had “nothing to do with the reality of relations with China”’ (Shambaugh et al., 2007, p. 136; Hoslag, 2006, 2011; Fox & Godement, 2009). Traditionally, the

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European Commission has competence over Sino-European trading relations while the CFSP and CSDP remain intergovernmental. Before the Lisbon Treaty, despite having narrow competence in foreign and security policy, the European Commission played a prominent role, especially at early stages of the Sino-European relations. Mergenthaler contended that, due to its growing economic relevance, ‘China was possibly the one geographical area of EU foreign policy with the greatest Commission footprint relative to its formal treaty-based competences’, which increased tensions between the goals pursued by the Commission and by Member States (Mergenthaler, 2015, pp. 79–80, 83). The European Commission maximised the use of its official communication, policy papers, and declarations, to shape the framework of the EU foreign policy towards the PRC. Furthermore, the fact that the DG Trade pursued trade liberalisation often in contradiction with other EU’s objectives, such as developmental goals (Keukeleire & MacNaughtan, 2008, p. 87), created internal competition within the European Commission. The Lisbon Treaty has made progress, notably with the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and improved the discontinuity of CFSP caused by the rotating presidency. Furthermore, it has rationalised the High Representative for foreign and security policy who also became Vice President of the European Commission (HR/VP). Hence, the High Representative for CFSP at the Council and Commissioner for External Relations in the European Commission acquired some initiative powers, could represent the EU at ministerial levels and could head the External Relations Council meetings and preparatory bodies (Mergenthaler, 2015, pp. 77, 87). Furthermore, the Treaty expanded the legislative powers of the EP in several domains, such as energy security or judicial cooperation. Despite lacking a formal consultative role in CFSP, the EP has relevant informal power: it acts as the ‘institutional watchdog’ for the CFSP actors, can veto the signing of treaties with third countries and has cooperation mechanism with China (e.g. interparliamentary Delegation with the National People’s Congress of China) (Mergenthaler, 2015, pp. 90–1). As the most vocal European institution vis-à-vis China, the EP releases reports on Human Rights violations in China. Despite these improvements and the existence of an EU-China policy, the EU still lacks a CFSP vis-à-vis China: the EU has competencies on trade and the European Commission can act in the name of the Member States when dealing with Beijing. But Brussels has no such competence or

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representative power on foreign and security policy. There is lack of coordination at the European level where Member States often act according to their national interests and without synchronising with other Member States. Hence, the EU resembles ‘a strange two-layered institutional animal: while all member-states have agreed to draft and implement a common foreign and security policy, they continue to run the bulk of their own foreign and security policies’ (Cabestan, 2011, p. 80). In particular, major EU Member States like Germany, France, and the UK had their own perception of the rise of China, long-established and complex bilateral relations and often competed among each other when dealing with China. This made them reluctant to join forces with other Member States or with the EU (Casarini, 2007; Grant, 2008, p.  22; Fox & Godement, 2009). Sino-European security and military relations remain ‘soft’ activities, from strategic dialogue, military-to-military relations, training and academic exchanges, port visits, and UN PKOs training (Chu & Chen, 2011, p. 100). Beijing has been keen in developing its security and military ties with European countries to gather information and reduce its lack of fight experience. The growing deployment of the PLA overseas, including its participation in UN PKOs, its military drills, training, and cooperation with foreign Armies, has offered unparalleled opportunities to develop its combat skills in war-like scenarios while taking advantage of the experience of Western Armies. Efficient training and professionalisation are essential to improve Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities (Blasko, 2013, pp. 144–79). Since in 2010 less than 1% of the PLA personnel had participated in such military operations and had some sort of real combat experience (Cliff, 2015, p. 135), China made great efforts to establish a network of military exchanges and cooperation with foreign armies, especially the most advanced ones. For an army that has not fought a war since the Korean War, except for a limited maritime conflict with Vietnam in 1978, this proved an efficient way of gaining military experience without raising suspicions. Hence, the PLA expanded its military-to-military contacts with foreign countries and local militaries, while testing new equipment and material; its participation in military exercises enhanced the PLA’s operational preparedness while showing the evolution of the PLA thinking on military cooperation as a key factor for improving combat readiness (Hagt, 2015, p. 228).

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China’s first EU policy paper of 2003 had listed military personnel exchanges and training as core objectives (European Commission, 2003). Since 2001, the PLAN has performed numerous port visits in European countries, the first dating back to September 2001 when PLAN vessels stopped in France, Germany, Italy, and the UK (Bates, 2008, p.  266). Moreover, China and the big three European countries set up consultation dialogues on counterterrorism and defence, as well as exchange training programmes of army officers. Their armies are increasingly interacting in UN PKO, port calls, rescue and humanitarian operations, and military exercises. China’s participation in UN PKOs also helped counter some of the criticisms raised against its authoritarian regime; it enhanced the Chinese pride, thus serving as a Party’s displaying of its role as a responsible international actor (Örtel, 2011, pp.  170–71). As the largest contributor to peacekeepers among the P5, China’s engagement was generally seen as a positive development by European countries that had been reducing their financial and operational contribution. For instance, France and the UK trained Chinese peacekeepers and, since 2001, China and the UK have organised the annual Joint PKO Doctrinal Seminar. The UK was also involved in the training of PLA officers prior to their deployment in UN PKO missions, notably in Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Beijing has traditionally considered PKOs as an infringement of sovereignty, thus preferring not to vote on PKOs. This changed in 1981, when for the first time the PRC voted for extending the UNPKO in Cyprus; in 1982 it backed the operation in Lebanon and, in 1988, entered the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. But it was only ‘in the 1990s that the PRC dispatched engineers, observers, liaison officers, and military advisors’ (Geeraerts et al., 2007, p. 66). Despite China’s pre-eminence of sovereignty and non-intervention in foreign countries’ internal affairs (Bates & Reilly, 2000) since the beginning of the twenty-first century Beijing slowly but consistently increased its contribution to UN PKOs. Since European and Chinese soldiers and experts have been engaged in supporting numerous UN PKOs, such as Kosovo, Darfur, Sudan, Liberia, and the DRC (Chu & Chen, 2011, p.  100), China’s deepening and expanding of its contribution to UN PKOs has provided more interactions with European armies. Africa became the focus of both UN PKOs and China’s interventions abroad because Beijing increasingly needed to protect its growing

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economic interests on that continent. Hence, from Mali to the Gulf of Aden, the PLA gradually widened its role as a security provider, and the Gulf of Aden became the theatre of learning interaction between EU NAFVOR and the PLAN.  Launched in December 2008, Operation EUNAVFOR Atalanta saw for the first time European and Chinese navies operate together and exchange liaison officers (Kamerling & van der Putten, 2001, p. 189). At the 2012 EU-China Summit, Brussels and Beijing facilitated the dialogue among special representatives on defence and security, which has paved the way for organising the first High Level Seminar on Defence and Security in 2013. At the EU-China Peace and Security Forum organised by the EU Delegation to China in December 2012, EU Ambassador to China Hans Dietmer Schweisgut acknowledged the need for an EU-China strong partnership to provide global stability on numerous domains. He recognised that the EU and China had to deepen their practical cooperation on global issues such as North Korea, Africa, the Middle East, Syria, Afghanistan, and Iran (Delegation of the EU to China, 2017). But the limited outcome of the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation of 2013 demonstrates the difficulties that the EU encounters when dealing with China, the latter consistently resisting the European attempts to put forward the rule of law or the freedom of expression. The Strategic Agenda explicitly recognised this disagreement between Beijing and Brussels on these issues (EEAS, 2013). Even if non-proliferation was not communitarised, in 1998 the EU started a dialogue on nuclear proliferation with the PRC, in view of gaining access to the Chinese market (Mergenthaler, 2015, p. 121–129). Since 2001, Brussels and Beijing have held a dialogue on arms control and non-­ proliferation (EU Council, 2001). In 2003, they issued a Joint Declaration on Non-Proliferation and Arms Control, and in 2004 a Joint Declaration on Arms control and Disarmament. The last included provisions on specific cooperation projects, such as export controls for dual-use goods. However, Sino-European nuclear cooperation was undermined by China’s a long history of nuclear proliferation (e.g. North Korea, Iran, Pakistan), its reluctance to observe the European agenda for non-proliferation and its refusal to adhere to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The powershift towards Asia mirrors Asian military growth. The region displays numerous security issues, from the Korean peninsula to Taiwan and the maritime disputes in the China Seas, ‘where the EU and its member states enjoy little ability to exert military pressure’ (Duke, 2017,

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p.  102). The maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas are a source of concern for the EU and its Member States. On top of the risk of Chinese actions undermining international law, there is also the risk for Europeans to be dragged into a conflict if Washington intervenes against Beijing. Other security issues include the access to natural resources including rare earths. In 2012, the EU, the US, and Japan filed a WTO complaint against China’s quotas on rare earth exports (Reuters, 2012). In 2010, an ad hoc Working Group on Defining Critical Raw Materials (CRM) of the European Commission identified a list of 14 rare earth minerals that played a critical role in European industry; it underlined the EU’s dependence on China and other exporters and suggested to reduce this dependence by finding alternative materials, recycling rare earth resources, and developing partnerships with other export countries, such as Australia, Namibia, and Kazakhstan (European Commission, 2011). The list of CRMs was updated in 2017 and brought their number to 27 (European Commission, 2017).2 Despite the strategic dimension of the CRM, European countries continued to move in a random order and the European approach remained ‘an amalgam of policy proposals’ (Miskimmon & Paterson, 2003, p. 327). For instance, to mitigate its lack of titanium, France offered other Member States to secure these sources through ‘partnerships, long-term contracts or equity participation in mining’; however, the UK was not interested as it relied on the help of the US and was the only Member State with fusion and transformation capabilities. Because of the lack of interest of its European neighbours for a mutualisation guaranteeing access to titanium, the French industrialists eventually created a Joint Venture with Kazakhstan (Esper et al., 2011, p. 95). This was a clear example of the French propensity to act alone because of the difficulty in federating other Member States around its interests. Traditionally, it was assumed that thanks to its intrinsic support to multilateralism and absence of geopolitical rivalry with Beijing, the EU was better placed than the US to promote China’s integration in the international system (Grant, 2008, pp. 1, 7). Because of both the absence of a coherent CFSP towards China and the instability of the international 2  While rare earth is not rare per se, its extraction causes high levels of pollution and environmental damage, which is why Europeans delegated this polluting activity to other countries.

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system, Chu and Chen even propose a US-China-EU security cooperation as a trilateral security cooperation mechanism, a ‘neo-trilateralism’ for a new global security regime (Chu & Chen, 2011, p.  105). Whilst since 2005 there is a transatlantic dialogue between Washington and Brussels, the weight of the US greatly reduces the importance of such a dialogue. In a changing and unstable security environment characterised by transatlantic divergences and growing Sino-American tensions, especially under the Trump Administration, the rise of China has become a likely destabilising element. The EU increasingly shares some of the American concerns vis-à-vis China, such as the need to defend the law of the sea and the freedom of navigation, the danger of an undervalued Renminbi, China’s infringements of intellectual property, technology theft, espionage, and European countries’ skyrocketing trade deficit with China (Germany being a rare exception). The year 2016 was significant because of the Brexit referendum, the Joint Communication ‘Elements for a new EU strategy on China’ (European Commission and HR/VP, 2016) and the first EU Global Strategy (EUGS) formulated by the EEAS. In 2018, the conclusions of the European Council on enhancing the security cooperation with Asia (European Council of the EU, 2018) and the EU took the first step towards a European strategy on the BRI (European Commission and HR/VP, 2018). These two documents are probably the basis for the future development of Sino-European relations. Mergenthaler found that the EU has shaped its foreign policy approach towards China through a mix of pragmatic and project-oriented approach based on trade (network diplomacy). Whilst this required building trust and effective working-level cooperation with China on practical issues among sub-state actors, it created bureaucratic interests deprived of high-­ level political backing, and the EU largely failed to use its relations with China to realise its wider foreign policy goals (Mergenthaler, 2015, pp. 185–186). In the long term, the normative power of the EU is increasingly challenged by China, and a resurgent Russia (Sjursen, 2017, p. 446). The EUGS clearly stated that ‘the EU will promote a rules-based global order with multilateralism as its key principle and the United Nations at its core. As a Union of medium-to-small sized countries, we have a shared European interest in facing the world together’ (European External Action Service, 2016, p. 15). And the EUGS enumerated the EU’s ‘shared interests’, including the promotion of a rules-based global order (European

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External Action Service, 2016, pp. 7, 8) worryingly reminiscent of George W. Bush Senior’s undefined New World Order. As in the German and French cases, the process that led to the EUGS consisted in a complex and inclusive process of consultation among academicians, politicians, experts, and other practitioners. This British-American influence was coupled with the use of the term ‘principled pragmatism’ used by the Obama administration to stress the need for adapting to changing situations. Therefore, the EUGS indicates that the EU external action will be guided by ‘principled pragmatism’ (Giusti, 2020, p. 1456), once again following the path traced by Washington. Until Brexit, the big three EU Member States did not perceive the EU as a means, but rather as a tool to pursue their national interests. Their foreign policy stance towards the PRC prevented the development of a coherent CFSP vis-à-vis China, and even when France tried to upload its foreign policy, it was not followed by other Member States; not only did its attempt fail but it was evident that the French goal was not to empower the EU but to defend the national interests. More recently, the Russo-Ukrainian war started in February 2022 has further complicated the European security environment and stability. As Moscow is one of Beijing’s main partners, it is necessary to look at the likely impact that such a conflict may have on EU-China relations; this has to do with the role of NATO and its changing perception of the PRC.  Moreover, NATO’s New Strategic Concept (NSC) is certainly going to influence the posture of Germany, France, and the UK, which are in the process of releasing their own new strategy vis-à-vis China. This is the subject of the following section.

2.3  NATO and China: A Residual Role for the EU? Since Moscow’s annexation of Crimea in 2013 led to the Russian exclusion from the G7 and Western sanctions against it, China has found herself in an awkward position because Moscow was already one of Beijing’s main strategic partners. This situation became even more daunting in 2022 after Russia’s invasion of Eastern Ukraine. Not only is Russia China’s largest neighbouring country, an important source of energy resources, a military provider and strategic partner, but Xi and Putin also signed a historic joint statement at the opening ceremony of the 2022 Olympic Games in

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China, just before the Russian invasion. Their bilateral cooperation has even been described as having ‘no limits’ (Munroe et  al., 2022): both Russia and China see NATO as a source of threat and aim at countering Washington’s ‘hegemony’ and NATO’s eastward expansion. Chinese scholars were surprised by the fact that European leaders adopted a unified posture and recognise that a European realignment with the US would likely worsen the Sino-European relations (Yang, 2022). Pressured by the US and the EU to side with the West against Russia, Beijing wants to anger neither Russia nor the US, the EU, and their allies in the Asia-Pacific region. Hence, China’s diplomatic position remains ambiguous, and even if it has not condemned Russia, Beijing does not openly support it. In the twenty-first century, NATO has become increasingly global by expanding its mandate to face the post-Cold War strategic environment. For instance, US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, Daniel Fried, explained that despite the Alliance being a transatlantic organisation, its article 5 has global implications; this further raises Chinese suspicions that NATO ‘is likely to become a global military force’ (Chu & Chen, 2011, pp. 103, 104). This fear is reinforced by that fact that, for the first time, the 2022 NATO Summit registered the participation of Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea. Following 9/11 and the US attack on Iraq in 2003, the fight against terrorism became NATO’s focus temporarily eclipsing the challenge posed by the rise of China. Immediately after 9/11, Beijing publicly stated its support to the US, even obtaining by Washington the inclusion of Uyghurs’ organisations in the list of international terrorist organisations (Zanardi, 2019). Remembering the 1999 NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Beijing sees NATO as dependant on Washington and calls it ‘US-led NATO’. This likely explains why, starting in 2002, China’s dialogue with NATO proved inconclusive. Therefore, in the aftermath of the American attack on Afghanistan and NATO establishing military bases in Central Asia, Beijing felt increasingly at unease, believing that NATO started taking military action in Eurasia under cover to safeguard human rights (Chu & Chen, 2011, p. 96). Despite its negative perception of NATO, China has worked with NATO during EUNAVFOR Atalanta with exchanges and information sharing between naval officers of the PLAN and NATO (Hang & Seibel, 2015). However, these activities remained limited to basic operability

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because of both sides’ prudence, mistrust, and China’s long tradition of secrecy in military affairs. However, things changed with NATO’s London declaration of 2019 that acknowledged the rise of China as a potential challenge. Although the NATO Summit of 2021 refrained from openly identifying Beijing as an enemy to avoid directly challenging China, likely due to Washington’s pressure, the Heads of State and government recognised that its ‘growing influence and international policies can present challenges that we need to address together’ (NATO, 2021). In 2021, the NATO Summit followed the EU-US Summit where both parties had expressed criticism towards China’s growing assertiveness (The White House, 2021). Among the challenges identified at the Summit were cyber, hybrid, and other asymmetric threats such as disinformation campaigns, space, and proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), all of which may relate to the rise of China as a military power and are concerns shared by the EU as well. For instance, the adoption of Huawei 5G by any European country member of NATO would be considered as a potential threat to the Alliance. The Summit launched ‘NATO 2030—a Transatlantic Agenda for the Future’ to forecast and manage the security threats of the new international environment. At the April 2022 meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers from Ukraine, Finland, Georgia, Finland, but also Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea, Jens Stoltenberg declared that NATO wished to deepen its security cooperation with Asia-Pacific countries, namely on issues such as the fight against disinformation, cybersecurity, maritime security, or new technologies. More recently, due to the deepening of Sino-Russian relations and the parallel that Beijing sees between Ukraine and Taiwan (as it will be explained later), Beijing perceives any alignment of the EU and its Member States to NATO on the Ukrainian crisis as negative. At the 2022 EU-China Summit, for the first time the EU called China to refrain from providing help to Moscow and, rather, to side with the EU and the US. As previously explained, Beijing did not want to be dragged into a war that it did not see as theirs and perceives the further NATO enlargement to traditionally neutral countries, such as Finland and Sweden, as an undue provocation. If isolated, China can also turn to the BRIC group and other institutions it leads, such as the SCO or the BRI Initiative. Thus, Wang Yi declared that treating the Ukraine issue as a confrontation between opposed blocs as during the Cold War bared endless risks. Furthermore, Washington’s Indo-Pacific Strategy represents a means to deepen regional

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tension, antagonism, and confrontation. Therefore, China cannot accept a renewed ‘Cold War mentality’ and should prevent the tragedy of Ukraine happening in Asia too (Yi, 2020). Even if NATO has left Afghanistan, Beijing feels NATO’s expansion as potentially spilling out of Europe and believes that Washington mastered the war in Ukraine by pushing Moscow to react to numerous NATO’s expansions towards Russia’s backyard. For instance, Vice Minister Le Yucheng argued that the US Indo-Pacific policy creates the same danger of replicating the Ukrainian situation in Asia. And by drawing a historical parallel, he said that the US Indo-Pacific policy was ‘as dangerous’ as NATO’s expansion in Europe (Le, 2022). Since almost all EU Member States are members of NATO, China perceives the expansion of the role of NATO as worrisome: not only does this constitute a threat to Russia, as the Ukrainian crisis points out, but it also undermines the role of the EU as an independent and trustful security actor. Because of the similarities between the geopolitical situation of Ukraine in Europe and Taiwan in East Asia, any NATO engagement against Moscow may be interpreted by Beijing as potentially undermining its claims over Taiwan, thus pushing Beijing even closer to Moscow. In Taiwan, the Russo-Ukraine conflict is perceived as a possible indication of the destiny of the island. In the aftermath of the Russian invasion, President Tsai Ing-wen declared that ‘Taiwan has faced military threats and intimidations from China for a long time. Therefore, we empathise with Ukraine’s situation’ (Reuters, 2022; NYT, 2022). Parallels between Taiwan and Ukraine are also emerging outside the island, as is the case with the former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen (Grossman, 2022; Feng & Brennan, 2022). Hence, some argue that China sees the Taiwan issue as ‘the mirror image of the Ukrainian issue for Russia’; since Taiwan was taken away by Japan from the Qing Empire and Ukraine was removed from the Russian Empire, they should not be considered as independent countries (Eran & Magen, 2022). Even before the Russian invasion of Eastern Ukraine, some scholars noticed that ‘the Russian referendum in Crimea to legitimise the annexation is of no consolation at all in the PRC since this could be used as a precedent in Taiwan’ (Ferdinand, 2018). Overall, even if there are some similarities between the two cases, there also are some differences, such as the legal status of the two entities, their economies, and so on (CSIS, 2022). What is noteworthy however, is that the outcome of the Russo-Ukraine war will certainly impact the Chinese

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attitude and, as a Pacific power with military bases and alliances in the region, the US has more at stake in the Taiwanese issue, while it is only indirectly touched by the Ukrainian conflict, notably via NATO (Kapila, 2022). Therefore, there is a tangible risk to transform NATO into a global democratic alliance opposed to a Sino-Russian authoritarian axis. Even if their close partnership were only a temporary one and the shared strategic and ideologic similarities between Moscow and Beijing do not erase the differences between the two countries, the Sino-Russian axis does challenge the West on several domains. The neoconservative Robert Kagan had already predicted the forming of a Sino-Russian ‘axis of autocracies’ to fight against Western liberalism rallied around an axis of democracies made of the US, the EU, Japan, and maybe India (Kagan, 2007; Kagan & Fukuyama, 2008). Later, others stressed the danger for NATO of a growing illiberal environment characterised by the strengthening of both Russian and Chinese defence budgets (Lindley-French, 2015, p.  117). Interestingly, during his visit to Brussels in 2007 Prime Minister Abe pledged for deepening Japan’s ties with NATO which is increasingly becoming a tool of American policies in Asia [&] Condoleezza Rice once dubbed as a ‘cordon of democratic national’. (Zhu, 2007, p. 109)

Even if, following its withdrawal from Afghanistan, NATO is no longer militarily present in Asia, it has several partnerships as well as exchange programmes in the region and runs joint military activities. Therefore, given the growing tensions between the US and its allies on one side and the Sino-Russian axis on the other side, NATO’s role in the Indo-Pacific region to defend the rule-based international order should not be ruled out. Equally possible is that the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) may develop as a complement to NATO’s role in the Indo-Pacific region. At the time of writing, growing Sino-American tensions provide Washington with a strong argument to pressure its European allies to reduce cooperation on technological transfers to China and back NATO’s role as a global player. The US has constantly required its European allies to boost their military contribution and provide for their own defence. Voice had risen asking for a division of labour in transatlantic relations (Tunsjo, 2015), which remained hard to implement since European countries are sinking under unprecedented levels of public debt heading towards a widespread economic collapse. Furthermore, they lack a strong

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strategic defence industrial base and, in the long-term, European defence companies risk being left behind by the American and Chinese giant companies. In a global market squeezed by both the COVID-19 measures and increasing harsh competition, even European champions such as Airbus, face this risk of being pushed out of the market. In a geopolitical framework characterised by extreme instability and growing regional and international tensions, NATO’s New Strategic Concept of 2022 is expected to provide the tools to tackle both a rising China and a resurgent Russia. Moreover, the design of the NSC occurs at the very moment in which the US is also updating its own strategic review, the EU is for the first time trying to develop its own strategic concept, and several European countries are reviewing their security concept. Lindley-French argues that nowadays ‘the world has two security leadership hubs: NATO and the EU’ (Lindley-French, p. 141), which should act as a collective block: notably, NATO would be a credible sword, while the EU would be the shield working through the Member States to enhance civil defence to protect Europeans. In fact, soft security issues such as crisis management, peace-building, arms control, or energy security have been traditionally attributed to the EU (Lindley-French, 2015). However, if the political dimension of NATO is strengthened, the EU will likely see its prerogatives limited and it is unclear whether the NSC will impinge on the EU’s ability to act. It is also important to notice that, whilst the EU may be a complementary player to/for NATO, Brexit has greatly reduced the EU defence capabilities and a third country arrangement to take part in EU flag operations would be necessary to allow a British contribution. Brexit has also likely contributed to deepen London’s strategic reliance on both Washington and a strong NATO. This would be aligned to Washington’s vision of NATO as part of a wider network linked to the Indo-Pacific, which includes the Quad but also Australia and New Zealand. In all these instances, the US, which has so far refrained from directly opposing Beijing and has privileged more ad hoc alliances in the Indo-Pacific (Wuthnow, 2019) stands for the cornerstone. NATO NSC released at the 2022 Madrid Summit addressed the threat of Russia but also China. The fact that Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea for the first time attended the Summit signalled the goal of the Alliance to address concerns about China (Deutsche Welle, 2022), which vehemently reacted against the declarations of the Alliance (Lawless et al., 2022). For the first time, a strategic concept criticises China as posing a

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challenge to the Alliance and reflects previous heavy criticism expressed at the 2022 G7 (Donnet, 2022). While Russia was named as a direct threat, China was identified as a ‘serious challenge’ to global stability. NATO will focus on certain areas where the Chinese challenge appears to be global, such as in the case of cybersecurity or the militarisation of outer space, which have been included in NATO’s interests since 2021. In fact, point N. 6 of the Madrid Summit Declaration released by the Heads of State and Government recognises that We are confronted by cyber, space, and hybrid and other asymmetric threats, and by the malicious use of energy and disruptive technologies. We face systemic competition from those, including the PRC, who challenge our interest, security, and values and seek to undermine the rules-based international order. (NATO, 2022a)

NATO NSC mentions China in its points N.13 and N.14; namely, NATO acknowledges China’s global ‘ambitious and coercive policies’ as a challenge to the Alliance ‘interests, security, and values’. On the point N.13, the Alliance complains that Malicious hybrid and cyber operations and its confrontational rhetoric and disinformation target Allies and harm Alliance security. The PRC seeks to control key technological and industrial sectors, critical infrastructure, and strategic dependencies and enhance its influence. It strives to subvert the rules-­ based international order, including in the space, cyber, and maritime domains. (NATO, 2022b)

And point N. 13 concludes by pointing to the strengthening of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership as a challenge to the rules-based international order and the interest and values of the Alliance. While on point 14 of the NSC it is stated that the Alliance is willing to engage with Beijing, it reaffirms the ‘systemic challenges posed by the PRC to Euro-Atlantic security’ (NATO, 2022b). As it is going to be discussed in the next chapters, the challenge that China poses to the rules-based international order is also one of the central challenges identified by the EU and, among the three case studies considered, by the UK. The issue of values and interests challenged by China’s

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actions is also central to all the three countries, although with different degrees. Hence, NATO should remain relevant on the Russian front with an enhanced role of the European allies, while the US should lead on the Chinese front in the Indo-Pacific region (Colby & Brzezinski, 2021). France seems to see NATO’s theatre as geographically limited and shares Germany’s appeasing posture towards Beijing (Macron, 2021). Yet, it is important to remember that it is the EU Member States that are part of NATO, not the EU. Since NATO is a collective security organisation with Germany, France, and the UK as its main contributors in terms of military spending (65% of the total) (Lindley-French, 2015, p. 117), these country’s security policies answer NATO’s requirements and agenda. And there is a widespread belief that a European Security and Defence Identity should only develop within NATO to allow for a European contribution to transatlantic security. For instance, in 2002 the Berlin Plus agreement between the EU and NATO allowed the EU to intervene in an international crisis by using NATO’s resources if NATO refused to intervene (right of first refusal). Thus, it is exclusively when NATO does not intervene, that the EU can act independently (Chu & Chen, 2011, p. 97). Since 2016, peace-building cooperation between the EU and NATO has been strengthened and, at the end of 2020, for the first time NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg held a meeting with the European Commission (NATO, 2020). If this meeting is institutionalised, it may provide a bridge between the two institutions. But the NATO membership of European countries has long been a limiting factor for developing an EU security and defence policy, which in turn has contributed to restrain their willingness to develop a security policy towards China. The fact that NATO has formally named the PRC as a security challenge may be either a new obstacle for setting up a comprehensive CFSP on China or a trigger for further developing CFSP/CSDP.

2.4  Conclusions This chapter has provided the security framework in which France, Germany, and the UK develop their national foreign and security policy. Since the EU and NATO are the two international security actors that influence the three European countries’ foreign policy decisions, likely

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even after Brexit, it was important to understand the dynamics among the two and their current developments related to China. Therefore, the chapter has first considered how the EU has been developing as an international security actor. After describing the peculiar characteristics of the EU foreign and security policy, it focused on the gradual but constant strengthening of the Sino-European relations to include security and military issues; and this despite the existence of the EU arms embargo vis-à-vis the PRC. It has been shown that in doing so, the EU and the PRC had diverse definitions of security and pursued different agendas. Despite these obstacles, both sides committed to quietly expand their relations, likely to avoid public criticism. Despite the strengthening of the EU-China bilateral relations, and their strategic dimension, European countries continued to move in a random order and the European approach remained a collection of different national proposals. This pushed France to act alone on several matters because of the difficulty in federating other Member States around its interests. It was traditionally assumed that thanks to its intrinsic support to multilateralism and absence of geopolitical rivalry with Beijing, the EU was better placed than the US to promote China’s integration in the international system. Some even proposed a US-China-EU security cooperation as a trilateral security cooperation mechanism, a ‘neo-trilateralism’ for a new global security regime. But the weight of the US outmatches the weight of the EU. The changing and unstable security environment characterised by transatlantic divergences and growing Sino-American tensions, the disruptive Trump Administration, and China’s growing assertiveness have pushed European countries to discuss how to implement more European strategic autonomy from the US. They have also started to increasingly share some of the American concerns vis-à-vis China, such as the need to defend the law of the sea and the freedom of navigation, the danger of an undervalued Renminbi, and so on. However, this trend was already visible in 2016, which was a watershed in China-EU relations with the Brexit referendum to the Joint Communication ‘Elements for a new EU strategy on China’ and the first EU Global Strategy (EUGS) of the EEAS.  In 2018, the conclusions of the European Council focused on enhancing the security cooperation with Asia and the EU took the first step towards a European strategy on the BRI. At least until Brexit, the big three EU Member States did not perceive the EU as a means, but rather as a tool to pursue their national interests.

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Their foreign policy stance towards China prevented the development of a coherent CFSP vis-à-vis China, and even when France tried to upload its foreign policy, it was not followed by other Member States; not only did its attempts fail but it was evident that the French goal was not to empower the EU but to defend the national interests. Eventually, this chapter has addressed the role that NATO and the EU may play vis-à-vis the PRC. On the one hand, NATO increasingly acknowledged the rise of China as a potential source of challenge and identified China as a strategic challenge. In 2022, Jens Stoltenberg declared that NATO wished to deepen its security cooperation with Asia-Pacific countries, namely on issues such as the fight against disinformation, cybersecurity, maritime security, or new technologies. On the other hand, Beijing sees NATO as dependent on Washington. Following the American attack on Afghanistan and NATO’s establishing military bases in Central Asia, Beijing believed that NATO started taking military action in Eurasia under cover to safeguard human rights. Due to its strong ties with Moscow, and the parallels that Beijing sees between Ukraine and Taiwan, Beijing perceives as problematic any alignment of European countries to NATO on the Ukrainian crisis. Hence, there is a tangible risk to transform NATO into a global democratic alliance opposed to a Sino-Russian authoritarian axis. NATO’s NSC should provide the tools to tackle both a rising China and a resurgent Russia. The EU and NATO should act as a collective block with hard security issues attributed to NATO and soft security issues to the EU.  However, if the political dimension of NATO is strengthened, the EU will likely see its prerogatives limited and it is unclear whether the NSC will impinge on the EU’s ability to act. Furthermore, Brexit has reduced the EU defence capabilities and a third country arrangement to take part in EU flag operations would be necessary to allow a British contribution. It has also likely contributed to deepening London’s strategic reliance on both Washington and a strong NATO. Overall, it seems more likely that NATO should remain relevant on the Russian front with an enhanced role of the European allies, while the US should lead on the Chinese front in the Indo-Pacific region. There is a widespread belief that a European Security and Defence Identity should only develop within NATO to allow for a European contribution to transatlantic security. However, the fact that NATO has formally named the PRC as a security challenger may indeed be a new obstacle for setting up

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a comprehensive CFSP on China, thus undermining the role of the EU as a security actor. In fact, for the first time NATO NSC released at the 2022 Madrid Summit identified China as posing serious challenges to the Alliance. The inclusion of Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea to the Summit signalled the goal of the Alliance to address concerns about China. This is certainly going to impact the formulation of the strategic concept of the three European countries as well as the EU.

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CHAPTER 3

The Re-emergence of China and the Deepening of EU-China Relations

3.1   The Rise of China: Views from International Scholars Since Deng Xiaoping’s reforms (Spence, 2013), the re-emergence of China has sparked countless debates among International Relations scholars on how best to respond. On the one hand, liberal scholars have pointed out that its re-­emergence has been made possible by and within the liberal order. A common belief was that China’s inclusion into the international system after the Second World War made possible its development as an economic powerhouse. Therefore, it was in Beijing’s interest to support the liberal order (Lieberthal,  2013). Lieberthal called the US for avoiding containment and instead enhancing engagement with Beijing to increase Washington’s influence over China and push it to act according to expectations (Lieberthal, 1995, p. 47). Steinfeld had an extremely optimistic view of China’s integration and contribution to the economic system (Steinfeld, 2010) and argued that China is not a revisionist country aiming at overthrowing the liberal order since this would undermine its own prosperity. In a more cautious attitude, Johnston admitted that contemporary China is more inclined to be the status quo power than a Maoist China. However, he noted that growing social instability domestically and the growing security dilemma may destabilise this situation (Johnston, 2003, p. 56).

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More recently, Qiu analysed how China went from being a game player to being a game maker (Qiu, 2015). On the other hand, realists focused on growing competition between a re-emerging China and a declining US, thus painting a more pessimistic picture of the rise of China in the twenty-first century. They considered China mostly as a revisionist power and believed that the more Beijing increases its power, the more it would assert itself. This was confirmed by China’s growing confidence following the global economic crisis and more aggressive foreign policy following the Olympic Games in 2008. Subsequently, the dominant power, the US had to co-opt its allies to balance against the new challenger from Asia. Some realist scholars have even depicted China as a new Wilhelmine Germany, clearly en route to a collision with the US (Ross, 2009; Holmes & Yoshihara, 2010). One of the most striking features of China’s re-emergence is its global dimension. No other country of such a population and size has ever developed as fast as the PRC. Dittmer emphasised the global dimension of such a phenomenon by identifying its regional and global consequences for the US (Dittmer, 2012). He argued that, in the aftermath of the economic crisis, the rise of China ‘has changed the security and geostrategic calculation of its neighbours and the US’ (Dittmer, 2012, p. 61). According to Lattimore, Beijing had two main objectives: first, to increase its power projection, especially in the maritime field and, second, to reform the financial order. Both goals diminished the American dominance in the Asia-Pacific region. Another author who analysed the impact of the Chinese re-emergence on the US dominance in the Asia-Pacific region was Shambaugh. He found that China has reshaped the regional order in Asia-Pacific at the expense of Washington. However, he believed that China was not yet a great power but rather a ‘partial power’, a likely future great power that had not yet reached its full potential (Shambaugh, 2005, 2013, 2016). A gloomier prediction came from Kagan. He claimed that the PRC is indeed a revisionist state ‘dissatisfied with the current global configuration of power’ (Kagan, 1997, p. 22), which aims at changing the international order. Hoslag acknowledged the Chinese military modernisation as ‘impressive’ and anticipated the risk of a war in Asia because China’s national interests collide with the national interests of neighbouring countries (Hoslag, 2015, p. 146). He also criticised the approach of the leadership of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao (2002–2012), framed by the idea of the international system as a ‘harmonious world’ (和谐世界, héxié shìjiè)

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(Gung  &  Kang, 2007) where China can ‘rise peacefully’ (和平崛起, hépíng juéqǐ) (Zheng, 2005) or ‘develop peacefully’ (和平发展, Hépíng fāzhǎn) (Glaser & Medeiros, 2007; State Council of Information Office, 2005) to avoid American and Asian reactions. As an offensive realist, Mersheimer contended that China cannot rise peacefully: as the incoming challenger, its growing power is likely to trigger a conflict with the hegemon that defends its dominant position in the international system (Mearsheimer, 2006, 2010). In contrast, defensive realists such as Glaser opposed this interpretation as too deterministic, asserting that realism does not predict an automatic collision between the hegemon and its challenger; rather, there is always room for manoeuvre depending on the situation. Therefore, there is no predetermination of conflict as the outcome depends on Washington’s willingness to ‘adjust to the new international conditions, making some uncomfortable concessions and not exaggerating the dangers’ (Glaser, 2011, p. 81). Like the US, Europe has strong interest in the stability of East Asia, which is ‘a major driver of the global economy and the EU has important trade and investment partnerships in this region’ (European Commission, 2001). Nevertheless, Foot stressed that Europe’s idea of power and view of the international order differ from the US (Foot, 2010, p. 212). Since it lacks a military presence in Asia, the role of the EU does not match the role of the US in that region and the only area in which the EU plays a role is non-traditional security. The European preference for multilateralism also diverges from the US’ mistrust of regional and multilateral organisations, which grew stronger under the Trump Administration (2017–2021). The latter attacked the multilateral system and its institutions, including the EU that was defined as a ‘foe’. Trump even ‘downgraded the diplomatic status of the EU’s ambassador to the US’, which in turn pushed Germany and France to ‘pursue their sovereign autonomy’ (Schaeffer, 2022, pp. 227, 302). Although the US Pivot to Asia served as a wake-up call for the EU and its Member States, the CFSP and CSDP remain the prerogative of the Member States. This is the focus of the following chapter, which examines the evolution of EU-China relations as a necessary framework to understand the foreign policy changes by Germany, France, and the UK vis-à-vis the PRC. Until recently, the perception of China as a danger and a strategic competitor threatening Washington’s supremacy starkly contrasted with the European perception of China as an important economic and trading partner. In 2006, the European Council stated that Europe has an interest

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in Asian stability and called for initiative to lower military and security tensions, such as growing ‘transparency in equipment development and acquisition, doctrine and planning, wider participation in observation and military exercises […] deepening dialogue and cooperation arrangements’ (Bates, 2008, p. 263).1 Nevertheless, the EU can rely on limited means to promote these goals: for example, its participation in ARF and ASEM, the annual EU-China Summit, and ‘soft’ Sino-European military relations. Under the Trump Administration, the US’ posture towards China has become increasingly confrontational (The White House, 2018). The National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2017 qualified China as a revisionist power and identified a ‘geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order’ (The White House, 2017). The National Defence Authorization Act even recognised Beijing as Washington’s primary threat. The withdrawal of the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in 2017 and the skyrocketing of the trade war with China undermined the unity of the Western camp in defending the liberal order, and has left Beijing gaining a wide margin of manoeuvre to promote its standards while portraying itself as the defender of free trade (Mitchell, 2018, p. 38). China aimed at establishing a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Launched in 2012, this Free Trade Area (FTA) includes ASEAN countries and six Asia-Pacific countries having an agreement with ASEAN (Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand) (Liu, 2018). Concluded in 2020, it excludes both the US and the EU. Therefore, the EU and its Member States have to consider where to stand if they want to avoid being scattered by a resurgence of the Sino-­ American confrontation. Even if China preferred a G3 of US-EU-China collective global leadership to Kissinger’s proposal for a G2 with the US as it was promoted by Robert Cooper (Zhang, 2008; Kissinger, 2009), the EU still lacks the power to play at the same level of those two great powers (Biba & Wolf, 2021).

3.2   China’s Complexity as a Global Actor Thanks to its economic performance, China became a complex and growingly powerful regional and global player. This also changed its attitude towards the international community by increasing participation in 1

 European Council 10–11 December 2006 quoted by Gill Bates.

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regional organisations. For instance, in 1995 the PRC started the Group of Five that evolved into the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in 2001. China became a member of the WTO (2001) and signed FTAs, such as the ASEAN-China FTA (ACFTA) of 2004, one of the widest FTA worldwide (Cai, 2005; Chakraborty & Kumar, 2012). Hence, China is a powerful player to deal with, especially for the EU that is not a unified actor in several areas. For instance, Smith identified five major challenges that China poses to the EU, the first being the trade-off between economic and political/ security issues at not only European but also Member States’ levels. Several Member States keep great interest in their relations with Beijing and the asymmetric nature of their relationship prevented a unified European strategy towards China. Smith argued that ‘Germany, France and Britain retain active and growing links with China, especially focused on trade and investment, and these lead to independent diplomatic activity and influence over EU diplomacy’ (Smith, 2016, p. 148). The second challenge is China’s impact within the EU, according to the national and European levels and the diverse constituencies within the EU and its Member States. The third challenge is the fragmented nature of the EU as an international actor. The fourth challenge is at the institutional level of the Sino-European relations as each dialogue involves different actors and, finally, the fifth challenge is at the governance level (Smith, 2016, pp. 146–63). Economically, in 2009 China overtook Germany and Japan in 2010 (McCurry & Kollewe, 2011) to become the third and second largest economy worldwide respectively (Fig. 3.1). Thanks to the country’s fixed exchange rate system, which is set up by an authoritarian regime (Bergsten et al., 2008, pp. 14–17), since 2010 the Chinese foreign exchange reserves (forex) rose to more than US $3 trillion, even if their percentage of GDP declined 47.6% in 2010 to 28.7% in 2017 (Barbones, 2018; Chan, 2017; Strange, 2015). Due to its size, the Chinese economy inevitably impacts, directly or indirectly, on the economy of other countries. The EU is not alone in running a trade deficit with China: the US and all Member States but Germany, also have a trade deficit with Beijing. The EU’s trade imbalance with China worsened after the economic crisis (Figs. 3.2 and 3.3) while complaints about restrictions imposed on European companies to access the Chinese market have mushroomed (Grant, 2007, p.  36). This included the issue of access to the projects within the framework of the BRI (Keegan, 2018). Hoslag noted that while the EU ‘Member states

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The position of China among the world’s largest traders in goods, 2016 Exports

Imports United States 18%

China 17%

Other 46%

EU-28 16%

Hong Kong 4%

Other 46%

EU-28 15%

China 12%

United States 12%

Hong Kong 4%

Japan 5%

Japan 5%

Source: Eurostat (online data code: ext_It_introle)

eurostat Fig. 3.1  Largest traders worldwide (2021)

China among the world’s largest traders of goods, 2020 (% share of world exports/imports) Exports

Imports

China 18.0%

United States 16.4%

Other 48.3% Other 47.5%

China 14.0%

EU 15.4%

United States 10.0% United Kingdom Hong Kong Japan 4.5% 4.3% 3.8% Source: Eurostat (online data code: ext_It_introeu27_2020) and UNCTAD

EU 13.4% Japan 4.3%

eurostat

Fig. 3.2  EU’s main trading partners (2020)

continued their pilgrimage to the PRC […] only a few leaders started exploring ways to defend their economies against the Chinese influence’ (Hoslag, 2015, p. 131). Its economic power turned China into the most likely challenger of the economic order and international law. After the Olympic Games, its aggressive foreign policy coincided with the global economic crisis. While

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EU trade in goods with China, 2011-2021 (€ billion) 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 -100 -200 -300

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

Balance

2016 Imports

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

Exports

Source: Eurostat (online data code: ext_st_eu27_2020sitc and DS-018995)

eurostat Fig. 3.3  EU trade deficit with China (2011–2021)

Western economies were heavily affected, China’s US $586 billion stimulus plan temporarily isolated the country (Barboza, 2008; Belder, 2018, p.  15). This was at the risk of long-term negative effects (Matthews, 2016), such as fast-growing debt and the building of unnecessary infrastructure. Furthermore, China’s enhanced economic status also impact on security and international norms, to the point that some authors stressed that it ‘poses a major challenge to the US and the rest of the world simply by virtue of its status as a new global economic superpower’ (Collier, 2017, pp.  25–33; Bergsten et  al., 2008, p.  10). Kang argued that the behaviour of the PRC from 2008 onward sparked worries in the international community as Beijing abandoned its ‘smile diplomacy’ for a ‘snarl diplomacy’ (Kang, 2005, p.  39), later baptised as ‘Wolf Warrior diplomacy’ (Martin, 2021). Historically, Beijing looked at Europe as the sign of ‘the emergence of a more multipolar world with both Western Europe and China as two of the poles’ (Yahuda, 1995). Hence, the PRC made efforts to expand its ties both with European countries and with the EU. In 1997, the return of Hong Kong to China, followed by the return of Macao by Portugal in

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1999, further eased the relations between London and Beijing as well as between Brussels and Beijing; notably, it facilitated the signing of a Comprehensive partnership (1998) between the EU and China, which included annual Summits, bilateral cooperation on economics, Sciences and Technology (S&T), education, and law. However, the recovery of Hong Kong and Macao was only the first milestone in China’s re-appropriation of its historical status (domestically, regionally, and internationally). The next stage consists in asserting sovereignty over Taiwan as well as the South and East China Seas. The year of 2021 was the first landmark celebrating the 100 years of the funding of the CPC and China’s regained status as a regional leader. Moreover, the 100 years anniversary of the founding of the PRC (2049) represents the last stage of the Chinese leadership’s goal to make the country great again. These two milestones are the ‘two centennials’ or ‘centennial goals’ (Lu, 2016) at the basis of Xi Jinping’s China Dream (中国梦, Zhōngguó mèng) of China’s rejuvenation. Issued at the 18th National Congress of the CPC of 2012, they aimed at: Building a moderately well-off society; and accelerating socialist modernization [that] means doubling China's 2010 GDP and per capita income for both urban and rural residents by the time the CPC celebrates its centenary in 2021 and building China into a modern socialist country that […] reaches the level of moderately developed countries by the time the PRC celebrates its centenary in 2049. (China.org.cn, 2014)

Beijing’s growing assertiveness demonstrated the failure of the Western belief that China could have been successfully co-opted or ‘socialised’ within the post-1945 order; instead, this revealed the Chinese willingness to reshape it. The idea that ‘projecting the EU’s soft power in China as well as in Asia should become a constant endeavour both for the EU’s institutions and the member states’ (Reuter, 2007, p. xx) showed its limitations. Not only did China maintain its authoritarian features but it also assumed an increasingly assertive posture by pushing forward the ‘Chinese characteristic’ as a defining multidimensional element of its policies, from its economic model to the cultural model (Zanardi, 2016, 2017). The same noncompliance posture mirrored China’s bypassing of international law rooted in Chinese ‘pride’ in 2001, when Beijing ignored international law and held the crew of the EPS-3 for nearly two weeks demanding that Washington apologise for spying on China. This attitude

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nullified efforts to implement the 1997 agreement to regulate Sino-­ American air and naval forces, based on the previous Soviet-American agreement. On another occasion, China launched an anti-satellite test (ASAT) in January 2007 disregarding the international practice of giving public notice in due time. It also created space debris potentially damaging other countries’ space assets. The list of Chinese contempt for international practices also included its 2007 refusal to grant a port call to two US minesweepers in Hong Kong following Washington’s arms sales to Taiwan and the Dalai Lama’s visit to the US. Hence, China selectively adhered to some international law and accepted international standards while clearly ignoring those against its interests (Bergsten et  al., 2008, pp.  225–26). Growing tensions between the US and China also exacerbated the underlying issue of who will put in place international rules and standards since China has increasingly presented itself as an alternative leader for the developing countries. Beijing’s attitude on the maritime disputes in the China Seas is another case in point. Since the beginning of the 2010s, maritime disputes rapidly escalated. 2012 was a watershed year: in March, Beijing detained 21 Vietnamese fishermen near the Paracel Islands. The next month, the Philippines accused Chinese fishermen of illegal activities near the Scarborough Shoal and held military exercises with the U.S.  In June, Vietnam passed a law claiming sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, while China raised the administrative status of the South China Sea islands from county to prefectural level (Global Times, 2012). In September, The Philippines renamed the sea to its west as the West Philippines Sea. At the same time, Japan escalated the tensions in the East China Sea by acquiring the Senkaku islands (Diaoyu in Chinese), which prompted China to send its patrols (Takenaka, 2012). Not only does Beijing endanger the stability of the Asia-Pacific, but it also tests the international law of the sea (Smith, 2012). When meeting with the US Secretary of Defence Mattis, Xi Jinping declared the Pacific Ocean to be ‘vast enough to accommodate China and the US, as well as other countries’ (Xinhua,  2018) thus signalling the Chinese attempt to divide the Pacific Ocean in zones of influence: the part of the Ocean closer to China would implicitly be under Chinese influence while the part closer to the US under Washington’s influence (Zanardi, 2019). In fact, Beijing’s mentality based on sphere of influence seems unwilling to make concessions: as Xi Jinping declared: ‘our stance is steadfast and clear-cut when it comes to China’s sovereignty and territorial

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integrity any inch of territory passed down from ancestors cannot be lost while we want nothing from others’ (Xinhua, 2018). The use of the term ‘inch’ referring to China’s maritime disputes showed that China equals land and sea (Zanardi, 2019), and China’s traditional use of artificially constructed historical arguments illustrates its tendency to manipulate history to its own service (Hayton, 2018; Malik, 2013; Buszynski, 2012, pp. 140–41). Finally, President Xi invited Washington to act wisely and accept China’s claims, to avoid military interventionism because ‘real experts on military affairs do not want to employ military means to solve issues’ (Xinhua, 2018). Regarding Africa, since the establishment of the Forum on China-­ Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000, the Chinese presence in that continent expanded rapidly. The volume of China-Africa trade in goods increased from US $11 billion in 2000 to US $210 billion in 2012, and China became Africa’s main trading partner. Beijing abandoned its revolutionary ideology and adopted a pragmatic foreign policy that seemed welcomed by African countries, particularly by those that do not want to conform to Western conditionalities (Zanardi, 2014, p.  81). China’s emphasis on South-South cooperation depended on its status as the largest developing country (Eisenman & Shinn, 2018, p. 138), which legitimises its interests in Africa distinguishing China from former colonial powers. However, this argument is disputed because China is no longer a developing country and has neo-colonialist intentions in Africa, where Beijing is building a new type of informal empire in the developing world (Cardenal & Araújo, 2013). Not only does China present itself in opposition to former colonial powers, but its non-conditionality approach interferes with the EU and its Member States’ promotion of good governance, democracy (Hackenesch 2015), Human Rights, and so on (Wissenbach, 2009; Bergsten et  al., 2008, p. 219). For instance, in 2008 the European Parliament adopted a non-legislative resolution acknowledging the overall criticisms from European specialists, especially French and British specialists (European Parliament, 2008). Although the report acknowledged the positive economic impact that China’s growing cooperation could have on African countries, it also criticised Beijing’s role in backing repressive regimes, such as Sudan and Zimbabwe, and called ‘the EU to encourage China to assume its responsibilities as a permanent member of the UN Security Council’ (Cabestan, 2011, p. 90). In 2008, Beijing had opposed Western condemnation of election fraud in Zimbabwe and vetoed a UN Resolution

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establishing an arms embargo on Harare (Eisenman & Shinn, 2018, p.  139). China’s non-string attached policy has also undermined the European approach based on good governance and Human Rights’ policy in African countries (e.g. Burundi), which see China as the alternative to Western sanctions or lack of funding (Lemaître, 2018). The EP’s resolution on China’s engagement in Africa was released following the proposal led by the DG Development (DG Dev) to deal with the crisis in Darfur and plead for developing bilateral cooperation with China. In contradiction with China’s role in selling SALW to African actors and its poor record on Human Rights, the European Commissioner for Development, Luis Michel, declared that China and the EU had common goals in the African continent and worked jointly on economic development (Mergenthaler, 2015, p. 177). The European Commission issued the communication The EU, Africa, and China: towards trilateral dialogue and cooperation on peace, stability, and sustainable development (European Commission, 2008), which identified four fields of potential cooperation among the EU, China, and Africa, including peace and security. On the one hand, Brussels acknowledged China’s rising strategic relevance in Africa. On the other hand, it expressed expectations for China’s contribution to African security. The Chinese Policy Paper on the EU of 2014 also identified security cooperation in Africa as a field of possible cooperation between the PRC and the EU. Nevertheless, European and Chinese security interests seemed too different for giving a real impetus to the first EU-China-Africa Communication of the European Commission. Furthermore, China’s growing role as a security actor in the African continent impinged on the EU’s approach focusing on human security instead of state security and counterterrorism. Triggered by 9/11, counterterrorism ‘engulfed most of the EU’s policies towards Africa, leading to a shift in perspective regarding areas of instability on the continent’ (Barton, 2018, p. 54). Since the beginning of the Arab Spring (2010), the security environment in Africa deteriorated rapidly and the EU and China experienced setbacks. China’s foreign policy principles of non-interference and non-­ intervention were no longer viable as Beijing could no longer avoid dealing with African security matters (Barton, 2018, pp. 37–38). In fact, the scale of Chinese investments reached such a level that it can no longer be neutral (e.g. Angola, Darfur, Sudan). As the collapse of Libya (2011) demonstrated, China’s growing economic interests and communities in Africa needed to be protected and further evacuations of Chinese

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nationals and business losses prevented. Hence, the PLA deepened its military relations with African countries and increased its role as a security actor in the continent (Zanardi, 2017). China became a contributor to UN PKOs, to the financing of the security capabilities of the African Union (AU) and other African regional organisations. China’s second policy paper on Africa (2015) included a section on security issues and, in June 2018, Beijing organised the first China-Africa Security Forum (Africa Times, 2018). Hence, Barton identified PKOs, military cooperation (including arms sales), naval projection, and diplomatic engagement in conflict resolution efforts, as China’s main tools for engagement in African security issues (Barton, 2018, pp. 40–49). Regarding the EU, since its first military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Operation Artemis) in 2003, the EU tried to play a growing role in African security through the deployment of numerous missions (Sicurelli, 2010; Tardy, 2016; Furness & Olsen, 2016), but not always with long-term positive outcomes. Therefore, both the EU and China are increasingly committed to back the military capabilities of the AU, African regional organisations, and African countries. For instance, the EU stepped up its contribution to the security role of the AU by supporting the African Peace Facility (APF) established in 2004 by mobilising the European Development Fund (EDF) to support PKOs’ efforts led by African institutions. Other European initiatives included ‘€350m of EDF funding over seven years to regional security programmes, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), the Development and Cooperation Instrument (DCI), or trust funds to support initiatives on conflict prevention or mediation’ (European Parliament, 2008). When it came to African security, France proved to be the most active Member State. For example, in 2008 the French RECAMP (Reinforcement des capacités Africaines de Maintien de la Paix) initiative launched in 1997 became the Euro-RECAMP Initiative (Diallo, 2016, p.  62), jointly launched by the EU and the AU to support the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) (African Union, 2012). Despite the nuanced outcome, France remains the most active European country in the region: in 2013, it launched a military operation in the Central African Republic under the UN mandate, and in 2014, Operation Barkhane in the Sahel, where Paris set up a Group of Five countries of the region. The UK contributed to fund the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (Ghana), the Ecole de maintien de la paix (Bamako) and a Planning Element (Kenya) (Chafer & Cumming, 2010, p. 1139).

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Over the past two decades, China became increasingly involved in African security (Alden et al., 2018): it expanded its network of military relations and defence cooperation with African countries and organised the first Sino-African Summit on security and defence. China’s support to develop African military capabilities mirrored its growing economic interests in the continent as its ‘go out’ strategy pushed Chinese companies to implant their business abroad. Africa was one of the main receivers of Chinese business (Bräutigam & Tang, 2013) with an estimated 1 million Chinese citizens working in the continent (French, 2014). In 2013, China became Africa’s largest export and development partner (Pigato & Tang, 2015) and replicated its Special Economic Zones (SEZs) in several African countries (Bräutigam, 2011). Moreover, the need to tackle piracy activities in the Horn of Africa has led China to contribute to African maritime security. The establishment of its first naval base in Djibouti was greeted with scepticism by Western countries, especially the US, France, and the UK, which already disposed of military bases in the small East African country. China’s commitment to provide security through multilateral organisations, such as the UN, progressed rapidly and China became the first contributor of Blue Helmets among the P5 and supported the Group of Five (G5) Sahel countries even if it proved unable to eradicate terrorist groups. In 2015, President Xi committed to create a force of 8000 soldiers for UN intervention, offered helicopters (four Mi-171) and financial aid worth US $100 million to the AU (Perlez, 2015). Nevertheless, China remained one of the larger arms exporters to Africa: from 2010 to 2014, it exported weapons to 18 African states, including three frigates to Algeria, unmanned aerial vehicles to Nigeria, conventional arms to Angola, Egypt, Morocco, and Sudan (Mariani & Kirkham, 2018, p.  337). Chinese defence companies quickly increased their market share in Africa: from 2013 to 2017, their sales increased by 55% compared to the period from 2008 to 2012. This brought to 17% the Chinese share in Africa, and 27% in Sub-Saharan Africa alone (Wezeman et al., 2019, p. 7). Therefore, China’s defence companies are already competing with major arms exporters, including European companies. But China also exports Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) to African countries, such as Sudan and Zimbabwe. In 2014, it sold weapons to conflict-torn South. Furthermore, evidence pointed to non-state actors using Chinese SALW transferred by African countries (Mariani & Kirkham, 2018, p. 338).

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In 2006, the EU and the PRC launched a bilateral forum on African security and exchanged on that topic at political dialogues (Mergenthaler, 2015, pp. 173, 175), but despite several areas of potential cooperation in Africa, any attempt to organise it has proved unsuccessful (Stahl, 2018; Hooijmaaijers, 2018). This was partly due to the lack of a unified vision of China among Europeans: while some accused China of being a predatory country in Africa (Middle Vampire) (Cohen & Richard, 2010) or a neo-­ colonial power (Cardenal & Araújo, 2013), others pondered the negative and positive effects coming from China’s growing presence in the continent (Bräutigam, 2009). The European Commission remained cautious and never pushed forward an agenda for developing joint projects. In 2008, its communication to set up a trilateral dialogue between the EU, China, and Africa on peace and security, infrastructure, regional integration, environment, natural resources, agriculture, and food security (Council of the EU, 2008) remained a dead letter.

3.3   The Thorny Issue of China’s Investment in the EU Since the mid-1990s, the Chinese leadership has promoted the ‘Going out’ (走出去, Zǒu chūqù) strategy, which inaugurated the official internationalisation of Chinese companies (Beasley et  al., 2013). At the same time, the cyberwar capabilities of the PLA have risen fast because military and civilian actors have strong interests in developing these capabilities. This poses the question of civil-military interplay (Sheldon & McReynolds, 2015) since China’s major defence companies are State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) with ties with the CPC. For instance, the PLA is one of the key players in the modernisation of China’s telecommunications and has been buying foreign equipment for civilian and military use (Mulvenon & Bickford, 1995, p. 2). The growing internationalisation of Chinese companies and the opaqueness of their actual status as private or SOEs, has made it difficult to limit their activities abroad. Huawei is a case in point: created in the 1980s by a former general, Ren Yunfei, it is the second largest company worldwide for sales of network equipment. An EU representative singled out the interrelation between the PLA and Chinese companies by explaining that ‘while they [Huawei] present themselves as a private company

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with nothing to do with the Party, the links with the CPC are well known’ (EEAS Representative (b), 2014). Huawei has been lobbying very hard the European institutions, and not always with positive results. For example, in 2014 a European MP complained that, following their first visit to the Huawei’s R&D facility in Shenzhen, the parliamentarian delegation communicated their unwillingness to visit the facility again. However, they complained that the following year the exact same visit had been scheduled again during their visit to China (European Member of Parliament, 2014). The presence of Chinese companies in the European market has raised national security questions and has created tensions with Washington, which has ruled out Huawei and also ZTE from the American market on the ground of national security (Rogers & Ruppersberger, 2012). In contrast, Huawei is well implanted in countries such as the UK and Germany, where it has R&D Centres, but also France and Poland. As it offered cheap and advanced technology it was even ‘set to become one of the biggest beneficiaries of the European Commission’s push to roll out 5G wireless technology’ (Cerulus, 2017). In 2018, the arrest of Huawei’s vice-president and daughter of its founder by Canadian authorities triggered a diplomatic row between Washington and Beijing. As the US put pressure on European countries to limit the presence of Huawei in their markets, the arrest of Huawei’s sales director by Poland as well as a former Polish intelligence officer on spying charges (Zheng et al., 2019) revealed the tip of this diplomatic row. Not only did it signal the US’ attempt to counter the Chinese expansion in Europe, including the expansion of the BRI, but it also demonstrated Washington’s willingness to influence Member States’ choices in a typical logic of power politics. For instance, Poland wanted the American engagement against a resurgent Russia by hosting an American military base. This in turn likely limited Huawei’s presence in the Polish market and more generally China’s attempt to turn Poland into a BRI communications-­ hub (Pancevski & Dalton, 2019). One of the consequences has been the sparking off of a debate at the EU level, where the European Commission began to study the likely implications of the bid of Huawei 5G technology for the European market (Brzozowski et al., 2019). What is surprising here is that EU institutions only started to look at this strategic issue after Washington raised its voice, as if the security of European telecommunications were an American interest more than a European interest. On the issue of the 5G provided by

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Huawei, Germany seems to lack a clear position (Delphine & Reitzer, 2019, p. 117), while the UK appears to take the most critical stance, thus reflecting its major ally’s preferences. In need of acquiring advanced technologies, Chinese companies have increasingly invested in European companies. A report found that, from 2008 to 2018, Europe ranked ‘behind Africa as a recipient of Chinese direct investment and infrastructure contracts, pulling in US$344bn compared with Africa’s US$371bn’ (Peel & Hornby, 2018); and this despite excluding bonds and real estate investment. The financial crisis made it more appealing for China to buy European countries’ sovereign debt. Moreover, its influx of capital was welcomed by several highly indebted European countries, such as Greece and Portugal. For instance, during Xi Jinping’s visit in December 2018, Lisbon and Beijing signed an MoU including 17 cooperation agreements under the BRI and a project to develop a deep-water port in Sines as a transatlantic logistic hub (Hatton, 2018). The issue of the Chinese investment in the EU is a source of concern because of the authoritarian nature of the Chinese regime, its links with Chinese SOEs, and the subsidies that the last are granted. In addition, any Chinese investment abroad must first be approved by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MofCom), and it is China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) that plans the investment abroad (Banik, 2016, p. 28). To make things worse, since 2017 the Chinese legislation requires Chinese companies to create an internal CPC committee and assist the Chinese Bureau of National Security when necessary. Furthermore, China’s investment abroad remains opaque. For instance, the European Commission stopped the construction of the Belgrade-­ Budapest Railway for no respect of the market rules. Chinese FDI likely comes through offshore centres, which makes it difficult to trace their origin and paves the way to possible interference by an authoritarian regime in the national policies of the Member States, especially the small ones (Le Corre, 2018). For instance, the Greek government started to back the Chinese position both at the European Council and at the UN Human Rights Council. More broadly, China’s initiative in the Central and East European Countries (CEEC) has widened the gap between CEECs and old Member States and has also pushed CEECs to compete for accessing Chinese investment under the BRI. The fact that China deals with 16 CEECs in the ‘16+1’ framework, turned 17+1 after the inclusion of Greece, which

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originally excluded the EU, shows that Beijing shapes and deals with European sub-regions according to its own preferences and without considering the territorial integrity of the EU. This demonstrates that Beijing does not consider the EU as a full-fledged actor with a well-defined territory: instead, it deals with sub-regions that include Member States as well as candidate countries. Some argued that despite increasing, the media overstated the official level of Chinese FDI in European countries; for instance, a German ‘top-­ official’ described it as ‘twice peanuts’ (Obbema, 2015, p. 78). What is clear is that, before the Covid measures, Chinese FDI focused on some European countries and was not regularly distributed among all Member States: rather, Western European countries received the bulk of the Chinese investment (Hanemann & Huotari, 2018). In CEECs, Chinese companies took advantage of cheap labour cost, highly skilled labour market, and proximity to other European countries. Chinese companies had also set up plants in CEECs before they became Member States with the goal of gaining access to the EU market (Banik, 2016, p. 33). Among the Chinese investors in the European market, there are Chinese wealth funds, such as the China Investment Corporation (CIC) or the Safe Investment Company (SIC). They report directly to the Chinese Ministry of Finance, but they are less scrutinised than other Chinese companies. CIC is a shareholder in many European multinationals: in the UK, it acquired stakes in Morgan Stanley—$5 bn in 2007— HSBC, Barclays Bank, Thames Water, Heathrow, and The House of Fraser, among others (Grant & Barysch, 2008, p. 51; Evans, 2014). It also owns British brands such as Weetabix, Sunseekers, and Pizza Express. In 2008, China’s State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) invested 1.8 bn Euros in the French national petroleum company Total as well as £1bn in Britain’s national petroleum company British Petroleum (Grant & Barysch,  2008, p.  51). This was likely the result of China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC)’s failed acquisition of Unocal in the US in 2005, which pushed Chinese companies to move from the increasingly hostile American market to the more open European market. Hence, not only a Chinese entity did invest in both French and British national companies, but also in such a strategic domain as the energy field. And in both cases, the investment came as a fait accompli. Despite a few attempts to raise voices against these investments, Chinese investments in the UK did not cause major controversy due to British pragmatism, even in the case of the Chinese participation in the Somerset

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nuclear power plant (Obbema, 2015, p.  84). In France, while the law prevented takeovers in the defence and pharmaceutical industries, in 2013 President Hollande publicly invited China to invest in other French sectors. Subsequently, in 2014, Dongfeng succeeded in buying a minority stake in PSA, the French strategic automotive industry (Obbema, 2015, p. 83; Xinhua, 2015). As this phenomenon was not circumscribed to the UK and France, European countries began to tighten the national rules governing foreign investment, particularly for reasons of national security. At the European level, the initiative to create a European Committee on Foreign Investment as in the US dates back to 2010, when Xinmao unsuccessfully tried to take over the Dutch cable-maker Draka (Pigna, 2010). At that time, the EU Commissioner for Industry, Antonio Tajani, proposed to establish a board to examine foreign investments within the EU (EU Business, 2010). Nevertheless, such initiative was never implemented. In 2013, following a complaint by a German company, the European Commission was willing to sue Chinese solar panels companies. However, likely to avoid reprisals from China against its companies in China, Berlin surprisingly joined forces with Beijing. As a result, in November 2013, Beijing and Brussels announced the start of bilateral negotiations for an EU-China CAI to overcome the deadlock caused by disagreement over the issue of China’s dumping of solar panel and illegal subsidies, the EU move against Chinese telecommunications companies, and China’s subsequent denunciation of EU dumping on wine (Euractiv, 2014). Hence, the EU’s long-term interest in adopting a unified common approach on FDI was hampered by the short-termism of individual Member States, particularly Germany (Obbema, 2015, pp. 85, 238). It was only in February 2017 that Berlin, Paris, and Rome suggested the adoption by the European Commission of a screening mechanism for FDI. Presented as a European Commission proposal in September 2017 (Brattberg & Soula, 2018), supported by trade MEPs in May 2018 (European Parliament, 2018) an agreement with the Commission was reached on 20 November 2018. Hence, the European Commission established a European framework for tracking FDI in strategic sectors and created a coordination mechanism between the Member States and the European Commission (European  Commission, 2018). The main limit remains its non-binding requirement.

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3.3.1   Technology Transfer Technical cooperation and knowledge transfer functioned as political leverage for expanding the Sino-European relations through sectoral dialogues held at administrative levels (Mergenthaler, 2015, pp.  32–34). They were halted in the aftermath of Tiananmen when the EU imposed an arms embargo towards the PRC.  While the economic and political sanctions are soon removed, the arms embargo remains in place. However, as it is declaratory and not legally binding, each Member State has a wide deal of discretion in interpreting it in accordance with its national laws and regulations. This brings some to argue that in reality ‘there is no one embargo, but several embargoes, one for each Member State’ (Former German Ambassador, 2015). An expert on China points out that the arms embargo is paradoxical: on the one hand, it is not binding but on the other hand there are political obstacles to lift it, notably Washington’s veto. Since the embargo is set up before the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) and the creating the CFSP: whilst no arms will be sold to China and no direct support provided to modernisation of the PLA unless the European Council revises the decision, ‘as a matter of fact, at the national level, there is a lot of interaction’ (Former Defense Attaché to the PRC, 2014). Since the European declaration of the arms embargo does not define the term of ‘arms’, does not stipulate penalties (Bates, 2008, p. 268), and the distinction between military and civilian technologies is increasingly blurred, Western countries’ ‘exports of commercial high-tech and expertise with potential military applications, such as space-related technologies, continue to expand and already may contribute to improvements in Chinese defence production capabilities’ (Bates, 2008, p. 268). In addition, China is increasingly refusing to acquire foreign equipment, especially military equipment, without including technology transfers, with the aim of boosting China’s indigenous production (Facon, 2013). On this issue, the American and European approaches diverge with Washington adopting a harsher stance, for instance vis-à-vis the Chinese espionage (US Department of Justice, 2018). In a testimony in front of the US Congress, Dennis Shea defined the Chinese strategy as ‘multifaceted’ because it includes not only ‘forced’ technology transfers, but also mergers and acquisitions (M&As) of relevant companies, trade policies that benefit Chinese indigenous industries, incentives to encourage foreign companies to do R&D in China, investments in R&D and, finally, industrial and cyber espionage (Rogers & Ruppersberger, 2012).

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Traditionally, China relies on copy and reverse-engineering to strengthen its defence innovation system. For example, in 2002 the director of the National Security Agency (NSA) declared that Chinese cyber espionage is ‘the greatest transfer of wealth in history’ (Rogin, 2012). Since China still needs Western technology, especially defence and dual-­ use capabilities, it does not hesitate to resort to illegal actions to obtain it (Lindsay & Cheung, 2015, p. 68). The proof is that there are several military technologies that China appropriated through industrial espionage. A case in point is the Y-20 Xian (Kunpeng) military cargo plane that looks very similar to the Boeing C-17. Therefore, cyber-related economic espionage is also widespread in commercial fields; for instance, the British inventor James Dyson accused China of illegally using his designs (Axe, 2012). Regarding dual-use technology, in the 2000s, China’s cooperation with the EU to develop the European navigation satellite Galileo was a case in point: a typical case of civilian technology with military applications, Beijing soon withdrew from the project to develop its own indigenous system (BeiDou). The uncovering of a vast network of Chinese spy rings in France and other Member States, as it was also reported by Danish and Dutch intelligence services, should raise some questions among Europeans (Cornevin & Chichizola, 2018; Cerulus, 2017). In 2014, European Commission representatives working on Chinese matters highlighted Chinese repeated intrusions into the Commission’s servers (European Member of Parliament, 2014). In 2018, the German intelligence agency (BfV) complained that ‘the focus of Chinese intelligence activities is shifting toward political espionage. They are now trying to obtain more information about supranational entities such as the EU and about international conferences such as the G20 Summit’ (Cerulus, 2017). Technology transfer is crucial because it helps Chinese leaders to avoid the middle-income trap by moving the country up to the international chain-value and boosting indigenous high-tech and innovation. This is at the core of Xi Jinping’s ‘Made in China 2025’ (中国制造, Zhōngguó zhìzào) (The State Council of the PRC, 2015), which aimed at transforming China into an independent high-tech powerhouse. One of the ways to legally obtain foreign technology is to invest in Western companies. Traditionally, Washington is sceptical about China’s intentions underpinning the Made in China 2025. A report by the US Chamber of Commerce pointed to the Chinese attempt to forge national high-tech champions

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indicates that China is trying to forge them through protectionist practices (US Chamber of Commerce, 2017, p. 7). As the US market became increasingly difficult to access for Chinese companies, the EU turned to be a good second choice because it is relatively open to Chinese investments. Nevertheless, the 2006 Communication of the European Commission already focused on ‘forced technology transfers’ (European Commission, 2006). In addition, Articles 157 and 163 of the Lisbon Treaty broaden the mandate of the European Commission ‘to protect the EU commercial interests and add trade in services, commercial aspects of the intellectual property and foreign direct investment to its exclusive competences’ (Hoslag, 2015, p.  137). Since market openness and liberalisation are the main drivers of the EU foreign policy, Brussels put pressure on Beijing to comply with WTO commitments: Brussels opposes the forced transfer of technology, defends intellectual property rights (IPR), the end of subsidies and the protection in areas such as banking and raw materials (Gow, 2010, p. 111). However, considering the results produced by this approach, it seems that the real influence of Brussels on Beijing remained more declaratory and rhetorical than conducive to real changes in China’s attitude. In June 2018, Brussels started WTO proceedings against China’s unfair technology transfers (European Commission, 2018), signalling a more active European stance. The issue of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) is a key issue for both the US and the EU, but Brussels can only be successful if its Member States act in concert. Since in December 2018, the European Commission broadened and deepened the scope of its action against China (Blenkinsop, 2018), this could become a test for the EU and its credibility as an international actor navigating growing Sino-American tensions. Overall, among Europeans a certain suspicion started to grow that China’s investments aimed at acquiring high technology to help build the country’s indigenous technology, which will turn China into a competitor of European companies. Despite the COVID-19 measures, the backfire of China’s so-called mask diplomacy in Europe, and the growing recognition that the European trade dependence on China should be reduced (Eggleton, 2021, pp. 102–103), China is the EU’s main trading partner. Furthermore, the 2022 bilateral Summit was held under the ongoing Ukrainian conflict, which complicates the relationship since Brussels asked Beijing not to interfere in the conflict and, rather to side with the EU and the US against Russia. The EU focused on this issue while the Chinese counterpart

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wanted to avoid it. However, China calls the EU to step back, arguing that this is not its war and thus should keep out of it. China feels closer to Russia’s criticism towards NATO’s expansion and argues that conflicts should be dealt under the Charter of the UN by finding a peaceful solution. China perceives the US—and the EU position too—as hostile towards China. Since Beijing has a strong relationship with Moscow, Beijing offers to play a role as negotiator. Beijing contends that for the EU to play a role in Ukraine, it should first recognise the reunification of Taiwan and China, something that Brussels is very unlikely to do. Despite having been discussed for seven years, the Sino-EU investment agreement cannot be ratified as the EU defends its values. Although at the very end of her last year in power Angela Merkel pushed hard for the CAI to be adopted before the new Biden administration was enshrined and did not consult with Washington on that matter, the EP blocked the ratification of the agreement. In March 2021, following American pressure, the EU had imposed sanctions on Chinese people and institutions because of the latter’s violations of Human Rights in Xinjiang. China’s harsh retaliation against MEP, European institutions, and individuals, contributed to the EP’s rejection of the investment agreement.

3.4   The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the EU Officially launched by President Xi in 2013, the BRI aims to link the entire Eurasian continent and, thus, China and Europe. It was for this reason that Xi Jinping became the first Chinese President to pay an official visit to European institutions in 2014 (BBC, 2014), thus upgrading EU-China relations. This ambitious foreign policy strategy is so important that it was included in the CCP Constitution (Goh & Ruwitch, 2017): by stimulating China’s economic growth, the BRI should help avoid the middle-­ income trap and keep the CPC in power (Woo et al., 2012; Eichengreen, et al., 2013). In fact, official data on BRI projects remain scarce and show Chinese companies account for the majority of BRI procurement, even considering their high share of total infrastructure projects in developing countries. (Ghossein, 2018, pp. 4–5)

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Furthermore, the selection procedures for implementing BRI projects remain scattered and opaque. By recognising China’s game-changing potential to reshape global governance through the BRI, in December 2015 the Foreign Affairs Committee of the EP called the Member States to work together. While welcoming a close cooperation of the EU with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Committee criticised the lack of coordination within the EU on the membership of the Member States of the AIIB (European Parliament, 2015). Because of their geographic position, CEECs are an important hub for communication and transport, especially for the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), China has built its influence in the region. Starting from a weak position, Chinese trade and investment have reached US $58.7 bn in 2016 from US $43.9 bn in 2010 (Kuo, 2017). China’s interest in CEECs, particularly Poland, preceded the unveiling of the BRI because Poland is located along the New Eurasian Land Bridge (ELB), 2 the railroad linking the east coast of China to Germany. For instance, in 2009 China launched the ‘Riga-based “silk roads” project […] and the proposed “new silk [rail-]road”’ (Palonka, 2010, p.  370). The Łódz-Chengdu and the Warsaw-Suzhou railways were already functional in 2013. However, it was only in 2015 that the Łódz-Chengdu railway carried Polish cargo towards China (Szczudlik, 2016, p. 45) because China’s heavy subsidising of the rail service amplified the Chinese overcapacity and made the exchanges unbalanced. Noteworthy, in 2018 the rail service from China to Małaszewicze was unable to handle the rail traffic from China: train trips between China and the EU went up from 17 in 2011 to 3673 in 2017 (Goh & Goettig, 2018). Moreover, sceptics claim that Chinese companies have lower standards than the EU, are often closely linked to the CCP, and alternative financing provided by China could ultimately undermine European standards of good governance while exposing the host country to excessive debt burden. This is because Chinese banks extend financing based on sovereign guarantees from the recipient countries. This, in turn, might negatively affect fiscal stability, thereby reducing the likelihood of recipient countries being able to acquire more funding from other international players. (Makocki, 2017)  The first Eurasian Land Bridge was the Trans-Siberian Railway.

2

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Furthermore, funded projects are often inefficient, may undermine the allegiance of the Member States to the EU and even create security problems (Makocki, 2017). For example, in Greece, the SOE China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) took control of the Piraeus port (Chaziza, 2018), a strategic asset in the maritime trade between Asia and Europe and an important economic asset for Greece. This gave COSCO considerable economic weight, which translated into political influence: for example, the Hellenic country increasingly supported the Chinese agenda in international organisations. And the new government led by Kyriakos Mitsotakis (2019–currently) seems to follow a path of continuity more than change from the policy of his predecessor Alexis Tsipras (2015–2019) (Stroikos, 2022, pp. 14–15). Over the last decade, China’s relations with CEECs have expanded rapidly. Since 2012, the ‘16+1’ framework provided a new platform to develop relations between China and CEECs. As it includes 11 Member States as well as the five Balkan countries wishing to join the EU, this initiative raised concerns both in Brussels and in Western capitals. In fact, although presented as a trade and investment initiative, the BRI has long-­ term political implications and supports China’s geopolitical vision: it provides Beijing with a powerful tool for exploiting divisions between the ‘old’ Western Member States and the ‘new’ CEECs, while increasing their economic dependence on China. Therefore, the BRI poses some challenges to the EU. According to an ECFR Report, ‘there is no question that the 16+1 scheme is part of a broad “divide and rule” practice’ (Godement & Vasselier, 2017, p. 65). Furthermore, ‘although Chinese investment helps provide the necessary infrastructure at a time when Brexit has reduced the EU budget, growing relations between China and Member States may further divide the EU’ (Zanardi, 2021, p.  162). Brussels increasingly sees with suspicion the development of the BRI (Kynge & Peel, 2017); notably, the deepening of relations between China and some Member States is likely to aggravate the divergences within the EU, while the deepening of China’s relations with candidate countries may keep them farther from entering the EU. The EU was not initially invited to the 16+1 Summits, but EU representatives eventually obtained the authorisation to attend those meetings. As China has become an alternative source of finance, the EU has every interest in monitoring the implementation of BRI projects. The EU Joint declaration on China of 2016 recognises that Beijing needs to demonstrate that the BRI is

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an open platform which adheres to market rules and international norms to deliver benefits for all and to encourage responsible economic behaviour in third countries. (HR/VP, 2016, p. 9)

There were potential synergies between the Investment Plan for Europe of 2015 (Juncker Plan), mainly funded by France and Germany and the BRI (Paulo, 2018, p. 180). In 2015, the EP approved a European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI). But it was only in September 2018 that the EU finally released an Action Plan on the BRI with the aim of agreeing on a Strategy on Connecting Europe and Asia (European Commission/ High Representative 2018), a belated European reaction to the spread of the BRI near and within the EU. In 2017, at the BRI Forum organised by China, the EU successfully resisted the Chinese initiative thanks to the showing of a rare collective stance that took the Chinese side by surprise (Rolland, 2019). At the level of Member States, France and Germany showed a defensive attitude. President Macron warned that the BRI may use China’s increasing influence over weak European countries as a Trojan horse within the EU (Wallace & Hanke, 2018). And German vice-chancellor and Foreign Minister Gabriel urged China to respect the concept of ‘one Europe’ explained arguing that a unified strategy vis-à-vis China was necessary to prevent Beijing from further dividing Europe (Kynge & Peel, 2017). This was especially true for increasingly Eurosceptic and illiberal Member States, such as Poland and Hungary. For example, since the €86 bn EU structural funds for Poland (2014–2020) were set to end in 2020 (Kynge & Peel, 2017), Warsaw looked for other sources of funding in case Brussels adopted measures against the conservative and Eurosceptic government of the Law and Justice Party. The injection of Chinese investments provided funding to develop the necessary infrastructure when the EU budget was expected to decrease due to both Brexit and the expiry of Structural Funds. This exposed Poland to a stiff competition with other CEECs to secure investment under the BRI. The 2018 BRI report written by 27 EU Ambassadors to China, except for the Ambassador of Hungary, summed up the growing concern of the Member States (Heide et al., 2018; Prasad, 2018). Once again, this initiative was likely inspired by the US, notably by the March 2017 report of the US Chamber of Commerce that was extremely critical of the BRI.

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Finally, there is increasing awareness of the Chinese attempt to exert influence on domestic affairs in European countries, including on elections. The sinologue Billeter warned that We must win another battle. The order created by the Chinese regime is not an isolated phenomenon. It resembles that the great capital is imposing on our part of the world [the West]. A heavy trend is operating, the same from one side to the other [Author’s translation]. (Billeter, 2020, p. 117)

Therefore, the authoritarian influence that the Chinese regime exerts on European countries posed serious questions at the very roots of democracy. Beijing’s political interference in European affairs has also been stressed by two researchers affiliated to the Institute for Strategic Research (Institut pour la Recherche Stratégique, IRSEM). In 2021, they released a report tracking China’s meddling in European affairs and singled out a network of institutions and personalities facilitating Chinese interests in France Charon (Jeangène Vilmer & Charon, 2021). Since the growing geostrategic competition between the US and China was reshaping the balance of power in Asia and potentially worldwide, the initiatives adopted by both the US and the EU towards the BRI included a security dimension. In a surprising turn, the head of the new European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen declared that the European Commission would be a ‘geopolitical Commission’, an idea that was restated in the 2019 EU-China: A Strategic Outlook. In the same year, the Overseas Private Investment Cooperation (OPIC), the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Japan’s Bank for International Cooperation started the Blue Dot Network initiative in the Indo-Pacific region, later extended to other parts of the world. This was nothing else than Washington’s reaction to the BRI: rebaptised the US International Development Finance Corporation in 2020, the trilateral group was a sort of US development bank, facilitated by the 2020 Trump administration’s Better Utilisation of Investment Leading to Development (BUILD) Act to found infrastructure building and technology programmes (Pradt, 2020). At the ‘Sorbonne Speech’ of 2017, Macron called for relaunching the EU. The EU stood high in Macron’s presidential candidate campaign and in 2019 he invited Merkel and Junker to meet Xi Jinping during his official visit. Therefore, there were high expectations for the French Presidency of the EU during the first semester of 2022. However, despite the positive signs, external events, such as the Covid crisis and the war in Ukraine,

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severely undermined the role that France could play. The COVID-19 crisis almost stopped the diplomatic agenda even if some meetings continued to be held online. Not only did it undermine the Sino-European relations from the beginning but it deepened national debt so much as to engender future economic recovery. On top of the nefarious economic effects engendered by the measures adopted to fight COVID-19, the war in Ukraine worsened the bilateral relations and further pushed China towards Russia, while the EU sided with the US and other democracies. The decoupling, which had already started during the Trump administration, received a serious acceleration during these two crises, which are likely to achieve what was deemed unthinkable before 2020. Furthermore, other issues impinged on EU-China relations, namely the Chinese handling of Hong Kong or Xinjiang. Although the EU did not follow the American sanctions against China, it increased cooperation with the US through proposing a Trade and Technology Council in December 2020 to discuss issues such as export control or the securitisation of Information Communication Technologies, and an Indo-Pacific High-Level Dialogue. Moreover, in 2019 the European Council published a document titled ‘On EU-China Relations. A Strategic Vision’, which broke with the traditional European positive vision of China by naming it a ‘systemic rival’. This signalled a shift in European perceptions that had started well before and deepened during the tenure of the Trump administration (Brown, 2019). Unrealistic calls for a strategic autonomy of the EU or a European sovereignty, which can only exist if national identities disappear, added hubris to the already numerous problems faced by EU-China relations. The 2021 EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region proposed to deepen cooperation on security issues such as human security, maritime security, or digital connectivity (European Council, 2021). It was welcomed by Southeast Asian countries as a likely positive initiative balancing the presence of great powers such as the US and China, the EU being better perceived than a NATO engagement would be. The Strategy also recognised ASEAN’s centrality in the region. However, although the EU treats ASEAN as a peer, the organisation had neither the institutional nor the political stance of the EU, and it remained unclear how it will provide practical means to advance its cooperation with the EU. As a follow-up to the Council conclusions, the Commission and the HR/VP presented a Joint Communication on the EU’s Indo-Pacific

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Strategy on 16 September 2021, for which Paris, but also Berlin and Amsterdam had been lobbying. Whilst it is not clear whether this is truly a strategy, it also listed the goal of finalising the CAI with China, which was rejected by the European Parliament. The last required the lifting of the Chinese sanctions towards European individuals and institutions as a precondition for any further advancement on that issue. The Joint Communication did not explicitly target China and highlighted seven priorities, notably a sustainable and inclusive prosperity, green transition, Ocean governance, digital governance, connectivity, security and defence, and finally human security. However, its stress on cooperation with countries sharing the same values and principles indirectly excludes the PRC. Thus, the EU aims at maintaining Freedom of Navigation (FON) and promoting an open and rules-based regional security architecture, SLOCs security, security dialogue, capacity-building, a naval presence thanks to the navies of some EU Member States in the region, support to enhance countries’ maritime capabilities and capacity-­ building to fight cybercrime. Being the Digital Silk Road (DSR) part of the BRI, China’s will to set norms and standards on the digital market represented a challenge to the EU and European countries, particularly in the African continent where Chinese telecommunications companies and satellite cooperation were the most developed. The DSR must be built on the 5G, and the EU-China agreement of 2015 on 5G communications systems was supposed to pave the way for the European adoption of Chinese 5G technology by 2020 (Paulo, 2018, p. 194). This involved the issue of future standardisation of digital technologies and digital economy, academic and experts’ cooperation, joint R&D, and other matters that have a key-strategic dimension for the future of European countries. When Xi Jinping met with the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Policy and Security Affairs Joseph Borrell and EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, he restated China’s neutrality regarding the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This raised Borrell’s contempt since Beijing’s attitude has been one of pro-Russian neutrality. China does not condone Russia’s behaviour—it abstained in the UN General Assembly votes—but it does support Russia’s justifications of the war, i.e., the claim that the root causes lie in ‘Cold War thinking’ and especially NATO enlargement. […] Russia and China have made clear that they believe that great powers are entitled to a zone of influence in their respective neighbourhoods. We instead

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believe that the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act enshrine the right of countries to make their own, sovereign choices. The joint Russia-China statement of 4 February is, at heart, a revisionist manifesto as I said at the Munich Security Conference on 20 February 2022. (Borrell, 2022)

Therefore, it seems that the EU is already stuck between the US and its allies on one side, and China and Russia on the other side. Whatever Brussels’ choice, it will make one of the two sides unhappy.

3.5   Conclusions Firstly, this chapter has examined the deepening of the Sino-European relations since the recognition of the PRC by the EEC and the TCA. At their peak, their bilateral relations developed to a strategic partnership. While some emphasised the importance of the strategic partnership, others highlighted that it remains an empty shell. In any case, Sino-European relations spread to different fields to become increasingly institutionalised. Brussels and Beijing expanded their dialogue to the vice-ministerial level and launched the negotiation of a PCA to replace the TCA.  However, negotiations have been stalling. Even negotiations on an investment treaty, the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), stalled due to Chinese intransigence. Secondly, the chapter addressed the specificity of China’s multidimensional rise as a complex international player, which posed challenges to both the US and the EU. Nevertheless, even though they shared common interests, such as the respect of international law or of the post-Second World War international order, European countries perceived the rise of China and its complexity differently from the US. Thus, China has better relations with the EU and its Member States than with the US, the last trying to influence European countries’ attitude towards China to defend the American interests. Furthermore, the chapter underlined China’s preference for dividing and ruling European countries. This was also the case for its growing investment in European countries, particularly the main ones. The author of this book stressed that this trend follows the going out strategy for Chinese companies, which aimed at channelling Chinese overcapacity while acquiring European high-tech companies, thus contributing to enhance the value of China’s indigenous production. More recently, the issue of Chinese investment in European countries was closely related to

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the BRI, which was the topic of the fourth section showing the subsequent growing uneasiness of European countries. When in 2017 the European Commission, supported by Germany and France, called for a more cautious approach to foreign investments in infrastructure and technology, several countries, including Greece, said they would not support the initiative. This indicated that China’s economic presence in Member States such as Greece was already translating into political influence and should also alert other Member States and the EU about the long-term consequences of economic dependence on Chinese capital. Brussels saw this development with suspicion since it feared that the BRI could serve to divide and rule Europe. China being an alternative source of financing, the EU had every interest in monitoring the implementation of the BRI projects. The 2016 EU Joint declaration on China recognised that it was up to Beijing to demonstrate that the BRI was transparent, respected market rules and international norms, and encouraged responsible behaviour in third countries. In 2018, the EU finally released an Action Plan on the BRI with the aim of agreeing on a Strategy on Connecting Europe and Asia, a late reaction to the spread of the BRI in Europe. Paris and Berlin showed a defensive attitude. France warned that the BRI might work as a Trojan horse within the EU, as it happened when the Hungarian Ambassador to China refused to sign a 2018 report by all European Ambassadors to China on growing concern over the BRI. Germany urged China to respect ‘one Europe’ and called for a unified strategy to prevent Beijing from dividing Europe. The EU’s traditional approach to China was one of engagement and partnership, an approach often criticised as ‘unconditional engagement’. Furthermore, the posture of the Member States vis-à-vis China resembled power politics in disguise. Indeed, when it comes to European foreign policy, the attitude of the Member States towards China seems dictated by competition more than by cooperation. And this was subtly exploited by Beijing. This is also confirmed by the last section of the chapter, which dealt with the deepening of Sino-European foreign and security cooperation despite the existence of the EU arms embargo on China. Finally, launched in 2020, the work around an EU Strategic Compass to be issued under the French presidency of the EU represented a first a White Paper on defence. Although recent debates of the EU about the autonomous strategy do not appear to convince (Tocci, 2021) because the EU simply lacks both the means and the political will to develop such a

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strategy, there may be positive advancements in rationalising the way in which the EU operates as a security actor. Nevertheless, any call for a European sovereignty pushed by France seems to forget that such a sovereignty may only exist if national sovereignties are wiped out, which seems neither possible nor desirable, especially in the current turbulent times.

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Wallace, C., & Hanke, T. (2018). Macron Warns China over Silk Road Project. Handelsblatt, 1 August. Wezeman, P.  D., Aude, F., Kuimova, A., Tian, N., & Wezeman S.  T. (2019). Trends in International Arms Transfers 2018. Retrieved https://www.sipri. org/sites/default/files/2019-­03/fs_1903_at_2018.pdf Wissenbach, U. (2009). The EU’s Response to China’s Africa Safari: Can Triangular Co-operation Match the Needs? The European Journal of Development Research, 21(4), 662–674. Woo, W. T., Ming, L., Sachs, J. D., & Chen, Z. (2012). A New Economic Growth Engine for China: Escaping the Middle-Income Trap by Not Doing More of The Same. London: Imperial College Press. Xinhua. (2015). Dongfeng, PSA Peugeot Citroen to Deepen Cooperation. 21 April. Xinhua. (2018). Xi Meets with U.S. Secretary of Defence. Retrieved http://www. xinhuanet.com/english/2018-06/28/c_137285165.htm#:~:text= BEIJING%2C%20June%2027%20(Xinhua),major%20developments%2C% 20transformation%20and%20adjustment Yahuda, M. (1995). The International Politics of Asia Pacific, 1945–1995. Routledge. Zanardi, C. (2014). Les relations militaires sino-algériennes, In T. Pairault & F. Talahite (Eds.), Chine-Algérie: Une relation singulière en Afrique. Paris: Riveneuve éditions. Zanardi, C. (2016). Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics. Journal of Power, October 2016. Zanardi, C. (2017). Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics. In M.  Chatin & G. M. Gallarotti (Eds.), Emerging Powers in International Politics. Routledge. Zanardi, C. (2019). The Rise of China and Connecting Eurasia and Asia Pacific. In R. Wisniewski, T. Wallas & A. Stelmach (Eds.), Beyond Europe. Reconnecting Eurasia (pp. 13–32). Berlin: Logos Verlag. Zanardi, C. (2021). Europe and the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI): Infrastructure and Connectivity. In S. Biba & R. Wolf (Eds.), Europe in an Era of Growing Sino-American Competition: Coping with an Unstable Triangle (pp. 155–169). Routledge. Zhang, B. (2008). Europe Strives for US-China-Europe to Govern World in ‘Collective Leading’ Form. Zhongguo Qingnian Bao, 16 October. Zheng, B. (2005). China’s Peaceful Rise. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. Zheng, W., Ma, J., & Keegan, E. (2019). China Voices ‘Grave Concerns’ over Poland’s Arrest of Huawei Sales Director on Spying Charges. South China Morning Post, 11 January.

CHAPTER 4

German Foreign and Security Policy Towards China in the Twenty-First Century

4.1   German Foreign Policy and Its Limitations During the Cold War, Washington vetoed diplomatic relations between the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG, 1949–1990) and any state recognising the Democratic Republic of Germany (DRG), except for the USSR.  Thus, while the GDR recognised the PRC in 1949, the FRG refrained from recognising the PRC. Although the Hallstein doctrine also excluded the diplomatic recognition of the PRC (Hook, 2002, p. 14), in 1963 the FRG began negotiations with Beijing because of the prospect of economic gains. Negotiations intensified after France recognised China in 1964 and diplomatic relations were established in 1972 under Chancellor Brandt’s (1969–1974) Ostpolitik (Eastern policy). However, as in the French case, the recognition of Communist China did not produce substantial results. Later, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Vice Chancellor Genscher (1974–1992) neglected the relations with China to the point that some rhetorically asked: ‘Is there a German policy on China? (Gibt es eine Deutschland Chinapolitik?)’ (Glaubitz, 1996, p. 149), and he rather privileged relations with Southeast Asian countries through EC-ASEAN ties (1978) (Smith, 2014, p. 70). The reunification of Germany in 1991 made its neighbours fear the rise of a Mittle European power and threatened the ‘normalisation’ of its foreign policy (Dettke, 2009). Although in his inaugural speech (1998) Chancellor Schröder proclaimed that Germany can ‘exercise its sovereign © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 C. Zanardi, European Foreign and Security Policy towards China, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12259-0_4

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powers as a normal country’ (Stumbaum, 2011, pp. 1–2), German foreign policy remained constrained by the limitations imposed after the Second World War, which persisted long after the end of the Cold War (Dyson & Goetz, 2003). Germany’s priority remained (1) to enhance the understanding of security policy interests while (2) avoiding isolation from traditional allies when requesting military solidarity (Hacke, 1996, p. 11). Although Germany slowly began to support international stability by resorting to limited military contributions (Keller, 2013), the persistence of its self-image of a civilian power (Zivilmacht) (Gareis, 2005), a trading state (Handelsstaat), a detente power (Entspannungsvormacht), and a force for European integration (Integrationslokomotive) (Hacke, 1996, pp. 10–11) perpetuated its scarce interest in becoming an active foreign policy actor. In addition, its strong Atlanticism has implied that ‘NATO rather than the EU is […] the pillar of Germany’s defence and security policy’ (Dyson, 2007, p.  173). Maull (1990) described Germany (and Japan) as a civilian power, followed by Harnisch & Maull (2001) who further developed this concept. Furthermore, Berlin must constantly balance ‘its relations with its European Partners [and] with the United State’ (Miskimmon, 2001, p. 102) in an international environment in which Washington increasingly focuses on the Middle East (Global War on Terror, GWOT) and Asia (Obama’s Pivot to Asia and Trump’s Great power competition) (Ali, 2018). In a globalised world Germany’s ‘horizon no longer stops at the borders of the EU or on the West Coast and German decision-makers must increasingly look to America, China, India and Iran’ (Kunz, 2016, p. 86). Hence, German foreign policy must go beyond its borders, acknowledge the role played by new actors while balancing its transatlantic relations and the ties with emerging powers, such as China. However, the literature ‘on Germany’s special relations in general, and its relations with China and India in particular, remains relatively small’ (Heiduk, 2015, p. 133) and limited to economics.

4.2   German Traditional Foreign Policy Towards China Since Reunification In the aftermath of the Second World War, Germany’s foreign policy developed within the double framework of NATO and European integration. This provided the country with international legitimacy but required

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heavy restrictions on foreign and security policies. Subsequently, Germany developed its traditional preference for trade, soft diplomacy, unilateral disarmament, and its free-rider attitude on security (Keller, 2013, p. 5). And this approach also applies to China. Generally viewed as a vast market for German products, China must remain open to German companies. The pre-eminence of the economic dimension of Berlin’s policy vis-à-vis China was not compromised by the German reunification, the European integration, or the economic crisis of 2008; rather, it was strengthened. Motivated by the deplorable status of post-reunification Germany, Berlin developed its commercial relations with China: in December 1992, the Bundestag voted to lift the economic sanctions imposed on the PRC after Tiananmen; visits by Minister of Foreign Affairs were already held and, while in Beijing, Foreign Minister Kinkel promised the German support to China’s application to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (Glaubitz, 1996, p. 150). Berlin was under pressure because of the financial burden of unification and Chancellor Kohl feared the loss of economic opportunities in China, thus lobbying in favour of lifting the sanctions. There was discordance between the Federal Chancellery and the Foreign Office’s considerations of the violation of Human Rights in China: despite the competence of the Foreign Office on this matter, the Chancellor exercises his authority because he believes that a ‘condemnation of record would put at risk improved relations’ (Siwert-Probst, 1998, pp.  36–7) between the two countries. Therefore, although the German Foreign Minister provides the European Council with extensive evidence of China’s Human Rights violations, Kohl does not back a resolution against the PRC. This demonstrates that even if the German Basic Law does not clearly state who oversees Germany’s foreign policy, and the Ministry of foreign affairs retains responsibility for the foreign policy, eventually it is the authority of the Chancellor that prevails (Kanzlerprinzip) against the authority of either the government (Kabinettsprinzip) or the ministries (Ressortprinzip) (Siwert-Probst, 1998, p. 19). Kohl’s cautious strategy consists of three layers: a ‘silent diplomacy’, the belief that China can be changed through bilateral interactions, and the validation of the ‘One China policy’ (Nesshöver & Richard, 1999, p. 104). The first two layers rest on the belief that trade brings improvements in Human Rights, democracy, and the rule of law, while a policy of naming and shaming produces negative effects. The third layer reflects the policy of the German federal government since the 1950s, which is later

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uploaded to shape the non-confrontational EU-China dialogue of 1997. When the European Commission releases the Asian Strategy paper (1994) (European Commission, 1994; Stumbaum, 2007, p. 61), it is guided by the Asienkonzept (1993), which validates Germany’s influence on the determination of Europe’s position vis-à-vis China. Traditionally, Germany’s trade relations with the PRC have prevailed over other issues, including Taiwan or Human Rights. For instance, China opened its market to German companies shortly after Berlin’s cancellation of a deal to provide Taiwan with ten submarines and ten frigates. In 1987, Berlin and Taipei had signed a Letter of Intent, which was rejected twice (1993, 1995) by the government of Helmut Kohl (1982–1998), who pursued a policy of aggressive commercial and direct investment in China. The negotiations between the FRG and the Republic of China (ROC) for the sale of the Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft (HDW) submarines produced by the ThyssenKrupp Marine System dated back to 1986 (NTI, 2013). They went against Washington’s foreign policy preferences since, under the Taiwan Relations Act (1979), the US was the last guarantor of Taiwan’s security (Goldstein & Schriver, 2001). While relations between Britain and the EU have always been ambivalent, Germany perceived the European integration as an opportunity to reintegrate the international community as a normalised country. Therefore, it is often considered as endowed with a ‘uniquely positive European identity’ (Anderson, 1999, p. 209). As France, Germany’s continental position at the centre of Europe has facilitated the development of a sense of belonging to the EU. Hence, Katzenstein identified the ‘Special Relationship’ between Germany and the EU as a sort of ‘Europeanisation of state identity’ (Katzenstein, 1997, p. 29). Germany’s commitment to deepen the European integration through a ‘norm-consistent foreign policy behaviour’ (Rittberger, 2001, p. 7) is sometimes perceived as the pursuit ‘of Germanisation via Unionisation’ (Janning, 1966, p. 54), such in the case of the introduction of the Euro, or of the 2004 enlargement. If German reunification achieved the major objective of German foreign policy, it also created an economic shock due to the integration of the underdeveloped East Germany into West Germany. This prompted Kohl to develop a federal strategy to penetrate the Asian markets and provide Germany with the necessary long-term growth. The year 1993 marked a turning point in Germany’s foreign policy towards China and Asia: following his official visit to Asia, Kohl acknowledged the growing importance of the development of ‘economic relations with the largest growth region

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of the world’ (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2002). Furthermore, the Commission for Asia-Pacific was created to deal with the debt of Federal Germany (Kundnani & Parello-Plesner, 2012, p. 2), an ‘Asia concept of the Federal government’ was released (das Asien-Konzepts der Bundesregierung) together with an ‘active Asian policy’ (active Asienpolitik) (Naß, 1993). The last was the first strategy ever published by a European country towards Asia (Casarini, 2007). The creation of an Asia-Pacific Committee (APA) to coordinate and promote German companies in Asia highlights Kohl’s priority (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2002). This reorientation of German foreign policy has also been uploaded at European level: during the German Presidency of the EU (1994), the European Commission released a ‘New European Strategy towards Asia’, the very first strategy of the EU in Asia (European Commission, 1994). In 1996, Berlin influenced the development of a European approach vis-à-vis Asia by participating with Paris, Rome, and London, in the establishment of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Dialogue Forum between Asian and European countries (Kernic, 2007, pp. 159–94; Umezawa, 2015, p. 314). When the Asian financial crisis revealed the great heterogeneity of this region (Auswärtiges Amt, Asia in German Foreign Policy , 2010), the reform of Germany’s policy vis-à-vis Asia and that of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs proved ineffective. As Asia was not a unified entity, its differentiation required a new approach (2002) to include issues such as civil society, good governance, the rule of law, and the fight against terrorism at regional, sub-regional, and bilateral levels. Berlin placed democracy, the rule of law, human rights, peace and stability, economic development, development cooperation with civil society, and the CFSP at the centre of its Asian policy (Auswaertiges-amt.de, 2010). Probably driven by the signing of France’s special relation with China in 1997, the following year Berlin and Beijing upgraded their bilateral relations at the level of special relations. Chancellor Schröder (1998–2005) defined guidelines rather than a proper political agenda (Gottwald, 2006, p. 250) to promote democracy, security, sustainable development, and Human Rights in the framework of German-Asian relations. Since his priority remained to avoid harming German economic interests (Stark, 2011, p. 169–71), Schröder was later criticised for not defending German foreign policy values vis-à-vis China (and Russia).

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The reforms introduced by his Red-Green coalition (1998–2005)1 made the German economy increasingly dependent on exports. Schröder’s priorities remained domestic growth and the creation of an EU as a global economic power (Gerhard, 1999). Hence, Gottwald emphasised the continuity of German foreign policy on China under Schröder, who extended the habit of its predecessor to focus the China policy within the Chancellery (Gottwald, 2005, 2006) and assumed that trade and economic development would progressively change (Wandel durch Handel) China, as it happened successfully with East Germany. As the end of the Cold War confirmed the success of this approach based on the transformative power of trade and the peaceful resolution of problems through multilateralism and international law (Bluth, Bluth, 2000, p. 35), this approach remained a pillar of German foreign policy. Berlin focused on developing NGOs’ and civil societies’ dialogues, programmes, and training on justice and strengthening the rule of law in China. This approach was more common among the Social-Democrats, such as Schröder and Steinmeier, who emphasised cooperation instead of confrontation with China. Leading German experts interviewed have also underlined ‘integration (Einbildung) and Co-operation rather than confrontation’ (Kundnani & Parello-Plesner, 2012, p. 3) between Germany and China. For instance, as Minister of Foreign affairs, Steinmeier proposed a community of responsibility (Verantwortungsgemeinschaft) with Brazil, China, and India (Steinmeier, 2008). When Schröder was visiting Beijing, he made considerable efforts to avoid escalating the diplomatic crisis created by the 1999 NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade: he immediately apologised on behalf of NATO, Germany, but also the EU, because Germany had the rotating Presidency of the EU (BBC News, 2013). At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Washington and Moscow oriented their foreign policy towards East Asia and Germany decided to make its policy towards East Asia ‘a cornerstone of the global foreign and security policy of both Germany and the EU (Auswaertiges-amt.de, 2002, p.  4). While refuting the idea of a twenty-first ‘Asian century’, Berlin acknowledged the growing importance of Asian security for Europe: there is ‘globalisation of political and economic opportunities and risks’ (Auswaertiges-amt.de, 2002, p.  1), which are the main foreign policy concerns. Berlin also identified several alarming features of East Asian 1

 Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD)-Grüner Partei.

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security, such as the presence of some of the largest armies in the world, of nuclear powers (China and North Korea), the risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the division of the Korean peninsula and North Korea’s nuclear tests (Auswaertiges-amt.de, 2002, p. 4). The Asienstrategie (2002) of the Red-Green Coalition government of the CDU/CSU, the alliance between the Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands) and the Christian Social Union in Bavaria (Christlich-Soziale Union), had stressed the high economic relevance of Asia for Germany’s economy. It had also recognised that partnership with Asian countries could only thrive based on common values and beliefs and that ‘only established democracies could be viewed to be amongst Germany’s traditional friends in Asia’ (Heiduk, 2015, p. 139). Regarding security issues, though the new Asienkonzept insisted that closer relations with China be established in areas such as cooperation on defence and the fight against terrorism (Heiduk, 2015, p. 135), the development in these areas remained limited. The inclusion of security and defence cooperation reflected the need for Berlin to deepen the bilateral dialogue in an unstable international context, rather than its genuine willingness to implement such a cooperation with Beijing. It is likely that cooperation on defence and counterterrorism were the counterpart of the Human Rights dialogue (Menschenrechtsdialogue) set up under Schröder (2003), followed by the Rule of Law Dialogue (Rechtsstaatsdialogue) established in 1999 to train Chinese judges and lawyers and managed by the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung, BMZ). Chancellor Merkel’s stance on China opposed Schröder’s approach. Her commitment to a ‘new foreign policy based on values’ (neue wertegeleitete Aussenpolitik) vis-à-vis China reflected the negative perception that German public opinion had of China’s poor record on Human Rights (Richter & Gebauer, 2010). When at the opposition, Merkel met the Dalai Lama. As the Chancellor (2005), her declarations in favour of Human Rights were also followed by some actions (Bundeskanzlerin.de, 2006), such as her call for criticising China when necessary (Mut zu kritischen Tönen) (Frankfurten Allgemeine Zeitung, 2006). Nevertheless, as the position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is traditionally attributed to the leader of the small coalition party, Steinmeier obtained that position. A close collaborator of Schröder, Steinmeier limited Merkel’s margins of

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manoeuvre and brought more continuity in German foreign policy towards Asia. Subsequently, the declarations seemed more rhetorical than fundamental and the policy of the Red-Green coalition vis-à-vis China was one of pragmatic continuity more than severe criticism (Gottwald, 2006). Even the issue of Human Rights (HRs), a trumpet motive of Merkel’s first political campaign against Schröder, waned soon after her election; and in Beijing in 2007, despite calling for the respect of Human Rights, which are ‘vital’ for Germany, her speech was not reported by the official media (Pedroletti, 2007). During Merkel’s first official visit to China in 2006, she also met Bishop Aloysius Jin (Lorenz, 2006) and, in 2007, privately received the Dalai Lama at the Chancellery (Deutsche Welle, 2007). This triggered a diplomatic raw with Beijing that unsettled the Sino-German strategic dialogue until the foreign ministerial talks in June 2008 (Heilmann & Schmidt, 2014, p. 152). Berlin was not the only Member State to be targeted by Chinese reprisals: the same year, Beijing cancelled the EU-China summit in December 2008  in retaliation for Sarkozy’s meeting with the Dalai Lama (Federal Foreign Office, 2008). Therefore, even if she did not suffer the scale of retaliation imposed on France (2008) and the UK (2010), Germany faced the disruption of the bilateral cooperation, which encouraged the Chancellor to refrain from publicly criticising or raising sensitive issues against China. Interestingly, the perception of French and British experts was different: they believed that Beijing did not react to the decision of Merkel. In contrast, German interviewees recognised that Germany was the target of harsh criticism from China. Not only must she postpone the Human Rights dialogue with China, but Beijing made it clear that such an event should not happen again (Buck, 2007). For instance, when the row started, a German diplomat at the UN saw the German Ambassador to the UN speechless while being reprimanded for over half an hour by an angry Chinese Ambassador (Matussek, 2014). In addition, when Merkel received the Dalai Lama, Beijing took advantage of the divisions within the EU and greeted Sarkozy. The latter oversaw the signing of a US $11.9 billion contract for the sale of two French nuclear reactors and an Airbus aircraft worth US $17 billion to China. This showed the competition between Member States when dealing with Beijing as well as the primacy of their national interests over those of both other Member States and the EU.  China’s retaliation against Germany also proved ‘tougher than its response to the first public appearance by an American president with the Dalai Lama in October’ (The Economist,

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2007) in 2007; this was likely because Beijing perceives Washington as a powerful actor and its punishment is still tailored to the importance of the country targeted. Following the economic crisis of 2008, the decline in demand from developed countries was partly offset by the growing demand from emerging countries, particularly China. Nowadays, the maritime disputes between the PRC and several Asian countries and the deterioration of China’s domestic security show the limits of the German approach based on economic aid and cooperation. The belief that ‘economic power has become the key to political influence in the restructuring of international relations’ (Bluth, 2000, p. 52) is clearly unrealistic. Solid economic relations with China mirror Germany’s weakness, as Germany’s increasing dependence on exports towards China inevitably links its economic growth to China’s domestic security. Since 2016, China has been Germany’s first trading partner ahead of Belgium and the US, with trade worth €186.6 billion (Auswaertiges-amt.de, 2018), and Germany is China’s leading trading partner in Europe. The German export-oriented model may become a dangerous liability not only if Beijing clashes with its neighbouring countries and/or Washington, but also if unrest erupts in China. Therefore, the stability of the country and its environment has become a necessity to sustain the German economic growth. In this context, annual Sino-German intergovernmental consultations were decided in 2010 and started in 2011: presided over by the two heads of government, the two Cabinets meet with more than ten line-ministers from each side. Although Sino-German relations are often portrayed as an oasis of agreement and cooperation, China is increasingly seen as a partner with which differences of opinion (Meinungsunterschiede) persist. For instance, Merkel described China as a partner ‘reluctant to give up its national sovereignty and unwilling to become more fully integrated in international multilateral frameworks’ (Heiduk, 2015, p. 143), and a ‘disabler’ more than a partner in international fora.

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4.3  A Cautious Power: Uploading the Trade First Preference Towards China Of all the Member States, Germany is the most populous, has the largest economy, and is the main interlocutor for Beijing in Europe (Heumann, 2014). It has developed sound bilateral relations with the PRC while gradually regaining its centrality in the old continent; its weight has been further amplified by the current French economic impasse and Brexit. Some argued that Berlin has eventually changed its preference for more Europe and that the crisis of the Franco-German tandem has weakened the German European vocation just as the country has regained its centrality in Europe (Padgett et  al., 2014, p.  11). Someone even argued that Germany has become a hegemon in Europe (Grawford, 2007). At the beginning of the twentieth century, Germany’s foreign policy remained anchored in its tradition of pre-unification: namely, it is ‘strongly Western-oriented, multilateralist and Euro-centric’ (Webber, 2001, p. 15). To meet the new international security challenges, Germany adopted an ‘extended security concept’ (erweiterter Sicherheitsbegriff) (Stumbaum, 2011, p.  10) and its foreign and security policy reaffirmed Germany’s longstanding commitment to multilateralism, whether within NATO or by uploading Germany’s preference to the EU.  This process of foreign policy adaptation remained constrained by the previously mentioned historical limitations and, although Germany has ‘been successful in influencing the development of the CFSP to mirror its own national preferences of self-restraint, it remains a ‘reluctant power’ or a ‘reluctant hegemon’ (Stumbaum, 2011, pp.  1–2; Meiers, 1995; Lehne, 2012; The Economist, 2013). Nevertheless, this policy of restraint has become increasingly unsustainable and German foreign policy seems to lack both leadership and strategic coherence. This has also tarnished Germany’s reputation as a reliable partner (Maull, 2011). For instance, its refusal to support the Libyan operation in 2011 made Berlin side with authoritarian countries like China and Russia (Hyde-Price, 2015, p. 601) instead of backing its European allies (France and the UK). The input for a more in-depth debate on Germany’s foreign policy grew stronger from the bottom, which is a less politicised way of launching such a sensitive debate. Think-tanks such as the Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS) and the Carnegie Endowment in Brussels played a leading role. Because of the resistance within the German political class,

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the input had to come from outside to make it more acceptable to the German public opinion. Thus, it was an American think-tank (the German Marshall Fund of the US) together with one of Germany’s leading political think-tanks advising the Bundestag and the Federal government on foreign policy issues (the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, SWP) that called on Berlin to assume ‘new power, new responsibilities’ (Bendiek, 2015, p.  4). In an article for the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), Keller contended that, as the leading European economic power and central political actor, ‘Germany could and should play a leading role in reversing the decline of European hard power’ (Keller, 2013). As the coordinator of foreign and security policy at KAS, he sent a message to German leadership since AEI is an American conservative think-­ tank, and the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) together with the Christian Social Union (CSU) had just won the federal elections (2013). This also shows the influence of the US on German foreign policy circles; and this despite the scandal of the National Security Agency (NSA) spying on Merkel’s mobile phone. In fact, despite the widespread condemnation of the ‘NSA-Skandal’ in Germany, which brought the relations between Berlin and Washington to a low point (Der Spiegel, 2013), their bilateral relations were rapidly back on track. This bottom-up process for debating Germany’s foreign policy aimed at gathering ideas on how to update Germany’s foreign and security policy. It triggered a one-year consultation.2 Branded as the ‘2014 Review: understanding tomorrow’s foreign policy’ (Auswaertiges-amt.de, 2014), the outcome was presented by Foreign by Minister Steinmeier at the Carnegie Endowment, Brussels (2015) (Auswaertiges-amt.de, 2015). The attempt to rethink Germany’s foreign policy was also made necessary by the fast rise of emerging countries; despite its reunification, Germany was now modest in size compared to continent-size countries, such as the US or China. Therefore, the EU should ‘more than ever be a vehicle for Germany’s influence in the world [my translation]’ (Kunz, 2016, p. 88). Yet, in a keynote address calling for a new direction for the country’s foreign policy, President Gauck wondered: ‘what is Germany doing to help aspiring emerging countries become partners on the international 2  First, international and German experts were invited to share their perception of Germany’s role internationally and within Europe. Second, consultations with the German public were held, and third, it followed an assessment of the role of the Federal Foreign Office and of the challenges of German diplomacy in a rapidly changing world.

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stage?’ (Bundespräsident, 2013). In fact, despite its growing economic relations with China, Berlin was not thinking strategically about the PRC and ‘continue[d] to punch below its weight in foreign and security terms’ (Padgett et  al., 2014). Germany’s traditional foreign policy discourse depicted the country as bringing peace to the world (Friedenspolitik) (Guenther, 1991) and, therefore, to China. German interviewees acknowledged the ‘lack of knowledge and strategic thinking’ in Germany (Stumbaum, 2013), especially on Beijing. According to Stumbaum, this issue and security policy caused ‘uneasiness’ among experts because ‘foreign and security policy is a difficult issue in Germany’ (Kunz, 2016, p. 85). It has also created continuous tensions with other European countries as well as with the US. In a complex and globalised multipolar world, the reformulation of German foreign policy should harmonise the international environment with internal debates (Kunz, 2016, p.  95–6) and should consider the other Member States as well as the US, the deepening of European integration, and the development of the EU as an international actor. In response to growing pressure from its allies to play a more responsible role as a foreign and security actor, in 2013 Foreign Minister Steinmeier launched an initiative to clarify the country’s foreign policy perspectives and its concomitant transposition in the 2014 Review (Bendiek, 2015, p. 4). He recognised that the time has come for a wide national debate on Germany’s international role. Inaugurated by the Federal Foreign Office, this Review found new foreign policy directions and signalled the growing recognition among politicians of the need to reformulate foreign policy to assume more responsibilities within the EU, NATO, and the international community. This stood for an important first step in the emancipation of Germany from its role ‘as France’s junior partner in Europe and as the US’ junior partner in the world’ (Bendiek, 2015, p. 10). Although Merkel showed a ‘significant lack of interest in German defence policy during the 2009–12 legislative period’ (Dyson, 2014, p. 460), the debate on German foreign and security policy accelerated at the end of 2013: on the day of German Unity, President Gauck declared that Germany was not a sheltered island safe from international crises and questioned the fact that its international engagement and responsibility mirrored its status. He wondered ‘what is Germany’s duty in Europe and in the world?’ adding that ‘assuming less responsibility is no longer an option’ (Bundespräsident, 2013). Finally, Gauck deplored that ‘it looks as if, having been denied world domination, the Germans have fallen in love

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with powerlessness’ (Bundespräsident, 2013). His intervention was highly symbolic: by publicly acknowledging the need for a new foreign and security policy and underlining Germany’s negative image in the international community as a ‘sleepwalking giant or a spectator of global affairs’ (Bundespräsident, 2013), thus breaking national taboo. The call for updating the German foreign policy gained momentum at the Munich Security Conference of 2014, when high-profile political figures, such as Foreign Minister Steinmeier, Ministry of Defence von der Leyen, and President Gauck called for a more active foreign policy. This proved the leadership’s intention to inaugurate a more active foreign and security policy, even if Merkel refrained from taking a public and direct stance; she traditionally let her Ministers take a more visible stance on those questions. Regarding Germany’s foreign policy on China, according to four respondents Berlin enjoyed a higher status in China than other Member States, including France and the UK. A German expert maintained that Germany and China ‘have very special relations, [and] Germany is the natural partner of China in Europe’ (Gippner, 2014). And a former Ambassador agreed that ‘China sees Germany as its main political partner in Europe’ (Schäfer, 2014). Nevertheless, despite the strengthening of their bilateral relations at the level of special relations, the establishment of a hotline (Stumbaum, 2007, p. 60) and the inclusion of security matters in their strategic partnership, bilateral relations remained focused on economic issues (Zhou, 2017, p. 16). For instance, following the global economic crisis Berlin and Beijing released a Joint Statement to stabilise the international economic situation, and in 2010 a Joint Communiqué (The Federal Chancellor, 2010) pushed forward their strategic partnership (Zhou, 2017, p. 16). Only a few studies have examined the impact of the rise of China on German foreign policy. For instance, Kundnani and Parello-Plesner assessed the likely development of a Sino-German special relationship and its importance for the EU (Weisman & Halle, 2012; Kundnani & Parello-­ Plesner, 2012). The two authors argued that the future of Sino-European relations would probably depend on the evolution of Sino-German relations (Kundnani & Parello-Plesner, 2012, p. 1) since Germany is China’s main trading partner in the EU and the first Member State to set up a government-to-government partnership with the PRC. Beijing has given priority to its partnership with Germany, which is part of a small category of China’s ‘comprehensive strategic partnerships’ (e.g. with the other

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BRICS countries: Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa). Only two interviewees believed that the strategic partnership could become a tool to divide the EU (Heumann, 2014) and ‘manipulate Germany’ (Military Expert, 2014), for example by preventing the creation of a comprehensive CFSP vis-à-vis China. German media have warned that Sino-German relations ‘should not stand in the way of a common European policy towards China’ (von Hein, 2013). Traditionally, China prefers to deal with only one Member State at a time to exploit their division. Although political interactions between Berlin and Beijing have intensified, some have argued that the idea that Beijing regularly resort to Berlin to deal with the EU is overstated (von Hein, 2013). Others have noted that Beijing is already using its special relationship with Berlin to pressure German leaders to defend the interests of China. For instance, in the solar panel dispute, a German company accused China of subsidising its domestic producers, but Merkel’s intervention avoided the European trade action advocated by the European Commissioner for trade, De Gucht. During her visit to China the Chancellor declared: ‘we should try to solve the problems in the solar sector to avoid an anti-dumping case’ (Halle & Chaffin, 2012; Brice, 2013). The fact that she made the statement with Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao reflected the close bilateral cooperation at ministerial level between Berlin and Beijing. Furthermore, Markel’s approach demonstrated that who managed the policy on China is the Office of the Chancellor rather than foreign ministry (Wacker, 2010, p. 78). The Chancellor ‘opposed the trade case from the very beginning, saying that it would be preferable to continue talking with Chinese officials about the issue’ (Bradsher, 2013); Germany also lobbied other Member States to adopt the same position because it feared reprisals from China against the German companies. Eventually, this pressure to overcome the spat prompted Brussels and Beijing ‘to settle the dispute several weeks later in terms considered largely favourable to Chinese manufacturers’ (Christensen, 2015, p.  158; Bradsher, 2013). Hence, Merkel’s intervention ultimately nullified a European unified action at the very moment in which the EU seemed ready to act. Despite in the first White Book on the Accomplishment and Perspectives of Sino-German Cooperation in 2011, China stressed the need to develop a strategic and political dialogue, four German interviewees saw the Strategic Partnership as a sheer name-change and a signal that Beijing considered Germany as its major partner in Europe. In contrast, they

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emphasised the government-to-government dialogue (2011) as the major bilateral development because it set up ministerial coordination and regular meetings to deal with economic, political, and security issues. Even if the common declaration for special relationship indicated that the two countries were willing to cooperate regularly and closely within international organisations to assume their responsibility (Les Échos, 2014), this did not apply to security issues. For instance, during the 4th Sino-German government consultations in 2016, the two countries assessed the future development of the EU-China comprehensive strategic partnership and called for strengthening their political dialogue. They also reaffirmed their commitment to implement the China-EU 2020 Strategy (Bundesregierung.de, 2016), which included developing cooperation on international peace. Since there are only a few think-tanks considering China as a security actor, it was crucial to collect the opinion of those experts (Dakowska, 2014, pp. 46–48, 85).3 A special case is the Mercator Institute for China Studies (Merics) created in 2013 by the Shifting Mercator, which is part of the Mercator family, a major private European filo-American foundation. It ‘aims to supply a nuanced perspective on [China], to influence public debate and to enhance expertise on China in Germany and Europe’ (Merics, n.d.), recognises the relevance of the powershift to Asia for Germany, poses the question of the rise of China in all its dimensions and its direct and indirect consequences on Germany and Europe. Merics names three ‘fundamental challenges’ for the development of China as a powerful international actor: international competition, security tensions, and the domestic problems inherent to China’s development. Therefore, it is essential to understand the risks and opportunities for cooperation with China, a precarious global power limited by the 3  Main think-tanks in international affairs: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) linked to the Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands, CDU); Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) linked to the Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD); Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung linked to the Communist Party (Die Linke); Heinrich Böll Stiftung linked to the Green Party (Die Grünen); Friederich Neumann Stiftung für die Freiheit (FNF) linked to the Liberal Party (Freie Demokratische Partei); Hanns Seidel Stiftung associated to the Christian Social Union in Bavaria (Christlich-Soziale Union, CSU). Because of its engagement for supporting freedom and the Tibetan cause, in 1996 the FNF had to close its office in Beijing after organising a conference on Tibet. Körber Foundation: active in organising high-level discussions on topics including China as a security actor. Other institutes or think-tanks lack programmes to assess this issue.

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external constraints of powerful international forces as well as by the main domestic economic challenges. In 2015, Steinmeier praised the ‘exemplary’ work of Merics on Sino-German relations and its close cooperation with us on […] the debate about making foreign policy in this country a genuine two-way street between the government and the public (Auswaertiges-amt.de, 2015). However, four interviewees noted that Merics had not yet met the expectations; the Mercator Foundation on which it depends has close ties to US circles and, as a result, Merics relied on American sources for German analysis. Hence, American foreign policy probably influenced the work of Merics. As a German expert confirmed, though Merics tries to enhance the debate about China, it is not independent as its research is more linked to US research (Linke, 2014). As the debate on German foreign and security policy gathered momentum, China’s military modernisation and its potential consequences for Germany remained unnoticed. When questioned about the rise of China, German interviewees generally pointed to the economic gains that Germany derives from its relations with China. When asked again to give their opinion, as their French and British counterparts they esteemed that China’s military modernisation was a natural development that mirrors its economic rise. However, German experts differed from French experts in that they considered security issues exclusively by their likely economic impact on the German economy. Since good relations are based on bilateral trade, German policymakers did not want to risk such an important source of economic growth. Furthermore, Germany seemed to lack an indigenous perception about Asian affairs and relies on American analyses and actions (Linke, 2014; Biba, 2021). As it can be summarised in Table 4.1 according to Nuechterlein’s two-­ dimensional criteria, the upgrade of the PLA is considered neither as a threat nor as a challenge to Germany. It is a peripheral issue in all dimensions, from the ideological to the international system and defence. The only aspect in which China’s military modernisation may impact Germany is through the disruption of the economy that a conflict between China and the US or one of its neighbouring countries may cause. This is signalled by the arrow on the economic dimension indicating a potential shift towards a ‘major’ issue instead of the current peripheral issue. In fact, German experts such as Heilmann and Schmidt assessed whether China may represent a military threat only in relation to the US (Heilmann & Schmidt, 2014, pp. 77–78). They have argued that the ‘low

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Table 4.1  German vision of China’s military modernisation Germany PLA upgrade Defence Economy Intl. system Ideological

Survival

Vital

Major

Peripheral X